quoniam in Catone Maiore satis multa diximus, illim[153] assumes, quae
ad hunc locum pertinebunt.

    [152] _homine libero_ Edd.; _homine nihil libero_ B H L a b
    c.

    [153] _illim_ B^1, Edd.; _illum_ H; _illa_ B^2 p; _illinc_ a
    b c; _illic_ L.

#Occupations:#

#(1) vulgar,#

*150* XLII. Now in regard to trades and other means of livelihood, which
ones are to be considered becoming to a gentleman and which ones are
vulgar, we have been taught, in general, as follows. First, those means
of livelihood are rejected as undesirable which incur people's ill-will,
as those of tax-gatherers and usurers. Unbecoming to a gentleman, too,
and vulgar are the means of livelihood of all hired workmen whom we pay
for mere manual labour, not for artistic skill; for in their case the
very wages they receive is a pledge of their slavery. Vulgar we must
consider those also who buy from wholesale merchants to retail
immediately; for they would get no profits without a great deal of
downright lying; and verily, there is no action that is meaner than
misrepresentation. And all mechanics are engaged in vulgar trades; for
no workshop can have anything liberal about it. Least respectable of all
are those trades which cater to sensual pleasures:

    "Fishmongers, butchers, cooks, and poulterers,
    And fishermen,"

as Terence says. Add to these, if you please, the perfumers, dancers,
and the whole _corps de ballet_.[AF]

#(2) liberal.#

*151* But the professions in which either a higher degree of
intelligence is required or from which no small benefit to society is
derived--medicine and architecture, for example, and teaching--these are
proper for those whose social position they become. Trade, if it is on a
small scale, is to be considered vulgar; but if wholesale and on a large
scale, importing large quantities from all parts of the world and
distributing to many without misrepresentation, it is not to be greatly
disparaged. Nay, it even seems to deserve the highest respect, if those
who are engaged in it, satiated, or rather, I should say, satisfied with
the fortunes they have made, make their way from the port to a country
estate, as they have often made it from the sea into port. But of all
the occupations by which gain is secured, none is better than
agriculture, none more profitable, none more delightful, none more
becoming to a freeman. But since I have discussed this quite fully in my
Cato Major, you will find there the material that applies to this point.

    [AF] The _ludus talarius_ was a kind of low variety show,
    with loose songs and dances and bad music.

*152* XLIII. Sed ab iis partibus, quae sunt honestatis, quem ad modum
officia ducerentur, satis expositum videtur. Eorum autem ipsorum, quae
honesta sunt, potest incidere saepe contentio et comparatio, de duobus
honestis utrum honestius, qui locus a Panaetio est praetermissus. Nam
cum omnis honestas manet a partibus quattuor, quarum una sit
cognitionis, altera communitatis, tertia magnanimitatis, quarta
moderationis, haec in deligendo officio saepe inter se comparentur
necesse est.

*153* Placet igitur aptiora esse naturae ea officia, quae ex
communitate, quam ea, quae ex cognitione ducantur, idque hoc argumento
confirmari potest, quod, si contigerit ea vita sapienti, ut omnium rerum
affluentibus copiis [quamvis] omnia,[154] quae cognitione digna sint,
summo otio secum ipse consideret et contempletur, tamen, si solitudo
tanta sit, ut hominem videre non possit, excedat e vita. Princepsque
omnium virtutum illa sapientia, quam σοφίαν Graeci vocant--prudentiam
enim, quam Graeci φρόνησιν dicunt, aliam quandam intellegimus, quae est
rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia; illa autem sapientia, quam
principem dixi, rerum est divinarum et humanarum scientia, in qua
continetur deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos; ea si
maxima est, ut est certe, necesse est, quod a communitate ducatur
officium, id esse maximum. Etenim cognitio contemplatioque naturae manca
quodam modo atque inchoata sit, si nulla actio rerum consequatur. Ea
autem actio in hominum commodis tuendis maxime cernitur; pertinet igitur
ad societatem generis humani; ergo haec cognitioni anteponenda est.

*154* Atque id optimus quisque re ipsa[155] ostendit et iudicat. Quis
enim est tam cupidus in perspicienda cognoscendaque rerum natura, ut, si
ei tractanti contemplantique res cognitione dignissimas subito sit
allatum periculum discrimenque patriae, cui subvenire opitularique
possit, non illa omnia relinquat atque abiciat, etiamsi dinumerare se
stellas aut metiri mundi magnitudinem posse arbitretur? atque hoc idem
in parentis, in amici re aut periculo fecerit.

*155* Quibus rebus intellegitur studiis officiisque scientiae
praeponenda esse officia iustitiae, quae pertinent ad hominum
utilitatem,[156] qua nihil homini esse debet antiquius.

    [154] _copiis_ [_quamvis_] _omnia_, Ed.; _copiis quamvis omnia_
    MSS.; _copiis omnia_ Lambinus, Bt., Müller, Heine.

    [155] _re ipsa_ B H a b, Bt., Ed.; _re ab se_ L c (i.e.
    _reapse_ Orelli, Müller, Heine); _ab ipsa re_ p.

    [156] _utilitatem_ B H a b; _caritatem_ L c p (affection).

#Comparative estimate of duties.#

*152* XLIII. Now, I think I have explained fully enough how moral duties
are derived from the four divisions of moral rectitude. But between
those very actions which are morally right, a conflict and comparison
may frequently arise, as to which of two moral actions is morally
better--a point overlooked by Panaetius. For, since all moral rectitude
springs from four sources (one of which is prudence; the second, social
instinct; the third, courage; the fourth, temperance) it is often
necessary in deciding a question of duty that these virtues be weighed
against one another.

#Justice _vs._ Wisdom.#

*153* My view, therefore, is that those duties are closer to nature
which depend upon the social instinct than those which depend upon
knowledge; and this view can be confirmed by the following argument: (1)
suppose that a wise man should be vouchsafed such a life that, with an
abundance of everything pouring in upon him, he might in perfect peace
study and ponder over everything that is worth knowing, still, if the
solitude were so complete that he could never see a human being, he
would die. And then, the foremost of all virtues is wisdom--what the
Greeks call σοφία; for by prudence, which they call φρόνησις, we
understand something else, namely, the practical knowledge of things to
be sought for and of things to be avoided. (2) Again, that wisdom which
I have given the foremost place is the knowledge of things human and
divine, which is concerned also with the bonds of union between gods and
men and the relations of man to man. If wisdom is the most important of
the virtues, as it certainly is, it necessarily follows that that duty
which is connected with the social obligation is the most important
duty.[AG] And (3) service is better than mere theoretical knowledge, for
the study and knowledge of the universe would somehow be lame and
defective, were no practical results to follow. Such results, moreover,
are best seen in the safe-guarding of human interests. It is essential,
then, to human society; and it should, therefore, be ranked above
speculative knowledge.

*154* Upon this all the best men agree, as they prove by their conduct.
For who is so absorbed in the investigation and study of creation, but
that, even though he were working and pondering over tasks never so much
worth mastering and even though he thought he could number the stars and
measure the length and breadth of the universe, he would drop all those
problems and cast them aside, if word were suddenly brought to him of
some critical peril to his country, which he could relieve or repel? And
he would do the same to further the interests of parent or friend or to
save him from danger.

*155* From all this we conclude that the duties prescribed by justice
must be given precedence over the pursuit of knowledge and the duties
imposed by it; for the former concern the welfare of our fellow-men; and
nothing ought to be more sacred in men's eyes than that.

    [AG] Cicero is guilty of a curious fallacy. If it follows
    from his premises, (1) some one virtue is the highest virtue,
    and (2) the duties derived from the highest virtue are the
    highest duties, and if (3) wisdom is the highest virtue, then
    it can only follow that the duties derived from wisdom are
    the highest duties. But Cicero throws in a fourth premise
    that the "bonds of union between gods and men and the
    relations of man to man" are derived from wisdom, and
    therewith sidetracks wisdom and gives the duties derived from
    the social instinct the place from which wisdom has been
    shunted.

    Cicero could not refrain from introducing a bit of
    theoretical speculation that has no value for his practical
    position--it actually prejudices it and confuses the reader.

XLIV. Atque illi, quorum studia vitaque omnis in rerum cognitione
versata est, tamen ab augendis hominum utilitatibus et commodis non
recesserunt: nam et erudiverunt multos, quo meliores cives utilioresque
rebus suis publicis essent, ut Thebanum Epaminondam Lysis Pythagoreus,
Syracosium Dionem Plato multique multos, nosque ipsi, quicquid ad rem
publicam attulimus, si modo aliquid attulimus, a doctoribus atque
doctrina instructi ad eam et ornati accessimus. *156* Neque solum vivi
atque praesentes studiosos discendi erudiunt atque docent, sed hoc idem
etiam post mortem monumentis litterarum assequuntur. Nec enim locus
ullus est praetermissus ab iis, qui ad leges, qui ad mores, qui ad
disciplinam rei publicae pertineret, ut otium suum ad nostrum negotium
contulisse videantur. Ita illi ipsi doctrinae studiis et sapientiae
dediti ad hominum utilitatem suam prudentiam intellegentiamque
potissimum conferunt; ob eamque etiam causam eloqui copiose, modo
prudenter, melius est quam vel acutissime sine eloquentia cogitare, quod
cogitatio in se ipsa vertitur, eloquentia complectitur eos, quibuscum
communitate iuncti sumus.

*157* Atque ut apium examina non fingendorum favorum causa congregantur,
sed, cum congregabilia natura sint, fingunt favos, sic homines, ac multo
etiam magis, natura congregati adhibent agendi cogitandique[157]
sollertiam. Itaque, nisi ea virtus, quae constat ex hominibus tuendis,
id est ex societate generis humani, attingat cognitionem rerum, solivaga
cognitio et ieiuna videatur, itemque magnitudo animi remota
communitate[158] coniunctioneque humana feritas sit quaedam et
immanitas. Ita fit, ut vincat cognitionis studium consociatio hominum
atque communitas.

#Plato, Rep. II, 369 B; Arist., Pol. I, 1253 A#

*158* Nec verum est, quod dicitur a quibusdam, propter necessitatem
vitae, quod ea, quae natura desideraret, consequi sine aliis atque
efficere non possemus, idcirco initam esse cum hominibus communitatem et
societatem; quodsi omnia nobis, quae ad victum cultumque pertinent,
quasi virgula divina, ut aiunt, suppeditarentur, tum optimo quisque
ingenio negotiis omnibus omissis totum se in cognitione et scientia
collocaret. Non est ita; nam et solitudinem fugeret et socium studii
quaereret, tum docere tum discere vellet, tum audire tum dicere. Ergo
omne officium, quod ad coniunctionem hominum et ad societatem tuendam
valet, anteponendum est illi officio, quod cognitione et scientia
continetur.

    [157] _cogitandique_ L c p, Edd.; _congregandique_ B H a b.

    [158] _communitate_ p (per compendium), Bt.^2, Müller, Heine;
    _comitate_ A B H L a b c.

#Wisdom in the service of Justice.#

XLIV. And yet scholars, whose whole life and interests have been devoted
to the pursuit of knowledge, have not, after all, failed to contribute
to the advantages and blessings of mankind. For they have trained many
to be better citizens and to render larger service to their country. So,
for example, the Pythagorean Lysis taught Epaminondas of Thebes; Plato,
Dion of Syracuse; and many, many others. As for me myself, whatever
service I have rendered to my country--if, indeed, I have rendered
any--I came to my task trained and equipped for it by my teachers and
what they taught me. *156* And not only while present in the flesh do
they teach and train those who are desirous of learning, but by the
written memorials of their learning they continue the same service after
they are dead. For they have overlooked no point that has a bearing
upon laws, customs, or political science; in fact, they seem to have
devoted their retirement to the benefit of us who are engaged in public
business. The principal thing done, therefore, by those very devotees of
the pursuits of learning and science is to apply their own practical
wisdom and insight to the service of humanity. And for that reason also
much speaking (if only it contain wisdom) is better than speculation
never so profound without speech; for mere speculation is self-centred,
while speech extends its benefits to those with whom we are united by
the bonds of society.

*157* And again, as swarms of bees do not gather for the sake of making
honeycomb but make the honeycomb because they are gregarious by nature,
so human beings--and to a much higher degree--exercise their skill
together in action and thought because they are naturally gregarious.
#Justice more valuable than Wisdom and Fortitude.# And so, if that
virtue [Justice] which centres in the safeguarding of human interests,
that is, in the maintenance of human society, were not to accompany the
pursuit of knowledge, that knowledge would seem isolated and barren of
results. In the same way, courage [Fortitude], if unrestrained by the
uniting bonds of society, would be but a sort of brutality and savagery.
Hence it follows that the claims of human society and the bonds that
unite men together take precedence of the pursuit of speculative
knowledge.

*158* And it is not true, as certain people maintain, that the bonds of
union in human society were instituted in order to provide for the needs
of daily life; for, they say, without the aid of others we could not
secure for ourselves or supply to others the things that nature
requires; but if all that is essential to our wants and comfort were
supplied by some magic wand, as in the stories, then every man of
first-rate ability could drop all other responsibility and devote
himself exclusively to learning and study. Not at all. For he would seek
to escape from his loneliness and to find some one to share his studies;
he would wish to teach, as well as to learn; to hear, as well as to
speak. Every duty, therefore, that tends effectively to maintain and
safeguard human society should be given the preference over that duty
which arises from speculation and science alone.

*159* XLV. Illud forsitan quaerendum sit, num haec communitas, quae
maxime est apta naturae, sit etiam moderationi modestiaeque semper
anteponenda. Non placet; sunt enim quaedam partim ita foeda, partim ita
flagitiosa, ut ea ne conservandae quidem patriae causa sapiens facturus
sit. Ea Posidonius collegit permulta, sed ita taetra quaedam, ita
obscena, ut dictu quoque videantur turpia. Haec igitur non suscipiet rei
publicae causa, ne res publica quidem pro se suscipi volet. Sed hoc[159]
commodius se res habet, quod non potest accidere tempus, ut intersit rei
publicae quicquam illorum facere sapientem.

*160* Quare hoc quidem effectum sit, in officiis deligendis id[160]
genus officiorum excellere, quod teneatur hominum societate. [Etenim
cognitionem prudentiamque sequetur considerata actio; ita fit, ut agere
considerate pluris sit quam cogitare prudenter.][161]

Atque haec quidem hactenus. Patefactus enim locus est ipse, ut non
difficile sit in exquirendo officio, quid cuique sit praeponendum,
videre. In ipsa autem communitate sunt gradus officiorum, ex quibus,
quid cuique praestet, intellegi possit, ut prima dis immortalibus,
secunda patriae, tertia parentibus, deinceps gradatim reliquis
debeantur.

*161* Quibus ex rebus breviter disputatis intellegi potest non solum id
homines solere dubitare, honestumne an turpe sit, sed etiam duobus
propositis honestis utrum honestius sit. Hic locus a Panaetio est, ut
supra dixi, praetermissus. Sed iam ad reliqua pergamus.

