valuable, the appreciation of mental qualities must form a large part
of it, and that the presence of this part makes the whole far more
valuable than it could have been without it. But it seems very doubtful
whether this appreciation, by itself, can possess as much value as the
whole in which it is combined with an appreciation of the appropriate
_corporeal_ expression of the mental qualities in question. It is
certain that in all actual cases of valuable affection, the bodily
expressions of character, whether by looks, by words, or by actions, do
form a part of the object towards which the affection is felt, and that
the fact of their inclusion appears to heighten the value of the whole
state. It is, indeed, very difficult to imagine what the cognition of
mental qualities _alone_, unaccompanied by _any_ corporeal expression,
would be like; and, in so far as we succeed in making this abstraction,
the whole considered certainly appears to have less value. I therefore
conclude that the importance of an admiration of admirable mental
qualities lies chiefly in the immense superiority of a whole, in which
it forms a part, to one in which it is absent, and not in any high
degree of intrinsic value which it possesses by itself. It even appears
to be doubtful, whether, in itself, it possesses so much value as the
appreciation of mere corporeal beauty undoubtedly does possess; that is
to say, whether the appreciation of what has great intrinsic value is
so valuable as the appreciation of what is merely beautiful.

But further if we consider the nature of admirable mental qualities,
by themselves, it appears that a proper appreciation of them involves
a reference to purely material beauty in yet another way. Admirable
mental qualities do, if our previous conclusions are correct, consist
very largely in an emotional contemplation of beautiful objects;
and hence the appreciation of them will consist essentially in the
contemplation of such contemplation. It is true that the most valuable
appreciation of persons appears to be that which consists in the
appreciation of their appreciation of other persons: but even here a
reference to material beauty appears to be involved, _both_ in respect
of the fact that what is appreciated in the last instance may be the
contemplation of what is merely beautiful, _and_ in respect of the fact
that the most valuable appreciation of a person appears to _include_
an appreciation of his corporeal expression. Though, therefore, we
may admit that the appreciation of a person’s attitude towards other
persons, or, to take one instance, the love of love, is far the most
valuable good we know, and far more valuable than the mere love of
beauty, yet we can only admit this if the first be understood to
_include_ the latter, in various degrees of directness.

With regard to the question what _are_ the mental qualities of which
the cognition is essential to the value of human intercourse, it is
plain that they include, in the first place, all those varieties of
aesthetic appreciation, which formed our first class of goods. They
include, therefore, a great variety of different emotions, each of
which is appropriate to some different kind of beauty. But we must now
add to these the whole range of emotions, which are appropriate to
persons, and which are different from those which are appropriate to
mere corporeal beauty. It must also be remembered that just as these
emotions have little value in themselves, and as the state of mind in
which they exist may have its value greatly heightened, or may entirely
lose it and become positively evil in a great degree, according as the
cognitions accompanying the emotions are appropriate or inappropriate;
so too the appreciation of these emotions, though it may have some
value in itself, may yet form part of a whole which has far greater
value or no value at all, according as it is or is not accompanied by
a perception of the appropriateness of the emotions to their objects.
It is obvious, therefore, that the study of what is valuable in human
intercourse is a study of immense complexity; and that there may be
much human intercourse which has little or no value, or is positively
bad. Yet here too, as with the question what is beautiful, there seems
no reason to doubt that a reflective judgment will in the main decide
correctly both as to what are positive goods and even as to any _great_
differences in value between these goods. In particular, it may be
remarked that the emotions, of which the contemplation is essential
to the greatest values, and which are also themselves appropriately
excited by such contemplation, appear to be those which are commonly
most highly prized under the name of affection.

=123.= I have now completed my examination into the nature of those
great positive goods, which do not appear to include among their
constituents anything positively evil or ugly, though they include
much which is in itself indifferent. And I wish to point out certain
conclusions which appear to follow, with regard to the nature of the
Summum Bonum, or that state of things which would be the most perfect
we can conceive. Those idealistic philosophers, whose views agree
most closely with those here advocated, in that they deny pleasure to
be the sole good and regard what is completely good as having some
complexity, have usually represented a purely spiritual state of
existence as the Ideal. Regarding matter as essentially imperfect, if
not positively evil, they have concluded that the total absence of
all material properties is necessary to a state of perfection. Now,
according to what has been said, this view would be correct so far
as it asserts that any great good must be _mental_, and so far as it
asserts that a purely material existence, _by itself_, can have little
or no value. The superiority of the spiritual over the material has,
in a sense, been amply vindicated. But it does not follow, from this
superiority, that a perfect state of things must be one, from which
all material properties are rigidly excluded: on the contrary, if our
conclusions are correct, it would seem to be the case that a state of
things, in which they are included, must be vastly better than any
conceivable state in which they were absent. In order to see that this
is so, the chief thing necessary to be considered is _exactly what it
is_ which we declare to be good when we declare that the appreciation
of beauty in Art and Nature is so. That this appreciation _is_ good,
the philosophers in question do not for the most part deny. But, if we
admit it, then we should remember Butler’s maxim that: Everything is
what it is, and not another thing. I have tried to shew, and I think
it is too evident to be disputed, that such appreciation is an organic
unity, a complex whole; and that, in its most undoubted instances,
part of what is included in this whole is _a cognition of material
qualities_, and particularly of a vast variety of what are called
_secondary_ qualities. If, then, it is _this_ whole, which we know to
be good, and not another thing, then we know that material qualities,
even though they be perfectly worthless in themselves, are yet
essential constituents of what is far from worthless. What we know to
be valuable is the apprehension of just these qualities, and not of any
others; and, if we propose to subtract them from it, then what we have
left is _not_ that which we know to have value, but something else. And
it must be noticed that this conclusion holds, even if my contention,
that a true belief in the existence of these qualities adds to the
value of the whole in which it is included, be disputed. We should
then, indeed, be entitled to assert that the _existence_ of a material
world was wholly immaterial to perfection; but the fact that what we
knew to be good was a cognition of _material qualities_ (though purely
imaginary), would still remain. It must, then, be admitted on pain of
self-contradiction--on pain of holding that things are not what they
are, but something else--that a world, from which material qualities
were wholly banished, would be a world which lacked many, if not all,
of those things, which we know most certainly to be great goods. That
it _might_ nevertheless be a far better world than one which retained
these goods, I have already admitted (§ 111 (1)). But in order to shew
that any such world _would_ be thus better, it would be necessary to
shew that the retention of these things, though good in themselves,
impaired, in a more than equal degree, the value of some whole, to
which they might belong; and the task of shewing this has certainly
never been attempted. Until it be performed, we are entitled to assert
that material qualities are a necessary constituent of the Ideal;
that, though something utterly unknown _might_ be better than any
world containing either them or any other good we know, yet we have no
reason to suppose that anything whatever would be better than a state
of things in which they were included. To deny and exclude matter,
is to deny and exclude the best we know. That a thing may retain its
value, while losing some of its qualities, is utterly untrue. All that
is true is that the changed thing may have more value than, or as much
value as, that of which the qualities have been lost. What I contend is
that nothing, which we _know_ to be good and which contains no material
qualities, has such great value that we can declare it, _by itself_, to
be superior to the whole which would be formed by the addition to it of
an appreciation of material qualities. That a _purely_ spiritual good
may be the _best_ of single things, I am not much concerned to dispute,
although, in what has been said with regard to the nature of personal
affection, I have given reasons for doubting it. But that by adding
to it some appreciation of material qualities, which, though perhaps
inferior by itself, is certainly a great positive good, we should
obtain a greater sum of value, which no corresponding decrease in the
value of the whole, as a whole, could counterbalance--this, I maintain,
we have certainly no reason to doubt.

