soldiers were much more accustomed to severe winters than the German
forces, because a very much larger part of the Russian than of the
German Empire is subject to very low winter temperatures, still the
Germans, all in all, had the advantage over their adversaries under
these conditions. In the first place the percentage of mechanically
and scientifically trained men in the German army is far greater than
that in the Russian army, because the latter is recruited primarily
from an agricultural population, whereas the former draws its largest
numbers from an intensively industrial body. Furthermore, organization
within and without the army had been developed to a far higher degree
by the Germans than by their eastern neighbors. It is, therefore, not
at all surprising to hear of the marvelous preparations that the
Germans had made for the approaching winter, and inasmuch as most of
this information is gathered from Russian sources, there can be little
doubt of its correctness.

Down below in their trenches, covering the walls of their dugouts, the
Germans had erected light metal buildings. These had been manufactured
back in Germany in immense quantities in simple, standardized parts.
Easily shipped in a "knockdown" condition, they were just as easily
put up and put together, and all of them were fitted with heating
apparatus of some kind. Warm clothing of every kind and description
had either been manufactured at the Government's expense or had been
collected from private sources throughout the empire by appealing to
the nation at large by means of the newspapers. Although the
statement, frequently heard, that each man had a sleeping sack
undoubtedly was vastly exaggerated, vast quantities of these useful
articles had been distributed. Then, too, officers, from captains
down, gave their men detailed instructions and orders how to protect
themselves efficiently against severe cold, and how to treat promptly
and effectively any of the many ailments that are apt to afflict
people unused to very low temperatures in a rather moist region, from
frostbite down to colds.

From every possible line of human enterprise the Germans, according to
Russian reports, apparently tried to learn lessons which might become
applicable in these near-arctic conditions on the east front. Having
been taught by the previous winter's experience the impossibility of
trench digging, they promptly organized extensive mining detachments
among their engineering troops, augmenting the latter in great
quantities by soldiers from other branches of their general service
who, from their experiences in times of peace, had become particularly
adaptable to such work. These mining troops, later on in the winter,
were to creep forward under the protection of night's shadows and
blast with dynamite those trenches that were absolutely essential for
cover of advancing troops and that could not be dug in the frozen
ground with more simple tools. Long before this, however, while winter
had not yet shown its full severity, these troops were busily occupied
with the preparation of land mines, which were to act as substitutes
for barbed-wire entanglements when freezing snow, piling up many feet
high, rendered the latter useless. Previous experience, too, had
taught that, when such weather conditions arose, the immense
quantities of snow that fall in these regions not only completely
covered barbed-wire entanglements, but as repeated snowstorms
thickened the mass day by day, and sleet and thaw, caused by an
occasional hour's sunshine, hardened it, made it even possible for the
enemy's forces to advance securely on it in spite of, and on the very
top of, all barbed-wire obstacles.

Throughout the first winter of the war the Germans had also used ski
detachments. Most of these were employed in the mountainous regions of
the western front. But small troops had been sent to East Prussia and
had proven themselves very valuable there. Again and again Russian
troops, attempting operations on ground covered with two or three
days' snowfall, had sunk to their waists and chests into the snow and
had become easy prey to attacks made by German soldiers on skis. So
the Germans early in the fall, when certain parts of south Germany and
Austria, covered with high mountains, lend themselves admirably for
ski practice, had sent time after time detachments of carefully
selected infantry troops to these regions and had made ski experts out
of them. Sledges too--large and small--had been provided in
quantities, because they had proven their value as means of
transporting men and supplies where all other means had failed
absolutely.

With the approach of real winter all these comparatively new features
of warfare were put to use. Of course the Germans were by no means the
only ones to profit from past experience and from the modern advance
of the sciences and mechanical industries. But from all reports it is
clear that they outdid the Russians in inventiveness as well as in the
thoroughness and extent of their preparations.

"Jack Frost" also definitely stopped regular fighting. With its
arrival war at the eastern front deteriorated into more or less of a
guerrilla war. Instead of attempts to break through the line by miles,
both sides settled down to a bitter contest for choice pieces of
ground here and there. An exchange of a bit of high ground for a
nasty, damp trench in a bog was considered quite a victory. The
capture of a small supply train by a small detachment that had managed
to sneak through the line at some point unobserved or unoccupied,
because it apparently was impossible for occupation on account of the
nature of the ground, was as much talked about as only a victory in a
real engagement would have been two or three months ago. In a way,
both the Russian and German and Austro-Hungarian armies had a much
more severe time of it on the east front than the German and
Franco-English forces had at the west front. First of all, the latter
was located in much more civilized regions, cleaner, therefore, and
healthier. Then, too, the nature of the ground in the west was less
hard on the fighters, higher in most places, and, therefore, drier.
Furthermore, the western line was practically an unbroken line from
the English Channel down to the Swiss border. In the east, however,
marshes, lakes, and rivers made an unbroken line impossible. All along
the front there were innumerable gaps. Of course many of these were
gaps because no human being could find a foothold on them, and,
therefore, needed no watching. Others, however, while impossible for
occupation, were not equally impossible for passage, provided those
that attempted to pass were willing to take great risks. And there was
no lack of such on either side. So Russians, Germans, and
Austro-Hungarians had to be continuously on the jump to prevent such
raids of their lines which, though they might have been very small in
the beginning, might have had very serious consequences. These
conditions, therefore, made war on the east front for everybody
concerned truly a war of attrition, equally racking for nerves and
bodies.

Only one other event of importance occurred on the east front during
the winter of 1915-16. General Russky, commanding the Russian forces
fighting before Riga and Dvinsk and in the Dvina-Vilia sector, was
forced by illness to retire from his command. He was succeeded by
General Everth, who up to then had commanded the next adjoining army
group, from the Vilia down to the Pripet Marshes, and who now assumed
command over all the Russian forces from the Gulf of Riga to the
Pripet Marshes. Farther down the line General Ivanoff continued the
leadership that he had assumed after the German advance had come to a
standstill at the end of October.

Thus the winter passed. As we have learned in some of the preceding
chapters, operations were resumed in a small way at certain points
along the line from time to time. With the approach of the spring of
1916 these activities slightly increased in extent and severity. But
both sides, as long as frost continued, were satisfied with this state
of conditions and with never-ceasing preparations for new offensive
operations to begin as soon as nature would permit.

PART VI--THE BALKANS

CHAPTER XXX

BATTLE CLOUDS GATHER AGAIN

Though Serbia had been the first to be attacked by the Central Powers
when the world war began, the end of the first year's fighting was to
find her still unconquered, though she had passed through ordeals
quite as severe as those suffered by Belgium.

Let us review, briefly, the events of the first year:

Hardly had hostilities been declared by Austria-Hungary, on July 28,
1914, when the armies of the Dual Empire began gathering along the
Serbian frontiers; then, within a few days, they hurled themselves
into Serbia, hoping to overwhelm her by the sheer weight of their
numbers. Not only did the soldiers of the little Balkan nation
withstand the onslaught of the imperial troops, but within the week
they had swept them back, driving them across the frontiers.

So astounded was the Austrian General Staff, so dumfounded was it by
this unexpected disaster, that it required some weeks to realize what
had happened, and to prepare for a second and mightier attempt to
overcome the resistance of the Serbians.

On came the Austrians again, only to suffer a second defeat. Then they
made their third and mightiest effort, and this time every available
resource of the empire was strained to the utmost; every soldier not
absolutely needed elsewhere was utilized. And this time, indeed, the
Austrian forces did penetrate some distance within Serbian territory,
and for over a fortnight the Serbian capital was theirs. But their
initial success only made their final defeat the more complete. For
the third time the Serbian soldiers beat them back, and from that
date, December 14, 1914, Serbia remained undisturbed by foreign
invasion for almost a year.

Shortly after the beginning of the New Year, came an enemy for whom
the Serbians were not so well prepared: a typhus epidemic, which took
almost as many victims as had the fighting. Realizing their
helplessness, the Serbians uttered an appeal for help, and almost
every nation, not an enemy, including the United States, responded
generously with money, and by sending Red Cross corps to nurse the
plague victims. By the summer of 1915, the epidemic had spent itself,
after decimating the army and the civil population.

Meanwhile a danger threatened the Serbians which overshadowed even
that from the Austrians; namely the danger that other Balkan nations,
and especially Bulgaria, might join the Teutonic Powers. Serbia had
already shown that she could take care of the Austrians alone, but
with Bulgaria attacking her flank, even the most optimistic realized
that the fight against such odds probably would be hopeless.

Turkey, even while Serbia was hurling back the Austrians for the
second time, in November, 1914, was the first to declare herself in
favor of the Teutons by attacking the Russians. Then began the game of
diplomacy to win over the Christian states to the Allies. All had
declared themselves neutral, even Greece, though she was bound by a
treaty to assist Serbia against foreign attack. But it was generally
realized that each was only watching for the first signs of weakness
on either side before deciding which to support. To give weight to her
diplomacy Great Britain began her military operations on Gallipoli, on
the understanding with Greece, of which Venizelos was then premier,
that Greek troops should assist. But Venizelos was forced to resign by
the Greek King and the governing clique, and Greece continued to
maintain her neutrality.

Rumania, in spite of her leanings toward the Allies, remained firm in
her neutrality. Bulgaria was more explicit; she made it understood
that she would join that side which could most effectually guarantee
her possession of the territory in Macedonia which she considered she
had won in the First Balkan War and which was given over to Serbia and
Greece after the Second Balkan War by the Treaty of Bucharest.
Throughout the year the negotiations continued whereby the Allies
attempted to persuade Greece and Serbia to agree to Bulgaria's terms,
but Greece continued obdurate in her determination to hold all she
had, and Serbia yielded only in part, and very reluctantly. In August,
1915, beginning the second year of the war, these negotiations were
still in progress. As it was still unknown publicly that Bulgaria had
already signed a secret alliance with Germany, the situation was
considered favorable to the Allies, especially as on August 22, 1915,
it was announced that Venizelos was again to become prime minister of
Greece.

The first indication that King Ferdinand and his cabinet had come to a
decision was in the agitation that appeared in Bulgaria itself among
the leaders of the opposition parties, protesting against the
Germanophile policy of the Government. On September 18, 1915, a
deputation of these leaders had an interview with the king, in which
they made their protest; the report was that a stormy scene occurred,
in which several members of the deputation used language to the effect
that should the king go against the popular feeling, which was in
favor of the Entente, it would cost him his throne. They also demanded
that the National Assembly be convened.

The king's reply was to order a general order of mobilization of the
Bulgarian army. At the same time a note was issued to all foreign
representatives in which the Government stated explicitly that
Bulgaria had no intention of entering the war; that she had called her
men to the colors only to maintain an "armed neutrality," as Holland
and Switzerland were doing. In spite of these assurances, Greece also
began mobilizing. On September 20, 1915, there appeared a significant
statement in the German official report of military operations, to the
effect that German artillery, stationed on the Danube opposite
Semendria, had opened fire on a Serbian position. Never before had
there been mention of German guns so far south. Altogether, the
situation in the Balkans was now becoming acute.

On September 28, 1915, Sir Edward Grey made a statement in the British
Parliament which made the world realize that a crisis in the Balkans
was imminent. He announced that efforts were still being made to
arrange an agreement between Bulgaria and Serbia and Greece regarding
Macedonia, "but," he added significantly, "if Bulgaria assumes an
aggressive attitude on the side of our enemies, we will support our
friends in the Balkans with all our power, in concert with our Allies
and without reserve or qualification."

This was followed up by another statement on October 1, 1915, to the
effect that German and Austrian officers were arriving in the
Bulgarian capital, creating a situation of "the utmost gravity."
Within forty-eight hours, Russia issued an ultimatum to Bulgaria
demanding that the German and Austrian officers in Sofia be removed
within twenty-four hours, otherwise Russia would sever all diplomatic
relations with King Ferdinand's Government. To this Bulgaria made no
immediate reply, with the result that the Russian Minister left Sofia
the next day. Premier Radoslavov, however, on the same day, published
an official statement that there were no German or Austrian officers
in Sofia and that Bulgaria had no intention of breaking her
neutrality. Meanwhile came reports through Greece stating that
Bulgarian troops were being massed up against the Serbian frontier. As
subsequent events soon proved, Bulgaria was determined to hide her
real purpose to the last moment; not until she actually made her first
attack did she cease denying her hostile intentions.

That Bulgaria was acting in cooperation with the Teutonic allies was
obvious, for already the Serbians had observed that great forces were
being mobilized across the rivers, along her northern and northwestern
frontiers, along the banks of the Danube, the Save, and the Drina.

What did not develop so soon was the fact that this new invasion was
to be under the leadership of the German General von Mackensen, and
that the invaders were to consist in large part of German regiments.
During the summer Mackensen had been engaged in directing a strong
Austro-German offensive against the Russians, with conspicuous
success. For weeks after he had left this front and was busy
organizing a similar offensive against the Serbians, the German
official dispatches continued to associate his name with actions on
the Russian front that the preparations in the south might continue
secret as long as possible.