    [159] _hoc_ L c p, Edd.; _haec_ B H a b.

    [160] _id_ a, Edd.; _ut_ b; _hoc_ B H L c p.

    [161] _Etenim ... prudenter_ bracketed by Unger.

#Justice _vs._ Temperance.#

*159* XLV. The following question should, perhaps, be asked: whether
this social instinct, which is the deepest feeling in our nature, is
always to have precedence over temperance and moderation also. I think
not. For there are some acts either so repulsive or so wicked, that a
wise man would not commit them, even to save his country. Posidonius has
made a large collection of them; but some of them are so shocking, so
indecent, that it seems immoral even to mention them. The wise man,
therefore, will not think of doing any such thing for the sake of his
country; no more will his country consent to have it done for her. But
the problem is the more easily disposed of because the occasion cannot
arise when it could be to the state's interest to have the wise man do
any of those things.

#Order of precedence of duties.#

*160* This, then, may be regarded as settled: in choosing between
conflicting duties, that class takes precedence which is demanded by the
interests of human society. [And this is the natural sequence; for
discreet action will presuppose learning and practical wisdom; it
follows, therefore, that discreet action is of more value than wise (but
inactive) speculation.]

So much must suffice for this topic. For, in its essence, it has been
made so clear, that in determining a question of duty it is not
difficult to see which duty is to be preferred to any other. Moreover,
even in the social relations themselves there are gradations of duty so
well defined that it can easily be seen which duty takes precedence of
any other: our first duty is to the immortal gods; our second, to
country; our third, to parents; and so on, in a descending scale, to the
rest.

*161* From this brief discussion, then, it can be understood that people
are often in doubt not only whether an action is morally right or wrong,
but also, when a choice is offered between two moral actions, which one
is morally better. This point, as I remarked above, has been overlooked
by Panaetius. But let us now pass on to what remains.

CICERO DE OFFICIIS

BOOK II

EXPEDIENCY

LIBER SECUNDUS / BOOK II

*1* I. Quem ad modum officia ducerentur ab honestate, Marce fili, atque
ab omni genere virtutis, satis explicatum arbitror libro superiore.
Sequitur, ut haec officiorum genera persequar, quae pertinent ad vitae
cultum et ad earum rerum, quibus utuntur homines, facultatem, ad opes,
ad copias[; in quo tum quaeri dixi, quid utile, quid inutile, tum ex
utilibus quid utilius aut quid maxime utile].[162] De quibus dicere
aggrediar, si pauca prius de instituto ac de iudicio meo dixero.

*2* Quamquam enim libri nostri complures non modo ad legendi, sed etiam
ad scribendi studium excitaverunt, tamen interdum vereor, ne quibusdam
bonis viris philosophiae nomen sit invisum mirenturque in ea tantum me
operae et temporis ponere.

Ego autem, quam diu res publica per eos gerebatur, quibus se ipsa
commiserat, omnis meas curas cogitationesque in eam conferebam; cum
autem dominatu unius omnia tenerentur neque esset usquam consilio aut
auctoritati locus, socios denique tuendae rei publicae, summos viros,
amisissem, nec me angoribus dedidi, quibus essem confectus, nisi iis
restitissem, nec rursum indignis homine docto voluptatibus.

*3* Atque utinam res publica stetisset, quo coeperat, statu nec in
homines non tam commutandarum quam evertendarum rerum cupidos
incidisset! Primum enim, ut stante re publica facere solebamus, in
agendo plus quam in scribendo operae poneremus, deinde ipsis scriptis
non ea, quae nunc, sed actiones nostras mandaremus, ut saepe fecimus.
Cum autem res publica, in qua omnis mea cura, cogitatio, opera poni
solebat, nulla esset omnino, illae scilicet litterae conticuerunt
forenses et senatoriae. *4* Nihil agere autem cum animus non posset, in
his studiis ab initio versatus aetatis existimavi honestissime
molestias[163] posse deponi, si me ad philosophiam rettulissem. Cui cum
multum adulescens discendi causa temporis tribuissem, posteaquam
honoribus inservire coepi meque totum rei publicae tradidi, tantum erat
philosophiae loci, quantum superfuerat amicorum et rei publicae
temporibus;[164] id autem omne consumebatur in legendo, scribendi otium
non erat.

    [162] _in quo ... maxime utile_ bracketed by Heumann,
    Facciolati, Edd.; _tum ex ... maxime utile_ not in B H a b.

    [163] _molestias_ L c p, Nonius, Edd.; not in B H a b.

    [164] _temporibus_ Victorius, Edd.; _temporis_ B H a b;
    _tempori_ L c p.

#Statement of subject.#

*1* I. I believe, Marcus, my son, that I have fully explained in the
preceding book how duties are from moral rectitude, or rather from each
of virtue's four divisions. My next step is to trace out those kinds of
duty which have to do with the comforts of life, with the means of
acquiring the things that people enjoy, with influence, and with wealth.
[In this connection, the question is, as I said: (1) what is expedient,
and what is inexpedient; and (2) of several expedients, which is of more
and which of most importance.] These questions I shall proceed to
discuss, after I have said a few words in vindication of my present
purpose and my principles of philosophy.

#Why Cicero wrote on philosophy.#

*2* Although my books have aroused in not a few men the desire not only
to read but to write, yet I sometimes fear that what we term philosophy
is distasteful to certain worthy gentlemen, and that they wonder that I
devote so much time and attention to it.

Now, as long as the state was administered by the men to whose care she
had voluntarily entrusted herself, I devoted all my effort and thought
to her. But when everything passed under the absolute control of a
despot and there was no longer any room for statesmanship or authority
of mine; and finally when I had lost the friends[AH] who had been
associated with me in the task of serving the interests of the state,
and who were men of the highest standing, I did not resign myself to
grief, by which I should have been overwhelmed, had I not struggled
against it; neither, on the other hand, did I surrender myself to a life
of sensual pleasure unbecoming to a philosopher.

*3* I would that the government had stood fast in the position it had
begun to assume and had not fallen into the hands of men who desired not
so much to reform as to abolish the constitution. For then, in the first
place, I should now be devoting my energies more to public speaking than
to writing, as I used to do when the republic stood; and in the second
place, I should be committing to written form not these present essays
but my public speeches, as I often formerly did. But when the republic,
to which all my care and thought and effort used to be devoted, was no
more, then, of course, my voice was silenced in the forum and in the
senate. *4* And since my mind could not be wholly idle, I thought, as I
had been well-read along these lines of thought from my early youth,
that the most honourable way for me to forget my sorrows would be by
turning to philosophy. As a young man, I had devoted a great deal of
time to philosophy as a discipline; but after I began to fill the high
offices of state and devoted myself heart and soul to the public
service, there was only so much time for philosophical studies as was
left over from the claims of my friends and of the state; all of this
was spent in reading; I had no leisure for writing.

    [AH] Such as Pompey, Cato, Hortensius, and Piso.

*5* II. Maximis igitur in malis hoc tamen boni assecuti videmur, ut ea
litteris mandaremus, quae nec erant satis nota nostris et erant
cognitione dignissima. Quid enim est, per deos, optabilius sapientia,
quid praestantius, quid homini melius, quid homine dignius? Hanc igitur
qui expetunt,[165] philosophi nominantur, nec quicquam aliud est
philosophia, si interpretari velis, praeter studium sapientiae.
Sapientia autem est, ut a veteribus philosophis definitum est, rerum
divinarum et humanarum causarumque, quibus eae res continentur,
scientia; cuius studium qui vituperat, haud sane intellego, quidnam sit,
quod laudandum putet. *6* Nam sive oblectatio quaeritur animi requiesque
curarum, quae conferri cum eorum studiis potest, qui semper aliquid
anquirunt, quod spectet et valeat ad bene beateque vivendum? sive ratio
constantiae virtutisque ducitur, aut haec ars est aut nulla omnino, per
quam eas assequamur. Nullam dicere maximarum rerum artem esse, cum
minimarum sine arte nulla sit, hominum est parum considerate loquentium
atque in maximis rebus errantium. Si autem est aliqua disciplina
virtutis, ubi ea quaeretur, cum ab hoc discendi genere discesseris?

#Hortensius, de Div., II, 1.#

Sed haec, cum ad philosophiam cohortamur, accuratius disputari solent,
quod alio quodam libro fecimus; hoc autem tempore tantum nobis
declarandum fuit, cur orbati rei publicae muneribus ad hoc nos studium
potissimum contulissemus.

*7* Occurritur autem nobis, et quidem a doctis et eruditis quaerentibus,
satisne constanter facere videamur, qui, cum percipi nihil posse
dicamus, tamen et aliis de rebus disserere soleamus et hoc ipso tempore
praecepta officii persequamur. Quibus vellem satis cognita esset nostra
sententia. Non enim sumus ii, quorum vagetur animus errore nec habeat
umquam, quid sequatur. Quae enim esset ista mens vel quae vita potius
non modo disputandi, sed etiam vivendi ratione sublata? Nos autem, ut
ceteri alia certa, alia incerta esse dicunt, sic ab his dissentientes
alia probabilia, contra alia dicimus.

*8* Quid est igitur, quod me impediat ea, quae probabilia mihi
videantur, sequi, quae contra, improbare atque affirmandi arrogantiam
vitantem fugere temeritatem, quae a sapientia dissidet plurimum? Contra
autem omnia disputatur[166] a nostris, quod hoc ipsum probabile elucere
non posset,[167] nisi ex utraque parte causarum esset facta contentio.

#II, 20 ff.#

Sed haec explanata sunt in Academicis nostris satis, ut arbitror,
diligenter. Tibi autem, mi Cicero, quamquam in antiquissima
nobilissimaque philosophia Cratippo auctore versaris iis simillimo, qui
ista praeclara pepererunt, tamen haec nostra finitima vestris ignota
esse nolui.

Sed iam ad instituta pergamus.

    [165] _expetunt_ L c p, Edd.; _expetant_ H; _expectant_ B a
    b.

    [166] _disputatur_ Edd.; _disputantur_ MSS.

    [167] _posset_ a c; _possit_ B H b.

#Why philosophy is worth while.#

*5* II. Therefore, amid all the present most awful calamities I yet
flatter myself that I have won this good out of evil--that I may commit
to written form matters not at all familiar to our countrymen but still
very much worth their knowing. For what, in the name of heaven, is more
to be desired than wisdom? What is more to be prized? What is better
for a man, what more worthy of his nature? Those who seek after it are
called philosophers; and philosophy is nothing else, if one will
translate the word into our idiom, than "the love of wisdom." Wisdom,
moreover, as the word has been defined by the philosophers of old, is
"the knowledge of things human and divine and of the causes by which
those things are controlled." And if the man lives who would belittle
the study of philosophy, I quite fail to see what in the world he would
see fit to praise. *6* For if we are looking for mental enjoyment and
relaxation, what pleasure can be compared with the pursuits of those who
are always studying out something that will tend toward and effectively
promote a good and happy life? Or, if regard is had for strength of
character and virtue, then this is the method by which we can attain to
those qualities, or there is none at all. And to say that there is no
"method" for securing the highest blessings, when none even of the least
important concerns is without its method, is the language of people who
talk without due reflection and who blunder in matters of the utmost
importance. Furthermore, if there is really a way to learn virtue, where
shall one look for it, when one has turned aside from this field of
learning?

Now, when I am advocating the study of philosophy, I usually discuss
this subject at greater length, as I have done in another of my books.
For the present I meant only to explain why, deprived of the tasks of
public service, I have devoted myself to this particular pursuit.

#Position of the New Academy.#

*7* But people raise other objections against me--and that, too,
philosophers and scholars--asking whether I think I am quite consistent
in my conduct: for although our school maintains that nothing can be
known for certain, yet, they urge, I make a habit of presenting my
opinions on all sorts of subjects and at this very moment am trying to
formulate rules of duty. But I wish that they had a proper understanding
of our position. For we Academicians are not men whose minds wander in
uncertainty and never know what principles to adopt. For what sort of
mental habit, or rather what sort of life would that be which should
dispense with all rules for reasoning or even for living? Not so with
us; but, as other schools maintain that some things are certain, others
uncertain, we, differing with them, say that some things are probable,
others improbable.

*8* What, then, is to hinder me from accepting what seems to me to be
probable, while rejecting what seems to be improbable, and from shunning
the presumption of dogmatism, while keeping clear of that recklessness
of assertion which is as far as possible removed from true wisdom? And
as to the fact that our school argues against everything, that is only
because we could not get a clear view of what is "probable," unless a
comparative estimate were made of all the arguments on both sides.

But this subject has been, I think, quite fully set forth in my
"Academics." And although, my dear Cicero, you are a student of that
most ancient and celebrated school of philosophy, with Cratippus as your
master--and he deserves to be classed with the founders of that
illustrious sect[AI]--still I wish our school, which is closely related
to yours, not to be unknown to you.

Let us now proceed to the task in hand.

    [AI] Aristotle and Theophrastus.

*9* III. Quinque igitur rationibus propositis officii persequendi,
quarum duae ad decus honestatemque pertinerent, duae ad commoda vitae,
copias, opes, facultates, quinta ad eligendi iudicium, si quando ea,
quae dixi, pugnare inter se viderentur, honestatis pars confecta est,
quam quidem tibi cupio esse notissimam.

Hoc autem, de quo nunc agimus, id ipsum est, quod "utile" appellatur. In
quo verbo lapsa consuetudo deflexit de via sensimque eo deducta est, ut
honestatem ab utilitate secernens constitueret esse honestum aliquid,
quod utile non esset, et utile, quod non honestum, qua nulla pernicies
maior hominum vitae potuit afferri.

*10* Summa quidem auctoritate philosophi severe sane atque honeste haec
tria genera confusa[168] cogitatione distinguunt. [Quicquid enim iustum
sit, id etiam utile esse censent, itemque quod honestum, idem iustum; ex
quo efficitur, ut, quicquid honestum sit, idem sit utile.][169] Quod qui
parum perspiciunt, ii saepe versutos homines et callidos admirantes
malitiam sapientiam iudicant. Quorum error eripiendus est opinioque
omnis ad eam spem traducenda, ut honestis consiliis iustisque factis,
non fraude et malitia se intellegant ea, quae velint, consequi posse.

*11* Quae ergo ad vitam hominum tuendam pertinent, partim sunt inanima,
ut aurum, argentum, ut ea, quae gignuntur e terra, ut alia generis
eiusdem, partim animalia, quae habent suos impetus et rerum appetitus.
Eorum autem alia[170] rationis expertia sunt, alia ratione utentia;
expertes rationis equi, boves, reliquae pecudes, [apes,][171] quarum
opere efficitur aliquid ad usum hominum atque vitam; ratione autem
utentium duo genera ponunt, deorum unum, alterum hominum. Deos placatos
pietas efficiet et sanctitas, proxime autem et secundum deos homines
hominibus maxime utiles esse possunt.

