grave and momentous. But the gravity of the situation was chiefly based
upon the possibility,--if not upon a probability,--of a reversal of
what had been the established order of things, especially those of a
political nature.

The inevitable conflict between the antagonistic elements of which
Southern society was composed could no longer be postponed. But the
colored vote was the important factor which now had to be considered and
taken into account. It was conceded that whatever element or faction
could secure the favor and win the support of the colored vote would be
the dominant and controlling one in the State. It is true that between
1868 and 1872, when the great majority of Southern whites maintained a
policy of "masterly inactivity," the colored voters were obliged to
utilize such material among the whites as was available; but it is a
well-known fact that much of the material thus utilized was from
necessity and not from choice, and that whenever and wherever an
acceptable and reputable white man would place himself in a position
where his services could be utilized he was gladly taken up and loyally
supported by the colored voters.

After 1872 the necessity for supporting undesirable material no longer
existed; and colored voters had the opportunity not only of supporting
Southern whites for all the important positions in the State, but also
of selecting the best and most desirable among them. Whether the poor
whites or the aristocrats of former days were to be placed in control of
the affairs of the State was a question which the colored voters alone
could settle and determine. That the colored man's preference should be
the aristocrat of the past was perfectly natural, since the relations
between them had been friendly, cordial and amicable even during the
days of slavery. Between the blacks and the poor whites the feeling had
been just the other way; which was due not so much to race antipathy as
to jealousy and envy on the part of the poor whites, growing out of the
cordial and friendly relations between the aristocrats and their slaves;
and because the slaves were, in a large measure, their competitors in
the industrial market. When the partiality of the colored man for the
former aristocrats became generally known, they--the former
aristocrats,--began to come into the Republican party in large numbers.
In Mississippi they were led by such men as Alcorn, in Georgia by
Longstreet, in Virginia by Moseby, and also had as leaders such
ex-governors as Orr, of South Carolina; Brown, of Georgia, and Parsons,
of Alabama.

Between 1872 and 1875 the accessions to the Republican ranks were so
large that it is safe to assert that from twenty-five to thirty per cent
of the white men of the Southern States were identified with the
Republican party; and those who thus acted were among the best and most
substantial men of that section. Among that number in the State of
Mississippi was J.L. Alcorn, J.A. Orr, J.B. Deason, R.W. Flournoy, and
Orlando Davis. In addition to these there were thousands of others, many
of them among the most prominent men of the State. Among the number was
Judge Hiram Cassidy, who was the candidate of the Democratic party for
Congress from the Sixth District in 1872, running against the writer of
these lines. He was one of the most brilliant and successful members of
the bar in southern Mississippi. Captain Thomas W. Hunt, of Jefferson
County, was a member of one of the oldest, best, and most influential
families of the South. The family connections were not, however,
confined to the South; George Hunt Pendelton of Ohio, for instance, who
was the Democratic candidate for Vice-President of the United States on
the ticket with McClellan, in 1864, and who was later one of the United
States Senators from Ohio, was a member of the same family.

While the colored men held the key to the situation, the white men knew
that the colored men had no desire to rule or dominate even the
Republican party. All the colored men wanted and demanded was a voice in
the government under which they lived, and to the support of which they
contributed, and to have a small, but fair, and reasonable proportion of
the positions that were at the disposal of the voters of the State and
of the administration.

While the colored men did not look with favor upon a political alliance
with the poor whites, it must be admitted that, with very few
exceptions, that class of whites did not seek, and did not seem to
desire such an alliance. For this there were several well-defined
reasons.

In the first place, while the primary object of importing slaves into
that section was to secure labor for the cultivation of cotton, the
slave was soon found to be an apt pupil in other lines of industry. In
addition to having his immense cotton plantations cultivated by slave
labor, the slave-owner soon learned that he could utilize these slaves
as carpenters, painters, plasterers, bricklayers, blacksmiths and in all
other fields of industrial occupations and usefulness. Thus the whites
who depended upon their labor for a living along those lines had their
field of opportunity very much curtailed. Although the slaves were not
responsible for this condition, the fact that they were there and were
thus utilized, created a feeling of bitterness and antipathy on the part
of the laboring whites which could not be easily wiped out.

In the second place, the whites of that class were not at that time as
ambitious, politically, as were the aristocrats. They had been held in
political subjection so long that it required some time for them to
realize that there had been a change. At that time they, with a few
exceptions, were less efficient, less capable, and knew less about
matters of state and governmental administration than many of the
ex-slaves. It was a rare thing, therefore, to find one of that class at
that time that had any political ambition or manifested any desire for
political distinction or official recognition. As a rule, therefore, the
whites that came into the leadership of the Republican party between
1872 and 1875 were representatives of the most substantial families of
the land.

CHAPTER XI

RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RADICALISM IN THE SOUTH

After the Presidential election of 1872 no one could be found who
questioned the wisdom or practicability of the Congressional Plan of
Reconstruction, or who looked for its overthrow, change or modification.
After that election the situation was accepted by everyone in perfect
good faith. No one could be found in any party or either race who was
bold enough to express the opinion that the Congressional Plan of
Reconstruction was a mistake, or that negro suffrage was a failure. To
the contrary it was admitted by all that the wisdom of both had been
fully tested and clearly vindicated. It will not be denied even now by
those who will take the time to make a careful examination of the
situation, that no other plan could have been devised or adopted that
could have saved to the country the fruits of the victory that had been
won on the field of battle. The adoption of any other plan would have
resulted in the accomplishment of nothing but the mere physical
abolition of slavery and a denial of the right of a State to withdraw
from the Union. These would have been mere abstract propositions, with
no authority vested in the National Government for their enforcement.
The war for the Union would have been practically a failure. The South
would have gained and secured substantially everything for which it
contended except the establishment of an independent government. The
black man, therefore, was the savior of his country, not only on the
field of battle, but after the smoke of battle had cleared away.

Notwithstanding the general acceptance of this plan after the
Presidential election of 1872, we find that in the fall of 1874 there
was a complete and radical change in the situation,--a change both
sudden and unexpected. It came, as it were, in the twinkling of an eye.
It was like a clap of thunder from a clear sky. It was the State and
Congressional elections of that year.

In the elections of 1872 nearly every State in the Union went
Republican. In the State and Congressional elections of 1874 the result
was the reverse of what it was two years before,--nearly every State
going Democratic. Democrats were surprised, Republicans were
dumbfounded. Such a result had not been anticipated by anyone. Even the
State of Massachusetts, the birthplace of abolitionism, the cradle of
American liberty, elected a Democratic Governor. The Democrats had a
majority in the National House of Representatives that was about equal
to that which the Republicans had elected two years before. Such veteran
Republican leaders in the United States Senate as Chandler, of Michigan,
Windom, of Minnesota, and Carpenter, of Wisconsin, were retired from the
Senate. When the returns were all in it was developed that the Democrats
did not have a clear majority on joint ballot in the Michigan
Legislature, but the margin between the two parties was so close that a
few men who had been elected as independent Republicans had the balance
of power. These Independents were opposed to the reëlection of Senator
Chandler. That the Democrats should be anxious for the retirement of
such an able, active, aggressive, and influential Republican leader as
Chandler was to be expected. That party, therefore, joined with the
Independents in the vote for Senator which resulted in the election of a
harmless old gentleman by the name of Christiancy. The Michigan
situation was found to exist also in Minnesota, and the result was the
retirement of that strong and able leader, Senator William Windom, and
the election of a new and unknown man, McMillan.

What was true of Michigan and Minnesota was also found to be true of
Wisconsin. The same sort of combination was made, which resulted in the
retirement of the able and brilliant Matt Carpenter, and the election of
a new man, Cameron, who was not then known outside of the boundaries of
his State. Cameron proved to be an able man, a useful Senator, a good
Republican and an improvement, in some respects, upon his predecessor;
but his election was a defeat of the Republican organization in his
State, which, of course, was the objective point with the Democrats.

It was the State and Congressional elections of 1874 that proved to be
the death of the Republican party at the South. The party in that
section might have survived even such a crushing blow as this, but for
subsequent unfortunate events to which allusion has been made in a
previous chapter, and which will be touched upon in some that are to
follow. But, under these conditions, its survival was impossible. If the
State and Congressional elections of 1874 had been a repetition of those
of 1872 or if they had resulted in a Republican victory, Republican
success in the Presidential election of 1876 would have been a
reasonably assured fact. By that time the party at the South would have
included in its membership from forty to fifty per cent of the white men
of their respective States and as a result thereof it would have been
strong enough to stand on its own feet and maintain its own independent
existence, regardless of reverses which the parent organization might
have sustained in other sections. But at that time the party in that
section was in its infancy. It was young, weak, and comparatively
helpless. It still needed the fostering care and the protecting hand of
the paternal source of its existence.

When the smoke of the political battle that was fought in the early part
of November, 1874, had cleared away, it was found that this strong,
vigorous and healthy parent had been carried from the battle-field
seriously wounded and unable to administer to the wants of its Southern
offspring. The offspring was not strong enough to stand alone. The
result was that its demise soon followed because it had been deprived of
that nourishment, that sustenance and that support which were essential
to its existence and which could come only from the parent which had
been seriously if not fatally wounded upon the field of battle. After
the Presidential election of 1872 Southern white men were not only
coming into the Republican party in large numbers, but the liberal and
progressive element of the Democracy was in the ascendency in that
organization. That element, therefore, shaped the policy and declared
the principles for which that organization stood. This meant the
acceptance by all political parties of what was regarded as the settled
policy of the National Government. In proof of this assertion a
quotation from a political editorial which appeared about that time in
the Jackson, Mississippi, _Clarion_,--the organ of the Democratic
party,--will not be out of place. In speaking of the colored people and
their attitude towards the whites, that able and influential paper said:

"While they [the colored people] have been naturally tenacious of their
newly-acquired privileges, their general conduct will bear them witness
that they have shown consideration for the feelings of the whites. The
race line in politics would never have been drawn if opposition had not
been made to their enjoyment of equal privileges in the government and
under the laws after they were emancipated."

In other words, the colored people had manifested no disposition to rule
or dominate the whites, and the only color line which had existed grew
out of the unwise policy which had previously been pursued by the
Democratic party in its efforts to prevent the enjoyment by the
newly-emancipated race of the rights and privileges to which they were
entitled under the Constitution and laws of the country. But after the
State and Congressional elections of 1874 the situation was materially
changed. The liberal and conservative element of the Democracy was
relegated to the rear and the radical element came to the front and
assumed charge.

Subsequent to 1872 and prior to 1875 race proscription and social
ostracism had been completely abandoned. A Southern white man could
become a Republican without being socially ostracized. Such a man was no
longer looked upon as a traitor to his people, or false to his race. He
no longer forfeited the respect, confidence, good-will, and favorable
opinion of his friends and neighbors. Bulldozing, criminal assaults and
lynchings were seldom heard of. To the contrary, cordial, friendly and
amicable relations between all classes, all parties, and both races
prevailed everywhere. Fraud, violence, and intimidation at elections
were neither suspected nor charged by anyone, for everyone knew that no
occasion existed for such things. But after the State and Congressional
elections of 1874 there was a complete change of front. The new order of
things was then set aside and the abandoned methods of a few years back
were revived and readopted.

It is no doubt true that very few men at the North who voted the
Republican ticket in 1872 and the Democratic ticket in 1874 were
influenced in changing their votes by anything connected with
Reconstruction. There were other questions at issue, no doubt, that
influenced their action. There had been in 1873, for instance, a
disastrous financial panic. Then there were other things connected with
the National Administration which met with popular disfavor. These were
the reasons, no doubt, that influenced thousands of Republicans to vote
the Democratic ticket merely as an indication of their dissatisfaction
with the National Administration.

But, let their motives and reasons be what they may, the effect was the
same as if they had intended their votes to be accepted and construed as
an endorsement of the platform declarations of the National Democratic
Convention of 1868, at least so far as Reconstruction was concerned.
Democrats claimed, and Republicans could not deny, that so far as the
South was concerned this was the effect of the Congressional elections
of 1874. Desertions from the Republican ranks at the South, in
consequence thereof, became more rapid than had been the accessions
between 1872 and 1875. Thousands who had not taken an open stand, but
who were suspected of being inclined to the Republican party, denied
that there had ever been any justifiable grounds for such suspicions.
Many who had taken an open stand on that side returned to the fold of
the Democracy in sackcloth and ashes,--upon bended knees, pleading for
mercy, forgiveness and for charitable forbearance. They had seen a new
light; and they were ready to confess that they had made a grave
mistake, but, since their motives were good and their intentions were
honest, they hoped that they would not be rashly treated nor harshly
judged.