Not long after the first Austro-German guns began hurling their shells
across the Danube, against the Serbian position at Semendria, the
Serbians learned of the disposition and the resources of the enemy.
The troops under Mackensen were divided into two armies, each in close
contact with the other. One of these wings was under the command of a
German, General von Gallwitz, who had distinguished himself against
the Russians a short time previously. The men under him were entirely
Germans. The other army was under the command of an Austrian, General
von Kövess von Kövesshaza. His men were both German and Austrian, the
latter predominating.

The army under Gallwitz extended from Orsova, near the Rumanian
frontier, along the Danube westward to a point opposite Semendria.
Here his right flank joined Kövess's line, which extended up past
Belgrade, along the Save and part way up the Drina. The rest of the
frontier up the Drina was covered by a smaller Austrian army.

Altogether, the Austro-German armies comprised at least 300,000 men.
The Austrians were picked troops, for it was only natural that the
general staff wished to retrieve, in some measure, the humiliation of
the previous year. The Germans, numbering fully half of the total
force, were also hardened veterans, who had seen plenty of fighting on
the Russian front or in France or Flanders.

Mackensen's overwhelming success in driving the Russians out of
Galicia had been mainly due to his artillery, that arm of the military
service in which the Germans excelled all their enemies. And here,
too, the artillery was to play an important part, for fully 2,000
cannon, nearly all of mid-caliber and heavy caliber, had been brought
down against the Serbians. During the first three invasions the
Austrians had thrown their infantry up against the Serbian lines. Now
German tactics were to be tried: the Serbian trenches and other
defensive positions were to be pulverized with powerful explosives,
then rushed with infantry.

Though they had been undisturbed for so long, the Serbians were by no
means in doubt as to what was yet to come. They had realized that
eventually the enemy would return more determined and more powerful
than ever. Therefore, they had spent the nine months since the last
defeat of the Austrians in extensive preparations. Line after line of
trenches had been built back into the interior of the country, and all
the possible crossings on the rivers had been heavily fortified.
Moreover, they had drained the civilian population of every male
person strong enough to carry a gun.

At this time, when the fourth invasion began threatening, their army
mustered fully 310,000 men, slightly more than the Austro-German. In
regard to small arms and ammunition they were also at least equal to
the enemy, for vast consignments of military stores had been sent into
the country by the Allies. Only in heavy artillery were they inferior,
but then this was also true of all the armies facing the Germans
throughout Europe.

Therefore, had the Serbians been called upon to defend themselves only
against General von Mackensen's armies, it is highly probable that
they would have been able to give the same answer as they had the year
previous. So probable, in fact, that Mackensen would hardly dared to
have attacked them with only 300,000 men. To be sure, their enemy was
no longer made up of raw recruits and there was now the heavy
artillery as well as a commander of great ability to face, but the
preparations they had made in defensive works, as well as the
mountainous nature of their country, more than made up for these
advantages possessed by their opponents. It was the Bulgarians who
would turn the scale.

Because of the greed for territory of their governing clique, the
Serbians now faced dangers which even their rugged qualities could not
contend against long. For now, while they were steeling themselves to
meet the impact of the blow from the Austro-Germans from the north,
the Bulgarian army, fully as strong as themselves, was gathering on
their right flank. In spite of the diplomatic protests of Ferdinand
and Radoslavov, the Serbians were not deceived.

The danger from the Bulgarian army meant more to the Serbians than the
mere doubling in number of their enemy's forces. It was the position
of the Bulgarians which made the situation especially precarious,
impossible.

A glance at the map will show that the main line of railroad, running
down from Belgrade to Saloniki by way of Nish, passes within a few
miles of the Bulgarian frontier, just opposite Sofia. Indeed, from
Klisura on the frontier the distant whistle of the locomotives and the
rattle of the trains across stretches of trestle work can be heard
plainly on still days. From Klisura on the frontier to the railroad is
all down hill. Farther south, at Kustendil, the danger was even
greater, though the distance from frontier to railroad somewhat more,
for at Kustendil was the terminus of a short railroad from the
Bulgarian capital. From this point on the frontier toward the railroad
at Kumanova the terrain was all in favor of the Bulgarians, for
Kustendil is at the top of a chain of mountains and the railroad runs
along the bottom of a valley, the famous Morava Valley.

This railroad, from Upper Serbia down to Saloniki, was the only line
of communication and transportation between the main Serbian armies
and the Allies. Cut this, and they would wither like a flower
separated from its stem.

So keenly did the Serbians realize their danger that they asked
permission of the Allies to attack Bulgaria before the Bulgarian army
was completely mobilized. They hoped thereby to disable Bulgaria with
one sharp blow while she was not yet prepared, then turn their whole
attention toward the enemy in the north. But to this plan the Allies
would not consent, still hoping that Ferdinand would reconsider his
resolution.

[Illustration: General Map of Balkan (Serbian) Operations.]

Just before the fourth invasion actually began, the Serbians held
their frontier along the Danube and the Save with three armies,
consisting of nearly eight divisions, or half of all their available
men. On the west the First Serbian Army, of three divisions, commanded
by General Mishitch, occupied the angle formed by the Save and the
Drina, with its headquarters at Shabatz, the scene of such bloody
fighting a year before. To the eastward came a force of a division and
a half under command of General Zivkovitch, known as the Army for the
Defense of Belgrade, which indicates its position. Between Belgrade
and the Rumanian frontier lay the Third Serbian Army, of three
divisions, with General Jourishitch at its head, protecting the mouth
of the Morava Valley.

Facing the Austrians over in the west, in the vicinity of Vichegrad,
was the army of Ushitze, of less than two divisions, under General
Goykovitch.

These were the forces, about two-thirds of the total Serbian army,
which faced the Austro-Germans. But another 100,000 had also to be
deployed along the Bulgarian frontier to protect the railroad as best
they could. Thus it was that wherever she faced her enemies, Serbia,
was hopelessly outnumbered.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE INVASION BEGINS

As already stated, the first of Mackensen's huge shells began bursting
over the Serbian defenses across the river on September 20, 1915.
While the wheels of diplomacy continued turning during the following
weeks, the roar of the big guns grew louder and more persistent and
swept up and down the long line. Then came several attempts on the
part of the Austro-Germans to cross the rivers; all these the Serbians
successfully repulsed, though they may have been mere feints, as a
boxer jabs at his opponent's jaw while he really aims for his wind.
There were seven of these attempts. In one, near Semendria, the
Serbians reported that a whole battalion of an enemy was destroyed.
Meanwhile German aeroplanes whirred back and forth over the Serbian
lines, reconnoitering their positions and sometimes dropping bombs.
One of them flew south as far as Nish, then turned eastward and
disappeared over the mountain ridges toward Bulgaria. And all this
while the frontier guards reported that the Bulgarians were massing
their troops day by day.

As already noted, the Serbian frontier in Macedonia was left
practically unguarded. Possibly the Serbians still hoped the Greeks
would hold to their treaty and join them from that direction. And,
indeed, the Greek army was being mobilized, frankly to meet the
Bulgarians. More encouraging still, the news came that France and
England, at the request of Venizelos, had agreed to send to Saloniki
150,000 men to make up for an equal number which, by the terms of the
Serbo-Greek treaty for mutual defense against Bulgaria, Serbia would
have provided had she been able to do so.

This force began landing in Saloniki on October 5, 1915, but on the
same day Venizelos was again compelled to resign by King Constantine,
who was determined to keep the Greek nation out of the war. This was a
sad blow to the hopes of the Serbians. Still, the British and French
troops continued landing, in spite of the "protest" from the Greek
Government.

Beginning on October 3, 1915, the fire of the Austro-German artillery
became doubly insistent, thundering up and down the whole front with
increasing vigor. Again the Teutons began poking their pontoons out
into the river, and again they were smashed by the Serbian guns. The
fighting waxed hottest at Ram, Dubrovitza, and Semendria, on the
Danube, and in and about Ciganlia Island (Island of the Gypsies), at
Obrenovatz, Shabatz, and Jarak on the Save, where it is joined by the
Drina. Ram and Semendria, both fortified places, guarded the mouth of
the Morava Valley, and these Gallwitz subjected to an especially heavy
fire. By October 5, 1915, the shelling became heaviest in this sector:
the enemy's guns and howitzers belched forth a steady hail of big
shells.

Belgrade, also, became the object of an increasingly tremendous effort
on the part of the Austro-German artillery. Here they had brought up
long-range guns, and with these inflicted heavy damage.

Nevertheless, the Serbians in Belgrade gave a good account of
themselves. There were stationed there the big naval guns, 4.7-inch
and 6-inch, sent into the country by Great Britain, France, and
Russia, and served by their expert gunners. For several days the
foreign gunners, under command of Rear Admiral Troubridge, swept the
broad surface of the Danube and the Save, sinking two of the enemy's
gunboats that happened to come within range.

On October 5, 1915, the German fire on Belgrade intensified and became
terrific. They no longer satisfied themselves with pouring their
deadly fire on the fortress of Belgrade and the neighboring positions
at Zamar, but they began a systematic bombardment of the city itself,
hurling vast quantities of inflammatory bombs, as though they meant to
burn down every building before attempting to take it. Into the
suburbs beyond, through which ran the highways leading into the
interior, they rained a curtain of fire which made flight for the
inhabitants almost impossible.

On October 6, 1915, the Austro-German forces finally managed to effect
a crossing which the Serbians were not able to repulse; at several
points they landed on the opposite bank, including Belgrade itself.
The first attempts had been made at Jarak, Podgorska Island, and
Zabrez, and had been driven back again and again, but this time the
enemy put such energy behind his efforts that eventually the Serbians
were no longer able to drive him back. Gypsy Island, too, a short
distance from Belgrade, was captured, whence a landing was made under
the Lower Fortress and on the Danube Quay in the city itself. In the
first attempt all the Austrians or Germans who landed under the Lower
Fortress were either killed or captured. Finally the invaders
established themselves permanently on the quay. During that day the
fighting was of a bloodier character than had as yet taken place.

Next day, October 7, 1915, the Austro-Germans pushed on to further
success; their big guns raked the river shore up and down and tore
down all defensive works, making them untenable for the defenders. And
on the day following, October 8, 1915, the Austro-Hungarian troops of
Kövess penetrated into the northern sections of the city, taking the
citadel by storm. At the same time a German contingent, attached to
Kövess's command, landed west of the city and took the heights in that
section, fighting its way to the Konak and finally to the Royal
Palace, in the center of the city, over which they hoisted the German
and Austrian flags. Though there was still much to do, Belgrade was
now practically in their hands.

Little by little the foreign naval guns in Belgrade had been silenced
by the big shells of the German howitzers. In the afternoon General
Zikovitch, seeing that the city was now lost and hoping to save it
from complete destruction, ordered his forces to retire on the
fortified positions lying behind and south of the capital. Several
detachments of the defenders, however, had already been cut off and
were obliged to remain. Some fought grimly to the bitter end,
inflicting heavy losses on the invaders; others were obliged to
surrender. In some of the streets the fighting took on a bloody,
hand-to-hand character, in which some of the civilians took part. All
through the night Mannlicher rifles sputtered back and forth,
interspersed here and there with the deeper detonation of the hand
bombs which the Serbians hurled in the skirmishes from street to
street and from terrace to terrace. When morning dawned the last of
the firing died down and the greater part of Belgrade was a vast field
of charred timbers and tumbled-down stones.

Belgrade was taken, as the official German and Austrian reports
announced joyously next day, but its taking had been at an enormous
cost and, aside from the political value of its possession, with very
little gain. The official list specified the war material captured as
only 9 naval guns, and 26 unmounted field pieces, the prisoners
amounting to 10 officers and 600 men, many of whom were wounded. The
Serbian Government had been established in Nish since the beginning of
the war.

What had happened at Belgrade was typical of the fighting at a number
of other points along the banks of the three rivers. On the same day
that Belgrade was taken the Austro-Germans crossed the Danube between
Gradishte and Semendria, near the village of Zatagna and the small
fort called Kosolatz. Ram, too, after having been heavily bombarded,
was taken. Then, from these points they tried to blast their way
through farther south, away from the river into the interior, but the
Serbians held them back from the neighboring heights.

In the west, on the Save, toward the mouth of the Drina, the invaders
were not so successful. In this area were some of the best of the
Serbian soldiers, among them the Shumadia Division, which especially
distinguished itself during all the later fighting. Here Marshal
Mishitch, who had led his men so ably during the third invasion ten
months previously, was in command. He also had charge of the defenses
along the lower Drina, and opposite Badovintse he drove back the
Austrians with bloody slaughter.

Between Obrenovatz and Kratinska, on the Save, the Austro-Germans had
delivered heavy attacks for three nights successively, but were
effectively checked. The operations were directed specially against
Zabrez. On October 10, 1915, this Serbian position was still holding
out. In the afternoon of that date the Austrians bombarded heavily,
using great quantities of asphyxiating bombs. Then they charged in
solid masses, believing that the gases had thrown the Serbians into
disorder. The latter, however, were provided with masks, and when the
enemy charged they sprang from their trenches and met them on the open
ground in hand-to-hand bayonet fighting, driving them back in panic.

