General Assembly at the same time have been deeply impressed
     with a sense of the necessity of speedily adopting some
     effectual measures for supplying the continental treasury,
     for the restoration of the public credit, and the salvation
     of the country;--and propose, as the present session is near
     terminating, again to take the subject of the impost duty
     into consideration early in the next. From these
     observations, you may easily learn the difficult and critical
     situation the legislature is in, and they rely on the wisdom
     of Congress to adopt and propose some measure for relief in
     this extremity.

     "In the name and by order of the General Court,

          "We are your Excellency's most obedient humble servants,

                                       "SAMUEL ADAMS,
                                 _President of the Senate_.

                                     "TRISTRAM DALTON,
                         _Speaker of the House of Representatives_.

     "HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS."

     This letter was thought worthy an answer, and accordingly a
     report upon it was brought in by Mr. Madison, and adopted in
     Congress, containing among other things the following:--

     "Your committee consider the measure of Congress as the
     result of a deliberate judgment, framed on a general view of
     the interests of the Union at large. They consider it to be a
     truth, that no State in this Confederacy can claim (more
     equitably than an individual in a society) to derive
     advantages from a Union, without conforming to the judgment
     of a constitutional majority of those who compose it; still,
     however, they conceive it will be found no less true, that,
     if a State every way so important as Massachusetts should
     withhold her solid support to constitutional measures of the
     Confederacy, the result must be a dissolution of the
     Union;--and then she must hold herself as alone responsible
     for the anarchy and domestic confusion that may succeed, and
     for exposing all these confederated States (who at the
     commencement of the late war leagued to defend her violated
     rights) an easy prey to the machinations of their enemies,
     and the sport of European politics; and therefore they are of
     opinion, that Congress should still confide that a free,
     enlightened, and generous people will never hazard
     consequences so perilous and alarming, and in all
     circumstances rely on the wisdom, temper, and virtue of their
     constituents, which (guided by an all-wise Providence) have
     ever interposed to avert impending evils and misfortunes.
     Your committee beg leave further to observe, that, from an
     earnest desire to give satisfaction to such of the States as
     expressed a dislike to the half-pay establishment, a sum in
     gross was proposed by Congress, and accepted by the officers,
     as an equivalent for their half-pay. That your committee are
     informed, that such equivalent was ascertained on established
     principles which are acknowledged to be just, and adopted in
     similar cases; but that if the objections against the
     commutation were ever so valid, yet, as it is not now under
     the arbitration of Congress, but an act finally adopted, and
     the national faith pledged to carry it into effect, they
     could not be taken into consideration. With regard to the
     salaries of civil officers, it may be observed, that the
     necessaries of life have been very high during the war: hence
     it has happened that even the salaries complained of have not
     been found sufficient to induce persons properly qualified to
     accept of many important offices, and the public business is
     left undone." (Journals of Congress, VIII. 379--385.
     September 25, 1783.)

NOTE TO PAGE 186.

ON THE NEWBURGH ADDRESSES.

     There was a period in this business, when the officers would
     have accepted from Congress a recommendation to their several
     States for the payment of their dues. Their committee,
     consisting of General McDougall, Colonel Brooks of
     Massachusetts, and Colonel Ogden of New Jersey, arrived in
     Philadelphia about the 1st of January. In their memorial to
     Congress, they abstained from designating the funds from
     which they desired satisfaction of their demands, because
     their great object was to get a settlement of their accounts
     and an equivalent for the half-pay established. But they
     were, in fact, at one time, impressed with the belief that
     their best, and indeed their only security, was to be sought
     for in funds to be provided by the States, under the
     recommendation of Congress. This plan would have involved a
     division of the army into thirteen different parts, leaving
     the claims of each part to be satisfied by its own State: a
     course that would unquestionably have led to the rejection of
     their demands in some States, and probably in many. To
     prevent this, there is little doubt that the influence of
     those members of Congress who wished to promote their
     interests, and to identify them with the interests of the
     other public creditors, was used; and by the middle of
     February the committee of the officers became satisfied, that
     the army must unitedly pursue a common object, insisting on
     the grant of revenues to the general government, adequate to
     the liquidation of all the public debts. (Letter of
     Gouverneur Morris to General Greene, February 15, 1783. Life,
     by Sparks, I. 250.) The point, however, which they continued
     to urge, was the commutation; and upon this they encountered
     great obstacles. The committee of Congress to whom their
     memorial was referred went into a critical examination of the
     principles of annuities, in order to determine on an
     equivalent for the half-pay for life, promised by the resolve
     of 1780. The result was a report, declaring that six years'
     full pay was the proper equivalent. This report was followed
     by a declaratory resolve, which was passed, "that the troops
     of the United States, in common with all the creditors of the
     same, have an undoubted right to expect security; and that
     Congress will make every effort to obtain, from the
     respective States, substantial funds, adequate to the object
     of funding the whole debt of the United States, and will
     enter upon an immediate and full consideration of the nature
     of such funds, and the most likely mode of obtaining them."
     The remainder of the report, however, was referred to a new
     committee of five, the number of years being considered too
     many. The second committee reported five years' whole pay as
     an equivalent, after another calculation of annuities; but
     the approval of nine States could not be obtained. A desire
     was then expressed by some of the members, who were opposed
     both to the commutation and the half-pay, to have more time
     for consideration, and this was granted.

     This was the position of the matter on the 8th of February,
     when the committee of the officers wrote to General Knox on
     the part of the army. They stated that "Massachusetts, New
     York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North and South Carolina were
     for the equivalent; New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut,
     and Jersey against it. There is some prospect of getting one
     more of these States to vote for the commutation. If this is
     accomplished, with Maryland and Delaware, the question will
     be carried; whenever it is, as the report now stands, it will
     be at the election of the line, as such, to accept of the
     commutation or retain their claim to the half-pay, Congress
     being determined, that no alteration shall take place in the
     emolument held out to the army but by their consent. This
     rendered it unnecessary for us to consult the army on the
     equivalent for half-pay. The zeal of a great number of
     members of Congress to get continental funds, while a few
     wished to have us referred to the States, induced us to
     conceal what funds we wished or expected, lest our
     declaration for one or the other might retard a settlement of
     our accounts, or a determination on the equivalent for
     half-pay. Indeed, some of our best friends in Congress
     declared, however desirous they were to have our accounts
     settled, and the commutation fixed, as well as to get funds,
     yet they would oppose referring us to the States for a
     settlement and security, till all prospect of obtaining
     continental funds was at an end. Whether this is near or not,
     as commutation for the half-pay was one of the principal
     objects of the address, the obtaining of that is necessary,
     previous to our particularizing what fund will be most
     agreeable to us: this must be determined by circumstances. If
     Congress get funds, we shall be secured. If not, the
     equivalent settled, a principle will be established, which
     will be more acceptable to the Eastern States than half-pay,
     if application must be made to them. As it is not likely that
     Congress will be able to determine soon on the commutation,
     (for the reasons above mentioned,) it is judged necessary
     that Colonel Brooks return to the army, to give them a more
     particular detail of our prospects than can be done in the
     compass of a letter." (Writings of Washington, VIII. 553,
     554.)

     Two classes of persons existed at this time in Congress, of
     very different views; the one attached to State, the other to
     continental politics; the one strenuous advocates for funding
     the public debts upon solid securities, the other opposed to
     this plan, and finally yielding to it only in consequence of
     the clamors of the army and the other public creditors. The
     advocates for continental funds, convinced that nothing could
     be done for the public credit by any other measures,
     determined to blend the interests of the army and those of
     the other creditors in their scheme, in order to combine all
     the motives that could operate upon different descriptions of
     men in the different States. Washington, who naturally
     regarded the interests of the army as the first object in
     point of importance, and who had not given his attention so
     much to the general financial affairs of the country, seems
     to have thought it unadvisable to bring the claims of the
     army before the States, in connection with the other public
     debts. On the 4th of March, he wrote to Hamilton (then in
     Congress), that "the just claims of the army ought, and it is
     to be hoped will, have their weight with every sensible
     legislature in the United States, if Congress point to their
     demands, and show, if the case is so, the reasonableness of
     them, and the impracticability of complying with them without
     their aid. In any other point of view, it would in my opinion
     be impolitic to introduce the army on the tapis, lest it
     should excite jealousy and bring on its concomitants. The
     States surely cannot be so devoid of common sense, common
     honesty, and common policy, as to refuse their aid on a full,
     clear, and candid representation of facts from Congress; more
     especially if these should be enforced by members of their
     own body, who might demonstrate what the inevitable
     consequences of failure will lead to." (Writings, VIII. 390.)

     But while the advocates of the continental system were
     maturing their plans, new difficulties arose, in consequence
     of the proceedings of the officers at Newburgh, and of the
     jealousies which the army began to entertain. Among the
     resolutions adopted by the officers was one, which expressed
     their unshaken confidence in the justice of Congress and the
     country, and their conviction that Congress would not
     disband them, until their accounts had been liquidated, and
     adequate funds established for their payment. But Congress
     had no constitutional power, under the Confederation, to
     demand funds of the States; and to determine that the army
     should be continued in service until the States granted the
     funds, which it was intended to recommend, would be to
     determine that it should remain a standing army in time of
     peace, until the States should comply with the
     recommendation. On the other hand, Congress had no present
     means of paying the army, if they were to disband them. This
     dilemma rendered it necessary to evade for a short time any
     explicit declaration of the purposes of Congress as to
     disbanding the army; and hence arose a jealousy, on the part
     of the army, that they were to be used as mere puppets to
     operate upon the country, in favor of a general revenue
     system. Washington himself communicated the existence of
     these suspicions to Hamilton, on the 4th of April, advising
     that the army should be disbanded as soon as possible,
     consulting its wishes as to the mode. He also intimated that
     the Superintendent of the Finances, Robert Morris, was
     suspected to be at the bottom of the scheme of keeping the
     army together, for the purpose of aiding the adoption of the
     revenue system.

