Q. Goering was on top, and then came these four in a parallel line below
him; is that right?

A. Yes, under Goering.

Q. And you, from 1941, November, following Udet’s death until sometime
in the middle of 1944, held both the office of GL and inspector general?

A. That is correct.

MR. DENNEY: If your Honor pleases, I ask that this be marked Prosecution
Exhibit 133 for identification. This is a letter, dated 1 April 1943.
The writer of the letter is Sauckel, and the letter is addressed to the
defendant.

    “Most honored Field Marshal,

    “I take the liberty of enclosing in confidence three copies of
    the speech I gave in Poznan on 5 and 6 February 1943, on the
    occasion of the Reich and Gauleiters meeting and beg you kindly
    to peruse it. The figures contained in this speech refer to the
    end of the year 1942. Of course, the figures given concerning
    utilization of labor have again increased in the meantime. I
    would ask for your continued sympathetic understanding of the
    interests of manpower utilization, and your understanding and
    assistance in my task as far as possible. On my side, I can
    assure you that I always have asked the offices of the labor
    allocation administration subordinate to me for close and
    successful cooperation with all departments, and that I will do
    so for the future too.

                                                  “Heil Hitler,
                                             “Yours respectfully,
                                                 [Signed] “Sauckel”

And, on the 7th, the last page, the defendant acknowledges receipt of
this letter:

    “Most esteemed Gauleiter,

    “I thank you most cordially for kindly transmitting to me the
    speech you made in Poznan on 5 and 6 February 1943 on the
    occasion of the Reich and Gauleiters meeting.

    “Heil Hitler! Yours.”

Q. Do you recall receiving it from Sauckel on 1 April 1943?

A. No. At the beginning of April I wasn’t there the first few days. I
see a remark, by somebody else, on this document. It probably says—I
can’t read it very well—“for the files of the Central Planning Board”.
Perhaps this letter may have been submitted to me later on—I do not
know whether I replied myself. I certainly did not read the report
because otherwise I would be able to recall the figures.

Q. But you did initial the letter, didn’t you?

A. I do not know. I do not recall it at all.

MR. DENNEY: On the copy that your Honors have, I believe it’s apparent
in the upper left-hand corner of the first page, the defendant’s
initials appear there, as well as on the original letter.

Q. Now, do you ever recall saying that you would put the German workers
into concentration camps, the ones who did not work well?

A. When I talked about slackers, I referred to education by Himmler, but
not to sending them into concentration camps. Himmler had other training
places for workers where such people who were disinclined to work were
being trained by making their supplementary rations dependent on their
production.

Q. Don’t you recall that you asked that certain camps be set up
especially to take care of these German workers who weren’t doing well?

A. I did not say that we should make a special camp, but that they
should go to the training camps which already existed and we could get
them back from there. I do wish to emphasize here these were people,
Germans, who did not do their duty towards their Fatherland. I thought
it justified that such people should be trained.

MR. DENNEY: Witness, I believe you said you kept a diary?

A. A diary? You could not call it exactly a diary, I only took some
short notes concerning my stay, and I jotted down a few key words which
conveyed generally the most important matters.

Q. That was lost, was it, or destroyed, when you were captured?

A. It has not been lost. I still have it here.

Q. That is what you are referring to?

A. If I look up where I was at a particular day or what personalities I
met, I refer only to the most important questions, not to everything, I
can see whom I was with. Sometimes there is a table of contents, too,
which is more detailed, according to the interest I had in those
questions. For instance, for 28 October, which you referred to a while
ago, I only have the following: My dispute with Goering he had reported
to Hitler; he had not obtained anything, and now he started to vent his
bad humor on me. Then comes a short note again that there was a
conference afterwards with Goering. That was in Karinhall. It went on
for the whole day. It was one hour from Berlin by car. I noted down that
Speer was there, that Sauckel was there, Grawitz, von der Heyde, and
some others. There is no mention what subjects were discussed, but the
attendance of Sauckel clarifies the matter for me. That is an example of
how I would enter these notes in this book.

Q. Insofar as you recall, you were at that meeting on 28 October?

A. Yes, indeed. I have found it here in my book.

PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Mr. Denney, let’s get an unequivocal answer to
this. Did you put the initials on the letter from Sauckel?

MILCH: The “Mi”, yes, indeed.

Q. You wrote that?

A. Yes, I did. I wrote it. Somebody else wrote “to the files—”

Q. Never mind what somebody else wrote. Now, on the first page of the
pamphlet, the printed speech, there are some initials. Did you write
those?

A. On the cover, yes; I did, “Mi, 6/4”, that is what I wrote.

Q. All right.

MR. DENNEY: Do you recall saying that Americans were never assigned to
work in any of the airplane factories?

MILCH: Yes, I said that.

Q. This is Document NOKW-364, which is a partial translation of the
minutes of the Jaegerstab, held on 19 June 1944. The cover page, which
is photostated here in the German, which will be given to the Secretary
General, bears the initials of the defendant.

PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Is this a new exhibit?

MR. DENNEY: Yes, your Honor. This will bear Prosecution Exhibit Number
135 for identification, if your Honor pleases. Document NOKW-364, a
partial translation of the minutes of the Jaegerstab of a meeting held
19 June 1944. On the covering page there appear the initials of the
defendant. Perhaps the Secretary General would be good enough to let Mr.
Blakeslee have the original so the cover page can be shown to the
defendant. Just show it to him, Mr. Blakeslee.

    (The document was handed to the defendant.)

MR. DENNEY: Do your records show that you attended a conference of the
GL on 4 August 1942?

A. Yes, indeed. These discussions were twice a week. (_NOKW-409, Pros.
Ex. 140._)

JUDGE MUSMANNO: Curiosity consumes me as to what would happen if an
officer inferior in rank to yourself took you at your word and actually
executed a number of these workers or prisoners of war. Would that
officer then be punished?

A. No one was there who would have been in a position to do that. Apart
from that, all those who were under my orders knew me and my way of
handling things. They knew that I didn’t mean it, and apart from that
they always laughed about my remarks when I let myself go, as they said.

Q. In other words the comment of the Field Marshal in a matter of this
seriousness was really of no value?

A. Because the people knew that I got excited very easily about certain
things, and these incidents here have been selected and produced. From
every one of these meetings which took place twice a month, there was a
long report and owing to one or other of these reports, maybe once or
twice, there would be a certain outburst or explosion, and then, as we
soldiers were accustomed to do, we would just get mad, that is all.
However, I didn’t intend to do anything about it and I spoke to those
under my orders when the opportunity offered. They pointed the matter
out to me. They knew exactly from my words that this was not meant
seriously. They knew exactly that no such order had been given and that
I myself would never cause anybody to be punished, not even then when it
might have been justified, for the very simple reason that I did not
have the power to administer punishments.

JUDGE PHILLIPS: Mr. Denney read this paragraph to you, Document
NOKW-409, Prosecution Exhibit 140. I understood you to say this, that
the paragraph did not contain your attitude there, that you never gave
such an order, that when you were worried you sometimes used strong
language as a soldier would. Didn’t you say that?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, now whether you meant it or not, you would say these things,
and by so doing you counseled and advised others under you at a meeting
over which you presided to do such things. Whether you meant it or not
you did that, didn’t you?

A. No, I never gave an order by using these words, because my people
spoke with me, and they knew afterwards from my words that I never meant
it earnestly.

Q. Didn’t you say, “I would band the workers together and have fifty
percent of them shot. I would then publish this fact and compel the
other fifty percent to work by beating if necessary.” Did you say that
or not?

A. I do not remember having said that. However, three days ago I believe
I said that, when I had such a rush of blood to my head, due to that
injury I had, and I couldn’t remember what I had said at that particular
moment. I just burst out with rage.

Q. Well, if you did say that, you were advising and counseling others to
do that, were you not?

A. No, that was not a counsel or an advice to anybody else. On the
contrary, it was known that if someone had done such a thing I would
have intervened myself.

[March 20]

JUDGE MUSMANNO: Since we are on the subject of Jews, I would like to
refer to something which occurred at the first trial. Now you are not
compelled to discuss this matter if for any reason you prefer not to,
but you will recall that you were cross-examined by Justice Jackson on
the subject of your being Aryanized. Do you recall that?

A. Yes, I recall it.

Q. Now you gave an explanation at the trial which, however, was not
definite, it seems to have left something in mid-air, and since you have
given us quite a long autobiographical sketch of yourself, if you would
care to enlighten us on this point, you are free to do so.

A. My point of view is as I stated at the time.

Q. Yes.

A. That point of view I still adhere to.

Q. Let us see. You were asked certain questions and gave certain answers
as follows:

    “Question: At that time” (Goering had referred to 1933) “Goering
    had you—we will have no misunderstanding about this—Goering
    made you what you call a full Aryan; was that right?

    “Answer: I do not think he made me one; I was one.

    “Question: Well, he had it established, let us say.

    “Answer: He had helped me in clearing up this question, which
    was not clear.

    “Question: That is, your mother’s husband was a Jew; is that
    correct?

    “Answer: It was not said so.

    “Question: You had to demonstrate that none of your ancestry was
    Jewish; is that correct?

    “Answer: Yes, everybody had to do that.

    “Question: And in your case that involved your father, your
    alleged father, is that correct?

    “Answer: Yes.” [There the inquiry rested.]

A. Yes.

Q. Just what had to be done to demonstrate that you were a full Aryan,
and why did the question arise?

A. The first time that question arose was in 1933, and the occasion was
the following: The president of the German Aero Club was reported as
being adverse to the Hitler regime, and I protected that man. Following
that, a man who was a member of the SA sent a letter to Goering, and I
may add that this was a man who was trying to become a state secretary
in the Air Ministry, and he had been deeply hurt when he, an old Party
member, had to take second place to me. In this letter he said that
State Secretary Milch was not a full Aryan. This happened in the summer
of 1933. Goering forwarded this letter to me, and I went to Goering.
Following that I was asked to submit my family tree. That is how this
matter arose.

Q. In other words, you had to establish that no Jewish blood flowed in
your veins, is that correct?

A. Yes, that is what I was supposed to do.

Q. And you established that to their satisfaction?

A. That was established.

Q. * * * Now, I understand you to say that the first time you learned of
the proposed war against Poland was on 21 August, and even then it was
not very clearly indicated that a war could actually be unleashed, and
that further it was not until the very end of the day, that is to say,
at five o’clock in the afternoon of 31 August that you were directed to
put the Luftwaffe, or all your forces, in readiness for the attack. Is
that correct? Is that what you said?

A. On 31 August, not to get ready, but I received the order: “The attack
starts tomorrow,” that was the order for an attack, whereas, over-all
preparations had been made previously at the meeting which took place
with Hitler on 22 August, only then there was still the possibility of
negotiations which were still going on. These negotiations came to an
end on 31 August at 1700 hours.

Q. Did you not tell this Tribunal that after the meeting of 23 May 1939
you were convinced that war was not intended?

A. 23d of May?

Q. Yes, 23 May 1939?

A. Yes.

Q. That you had no intimation that Hitler intended an aggressive war on
Poland?

A. Yes, because at that time, according to my recollection, Hitler
stated again and again that he was certainly going to settle the Polish
problem, but that he would not allow war to break out.

Q. And that you had called to his attention the necessity of
manufacturing bombs, because you believed that hostilities might break
out?

A. That was before that date, before the 23d, and also after the 23d,
because I myself did not share Hitler’s optimism. Although he may not
have intended to wage war, his policy might nevertheless have led to
war, for he alone was not the deciding factor, the others would have
something to say as well.

Q. And that assumption lulled you into the conviction that there would
be no war, since he refused you authority to manufacture bombs?

A. Today I must assume that, at that time I was not aware of it.

Q. When did you first learn that an attack on Russia was intended?

A. At the beginning of January 1941—I beg your pardon—yes, that is
right, 1941, on 13 January actually. It was then that Goering, during a
conference with a large circle of commanding officers, informed us that
one’s attention should be turned to the East, as Hitler was fearing an
attack by the Russians.

Q. Yes, and you finally came to the conclusion that the declaration of
war, or rather, the undeclared war against Russia was a crime against
Germany.

A. Yes.

Q. Did you think it was a crime against Russia?

A. Yes, against Russia also.

Q. Also?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, you endeavored to see Hitler to persuade him not to enter this
war.

A. Yes.

Q. And your immediate circle, your military friends, realized that it
was foolhardy to provoke a war with Russia and thereby establish two
fronts?

A. Exactly the way I saw it, yes. My immediate circle were of the same
opinion as I was.

Q. And all the generals were of the same impression—that it was
hopeless for Germany, and that further it was tragic and suicidal to
Germany to allow Hitler to take over the control of the armed forces?
You were practically unanimous in that belief, were you not?