*12* Earumque item rerum, quae noceant et obsint, eadem divisio est. Sed
quia deos nocere non putant, iis exceptis homines hominibus obesse
plurimum arbitrantur.

Ea enim ipsa, quae inanima diximus, pleraque sunt hominum operis
effecta; quae nec haberemus, nisi manus et ars accessisset, nec iis sine
hominum administratione uteremur. Neque enim valetudinis curatio neque
navigatio neque agri cultura neque frugum fructuumque reliquorum
perceptio et conservatio sine hominum opera ulla esse potuisset. *13*
Iam vero et earum rerum, quibus abundaremus, exportatio et earum, quibus
egeremus, invectio certe nulla esset, nisi his[172] muneribus homines
fungerentur. #(Attius, Prometheus?), Inc. inc. fab. Ribbeck^2, 154#
Eademque ratione nec lapides ex terra exciderentur ad usum nostrum
necessarii, nec "ferrum, aes, aurum, argentum" effoderetur "penitus
abditum" sine hominum labore et manu.

    [168] _haec tria genera confusa_ B H a b, Bt.^2, Heine; _haec
    tria genere confusa_ c, Bt.^1, Müller; _haec tria genera, re
    confusa_ J. F. Heusinger.

    [169] _Quicquid ... sit utile_ bracketed by Unger, Bt.^2,
    Müller, Heine.

    [170] _alia_ H^2 (inserted above the line) a, Edd.; not in B
    H^1 b; _partim_ c.

    [171] _apes_ MSS.; bracketed by Facciolati, Edd.

    [172] _his_ H, Edd.; _iis_ B L b; _hijs_ c.

#Expediency and Moral Rectitude identical.#

*9* III. Five principles, accordingly, have been laid down for the
pursuance of duty: two of them have to do with propriety and moral
rectitude; two, with the external conveniences of life--means, wealth,
influence; the fifth, with the proper choice, if ever the four first
mentioned seem to be in conflict. The division treating of moral
rectitude, then, has been completed, and this is the part with which I
desire you to be most familiar.

The principle with which we are now dealing is that one which is called
Expediency. The usage of this word has been corrupted and perverted and
has gradually come to the point where, separating moral rectitude from
expediency, it is accepted that a thing may be morally right without
being expedient, and expedient without being morally right. No more
pernicious doctrine than this could be introduced into human life.

*10* There are, to be sure, philosophers of the very highest reputation
who distinguish theoretically between these three conceptions,[AJ]
although they are indissolubly blended together; and they do this, I
assume, on moral, conscientious principles. [For whatever is just, they
hold, is also expedient; and in like manner, whatever is morally right
is also just. It follows, then, that whatever is morally right, is also
expedient.] Those who fail to comprehend that theory do often, in their
admiration for shrewd and clever men, take craftiness for wisdom. But
they must be disabused of this error and their way of thinking must be
wholly converted to the hope and conviction that it is only by moral
character and righteousness, not by dishonesty and craftiness, that they
may attain to the objects of their desires.

#Classification of expedients.#

*11* Of the things, then, that are essential to the sustenance of human
life, some are inanimate (gold and silver, for example, the fruits of
the earth, and so forth), and some are animate and have their own
peculiar instincts and appetites. Of these again some are rational,
others irrational. Horses, oxen, and the other cattle, [bees,] whose
labour contributes more or less to the service and subsistence of man,
are not endowed with reason; of rational beings two divisions are
made--gods and men. Worship and purity of character will win the favour
of the gods; and next to the gods, and a close second to them, men can
be most helpful to men.

*12* The same classification may likewise be made of the things that are
injurious and hurtful. But as people think that the gods bring us no
harm, they decide (leaving the gods out of the question) that men are
most hurtful to men.

#Necessity of man's helpfulness to man.#

As for mutual helpfulness, those very things which we have called
inanimate are for the most part themselves produced by man's labours; we
should not have them without the application of manual labour and skill
nor could we enjoy them without the intervention of man. And so with
many other things: for without man's industry there could have been no
provisions for health, no navigation, no agriculture, no ingathering or
storing of the fruits of the field or other kinds of produce. *13* Then,
too, there would surely be no exportation of our superfluous commodities
or importation of those we lack, did not men perform these services. By
the same process of reasoning, without the labour of man's hands, the
stone needful for our use would not be quarried from the earth, nor
would "iron, copper, gold, and silver, hidden far within," be mined.

    [AJ] That is, they make a false distinction between (1) moral
    rectitude that is at the same time expedient; (2) moral
    rectitude that is (apparently) not expedient; and (3) the
    expedient that is (apparently) not morally right.

IV. Tecta vero, quibus et frigorum vis pelleretur et calorum molestiae
sedarentur, unde aut initio generi humano dari potuissent aut postea
subveniri,[173] si aut vi tempestatis aut terrae motu aut vetustate
cecidissent, nisi communis vita ab hominibus harum rerum auxilia petere
didicisset? *14* Adde ductus aquarum, derivationes fluminum, agrorum
irrigationes, moles oppositas fluctibus, portus manu factos, quae unde
sine hominum opere habere possemus? Ex quibus multisque aliis perspicuum
est, qui fructus quaeque utilitates ex rebus iis, quae sint inanimae,
percipiantur, eas nos nullo modo sine hominum manu atque opera capere
potuisse.

Qui denique ex bestiis fructus aut quae commoditas, nisi homines
adiuvarent, percipi posset? Nam et qui principes inveniendi fuerunt,
quem ex quaque belua usum habere possemus, homines certe fuerunt, nec
hoc tempore sine hominum opera aut pascere eas aut domare aut tueri aut
tempestivos fructus ex iis capere possemus; ab eisdemque et, quae
nocent,[174] interficiuntur et, quae usui possunt esse, capiuntur.

*15* Quid enumerem artium multitudinem, sine quibus vita omnino nulla
esse potuisset? Qui enim aegris subveniretur,[175] quae esset oblectatio
valentium, qui victus aut cultus, nisi tam multae nobis artes
ministrarent? quibus rebus exculta hominum vita tantum distat[176] a
victu et cultu bestiarum. Urbes vero sine hominum coetu non potuissent
nec aedificari nec frequentari; ex quo leges moresque constituti, tum
iuris aequa discriptio[177] certaque vivendi disciplina; quas res et
mansuetudo animorum consecuta et verecundia est effectumque, ut esset
vita munitior, atque ut dando et accipiendo mutuandisque facultatibus et
commodandis[178] nulla re egeremus.

    [173] _subveniri_ L c, Müller, Heine; _subvenire_ B H a b,
    Bt., Ed.

    [174] _et, quae nocent_ Bt.^2; _et eae, quae nocent_ B H b,
    Bt.^1; _et ea quae nocent_ L; _ea quae nocent_ c.

    [175] _qui ... subveniretur_ Gernhard, Edd.; _qui ...
    subvenire_ B H; _quis ... subveniret_ L c; _quid ...
    subveniret_ a b.

    [176] _distat_ L c p, Müller, Heine; _destitute_ B H a b, Bt.

    [177] _discriptio_ H b; _descriptio_ B a c.

    [178] _mutuandisque facultatibus et commodandis_ Nonius,
    Bt.^2, Müller; _mutandisque facultatibus et commodis_ MSS.,
    Bt.^1, Heine.

#Mutual helpfulness the key to civilization.#

IV. And how could houses ever have been provided in the first place for
the human race, to keep out the rigours of the cold and alleviate the
discomforts of the heat; or how could the ravages of furious tempest or
of earthquake or of time upon them afterward have been repaired, had not
the bonds of social life taught men in such events to look to their
fellow-men for help? *14* Think of the aqueducts, canals, irrigation
works, breakwaters, artificial harbours; how should we have these
without the work of man? From these and many other illustrations it is
obvious that we could not in any way, without the work of man's hands,
have received the profits and the benefits accruing from inanimate
things.

Finally, of what profit or service could animals be, without the
co-operation of man? For it was men who were the foremost in discovering
what use could be made of each beast; and to-day, if it were not for
man's labour, we could neither feed them nor break them in nor take care
of them nor yet secure the profits from them in due season. By man, too,
noxious beasts are destroyed, and those that can be of use are captured.

*15* Why should I recount the multitude of arts without which life would
not be worth living at all? For how would the sick be healed? What
pleasure would the well enjoy? What comforts should we have, if there
were not so many arts to minister to our wants? In all these respects
the civilized life of man is far removed from the standard of the
comforts and wants of the lower animals. And without the association of
men, cities could not have been built or peopled. In consequence of city
life, laws and customs were established, and then came the equitable
distribution of private rights and a definite social system. Upon these
institutions followed a more humane spirit and consideration for others,
with the result that life was better supplied with all it requires, and
by giving and receiving, by mutual exchange of commodities and
conveniences, we succeeded in meeting all our wants.

*16* V. Longiores hoc loco sumus, quam necesse est. Quis est enim, cui
non perspicua sint illa, quae pluribus verbis a Panaetio commemorantur,
neminem neque ducem bello[179] nec principem domi magnas res et
salutares sine hominum studiis gerere potuisse? Commemoratur ab eo
Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexander, quos negat sine
adiumentis hominum tantas res efficere potuisse. Utitur in re non dubia
testibus non necessariis.

Atque ut magnas utilitates adipiscimur conspiratione hominum atque
consensu, sic nulla tam detestabilis pestis est, quae non homini ab
homine nascatur. Est Dicaearchi liber de interitu hominum, Peripatetici
magni et copiosi, qui collectis ceteris causis eluvionis, pestilentiae,
vastitatis, beluarum etiam repentinae multitudinis, quarum impetu docet
quaedam hominum genera esse consumpta, deinde comparat, quanto plures
deleti sint homines hominum impetu, id est bellis aut seditionibus, quam
omni reliqua calamitate.

*17* Cum igitur hic locus nihil habeat dubitationis, quin homines
plurimum hominibus et prosint et obsint, proprium hoc statuo esse
virtutis, conciliare animos hominum et ad usus suos adiungere. Itaque,
quae in rebus inanimis quaeque in usu et[180] tractatione beluarum fiunt
utiliter ad hominum vitam, artibus ea tribuuntur operosis, hominum autem
studia ad amplificationem nostrarum rerum prompta ac parata [virorum
praestantium][181] sapientia et virtute excitantur. *18* Etenim virtus
omnis tribus in rebus fere vertitur, quarum una est in perspiciendo,
quid in quaque re verum sincerumque sit, quid consentaneum cuique, quid
consequens, ex quo quaeque gignantur, quae cuiusque rei causa sit,
alterum cohibere motus animi turbatos, quos Graeci πάθη nominant,
appetitionesque, quas illi ὁρμάς, oboedientes efficere rationi, tertium
iis, quibuscum congregemur, uti moderate et scienter, quorum studiis ea,
quae natura desiderat, expleta cumulataque habeamus, per eosdemque, si
quid importetur nobis incommodi, propulsemus ulciscamurque eos, qui
nocere nobis conati sint, tantaque poena afficiamus, quantam aequitas
humanitasque patitur.

    [179] _bello_ B H a b, Müller, Heine; _belli_ L c p, Bt.

    [180] _usu et_ L c p; not in B H a b; bracketed by Bt.^1

    [181] _virorum praestantium_ bracketed by Ed.

*16* V. I have dwelt longer on this point than was necessary. For who is
there to whom those facts which Panaetius narrates at great length are
not self-evident--namely, that no one, either as a general in war or as
a statesman at home could have accomplished great things for the benefit
of the state, without the hearty co-operation of other men? He cites the
deeds of Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexander, who, he
says, could not have achieved so great success without the support of
other men. He calls in witnesses, whom he does not need, to prove a fact
that no one questions.

#Man's hurtfulness to man.#

And yet, as, on the one hand, we secure great advantages through the
sympathetic co-operation of our fellow-men; so, on the other, there is
no curse so terrible but it is brought down by man upon man. There is a
book by Dicaearchus on "The Destruction of Human Life." He was a famous
and eloquent Peripatetic and he gathered together all the other causes
of destruction--floods, epidemics, famines, and sudden incursions of
wild animals in myriads, by whose assaults, he informs us, whole tribes
of men have been wiped out. And then he proceeds to show by way of
comparison how many more men have been destroyed by the assaults of
men--that is, by wars or revolutions--than by any and all other sorts of
calamity.

#Co-operation and the virtues.#

*17* Since, therefore, there can be no doubt on this point, that man is
the source of both the greatest help and the greatest harm to man, I set
it down as the peculiar function of virtue to win the hearts of men and
to attach them to one's own service. And so those benefits that human
life derives from inanimate objects and from the employment and use of
animals are ascribed to the industrial arts; the co-operation of men, on
the other hand, prompt and ready for the advancement of our interests,
is secured through wisdom and virtue [in men of superior ability]. *18*
And, indeed, virtue in general may be said to consist almost wholly in
three properties: the first is [Wisdom,] the ability to perceive what in
any given instance is true and real, what its relations are, its
consequences, and its causes; the second is [Temperance,] the ability to
restrain the passions (which the Greeks call πάθη) and make the impulses
(ὁρμαί) obedient to reason; and the third is [Justice,] the skill to
treat with consideration and wisdom those with whom we are associated,
in order that we may through their co-operation have our natural wants
supplied in full and overflowing measure, that we may ward off any
impending trouble, avenge ourselves upon those who have attempted to
injure us, and visit them with such retribution as justice and humanity
will permit.

*19* VI. Quibus autem rationibus hanc facultatem assequi possimus, ut
hominum studia complectamur eaque teneamus, dicemus, neque ita multo
post, sed pauca ante dicenda sunt.

Magnam vim esse in fortuna in utramque partem, vel secundas ad res vel
adversas, quis ignorat? Nam et, cum prospero flatu eius utimur, ad
exitus pervehimur optatos et, cum reflavit, affligimur. Haec igitur ipsa
fortuna ceteros casus rariores habet, primum ab inanimis procellas,
tempestates, naufragia, ruinas, incendia, deinde a bestiis ictus,
morsus, impetus; haec ergo, ut dixi, rariora. *20* At vero interitus
exercituum, ut proxime trium, saepe multorum, clades imperatorum, ut
nuper summi et singularis viri, invidiae praeterea multitudinis atque ob
eas bene meritorum saepe civium expulsiones, calamitates, fugae,
rursusque secundae res, honores, imperia, victoriae, quamquam fortuita
sunt, tamen sine hominum opibus et studiis neutram in partem effici
possunt.

Hoc igitur cognito dicendum est, quonam modo hominum studia ad
utilitates nostras allicere atque excitare possimus. Quae si longior
fuerit oratio, cum magnitudine utilitatis comparetur; ita fortasse
etiam brevior videbitur.