The prospects for the gratification and realization of the ambition of
white men in that section had been completely reversed. The conviction
became a settled fact that the Democratic party was the only channel
through which it would be possible in the future for anyone to secure
political distinction or receive official recognition,--hence the return
to the ranks of that party of thousands of white men who had left it.
All of them were eventually received, though some were kept on the
anxious seat and held as probationers for a long time.

It soon developed that all that was left of the once promising and
flourishing Republican party at the South was the true, faithful, loyal,
and sincere colored men,--who remained Republican from necessity as well
as from choice,--and a few white men, who were Republicans from
principle and conviction, and who were willing to incur the odium, run
the risks, take the chances, and pay the penalty that every white
Republican who had the courage of his convictions must then pay. This
was a sad and serious disappointment to the colored men who were just
about to realize the hope and expectation of a permanent political
combination and union between themselves and the better element of the
whites, which would have resulted in good, honest, capable, and
efficient local government and in the establishment and maintenance of
peace, good-will, friendly, cordial, and amicable relations between the
two races. But this hope, politically at least, had now been destroyed,
and these expectations had been shattered and scattered to the four
winds. The outlook for the colored man was dark and anything but
encouraging. Many of the parting scenes that took place between the
colored men and the whites who decided to return to the fold of the
Democracy were both affecting and pathetic in the extreme.

The writer cannot resist the temptation to bring to the notice of the
reader one of those scenes of which he had personal knowledge. Colonel
James Lusk had been a prominent, conspicuous and influential
representative of the Southern aristocracy of ante-bellum days. He
enjoyed the respect and confidence of the community in which he
lived,--especially of the colored people. He, like thousands of others
of his class, had identified himself with the Republican party. There
was in that community a Republican club of which Sam Henry, a well-known
colored man, was president. When it was rumored,--and before it could be
verified,--that Colonel Lusk had decided to cast his fortunes with the
Republican party Henry appointed a committee of three to call on him and
extend to him a cordial invitation to appear before the club at its next
meeting and deliver an address. The invitation was accepted. As soon as
the Colonel entered the door of the club, escorted by the committee,
every man in the house immediately arose and all joined in giving three
cheers and a hearty welcome to the gallant statesman and brave
ex-Confederate soldier who had honored them with his distinguished
presence on that occasion. He delivered a splendid speech, in which he
informed his hearers that he had decided to cast his lot with the
Republican party. It was the first public announcement of that fact that
had been made. Of course he was honored, idolized and lionized by the
colored people wherever he was known.

After the Congressional elections of 1874 Colonel Lusk decided that he
would return to the ranks of the Democracy. Before making public
announcement of that fact he decided to send for his faithful and loyal
friend, Sam Henry, to come to see him at his residence, as he had
something of importance to communicate to him. Promptly at the appointed
time Henry made his appearance. He did not know for what he was wanted,
but he had a well-founded suspicion, based upon the changed conditions
which were apparent in every direction; hence, apprehension could be
easily detected in his countenance. Colonel Lusk commenced by reminding
Henry of the fact that it was before the club of which he was president
and upon his invitation that he, Lusk, had made public announcement of
his intention to act in the future with the Republican party. Now that
he had decided to renounce any further allegiance to that party he
thought that his faithful friend and loyal supporter, Sam Henry, should
be the first to whom that announcement should be made. When he had
finished Henry was visibly affected.

"Oh! no, Colonel," he cried, breaking down completely, "I beg of you do
not leave us. You are our chief, if not sole dependence. You are our
Moses. If you leave us, hundreds of others in our immediate neighborhood
will be sure to follow your lead. We will thus be left without solid and
substantial friends. I admit that with you party affiliation is
optional. With me it is not. You can be either a Republican or a
Democrat, and be honored and supported by the party to which you may
belong. With me it is different. I must remain a Republican whether I
want to or not. While it is impossible for me to be a Democrat it is not
impossible for you to be a Republican. We need you. We need your
prestige, your power, your influence, and your name. I pray you,
therefore, not to leave us; for if you and those who will follow your
lead leave us now we will be made to feel that we are without a country,
without a home, without friends, and without a hope for the future. Oh,
no, Colonel, I beg of you, I plead with you, don't go! Stay with us;
lead and guide us, as you have so faithfully done during the last few
years!"

Henry's remarks made a deep and profound impression upon Colonel Lusk.
He informed Henry that no step he could take was more painful to him
than this. He assured Henry that this act on his part was from necessity
and not from choice.

"The statement you have made, Henry, that party affiliations with me is
optional," he answered, "is presumed to be true; but, in point of fact,
it is not. No white man can live in the South in the future and act with
any other than the Democratic party unless he is willing and prepared to
live a life of social isolation and remain in political oblivion. While
I am somewhat advanced in years, I am not so old as to be devoid of
political ambition. Besides I have two grown sons. There is, no doubt, a
bright, brilliant and successful future before them if they are
Democrats; otherwise, not. If I remain in the Republican party,--which
can hereafter exist at the South only in name,--I will thereby retard,
if not mar and possibly destroy, their future prospects. Then, you must
remember that a man's first duty is to his family. My daughters are the
pride of my home. I cannot afford to have them suffer the humiliating
consequences of the social ostracism to which they may be subjected if I
remain in the Republican party.

"The die is cast. I must yield to the inevitable and surrender my
convictions upon the altar of my family's good,--the outgrowth of
circumstances and conditions which I am powerless to prevent and cannot
control. Henceforth I must act with the Democratic party or make myself
a martyr; and I do not feel that there is enough at stake to justify me
in making such a fearful sacrifice as that. It is, therefore, with deep
sorrow and sincere regret, Henry, that I am constrained to leave you
politically, but I find that I am confronted with a condition, not a
theory. I am compelled to choose between you, on one side, and my family
and personal interests, on the other. That I have decided to sacrifice
you and yours upon the altar of my family's good is a decision for which
you should neither blame nor censure me. If I could see my way clear to
pursue a different course it would be done; but my decision is based
upon careful and thoughtful consideration and it must stand."

Of course a stubborn and bitter fight for control of the Democratic
organization was now on between the antagonistic and conflicting
elements among the whites. It was to be a desperate struggle between the
former aristocrats, on one side, and what was known as the "poor
whites," on the other. While the aristocrats had always been the weaker
in point of numbers, they had been the stronger in point of wealth,
intelligence, ability, skill and experience. As a result of their wide
experience, and able and skillful management, the aristocrats were
successful in the preliminary struggles, as illustrated in the persons
of Stephens, Gordon, Brown and Hill, of Georgia; Daniels and Lee, of
Virginia; Hampton and Butler, of South Carolina; Lamar and Walthall, of
Mississippi, and Garland, of Arkansas. But in the course of time and in
the natural order of things the poor whites were bound to win. All that
was needed was a few years' tutelage and a few daring and unscrupulous
leaders to prey upon their ignorance and magnify their vanity in order
to bring them to a realization of the fact that their former political
masters were now completely at their mercy, and subject to their will.

That the poor whites of the ante-bellum period in most of the late
slaveholding or reconstructed States are now the masters of the
political situation in those States, is a fact that will not be
questioned, disputed or denied by anyone who is well informed, or who is
familiar with the facts. The aristocrats of ante-bellum days and their
descendants in the old slave States are as completely under the
political control and domination of the poor whites of the ante-bellum
period as those whites were under them at that time. Yet the reader must
not assume that the election returns from such States indicate the
actual, or even the relative, strength of the opposing and antagonistic
elements and factions. They simply indicate that the poor whites of the
past and their descendants are now the masters and the leaders, and
that the masters and the leaders of the past are now the submissive
followers.

In the ranks of those who are now the recognized leaders is to be found
some of the very best blood of the land,--the descendants of the finest,
best, most cultivated, and most refined families of their respective
States. But as a rule they are there, not from choice, but from
necessity,--not because they are in harmony with what is being done, or
because they approve of the methods that are being employed and pursued,
but on account of circumstances and conditions which they can neither
control nor prevent. They would not hesitate to raise the arm of revolt
if they had any hope, or if they believed that ultimate success would be
the result thereof. But as matters now stand they can detect no ray of
hope, and can see no avenue of escape. Hence nothing remains for them to
do but to hold the chain of political oppression and subjugation, while
their former political subordinates rivet and fasten the same around
their unwilling necks. They find they can do nothing but sacrifice their
pride, their manhood, and their self-respect upon the altar of political
necessity. They see, they feel, they fully realize the hopelessness of
their condition and the helplessness of their situation. They see, they
know, they acknowledge that in the line of political distinction and
official recognition they can get nothing that their former political
subordinates are not willing for them to have. With a hope of getting a
few crumbs that may fall from the official table they make wry faces and
pretend to be satisfied with what is being done, and with the way in
which it is done. They are looked upon with suspicion and their loyalty
to the new order of things is a constant source of speculation,
conjecture, and doubt. But, for reasons of political expediency, a few
crumbs are allowed occasionally to go to some one of that class,--crumbs
that are gratefully acknowledged and thankfully received, upon the
theory that some little consideration is better than none at all,
especially in their present helpless and dependent condition. But even
these small crumbs are confined to those who are most pronounced and
outspoken in their declarations and protestations of loyalty, devotion,
and subservient submission to the new order of things.

CHAPTER XII

EVENTFUL DAYS OF THE FORTY-THIRD CONGRESS

The Mississippi Constitution having been ratified in 1869,--an odd year
of the calendar,--caused the regular elections for State, district and
county officers to occur on the odd year of the calendar, while the
National elections occurred on the even years of the calendar, thus
necessitating the holding of an election in the State every year.
Therefore, no election was to be held in 1874, except for Congressmen,
and to fill a few vacancies, while the regular election for county
officers and members of the Legislature would be held in 1875.

Since the regular session of the 44th Congress would not convene before
December, 1875, in order to avoid the trouble and expense incident to
holding an election in 1874, the Legislature passed a bill postponing
the election of members of Congress until November, 1875. There being
some doubt about the legality of this legislation, Congress passed a
bill legalizing the act of the Legislature. Consequently no election was
held in the State in 1874 except to fill a few vacancies that had
occurred in the Legislature and in some of the districts and counties.

One of the vacancies to be filled was that of State Senator, created by
the resignation of Senator Hiram Cassidy, Jr. Senator Cassidy, who was
elected as a Democrat in 1873, and who had voted for Mr. Bruce, the
Republican caucus nominee, for United States Senator, had in the mean
time publicly identified himself with the Republican party, thus
following in the footsteps of his able and illustrious father, Judge
Hiram Cassidy, Sr., who had given his active support to the Republican
candidate for Governor in 1873.

Governor Ames had appointed Senator Cassidy a Judge of the Chancery
Court, to accept which office it was necessary for him to resign his
seat as a member of the State Senate. A special election was held in
November, 1874, to fill that vacancy. The Democrats nominated a strong
and able man, Judge R.H. Thompson, of Brookhaven, Lincoln County. The
Republicans nominated a still stronger and abler man, Hon. J.F.
Sessions, of the same town and county,--a Democrat who had represented
Franklin County for several terms, but who had that year identified
himself with the Republican party. Sessions was Chancellor Cassidy's law
partner.

Since the counties comprising that senatorial district constituted a
part of the district that I then represented in Congress, I took an
active part in the support of the candidacy of Sessions. Although a
Democrat, Hiram Cassidy, Jr., had been elected from that district in
1873, Sessions, a Republican, was elected by a handsome majority in
1874. A vacancy had also occurred in the Legislature from Franklin
County, to fill which the Republicans nominated Hon. William P. Cassidy,
brother of Chancellor Cassidy; but the Democratic majority in the county
was too large for one even so popular as Wm. P. Cassidy to overcome;
hence he was defeated by a small majority.