     Hamilton's reply explains the position of the whole matter,
     and the motives and purposes of those with whom he acted.
     "But the question was not merely how to do justice to the
     creditors, but how to restore public credit. Taxation in this
     country, it was found, could not supply a sixth part of the
     public necessities. The loans in Europe were far short of the
     balance, and the prospect every day diminishing; the court of
     France telling us, in plain terms, she could not even do as
     much as she had done; individuals in Holland, and everywhere
     else, refusing to part with their money on the precarious
     tenure of the mere faith of this country, without any pledge
     for the payment either of principal or interest. In this
     situation, what was to be done? It was essential to our cause
     that vigorous efforts should be made to restore public
     credit; it was necessary to combine all the motives to this
     end, that could operate upon different descriptions of
     persons in the different States. The necessity and
     discontents of the army presented themselves as a powerful
     engine. But, sir, these gentlemen would be puzzled to support
     their insinuations by a single fact. It was indeed proposed
     to appropriate the intended impost on trade to the army debt,
     and, what was extraordinary, by gentlemen who had expressed
     their dislike to the principle of the fund. I acknowledge I
     was one that opposed this, for the reasons already assigned,
     and for these additional ones: _that_ was the fund on which
     we most counted to obtain further loans in Europe; it was
     necessary we should have a fund sufficient to pay the
     interest of what had been borrowed and what was to be
     borrowed. The truth was, these people in this instance wanted
     to play off the army against the funding system. As to Mr.
     Morris, I will give your Excellency a true explanation of his
     conduct. He had been for some time pressing Congress to
     endeavor to obtain funds, and had found a great backwardness
     in the business. He found the taxes unproductive in the
     different States; he found the loans in Europe making a very
     slow progress; he found himself pressed on all hands for
     supplies; he found himself, in short, reduced to this
     alternative,--either of making engagements which he could not
     fulfil, or declaring his resignation in case funds were not
     established by a given time. Had he followed the first
     course, the bubble must soon have burst; he must have
     sacrificed his credit and his character, and _public_ credit,
     already in a ruined condition, would have lost its last
     support. He wisely judged it better to resign; this might
     increase the embarrassments of the moment, but the necessity
     of the case, it was to be hoped, would produce the proper
     measures, and he might then resume the direction of the
     machine with advantage and success. He also had some hope
     that his resignation would prove a stimulus to Congress. He
     was, however, ill-advised in the publication of his letters
     of resignation. This was an imprudent step, and has given a
     handle to his personal enemies, who, by playing upon the
     passions of others, have drawn some well-meaning men into the
     cry against him. But Mr. Morris certainly deserves a great
     deal from his country. I believe no man in this country but
     himself could have kept the money machine going during the
     period he has been in office. From every thing that appears,
     his administration has been upright as well as able. The
     truth is, the old leaven of Deane and Lee is at this day
     working against Mr. Morris. He happened in that dispute to
     have been on the side of Deane, and certain men can never
     forgive him.... The matter, with respect to the army, which
     has occasioned most altercation in Congress, and most
     dissatisfaction in the army, has been the half-pay. The
     opinions on this head have been two: one party was for
     referring the several lines to their States, to make such
     commutation as they should think proper; the other, for
     making the commutation by Congress, and funding it on
     continental security. I was of this last opinion, and so were
     all those who will be represented as having made use of the
     army as our puppets. Our principal reasons were:--First, by
     referring the lines to their respective States, those which
     were opposed to the half-pay would have taken advantage of
     the officers' necessities to make the commutation short of an
     equivalent. Secondly, the inequality which would have arisen
     in the different States when the officers came to compare,
     (as has happened in other cases,) would have been a new
     source of discontent. Thirdly, such a reference was a
     continuance of the old, wretched State system, by which the
     ties between Congress and the army have been nearly
     dissolved,--by which the resources of the States have been
     diverted from the common treasury and wasted: a system which
     your Excellency has often justly reprobated. I have gone into
     these details to give you a just idea of the parties in
     Congress. I assure you, upon my honor, sir, I have given you
     a candid statement of facts, to the best of my judgment. The
     men against whom the suspicions you mention must be directed,
     are in general the most sensible, the most liberal, the most
     independent, and the most respectable characters in our body,
     as well as the most unequivocal friends to the army; in a
     word, they are the men who think continentally." (Life of
     Hamilton, II. 162-164.)

FOOTNOTES:

[177] The debt due to the crown of France was ascertained in 1782 to be
eighteen millions of livres; and by the contract entered into by the
Unites States with the king of France, on the 16th of July, 1782, the
principal of this debt was to be paid in twelve annual instalments of
one million five hundred thousand livres each, in twelve years, to
commence from the third year after a peace, at the royal treasury in
Paris. The interest was payable annually, at the time and place
stipulated for the payment of the instalments of the principal, at five
per cent. The king generously remitted the arrears of interest due at
the date of the contract. There was also due to the King of France ten
millions of livres, borrowed by him of the States-General of the
Netherlands for the use of the United States, and the payment of which
he had guaranteed. This sum was to be paid in Paris in ten annual
instalments of one million of livres each, commencing on the 5th of
November, 1787. The interest on this loan was payable in Paris
immediately, and the first payment of interest became due on the 5th of
November, 1782. There was also due to the Farmers-General of France one
million of livres, and to the king six millions of livres, on a loan for
the year 1783; making in the whole thirty-eight millions of livres, or
$7,037,037, due in France. There was also due to money-lenders in
Holland $671,000; for money borrowed by Mr. Jay in Spain, $150,000; and
a year's interest on the Dutch loan of ten millions of livres, amounting
to $26,848;--making the whole foreign debt $7,885,085. The domestic debt
amounted to $34,115,290. Five millions of this were due to the army,
_under the commutation_ resolves of March, 1783. The residue was held by
other citizens, or consisted of arrears of interest. The whole debt of
the United States was estimated at $42,000,375, and the annual interest
of this sum was $2,415,956.

[178] Mr. Madison (under the date of December 24, 1782) says, that, on
the receipt of this intelligence, "the most intelligent members were
deeply affected, and prognosticated a failure of the impost scheme, and
the most pernicious effects to the character, the duration, and the
interests of the Confederacy. It was at length, notwithstanding,
determined to persist in the attempt for permanent revenue, and a
committee was appointed to report the steps proper to be taken." Debates
in the Congress of the Confederation, Elliot, I. 17.

[179] $1,545,818 and 30/90 was the whole amount.

[180] On the final question, as to the revenue system, Hamilton voted
against it. His reasons were given in a letter to the Governor of New
York, under date of April 14, 1783. They were, "First, that it does not
designate the funds (except the impost) on which the whole interest is
to arise; and by which (selecting the capital articles of visible
property) the collection would have been easy, the funds productive, and
necessarily increasing with the increase of the country. Secondly, that
the duration of the funds is not coextensive with the debt, but limited
to twenty-five years, though there is a moral certainty that in that
period the principal will not, by the present provision, be fairly
extinguished. Thirdly, that the nomination and appointment of the
collectors of the revenue are to reside in each State, instead of, at
least, the nomination being in the United States; the consequence of
which will be, that those States which have little interest in the
funds, by having a small share of the public debt due to their own
citizens, will take care to appoint such persons as are the least likely
to collect the revenue." Still, he urged the adoption of the plan by his
own State, "because it is her interest, at all events, to promote the
payment of the public debt in continental funds, independent of the
general considerations of union and propriety. I am much mistaken, if
the debts due from the United States to the citizens of the State of New
York do not considerably exceed its proportion of the necessary funds;
of course, it has an immediate interest that there should be a
continental provision for them. But there are superior motives that
ought to operate in every State,--the obligations of national faith,
honor, and reputation. Individuals have been too long already sacrificed
to the public convenience. It will be shocking, and, indeed, an eternal
reproach to this country, if we begin the peaceable enjoyment of our
independence by a violation of all the principles of honesty and true
policy. It is worthy of remark, that at least four fifths of the
domestic debt are due to the citizens of the States from Pennsylvania,
inclusively, northward." Life of Hamilton, II. 185, 186.

[181] Address.

[182] Ibid.

[183] With what success this was attended may be seen from the fact,
that, from the year 1782 to the year 1786, Congress made requisitions on
the States for the purpose of paying the interest on the public debts,
of more than six millions of dollars, and on the 31st of March, 1787,
about one million only of this sum had been received. The interest of
the debt due to domestic creditors remained wholly unpaid; money was
borrowed in Europe to pay the interest on the foreign loans; and the
domestic debt sunk to so low a value, that it was often sold for one
tenth of its nominal amount.

[184] General Washington's letter to Hamilton, March 31, 1783. Writings,
VIII. 409, 410. Circular Letter to the Governors of the States, on
disbanding the army. Ibid. 439, 451.

[185] None of the documents, connected with the Address to the People of
the United States, issued by Congress in 1783, discussed the question as
one of direct interest and advantage, except Hamilton's answer to the
objections of Rhode Island. The Address itself appealed entirely to
considerations of honor, justice, and good faith. Hamilton's paper,
however, showed with great perspicacity, that the proposed impost would
not be unfavorable to commerce, but the contrary; that it would not
diminish the profits of the merchant, being too moderate in amount to
discourage the consumption of imported goods, and therefore that it
would not diminish the extent of importations; but that, even if it had
this tendency, it was a tendency in the right direction, because it
would lessen the proportion of imports to exports, and incline the
balance in favor of the country. But the great question of yielding the
control of foreign commerce to the Union, _for the sake of uniformity of
regulation_, was not touched in any of these papers. The time for it had
not arrived.

[186] See note at the end of this chapter.

[187] See note on page 194.

[188] As it was, the approach of peace had reduced the attendance upon
Congress below the constitutional number of States necessary to ratify
the treaty, when it was received. On the 23d of December, 1783, a
resolve was passed, "That letters be immediately despatched to the
executives of New Hampshire, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, South
Carolina, and Georgia, informing them that the safety, honor, and good
faith of the United States require the immediate attendance of their
delegates in Congress; that there have not been during the sitting of
Congress at this place [Annapolis] more than seven States represented,
namely, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, and North Carolina, and most of those by only two delegates;
and that the ratification of the definitive treaty, and several other
matters, of great national concern, are now pending before Congress,
which require the utmost despatch, and to which the assent of at least
nine States is necessary." (Journals, IX. 12.)

CHAPTER III.

1781-1783.

OPINIONS AND EFFORTS OF WASHINGTON AND OF HAMILTON.--DECLINE OF THE
CONFEDERATION.

The proposal of the revenue system went forth to the country, although
not in immediate connection, yet nearly at the same time, with those
comprehensive and weighty counsels which Washington addressed to the
States, when the great object for which he had entered the service of
his country had been accomplished, and he was about to return to a
private station. His relations to the people of this country had been
peculiar. He had been, not only the leader of their armies, but, in a
great degree, their civil counsellor; for although he had rarely, if
ever, gone out of the province of his command to give shape or direction
to constitutional changes, yet the whole circumstances of that command
had constantly placed him in contact with the governments of the States,
as well as with the Congress; and he had often been obliged to interpose
the influence of his own character and opinions with all of them, in
order that the civil machine might not wholly cease to move. At the
moment when he was about to lay aside the sword, he saw very clearly
that there were certain principles of conduct which must be called into
action in the States, and among the people of the States, for the
preservation of the Union. He, and he alone, could address to them with
effect the requisite words of admonition, and point out the course of
safety and success. This great service, the last act of his
revolutionary official life, was performed with all the truth and wisdom
of his character, before he proceeded to resign into the hands of
Congress the power which he had held so long, and which he now
surrendered with a virtue, a dignity, and a sincerity, with which no
such power has ever been laid down by any of the leaders of revolutions
whom the world has seen.

His object in this Address was not so much to urge the adoption of
particular measures, as to inculcate principles which he believed to be
essential to the welfare of the country. So clearly, however, did it
appear to him, that the honor and independence of the country were
involved in the adoption of the revenue system which Congress had
recommended, that he did not refrain from urging it as the sole means by
which a national bankruptcy could be averted, before any different plan
could be proposed and adopted.

But how far, at this time, any other or further plans, for the formation
of a better constitution, had been formed, or how far any one perceived
both the vicious principle of the Confederation and the means of
substituting for it another and more efficient power, we can judge only
by the published writings of the Revolutionary statesmen. It is quite
certain that at this period Washington saw the defects of the
Confederation, as he had seen them clearly, and suffered under them,
from the beginning. He saw that in the powers of the States, which far
exceeded those of the Continental Congress, lay the source of all the
perplexities which he had experienced in the course of the war, and of
almost the whole of the difficulties and distresses of the army; and
that to form a new constitution, which would give consistency,
stability, and dignity to the Union, was the great problem of the time.
He saw, also, that the honor and true interest of this country were
involved in the development of continental power; that local and State
politics were destined to interfere with the establishment of any more
liberal and extensive plan of government, which the circumstances of the
country required, as they had perpetually weakened the bond by which the
Union had thus far been held together; and that such local influences
would make these States the sport of European policy. He predicted,
moreover, that the country would reach, if it reached at all, some
system of sufficient capabilities, only through mistakes and disasters,
and through an experience purchased at the price of further difficulties
and distress. Such were his general views, at the close of the war.[189]

But there was one man in the country who had looked more deeply still
into its wants, and who had formed in his enlarged and comprehensive
mind the clearest views of the means necessary to meet them, even before
the Confederation had been practically tried. A reorganization of the
government had engaged the attention of Hamilton, as early as 1780; and,
with his characteristic penetration and power, he saw and suggested what
should be the remedy.