=124.= In order to complete this discussion of the main principles
involved in the determination of intrinsic values, the chief remaining
topics, necessary to be treated, appear to be two. The first of these
is the nature of great intrinsic _evils_, including what I may call
_mixed_ evils; that is to say, those evil wholes, which nevertheless
contain, as essential elements, something positively good or beautiful.
And the second is the nature of what I may similarly call _mixed_
goods; that is to say, those wholes, which, though intrinsically good
_as wholes_, nevertheless contain, as essential elements, something
positively evil or ugly. It will greatly facilitate this discussion,
if I may be understood throughout to use the terms ‘beautiful’ and
‘ugly,’ not necessarily with reference to things of the kind which
most naturally occur to us as instances of what is beautiful and ugly,
but in accordance with my own proposed definition of beauty. Thus I
shall use the word ‘beautiful’ to denote that of which the admiring
contemplation is good in itself; and ‘ugly’ to denote that of which the
admiring contemplation is evil in itself.

I. With regard, then, to great positive evils, I think it is evident
that, if we take all due precautions to discover _precisely what_ those
things are, of which, _if they existed absolutely by themselves_, we
should judge the existence to be a great evil, we shall find most of
them to be organic unities of exactly the same nature as those which
are the greatest positive goods. That is to say, they are cognitions of
some object, accompanied by some emotion. Just as neither a cognition
nor an emotion, _by itself_, appeared capable of being greatly good,
so (with one exception), neither a cognition nor an emotion, _by
itself_, appears capable of being greatly evil. And just as a whole
formed of both, even without the addition of any other element,
appeared undoubtedly capable of being a great good, so such a whole,
_by itself_, appears capable of being a great evil. With regard to the
_third_ element, which was discussed as capable of adding greatly to
the value of a good, namely, _true belief_, it will appear that it has
different relations towards different kinds of evils. In some cases the
addition of true belief to a positive evil seems to constitute a far
worse evil; but in other cases it is not apparent that it makes any
difference.

The greatest positive evils may be divided into the following three
classes.

=125.= (1) The first class consists of those evils, which seem always
to include an enjoyment or admiring contemplation of things which
are themselves either evil or ugly. That is to say these evils are
characterised by the fact that they include precisely the same emotion,
which is also essential to the greatest unmixed goods, from which they
are differentiated by the fact that this emotion is directed towards an
inappropriate object. In so far as this emotion is either a slight good
in itself or a slightly beautiful object, these evils would therefore
be cases of what I have called ‘mixed’ evils; but, as I have already
said, it seems very doubtful whether an emotion, completely isolated
from its object, has either value or beauty: it certainly has not much
of either. It is, however, important to observe that the very same
emotions, which are often loosely talked of as the greatest or the only
goods, may be essential constituents of the very worst wholes: that,
according to the nature of the cognition which accompanies them, they
may be conditions either of the greatest good, or of the greatest evil.

In order to illustrate the nature of evils of this class, I may take
two instances--cruelty and lasciviousness. That these are great
intrinsic evils, we may, I think, easily assure ourselves, by imagining
the state of a man, whose mind is solely occupied by either of these
passions, in their worst form. If we then consider what judgment we
should pass upon a universe which consisted _solely_ of minds thus
occupied, without the smallest hope that there would ever exist in it
the smallest consciousness of any object other than those proper to
these passions, or any feeling directed to any such object, I think
we cannot avoid the conclusion that the existence of such a universe
would be a far worse evil than the existence of none at all. But, if
this be so, it follows that these two vicious states are not only, as
is commonly admitted, bad as means, but also bad in themselves.--And
that they involve in their nature that complication of elements,
which I have called a love of what is evil or ugly, is, I think, no
less plain. With regard to the pleasures of lust, the nature of the
cognition, by the presence of which they are to be defined, is somewhat
difficult to analyse. But it appears to include both cognitions of
organic sensations and perceptions of states of the body, of which
the enjoyment is certainly an evil in itself. So far as these are
concerned, lasciviousness would, then, include in its essence an
admiring contemplation of what is ugly. But certainly one of its
commonest ingredients, in its worst forms, is an enjoyment of the same
state of mind in other people: and in this case it would therefore also
include a love of what is evil. With regard to cruelty, it is easy
to see that an enjoyment of pain in other people is essential to it;
and, as we shall see, when we come to consider pain, this is certainly
a love of evil: while, in so far as it also includes a delight in
the bodily signs of agony, it would also comprehend a love of what
is ugly. In both cases, it should be observed, the evil of the state
is heightened not only by an increase in the evil or ugliness of the
object, but also by an increase in the enjoyment.

It might be objected, in the case of cruelty, that our disapproval of
it, even in the isolated case supposed, where no considerations of
its badness as a means could influence us, may yet be really directed
to the pain of the persons, which it takes delight in contemplating.
This objection may be met, in the first place, by the remark that it
entirely fails to explain the judgment, which yet, I think, no one, on
reflection, will be able to avoid making, that even though the amount
of pain contemplated be the same, yet the greater the delight in its
contemplation, the worse the state of things. But it may also, I think,
be met by notice of a fact, which we were unable to urge in considering
the similar possibility with regard to goods--namely the possibility
that the reason why we attribute greater value to a worthy affection
for a _real_ person, is that we take into account the additional good
consisting in the existence of that person. We may I think urge, in
the case of cruelty, that its intrinsic odiousness is equally great,
whether the pain contemplated really exists or is purely imaginary. I,
at least, am unable to distinguish that, in this case, the presence
of _true belief_ makes any difference to the intrinsic value of the
whole considered, although it undoubtedly may make a great difference
to its value _as a means_. And so also with regard to other evils of
this class: I am unable to see that a true belief in the _existence_
of their objects makes any difference in the degree of their positive
demerits. On the other hand, the presence of another class of beliefs
seems to make a considerable difference. When we enjoy what is evil
or ugly, in spite of our knowledge that it is so, the state of things
seems considerably worse than if we made no judgment at all as to the
object’s value. And the same seems also, strangely enough, to be the
case when we make a false judgment of value. When we admire what is
ugly or evil, believing that it is beautiful and good, this belief
seems also to enhance the intrinsic vileness of our condition. It must,
of course, be understood that, in both these cases, the judgment in
question is merely what I have called a judgment of taste; that is to
say, it is concerned with the worth of the qualities actually cognised
and not with the worth of the object, to which those qualities may be
rightly or wrongly attributed.

Finally it should be mentioned that evils of this class, _beside_ that
emotional element (namely enjoyment and admiration) which they share
with great unmixed goods, appear always also to include some specific
emotion, which does not enter in the same way into the constitution
of any good. The presence of this specific emotion seems certainly
to enhance the badness of the whole, though it is not plain that, by
itself, it would be either evil or ugly.