From a Republican point of view Mississippi, as was true of the other
reconstructed States, up to 1875 was all that could be expected and
desired and, no doubt, would have remained so for many years, but for
the unexpected results of the State and Congressional elections of 1874.
While it is true, as stated and explained in a previous chapter, that
Grant carried nearly every state in the Union at the Presidential
election in 1872, the State and Congressional elections throughout the
country two years later went just the other way, and by majorities just
as decisive as those given the Republicans two years before.

Notwithstanding the severe and crushing defeat sustained by the
Republicans at that time, it was claimed by some, believed by others,
and predicted by many that by the time the election for President in
1876 would roll around it would be found that the Republicans had
regained substantially all they had lost in 1874; but these hopes,
predictions, and expectations were not realized. The Presidential
election of 1876 turned out to be so close and doubtful that neither
party could claim a substantial victory. While it is true that Hayes,
the Republican candidate for President, was finally declared elected
according to the forms of law, yet the terms and conditions upon which
he was allowed to be peaceably inaugurated were such as to complete the
extinction and annihilation of the Republican party at the South. The
price that the Hayes managers stipulated to pay,--and did pay,--for the
peaceable inauguration of Hayes was that the South was to be turned over
to the Democrats and that the administration was not to enforce the
Constitution and the laws of the land in that section against the
expressed will of the Democrats thereof. In other words, so far as the
South was concerned, the Constitution was not to follow the flag.

In the 43rd Congress which was elected in 1872 and which would expire by
limitation March 4, 1875, the Republicans had a large majority in both
Houses. In the House of Representatives of the 44th Congress, which was
elected in 1874, the Democratic majority was about as large as was the
Republican majority in the House of the 43rd Congress. The Republicans
still retained control of the Senate, but by a greatly reduced majority.

During the short session of the 43rd Congress, important legislation was
contemplated by the Republican leaders. Alabama was one of the States
which the Democrats were charged with having carried in 1874 by
resorting to methods which were believed to be questionable and illegal.
An investigation was ordered by the House. A committee was appointed to
make the investigation, of which General Albright, of Pennsylvania, was
chairman. This committee was authorized to report by bill or otherwise.
After a thorough investigation, the chairman was directed, and
instructed by the vote of every Republican member of the committee,
which constituted a majority thereof, to report and recommend the
passage of what was called the Federal Elections Bill. This bill was
carefully drawn; following substantially the same lines as a previous
temporary measure, under the provisions of which what was known as the
Ku Klux Klan had been crushed out, and order had been restored in North
Carolina.

It is safe to say that this bill would have passed both Houses and
become a law, but for the unexpected opposition of Speaker Blaine. Mr.
Blaine was not only opposed to the bill, but his opposition was so
intense that he felt it his duty to leave the Speaker's chair and come
on the floor for the purpose of leading the opposition to its passage.
This, of course, was fatal to the passage of the measure. After a
desperate struggle of a few days, in which the Speaker was found to be
in opposition to a large majority of his party associates, and which
revealed the fact that the party was hopelessly divided, the leaders in
the House abandoned the effort to bring the measure to a vote.

Mr. Blame's motives in taking this unexpected position, in open
opposition to the great majority of his party associates, has always
been open to speculation and conjecture. His personal and political
enemies charged that it was due to jealousy of President Grant. Mr.
Blaine was a candidate for the Republican Presidential nomination the
following year. It was a well-known fact that President Grant was not
favorable to Mr. Blaine's nomination, but was in sympathy with the
movement to have Senator Roscoe Conkling, of New York, Mr. Blaine's
bitterest political enemy, nominated. Mr. Blaine was afraid, his enemies
asserted, that, if the Federal Elections Bill,--under the provisions of
which great additional power would have been conferred upon the
President,--had become a law, that power would be used to defeat his
nomination for the Presidency in 1876; hence his opposition to the Bill.
But, whatever his motives were, his successful opposition to that
measure no doubt resulted in his failure to realize the ambition of his
life,--the Presidency of the United States. But for the stand he took
on that occasion, he would probably have received sufficient support
from Southern delegates in the National Convention to secure him the
nomination, and, had he been nominated at that time, the probabilities
are that he would have been elected. But his opposition to that bill
practically solidified the Southern delegates in that convention against
him, and as a result he was defeated for the nomination, although he was
the choice of a majority of the Northern delegates.

Even when Blaine received the nomination in 1884 it was developed that
it could not have happened had the Southern delegates been as solidly
against him at that time as they were in 1876. But by 1884 the Southern
Republicans had somewhat relented in their opposition to him, and, as a
result thereof, he received sufficient support from that section to give
him the nomination. But he was defeated at the polls because the South
was solid against him,--a condition which was made possible by his own
action in defeating the Federal Elections Bill in 1875. In consequence
of his action in that matter he was severely criticised and censured by
Republicans generally, and by Southern Republicans especially.

Although I was not favorable to his nomination for the Presidency at any
time, my relations with Mr. Blaine had been so cordial that I felt at
liberty to seek him and ask him, for my own satisfaction and
information, an explanation of his action in opposing and defeating the
Federal Elections Bill. I therefore went to him just before the final
adjournment of the 43rd Congress and informed him that I desired to have
a few minutes' private audience with him whenever it would be convenient
for him to see me. He requested me to come to the Speaker's room
immediately after the adjournment of the House that afternoon.

When I entered the room Mr. Blaine was alone. I took a seat only a few
feet from him. I informed him of the great disappointment and intense
dissatisfaction which his action had caused in defeating what was not
only regarded as a party measure, but which was believed by the
Republicans to be of vital importance from a party point of view, to say
nothing of its equity and justice. I remarked that for him to array
himself in opposition to the great majority of his own party
associates,--and to throw the weight of his great influence against such
an important party measure as the Federal Elections Bill was believed to
be,--he must have had some motive, some justifiable grounds of which the
public was ignorant, but about which I believed it was fair to himself
and just to his own friends and party associates, that he give some
explanation.

"As a southern Republican member of the House, and as one that is not
hostile or particularly unfriendly to you," I said, "I feel that I have
a right to make this request of you."

At first he gave me a look of surprise, and for several seconds he
remained silent. Then, straightening himself up in his chair, he
answered:

"I am glad, Mr. Lynch, that you have made this request of me, since I am
satisfied you are not actuated by any unfriendly motive in doing so. I
shall, therefore, give a frank answer to your question. In my judgment,
if that bill had become a law the defeat of the Republican party
throughout the country would have been a foregone conclusion. We could
not have saved the South even if the bill had passed, but its passage
would have lost us the North; indeed, I could not have carried even my
own State of Maine, if that bill had passed. In my opinion, it was
better to lose the South and save the North, than to try through such
legislation to save the South, and thus lose both North and South. I
believed that if we saved the North we could then look after the South.
If the Southern Democrats are foolish enough to bring about a Solid
South the result will be a Solid North against a Solid South; and in
that case the Republicans would have nothing to fear. You now have my
reasons, frankly and candidly given, for the action taken by me on the
occasion referred to. I hope you are satisfied with them."

I thanked Mr. Blaine cordially for giving me the desired explanation.
"I now feel better satisfied with reference to your action upon that
occasion," I assured him. "While I do not agree with you in your
conclusions, and while I believe your reasoning to be unsound and
fallacious, still I cannot help giving you credit for having been
actuated by no other motive than to do what you honestly believed was
for the best interest of the country and the Republican party."

CHAPTER XIII

STATE CAMPAIGN OF 1875. REPUBLICAN VICTORY

When I returned to my home after the adjournment of Congress in March,
1875, the political clouds were dark. The political outlook was
discouraging. The prospect of Republican success was not at all bright.
There had been a marked change in the situation from every point of
view. Democrats were bold, outspoken, defiant, and determined. In
addition to these unfavorable indications I noticed that I was not
received by them with the same warmth and cordiality as on previous
occasions. With a few notable exceptions they were cold, indifferent,
even forbidding in their attitude and manner. This treatment was so
radically different from that to which I had been accustomed that I
could not help feeling it keenly. I knew it was indicative of a change
in the political situation which meant that I had before me the fight of
my life.

My advocacy and support of the Federal Elections Bill, commonly called
the "Force Bill," was occasionally given as the reason for this change;
but I knew this was not the true reason. In fact, that bill would hardly
have been thought of but for the fact that Mr. Blaine, the Republican
Speaker of the House, had attracted national attention to it through his
action in vacating the chair and coming on the floor of the House to
lead the opposition to its passage. This act on the part of the
statesman from Maine made him, in the opinion of many Southern
Democrats, the greatest man that our country had ever produced,--George
Washington, the Father of the Republic, not excepted. They were loud in
their thanks for the valuable service he had thus rendered them and, as
evidence of their gratitude to him, they declared their determination to
show their appreciation of this valuable service in a substantial manner
whenever the opportunity presented itself for it to be done.

No man in the country was stronger, better or more popular than the
statesman from Maine, until his name came before them as a candidate for
President of the United States on a Republican ticket. A sudden
transformation then took place. It was then discovered, to their great
surprise and disappointment, that he was such an unsafe and dangerous
man that no greater calamity could happen to the country than his
elevation to the Presidency. Nothing, therefore, must be left undone to
bring about his defeat.

I was well aware of the fact at the time that it was the result of the
State and Congressional elections at the north in 1874 that had
convinced Southern Democrats that Republican ascendency in the National
Government would soon be a thing of the past--that the Democrats would
be successful in the Presidential and Congressional elections of 1876
and that that party would, no doubt, remain in power for at least a
quarter of a century. It was this, and not the unsuccessful effort to
pass a Federal Elections Bill, that had produced the marked change that
was noticeable on every hand. Every indication seemed to point to a
confirmation of the impression that Democratic success at the
Presidential election was practically an assured fact.

There had been a disastrous financial panic in 1873 which was no doubt
largely responsible for the political upheaval in 1874; but that was
lost sight of in accounting for that result. In fact they made no effort
to explain it except in their own way. The Democrats had carried the
country; the reasons for this they construed to suit themselves. The
construction they placed upon it was that it was a national condemnation
and repudiation of the Congressional Plan of Reconstruction, and they
intended to govern themselves accordingly.

The election in Mississippi in 1875 was for members of Congress, members
of the Legislature, and county officers, and also a State Treasurer to
serve out the unexpired term of Treasurer Holland, deceased. My own
renomination for Congress from the Sixth (Natchez) District was a
foregone conclusion, since I had no opposition in my own party; but I
realized the painful fact that a nomination this time was not equivalent
to an election. Still, I felt that it was my duty to make the fight, let
the result be what it might.

If Congressmen had been elected in 1874 the State would have returned
five Republicans and one Democrat as was done in 1872; but in 1875 the
prospect was not so bright, the indications were not so favorable. The
Democrats nominated for State Treasurer Hon. Wm. L. Hemmingway, of
Carroll County. He was an able man, and had been quite prominent as a
party leader in his section of the State. The defiant attitude assumed,
and the bold declarations contained in the platform upon which he was
nominated were accepted by the Republicans as notice that the Democrats
intended to carry the election--"peaceably and fairly."

The Republicans nominated Hon. George M. Buchanan, of Marshall County,
upon a platform which strongly endorsed the National and State
administrations. Mr. Buchanan was a strong and popular man. He had been
a brave and gallant Confederate soldier. He had been for several years
Sheriff and Tax Collector of his county, and was known to be especially
fitted for the office of State Treasurer. As Sheriff and Tax Collector
of Marshall County,--one of the wealthiest counties in the State,--he
had handled and disbursed many thousands of dollars, every dollar of
which had been faithfully accounted for. His honesty, integrity,
ability, fitness, and capacity, everyone, regardless of race or party,
unhesitatingly admitted.

The administration of Governor Ames was one of the best the State had
ever had. The judiciary was quite equal to that which had been appointed
by Governor Alcorn. The public revenues had been promptly collected, and
honestly accounted for. There had not only been no increase in the rate
of taxation, but, to the contrary, there had been a material reduction.
Notwithstanding these things the Democrats, together with the radical
element in charge of the party machinery, determined to seize the State
Government _vi et armis_; not because it was at all necessary for any
special reason, but simply because conditions at that time seemed to
indicate that it could be safely done.