*21* Quaecumque igitur homines homini tribuunt ad eum augendum atque
honestandum, aut benivolentiae gratia faciunt, cum aliqua de causa
quempiam diligunt, aut honoris, si cuius virtutem suspiciunt, quemque
dignum fortuna quam amplissima putant, aut cui fidem habent et bene
rebus suis consulere arbitrantur, aut cuius opes metuunt, aut contra, a
quibus aliquid exspectant, ut cum reges popularesve homines largitiones
aliquas proponunt, aut postremo pretio ac mercede ducuntur, quae
sordidissima est illa quidem ratio et inquinatissima et iis, qui ea
tenentur, et illis, qui ad eam[182] confugere conantur; *22* male enim
se res habet, cum, quod virtute effici debet, id temptatur pecunia. Sed
quoniam non numquam hoc subsidium necessarium est, quem ad modum sit
utendum eo, dicemus, si prius iis[183] de rebus, quae virtuti propiores
sunt, dixerimus.

Atque etiam subiciunt se homines imperio alterius et potestati de causis
pluribus. Ducuntur enim aut benivolentia aut beneficiorum magnitudine
aut dignitatis praestantia aut spe sibi id utile futurum aut metu, ne vi
parere cogantur, aut spe largitionis promissisque[184] capti aut
postremo, ut saepe in nostra re publica videmus, mercede conducti.

    [182] _eam_ c, Edd.; _ea_ B H a b.

    [183] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ B H a b; _hijs_ c.

    [184] _promissisque_ L c, Edd.; _promissionisque_ B H a b;
    _promissionibusque_ alii.

*19* VI. I shall presently discuss the means by which we can gain the
ability to win and hold the affections of our fellow-men; but I must say
a few words by way of preface.

#Co-operation _vs._ Fortune.#

Who fails to comprehend the enormous, two-fold power of Fortune for weal
and for woe? When we enjoy her favouring breeze, we are wafted over to
the wished for haven; when she blows against us, we are dashed to
destruction. Fortune herself, then, does send those other less usual
calamities, arising, first, from inanimate nature--hurricanes, storms,
shipwrecks, catastrophes, conflagrations; second, from wild
beasts--kicks, bites, and attacks. But these, as I have said, are
comparatively rare. *20* But think, on the one side, of the destruction
of armies (three lately, and many others at many different times), the
loss of generals (of a very able and eminent commander recently), the
hatred of the masses, too, and the banishment that as a consequence
frequently comes to men of eminent services, their degradation and
voluntary exile; think, on the other hand, of the successes, the civil
and military honours, and the victories;--though all these contain an
element of chance, still they cannot be brought about, whether for good
or for ill, without the influence and the co-operation of our
fellow-men.

With this understanding of the influence of Fortune, I may proceed to
explain how we can win the affectionate co-operation of our fellows and
enlist it in our service. And if the discussion of this point is unduly
prolonged, let the length be compared with the importance of the object
in view. It will then, perhaps, seem even too short.

#How men are led to promote another's interests.#

*21* Whenever, then, people bestow anything upon a fellow-man to raise
his estate or his dignity, it may be from any one of several motives:
(1) it may be out of good-will, when for some reason they are fond of
him; (2) it may be from esteem, if they look up to his worth and think
him deserving of the most splendid fortune a man can have; (3) they may
have confidence in him and think that they are thus acting for their own
interests; or (4) they may fear his power; (5) they may, on the
contrary, hope for some favour--as, for example, when princes or
demagogues bestow gifts of money; or, finally, (6) they may be moved by
the promise of payment or reward. This last is, I admit, the meanest and
most sordid motive of all, both for those who are swayed by it and for
those who venture to resort to it. *22* For things are in a bad way,
when that which should be obtained by merit is attempted by money. But
since recourse to this kind of support is sometimes indispensable, I
shall explain how it should be employed; but first I shall discuss those
qualities which are more closely allied to merit.

Now, it is by various motives that people are led to submit to another's
authority and power: they may be influenced (1) by good-will; (2) by
gratitude for generous favours conferred upon them; (3) by the eminence
of that other's social position or by the hope that their submission
will turn to their own account; (4) by fear that they may be compelled
perforce to submit; (5) they may be captivated by the hope of gifts of
money and by liberal promises; or, finally, (6) they may be bribed with
money, as we have frequently seen in our own country.

*23* VII. Omnium autem rerum nec aptius est quicquam ad opes tuendas ac
tenendas quam diligi nec alienius quam timeri. Praeclare enim Ennius:

#(Thyestes?) Fab. inc. Vahlen^2, 402#

Quém metuunt, odérunt; quem quisque ódit, periisse éxpetit.

Multorum autem odiis nullas opes posse obsistere, si antea fuit ignotum,
nuper est cognitum. Nec vero huius tyranni solum, quem armis oppressa
pertulit civitas ac paret cum maxime mortuo,[185] interitus declarat,
quantum odium hominum valeat[186] ad pestem, sed reliquorum similes
exitus tyrannorum, quorum haud fere quisquam talem interitum effugit;
malus enim est custos diuturnitatis metus contraque benivolentia fidelis
vel ad perpetuitatem.

*24* Sed iis, qui vi oppressos imperio coërcent, sit sane adhibenda
saevitia, ut eris[187] in famulos, si aliter teneri non possunt; qui
vero in libera civitate ita se instruunt, ut metuantur, iis[188] nihil
potest esse dementius. Quamvis enim sint demersae leges alicuius opibus,
quamvis timefacta libertas, emergunt tamen haec aliquando aut iudiciis
tacitis aut occultis de honore suffragiis. Acriores autem morsus sunt
intermissae libertatis quam retentae. Quod igitur latissime patet neque
ad incolumitatem solum, sed etiam ad opes et potentiam valet plurimum,
id amplectamur, ut metus absit, caritas retineatur. Ita facillime quae
volemus, et privatis in rebus et in re publica consequemur.

Etenim qui se metui volent, a quibus metuentur, eosdem metuant ipsi
necesse est. *25* Quid enim censemus superiorem illum Dionysium quo
cruciatu timoris angi solitum, qui cultros metuens tonsorios candente
carbone sibi adurebat capillum? quid Alexandrum Pheraeum quo animo
vixisse arbitramur? qui, ut scriptum legimus, cum uxorem Theben admodum
diligeret, tamen ad eam ex epulis in cubiculum veniens barbarum, et eum
quidem, ut scriptum est, compunctum notis Thraeciis, destricto gladio
iubebat anteire praemittebatque de stipatoribus suis, qui scrutarentur
arculas muliebres et, ne quod in vestimentis telum occultaretur,
exquirerent. O miserum, qui fideliorem et barbarum et stigmatiam putaret
quam coniugem! Nec eum fefellit; ab ea est enim ipsa propter pelicatus
suspicionem interfectus.

Nec vero ulla vis imperii tanta est, quae premente metu possit esse
diuturna. *26* Testis est Phalaris, cuius est praeter ceteros nobilitata
crudelitas, qui non ex insidiis interiit, ut is, quem modo dixi,
Alexander, non a paucis, ut hic noster, sed in quem universa
Agrigentinorum multitudo impetum fecit.

Quid? Macedones nonne Demetrium reliquerunt universique se ad Pyrrhum
contulerunt? Quid? Lacedaemonios iniuste imperantes nonne repente omnes
fere socii deseruerunt spectatoresque se otiosos praebuerunt Leuctricae
calamitatis?

    [185] _ac paret cum maxime mortuo_, Halm, Müller, Heine;
    _paretque cum maxime mortuo_ c^1, Bt.; _paretque, c. m. m._
    L; _apparet, cuius maxime mortui_ b; _apparet cuius maxime
    portui_ B H a.

    [186] _valeat_ c; _valet_ B H a b.

    [187] _ut eris_ Baiter; _ut eriis_ B; _uteris_ L; _utere
    hiis_ H; _utere iis_ b; _utere his_ a; _utantur eis_ c.

    [188] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ B H L a; _hijs_ c; _hiis_ b.

#The motive of love _vs._ that of fear.#

*23* VII. But of all motives, none is better adapted to secure influence
and hold it fast than love; nothing is more foreign to that end than
fear. For Ennius says admirably:

    "Whom they fear they hate. And whom one hates, one hopes to see him
      dead."

And we recently discovered, if it was not known before, that no amount
of power can withstand the hatred of the many. #Hatred of tyranny.# The
death of this tyrant,[AK] whose yoke the state endured under the
constraint of armed force and whom it still obeys more humbly than ever,
though he is dead, illustrates the deadly effects of popular hatred; and
the same lesson is taught by the similar fate of all other despots, of
whom practically no one has ever escaped such a death. For fear is but a
poor safeguard of lasting power; while affection, on the other hand, may
be trusted to keep it safe for ever.

*24* But those who keep subjects in check by force would of course have
to employ severity--masters, for example, toward their servants, when
these cannot be held in control in any other way. But those who in a
free state deliberately put themselves in a position to be feared are
the maddest of the mad. For let the laws be never so much overborne by
some one individual's power, let the spirit of freedom be never so
intimidated, still sooner or later they assert themselves either through
unvoiced public sentiment, or through secret ballots disposing of some
high office of state. Freedom suppressed and again regained bites with
keener fangs than freedom never endangered. Let us, then, embrace this
policy, which appeals to every heart and is the strongest support not
only of security but also of influence and power--namely, to banish fear
and cleave to love. And thus we shall most easily secure success both in
private and in public life.

Furthermore, those who wish to be feared must inevitably be afraid of
those whom they intimidate. *25* #The wretchedness of fear.# What, for
instance, shall we think of the elder Dionysius? With what tormenting
fears he used to be racked! For through fear of the barber's razor he
used to have his hair singed off with a glowing coal. In what state of
mind do we fancy Alexander of Pherae lived? We read in history that he
dearly loved his wife Thebe; and yet, whenever he went from the banquet
hall to her in her chamber, he used to order a barbarian--one, too,
tattooed like a Thracian, as the records state--to go before him with a
drawn sword; and he used to send ahead some of his bodyguard to pry into
the lady's caskets and to search and see whether some weapon were not
concealed in her wardrobe. Unhappy man! To think a barbarian, a branded
slave, more faithful than his own wife! Nor was he mistaken. For he was
murdered by her own hand, because she suspected him of infidelity.

And indeed no power is strong enough to be lasting, if it labours under
the weight of fear. *26* Witness Phalaris, whose cruelty is notorious
beyond that of all others. He was slain, not treacherously (like that
Alexander whom I named but now), not by a few conspirators (like that
tyrant of ours), but the whole population of Agrigentum rose against him
with one accord.

Again, did not the Macedonians abandon Demetrius and march over as one
man to Pyrrhus? And again, when the Spartans exercised their supremacy
tyrannically, did not practically all the allies desert them and view
their disaster at Leuctra, as idle spectators?

    [AK] Julius Caesar.

VIII. Externa libentius in tali re quam domestica recordor. Verum tamen,
quam diu imperium populi Romani beneficiis tenebatur, non iniuriis,
bella aut pro sociis aut de imperio gerebantur, exitus erant bellorum
aut mites aut necessarii, regum, populorum, nationum portus erat et
refugium senatus, *27* nostri autem magistratus imperatoresque ex hac
una re maximam laudem capere studebant, si provincias, si socios
aequitate et fide defendissent; *(27)* itaque illud patrocinium orbis
terrae verius quam imperium poterat nominari.

Sensim hanc consuetudinem et disciplinam iam antea minuebamus, post vero
Sullae victoriam penitus amisimus; desitum est enim videri quicquam in
socios iniquum, cum exstitisset in cives tanta crudelitas. Ergo in illo
secuta est honestam causam non honesta victoria; est enim ausus dicere,
hasta posita cum bona in foro venderet et bonorum virorum et locupletium
et certe civium, "praedam se suam vendere." Secutus est, qui in causa
impia, victoria etiam foediore non singulorum civium bona publicaret,
sed universas provincias regionesque uno calamitatis iure
comprehenderet.

*28* Itaque vexatis ac perditis exteris nationibus ad exemplum amissi
imperii portari in triumpho Massiliam vidimus et ex ea urbe triumphari,
sine qua numquam nostri imperatores ex Transalpinis bellis triumpharunt.
Multa praeterea commemorarem nefaria in socios, si hoc uno quicquam sol
vidisset indignius. Iure igitur plectimur. Nisi enim multorum impunita
scelera tulissemus, numquam ad unum tanta pervenisset licentia; a quo
quidem rei familiaris ad paucos, cupiditatum ad multos improbos venit
hereditas. *29* Nec vero umquam bellorum civilium semen et causa deerit,
dum homines perditi hastam illam cruentam et meminerint et sperabunt;
quam P.[189] Sulla cum vibrasset dictatore propinquo suo, idem sexto
tricesimo anno post a sceleratiore hasta non recessit; alter autem, qui
in illa dictatura scriba fuerat, in hac fuit quaestor urbanus. Ex quo
debet intellegi talibus praemiis propositis numquam defutura bella
civilia.

Itaque parietes modo urbis stant et manent, iique ipsi iam extrema
scelera metuentes, rem vero publicam penitus amisimus. Atque in has
clades incidimus (redeundum est enim ad propositum), dum metui quam cari
esse et diligi malumus. Quae si populo Romano iniuste imperanti accidere
potuerunt, quid debent putare singuli? Quod cum perspicuum sit,
benivolentiae vim esse magnam, metus imbecillam sequitur, ut disseramus,
quibus rebus facillime possimus eam, quam volumus, adipisci cum honore
et fide caritatem.

*30* Sed ea non pariter omnes egemus; nam ad cuiusque vitam institutam
accommodandum est, a multisne opus sit an satis sit a paucis diligi.
Certum igitur hoc sit, idque et primum et maxime necessarium,
familiaritates habere fidas amantium nos amicorum et nostra mirantium;
haec enim una[190] res prorsus, ut non multum differat inter summos et
mediocris viros, aeque[191] utrisque est propemodum comparanda.

*31* Honore et gloria et benivolentia civium fortasse non aeque omnes
egent, sed tamen, si cui haec suppetunt, adiuvant aliquantum cum ad
cetera, tum ad amicitias comparandas.

    [189] _P._ c, Edd.; _L._ B H a b.

    [190] _enim una_ Baiter; _enim est una_ MSS.

    [191] _aeque_ Lund; _eaque_ MSS.

#The old Republic and the new despotism.#

VIII. I prefer in this connection to draw my illustrations from foreign
history rather than from our own. Let me add, however, that as long as
the empire of the Roman People maintained itself by acts of service, not
of oppression, wars were waged in the interest of our allies or to
safeguard our supremacy; the end of our wars was marked by acts of
clemency or by only a necessary degree of severity; the senate was a
haven of refuge for kings, tribes, and nations; *27* and the highest
ambition of our magistrates and generals was to defend our provinces and
allies with justice and honour. *(27)* And so our government could be
called more accurately a protectorate of the world than a dominion.

This policy and practice we had begun gradually to modify even before
Sulla's time; but since his victory we have departed from it altogether.
For the time had gone by when any oppression of the allies could appear
wrong, seeing that atrocities so outrageous were committed against Roman
citizens. In Sulla's case, therefore, an unrighteous victory disgraced a
righteous cause. For when he had planted his spear[AL] and was selling
under the hammer in the forum the property of men who were patriots and
men of wealth and, at least, Roman citizens, he had the effrontery to
announce that "he was selling his spoils." After him came one who, in an
unholy cause, made an even more shameful use of victory; for he did not
stop at confiscating the property of individual citizens, but actually
embraced whole provinces and countries in one common ban of ruin.