Again the Austrians showered gas shells on the Serbians; then, toward
dusk, came on again, but the Serbians once more broke through the
Austrian ranks and captured many prisoners.

[Illustration: The Beginning of the German-Austro-Bulgar Campaign
against Serbia.]

But in spite of these local successes by the Serbians, the fighting
was beginning to go against them; the invaders had crossed the
frontier and could no longer be dislodged. On October 11, 1915, the
official German dispatches were able to announce that Mackensen's
forces were in possession of the Serbian banks of the Danube and the
Save between Gradishte and Shabatz, a stretch of over a hundred miles.
On the Drina too, the Austrians had been able to cross over in
several places. To all these points they hurried large bodies of
reserves to push their advantages and so continue a vigorous offensive
east, south, and west of Belgrade, in a wide, sweeping movement along
the entire front.

The main effort was made in the east, to secure possession of the
Morava Valley and its railroad. Near Semendria, Gallwitz's right wing
was in touch with Kövess's left. The plan was that they should advance
up the Morava together, each covering one side of the valley. But it
was first necessary to reduce the Serbian forts at Semendria and
Pojarevatz.

It was now two weeks since the heavy artillery had begun playing on
Semendria. By October 11, 1915, the invaders had succeeded in taking
Semendria, the garrison retiring to Pojarevatz. Here a very severe
battle was fought, but finally the Serbians were forced back, though
not without inflicting the heaviest losses that the enemy had as yet
suffered. After two days the fort was taken and the Serbians retired
to the hills beyond. Thus the invaders were now ready to begin their
advance down the Morava Valley.

But just then there came a pause in the fighting. The Serbians
observed that Gallwitz waited. What he waited for was not immediately
obvious to them. Within a few days they were to know.

CHAPTER XXXII

BULGARIA ENTERS THE WAR

The Bulgarian Government suddenly threw aside all dissimulation and
declared war on Serbia, on the pretext that the Serbians had crossed
the frontier and attacked Bulgarian troops. On October 11, 1915, the
Bulgarian army began operations by attacking the Serbians at
Kadibogas, northwest of Nish, the attack gradually extending up and
down the frontier. This was the fatal blow. To oppose the 300,000 men
that the Bulgarians could easily put into this field, the Serbians had
not over a third as many.

Bulgaria had two large armies against the Serbian frontier. The First
Army, under General Boyadjieff, was fully 200,000 strong and was
concentrated in the north from Vidin to Zaribrod, threatening the
Timok Valley and that part of the Belgrade-Sofia railroad running from
Pirot to Nish.

The Second Army, under the command of General Todoroff, was only half
as large, and directed itself toward Macedonia and especially toward
Uskub, both on account of the strategic importance of that place as a
railroad center and as the best point from which a wedge might be
driven into the side of Serbia, separating the north from the south.
The headquarters of this second force was in Kustendil, its left wing
extending down to Strumitza in Macedonia.

On this eastern front, to oppose the Bulgarians, the Serbian forces
were in three groups. In the north, its left flank touching the forces
operating against the Austro-Germans, lay the Timok group, commanded
by General Zivkovitch, whose headquarters were in Zaichar. South of
this force came the second group--territorial troops--numbering three
divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, altogether about 80,000 men,
and commanded by Marshal Stepanovitch. It was based on Pirot and was
especially charged with the defense of the railroad. Lower down, with
headquarters in Vranya, was the detachment of the Southern Morava.
Farther down in Macedonia, concentrated around Uskub, Veles, and
stretched down along the Vardar toward the Greek frontier at Doiran,
were another 25,000 men under the command of General Bojovitch.

[Illustration: Under fire from the Serbian forces, General Mackensen's
engineers constructed this great bridge across the Danube, and his
army crossed for the invasion of Serbia.]

As a slight offset to the disheartening news that the Bulgarians had
at last definitely joined hands with the Teutonic forces, came the
tidings that France and England had declared war on Bulgaria and that
their forces, which had been landing in Saloniki, were already
advancing up the Vardar with the intention of making a junction with
the southern Serbian forces. Already, on that same day, October 15,
1915, the allied vanguard had advanced as far as Valandova and was
there attacked by the Bulgarians, the latter being beaten back and
heavily defeated. These were the French troops, under command of
General Sarrail; having thrown back the Bulgarians he worked his way
northward along the railroad until he reached Krivolak and Gradsko, a
few miles below Veles. But transporting troops from France and England
was a slow business, and General Sarrail had not then, nor had he
later, enough forces to advance north any farther. Meanwhile the
Bulgarians in the north, under Boyadjieff, began operations against
the Serbians.

The country in this section is extremely rough, being all rocky ridges
and deep ravines, with roads little better than mountain trails.
Boyadjieff succeeded at once in crossing the Lower Timok, then divided
his force into two main divisions. One of these he advanced against
Pirot, the other against Zaichar and Kniashevatz. But now the Serbians
began a strong resistance.

On October 15, 1915, the Bulgarians began three strong assaults, east
and southeast of Zaichar, all of which the Serbians repulsed
successfully. East of Kniashevatz another series of bitterly contested
encounters took place, neither side making any decided gains. On the
following day the fighting extended to Svinski Vis. By this time the
Serbians east of Kniashevatz began giving way slowly and the
Bulgarians pushed forward and on October 19, 1915, they arrived before
Negotin. Toward Pirot they also succeeded in making some advance.

For several days the two fighting lines of men swayed back and forth.
Here artillery played not so important a part. Both Bulgars and Serbs,
primitive, rugged fighters, threw military science to the winds and
plunged into the battle face to face and breast to breast, thrusting
each other with cold steel. In some of the struggles the men lost
their guns; they picked up the bowlders that lay about them thickly
and hurled them at their enemies or they gripped each other with their
hands and fought as animals fight. Quarter was neither asked nor
given.

Witnesses state that in neither of the two Balkan wars was there such
ferocious fighting, such awful slaughter, as during the encounters
between the Serbians and Bulgarians along this section of the
frontier. Both sides lost heavily; whole companies and even battalions
were hemmed in against the rock walls, then exterminated to the last
man.

But finally numbers began to show the advantage, and the Serbians were
obliged to retire from ridge to ridge. Village after village was taken
and burned.

In Macedonia, Todoroff, though his force was much smaller, was having
comparatively easy work. A large part of the vital railroad line
passed through this section and it was Todoroff's first aim to throw
himself astride of it, thus effectually breaking off communication
between the vanguard of the French army and the Serbians. It was this
portion of the country that the Greeks would have defended, had they
joined the Allies.

The first thing that Todoroff did was to detach a strong force from
his main body, with which he struck at the railroad between Vranya and
Zibeftcha and succeeded in cutting it. The detachment of the Southern
Morava was driven back at the first encounter and on October 17, 1915,
the Bulgarians entered Vranya. On the same day the main body of the
Bulgarians advanced down the slopes from Kustendil and took Egri
Palanka, on the road toward Kumanova and Uskub. Farther south they
penetrated the Valley of the Bregalnitza, the scene of the Bulgarian
defeat in the Second Balkan War, where they captured the important
strategic point, Sultan Tepe, and the town of Katshana, taking twelve
field pieces. Passing rapidly on through Ishtip, they occupied that
part of Veles lying east of the Vardar River, where, on October 20,
1915, they again cut the railroad line and so made any further advance
on the part of the French almost impossible. The next day the
Bulgarians captured Kumanova and then, on the day following, drove the
Serbians on through Uskub. The Serbians retired fighting to Katshanik
Pass, north of Uskub, where they made a stand that became one of the
notable achievements, on their part, of the whole campaign. For by the
defense of this pass they made the Bulgarian effort to cut Serbia in
two for some time fruitless.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE TEUTONIC INVASION ROLLS ON

Meanwhile, Bulgaria having plunged into the fighting, the Teutonic
allies in the north resumed their efforts to advance southward. But
for some time they had all they could do to maintain themselves on the
banks of the rivers. Before them rose the rock-ribbed hills skirting
the mountains of the interior, and along these hills the Serbians had,
during the previous ten months, built up line after line of strong
intrenchments, one behind the other. To carry one line was only to
gain a few hundred yards of territory.

Just as soon as Kövess felt his hold on Belgrade secure, he began an
attack on the heights to the south. After three days of intense
bombardment he succeeded in taking Mount Avala, an eminence some 1,600
feet in height and ten miles from the city. On the same day, October
18, 1915, Obrenovatz fell into his hands, and Shabatz three days
later. However, these two places were still only on the banks of the
river.

The chief efforts of the invaders, however, were directed toward
making an advance down the Morava Valley. Their first assault was made
against the Serbian positions in the mountainous country of the
Podunavlie. Gallwitz here had an exceedingly difficult task, for the
ground rose in rocky, steplike formation, offering all the advantages
to the defenders. But the bombardment from the heavy artillery had its
effect and slowly the Germans advanced. By October 23, 1915, they had
reached the southern bank of the Jesenitza, not far from Palanka and
had passed Rakinatz on the road to Petrovatz on the Mlava.

During this same period the German left wing, having smashed Tekia
with gunfire, crossed the Danube near Orsova and succeeded in taking
the heights overlooking the river. On the extreme western front the
Austrians crossed the Drina at Vishegrad. Thus all the rivers forming
the frontiers had passed completely into the hands of the invaders.
But it had been a costly gain. By this time the Austro-German forces
had lost very heavily. The Serbians also had had heavy losses, but not
half so many as the enemy.

It was the policy of General Putnik, the Serbian Chief of Staff, to
prolong the fighting as much as possible, for during this time the
transports of the Allies were disembarking troops in Saloniki, at the
rate of 5,000 men a day, and there was hope that eventually they would
be able to advance northward, and at least save the Serbians from the
Bulgarians. This same hope had stiffened the resistance of the
soldiers in every skirmish. Then came word that the Russians would
relieve the pressure by attacking the Bulgarians, either through
Rumania, or by landing troops in either Bourgas or Varna. And once
indeed the Russian ships did bombard Varna, but without any attempt at
disembarking troops.

As the days passed and no help from outside came, the belief began
gradually to dawn on the Serbian people that they were doomed as a
nation. This feeling first manifested itself in the flight of the
civil population. At first the noncombatants had merely retired with
the fighting line. The first three invasions had shown that the
Austrians did not always refrain from committing atrocities,
especially when their armies had suffered unusually. Nor was there any
reason to suppose that the Germans were any kindlier to civilians.
Thus it was that hardly any of the civil population remained behind in
conquered territory.

Then, gradually, came the conviction that Serbian soldiers alone must
face the enemy, and even the most patriotic realized what a hopeless
fight it was. The whole population began moving southward; along every
available road trailed long lines of slowly moving ox carts, loaded
with the few movable belongings of their peasant owners. South
continued the exodus and then--the Bulgarians blocked the way. The
roads to Greece were closed. There remained nothing for them to do but
to turn toward the awful mountain wilderness intervening between them
and the Adriatic sea coast, infested by fierce bands of Albanian
brigands and tribesmen.

The weather was bad; rain fell heavily and incessantly, the roads were
deep in mud and the plight of these people, most of them old men and
women and children, became intensely miserable.

The Austro-German lines in the north continued their slow but
persistent southward advance; the invasion rolled on, the Serbians
retiring before them step by step. During the last week of the month
Gallwitz came to the heights east of Banitzina, south of Jesenitza,
and began storming them. Then followed another spurt of severe
fighting and Livaditza and Zabari, on the Morava River, fell into
their hands, after which they occupied the region south of Petrovatz.
By the 28th they had gained Svilajnatz, beating down the Serbian
resistance by sheer weight of men and guns, and by the last day of the
month they were within a day's march of Kragujevatz, in which was
located Serbia's chief arsenal. Situated on the Lepenitza, a branch of
the Morava, it lay about half way between Belgrade and Nish, on a
branch line of the main railroad. It was a point well worth defending,
and the Serbians did defend it stubbornly, but on November 1, 1915,
they were compelled to evacuate it, after first destroying the arsenal
and all the materials it contained.

It was here that the Shumadia Division especially distinguished
itself. The regiments of that unit had been recruited in this section;
it was literally defending its native soil. During the first part of
the fighting it had been intrenched in the hills to the north of the
town. The day was wet and dense mists rolled through the mountain
passes down over the hills. The Germans had effectually shelled the
positions of the Shumadians and were under the impression that they
had retired, wherefore they advanced upward to occupy the deserted
trenches.

And then, suddenly, wild yells and shouts burst out from the rolling
mist and the Shumadians fell upon the invaders with set bayonets. The
latter, who had been growing accustomed to the purely defensive
tactics of their enemy, were completely taken by surprise and thrown
into disorder.

The first line of the Teutons wavered, then broke and scattered.
Coming up against reenforcements behind, they re-formed and advanced
again. And again the Shumadians burst down on them and engaged them
hand to hand. Fighting like savages, they drove the invaders before
them for a considerable distance, taking over 3,000 prisoners and
several guns. When finally they retired just as the main body of the
advancing foe was coming up, they left behind them hundreds of enemy
dead, the fallen literally covering the ground in heaps.