=126.= (2) The second class of great evils are undoubtedly mixed
evils; but I treat them next, because, in a certain respect, they
appear to be the _converse_ of the class last considered. Just as it
is essential to this last class that they should include an emotion,
appropriate to the cognition of what is good or beautiful, but directed
to an inappropriate object; so to this second class it is essential
that they should include a cognition of what is good or beautiful, but
accompanied by an inappropriate emotion. In short, just as the last
class may be described as cases of the love of what is evil or ugly, so
this class may be described as cases of the hatred of what is good or
beautiful.

With regard to these evils it should be remarked: First, that the vices
of hatred, envy and contempt, where these vices are evil in themselves,
appear to be instances of them; and that they are frequently
accompanied by evils of the first class, for example, where a delight
is felt in the pain of a good person. Where they are thus accompanied,
the whole thus formed is undoubtedly worse than if either existed
singly.

And secondly: That in their case a true belief in the existence of the
good or beautiful object, which is hated, does appear to enhance the
badness of the whole, in which it is present. Undoubtedly also, as in
our first class, the presence of a true belief as to the _value_ of the
objects contemplated, increases the evil. But, contrary to what was the
case in our first class, a _false_ judgment of value appears to lessen
it.

=127.= (3) The third class of great positive evils appears to be the
class of _pains_.

With regard to these it should first be remarked that, as in the case
of pleasure, it is not pain itself, but only the consciousness of pain,
towards which our judgments of value are directed. Just as in Chap.
III., it was said that pleasure, however intense, which no one felt,
would be no good at all; so it appears that pain, however intense, of
which there was no consciousness, would be no evil at all.

It is, therefore, only the consciousness of intense pain, which can
be maintained to be a great evil. But that this, _by itself_, may be
a great evil, I cannot avoid thinking. The case of pain thus seems to
differ from that of pleasure: for the mere consciousness of pleasure,
however intense, does not, _by itself_, appear to be a _great_ good,
even if it has some slight intrinsic value. In short, pain (if we
understand by this expression, the consciousness of pain) appears to
be a far worse evil than pleasure is a good. But, if this be so, then
_pain_ must be admitted to be an exception from the rule which seems to
hold both of all _other_ great evils and of _all_ great goods: namely
that they are all organic unities to which _both_ a cognition of an
object _and_ an emotion directed towards that object are essential. In
the case of pain and of pain alone, it seems to be true that a mere
cognition, by itself, may be a great evil. It is, indeed, _an_ organic
unity, since it involves both the cognition and the object, neither of
which, by themselves, has either merit or demerit. But it is a less
complex organic unity than any other great evil and than any great
good, _both_ in respect of the fact that it does not involve, _beside_
the cognition, an emotion directed towards its object, _and also_ in
respect of the fact that the _object_ may here be absolutely simple,
whereas in most, if not all, other cases, the object itself is highly
complex.

This want of analogy between the relation of pain to intrinsic evil and
of pleasure to intrinsic good, seems also to be exhibited in a second
respect. Not only is it the case that consciousness of intense pain
is, by itself, a great evil, whereas consciousness of intense pleasure
is, by itself, no great good; but also the _converse_ difference
appears to hold of the contribution which they make to the value of
the whole, when they are combined respectively with another great evil
or with a great good. That is to say, the presence of pleasure (though
not in proportion to its intensity) does appear to enhance the value
of a whole, in which it is combined with any of the great unmixed
goods which we have considered: it might even be maintained that it
is _only_ wholes, in which _some_ pleasure is included, that possess
any great value: it is certain, at all events, that the presence of
pleasure makes a contribution to the value of good wholes greatly in
excess of its own intrinsic value. On the contrary, if a feeling of
pain be combined with any of the evil states of mind which we have been
considering, the difference which its presence makes to the value of
the whole, _as a whole_, seems to be rather for the better than the
worse: in any case, the only additional evil which it introduces, is
that which it, by itself, intrinsically constitutes. Thus, whereas pain
is _in itself_ a great evil, but makes no addition to the badness of a
whole, in which it is combined with some other bad thing, except that
which consists in its own intrinsic badness; pleasure, conversely, is
not _in itself_ a great good, but does make a great addition to the
goodness of a whole in which it is combined with a good thing, quite
apart from its own intrinsic value.

=128.= But finally, it must be insisted that pleasure and pain are
completely analogous in this: that we cannot assume either that the
presence of pleasure always makes a state of things better _on the
whole_, or that the presence of pain always makes it worse. This is the
truth which is most liable to be overlooked with regard to them; and
it is because this is true, that the common theory, that pleasure is
the only good and pain the only evil, has its grossest consequences in
misjudgments of value. Not only is the pleasantness of a state _not_
in proportion to its intrinsic worth; it may even add positively to
its vileness. We do not think the successful hatred of a villain the
less vile and odious, because he takes the keenest delight in it; nor
is there the least need, in logic, why we should think so, apart from
an unintelligent prejudice in favour of pleasure. In fact it seems to
be the case that wherever pleasure is added to an evil state of either
of our first two classes, the whole thus formed is _always_ worse than
if no pleasure had been there. And similarly with regard to pain. If
pain be added to an evil state of either of our first two classes, the
whole thus formed is _always_ better, _as a whole_, than if no pain
had been there; though here, if the pain be too intense, since that
is a great evil, the state may not be better _on the whole_. It is in
this way that the theory of vindictive punishment may be vindicated.
The infliction of pain on a person whose state of mind is bad may, if
the pain be not too intense, create a state of things that is better
_on the whole_ than if the evil state of mind had existed unpunished.
Whether such a state of things can ever constitute a _positive_ good,
is another question.

=129.= II. The consideration of this other question belongs properly to
the second topic, which was reserved above for discussion namely the
topic of ‘mixed’ goods. ‘Mixed’ goods were defined above as things,
which, though positively good _as wholes_, nevertheless contain, as
essential elements, something intrinsically evil or ugly. And there
certainly seem to be such goods. But for the proper consideration
of them, it is necessary to take into account a new distinction the
distinction just expressed as being between the value which a thing
possesses ‘_as a whole_,’ and that which it possesses ‘_on the whole_.’