A. This was never discussed in any larger circles.

Q. But you have testified—it is in the record—that you were all of
that belief.

A. It transpired at a later stage, when it was discussed, that they were
all of the same opinion.

Q. When was that?

A. Later on in the course of the war.

Q. When did you realize that it was a mistake to have Hitler as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces?

A. I, personally?

Q. When was it thoroughly recognized, even though not expressed at a
public meeting among the generals, that it was suicidal, a great
mistake, to have Hitler as Commander in Chief?

A. That was the general point of view after Stalingrad. That is when it
became general.

Q. And when was that?

A. That was the end of January 1943.

Q. Yes. You still had two and a half years of war ahead of you?

A. Yes.

Q. Why didn’t you do something about having Hitler removed?

A. It was my duty toward my people to keep allegiance to him. I had
sworn an oath of allegiance to Hitler. I am only a human being who can
see this world subjectively and I cannot presume to be an impartial
judge on such questions. Moreover, I believe that in the whole of
Germany’s history there is not one instance of soldiers rising against
their military commander. I certainly do not know of one.

Q. Even though you realized that Hitler was leading Germany into stark
annihilation and unspeakable hardship, and even though all the generals
were of that same belief, yet you upheld this fetish of an allegiance
which was destined, and very clearly so, to bring unparalleled misery to
the people that you professed to be faithful to?

A. Your Honor, I personally did not presume to say that my judgment was
right, and that Hitler’s judgment, and the judgment of all those around
him, was wrong.

Q. Then, you modify your statement that Hitler was wrong? You say that
he might have been right?

A. No, no, I am not saying that. What I am trying to say is that it was
my point of view that the question whether the head of the state was to
be overthrown or not was a matter for the constitution, and that for
this eventuality the constitution and the state must surely have powers,
means through which in such cases there could be intervention; but then
it could not be the task of any individual general to take steps in such
questions, which were, after all, unlawful.

-----

[139] The defendant Milch testified in his own behalf on eight full
trial days (March 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, and 20, 1947). His
testimony is recorded in 581 mimeographed pages (_Tr. pp. 1696-2276_).

[140] Wolfgang Vorwald, former Commander of Luftgau (Air Force
Administrative Command) VII, Munich.

[141] Defendant in case of United States _vs._ Ernst von Weizsaecker, et
al. See Vols. XII, XIII, XIV.

[142] Doc. R-124, Pros. Ex. 48-A, Conference of 1 March 1944, pp.
484-498.

                         V. CLOSING STATEMENTS

              A. Closing Statement of the Prosecution[143]

MR. CLARK DENNY: We close today the trial of a major war criminal—a
leader in a slaving operation, the enormity of which is without
historical parallel; a principal in a crime of murder in the ironic
masquerade of scientific progress which has shocked alike the world of
medicine and the world of laymen. The evidence set forth before the
Tribunal has shown that Erhard Milch was primarily implicated as a
leader in a program to bring laborers into Germany by force, of
allocating them to the various segments of the German war economy, and
of munitions.

We deal here with a top military and economic planner who at all times
was fully informed as to the aims and objectives of the Nazi plan.
Unlike his colleagues Speer and Sauckel, Milch entered the conspiracy
early. The defendant was one of a small group of men who constituted the
leadership of the Reich.

Before dealing directly with the responsibility of the defendant for the
crimes charged in the indictment, as shown by the evidence, we should
like to review, briefly, the law applicable to these crimes.

                               _THE LAW_

The indictment charges and the evidence has connected the defendant with
a wide variety of crimes incident to the enforced labor program of the
Nazi regime. In themselves, these crimes are not new except in their
enormity. In domestic law they have, from ancient times, borne such
familiar titles as assault, battery, murder, kidnapping and pillage. In
international law the principles which protect the individual from undue
interference with his person and his personal freedom have given rise to
a series of kindred precepts governing the conduct of a nation which has
gained factual control over the citizens of another state. We shall
consider briefly some salient precepts and prohibitions of international
law up to, and including the provisions of Control Council Law No. 10.

Much of the labor which supplied Germany with the tools of total war was
exacted from people who had been uprooted from their homes in occupied
territories and imported to Germany. Displacement of groups of persons
from one country to another is the proper concern of international law
insofar as it affects the community of nations.

The law has recognized that some conditions may justify the transfer of
people from one country to another. Correspondingly, and with much more
relevance to the present case, international law has enunciated certain
conditions under which the fact of deportation becomes a crime.

If the transfer is carried out without a legal title, as is the case
where people are deported from a country occupied by an invader while
the occupied enemy still has an army in the field, the deportation is
contrary to international law. The rationale of this rule lies in the
supposition that the occupying power has prevented temporarily the
rightful sovereign from exercising power over its citizens.

Articles 43, 46, 49, 52, 55, and 56 of the Hague Regulations, which
limit the rights of the belligerent occupant, do not _expressly_ specify
as a crime the deportation of civilians from an occupied territory.
However, Article 52 states the following conditions under which services
may be demanded from the inhabitants of occupied countries:

   1. They must be for the needs of the army of occupation;
   2. They must be in proportion to the resources of the country; and
   3. They must be of such a nature as not to involve the inhabitants in
        the obligation to take part in military operations against their
        own country.

Insofar as this section limits the conscription of labor to that
required for the needs of the army of occupation, it is clear that the
use of labor from occupied territories outside of the area of occupation
is forbidden by the Hague Regulations.

The illegality of the deportation of civilians in territories under
belligerent occupation was demonstrated in the First World War when the
Germans attempted a deportation program of Belgian workers into Germany.
This measure met with world-wide protest and was abandoned after about
four months.

Among the voices raised in protest against the deportation of Belgians
by Germany in 1916-1917 was that of Lansing, Secretary of State. He
wrote:

    “The Government of the United States has learned with the
    greatest concern and regret of the policy of the German
    Government to deport from Belgium a portion of the civilian
    population for the purposes of forcing them to labor in Germany,
    and is constrained to protest in a friendly spirit but most
    solemnly against this policy which is in contravention of all
    precedent and all principles of international practice which
    have long been accepted and followed by civilized nations in
    their treatment of noncombatants in conquered territory.”

Other protests were lodged with the German Government by Spain,
Switzerland, Netherlands, and Brazil, all neutral countries.
International lawyers all over the world condemned Germany’s action in
the strongest terms.

The opposition in the German Reichstag accused the government of
violating the Hague Convention and refused to vote for the war budget.

It is worthy of note, in passing, that the defendant has testified at
this trial that he knew of this effort at deportation of labor on the
part of Germany in the First War and that he was much interested in the
investigation conducted by a Reichstag Committee concerning this matter.
He could not have followed this investigation, as he admits he did,
without learning that the deportation in question was a violation of
international law.

The second condition under which deportation becomes a crime occurs when
the purpose of the displacement is illegal. A conspicuous example of
illegality of purpose is found when the deportation is for the purpose
of compelling the deportees to manufacture weapons for use against their
homeland or to be assimilated in the working economy of the occupying
country.

An attempt has been made by the defense in this trial to show that
persons were deported from France into Germany legally and for a legal
purpose, by pointing out that such deportations were authorized by
agreements between Nazi and Vichy French authorities. This defense is
both technically and substantially deficient. Many of the Vichy
Government’s highest officials, who held office by reason of and under
the protection of Nazi power, have been punished for treason by the
present legitimate government. And, too, the agreements themselves were
illegal—because they were exacted under duress, and because they were
void _ab initio_ because of their immoral content. It is common
knowledge that even the puppets of Vichy did not of their own accord
agree to the Nazi deportation measures. It is equally clear that these
agreements were _contra bonos mores_. Then, too, it was illegal for any
French Government to conclude agreements which provided for the
compulsory mass deportation of French workers to aid the enemy’s war
effort. At the time of the agreement between Germany and Vichy there was
merely a state of suspension of hostilities. French resistance had not
ceased, and the outcome of the war continued to be uncertain. Lastly,
the deportation agreements were invalid because their manifest purpose
was to aid Germany in the commission of the crime of aggressive war.
That an agreement in furtherance of an act which is illegal in
international law is invalid has been stated by various authorities. For
example, Professor Charles Cheney Hyde, of Columbia University, defines
as internationally illegal “agreements which are concluded for the
purpose of, and with a view to, causing the performance of acts which it
(international law) proscribes.”

Professor Hall, page 382 of the 8th Edition of International Law (1924),
declares:

    “The requirement that contracts shall be in conformity with law
    invalidates, or at least renders voidable, all agreements which
    are at variance with the fundamental principles of international
    law and their undisputed applications * * *.”

Lauterpacht on International Law by L. Oppenheim, in volume I, page 706,
states:

    “It is a unanimously recognized customary rule of international
    law that obligations which are at variance with universally
    recognized principles of international law cannot be the object
    of a treaty.”

The final condition under which deportation becomes illegal occurs
whenever generally recognized standards of decency and humanity are
disregarded. This flows from the established principle of law that an
otherwise permissible act becomes a crime when carried out in a criminal
manner.

A study of the pertinent parts of Control Council Law No. 10 strengthens
the conclusions of the foregoing statements, that deportation of the
population is criminal whenever there is no title in the deporting
authority or whenever the purpose of the displacement is illegal, or
whenever the deportation is characterized by inhumane or illegal
methods.

Article II (1) (_b_) lists under war crimes “ill-treatment or
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose, of civilian
population from occupied territory.” It is clear that Law No. 10
establishes the following separate and distinct crimes: ill-treatment of
civilians from occupied territories; deportation to slave labor of such
civilians; and deportation for any other purposes of such civilians.

The prohibition of deportation of civilians from occupied territories
irrespective of the purpose, as stated in Control Council Law No. 10, is
a recognition of the principle of international law that a power in
belligerent occupation has no right or authority (title) to deport the
citizens of the occupied territories. The separate specification as a
war crime in Law No. 10 of ill-treatment of civilians from occupied
territories is a recognition of the rule of international law, as
heretofore discussed, that even an otherwise lawful deportation (by an
authority having title and for a legitimate purpose) is rendered illegal
where the deportees are ill-treated.

Without entering into a detailed discussion of the evidence, it should
be pointed out at this point, that all these conditions for criminal
deportation were abundantly present in the enforced labor program of
Germany during the 2d World War, and that the _knowing connection_ of
the defendant with all phases of illegal deportation has been
established.

Article II (1) (_c_) of Control Council Law No. 10 specifies certain
crimes against humanity. Among these is listed the “deportation * * *
(of) any civilian population * * *”. The general language of this
sub-section, as applied to deportation, indicates that Control Council
Law No. 10 has indeed unconditionally condemned, as a crime against
humanity, every instance of the deportation of civilians. Under this
sub-section, there would seem to be no room for argument as to the
legality of any agreement on the part of any government, legitimate or
illegitimate, which allows deportation of its subjects in time of war.

We come now to a consideration of the crime of enslavement. Whereas
Article II (_b_) names deportation to slave labor as a war crime,
Article II (1) (_c_) states that the “enslavement * * * (of) any
civilian population” is a crime against humanity. Thus, Law No. 10
treats as separate crimes, and different types of crime, “deportation to
slave labor” and “enslavement.”

Article II (_b_) does not specify as a crime the detention (as
distinguished from the deportation) of civilians for use as slave labor
or for any other purpose. However, the section does stipulate that any
atrocities or offenses against persons which constitute violations of
the laws or customs of war, _including but not limited to_ deportation
to slave labor, are war crimes. Use or detention of persons from
occupied territories for slave labor or for any other purpose, in and of
themselves, _do_ constitute violations of the laws and customs of war.
Ergo, such use or detention is a _war crime_ within II (1) (_b_) of Law
No. 10.

The _crime against humanity_ which is termed “enslavement” in Article II
(1) (_c_) of Law No. 10 is susceptible of two meanings. It can be
understood to embrace the initial act of deprivation of the freedom of
another, and an act whereby such deprivation is continued, or either of
them, or it may be interpreted as referring only to the initial measures
whereby a person is deprived of his freedom.

It is the contention of the prosecution in this case that all phases of
the slave labor program, the taking, the transportation, the detention,
the use and the inhuman treatment of foreign workers as practiced by the
Nazi state and participated in by the defendant, constitute enslavement
within the meaning of Article II (1) (_c_). No sufficient reason appears
for the limitation of the crime to the mere initial act. In every true
and complete sense a person is enslaved from the moment when his liberty
is taken from him until the time when it is restored to him. It is more
than probable that if Law No. 10 is intended to limit the crime of
enslavement to the initial measures under which a person was deprived of
his liberty, there would have been some definite indication, either in
the language or in the context of the statute.