The mixed forces of Kövess, keeping in touch with Gallwitz's right
wing, had been advancing more or less in line with the Germans,
marching along the railroad from Belgrade and Obrenovatz toward the
Western Morava. South of Belgrade the Serbians had put up a stout
resistance at Kosmai, but were finally dislodged by the heavy
artillery fire. On October 25, 1915, Kövess arrived at Ratcha, south
of Palanka, on the right side of the Morava. After a hard fought
battle at Gorni Milanovatz, he reached Cacak on November 1, 1915, a
few miles west of Kragujevatz. Here it was that he struck the Western
Morava and the railroad passing along it eastward from Ushitze to its
junction with the main line. Farther to the westward his cavalry, on
October 26, 1915, had occupied Valievo on the Upper Kolubara and one
of his divisions had crossed the Maljen Mountains, where the Austrians
had been so humiliatingly defeated the year before. Farther west, but
more to the south, the Austrians, who had pushed on from Vishegrad,
arrived in Ushitze on November 2, 1915, and presently effected a
junction with the main body.

Meanwhile, a day or two before the end of the month, an incident up in
the northeast foreshadowed the attainment of the main objective of the
Austro-German forces. The Serbians had, naturally, withdrawn from this
section and now a German cavalry patrol, scouting in advance of its
own lines, met with a body of Bulgarian scouts. The Bulgarian and the
Teutonic forces had come in contact with each other. But the chief
significance of this fact was that now the road was open for
communication between Germany and Turkey. Even if the railroad running
from Belgrade to Constantinople, by way of Sofia, should be
temporarily cut, or should not be captured throughout its entire
length for some time, shipments of war material could already be made
to Turkey by way of the Danube down to Rustchuk in northern Bulgaria
and thence by railroad. Thus the Turks at Gallipoli, who had been
running short of ammunition, could now be relieved.

This opening of communication with Turkey was made much of in the
German official reports and some of the newspapers began referring to
Mackensen's army as "the army of Egypt."

On the first day of November, 1915, Mackensen could really say that he
had conquered all of northern Serbia. But the fact remained that the
Serbian army was still in the field; not even a part of it had as yet
been captured or annihilated. And it is a military axiom that no
matter how far an army may retreat and no matter how much territory
may have been conquered, no battle is decisive until the enemy has
been destroyed, either entirely or in large part. The Germans were to
be reminded of this fact more than once on the Russian front.

Up till this time Boyadjieff, at the head of his Bulgarian army, was
attacking the Serbians from two directions: along the Timok against
Kniashevatz, Zaichar, and Negotin, and along the Nishava against
Pirot. Both movements were directed ultimately toward Nish, but the
more northerly had also the purpose of effecting a junction with the
left wing of the Germans under Gallwitz, which was advancing from
Tekia, in the northeast corner of Serbia. Negotin and Prahovo, the
latter a port on the Danube, had been taken on October 25, 1915. Lower
down, the Bulgarians, who were in overwhelming strength, occupied both
Zaichar and Kniashevatz on the 28th. Meanwhile, the Serbians were also
compelled to abandon the commanding heights of Drenova Glava, fifteen
miles northwest of Pirot, and on the 28th Pirot fell, though not
without heavy fighting. With Pirot on the south and Kniashevatz on the
north in the hands of the Bulgarians, the situation of Nish became
very precarious. The Serbian Government was now shifted to Kralievo.

Down in Macedonia the Second Bulgarian Army, under Todoroff, seemed to
have come to an end of its initial success. After its occupation of
Uskub it had advanced to Katshanik Pass, which was occupied by the
Serbians under General Bojovitch. Todoroff at once began a violent
attack and by October 28, 1915, part of the defile seemed to have been
cleared of the Serbians. But presently the Serbians were reenforced
by two regiments of the Morava Division and two of the Drina Division,
whereupon Bojovitch suddenly turned and once more possessed himself of
the pass.

Again and again the Bulgarians attacked, determined to take the pass,
but as often as they hurled themselves up the defile, just so often
the Serbians drove them back with fire and bayonet.

During this same period another Serbian force under Colonel Vassitch
was fighting farther south. On October 22, 1915, he succeeded in
recapturing Veles, which, it will be remembered, Todoroff had taken in
his rapid advance during the first few days of his fighting. Here it
was that the Serbians expected to make a juncture with the French
forces under Sarrail, and for several days they could even hear the
thunder of the French guns repelling a Bulgarian attack, so close
together were they.

For a whole week Vassitch held Veles against the overwhelming attacks
of the Bulgarians; then, finally, on the 29th, he was compelled to
retire to the Babuna Pass, the narrow defile also known as the Iron
Gate, through which passed the highway from Veles to Monastir, by way
of Prilep. By the first of November, 1915, the Serbians were still
holding this pass, which was all that prevented the Bulgarians from
driving in the wedge that was to separate Upper Serbia from Macedonia.

While it was true that no important part of the Serbian army had as
yet been eliminated from the field; that it was, as a whole, still
intact, yet it was now evident that the little nation had come very
near to the end of her resistance. By this time it was quite obvious
that no real help could be expected from the Allies. Great Britain had
offered the island of Cyprus to the Greeks, if they would stand by
their agreement by joining the Serbians, against the Bulgarians, at
least. But even that tempting offer would not induce them to risk
themselves in a fight whose outcome seemed so doubtful. On October 20,
1915, Italy had given her moral support by declaring war against
Bulgaria, but for the time being she offered nothing more material. On
October 21, 1915, British and French ships bombarded the Bulgarian
port of Dedeagatch, on the Gulf of Enos, and also a junction of the
railroad connecting Saloniki with Constantinople, but this had no
material result in deterring the Bulgarians from pressing their
campaign against the Serbians in Macedonia. On October 28, 1915,
Russian ships bombarded Varna, on the Black Sea coast of Bulgaria.
This was done, not so much for any material damage that could be done
to Bulgaria, but for the moral effect it might have on the population,
which was supposed to have very deep feelings of regard for Russia,
because she had freed them from the Turks in 1878. But the Bulgarian
troops previously stationed at this point had been replaced by Turkish
forces, so that it is probable that the Bulgarian population was not
much affected.

On land, the French troops under Sarrail had advanced farthest north;
on October 23, 1915, they defeated the Bulgarians severely at Rabrova
and pushed on to Krivolak, where they again engaged the Bulgarians on
the 30th and repulsed their attack. By November 2, 1915, the French
were at Gradsko, where the Tcherna joins the Vardar River, hoping to
get in touch with the Serbians who were defending the Babuna Pass and
whose guns they could hear pounding over the ten miles of intervening
mountain ridges. The British bore little of this fighting, having made
their advance over toward Lake Doiran.

But though the French had arrived within hearing of the Serbian guns,
they lacked the numbers that would give them the strength to push
farther. The French, indeed, had done well in their efforts to support
the Serbians in their distress. It was Great Britain that had not
lived up to her promise of affording "our Allies all the material
assistance in our power." So obviously had the British military
authorities failed that much public sentiment in Great Britain was
worked up against them, which became all the more acute when a
telegram from M. Pachitch, the Serbian premier, was published, in
which he said: "Serbia is making superhuman efforts to defend her
existence, in response to the advice and desire of her great ally. For
this she is condemned to death.... In spite of the heroism of our
soldiers, our resistance cannot be maintained indefinitely. We beg
you to do all you can to insure your troops reaching us that they may
help our army...."

On the same day this was published in the London papers, there was
also printed a speech made by Lord Lansdowne in the House of Lords, in
which he stated that the British had landed in Saloniki a force of
only 13,000 men.

In France the sentiment in favor of assisting the Serbians was so
strong that the Cabinet, which did not approve of a Balkan campaign,
was forced to resign. The French president thereupon found a new prime
minister in M. Briand, the ex-Socialist, who once before had been
premier, and, associating with himself M. Viviani and other
ex-ministers, he formed a Cabinet which was prepared to push the
campaign in aid of Serbia to the fullest extent. On the following day,
October 29, 1915, General Joffre went to London to consult with the
British Government and to persuade them to take more energetic
measures with regard to transporting troops to Saloniki. Apparently
his mission was successful, for after that large forces were sent to
the Near East, but so far as any effectual help to Serbia was
concerned, it was now too late.

At about this time Greece was showing a decided change of attitude.
Evidently this change was not a little due to the success of the
Austro-Germans and the Bulgarians in the north, and the nearer they
came to her own frontier, the less cordial became Greece to the
Allies. Every obstacle, short of armed interference, was put in the
way of transportation of troops and supplies to the front up in
Macedonia. This attitude was to continue until the Serbians were
finally swept out of their native land and the question came up of
retiring the allied troops back to Saloniki, across Greek territory,
when the British and French took very severe measures against the
Greek authorities.

Meanwhile, the invasion of Serbia was rolling onward. Having taken
Kragujevatz, where they began restoring the arsenal to working order
with feverish haste, the Austro-Germans crossed the Cacak-Kragujevatz
road and continued onward. Kövess advanced over the Posetza and the
Germans entered Jagodina on November 3, 1915.

By this time the Serbian headquarters at Kralievo was seriously
threatened; in fact, the Serbian Government was able to withdraw just
in time to prevent capture and establish itself in Rashka. On came the
enemy, along both banks of the Western Morava. In the streets of
Kralievo there was fierce fighting, at times hand-to-hand, between the
defenders and the Brandenburg troops of the invaders, but finally, on
November 5, 1915, the town was taken.

Here the invaders made their first large capture of war material,
which included 130 guns, though most of them were said to be of an
obsolete pattern, the others being without breech-blocks. Within
forty-eight hours the Germans had reached Krushevatz, where 3,000
Serbian soldiers were captured, not counting 1,500 wounded lying in
the hospital.

The whole Western Morava was now in the hands of the invaders. To the
eastward Gallwitz pressed on until he came to the hills south of
Lugotzni, where he was held up for a short space by the Serbian rear
guards. Finally, the heights were taken by storm. On November 4, 1915,
Parachin on the railroad was taken; from this point a branch line runs
back to Zaichar, already in possession of the Bulgarians, so that now
the two armies, German and Bulgarian, were almost in touch with each
other. And next day, in fact, their lines joined up at Krivivir, which
was taken that night by an assault under cover of darkness. Their
lines were now only thirty miles from Nish.

During this time other large bodies of Bulgarians under Boyadjieff
were also advancing on Nish; one from Pirot, in a southerly direction,
and another along the road from Kniashevatz, marching north. They were
now closing in on that city in overwhelming strength.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE FALL OF NISH--DEFENSE OF BABUNA PASS

At a small village called Svrlig, six miles outside the city, the
Serbians began a fight which presently assumed the character of some
of the bloody battles they had fought earlier in the campaign. Again
and again the Bulgarian attacks were hurled back; thus the battle
lasted for three days, from November 2 to 5, 1915. The Serbians
retired only when the Bulgarians began bringing up their big guns, and
the shells were already dropping into Nish. On November 5, 1915, the
Bulgarians entered the city and took possession, where even yet the
British and French flags were flying, raised by the Serbians when they
still thought that only a few days intervened until they would be
welcoming the allied troops. A hundred guns were taken with Nish,
though the Serbians claimed that they were old and obsolete.

The fall of Nish, from a political point of view, at least, was the
worst blow that the Serbians had suffered since the capture of
Belgrade. The German and Austrian papers made the most of it, and
indeed all Europe now realized that the last days of the Serbian
resistance were at hand.

In Macedonia the Bulgarians under Todoroff were not having an easy
success. They were being held up still at Katshanik Pass, where the
Serbians under Colonel Bojovitch were daily beating back the Bulgarian
assaults and thus keeping open the retreat of the main Serbian army.
Down in the Babuna Pass the Serbians were making a similar stubborn
defense, hoping against hope that the French would come to their
relief. And possibly, had it not been for the defeats that the
Bulgarians were receiving from the French at Strumitza, they would
have been able to take the pass long before. For in that direction
Todoroff had been suffering great loss; so severely was he pressed
that he was, for the time being, unable to press his advance into the
heart of Macedonia. To this extent, at least, the Allies, and
especially the French, did help the Serbians.

The Bulgarians were in exactly the same position, and trying to
accomplish exactly the same thing, as in the Second Balkan War. At
that time they were endeavoring to drive a wedge in between the
Serbians and the Greeks. Now the situation was the same, except that
the French were in the place of the Greeks.

From Katshanik to Krivolak the railroad was in Bulgarian hands. From
Krivolak south to Doiran it was in the hands of the Allies, though
parts of it were at times under the fire of the Bulgarian artillery.
South of Katshanik the Bulgarians had crossed the road and had pushed
westward until they were held up at the Babuna Pass. Should the pass
be forced the Serbian line was in immediate danger of being flanked
and the French, too, would be in a similar danger, for by striking
south the Bulgarians could make a move around toward the French rear.
Hence the almost superhuman efforts both Serbians and French were
making to close this gap.