When ‘mixed’ goods were defined as things positively good _as wholes_,
the expression was ambiguous. It was meant that they were positively
good _on the whole_; but it must now be observed that the value which
a thing possesses _on the whole_ may be said to be equivalent to the
sum of the value which it possesses _as a whole_, _together with_ the
intrinsic values which may belong to any of its parts. In fact, by the
‘value which a thing possesses as a whole,’ there may be meant two
quite distinct things. There may be meant either (1) That value which
arises solely _from the combination_ of two or more things; or else (2)
The total value formed by the addition to (1) of any intrinsic values
which may belong to the things combined. The meaning of the distinction
may perhaps be most easily seen by considering the supposed case of
vindictive punishment. If it is true that the combined existence of two
evils may yet constitute a less evil than would be constituted by the
existence of either singly, it is plain that this can only be because
there arises from the combination a positive good which is greater than
the _difference_ between the sum of the two evils and the demerit of
either singly: this positive good would then be the value of the whole,
_as a whole_, in sense (1). Yet if this value be not so great a good
as the sum of the two evils is an evil, it is plain that the value of
the whole state of things will be a positive evil; and this value is
the value of the whole, _as a whole_, in sense (2). Whatever view may
be taken with regard to the particular case of vindictive punishment,
it is plain that we have here _two distinct things_, with regard to
_either_ of which a separate question may be asked in the case of every
organic unity. The first of these two things may be expressed as _the
difference_ between the value _of the whole thing_ and the sum of the
value of its parts. And it is plain that where the parts have little or
no intrinsic value (as in our first class of goods, §§ 114, 115), this
difference will be nearly or absolutely identical with the value of
the whole thing. The distinction, therefore, only becomes important in
the case of wholes, of which one or more parts have a great intrinsic
value, positive or negative. The first of these cases, that of a
whole, in which one part has a great _positive_ value, is exemplified
in our 2nd and 3rd classes of great unmixed goods (§§ 120, 122); and
similarly the Summum Bonum is a whole of which _many_ parts have a
great _positive_ value. Such cases, it may be observed, are also very
frequent and very important objects of Aesthetic judgment; since the
essential distinction between the ‘classical’ and the ‘romantic’ styles
consists in the fact that the former aims at obtaining the greatest
possible value for the whole, _as a whole_, in sense (1), whereas
the latter sacrifices this in order to obtain the greatest possible
value for some _part_, which is itself an organic unity. It follows
that we cannot declare either style to be necessarily superior, since
an equally good result _on the whole_, or ‘as a whole’ in sense (2),
may be obtained by either method; but the distinctively _aesthetic_
temperament seems to be characterised by a tendency to prefer a good
result obtained by the classical, to an equally good result obtained by
the romantic method.

=130.= But what we have now to consider are cases of wholes, in which
one or more parts have a great _negative_ value--are great positive
evils. And first of all, we may take the _strongest_ cases, like that
of retributive punishment, in which we have a whole, exclusively
composed of two great positive evils--wickedness and pain. Can such a
whole ever be positively good _on the whole_?

(1) I can see no reason to think that such wholes ever are positively
good _on the whole_. But from the fact that they may, nevertheless, be
less evils, than either of their parts taken singly, it follows that
they have a characteristic which is most important for the correct
decision of practical questions. It follows that, quite apart from
_consequences_ or any value which an evil may have as a mere means,
it may, _supposing_ one evil already exists, be worth while to create
another, since, by the mere creation of this second, there may be
constituted a whole less bad than if the original evil had been left
to exist by itself. And similarly, with regard to all the wholes which
I am about to consider, it must be remembered, that, even if they are
not goods _on the whole_, yet, where an evil already exists, as in this
world evils do exist, the existence of the other part of these wholes
will constitute a thing desirable _for its own sake_--that is to say,
not merely a means to future goods, but one of the _ends_ which must
be taken into account in estimating what that best possible state of
things is, to which every right action must be a means.

=131.= (2) But, as a matter of fact, I cannot avoid thinking that there
are wholes, containing something positively evil and ugly, which are,
nevertheless, great positive goods on the whole. Indeed, it appears
to be to this class that those instances of virtue, which contain
anything intrinsically good, chiefly belong. It need not, of course,
be denied that there is sometimes included in a virtuous disposition
more or less of those unmixed goods which were first discussed--that
is to say, a real love of what is good or beautiful. But the typical
and characteristic virtuous dispositions, so far as they are not
mere means, seem rather to be examples of mixed goods. We may take
as instances (_a_) Courage and Compassion, which seem to belong to
the second of the three classes of virtues distinguished in our last
chapter (§ 107); and (_b_) the specifically ‘moral’ sentiment, by
reference to which the third of those three classes was defined (§ 108).

Courage and compassion, in so far as they contain an intrinsically
desirable state of mind, seem to involve essentially a cognition of
something evil or ugly. In the case of courage the object of the
cognition may be an evil of any of our three classes; in the case of
compassion, the proper object is pain. Both these virtues, accordingly,
must contain precisely the same cognitive element, which is also
essential to evils of class (1); and they are differentiated from these
by the fact that the emotion directed to these objects is, in their
case, an emotion of the same kind which was essential to evils of class
(2). In short, just as evils of class (2) seemed to consist in a hatred
of what was good or beautiful, and evils of class (1) in a love of what
was evil or ugly; so these virtues involve a _hatred_ of what is evil
or ugly. Both these virtues do, no doubt, also contain other elements,
and, among these, each contains its specific emotion; but that their
value does not depend solely upon these other elements, we may easily
assure ourselves, by considering what we should think of an attitude of
endurance or of defiant contempt toward an object intrinsically good
or beautiful, or of the state of a man whose mind was filled with pity
for the happiness of a worthy admiration. Yet pity for the undeserved
sufferings of others, endurance of pain to ourselves, and a defiant
hatred of evil dispositions in ourselves or in others, seem to be
undoubtedly admirable in themselves; and if so, there are admirable
things, which must be lost, if there were no cognition of evil.

Similarly the specifically ‘moral’ sentiment, in all cases where it has
any considerable intrinsic value, appears to include a hatred of evils
of the first and second classes. It is true that the emotion is here
excited by the idea that an action is right or wrong; and hence the
object of the idea which excites it is generally not an intrinsic evil.
But, as far as I can discover, the emotion with which a conscientious
man views a real or imaginary right action, contains, as an essential
element, the same emotion with which he views a wrong one: it seems,
indeed, that this element is necessary to make his emotion specifically
_moral_. And the specifically moral emotion excited by the idea of a
wrong action, seems to me to contain essentially a more or less vague
cognition of the kind of intrinsic evils, which are usually caused
by wrong actions, whether they would or would not be caused by the
particular action in question. I am, in fact, unable to distinguish, in
its main features, the moral sentiment excited by the idea of rightness
and wrongness, wherever it is intense, from the total state constituted
by a cognition of something intrinsically evil together with the
emotion of hatred directed towards it. Nor need we be surprised that
this mental state should be the one chiefly associated with the idea
of rightness, if we reflect on the nature of those actions which are
most commonly recognised as duties. For by far the greater part of the
actions, of which we commonly think as duties, are _negative_: what we
feel to be our duty is to _abstain_ from some action to which a strong
natural impulse tempts us. And these wrong actions, in the avoidance
of which duty consists, are usually such as produce, very immediately,
some bad consequence in pain to others; while, in many prominent
instances, the inclination, which prompts us to them, is itself an
intrinsic evil, containing, as where the impulse is lust or cruelty,
an anticipatory enjoyment of something evil or ugly. That right action
does thus so frequently entail the suppression of some evil impulse,
is necessary to explain the plausibility of the view that virtue
_consists_ in the control of passion by reason. Accordingly, the truth
seems to be that, whenever a strong moral emotion is excited by the
idea of rightness, this emotion is accompanied by a vague cognition of
the kind of evils usually suppressed or avoided by the actions which
most frequently occur to us as instances of duty; and that the emotion
is directed towards this evil quality. We may, then, conclude that the
specific moral emotion owes almost all its intrinsic value to the fact
that it includes a cognition of evils accompanied by a hatred of them:
mere rightness, whether truly or untruly attributed to an action, seems
incapable of forming the object of an emotional contemplation, which
shall be any great good.