He entertained the opinion, at this time, as he had always entertained
it, that the discretionary powers originally vested in Congress for the
safety of the States, and implied in the circumstances and objects of
their assembling, were fully competent to the public exigencies. But
their practice, from the time of the Declaration of Independence through
all the period that preceded the establishment of the Confederation, had
accustomed the country to doubts of their original authority, and had at
last amounted to a surrender of the ground from which they might have
exercised it. No remedy, therefore, remained, applicable to the
circumstances, and capable of rescuing the affairs of the country from
their deplorable situation, but to vest in Congress, expressly and by a
direct grant, the powers necessary to constitute an efficient government
and a solid, coercive union. The project then before the country, in the
Articles of Confederation, had been designed to accomplish what the
revolutionary government had failed to do. But it was manifestly
destined to fail in its turn; for it left an uncontrollable sovereignty
in the States, capable of defeating the beneficial exercise of the very
powers which it undertook to confer upon Congress. It made the army,
not a unit, formed and organized by a central and supreme authority, and
looking up to that authority alone, but a collection of several armies,
raised by the several States. It gave to the State legislatures the
effective power of the purse, by withholding all certain revenues from
Congress. It proposed to introduce no method and energy of
administration; and without an executive, it left every detail of
government to be managed by a deliberative body, whose constitution
rendered it fit for none but legislative functions.

Under these circumstances, it was Hamilton's advice, before the
Confederation took effect, that Congress should plainly, frankly, and
unanimously confess to the States their inability to carry on the
contest with Great Britain, without more ample powers than those which
they had for some time exercised, or those which they could exercise
under the Confederation; and that a convention of all the States be
immediately assembled, with full authority to agree upon a different
system. He suggested that a complete sovereignty should be vested in
Congress, except as to that part of internal police which relates to the
rights of property and life among individuals, and to raising money by
internal taxes, which he admitted should be regulated by the State
legislatures. But in all that relates to war, peace, trade, and finance,
he maintained that the sovereignty of Congress should be complete; that
it should have the entire management of foreign affairs, and of raising
and officering armies and navies; that it should have the entire
regulation of trade, determining with what countries it should be
carried on, laying prohibitions and duties, and granting bounties and
premiums; that it should have certain perpetual revenues of an internal
character, in specific taxes; that it should be authorized to institute
admiralty courts, coin money, establish banks, appropriate funds, and
make alliances offensive and defensive, and treaties of commerce. He
recommended also that Congress should immediately organize executive
departments of foreign affairs, war, marine, finance, and trade, with
great officers of state at the head of each of them.[190]

Hamilton's entry into Congress in 1782 marks the commencement of his
public efforts to develop the idea of a general government, whose organs
should act directly, and without the intervention of any State
machinery. He first publicly propounded this idea in the paper which he
prepared, as chairman of a committee, to be addressed to the legislature
of Rhode Island, in answer to the objections of that State to the
revenue system proposed in 1781. One of these objections was, that the
plan proposed to introduce into the State officers unknown and
unaccountable to the State itself, and therefore that it was against its
constitution. From the prevalence of this notion, we may see how
difficult it was to create the idea of a national sovereignty, that
would consist with the sovereignty of the States, and would work in its
appropriate sphere harmoniously with the State institutions, because
directed to a different class of objects. The nature of a federal
constitution was little understood. It was apparent that the exercise of
its powers must affect the internal police of its component members, to
some extent; but it was not well understood that political sovereignty
is capable of partition, according to the character of its subjects, so
that powers of one class may be imparted to a federal, and powers of
another class remain in a State constitution, without destroying the
sovereignty of the latter. Hamilton presented this view, and at the same
time pointed out, that, unless the constitution of a State expressly
prohibited its legislature from granting to the federal government new
power to appoint officers for a special purpose, to act within the State
itself, it was competent to the legislative authority of the State to
communicate such power, just as it was competent to it originally to
enter into the Confederation.[191]

In the same paper, also, he urged the necessity of vesting the
appointment of the collectors of the proposed revenue in the general
government, because it was designed as a security to creditors, and must
therefore be general in its principle and dependent on a single will,
and not on thirteen different authorities. This was the earliest
suggestion of the principle, that, in exercising its powers, the federal
government ought to act directly, through agents of its own appointment,
and thus be independent of State negligence or control. When the debate
came on in January, 1783, upon the new project of a revenue system, he
again urged the necessity of strengthening the federal government,
through the influence of officers deriving their appointments directly
from Congress;--a suggestion that was received at the moment with
pleasure by the opponents of the scheme, because it seemed to disclose a
motive calculated to touch the jealousy rather than to propitiate the
favor of the States. But the temporary expedients of the moment always
pass away. The great ideas of a statesman like Hamilton, earnestly bent
on the discovery and inculcation of truth, do not pass away. Wiser than
those by whom he was surrounded, with a deeper knowledge of the science
of government and the wants of the country than all of them, and
constantly enunciating principles which extended far beyond the
temporizing policy of the hour, the smiles of his opponents only prove
to posterity how far he was in advance of them.[192]

The efforts of Hamilton to effect a change in the rule of the
Confederation, as to the ratio of contribution by the States to the
treasury of the Union, also evince both the defects of the existing
government and the foresight with which he would have obviated them, if
he could have been sustained. The rule of the Confederation required
that the general treasury should be supplied by the several States in
proportion to the value of all lands within each State, granted or
surveyed, with the buildings and improvements thereon, to be estimated
according to such mode as Congress should from time to time direct and
appoint; the taxes for paying such proportion to be laid and levied by
the State legislatures, within the time fixed by Congress. But Congress
had never appointed any mode of ascertaining the valuation of lands
within the States. The first requisition called for after the
Confederation took effect was apportioned among the several States
without any valuation,--provision being made by which each State was to
receive interest on its payments, as far as they exceeded what might
afterwards be ascertained to be its just proportion, when the valuation
should have been made.[193] At the outset, therefore, a practical
inequality was established, which gave rise to complaints and jealousies
between the States, and increased the disposition to withhold compliance
with the requisitions. The dangerous crisis in the internal affairs of
the country which attended the approach of peace, had arrived in the
winter and spring of 1783, and nothing had ever been done to carry out
the rule of the Confederation, by fixing upon a mode of valuation. When
the discussion of the new measures for sustaining the public credit came
on, three courses presented themselves, with regard to this part of the
subject;--either, first, to change the principle of the Confederation
entirely; or, secondly, to carry it out by fixing a mode of valuation,
at once; or, thirdly, to postpone the attempt to carry it out, until a
better mode could be devised than the existing state of the country then
permitted.

Hamilton's preference was for the first of these courses, as the one
that admitted of the application of those principles of government which
he was endeavoring to introduce into the federal system; for he saw that
in the theory of the Confederation there was an inherent inequality,
which would constantly increase in practice, and which must either be
removed, or destroy the Union. He maintained, that, where there are
considerable differences in the relative wealth of different
communities, the proportion of those differences can never be
ascertained by any common measure; that the actual wealth of a country,
or its ability to pay taxes, depends on an endless variety of
circumstances, physical and moral, and cannot be measured by any one
general representative, as _land_, or _numbers_; and therefore that the
assumption of such a general representative, by whatever mode its local
value might be ascertained, would work inevitable inequality. In his
view, the only possible way of making the States contribute to the
general treasury in an equal proportion to their means, was by general
taxes imposed under continental authority; and it is a striking proof of
the comprehensive sagacity with which he looked forward, that, while he
admitted that this mode would, for a time, produce material
inequalities, he foresaw that balancing of interests which would arise
in a continental legislation, and would relieve the hardships of one tax
in a particular State by the lighter pressure of another bearing with
proportional weight in some other part of the Confederacy.[194]

Accordingly, after an attempt to postpone the consideration of a mode of
carrying out the Confederation, he made an effort to have its principle
changed, by substituting specific taxes on land and houses, to be
collected and appropriated, as well as the duties, under the authority
of the United States, by officers to be nominated by Congress, and
approved by the State in which they were to exercise their functions,
but accountable to and removable by Congress.[195] These ideas, however,
as he himself saw, were not agreeable to the spirit of the times, and
his plan was rejected. After many fruitless projects had been suggested
and discussed, for making the valuation required by the
Confederation,--some of them proposing that it should be done by
commissioners appointed by the United States, and some by commissioners
appointed by the States,--it was determined to propose no other change
in the principle of making requisitions on the States, than to
substitute population in the place of land, as the rule of
proportion.[196]

Equally extensive and important were his views on the subject of a
peace establishment, for which he saw the necessity of providing, as the
time approached when the Confederation would necessarily be tested as a
government for the purposes of peace. To adapt a constitution, whose
principal powers were originally designed to be exercised in a state of
war, to a state of peace, for which it possessed but few powers, and
those not clearly defined, was a problem in the science of government of
a novel character. It might prove to be an impossible task; for on
applying the constitutional provisions to the real wants and necessities
of the country, it might turn out that the Confederation was in some
respects destitute of the capacity to provide for them; and in
undertaking to carry out its actual and sufficient powers, which had
never hitherto been exercised, opposition might spring up, from State
jealousy and local policy, which, in the real weakness of the federal
government, would be as effectual a barrier as the want of
constitutional authority. Still the effort was to be made; and Hamilton
approached the subject with all the sagacity and statesmanship for which
he was so distinguished.

He saw that the Confederation contained provisions which looked to the
continuance of the Union after the war had terminated, and that these
provisions required practical application, through a machinery which
had never been even framed. The Articles of Confederation vested in
Congress the exclusive management of foreign relations; but the
department of foreign affairs had never been properly organized. They
also gave to Congress the exclusive regulation of trade and intercourse
with the Indian nations; but no department of Indian affairs had been
established with properly defined powers and duties. Nothing had been
done to carry out the provision for fixing the standard of weights and
measures throughout the United States, or to regulate the alloy and
value of coin. Above all, the great question of means, military and
naval, for the external and internal defence of the country during
peace, for the preservation of tranquillity, the protection of commerce,
the fulfilment of treaty stipulations, and the maintenance of the
authority of the United States, had not been so much as touched. To
regulate these important subjects was the design of a committee, at the
head of which Hamilton was placed; and his earliest attention was
directed to the most serious and difficult of them,--the provision for a
peace establishment of military and naval forces.[197]

The question whether the United States could constitutionally maintain
an army and navy, in time of peace, was, under the Articles of
Confederation, not free from difficulty; but it became of imminent
practical importance, under the treaty of peace. That treaty provided
for an immediate withdrawal of the British forces from all posts and
fortifications within the United States; and it became at once an
important question, whether these posts and fortifications--especially
those within certain districts, the jurisdiction and property of which
had not been constitutionally ascertained--should be garrisoned by
troops of the United States, or of the States within which they were
situated. There was also territory appertaining to the United States,
not within the original claim of the United States. The whole of the
Western frontier required defence. The navigation of the Mississippi and
the lakes, and the rights of the fisheries and of foreign commerce, all
belonging to the United States, and depending on the laws of nations and
treaty stipulations, demanded the joint protection of the Union, and
could not with propriety be left to the separate establishments of the
States.