The stand that the Serbians made in Babuna Pass was one of those feats
which will remain inscribed on the pages of history through the ages
and will excite the admiration of all people, regardless of how their
sympathies may lie toward the main issues of the war. During the first
week of November Colonel Vassitch had only 5,000 men with which to
dispute the right of way against 20,000 Bulgarians. And not only had
the Bulgarians a great advantage in the matter of numbers, but they
were well supplied with big guns. Day after day and night after night,
the little force of Serbians crouched among the deep shadows of the
defile, sometimes without food, always under a heavy fire, now and
again making the rock cliffs about them echo with bursts of their
plaintive, national folk songs. After November 4, 1915, the Bulgarian
attacks became more persistent, and their infantry would hurl itself
up into the pass; then the Serbians would spring up from behind rocks
and ledges and throw themselves at their hated kinsmen with naked
bayonets, shouting such words in their common language as send the
flush of rage burning through the cheeks of men and make things red
before their eyes. Again and again were these sanguinary hand-to-hand
struggles enacted under the towering rock walls of those forbidding
mountains, and again and again the Bulgarians were thrown back.
Meanwhile, the French, only ten miles away, were within sound of the
firing.

As a matter of fact, General Sarrail had already done wonders,
considering the shortness of the time he had had and the small forces
and few facilities at his disposal. It seemed, to those at a distance,
such a small gap to fill. And indeed, so nearly did Sarrail effect the
junction that nothing but the absence of reenforcements at a critical
moment caused him to fail.

As soon as he had landed at Saloniki he had sent every soldier under
his command along the railroad up the valley of Vardar, toward Veles.
Unfortunately, transportation facilities were poor; the road was only
single track; curving and twisting in and out among the rising
foothills and mountain spurs.

His first fighting had been at Strumitza station, where he defeated
the Bulgarians and so assured himself of possession of Demir Kapu
defile, a cleft in the mountains ten miles in length and from which,
had they held it, the Bulgarians could easily, with a comparatively
small force, have prevented any further advance. Having secured this
pass, Sarrail pushed through it to Krivolak, which was reached on
October 19, 1915. But here he was compelled to make a halt, to fortify
this advanced position and to await further reenforcements.

When news of the proximity of the French advance reached Vassitch, he
redoubled his efforts, and on October 22, 1915, he thrust his little
army forward and succeeded in recapturing Veles. This town lay along
the railroad, about thirty-five miles northwest of Krivolak.

Three miles north of Krivolak, on the road to Ishtip, rises a steep
and forbidding height, called Kara Hodjali (the Black Priest), which
the French were fortunate enough to take before the Bulgarians came up
in force. It was this height which enabled them, when the Bulgarians
did swarm down on them, some days later, to hold their position. From
October 30, 1915, until November 5, 1915, the fighting here was
furious, but finally the Bulgarians were driven back. Meanwhile,
however, the advance had been delayed and Vassitch, after holding
Veles a week, was forced to retire to Babuna Pass again.

From Krivolak to the pass was twenty-five miles, due east. For fifteen
miles the road lay across a rolling plain, to the River Tserna, as the
Macedonians and Serbians called it, or Tcherna, meaning "Black," in
Bulgarian. Beyond that rose steep and difficult mountain ridges, which
the Bulgarians had occupied and fortified. Yet Sarrail determined to
make an effort to force his way across.

By this time reenforcements had arrived from Saloniki, so he began
moving across the plain through Negotin and Kavadar to the Tcherna.
This stream, though narrow, was deep and unfordable. It could be
crossed only in one place, by a small plank bridge, at Vozartzi.

On November 5, 1915, the French troops began crossing this bridge and
scaling the heights before them, some of whose peaks towered fully a
thousand feet above the river. And here it was that they first heard
the booming of the Serbian guns, on the other side of the ridge.

Sarrail now advanced his men northward, along the west bank of the
Tcherna, and next day he delivered an assault on the Mount of the
Archangel, ten miles below Vozartzi. Here was the center of the
Bulgarian positions, and here their lines must be pierced, if Babuna
Pass was to be reached.

But not only was this position well fortified, but the Bulgarians were
in superior force to the French. Moreover, as soon as Todoroff heard
of what was going on, he hurried reenforcements to the Bulgarians on
Mount Archangel. And this Sarrail knew; yet, without hesitation, he
began the assault.

At the first attack the Bulgarian advance lines were driven out of the
villages at the base of the mountain. The French continued their
advance, and on November 10, 1915, they began a circling movement
which resulted in the Bulgarians being squeezed out of Sirkovo, a
village some distance up the mountain.

But by this time the Bulgarian reenforcements were beginning to
arrive, and by the end of the second week of the month they began to
take the offensive. They now had 60,000 men; against this force it was
obviously impossible for the French to make any further headway.

The Bulgarian commander now showed that it was his intention to circle
about the French, cut off their retreat by destroying the wooden
bridge over the Tcherna in their rear, then pin them up against the
mountain and pound them until they surrendered, all of which might
have been accomplished by a more skillful general.

For three days a violent battle raged, in which the fate of the French
army more than once hung in the balance, but superior military skill
counted in the end. Possibly, too, the hearts of the Bulgarian
soldiers were not in this fight, for the Bulgarian people have an
almost reverential respect for the French. At any rate, they did not
show here the same qualities that so distinguished them in the war
against the Turks. At the end of the third day their lines began
wavering, then broke. So completely were they routed that the French
were compelled to bury nearly 4,000 of the dead they left behind. So
close had the fighting been that at times the Bulgarian infantry
charged the French positions to within a dozen yards, but in the last
moment lacked the dash to carry them through the machine-gun fire and
into the French ranks. At such moments the French would countercharge,
whereupon the Bulgarians would turn and flee. Had the French been only
a few thousand men stronger, they could have followed up their
advantage, completely routed the Bulgarians, pushed their way across
the mountains to Babuna Pass and so relieved the Serbians, as well as
closing the gap through which the Bulgarians were yet to penetrate
into Macedonia.

The French completed their victory on November 14, 1915; until the
next day the Serbians held out, hearing the French guns, now loud and
clear, then receding, hoping every hour to see them come streaming
over the mountains to their aid. But the French could not do the
impossible. The Bulgarians had been thrown back, but not crushed.
Sarrail dared not leave that slender crossing over the Tcherna too far
behind.

On November 16, 1915, the Serbians finally fell back from the pass on
Prilep. The French, however, not knowing of the Serbian retirement at
the time, continued to hold their advanced position at Mount Archangel
until November 20, 1915, when the Bulgarians returned to give them
fresh battle. And again the French were able to repulse their attacks,
but further advance was now out of the question.

The situation of the Serbian armies up in the north was now truly
desperate. The combined Austro-German and Bulgarian lines, beginning
at Vishegrad, north of Montenegro, swept in a straight line across the
heart of Serbia to Nish, where it curved downward to Vranya, then
swept into Veles and down to where the French army prevented it from
reaching the Greek frontier. It was, in fact, like a great dragnet,
which had only to be contracted to sweep the Serbians inward, over
against the awful defiles of the Montenegrin and Albanian Mountains, a
country through which no organized army could pass in a body, and
through which only the strongest of the noncombatants could hope to
escape alive. And for a time it seemed as though the French would
prick a hole through this net, through which, by rending it into a
wide gap, the Serbians could have been saved. But with the retirement
of Colonel Vassitch from Babuna Pass that last chance was gone; Serbia
was left to her fate.

Meanwhile the pressure from the north continued irresistibly; steadily
the Serbian armies were being pushed back against the mountain ranges,
in comparison to which their own mountains were mere hills. And while
the Serbians were waxing weaker every day, their enemies were growing
stronger, not only because their long line was contracting, but
because now they were being constantly reenforced. Also, with the
cutting of the railroad, all means of supply were gone; the Serbians
must now continue the fight with their own resources. They were now
becoming woefully short, not only of ammunition, but of food as well.
Yet they continued the struggle, retreating before the enemy facing
them, step by step backward, taking advantage of every little natural
position to cause the invaders as much loss as possible.

During the two weeks following the fall of Nish the three commanders
of the invading armies began, and continued, a great converging
movement on the Kossovo Plain, their object being to completely
encircle the main Serbian armies. Kövess was advancing his forces
toward Mitrovitza on the north side of the plain from Kralievo up the
valley of the Ibar, branching out of the Western Morava. In the hills
north of Ivanitza the Serbian rear guards made a stubborn attempt to
hold him back, but finally they were dislodged and the Austrians
occupied Ivanitza on November 9, 1915. Four days later, after driving
the Serbians from their intrenchments in the Stolovi ranges, he
reached Rashka, which had been the seat of the Serbian Government
after its flight from Kralievo and which was situated on the Ibar,
some distance along the road to Mitrovitza and only a few miles from
Novi Bazar. This place he took on November 20, 1915, and with it a
small arsenal, in which were fifty large mortars and eight guns, which
even the German reports described as of "somewhat ancient pattern."

To the eastward the Austrians had taken possession of Sienitza and
Novi Varosh, up toward the Montenegrin frontier. Being expelled from
Zhochanitza, the Serbians retired to Mitrovitza. By November 22, 1915,
the Austrian lines had followed to within five miles of that point.

Gallwitz and his Germans, in the meanwhile, operating on the left
flank of the Austrians, was pushing southward, his object being to
take Pristina, on the east side of the Kossovo Plain and about twenty
miles southeast of Mitrovitza. But this was a task that could not be
accomplished without much difficulty, for before him towered the
backbone of Serbia's main mountain ridges, each ravine and each ledge
sheltering strong Serbian forces.

As usual, however, the big guns cleared the way before Gallwitz,
though at Jastrebatz the Serbians made him pay a heavy price in the
losses he suffered. On this front the Bulgars were now coming close
enough to the Germans to support them; against the two the Serbians
had not the slightest chance.

By November 8, 1915, Gallwitz was starting out from Krushevatz, after
which he followed the banks of a small branch of the Western Morava in
a southwesterly direction, toward Brus, with one part of his force,
another being sent due south across a range of high hills toward
Kurshumlia. He soon reached Ribari and Ribarska Bania, where the
retreating Serbians gave him what he himself described in his official
report as "very stiff fighting." Next he stormed the pass through the
mountains and thus gained an entrance to the valley of the Toplitza,
through which flows a river westward into the Morava, the main stream
by that name, though in this district it is known as the Southern
Morava.

A week's hard fighting and marching followed before Kurshumlia could
be taken, which the Serbians evacuated without resistance, though not
before they had stripped it of everything that might be of value to
the enemy. Here was located a Serbian hospital, full of wounded
soldiers, all of whom fell into the hands of the Germans.

Moving on from this town, which lay about halfway between Krushevatz
and Pristina, the Germans next pushed on to Prepolatz defile in the
eastern part of the Kopaonik Mountains, which they reached on November
20, 1915, then scaled the intervening ridges on their way southward.
The Serbians struggled on, but the same day on which Kövess came
within striking distance of Mitrovitza, Gallwitz was threatening
Pristina from the north end of the Lab Valley.

Thus the Serbians were finally driven out of the last corner of their
native land, on November 20, 1915. Only a week previously Mackensen
had communicated with the Serbian leaders, offering them terms that
certainly should have seemed alluring to them in their dire extremity.
This offer had been to the effect that if they would make peace they
should lose nothing but Macedonia and a strip of territory along the
Bulgarian frontier, including Pirot and Vranya.

The answer of the Serbian Premier, M. Pachitch, to this offer of
separate terms was:

"Our way is marked out. We will be true to the Entente and die
honorably."

After the evacuation of Nish the Serbians, under Marshal Stepanovitch,
retreated to the west bank of the Morava, blowing up the bridges as
soon as they were across. Here they held up the Bulgarians for some
time, the river acting as a screen. It will have been noted that the
Serbian forces always offered the most stubborn resistance to the
Bulgarians, often coming to close quarters with them, whereas the
Austro-Germans drove them on miles ahead of them. The reason was that
the Bulgarians were not so well provided with heavy artillery, such as
they had being more or less matched by the Serbian field pieces. The
Germans, however, could stand off several miles and shell a Serbian
position without the Serbians being able to reply with one effective
shot.

In this battle along the Morava, King Peter appeared, hobbling up and
down the lines under fire, talking to the men here and there and
uttering words of encouragement. This had the effect of reviving some
of the old enthusiasm which was somewhat dampened after such a
continuous series of reverses and retreats.

CHAPTER XXXV

BULGARIAN ADVANCE--SERBIAN RESISTANCE

On November 7, 1915, the Bulgarians captured Alexinatz in the north.
The Serbian army of the Timok, retiring from Zaitchar, barely
succeeded in crossing the bridge over the river in time to avoid
complete disaster. In the south, and on that same day, the Serbians
were compelled to abandon Leskovatz. With the capture of these two
towns, and several other minor points along the line, the enemy
secured complete possession of the main line of railroad from Belgrade
through Nish to Sofia and Constantinople, and of the Nish-Saloniki
railroad as far south as the French intrenchments at Krivolak. This
was to them a very material triumph, for hitherto they had been
transporting munitions to the Turks by the water route, along the
Danube to Rustchuk in northern Bulgaria. This route was not only more
direct, but much quicker. Their main object had now been accomplished
in full. Thus Germany was now in direct railroad communication with
Asia, and again the German and Austrian papers made frequent
references to a possible Egyptian campaign in the future. Another
great advantage resulting to both Bulgaria and the two Teutonic
empires from the capture of the railroad was the fact that Bulgaria,
whose cereal crops had been accumulating in big stores because they
could not be exported, could now send them into Germany and Austria,
where they were badly needed, thus defeating in some measure the
object of the British blockade.