=132.= If this be so, then we have, in many prominent instances of
virtue, cases of a whole, greatly good in itself, which yet contains
the cognition of something, whereof the existence would be a great
evil: a great good is absolutely dependent for its value, upon its
inclusion of something evil or ugly, although it does not owe its
value _solely_ to this element in it. And, in the case of virtues,
this evil object does, in general, actually exist. But there seems no
reason to think that, when it does exist, the whole state of things
thus constituted is therefore the better _on the whole_. What seems
indubitable, is only that the feeling contemplation of an object, whose
existence _would_ be a great evil, or which is ugly, may be essential
to a valuable whole. We have another undoubted instance of this in the
appreciation of tragedy. But, in tragedy, the sufferings of Lear, and
the vice of Iago may be purely imaginary. And it seems certain that,
if they really existed, the evil thus existing, while it must detract
from the good consisting in a proper feeling towards them, will add
no positive value to that good great enough to counterbalance such a
loss. It does, indeed, seem that the existence of a true belief in the
object of these mixed goods does add _some_ value to the whole in which
it is combined with them: a conscious compassion for real suffering
seems to be better, _as a whole_, than a compassion for sufferings
merely imaginary; and this may well be the case, even though the evil
involved in the actual suffering makes the total state of things bad
_on the whole_. And it certainly seems to be true that a _false_ belief
in the actual existence of its object makes a worse mixed good than
if our state of mind were that with which we normally regard pure
fiction. Accordingly we may conclude that the only mixed goods, which
are positively good _on the whole_, are those in which the object is
something which _would_ be a great evil, if it existed, or which _is_
ugly.

=133.= With regard, then, to those mixed goods, which consist in an
appropriate attitude of the mind towards things evil or ugly, and which
include among their number the greater part of such virtues as have any
intrinsic value whatever, the following three conclusions seem to be
those chiefly requiring to be emphasized:--

(1) There seems no reason to think that where the object is a thing
evil in itself, which _actually exists_, the total state of things is
ever positively _good on the whole_. The appropriate mental attitude
towards a really existing evil contains, of course, an element which
is absolutely identical with the same attitude towards the same evil,
where it is purely imaginary. And this element, which is common to
the two cases, may be a great positive good, on the whole. But there
seems no reason to doubt that, where the evil is _real_, the amount of
this real evil is always sufficient to reduce the total sum of value
to a negative quantity. Accordingly we have no reason to maintain the
paradox that an ideal world would be one in which vice and suffering
must exist in order that it may contain the goods consisting in the
appropriate emotion towards them. It is not a positive good that
suffering should exist, in order that we may compassionate it; or
wickedness, that we may hate it. There is no reason to think that any
actual evil whatsoever would be contained in the Ideal. It follows that
we cannot admit the actual validity of any of the arguments commonly
used in Theodicies; no such argument succeeds in justifying the fact
that there does exist even the smallest of the many evils which this
world contains. The most that can be said for such arguments is that,
when they make appeal to the principle of organic unity, their appeal
is valid _in principle_. It _might_ be the case that the existence of
evil was necessary, not merely as a means, but analytically, to the
existence of the greatest good. But we have no reason to think that
this _is_ the case in any instance whatsoever.

But (2) there _is_ reason to think that the cognition of things evil
or ugly, which are purely imaginary, is essential to the Ideal. In this
case the burden of proof lies the other way. It cannot be doubted that
the appreciation of tragedy is a great positive good; and it seems
almost equally certain that the virtues of compassion, courage, and
self-control contain such goods. And to all these the cognition of
things which would be evil, if they existed, is analytically necessary.
Here then we have things of which the existence must add value to
any whole in which they are contained; nor is it possible to assure
ourselves that any whole, from which they were omitted, would thereby
gain more in its value _as a whole_, than it would lose by their
omission. We have no reason to think that any whole, which did not
contain them, would be so good _on the whole_ as some whole in which
they were obtained. The case for their inclusion in the Ideal is as
strong as that for the inclusion of material qualities (§ 123, above).
_Against_ the inclusion of these goods nothing can be urged except a
bare possibility.

Finally (3) it is important to insist that, as was said above, these
mixed virtues have a great practical value, in addition to that which
they possess either in themselves or as mere means. Where evils do
exist, as in this world they do, the fact that they are known and
properly appreciated, constitutes a state of things having greater
value _as a whole_ even than the same appreciation of purely imaginary
evils. This state of things, it has been said, is never positively
good _on the whole_; but where the evil, which reduces its total value
to a negative quantity, already unavoidably exists, to obtain the
intrinsic value which belongs to it _as a whole_ will obviously produce
a better state of things than if the evil had existed by itself,
quite apart from the good element in it which is identical with the
appreciation of imaginary evils, and from any ulterior consequences
which its existence may bring about. The case is here the same as with
retributive punishment. Where an evil already exists, it is well that
it should be pitied or hated or endured, according to its nature; just
as it may be well that some evils should be punished. Of course, as in
all practical cases, it often happens that the attainment of this good
is incompatible with the attainment of another and a greater one. But
it is important to insist that we have here a real intrinsic value,
which must be taken into account in calculating that greatest possible
balance of intrinsic value, which it is always our duty to produce.