But the Articles of Confederation contained no express provision for the
establishment and maintenance of any military and naval forces during
peace. They empowered the United States, generally, (and without mention
of peace or war,) to build and equip a navy, and to agree upon the
number of land forces to be raised, and to call upon the States to
furnish their quotas. But they also declared that no vessels of war
should be kept up by any State in time of peace, except such number only
as should be deemed necessary by Congress for the defence of such State
or its trade; and that no body of forces should be kept up by any State
in time of peace, except such number only as Congress should deem
requisite to garrison the posts necessary for the defence of such State.
This provision might be construed to imply, that, in time of peace, the
general defence was to be provided for by the forces of each State, and,
in time of war, by those of the Union. But it was the opinion of
Hamilton, that the restrictions on the powers of the States, with regard
to maintaining forces during peace, could not with propriety be said to
contain any directions to the United States, or to contravene the
positive power vested in the latter to raise both sea and land forces,
without mention of peace or war. He strengthened this view by the
capital inconvenience of the contrary construction, and by the manifest
necessities of the country, which could only be provided for by the
power of the Union. If the United States could have neither army nor
navy, until war had been declared, they would be obliged to begin to
create both at the very moment when both were needed in actual
hostilities; and, if the States were to be intrusted with the defence of
the country in time of peace, that defence would be left to thirteen
different armies and navies, under the direction of as many different
governments.[198]

He contemplated, therefore, the formation of a peace establishment, to
consist of certain corps of infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineers, and
dragoons;[199] a general survey, preparatory to the adoption of a
general system of land fortifications; the establishment of arsenals and
magazines, and the erection of founderies and manufactories of arms. He
advised the establishment of ports and maritime fortifications, and the
formation and construction of a navy; and his report embraced also a
plan for classing and disciplining the militia.[200]

In all this design, Hamilton pursued the purpose, which he had long
entertained, of strengthening and consolidating the Union, and guarding
against its dissolution, by providing the means necessary for its
defence. Federal, rather than State provision for the defence of every
part of the Confederacy, in peace as well as in war, seemed to him
essential. He thought, that the general government should have
exclusively the power of the sword, and that each State should have no
forces but its militia.[201] But his great plans were arrested, partly
in consequence of the doubts entertained on the point of constitutional
power, and partly by reason of the great falling off of the attendance
of members in Congress. At the very time when this important subject was
under consideration, Congress were driven from Philadelphia, by the
mutiny of a handful of men, whom they could not curb at the moment
without the aid of the local authorities, and that aid was not promptly
and efficiently given.[202]

Convinced, at length, that no temporary expedients would meet the wants
of the country, and that a radical reform of its constitution could
alone preserve the Union from dissolution, Hamilton surveyed the
Confederation in all its parts, and determined to lay before the country
its deep defects, with a view to the establishment of a government with
proper departments and adequate powers. In this examination, he applied
to the Confederation the approved maxims of free government, which had
been made familiar in the formation of the State constitutions, and
which point to the distinct separation of the legislative, executive,
and judicial functions. The Confederation vested all these powers in a
single body, and thus violated the principles on which the government of
nearly every State in the Union was founded. It had no federal
judicature, to take cognizance of matters of general concern, and
especially of those in which foreign nations and their subjects were
concerned; and thus national treaties, the national faith, and the
public tranquillity were exposed to the conflict of local regulations
against the powers vested in the Union. It gave to Congress the power of
ascertaining and appropriating the sums necessary for the public
expenses, but withheld all control over either the imposition or
collection of the taxes by which they were to be raised, and thus made
the inclinations, not the abilities, of the respective States, the
criterion of their contributions to the common expenses of the Union. It
authorized Congress to borrow money, or emit bills, on the credit of the
United States, without the power of providing funds to secure the
repayment of the money, or the redemption of the bills emitted.

It made no proper or competent provision for interior or exterior
defence; for interior defence, because it allowed the individual States
to appoint all regimental officers of the land forces, and to raise the
men in their own way, while at the same time an ambiguity rendered it
uncertain whether the defence of the country in time of peace was not
left to the particular States, both by sea and land;--for exterior
defence, because it authorized Congress to build and equip a navy,
without providing any compulsory means of manning it.

It failed to vest in the United States a general superintendence of
trade, equally necessary both with a view to revenue and regulation.

It required the assent of nine States in Congress to matters of
principal importance, and of seven to all others except adjournments
from day to day, and thus subjected the sense of a majority of the
people of the United States to that of a minority, by putting it in the
power of a small combination to defeat the most necessary measures.

Finally, it vested in the federal government the sole direction of the
interests of the United States in their intercourse with foreign
nations, without empowering it to pass _all general laws_ in aid and
support of the laws of nations; thus exposing the faith, reputation, and
peace of the country to the irregular action of the particular
States.[203]

Having thus fully analyzed for himself the nature of the existing
constitution, Hamilton proposed to himself the undertaking of inducing
Congress freely and frankly to inform the country of its imperfections,
which made it impossible to conduct the public affairs with honor to
themselves and advantage to the Union; and to recommend to the several
States to appoint a convention, with full powers to revise the
Confederation, and to adopt and propose such alterations as might appear
to be necessary, which should be finally approved or rejected by the
States.[204]

But he was surrounded by men, who were not equal to the great enterprise
of guiding and enlightening public sentiment. He was in advance of the
time, and far in advance of the men of the time. He experienced the fate
of all statesmen, in the like position, whose ideas have had to wait the
slow development of events, to bring them to the popular comprehension
and assent. He saw that his plans could not be adopted; and he passed
out of Congress to the pursuits of private life, recording upon them his
conviction, that their public proposal would have failed for want of
support.[205]

There was in fact a manifest indisposition in Congress to propose any
considerable change in the principle of the government. Hence, nothing
but the revenue system, with a change in the rule by which a partition
of the common burdens was to be made, was publicly proposed. Although
this system was a great improvement upon that of the Confederation, it
related simply to revenue, in regard to which it proposed a reform, not
of the principle of the government, but of the mode of operation of the
old system; for it embraced only a specific pledge by the States of
certain duties for a limited term, and not a grant of the unlimited
power of levying duties at pleasure. There was confessedly a departure
from the strict maxims of national credit, by not making the revenue
coextensive with its object, and by not placing its collection in every
respect under the authority charged with the management and payment of
the debt which it was designed to meet.[206]

These relaxations were a sacrifice to the jealousies of the States; and
they show that the time had not come for a change from a mere federative
union to a constitutional government, founded on the popular will, and
therefore acting by an energy and volition of its own.

The temper of the time was wholly unfavorable to such a change. The
early enthusiasm with which the nation had rushed into the conflict with
England, guided by a common impulse and animated by a national spirit,
had given place to calculations of local interest and advantage; and the
principle of the Confederation was tenaciously adhered to, while the
events which accompanied and followed the peace were rapidly displaying
its radical incapacity. The formation of the State governments, and the
consequent growth and importance of State interests, which came into
existence with the Confederation, and the fact that the Confederation
was itself an actual diminution of the previous powers of the Union, may
be considered the chief causes of the decline of a national spirit. That
spirit was destined to a still further decay, until the conflict of
State against State, and of section against section, by shaking the
government to its foundation, should reveal both the necessity for a
national sovereignty and the means by which it could be called into
life.

As a consequence and proof of the decline of national power, it is
worthy of observation, that, at the close of the year 1783, Congress had
practically dwindled to a feeble junto of about twenty persons,
exercising the various powers of the government, but without the dignity
and safety of a local habitation. Migrating from city to city and from
State to State, unable to agree upon a seat of government, from jealousy
and sectional policy; now assembling in the capitol of a State, and now
in the halls of a college; at all times dependent upon the protection
and even the countenance of local authorities, and without the presence
of any of the great and powerful minds who led the earlier counsels of
the country, this body presented a not inadequate type of the decaying
powers of the Union.[207] At no time in the history of the
Confederation, had all the States been represented at once; and the
return of peace seemed likely to reduce the entire machinery of the
government to a state of complete inaction.[208]

The Confederation, at the close of the war, is found to have
accomplished much, and also to have failed to accomplish much more. It
had effected the cession of the public lands to the United States; for
although that cession was not completed until after the peace, still the
arch on which the Union was ultimately to rest for whatever of safety
and perpetuity remained for it through the four following years, was
deposited in its place, when the Confederation was established. It had
also placed the United States, as a nation, in a position to contract
some alliances with foreign powers. It had finished the war; it had
achieved the independence of the nation; and had given peace to the
country. It had thus demonstrated the value of the Union, although its
defective construction aided the development of tendencies which
weakened and undermined its strength.

But its imperfect performance of the great tasks to which it had been
called, displayed its inherent defects. It had often been unequal to the
purpose of effectually drawing forth the resources of its members for
the common welfare and defence. It had often wanted an army adequate to
the protection and proportioned to the abilities of the country. It had,
therefore, seen important posts reduced, others imminently endangered,
and whole States and large parts of others overrun by small bodies of
the enemy;--had been destitute of sufficient means of feeding, clothing,
paying, and appointing its troops, and had thus exposed them to
sufferings for which history scarcely affords a parallel. It had been
compelled to make the administration of its affairs a succession of
temporary expedients, inconsistent with order, economy, energy, or a
scrupulous adherence to public engagements. It found itself, at the
close of the war, without any certain means of doing justice to those
who had been the principal supporters of the Union;--to an army which
had bravely fought, and patiently suffered,--to citizens and to
foreigners, who had cheerfully lent their money,--and to others who had
contributed property and personal service to the common cause. It was
obliged to rely, for the last hope of doing that justice, on the
precarious concurrence of thirteen distinct legislatures, the dissent of
either of which might defeat the plan, and leave the States, at an early
period of their existence, involved in all the disgrace and mischiefs
of violated faith and national bankruptcy.[209]

While, therefore, the United States emerged from the war, which for
seven long years had wasted the energies and drained the resources of
the people, with national independence, dark and portentous clouds
gathered about the dawn of peace, as the future opened before them. The
past had been crowned with victory;--dearly bought, but not at too dear
a price, for it brought with it the vast boon of civil liberty. But the
dangers and embarrassments through which that victory had been achieved
made it apparent that the government of the country was unequal to its
protection and prosperity. That government was now called to assume the
great duties of peace, without the acknowledged power of maintaining
either an army or a navy, and without the means of combining and
directing the forces and wills of the several parts to a general end;
without the least control over commerce; without the power to fulfil a
treaty; without laws acting upon individuals; and with no mode of
enforcing its own will, but by coercing a delinquent State to its
federal obligations by force of arms. How it met the great demands upon
its energy and durability which its new duties involved, we are now to
inquire.

FOOTNOTES:

[189] Letter to Hamilton, March 31, 1783. Writings, VIII. 409. Letter to
Lafayette, April 5, 1783. Ibid. 411. Address to the States, June 8,
1783. Ibid. 439.

[190] These suggestions were made by Hamilton, in a letter of great
ability, written in 1780, while he was still in the army, to James
Duane, a member of Congress from New York. It was not published until it
appeared in his Life, I. 284. At its close, he says: "I am persuaded a
solid confederation, a permanent army, a reasonable prospect of
subsisting it, would give us treble consideration in Europe, and produce
a peace this winter. _If a convention is called, the minds of all the
States and the people ought to be prepared to receive its determinations
by sensible and popular writings_, which should conform to the views of
Congress. There are epochs in human affairs when _novelty_ is useful. If
a general opinion prevails that the old way is bad, whether true or
false, and this obstructs or relaxes the operations of the public
service, a change is necessary, if it be but for the sake of change.
This is exactly the case now. 'T is an universal sentiment, that our
present system is a bad one, and that things do not go right on this
account. The measure of a convention would revive the hopes of the
people, and give a new direction to their passions, which may be
improved in carrying points of substantial utility. The Eastern States
have already pointed out this mode to Congress: they ought to take the
hint, and anticipate the others." What is here said of the action of the
Eastern States probably refers, not to any suggestion of a convention to
revise the powers of the general government, but to a convention of
committees of the Eastern States, which first assembled at Hartford, and
afterwards at Boston, in November, 1779, and in August, 1780, _for
regulating the prices of commodities_. Journals of Congress, V. 406; VI.
271, 331, 392. But the writer may have had in his mind the convention
which had just assembled in Massachusetts to form the constitution of
that State. I am aware of no public proposal, as early as 1780, of a
general convention to remodel the Confederacy.