*28* And so, when foreign nations had been oppressed and ruined, we have
seen a model of Marseilles carried in a triumphal procession, to serve
as proof to the world that the supremacy of the people had been
forfeited; and that triumph we saw celebrated over a city without whose
help our generals have never gained a triumph for their wars beyond the
Alps. I might mention many other outrages against our allies, if the sun
had ever beheld anything more infamous than this particular one. #The
wages of the sin of Rome.# Justly, therefore, are we being punished. For
if we had not allowed the crimes of many to go unpunished, so great
licence would never have centred in one individual. His estate descended
by inheritance to but a few individuals, his ambitions to many
scoundrels. *29* And never will the seed and occasion of civil war be
wanting, so long as villains remember that blood-stained spear and hope
to see another. As Publius Sulla wielded that spear, when his kinsman
was dictator, so again thirty-six years later he did not shrink from a
still more criminal spear. And still another Sulla, who was a mere clerk
under the former dictatorship, was under the later one a city quaestor.
From this, one would realize that, if such rewards are offered, civil
wars will never cease to be.

And so in Rome only the walls of her houses remain standing--and even
they wait now in fear of the most unspeakable crimes--but our republic
we have lost for ever. But to return to my subject: it is while we have
preferred to be the object of fear rather than of love and affection,
that all these misfortunes have fallen upon us. And if such retribution
could overtake the Roman People for their injustice and tyranny, what
ought private individuals to expect? And since it is manifest that the
power of good-will is so great and that of fear is so weak, it remains
for us to discuss by what means we can most readily win the affection,
linked with honour and confidence, which we desire.

#The acquisition of friends.#

*30* But we do not all feel this need to the same extent; for it must be
determined in conformity with each individual's vocation in life whether
it is essential for him to have the affection of many or whether the
love of a few will suffice. Let this then be settled as the first and
absolute essential--that we have the devotion of friends, affectionate
and loving, who value our worth. For in just this one point there is but
little difference between the greatest and the ordinary man; and
friendship is to be cultivated almost equally by both.

*31* All men do not, perhaps, stand equally in need of political honour,
fame, and the good-will of their fellow-citizens; nevertheless, if these
honours come to a man, they help in many ways, and especially in the
acquisition of friends.

    [AL] The Romans were accustomed to set up a spear as a sign
    of an auction-sale--a symbol derived from the sale of booty
    taken in war.

IX. Sed de amicitia alio libro dictum est, qui inscribitur Laelius; nunc
dicamus de gloria, quamquam ea quoque de re duo sunt nostri libri, sed
attingamus, quandoquidem ea in rebus maioribus administrandis adiuvat
plurimum.

Summa igitur et perfecta gloria constat ex tribus his: si diligit
multitudo, si fidem habet, si cum admiratione quadam honore dignos
putat. Haec autem, si est simpliciter breviterque dicendum, quibus rebus
pariuntur a singulis, eisdem fere a multitudine. Sed est alius quoque
quidam aditus ad multitudinem, ut in universorum animos tamquam influere
possimus.

*32* Ac primum de illis tribus, quae ante dixi, benivolentiae praecepta
videamus; quae quidem capitur beneficiis maxime, secundo autem loco
voluntate benefica benivolentia movetur, etiamsi res forte non suppetit;
vehementer autem amor multitudinis commovetur ipsa fama et opinione
liberalitatis, beneficentiae, iustitiae, fidei omniumque earum virtutum,
quae pertinent ad mansuetudinem morum ac facilitatem. Etenim illud
ipsum, quod honestum decorumque dicimus, quia per se nobis placet
animosque omnium natura et specie sua commovet maximeque quasi perlucet
ex iis, quas commemoravi, virtutibus, idcirco illos, in quibus eas
virtutes esse remur, a natura ipsa diligere cogimur. Atque hae quidem
causae diligendi gravissimae; possunt enim praeterea non nullae esse
leviores.

*33* Fides autem ut habeatur, duabus rebus effici potest, si
existimabimur adepti coniunctam cum iustitia prudentiam. Nam et iis
fidem habemus, quos plus intellegere quam nos arbitramur quosque et
futura prospicere credimus et, cum res agatur in discrimenque ventum
sit, expedire rem et consilium ex tempore capere posse; hanc enim utilem
homines existimant veramque prudentiam. Iustis autem et fidis[192]
hominibus, id est bonis viris, ita fides habetur, ut nulla sit in
iis[193] fraudis iniuriaeque suspicio. Itaque his salutem nostram, his
fortunas, his liberos rectissime committi arbitramur.

*34* Harum igitur duarum ad fidem faciendam iustitia plus pollet, quippe
cum ea sine prudentia satis habeat auctoritatis, prudentia sine iustitia
nihil valet ad faciendam fidem. Quo enim quis versutior et callidior,
hoc invisior et suspectior est detracta opinione probitatis. Quam ob rem
intellegentiae iustitia coniuncta, quantum volet, habebit ad faciendam
fidem virium; iustitia sine prudentia multum poterit, sine iustitia
nihil valebit prudentia.

    [192] _et fidis_ MSS.; del. Facciolati, Pearce; [_et fidis_]
    Bt., Ed.

    [193] _iis_ B; _his_ H a b; _hijs_ c.

IX. But friendship has been discussed in another book of mine, entitled
"Laelius." #The attainment of glory.# Let us now take up the discussion
of Glory, although I have published two books[AM] on that subject also.
Still, let us touch briefly on it here, since it is of very great help
in the conduct of more important business.

The highest, truest glory depends upon the following three things: the
affection, the confidence, and the mingled admiration and esteem of the
people. Such sentiments, if I may speak plainly and concisely, are
awakened in the masses in the same way as in individuals. #How to gain
popularity:# But there is also another avenue of approach to the masses,
by which we can, as it were, steal into the hearts of all at once.

#(1) through good-will,#

*32* But of the three above-named requisites, let us look first at
good-will and the rules for securing it. Good-will is won principally
through kind services[AN]; next to that, it is elicited by the will to
do a kind service, even though nothing happen to come of it. Then, too,
the love of people generally is powerfully attracted by a man's mere
name and reputation for generosity, kindness, justice, honour, and all
those virtues that belong to gentleness of character and affability of
manner. And because that very quality which we term moral goodness and
propriety is pleasing to us by and of itself and touches all our hearts
both by its inward essence and its outward aspect and shines forth with
most lustre through those virtues named above, we are, therefore,
compelled by Nature herself to love those in whom we believe those
virtues to reside. Now these are only the most powerful motives to
love--not all of them; there may be some minor ones besides.

#(2) through confidence,#

*33* Secondly, the command of confidence can be secured on two
conditions: (1) if people think us possessed of practical wisdom
combined with a sense of justice. For we have confidence in those who we
think have more understanding than ourselves, who, we believe, have
better insight into the future, and who, when an emergency arises and a
crisis comes, can clear away the difficulties and reach a safe decision
according to the exigencies of the occasion; for that kind of wisdom the
world accounts genuine and practical. But (2) confidence is reposed in
men who are just and true--that is, good men--on the definite assumption
that their characters admit of no suspicion of dishonesty or
wrong-doing. And so we believe that it is perfectly safe to entrust our
lives, our fortunes, and our children to their care.

#Justice _vs._ Wisdom;#

*34* Of these two qualities, then, justice has the greater power to
inspire confidence; for even without the aid of wisdom, it has
considerable weight; but wisdom without justice is of no avail to
inspire confidence; for take from a man his reputation for probity, and
the more shrewd and clever he is, the more hated and mistrusted he
becomes. Therefore, justice combined with practical wisdom will command
all the confidence we can desire; justice without wisdom will be able to
do much; wisdom without justice will be of no avail at all.

    [AM] Now lost, though they were still known to Petrarch.

    [AN] Cicero means by "kind services" the services of the
    lawyer; he was forbidden by law to accept a fee; his
    services, if he contributed them, were "acts of kindness."

*35* X. Sed ne quis sit admiratus, cur, cum inter omnes philosophos
constet a meque ipso saepe disputatum sit, qui unam haberet, omnes
habere virtutes, nunc ita seiungam, quasi possit quisquam, qui non idem
prudens sit, iustus esse, alia est illa, cum veritas ipsa limatur in
disputatione, subtilitas, alia, cum ad opinionem communem omnis
accommodatur oratio. Quam ob rem, ut volgus, ita nos hoc loco loquimur,
ut alios fortes, alios viros bonos, alios prudentes esse dicamus;
popularibus enim verbis est agendum et usitatis, cum loquimur[194] de
opinione populari, idque eodem modo fecit Panaetius. Sed ad propositum
revertamur.

*36* Erat igitur ex iis[195] tribus, quae ad gloriam pertinerent, hoc
tertium, ut cum admiratione hominum honore ab iis[196] digni
iudicaremur. Admirantur igitur communiter illi quidem omnia, quae magna
et praeter opinionem suam animadverterunt, separatim autem, in singulis
si perspiciunt necopinata quaedam bona. Itaque eos viros suspiciunt
maximisque efferunt laudibus, in quibus existimant se excellentes
quasdam et singulares perspicere virtutes, despiciunt autem eos et
contemnunt, in quibus nihil virtutis, nihil animi, nihil nervorum
putant. Non enim omnes eos contemnunt, de quibus male existimant. Nam
quos improbos, maledicos, fraudulentos putant et ad faciendam iniuriam
instructos, eos haud contemnunt quidem,[197] sed de iis[198] male
existimant. Quam ob rem, ut ante dixi, contemnuntur ii,[199] qui "nec
sibi nec alteri," ut dicitur, in quibus nullus labor, nulla industria,
nulla cura est.

*37* Admiratione autem afficiuntur ii, qui anteire ceteris virtute
putantur et cum omni carere dedecore, tum vero iis vitiis, quibus alii
non facile possunt obsistere. Nam et voluptates, blandissimae dominae,
maioris partis animos[200] a virtute detorquent et, dolorum cum
admoventur faces, praeter modum plerique exterrentur; vita mors,
divitiae paupertas omnes homines vehementissime permovent. Quae qui in
utramque partem excelso animo magnoque despiciunt, cumque aliqua iis
ampla et honesta res obiecta est, totos ad se convertit et rapit, tum
quis non admiretur splendorem pulchritudinemque virtutis?

    [194] _loquimur_ B; _loquamur_ H a b; _loquemur_ c.

    [195] _iis_ Bt.; _his_ B H; _hijs_ c; not in a b.

    [196] _iis_ Bt.; _his_ B H a b; _hijs_ c.

    [197] _haud contemnunt quidem_ b, Bt.^2; _contemnunt quidem
    nautiquam_ B H a p, Bt.^1, Heine; _contemnunt quidem
    nequaquam_ c; _non contemnunt quidem_ Madvig, Müller.

    [198] _iis_ B, Edd.; _his_ H a b; _hijs_ c.

    [199] _ii_ B b; _hii_ H; _hi_ a; _hij_, c. So § 37.

    [200] _maioris partis animos_ c, Edd.; _maiores partis animi_
    B; _maiores partes animi_ H a b.

*35* X. But I am afraid some one may wonder why I am now separating the
virtues--as if it were possible for anyone to be just who is not at the
same time wise; for it is agreed upon among all philosophers, and I
myself have often argued, that he who has one virtue has them all. The
explanation of my apparent inconsistency is that the precision of speech
we employ, when abstract truth is critically investigated in philosophic
discussion, is one thing; and that employed, when we are adapting our
language entirely to popular thinking, is another. And therefore I am
speaking here in the popular sense, when I call some men brave, others
good, and still others wise; for in dealing with popular conceptions we
must employ familiar words in their common acceptation; and this was the
practice of Panaetius likewise. But let us return to the subject.

#(3) through esteem and admiration.#

*36* The third, then, of the three conditions I named as essential to
glory is that we be accounted worthy of the esteem and admiration of our
fellow-men. While people admire in general everything that is great or
better than they expect, they admire in particular the good qualities
that they find unexpectedly in individuals. And so they reverence and
extol with the highest praises those men in whom they see certain
pre-eminent and extraordinary talents; and they look down with contempt
upon those who they think have no ability, no spirit, no energy. For
they do not despise all those of whom they think ill. For some men they
consider unscrupulous, slanderous, fraudulent, and dangerous; they do
not despise them, it may be; but they do think ill of them. And
therefore, as I said before, those are despised who are "of no use to
themselves or their neighbours," as the saying is, who are idle, lazy,
and indifferent.

*37* On the other hand, those are regarded with admiration who are
thought to excel others in ability and to be free from all dishonour and
also from those vices which others do not easily resist. For sensual
pleasure, a most seductive mistress, turns the hearts of the greater
part of humanity away from virtue; and when the fiery trial of
affliction draws near, most people are terrified beyond measure. Life
and death, wealth and want affect all men most powerfully. But when
men, with a spirit great and exalted, can look down upon such outward
circumstances, whether prosperous or adverse, and when some noble and
virtuous purpose, presented to their minds, converts them wholly to
itself and carries them away in its pursuit, who then could fail to
admire in them the splendour and beauty of virtue?

*38* XI. Ergo et haec animi despicientia admirabilitatem magnam facit et
maxime iustitia, ex qua una virtute viri boni appellantur, mirifica
quaedam multitudini videtur, nec iniuria; nemo enim iustus esse potest,
qui mortem, qui dolorem, qui exsilium, qui egestatem timet, aut qui ea,
quae sunt his contraria, aequitati anteponit. Maximeque admirantur eum,
qui pecunia non movetur; quod in quo viro perspectum sit, hunc igni
spectatum arbitrantur.

Itaque illa tria, quae proposita sunt ad gloriam, omnia iustitia
conficit, et benivolentiam, quod prodesse vult plurimis, et ob eandem
causam fidem et admirationem, quod eas res spernit et neglegit, ad quas
plerique inflammati aviditate rapiuntur.

*39* Ac mea quidem sententia omnis ratio atque institutio vitae
adiumenta hominum desiderat, in primisque ut habeat, quibuscum possit
familiares conferre sermones; quod est difficile, nisi speciem prae te
boni viri feras. Ergo etiam solitario homini atque in agro vitam agenti
opinio iustitiae necessaria est, eoque etiam magis, quod, eam si non
habebunt, [iniusti habebuntur,][201] nullis praesidiis saepti multis
afficientur iniuriis. *40* #I, 96# Atque iis[202] etiam, qui vendunt
emunt, conducunt locant contrahendisque negotiis implicantur, iustitia
ad rem gerendam necessaria est, cuius tanta vis est, ut ne illi quidem,
qui maleficio et scelere pascuntur, possint sine ulla particula
iustitiae vivere. Nam qui eorum cuipiam, qui una latrocinantur, furatur
aliquid aut eripit, is sibi ne in latrocinio quidem relinquit locum,
ille autem, qui archipirata dicitur, nisi aequabiliter praedam
dispertiat, aut interficiatur a sociis aut relinquatur; quin etiam leges
latronum esse dicuntur, quibus pareant, quas observent. Itaque propter
aequabilem praedae partitionem et Bardulis Illyrius latro, de quo est
apud Theopompum, magnas opes habuit et multo maiores Viriathus
Lusitanus; cui quidem etiam exercitus nostri imperatoresque cesserunt;
quem C. Laelius, is qui Sapiens usurpatur, praetor fregit et comminuit
ferocitatemque eius ita repressit, ut facile bellum reliquis traderet.