Even if we were to concede the narrowest possible meaning for the term
“enslavement” in Article II (1) (_c_), so as to understand by it only
the first acts of deprivation of liberty, all acts under which such
people were kept in an enslaved status would be crimes against humanity,
because the same section defines as such any atrocities and offenses
committed against the civilian population. By express proviso
“enslavement” and “deportation” are only illustratively mentioned, and
“other inhuman acts committed against any civilian population”
constitute crimes against humanity.

The result is that whether we adopt the broad interpretation of the term
“enslavement” or the narrower one, the deportation, the transportation,
the retention, the use and the inhuman treatment of civilian populations
are crimes against humanity. The prosecution charges that the defendant
was criminally connected with all the phases of the slave labor program,
whether these divisions be comprehended within the technical term
“enslavement” or be divided between the crime of “enslavement” and that
of “other inhuman acts.”

We shall now make brief comment on the subject of the treatment and use
of prisoners of war. The Hague and Geneva Conventions merely codify the
precepts of the laws and usages of all civilized nations. Article 31 of
the Geneva Convention provides that “labor furnished by prisoners of war
shall have no direct relation to war operations.” Thus the Convention
forbids:

    1. The use of prisoners of war in manufacture or transportation
    of arms or munitions of any kind, and

    2. The use of prisoners of war for transporting material
    intended for combat units.

The Hague Regulations contain comparable provisions.

The essence of the crime of the misuse of prisoners of war derives from
the kind of work to which they are assigned—in other words, to work
directly connected with the war effort. The prosecution would like to
recall to the court the evidence which connects the defendant with both
the _illegal employment_ of prisoners of war and with their abusive
treatment. The Tribunal will recall that the defendant ordered the
murder of prisoners of war who attempted to escape. We will discuss this
crime more fully later. It will be remembered that there never has been
a substantial denial of the fact that prisoners of war were used to man
German antiaircraft batteries. Nor is it subject to doubt that prisoners
were used in air armament industries over which the defendant exercised
supervisory control.

We now come to the consideration of the basic charges and the law
governing the defendant’s complicity in, and responsibility for, the
Medical Experiments Program. The fundamental crime with which the
defendant is charged in this connection is murder. Also involved are
various atrocities, tortures, offenses against the person, and other
inhuman acts.

The applicable provisions of Control Council Law No. 10, Article II, are
(_b_) war crimes, (_c_) crimes against humanity. In connection with the
criminal Medical Experiments Program, the prosecution submits that the
defendant is guilty of—

    (_a_) War crimes, namely violations of the laws and customs of
    war, as the medical experiments performed upon involuntary
    persons, some of them nationals of countries at war with the
    German Reich, involved the commission of murders, tortures, and
    other inhuman acts.

    (_b_) Crimes against humanity, namely medical experiments
    performed upon involuntary German nationals and nationals of
    other countries, in the course of which, brutalities, murders,
    and other inhuman acts were committed.

Before we pass from the law involved in this case to a consideration of
the evidence, we wish to mention the legal basis for the prosecution’s
contention that the defendant must share the guilt which attaches to the
slave labor program and the conduct of medical experiments upon
unconsenting human beings. Control Council Law No. 10 defines for us the
theory upon which this trial proceeds in Article II, paragraph 2, when
it says:

    “Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in
    which he acted, is deemed to have committed a crime as defined
    in paragraph 1 of this Article, if he was (_a_) a principal or
    (_b_) an accessory to the commission of any such crime, or
    ordered or abetted the same or (_c_) took a consenting part
    therein or (_d_) _was connected with plans or enterprises
    involving its commission or_ (_e_) _was a member of any
    organization or group connected with the commission of any such
    crime_. * * *” [Emphasis added.]

Without wishing to limit the scope of the testimony in this case, the
Tribunal’s attention is directed to the evidence which has established
that the defendant, as a member of the Central Planning Board, and the
Jaegerstab, and as Generalluftzeugmeister, and in every one of his
capacities, was connected with “plans and enterprises” for the
commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and was a “member
of organizations and groups”, within the meaning of subdivisions (_d_)
and (_e_) of paragraph 2, “connected with the commission of such
crimes”.

Count One, paragraph 6, of the indictment charges the defendant Milch
with guilt in the murder of prisoners of war who had attempted to escape
from enforced labor in German war industry. The gist of this crime is
murder, which is, and always has been, prohibited by every country which
laid any claim to civilization. It was specified as a war crime under
the Hague and Geneva Conventions and under the provisions of Article II
of Control Council Law No. 10. The evidence which connects the defendant
with this crime will be discussed in another part of this summation.

Law Number 10, Article II, paragraph 3 provides that the death penalty
or lesser sentences may be prescribed for the commission of war crimes
and crimes against humanity as defined in the statute.

We turn now from the law to the evidence. In the presentation of its
case in chief, the prosecution first offered evidence to describe the
slave labor program in Germany in all its stark terror. It then turned
to a presentation of the proof which connected the defendant with the
slave labor program in two of his principal capacities, as member of the
Central Planning Board and as member of the Jaegerstab. Next there was
put in evidence the documents which established the defendant’s
connection with the medical experiments, and finally, after the defense
had put in its case, the defendant was confronted with the evidence of
additional documents which connected him with the detention and
mistreatment of slave labor in his capacity as Generalluftzeugmeister.
In summing up the evidence the prosecution wants to keep roughly the
same order. It will deal in turn with the evidence of the defendant’s
activities as member of the Central Planning Board and as member of the
Jaegerstab. The documents relating to the defendant as
Generalluftzeugmeister will then be dealt with and, in conclusion, the
defendant’s implication in the criminal medical experiments will be
discussed.

When, in the course of presenting the evidence, we first turned our
attention from the general documents which established the body of the
crime of slave labor to the documents which were to prove the
defendant’s connection with that crime, we asked the Court’s attention
to certain key words which we said would run like small threads through
our proof. These words were cited to be “procurement, allocation and
use”. It was stated that we would often use them. We offered many
documents to prove Milch’s connection with each of the functions
described by these key words. Once again, we ask the Tribunal to keep
these words in mind.

The Central Planning Board, which was established in April 1942, served
as a means of consolidating in a single agency all controls over German
war production. The minutes of the Central Planning Board which have
been submitted to the Tribunal reflect the dominant role played by the
defendant at meetings of the Board.

The best evidence of the scope and authority of the Central Planning
Board is contained in the Board’s own minutes. The first conference of
the Central Planning Board was held on 27 April 1942. The duties and
responsibilities of the Board were announced in these words:

    “The Central Planning in the Four Year Plan (decree of the Reich
    Marshal of Greater Germany [Goering] of 22 April 1942) is a task
    for leaders. It encompasses only principles and executive
    matters. It makes unequivocal decisions and supervises the
    execution of its directives. The Central Planning does not rely
    on anonymous institutions difficult to control but always on
    individuals and fully responsible persons who are free in the
    selection of their working methods and their collaborations, as
    far as there are no directives issued by the Central Planning.”

Then, six months later, on 20 October 1942, the statutes of the Central
Planning Board were published and distributed. A portion of these
states:

    “The Central Planning Board created by the Fuehrer and Reich
    Marshal in order to unify armament and war economy deals only
    with the decision of basic questions. Professional questions
    remain the task of the competent departments which in their
    field remain responsible within the framework of the decisions
    made by the Central Planning Board.”

It is addressed to: “The highest Reich authorities, the Reich Protector,
the Governor General and the executive authorities in the occupied
countries.” The letter of transmittal stated in part:

    “Enclosed I send you for your information the statutes of the
    Central Planning Board with the request to support the office of
    the Central Planning Board in every possible way in its work,
    and to direct, more particularly, your section chiefs and
    reporters to forward all information requested orally, or by
    writing, in the shortest possible time. By this collaboration by
    your section chiefs and reporters, the building up of larger
    machinery in the framework of the Central Planning Board is to
    be avoided.”

The International Military Tribunal found that the Central Planning
Board “had supreme authority for the scheduling of German production and
the allocation and development of raw material”.

It needs no emphasis that the effective performance of these functions
necessarily involved the Board in the requisitioning and distribution of
labor, and the records of the Board, which have been submitted, leave no
doubt that the Board exercised the authority conferred upon it in the
field of labor. The International Military Tribunal in its opinion found
that the Board requisitioned labor from Sauckel with full knowledge that
the demands could be supplied only by foreign forced labor, and that the
Board determined the basic allocation of this labor within the German
war economy.

In assessing the guilt of the defendant Funk, the Court said:[144]

    “In the fall of 1943, Funk was a member of the Central Planning
    Board which determined the total number of laborers needed for
    German industry, and required Sauckel to produce them, usually
    by deportation from occupied territories. Funk did not appear to
    be particularly interested in this aspect of the forced labor
    program, and usually sent a deputy to attend the meetings, often
    SS General Ohlendorf, the former Chief of the SD inside of
    Germany and the former Commander of Einsatzgruppe D. But Funk
    was aware that the Board of which he was a member was demanding
    the importation of slave laborers, and allocating them to the
    various industries under its control.”

Bearing in mind the fact that Funk was a minor member of the Board, how
much greater is the responsibility of the defendant who was a dominant
figure on the Board throughout its existence.

There is no need to review in historical detail the defendant’s personal
participation in the criminal activities of the Board. A few references
to the pattern for 1944 will suffice. The Tribunal will recall that
Albert Speer, the other dominant member of the Board, was ill during
most of this period.

On 4 January 1944, demands were made at a Hitler conference that Sauckel
produce four million new workers from the occupied countries. The
defendant was present at the conference, and at this meeting, Sauckel,
in pledging himself to perform his recruitment tasks, indicated that the
demands could be met only by Himmler, and the promise of assistance was
forthcoming from the Reich Leader SS.

The allocation of this labor to the various sectors of the German
economy was determined by the Board at its 53d meeting. The defendant
was the presiding officer at this meeting. The chart compiled by Milch
and found in his files shows his personal knowledge of the sources of
the labor being allocated.

Sauckel was, however, unable to satisfy completely these demands. He
reported this inability at its 54th meeting. This meeting of the Board
was presided over by the defendant, and the minutes which we have
submitted show the subordinate position occupied by Sauckel with respect
to the Board. The Tribunal will recall Sauckel’s opening statement:

    “Field Marshal, gentlemen, it goes without saying that we shall
    satisfy as far as possible the demands agreed upon by the
    Central Planning Board.”

And then later on in the meeting:

    “If I am to fulfill the demands which you present to me * * *.”

We shall not review in detail the minutes of this meeting, but the
Tribunal’s attention is again directed to the fact that Sauckel was
questioned closely by the defendant who suggested that the Wehrmacht be
assigned to the task of assisting in the recruitment drive. The
defendant suggested that French workers be coerced by a system of
premeditated starvation. In dealing with the problem of Italian
laborers, the defendant suggested that only those who went to Germany or
worked in protected factories be given food.

As a further means of meeting the manpower shortage, consideration was
given to possible measures for increasing the productive power of
prisoners of war. Accordingly, on 5 March 1944, a conference was held at
the Fuehrer Headquarters. It is evident from the minutes which have been
submitted to the Tribunal that the defendant was in attendance. The
Tribunal will recall that the decision was made to give the direction of
the Stalags to the SS, in order to increase the production power of the
prisoners. This was not to apply to the Americans or the English. The
Tribunal will take judicial notice of the methods of the SS.

On 7 July 1944, Sauckel issued a report showing new manpower placed at
the disposal of German war industry during the first half of 1944. We
shall not review in detail this report, but merely state that it is
proof of the Board’s directive to Sauckel.

This report, however, showed a deficit, and on 11 July 1944 a further
conference was held to solve the question of how greater compulsion
could be exerted on persons to work in Germany. The defendant has
testified that he was in virtual retirement from production matters
since late June 1944. Yet the record of this conference shows that he
was present. The result of this conference was the greater utilization
of the Wehrmacht in the recruitment of forced labor. The directive of
Field Marshal von Kluge, which has been submitted in evidence, makes
specific reference to the results of this conference.

Here, in brief, we have the picture. The defendant and the Board, of
which he was a dominant member, requisitioning forced labor from
Sauckel, allocating this labor to the various sectors of the German war
economy, and later improvising new and more brutal techniques of force
and terror for the recruitment of new labor.

The defense, besides denying the power and authority of the Central
Planning Board, has challenged the authenticity and accuracy of its
transcripts. The prosecution has been compelled to rely upon these
minutes for much of its proof.

In this connection, it might be said that these same transcripts
constituted the basis for findings of fact by the International Military
Tribunal. They are quoted in the decision of that Court.