After the nominations had all been made, the campaign was opened in dead
earnest. Nearly all Democratic clubs in the State were converted into
armed military companies. Funds with which to purchase arms were
believed to have been contributed by the National Democratic
organization. Nearly every Republican meeting was attended by one or
more of those clubs or companies,--the members of which were
distinguished by red shirts, indicative of blood,--the attendance being
for the purpose, of course, of "keeping the peace and preserving
order." To enable the Democrats to carry the State a Republican majority
of between twenty and thirty thousand had to be overcome. This could be
done only by the adoption and enforcement of questionable methods. It
was a case in which the end justified the means, and the means had to be
supplied.

The Republican vote consisted of about ninety-five per cent of the
colored men, and of about twenty-five per cent of the white men. The
other seventy-five per cent of the whites formerly constituted a part of
the flower of the Confederate Army. They were not only tried and
experienced soldiers, but they were fully armed and equipped for the
work before them. Some of the colored Republicans had been Union
soldiers, but they were neither organized nor armed. In such a contest,
therefore, they and their white allies were entirely at the mercy of
their political adversaries.

Governor Ames soon took in the situation. He saw that he could not
depend upon the white members of the State militia to obey his orders,
to support him in his efforts to uphold the majesty of the law, and to
protect the law-abiding citizens in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and
property. To use the colored members of the militia for such a purpose
would be adding fuel to the flames. Nothing, therefore, remained for him
to do but to call on the National administration for military aid in
his efforts to crush out domestic violence and enforce the laws of the
State. He did call for such aid, but for reasons that will be given
later it was not granted.

When the polls closed on the day of the election, the Democrats, of
course, had carried the State by a large majority,--thus securing a
heavy majority in both branches of the Legislature. Of the six members
of Congress the writer was the only one of the regular Republican
candidates that pulled through, and that, by a greatly reduced majority.
In the Second (Holly Springs) District, G. Wiley Wells ran as an
Independent Republican against A.R. Howe, the sitting member, and the
regular Republican candidate for reëlection. The Democrats supported
Wells, who was elected.

The delegation, therefore, consisted of four Democrats, one Republican,
and one Independent Republican. While the delegation would have
consisted of five straight Republicans and one Democrat had the election
been held in 1874, still, since the Democrats had such a large majority
in the House, the political complexion of the Mississippi delegation was
not important. The election of the writer, it was afterwards developed,
was due in all probability to a miscalculation on the part of some of
the Democratic managers. Their purpose was to have a solid delegation,
counting Wells as one of that number, since his election would be due
to the support of the Democratic party.

But in my district the plan miscarried. In one of the counties there
were two conflicting reports as to what the Democratic majority was;
according to one, it was two hundred and fifty, according to the other,
it was five hundred. The report giving two hundred and fifty was, no
doubt, the correct one, but the other would probably have been accepted
had it been believed at the time that it was necessary to insure the
election of the Democratic candidate. To overcome the majority in that
district was more difficult than to overcome it in any of the other
districts. While their candidate, Colonel Roderick Seal, was quite a
popular man, it was well known that I would poll a solid Republican vote
and some Democratic votes in addition. Fortunately for me there was a
split in the party in my own county (Adams) for county officers, which
resulted in bringing out a very heavy vote. This split also made the
count of the ballots very slow,--covering a period of several days. My
name was on both tickets. The election took place on Tuesday, but the
count was not finished until the following Friday evening. Hence, the
result for member of Congress in that county could not be definitely
ascertained until Friday night.

The Democratic managers at the State Capital were eager to know as soon
as possible what the Republican majority in Adams County would be for
Congressman, hence, on Wednesday evening, the editor of the local
Democratic paper received a telegram from the Secretary of the
Democratic State Committee, requesting to be informed immediately what
the Republican majority for Congressman would be in Adams County. The
editor read the telegram to me and asked what, in my opinion, would be
my majority in the county. My reply was that I did not think it would
exceed twelve hundred; whereupon he sent in the following report:
"Lynch's majority in Adams will not exceed twelve hundred."

Upon receipt of this telegram the majority of two hundred and fifty
instead of five hundred was deemed sufficient from the county heretofore
referred to. If the Republican majority in Adams would not exceed twelve
hundred, the success of the Democratic Congressional candidate by a
small but safe majority was assured on the face of the returns. Since
Adams was the last county to be reported, no change could thereafter be
made. When the count was finally finished in Adams it was found I had a
majority of over eighteen hundred. This gave me a majority in the
district of a little over two hundred on the face of the returns.

The disappointment and chagrin on the part of the Democratic managers
can better be imagined than described. But the agreeable surprise to the
Republicans was at least equal to the Democrats' disappointment. The
defeated Democratic candidate threatened to make a contest for the seat
on the ground of violence and fraud; but this was so ridiculous that the
managers of his own party would not allow him to carry the threat into
execution.

CHAPTER XIV

INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE AUTHOR AND THE PRESIDENT REGARDING STATE
APPOINTMENTS

Shortly after I reached Washington in the latter part of November, 1875,
I called on the President to pay my respects, and to see him on business
relating to a Civil Service order that he had recently issued, and that
some of the Federal office-holders had evidently misunderstood.
Postmaster Pursell, of Summit, an important town in my district, was one
of that number. He was supposed to be a Republican, having been
appointed as such. But he not only refused to take any part in the
campaign of 1875, but he also declined to contribute a dollar to meet
the legitimate expenses of that campaign. The President's Civil Service
order was his excuse. According to Pursell's construction of that order,
Federal office-holders must not only take no part in political or party
campaigns, but they must make no contributions for political purposes.
He not only said nothing and did nothing in the interest of his party in
that campaign, but it was believed by some that he did not even vote the
Republican ticket.

After paying my respects to the President I brought this case to his
attention. I informed him that I very much desired to have Postmaster
Pursell removed, and a good Republican appointed in his stead.

"What is the matter with him?" the President asked. "Is he not a good
postmaster?"

"Yes," I replied, "there is nothing to be said against him, so far as I
know, with reference to his administration of the office. I only object
to him on account of politics. He may be,--and no doubt is,--a good,
capable, and efficient postmaster; but politically he is worthless. From
a party point of view he is no good. In my opinion, there ought to be a
man in that office who will not only discharge his duties in a
creditable manner, but who will also be of some service to the party and
to the administration under which he serves. In the present postmaster
of the town of Summit we have not such a man, but we can and will have
one if you will appoint the one whose name I now present and for whom I
ask your favorable consideration. We had, as you know, a bitter and
desperate struggle. It was the very time that we stood sadly in need of
every man and of every vote. We lost the county that Summit is in by a
small majority. If an active and aggressive man, such as the one whose
name I now place before you, had been postmaster at Summit, the result
in that County might have been different. I therefore earnestly
recommend that Pursell be removed, and that Mr. Garland be appointed to
succeed him."

The President replied: "You have given good and sufficient reasons for a
change. Leave with me the name of the man you desire to have appointed,
and his name will be sent to the Senate as soon as Congress meets." I
cordially thanked the President, and assured him that he would have no
occasion to regret making the change. In explanation of his Civil
Service order the President remarked that quite a number of
office-holders had seemed to misunderstand it, although it was plainly
worded, and, as he thought, not difficult to understand. There had never
been any serious complaints growing out of active participation in
political campaigns on the part of office-holders, and that it was not,
and never had been, the purpose of the administration, by executive
order or otherwise, to limit or restrict any American citizen in the
discharge of his duties as a citizen, simply because he happened to be
an office-holder, provided that in so doing he did not neglect his
official duties. There had, however, been serious complaints from many
parts of the country about the use and abuse of Federal patronage in
efforts to manipulate party conventions, and to dictate and control
party nominations. To destroy this evil was the primary purpose of the
civil service order referred to.

I told the President that his explanation of the order was in harmony
with my own construction and interpretation of it. That is why I made
the recommendation for a change in the postmastership at Summit. The
change was promptly made. I then informed the President that there was
another matter about which I desired to have a short talk with him, that
was the recent election in Mississippi. After calling his attention to
the sanguinary struggle through which we had passed, and the great
disadvantages under which we labored, I reminded him of the fact that
the Governor, when he saw that he could not put down without the
assistance of the National Administration what was practically an
insurrection against the State Government, made application for
assistance in the manner and form prescribed by the Constitution, with
the confident belief that it would be forthcoming. But in this we were,
for some reason, seriously disappointed and sadly surprised. The reason
for this action, or rather non-action, was still an unexplained mystery
to us. For my own satisfaction and information I should be pleased to
have the President enlighten me on the subject.

The President said that he was glad I had asked him the question, and
that he would take pleasure in giving me a frank reply. He said he had
sent Governor Ames' requisition to the War Department with his approval
and with instructions to have the necessary assistance furnished without
delay. He had also given instructions to the Attorney-General to use
the marshals and the machinery of the Federal judiciary as far as
possible in coöperation with the War Department in an effort to maintain
order and to bring about a condition which would insure a peaceable and
fair election. But before the orders were put into execution a committee
of prominent Republicans from Ohio had called on him. (Ohio was then an
October State,--that is, her elections took place in October instead of
November.) An important election was then pending in that State. This
committee, the President stated, protested against having the
requisition of Governor Ames honored. The committee, the President said,
informed him in a most emphatic way that if the requisition of Governor
Ames were honored, the Democrats would not only carry Mississippi,--a
State which would be lost to the Republicans in any event,--but that
Democratic success in Ohio would be an assured fact. If the requisition
were not honored it would make no change in the result in Mississippi,
but that Ohio would be saved to the Republicans. The President assured
me that it was with great reluctance that he yielded,--against his own
judgment and sense of official duty,--to the arguments of this
committee, and directed the withdrawal of the orders which had been
given the Secretary of War and the Attorney-General in that matter.

This statement, I confess, surprised me very much.

"Can it be possible," I asked, "that there is such a prevailing
sentiment in any State in the North, East or West as renders it
necessary for a Republican President to virtually give his sanction to
what is equivalent to a suspension of the Constitution and laws of the
land to insure Republican success in such a State? I cannot believe this
to be true, the opinion of the Republican committee from Ohio to the
contrary notwithstanding. What surprises me more, Mr. President, is that
you yielded and granted this remarkable request. That is not like you.
It is the first time I have ever known you to show the white feather.
Instead of granting the request of that committee, you should have
rebuked the men,--told them that it is your duty as chief magistrate of
the country to enforce the Constitution and laws of the land, and to
protect American citizens in the exercise and enjoyment of their rights,
let the consequences be what they may; and that if by doing this Ohio
should be lost to the Republicans it ought to be lost. In other words,
no victory is worth having if it is to be brought about upon such
conditions as those,--if it is to be purchased at such a fearful cost as
was paid in this case."

"Yes," said the President, "I admit that you are right. I should not
have yielded. I believed at the time that I was making a grave mistake.
But as presented, it was duty on one side, and party obligation on the
other. Between the two I hesitated, but finally yielded to what was
believed to be party obligation. If a mistake was made, it was one of
the head and not of the heart. That my heart was right and my intentions
good, no one who knows me will question. If I had believed that any
effort on my part would have saved Mississippi I would have made it,
even if I had been convinced that it would have resulted in the loss of
Ohio to the Republicans. But I was satisfied then, as I am now, that
Mississippi could not have been saved to the party in any event and I
wanted to avoid the responsibility of the loss of Ohio, in addition.
This was the turning-point in the case.