=134.= I have now completed such remarks as seemed most necessary to
be made concerning intrinsic values. It is obvious that for the proper
answering of this, the fundamental question of Ethics, there remains
a field of investigation as wide and as difficult, as was assigned
to Practical Ethics in my last chapter. There is as much to be said
concerning what results are intrinsically good, and in what degrees,
as concerning what results it is possible for us to bring about: both
questions demand, and will repay, an equally patient enquiry. Many of
the judgments, which I have made in this chapter, will, no doubt, seem
unduly arbitrary: it must be confessed that some of the attributions
of intrinsic value, which have seemed to me to be true, do not display
that symmetry and system which is wont to be required of philosophers.
But if this be urged as an objection, I may respectfully point out
that it is none. We have no title whatever to assume that the truth on
any subject-matter will display such symmetry as we desire to see--or
(to use the common vague phrase) that it will possess any particular
form of ‘unity.’ To search for ‘unity’ and ‘system,’ at the expense
of truth, is not, I take it, the proper business of philosophy,
however universally it may have been the practice of philosophers.
And that all truths about the Universe possess to one another all
the various relations, which may be meant by ‘unity,’ can only be
legitimately asserted, when we have carefully distinguished those
various relations and discovered what those truths are. In particular,
we can have no title to assert that ethical truths are ‘unified’ in
any particular manner, except in virtue of an enquiry conducted by
the method which I have endeavoured to follow and to illustrate. The
study of Ethics would, no doubt, be far more simple, and its results
far more ‘systematic,’ if, for instance, pain were an evil of exactly
the same magnitude as pleasure is a good; but we have no reason
whatever to assume that the Universe is such that ethical truths must
display this kind of symmetry: no argument against my conclusion,
that pleasure and pain do _not_ thus correspond, can have any weight
whatever, failing a careful examination of the instances which have
led me to form it. Nevertheless I am content that the results of this
chapter should be taken rather as illustrating the method which must
be pursued in answering the fundamental question of Ethics, and the
principles which must be observed, than as giving the correct answer
to that question. That things intrinsically good or bad are many and
various; that most of them are ‘organic unities,’ in the peculiar and
definite sense to which I have confined the term; and that our only
means of deciding upon their intrinsic value and its degree, is by
carefully distinguishing exactly what the thing is, about which we ask
the question, and then looking to see whether it has or has not the
unique predicate ‘good’ in any of its various degrees: these are the
conclusions, upon the truth of which I desire to insist. Similarly, in
my last chapter, with regard to the question ‘What ought we to do?’
I have endeavoured rather to shew exactly what is the meaning of the
question, and what difficulties must consequently be faced in answering
it, than to prove that any particular answers are true. And that these
two questions, having precisely the nature which I have assigned to
them, are _the_ questions which it is the object of Ethics to answer,
may be regarded as the main result of the preceding chapters. These
are the questions which ethical philosophers have always been mainly
concerned to answer, although they have not recognised what their
question was--what predicate they were asserting to attach to things.
The practice of asking what things are virtues or duties, without
distinguishing what these terms mean; the practice of asking what ought
to be here and now, without distinguishing whether as means or end--for
its own sake or for that of its results; the search for one single
_criterion_ of right or wrong, without the recognition that in order
to discover a criterion we must first know what things _are_ right or
wrong; and the neglect of the principle of ‘organic unities’--these
sources of error have hitherto been almost universally prevalent in
Ethics. The conscious endeavour to avoid them all, and to apply to
all the ordinary objects of ethical judgment these two questions and
these only: Has it intrinsic value? and Is it a means to the best
possible?--this attempt, so far as I know, is entirely new; and its
results, when compared with those habitual to moral philosophers, are
certainly sufficiently surprising: that to Common Sense they will not
appear so strange, I venture to hope and believe. It is, I think,
much to be desired that the labour commonly devoted to answering such
questions as whether certain ‘ends’ are more or less ‘comprehensive’
or more or less ‘consistent’ with one another--questions, which, even
if a precise meaning were given to them, are wholly irrelevant to the
proof of any ethical conclusion--should be diverted to the separate
investigation of these two clear problems.

=135.= The main object of this chapter has been to define roughly
the class of things, among which we may expect to find either great
intrinsic goods or great intrinsic evils; and particularly to point
out that there is a vast variety of such things, and that the simplest
of them are, with one exception, highly complex wholes, composed of
parts which have little or no value in themselves. All of them involve
consciousness of an object, which is itself usually highly complex,
and almost all involve also an emotional attitude towards this object;
but, though they thus have certain characteristics in common, the vast
variety of qualities in respect of which they differ from one another
are equally essential to their value: neither the generic character
of all, nor the specific character of each, is either greatly good
or greatly evil by itself; they owe their value or demerit, in each
case, to the presence of both. My discussion falls into three main
divisions, dealing respectively (1) with unmixed goods, (2) with evils,
and (3) with mixed goods. (1) Unmixed goods may all be said to consist
in the love of beautiful things or of good persons: but the number of
different goods of this kind is as great as that of beautiful objects,
and they are also differentiated from one another by the different
emotions appropriate to different objects. These goods are undoubtedly
good, even where the things or persons loved are imaginary; but it
was urged that, where the thing or person is real and is believed to
be so, these two facts together, when combined with the mere love of
the qualities in question, constitute a whole which is greatly better
than that mere love, having an additional value quite distinct from
that which belongs to the existence of the object, where that object
is a good person. Finally it was pointed out that the love of mental
qualities, by themselves, does not seem to be so great a good as that
of mental and material qualities together; and that, in any case, an
immense number of the best things are, or include, a love of material
qualities (113-123). (2) Great evils may be said to consist either
(_a_) in the love of what is evil or ugly, or (_b_) in the hatred of
what is good or beautiful, or (_c_) in the consciousness of pain.
Thus the consciousness of pain, if it be a great evil, is the only
exception to the rule that all great goods and great evils involve both
a cognition and an emotion directed towards its object (124-128). (3)
Mixed goods are those which include some element which is evil or ugly.
They may be said to consist either in hatred of what is ugly or of
evils of classes (_a_) and (_b_), or in compassion for pain. But where
they include an evil, which actually exists, its demerit seems to be
always great enough to outweigh the positive value which they possess
(129-133).

INDEX.

  Aesthetic
    enjoyments 189-202, 203
    judgment 215
    temperament 216

  Aesthetics 200

  Affection
    beauty of 204-5
    misdirected 195, 198
    reciprocal 198
    value of 188-9, 203-5

  Altruism 96-7, 167

  Analytic judgments 7, 29, 33-4, 35, 220-1

  Appreciation 189-90, 200, 204-5, 221

  Approval 131

  Approve 60

  Approbation 171

  Appropriate, inappropriate 192, 199, 204-5, 209, 211, 220
    defined 190

  Aristotle 4
    definition of virtue 171
    valuation of virtues 176-7
    valuation of knowledge 199

  Art
    value of 188
    _representative_, value of 193, 195, 196, 200

  Autonomy 127

  Bad 5, 27, 28, 95, 140, 143, 157, 178, 181, 188, 209, 210, 213, 214,
    216, 218

  ‘Based on’ 38, 49, 54, 114, 115, 118, 120, 122, 144

  Beauty
    corporeal 203-4
    no criterion of 202
    definition of 201-2, 208
    mental 203-5
    ‘seeing’ of 190-1
    value of 28, 81-2, 83-5, 86, 94, 188-9, 201-2, 209, 211, 224

  Being, dist. from existence 110-11

  Belief, value of 193-200, 208, 210-11, 212, 219, 224-5

  Benevolence, Sidgwick’s ‘principle of Rational’ 102-3

  Bentham 145
    naturalistic fallacy 17-19
    quantity of pleasure 77-8

  Bradley, F. H.
    pleasure and desire 70
    theory of judgment 125

  Butler, Bishop 86, 206

  Casuistry 4-5

  Causal judgments
    relation to Ethics 21-7, 36, 146-8, 149, 180

  Causal relations 31-3, 34-6

  Chastity 158

  Classical style 215-16

  Christ
    on value of motives 178
    on love 179

  Christian Ethics 178
    on ‘external’ rightness 177
    on ‘internal’ rightness 178-9
    on value of motives 177-9
    on value of virtue 174

  Clifford, W. K. 40

  Cognition
    of evil 217-19
    dist. from knowledge 194
    relation to will and feeling 129-30, 133, 135-6, 141
    value of 85, 189-92, 194, 199, 208, 212, 224, 225

  Commands, confused with moral laws 128-9, 141

  Common sense 224
    on value of pleasure 86, 91-2, 94-5
    on duties 156-9

  Compassion 217, 219, 220, 225

  Conduct, relation of to Ethics 2-3, 146, 180

  Conscience
    defined 178
    not infallible 149, 180

  Conscientiousness 218
    defined 179
    utility of 180

  Contempt 211, 217

  Corporeal beauty 203-4

  Courage 217

  Crimes 161

  Criterion
    of beauty 202
    evolution as 46, 50, 55-6
    of goodness 137-8
    pleasure as 91-2, 94-5, 108
    of right and wrong 223
    will as 137-8
    of truth 133