The statutes of the Central Planning Board, mentioned a few minutes ago,
show the extreme care taken to insure the accuracy of reporting these
meetings, as well as action taken or ordered to be taken. The statutes
of the Board provide in part:

    “In order to have the conferences properly prepared and to have
    the execution of the decisions supervised, the Central Planning
    Board appoints an office. This office consists of the deputies
    appointed by each of three members of the Central Planning
    Board; one of these three deputies shall be appointed chief of
    the office.”

Then follows a handwritten marginal note which I shall omit.

    “In accordance with the attached distribution of work the office
    appoints reporters. These reporters are at the disposal of all
    members of the Central Planning Board. The office appoints one
    reporter to keep the record.”

And then, tasks of the office:

    “The office prepares the meetings of the Central Planning Board
    in such a manner that the members of the Central Planning Board
    have the agenda and the material of discussion 24 hours in
    advance. For this purpose the office conducts preliminary talks
    with the competent departments, etc.

    “On the strength of the record made by the reporter, the office
    sees to the execution of the decisions of the Central Planning
    Board by the competent agencies, and sees to it that the
    deadlines fixed are complied with.

    “The members of the office keep the members of the Central
    Planning Board informed between the sessions.”

The minutes of these meetings which have been submitted to this Tribunal
show that these proceedings were recorded and transcribed with
characteristic German detail and accuracy. We need only refer to the
charts and tables, and the remarks quoted in the transcripts. Of the 59
meetings fully covered by these official reports, 41 were prepared and
signed by Ministerialrat Steffler, who was personally responsible for
the accuracy and completeness of these reports.

Without the Central Planning Board the slave labor program could not
have functioned.

                           _THE JAEGERSTAB._

Here we have the defendant in immediate contact with the slave labor
program at its peak. By the testimony of the defendant, it was he who
conceived and instigated the formation of the Jaegerstab. Speer and the
defendant constituted its leadership. Speer’s participation was nominal
and it was the defendant who directed its activities and acted as its
chairman. Speer was ill during part of the Jaegerstab’s existence and
has stated to the Court that he did not preside at a meeting.

The Jaegerstab assumed control over fighter production when the
exploitation of foreign forced labor in air armament had already reached
unparalleled heights. On 16 February 1944, the defendant had told his
colleagues in the Central Planning Board that “our best new engine is
made 88 percent by Russian prisoners of war.” On 25 March, he told his
engineers that soon the percentage of foreign personnel in the aircraft
industry would reach 90 percent. Reich Leader SS Himmler, reporting to
Goering on 9 March 1944 on the employment of concentration camp
personnel in the aircraft industry, stated that nearly 36,000 prisoners
were employed and that an increase to 90,000 was expected. The formation
of the Jaegerstab is partly explainable in terms of the battle to
increase the manpower resources available for fighter production.

The Jaegerstab was assigned top priority. Projects for the recruitment
and commitment of manpower were discussed by the Jaegerstab. The
evidence presented before the Tribunal has shown that questions of
manpower were time and time again referred to the defendant. We have
seen him agreeing to use his prestige and influence upon Sauckel in
efforts to obtain new workers for aircraft production. When manpower in
sufficient numbers was not forthcoming through normal channels, the
Jaegerstab did not shrink from other methods of obtaining its labor.
When necessary the Jaegerstab recruited its own labor, either directly
or by engineering “snatching” expeditions for the seizure of manpower
arriving on transports from the East.

The defendant’s frank admission to his subordinates that “international
law cannot be observed here” characterizes best his own participation in
the activities of the Jaegerstab. Where, as was the case with France,
transfers of production facilities were concerned, the defendant
advocated the stripping of the country and the deportation of its people
as prisoners of war. When the discussion turned to PW’s, the defendant
was quick to suggest their transfer to places under air attack. When the
transportation of Italian civilian conscripts directly recruited by the
Jaegerstab for service in Germany was in question, it was the defendant
who advocated the shooting of those who attempted to escape.

The Jaegerstab was no mere discussion group. As an agency with absolute
authority over fighter production, the Jaegerstab acted by orders and
directives. The Jaegerstab fixed hours of labor and conditions of work.
It was the Jaegerstab, for example, which established the 72-hour work
week in the aircraft industry.

In addition to its jurisdiction over fighter production, the Jaegerstab
was charged with the program for the decentralization of the German
aircraft industry, both to above ground bombproof installations and to
subterranean locations. Much of the labor employed in both phases of the
project was concentration camp labor. The defendant must have known this
fact.

One phase, the transfer to new installations underground, was under the
immediate supervision of SS Gruppenfuehrer Heinz Kammler. Kammler was a
member of the Jaegerstab. Where, as was the case in some instances,
labor was not forthcoming in sufficient quantity, Kammler informed the
Jaegerstab of his intention to take large numbers of persons into
protective custody for use on his projects. Members of the Jaegerstab
knew that manpower shortages on the construction projects were at least
in part due to the high death rate. The conditions of employment on the
projects have not been substantially disputed. The Jaegerstab was well
informed of these conditions. While on trips with the Jaegerstab,
Kammler visited these projects and his fellow members of the Jaegerstab
were well advised as to the manner in which workers employed on them
were treated. Where it was necessary to hang thirty people merely as an
example to others, Kammler reported this fact to the Jaegerstab.

A second phase of the program, the transfer of fighter production to
bombproof factories above ground, was carried out for the Jaegerstab by
Stobbe-Dethleffsen and later Xaver Dorsch. While Stobbe-Dethleffsen and
Dorsch were immediately in charge, it was the Jaegerstab which received
the funds and raw materials necessary for the carrying out of this
project. When sufficient progress had not been made under
Stobbe-Dethleffsen, the Jaegerstab demanded that Dorsch carry out this
program. The defendant was a leader in the planning which preceded
Dorsch’s appointment.

By the testimony of Dorsch, Milch was one of a small group which worked
out with Goering the details of the project, including the question of
manpower. Dorsch was represented on the Jaegerstab by Schlempp, and
later Knipping, deputies designated for this particular purpose.
Schlempp informed the Jaegerstab on the progress of the work, both
orally and in writing. Dorsch received manpower from the Jaegerstab.
This was the immediate concern of Schmelter.

Early in April 1944 the defendant represented the Jaegerstab at
conferences with Hitler where the decision was first taken to carry out
deportations. Shortly thereafter, the defendant received written
confirmation of the results of this conference, as did Himmler, who was
to procure the workers. Progress reports were made and delivery dates
agreed upon. Then came the disappointing news that the first transports
arriving at Auschwitz consisted primarily of old men, women, and
children. Later on there were reports as to the successful allocation of
this personnel. The testimony of Dorsch shows that these Jews were used
on the construction projects, that the conditions under which they lived
were intolerable, and that the death rate on the project was excessive.

In closing this phase of the case, it is submitted that the defendant
never resigned from the Jaegerstab. While it is true that the defendant
at Goering’s behest was removed from certain offices in the Air Ministry
in the summer of 1944, he retained his membership in the Jaegerstab
until its dissolution, the prosecution contends.

As Generalluftzeugmeister the defendant had complete control over
aircraft production. In this field his authority was unlimited. In
particular it has been shown that the defendant requisitioned labor for
the aircraft industry with knowledge of the brutal and inhumane
techniques employed in recruiting these laborers, and that he gave
directives for the criminal treatment of these laborers at the centers
of production.

There is evidence that the defendant presented the labor demands of the
aircraft industry to Sauckel. The Tribunal will recall that in his
affidavit Sauckel stated that it was the defendant who produced the
manpower figures for aviation. In view of the position occupied by
Sauckel in the slave labor program, this statement is of special
importance.

The statement of Sauckel is in agreement with the statements of Hermann
Goering, the defendant’s superior in the Luftwaffe. In his interrogation
the former Reich Marshal stated that the defendant was in charge of the
division for labor employment in the Air Ministry and that the industry
demands for labor in air armament were made by the defendant.

Even the defendant’s collaborator Albert Speer testified to the same
effect when he stated:

    “The requests of the air armament industry for laborers were
    presented by Milch and he did not permit anyone to take this
    right away from him until March 1944.”

The defendant as Generalluftzeugmeister was acquainted with the methods
employed in recruiting this manpower. In fact, many of the practices
indulged in by Sauckel were formulated at conferences at which the
defendant was in attendance. The Tribunal will recall that the defendant
was present at a conference in which Goering announced his plan to use
the Luftwaffe in the recruitment drive to capture laborers in Holland.
The Tribunal’s attention is also drawn to the Generalluftzeugmeister
meeting of 25 January 1944 in which methods for the more expeditious
deportation of young Czechs for work in the Luftwaffe were discussed.

The defendant also knew that prisoners of war and concentration camp
personnel were included in the manpower he was requisitioning and
distributing to the aircraft industry. We have seen him trying to
increase their numbers in the industry under his control, and we have
seen him ordering and abetting the inhumane treatment of this labor.

As chief of aircraft production, the defendant regulated the treatment
of foreign forced labor in the German aircraft industry. The defendant
fixed hours of labor and conditions of work and by directives to his
subordinates set basic policies for the handling of this labor within
the industry.

Where foreign workers refused to work, the defendant ordered that they
be shot. When these wretched slaves attempted to revolt, the defendant
directed that some of their numbers be killed, regardless of personal
guilt or innocence. In the case of prisoners of war who attempted to
escape, the defendant ordered that they be shot.

When the “contracts” of workers under his control expired, the defendant
ordered their compulsory extension, and when workers attempted to change
jobs, he advocated that they be put in concentration camps.

In the case of Italians who refused to work, the defendant ordered that
they be beaten and so informed his chief, Goering. And where Frenchmen
refused to work in French factories under his control, the defendant
stated that he would deport them by force and bring them to Germany or
to the East. Similar policies were applied by the defendant in the case
of Polish workers.

No more need be said about the Generalluftzeugmeister. The Tribunal has
seen the documents containing the minutes of the meetings. The documents
dealing with this phase of the case are particularly revealing in
showing the fanaticism of the defendant and the enthusiasm with which he
recommended ruthless treatment of the hapless victims of German
occupation policies.

We will now restate the pattern originally presented in terms of the
proof brought forward at the trial in order to ascertain to what extent
the defendant’s culpability has been established with reference to the
medical phase.

First, the body of the crime. The prosecution contends that in violation
of the laws of war and all the laws of humanity criminal high-altitude
and freezing experiments were carried on by Luftwaffe physicians.

The testimony of Dr. Erich Hippke, the Medical Inspector of the
Luftwaffe, is of interest on this subject. Hippke stated that Dr.
Rascher, a Luftwaffe physician at the time, came to Hippke with a
proposal to use prisoners as high-altitude experimental subjects in May
1941.

Hippke was in a receptive frame of mind, for it was essential that the
scope of these experiments be widened and new human subjects were
needed. The researchers working on the tests had developed a certain
immunity so that results of self-experimentation did not give a true
picture of the reactions.

With the aid of Himmler and the SS, the Luftwaffe was able to proceed
with the experiments which were allegedly necessary in the interests of
German military aviation medical knowledge. But lest one be inclined to
believe that these pressure experiments were considered as minor
nuisances to the subjects concerned, with no real dangers, note the
words of Dr. Hippke:

    “I asked him,” speaking of Rascher, “how he would be able to
    obtain such persons for experimentation, and he justified
    himself by saying that he had connections with the SS who had
    charge of such penal prisoners. There were such penal prisoners
    in Dachau and he would be in a position to obtain them for these
    purposes. I myself, because of my inner personal feelings on the
    matter, was very much against these experiments and could not
    make up my mind whether I should approve such experimentation.”

From the very beginning of the plan to conduct these experiments, Dr.
Hippke had strong mental reservations concerning the moral principles
involved in the task which the Luftwaffe doctors were about to
undertake. During the coming year Hippke weighed the problem, and it was
with some misgiving that he finally allowed his doctors to begin the
experiments, saying to them: “Please, children, go carefully.”

But, tragically enough, his “children” did not go carefully. Instead,
they ran amuck with their scientific apparatus and tests. The pressure
experiments which were supposed to have been helpful to fliers of the
Luftwaffe degenerated into so-called “X-experiments”, which meant
“execution” experiments.

Seventy to eighty persons were murdered during the spring and summer of
1942 when the pressure experiments were carried on at Dachau.

During the subsequent freezing experiments a comparable number of
concentration camp inmates forfeited their lives to the sadistic Dr.
Rascher and his Luftwaffe associates.

Dr. Romberg himself admits having seen three persons die in the
low-pressure chamber and concedes that at least nine other deaths may
well have occurred when he was absent from his post at Dachau.

Wolfram Sievers,[145] the manager of the Ahnenerbe, the SS Research
Institute, witnessed the death of an experimental subject in the
freezing tank.

