individual of the said squadron, but to their order, and to be
responsible for the same in his own proper name.

Whereas the said squadron has been formed for the purpose of injuring
the common enemies of France and America, it has been agreed that such
armed vessels, whether French or American, may be associated
therewith, as by common consent shall be found suitable for the
purpose, and that they shall have such proportion of the prizes, which
shall be taken, as the laws of their respective countries allow them.

In case of the death of any one of the beforementioned commanders of
vessels, he shall be replaced agreeably to the order of the tariff,
with liberty, however, to choose whether he will remain on board his
own vessel, and give up to the next in order the command of the vacant
ship.

It has moreover been agreed, that the commander of the Stag shall be
excepted from the last article of this present agreement, because in
case of a disaster to M. de Varage, he shall be replaced by his second
in command, and so on by the other officers of his cutter, the Stag.

  J. P. JONES,
  P. LANDAIS,
  DE COTTINEAU,
  VARAGE,
  P. RICOT,
  LE RAY DE CHAUMONT.

JAMES LOVELL TO B. FRANKLIN.

  March 31st, 1781.

  Sir,

I send you a few newspapers, and the last monthly journals which have
come from the press. The enemy will tell their own story of the naval
engagement on the 16th. They have ventured nearer to truth in
Rivington's Royal Gazette than almost at any one time before, since
the very commencement of hostilities. Our allies conducted most
gallantly, and the enemy are so convinced of the activity of the
French commander, that they have not ventured to remain in the
Chesapeake Bay, to do all the damage which the event of the battle
had put in their power.

I send you General Greene's account of an affair between him and
Cornwallis on the 15th. It differs but little from the prints. I will
endeavor to have it struck at the press. You shall have it, at least,
with our good Secretary's attestation, which is in the best credit,
even with the enemy.

The opportunity of sending is too precarious to admit of my enlarging.

  Your most humble servant,
  JAMES LOVELL,
  _For the Committee of Foreign Affairs_.

JAMES LOVELL TO B. FRANKLIN.

  Philadelphia, May 9th, 1781.

  Sir,

Mr Samuel Curson and Mr Isaac Gouverneur, Jun. of St Eustatia, after
that place was taken, were sent to England in the Vengeance man of
war, Commodore Hotham, stripped of everything but their wearing
apparel; their books, papers, and slaves having been taken from them,
and Mrs Gouverneur, with a young infant, turned out of doors. Special
severity, it is supposed, has been shown to them in consequence of
their acting as agents to Congress. Doctor John Witherspoon, Jun.
also, who was surgeon of the De Graaff letter of marque, taken at St
Eustatia, is sent to England in the Alimena man of war, and very
hardly treated on account of his father being a member of Congress, as
is supposed.

Your particular attention to the exchange of these persons will tend
to give confidence to all, who being connected specially with Congress
are exposed to captivity, and will also very particularly oblige the
relations of these unfortunates, who have requested Congress to
mention these circumstances to you.

  Your most humble servant,
  JAMES LOVELL,
  _For the Committee of Foreign Affairs_.

TO M. DE LAFAYETTE.

  Passy, May 14th, 1781.

  Dear Sir,

You are a very good correspondent, which I do not deserve, as I am a
bad one. The truth is, I have too much business upon my hands, a great
deal of it foreign to my function as a minister, which interferes with
my writing regularly to my friends. But I am nevertheless extremely
sensible of your kindness in sending me such frequent and full
intelligence of the state of affairs on your side of the water, and in
letting me see by your letters, that your health continues, as well as
your zeal for our cause and country.

I hope, that by this time the ship, which has the honor of bearing
your name, is safely arrived. She carries clothing for nearly twenty
thousand men, with arms, ammunition, &c. which will supply some of
your wants, and Colonel Laurens will bring a considerable addition, if
Providence favors his passage. You will receive from him the
particulars, which makes my writing more fully by him unnecessary.