"And while on this subject," the President went on, "let us look more
closely into the significance of this situation. I am very much
concerned about the future of our country. When the War came to an end
it was thought that four things had been brought about and effectually
accomplished as a result thereof. They were: first, that slavery had
been forever abolished; second, that the indissolubility of the Federal
Union had been permanently established and universally recognized;
third, that the absolute and independent sovereignty of the several
States was a thing of the past; fourth, that a national sovereignty had
been at last created and established, resulting in sufficient power
being vested in the general government not only to guarantee to every
State in the Union a Republican form of government, but to protect, when
necessary, the individual citizen of the United States in the exercise
and enjoyment of the rights and privileges to which he is entitled under
the Constitution and laws of his country. In other words, that there had
been created a National citizenship as distinguished from State
citizenship, resulting in a paramount allegiance to the United
States,--the general Government,--having ample power to protect its own
citizens against domestic and personal violence whenever the State in
which he may live should fail, refuse, or neglect to do so. In other
words, so far as citizens of the United States are concerned, the States
in the future would only act as agents of the general Government in
protecting the citizens of the United States in the enjoyment of life,
liberty, and property. This has been my conception of the duties of the
President, and until recently I have pursued that course. But there
seems to be a number of leading and influential men in the Republican
party who take a different view of these matters. These men have used
and are still using their power and influence, not to strengthen but to
cripple the President and thus prevent him from enforcing the
Constitution and laws along these lines. They have not only used their
power and influence to prevent and defeat wise and necessary legislation
for these purposes, but they have contributed, through the medium of
public meetings and newspaper and magazine articles, to the creation of
a public sentiment hostile to the policy of the administration. Whatever
their motives may be, future mischief of a very serious nature is bound
to be the result. It requires no prophet to foresee that the national
government will soon be at a great disadvantage and that the results of
the war of the rebellion will have been in a large measure lost. In
other words, that the first two of the four propositions above stated
will represent all that will have been accomplished as a result of the
war, and even they, for the lack of power of enforcement in the general
government, will be largely of a negative character. What you have just
passed through in the State of Mississippi is only the beginning of what
is sure to follow. I do not wish to create unnecessary alarm, nor to be
looked upon as a prophet of evil, but it is impossible for me to close
my eyes in the face of things that are as plain to me as the noonday
sun."

It is needless to say that I was deeply interested in the President's
eloquent and prophetic talk which subsequent events have more than fully
verified.

CHAPTER XV

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1876 AND ITS RESULTS

The Presidential election was held in 1876. The Republicans had carried
the country in 1872 by such a decisive majority that it indicated many
years of continued Republican ascendency in the National Government. But
the severe reverses sustained by that party at the polls two years later
completely changed this situation and outlook. Democrats confidently
expected and Republicans seriously apprehended that the Presidential
election of 1876 would result in a substantial Democratic victory. Mr.
Blaine was the leading candidate for the Republican nomination, but he
had bitter opposition in the ranks of his own party. That opposition
came chiefly from friends and supporters of Senator Conkling at the
North and from Southern Republicans generally. The opposition of the
Conkling men to Mr. Blaine was largely personal; while southern
Republicans were opposed to him on account of his having caused the
defeat of the Federal Elections Bill. The great majority of southern
Republicans supported Senator Oliver P. Morton of Indiana.

After the National Convention had been organized, it looked for a while
as if Mr. Blaine's nomination was a foregone conclusion. Hon. Edward
McPherson, of Pennsylvania,--a strong Blaine man,--had been made
President of the Convention. In placing Mr. Blaine's name in nomination,
Hon. Robert G. Ingersoll of Illinois made such an eloquent and effective
speech that he came very near carrying the Convention by storm, and thus
securing the nomination of the statesman from Maine. But the opposition
to Mr. Blaine was too well organized to allow the Convention to be
stampeded, even by the power and eloquence of an Ingersoll. It was this
speech that gave Mr. Ingersoll his national fame and brought him to the
front as a public speaker and lecturer. It was the most eloquent and
impressive speech that was delivered during the sitting of the
Convention. After a bitter struggle of many hours, and after a number of
fruitless ballots, the Convention finally nominated Gov. R.B. Hayes, of
Ohio, as a compromise candidate. This result was brought about through a
union of the combined opposition to Mr. Blaine. Hon. Wm. A. Wheeler, of
New York, was nominated for Vice-President and the work of the
Convention was over.

The Democrats nominated ex-Governor Samuel J. Tilden, of New York, for
President, and Thomas A. Hendricks, of Indiana, for Vice-President.
Their platform pledged many radical reforms in the administration of the
government. This ticket was made with the hope that it would be
successful in the doubtful and debatable States of New York, New Jersey,
Indiana, and Connecticut, which, with the Solid South, would constitute
a majority of the electoral college, even if all the other States should
go Republican, which was not anticipated.

That the prospect of Democratic success was exceedingly bright and the
probability of a Republican victory extremely dark, was generally
conceded. The South was counted upon to be solid in its support of the
Democratic ticket, for the methods that had been successfully
inaugurated in Mississippi the year before, to overcome a Republican
majority of more than twenty thousand, were to be introduced and adopted
in all the other States of that section in which conditions were
practically the same as in Mississippi.

To insure success, therefore, it was only necessary for the Democrats to
concentrate their efforts upon the four doubtful States outside of the
Solid South. Up to a certain point the plan worked well. Every
indication seemed to point to its successful consummation. As had been
anticipated, the Democrats were successful in the four doubtful Northern
States, and they also carried, on the face of the returns, every
Southern State, just as had been planned; the Mississippi methods
having been adopted in such of them as had Republican majorities to
overcome. Since through those methods the Democrats had succeeded in
overcoming a large Republican majority in Mississippi, there was no
reason why the same methods should not produce like results in South
Carolina, in Louisiana, and in Florida. In fact, it was looked upon as a
reflection upon the bravery and party loyalty of the Democracy of those
States if they could not do what had been done under like conditions in
Mississippi. Hence those States _had_ to be carried, "peaceably and
fairly," of course, "but they must be carried just the same." Failure to
carry them was out of the question, because too much was involved.
According to the plans and calculations that had been carefully made, no
Southern State could be lost. While it might be possible to win without
all of them, still it was not believed to be safe to run any such risk,
or take any such chance. If the Democrats should happen to carry a state
that was not included in the combination, so much the better.

Everything seemed to work admirably. That it was a plan by which
elections could be easily carried, with or without votes, had been
clearly demonstrated. On the face of the returns the majorities were
brought forth just as had been ordered and directed. But it seems that
such methods had been anticipated by the Republican governments in South
Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida, and that suitable steps had been
taken to prevent their successful consummation through the medium of
State Returning Boards. When the Returning Boards had rejected and
thrown out many of the majorities that had been returned from some of
the counties and parishes, the result was changed, and the Republican
candidates for Presidential electors were officially declared elected.
This gave the Republican candidates for President and Vice-President a
majority of one vote in the Electoral College. It has, of course, been
alleged by many,--and it is believed by some,--that the actions of those
Returning Boards defeated the will of the people as expressed at the
polls, thus bringing about the seating in the Presidential chair of the
man that had been fairly and honestly defeated. Yet, no one who is
familiar with the facts, and who is honest enough to admit them, will
deny that but for the inauguration in South Carolina, Florida, and
Louisiana, of the Mississippi methods, those three States would have
been as safely Republican at that time and in that election as were the
States of Pennsylvania and Vermont. But the plans of the Democratic
managers had been defeated. It was hard for them to lose a victory they
felt and believed to have been won by them, notwithstanding the
extraneous methods that had been employed to bring about such results.

CHAPTER XVI

EFFECTS OF THE REFORM ADMINISTRATION IN MISSISSIPPI

Because the Democrats carried the election in Mississippi in 1875, they
did not thereby secure control of the State Government. That election
was for members of the Legislature, members of Congress and county
officers. Only one State officer was elected,--a State Treasurer,--to
fill the vacancy created by the death of Treasurer Holland. All the
other State officers were Republicans. But the Democrats could not
afford to wait until Governor Ames' term expired. They were determined
to get immediate control of the State Government. There was only one way
in which this could be done, and that was by impeachment.

This course they decided to take. It could not be truthfully denied that
Governor Ames was a clean, pure, and honest man. He had given the State
an excellent administration. The State judiciary had been kept up to the
high standard established by Governor Alcorn. Every dollar of the public
money had been collected, and honestly accounted for. The State was in a
prosperous condition. The rate of taxation had been greatly reduced,
and there was every prospect of a still further reduction before the end
of his administration. But these facts made no difference to those who
were flushed with the victory they had so easily won. They wanted the
offices, and were determined to have them, and that, too, without very
much delay. Hence, impeachment proceedings were immediately instituted
against the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor,--not in the interest of
reform, of good government or of low taxes, but simply in order to get
possession of the State Government.

The weakness of the case against the Governor was shown when it
developed that the strongest charge against him was that he had entered
into an alleged corrupt bargain with State Senator Cassidy, resulting in
Cassidy's appointment as one of the Judges of the Chancery Court.
Cassidy had been elected a member of the State Senate as a Democrat.
Notwithstanding that fact he voted for Mr. Bruce, the Republican caucus
nominee for United States Senator, and subsequently publicly identified
himself with the Republican party. Later his brother, William P.
Cassidy, and his law partner, Hon. J.F. Sessions, did likewise. In 1874
Sessions was elected to the State Senate as a Republican to serve out
the unexpired term of his law partner, Cassidy, who had resigned his
seat in the Senate upon his appointment as a Judge of the Chancery
Court.

Cassidy was a brilliant young man, and an able lawyer. That the
Governor should have selected him for an important judicial position was
both wise and proper. It was one of his best and most creditable
appointments and was generally commended as such when it was made. The
fact that he had been elected to the State Senate as a Democrat, and
shortly thereafter joined the Republican party was made the basis of the
charge that his change of party affiliation was the result of a corrupt
bargain between the Governor and himself, for which the Governor, but
not the Judge, should be impeached and removed from office. There were a
few other vague and unimportant charges, but this one, as weak as it
was, was the strongest of the number.

When the articles of impeachment were presented to the House, it was
seen that they were so weak and so groundless that the Governor believed
it would be an easy matter for him to discredit them even before an
antagonistic legislature. With that end in view, he employed several of
the ablest lawyers in the country to represent him. They came to Jackson
and commenced the preparation of the case, but it did not take them long
to find out that their case was a hopeless one. They soon found out to
their entire satisfaction that it was not to be a judicial trial, but a
political one and that the jury was already prepared for conviction
without regard to the law, the Constitution, the evidence, or the
facts. Governor Ames was to be convicted, not because he was guilty of
any offense, but because he was in the way of complete Democratic
control of the State Government.

Personally they had nothing against Ames. It was not the man but the
office they wanted, and that they were determined to have. They knew he
had committed no offense, but, as matters then stood, being a Republican
was an offense which justified removal from office. To punish him
otherwise, for anything he had done or failed to do, did not at any time
enter into their calculations. The Governorship was the prize at stake.
In this matter there was no concealment of their purposes and
intentions. As soon as the Governor's legal advisers found out what the
actual situation was, they saw it was useless to continue the fight.
Upon their advice, therefore, the Governor tendered his resignation,
which was promptly accepted. He then left the State never to return
again. If the impeachment proceedings had been instituted in good
faith,--upon an honest belief that the chief executive had committed
offenses which merited punishment,--the resignation would not have been
accepted. The fact that it was accepted,--and that, too, without
hesitation or question,--was equivalent to a confession that the purpose
of the proceedings was to get possession of the office. Short work was
made of the Lieutenant-Governor's case; and State Senator John M.
Stone, the Democratic President pro tem. of the State Senate, was duly
sworn in and installed as the acting Governor of the State. Thus
terminated a long series of questionable acts, the inauguration of which
had no other purpose than to secure the ascendency of one political
party over another in the administration of the government of the State.

The sanguinary revolution in the State of Mississippi in 1875 was
claimed to be in the interest of good administration and honest
government; it was an attempt to wrest the State from the control of
dishonest men,--negroes, carpet baggers, and scalawags,--and place it in
control of intelligent, pure, and honest white men. With that end in
view, Geo. M. Buchanan, a brave and gallant ex-Confederate soldier, was,
through questionable and indefensible methods, defeated for the office
of State Treasurer, and Wm. L. Hemmingway was declared elected. Yet when
the change took place it was found that every dollar of the public money
was accounted for. During the whole period of Republican administration
not a dollar had been misappropriated, nor had there been a single
defalcation, although millions of dollars had passed through the hands
of the fiscal agents of the State and of the different counties.

How was it with the new reform administration? Treasurer Hemmingway had
been in office only a comparatively short while when the startling
information was given out that he was a defaulter to the amount of
$315,612.19. William L. Hemmingway a defaulter! Could such a thing be
possible? Yes, it was an admitted and undisputed fact.