From Alexinatz the hard-pressed army of the Timok had only a single
line of retreat, which was by the road to Prokuplie and Kurshumlia,
and, in danger of being cut off by the Germans in the west, it began a
hurried march, though fighting rear-guard actions all the while, and
was thus able to make a junction with the Serbians retiring from
Krushevatz. Prokuplie did not fall into the hands of the Bulgarians
until November 16, 1915. Northwest of Leskovatz, where the pressure
was not quite so extreme, the Serbians under Stepanovitch made a
determined stand on November 11-12, 1915. Charging the Bulgarian
center suddenly, they broke through their lines and threw them back in
great confusion and took some guns and a number of prisoners. But as
usual, the Serbians were not strong enough to follow up their
advantage, and presently strong reserves came up to reenforce the
Bulgarian forces. Two days later the fight was renewed and the
Serbians were compelled to retire down the road toward Tulare and
Pristina.

Meanwhile the Bulgarians in Uskub were sending forces north toward
Pristina, and this sector of the campaign was to witness the battle of
Katshanik Pass, in which the Serbians were yet to put up a fight as
heroic as any of the whole campaign.

It has now become quite obvious to the Serbians that they were not to
receive from the Allies the assistance that was necessary to save
their main armies. At this time there were reports of a Russian
invasion of Bulgaria to be led by General Kuropatkin, and it was even
said that the czar had himself sent a telegram to the Serbian Premier,
M. Pachitch, promising him such aid if only he could hold out until
the end of November, 1915. How much of these rumors reached the
Serbians is not known, but at any rate they did not materially affect
their plan of action. There was only one plan now possible, and that
was to effect an orderly retreat to some territory where their enemies
could not follow, and thus keep the army intact. The way behind them,
into the mountains of Montenegro or Albania, lay open. But without
railroads, without even one good wagon road, it was impossible for an
army to pass this way in a body. It would have to break into small
bands, each taking a separate trail by itself. Aside from that there
was no food supply; the soldiers would starve to death. It was true
that the ships of the Allies controlled the Adriatic, but without
roads no adequate food supply could be forwarded to the retreating
armies. Nor did those barren regions offer any local supply; the
poverty-stricken natives could barely maintain themselves. The only
alternative to a retreat through this wilderness was to escape south
over the Greek frontier, where they could join the French and British
forces outside Saloniki.

But this was just the alternative which the Austro-Germans and the
Bulgarians were determined to deny them. The Serbian forces still
numbered somewhere around 200,000; this body, combined with the allied
troops, who would presently be numbering another 100,000, would form a
military force, its rear protected by the British and French ships,
which the Teutons and Bulgarians would never dare to attack, even
though the Greeks still continued neutral. Moreover, there was no
doubt that the Greeks would interfere should the Bulgars cross their
frontier.

This force, then, would continue a constant threat to the lines of
communication and transportation which had just been opened up between
the Central Powers and Turkey, and along which they would soon be
sending large quantities of war munitions to the Turkish forces at
Gallipoli. At any moment the enemy at Saloniki might strike, and to
guard against such a possibility, the Austro-Germans would have to
maintain larger forces along the railroad than they could spare. At
all costs the Serbians must be prevented from joining the Allies. And
this was the object of the powerful effort made by the Bulgarians to
hurl their forces through the gap between Sarrail and the Serbians in
the Babuna Pass.

However, the Serbians decided on a determined effort to break through
the net that was being drawn around them. This meant, first of all,
that the Katshanik Pass, which in the second week of November, 1915,
was still in the hands of the Serbians but was being attacked from the
south by the Bulgarians, had to be first cleared of the enemy, who
must then be driven out of Uskub, whence the Serbians would then be
able to force their way west to Tetovo, and then south by the main
highway through Gostivar and Kitchevo, to Monastir. Once at Monastir
the road would be comparatively easy to Saloniki, by way of the short
branch of railroad whose terminus was at Monastir.

In the effort to carry out this plan one of the most desperate battles
of the whole Serbian campaign was fought, quite as bloody and as
heroic as any of the large engagements that were fought in the
beginning of the invasion. It failed, but it was a failure of which no
army need to have been ashamed.

On about November 10, 1915, Bojovitch's army with which he had been
holding the pass against overwhelming numbers of Bulgarians, had
dwindled to 5,000. At about that time he was reenforced by three
regiments, including one from the famous Shumadia Division and one
from the Morava Division, which were sent to him along the railroad,
the only bit of railroad remaining to the Serbians, leading from
Pristina to Ferizovitch, the latter point being some ten miles distant
from the Katshanik Pass. The weather had begun getting cold and raw by
this time, and the roads were in a miserable condition. The Serbians,
though exhausted by their many hardships, and weak from the want of
proper food, set out from the terminus of the railroad and pressed on
toward the pass. As soon as they arrived Bojovitch prepared to deliver
his final attack on the Bulgarians.

The Serbian general had now about one hundred field pieces, mostly of
the French 75 and 155 type; 3 inches and 6 inches. With these he began
a vigorous bombardment of the Bulgarian trenches, raining a continuous
shower of shrapnel and high explosive shells on them. Under this
terrible fire the Bulgarians were compelled to retire from their
defensive works and retreat south for four miles, out of range of the
Serbian artillery.

Then the Serbian infantry charged, pouring volley after volley into
the ranks of the retreating Bulgarians. The latter began fleeing in
disorder, but presently they came up against their reserves, whereupon
they rallied. On came the Serbians with cries of "Na nosh! Na nosh!"
and "Cus schtick! Cus schtick!" ("With the knife!" and "With the
bayonet!")

Those were cries that the Bulgarians knew well, and they too set up
the same shouts. The rifle firing died down. The two lines charged
each other silently, like warriors of old, with points of glittering
steel before them. Then came the merging clash, and the rows of
running men broke into turbulent mêlées, knots of struggling, writhing
bodies. Shouts and hideous curses sounded up and down the lines like
the snarls of savage animals. Wounded men reeled, panting and sobbing,
sometimes in their savage agony springing on their friends and rending
them with their hands and teeth before they finally collapsed into
inert heaps, dead. Others, throwing down their unloaded rifles, picked
up jagged rocks and hurled them into knots of struggling men,
regardless of whether they smashed in the skulls of friends or foes.
There had been greater battles in that campaign, but never had the
fighting been so savage, so bitter; even the battle of Timok, the
first encounter between Bulgar and Serb, was far outdone.

For a while it seemed as if the Serbians would actually batter their
way through. One Serbian regiment charged seven times and each time
captured three guns, only to have them wrested out of its hands again.
Once the Bulgarians' center was pierced by a tremendous effort on the
part of the Shumadians and the Morava troops. The Bulgarians sagged
back, and some broke and fled.

But again reserves came on the scene, whereas the Serbians were, every
last man of them, on the front line of the fighting. Fresh forces of
Bulgarians, being shipped up from Uskub by rail, were constantly
arriving on the field, and in the end they were enough to turn the
balance.

For three days the battle had raged, one continuous series of sharp,
hand-to-hand encounters, by night as well as by day. But finally, on
November 15, 1915, the Serbians had reached the limit of their
strength; the battle was going against them. And then they retired
from the pass by way of the Jatzovitza Hills toward Prisrend.

Thus the plans of the Serbians to cut their path south to their Allies
on the Greek frontier were defeated, and they were forced back into
the north again. The effect of the collapse of this effort was
immediately seen in the withdrawal from Mitrovitza of the Serbian
staff, such members of the Serbian Government as had remained there
and the diplomatic representatives of the Entente nations.

The Bulgarians had been perfectly well aware of the plans that lay
behind the tremendous effort made by the Serbians at Katshanik Pass
and they had sought to forestall part of it by attacking Kalkandelen,
a point which had been taken and retaken more than once. On November
15, 1915, they took it again, and finally, driving the small Serbian
force that had occupied it before them, they took Gostivar on the
following day, the Serbians retiring to Kichivo, on the road to
Monastir. On about the same day, or a little later, Boyadjieff, after
a stiff fight, stormed the heights near Gilan, northwest of Kutshanik
Pass, and, after occupying Gilan itself, advanced toward Pristina,
reaching its vicinity by November 22, 1915.

The invaders had succeeded in their main object, which was to round up
and if possible corner the main Serbian forces; they were now rolled
back on to the great Kossovo Plain, where they were united, but
considerably confused and hampered by the vast crowds of fugitives
fleeing from all parts of the north, center and east of the country.
Near Mitrovitza, on the north of the plain, near Pristina on the east
of it, and at Katshanik at its southern extremity, the Austro-Germans
and the Bulgarians had, by the beginning of the fourth week of
November, 1915, absolutely rounded up and hemmed in all the larger
forces of the Serbians. Here they must either surrender, engage in one
last desperate battle that meant certain destruction, or retire
backward into the mountains of Montenegro and Albania, which by this
time were covered with deep snow.

It was finally decided to give the enemy one more battle and if that
failed, as seemed inevitable, to retreat into the wilderness, thus
defeating the main hope of Mackensen, which was to eliminate the
Serbians entirely as a factor in the war, either by capturing the
whole army or destroying it. King Peter himself was present, hoping by
his presence to revive the spirits of his soldiers to such a pitch
that they would make a hard fight, for by this time they had
undoubtedly lost a good deal of their morale.

Von Gallwitz had passed through Nish and was now driving back the
Serbian advance posts in the Toplitza Valley, while the Austrians, on
his right, were pressing on toward Novi Bazar. As will be seen by a
glance at the map, the Serbians were therefore bearing the
concentrated attack of four armies; that which operated from
Vishegrad, the mixed forces under Kövess, Gallwitz's army and the main
Bulgarian forces. The pressure was incessant. Reenforcements had been
hurried through from Germany to make good the heavy losses which had
been sustained during the campaign. Communication between the main
Serbian armies and the Serbians in the south had now been cut
completely and only Prisrend and Monastir remained to be taken before
the whole of Serbia and Serbian Macedonia would be cleared of the
Serbian fighting forces.

The fight in the region of Pristina was to be the last grand battle of
the retreat. Here what remained of the Serbian main forces took battle
formation, finally to dispute the enemy's advance. To this end the
remaining stock of gun ammunition and rifle cartridges had been
carefully saved and a store of war material gathered at Mitrovitza in
readiness for such a stand. The weary bullocks were turned loose from
the gun carriages they hauled, for there could be no taking them along
up among the crags of the mountain country. The guns themselves were
brought into position on the surrounding hills, trenches were dug
wherever possible. Machine guns were located to cover the mountain
paths and valley roads, and strong redoubts, which had been thrown up
with civilian labor before the army had arrived, were manned. And then
there remained a brief period during which the weary soldiers could
take some much needed rest.

There was something tragically significant that this last stand should
be made on the plains of Kossovo, or the "Field of the Ravens," as it
is sometimes called by the natives, on account of the great flocks of
those birds that frequent it. For on this same field it was that
Lazar, the last of the ancient Serbian czars, whose empire included
the whole of Macedonia, Albania, Thessaly, northern Greece, and
Bulgaria, had fought just such a last desperate battle against the
Turks in 1389, and had gone down before the Moslem hordes, and with
him the Serbian nation. Each year the Serbians had commemorated the
anniversary of this event by mourning.

Kossovo Plain is a high plateau, forty miles long and ten wide; from
its rolling fields the forbidding crags of Montenegro and Albania are
plainly visible, black in summer and white with snow in winter.

The gray dawn of a November day brought the first mutterings of the
storm that was presently to break in fury up and down the whole front.
The ragged, mud-stained cavalry of Serbia came trotting wearily
through the infantry lines, bearing signs of the many skirmishes they
had taken part in. The outlying posts were exchanging rifle fire with
the advance guards of the enemy and now, through his powerful field
glasses, the Serbian commander could see great masses of the invading
troops deploying against his front.

"You have come to see the death of a nation," he remarked to an
American correspondent who was present.

"It is sad that a stranger's eyes should see us die," said another
officer in high command.

Soon the crackling and sputtering fire of the Mannlicher rifles was
rippling up and down the lines; the whole front from Pristina to
south of Marcovitza blazed flame, and the last big battle of Serbia's
resistance was on. Two lines of men, the one thick and heavily
equipped, the other attenuated and half-starved, were locked together
in a desperate hand-to-hand struggle.

As though to afford a proper setting for the scene, nature herself
broke into a wild fury; overhead the sky darkened, then the black
clouds burst into a howling storm, full of cold sleet and rain. Amidst
the black, stark hills, in a ceaseless downpour, men trampled and
slipped through the clay mud, dripping wet from head to foot,
stabbing, shooting, hurling hand bombs, until this peaceful valley
echoed to the shouts and roar of combating armies.