[191] "It is not to be presumed," he said, "that the constitution of any
State means to define and fix the precise numbers and descriptions of
all officers to be permitted in the State, excluding the creation of any
new ones, whatever might be the necessity derived from that variety of
circumstances incident to all political institutions. The legislature
must always have a discretionary power of appointing officers, not
expressly known to the constitution, and this power will include that of
authorizing the federal government to make the appointments in cases
where the general welfare may require it. The denial of this would prove
too much; to wit, that the power given by the Confederation to Congress,
to appoint all officers in the post-office, was illegal and
unconstitutional. The doctrine advanced by Rhode Island would perhaps
prove also that the federal government ought to have the appointment of
no internal officers whatever; a position that would defeat all the
provisions of the Confederation, and all the purposes of the union. The
truth is, that no federal constitution can exist without powers that in
their exercise effect the internal police of the component members. It
is equally true, that no government can exist without a right to appoint
officers for those purposes which proceed from, and concentre in,
itself; and therefore the Confederation has expressly declared, that
Congress shall have authority to appoint all such 'civil officers as may
be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States under
their direction.' All that can be required is, that the federal
government confine its appointments to such as it is empowered to make
by the original act of union, or by the subsequent consent of the
parties; unless there should be express words of exclusion in the
constitution of a State, there can be no reason to doubt that it is
within the compass of legislative discretion to communicate that
authority. The propriety of doing it upon the present occasion, is
founded on substantial reasons. The measure proposed is a measure of
necessity. Repeated experiments have shown, that the revenue to be
raised within these States is altogether inadequate to the public wants.
The deficiency can only be supplied by loans. Our applications to the
foreign powers on whose friendship we depend, have had a success far
short of our necessities. The next resource is to borrow from
individuals. These will neither be actuated by generosity nor reasons of
state. 'Tis to their interest alone we must appeal. To conciliate this,
we must not only stipulate a proper compensation for what they lend, but
we must give security for the performance. We must pledge an ascertained
fund, simple and productive in its nature, general in its principle, and
at the disposal of a single will. There can be little confidence in a
security under the constant revisal of thirteen different deliberatives.
It must, once for all, be defined and established on the faith of the
States, solemnly pledged to each other, and not revocable by any without
a breach of the general compact. 'Tis by such expedients that nations
whose resources are understood, whose reputations and governments are
erected on the foundation of ages, are enabled to obtain a solid and
extensive credit. Would it be reasonable in us to hope for more easy
terms, who have so recently assumed our rank among the nations? Is it
not to be expected, that individuals will be cautious in lending their
money to a people in our circumstances, and that they will at least
require the best security we can give? We have an enemy vigilant,
intriguing, well acquainted with our defects and embarrassments. We may
expect that he will make every effort to instil diffidences into
individuals, and in the present posture of our internal affairs he will
have too plausible ground on which to tread. Our necessities have
obliged us to embrace measures, with respect to our public credit,
calculated to inspire distrust. The prepossessions on this article must
naturally be against us, and it is therefore indispensable we should
endeavor to remove them, by such means as will be the most obvious and
striking. It was with these views Congress determined on a general fund;
and the one they have recommended must, upon a thorough examination,
appear to have fewer inconveniences than any other. It has been remarked
as an essential part of the plan, that the fund should depend on a
single will. This will not be the case, unless the collection, as well
as the appropriation, is under the control of the United States; for it
is evident, that, after the duty is agreed upon, it may, in a great
measure, be defeated by an ineffectual mode of levying it. The United
States have a common interest in a uniform and equally energetic
collection; and not only policy, but justice to all the parts of the
Union, designates the utility of lodging the power of making it where
the interest is common. Without this, it might in reality operate as a
very unequal tax." Journals of Congress, VIII. 153.

[192] He said, as an additional reason for the revenue being collected
by officers under the appointment of Congress, that, "as the energy of
the federal government was evidently short of the degree necessary for
pervading and uniting the States, it was expedient to introduce the
influence of officers deriving their emoluments from, and consequently
interested in supporting the power of Congress." Upon this Mr. Madison
observes: "This remark was imprudent, and injurious to the cause it was
intended to serve. This influence was the very source of jealousy which
rendered the States averse to a revenue under collection, as well as
appropriation, of Congress. All the members of Congress who concurred in
any degree, with the States in this jealousy, smiled at the disclosure.
Mr. Bland, and still more Mr. Lee, who were of this number, took notice,
in private conversation, that Mr. Hamilton had let out the secret."
Elliot's Debates, I. 35.

[193] March 18 and 23, 1781. Journals, VII. 56, 67.

[194] Life of Hamilton, II. 50-57.

[195] March 20, 1783. Journals, VIII. 157-159.

[196] The census was to be of "the whole number of white and other free
citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex, and condition, including
those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three fifths of all
other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except
Indians, not paying taxes, in each State; which number shall be
triennially taken and transmitted to the United States in Congress
assembled, in such mode as they shall direct and appoint." When the
Articles of Confederation were framed and adopted in Congress, a
valuation of land as the rule of proportion was adopted instead of
numbers of inhabitants, in consequence of the impossibility of
compromising the different ideas of the Eastern and Southern States as
to the rate at which slaves should be counted; the Eastern States of
course wishing to have them counted in a near ratio to the whites, and
the Southern States wishing to diminish that ratio. Numbers would have
been preferred by the Southern States to land, if half their slaves only
could have been taken; but the Eastern States were opposed to this
estimate. (Elliot's Debates, I. 79.) In 1783, when it was proposed to
change the rule of proportion from land to numbers, the first compromise
suggested (by Mr. Wolcott of Connecticut) was to include only such
slaves as were between the ages of sixteen and sixty; this was found to
be impracticable; and it was agreed on all sides, that, instead of
fixing the proportion by ages, it would be best to fix it in absolute
numbers, and the rate of three fifths was agreed upon. (Ibid. 81, 82.)

[197] Life of Hamilton, II. 204-212.

[198] Ibid.

[199] He proposed that the States should transfer to Congress the right
to appoint the regimental officers, and that the men should be enlisted
under continental direction.

[200] That the subject of a peace establishment originated with Hamilton
is certain, from the fact that early in April, soon after the
appointment of the committee, he wrote to General Washington, wishing to
know his sentiments at large on such institutions of every kind for the
interior defence of the States as might be best adapted to their
circumstances. (Writings of Washington, VIII. 417.) Washington wrote to
all the principal officers of the army then in camp, for their views,
and from the memoirs which they presented to him an important document
was compiled, which was forwarded by him to the committee of Congress.
In one of these memoirs Colonel Pickering suggested the establishment of
a military academy at West Point. "If any thing," he said, "like a
military academy in America be practicable at this time, it must be
grounded on the permanent military establishment of our frontier posts
and arsenals, and the wants of the States, separately, of officers to
command the defences of their sea-coasts. On this principle, it might be
expedient to establish a military school, or academy, at West Point. And
that a competent number of young gentlemen might be induced to become
students, it might be made a rule, that vacancies in the standing
regiments should be supplied from thence; those few instances excepted
where it would be just to promote a very meritorious sergeant. For this
end, the number which shall be judged requisite to supply vacancies in
the standing regiment might be fixed, and that of the students, who are
admitted with an exception of filling them, limited accordingly. They
might be allowed subsistence at the public expense. If any other youth
desired to pursue the same studies at the military academy, they might
be admitted, only subsisting themselves. Those students should be
instructed in what is usually called military discipline, tactics, and
the theory and practice of fortification and gunnery. The commandant and
one or two other officers of the standing regiment, and the engineers,
making West Point their general residence, would be the masters of the
academy; and the inspector-general superintend the whole." (Ibid.) The
subject of a peace establishment was made one of the four principal
topics on which Washington afterwards enlarged in his circular letter to
the States, in June; but his suggestions related chiefly to a uniform
organization of the militia throughout the States. He subsequently had
several conferences with the committee of Congress, on the whole
subject, but nothing was done. (Vide note, infra.)

[201] Life of Hamilton, II. 214-219. The State of New York precipitated
the constitutional question, by demanding that the Western posts within
her limits should be garrisoned by troops of her own, and by instructing
her delegates in Congress to obtain a declaration, conformably to the
sixth article of the Confederation, of the number of troops necessary
for that purpose. Hamilton forbore to press this application while the
general subject of a peace establishment was under consideration. But
the doubts that arose as to the constitutional power of Congress to
raise an army for the purposes of peace, and the urgency of the case,
made it necessary to adopt a temporary measure with regard to the
frontier posts, and to direct the commander-in-chief to garrison them
with a part of the troops of the United States which had enlisted for
three years. This was ordered on the 12th of May. Soon after, the mutiny
of a portion of the new levies of the Pennsylvania line occurred, which
drove Congress from Philadelphia to Princeton, on the 21st of June. At
Princeton, they remained during the residue of the year, but with
diminished numbers and often without a constitutional quorum of States.
In September, General Washington wrote to Governor Clinton: "Congress
have come to no determination yet respecting a peace establishment, nor
am I able to say when they will. I have lately had a conference with a
committee on this subject, and have reiterated my former opinions: but
it appears to me, that there is not a sufficient representation to
discuss great national points; nor do I believe there will be, while
that honorable body continue their sessions at this place. The want of
accommodation, added to a disinclination in the Southern delegates to be
farther removed than they formerly were from the centre of the empire,
and an aversion in the others to give up what they conceive to be a
point gained by the late retreat to this place, keep matters in an
awkward situation, to the very great interruption of national concerns.
Seven States, it seems, by the Articles of Confederation, must agree,
before any place can be fixed upon for the seat of the federal
government; and seven States, it is said, never will agree;
consequently, as Congress came here, here they are to remain, to the
dissatisfaction of the majority and a great let to business, having none
of the public offices about them, nor any place to accommodate them, if
they were brought up; and the members, from this or some other cause,
are eternally absent."

[202] Mr. Madison has given the following account of this
occurrence:--"On the 19th of June, Congress received information from
the Executive Council of Pennsylvania, that eighty soldiers, who would
probably be followed by others, were on the way from Lancaster to
Philadelphia, in spite of the expostulations of their officers,
declaring that they would proceed to the seat of Congress and demand
justice, and intimating designs against the Bank. A committee, of which
Colonel Hamilton was chairman, was appointed to confer with the
executive of Pennsylvania, and to take such measures as they should find
necessary. After a conference, the committee reported that it was the
opinion of the executive that the militia of Philadelphia would probably
not be willing to take arms before they should be provoked by some
actual outrage; that it would hazard the authority of government to make
the attempt; and that it would be necessary to let the soldiers come
into the city, if the officers who had gone out to meet them could not
stop them. The next day the soldiers arrived in the city, led by their
sergeants, and professing to have no other object than to obtain a
settlement of accounts, which they supposed they had a better chance for
at Philadelphia than at Lancaster. On the 21st, they were drawn up in
the street before the State-House, where Congress were assembled. The
Executive Council of the State, sitting under the same roof, was called
on for the proper interposition. The President of the State (Dickinson)
came in and explained the difficulty of bringing out the militia of the
place for the suppression of the mutiny. He thought that, without some
outrages on persons or property, the militia could not be relied on.
General St. Clair, then in Philadelphia, was sent for, and desired to
use his interposition, in order to prevail on the troops to return to
the barracks. But his report gave no encouragement. In this posture of
things, it was proposed by Mr. Izard that Congress should adjourn.
Colonel Hamilton proposed that General St. Clair, in concert with the
Executive Council of the State, should take order for terminating the
mutiny. Mr. Reed moved that the General should endeavor to withdraw the
mutineers, by assuring them of the disposition of Congress to do them
justice. Nothing, however, was done. The soldiers remained in their
position, occasionally uttering offensive words and pointing their
muskets at the windows of the hall of Congress. At the usual hour of
adjournment the members went out, without obstruction; and the soldiers
retired to their barracks. In the evening Congress reassembled, and
appointed a committee to confer anew with the executive of the State.
This conference produced nothing but a repetition of the doubts
concerning the disposition of the militia to act, unless some actual
outrage were offered to persons or property, the insult to Congress not
being deemed a sufficient provocation. On the 24th, the efforts of the
State authority being despaired of, Congress were summoned by the
President to meet at Trenton." (Elliot's Debates, I. 92-94.) The mutiny
was afterwards suppressed by marching troops into Pennsylvania under
Major-General Howe. (Journals, VIII. 281.)

[203] Life of Hamilton, II. 230-237.

[204] Life of Hamilton, II. 230-237.

[205] Ibid.

[206] See the Address to the States, accompanying the proposed revenue
system, April 26, 1783, from the pen of Mr. Madison. Journals, VIII.
194-201.