Mr. Hemmingway had been quite prominent in the politics of the State;
but those who knew the man, and I was one of those, had every reason to
believe that he was an honest man, and that he was the personification
of integrity. He was neither a speculator nor a gambler. Even after the
defalcation was made known there was nothing to indicate that any part
of the money had been appropriated to his own use. Yet the money had
mysteriously disappeared. Where was it? Who had it? These were questions
the people of the State desired to have answered, but they have never
yet been answered and, it is safe to say, they never will be. Hemmingway
no doubt could and can answer those questions, but he has not done so
and the probabilities are that he never will. He evidently believed that
to turn State's evidence would render him more culpable than to be
guilty of the act which he had allowed to be committed. He might have
been forced to make a confession, or at least been compelled to give the
prosecution a clue to the real criminal or criminals if the prosecution
had been in charge of persons who could not be suspected of being the
political beneficiaries of the methods by which it was possible for him
to be placed in charge of the office. It was hardly reasonable to expect
such men to make very much of an effort to secure a confession. In fact,
it seems to have been a relief to them to have the accused take the
position that he alone was the responsible party and that he was willing
to bear all the blame and assume all the consequences that would result
from the act. The names, therefore, of those who were the beneficiaries
of this remarkable defalcation will, no doubt, remain a secret in the
bosom of William L. Hemmingway, and will be buried with him in his
grave.

Hemmingway was tried, convicted, sentenced and served a term in the
State Prison; all of which he calmly endured rather than give the name
of any person having connection with that unfortunate affair. All the
satisfaction that the public can get with reference to it,--other than
the punishment to which Hemmingway was subjected,--is to indulge in
conjectures about it. One conjecture, and the most reasonable and
plausible one, is that if Hemmingway had made a full confession it might
have involved not only some men who were prominent and influential, but
perhaps the Democratic State organization as well. For it was a
well-known fact that in 1875 nearly every Democratic club in the State
was converted into an armed military company. To fully organize, equip,
and arm such a large body of men required an outlay of a large sum of
money. The money was evidently furnished by some persons or through some
organization. Those who raised the money, or who caused it to be raised,
no doubt had an eye to the main chance. A patriotic desire to have the
State redeemed (?) was not with them the actuating motive. When the
redemption (?) of the State was an accomplished fact they, no doubt,
felt that they were entitled to share in the fruits of that redemption.
Their idea evidently was that the State should be made to pay for its
own salvation and redemption, but the only way in which this could be
done was to have the people's money in the State treasury appropriated
for that purpose otherwise than by legislative enactment. This, as I
have already stated, is only a conjecture, but, under the circumstances,
it is the most reasonable and plausible one that can be imagined.

The case of Treasurer Hemmingway is conclusive evidence that in point of
efficiency, honesty and official integrity the Democratic party had no
advantage over the party that was placed in power chiefly through the
votes of colored men. What was true of Mississippi in this respect was
also true,--in a measure, at least,--of the other reconstructed States.

CHAPTER XVII

THE HAYES-TILDEN CONTEST. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION

Although the action of the returning boards in South Carolina,
Louisiana, and Florida, gave Mr. Hayes a majority of one vote in the
Electoral College, the Democrats, who were largely in the majority in
the National House of Representatives, were evidently not willing to
acquiesce in the declared result,--claiming that Mr. Tilden had been
fairly elected and that he ought to be inaugurated.

Hon. Henry Watterson, of Kentucky,--who was at that time a member of the
House,--delivered a fiery speech in which he declared that a hundred
thousand armed men would march to Washington to see that Mr. Tilden was
inaugurated. The situation for a while looked very grave. It seemed as
if there would be a dual government, Hayes and Tilden each claiming to
be the legally elected President. To prevent this was the problem then
before Congress and the American people. Conferences, composed of
influential men of both parties, were being frequently held in different
parts of the city.

The creation of an electoral commission to pass upon and decide the
disputed points involved was finally suggested, and was accepted by a
majority of both parties. The name of the originator of this suggestion
has never been made public; but it is believed by many that Senator
Edmunds, of Vermont, was the man, since he was the principal champion of
the measure in the Senate. Subsequent events appeared to indicate that
Hon. Wm. M. Evarts of New York, was also an influential party to the
scheme, if not the originator of it. At any rate, no one seemed to have
been sufficiently proud of it to lay claim to its paternity. It was
merely a temporary scheme, intended to tide over an unpleasant, and
perhaps dangerous, condition which existing remedies did not fully meet.
It was equivalent to disposing of the Presidency by a game of
chance,--for the composition of the proposed commission was,
politically, purely a matter of chance.

As finally agreed upon, the measure provided for a commission to be
composed of fifteen members,--five from the House, five from the Senate,
and five Justices of the Supreme Court. As the Democrats had a majority
in the House, it was agreed that they should have three, and the
Republicans two of the five members of that body. Since the Republicans
had a majority in the Senate it was agreed that they should have three,
and the Democrats two of the five members of that body. Of the five
justices of the Supreme Court, two were to be Republicans and two,
Democrats; the fifth Justice to be an independent,--or one who was as
near an independent as could be found on the bench of that Court.

When the bill creating this commission came before the House I spoke
against it, and voted against it, for two reasons. In the first place, I
believed it was a dangerous precedent to subject the Presidency of the
United States to such a game of chance as was contemplated by the bill
then under consideration. Either Hayes or Tilden had been elected, and
the result ought to be ascertained according to legal forms. In the
second place, I had a suspicion that it was the outgrowth of an
understanding or agreement which would result in the abandonment of
Southern Republicans by the National Administration.

Mr. Lamar, for instance, did not hesitate to declare that it was more
important that the South should have local self-government than that the
President should be a Democrat. In other words, what Southern Democrats
wanted was to be let alone,--was to have the National Administration
keep its hands off, and allow them to manage their own affairs in their
own way, even if that way should result in a virtual nullification, in
part at least, of the War Amendments to the Federal Constitution.

I had a suspicion that this concession had been granted upon condition
that the southern Democratic leaders in Congress would consent to the
creation of the proposed commission, and to the ratification of its
decision, whatever that decision might be. To such a bargain I did not
care to be even an innocent party. My suspicions were strengthened by
the fact that the principal opposition among Democrats to the creation
of the commission and to the ratification of its decision came from
northern Democrats. Southern Democrats, with a few notable exceptions,
not only favored the creation of the commission and the ratification of
its decision, but even the fiery Watterson was induced to hold his peace
and to give expression to his righteous indignation through the medium
of a silent vote. That my suspicions were well founded subsequents
events more than demonstrated. I took the position that Mr. Hayes had
been legally elected, at least according to the forms of law and in the
manner prescribed by the Constitution,--and that he should, therefore,
be duly inaugurated even if it should be necessary for President Grant,
as Commander-in-chief of the Army, to use the military force of the
Government for that purpose. I contended that, having been thus legally
elected, Hayes should not be subjected to the chance of losing his title
to the office and that the incoming President should not be bound by
any ante-inauguration pledges, which, in the opinion of some, would have
a tendency to cast a cloud upon his title to the office. But the bill
was passed and the commission was duly appointed.

At this point the game of chance turned in favor of the Republicans. It
was generally understood that Justice David Davis, of Illinois, would be
the fifth Justice to be placed on the commission. He was said to be an
Independent,--the only member of the Supreme Court that could be thus
classed politically. But, in point of fact, he was more of a Democrat
than an Independent. Had he been made a member of the commission it is
more than probable that Mr. Tilden, and not Mr. Hayes, would have been
made President. The Legislature of Illinois was at that time engaged in
an effort to elect a United States Senator. The Legislature was composed
of about an equal number of Republicans and Democrats,--three
Independents holding the balance of power. The Independents at length
presented the name of Justice David Davis as their choice for Senator.
In order to make sure of the defeat of a Republican, the Democrats
joined the Independents in the support of Justice Davis, which resulted
in his election. This took place only a few days before the time
appointed for the selection of the commissioners.

As soon as it was announced that Justice Davis had been elected to the
Senate the Republican leaders in Congress insisted that he was no
longer eligible to a seat on the Electoral Commission. This was at first
strongly combated by the Democrats, who contended that the Justice was
only a Senator-elect, and that he did not cease to be a member of the
Court until he tendered his resignation as such; this he was neither
required nor expected to do until shortly before the beginning of his
term as a Senator. But the Republicans pressed their objections so
strongly that the Democrats were induced to yield the point, and Justice
Bradley was selected as the fifth Justice. Next to Davis, Bradley came
as near being an Independent as any member of the Court. Although he had
been appointed as a Republican by President Grant,--as had Justice Davis
by President Lincoln,--yet he had rendered several decisions which gave
the Democrats hope that he might give the deciding vote in their favor
and thus make Mr. Tilden President. In this they were disappointed; for
it turned out that the substitution of Bradley for Davis made Hayes
President of the United States. It would, perhaps, be unfair to say that
the decisions of the commission were rendered regardless of the
evidence, the law, and the arguments, yet it so happened that every
important point was decided by a strict party vote,--eight to seven.

In this connection it will not be out of place to refer to a scene that
was created on the Democratic side of the House by Hon. Ben. Hill, of
Georgia. Mr. Hill entered the House one afternoon, having just returned
from the Supreme Court Chamber, where the commission was in session. He
remarked to one of his colleagues in a low tone that he had just
returned from where the sessions of the commission were being held, and
that while there the important and valuable information had been
imparted to him that on a most vital point the Democrats could with
absolute certainty depend upon the vote of Mr. Justice Bradley.

"Can that be possible?" exclaimed his excited and highly elated
colleague.

"Yes," replied Mr. Hill, "there can be no doubt about it. I know whereof
I speak. It came to me through a source that cannot be questioned."

"Then wait until I can call several of our friends," replied his
colleague, "I want them to hear the good news at the same time it is
heard by me, so that we can rejoice together."

Mr. Hill was soon surrounded by an eager, excited, and interested group
of anxious Democratic members. "We are now ready," said his delighted
colleague, whose face was covered with a smile of satisfaction, "to hear
the good news."

"Well," replied Mr. Hill, whose manner was grave and whose countenance
gave every evidence of deep emotion, "whenever a motion to adjourn is
made by a Democratic member of the commission we can safely depend upon
the vote of Mr. Justice Bradley being cast in the affirmative."

The heads of the anxious group immediately fell in deep disappointment
and despair. But, of course, they did not fail to see the irony of Mr.
Hill's remark. It did transpire that whenever a motion to adjourn was
made by a Democratic member of the commission it was usually carried by
a vote of eight to seven,--Mr. Justice Bradley voting in the affirmative
with the Democrats. On no other question, however, could they depend on
his vote.

The decision of the Electoral Commission was finally rendered in favor
of Mr. Hayes by a strict party vote,--eight to seven. Strong and bitter
opposition to the approval of the decision was made in the House by
quite a number of northern Democrats, but the majority of southern
Democrats, aided by such northern Democrats as represented districts
having large commercial interests,--interests that are at all times
willing to pay any price for peace,--accepted the decision, and Mr.
Hayes was allowed to be peacefully inaugurated.

CHAPTER XVIII

ATTITUDE OF THE HAYES ADMINISTRATION TOWARD THE SOUTH

The new administration had been in power only a short while before it
became apparent to southern Republicans that they had very little to
expect from this administration. It was generally understood that a
southern man would be made Postmaster General in the new cabinet, but it
was assumed, of course, by those, at least, who were not fully informed
about the secret deals and bargains that had been entered into as a
condition precedent to a peaceable inauguration of the new
administration,--that he would be a Republican.

Senator Alcorn, of my own State, Mississippi, who had just retired from
the Senate, had an ambition to occupy that position. I was one to whom
that fact was made known. I did not hesitate to use what little
influence I had to have that ambition gratified. I was so earnest and
persistent in pressing his claims and merits upon those who were known
to be close to the appointing power, that I succeeded in finding out
definitely and authoritatively the name of the man that had been agreed
upon and would, no doubt, be appointed to that position. Ex-Senator
Key, a Democrat from Tennessee, was the man. When I informed Senator
Alcorn of that fact the manifestation of surprise, disappointment, and
disgust with which he received it can better be imagined than described.
This was not due so much to the fact that some other one than himself
had been selected, but to the fact that the fortunate man was a Southern
Democrat. For the first time the Senator became convinced that southern
Republicans had been made the subjects of barter and trade in the
shuffle for the Presidency, and that the sacrifice of southern
Republicans was the price that had to be paid for the peaceable
inauguration of Mr. Hayes. This, in Senator Alcorn's opinion, meant that
the Republican party in the reconstructed States of the South was a
thing of the past. There was no hope for it in the future.