  Cruelty 209-11, 218

  Darwin 47

  Definition, nature of 6-9, 18-20

  Desirable, meaning of 65-7, 73

  Desire, cause and object of 68-70, 73-4

  Duty
    = cause of or means to good 24-5, 105, 146-8, 167, 180, 223
    fuller definitions of 148, 161, 180-1, 222
    incapable of being known 149-50, 181
    mainly negative 218
    object of _psychological_ intuition 148
    relations to expediency 167-70, 181
      interest 170-1, 181
      possibility 150-2
      rightness 148
      utility 146-7, 167-70
      virtue 172
      will 160, 161
    not self-evident 148, 181
    self-regarding 168

  Egoistic Hedonism 18

  Egoism, as doctrine of end 18, 96-105, 109
    contradiction of 99, 101-5, 109
    relation to Hedonism 97-8
    relation to Naturalistic Hedonism 104-5
    Sidgwick’s ‘Rational’ 98-9, 102-4

  Egoism, as doctrine of means 96-7, 105, 167

  Emotion
    aesthetic 190
    value of 189-92, 199, 203, 204-5, 208, 209, 211, 212, 217, 224, 225

  Empirical 39, 111, 123

  Empiricism 103, 124-5, 130

  End = effect 32

  End = good in itself 18, 24, 64-6, 72, 73, 79-81, 83, 85, 94-5, 184,
    216
    dist. from ‘good as means’ 24, 72, 74, 79-81, 89, 90, 94-5, 106-7,
      173-4, 178, 216, 223
    ‘ultimate’ 51, 83, 85, 96-7, 99-102, 183, 189
    ‘never justifies means’ 147, 163

  End = object of desire 68, 70, 71, 72

  Enjoyment 77, 96, 188, 208
    aesthetic 188-9, 203
    of evil and ugly 208-11, 218
    sexual 95

  Envy 211

  Epistemology 133, 140-1

  Ethics
    Evolutionistic 46, 50, 54, 58
    Metaphysical 39, 58, 113-15
    Naturalistic 39-41, 58, 59
    Practical 115-18, 140, 146, 149, 151, 154, 180, 222
    province of 1-6, 21, 24, 26-7, 36, 37, 77, 115, 118, 142-6, 184,
      222-4

  Eudaemonist 175

  Evil 153, 156, 158, 160, 186, 193, 205, 207-14, 224, 225
    mixed 208, 209, 211
    positive value of 216-22, 225

  Evolution 46-8, 54-8

  Evolutionistic 46, 50, 52, 54, 58

  Existence
    dist. from being 110-12
    judgments about 123-5
    relation to value 115-18, 118-22, 125-6, 194, 196, 197-9, 206, 210,
      216, 219, 220, 221, 225

  Expediency 167-70, 181

  Feeling
    supposed analogy to cognition 129-31, 141
    supposed bearing on Ethics 129-31, 141

  Fiction 121-2

  Freedom, value of 86, 186

  Freedom (of Will) 127

  God 82, 102-4
    love of 113, 194, 195-6, 200

  Good
    indefinable 6-16, 41, 79, 110-11, 142-4
    = means to good 21, 24
    the Absolute 183, 184, 186
    the Human 183, 184, 186
    mixed and unmixed 208, 209, 214, 215, 217, 219-20, 224
    my own 97-9, 101, 170
    ‘private’ 99
    _the_ 8-9, 18
    ‘Universal’ 99-102
    Will 174-5, 179 _n._ 2, 180

  Green, T. H. 139

  Guyau, M. 46

  Habit 171, 175-6, 177

  Hatred 211, 214
    of beautiful and good 211, 217, 225
    of evil and ugly 178, 217, 218, 220, 221, 225

  Health 42-3, 65, 157, 167

  Heaven 115, 174, 183, 185, 195
    upon Earth 186

  Hedonism 39, 52, 59-63, 90-1, 96, 108-9, 174
    Egoistic 18
    Ethical 70, 144
    Intuitionistic 59, 74-6, 144
    Naturalistic 46, 50, 53, 54, 68, 104, 105
    Psychological 18, 68, 69, 70, 73
    Universalistic 103

  Hegel 30, 34, 110

  Heteronomous 127

  Higher 48-9, 78

  Hobbes 97

  Honesty 175-6

  Hypothetical laws 22, 155

  Ideal
    three meanings of 183-4
    _the_ 183, 185, 205-7, 220-1

  Idealistic 130, 205

  Imagination, value of 193, 194, 196, 197, 210, 219, 220, 221, 224

  Imperative 128

  Industry 157, 167

  Intention 179 _n._ 1

  Interest 102
    meaning of 97-8, 106, 170-1
    dist. from ‘duty’ 170-1, 181

  Intrinsic
    evil 207, 213, 218, 224
    value 17, 21, 25-30, 36, 147, 173-7, 187, 189, 207, 214-16, 222-4

  Intuition
    = proposition incapable of proof 59, 77, 108
    in psychological sense 75, 79, 85, 92, 108, 144, 148-9, 173

  Intuitionism
    in Sidgwick’s sense 59, 76, 144
    in proper sense 106, 148

  Judgment
    error of 192-3
    two types of ethical 21, 23-7, 115, 146, 148, 222, 224

  Justice 178

  Justify 97, 101, 147, 163

  Kant 110, 129
    ‘Copernican revolution’ 133
    value of Good Will 174-5, 179 _n._ 2, 180
    value of Happiness 174-5
    theory of judgment 125
    ‘Kingdom of Ends’ 113
    ‘practical love’ 179
    connection of ‘goodness’ with ‘will’ 126-8

  Knowledge
    involves truth of object 132, 134
    involves belief 194
    value of 82, 86, 194, 195, 196, 197, 199, 211, 221

  Lasciviousness 209-10

  Law
    ethical 155
    hypothetical 22, 155
    legal 126, 128
    moral 126-8, 146, 148, 160, 162, 165
    natural 26, 29, 57, 126, 183, 186
    scientific 22-3, 124, 155

  Legal 126, 128

  Leibniz 125

  Life 15, 46, 50, 52, 156

  Logical
    dependence 61, 110, 118, 122, 139, 143-4
    fallacy 140-1

  Love
    Christ and Kant on 179
    of beautiful and good 177-9, 199, 204, 217, 224
    of evil and ugly 209, 210, 211, 217, 225

  Lucian 45

  Lust 209-10, 218

  Lying 154

  Mackenzie, Prof. J. S. 114, 120

  Material qualities, value of 204, 205-7, 221, 225

  Matter, value of 205-7

  Meaning, ‘to have no’ 31, 34-5

  Means = cause or necessary condition 18, 21-3, 89, 180
    dist. from ‘part of organic whole’ 27, 29-30, 32, 220
    goodness as, dist. from intrinsic value 21, 24, 26, 27, 37, 72, 74,
      79-81, 89, 90, 94-5, 106-7, 115, 118, 173-4, 178, 187, 195-6,
      197-8, 216, 223
    ‘not justified by end’ 147, 163