And as the first day's fighting increased in intensity, the fury of
the elements overhead intensified, and presently it was impossible to
distinguish the roar of the big cannon from the deep crash of thunder;
intermingling with the shouts and cries of men roared the blast of the
gale as it whipped over rocky eminences.

Here again was raised that dreaded battle cry: "Na nosh! Na nosh!"
With such a shout a whole regiment of the fierce Shumadians leaped out
of its trenches and tore across the intervening ground between its
trenches and the rocks of a near-by eminence which a force of Magyars
had made into a position. Haggard from pain and starvation, their hair
long and matted, some still in ragged uniforms, but most of them in
the sheepskin coats of peasants, their eyes bloodshot with rage, they
formed not a pleasant picture to the intrenched Huns. The rifle fire
from the eminence leaped to a climax; the Hungarians knew they were
fighting for their lives. In the horde rushing up the steep slope lay
an appalling danger. Up they surged, without firing a shot, the
bayonets gleaming in the lightning flashes. Among the rocks appeared
white faces behind black rifle barrels. And then, with one fierce
yell, the men in the shaggy sheepskin coats were hurling themselves in
among the men in blue-gray uniforms. For a few brief moments there was
a wild mêlée; then the men in blue-gray broke and ran.

Such scenes were common throughout the three or four days of the
battle.

What made the resistance of the Serbian soldiers so fierce was the
knowledge possessed by each that there was no alternative to victory
but a retreat into those white, bleak wilds behind him. And there was
not a Serbian boy in those ranks who did not realize what a winter's
march through that country would mean.

From the fall of Nish, in fact, the Serbians had been fighting with
their backs to a wall, and grim and bloody were the struggles between
Serb and German in the wild tangle of hills that surrounded the Plain
of Kossovo. Quarter was neither given nor asked, and unlucky was the
too venturesome Austrian regiment that penetrated the Serbian lines
the first few days without sufficient support.

"The 184th Regiment," said one of the soldiers' letters, which were
published in the Austrian papers, "went into a valley and was never
seen again." One Serbian regiment, stationed to hold the mouth to a
small valley, to cover the retirement of another Serbian regiment,
remained at its post for four days, fighting off the greater part of
an Austro-German division, until, of the 1,200 men of the original
detachment, only sixty-three remained on their feet, and most of those
wounded.

To his credit be it said that the aged King of Serbia remained with
his battling men to the end. While the guns were thundering against
Pristina and the thin line of the last resistance was frenziedly
holding back the German and Bulgarian lines, there came to an ancient
church, which was under fire, a mud-stained old man in a field service
uniform. The few foreign correspondents who saw him pass into the
church did not recognize in this old man, bent, haggard and unshaven,
the king who had sat on the throne of Kara-Georgevitch--the grandson
of that famous swineherd.

Before the high altar the old man knelt in prayer while a group of
staff officers stood at a distance, watching him in silence. The crash
of bursting shrapnel came to them from outside and once a window was
shattered and the little church was filled with splinters of flying
glass and still the King of Serbia knelt at his devotions, praying
that at the last moment his kingdom might be saved from destruction.

But in spite of his appeals the end came.

CHAPTER XXXVI

END OF GERMAN OPERATIONS--FLIGHT OF SERB PEOPLE--GREECE

With the fall of Pristina and Mitrovitza on November 23, 1915, ended
the operations against Serbia, so far as Mackensen and his Germans
were concerned. On November 28, 1915, German Headquarters issued an
extraordinary report in which it announced that with the flight of the
scanty remains of the Serbian army into the Albanian Mountains "our
great operations in the Balkans are brought to a close. Our object, to
effect communications with Bulgaria and the Turkish Empire, has been
accomplished." After briefly describing these operations and admitting
the "tough resistance" of the Serbians, who had "fought bravely," this
communiqué asserted that more than 100,000 of them, almost half their
original force, had been taken prisoners, while their losses from
killed and desertions could not be estimated. The impression left by
this document was that there were very few of the Serbian soldiers
left. On the other hand, the Allies claimed that on the date mentioned
Serbia still had 200,000 fighting men left.

At any rate, it was true that Germany had now opened railroad
communications with the Orient. Her engineers and military railroad
staff had repaired the damage the retreating Serbians had done to the
main trunk line, and early in December through trains were running
from Berlin to Constantinople. Having accomplished this, Germany
withdrew most of her troops from the Balkans, leaving the Bulgarians
to finish Macedonia, and Austria to deal with Montenegro.

It was a nation, rather than an army, that was in flight; not for many
hundreds of years has there been such an instance in history. When
Nish had fallen into the hands of the enemy, the population in general
had realized that the whole land was going to be overrun by the
invaders. Then almost the whole people had set out in flight for
Monastir, near the Greek frontier, where the Bulgarians had not yet
closed in. On its retreat from Kossovo Plain the Serbian army caught
up with the rear of this fleeing throng. Winter had set in unusually
early that year. Even at Saloniki on the shores of the tepid Ægean and
sheltered behind a ring of hills, where snow had not fallen in
November in ten years, a fierce northerly gale, known as the "Vardar
wind," had sprung up on November 26, 1915, and kept the air swirling
with snow-flakes, while up in the near-by hills the snow was already
two feet deep. Up in the Albanian Mountains the paths and trails were
already choked, while chilling blasts of sleet-laden winds howled
through the defiles.

The way from Upper Serbia to Monastir led across great, bleak slopes,
which were now being lashed by these terrible winter storms. Old women
and children fell by the wayside; young mothers, hugging their babies
to their breasts, sought shelter behind rocks and died there of
weakness and starvation. All along the road of retreat was marked by
the abandoned dead and dying. One of the very few descriptions of this
phase of the Serbian flight that has appeared was written by Mr.
William G. Shepherd, special correspondent of the American United
Press:

"The entire world must prepare to shudder," he writes from Monastir,
"when all that is happening on the Albanian refugee trails finally
comes to light. The horrors of the flight of the hapless Serbian
people are growing with the arrival here of each new contingent from
the devastated district.

"They say that nearly the whole route from Prisrend to Monastir,
ninety miles, is lined with human corpses and the carcasses of horses
and mules dead of starvation, while thousands of old men, women, and
children are lying on the rocks and in the thickets beside the trail,
hungry and exhausted, awaiting the end.

"At night the women and children, ill-clad and numbed with cold,
struggle pitifully around meager fires of mountain shrub, to resume in
the morning the weary march toward their supposed goal of
safety--Monastir. But by the time this dispatch is printed Monastir,
too, may be in the hands of the enemy. This will leave them to the
mercy of the inhospitable mountain fastnesses, where for the past two
days a terrific blizzard has been raging, or to the Bulgarians."

The chief of the Serbian General Staff, Field Marshal Putnik, old and
now very ill, was driven along the road in a carriage until his horses
fell dead of exhaustion. His escort of soldiers carried him for two
days in an ordinary chair to which poles had been tied for handles and
so brought him to safety. One account reported that the carriages of
the retreating Serbians literally passed over the dead who had fallen
in the road, for it was impossible either to spare the time to drag
them out of the way or to make a detour to avoid them.

King Peter himself had escaped from Prisrend by motor car, accompanied
by three officers and four men, arriving in Liuma over the Albanian
frontier. Thence the monarch and his remaining handful of followers
set out through the mountains, the king traveling part of the way on
horseback and partly in a litter slung between two mules, through mud
and a constant downpour of rain. During the evening of the second day
they lost the trail, which was only rediscovered after much wandering.

After two weeks' rest at Scutari, King Peter continued his journey to
San Giovanni di Medua, Durazzo, and Avlona, whence the party crossed
over the Adriatic to Brindisi in Italy, where the king remained
incognito for six days. After a two days' sea voyage from Brindisi the
old monarch finally arrived in Saloniki, where he was received with
all honors by the Greek authorities and the Allies.

It is estimated that the number of civilians in flight over these
terrible roads numbered fully 700,000. And of these fully 200,000
died.

"It seems so useless," writes a German officer, in a letter which was
published in a German paper, "for there is nowhere else for us to
reach except the sea and there is nothing but the smell of dead bodies
of horses, men, cattle--a discord of destruction that seems contrary
to all our civilization. Our own men are apathetic and weary, and have
no heart in the business. The Bulgarian soldiers are not very popular
with us. In the first place they are more like Russians than Germans,
and there is something about the Slav that makes one's hair bristle.
Their cruelty is terrible."

Meanwhile, Prisrend, on the extreme right of the Serbian main force,
did not fall till November 30, 1915. From Mitrovitza a part of the
Serbian army had retired and fought the Austrians again at Vutchitra,
but was beaten and driven across the Sitnitza, on the western bank of
which stream it continued fighting until finally it fled into the
mountains.

The main line of retreat was along the highway from Pristina to
Prisrend. The Bulgarians, pressing on after, took the heights west of
Ferizovitch and also advanced northward toward Ipek, against which
point Kövess had sent a detachment. The retreat to Prisrend was
covered by the Shumadians. On November 27, 1915, 80,000 Serbians stood
at bay in front of this town, but next day, after a few hours'
fighting, and having used up all their ammunition, they unbreeched
their guns and fled across the frontier into Albania, making along the
White Drin for Kula Liuma, while several thousands of them fell
prisoners into the hands of the enemy. Thus was the last shot of the
Serbian resistance in the northern section of the country fired.

[Illustration: Retreat of Serbians.]

The retreat of the Serbian armies through the mountains of Albania was
almost as heartrending as the flight of the civilian population. Day
by day, thousands of men, ill-clad and ill-shod, or with bare and
bleeding feet, so famished that they fed on the flesh of dead horses
by the wayside, stumbled painfully and wretchedly along, over trails
deep in snow, some going west toward Scutari, others attempting to
reach Greece through Elbassan and Dibra. All semblance of military
formation or order was lost; they were now nothing more than a fleeing
mob of disorganized peasants, some unarmed, others with guns but no
ammunition. Officers and men trudged on side by side, on equal
terms. Once an Austrian light mountain battery, following on the
heels of the retreat, had arrived at the mouth of a long defile
through which the last of the retreating Serbians were winding their
way into the mountains, in single file. The Austrian battery
immediately opened fire and swept the defile from end to end of all
human life.

While the main Serbian armies were being driven out of their native
land, the Bulgarians, after taking Babuna Pass and Kitchevo and
Kruchevo, on November 20, 1915, halted on their way to Monastir, now
only a few miles distant. Monastir itself is practically an
unfortified city; it lies on the edge of a broad level plain, offering
not the least advantage to a defending force. A few guns might easily
sweep the city into a heap of ruins. But above Monastir towers a lofty
mountain, so steep that even under peaceful conditions a strong man
finds it hard to climb. A few guns placed in position among the rocks
on top of this mountain could command the city and all of the
surrounding plain within range of their fire. Therefore, the problem
of an invading force is to take the mountain outside the city, rather
than the city itself.

Beyond this lofty eminence, to the westward, rise thickly wooded
ridges, rugged mountain fastnesses, through which, along the bottom of
a winding defile, runs the road to Resen and Ochrida and three large
lakes: Ochrida, Prespa, and Little Prespa. Below these lakes, which
almost join, is the Greek frontier; above them, and some distance
beyond, lies the Albanian frontier.

For some days Vassitch and his remaining force of a few thousand
footsore soldiers remained at Prilep, awaiting the Bulgarians. When
finally they took Brod, with the object of cutting off his retreat, he
quitted Prilep and fell back on Monastir, then retired over the
mountains to Resen. Here he was joined by two barefooted regiments
that had come down from the north with the refugees, but they were too
exhausted to be of much value for fighting. Altogether they numbered
about 7,000, while the pursuing Bulgarians were at least 30,000
strong. At Resen, where the roughness of the country enabled them to
make some resistance, they fought the last battle, or skirmish rather,
that was to take place between the Serbians and the invaders, then
retired down along the eastern shore of Lake Prespa and so over into
Greece. And now not one Serbian soldier remained either in Serbia
proper or Serbian Macedonia. Many of them were yet to do some more
fighting, against the Austrians at least, for Austria had yet to
invade and conquer that other little Serbian state, Montenegro. As yet
the Austrian right wing of Kövess's army had not entered Montenegro,
but maintained itself at Vishegrad, from which, using it as a pivot,
the center and left wing had swept over Serbia. From Vishegrad across
the northern boundary of Montenegro stretched another force of
Austrians, meant only to hold the Montenegrins back. Hitherto, the
Montenegrin army had been facing this line, without being able to
afford the Serbians much assistance. It was not until after the last
of the Serbians had been dealt with that the Austrians turned their
attention toward the Montenegrins and the conquest of their rugged
country. Nor did they seriously undertake this task until toward the
end of the year; the whole of this campaign is an episode by itself
and will be dealt with presently.