"It would have been far better," said the Senator, "not only for the
Republican party at the South but for the country at large, to have
allowed the Democrats to inaugurate Tilden, and to have taken charge of
the Government, than to have purchased Republican victory at such a
fearful cost. What inducement can a southern white man now have for
becoming a Republican? Under the present state of things he will be
hated at home, and despised abroad. He will be rejected by his old
friends and associates, and discountenanced by his new ones. He will
incur the odium, and merit the displeasure and censure of his former
friends, associates, and companions with no compensating advantages for
the sacrifices thus made."

The Senator spoke with deep feeling. He could see that his efforts to
build up a strong Republican party at the South must necessarily fail
under such conditions, and that it was useless to make any further
effort in that direction. Under his influence and leadership very many
of the best and most influential white men in his state had identified
themselves with the Republican party. His efforts in that direction
would have been continued, in spite of the temporary defeat of the party
at the polls, however severe that defeat might have been, if those
efforts had been appreciated and appropriately recognized by the
national leaders of the organization. But when he saw that not only was
this not to be done, but that one of those who was known to be fully
identified with the political persecutors of southern Republicans was to
be recognized,--thus placing the stamp of approval upon their work by an
administration that was supposed to be Republican and therefore opposed
to such methods,--it was time for southern white men, who had been
acting with the Republican party and for those who may have such action
in contemplation, to stop and seriously consider the situation. It was
now in order for each one of them to ask himself the question: "Can I
afford to do this?"

The appointment of a southern Democrat to a seat in the Cabinet of a
Republican President, especially at that particular time, was a crushing
blow to southern Republicans. It was the straw that broke the camel's
back. Senator Alcorn was a man suitable in every way for the office of
Postmaster-General. He had a commanding presence, he was an eloquent
speaker, and an able debater,--by nature a leader and not a follower. He
had taken an active part in the politics of his state before and after
the War. After he identified himself with the Republican party he was
ambitious to be chiefly instrumental in building up a strong party in
his State and throughout the South which would not only recognize merit
in the colored people and accord absolute justice and fair play to them,
but which would include in its membership a large percentage, if not a
majority, of the best and most substantial white men of that section.

That he had made splendid progress along those lines cannot be denied.
The announced southern policy of the Hayes administration not only
completed the destruction of what had been thus accomplished, but it
made any further progress in that direction absolutely impossible. The
selection of ex-Senator Key was, however, not the only Cabinet
appointment which clearly indicated the southern policy of the
administration. There were two others,--those of William M. Evarts and
Carl Schurz. Those men had been prominent in their bitter opposition to
the southern policy of President Grant. Mr. Schurz had been one of the
leaders in the Greeley movement against President Grant and the
Republican party in 1872, while Mr. Evarts was later the principal
speaker at a public indignation meeting that was held at New York to
denounce the southern policy of the Grant administration. In fact, John
Sherman was the only one of the Cabinet ministers that had a positive
national standing, and even his brilliant star was somewhat marred on
account of the impression that, as one of the Hayes managers, he had
been a party to the deals and agreements that had been made and entered
into as a condition precedent to the peaceable induction of Mr. Hayes
into office. It was known, or at any rate believed, that Mr. Sherman's
appointment as Secretary of the Treasury was for the one specific
purpose of bringing about the resumption of specie payments. He was the
author of the act which fixed the date when specie payments should be
resumed. He had the reputation of being one of the ablest financiers the
country had produced. That he should be named to carry into effect the
act of which he was the author was to be expected. For the reasons above
stated, it was the one Cabinet appointment that met with general
approval.

It was soon seen, however, that the Cabinet was so constructed as to
make it harmonize with the southern policy of the administration. It was
not long before the announcement was officially made in prolix
sentences, of which Secretary Evarts was no doubt the author, that the
army could not and would not be used to uphold and sustain any State
Government in an effort to maintain its supremacy and enforce obedience
to its mandates. In other words, it was a public announcement of the
fact that if there should be an armed revolt in a State against the
lawful State Government which would be strong enough to seize and take
possession of that government, the National Government would refuse to
interfere, even though a request for assistance should be made by the
Chief Executive of the State in the manner and form prescribed by the
Constitution. I have never believed that this policy,--which was meant,
of course, for the South,--was in harmony with Mr. Hayes' personal
convictions; especially in view of his public utterances during the
progress of the campaign and immediately after the announcement had been
made that he had been defeated. But he no doubt asked himself the
question: "What can I do?" This is what he had been bound to do, by his
managers through the medium of an ante-inauguration pledge, which he
felt in honor bound to respect. Mr. Hayes was not a man of sufficient
force of character to disregard and repudiate such a pledge or bargain.
Had he been a Napoleon, or even an Andrew Jackson, he would have
declared that no man or set of men had any authority to make for him any
ante-inauguration pledge, promise, or bargain by which he would be bound
as chief magistrate of the country. To the contrary, he would have
openly and publicly declared:

"I am President, or I am not. That I am the legally elected President is
a recognized and undisputed fact, and, as such, I shall neither
recognize nor respect any pledge, promise or bargain which involves
dishonor on my part or acquiescence in the suspension, violation or
evasion of the Constitution or of any law made in pursuance thereof. As
President of the United States I have taken and subscribed to an oath by
which I am bound to uphold the Constitution of my country, and to see
that the laws are duly executed and enforced. That oath I am determined
to respect and honor. I shall not only do all in my power to see that
the Constitution and the laws of the land are obeyed and enforced,--both
in letter and in spirit,--but it is also my determination to see that
every American citizen is protected in the exercise and enjoyment of his
rights, as far as it may be in the power of the President to protect
him." Such a declaration, accompanied by an honest effort to carry the
same into effect, even if he had been unsuccessful, would have carried
the name of R.B. Hayes down in history as one of the greatest and most
brilliant statesmen our country had ever produced. But, he was not equal
to the occasion, and therefore failed to take advantage of such a golden
opportunity. On the contrary, he decided to live up to and carry out to
the very letter, every pledge, promise, agreement or bargain that had
been made in his behalf, which involved the dishonor of his own name and
the disgrace of his country. Packard, for Governor of Louisiana, and
Chamberlain, for Governor of South Carolina, were voted for at the same
time that the Hayes electors were voted for in their respective States.
Each of these candidates polled a much larger vote than that of the
Hayes electors. If, therefore, Mr. Hayes was legally or mortally
entitled to the electoral votes of those States, without which he could
not have been elected, those men were entitled to be recognized and
supported as Governor of their respective States. But it was a
well-known fact that without the support and backing of the National
Administration at that particular time, they could not maintain and
enforce their authority against the organization of the Democratic
party. The public announcement of the southern policy of the National
Administration put an effectual end to any further effort on the part
of either Packard or Chamberlain. The Administration not only deserted
and abandoned those two men and the party for which they had so bravely
and so gallantly stood, but it allowed the very men whose votes made Mr.
Hayes President to be harassed and persecuted for what they had done in
that direction. After Packard surrendered to the inevitable he was
tendered a position in the foreign service, which he accepted. When
Chamberlain was forced to abandon the hopeless struggle in South
Carolina, he moved to New York and engaged in the practice of law.
Politically he affiliated with the Democratic party until his death.

CHAPTER XIX

QUESTION OF THE VALIDITY OF SENATOR LAMAR'S ELECTION

Mr. Blaine had been elected to the United States Senate from Maine, his
term beginning March 4th, 1877. The term for which Mr. Lamar, of
Mississippi, had been elected, commenced at the same time. It was not
possible to have a Congressional investigation of the Mississippi
election of 1875 unless the same should be ordered by the Senate,--the
Republicans having a small majority in that body. Each House being the
sole judge of the elections and qualifications of its own members, the
Senate could, of course, have Mr. Lamar's credentials referred to the
Committee of Privileges and Elections, with instructions to make an
investigation of the methods used to carry the election. This committee
would ascertain and report whether or not there had been a legal and
valid election in that State, and, pending the investigation and report
by the committee and the disposition of the same by the Senate, the seat
to which Mr. Lamar had been elected would remain vacant. As the result
of a number of conferences between Republican Senators and
representative Mississippi Republicans, this course was decided upon as
the one to be pursued. But, in order to do this, the Senate must have
something upon which to base its contemplated action. It could not be
expected to take official notice of rumors or newspaper reports of what
had taken place. It was therefore decided that a memorial should be
drawn up and signed by a number of reputable and well-known citizens of
the State, making specific allegations with reference to that election,
and concluding with a request that a thorough investigation be made
before the Senator, chosen by the Legislature that had been brought into
existence by that election, could be admitted to the Senate.

In support of this contemplated action there had been a number of
precedents,--the recent case of Mr. Pinchback, of Louisiana, being one
of them. It fell to my lot to draw up the memorial. It was to be
presented to the Senate and championed in that body by Senator Morton,
of Indiana. The Republican majority in the Senate was small. The
Democrats, of course, would bitterly oppose the Morton motion. To make
sure of its adoption the affirmative vote of nearly every Republican
Senator was necessary. At any rate there could be no serious defection
in the Republican ranks, otherwise the Morton proposition could not
prevail. That anyone on the Republican side would oppose it was not
anticipated, for every one that had been approached expressed his
intention of supporting it. No one of the newly elected Senators had
been approached. It was not deemed necessary. It was not anticipated
that any one of them would do otherwise than support the program that
had been agreed upon by the older members of the Senate. Senator Morton
was to submit the memorial and make the motion when the name of Mr.
Lamar was called to take the oath of office.

The names of the States were called in alphabetical order, about three
being called at a time. Maine was reached before Mississippi, and Mr.
Blaine was duly sworn in as a Senator from that State. No one expected
that he would do otherwise than support the program that had been agreed
upon, but, contrary to expectations, as soon as Mississippi was called
Mr. Blaine was on his feet, demanding recognition. Of course he was
recognized by the chair. He made a motion that Mr. Lamar be sworn in
_prima facie_ as the Senator from Mississippi. His contention was that,
since his credentials were regular, the Senator-elect should be sworn
in; and if there should be any question about the legality of the
election it could be made the subject of a subsequent investigation.

This unexpected action on the part of Mr. Blaine took everyone by
surprise, with the possible exception of Mr. Lamar, who, no doubt, was
well aware of what was in contemplation. It produced consternation and
caused a panic among the Republican leaders in the Senate. Hurried and
excited conferences were being held while the subject was being debated.
For the seriousness of the situation was recognized. Mr. Blaine's
defection meant the defeat of the Morton motion should it be made, and
the adoption of the Blaine motion by the solid vote of the Democrats, to
which would be added a small minority of the Republicans. This division
in the ranks of the party at the beginning of the Hayes administration
had to be avoided if possible. That Mr. Blaine should recede from his
position was, of course, out of the question. Nothing, therefore,
remained to be done but for Senator Morton to refrain from making his
motion; for a hurried canvass of the Senate had revealed the fact that
the motion, if made and brought to a vote, would be defeated, and the
effect of such a defeat would be worse than if the motion had not been
made. So the Blaine motion was allowed to go by default, and Mr. Lamar
was duly sworn in as a Senator from Mississippi. Of course it was well
known at the time by many,--Mr. Blaine among the number,--that this
ended the controversy and that no subsequent investigation would be
made. That Mr. Blaine was sadly and seriously disappointed at the
result of his action in this case, as well as in his action in defeating
the Federal Elections Bill, will be made clear in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER XX

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION OF 1880. NOMINATION OF THE COMPROMISE
CANDIDATE, GARFIELD

Since the indications were that the Democrats would be successful in the
Congressional elections of 1878, the election in the "shoe-string
district" that year was allowed to go by default.

In 1880, the year of the Presidential election, I decided that I would
again measure arms with Chalmers for Representative in Congress from
that district. It was practically a well-settled fact that there was to
be a bitter fight for the Republican Presidential nomination that year.
There were three prominent candidates in the field for the
nomination,--James G. Blaine, U.S. Grant, and John Sherman. Grant was
especially strong with southern Republicans, while Blaine had very
little support in that section. Sherman was well thought of on account
of the splendid record he had made as a member of the United States
Senate, and, in addition to that, he had the influence and the support
of the National Administration, of which he was a member,--being at that
time Secretary of the Treasury.