[207] The first Continental Congress was called to meet at Philadelphia,
that being the nearest to the centre of the Union of any of the
principal cities in the United States. Succeeding Congresses had been
held there, with the exception of the period when the city was in the
possession of the enemy, in the year 1777, until, on the 21st of June,
1783, in consequence of the mutiny of the soldiers, the President was
authorized to summon the members to meet at Trenton, or Princeton, in
New Jersey, "in order that further and more effectual measures may be
taken for suppressing the present revolt, and maintaining the dignity
and authority of the United States." On the 30th, Congress assembled at
Princeton, in the halls of the college, which were tendered by its
officers for their use. In August, a proposition was made to return to
Philadelphia, and that, on the second Monday in October, Congress should
meet at Annapolis, unless in the mean time it had been ordered
otherwise. But this was not agreed to. A committee was then appointed
(in September), "to consider what jurisdiction may be proper for
Congress in the place of their permanent residence." This seems to have
been followed by propositions from several of the States, from New York
to Virginia inclusive, respecting a place for the permanent residence of
Congress, although the Journal does not state what they were. A question
was then taken (October 6), in which State buildings should be provided
and erected for the residence of Congress, beginning with New Hampshire
and proceeding with all the States in their order. Each State was
negatived in its turn. The highest number of votes given (by States)
were for New Jersey and Maryland, which had four votes each. A
resolution was then carried, "that buildings for the use of Congress be
erected on or near the banks of the Delaware, provided a suitable
district can be procured on or near the banks of said river, for a
federal town; and that the right of soil, and an exclusive or such
jurisdiction as Congress may direct, shall be vested in the United
States"; and a committee was appointed, to repair to the falls of the
Delaware, to view the country, and report a proper district for this
purpose. A variety of motions then followed, for the selection of a
place of temporary residence, but none was adopted. On the 17th of
October, a proposition was made by a delegate of Massachusetts (Mr.
Gerry), to have buildings provided for the alternate residence of
Congress in two places, with the idea of "securing the mutual confidence
and affection of the States, and preserving the federal balance of
power"; but the question was lost. Afterwards, the following resolution
was agreed to: "Whereas, there is reason to expect that the providing
buildings for the alternate residence of Congress in two places will be
productive of the most salutary effects, by securing the mutual
confidence and affections of the States, _Resolved_, That buildings be
likewise erected, for the use of Congress, at or near the lower falls of
the Potomac, or Georgetown, provided a suitable district on the banks of
the river can be procured for a federal town, and the right of soil, and
an exclusive jurisdiction, or such as Congress may direct, shall be
vested in the United States; and that until the buildings to be erected
on the banks of the Delaware and Potomac shall be prepared for the
reception of Congress, their residence shall be alternately, at equal
periods of not more than one year and not less than six months, in
Trenton and Annapolis; and the President is hereby authorized and
directed to adjourn Congress on the twelfth day of November next, to
meet at Annapolis on the twenty-sixth day of the same month, for the
despatch of public business." (Journals of Congress from June to
November, 1783.)

[208] Report of a committee appointed to devise means for procuring a
full representation in Congress, made November 1, 1783. Journals, VIII.
480-482.

[209] Hamilton's proposed Resolutions; Life, II. 230-237.

BOOK III.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE PEACE OF
1783 TO THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787.

CHAPTER I.

JANUARY, 1784-MAY, 1787.

DUTIES AND NECESSITIES OF CONGRESS.--REQUISITIONS ON THE
STATES.--REVENUE SYSTEM OF 1783.

The period which now claims our attention is that extending from the
Peace of 1783 to the calling of the Convention which framed the
Constitution, in 1787. It was a period full of dangers and difficulties.
The destinies of the Union seemed to be left to all the hazards arising
from a defective government and the illiberal and contracted policy of
its members. Patriotism was generally thought to consist in adhesion to
State interests, and a reluctance to intrust power to the organs of the
nation. The national obligations were therefore disregarded; treaty
stipulations remained unfulfilled; the great duty of justice failed to
be discharged; rebellion raised a dangerous and nearly successful front;
and the commerce of the country was exposed to the injurious policy of
other nations, with no means of counteracting or escaping from its
effects. At length, the people of the United States began to see danger
after they had felt it, and the growth of sounder views and higher
principles of public conduct gave to the friends of order, public
faith, and national security a controlling influence in the country, and
enabled the men, who had won for it the blessings of liberty, to
establish for it a durable and sufficient government.

Four years only elapsed, between the return of peace and the downfall of
a government which had been framed with the hope and promise of
perpetual duration;--an interval of time no longer than that during
which the people of the United States are now accustomed to witness a
change of their rulers, without injury to any principle or any form of
their institutions. But this brief interval was full of suffering and
peril. There are scarcely any evils or dangers, of a political nature,
and springing from political and social causes, to which a free people
can be exposed, which the people of the United States did not experience
during this period. That these evils and dangers did not precipitate the
country into civil war, and that the great undertaking of forming a new
and constitutional government, by delegates of the people, could be
entered upon and prosecuted, with the calmness, conciliation, and
concession essential to its success, is owing partly to the fact that
the country had scarcely recovered from the exhausting effects of the
Revolutionary struggle; but mainly to the existence of a body of
statesmen, formed during that struggle, and fitted by hard experience to
build up the government. But before their efforts and their influences
are explained, the period which developed the necessity for their
interposition must be described. He who would know what the
Constitution of the United States was designed to accomplish, must
understand the circumstances out of which it arose.

On the 3d of November, 1783, a new Congress, according to annual custom,
was assembled at Annapolis, and attended by only fifteen members, from
seven States. Two great acts awaited the attention of this
assembly;--both of an interesting and important character, both of
national concern. The one was the resignation of Washington; a solemnity
which appealed to every feeling of national gratitude and pride, and
which would seem to have demanded whatever of pomp and dignity and power
the United States could display. The other was a legislative act, which
was to give peace to the country, by the ratification of the Treaty.
Several weeks passed on, and yet the attendance was not much increased.
Washington's resignation was received, at a public audience of seven
States, represented by about twenty delegates;[210] and on the same day
letters were despatched to the other States, urging them, for the
safety, honor, and good faith of the United States, to require the
immediate attendance of their members.[211] It was not, however, until
the 14th of January that the Treaty could be ratified by the
constitutional number of nine States; and, when this took place, there
were present but three-and-twenty members.[212]

It should undoubtedly be considered, that, from the nature and form of
the government, the delegates in Congress had in some sense an
ambassadorial character, and were assembled as the representatives of
sovereign States. But with whatever dignity, real or fictitious, they
may be considered as having been clothed, the government itself was one
that created a constant tendency to the neglect of its functions, and
therefore produced great practical evils. The Articles of Confederation
provided that delegates should be annually appointed by the States, to
meet in Congress on the first Monday in November in every year; and
although they also gave to Congress the power of adjournment for a
recess, during which the government was to be devolved on a Committee of
the States, they fixed no period for the termination of a session. While
the war lasted, it had been both customary and necessary for the old
Congress, and for its successors under the Confederation, to be
perpetually in session; and this practice was continued after the peace,
with very short intervals of Committees of the States, partly from
habit, and partly in consequence of the reduction of the delegations to
the lowest constitutional number. This rendered despatch impossible, by
putting it in the power of a few members to withhold from important
matters the constitutional concurrence of nine States. Without any
reference to population by the Articles of Confederation, not less than
two nor more than seven delegates were allowed to each State; and by
casting the burden of maintaining its own delegates upon each State,
they created a strong motive for preferring the smaller number, and
often for not being represented at all. This motive became more active
after the peace, when the immediate stimulus of hostilities was
withdrawn; and it was at the same time accompanied, in most of the
States, by a great jealousy of the powers of Congress, a disinclination
to enlarge them, and a prevalent feeling that each State was sufficient
unto itself for all the purposes of government.[213] The consequence
was, that the Congress of the Confederation, from the ratification of
the Treaty of Peace to the adoption of the Constitution, although
entitled to ninety-one members, was seldom attended by one third of that
number; and the state of the representation was sometimes so low, that
one eighth of the whole number present could, under the constitutional
rule, negative the most important measures.[214]

Such was the government which was now called to provide for the payment
of at least the interest on the public debts, and to procure the means
for its own support; to carry out the Treaty of Peace, and secure to
the country its advantages; to complete the cessions of the Western
lands, and provide for their settlement and government; to guard the
commerce of the country against the hostile policy of other nations; to
secure to each State the forms and principles of a republican
government; to extend and secure the relations of the country with
foreign powers; and to preserve and perpetuate the Union. By tracing the
history of its efforts and its failures with regard to these great
objects, we may understand the principal causes which brought about the
conviction on the part of the people of the United States, that another
and a stronger government must take the place of the Confederation.

It was ascertained in April, 1784, that a sum exceeding three millions
of dollars would be wanted to pay the arrears of interest, and to meet
the interest and current expenses of the public service for the
year.[215] Two sources only could be looked to for this supply. It must
either be obtained by requisitions on the States, according to the old
rule of the Confederation, or from the new duties and taxes proposed by
the revenue system of 1783. But that proposal was still under the
consideration of the State legislatures; some of them having as yet
acceded to the impost only, and others having decided neither on the
impost nor on the supplementary taxes. Some time must therefore elapse
before the final confirmation of this system, even if its final
confirmation were probable; and, after it should have been confirmed,
further time would be requisite to bring it into operation. It was quite
clear, therefore, that other measures must be resorted to. Requisitions
presented the sole resource. But in what mode were they to be made? The
preceding Congress had offered two recommendations to the States on the
subject of the rule of the Confederation, which directed that the quotas
of the several States should be apportioned according to the value of
their lands. The Congress of 1783, in order to give this rule a fair
trial, had recommended to the States to make returns of their lands,
buildings, and inhabitants;[216] but, apprehending that the
insufficiency of the rule would immediately show itself, they had
followed this recommendation with another, to change the basis of
contribution from land to numbers of inhabitants.[217] Both of these
propositions were still under the consideration of the State
legislatures, and four States only had acceded to them.[218] A new
requisition, therefore, if made at all, must be made under the old rule
of the Confederation, and with entirely imperfect means of making it
with justice and equality. It was found, however, that large arrears
were still due from the States, of the old requisitions made during the
war.[219] A new call upon them to pay one half of these arrears,
deducting therefrom the amount of their payments to the close of the
year, would, if complied with, produce a sum nearly sufficient for the
wants of the government. This resource was accordingly tried.[220]

In the year 1785, three millions, it was ascertained, would be required
for the service of the year. A renewed call was made for the remaining
unpaid moiety of the old requisition of eight millions, and for the
whole of the old requisition of two millions; but, considering that the
public faith required Congress to continue their annual demand for
money, they issued a new requisition for three millions, and adjusted it
according to the best information they could obtain.[221]

In the year 1786, a sum of more than three millions was wanted for the
current demands on the treasury, and a new requisition was made for it,
under the old rule of the Confederation.[222] Two of the States, Rhode
Island and New Jersey, thereupon passed acts, making their own paper
currency receivable on all arrears of taxes due to the United States,
and proposing to pay their quotas in such currency.[223]

But the entire inadequacy of this source of supply to maintain the
federal government, and to discharge the annual public engagements, had
now become but too apparent. From the 1st of November, 1781, to the 1st
of January, 1786, less than two and a half millions of dollars had been
received from requisitions made during that period, amounting to more
than ten millions.[224] For the last fourteen months of that interval,
the average receipts from requisitions amounted to less than four
hundred thousand dollars per annum, while the interest alone due on the
foreign debt was more than half a million; and, in the course of each of
the nine following years, the average sum of one million, annually,
would become due by instalments on the principal of that debt.[225] In
addition to this, the interest on the domestic debt; the security of the
navigation and commerce of the country against the Barbary powers; the
immediate protection of the people dwelling on the frontier from the
savages; the establishment of military magazines in different parts of
the Union, quite indispensable to the public safety; the maintenance of
the federal government at home, and the support of the public servants
abroad,--each and all depended upon the contribution of the States under
the annual requisitions, and were each and all likely to be involved in
a common failure and ruin.[226]