There is adequate evidence that the low-pressure and freezing
experiments were carried out by Luftwaffe physicians for the benefit of
the Luftwaffe. There has been no valid denial of the fact that the
defendant was the Luftwaffe official responsible for the deaths and
cruelties suffered in these twin torture chambers, the pressure chamber
and the freezing tank.

Now, let us examine in more detail the second basic charge of the
prosecution, namely, that the defendant was officially connected with
these experiments which violated the laws of war and humanity.

We have the “Wolffy” letter of 20 May 1942 in which the defendant tells
Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff of the SS that “the altitude experiments
carried out by the SS and the Luftwaffe at Dachau have been finished.”
In this same letter Milch announces that experiments in connection with
perils on the high seas would be important; that the necessary
arrangements have been made and, since the low-pressure chamber is no
longer needed, it must be moved from Dachau. Thus the defendant has
entered the picture and established his official connection with the
high-altitude experiments and the low-temperature experiments, which
proved to be considerably more than mere harmless chilling tests.

If, as the defendant contends, he was not officially responsible for
these Luftwaffe medical experiments, then it should follow that other
persons connected with them would not take cognizance of the defendant
in this matter. The contention is ridiculous.

The witness Wolff had the following to say regarding a meeting he had
with Milch in August or September 1942:

    “Thereafter, we had discussed our official questions. I inquired
    about how he was, and if everything between the Luftwaffe and
    the SS was all right. During that occasion we also spoke about
    these experiments very shortly, if at all, and we spoke of the
    invaluable help which the SS was giving us by providing these
    voluntary inmates, which was helping us with our medical
    material which could be used at the front.”

It is to be noted that they talked about the experiments and Wolff asked
how the Luftwaffe SS relations were. It is submitted that this
demonstrates that Wolff regarded the defendant as the top man in the
Luftwaffe Medical Experiments Program, as indeed he was.

Then there are the two letters addressed to Milch by Himmler and Wolff,
substantially alike in content; Himmler’s, dated November 1942, in which
he cites the opposition that exists among “Christian medical circles” to
conducting experiments on helpless, involuntary concentration camp
inmates. He refers to the narrow-mindedness of such medical men, which
“will take at least another ten years” to remove. But this
narrow-mindedness did not trouble the consciences of Himmler or the
defendant Milch. Decidedly not. In the words of the Reich Leader SS: “We
two should not get angry about these difficulties.”

The prosecution submits that Himmler would not have written a letter in
this tenor unless he was certain that his good friend Milch would be in
complete agreement with his views.

And how did Himmler regard Milch in connection with the experiments? As
a casual onlooker, with a purely academic interest in the results
obtained? No, Himmler knew that Milch possessed the over-all command,
the ultimate authority in the Luftwaffe; that the Inspector General of
the Luftwaffe was the man to refer to whenever a question arose as to
the disposition of the pressure chamber or the status of Dr. Rascher.
Witness Himmler’s request in his letter:

    “I beg you to release Dr. Rascher, Stabsarzt in the reserve,
    from the air force and to transfer him to me to the Waffen SS. I
    would then assume the sole responsibility for having these
    experiments made in this field and would put the results, which
    we in the SS need only for the frost injuries in the East,
    entirely at the disposal of the air force.”

The logical corollary to this statement is inescapable. _If_ Rascher was
not transferred to the SS and remained with the air force, the
responsibility would not be Himmler’s alone. And we must remember that
Rascher did not leave his Luftwaffe post until the year 1943 _after_ the
experimental atrocities had been largely completed. Then where did this
responsibility rest? Himmler had no doubts; it was on the shoulders of
the defendant.

Nor did Karl Wolff, Himmler’s right-hand man, have any doubts as to the
responsible person in the Luftwaffe, with reference to the medical
experiments. He, too, wrote to Milch requesting that Rascher be released
from the Luftwaffe and transferred to the SS. Here was a man, who, by
his own testimony, “had a good comradely relationship” with the
defendant. On the direct examination, Wolff testified regarding his
connection with Milch:

    “Q. In your position during the war did you have any official
    dealings with Milch?

    “A. Yes.

    “Q. In what connection?

    “A. During peacetime—that is, from 1933 on, until 1939—there
    was a personal cooperation between Milch and me. _All
    difficulties between the Luftwaffe and the SS were handled at
    personal conferences in a very comradely way. This usage also
    took place during the war._”

It is because of the situation above described, that the prosecution has
called Wolff the liaison man between Himmler and the SS on the one hand,
and the defendant and the Luftwaffe, on the other.

The testimony and affidavit of Walter Neff, the Dachau prisoner who
later became a block leader in Dachau, is of interest. This man saw
Rascher often. Was Milch’s name mentioned by Rascher in connection with
the medical experiments? It was. In his affidavit, which he did not
repudiate when testifying before this Court, Neff said:

    “The name of Field Marshal _Milch_ was frequently mentioned in
    Dachau. Every time I asked Dr. Romberg how long the cars and the
    low-pressure chambers would remain in Dachau, he assured me that
    _Milch_ would attend to everything. Dr. Rascher said to me that
    he had communicated with Milch personally and that the cars
    would remain in Dachau as long as he specified.”

Dr. Siegfried Ruff,[146] an important figure in the medical experiments
program, head of the research section of the DVL, recognized the
defendant Milch as the supreme authority in the experimental program. In
his affidavit Ruff said:

    “The entire medical research for aviation was under General Dr.
    Erich Hippke, in his capacity as Chief of the Medical Service,
    until 1944, and subsequently under Professor Dr. Schroeder. As
    Chief of the Medical Service, General Hippke was immediately
    subordinate to Field Marshal Milch * * *. The chain of command
    for these experiments was Milch—Hippke—Ruff—Romberg.”

Again there is the chart drawn up by Dr. Oskar Schroeder,[147] outlining
the official Luftwaffe channels through which orders flowed from Milch
to Hippke, and from Hippke to the various doctors engaged in the actual
process of experimentation. Schroeder thus knew definitely that Milch
was the Luftwaffe Chief in the medical experiments program. He later
succeeded Hippke as Medical Inspector. Consequently, his chart is
entitled to material weight in the proof offered by the prosecution.

Rudolf Brandt,[148] adjutant to Himmler, often had occasion to deal with
correspondence between the Luftwaffe and the SS, regarding the
experiments. In referring to Himmler’s request that Milch order Dr.
Rascher to be transferred to the SS, Brandt wrote a letter to Wolfram
Sievers, of the Ahnenerbe Society, stating—

    “I assume that the _Field Marshal will of himself give the
    necessary orders_, and then confine himself to sending a brief
    answer to the Reich Leader SS.”

And Sievers writing to Brandt about the use of the low-pressure chamber
says—

    “The putting at our disposal of the low-pressure chamber,
    however, will be possible then _only if the Reich Leader SS
    writes in person to Field Marshal Milch concerning this_.”

These two men, Sievers and Brandt, were not uninformed of the course of
the medical experiments nor of the competent personnel in the Luftwaffe
and SS in this matter. On the contrary, Sievers admitted witnessing the
death of an experimental subject in the freezing tank, and the
subsequent autopsy, while Rudolf Brandt stated in his affidavit—

    “Field Marshal E. Milch and Professor Hippke, Inspector of the
    Medical Service of the Luftwaffe, were fully informed about the
    low-pressure experiments. Actually these experiments could not
    have been conducted without the knowledge and approval of these
    men, as they were conducted for the benefit of the Luftwaffe and
    the experimenting persons were mostly Luftwaffe physicians.”

In the eyes of other persons, the defendant was the dominant force
behind the Luftwaffe participation in the Medical Experiments Program.
The defense has brought forward no adequate proof to show that they were
mistaken. It is the conviction of the prosecution that no such proof
exists.

The Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, Reich Marshal Hermann Goering,
was thoroughly familiar with the organization which was his brain child,
the Luftwaffe, and the way it functioned. What importance did Milch’s
position have in Goering’s mind?

His affidavit reads—

    “Included among the responsibilities of the Office of the
    Inspector General was the conduct of all research and
    experiments and of all matters pertaining to health and
    sanitation inspection * * *.

    “That Generaloberstabsarzt Erich Hippke was the Sanitation
    Inspector of the Luftwaffe during the period from 1941 through
    1944; that the Office of the Sanitation Inspector was directly
    responsible for the conduct of all research and medical
    experiments; that the Office of the Sanitation Inspector, of
    which Generaloberstabsarzt Erich Hippke was the head, was
    directly subordinate to the Inspector General, former Field
    Marshal Milch, and that former Field Marshal Milch was
    responsible for all action taken by Generaloberstabsarzt Hippke,
    or by the Office of the Sanitation Inspector or its
    subordinates.”

It has been established that criminal experiments, high-altitude and
freezing, were carried on at Dachau by Luftwaffe physicians, working
under the orders and supervision of competent Luftwaffe authorities.

We have shown that all Luftwaffe personnel connected with, or knowing
about these experiments, from those closest to the place where the
experiments were conducted—Dr. Rascher, and Walter Neff—to those high
up in the positions of command—Goering and Schroeder—looked to Milch
as the ultimate authority in the Medical Experiments Program. An
investigation of the attitudes and convictions of the SS officials
concerned in this program discloses the same picture.

Could all these men have been mistaken? Were they writing to and
referring to the wrong man when they contacted the defendant? To put
forward such a proposition is to deny the facts. There was no error, the
facts are indisputable.

The defendant was and is officially responsible for the Medical
Experiments Program of the Luftwaffe.

Lastly, we come to the question of the defendant’s knowledge of the
experiments which were being carried out at Dachau for the Luftwaffe.

Throughout direct examination by his defense counsel, the defendant has
consistently denied receiving reports authored by Rascher or in any
other way being informed of the criminal nature of those experiments,
until the time of this trial.

However, he was very much interested in altitude experiments as such.
The following excerpt is from his testimony under questioning by Dr.
Bergold:

    “Q. Witness, how far were you interested in these high-altitude
    experiments in question as GL?

    “A. We were interested in the real altitude tests as I know it
    exactly, because I want to state this figure as 13,500 meters,
    and we added 500 meters in order to get a square figure.
    However, we knew that this last 500 meters, which I have
    mentioned, we were not too interested in that. We were only
    interested in the first place in cabin planes, too, after a
    certain test had been carried out on 388-cabin suits, whether it
    did not succeed or fail, because a person could not move
    properly the way those suits were, due to low pressure up there
    in the air is felt much more than here on the ground.”

The Tribunal’s attention is directed to this figure of 14,000 meters,
which is approximately ten miles. Milch wanted that altitude simulated
in the pressure chamber and the human reactions studied.

It was on 20 May 1942 that Milch wrote his letter to Wolff. Here he said
that Hippke had reported to him that the altitude experiments carried
out by the SS and Luftwaffe at Dachau were finished. Mention was made of
Rascher’s availability for the forthcoming experiments dealing with sea
perils. And Milch stated that the low-pressure chamber could no longer
remain at Dachau. In this one letter, the defendant demonstrates his
knowledge that the SS and the Luftwaffe were conducting, and had
completed, altitude experiments at Dachau and that Dr. Rascher was
involved.

There is the letter of 4 June 1942 to Hippke, wherein the defendant
exhibits his authority in regard to the low-pressure chamber and the
tasks of Dr. Rascher.

On 25 August 1942, Himmler wrote to the defendant enclosing the report
on the high-altitude experiments. Moreover, he asked Milch to receive
Drs. Rascher and Romberg for a lecture and presentation of the film on
the experiments. Himmler suggested that Milch refer the matter to the
Reich Marshal “because of its importance”.

This last statement should dispel any possible doubts as to the
attention accorded these experiments by official German military
circles. In fact, the defendant himself admitted discussing the
experiments with Goering on 13 September 1942. The defendant spoke of
Himmler’s interest in the program, and the apprehension felt by the
Medical Inspector Hippke, although “he did tell me that everything was
all right.” The disposal of the pressure chamber was settled in this
talk with Goering.

The defendant has said that the experiments, reports, and other aspects
of the matter were not known to him, partly because he had no time for
this, and partly because he had no technical knowledge of the subject.
He would have this Court believe that the experimental program was a
minor matter—one that the Inspector General of the Luftwaffe would not
pay close attention to. Yet we have seen that it was important enough so
that Himmler was frequently corresponding with the defendant or others
on the subject. It was important enough for the defendant to bring the
matter to Goering’s attention, even to the details of the disposition of
the low-pressure chamber.

On 31 August 1942, the defendant wrote to Himmler, acknowledging receipt
of the report on altitude experiments, and telling Himmler that he was
“informed about the current experiments”.