Your friends have heard of your being gone against the traitor
Arnold, and are anxious to hear of your success, and that you have
brought him to punishment. Enclosed is a copy of a letter from his
agent in England, captured by one of our cruisers, and by which the
price or reward he received for his treachery may be guessed at. Judas
sold only one man, Arnold three millions. Judas got for his one man
thirty pieces of silver, Arnold not a halfpenny a head. A miserable
bargain! especially when one considers the quantity of infamy he has
acquired to himself, and entailed on his family.

The English are in a fair way of gaining still more enemies; they play
a desperate game. Fortune may favor them as it sometimes does a
drunken dicer; but by their tyranny in the East, they have at length
roused the powers there against them, and I do not know that they have
in the West a single friend. If they lose their India commerce, (which
is one of their present great supports,) and one battle at sea, their
credit is gone, and their power follows. Thus empires, by pride,
folly, and extravagance, ruin themselves like individuals. M. de la
Motte Piquet has snatched from between their teeth a good deal of
their West India prey, having taken twentytwo sail of their homeward
bound prizes. One of our American privateers has taken two more, and
brought them into Brest, and two were burnt; there were thirtyfour in
company, with two men of war of the line and two frigates, who saved
themselves by flight, but we do not hear of their being yet got in.

I think it was a wise measure to send Colonel Laurens here, who could
speak knowingly of the state of the army. It has been attended with
all the success that perhaps could reasonably be expected, though not
with all that was wished. He has fully justified your character of
him, and returns thoroughly possessed of my esteem; but that cannot
and ought not to please him so much, as a little more money would have
done for his beloved army. This Court continues firm and steady in its
friendship, and does everything it can for us. Can we not do a little
more for ourselves? My successor (for I have desired the Congress to
send me one) will find it in the best disposition towards us, and I
hope he will take care to cultivate that disposition. You, who know
the leading people of both countries, can perhaps judge better than
any member of Congress of a person suitable for this station. I wish
you may be in a way to give your advice, when the matter is agitated
in that assembly. I have been long tired of the trade of minister, and
wished for a little repose before I went to sleep for good and all. I
thought I might have held out till the peace, but as that seems at a
greater distance than the end of my days, I grow impatient. I would
not, however, quit the service of the public, if I did not sincerely
think that it would be easy for the Congress, with your counsel, to
find a fitter man. God bless you, and crown all your labors with
success.

With the highest regard and most sincere affection, I am, dear Sir,
&c.

  B. FRANKLIN.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

  Passy, May 14th, 1781.

  Sir,

I did myself the honor of writing to your Excellency pretty fully on
the 12th of March, to which I beg leave to refer. Colonel Laurens
arriving soon after, we renewed the application for more money.

His indefatigable endeavors have brought the good dispositions of this
Court to a more speedy determination of making an addition, than could
well have been expected so soon after the former grant. As he will
have an opportunity of acquainting you personally with all the
particulars of importance, a circumstantial account of the transaction
from me is unnecessary. I would only mention, that as it is the
practice here to consider early in the year the probable expenses of
the campaign, and appropriate the revenues to the several necessary
services, all subsequent and unexpected demands are extremely
inconvenient and disagreeable, as they cannot be answered without
difficulty, occasion much embarrassment, and are sometimes
impracticable. If, therefore, the Congress have not on this occasion
obtained all they wished, they will impute it to the right cause, and
not suppose a want of good will in our friends, who indeed are such,
most firmly and sincerely.

The whole supply for the current year now amounts to twenty millions;
but out of this are to be paid your usual drafts for interest money,
those in favor of M. de Beaumarchais, and those heretofore drawn on Mr
Jay and Mr Laurens, which I have already either paid or engaged for,
with the support of your several Ministers, &c. &c. which I mention,
that the Congress may avoid embarrassing my successor with drafts,
which perhaps he may not have the means in his hands of honoring.
Besides paying the second year's salaries of Messrs Adams and Dana,
Jay and Carmichael, I have furnished Mr Dana with £1,500 sterling
credit on Petersburgh, for which place I suppose he is now on his
way.

You will receive from Holland advices of the late declaration of that
Court, with regard to the English refusal of its mediation, and of the
assistance requested by the States-General. I hope Mr Dana will find
it well disposed towards us.