Cum igitur tanta vis iustitiae sit, ut ea etiam latronum opes firmet
atque augeat, quantam eius vim inter leges et iudicia et in constituta
re publica fore putamus?

    [201] _iniusti habebuntur_ B H b; bracketed by Facciolati,
    Edd.

    [202] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ B H a b, not in c.

#Justice is the best way to popularity.#

*38* XI. As, then, this superiority of mind to such externals inspires
great admiration, so justice, above all, on the basis of which alone men
are called "good men," seems to people generally a quite marvellous
virtue--and not without good reason; for no one can be just who fears
death or pain or exile or poverty, or who values their opposites above
equity. And people admire especially the man who is uninfluenced by
money; and if a man has proved himself in this direction, they think him
tried as by fire.

Those three requisites, therefore, which were presupposed as the means
of obtaining glory, are all secured by justice: (1) good-will, for it
seeks to be of help to the greatest number; (2) confidence, for the same
reason; and (3) admiration, because it scorns and cares nothing for
those things, with a consuming passion for which most people are carried
away.

*39* Now, in my opinion at least, every walk and vocation in life calls
for human co-operation--first and above all, in order that one may have
friends with whom to enjoy social intercourse. And this is not easy,
unless one is looked upon as a good man. So, even to a man who shuns
society and to one who spends his life in the country a reputation for
justice is essential--even more so than to others; for they who do not
have it [but are considered unjust] will have no defence to protect
them and so will be the victims of many kinds of wrong. *40* So also to
buyers and sellers, to employers and employed, and to those who are
engaged in commercial dealings generally, justice is indispensable for
the conduct of business. #Honour among thieves.# Its importance is so
great, that not even those who live by wickedness and crime can get on
without some small element of justice. For if a robber takes anything by
force or by fraud from another member of the gang, he loses his standing
even in a band of robbers; and if the one called the "Pirate Captain"
should not divide the plunder impartially, he would be either deserted
or murdered by his comrades. Why, they say that robbers even have a code
of laws to observe and obey. And so, because of his impartial division
of booty, Bardulis, the Illyrian bandit, of whom we read in Theopompus,
acquired great power, Viriathus, of Lusitania, much greater. He actually
defied even our armies and generals. But Gaius Laelius--the one surnamed
"the Wise"--in his praetorship crushed his power, reduced him to terms,
and so checked his intrepid daring, that he left to his successors an
easy conquest.

Since, therefore, the efficacy of justice is so great that it
strengthens and augments the power even of robbers, how great do we
think its power will be in a constitutional government with its laws and
courts?

*41* XII. Mihi quidem non apud Medos solum, ut ait Herodotus, sed etiam
apud maiores nostros iustitiae fruendae causa videntur olim bene morati
reges constituti. Nam cum premeretur inops[203] multitudo ab iis, qui
maiores opes habebant, ad unum aliquem confugiebant virtute praestantem;
qui cum prohiberet iniuria tenuiores, aequitate constituenda summos cum
infimis[204] pari iure retinebat.[205] Eademque constituendarum legum
fuit causa, quae regum. *42* Ius enim semper est quaesitum aequabile;
neque enim aliter esset ius. Id si ab uno iusto et bono viro
consequebantur, erant eo contenti; cum id minus contingeret, leges sunt
inventae, quae cum omnibus semper una atque eadem voce loquerentur.

Ergo hoc quidem perspicuum est, eos ad imperandum deligi solitos, quorum
de iustitia magna esset opinio multitudinis. Adiuncto vero, ut idem
etiam prudentes haberentur, nihil erat, quod homines iis auctoribus non
posse consequi se arbitrarentur. Omni igitur ratione colenda et
retinenda iustitia est cum ipsa per sese (nam aliter iustitia non
esset), tum propter amplificationem honoris et gloriae.

Sed ut pecuniae non quaerendae solum ratio est, verum etiam collocandae,
quae perpetuos sumptus suppeditet, nec solum necessarios, sed etiam
liberales, sic gloria et quaerenda et collocanda ratione est. *43* #Xen.
Mem. II, 6, 39# Quamquam praeclare Socrates hanc viam ad gloriam
proximam et quasi compendiariam dicebat esse, si quis id ageret, ut,
qualis haberi vellet, talis esset. Quodsi qui simulatione et inani
ostentatione et ficto non modo sermone, sed etiam voltu stabilem se
gloriam consequi posse rentur, vehementer errant. Vera gloria radices
agit atque etiam propagatur, ficta omnia celeriter tamquam flosculi
decidunt, nec simulatum potest quicquam esse diuturnum. Testes sunt
permulti in utramque partem, sed brevitatis causa familia contenti
erimus una. Ti. enim Gracchus P. f. tam diu laudabitur, dum memoria
rerum Romanarum manebit; at eius filii nec vivi probabantur bonis et
mortui numerum optinent iure caesorum.

    [203] _inops_ inferior MSS., Edd.; _in otio_ (i.e. "at will")
    B H a b p; _inicio_ (= _initio_) c.

    [204] _infimis_ c, Edd.; _infirmis_ B a b; _infirmos_ H.

    [205] _retinebat_ c, Edd.; _pertinebat_ B H a p;
    _pertinebant_ b.

#Kings chosen for the sake of justice.#

*41* XII. Now it seems to me, at least, that not only among the Medes,
as Herodotus tells us, but also among our own ancestors, men of high
moral character were made kings in order that the people might enjoy
justice. For, as the masses in their helplessness were oppressed by the
strong, they appealed for protection to some one man who was
conspicuous for his virtue; and as he shielded the weaker classes from
wrong, he managed by establishing equitable conditions to hold the
higher and the lower classes in an equality of right. The reason for
making constitutional laws was the same as that for making kings. *42*
For what people have always sought is equality of rights before the law.
For rights that were not open to all alike would be no rights. If the
people secured their end at the hands of one just and good man, they
were satisfied with that; but when such was not their good fortune, laws
were invented, to speak to all men at all times in one and the same
voice.

This, then, is obvious: nations used to select for their rulers those
men whose reputation for justice was high in the eyes of the people. If
in addition they were also thought wise, there was nothing that men did
not think they could secure under such leadership. Justice is,
therefore, in every way to be cultivated and maintained, both for its
own sake (for otherwise it would not be justice) and for the enhancement
of personal honour and glory.

But as there is a method not only of acquiring money but also of
investing it so as to yield an income to meet our continuously recurring
expenses--both for the necessities and for the more refined comforts of
life--so there must be a method of gaining glory and turning it to
account. *43* #The way to glory is Justice.# And yet, as Socrates used
to express it so admirably, "the nearest way to glory--a short-cut, as
it were--is to strive to be what you wish to be thought to be." For if
anyone thinks that he can win lasting glory by pretence, by empty show,
by hypocritical talk and looks, he is very much mistaken. True glory
strikes deep root and spreads its branches wide; but all pretences
soon fall to the ground like fragile flowers, and nothing counterfeit
can be lasting. There are very many witnesses to both facts; but for
brevity's sake, I shall confine myself to one family: Tiberius Gracchus,
Publius's son, will be held in honour as long as the memory of Rome
shall endure; but his sons were not approved by patriots while they
lived, and since they are dead they are numbered among those whose
murder was justifiable.

XIII. Qui igitur adipisci veram gloriam[206] volet, iustitiae fungatur
officiis. #I, 20-41# Ea quae essent, dictum est in libro superiore.

    [206] _veram gloriam_ Edd.; _veram iustitiae gloriam_ MSS.

#Ways of winning a good name:#

XIII. If, therefore, anyone wishes to win true glory, let him discharge
the duties required by justice. And what they are has been set forth in
the course of the preceding book.

*44* (XIII.) Sed ut facillime, quales simus, tales esse videamur, etsi
in eo ipso vis maxima est, ut simus ii, qui haberi velimus, tamen
quaedam praecepta danda sunt. Nam si quis ab ineunte aetate habet causam
celebritatis et nominis aut a patre acceptam, quod tibi, mi Cicero,
arbitror contigisse, aut aliquo casu atque fortuna, in hunc oculi omnium
coniciuntur atque in eum, quid agat, quem ad modum vivat, inquiritur et,
tamquam in clarissima luce versetur, ita nullum obscurum potest nec
dictum eius esse nec factum. *45* Quorum autem prima aetas propter
humilitatem et obscuritatem in hominum ignoratione versatur, ii,[207]
simul ac iuvenes esse coeperunt, magna spectare et ad ea rectis studiis
debent contendere: quod eo firmiore animo facient, quia non modo non
invidetur illi aetati, verum etiam favetur.

Prima igitur est adulescenti commendatio ad gloriam, si qua ex bellicis
rebus comparari potest, in qua multi apud maiores nostros exstiterunt;
semper enim fere bella gerebantur. Tua autem aetas incidit in id bellum,
cuius altera pars sceleris nimium habuit, altera felicitatis parum. Quo
tamen in bello cum te Pompeius alae [alteri][208] praefecisset, magnam
laudem et a summo viro et ab exercitu consequebare equitando, iaculando,
omni militari labore tolerando. Atque ea quidem tua laus pariter cum re
publica cecidit.

Mihi autem haec oratio suscepta non de te est, sed de genere toto; quam
ob rem pergamus ad ea, quae restant.

*46* Ut igitur in reliquis rebus multo maiora opera sunt animi quam
corporis, sic eae res, quas ingenio ac ratione persequimur, gratiores
sunt quam illae, quas viribus. Prima igitur commendatio proficiscitur a
modestia cum[209] pietate in parentes, in suos benivolentia. Facillime
autem et in optimam partem cognoscuntur adulescentes, qui se ad claros
et sapientes viros bene consulentes rei publicae contulerunt; quibuscum
si frequentes sunt, opinionem afferunt populo eorum fore se similes,
quos sibi ipsi delegerint ad imitandum. *47* P. Rutili adulescentiam ad
opinionem et innocentiae et iuris scientiae P. Muci commendavit domus.
Nam L. quidem Crassus, cum esset admodum adulescens, non aliunde
mutuatus est, sed sibi ipse peperit maximam laudem ex illa accusatione
nobili et gloriosa, et, qua[210] aetate qui exercentur, laude affici
solent, ut de Demosthene accepimus, ea aetate L. Crassus ostendit id se
in foro optime iam facere, quod etiam tum poterat domi cum laude
meditari.

    [207] _ii_ B, Edd.; _hi_ H; _iis_ b; _hij_ c; _his_ a.

    [208] _alteri_ MSS.; om. Graevius, Edd.

    [209] _cum_ Victorius, Edd.; _tum_ MSS.

    [210] _et, qua_ Manutius, Edd.; _ex qua_ MSS.

*44* (XIII.) But although the very essence of the problem is that we
actually be what we wish to be thought to be, still some rules may be
laid down to enable us most easily to secure the reputation of being
what we are. For if anyone in his early youth has the responsibility of
living up to a distinguished name acquired either by inheritance from
his father (as, I think, my dear Cicero, is your good fortune) or by
some chance or happy combination of circumstances, the eyes of the world
are turned upon him; his life and character are scrutinized; and, as if
he moved in a blaze of light, not a word and not a deed of his can be
kept a secret. *45* Those, on the other hand, whose humble and obscure
origin has kept them unknown to the world in their early years ought, as
soon as they approach young manhood, to set a high ideal before their
eyes and to strive with unswerving zeal towards its realization. This
they will do with the better heart, because that time of life is
accustomed to find favour rather than to meet with opposition.

#(1) by a military career,#

Well, then, the first thing to recommend to a young man in his quest for
glory is that he try to win it, if he can, in a military career. Among
our forefathers many distinguished themselves as soldiers; for warfare
was almost continuous then. The period of your own youth, however, has
coincided with that war in which the one side was too prolific in crime,
the other in failure. And yet, when Pompey placed you in command of a
cavalry squadron in this war, you won the applause of that great man and
of the army for your skill in riding and spear-throwing and for
endurance of all the hardships of the soldier's life. But that credit
accorded to you came to nothing along with the fall of the republic.

The subject of this discussion, however, is not your personal history,
but the general theme. Let us, therefore, proceed to the sequel.

#(2) by personal character,#

*46* As, then, in everything else brain-work is far more important than
mere hand-work, so those objects which we strive to attain through
intellect and reason gain for us a higher degree of gratitude than those
which we strive to gain by physical strength. The best recommendation,
then, that a young man can have to popular esteem proceeds from
self-restraint, filial affection, and devotion to kinsfolk. #(3) by
association with the great,# Next to that, young men win recognition
most easily and most favourably, if they attach themselves to men who
are at once wise and renowned as well as patriotic counsellors in public
affairs. And if they associate constantly with such men, they inspire in
the public the expectation that they will be like them, seeing that they
have themselves selected them for imitation. *47* His frequent visits
to the home of Publius Mucius assisted young Publius Rutilius to gain a
reputation for integrity of character and for ability as a jurisconsult.
Not so, however, Lucius Crassus; for though he was a mere boy, he looked
to no one else for assistance, but by his own unaided ability he won for
himself in that brilliant and famous prosecution[AO] a splendid
reputation as an orator. And at an age when young men are accustomed
with their school exercises to win applause as students of oratory, this
Roman Demosthenes, Lucius Crassus, was already proving himself in the
law-courts a master of the art which he might even then have been
studying at home with credit to himself.

    [AO] At the age of 21 Crassus conducted the case against
    Gaius Papirius Carbo, a former supporter of the Gracchi. The
    prosecution was so ably conducted that Carbo committed
    suicide to escape certain condemnation.

*48* XIV. Sed cum duplex ratio sit orationis, quarum in altera sermo
sit, in altera contentio, non est id quidem dubium, quin contentio
[orationis][211] maiorem vim habeat ad gloriam (ea est enim, quam
eloquentiam dicimus); sed tamen difficile dictu est, quantopere
conciliet animos comitas affabilitasque sermonis. Exstant epistulae et
Philippi ad Alexandrum et Antipatri ad Cassandrum et Antigoni ad
Philippum filium, trium prudentissimorum (sic enim accepimus); quibus
praecipiunt, ut oratione benigna multitudinis animos ad benivolentiam
alliciant militesque blande appellando [sermone][212] deliniant. Quae
autem in multitudine cum contentione habetur oratio, ea saepe universam
excitat [gloriam][213]; magna est enim admiratio copiose sapienterque
dicentis; quem qui audiunt, intellegere etiam et sapere plus quam
ceteros arbitrantur. Si vero inest in oratione mixta modestia gravitas,
nihil admirabilius fieri potest, eoque magis, si ea sunt in adulescente.