While on the stand the defendant attempted to explain this letter by
referring to the usage of German Ministries, where the form “I” means
the Ministry as such. But he admitted that he had written the closing
sentences of this letter “I remain yours, as ever, etc.” Here he did not
deny that “I” was used in its ordinary sense. It is neither logical nor
capable of belief that in the same letter to Himmler, defendant would
use the word “I” in two different senses.

It was also on 31 August 1942 that Hippke discussed the experiments with
the defendant, expressing _doubts_ and _misgivings_. In reply to Milch’s
question, Hippke told him that these doubts had not been substantiated.

Thus it can be seen, from Milch’s testimony itself, that a cloud of
suspicion and evil hovered over the entire Medical Experiments Program.

It is useless, indeed futile, to punish the perpetrators of criminal
acts on the one hand, and to ignore those in high positions who have
made possible the commission of the crimes. The defendant has belabored
the term “duty” in the course of his testimony. He has spoken of his
solemn oath to Hitler and to the German people. It would seem that it
was incumbent upon the defendant to acquaint himself with the activities
of his subordinates, at least to the extent that he should have known
that people were being murdered in experiments, which from the evidence,
were useless as far as the advancement of the knowledge of aviation
medicine is concerned.

The present case is not without judicial precedent. A close analogy can
be drawn between it and a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States, _in re Yamashita_ [U. S. Reports, Vol. 327, October
term 1945, Nos. 61 and 672]. The procedural and jurisdictional questions
therein decided are of no moment to us now, but the facts of the
Yamashita case are similar to those of the Milch case, and the opinion
rendered by the Court is particularly in point in the matter of
responsibility for senior officers.

General Yamashita was the Commanding General of the 14th Army Group of
the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippines.

Upon surrendering to United States Forces, he was indicted and tried as
a war criminal before a Military Tribunal on the following
charge—“while commander of armed forces of Japan at war with the United
States of America and its Allies, unlawfully disregarded and failed to
discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of the members
of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other
high crimes against people of the United States and of its Allies and
dependencies, particularly the Philippines, and he * * * thereby
violated the laws of war.”

The Court summed up the issue as follows:

    “The question then is whether the law of war imposes on an army
    commander a duty to take such appropriate measures as are within
    his power to control the troops under his command for the
    prevention of the specified acts which are violations of the law
    of war and which are likely to attend the occupation of hostile
    territory by an uncontrolled soldiery, and whether he may be
    charged with personal responsibility for his failure to take
    such measures when violations result.”

The Court cited Articles 1 and 43 of the Fourth Hague Convention of
1907, Article 19 of the Tenth Hague Convention, and Article 26 of the
Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1929. It then stated—

    “These provisions plainly imposed on petitioner, who at the time
    specified was Military Governor of the Philippines, as well as
    commander of the Japanese forces, an affirmative duty to take
    such measures as were within his power, and appropriate in the
    circumstances, to protect prisoners of war and the civilian
    population. This duty of a commanding officer has heretofore
    been recognized and its breach penalized by our own military
    tribunals.”

The Court thereupon denied the petition for certiorari and leave to file
petitions, for writs of habeas corpus, and prohibition.

In the case of the medical experiments, we have a much less complex
situation. There is no question of a senior officer in an occupied
country, rather we are faced with a simple direct chain of command
problem: Milch—Foerster—Hippke. Had Milch given the order, the
experiments would have been terminated, but no order of termination was
given—people were murdered and Rascher remained in the Luftwaffe until
he was transferred to the SS in March 1943. The defendant had an
affirmative duty to know what was going on, and an affirmative duty to
act so as to stop the experiments. That he was ignorant of the true
state of affairs is unbelievable in view of the letters and the
testimony of those who were below him. Field marshals are not made as
are noncommissioned officers. The road is a long one in any army from
the position of private to the lofty peak of a field marshal. The
defendant would have you believe that his powers were similar to those
of a private first class. Yet we have seen him, high in the councils, a
confidant of Hitler, one who could disagree with Goering, whose deputy
he was on occasion, a man who was so thoroughly skilled a soldier that
he seriously requested an assignment as a division commander, although
his service had been in the air force for a decade prior to the request.
If the defendant was not the responsible officer in connection with the
medical experiments, then the scourge of the Wehrmacht has not touched
the continent of Europe. There is no one who knows better than the
defendant the principle of responsibility in any army. By holding the
office which he held, he had the duty to control the activities of those
who were his subordinates, to insure that they conducted themselves as
soldiers and not as murderers. He has failed woefully in the task.

We have concluded now our remarks regarding the criminal activities of
the defendant in his various capacities with respect to the slave labor
program and the medical experiments. It remains only for us to deal
briefly with the defendant’s participation in the murder of two Russian
escapees, to discuss his defense of irresponsibility because of a bad
temper, to discuss the use of PW’s, and to touch upon the testimony of
some of the witnesses who appeared in his behalf, and the record of the
meeting of 23 May 1939.

The defendant has maintained that he knew nothing about the shooting of
the two Russian officers who attempted to escape in February 1944. We
have his own statement, made at a time when the general situation, from
the Wehrmacht’s point of view, was acute but not forlorn. The
International Military Tribunal has stated in its judgment concerning
Fritz Sauckel,[149] speaking of a statement made by Sauckel at a Central
Planning Board meeting, “Although he now claims that the statement is
not true, the circumstances under which it was made, as well as the
evidence presented before the Tribunal, leave no doubt that it was
substantially accurate.” The word “circumstances” as there used refers
to a meeting of the Central Planning Board on 1 March 1944. Milch made
his statement at the prior meeting held on 16 February 1944 (53d). The
letters submitted by the defense in connection with this episode are
interesting. The first and second from Schmidtke on 10 January, and from
Gangolf on 13 January, refer to a similar incident other than that with
which we are here concerned. The third letter from Winterstein on 12
January says nothing about the deaths. The affidavit of Prell, other
than stating that the deaths occurred on a Saturday, is of no value. The
witness Barthelmess, who made an affidavit though a resident of
Nuernberg, was not called. The affidavits of Klein and Popp were
offered; each is in a prison camp in the American Zone, yet neither was
called. The letter of Janko recites the facts in a context suggestive of
the words used by the defendant when he described the incident in the
53d meeting of the Central Planning Board on 16 February 1944. Here,
too, it is submitted that the circumstances under which the statement
was made leave no doubt that it was substantially accurate. The
defendant boasted of his prowess as a commander who ordered executions
when he would impress those who curried his favor at the Central
Planning Board meetings, but now he says he had no authority to give
orders and if he had given them, they would not have been obeyed.

The defendant has offered, as a plausible reason for the employment of
Russian, French, and Italian prisoners of war, the fact that various
historical events made it unnecessary to abide by the terms of the
convention concerning prisoners of war. The witness von Neurath
testified that Russia had renounced the conventions in question, and
hence Germany could renounce them as to Russia. As for France, it is
contended that the alleged government headed by Pierre Laval had
concluded an arrangement with the Reich which made it legal to employ
prisoners of war in tasks forbidden by the Conventions. A similar reason
is advanced for the use of Italian prisoners, the concluding of an
arrangement between the Reich and Mussolini. The International Military
Tribunal made a finding with respect to this matter.[150]

    “The argument in defense of the charge with regard to the murder
    and ill-treatment of Soviet prisoners of war, that the U.S.S.R.
    was not a party to the Geneva Convention, is quite without
    foundation. On 15 September 1941 Admiral Canaris protested
    against the regulations for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of
    war, signed by General Reinecke on 8 September 1941.”

I might add that Admiral Canaris was a member of the German Navy.
Resuming the quotation—

    “He”—Canaris—“then stated, ‘The Geneva Convention for the
    treatment of prisoners of war is not binding in the relationship
    between Germany and the U.S.S.R. Therefore only the principles
    of general international law on the treatment of prisoners of
    war apply. Since the 18th century these have gradually been
    established along the lines that war captivity is neither
    revenge nor punishment, but solely protective custody, the only
    purpose of which is to prevent the prisoners of war from further
    participation in the war. This principle was developed in
    accordance with the view held by all armies that it is contrary
    to military tradition to kill or injure helpless people * * *.
    The decrees for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war
    enclosed are based on a fundamentally different viewpoint.’

    “This protest, which correctly stated the legal position, was
    ignored”.

The defendant was a soldier of some experience, he knew it was improper,
even criminal, to have the Russian prisoners work in the Luftwaffe
factories, but he paid no attention to the breach of this duty of the
soldier. The manner in which the Reich bludgeoned a treaty from the
French is too well known to warrant discussion. It cannot be contended
with any seriousness that the French prisoners of war, who were
negotiated into slavery by a puppet government, were voluntary employees
of the Germans. Indeed the witness Le Friec has testified that when he
was taken to work in the airplane factory, he was told that he would
“work on baby carriages”. The position of the defendant with reference
to Italian prisoners of war and their illegal employment is still more
absurd, if that is possible. The Wehrmacht had moved into Italy early in
the war, and in 1943, when the Badoglio government concluded an
armistice with the Allies, the Wehrmacht continued to occupy the
northern part of Italy as an occupying power. They allegedly made a
treaty with the by then tottering shadow of the former sawdust Cæsar and
proceeded to bring the Italian prisoners of war to the Reich to work.
Here again the soldiery had been sold into bondage by their former
chief. The record shows that the Russian, French, and Italian prisoners
of war were used to work in airplane factories. Whether they made the
fighter plane, Me 109, or the jet fighter, Me 262, or the transport
plane, Ju 52, is of little moment. In the total warfare in which the
Reich was engaged, there is one certainty, that nothing was being
constructed which was not part of the war armament program.

The International Military Tribunal stated in this connection—[151]

    “Many of the prisoners of war were assigned to work directly
    related to military operations, in violation of Article 31 of
    the Geneva Convention. They were put to work in munitions
    factories and even made to load bombers, to carry ammunition and
    to dig trenches, often under the most hazardous conditions. This
    condition applied particularly to Soviet prisoners of war. On 16
    February 1943, at a meeting of the Central Planning Board, * * *
    Milch said: ‘We have made a request for an order that a certain
    percentage of men in the Ack-Ack artillery must be Russians;
    50,000 will be taken altogether. Thirty thousand are already
    employed as gunners. This is an amusing thing, that the Russians
    must work the guns’”.

That every aircraft factory in the Reich had antiaircraft batteries to
protect it goes without saying. Who would know better than the defendant
that such use was made of the Soviet prisoners of war? Further, this
type of artillery was a part of the Luftwaffe and not a separate branch
in the ground forces, as it is in the U.S. Army. The witness Foerster
has testified that Soviet prisoners of war worked at the gun positions.
If the number two man in the German air force could not have done
anything toward arranging that the prisoners of war did not work in the
factories, or work the guns, then no one in the Wehrmacht could have
done anything about the situation.

We have heard much of the defendant’s violent temper and the resulting
statements which, witnesses assert, were never taken seriously by those
who heard them. The explanations offered by the defense are as frivolous
as the alleged outbursts were frequent. It would have been difficult, if
not impossible, for one who occupied the positions held by the
defendant, to accomplish anything if his subordinates had to sift all of
the strong statements he made, in an effort to determine which of them
were seriously said. Further, his strong statements about the
procurement and treatment of laborers are closely aligned with the grim
reality as we have seen it. We submit that this man of violent temper
believed in, and consciously advocated, the ruthless measures he
recommended, and that his subordinates, to the best of their ability,
complied with his recommendations. It is not reasonable to assume that
one with his power could have made statements, of the kind of which we
have heard here, and that he would then rely on the good offices of
those who were around him to insure that nothing was done as a result of
these statements. The Reich was not a country of innocent victims of one
tyrant, but rather it was composed of a series of tyrants, each like the
master tyrant, each with his own group of subordinates, who carried out
the wishes and whims of their respective chiefs. If all men who held
positions of authority in the Reich are to be believed when they say
that they were personally opposed to criminal excesses, then we have the
fantastic conclusion that these crimes were committed in the face of
influential and unanimous opposition.

The witnesses produced by the defense left a little to be desired.
Without indulging in exhaustive detail, a few statements made by some
are worth comment.

The witness Koenig said that he didn’t know Himmler was head of the SS
until 1945.

The witness von Brauchitsch did not know families were broken up and
sent to concentration camps. It was this man, the aid to Goering, who
passed on the Terboven letter of May 1942 to the defendant. The Court
will recall that the letter told of the attempted escape and the
resulting concentration camp detention of the Norwegians. It was the
defendant who said that an attempt to escape by a prisoner of war is an
honorable thing. Would not a similar effort on the part of some
Norwegians merit something less than a concentration camp? Brauchitsch
had said a little earlier that he did not know that foreigners were in
concentration camps.