With the disappearance of the last of the Serbian armies into the
defiles of the Albanian Mountains, the French and British forces,
which had been vainly endeavoring to save Serbia, had no longer any
special object in holding their advanced positions in Macedonia,
especially as they were not strong enough to undertake an offensive
movement, even after the last Serbian defeat, though during November,
1915, large reenforcements had been arriving and disembarking in
Saloniki. As already stated, the rumors of military action on the part
of Russia against Bulgaria had proved unfounded and a second
bombardment of Varna had had no effect on the course of the campaign.
Italy had done nothing in the Balkans as yet, except to fire a few
shells into Dedeagatch on November 11, 1915. A month later she landed
an army on the Albanian coast, at Avlona and elsewhere, but, while
this facilitated the escape of many of the Serbian refugees, it was
too late to have any effect on the military situation.

Throughout the latter part of November, 1915, after the battle between
General Sarrail's army at Mt. Archangel, the British had sent up
considerable forces which were deployed on the French right and were
holding the mountain chain to the north of Lake Doiran, forming a
natural boundary between Greek and Bulgarian territory.

Though Sarrail had repulsed all the Bulgarian attacks, his position
was rendered embarrassing by the fact that the Greek Government had
decided to concentrate a large part of its army in that particular
corner of its frontiers. Obviously, the Greeks had a right to make
whatever movements they wished on their own territory, but the
consequences were singularly unfortunate, both for the French and the
British, for the Greek commander in chief found it necessary to move
troops and stores along the same line of railroad which the British
and the French were using. This meant a curtailment of supplies and
the checking of effective and continuous supports for the fighting
line.

Added to this was the sudden coming of an early winter. While snow was
falling even in Saloniki, up in the hills where the advanced lines
were deployed a furious blizzard was blowing, against which the
soldiers were only prepared with small tents of waterproof sheets for
shelters. Down in the base camps the gale swept down the tents so that
the men were practically unprotected from the fury of the freezing
blasts. At the front the enemy's positions were no longer visible, the
intervening valleys being full of swirling clouds of snow. On November
27, 1915, the French War Office issued an official communiqué, which
gave the first indication of what was about to happen:

"In view of the present situation of the Serbian armies our troops,
which have been occupying the left bank of the Tcherna, have been
removed to the right bank of the river, the movement being effected
without difficulty."

CHAPTER XXXVII

ALLIES WITHDRAW INTO GREECE--ATTITUDE OF GREEK GOVERNMENT

A general withdrawal into Greece, with Saloniki as base, had been
decided on by General Sarrail, in accordance with instructions from
Paris and London.

This now brought up a very peculiar and delicate situation between the
Allies and Greece. As a neutral, Greece was strongly disposed to take
up the same attitude toward the belligerents as Holland, who during
the early part of the war had been interning great numbers of the
English and Belgian soldiers who had sought refuge inside her
boundaries when the Germans had taken Belgium. The Allies, on the
other hand, were not inclined to accept this point of view, as Greece
was bound to Serbia by a defensive treaty and therefore could not
assume full neutrality without repudiating this treaty. To this Greece
opposed the contention, based on a technicality, that the treaty with
Serbia had in view only a defensive alliance against Bulgaria, whereas
now the Austrians and Germans were attacking, as well as the
Bulgarians. The successes of the Austro-German forces had stiffened
the determination of the Greek King and his Government to stand by
this policy.

However, there was ample room for a diversity of opinion among the
Greeks themselves; on which side Greece's political interests lay was
largely a matter of individual opinion. The chief, and probably the
only, reason why there was any popular feeling in favor of the Allies
was because they were opposed to the Bulgarians, whom the Greeks hate
in season and out.

But on the other hand, Greek ambitions and Italian ambitions clash in
Albania, in the islands of the Archipelago and in Asia Minor. Both
nations hope to acquire territory in those countries. And Italy was
one of the Allies. Had Italy not entered the war it is very probable
that Greece would have aligned herself with the Serbians, French, and
British in the early stages of their operations. But when Italy
declared war on the side of the Allies, there was no doubt in the
minds of the Greek politicians that she had been promised much, if not
all, of the territories on which they had their own eyes. Added to
this, the King of Greece was related to the German Emperor through
marriage, his queen being a sister of Emperor William.

All through November, 1915, and during the early part of December,
1915, the ambiguous, doubtful attitude of Greece was causing the
French and the British much anxiety. It was a curious and, for the
Allies, a very dangerous situation. Faced as they were by an enemy
much their superior in numbers, there was danger of finding that
disadvantage considerably intensified by the inclusion of Greece among
their enemies.

The unrestricted command of the base at Saloniki was now indispensable
for the safety of the allied forces. They had landed under the terms
of a "benevolent neutrality," even at the request of the Greek
Government, while Venizelos was at its head. With the change in
premiers had come a complete change in attitude. The Greeks had begun
hampering the Allies at every turn. Prices were raised; they were
called upon to pay in advance, and in gold, for the use of the
railroads in transporting the troops. Further, the Greek troops were
actually occupying the defensive positions around Saloniki; positions
which the Allies should occupy and strengthen, if they were to make
their base secure. The Greeks stretched barbed-wire entanglements
between themselves and the allied troops. Submarine mines, stored as
if ready to be launched, were discovered at the mouth of the Vardar
River, and the fort at the entrance to the upper Gulf of Saloniki had
been secretly strengthened and heavy guns mounted. The port swarmed
with German and Austrian and Bulgarian spies; its atmosphere was heavy
with hostility to the Allies. Prince Andrew of Greece, in an interview
with a neutral journalist, said that as long as 80,000 French soldiers
were hostages to the Greek army for the Allies' good behavior, the
Allies would never dare to bombard Athens or any other Greek port. So
critical did the situation become that one Sunday the British ships
cleared for action.

And now, after the failure of the French troops to join up with the
Serbians in Babuna Pass, arose the probability of withdrawing their
forces in Serbian and Bulgarian territory across the frontier to
Saloniki. Thus arose the question: How would Greece comport herself on
their retirement? Would she give them complete freedom of
communication south of the frontier to Saloniki? Or would she seek to
disarm and intern them and such Serbians as crossed the border?

A brief review of the political events that had been happening in
Athens since the situation of the Serbians had become acute will show
how divided Greece herself was on these questions.

When France and Great Britain decided to assist Serbia by sending
forces to her support, Venizelos was premier of Greece and it was with
his consent that the first contingents began disembarking in Saloniki
on October 5, 1915. His policy of thus aiding the operations was
thoroughly discussed in the Greek Chamber of Deputies and approved by
a majority of 45 in a house of 257.

The following day King Constantine summoned the premier and told him
that he could not support his policy and demanded his resignation,
which was given. In his place the king installed M. Zaimis. In a
meeting of the Chamber a day or two later, on October 11, 1915, the
new premier defined the policy of his Government as one of armed
neutrality, adding that "our attitude in the future will be adapted to
events, the course of which will be followed with the closest of
attention." Whereupon Venizelos arose, protesting, and made a speech
that clearly defined the attitude that he thought Greece should
follow, and which he felt was supported by a majority of the people.

"Even if there did not exist the treaty with Serbia," he said, "our
interests oblige us to depart from neutrality, as another state wishes
to aggrandize itself at our expense. The question is not whether we
ought to make war or not, but when we ought to make war. In any case
we ought not to allow Bulgaria to crush Serbia. The national soul will
say that it is to the interest of Greece that Bulgaria should be
crushed. If Bulgaria should conquer, Hellenism will be completely
vanquished."

That Venizelos spoke for the majority of the deputies was soon to
manifest itself. On November 4, 1915, in the course of a debate in the
Chamber, a Venizeloist deputy, M. Vlachos, made some criticism of the
minister of war, which caused the latter to leave the Chamber in
violent anger. The scene provoked a tumult, in which cheers and
protests mingled. The deputy finally apologized and order was
reestablished, the minister of war returning to his seat. It was then
that Venizelos arose and expressed the opinion that an apology was
also due from the war minister because of his disrespectful behavior
in leaving the House. The premier, M. Zaimis, thereupon declared that,
in the opinion of the Government, the war minister's conduct had been
perfectly correct and he demanded a vote of confidence from the
assembled deputies.

M. Venizelos replied by delivering a strong attack on the Government's
war policy, which, he said, was not supported by a majority, deploring
that Bulgaria was being allowed to crush Serbia, that she might fall
on Greece later.

As a result of the vote that followed this discussion, the Chamber
refused to express confidence in the present Government by a vote of
147 against 114, in consequence of which the premier, Zaimis, was
compelled to resign. The king, however, still persisted in his
opposition to the policy of the Venizelos party and immediately called
upon M. Skouloudis, one of his own partisans, to form a new cabinet.
To avoid any more expressions of disagreement with the king's policy
on the part of the Chamber, the new premier, only a week later,
ordered the dissolution of that body, his pretext being that the
country at large should have an opportunity of expressing itself
through a general election. This was a move which Venizelos had always
opposed; for, he pointed out, so long as the Greek army was mobilized
and Greek soldiers were excluded from casting their votes, the true
opinion of the people could never be determined. And even if the
soldiers were allowed to vote, they would be under the influence of
their officers, who always supported the king's policy.

This high-handed procedure on the part of the Government created a bad
impression in France and Great Britain. What added to that was the
dispatch which announced, only a few days before, the arrival in
Saloniki in a special train from Sofia of four German officers: Baron
Falkenhausen, Colonel von Erbstner, General von der Goltz's A. D. C.,
Prince von Bülow's son, and another. After a short stay in Saloniki
they departed for Athens in a Greek torpedo boat, accompanied by Greek
officers of high rank. It was just after the arrival of such a mission
in Sofia that Bulgaria had made her agreement with Germany, promising
her support in driving out the Serbians. And meanwhile Premier
Skouloudis, doing as Radislavov, the Premier of Bulgaria, had done,
was protesting daily that Greece had no intention of going against the
Allies.

But incidentally he also expressed the opinion publicly that Greece's
"benevolent neutrality" did not extend to protecting the allied
troops, whether French, British, or Serbian, from the operation of
international law, and that, therefore, these troops would be disarmed
and interned on their passing over into Greek territory.

His words created some alarm in the allied countries, which was
deepened when it became known that Greece was concentrating 200,000
men in and around Saloniki. The question now arose, Should the Allies
submit quietly while Greece carried out this publicly declared
intention, or should they persuade her to a change of opinion by the
application of armed force?

Ordinary arguments had proved unavailing and much time was lost in
talk. Opinion and feeling began growing heated in France and Great
Britain over the delay, as well as over the question itself. France in
particular called for immediate and energetic action, urging that it
was necessary to show the iron hand under the velvet glove. The iron
hand was not a mere figure of speech, for the British and French
fleets could not only bombard the coast cities of Greece, but
institute a blockade which would cut off all her supplies.

On November 19, 1915, the British Legation in Athens, communicated a
statement to the press, beginning with the following passage:

"In view of the attitude adopted by the Hellenic Government toward
certain questions closely affecting the security of the allied troops
and their freedom of action (two privileges to which they are entitled
in the circumstances in which they landed on Greek territory), the
allied powers have deemed it necessary to take certain measures, the
effect of which is to suspend the economic and commercial facilities
which Greece has hitherto enjoyed at their hands."

At the same time came a dispatch from Athens announcing that the
French and British ships had begun to institute a severe search on
board all steamers flying the Greek flag in the Ægean and in the
Mediterranean.

Thus a partial embargo was placed on Greek shipping, only severe
enough to make the Greek Government realize what might happen should a
thorough blockade be established. At the same time two visits that
were paid to King Constantine while this crisis was acute had a
favorable influence on it. One was from M. Denys Cochin, a member of
the French Cabinet and a man held in the highest esteem in Greece; the
other was from Lord Kitchener, who was on his way back from an
inspection of the British forces in Gallipoli, whither he had been
dispatched by his colleagues in the British Cabinet to report on the
advisability or the reverse of abandoning that peninsula.

Still the negotiations were spun out and it was not till November 23,
1915, that matters were brought to a head by the presentation of a
combined note to Greece.

This note demanded formal assurances that the allied troops should
under no circumstances be disarmed and interned, but should be granted
full freedom of movement, together with such facilities as had already
been promised. Greece was only required to live up to her previous
promises; she need not abandon her attitude of neutrality. On the
other hand, the note categorically stated that the Allies would make
restitution for all territory occupied and pay suitable indemnities.
Two days later the Greek Government replied in friendly but somewhat
vague terms, which were not considered satisfactory, and on the 26th
the Entente sent a second note asking for a precise assurance
regarding the liberty of movement of the allied troops. The Greek
answer was liked so little that it was decided to tighten somewhat the
grip of the iron hand.

Thus what is known to international law as a "measure of constraint
short of war" was instituted. The pressure was at once felt. At
Saloniki particularly the people were obliged to live from hand to
mouth, the supply boats being able to bring in only enough flour to
last two days. So great was the need of grain in Greece itself that a
cargo of flour which had been condemned at Piræus was baked into
bread. The Bulgarians attempted to relieve the situation by sending
in 15,000 tons of wheat by rail from Sofia, but as the line over which
it passed through Drama was presently occupied by the British, this
source of supply could not be maintained, nor would it have been
sufficient to have relieved the situation.

The Greek public and their Government were strongly impressed. One
dispatch stated that Greek troops were patrolling the streets of
Athens and that a heavy guard had been placed around the royal palace
in fear of revolutionary attempts. Meanwhile the Cabinet Council was