*49* Sed cum sint plura causarum genera, quae eloquentiam desiderent,
multique in nostra re publica adulescentes et apud iudices et apud
populum[214] et apud senatum dicendo laudem assecuti sint, maxima est
admiratio in iudiciis.

Quorum ratio duplex est. Nam ex accusatione et ex defensione constat;
quarum etsi laudabilior est defensio, tamen etiam accusatio probata
persaepe est. Dixi paulo ante de Crasso; idem fecit adulescens M.
Antonius. Etiam P. Sulpici eloquentiam accusatio illustravit, cum
seditiosum et inutilem civem, C. Norbanum, in iudicium vocavit. *50* Sed
hoc quidem non est saepe faciendum nec umquam nisi aut rei publicae
causa, ut ii, quos ante dixi, aut ulciscendi, ut duo Luculli, aut
patrocinii, ut nos pro Siculis, pro Sardis in Albucio Iulius. In
accusando etiam M'. Aquilio L. Fufi cognita industria est. Semel igitur
aut non saepe certe. Sin erit, cui faciendum sit saepius, rei publicae
tribuat hoc muneris, cuius inimicos ulcisci saepius non est
reprehendendum; modus tamen adsit. Duri enim hominis vel potius vix
hominis videtur periculum capitis inferre multis. Id cum periculosum
ipsi est, tum etiam sordidum ad famam, committere, ut accusator
nominere; quod contigit M. Bruto summo genere nato, illius filio, qui
iuris civilis in primis peritus fuit.

*51* Atque etiam hoc praeceptum officii diligenter tenendum est, ne quem
umquam innocentem iudicio capitis arcessas; id enim sine scelere fieri
nullo pacto potest. Nam quid est tam inhumanum quam eloquentiam a natura
ad salutem hominum et ad conservationem datam ad bonorum pestem
perniciemque convertere? Nec tamen, ut hoc fugiendum est, item est
habendum religioni nocentem aliquando, modo ne nefarium[215] impiumque,
defendere; vult hoc multitudo, patitur consuetudo, fert etiam humanitas.
Iudicis est semper in causis verum sequi, patroni non numquam veri
simile, etiamsi minus sit verum, defendere; quod scribere, praesertim
cum de philosophia scriberem, non auderem, nisi idem placeret gravissimo
Stoicorum, Panaetio. Maxime autem et gloria paritur et gratia
defensionibus, eoque maior, si quando accidit, ut ei subveniatur, qui
potentis alicuius opibus circumveniri urguerique videatur, ut nos et
saepe alias et adulescentes contra L. Sullae dominantis opes pro Sex.
Roscio Amerino fecimus quae, ut scis, exstat oratio.

    [211] _orationis_ MSS., Ed.; bracketed by Fleckeisen, Bt.^2,
    Müller, Heine.

    [212] _blande appellando sermone_ a c, Edd.; _blando
    appellando sermone_ B H b; _blande appellando_ Gulielmus
    (with three inferior MSS.), Bt., Heine; [_sermone_] Ed.

    [213] _excitat gloriam_ MSS.; _excitat_ [_gloriam_] Ed.;
    _excitat_ Lange.

    [214] _et apud populum_ c, Edd.; not in B H a b.

    [215] _modo ne nefarium_ L c, Edd.; _modo nefarium_ Nonius;
    _et nefarium_ B H a b.

#(4) by eloquence.#

*48* XIV. But as the classification of discourse is a twofold
one--conversation, on the one side; oratory, on the other--there can be
no doubt that of the two this debating-power (for that is what we mean
by eloquence) counts for more toward the attainment of glory; and yet,
it is not easy to say how far an affable and courteous manner in
conversation may go toward winning the affections. We have, for
instance, the letters of Philip to Alexander, of Antipater to Cassander,
and of Antigonus to Philip the Younger. The authors of these letters
were, as we are informed, three of the wisest men in history; and in
them they instruct their sons to woo the hearts of the populace to
affection by words of kindness and to keep their soldiers loyal by a
winning address. But the speech that is delivered in a debate before an
assembly often stirs the hearts of thousands at once; for the eloquent
and judicious speaker is received with high admiration, and his hearers
think him understanding and wise beyond all others. And if his speech
have also dignity combined with moderation, he will be admired beyond
all measure, especially if these qualities are found in a young man.

*49* But while there are occasions of many kinds that call for
eloquence, and while many young men in our republic have obtained
distinction by their speeches in the courts, in the popular assemblies,
and in the senate, yet it is the speeches before our courts that excite
the highest admiration.

#Prosecution _vs._ defence.#

The classification of forensic speeches also is a twofold one: they are
divided into arguments for the prosecution and arguments for the
defence. And while the side of the defence is more honourable, still
that of the prosecution also has very often established a reputation. I
spoke of Crassus a moment ago; Marcus Antonius, when a youth, had the
same success. A prosecution brought the eloquence of Publius Sulpicius
into favourable notice, when he brought an action against Gaius
Norbanus, a seditious and dangerous citizen. *50* But this should not be
done often--never, in fact, except in the interest of the state (as in
the cases of those above mentioned) or to avenge wrongs (as the two
Luculli, for example, did) or for the protection of our provincials (as
I did in the defence of the Sicilians, or Julius in the prosecution of
Albucius in behalf of the Sardinians). The activity of Lucius Fufius in
the impeachment of Manius Aquilius is likewise famous. This sort of
work, then, may be done once in a lifetime, or at all events not often.
But if it shall be required of anyone to conduct more frequent
prosecutions, let him do it as a service to his country; for it is no
disgrace to be often employed in the prosecution of her enemies. And
yet a limit should be set even to that. For it requires a heartless man,
it seems, or rather one who is well-nigh inhuman, to be arraigning one
person after another on capital charges.[AP] It is not only fraught with
danger to the prosecutor himself, but is damaging to his reputation, to
allow himself to be called a prosecutor. Such was the effect of this
epithet upon Marcus Brutus, the scion of a very noble family and the son
of that Brutus who was an eminent authority in the civil law.

#Spare the innocent; defend the guilty.#

*51* Again, the following rule of duty is to be carefully observed:
never prefer a capital charge against any person who may be innocent.
For that cannot possibly be done without making oneself a criminal. For
what is so unnatural as to turn to the ruin and destruction of good men
the eloquence bestowed by nature for the safety and protection of our
fellow-men? And yet, while we should never prosecute the innocent, we
need not have scruples against undertaking on occasion the defence of a
guilty person, provided he be not infamously depraved and wicked. For
people expect it; custom sanctions it; humanity also accepts it. It is
always the business of the judge in a trial to find out the truth; it is
sometimes the business of the advocate to maintain what is plausible,
even if it be not strictly true, though I should not venture to say
this, especially in an ethical treatise, if it were not also the
position of Panaetius, that strictest of Stoics. Then, too, briefs for
the defence are most likely to bring glory and popularity to the
pleader, and all the more so, if ever it falls to him to lend his aid to
one who seems to be oppressed and persecuted by the influence of some
one in power. This I have done on many other occasions; and once in
particular, in my younger days, I defended Sextus Roscius of Ameria
against the power of Lucius Sulla when he was acting the tyrant. The
speech is published, as you know.

    [AP] A "capital charge" meant to the Roman a charge
    endangering a person's _caput_, or civil status. A conviction
    on such a charge resulted in his civil degradation and the
    loss of his privileges as a Roman citizen.

*52* XV. Sed expositis adulescentium officiis, quae valeant ad gloriam
adipiscendam, deinceps de beneficentia[216] ac de liberalitate dicendum
est; cuius est ratio duplex; nam aut opera benigne fit indigentibus aut
pecunia. Facilior est haec posterior, locupleti praesertim, sed illa
lautior ac splendidior et viro forti claroque dignior. Quamquam enim in
utroque inest gratificandi liberalis voluntas, tamen altera ex arca,
altera ex virtute depromitur, largitioque, quae fit ex re familiari,
fontem ipsum benignitatis exhaurit. Ita benignitate benignitas tollitur;
qua quo in plures usus sis, eo minus in multos uti possis. *53* At qui
opera, id est virtute et industria, benefici et liberales erunt, primum,
quo pluribus profuerint, eo plures ad benigne faciendum adiutores
habebunt, dein consuetudine beneficentiae paratiores erunt et tamquam
exercitatiores ad bene de multis promerendum.

Praeclare in[217] epistula[218] quadam Alexandrum filium Philippus
accusat, quod largitione benivolentiam Macedonum consectetur: "Quae te,
malum!" inquit, "ratio in istam spem induxit, ut eos tibi fideles
putares fore, quos pecunia corrupisses? An tu id agis, ut Macedones non
te regem suum, sed ministrum et praebitorem[219] sperent fore?"

Bene "ministrum et praebitorem,"[220] quia sordidum regi, melius etiam,
quod largitionem "corruptelam" dixit esse; fit enim deterior, qui
accipit, atque ad idem semper exspectandum paratior.

*54* Hoc ille filio, sed praeceptum putemus omnibus.

Quam ob rem id quidem non dubium est, quin illa benignitas, quae constet
ex opera et industria, et honestior sit et latius pateat et possit
prodesse pluribus; non numquam tamen est largiendum, nec hoc
benignitatis genus omnino repudiandum est et saepe idoneis hominibus
indigentibus de re familiari impertiendum, sed diligenter atque
moderate; multi enim patrimonia effuderunt inconsulte largiendo. Quid
autem est stultius quam, quod libenter facias, curare, ut id diutius
facere non possis? Atque etiam sequuntur largitionem rapinae; cum enim
dando egere coeperunt, alienis bonis manus afferre coguntur. Ita, cum
benivolentiae comparandae causa benefici esse velint, non tanta studia
assequuntur eorum, quibus dederunt, quanta odia eorum, quibus ademerunt.

*55* Quam ob rem nec ita claudenda res est familiaris, ut eam benignitas
aperire non possit, nec ita reseranda, ut pateat omnibus; modus
adhibeatur, isque referatur ad facultates. Omnino meminisse debemus, id
quod a nostris hominibus saepissime usurpatum iam in proverbii
consuetudinem venit, "largitionem fundum non habere"; etenim quis potest
modus esse, cum et idem, qui consuerunt, et idem illud alii desiderent?

    [216] _beneficentia_ Edd.; _beneficientia_ MSS. (ubique).

    [217] _in_ B H a b; not in L c p.

    [218] _epistula_ H, Heine; _epistola_ B L a b c.

    [219] _praebitorem_ B H L b c p; _praebitorem putant_ a.

    [220] _sperent ... praebitorem_ L c p, Edd.; not in B H a b.

#Generosity of two kinds:#

*52* XV. Now that I have set forth the moral duties of a young man, in
so far as they may be exerted for the attainment of glory, I must next
in order discuss kindness and generosity. The manner of showing it is
twofold: kindness is shown to the needy either by personal service, or
by gifts of money. The latter way is the easier, especially for a rich
man; but the former is nobler and more dignified and more becoming to a
strong and eminent man. For although both ways alike betray a generous
wish to oblige, still in the one case the favour makes a draft upon
one's bank account, in the other upon one's personal energy; and the
bounty which is drawn from one's material substance tends to exhaust the
very fountain of liberality. Liberality is thus forestalled by
liberality: for the more people one has helped with gifts of money, the
fewer one can help. *53* But if people are generous and kind in the way
of personal service--that is, with their ability and personal
effort--various advantages arise: first, the more people they assist,
the more helpers they will have in works of kindness; and second, by
acquiring the habit of kindness they are better prepared and in better
training, as it were, for bestowing favours upon many.

In one of his letters Philip takes his son Alexander sharply to task for
trying by gifts of money to secure the good-will of the Macedonians:
"What in the mischief induced you to entertain such a hope," he says,
"as that those men would be loyal subjects to you whom you had
corrupted with money? Or are you trying to do what you can to lead the
Macedonians to expect that you will be not their king but their steward
and purveyor?"

"Steward and purveyor" was well said, because it was degrading for a
prince; better still, when he called the gift of money "corruption." For
the recipient goes from bad to worse and is made all the more ready to
be constantly looking for one bribe after another.

*54* It was to his son that Philip gave this lesson; but let us all take
it diligently to heart.

That liberality, therefore, which consists in personal service and
effort is more honourable, has wider application, and can benefit more
people. There can be no doubt about that. #(1) gifts of money,#
Nevertheless, we should sometimes make gifts of money; and this kind of
liberality is not to be discouraged altogether. We must often distribute
from our purse to the worthy poor, but we must do so with discretion and
moderation. For many[AQ] have squandered their patrimony by
indiscriminate giving. But what is worse folly than to do the thing you
like in such a way that you can no longer do it at all? Then, too,
lavish giving leads to robbery[AR]; for when through over-giving men
begin to be impoverished, they are constrained to lay their hands on the
property of others. And so, when men aim to be kind for the sake of
winning good-will, the affection they gain from the objects of their
gifts is not so great as the hatred they incur from those whom they
despoil.

*55* One's purse, then, should not be closed so tightly that a generous
impulse cannot open it, nor yet so loosely held as to be open to
everybody. A limit should be observed and that limit should be
determined by our means. We ought, in a word, to remember the phrase,
which, through being repeated so very often by our countrymen, has come
to be a common proverb: "Bounty has no bottom." For indeed what limit
can there be, when those who have been accustomed to receive gifts claim
what they have been in the habit of getting, and those who have not wish
for the same bounty?

    [AQ] Julius Caesar was a striking example of this.

    [AR] Cicero evidently had in mind such instances as Sulla,
    Caesar, Antony, and Catiline--_alieni appetens, sui profusus_
    (Sall., Cat. V).

XVI. Omnino duo sunt genera largorum, quorum alteri prodigi, alteri
liberales: prodigi, qui epulis et viscerationibus et gladiatorum
muneribus, ludorum venationumque apparatu pecunias profundunt in eas
res, quarum memoriam aut brevem aut nullam omnino sint relicturi, *56*
liberales autem, qui suis facultatibus aut captos a praedonibus redimunt
aut aes alienum suscipiunt amicorum aut in filiarum collocatione
adiuvant aut opitulantur in re vel quaerenda vel augenda. *(56)* Itaque
miror, quid in mentem venerit Theophrasto in eo libro, quem de divitiis
scripsit; in quo multa praeclare, illud absurde: est enim multus in
laudanda magnificentia et apparatione popularium munerum taliumque
sumptuum facultatem fructum divitiarum putat. Mihi autem ille fructus
liberalitatis, cuius pauca exempla posui, multo et maior videtur et
certior.