The witness Felmy has stated that some Yugoslav partisans were sent to
Germany as laborers.

The witness Schniewind, who was present at the conference of 23 May
1939, did not under any circumstances gain the impression that
aggression was announced.

The witness Vorwald, a subordinate of the defendant and hence his
concern for these proceedings, may be assumed as being something short
of disinterested, was thoroughly glib and exceptionally agreeable. He
even agreed with the statement, on cross-examination, that the forces of
the Reich were no longer in Africa in 1943. It is a matter of historical
record that the invasion of that Continent began in November 1942 and
that the campaign was concluded in the spring of the following year.

The witness Koerner, still laboring under the spell of the former
leaders, stated that he believed Goering to be the last great man of the
Renaissance.

The last witness of whom we shall speak is Karl Wolff. In his affidavit
he spoke of meetings between Himmler and Milch over coffee and cigars.
He spoke of the great cultural works of the SS. Was he speaking of
Dachau and Mauthausen? With some vehemence, he insisted that he had
deported only 1,050 Jews from all of Italy. He knew nothing of Dachau
that led him to believe that anything unusual was happening there;
although he did say that, in his visit there in 1942, the place was so
clean that one could have eaten from the floor.

These represent a fair cross section of the witnesses, all of whom had
roles of varying importance in the tragedy with which we are here
concerned. Even as the defendant contends that he knew nothing of what
went on, so do they echo the same refrain.

Much time has been spent in attempting to discredit the Schmundt record
of the 23 May 1939 meeting. The Court is familiar with the findings
which have been made by the International Military Tribunal on this
subject. There has been no additional light thrown on the matter by the
evidence here presented to indicate that the Schmundt record is anything
other than a correct record of the events which transpired at the
meeting.

We wish to discuss now in conclusion one document offered by the
prosecution. This we have saved until the last because we believe that
of all the evidence presented by the prosecution it is most typical of
the defendant as a man and as a Nazi. We refer to the minutes of the
conference of air force engineers and others which was presided over and
was addressed by the defendant on 25 March 1944. This document, like so
many others in this case, was initialed by the defendant.

The defendant stated that, as of the date of the conference, “We have in
our employ today approximately 60 percent foreigners * * *.”

He continued, “The ratio is gradually approaching 90 percent foreigners,
with 10 percent German managers.”

These are statements by a man who said he did not know about the extent
to which foreign labor was used in his own industry, let alone in
Germany. He stated that—

    “The Fuehrer order provides clearly that the fighter plane
    program, which the Jaegerstab is starting, has priority over all
    other fields of armament * * *.”

He showed knowledge of the production of tanks and infantry munitions.
He spoke of having the air force production “to an extent safely
underground” in four months’ time. It is here that he stated that he was
head of the Jaegerstab and that Saur was his deputy and Chief of Staff.
Touching on his conferences with the various plant officials, he
stated—

    “On the spot the individual gentlemen are then told—supported
    by the combined authority of the State, the Wehrmacht, and the
    Party, that is Saur and me, Speer is unfortunately still on sick
    leave, otherwise he would also be present—what it is all
    about.”

He commented on labor—

    “Thus, all pertinent questions are dealt with in the conferences
    about the commitment of labor and all competent men, who have
    anything to do with the commitment of labor, meet, especially
    the president of the competent provincial labor office. Thus it
    is determined on the spot, in the individual spheres, what the
    factory lacks.”

This is the man who has constantly maintained that he had nothing to do
with labor. One can readily imagine a session between the Luftwaffe
field marshal and a labor office chief.

We have heard the defendant deny and re-deny any knowledge of the slave
labor program as such, let alone the extent to which it went. It is our
contention that anybody who walked the streets of Germany could not have
failed to have become aware of the activities which were being carried
on by Sauckel and his henchmen.

He makes an interesting reference to bureaucracy:

    “It is an error to believe that civilian offices are more
    bureaucratic than military offices. On the basis of my
    continuous and extensive experience, I can assure you exactly
    the opposite is true.”

This from one who would have the Tribunal believe that his staff and
officers were one big happy family who ran things in a rather casual
catch-as-catch-can fashion.

Speaking of the arrival of laborers, he said—

    “In brief, the people arrive there and are put to work there. If
    any doubts exist as to whether a request is justified—for the
    people are not requested by numbers, but as electricians,
    blacksmiths, fitters, turners, as unskilled laborers, as
    foreigners—then this is settled. If the result shows that the
    request for people is not justified, then the matter is referred
    to a commission and this commission examines the facts within 48
    hours. If it becomes apparent that dirty dealings are going on,
    my special court martial is called into play, and it hands down
    a quick decision.”

This from a man who has stated that he had no power to give orders. He
stated further, “the normal work week in our industry is 72 hours.” The
witness Krysiak testified that they worked 84 hours at the factory where
the Mauthausen inmates were employed.

Speaking of the difficulties that resulted from the hoarding of spare
parts by the various foremen, he said—

    “Now it is your task to teach these people some sense and to put
    the entire system of hoarding on a sensible basis. I therefore
    ask you, as the senior authorities in the field: teach that to
    these people by force. There is no sense in writing letters.
    Such letters are not read. They would not understand them
    anyhow.”

The wish of a field marshal is as an order, and he advocated the use of
force on his own people. The extent to which he urged that they go was
expressed a few lines further on when he stated—

    “Whoever hoards supplies must be punished immediately. By
    punishment I also mean shooting. For if these people are told
    what is at issue here, and they still try to hide parts of their
    supplies or to cover them up, that is dirty dealing and a crime
    against Germany. I want to say that very clearly and I want to
    say it in very sincere words, so that you yourselves will
    realize that we are dealing here with a question which is of
    decisive importance for Germany’s well-being, that we are not
    dealing with an ordinary point of discussion but with a question
    which decides about the life and death of Germany.”

He advocated killing Germans, not slackers but hoarders. He consciously
used strong language, yet he would have it believed that he never spoke
harshly except in a rage and that nothing ever came from his outbursts.
He indicated knowledge of the overall figures on the breakdown of
working hours.

    “In considering the figures one has to know that 52 percent of
    the total man-hours are spent in equipping a plane and only 48
    percent in building the aircraft frame and engine.”

He has said that he was powerless to do anything about requests from
industry, yet he stated—

    “If I want something from industry, then industry comes and
    says, ‘Yes, I have those and those requests.’ Only then can I do
    what you want.”

He again speaks of the death penalty when he says—

    “Gentlemen, in this connection I may call your attention to
    another important point. If I visit an office and find out that
    something is being hidden there, then I ask for the death
    penalty for such a crime today. That is fraud. That is sabotage
    of the German armament industry.”

Can it be seriously contended that these words were regarded by the
listeners as mere outbursts?

Next we have another illuminating passage on his attitude toward
prisoners of war.

    “Then there is still the human factor. We often had considerable
    difficulty with the human factor. The fluctuation there is very
    considerable. The quota of the Luftwaffe in the distribution of
    manpower was considerably lowered. The foreigners run away. They
    do not keep any contract. There are difficulties with Frenchmen,
    Italians, Dutch. The prisoners of war are partly unruly and
    fresh. The people are also supposed to be carrying on sabotage.
    These elements cannot be made more efficient by small means.
    They are just not handled strictly enough. If a decent foreman
    would sock one of those unruly guys because the fellow won’t
    work, the situation would soon change. International law cannot
    be observed here. I have asserted myself very strongly and, with
    the help of Saur, I have represented the point of view very
    strongly that the prisoners, with the exception of the English
    and the Americans, should be taken away from the military
    authorities. The soldiers are not in a position, as experience
    has shown, to cope with these fellows who know all the answers.
    I shall take very strict measures here and shall put such a
    prisoner of war before my court martial. If he has committed
    sabotage or refused to work, I will have him hanged right in his
    own factory. I am convinced that that will not be without
    effect.”

These words are strangely reminiscent of his speech at the 53d meeting
of the Central Planning Board. He knew he had advocated and participated
in flagrant violations of international law and here he went on record
on this subject.

We see the defendant making a “big request” of the Quartermaster General
and calling for “energetic action” by the chief of supply. This was a
meeting of considerable moment and these statements did not go unheeded.

He spoke of the laborers.

    “* * * We in the Luftwaffe armament industry have Russians,
    French prisoners of war, Dutch, and members of 32 other nations.
    The obtaining of interpreters alone presents a big difficulty
    there.”

Then he adds—

    “We, the Quartermaster General and Generalluftzeugmeister, have
    already agreed that we are to balance the personnel also. Above
    all it is necessary that the member of the troops be treated in
    exactly the same way as the industrial worker.”

We have a strong statement concerning the feelings of the German worker.
He said—

    “By unjust treatment the German worker means that the treatment
    is not the same for all. That is what makes the German worker
    indignant. He wants everyone to be treated the same way. He
    wants justice and does not want to be ill-treated in words or
    any other way. He cannot stand it and he is right in not being
    able to stand it.”

The defendant advocated that the German worker be carefully handled. The
Tribunal has heard from the witnesses Ferrier, Le Friec, and Krysiak how
the foreign workers were handled.

He outlined the working program for the Easter week end—

    “Finally I ask that the troops receive the fundamental order to
    work on Good Friday, the Saturday before Easter, and on Easter
    Monday in the same way as the people in the factories. The
    soldiers just do not have to go on furlough either. They must be
    told why.”

Are these the words of a man who is without authority to issue orders
concerning the troops?

He acknowledged his employment of Russian prisoners of war and advocated
that shirkers among the factory laborers be whipped back to their jobs.
He said—

    “I further ask for support by the Luftwaffe physicians. With all
    the rabble that we have among the foreign workers there is of
    course a lot of shirking. At the moment the Russians—that is,
    the Russian prisoners of war—are feigning a lot of fatigue and
    illness. The incidence of sickness of one and a half to two
    percent which we have had up to now has at least doubled, and in
    some factories it has been increased to eight, nine, and ten
    percent. That is, of course, done by previous agreement. There
    the official physicians must undertake an examination and if the
    physicians, who have to be very strict, find out that it is not
    true, then we return the fellows to work by means of the whip.
    Then the whip serves as cure.”

He again spoke of orders that have been given.

    “If the factory knows: Now we are going to be attacked, and it
    has a few trench shelters but does not have a bombproof shelter
    or the like, then the people simply ran away from the factory
    automatically at each raid after the first one, and they could
    usually not be caught the next day either. That applies
    particularly to the foreigners. We have therefore now issued the
    following order, and have equipped the superiors accordingly
    with weapons and pistols: As soon as a factory which has already
    been attacked a few times can count on the raid’s being aimed at
    that particular factory again, then the personnel leave the
    factory, but in closed groups by shops, under the leadership of
    the man in charge of the shop, and, to the extent that they are
    German personnel, they leave singing military songs.”

Are superiors armed with weapons and pistols to lead contented German
workers away from a factory in case of an air-raid? Little wonder that
the foreigners who had been brought in like chattels ran away when the
opportunity presented itself. Were these workers who were fleeing,
voluntary workers?

Commenting on the gravity of the task of fighter production, and the
importance of the months of April and May 1944, he said—

    “That will be decided in six to eight weeks. If we succeed in
    this, then we will once again have time to carry out all the
    other tasks and jobs of this war and can also achieve greater
    successes in other fields.”

Were the “other fields” tasks to be accomplished in the sowing of seeds
of the Reich’s culture?

The defendant has said that he knew nothing about the living conditions
of the foreigners. It is obvious that he knew something, for he said—

    “I also ask you to be of considerable assistance in the question
    of lodging in connection with the question of the relationship
    between our military personnel at the airfields and the workers.
    If we bring the people over to work, we also have to provide
    them with places to live. As far as foreigners are concerned,
    this has to be done in some suitable way. They cannot be put
    together with our people, just like that. But they should not be
    so far away from the airfield that one cannot get them to work
    at all.”

No, don’t let them live with the native workers, but be sure that they
live close enough to the factory so that they can put in their 72 hours
a week!

The importance of the fighter program is emphasized when he said—

    “There are no laws of bureaucracy, there are no regulations,
    there is nothing at all as important as the task of winning the
    war.”

The defendant could not agree with anything that Hitler stood for after
March 1943. He was trying to get out, but here he speaks of Hitler and
his henchmen—men who, he said, were leading Germany to certain
catastrophe:

    “It is quite surprising how the population has endured this
    thing so far and how it always gets on its feet again when it is
    led in the proper way by true leaders who, thank God, are
    present among the people through the Party and the rest of the
    leadership. But you must not forget, gentlemen, war nerves have
    reached a point which cause us in the leadership group worry.”