  Mental
    beauty of 203-5, 225
    value of 205-7

  Mercy 178

  Metaphysical 39, 58, 110-15, 139-40

  Method
    of discovering intrinsic value 20, 36, 59-60, 64, 89, 91, 92, 93, 95,
      142-5, 173, 185-6, 187-8, 195, 197-8, 206-7, 209, 223
    of discovering value as means 22-3, 146, 148-54, 172-3

  Mill, J. S. 145
    Hedonism 63-81, 108
    naturalistic fallacy 40, 66-7, 69, 72-3, 74, 104, 108
    Psychological Hedonism 68, 72, 73-4
    quality of pleasure 77-81, 108
    Utilitarianism 104-5

  Moral
    approbation 171
    law 126-8, 146, 148, 160, 162, 165
    obligation 128
    sentiment 168, 178, 217-19

  Motive 67, 70, 177, 178-80

  Murder 148, 151, 154, 156-7, 178

  Natural
    laws 26, 29, 57, 126, 183, 186
    objects and properties 13-14, 39-41, 58, 110-11
    selection 47

  Natural = normal 42-4, 58

  Natural = necessary 44-5, 58

  Naturalism 20, 40, 58, 144

  Naturalistic
    Ethics 39-41, 58, 59
    fallacy 10, 13-14, 18-20, 38-9, 48, 57, 58, 61, 64, 66-7, 69, 72-3,
      74, 104, 108, 114, 118, 124, 125, 139, 173, 176, 201
    Hedonism 46, 50, 53, 54, 68, 104, 105

  Nature 40-1, 110, 111, 112

  Nature, life according to 41-2, 113

  Nature, value of 188, 193, 195, 200, 206

  Necessity
    analytic 22, 33-4, 35, 220, 221
    causal or natural 29, 31-2, 34, 186, 187

  New Testament 177, 178, 179

  Object
    of cognition 141, 191, 192, 193, 211
    of desire 68-70
    natural 13-14, 39-41, 58, 110-11

  Objective 82, 201

  Obligation
    moral 103, 128, 147

  Obligatory 25, 148, 170

  Organic relation, unity, whole
    common usage 30-6
    my own usage 27-31, 32-3, 36, 93, 96, 149, 184, 187, 189, 190, 202,
      206, 208, 212, 215, 220, 223

  Ought
    to aim at 24-6, 100
    to do 26, 105, 115, 116, 117, 127, 128, 140, 146, 148, 173, 180, 223
    to be or exist 17, 115, 118, 127, 128, 148, 173, 180, 223

  Pain 64, 65, 210, 212-4, 217, 222-3, 225

  Particular 3-4

  Perception 111, 112, 134, 136

  Pessimism 51, 53, 156

  Plato
    on Egoism 98
    on goods 178
    on Hedonism 88
    on value of Knowledge 199
    on universal truths 111

  Pleasure 12-13, 16
    consciousness of 87-91, 109, 212
    as criterion 91-2, 108
    and desire 68-71, 73-4
    and ‘pleasures’ 79
    ‘quality of’ 77-81
    value of 39, 46, 50-4, 59-66, 71-2, 74-5, 79-81, 83, 85-96, 144,
      146, 171, 173, 174, 188, 205, 212-14, 222-3

  Pity 217, 221

  Positive science 39

  Possible action 150-1

  Practical 216, 221
    Ethics 115-18, 140, 146, 149, 151, 154, 180, 222
    Philosophy 2

  Practice 2, 20

  Praise 171

  Preference 77-9, 131

  Promises 157

  Property, respect of 157

  Propositions, types of 123-6

  Prove 11, 65, 66, 74, 75-7, 99, 112, 137, 141, 143, 145, 169, 181

  Prudence 168
    ‘Maxim of’ 102-4

  Psychological 11, 130, 140, 148
    Hedonism 18, 68, 69, 70, 73

  Punishment 164
    retributive or vindictive 214, 215, 216, 221

  Reason 143-4

  Representative art 193

  Reward 174

  Right 18, 24-5, 105, 146, 180, 216, 218, 223
    dist. from ‘duty’ 148
    relation to expediency 167
    externally 176-7
    internally 179 _n._ 1

  Romantic style 215-16

  Rousseau 42

  Sanctions 159, 164

  Secondary qualities 206

  Self-evidence 143, 144, 148, 181

  Self-realisation 113, 114, 120, 188

  Self-sacrifice 170

  Sensation 134

  Sensationalist 130

  Sidgwick, Henry 145
    value of beauty 81-4, 85-7
    on Bentham 17-19
    rationality of Egoism 99-103
    ‘good’ unanalysable 17
    Hedonism 59, 63, 64, 81-7, 91-6, 108-9
    ‘method’ of Intuitionism 59, 92-4
    value of knowledge 82, 86
    neglects principle of organic wholes 93
    pleasure as criterion 91-2, 94-5
    quality of pleasure 77, 81
    value of unconscious 81-4

  Sins 161

  Spencer, Herbert 46, 48-58

  Spinoza 110, 113

  Spiritual, value of 205-6

  Summum Bonum 183, 205

  Stoics 41, 110

  Synthetic 7, 58, 143

  Taste, error of 192-3, 211

  Taylor, A. E. 60

  Temperance 157, 168

  Theodicies 220

  Tragedy 219, 221

  Truth
    relation to existence 111, 124-5
      cognition 130, 132-4, 136, 141, 196
      knowledge 134, 194
    types of 111-12, 124-5
    value of 85-6, 193-200, 208, 210, 211, 212

  Tyndall 40

  Ugly 208, 209-11, 214, 216-19, 221

  Ultimate end 51, 83, 85, 96-7, 99-102, 183, 189

  Unity 222
    organic, see ‘Organic’

  Universal
    Good 99-102
    truths 21-3, 27, 57, 111, 126, 154-5, 181

  Universalistic Hedonism 103

  Useful 106, 146, 167

  Utilitarianism 63, 96, 99, 104-7, 109

  Utopias 183, 186

  Value
    intrinsic 17, 21, 25-30, 36, 147, 173-7, 187, 189, 207, 214-16, 222-4
    as means 21, 174, 195-6
    negative 215, 216

  Vice 171, 209, 211

  Virtue
    definition of 171-3, 181, 223
    three kinds of 175
    mixed 221
    relation to ‘duty’ 172
    value of 83, 85, 86, 87, 173-80, 181-2, 217-19, 221-2

  Volition
    supposed coordination with cognition 129-30, 133, 135-6, 141
    supposed bearing on Ethics 130, 136, 141

  Whole
    good as a 208, 214-16, 219, 221
    good on the 214-16, 219, 220, 221
    organic, see ‘Organic’

  Wickedness 220

  Will
    as criterion of value 137-8
    relation to duty 160, 161, 180
    the Good 174-5, 179 _n._ 2, 180
    supposed analogy to cognition 129-30, 135-6
    supposed bearing on Ethics 126-7, 128-31, 135-9, 141

  Wrong 180, 218, 223

  PRINTED IN ENGLAND BY J. B. PEACE, M.A.
  AT THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS