(ib. 16); the cedars being the product of nature, and not of art, are
described as having been planted by the Lord. Similarly we explain,
“And the writing was the writing of God” (Exod. xxxii. 16); the
relation in which the writing stood to God has already been defined in
the words “written with the finger of God” (ib. xxxi. 18), and the
meaning of this phrase is the same as that of “the work of thy fingers”
(Ps. viii. 4), this being said of the heavens; of the latter it has
been stated distinctly that they were made by a word; comp. “By the
word of the Lord were the heavens made” (ib. xxxiii. 6). Hence you
learn that in the Bible, the creation of a thing is figuratively
expressed by terms denoting “word” and “speech.” The same thing which
according to one passage has been made by the word, is represented in
another passage as made by the “finger of God.” The phrase “written by
the finger of God” is therefore identical with “written by the word of
God”; and if the latter phrase had been used, it would have been equal
to “written by the will and desire of God.” Onkelos adopted in this
place a strange explanation, and rendered the words literally “written
by the finger of the Lord”; he thought that “the finger” was a certain
thing ascribed to God; so that “the finger of the Lord” is to be
interpreted in the same way as “the mountain of God” (Exod. iii. 1),
“the rod of God” (ib. iv. 20), that is, as being an instrument created
by Him, which by His will engraved the writing on the tables. I cannot
see why Onkelos preferred this explanation. It would have been more
reasonable to say “written by the word of the Lord,” in imitation of
the verse “By the word of the Lord the heavens were made.” Or was the
creation of the writing on the tables more difficult than the creation
of the stars in the spheres? As the latter were made by the direct will
of God, not by means of an instrument, the writing may also have been
produced by His direct will, not by means of an instrument. You know
what the Mishnah says, “Ten things were created on Friday in the
twilight of the evening,” and “the writing” is one of the ten things.
This shows how generally it was assumed by our forefathers that the
writing of the tables was produced in the same manner as the rest of
the creation, as we have shown in our Commentary on the Mishnah (Aboth,
v. 6).

CHAPTER LXVII

Since the verb “to say” has been figuratively used to express the will
of the Creator, and the phrase “And he said” has repeatedly been
employed in the account of all the things created in “the six days of
the beginning,” the expression “to rest” has likewise been figuratively
applied to God in reference to the Sabbath-day, on which there was no
creation; it is therefore said, “And he rested (va-yishbot) on the
seventh day” (Gen. ii. 2). For “to leave off speaking” is, in Hebrew,
likewise expressed by the same verb, as, e.g., “So these three men
ceased (va-yishbetu) to answer Job” (Job xxxii. 1); also by nuaḥ, as,
in “They spake to Nabal according to all those words in the name of
David, and ceased (va-yanuḥu)” (1 Sam. xxv. 9). In my opinion,
(va-yanuḥu) means “they ceased to speak,” and waited for the answer;
for no allusion to exertion whatever having previously been mentioned,
the words, “and they rested,” in its primary signification, would have
been entirely out of place in that narrative, even if the young men who
spoke had really used some exertion. The author relates that having
delivered that whole speech, which, as you find, consisted of gentle
expressions, they were silent, that is to say, they did not add any
word or act by which the reply of Nabal could be justified; it being
the object of the entire passage to represent Nabal’s conduct as
extremely reprehensible. In that sense [viz., “to cease,” or “to leave
off”] the verb nuaḥ is used in the phrase “And he left off (va-yanaḥ)
on the seventh day.”

Our Sages, and some of the Commentators, took, however, nuaḥ in its
primary sense “to rest,” but as a transitive form (hiphil), explaining
the phrase thus: “and he gave rest to the world on the seventh day,”
i.e., no further act of creation took place on that day.

It is possible that the word va-yanaḥ is derived either from yanaḥ, a
verb of the class pe-yod, or naḥah, a verb of the class lamed-he, and
has this meaning: “he established” or “he governed” the Universe in
accordance with the properties it possessed on the seventh day; that is
to say, while on each of the six days events took place contrary to the
natural laws now in operation throughout the Universe, on the seventh
day the Universe was merely upheld and left in the condition in which
it continues to exist. Our explanation is not impaired by the fact that
the form of the word deviates from the rules of verbs of these two
classes; for there are frequent exceptions to the rules of
conjugations, and especially of the weak verbs; and any interpretation
which removes such a source of error must not be abandoned because of
certain grammatical rules. We know that we are ignorant of the sacred
language, and that grammatical rules only apply to the majority of
cases.—The same root is also found as a verb ʻayin-vav in the sense “to
place” and “to set,” as e.g., “and it shall be established and she
shall be placed (ve-hunniḥah) there upon her own base” (Zech. v. 11),
and “she suffered neither the birds of the air to settle (la-nuaḥ) on
them” (2 Sam. xxi. 10). According to my opinion, the verb has the same
signification in Hab. iii. 16, “that I might remain firm (anuaḥ) in the
day of trouble.”

The word (va-yinnafash) is a verb derived from nefesh, the homonymity
of which we have already explained (chap. xli.), namely, that it has
the signification of intention or will; (va-yinnafash) accordingly
means: “that which he desired was accomplished, and what he wished had
come into existence.”

CHAPTER LXVIII

You are acquainted with the well-known principle of the philosophers
that God is the intellectus, the ens intelligens, and the ens
intelligibile. These three things are in God one and the same, and do
not in any way constitute a plurality. We have also mentioned it in our
larger work, “Mishneh Torah,” and we have explained there that it is a
fundamental principle of our religion, namely, that He is absolutely
one, that nothing combines with Him; that is to say, there is no
Eternal thing besides Him. On that account we say ḥai adonay, “the Lord
liveth” (Ruth iii. 13), and not ḥe adonay, “the life of the Lord,” for
His life is not a thing distinct from His essence, as we have explained
in treating of the inadmissibility of the attributes. There is no doubt
that he who has not studied any works on mental philosophy, who has not
comprehended the nature of the mind, who has no knowledge of its
essence, and considers it in no other way than he would consider the
nature of whiteness and of blackness, will find this subject extremely
difficult, and to him our principle that the intellectus, the
intelligens, and the intelligibile, are in God one and the same thing,
will appear as unintelligible as if we said that the whiteness, the
whitening substance, and the material which is whitened are one and the
same thing. And, indeed, many ignorant people refute at once our
principle by using such comparisons. Even amongst those who imagine
that they are wise, many find this subject difficult, and are of
opinion that it is impossible for the mind to grasp the truth of this
proposition, although it is a demonstrated truth, as has been shown by
Metaphysicians. I will tell you now what has been proved. Man, before
comprehending a thing, comprehends it in potentia (δυνάμει); when,
however, he comprehends a thing, e.g., the form of a certain tree which
is pointed out to him, when he abstracts its form from its substance,
and reproduces the abstract form, an act performed by the intellect, he
comprehends in reality (ἐνεργείᾳ), and the intellect which he has
acquired in actuality, is the abstract form of the tree in man’s mind.
For in such a case the intellect is not a thing distinct from the thing
comprehended. It is therefore clear to you that the thing comprehended
is the abstract form of the tree, and at the same time it is the
intellect in action; and that the intellect and the abstract form of
the tree are not two different things, for the intellect in action is
nothing but the thing comprehended, and that agent by which the form of
the tree has been turned into an intellectual and abstract object,
namely, that which comprehends, is undoubtedly the intellect in action.
All intellect is identical with its action; the intellect in action is
not a thing different from its action, for the true nature and essence
of the intellect is comprehension, and you must not think that the
intellect in action is a thing existing by itself, separate from
comprehension, and that comprehension is a different thing connected
with it; for the very essence of the intellect is comprehension. In
assuming an intellect in action you assume the comprehension of the
thing comprehended. This is quite clear to all who have made themselves
familiar with the figurative language common to this discipline. You
therefore accept it as proved that the intellect consists in its
action, which is its true nature and essence. Consequently the very
thing by which the form of that tree has been made abstract and
intelligible, viz., the intellect, is at the same time the intelligens,
for the intellect is itself the agens which abstracts the form and
comprehends it, and that is the action, on account of which it is
called the intelligens; but itself and its action are identical; and
that which is called intellect in action consists [in the
above-mentioned instance] of nothing else but of the form of the tree.
It must now be obvious to you that whenever the intellect is found in
action, the intellect and the thing comprehended are one and the same
thing; and also that the function of all intellect, namely, the act of
comprehending, is its essence. The intellect, that which comprehends
and that which is comprehended, are therefore the same, whenever a real
comprehension takes place. But, when we speak of the power of
comprehension, we necessarily distinguish two things: the power itself,
and the thing which can be comprehended; e.g., that hylic intellect of
Zaid is the power of comprehension, and this tree is, in like manner, a
thing which is capable of being comprehended; these, undoubtedly, are
two different things. When, however, the potential is replaced by the
actual, and when the form of the tree has really been comprehended, the
form comprehended is the intellect, and it is by that same intellect,
by the intellect in action, that the tree has been converted into an
abstract idea, and has been comprehended. For everything in which a
real action takes place exists in reality. On the other hand, the power
of comprehension, and the object capable of comprehension are two
things; but that which is only potential cannot be imagined otherwise
than in connexion with an object possessing that capacity, as, e.g.,
man, and thus we have three things: the man who possesses the power,
and is capable of comprehending; that power itself, namely, the power
of comprehension, and the object which presents itself as an object of
comprehension, and is capable of being comprehended; to use the
foregoing example, the man, the hylic intellect, and the abstract form
of the tree, are three different things. They become one and the same
thing when the intellect is in action, and you will never find the
intellect different from the comprehensible object, unless the power of
comprehending and the power of being comprehended be referred to. Now,
it has been proved, that God is an intellect which always is in action,
and that—as has been stated, and as will be proved hereafter—there is
in Him at no time a mere potentiality, that He does not comprehend at
one time, and is without comprehension at another time, but He
comprehends constantly; consequently, He and the things comprehended
are one and the same thing, that is to say, His essence; and the act of
comprehending because of which it is said that He comprehends, is the
intellect itself, which is likewise His essence, God is therefore
always the intellectus, the intelligens, and the intelligibile.

We have thus shown that the identity of the intellect, the intelligens
and the intelligibile, is not only a fact as regards the Creator, but
as regards all intellect, when in action. There is, however, this
difference, that from time to time our intellect passes over from mere
potentiality to reality, and that the pure intellect, i.e., the active
intellect, finds sometimes obstacles, though not in itself, but
accidentally in some external cause. It is not our present intention to
explain this subject, but we will merely show that God alone, and none
besides Him, is an intellect constantly in action, and there is,
neither in Himself nor in anything beside Him, any obstacle whereby His
comprehension would be hindered. Therefore He always includes the
intelligens, the intellectus, and the intelligibile, and His essence is
at the same time the intelligens, the intelligibile, and the
intellectus, as is necessarily the case with all intellect in action.

We have reiterated this idea in the present chapter because it is
exceedingly abstruse, and I do not apprehend that the reader will
confound intellectual comprehension with the representative
faculty—with the reproduction of the material image in our imagination,
since this work is designed only for those who have studied philosophy,
and who know what has already been said on the soul and its faculties.

CHAPTER LXIX

The philosophers, as you know, call God the First Cause (in Hebrew
ʻillah and sibbah): but those who are known by the name of Mutakallemim
are very much opposed to the use of that name, and call Him Agens,
believing that there is a great difference whether we say that God is
the Cause or that He is the Agens. They argue thus: If we say that God
is the Cause, the coexistence of the Cause with that which was produced
by that Cause would necessarily be implied; this again would involve
the belief that the Universe was eternal, and that it was inseparable
from God. When, however, we say that God is the Agens, the co-existence
of the Agens with its product is not implied; for the agens can exist
anterior to its product; we cannot even imagine how an agens can be in
action unless it existed before its own production. This is an argument
advanced by persons who do not distinguish between the potential and
the actual. You, however, should know that in this case there is no
difference whether you employ the term “cause” or “agens”; for if you
take the term “cause” in the sense of a mere potentiality, it precedes
its effect; but if you mean the cause in action, then the effect must
necessarily co-exist with the cause in action. The same is the case
with the agens; take it as an agens in reality, the work must
necessarily co-exist with its agens. For the builder, before he builds
the house, is not in reality a builder, but has the faculty for
building a house—in the same way as the materials for the house before
it is being built are merely in potentiâ—but when the house has been
built, he is the builder in reality, and his product must likewise be
in actual existence. Nothing is therefore gained by choosing the term
“agens” and rejecting the term “cause.” My object here is to show that
these two terms are equal, and in the same manner as we call God an
Agens, although the work does not yet exist, only because there is no
hindrance or obstacle which might prevent Him from doing it whenever He
pleases, we may also call Him the Cause, although the effect may not
yet be in existence.

The reason why the philosophers called God the Cause, and did not call
Him the Agens, is not to be sought in their belief that the universe is
eternal, but in other motives, which I will briefly describe to you. It
has been shown in the science of Physics that everything, except the
Primal Cause, owes its origin to the following four causes:—the
substance, the form, the agens, the final cause. These are sometimes
direct, sometimes indirect causes; but each by itself is called “a
cause.” They also believe—and I do not differ from their opinion—that
God Himself is the agens, the form, and the end; therefore they call
God “the Cause,” in order to express that He unites in Himself these
three causes, viz., that He is the agens, the form, and the final cause
of the universe. In the present chapter I only wish to show you in what
sense it may be said of God that He is the agens, the form, and also
the final cause of the universe. You need not trouble yourself now with
the question whether the universe has been created by God, or whether,
as the philosophers have assumed, it is eternal, co-existing with Him.
You will find [in the pages of this treatise] full and instructive
information on the subject. Here I wish to show that God is the “cause”
of every event that takes place in the world, just as He is the Creator
of the whole universe as it now exists. It has already been explained
in the science of Physics, that a cause must again be sought for each
of the four divisions of causes. When we have found for any existing
thing those four causes which are in immediate connexion with it, we
find for these again causes, and for these again other causes, and so
on until we arrive at the first causes. E.g., a certain production has
its agens, this agens again has its agens, and so on and on until at
last we arrive at a first agens, which is the true agens throughout all
the intervening links. If the letter aleph be moved by bet, bet by
gimel, gimel by dalet, and dalet by hé—and as the series does not
extend to infinity, let us stop at hé—there is no doubt that the hé
moves the letters aleph, bet, gimel, and dalet, and we say correctly
that the aleph is moved by hé. In that sense everything occurring in
the universe, although directly produced by certain nearer causes, is
ascribed to the Creator, as we shall explain. He is the Agens, and He
is therefore the ultimate cause. We shall also find, after careful
examination, that every physical and transient form must be preceded by
another such form, by which the substance has been fitted to receive
the next form; the previous form again has been preceded by another,
and we arrive at length at that form which is necessary for the
existence of all intermediate forms, which are the causes of the
present form. That form to which the forms of all existing things are
traced is God. You must not imagine that when we say that God is the
first form of all forms existing in the Universe, we refer to that
first form which Aristotle, in the Book of Metaphysics, describes as
being without beginning and without end, for he treats of a form which
is a physical, and not a purely intellectual one. When we call God the
ultimate form of the universe, we do not use this term in the sense of
form connected with substance, namely, as the form of that substance,
as though God were the form of a material being. It is not in this
sense that we use it, but in the following: Everything existing and
endowed with a form, is whatever it is through its form, and when that
form is destroyed its whole existence terminates and is obliterated.
The same is the case as regards the relation between God and all
distant causes of existing beings; it is through the existence of God
that all things exist, and it is He who maintains their existence by
that process which is called emanation (in Hebrew shepha’), as will be
explained in one of the chapters of the present work. If God did not
exist, suppose this were possible, the universe would not exist, and
there would be an end to the existence of the distant causes, the final
effects, and the intermediate causes. Consequently God maintains the
same relation to the world as the form has to a thing endowed with a
form; through the form it is what it is, and on it the reality and
essence of the thing depends. In this sense we may say that God is the
ultimate form, that He is the form of all forms; that is to say, the
existence and continuance of all forms in the last instance depend on
Him, the forms are maintained by Him, in the same way as all things
endowed with forms retain their existence through their forms. On that
account God is called, in the sacred language, ḥe ha-ʻolamim, “the life
of the Universe,” as will be explained (chap. lxxii.). The same
argument holds good in reference to all final causes. If you assign to
a thing a certain purpose, you can find for that purpose another
purpose. We mention, e.g., a (wooden) chair; its substance is wood, the
joiner is its agens, the square its form, and its purpose is that one
should sit upon it. You may then ask, For what purpose does one sit
upon it? The answer will be that he who is sitting upon it desires to
be high above the ground. If again you ask, For what purpose does he
desire to be high above the ground, you will receive the answer that he
wishes to appear high in the eyes of those who see him. For what
purpose does he wish to appear higher in the eyes of those who see him?
That the people may respect and fear him. What is the good of his being
feared? His commands will be respected. For what purpose are his
commands to be respected? That people shall refrain from injuring each
other. What is the object of this precaution? To maintain order amongst
the people. In this way one purpose necessitates the pre-existence of
another, except the final purpose, which is the execution of the will
of God, according to one of the opinions which have been propounded, as
will be explained (III. xiii. and xvii.), and the final answer will be,
“It is the will of God.” According to the view of others, which will
likewise be explained, the final purpose is the execution of the decree
of His wisdom, and the final answer will be, “It has been decreed by
His wisdom.” According to either opinion, the series of the successive
purposes terminates, as has been shown, in God’s will or wisdom, which,
in our opinion, are identical with His essence, and are not any thing
separate from Himself or different from His essence. Consequently, God
is the final purpose of everything. Again, it is the aim of everything
to become, according to its faculties, similar to God in perfection;
this is meant by the expression, “His will, which is identical with His
essence,” as will be shown below (ibid.). In this sense God is called
the End of all ends.

I have thus explained to you in what sense God is said to be the Agens,
the Form, and the End. This is the reason why the philosophers not only
call Him “the Maker” but also the “Cause.” Some of the scholars
belonging to the Mutakallemim (Mohammedan theologians), went so far in
their folly and in their vainglory as to say that the non-existence of
the Creator, if that were possible, would not necessarily imply the
non-existence of the things created by Him, i.e., the Universe: for a
production need not necessarily cease to exist when the producer, after
having produced it, has ceased to exist. They would be right, if God
were only the maker of the Universe, and if its permanent existence
were not dependent on Him. The storehouse does not cease to exist at
the death of the builder; for he does not give permanent existence to
the building. God, however, is Himself the form of the Universe, as we
have already shown, and it is He who causes its continuance and
permanency. It is therefore wrong to say that a thing can remain
durable and permanent, after the being that makes it durable and
permanent has ceased to exist, since that thing can possess no more
durability and permanency than it has received from that being. Now you
understand the greatness of the error into which they have fallen
through their assumption that God is only the Agens, and not the End or
the Form.

CHAPTER LXX

The term rakab, “to ride,” is a synonym. In its primary signification
it is applied to man’s riding on an animal, in the usual way; e.g.,
“Now he was riding (rokeb) upon his ass” (Num. xxii. 22). It has then
been figuratively used to denote “dominion over a thing”; because the
rider governs and rules the animal he rides upon; e.g., “He made him
ride (yarkibehu) on the high places of the earth” (Deut. xxxii. 13);
“and I will cause thee to ride (ve-hirkabtika) upon the high places of
the earth” (Isa. lviii. 14), that is, you shall have dominion over the
highest (people) on earth; “I will make Ephraim to ride (arkib)” (Hos.
x. 11), i.e., I shall give him rule and dominion. In this same sense it
is said of God, “who rideth (rokeb) upon the heaven in thy help” (Deut.
xxxiii. 26), that is, who rules the heaven; and “Him that rideth
(la-rokeb) upon the ʻarabot” (Ps. lxviii. 4), i.e., who rules the
ʻarabot, the uppermost, all-encompassing sphere. It has also been
repeatedly stated by our Sages that there are seven rekiʻim
(firmaments, heavens), and that the uppermost of them, the
all-surrounding, is called ʻarabot. Do not object to the number seven
given by them, although there are more rekiʻim, for there are spheres
which contain several circles (gilgallim), and are counted as one; this
is clear to those who have studied that subject, and I shall also
explain it; here I wish merely to point out that our Sages always
assumed that ʻarabot is the uppermost sphere. The ʻarabot is also
referred to in the words, “who rideth upon the heaven in thy help.”
Thus we read in Talm. B. Ḥagigah, p. 12, “The high and exalted dwelleth
on ʻarabot, as it is said, ‘Extol Him that rideth upon ʻarabot’” (Ps.
lxviii. 4). How is it proved that “heaven” and “ʻarabot” are identical?
The one passage has “who rideth on ʻarabot,” the other “who rideth upon
the heaven.” Hence it is clear that in all these passages reference is
made to the same all-surrounding sphere, concerning which you will
hereafter (II. xxiv.) receive more information. Consider well that the
expression “dwelling over it,” is used by them, and not “dwelling in
it.” The latter expression would have implied that God occupies a place
or is a power in the sphere, as was in fact believed by the Sabeans,
who held that God was the soul of the sphere. By saying “dwelling over
it,” they indicated that God was separate from the sphere, and was not
a power in it. Know also that the term “riding upon the heavens,” has
figuratively been applied to God in order to show the following
excellent comparison. The rider is better than the animal upon which he
rides—the comparative is only used for the sake of convenience, for the
rider is not of the same class as the animal upon which he
rides—furthermore, the rider moves the animal and leads it as he likes;
it is as it were his instrument, which he uses according to his will;
he is separate from it, apart from it, not connected with it. In like
manner the uppermost sphere, by the rotation of which everything
moveable is set in motion, is moved by God, who is separate from the
sphere, and is not a power in it. In Bereshit Rabba we read that in
commenting on the Divine words, “The eternal God is a refuge” (lit., a
dwelling, Deut. xxxiii. 27), our Sages said, “He is the dwelling of His
world, the world is not His dwelling.” This explanation is then
followed by the remark, “The horse is secondary to the rider, the rider
is not subservient to the horse; this is meant by ‘Thou wilt ride upon
thy horses’” (Hab. iii. 8). Consider and learn how they described the
relation of God to the sphere, asserting that the latter is His
instrument, by means of which He rules the universe. For whenever you
find our Sages saying that in a certain heaven are certain things, they
do not mean to say that in the heavens there are any extraneous things,
but that from a certain heaven the force emanates which is required for
the production of certain things, and for their continuing in proper
order. The proof for my statement you may find in the following sayings
of our Sages—“The ʻarabot, in which there are justice, charity, right,
treasures of life and peace, treasures of blessing, of the souls of the
righteous, of the souls and the spirits of those to be born, and of the
dew by which God will at some future time revive the dead, etc.” It is
clear that the things enumerated here are not material, and do not
occupy a place—for “dew” is not to be taken in its literal
sense.—Consider also that here the phrase “in which,” meaning “in the
ʻarabot,” is used, and not “over which,” as if to say that all the
things existing in the universe derive their existence from powers
emanating from the ʻarabot, which God made to be the origin and the
place of these powers. They are said to include “the treasures of
life”; a perfectly true and correct assertion! For all existing life
originates in that treasure of life, as will be mentioned below (chap.
lxii., and II. chap. x.). Reflect on the fact that the souls of the
righteous as well as the souls and the spirits of those to be born are
mentioned here! How sublime is this idea to him who understands it! for
the soul that remains after the death of man, is not the soul that
lives in a man when he is born; the latter is a mere faculty, while
that which has a separate existence after death, is a reality; again,
the soul and the spirit of man during his life are two different
things; therefore the souls and the spirits are both named as existing
in man; but separate from the body only one of them exists. We have
already explained the homonymity of ruaḥ (spirit) in this work, and
also at the end of Sefer ha maddaʻ (Mishneh torah Hil. teshubah, viii.
3–4) we treated of the homonymity of these expressions. Consider how
these excellent and true ideas, comprehended only by the greatest
philosophers, are found scattered in the Midrashim. When a student who
disavows truth reads them, he will at first sight deride them, as being
contrary to the real state of things. The cause of this is the
circumstance, that our Sages spoke of these subjects in metaphors; they
are too difficult for the common understanding of the people, as has
been noticed by us several times.

I will now return to the subject which I commenced to explain, in order
to bring it to a conclusion. Our Sages commenced to adduce proofs from
Scripture for their assertion that the things enumerated above are
contained in the ʻarabot. As to justice and right they quote “Justice
and judgment are the habitation of thy throne” (Ps. lxxxix. 18). In the
same way they prove their assertion concerning all things enumerated by
them, by showing that they are described as being related to God, as
being near Him. Note this. In the Pirke Rabbi Eliezer it is said: God
created seven rekiʻim (heavens), and out of all of them He selected the
ʻaraboth for His royal throne; comp. “Exalt him who rideth upon the
ʻarabot” (Ps. lxviii. 4). These are his (Rabbi Eliezer’s) words. Note
them likewise.

You must know that in Hebrew the collective noun denoting animals used
for riding is “mercabah.” Instances of this noun are not rare. “And
Joseph made ready his chariot” (merkabto) (Gen. xlvi. 29); “in the
second chariot” (be-mirkebet) (ib. xli. 43); “Pharaoh’s chariots”
(markebot) (Exod. xv. 4). The following passage especially proves that
the Hebrew merkabah denotes a collection of animals: “And a merkabah
came up and went out of Egypt for six hundred shekels of silver, and a
horse for an hundred and fifty” (1 Kings x. 21). Hence we may learn
that mercabah denotes here four horses. Therefore I think that when it
was stated, according to the literal sense of the words, that four
Ḥayyot (beasts) carry the Throne of Glory, our Sages called this
“mercabah” on account of its similarity with the mercabah consisting of
four single animals. So far has the theme of this chapter carried us,
and we shall be compelled to make many further remarks on this subject.
Here, however, it is our object, and the aim of all we have said, to
show that “who rideth upon heaven” (Deut. xxxiii. 26) means “who sets
the all-surrounding sphere in motion, and turns it by His power and
will.” The same sense is contained in the conclusion of that verse:
“and in his excellency the spheres,” i.e., who in His excellency moves
the spheres (sheḥakim). In reference to the first sphere, the ʻarabot,
the verb “to ride” is used, in reference to the rest, the noun
“excellency,” because through the motion of the uppermost sphere in its
daily circuit, all the spheres move, participating as parts in the
motion of the whole; and this being that great power that sets
everything in motion, it is called “excellency.” Let this subject
constantly remain in your memory when you study what I am going to say;
for it—i.e., the motion of the uppermost sphere—is the greatest proof
for the existence of God, as I shall demonstrate. Note this.

CHAPTER LXXI

Know that many branches of science relating to the correct solution of
these problems, were once cultivated by our forefathers, but were in
the course of time neglected, especially in consequence of the tyranny
which barbarous nations exercised over us. Besides, speculative studies
were not open to all men, as we have already stated (Introd. p. 2, and
I. chap, xxxi.), only the subjects taught in the Scriptures were
accessible to all. Even the traditional Law, as you are well aware, was
not originally committed to writing, in conformity with the rule to
which our nation generally adhered, “Things which I have communicated
to you orally, you must not communicate to others in writing.” With
reference to the Law, this rule was very opportune; for while it
remained in force it averted the evils which happened subsequently,
viz., great diversity of opinion, doubts as to the meaning of written
words, slips of the pen, dissensions among the people, formation of new
sects, and confused notions about practical subjects. The traditional
teaching was in fact, according to the words of the Law, entrusted to
the Great Tribunal, as we have already stated in our works on the
Talmud. (Introd. to Mishneh Torah and Introd. to Commen. on the
Mishnah).

Care having been taken, for the sake of obviating injurious influences,
that the Oral Law should not be recorded in a form accessible to all,
it was but natural that no portion of “the secrets of the Law” (i.e.,
metaphysical problems) would be permitted to be written down or
divulged for the use of all men. These secrets, as has been explained,
were orally communicated by a few able men to others who were equally
distinguished. Hence the principle applied by our teachers, “The
secrets of the Law can only be entrusted to him who is a councillor, a
cunning artificer, etc.” The natural effect of this practice was that
our nation lost the knowledge of those important disciplines. Nothing
but a few remarks and allusions are to be found in the Talmud and the
Midrashim, like a few kernels enveloped in such a quantity of husk,
that the reader is generally occupied with the husk, and forgets that
it encloses a kernel.

In addition you will find that in the few works composed by the Geonim
and the Karaites on the unity of God and on such matter as is connected
with this doctrine, they followed the lead of the Mohammedan
Mutakallemim, and what they wrote is insignificant in comparison with
the kindred works of the Mohammedans. It also happened, that at the
time when the Mohammedans adopted this method of the Kalam, there arose
among them a certain sect, called Muʻtazilah, i.e., Separatists. In
certain things our scholars followed the theory and the method of these
Muʻtazilah. Although another sect, the Asha’ariyah, with their own
peculiar views, was subsequently established amongst the Mohammedans,
you will not find any of these views in the writings of our authors;
not because these authors preferred the opinions of the first-named
sect to those of the latter, but because they chanced first to become
acquainted with the theory of the Muʻtazilah, which they adopted and
treated as demonstrated truth. On the other hand our Andalusian
scholars followed the teachings of the philosophers, from whom they
accepted those opinions which were not opposed to our own religious
principles. You will find that they did not adopt any of the methods of
the Mutakallemim; in many respects they approached the view expressed
in the present treatise, as may be noticed in the few works which were
recently written by authors of that school. You should also know that
whatever the Mohammedans, that is, the Muʻtazilah and the Asha’ariyah,
said on those subjects, consists in nothing but theories founded on
propositions which are taken from the works of those Greek and Syrian
scholars who attempted to oppose the system of the philosophers, and to
refute their arguments. The following was the cause of that opposition:
At the time when the Christian Church brought the Greeks and Syrians
into its fold, and promulgated its well-known dogmas, the opinions of
the philosophers were current amongst those nations; and whilst
philosophy flourished, kings became defenders of the Christian faith.
The learned Greek and Syrian Christians of the age, seeing that their
dogmas were unquestionably exposed to severe attacks from the existing
philosophical systems, laid the foundation for this science of
Dogmatics; they commenced by putting forth such propositions as would
support their doctrines, and be useful for the refutation of opinions
opposed to the fundamental principles of the Christian religion.

When the Mohammedans caused Arabic translations of the writings of the
Philosophers to be made, those criticisms were likewise translated.
When the opinions of John the Grammarian, of Ibn Adi, and of kindred
authors on those subjects were made accessible to them, they adopted
them, and imagined that they had arrived at the solution of important
problems. Moreover, they selected from the opinions of the ancient
philosophers whatever seemed serviceable to their purposes, although
later critics had proved that those theories were false; as, e.g., the
theories of atoms and of a vacuum. They believed that the discussions
of those authors were of a general character, and contained
propositions useful for the defence of positive religion. At a
subsequent period the same theories were more fully developed, and
presented an aspect unknown to those Theologians of the Greeks and
other nations who were the immediate successors of the Philosophers. At
a later time, when the Mohammedans adopted certain peculiar theological
theories they were naturally obliged to defend them; and when their new
theories, again became the subject of controversy among them, each
party laid down such propositions as suited their special doctrine.

Their arguments undoubtedly involved certain principles which concerned
the three communities—Jews, Christians, and Mohammedans, such as the
creatio ex nihilo, which afforded support to the belief in miracles and
to various other doctrines. There are, however, other subjects of
belief which the Christians and Mohammedans have undertaken to defend,
such as the doctrine of the Trinity in the theological works of the
former, and “the Word” in the works of some Mohammedan sects; in order
to prove the dogmas which they thus desired to establish, they were
compelled to resort to certain hypotheses. It is not our object to
criticize things which are peculiar to either creed, or books which
were written exclusively in the interest of the one community or the
other. We merely maintain that the earlier Theologians, both of the
Greek Christians and of the Mohammedans, when they laid down their
propositions, did not investigate the real properties of things; first
of all they considered what must be the properties of the things which
should yield proof for or against a certain creed; and when this was
found they asserted that the thing must be endowed with those
properties; then they employed the same assertion as a proof for the
identical arguments which had led to the assertion, and by which they
either supported or refuted a certain opinion. This course was followed
by able men who originated this method, and adopted it in their
writings. They professed to be free from preconceived opinions, and to
have been led to a stated result by actual research. Therefore when
philosophers of a subsequent date studied the same writings they did
not perceive the true character of the arguments; on the contrary, they
found in the ancient works strong proofs and a valuable support for the
acceptance or the rejection of certain opinions, and thus thought that,
so far as religious principles were concerned, there was no necessity
whatever to prove or refute any of their propositions, and that the
first Mutakallemim had discussed those subjects with the sole object of
defeating certain views of the philosophers, and demonstrating the
insufficiency of their proofs. Persons who hold this opinion, do not
suspect how much they are mistaken; for the first Mutakallemim tried to
prove a proposition when it was expedient to demonstrate its truth; and
to disprove it, when its rejection was desirable, and when it was
contrary to the opinion which they wished to uphold, although the
contradiction might only become obvious after the application of a
hundred successive propositions. In this manner the earlier
Mutakallemim effected a radical cure of the malady! I tell you,
however, as a general rule, that Themistius was right in saying that
the properties of things cannot adapt themselves to our opinions, but
our opinions must be adapted to the existing properties.

Having studied the works of these Mutakallemim, as far as I had an
opportunity, just as I had studied the writings of the philosophers
according to the best of my ability, I found that the method of all
Mutakallemim was the same in its general characteristics, namely, they
assume that the really existing form of things proves nothing at all,
because it is merely one of the various phases of the things, the
opposite of which is equally admissible to our minds. In many instances
these Theologians were guided by their imagination, and thought that
they were following the dictates of the intellect. They set forth the
propositions which I shall describe to you, and demonstrated by their
peculiar mode of arguing that the Universe had a beginning. The theory
of the creatio ex nihilo being thus established, they asserted, as a
logical consequence, that undoubtedly there must be a Maker who created
the Universe. Next they showed that this Maker is One, and from the
Unity of the Creator they deduced His Incorporeality. This method was
adopted by every Mohammedan Mutakallem in the discussion of this
subject, and by those of our co-religionists who imitated them and
walked in their footsteps. Although the Mutakallemim disagree in the
methods of their proofs, and employ different propositions in
demonstrating the act of creation or in rejecting the eternity of the
Universe, they invariably begin with proving the creatio ex nihilo, and
establish on that proof the existence of God. I have examined this
method, and find it most objectionable. It must be rejected, because
all the proofs for the creation have weak points, and cannot be
considered as convincing except by those who do not know the difference
between a proof, a dialectical argument, and a sophism. Those who
understand the force of the different methods will clearly see that all
the proofs for the creation are questionable, because propositions have
been employed which have never been proved. I think that the utmost
that can be effected by believers in the truth of Revelation is to
expose the shortcomings in the proofs of philosophers who hold that the
Universe is eternal, and if forsooth a man has effected this, he has
accomplished a great deed! For it is well known to all clear and
correct thinkers who do not wish to deceive themselves, that this
question, namely, whether the Universe has been created or is eternal,
cannot be answered with mathematical certainty; here human intellect
must pause. We shall have occasion to speak more fully on this subject,
but for the present it may suffice to state that the philosophers have
for the last three thousand years been continually divided on that
subject, as far as we can learn from their works and the record of
their opinions.

Such being the nature of this theory, how can we employ it as an axiom
and establish on it the existence of the Creator? In that case the
existence of God would be uncertain; if the universe had a beginning,
God does exist; if it be eternal, God does not exist; the existence of
God would therefore remain either an open question, or we should have
to declare that the creation had been proved, and compel others by mere
force to accept this doctrine, in order thus to be enabled to declare
that we have proved the existence of God. Such a process is utterly
inadmissible. The true method, which is based on a logical and
indubitable proof, consists, according to my opinion, in demonstrating
the existence of God, His unity, and His incorporeality by such
philosophical arguments as are founded on the theory of the eternity of
the Universe. I do not propose this method as though I believed in the
eternity of the Universe, for I do not follow the philosophers on this
point, but because by the aid of this method these three principles,
viz., the existence of God, His unity and His incorporeality can be
fully proved and verified, irrespectively of the question whether the
universe has had a beginning or not. After firmly establishing these
three principles by an exact proof, we shall treat of the problem of
creation and discuss it as fully as possible. You are at liberty to
content yourself with the declaration of the Mutakallemim, and to
believe that the act of creation has been demonstrated by proof; nor
can there be any harm if you consider it unproven that the universe had
a beginning, and accept this theory as supported by the authority of
the Prophets. Before you learn our opinion on prophecy, which will be
given in the present work, do not ask, how could the belief in prophecy
be justified, if it were assumed that the universe was eternal. We will
not now expatiate on that subject. You should, however, know that some
of the propositions, started and proved by the Radicals, i.e., the
Mutakallemim, in order to prove the act of creation, imply an order of
things contrary to that which really exists, and involve a complete
change in the laws of nature; this fact will be pointed out to you, for
it will be necessary to mention their propositions and their
argumentation. My method, as far as I now can explain it in general
terms, is as follows. The universe is either eternal or has had a
beginning; if it had a beginning, there must necessarily exist a being
which caused the beginning; this is clear to common sense; for a thing
that has had a beginning, cannot be the cause of its own beginning,
another must have caused it. The universe was, therefore, created by
God. If on the other hand the universe were eternal, it could in
various ways be proved that apart from the things which constitute the
universe, there exists a being which is neither body nor a force in a
body, and which is one, eternal, not preceded by any cause, and
immutable. That being is God. You see that the proofs for the
Existence, the Unity and the Incorporeality of God must vary according
to the propositions admitted by us. Only in this way can we succeed in
obtaining a perfect proof, whether we assume the eternity or the
creation of the universe. For this reason you will find in my works on
the Talmud, whenever I have to speak of the fundamental principles of
our religion, or to prove the existence of God, that I employ arguments
which imply the eternity of the universe. I do not believe in that
eternity, but I wish to establish the principle of the existence of God
by an indisputable proof, and should not like to see this most
important principle founded on a basis which every one could shake or
attempt to demolish, and which others might consider as not being
established at all; especially when I see that the proofs of the
philosophers are based on those visible properties of things, which can
only be ignored by persons possessing certain preconceived notions,
while the Mutakallemim establish their arguments on propositions which
are to such an extent contrary to the actual state of things as to
compel these arguers to deny altogether the existence of the laws of
nature. When I shall have to treat of the creation, I shall in a
special chapter prove my opinion to some extent, and shall attain the
same end which every one of the Mutakallemim had in view, yet I shall
not contradict the laws of nature, or reject any such part of the
Aristotelean theory as has been proved to be correct. Even the most
cogent of the proofs offered by the Mutakallemim respecting the act of
creation, has only been obtained by reversing the whole order of things
and by rejecting everything fully demonstrated by the philosophers. I,
however, shall be able to give a similar proof without ignoring the
laws of nature and without being forced to contradict facts which have
been clearly perceived. I find it necessary to mention to you the
general propositions of the Mutakallemim, by which they prove the act
of creation, the Existence of God, His Unity and His Incorporeality. I
intend to explain their method, and also to point out the inferences
which are to be drawn from each proposition. After this, I shall
describe those theories of the philosophers which are closely connected
with our subject, and I shall then explain their method.

Do not ask me to prove in this work the propositions of the
philosophers, which I shall briefly mention to you; they form the
principal part of Physics and Metaphysics. Nor must you expect that I
should repeat the arguments of the Mutakallemim in support of their
propositions, with which they wasted their time, with which the time of
future generations will likewise be wasted, and on which numerous books
have been written. Their propositions, with few exceptions, are
contradicted by the visible properties of things, and beset with
numerous objections. For this reason they were obliged to write many
books and controversial works in defence of their theories, for the
refutation of objections, and for the reconciliation of all apparent
contradictions, although in reality this object cannot be attained by
any sophistical contrivance. As to the propositions of the philosophers
which I shall briefly explain, and which are indispensable for the
demonstration of the three principles—the Existence, the Unity, and the
Incorporeality of God, they will for the greater part be admitted by
you as soon as you shall hear them and understand their meaning; whilst
in the discussion of other parts reference must be made for their
proofs to works on Physics and Metaphysics, and if you direct your
attention to such passages as will be pointed out to you, you will find
everything verified that requires verification.

I have already told you that nothing exists except God and this
universe, and that there is no other evidence for His Existence but
this universe in its entirety and in its several parts. Consequently
the universe must be examined as it is; the propositions must be
derived from those properties of the universe which are clearly
perceived, and hence you must know its visible form and its nature.
Then only will you find in the universe evidence for the existence of a
being not included therein. I have considered it, therefore, necessary
to discuss first in a merely colloquial manner, in the next chapter,
the totality of existing things, and to confine our remarks to such as
have been fully proved and established beyond all doubt. In subsequent
chapters I shall treat of the propositions of the Mutakallemim, and
describe the method by which they explain the four fundamental
principles. In the chapters which will follow, I propose to expound the
propositions of the philosophers and the methods applied by them in
verifying those principles. In the last place, I shall explain to you
the method applied by me in proving those four principles, as I have
stated to you.

CHAPTER LXXII

Know that this Universe, in its entirety, is nothing else but one
individual being; that is to say, the outermost heavenly sphere,
together with all included therein, is as regards individuality beyond
all question a single being like Said and Omar. The variety of its
substances—I mean the substances of that sphere and all its component
parts—is like the variety of the substances of a human being: just as,
e.g., Said is one individual, consisting of various solid substances,
such as flesh, bones, sinews, of various humours, and of various
spiritual elements; in like manner this sphere in its totality is
composed of the celestial orbs, the four elements and their
combinations; there is no vacuum whatever therein, but the whole space
is filled up with matter. Its centre is occupied by the earth, earth is
surrounded by water, air encompasses the water, fire envelopes the air,
and this again is enveloped by the fifth substance (quintessence).
These substances form numerous spheres, one being enclosed within
another so that no intermediate empty space, no vacuum, is left. One
sphere surrounds and closely joins the other. All the spheres revolve
with constant uniformity, without acceleration or retardation; that is
to say, each sphere retains its individual nature as regards its
velocity and the peculiarity of its motion; it does not move at one
time quicker, at another slower. Compared with each other, however,
some of the spheres move with less, others with greater velocity. The
outermost, all-encompassing sphere, revolves with the greatest speed;
it completes its revolution in one day, and causes everything to
participate in its motion, just as every particle of a thing moves when
the entire body is in motion; for existing beings stand in the same
relation to that sphere as a part of a thing stands to the whole. These
spheres have not a common centre; the centres of some of them are
identical with the centre of the Universe, while those of the rest are
different from it. Some of the spheres have a motion independent of
that of the whole Universe, constantly revolving from East to West,
while other spheres move from West to East. The stars contained in
those spheres are part of their respective orbits; they are fixed in
them, and have no motion of their own, but participating in the motion
of the sphere of which they are a part, they appear themselves to move.
The entire substance of this revolving fifth element is unlike the
substance of those bodies which consist of the other four elements, and
are enclosed by the fifth element.

The number of these spheres encompassing the Universe cannot possibly
be less than eighteen; it may even be larger; but this is a matter for
further investigation. It also remains an open question whether there
are spheres which, without moving round the centre of the Universe,
have nevertheless a circular motion. Within that sphere which is
nearest to us, a substance is contained which is different from the
substance of the fifth element; it first received four primary forms,
and then became in these four forms, four kinds of matter: earth,
water, air, fire. Each of the four elements occupies a certain position
of its own assigned to it by nature; it is not found in another place,
so long as no other but its own natural force acts upon it; it is a
dead body; it has no life, no perception, no spontaneous motion, and
remains at rest in its natural place. When moved from its place by some
external force, it returns towards its natural place as soon as that
force ceases to operate. For the elements have the property of moving
back to their place in a straight line, but they have no properties
which would cause them to remain where they are, or to move otherwise
than in a straight line. The rectilinear motions of these four elements
when returning to their original place are of two kinds, either
centrifugal, viz., the motion of the air and the fire; or centripetal,
viz., the motion of the earth, and the water; and when the elements
have reached their original place, they remain at rest.

The spherical bodies, on the other hand, have life, possess a soul by
which they move spontaneously; they have no properties by which they
could at any time come to a state of rest; in their perpetual rotations
they are not subject to any change, except that of position. The
question whether they are endowed with an intellect, enabling them to
comprehend, cannot be solved without deep research. Through the
constant revolution of the fifth element, with all contained therein,
the four elements are forced to move and to change their respective
positions, so that fire and air are driven into the water, and again
these three elements enter the depth of the earth. Thus are the
elements mixed together; and when they return to their respective
places, parts of the earth, in quitting their places, move together
with the water, the air and the fire. In this whole process the
elements act and react upon each other. The elements intermixed, are
then combined, and form at first various kinds of vapours; afterwards
the several kinds of minerals, every species of plants, and many
species of living beings, according to the relative proportion of the
constituent parts. All transient beings have their origin in the
elements, into which again they resolve when their existence comes to
an end. The elements themselves are subject to being transformed from
one into another; for although one substance is common to all,
substance without form is in reality impossible, just as the physical
form of these transient beings cannot exist without substance. The
formation and the dissolution of the elements, together with the things
composed of them, and resolving into them, follow each other in
rotation. The changes of the finite substance, in successively
receiving one form after the other, may therefore be compared to the
revolution of the sphere in space, when each part of the sphere
periodically reappears in the same position.

As the human body consists both of principal organs and of other
members which depend on them and cannot exist without the control of
those organs, so does the universe consist both of principal parts,
viz., the quintessence, which encompasses the four elements and of
other parts which are subordinated and require a leader, viz., the four
elements and the things composed of them.

Again, the principal part in the human body, namely, the heart, is in
constant motion, and is the source of every motion noticed in the body;
it rules over the other members, and communicates to them through its
own pulsations the force required for their functions. The outermost
sphere by its motion rules in a similar way over all other parts of the
universe, and supplies all things with their special properties. Every
motion in the universe has thus its origin in the motion of that
sphere; and the soul of every animated being derives its origin from
the soul of that same sphere.

The forces which according to this explanation are communicated by the
spheres to this sublunary world are four in number, viz., (a) the force
which effects the mixture and the composition of the elements, and
which undoubtedly suffices to form the minerals; (b) the force which
supplies every growing thing with its vegetative functions; (c) the
force which gives to each living being its vitality, and (d) the force
which endows rational beings with intellect. All this is effected
through the action of light and darkness, which are regulated by the
position and the motion of the spheres round the earth.

When for one instant the beating of the heart is interrupted, man dies,
and all his motions and powers come to an end. In a like manner would
the whole universe perish, and everything therein cease to exist if the
spheres were to come to a standstill.

The living being as such is one through the action of its heart,
although some parts of the body are devoid of motion and sensation, as,
e.g., the bones, the cartilage, and similar parts. The same is the case
with the entire universe; although it includes many beings without
motion and without life, it is a single being living through the motion
of the sphere, which may be compared to the heart of an animated being.
You must therefore consider the entire globe as one individual being
which is endowed with life, motion, and a soul. This mode of
considering the universe is, as will be explained, indispensable, that
is to say, it is very useful for demonstrating the unity of God; it
also helps to elucidate the principle that He who is One has created
only one being.

Again, it is impossible that any of the members of a human body should
exist by themselves, not connected with the body, and at the same time
should actually be organic parts of that body, that is to say, that the
liver should exist by itself, the heart by itself, or the flesh by
itself. In like manner, it is impossible that one part of the Universe
should exist independently of the other parts in the existing order of
things as here considered, viz., that the fire should exist without the
co-existence of the earth, or the earth without the heaven, or the
heaven without the earth.

In man there is a certain force which unites the members of the body,
controls them, and gives to each of them what it requires for the
conservation of its condition, and for the repulsion of injury—the
physicians distinctly call it the leading force in the body of the
living being; sometimes they call it “nature.” The Universe likewise
possesses a force which unites the several parts with each other,
protects the species from destruction, maintains the individuals of
each species as long as possible, and endows some individual beings
with permanent existence. Whether this force operates through the
medium of the sphere or otherwise remains an open question.

Again, in the body of each individual there are parts which are
intended for a certain purpose, as the organs of nutrition for the
preservation of the individual, the organs of generation for the
preservation of the species, the hands and eyes for administering to
certain wants, as to food, etc.; there are also parts which, in
themselves, are not intended for any purpose, but are mere accessories
and adjuncts to the constitution of the other parts. The peculiar
constitution of the organs, indispensable for the conservation of their
particular forms and for the performance of their primary functions,
produces, whilst it serves its special purpose, according to the nature
of the substance, other things, such as the hair and the complexion of
the body. Being mere accessories, they are not formed according to a
fixed rule; some are altogether absent in many individuals; and vary
considerably in others. This is not the case with the organs of the
body. You never find that the liver of one person is ten times larger
than that of another person, but you may find a person without a beard,
or without hair on certain parts of his body, or with a beard ten times
longer than that of another man. Instances of this phenomenon, viz.,
great variation as regards hair and colour, are not rare. The same
differences occur in the constitution of the Universe. Some species
exist as an integral part of the whole system; these are constant and
follow a fixed law; though they vary as far as their nature permits,
this variation is insignificant in quantity and quality. Other species
do not serve any purpose; they are the mere result of the general
nature of transient things, as, e.g., the various insects which are
generated in dunghills, the animals generated in rotten fruit, or in
fetid liquids, and worms generated in the intestines, etc. In short,
everything devoid of the power of generation belongs to this class. You
will, therefore, find that these things do not follow a fixed law,
although their entire absence is just as impossible as the absence of
different complexions and of different kinds of hair amongst human
beings.

In man there are substances the individual existence of which is
permanent, and there are other substances which are only constant in
the species not in the individuals, as, e.g., the four humours. The
same is the case in the Universe; there are substances which are
constant in individuals, such as the fifth element, which is constant
in all its formations, and other substances which are constant in the
species, as, e.g., the four elements and all that is composed of them.

The same forces which operate in the birth and the temporal existence
of the human being operate also in his destruction and death. This
truth holds good with regard to this whole transient world. The causes
of production are at the same time the causes of destruction. This may
be illustrated by the following example. If the four forces which are
present in every being sustained by food, viz., attraction, retention,
digestion, and secretion, were, like intelligent forces, able to
confine themselves to what is necessary, and to act at the proper time
and within the proper limits, man would be exempt from those great
sufferings and the numerous diseases [to which he is exposed]. Since,
however, such is not the case, and since the forces perform their
natural functions without thought and intelligence, without any
consciousness of their action, they necessarily cause dangerous
maladies and great pains, although they are the direct cause of the
birth and the temporal existence of the human being. This fact is to be
explained as follows: if the attractive force would absorb nothing but
that which is absolutely beneficial, and nothing but the quantity which
is required, man would be free from many such sufferings and disorders.
But such is not the case; the attractive force absorbs any humour that
comes within the range of its action, although such humour be
ill-adapted in quality or in quantity. It is, therefore, natural that
sometimes a humour is absorbed which is too warm, too cold, too thick,
or too thin, or that too much humour is absorbed, and thus the veins
are choked, obstruction and decay ensue, the quality of the humour is
deteriorated, its quantities altered, diseases are originated, such as
scurvy, leprosy, abscess, or a dangerous illness, such as cancer,
elephantiasis, gangrene, and at last the organ or organs are destroyed.
The same is the case with every one of the four forces, and with all
existing beings. The same force that originates all things, and causes
them to exist for a certain time, namely, the combination of the
elements which are moved and penetrated by the forces of the heavenly
spheres, that same cause becomes throughout the world a source of
calamities, such as devastating rain, showers, snow-storms, hail,
hurricanes, thunder, lightning, malaria, or other terrible catastrophes
by which a place or many places or an entire country may be laid waste,
such as landslips, earthquakes, meteoric showers and floods issuing
forth from the seas and from the interior of the earth.

Bear in mind, however, that in all that we have noticed about the
similarity between the Universe and the human being, nothing would
warrant us to assert that man is a microcosm; for although the
comparison in all its parts applies to the Universe and any living
being in its normal state, we never heard that any ancient author
called the ass or the horse a microcosm. This attribute has been given
to man alone on account of his peculiar faculty of thinking, I mean the
intellect, viz., the hylic intellect which appertains to no other
living being. This may be explained as follows. An animal does not
require for its sustenance any plan, thought or scheme; each animal
moves and acts by its nature, eats as much as it can find of suitable
things, it makes its resting-place wherever it happens to be, cohabits
with any mate it meets while in heat in the periods of its sexual
excitement. In this manner does each individual conserve itself for a
certain time, and perpetuates the existence of its species without
requiring for its maintenance the assistance or support of any of its
fellow creatures; for all the things to which it has to attend it
performs by itself. With man it is different; if an individual had a
solitary existence, and were, like an animal, left without guidance, he
would soon perish, he would not endure even one day, unless it were by
mere chance, unless he happened to find something upon which he might
feed. For the food which man requires for his subsistence demands much
work and preparation, which can only be accomplished by reflection and
by plan; many vessels must be used, and many individuals, each in his
peculiar work, must be employed. It is therefore necessary that one
person should organize the work and direct men in such a manner that
they should properly co-operate, and that they should assist each
other. The protection from heat in summer and from cold in winter, and
shelter from rain, snow, and wind, require in the same manner the
preparation of many things, none of which can properly be done without
design and thought. For this reason man has been endowed with
intellectual faculties, which enable him to think, consider, and act,
and by various labours to prepare and procure for himself food,
dwelling and clothing, and to control every organ of his body, causing
both the principal and the secondary organs to perform their respective
functions. Consequently, if a man, being deprived of his intellectual
faculties, only possessed vitality, he would in a short time be lost.
The intellect is the highest of all faculties of living creatures; it
is very difficult to comprehend, and its true character cannot be
understood as easily as man’s other faculties.

There also exists in the Universe a certain force which controls the
whole, which sets in motion the chief and principal parts, and gives
them the motive power for governing the rest. Without that force, the
existence of this sphere, with its principal and secondary parts, would
be impossible. It is the source of the existence of the Universe in all
its parts. That force is God; blessed be His name! It is on account of
this force that man is called microcosm; for he likewise possesses a
certain principle which governs all the forces of the body, and on
account of this comparison God is called “the life of the Universe”;
comp. “and he swore by the life of the Universe” (Dan. xii. 7).

You must understand that in the parallel which we have drawn between
the whole universe, on the one hand, and the individual man, on the
other, there is a complete harmony in all the points which we mentioned
above; only in the following three points a discrepancy may be noticed.

First, the principal organ of any living being which has a heart,
derives a benefit from the organs under the control of the heart, and
the benefits of the organs thus become the benefits of the heart. This
is not the case in the constitution of the universe. That part which
bestows authority or distributes power, does not receive in return any
benefit from the things under its control; whatever it grants, is
granted in the manner of a generous benefactor, not from any selfish
motive, but from a natural generosity and kindliness; only for the sake
of imitating the ways of the Most High.

Secondly, living creatures endowed with a heart have it within the body
and in the midst thereof; there it is surrounded by organs which it
governs. Thus it derives a benefit from them, for they guard and
protect it, and they do not allow that any injury from without should
approach it. The reverse occurs in the case of the Universe. The
superior part encompasses the inferior parts, it being certain that it
cannot be affected by the action of any other being; and even if it
could be affected, there is nobody without it that could affect it.
While it influences all that is contained within, it is not influenced
by any act or force of any material being. There is, however, some
similarity [between the universe and man] in this point. In the body of
animals, the organs more distant from the principal organ are of less
importance than those nearer to it. Also in the universe, the nearer
the parts are to the centre, the greater is their turbidness, their
solidity, their inertness, their dimness and darkness, because they are
further away from the loftiest element, from the source of light and
brightness, which moves by itself and the substance of which is the
most rarefied and simplest: from the outermost sphere. At the same
ratio at which a body is nearer this sphere, it derives properties from
it, and rises above the spheres below it.

Thirdly. The faculty of thinking is a force inherent in the body, and
is not separated from it, but God is not a force inherent in the body
of the universe, but is separate from all its parts. How God rules the
universe and provides for it is a complete mystery; man is unable to
solve it. For, on the one hand, it can be proved that God is separate
from the universe, and in no contact whatever with it; but, on the
other hand, His rule and providence can be proved to exist in all parts
of the universe, even in the smallest. Praised be He whose perfection
is above our comprehension.

It is true, we might have compared the relation between God and the
universe, to the relation between the absolute acquired intellect and
man; it is not a power inherent in the body, but a power which is
absolutely separate from the body, and is from without brought into
contact with the body. The rational faculty of man may be further
compared to the intelligence of the spheres, which are, as it were,
material bodies. But the intelligence of the spheres, purely spiritual
beings, as well as man’s absolute and acquired intellect, are subjects
of deep study and research; the proof of their existence, though
correct, is abstruse, and includes arguments which present doubts, are
exposed to criticism, and can be easily attacked by objectors. We have,
therefore, preferred to illustrate the relation of God to the universe
by a simile which is clear, and which will not be contradicted in any
of the points which have been laid down by us without any
qualification. The opposition can only emanate either from an ignorant
man, who contradicts truths even if they are perfectly obvious, just as
a person unacquainted with geometry rejects elementary propositions
which have been clearly demonstrated, or from the prejudiced man who
deceives himself. Those, however, who wish to study the subject must
persevere in their studies until they are convinced that all our
observations are true, and until they understand that our account of
this universe unquestionably agrees with the existing order of things.
If a man is willing to accept this theory from one who understands how
to prove things which can be proved, let him accept it, and let him
establish on it his arguments and proofs. If, on the other hand, he
refuses to accept without proof even the foregoing principles, let him
inquire for himself, and ultimately he will find that they are correct.
“Lo this, we have searched it, so it is; hear it, and know thou it for
thy good” (Job v. 27).

After these preliminary remarks, we will treat of the subject which we
promised to introduce and to explain.

CHAPTER LXXIII

There are twelve propositions common to all Mutakallemim, however
different their individual opinions and methods may be; the
Mutakallemim require them in order to establish their views on the four
principles. I shall first enumerate these propositions, and then
discuss each separately, together with the inferences which may be
drawn from it.

Proposition I. All things are composed of atoms.

Proposition II. There is a vacuum.

Proposition III. Time is composed of time-atoms.

Proposition IV. Substance cannot exist without numerous accidents.

Proposition V. Each atom is completely furnished with the accidents
(which I will describe), and cannot exist without them.

Proposition VI. Accidents do not continue in existence during two
time-atoms.

Proposition VII. Both positive and negative properties have a real
existence, and are accidents which owe their existence to some causa
efficiens.

Proposition VIII. All existing things, i.e., all creatures, consist of
substance and of accidents, and the physical form of a thing is
likewise an accident.

Proposition IX. No accident can form the substratum for another
accident.

Proposition X. The test for the possibility of an imagined object does
not consist in its conformity with the existing laws of nature.

Proposition XI. The idea of the infinite is equally inadmissible,
whether the infinite be actual, potential, or accidental, i.e., there
is no difference whether the infinite be formed by a number of
co-existing things, or by a series of things, of which one part comes
into existence when another has ceased to exist, in which case it is
called accidental infinite; in both cases the infinite is rejected by
the Mutakallemim as fallacious.

Proposition XII. The senses mislead, and are in many cases inefficient;
their perceptions, therefore, cannot form the basis of any law, or
yield data for any proof.

First Proposition.

“The Universe, that is, everything contained in it, is composed of very
small parts [atoms] which are indivisible on account of their
smallness; such an atom has no magnitude; but when several atoms
combine, the sum has a magnitude, and thus forms a body.” If,
therefore, two atoms were joined together, each atom would become a
body, and they would thus form two bodies, a theory which in fact has
been proposed by some Mutakallemim. All these atoms are perfectly
alike; they do not differ from each other in any point. The
Mutakallemim further assert, that it is impossible to find a body that
is not composed of such equal atoms which are placed side by side.
According to this view genesis and composition are identical;
destruction is the same as decomposition. They do not use the term
“destruction,” for they hold that “genesis” implies composition and
decomposition, motion and rest. These atoms, they believe, are not, as
was supposed by Epicurus and other Atomists numerically constant; but
are created anew whenever it pleases the Creator; their annihilation is
therefore not impossible. Now I will explain to you their opinion
concerning the vacuum.

Second Proposition.

On the vacuum. The original Mutakallemim also believe that there is a
vacuum, i.e., one space, or several spaces which contain nothing, which
are not occupied by anything whatsoever, and which are devoid of all
substance. This proposition is to them an indispensable sequel to the
first. For, if the Universe were full of such atoms, how could any of
them move? For it is impossible to conceive that one atom should move
into another. And yet the composition, as well as the decomposition of
things, can only be effected by the motion of atoms! Thus the
Mutakallemim are compelled to assume a vacuum, in order that the atoms
may combine, separate, and move in that vacuum which does not contain
any thing or any atom.

Third Proposition.

“Time is composed of time-atoms,” i.e., of many parts, which on account
of their short duration cannot be divided. This proposition also is a
logical consequence of the first. The Mutakallemim undoubtedly saw how
Aristotle proved that time, space, and locomotion are of the same
nature, that is to say, they can be divided into parts which stand in
the same proportion to each other: if one of them is divided, the other
is divided in the same proportion. They, therefore, knew that if time
were continuous and divisible ad infinitum, their assumed atom of space
would of necessity likewise be divisible. Similarly, if it were
supposed that space is continuous, it would necessarily follow, that
the time-element, which they considered to be indivisible, could also
be divided. This has been shown by Aristotle in the treatise called
Acroasis. Hence they concluded that space was not continuous, but was
composed of elements that could not be divided; and that time could
likewise be reduced to time-elements, which were indivisible. An hour
is, e.g., divided into sixty minutes, the minute into sixty seconds,
the second into sixty parts, and so on; at last after ten or more
successive divisions by sixty, time-elements are obtained, which are
not subjected to division, and in fact are indivisible, just as is the
case with space. Time would thus be an object of position and order.

The Mutakallemim did not at all understand the nature of time. This is
a matter of course; for if the greatest philosophers became embarrassed
when they investigated the nature of time, if some of them were
altogether unable to comprehend what time really was, and if even
Galenus declared time to be something divine and incomprehensible, what
can be expected of those who do not regard the nature of things?

Now, mark what conclusions were drawn from these three propositions,
and were accepted by the Mutakallemim as true. They held that
locomotion consisted in the translation of each atom of a body from one
point to the next one; accordingly the velocity of one body in motion
cannot be greater than that of another body. When, nevertheless, two
bodies are observed to move during the same time through different
spaces, the cause of this difference is not attributed by them to the
fact that the body which has moved through a larger distance had a
greater velocity, but to the circumstance that motion which in ordinary
language is called slow, has been interrupted by more moments of rest,
while the motion which ordinarily is called quick has been interrupted
by fewer moments of rest. When it is shown that the motion of an arrow,
which is shot from a powerful bow, is in contradiction to their theory,
they declare that in this case too the motion is interrupted by moments
of rest. They believe that it is the fault of man’s senses if he
believes that the arrow moves continuously, for there are many things
which cannot be perceived by the senses, as they assert in the twelfth
proposition. But we ask them: “Have you observed a complete revolution
of a millstone? Each point in the extreme circumference of the stone
describes a large circle in the very same time in which a point nearer
the centre describes a small circle; the velocity of the outer circle
is therefore greater than that of the inner circle. You cannot say that
the motion of the latter was interrupted by more moments of rest; for
the whole moving body, i.e., the millstone, is one coherent body.” They
reply, “During the circular motion, the parts of the millstone separate
from each other, and the moments of rest interrupting the motion of the
portions nearer the centre are more than those which interrupt the
motion of the outer portions.” We ask again, “How is it that the
millstone, which we perceive as one body, and which cannot be easily
broken, even with a hammer, resolves into its atoms when it moves, and
becomes again one coherent body, returning to its previous state as
soon as it comes to rest, while no one is able to notice the breaking
up [of the stone]?” Again their reply is based on the twelfth
proposition, which is to the effect that the perception of the senses
cannot be trusted, and thus only the evidence of the intellect is
admissible. Do not imagine that you have seen in the foregoing example
the most absurd of the inferences which may be drawn from these three
propositions: the proposition relating to the existence of a vacuum
leads to more preposterous and extravagant conclusions. Nor must you
suppose that the aforegoing theory concerning motion is less irrational
than the proposition resulting from this theory, that the diagonal of a
square is equal to one of its sides, and some of the Mutakallemim go so
far as to declare that the square is not a thing of real existence. In
short, the adoption of the first proposition would be tantamount to the
rejection of all that has been proved in Geometry. The propositions in
Geometry would, in this respect, be divided into two classes: some
would be absolutely rejected; e.g., those which relate to properties of
the incommensurability and the commensurability of lines and planes, to
rational and irrational lines, and all other propositions contained in
the tenth book of Euclid, and in similar works. Other propositions
would appear to be only partially correct; e.g., the solution of the
problem to divide a line into two equal parts, if the line consists of
an odd number of atoms; according to the theory of the Mutakallemim
such a line cannot be bisected. Furthermore, in the well-known book of
problems by the sons of Shakir are contained more than a hundred
problems, all solved and practically demonstrated; but if there really
were a vacuum, not one of these problems could be solved, and many of
the waterworks [described in that book] could not have been
constructed. The refutation of such propositions is a mere waste of
time. I will now proceed to treat of the other propositions mentioned
above.

Fourth Proposition.

“The accidents of things have real existence; they are elements
superadded to the substance itself, and no material thing can be
without them.” Had this proposition been left by the Mutakallemim in
this form it would have been correct, simple, dear, and indisputable.
They have, however, gone further, asserting that a substance which has
not the attribute of life, must necessarily have that of death; for it
must always have one of two contrasting properties. According to their
opinion, colour, taste, motion or rest, combination or separation,
etc., can be predicated of all substances, and, if a substance have the
attribute of life, it must at the same time possess such other kinds of
accidents, as wisdom or folly, freewill or the reverse, power or
weakness, perception or any of its opposites, and, in short, the
substance must have the one or the other of all correlative accidents
appertaining to a living being.

Fifth Proposition.

“The atom is fully provided with all these foregoing accidents, and
cannot exist if any be wanting.” The meaning of the proposition is
this: The Mutakallemim say that each of the atoms created by God must
have accidents, such as colour, smell, motion, or rest, except the
accident of quantity: for according to their opinion an atom has no
magnitude; and they do not designate quantity as an accident, nor do
they apply to it the laws of accidents. In accordance with this
proposition, they do not say, when an accident is noticed in a body,
that it is peculiar to the body as such, but that it exists in each of
the atoms which form the constituent elements of that body. E.g., take
a heap of snow; the whiteness does not exist in that heap as a whole,
but each atom of the snow is white, and therefore the aggregate of
these atoms is likewise white. Similarly they say that when a body
moves each atom of it moves, and thus the whole body is in motion. Life
likewise exists, according to their view, in each atom of a living
body. The same is the case according to their opinion with the senses;
in each atom of the aggregate they notice the faculty of perception.
Life, sensation, intellect and wisdom are considered by them as
accidents, like blackness and whiteness, as will be shown in the
further discussion of their theory.

Concerning the soul, they do not agree. The view most predominant among
them is the following:—The soul is an accident existing in one of the
atoms of which, e.g., man is composed; the aggregate is called a being
endowed with a soul, in so far as it includes that atom. Others are of
opinion that the soul is composed of ethereal atoms, which have a
peculiar faculty by virtue of which they constitute the soul, and that
these atoms are mixed with the atoms of the body. Consequently they
maintain that the soul is an accident.

As to the intellect, I found that all of them agreed in considering it
to be an accident joined to one of the atoms which constitute the whole
of the intelligent being. But there is a confusion among them about
knowledge; they are uncertain whether it is an accident to each of the
atoms which form the knowing aggregate, or whether it belongs only to
one atom. Both views can be disproved by a reductio ad absurdum, when
the following facts are pointed out to them. Generally metals and
stones have a peculiar colour, which is strongly pronounced, but
disappears when they are pulverised. Vitriol, which is intensely green,
becomes white dust when pounded; this shows that that accident exists
only in the aggregate, not in the atoms. This fact is more striking in
the following instance: when parts of a living being are cut off they
cease to live, a proof that the accident [of life] belongs to the
aggregate of the living being, not to each atom. In order to meet this
objection they say that the accident is of no duration, but is
constantly renewed. In discussing the next proposition I shall explain
their view on this subject.

Sixth Proposition.

“The accidents do not exist during two time-atoms.”—The sense of the
proposition is this: They believe that God creates a substance, and
simultaneously its accidents; that the Creator is incapable of creating
a substance devoid of an accident, for that is impossible; that the
essential characteristic of an accident is its incapability of enduring
for two periods, for two time-atoms; that immediately after its
creation it is utterly destroyed, and another accident of the same kind
is created; this again is destroyed and a third accident of the same
kind is created, and so on, so long as God is pleased to preserve [in
that substance] this kind of accident; but He can at His will create in
the same substance an accident of a different kind, and if He were to
discontinue the creation and not produce a new accident, that substance
would at once cease to exist. This is one of the opinions held by the
Mutakallemim; it has been accepted by most of them, and it is the
so-called “theory of the creation of the accidents.” Some of them,
however, and they belong to the sect of the Muʻtazilah, say that there
are accidents which endure for a certain period, and other accidents
which do not endure for two atoms of time; they do not follow a fixed
principle in deciding what class of accidents has and what class has
not a certain duration. The object of this proposition is to oppose the
theory that there exists a natural force from which each body derives
its peculiar properties. They prefer to assume that God himself creates
these properties without the intervention of a natural force or of any
other agency: a theory which implies that no accident can have any
duration. For suppose that certain accidents could endure for a certain
period and then cease to exist, the question would naturally be asked,
What is the cause of that non-existence? They would not be satisfied
with the reply that God by His will brought about this non-existence,
and non-existence does not at all require any agens whatever; for as
soon as the agens leaves off acting, the product of the agens ceases
likewise to exist. This is true to some extent. Having thus chosen to
establish the theory that there does not exist any natural force upon
which the existence or non-existence of a thing depends, they were
compelled to assume that the properties of things were successively
renewed. When God desires to deprive a thing of its existence, He,
according to some of the Mutakallemim, discontinues the creation of its
accidents, and eo ipso the body ceases to exist. Others, however, say
that if it pleased the Almighty to destroy the world, He would create
the accident of destruction, which would be without any substratum. The
destruction of the Universe would be the correlative accident to that
of existence.—In accordance with this [sixth] proposition they say,
that the cloth which according to our belief we dyed red, has not been
dyed by us at all, but God created that colour in the cloth when it
came into contact with the red pigment; we believe that colour to have
penetrated into the cloth, but they assert that this is not the case.
They say that God generally acts in such a way, that, e.g., the black
colour is not created unless the cloth is brought into contact with
indigo; but this blackness, which God creates in the instant when the
cloth touches the black pigment is of no duration, and another creation
of blackness then takes place; they further say that after the
blackness is gone, He does not create a red or green colour, but again
a black colour.

According to this principle, the knowledge which we have of certain
things to-day, is not the same which we had of them yesterday; that
knowledge is gone, and another like it has been created. They
positively believe that this does take place, knowledge being an
accident. In like manner it would follow that the soul, according to
those who believe that it is an accident, is renewed each moment in
every animated being, say a hundred thousand times; for, as you know,
time is composed of time-atoms. In accordance with this principle they
assert that when man is perceived to move a pen, it is not he who has
really moved it; the motion produced in the pen is an accident which
God has created in the pen; the apparent motion of the hand which moves
the pen is likewise an accident which God has created in the moving
hand; but the creative act of God is performed in such a manner that
the motion of the hand and the motion of the pen follow each other
closely; but the hand does not act, and is not the cause of the pen’s
motion; for, as they say, an accident cannot pass from one thing to
another. Some of the Mutakallemim accordingly contend that this white
cloth, which is coloured when put into the vessel filled with indigo,
has not been blackened by the indigo; for blackness being an attribute
of indigo, does not pass from one object to another. There does not
exist any thing to which an action could be ascribed; the real agens is
God, and He has [in the foregoing instance] created the blackness in
the substance of the cloth when it came into contact with the indigo,
for this is the method adopted by Him. In short, most of the
Mutakallemim believe that it must never be said that one thing is the
cause of another; some of them who assumed causality were blamed for
doing so. As regards, however, the acts of man their opinions are
divided. Most of them, especially the sect of the Asha’ariyah, assume
that when the pen is set in motion God has created four accidents, none
of which is the cause of any of the rest, they are only related to each
other as regards the time of their co-existence, and have no other
relation to each other. The first accident is man’s will to move the
pen, the second is man’s power to do so, the third is the bodily motion
itself, i.e., the motion of the hand, and the fourth is the motion of
the pen. They believe that when a man has the will to do a thing and,
as he believes, does it, the will has been created for him, then the
power to conform to the will, and lastly the act itself. The act is not
accomplished by the power created in man; for, in reality, no act can
be ascribed to that power. The Muʻtazilah contend that man acts by
virtue of the power which has been created in him. Some of the
Asha’ariyah assert that the power created in man participates in the
act, and is connected with it, an opinion which has been rejected by
the majority of them. The will and the power created in man, according
to the concurrent belief of the Mutakallemim, together with the act
created in him, according to some of them, are accidents without
duration. In the instance of the pen, God continually creates one
motion after the other so long as the pen is in motion; it only then
ceases to move when God has created in it the accident of rest; and so
long as the pen is at rest, God continually renews in it that accident.
Consequently in every one of these moments, i.e., of the time-atoms,
God creates some accident in every existing individual, e.g., in the
angels, in the spheres and in other things; this creation takes place
continually and without interruption. Such is, according to their
opinion, the right interpretation of the creed that God is the causa
efficiens. But I, together with all rational persons, apply to those
theories the words, “Will you mock at Him, as you mock at man?” for
their words are indeed nothing but mockery.

Seventh Proposition.

“The absence of a property is itself a property that exists in the
body, a something superadded to its substance, an actual accident,
which is constantly renewed; as soon as it is destroyed it is
reproduced.” The reason why they hold this opinion is this: they do not
understand that rest is the absence of motion; death the absence of
life; that blindness is the absence of sight, and that all similar
negative properties are the absence of the positive correlatives. The
relation between motion and rest is, according to their theory, the
same as the relation between heat and cold, namely, as heat and cold
are two accidents found in two objects which have the properties of
heat and cold, so motion is an accident created in the thing which
moves, and rest an accident created in the thing which rests; it does
not remain in existence during two consecutive time-atoms, as we have
stated in treating of the previous proposition. Accordingly, when a
body is at rest, God has created the rest in each atom of that body,
and so long as the body remains at rest God continually renews that
property. The same, they believe, is the case with a man’s wisdom and
ignorance; the latter is considered by them as an actual accident,
which is subject to the constant changes of destruction and creation,
so long as there remains a thing of which such a man is ignorant. Death
and life are likewise accidents, and as the Mutakallemim distinctly
state, life is constantly destroyed and renewed during the whole
existence of a living being; when God decrees its death, He creates in
it the accident of death after the accident of life, which does not
continue during two time-atoms, has ceased to exist. All this they
state clearly.

The logical consequence of this proposition is that the accident of
death created by God instantly ceases to exist, and is replaced by
another death which again is created by God; otherwise death could not
continue. Death is thus continually created in the same manner as life
is renewed every moment. But I should wish to know how long God
continues to create death in a dead body. Does He do so whilst the form
remains, or whilst one of the atoms exists? For in each of the atoms of
the body the accident of death which God creates is produced, and there
are to be found teeth of persons who died thousands of years ago; we
see that those teeth have not been deprived of existence, and therefore
the accident of death has during all these thousands of years been
renewed, and according to the opinion prevailing amongst those
theorists, death was continually replaced by death. Some of the
Muʻtazilah hold that there are cases in which the absence of a physical
property is not a real property, that weariness is the absence of
strength, and ignorance the absence of knowledge; but this cannot be
said in every case of negative properties: it cannot be said that
darkness is the mere absence of light, or that rest is the absence of
motion. Some negative properties are thus considered by them as having
a real existence, while other negative properties are considered as
non-existing, just as suits their belief. Here they proceed in the same
manner as they proceed respecting the duration of accidents, and they
contend that some accidents exist a long time, and other accidents do
not last two time-atoms. Their sole object is to fashion the Universe
according to their peculiar opinions and beliefs.

Eighth Proposition.

“There exists nothing but substance and accident, and the physical form
of things belong to the class of accidents.” It is the object of this
proposition to show that all bodies are composed of similar atoms, as
we have pointed out in explaining the first proposition. The difference
of bodies from each other is caused by the accidents, and by nothing
else. Animality, humanity, sensibility, and speech, are denoted as
accidents like blackness, whiteness, bitterness, and sweetness, and the
difference between two individuals of two classes is the same as the
difference of two individuals of the same class. Also the body of the
heaven, the body of the angels, the body of the Divine Throne—such as
it is assumed to be—the body of anything creeping on the earth, and the
body of any plant, have one and the same substance; they only differ in
the peculiarity of the accidents, and in nothing else; the substance of
all things is made up of equal atoms.

Ninth Proposition.

“None of the accidents form the substratum of another accident; it
cannot be said, This is an accident to a thing which is itself an
accident to a substance. All accidents are directly connected with the
substance.” The Mutakallemim deny the indirect relation of the accident
to the substance, because if such a relation were assumed it would
follow that the second accident could only exist in the substance after
another accident had preceded it, a conclusion to which they would
object even with regard to some special accidents; they prefer to show
that these accidents can exist in every possible substance, although
such substance is not determined by any other accident; for they hold
that all the accidents collectively determine the thing. They advance
also another proof [in support of this proposition], namely: The
substratum which is the bearer of certain attributes must continue to
exist for a certain time; how, then, could the accident;
which—according to their opinion—does not remain in existence for two
moments, become the substratum of something else?

Tenth Proposition.

This proposition concerns the theory of “admissibility,” which is
mentioned by the Mutakallemim, and forms the principal support of their
doctrine. Mark its purport: they observe that everything conceived by
the imagination is admitted by the intellect as possible; e.g., that
the terrestrial globe should become the all-encompassing sphere, or
that this sphere should become the terrestrial globe; reason does not
find here an impossibility; or that the sphere of fire should move
towards the centre, and the sphere of earth towards the circumference.
Human intellect does not perceive any reason why a body should be in a
certain place instead of being in another. In the same manner they say
that reason admits the possibility that an existing being should be
larger or smaller than it really is, or that it should be different in
form and position from what it really is; e.g., a man might have the
height of a mountain, might have several heads, and fly in the air; or
an elephant might be as small as an insect, or an insect as huge as an
elephant. This method of admitting possibilities is applied to the
whole Universe. Whenever they affirm that a thing belongs to this class
of admitted possibilities, they say that it can have this form, and
that it is also possible that it be found differently, and that the one
form is not more possible than the other; but they do not ask whether
the reality confirms their assumption. They say that the thing which
exists with certain constant and permanent forms, dimensions, and
properties, only follows the direction of habit, just as the king
generally rides on horseback through the streets of the city, and is
never found departing from this habit; but reason does not find it
impossible that he should walk on foot through the place; there is no
doubt that he may do so, and this possibility is fully admitted by the
intellect. Similarly, earth moves towards the centre, fire turns away
from the centre; fire causes heat, water causes cold, in accordance
with a certain habit; but it is logically not impossible that a
deviation from this habit should occur, namely, that fire should cause
cold, move downward, and still be fire; that the water should cause
heat, move upward, and still be water. On this foundation their whole
fabric is constructed. They admit, however, the impossibility of two
opposite properties coexisting at the same time in one substance. This
is impossible; reason would not admit this possibility. Again, reason
does not admit the possibility of a substance existing without an
accident, or an accident existing without a substance, a possibility
admitted by some of the Mutakallemim. It is also impossible that a
substance should become an accident, that an accident should become a
substance, or that one substance should penetrate another. They admit
that reason rejects all these things as impossible. It is perfectly
true that no notion whatever can be formed of those things which they
describe as impossible; whilst a notion can be formed of those things
which they consider as possible. The philosophers object to this
method, and say, You call a thing impossible because it cannot be
imagined, or possible because it can be imagined; and thus you consider
as possible that which is found possible by imagination, not by the
intellect, consequently you determine that a thing is necessary,
possible, or impossible in some instances, by the aid of the
imagination—not by the intellect—and in other instances by the ordinary
common sense, as Abu Nasr says in speaking of that which the
Mutakallemim call intellect. It is clear that they describe as possible
that which can be imagined, whether the reality correspond to it or
not, and as impossible that which cannot be imagined. This proposition
can only be established by the nine aforementioned propositions, and no
doubt these were exclusively required for the support of this
proposition. This you will see clearly when I shall show and explain to
you some important parts of this theory, which I shall now introduce in
the form of a discussion supposed to have taken place between a
Mutakallem and a philosopher.

The Mutakallem said to the philosopher: What is the reason that we find
the substance of iron extremely hard and strong, with a dark colour;
the substance of cream, on the other hand, extremely soft and white?
The philosopher replied as follows: All physical bodies have two kinds
of accidents: those which concern their substance, as, e.g., the health
and the illness of a man; and those which concern their form, as, e.g.,
the astonishment and laughter of a man. The substances of compound
bodies differ very much in their ultimate form, according to the
difference of the forms peculiar to each component substance. Hence the
substance of iron has become in its properties the opposite of the
substance of cream, and this difference is attended by the difference
of accidents. You notice, therefore, hardness in the one, and softness
in the other: two accidents, whose difference results from the
difference which exists in the forms of the substances; while the
darkness and the whiteness are accidents whose divergence corresponds
to that of the two substances in their ultimate condition. The
Mutakallem refuted this reply by means of his propositions, as I am now
going to state:—There does not exist a form which, as you believe,
modifies the substance, and thus causes substances to be different from
each other; this difference is exclusively effected by the
accidents—according to the theory of the Kalâm, which we mentioned in
explaining the eighth proposition. He then continued thus: There is no
difference between the substance of iron and that of cream; all things
are composed of the same kind of atoms.—We explained the view of the
Mutakallemim on this point in treating of the first proposition, the
logical consequences of which are, as we have shown, the second and the
third propositions; they further require the twelfth proposition, in
order to establish the theory of atoms. Nor do they admit that any
accidents determine the nature of a substance, or predispose it to
receive certain other accidents; for, according to their opinion, an
accident cannot be the substratum of another accident, as we have shown
in explaining the ninth proposition; nor can it have any duration,
according to the sixth proposition. When the Mutakallemim have
established all that they wish to infer from these propositions, they
arrive at the conclusion that the component atoms of cream and of iron
are alike.—The relation of each atom to each of the accidents is the
same; one atom is not more adapted than another to receive a certain
accident; and as a certain atom is not more fitted to move than to
rest, so one atom is not more apt than another to receive the accident
of life, of reason, of sensation. It is here of no moment whether a
thing contains a larger or smaller quantity of atoms, for, according to
the view of the Mutakallemim, which we explained in treating of the
fifth proposition, every accident [of a thing] exists in each of its
atoms. All these propositions lead to the conclusion that a human being
is not better constituted to become wise than the bat, and establish
the theory of admissibility expressed in this [tenth] proposition.
Every effort was made to demonstrate this proposition, because it is
the best means for proving anything they like, as will be explained.

Note.—Mark, O reader, that if you know the nature of the soul and its
properties, and if you have a correct notion of everything which
concerns the soul, you will observe that most animals possess
imagination. As to the higher class of animals, that is, those which
have a heart, it is obvious that they have imagination. Man’s
distinction does not consist in the possession of imagination, and the
action of imagination is not the same as the action of the intellect,
but the reverse of it. For the intellect analyses and divides the
component parts of things, it forms abstract ideas of them, represents
them in their true form as well as in their causal relations, derives
from one object a great many facts, which—for the intellect—totally
differ from each other, just as two human individuals appear different
to the imagination; it distinguishes that which is the property of the
genus from that which is peculiar to the individual,—and no proof is
correct, unless founded on the former; the intellect further determines
whether certain qualities of a thing are essential or non-essential.
Imagination has none of these functions. It only perceives the
individual, the compound in that aggregate condition in which it
presents itself to the senses; or it combines things which exist
separately, joins some of them together, and represents them all as one
body or as a force of the body. Hence it is that some imagine a man
with a horse’s head, with wings, etc. This is called a fiction, a
phantasm; it is a thing to which nothing in the actual world
corresponds. Nor can imagination in any way obtain a purely immaterial
image of an object, however abstract the form of the image may be.
Imagination yields therefore no test for the reality of a thing.

Hear what profit we derive from the preliminary disciplines, and how
excellent the propositions are which we learn through them. Know that
there are certain things, which would appear impossible, if tested by
man’s imagination, being as inconceivable as the co-existence of two
opposite properties in one object; yet the existence of those same
things, which cannot be represented by imagination, is nevertheless
established by proof, and attested by their reality. E.g., Imagine a
large globe, of any magnitude you like, even as large as the
all-encompassing sphere; further an axis passing through the centre,
and two persons standing on the two extremities of the axis in such a
manner that their feet are in the same straight line with the axis,
which may be either in the plane of the horizon or not; in the first
case both persons would fall, in the second case one, namely the one
who stands on the lower extremity would fall, the other would remain
standing, as far as our imagination can perceive. It has however,
already been proved that the earth has the form of a globe, that it is
inhabited on both extremities of a certain diameter, that both the
inhabitants have their heads towards the heaven, and their legs towards
each other, and yet neither can possibly fall, nor can it be imagined;
for it is incorrect to say that the one extremity is above, the other
below; but the term “above” and “below” apply to both of them as
regards their relative position to each other. Similarly it has been
proved in the second chapter of the book on Conic Sections, that two
lines, which at first are at a certain distance from each other, may
approach each other in the same proportion as they are produced
further, and yet would never meet, even if they were produced to
infinity, although they are observed to be constantly converging. This
is a fact which cannot easily be conceived, and which does not come
within the scope of imagination. Of these two lines the one is
straight, the other curved, as stated in the aforementioned book. It
has consequently been proved that things which cannot be perceived or
imagined, and which would be found impossible if tested solely by
imagination, are nevertheless in real existence. The non-existence of
things which are represented by imagination as possible has likewise
been established by proof, e.g., the corporeality of God, and His
existence as a force residing in a body. Imagination perceives nothing
except bodies, or properties inherent in bodies.

It has thus been clearly shown that in man exists a certain faculty
which is entirely distinct from imagination, and by which the
necessary, the possible, and the impossible can be distinguished from
each other. This inquiry is most useful. It is of the greatest profit
to him who desires to guard himself against the errors of men guided by
imagination! Do not think that the Mutakallemim ignore this altogether;
to some extent they do take it into consideration; they know it, and
call that which can be imagined without having reality—as, e.g., the
corporeality of God—a phantom and a fancy; they state frequently that
such phantoms are not real. It is for this reason that they advance the
first nine propositions and establish on them the proof of the tenth,
according to which all those imaginable things which they wish to admit
as possible are really possible, because of the similarity of all atoms
and the equality of all accidents as regards their accidentality, as we
have explained.

Consider, O reader, and bear in mind that this requires deep research.
For there are certain notions which some believe to be founded on
reason, while others regard them as mere fictions. In such cases it
would be necessary to find something that could show the difference
between conceptions of the intellect and mere imaginary fancies. When
the philosopher, in his way of expressing himself, contends, “Reality
is my evidence; by its guidance I examine whether a thing is necessary,
possible, or impossible,” the religionist replies, “This is exactly the
difference between us; that which actually exists, has, according to my
view, been produced by the will of the Creator, not by necessity; just
as it has been created with that special property, it might have been
created with any other property, unless the impossibility which you
postulate be proved by a logical demonstration.”

About this admissibility (of imaginable things) I shall have to say
more, and I shall return to it in various parts of this treatise; for
it is not a subject which should be rejected in haste and on the spur
of the moment.

Eleventh Proposition.

“The existence of the infinite is in every respect impossible.” The
following is an explanation of this proposition. The impossibility of
the existence of an infinite body has been clearly demonstrated; the
same can be said of an infinite number of bodies, though each of them
be finite, if these beings, infinite in number, exist at the same time;
equally impossible is the existence of an infinite series of causes,
namely, that a certain thing should be the cause of another thing, but
itself the effect of another cause, which again is the result of
another cause, and so on to infinity, or that things in an infinite
series, either bodies or ideals, should be in actual existence, and in
causal relation to each other. This causal relation is the essential
order of nature, in which, as has been fully proved, the infinite is
impossible. As regards the virtual and the accidental existence of the
infinite, it has been established in some cases; it has been proved,
e.g., that a body can virtually be divided ad infinitum, also that time
can be divided ad infinitum; in other cases it is still an open
question, as, e.g., the existence of the infinite in succession, which
is called the accidental infinite, i.e., a series of things in which
one thing comes forth when the other is gone, and this again in its
turn succeeded a thing which had ceased to exist, and so on ad
infinitum. This subject requires deep research.

Those who boast that they have proved the eternity of the Universe say
that time is infinite; an assertion which is not necessarily erroneous;
for only when one atom has ceased to exist, the other follows. Nor is
it absolutely wrong, when they assert, that the accidents of the
substance succeed each other in an infinite series, for these accidents
do not co-exist, but come in succession one after the other, and the
impossibility of the infinite in that case has not been proved. The
Mutakallemim, however, make no difference between the existence of an
infinite body and the divisibility of a body or of time ad infinitum,
between the co-existence of an infinite number of things, as e.g., the
individual human beings who exist at present, and the infinite number
of beings successively existing, as, e.g., Reuben the son of Jacob, and
Jacob the son of Isaac, and Isaac the son of Abraham, and so on to
infinity. This is according to their opinion as inadmissible as the
first case; they believe these four forms of the infinite to be quite
equal. Some of the Mutakallemim endeavour to establish their
proposition concerning the last named form of the infinite, and to
demonstrate its impossibility by a method which I shall explain in this
treatise; others say that this impossibility is a self-evident axiom
and requires no further proof. But if it were undoubtedly wrong to
assume that an infinite number of things can exist in succession,
although that link of the series which exists at present is finite, the
inadmissibility of the eternity of the Universe would be equally
self-evident, and would not require for its proof any other
proposition. This, however, is not the place for investigating the
subject.

Twelfth Proposition.

“The senses are not always to be trusted.” For two reasons the
Mutakallemim find fault with the perception of the senses. First, the
senses are precluded from perceiving many objects, either on account of
the smallness of the objects—this is the case with the atoms, as we
have already stated—or on account of the remoteness of the objects from
the person who desires to perceive them; e.g., we cannot see, hear, or
smell at a distance of many miles; nor do we perceive the motion of the
heavens. Secondly, the senses misapprehend the objects of their
perception: a large object appears small from a distance; a small
object immersed in water appears larger; a crooked thing appears
straight when partly placed in water, and partly out of it; things
appear yellow to a person suffering from jaundice; sweet things are
bitter to him whose tongue has imbibed red gall; and they mention many
other things of this kind. Therefore they say, we cannot trust our
senses so far as to establish any proof on their perceptions. You must
not believe that the Mutakallemim had no purpose in agreeing upon this
proposition, or as most of the later adherents of that school affirm,
that the first Mutakallemim had no ulterior object in endeavouring to
prove the existence of atoms. On the contrary, every proposition here
mentioned is indispensable; if one of these be rejected, the whole
theory falls to the ground. The last-mentioned proposition is of
particular importance; for when our senses perceive things by which any
of the foregoing propositions are confuted, the Mutakallemim say that
no notice should be taken of the perception of the senses so long as
the proposition is supported by the testimony of the intellect, and
established (as they believe) by proof. Thus they say that the
continuous motion is interrupted by moments of rest; that the millstone
in its motion is broken into atoms; that the white colour of a garment
ceases to exist, and another whiteness comes in its stead. All these
theories are contrary to what the eye perceives, and many inferences
are drawn from the assumed existence of a vacuum, all of which are
contradicted by the senses. The Mutakallemim, however, meet these
objections by saying, whenever they can do so, that the perception of
these things is withheld from the senses; in other instances they
maintain that the contradiction has its source in the deceptive
character of the senses. You know that this theory is very ancient, and
was the pride of the sophists, who asserted that they themselves were
its authors; this is stated by Galenus in his treatise on natural
forces; and you know well what he says of those who will not admit the
evidence of the senses.

Having discussed these propositions, I now proceed to explain the
theory of the Mutakallemim concerning the above-mentioned four
problems.

CHAPTER LXXIV

In this chapter will be given an outline of the proofs by which the
Mutakallemim attempt to demonstrate that the universe is not eternal.
You must of course not expect that I shall quote their lengthy
arguments verbatim; I only intend to give an abstract of each proof, to
show in what way it helps to establish the theory of the creatio ex
nihilo or to confute the eternity of the universe, and briefly to
notice the propositions they employed in support of their theory. If
you were to read their well-known and voluminous writings, you would
not discover any arguments with which they support their view left
unnoticed in the present outline, but you might find there greater
copiousness of words combined with more grace and elegance of style;
frequently they employ rhyme, rhythm, and poetical diction, and
sometimes mysterious phrases which perhaps are intended to startle
persons listening to their discourses, and to deter those who might
otherwise criticize them. You would also find many repetitions;
questions propounded and, as they believe, answered, and frequent
attacks on those who differ from their opinions.

The First Argument.

Some of the Mutakallemim thought that by proving the creation of one
thing, they demonstrated the creatio ex nihilo in reference to the
entire universe. E.g., Zaid, who from a small molecule had gradually
been brought to a state of perfection, has undoubtedly not effected
this change and development by his own efforts, but owes it to an
external agency. It is therefore clear that an agent is required for
such organization and successive transmutation. A palm-tree or any
other object might equally be selected to illustrate this idea. The
whole universe, they argue, is analogous to these instances. Thus you
see how they believe that a law discovered in one thing may equally be
applied to everything.

The Second Argument.

This argument is likewise based on the belief that the proof by which
the creation of one thing is demonstrated, holds good for the creatio
ex nihilo in reference to the whole universe. E.g., a certain
individual, called Zaid, who one time was not yet in existence,
subsequently came into existence; and if it be assumed that Amr, his
father, was the cause of his existence, Amr himself must likewise have
passed from non-existence into existence; suppose then that Zaid’s
father unquestionably owed his origin to Khaled, Zaid’s grandfather, it
would be found that Khaled himself did not exist from eternity, and the
series of causes could thus be carried back to infinity. But such an
infinite series of beings is inadmissible according to the theory of
the Mutakallemim, as we have shown in our discussion of the eleventh
proposition. In continuing this species of reasoning, you come to a
first man, who had no parent, viz. Adam. Then you will of course ask,
whence came this first man? If, e.g., the reply be given that he was
made out of earth, you will again inquire, “Whence came that earth?”
“Out of water.” “Whence came the water?” The inquiry would be carried
on, either ad infinitum, which is absurd, or until you meet with a
something that came into existence from absolute non-existence; in this
latter case you would arrive at the real truth; here the series of
inquiries ends. This result of the question proves, according to the
opinion of the Mutakallemim, that the whole universe came into
existence from absolute non-existence.

The Third Argument.

The atoms of things are necessarily either joined together or separate,
and even the same atoms may at one time be united at another disunited.
It is therefore evident that the nature of the atoms does not
necessitate either their combination or their separation; for if they
were separate by virtue of their nature they would never join, and if
they were joined by virtue of their nature, they could never again be
separated. Thus there is no reason why atoms should rather be combined
than separate, or vice versâ, why rather in a state of separation than
of combination. Seeing that some atoms are joined, others separate, and
again others subject to change, they being combined at one time and
separated at another, the fact may therefore be taken as a proof that
the atoms cannot combine or separate without an agent. This argument,
according to the opinion of the Mutakallemim, establishes the theory
that the universe has been created from nothing. You have already been
told, that those who employ this argument rely on the first proposition
of the Mutakallemim with its corollaries.

The Fourth Argument.

The whole Universe is composed of substance and accidents; every
substance must possess one accident or more, and since the accidents
are not eternal, the substance, the substratum of the accidents, cannot
be eternal; for that which is joined to transient things and cannot
exist without them is itself transient. Therefore the whole Universe
has had a beginning. To the objection, that the substance may possibly
be eternal while the accidents, though in themselves transient, succeed
each other in an infinite series, they reply that, in this case, an
infinite number of transient things would be in existence, an
eventuality which, according to their theory, is impossible. This