He has said that he was not a wholehearted Nazi, but here he referred to
himself as one of the true leaders and this at a time when the hands on
the clock tolling the hours of the Reich were approaching twelve. Yet he
would have you believe that he was a minor man.

He did not confine his speaking efforts solely to the Luftwaffe; he was
one of the leaders, and as such it was natural that he should address
the armament feeder industry. On that subject he said—

    “What I am telling you today was told the other day to the
    entire armament feeder industry—that includes the blacksmiths,
    foundries, crankshaft workers of the iron producing industry,
    etc. They were likewise exhorted to produce the maximum. In the
    same way the Gauleitungen, all of the provincial offices,
    wherever we were, were addressed by us to that effect. But
    everyone considers that if he does not do his duty, we do not
    ask whether there is a law, we ask only that he is the
    responsible one, and that we will seize him no matter who he
    is.”

His first peroration is indicative of his attitude.

    “Please go wherever you are going and knock everybody down who
    blocks your way! We cover up everything here. We do not ask
    whether he is allowed to or whether he is not allowed to. For
    us, there is nothing but this one task. We are fanatics in this
    sphere. We do not even consider letting anything at all distract
    us from that task. No order exists which could prevent me from
    fulfilling this task. Nor shall I ever be given such an order.”

Yes, the defendant was a fanatic. Too, he was one who could cover up. It
was a willful man who could say that.

There is an interesting statement concerning the number of employees of
the Luftwaffe. The defendant set it at 1.8 million. This is somewhat in
excess of the .5 million figure that one witness mentioned.

It has been insisted that he had nothing to do with labor, it has been
insisted that he could give no orders, yet in his second peroration to
the same speech, he said—

    “We have given orders that will make you laugh. Some labor
    control office or other suddenly declared that the Jaegerstab
    was not entitled, according to paragraph so-and-so, to establish
    a 72-hour workweek; it was not valid. I said: The gentleman is
    herewith informed, if he should say such a thing once more, he
    will be picked up; I have excellent cellars in this house. Then
    the opposition disappears immediately. But you have to count on
    such things, and the difficulty for you is that, in order to get
    through all the junk, one should clean out, first of all, a
    whole lot of little pigsties. Something will come out of this
    whole affair with us, yet. Whoever of my technical people from
    the Ministry does not earn his keep with the Jaegerstab now, and
    does not cooperate, I guarantee that he will never appear again
    in this Ministry, in the machine where I give the orders.”

Is this the man who said he could not have people sent to concentration
camps? The witness Krysiak was “picked up” for having said in 1940 that
Germany would lose the war. He was arrested by the Gestapo as the result
of a private conversation. It is unbelievable that a field marshal could
not, and did not, exercise the same power.

Today is the third anniversary of the speech of 25 March 1944 made by
the defendant. His closing remarks on that day detail decisively the
philosophy of the then field marshal of the Luftwaffe. Those assembled
had been listening to their chief since midmorning. The hour was late.
The hands of the clock were past twelve. Germany was in the fifth year
of war. The defendant was concluding his speech. He said—

    “Gentlemen, I know, not every subordinate can say: for me the
    law no longer exists, but he has to have someone who covers up
    for him. Not out of cowardice, but if you act according to the
    spirit of the old field service regulation, ‘Abstaining from
    doing something hurts us more than erring in the choice of the
    means’, and if, moreover, you keep in touch and immediately
    clarify difficult points so that something can be done, then we
    are willing to accept the responsibility, whether this is the
    law or not. I see only two possibilities for me and for Germany;
    either we succeed and thereby save Germany, or we continue these
    slipshod methods and then get the fate that we deserve. I prefer
    to fall, while I am doing something that is against the rules
    but that is right and sensible, and be called to account for it,
    and, if you like, hanged, rather than be hanged because Papa
    Stalin is here in Berlin or the Englishmen. I have no desire for
    that. I would rather die in a different way. But I think we can
    accomplish this task, too. We are in the fifth year of war—I
    repeat: The decision will come during the next six weeks. Heil
    Hitler!”

The time is at hand for another decision, a decision which will follow
the dictates of sound reason. The record which will be made by this
Tribunal and its judgment will be one that shall give courage to
peaceful free men everywhere. Indeed, the defendant is fortunate that
the decision in the present case is in the hands of those who do believe
that the law exists and will continue to exist. There is no place for
passion or for prejudice in the ceaseless tasks, the seeking of truth
and the establishing of justice.

-----

[143] Mr. Clark Denney delivered the closing statement before the
Tribunal on 25 March 1947, Tr. pp. 2436-2488.

[144] Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. I, p. 306, Nuremberg, 1947.

[145] Defendant in case of United States _vs._ Karl Brandt, et al. See
Vol. I.

[146] Defendant in case of United States _vs._ Karl Brandt, et al. See
Vol. I.

[147] Same as preceeding footnote.

[148] Same as preceeding footnote.

[149] Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. I, p. 321, Nuremberg, 1947.

[150] Ibid., p. 232.

[151] Ibid., p. 246.

                B. Closing Statement of the Defense[152]

DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal. In my opening
statement I drew a picture of the defendant Milch which differs
considerably from the description given by the prosecution. It is my
hope that in the long course of producing evidence I have given proof
that my conception is the full truth.

According to the testimony of the witness Richter, the affidavit of the
witness von Mueller and according to the defendant Milch’s own
testimony, nobody can doubt that Milch has never been a good National
Socialist. His love for peace and his longing for a final understanding
between the nations of Europe, especially between Belgium, France,
England, and Germany, became completely obvious. No one who believes in
justice would refuse to believe him if he states that he regarded the
war as a misfortune. He was also one of the few intelligent men to admit
Germany’s defeat in the First World War. There was no proof supplied
that in any way prior to 1933 he supported any armaments. His testimony
and military affidavit from von Mueller have shown that under his
management the Luftwaffe was always a peaceful instrument of
communication among the nations. It is to be regretted that the
examination of foreign politicians, such as Van Zeeland, Pierre Cot, and
Delbos, were not permitted, because only then the personality of Milch
would have been shown in its true light. He must have been a peaceful
and just man; otherwise, all these statesmen would not have had
confidence in him. Even the witness delegate Messersmith, whose
affidavit, Document 1760-PS, was introduced in the International
Military Tribunal proceedings, affirmed that Milch condemned the
coercive methods of the Nazis. He was different from the other Party
members, so that after 1937 he lost Goering’s confidence. At that time
he asked to be allowed to retire but in spite of his threat of suicide,
he did not obtain that permission.

Such a man of such a past must be believed when he testified that even
in 1939 he had no knowledge of Hitler’s aggressive intentions. Milch had
misgivings about Hitler because he regarded the measures taken against
Czechoslovakia as a breach of peace, and he was sufficiently intelligent
to see that Britain would no longer tolerate such violations. Hitler was
dishonest with him and always put before him his intentions for peace,
even forbidding him the manufacture of bombs. The defendant never
requested the manufacture of bombs because he intended to lead a war of
offense, but only because, understanding the international situation, he
was convinced that England would fight against the Nazi regime.

Up to that time, your Honor, nobody can find any inconsistency in the
defendant’s outlook. It was no offense if he requested a Wehrmacht for
his country in view of the world situation, and therefore he favored a
reasonable rearmament. As long as all nations were peace-minded and
maintained armies, Germany had the right to maintain armed forces as
well. I beg you to remember that the defendant demanded from his
superiors that rearmament should be effected in a slow and reasonable
manner and that he had differences with them on account of this.

It was not for nothing, your Honor, I repeat that. Only for one to keep
all these things in mind will it be possible to judge whether or not the
defendant’s statement regarding the conference of 23 May 1939 is
correct. A man who loves peace and works for peace was present at that
conference and states today, or testified that the speech in question
did not contain any mention of aggressive war against Poland or any
other country. He even testified in this courtroom that this speech did
not have the contents as it is laid down in the Schmundt protocol.

I realize that the International Military Tribunal came to the
conclusion that the Schmundt protocol is correct. All defendants and
witnesses who were heard at that time declared that the contents of the
speech were not of so aggressive a nature as it is laid down in the
minutes. The defense counsel made a mistake at that time of not calling
all the witnesses which I requested. Nobody went to the trouble of
critically examining the text of the record. I can understand why the
IMT reached a different conclusion, having heard only the defendants’
general objection, which remained unsubstantiated in detail. Nowhere is
it yet permissible in law to maintain the verdict of a previous court
when new and better evidence has been submitted.

The witnesses Warlimont, Schniewind, Engel, and Raeder stated that
several passages of the Schmundt record contained a number of false
assertions regarding Hitler’s words. Warlimont testified that he was not
present, although he is listed as among those present. Milch’s testimony
made it absolutely definite that Goering was not present. If there were
only so few persons present and there were mistakes made concerning the
presence of persons, the record must have been made up a long time after
the event, otherwise no faults of that kind would have been possible.
Schniewind testified that a number of points contained in the Schmundt
record were never discussed at that time at all. He had the opinion that
many ideas laid down in the record were borne out at a later period,
that is to say, 1940. These ideas concerned, for example, the use which
could be made of war production after the defeat of France, the
importance of aircraft carriers for convoys, the collaboration of Italy,
and the break-through of the Maginot Line by this force, about Japan,
and last but not least, the so-called Fuehrer Decree. By the statement
of Felmy it is proved forever that the so-called Fuehrer order was given
only on 12 December 1940. Even Raeder stated that the principles of the
Fuehrer order were laid down at another occasion and that they were
accordingly carried out afterwards. This other occasion was given by the
statement of Felmy. Also Raeder did not hear anything about Japan; he
considered it impossible that Italy and the break-through of the Maginot
Line were discussed and he also states that nobody mentioned a better
production of cruisers. He also testified that in that meeting a
two-front war was not mentioned because he, as an officer, would have
noticed that. Furthermore, he testified that Belgium and Holland were
not referred to and that after the speech Goering did not open a debate.
Even though the witness was not present at all times, it is rather
strange that he should not have heard mention of any of the very points
not heard by the other witnesses. The defendant Milch gave you the
precise details of those points of the speech which were not mentioned
at the time, and he was even in a position to tell you when these
various points were first conceived.

Who, assuming responsibility for justice, can still seriously maintain
the findings of the IMT now that these precise statements have shown us
the errors of the Schmundt record? A record containing so many grave
mistakes is no longer of probative value and can never be made the basis
for any judgment. I am convinced that after this trial the historians of
the whole world will regard the Schmundt record as the product of a
later period, i.e., between the fall of 1940 and the spring of 1941 and
that they will regard it as the result of time, drawn up to make Hitler,
then regarded as the victor, seem possessed of a prophetic gift which in
reality he never had.

The conference did take place on 23 May 1939; that is true. Its real
topics, however, can no longer be stated on the basis of the Schmundt
record. Thus, the statements made in the first Nuernberg trial gain a
different and greater significance. Never again, therefore, will it be
possible for anyone to say that on that occasion Hitler preached war and
the enslavement of Europeans.

There is yet another argument possible against this record, which, it is
alleged, also contains the plan for slave labor. Document EC-194,
Exhibit 8, and 016-PS, Exhibit 13, submitted by the prosecution, show in
all clarity that the use of European peoples in German armament works
was a measure forced by the emergencies of the war and that the idea was
born and realized only by the military difficulties resulting from the
war with Russia.

With clean hands and a pure heart, Milch entered the war in August 1939
having previously advised Goering to fly to Britain to prevent the war.
He himself became the victim of Hitler’s deception, and he himself
believed that the war had been forced upon Hitler. Who can disregard
justice to such an extent as to reproach Milch with having held that
belief? It is his misfortune, but not his guilt, to have been deflected
from the truth by misleading propaganda. Who would so misinterpret
patriotism, heretofore regarded as one of man’s noblest instincts, as to
reproach Milch for having done in 1939 his duty as a soldier?

He never prepared any aggressive wars. In every case he was informed
shortly before the event, and nothing is more typical of the opinion his
superiors held of him than the fact that he chanced to hear about the
preparations for the war against Russia through a subordinate, who had
been told of Hitler’s plan before the field marshal was told. The first
Nuernberg trial has already shown that Milch saw Goering at once in an
effort to prevent that war. Goering himself admitted this. Milch’s good
intentions were of no avail because Goering turned him down. As Milch’s
superior officer, he even went so far as to forbid Milch to see Hitler
and to tell him that he, Goering, would prevent Milch from being
admitted to Hitler’s presence.

One of your Honors, in putting questions to the defendant, aimed to show
that it might be regarded as incriminating to the defendant that he did
not resign in 1941 or at least in 1943. Your Honors, only if one has
lived in Germany these last years is it possible truly to judge that
problem. As I said in my opening speech, one can judge the man only