There can be no doubt that the continuance of the practice of making
requisitions, after the proposal of the revenue system of 1783, had some
tendency to prevent the adoption of that system by the States. But there
was no other alternative within the constitutional reach of Congress;
and in the mean time, the revenue system, submitted as it necessarily
was to the legislatures of thirteen different States, was, as far as it
was assented to, embarrassed with the most discordant and irreconcilable
provisions. It was ascertained in February, 1786, that seven of the
States had granted the impost part of the system, in such a manner,
that, if the other six States had made similar grants, the plan of the
general impost might have been immediately put into operation.[227] Two
of the other States had also granted the impost, but had embarrassed
their grants with provisos, which suspended their operation until all
the other States should have passed laws in full conformity with the
whole system.[228] Two other States had fully acceded to the system in
all its parts;[229] but four others had not decided in favor of any part
of it.[230]

No member of the Confederacy had, at this time, suggested to Congress
any reasonable objection to the principles of the system; and the
contradictory provisions by which their assent to it had been clogged,
present a striking proof of the inherent difficulties of obtaining any
important constitutional change from the legislatures of the States. The
government was founded upon a principle, by which all its powers were
derived from the States in their corporate capacities; in other words,
it was a government created by, and deriving its authority from, the
governments of the States. They alone could change the fundamental law
of its organization; and they were actuated by such motives and
jealousies, as rendered a unanimous assent to any change a great
improbability. Still, the Congress of 1786 hoped that, by a clear and
explicit declaration of the true position of the country, the requisite
compliance of the States might be obtained. They accordingly made known,
in the most solemn manner, the public embarrassments, and declared that
the crisis had arrived, when the people of the United States must decide
whether they were to continue to rank as a nation, by maintaining the
public faith at home and abroad; or whether, for want of timely exertion
in establishing a general revenue, they would hazard the existence of
the Union, and the great national privileges which they had fought to
obtain.[231]

Under the influence of this urgent representation, all the States,
except New York, passed acts granting the impost, and vesting the power
to collect it in Congress, pursuant to the recommendations of 1783, but
upon the condition that it should not be in force until all the States
had granted it in the same manner. The State of New York passed an
act[232], reserving to itself the sole power of levying and collecting
the impost; making the collectors amenable to and removable by the
State, and not by Congress; and making the duties receivable in specie
or bills of credit, at the option of the importer. Such a departure from
the plan suggested by Congress, and adopted by the other States, of
course made the whole system inoperative in the other States, and there
remained no possibility of procuring its adoption, but by inducing the
State of New York to reconsider its determination. All hope of meeting
the public engagements, and of carrying on the government, now turned
upon the action of a single State.

The principal argument made use of, by those who supported the conduct
of New York, was, that Congress, being a single body, might misapply the
money arising from the duties. An answer to this pretence, from the pen
of Hamilton, declared that the interests and liberties of the people
were not less safe in the hands of those whom they had delegated to
represent them for one year in Congress, than they were in the hands of
those whom they had delegated to represent them for one or four years in
the legislature of the State; that all government implies trust, and
that every government must be trusted so far as it is necessary to
enable it to attain the ends for which it is instituted, without which
insult and oppression from abroad, and confusion and convulsion at home,
must ensue[233]. The real motive, however, with those who ruled the
counsels of New York at this period, was a hope of the commercial
aggrandizement of the State; and the jealousies and fears of national
power, which were widely prevalent, were diligently employed to defeat
the system proposed by Congress.

After the passage of the act of New York, and the adjournment of the
legislature, Congress earnestly recommended to the executive of that
State to convene the legislature again, to take into its consideration
the recommendation of the revenue system, for the purpose of granting
the impost to the United States, in conformity with the grants of
other States, so as to enable the United States to carry it into
immediate effect[234]. The Governor declined to accede to this
recommendation.[235] Congress repeated it, declaring that the critical
and embarrassed state of the finances required that the impost should
be carried into immediate operation, and expressing their opinion,
that the occasion was sufficiently important and extraordinary for
them to request that the legislature should be specially
convened.[236] The executive of New York again refused the request of
Congress, and the fate of the impost system remained suspended until
the meeting of the legislature, at its regular session in January,
1787. It was never adopted by that State, and consequently never took
effect.

FOOTNOTES:

[210] The Journals give the following account of General Washington's
resignation:--

"According to order, his Excellency the Commander-in-chief was admitted
to a public audience, and being seated, the President, after a pause,
informed him that the United States in Congress assembled were prepared
to receive his communications; whereupon he arose and addressed as
follows: 'MR. PRESIDENT,--The great events on which my resignation
depended having at length taken place, I have now the honor of offering
my sincere congratulations to Congress, and of presenting myself before
them to surrender into their hands the trust committed to me, and to
claim the indulgence of retiring from the service of my country. Happy
in the confirmation of our independence and sovereignty, and pleased
with the opportunity afforded the United States of becoming a
respectable nation, I resign with satisfaction the appointment I
accepted with diffidence; a diffidence in my abilities to accomplish so
arduous a task; which, however, was superseded by a confidence in the
rectitude of our cause, the support of the supreme power of the Union,
and the patronage of Heaven. The successful termination of the war has
verified the most sanguine expectations; and my gratitude for the
interposition of Providence, and the assistance I have received from my
countrymen, increases with every review of the momentous contest. While
I repeat my obligations to the army in general, I should do injustice to
my own feelings not to acknowledge, in this place, the peculiar services
and distinguished merits of the gentlemen who have been attached to my
person during the war. It was impossible the choice of confidential
officers to compose my family should have been more fortunate. Permit
me, sir, to recommend in particular those who have continued in the
service to the present moment, as worthy of the favorable notice and
patronage of Congress. I consider it an indispensable duty to close this
last act of my official life by commending the interests of our dearest
country to the protection of Almighty God, and those who have the
superintendence of them to his holy keeping. Having now finished the
work assigned me, I retire from the great theatre of action, and,
bidding an affectionate farewell to this august body, under whose orders
I have so long acted, I here offer my commission, and take my leave of
all the employments of public life.' He then advanced and delivered to
the President his commission, with a copy of his address, and having
resumed his place, the President (Thomas Mifflin) returned him the
following answer: 'SIR,--The United States in Congress assembled receive
with emotions too affecting for utterance the solemn resignation of the
authorities under which you have led their troops with success through a
perilous and doubtful war. Called upon by your country to defend its
invaded rights, you accepted the sacred charge, before it had formed
alliances, and whilst it was without funds or a government to support
you. You have conducted the great military contest with wisdom and
fortitude, invariably regarding the rights of the civil power through
all disasters and changes. You have, by the love and confidence of your
fellow-citizens, enabled them to display their martial genius, and
transmit their fame to posterity. You have persevered, till these United
States, aided by a magnanimous king and nation, have been enabled, under
a just Providence, to close the war in freedom, safety, and
independence; on which happy event we sincerely join you in
congratulations. Having defended the standard of liberty in this New
World, having taught a lesson useful to those who inflict and to those
who feel oppression, you retire from the great theatre of action with
the blessings of your fellow-citizens; but the glory of your virtues
will not terminate with your military command; it will continue to
animate remotest ages. We feel with you our obligations to the army in
general, and will particularly charge ourselves with the interests of
those confidential officers who have attended your person to this
affecting moment. We join you in commending the interests of our dearest
country to the protection of Almighty God, beseeching him to dispose the
hearts and minds of its citizens to improve the opportunity afforded
them of becoming a happy and respectable nation. And for you we address
to him our earnest prayers that a life so beloved may be fostered with
all his care; that your days may be happy as they have been illustrious;
and that he will finally give you that reward which this world cannot
give." Journals, IX. 12, 13. December 22, 1783.

[211] Ibid.

[212] Journals, IX. 30. January 14, 1784.

[213] See Washington's letter to Governor Harrison, of the date of
January 18, 1784. Writings, IX. 11.

[214] Twenty-three members voted on the ratification of the Treaty,
January 14, 1784. On the 19th of April of the same year, the same number
being present, eleven States only being represented, and nine of these
having only two members each, the following resolution was passed:
"_Resolved_, That the legislatures of the several States be informed,
that, whilst they are respectively represented in Congress by two
delegates only, such a unanimity for conducting the most important
public concerns is necessary as can be rarely expected; that if each of
the thirteen States should be represented by two members, five out of
twenty-six, being only a fifth of the whole, may negative any measures
requiring the voice of nine States; that of eleven States now on the
floor of Congress, nine being represented by only two members from each,
it is in the power of three out of twenty-five, making only one eighth
of the whole, to negative such a measure, notwithstanding that by the
Articles of Confederation the dissent of five out of thirteen, being
more than one third of the number, is necessary for such a negative;
that in a representation of three members from each State, not less than
ten of thirty-nine could so negative a matter requiring the voice of
nine States; that, from facts under the observation of Congress, they
are clearly convinced that a representation of two members from the
several States is extremely injurious, by producing delays, and for this
reason is likewise much more expensive than a general representation of
three members from each State; that therefore Congress conceive it to be
indispensably necessary, and earnestly recommend, that each State, at
all times when Congress are sitting, be hereafter represented by three
members at least; as the most injurious consequences may be expected
from the want of such representation." At the time when the report of
the Convention, transmitting the Constitution, was received (September
28, 1787), there were thirty-three members in attendance, from twelve
States. Rhode Island was not represented.

[215] The sum reported by a committee, and finally agreed to be
necessary, was $3,812,539.33. Journals, IX. 171. April 27, 1784.

[216] Journals, VIII. 129. February 17, 1783.

[217] Ibid. 198. April 26, 1783.

[218] Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina.

[219] Of the old requisition of $8,000,000, made October 30, 1781, only
$1,486,511.71 had been paid by all the States before December 31, 1783.

[220] Journals, IX. 171-179. April 27, 1784.

[221] Journals, X. 325-334. September 27, 1785.

[222] Journals, XI. 167. August 2, 1786.

[223] Ibid. 224. September 18, 1786. Upon this attempt of Rhode Island
and New Jersey to pay their proportions in their own paper currency, the
report of a committee declared, "That, to admit the receipt of bills of
credit, issued under the authority of an individual State, in discharge
of their specie proportions of a requisition, would defeat its object,
as the said bills do not circulate out of the limits of the State in
which they are emitted, and because a paper medium of any State, however
well funded, cannot, either in the extensiveness of its circulation, or
in the course of its exchange, be equally valuable with gold and silver.
That if the bills of credit of the States of Rhode Island and New Jersey
were to be received from those States in discharge of federal taxes,
upon the principles of equal justice, bills emitted by any other States
must be received from them also in payment of their proportions, and
thereby, instead of the requisitions yielding a sum in actual money,
nothing but paper would be brought into the federal treasury, which
would be wholly inapplicable to the payment of any part of the interest
or principal of the foreign debt, or the maintenance of the government
of the United States."

[224] Journals, XI. 34-40. February 15, 1786.

[225] Ibid.

[226] Journals, XI. 34-40. February 15, 1786.

[227] New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Virginia,
North Carolina, and South Carolina.

[228] Pennsylvania and Delaware.

[229] Delaware and North Carolina.

[230] Rhode Island, New York, Maryland, and Georgia.

[231] The report on this occasion (February 15, 1786), drawn by Rufus
King, declared, "that the requisitions of Congress for eight years past
have been so irregular in their operation, so uncertain in their
collection, and so evidently unproductive, that a reliance on them in
future as a source from whence moneys are to be drawn to discharge the
engagements of the Confederacy, definite as they are in time and amount,
would be not less dishonorable to the understandings of those who
entertain such confidence, than it would be dangerous to the welfare and
peace of the Union. The committee are therefore seriously impressed with
the indispensable obligation that Congress are under, of representing in
the immediate and impartial consideration of the several States the
utter impossibility of maintaining and preserving the faith of the
federal government by temporary requisitions on the States, and the
consequent necessity of an early and complete accession of all the
States to the revenue system of the 18th of April, 1783."