#Not found in our Aristotle.#

Quanto Aristoteles gravius et verius nos reprehendit! qui has pecuniarum
effusiones non admiremur, quae fiunt ad multitudinem deliniendam. _Ait
enim_,[221] "qui ab hoste obsidentur, si emere aquae sextarium
cogerentur[222] mina, hoc primo incredibile nobis videri, omnesque
mirari, sed cum attenderint, veniam necessitati dare, in his immanibus
iacturis infinitisque sumptibus nihil nos magnopere mirari, cum
praesertim neque necessitati subveniatur nec dignitas augeatur ipsaque
illa delectatio multitudinis ad breve exiguumque tempus _capiatur_,[223]
eaque a levissimo quoque, in quo tamen ipso una cum satietate memoria
quoque moriatur voluptatis." *57* Bene etiam colligit "haec pueris et
mulierculis et servis et servorum simillimis liberis esse grata, gravi
vero homini et ea, quae fiunt, iudicio certo ponderanti probari posse
nullo modo."

Quamquam intellego in nostra civitate inveterasse iam bonis temporibus,
ut splendor aedilitatum ab optimis viris postuletur.[224] Itaque et P.
Crassus cum cognomine dives, tum copiis functus est aedilicio maximo
munere, et paulo post L. Crassus cum omnium hominum moderatissimo Q.
Mucio magnificentissima aedilitate functus est, deinde C. Claudius App.
f., multi post, Luculli, Hortensius, Silanus; omnes autem P. Lentulus me
consule vicit superiores; hunc est Scaurus imitatus; magnificentissima
vero nostri Pompei munera secundo consulatu; in quibus omnibus quid mihi
placeat, vides.

    [221] _Ait enim_ Ed.; _at hi_ a; _at hii_ H; _at ii_ B b; _at
    hij_ c.

    [222] _cogerentur_ B H a b; _cogantur_ L c p.

    [223] _capiatur_ Beier; not in MSS.

    [224] _postuletur_ B H a b, Heine; _postularetur_ L c p, Bt.

#Extravagant waste of the public games.#

XVI. There are, in general, two classes of those who give largely: the
one class is the lavish, the other the generous. The lavish are those
who squander their money on public banquets, doles of meat among the
people, gladiatorial shows, magnificent games, and wild-beast
fights--vanities of which but a brief recollection will remain, or none
at all. *56* The generous, on the other hand, are those who employ their
own means to ransom captives from brigands, or who assume their friends'
debts or help in providing dowries for their daughters, or assist them
in acquiring property or increasing what they have. *(56)* And so I
wonder what Theophrastus could have been thinking about when he wrote
his book on "Wealth." It contains much that is fine: but his position is
absurd, when he praises at great length the magnificent appointments of
the popular games, and it is in the means for indulging in such
expenditures that he finds the highest privilege of wealth. But to me
the privilege it gives for the exercise of generosity, of which I have
given a few illustrations, seems far higher and far more certain.

How much more true and pertinent are Aristotle's words, as he rebukes us
for not being amazed at this extravagant waste of money, all to win the
favour of the populace. "If people in time of siege," he says, "are
required to pay a mina for a pint of water, this seems to us at first
beyond belief, and all are amazed; but when they think about it, they
make allowances for it on the plea of necessity. But in the matter of
this enormous waste and unlimited expenditure we are not very greatly
astonished, and that, too, though by it no extreme need is relieved, no
dignity is enhanced, and the very gratification of the populace is but
for a brief, passing moment; such pleasure as it is, too, is confined to
the most frivolous, and even in these the very memory of their enjoyment
dies as soon as the moment of gratification is past." *57* His
conclusion, too, is excellent: "This sort of amusement pleases children,
silly women, slaves, and the servile free; but a serious-minded man who
weighs such matters with sound judgment cannot possibly approve of
them."

#Magnificent entertainments expected of an aedile.#

And yet I realize that in our country, even in the good old times, it
had become a settled custom to expect magnificent entertainments from
the very best men in their year of aedileship. So both Publius Crassus,
who was not merely surnamed "The Rich" but was rich in fact, gave
splendid games in his aedileship; and a little later Lucius Crassus
(with Quintus Mucius, the most unpretentious man in the world, as his
colleague) gave most magnificent entertainments in his aedileship. Then
came Gaius Claudius, the son of Appius, and, after him, many others--the
Luculli, Hortensius, and Silanus. Publius Lentulus, however, in the year
of my consulship, eclipsed all that had gone before him, and Scaurus
emulated him. And my friend Pompey's exhibitions in his second
consulship were the most magnificent of all. And so you see what I
think about all this sort of thing.

*58* XVII. Vitanda tamen suspicio est avaritiae. Mamerco, homini
divitissimo, praetermissio aedilitatis consulatus repulsam attulit.
Quare et, si postulatur a populo, bonis viris si non desiderantibus, at
tamen approbantibus faciundum est, modo pro facultatibus, nos ipsi ut
fecimus, et, si quando aliqua res maior atque utilior populari
largitione acquiritur, ut Oresti nuper prandia in semitis decumae nomine
magno honori fuerunt. Ne M.[225] quidem Seio vitio datum est, quod in
caritate asse modium populo dedit; magna enim se et inveterata invidia
nec turpi iactura, quando erat aedilis, nec maxima liberavit. Sed honori
summo nuper nostro Miloni fuit, qui gladiatoribus emptis rei publicae
causa, quae salute nostra continebatur, omnes P. Clodi conatus
furoresque compressit.

Causa igitur largitionis est, si aut necesse est aut utile. *59* In
his[226] autem ipsis mediocritatis regula optima est. L. quidem
Philippus Q. f., magno vir ingenio in primisque clarus, gloriari solebat
se sine ullo munere adeptum esse omnia, quae haberentur amplissima.
Dicebat idem Cotta, Curio. Nobis quoque licet in hoc quodam modo
gloriari; nam pro amplitudine honorum, quos cunctis suffragiis adepti
sumus nostro quidem anno, quod contigit eorum nemini, quos modo
nominavi, sane exiguus sumptus aedilitatis fuit.

*60* Atque etiam illae impensae meliores, muri, navalia, portus, aquarum
ductus omniaque, quae ad usum rei publicae pertinent. Quamquam, quod
praesens tamquam in manum datur, iucundius est; tamen haec in posterum
gratiora. Theatra, porticus, nova templa verecundius reprehendo propter
Pompeium, sed doctissimi non probant, ut et his ipse Panaetius, quem
multum in his libris secutus sum, non interpretatus, et Phalereus
Demetrius, qui Periclem, principem Graeciae, vituperat, quod tantam
pecuniam in praeclara illa propylaea coniecerit. #The portion here
referred to is lost.# Sed de hoc genere toto in iis libris, quos de re
publica scripsi, diligenter disputatum.

Tota igitur ratio talium largitionum genere vitiosa est, temporibus
necessaria, et tum ipsum et ad facultates accommodanda et mediocritate
moderanda est.

    [225] _M._ Orelli, Ed.; _Marco_ MSS.

    [226] _his_ H, Edd.; _hijs_ c; _iis_ B b; _is_ L.

*58* XVII. Still we should avoid any suspicion of penuriousness.
Mamercus was a very wealthy man, and his refusal of the aedileship was
the cause of his defeat for the consulship. #Justification of such
extravagance.# If, therefore, such entertainment is demanded by the
people, men of right judgment must at least consent to furnish it, even
if they do not like the idea. But in so doing they should keep within
their means, as I myself did. They should likewise afford such
entertainment, if gifts of money to the people are to be the means of
securing on some occasion some more important or more useful object.
Thus Orestes recently won great honour by his public dinners given in
the streets, on the pretext of their being a tithe-offering. Neither did
anybody find fault with Marcus Seius for supplying grain to the people
at an _as_[AS] the peck at a time when the market-price was prohibitive;
for he thus succeeded in disarming the bitter and deep-seated prejudice
of the people against him at an outlay neither very great nor
discreditable to him in view of the fact that he was aedile at the time.
But the highest honour recently fell to my friend Milo, who bought a
band of gladiators for the sake of the country, whose preservation then
depended upon my recall from exile, and with them put down the desperate
schemes, the reign of terror, of Publius Clodius.

The justification for gifts of money, therefore, is either necessity or
expediency. *59* #The golden mean is best.# And in making them even in
such cases, the rule of the golden mean is best. To be sure, Lucius
Philippus, the son of Quintus, a man of great ability and unusual
renown, used to make it his boast that without giving any
entertainments he had risen to all the positions looked upon as the
highest within the gift of the state. Cotta could say the same, and
Curio. I, too, may make this boast my own--to a certain extent[AT]; for
in comparison with the eminence of the offices to which I was
unanimously elected at the earliest legal age--and this was not the good
fortune of any one of those just mentioned--the outlay in my aedileship
was very inconsiderable.

#Lavish expenditure on public works.#

*60* Again, the expenditure of money is better justified when it is made
for walls, docks, harbours, aqueducts, and all those works which are of
service to the community. There is, to be sure, more of present
satisfaction in what is handed out, like cash down; nevertheless public
improvements win us greater gratitude with posterity. Out of respect for
Pompey's memory I am rather diffident about expressing any criticism of
theatres, colonnades, and new temples; and yet the greatest philosophers
do not approve of them--our Panaetius himself, for example, whom I am
following, not slavishly translating, in these books; so, too, Demetrius
of Phalerum, who denounces Pericles, the foremost man of Greece, for
throwing away so much money on the magnificent, far-famed Propylaea. But
this whole theme is discussed at length in my books on "The Republic."

To conclude, the whole system of public bounties in such extravagant
amount is intrinsically wrong; but it may under certain circumstances be
necessary to make them; even then they must be proportioned to our
ability and regulated by the golden mean.

    [AS] The _as_ was a copper coin worth somewhat less than a
    penny. Selling grain to the people at such a price was
    practically giving it away to purchase their good-will.

    [AT] The saving clause is added, because Cicero never filled
    the office of Censor.

*61* XVIII. In illo autem altero genere largiendi, quod a liberalitate
proficiscitur, non uno modo in disparibus causis affecti esse debemus.
Alia causa est eius, qui calamitate premitur, et eius, qui res meliores
quaerit nullis suis rebus adversis. *62* Propensior benignitas esse
debebit in calamitosos, nisi forte erunt digni calamitate. In iis tamen,
qui se adiuvari volent, non ne affligantur, sed ut altiorem gradum
ascendant, restricti omnino esse nullo modo debemus, sed in deligendis
idoneis iudicium et diligentiam adhibere. Nam praeclare Ennius:

#Fab. inc. Vahlen^2, 409#

    Bene fácta male locáta male facta árbitror.

*63* Quod autem tributum est bono viro et grato, in eo cum ex ipso
fructus est, tum etiam ex ceteris. Temeritate enim remota gratissima est
liberalitas, eoque eam studiosius plerique laudant, quod summi cuiusque
bonitas commune perfugium est omnium. Danda igitur opera est, ut iis
beneficiis quam plurimos afficiamus, quorum memoria liberis posterisque
prodatur, ut iis ingratis esse non liceat. Omnes enim immemorem
beneficii oderunt eamque iniuriam in deterrenda liberalitate sibi etiam
fieri eumque, qui faciat, communem hostem tenuiorum putant.

Atque haec benignitas etiam rei publicae est utilis, redimi e servitute
captos, locupletari tenuiores; quod quidem volgo solitum fieri ab ordine
nostro in oratione Crassi scriptum copiose videmus. Hanc ergo[227]
consuetudinem benignitatis largitioni munerum longe[228] antepono; haec
est gravium hominum atque magnorum, illa quasi assentatorum populi
multitudinis levitatem voluptate quasi titillantium.

*64* Conveniet autem cum in dando munificum esse, tum in exigendo non
acerbum in omnique re contrahenda, vendundo emendo, conducendo locando,
vicinitatibus et confiniis, aequum, facilem, multa multis de suo iure
cedentem, a litibus vero, quantum liceat et nescio an paulo plus etiam,
quam liceat, abhorrentem. Est enim non modo liberale paulum non numquam
de suo iure decedere, sed interdum etiam fructuosum. Habenda autem ratio
est rei familiaris, quam quidem dilabi[229] sinere flagitiosum est, sed
ita, ut illiberalitatis avaritiaeque absit suspicio; posse enim
liberalitate uti non spoliantem se patrimonio nimirum est pecuniae
fructus maximus.

Recte etiam a Theophrasto est laudata hospitalitas; est enim, ut mihi
quidem videtur, valde decorum patere domus hominum illustrium hospitibus
illustribus, idque etiam rei publicae est ornamento, homines externos
hoc liberalitatis genere in urbe nostra non egere. Est autem etiam
vehementer utile iis, qui honeste posse multum volunt, per hospites apud
externos populos valere opibus et gratia. Theophrastus quidem scribit
Cimonem Athenis etiam in suos curiales Laciadas hospitalem fuisse; ita
enim instituisse et vilicis imperavisse, ut omnia praeberentur,
quicumque Laciades in villam suam devertisset.

    [227] _ergo_ B H a b, Müller; _ego_ L c p, Lactantius, Bt.,
    Heine.

    [228] _longe_ L c p, Lactantius, Edd.; not in B H a b.

    [229] _dilabi_ L c, Ed., Heine; _delabi_ B H a b, Bt.

#General rules for beneficence.#

*61* XVIII. Now, as touching that second division of gifts of money,
those which are prompted by a spirit of generosity, we ought to look at
different cases differently. The case of the man who is overwhelmed by
misfortune is different from that of the one who is seeking to better
his condition, though he suffers from no actual distress. *62* It will
be the duty of charity to incline more to the unfortunate, unless,
perchance, they deserve their misfortune. But of course we ought by no
means to withhold our assistance altogether from those who wish for aid,
not to save them from utter ruin but to enable them to reach a higher
degree of fortune. But in selecting worthy cases, we ought to use
judgment and discretion. For, as Ennius says so admirably,

    "Good deeds misplaced, methinks, are evil deeds."

*63* Furthermore, the favour conferred upon a man who is good and
grateful finds its reward, in such a case, not only in his own good-will
but in that of others. For when generosity is not indiscriminate giving,
it wins most gratitude and people praise it with more enthusiasm,
because goodness of heart in a man of high station becomes the common
refuge of everybody. Pains must, therefore, be taken to benefit as many
as possible with such kindnesses that the memory of them shall be handed
down to children and to children's children, so that they too may not be
ungrateful. For all men detest ingratitude and look upon the sin of it
as a wrong committed against themselves also, because it discourages
generosity; and they regard the ingrate as the common foe of all the
poor.

Ransoming prisoners from servitude and relieving the poor is a form of
charity that is a service to the state as well as to the individual.
And we find in one of Crassus's orations the full proof given that such
beneficence used to be the common practice of our order. This form of
charity, then, I much prefer to the lavish expenditure of money for
public exhibitions. The former is suited to men of worth and dignity,
the latter to those shallow flatterers, if I may call them so, who
tickle with idle pleasure, so to speak, the fickle fancy of the rabble.

*64* It will, moreover, befit a gentleman to be at the same time liberal
in giving and not inconsiderate in exacting his dues, but in every
business relation--in buying or selling, in hiring or letting, in
relations arising out of adjoining houses and lands--to be fair,
reasonable, often freely yielding much of his own right, and keeping out