In the State of Mississippi Bruce, Hill and I,--the three leading
colored men,--had formed an offensive and defensive alliance. Bruce was
United States Senator, which position he had secured largely through the
influence and active support of myself and Hill,--of Hill especially,
since he was on the ground at the time of the election, which enabled
him to take personal charge of the campaign before the Legislature in
the interest of Mr. Bruce.

Hill had been elected Secretary of State on the ticket with Ames in 1873
and, after the expiration of his term, was, through the influence and
support of Bruce and myself, made Collector of Internal Revenue for the
State of Mississippi. The office of Secretary of State, to which he was
elected in 1873, was one that the Democrats did not take possession of
in 1876. Unlike the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor, the removal of the
incumbent was not necessary to put that party in possession of the State
Government.

I, Lynch, was at that time a member of the National House of
Representatives, which position I was able to retain for a long time
with the active assistance and support of Bruce and Hill,--especially of
Bruce.

That we three should work in perfect political harmony was both natural
and proper, since, in doing so, we protected our own interests and
secured for ourselves, and for our friends and supporters, appropriate
official recognition. At nearly every State convention either Bruce or I
was made chairman of the convention, with Hill as floor manager.

The State committee was organized and controlled in the same way.
Through that thorough and effective organization I was Chairman of the
Republican State Committee from 1881 to 1892, and I could have retained
it longer had I consented to serve; notwithstanding the dissolution of
the combination, which took place about that time, as will be shown and
explained later.

There was a faction in the party that was opposed to the leadership of
these three influential colored men, but it was never strong enough to
organize or control a State Convention as long as we three worked in
union. While this union had the effect of keeping us at the front as
recognized leaders of the party it could not be said it was detrimental
to the party organization, for the reason that under that leadership the
organization never failed to support the men that the party believed to
be the strongest. In other words, while we used the party machinery to
prevent our own political extinction we never allowed our own ambitions
to conflict with what was believed by other influential members of the
party to be for the best interest of the organization.

It looked for a while as if the State Convention of 1880 would result
in a dissolution of this combination which had so successfully
controlled the party organization in the State so many years. Bruce and
Hill were supporters of Secretary Sherman for the Republican
Presidential nomination, while I was favorable to the candidacy of
ex-President Grant. That Grant was the choice of a large majority of the
Republicans of the State could not be truthfully denied. Mr. Bruce was
the Republican United States Senator in harmony with the administration.
Mr. Hill was an office-holder under that administration, and Secretary
Sherman was believed to be the administration candidate for the
nomination.

As soon as the fact was developed that Bruce and Hill were for Sherman
and that I was for Grant, the faction which had always opposed and
fought the leadership of the Bruce-Lynch-Hill combination took up the
fight for Grant, with the determination to take advantage of Grant's
strength and popularity in order to secure control of the party
machinery. It was this that prevented at that time a dissolution of the
Bruce-Hill-Lynch combination. The situation with which we were
confronted made it necessary for the three to come together and, in a
spirit of concession, agree upon a common line of action. Upon the
suggestion of Mr. Bruce a conference soon took place at which I agreed
that, since it was my purpose to be a candidate for the Congressional
nomination in the Sixth or "shoe-string district," I would not be a
candidate for delegate to the National Convention, but that I would
support Bruce and Hill as delegates from the State at large, with the
understanding that, if at any time Sherman's name should be withdrawn
and Grant's nomination were possible, they should support Grant. It was
further agreed that I should support the Bruce-Lynch-Hill combination in
the fight for the organization of the State Convention, but that I
should be at liberty to use my influence for the election of Grant men
as delegates other than Bruce and Hill.

At the conclusion of this conference I made public announcement of the
fact that, since it was my purpose to become a candidate for Congress in
the Sixth or "shoe-string district," I would not be a candidate for
delegate to the National Convention but would give my support to Bruce
and Hill, for two of the four places on the delegation from the State at
large, with the understanding that the delegation, if controlled by
them, would not be hostile to Grant. I had reasons to know that Mr.
Bruce, in consequence of his cordial relations with Senator
Conkling,--the national leader of the Grant forces,--was not unfriendly
to Grant, and that he would use his influence to prevent the delegation
from going into any combination for the sole purpose of defeating the
nomination of Grant. In other words, Grant was Brace's second choice for
the nomination.

The fight for the delegation was waged with a good deal of heat and
bitterness. The canvass had not progressed very far before it was
developed that Grant was much stronger than the faction by which he was
being supported. The fight was so bitter, and the delegates to the State
Convention were so evenly divided, that the result was the election of a
compromise delegation which was about evenly divided between Grant and
Sherman. Bruce and Hill were among those that were elected.

The National Convention, which was held in Chicago in June of that year,
was one of the most exciting and interesting in the history of the
party. It was that convention that abolished what was known as "the unit
rule." Up to that time the right of a State Convention to elect all the
delegates to which the State was entitled,--district as well as
State,--and to instruct them as a body had never before been questioned.
New York, as well as other States, had instructed the delegates to cast
the entire vote of the State for Grant. This was the unit rule. It is a
rule which even now is enforced in National Conventions of the
Democratic party. It was through the enforcement of this rule that Mr.
Cleveland was renominated, when he was so bitterly opposed by a portion
of the delegation from his own State,--especially the Tammany
delegates,--that General Bragg was moved to make the celebrated
declaration that he "loved Mr. Cleveland on account of the enemies he
had made." Notwithstanding the fact that those delegates were strongly
opposed to Mr. Cleveland, and though they protested against having their
votes recorded for him, they were so recorded through the application
and enforcement of the unit rule. It was the enforcement of this rule
upon which Mr. Conkling insisted in the National Republican Convention
of 1880. About twenty of the New York district delegates, under the
leadership of Judge W.H. Robertson, refused to be governed by the
instructions of the State Convention. Their contention was that the
State Convention had no right to bind by instructions any delegates
except the four from the State at large. After a lengthy and heated
debate the convention finally sustained this contention, and since that
time the unit rule has not been recognized in a National Republican
Convention.

This action, no doubt, resulted in the defeat of General Grant for the
nomination; for it was a well-known fact that his nomination was
possible only through the enforcement of the unit rule. His friends and
supporters, however, under the leadership of Senator Conkling, made a
strong and desperate fight with the hope that the tide might ultimately
turn in their favor, but with the intention, in any event, of
preventing if possible the nomination of Mr. Blaine. General Grant's
name was placed before the Convention by Senator Conkling in one of his
most eloquent and masterly efforts.

"The man whose name I shall place in nomination," he said, "does not
hail from any particular State; he hails from the United States. It is
not necessary to nominate a man that can carry Michigan. Any Republican
can carry Michigan. You should nominate a man that can carry New York.
That man is U.S. Grant."

Mr. Blaine's name was placed in nomination by a delegate from Michigan
by the name of Joy. His effort did not come up to public expectation.
The eloquent speech of Senator Frye, of Maine, who seconded the
nomination, made up in part for the public disappointment in Mr. Joy's
effort. The name of Secretary John Sherman was placed before the
Convention in one of General Garfield's most powerful and convincing
efforts. It is safe to say that the speech delivered by General Garfield
on that occasion made him the nominee of that convention. After drawing
an eloquent and vivid picture of the kind of man that should be made
President,--with the intention of naming John Sherman as the man thus
described,--he asked in a tone of voice that was pitched in a high key:

"Who is that man?"

The response came from different parts of the hall, "Garfield."

And sure enough it was Garfield. After a number of fruitless ballots it
became apparent that neither of the three leading candidates could
possibly be nominated. Very few, if any, of the Grant men would at any
time go to either Blaine or Sherman. Very few, if any, of the Sherman
men would go to Blaine, while Blaine men could not in any considerable
numbers, be induced to go either to Grant or Sherman. While a number of
Sherman men would have supported Grant in preference to Blaine, there
were not enough of them, even with the Grant men, to constitute a
majority. When Garfield's name was suggested as a compromise candidate
he was found to be acceptable to both the Blaine and the Sherman men as
well as to some of the Grant men, who had abandoned all hope of Grant's
nomination. The result was that Garfield was finally made the unanimous
choice of the convention. The New York delegation, being allowed to name
the man for Vice-President, nominated Chester A. Arthur, of that State.

Although General Garfield was nominated as a compromise candidate his
election was by no means a foregone conclusion. The Democrats had
nominated a strong and popular man, General W.S. Hancock, one of the
most brilliant and successful generals in the Union Army. Associated on
the ticket with him was a popular Indiana Democrat, William H. English.
It looked for a while as if Democratic success were reasonably certain,
especially after the September State and Congressional elections in the
State of Maine, the result of which was virtually a Democratic victory.

What was known as the celebrated Mentor Conference then took place.
Mentor was the home of General Garfield. The conference consisted of
General Garfield, General Grant, and Senator Conkling. Who was
instrumental in bringing that conference into existence perhaps will
never be known, and what was actually said and done on that occasion
will, no doubt, remain a mystery. But it resulted in bringing the
Grant-Conkling wing of the party,--which up to that time had been
lukewarm and indifferent,--into the active and aggressive support of the
ticket. Senator Conkling immediately took the stump and made a brilliant
and successful campaign, not only in New York but also in the other
close and doubtful States. The result was that Garfield carried New York
by a majority of about twenty thousand and was elected. Without New York
he would have been defeated; for the South this time was unquestionably
solid in its support of the Democratic ticket; at least, according to
the forms of law. It was not necessary to resort to the questionable
expedient of an electoral commission to determine the result of that
election. It is safe to say that, but for the active support given the
ticket in that campaign by General Grant and Senator Conkling, New York
would have been lost to the party and Garfield would have been defeated.
With the election of Garfield the National House of Representatives was
also Republican. The majority was small, but it was large enough to
enable the party to organize the House. The Garfield administration
started out under very favorable auspices. How it ended will be told in
another chapter.

CHAPTER XXI

STORY OF THE MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN GARFIELD AND CONKLING

The Garfield Administration, as I have said, started out under most
favorable auspices. Mr. Conkling took an active part in the Senate as a
champion and spokesman of the administration. He seemed to have taken it
for granted, that,--although his bitter enemy, Mr. Blaine, was Secretary
of State,--his own influence with the administration would be potential.
In conversation with his personal friends he insisted that this was a
part of the agreement that had been entered into at the famous Mentor
Conference, about which so much had been said and published. If it were
true that Mr. Conkling's control of the Federal patronage in New York in
the event of Republican success was a part of that agreement, it
transpired that Mr. Blaine had sufficient influence with the President
to bring about its repudiation.

It is a fact well known that the President was anxious to avoid a break
with Senator Conkling. Judge W.H. Robertson, who was a candidate for the
Collectorship of the port of New York was strongly supported by Mr.
Blaine. Judge Robertson had been one of the influential leaders of the
Blaine movement in New York. It was he who had disregarded the action of
the State Convention in instructing the delegates to cast the vote of
the State as a unit for General Grant. In bolting the action of the
State Convention Judge Robertson carried about nineteen other delegates
with him over to Mr. Blaine. Therefore Mr. Blaine insisted upon the
appointment of Judge Robertson to the Collectorship of the port at New
York. Senator Conkling would not consent under any circumstances to this
appointment. Mr. Blaine, it appears, succeeded in convincing the
President that, but for Judge Robertson's action, his, Garfield's,
nomination would have been impossible and that consequently it would be
base ingratitude not to appoint Robertson to the position for which he
was an applicant. Mr. Blaine contended that the administration would not
only be guilty of ingratitude should it refuse to appoint his candidate,
but that it would thereby allow itself to be the medium through which
this man was to be punished for his action in making the existence of
the administration possible.

"Can you, Mr. President, afford to do such a thing as this?" asked Mr.
Blaine.

To which the President gave a negative answer. Perhaps it did not occur
to Mr. Blaine at that time that, while the action of Judge Robertson
may have made the nomination of Mr. Garfield possible, the subsequent
action of Senator Conkling made his election possible. But,
notwithstanding this, the President decided that Judge Robertson should
have the office for which he was an applicant.

As previously stated, however, the President was anxious to avoid a
break with Senator Conkling. To get the Senator to consent to the
appointment of Judge Robertson was the task the President had before
him. With that end in view the President invited Mr. Conkling to a
private conference, at which he expressed a willingness to allow the New