[232] May 4, 1786.

[233] Life of Hamilton, II. 385.

[234] August 11, 1786.

[235] The ground of his refusal was, "that he had not the power to
convene the legislature before the time fixed by law for their stated
meeting, except upon '_extraordinary occasions_,' and as the present
business had already been particularly laid before them, and so recently
as at their last session received their determination, it cannot come
within that description." Life of Hamilton, II. 389.

[236] August 23, 1786.

CHAPTER II.

1784-1787.

INFRACTIONS OF THE TREATY OF PEACE.

The Treaty of Peace, ratified on the 14th of January, 1784, contained
provisions of great practical and immediate importance. One of its chief
objects, on the part of the United States, was, of course, to effect the
immediate withdrawal of the British troops, and of every sign of British
authority, from the country whose independence it acknowledged. A
stipulation was accordingly introduced, by which the King bound himself,
with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction, or
carrying away any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants,
to withdraw all his armies, garrisons, and fleets from the United
States, and from every post, place, and harbor within the same. Although
the ratification of the Treaty was followed by the departure of the
British forces from the Atlantic coast, many important posts in the
Western country, within the incontestable limits of the United States,
with a considerable territory around each of them, were still
retained[237].

On the part of England, it was of great consequence to secure to British
subjects the property, and rights of property, of the enjoyment of which
the state of hostilities had deprived them. A war between colonies and
the parent state, which had sundered the closest intimacies of social
and commercial intercourse, involved of necessity vast private
interests. There were two large classes of English creditors, whose
interests required protection; the British merchants to whom debts had
been contracted before the Revolution, and the Tories, who had been
obliged to depart from the United States, leaving debts due to them, and
landed property, which had been seized. Clear and explicit stipulations
were inserted in the Treaty, in order to protect these interests. It was
provided that creditors on either side should meet with no lawful
impediments to the recovery of the full value in sterling money of all
_bona fide_ debts contracted before the date of the Treaty.[238] It was
also agreed, that Congress should earnestly recommend to the
legislatures of the respective States to provide for the restitution of
all estates, rights, and properties, which had been confiscated,
belonging to real British subjects, and to persons resident in districts
in the possession of his Majesty's arms, and who had not borne arms
against the United States; that persons of any other description should
have free liberty to go into any of the States, and remain for the
period of twelve months unmolested in their endeavors to obtain the
restitution of their property and rights which had been confiscated;
that Congress should recommend to the States a reconsideration and
revision of all their confiscation laws, and a restoration of the rights
and property of the last-mentioned persons, on their refunding the _bona
fide_ price which any purchaser might have given for them since the
confiscation. It was also agreed, that all persons having any interest
in confiscated lands, either by debts, marriage settlements, or
otherwise, should meet with no lawful impediment in the prosecution of
their just rights.[239]

It was further provided, that there should be no future confiscations
made, nor any prosecutions commenced against any person on account of
the part he might have taken in the war, and that no person should, on
that account, suffer any future loss or damage, either in person,
liberty, or property, and that those who might be in confinement on such
charges, at the time of the ratification of the Treaty in America,
should be immediately set at liberty, and the prosecutions be
discontinued.[240]

These provisions related to a great subject, with which, in the existing
political system of this country, it was difficult to deal. The action
of the States, with regard to some of the interests involved in these
stipulations, had been irregular from an early period of the war. The
Revolutionary Congress, on the commencement of hostilities, had suffered
the opportunity of asserting their rightful control over the subject of
alien interests, except as to property found on the high seas, to pass
away; and the consequence was, that the States had, on some points,
usurped an authority which belonged to the Union. A Union, founded in
compact, and vesting the rights of war and peace in Congress, was formed
in 1775; and from that time the Colonies, or, as they afterwards became,
States, were never rightfully capable of passing laws to sequester or
confiscate the debts or property of a national enemy[241]. After the
great acts of national sovereignty which took place in 1775-6, a British
subject could not, with any propriety, be considered as the enemy of
Massachusetts, or of Virginia; he was the enemy of the United States,
and by that authority alone, as the belligerent, was his property, in
strictness, liable to be seized, or the debts due to him sequestered.
But neither the Revolutionary Congress, nor that of the Confederation,
appear to have ever exercised the power of confiscating the debts or
property of British subjects, within the States, or to have recommended
such confiscation to the States themselves[242]. On the other hand, they
did not interfere when the States saw fit to do it.

With regard to those inhabitants of the States who, adhering to the
British crown, had abandoned the country, and left property behind them,
it cannot so clearly be affirmed that the States should not have dealt
with their persons or property. Congress, as we have seen, at an early
period of the war, committed the whole subject of restraining the
persons of the Tories to the Colonies or States; and as Congress never
assumed or exercised any jurisdiction over their property, it was of
course left to be dealt with by the legislatures of the States, to whom
Congress had declared that their several inhabitants owed
allegiance[243]. But as these persons, by adhering to the crown, might
claim of the crown the rights and protection of British subjects, the
propriety of confiscating or withholding their property would remain for
solution, at the negotiation of the Treaty of Peace, as a question of
general justice and equity, rather than of public law.

The interests of both of these classes of persons were too important
to be overlooked. Three millions sterling were due from the
inhabitants of the Colonies to merchants in Great Britain, at the
commencement of the war. At the return of peace, the laws of five of
the States were found either to prohibit the recovery of the
principal, or to suspend its collection, or to prohibit the recovery
of interest, or to make land a good payment in place of money.[244]
The purpose of the Treaty was to declare, that all _bona fide_ debts,
contracted before the date of the Treaty, and due to citizens of
either country, remained unextinguished by the war; and consequently,
that interest, when agreed to be paid, or payable by the custom, or
demandable as damages for delay of payment, was justly due. Over this
whole subject of foreign debts, the national sovereignty, of right,
had exclusive control; for confiscation of the property of a national
enemy belongs exclusively to the power exercising the rights of war;
and therefore whatever State laws might have been passed during the
war, exercising rights which belonged to the national sovereign, they
could have no validity when that sovereign came to resume its control
over the subject, and to stipulate that the right of confiscation, if
it ever existed, should not be exercised. The State laws, however,
existed, and remained in conflict with the Treaty, for several years,
producing consequences to which we shall presently advert.

The fifth article of the Treaty was infringed by an act passed by the
State of New York, authorizing actions for rent to be brought by persons
who had been compelled to leave their lands and houses by the enemy,
against those who had occupied them while the enemy were in possession,
and declaring that no military order or command of the enemy should be
pleaded in justification of such occupation.[245]

The sixth article was also violated by an act of the same State, which
made those inhabitants who had adhered to the enemy, if found within the
State, guilty of misprision of treason, and rendered them incapable of
holding office, or of voting at elections.[246]

The powers of the government were entirely inadequate to meet this state
of things. The Confederation gave to the United States in Congress
assembled the sole and exclusive right of determining on peace and war,
and of entering into treaties and alliances. The nature of the
sovereignty thus established made a treaty the law of the land, and
binding upon every member of the Union; but there existed no means of
enforcing the obligation. If the legislatures of the States passed laws
restraining or interfering with the provisions of a treaty, Congress
could only declare that they ought to be, and recommend that they should
be, repealed. The simple and effectual intervention of a national
judiciary, clothed with the power of declaring void any State
legislation that conflicted with the national sovereignty, and of giving
the means of enforcing all rights which that sovereignty had guaranteed
by compact with a foreign power, did not exist. Resort, it is true,
could be had to the State tribunals; and, on one memorable occasion,
such resort was had to them with success. But the legislative power
assailed the independence of the judiciary, and indignantly declared a
decision, made with fairness by a competent tribunal, subversive of law
and good order, because it recognized the paramount authority of a
treaty over a statute of the State.[247]

The effect of such State legislation upon the relations of the two
countries was direct and mischievous. The Treaty of Peace was designed,
and was adapted, to produce a fair and speedy adjustment of those
relations, upon principles of equity and justice. But its obligations
were reciprocal, and it could not execute itself. It was made, on the
one side, by a power capable of performing, but also capable of waiting
for the performance of the obligations which rested upon the other
contracting party. On the other side, it was made by a power possessed
of very imperfect means of performance, yet standing in constant need of
the benefit which a full compliance with its obligations would insure.
After the lapse of three years from the signature of the preliminary
articles, and of more than two years from that of the definitive Treaty,
the military posts in the Western country were still held by British
garrisons, avowedly on account of the infractions of the Treaty on our
part. The Minister of the United States at St. James's was told, in
answer to his complaints, that one party could not be obliged to a
strict observance of the engagements of a treaty, and the other remain
free to deviate from its obligations; and that whenever the United
States should manifest a real determination to fulfil their part of the
Treaty, Great Britain would be ready to carry every article of it into
complete effect.[248] An investigation of the whole subject, therefore,
became necessary, and Congress directed the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
to make inquiry into the precise state of things. His report ascertained
that the fourth and fifth articles of the Treaty had been constantly
violated on our part by legislative acts still in existence and
operation; that on the part of England, the seventh article had been
violated, by her continuing to hold the posts from which she had agreed
to withdraw her garrisons, and by carrying away a considerable body of
negroes, the property of American inhabitants, at the time of the
evacuation of New York.[249]

The serious question recurred,--what was to be done? The United States
had neither committed nor approved of any violation of the Treaty; but
an appeal was made to their justice, relative to the conduct of
particular States, for which they were obliged eventually to answer.
They could only resolve and recommend; and accordingly, after having
declared that the legislatures of the States could not, of right, do any
thing to explain, interpret, or limit the operation of a treaty,
Congress recommended to the States to pass a general law, repealing all
their former acts that might be repugnant to the Treaty, and leaving to
their courts of justice to decide causes that might arise under it,
according to its true intent and meaning, by determining what acts
contravened its provisions.[250] This recommendation manifestly left the
interests of the Union exposed to two hazards; the one, that the
legislatures of the States might not pass the repealing statute, which
would submit the proper questions to their courts, and the other, that
their courts might not decide with firmness and impartiality between the
policy of the State, on the one hand, and the interests of foreigners
and obnoxious Tories, on the other.

But this was all that could be done, and partial success only followed
the effort. Most of the States passed acts, in compliance with the
recommendation of Congress, to repeal their laws which prevented the
recovery of British debts.[251] But the State of Virginia, although it
passed such an act, suspended its operation, until the Governor of the
State should issue a proclamation, giving notice that Great Britain had
delivered up the Western posts, and was taking measures for the further
fulfilment of the Treaty, by delivering up the negroes belonging to the
citizens of that State, which had been carried away, or by making
compensation for their value.[252] The two countries were thus brought
to a stand, in their efforts to adjust the matters in dispute, and the
Western posts remained in the occupation of British garrisons, inflaming
the hostile temper of the Indian tribes, and enhancing the difficulty of
settling the vacant lands in the fertile region of the Great Lakes.[253]

FOOTNOTES:

[237] Secret Journals of Congress, IV. 186, 187.

[238] Article IV.

[239] Article V.

[240] Article VI.

[241] See the Report made to Congress on this subject by Mr. Jay,
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, October, 1786. Secret Journals, IV. 209.

[242] Ibid.

[243] Resolve of June 24, 1776. Journals, II. 216. Ante, p. 52, note.

[244] An act passed by the legislature of Massachusetts, November 9,
1784, suspended judgment for interest on British debts, until Congress
should have put a construction upon the Treaty declaring that it was
due. An act of the State of New York, of July 12, 1782, restrained the
collection of debts due to persons within the enemy's lines.
Pennsylvania, soon after the peace, passed a law restraining the levy of
executions. Virginia, at the time of the peace, had existing laws
inhibiting the recovery of British debts. South Carolina had made land a
good payment, in place of money. (See Mr. Jay's Report.)