I have received no answer yet to my letters relating to the proposed
mode of lodging funds here, by supplying the French fleet and army.
Having as yet heard nothing of Colonel Palfrey, and it being now more
than four months since he sailed, there is great reason to fear he may
be lost. If that should unhappily be the case, the Congress cannot too
soon appoint another consul, such an officer being really necessary
here. Your Minister Plenipotentiary has hitherto had all that sort of
business upon his hands, and as I do not now speak for myself, I may
speak more freely, I think he should be freed from the burden of such
affairs, from all concerns in making contracts for furnishing
supplies, and from all your bill of exchange business, &c. &c. that he
may be more at liberty to attend to the duties of his political
function.

The prisoners in England are increasing by the late practice of
sending our people from New York, and the refusal of the English
Admiralty to exchange any Americans for Englishmen not taken by
American armed vessels. I would mention it for the consideration of
Congress, whether it may not be well to set apart five or six hundred
English prisoners, and refuse them all exchange in America, but for
our countrymen now confined in England.

Agreeably to the vote of Congress, and your Excellency's letter of the
4th of January, I have requested the assistance of this Court for
obtaining the release of Mr President Laurens. It does not yet appear
that the thing is practicable. What the present situation is of that
unfortunate gentleman, may be gathered from the enclosed letters.[26]

  [26] The reference here is to the letters of Sir Grey Cooper, and Mr
  Charles Vernon. See this volume, pages 174, 175, 176.

I hope the Alliance, with the ship _Marquis de Lafayette_ under her
convoy, is by this time arrived, as they sailed the 27th of March. I
flatter myself that the supplies of clothing, &c. which they carry,
will be found good of the kind, and well bought. I have by several
late opportunities sent copies of the government letters taken in the
New York packet. Your Excellency will see, that they are written in
the perfect persuasion of our submitting speedily, and that the
Commissioners are cautioned not to promise too much, with regard to
the future constitutions to be given us, as many changes of the old
may be necessary, &c. One cannot read those letters from the American
Secretary of State, and his Under-Secretary, Knox, without a variety
of reflections on the state we should necessarily be in, if obliged to
make the submission they so fondly hope for, but which I trust in God
they will never see. Their affairs in the East Indies, by the late
accounts, grow worse and worse; and twentytwo ships of the prey they
made in the West are wrenched out of their jaws by the squadron of M.
de la Motte Piquet.

I mentioned in a former letter, my purpose of remaining here for some
time after I should be superseded. I mean it with the permission of
Congress, and on the supposition of no orders being sent me to the
contrary; and I hope it will be so understood.

  With the greatest respect, I have the honor to be, &c.

  B. FRANKLIN.

TO THOMAS LEWIS.

  Passy, May 16th, 1781.

  Sir,

I received the letter you did me the honor of writing to me the 1st of
January. The bill for four thousand four hundred and fortyfour Mexican
dollars, which you remitted to Mr Schweighauser, being refused payment
by Mr Jay, for want of a regular endorsement by Mr Laurens, in whose
favor it was drawn, and which endorsement could not now be obtained,
Mr Schweighauser applied to me, informing me that he should not send
the things ordered by your Board, unless the bill was paid; and it
appearing on the face of the bill, that it was drawn for public
service, I concluded to take it up, on which he has purchased the
things and shipped them. Colonel Laurens has put on board some other
supplies for the army, and I suppose she will now sail directly.

The drafts from Congress upon me for various services, and those on Mr
Jay and Mr Laurens, all coming upon me for payment, together with the
expenses on the ships, &c. &c. have made it impracticable for me to
advance more for loading the Active; but as we have obtained lately
promises of a considerable aid for this year, I shall now try what I
can do, as the money comes in, towards supplying what is demanded in
the invoice you mention. You will receive, I hope, twentyeight cannon,
and a large quantity of powder and saltpetre, by the ship Marquis de
Lafayette.

I have by several opportunities written in answer to your questions
relative to the ship Alliance.

  I have the honor to be, &c.

  B. FRANKLIN.

_P. S._ Please to present my respects to the Board.

JAMES LOVELL TO B. FRANKLIN.

  Philadelphia, May 17th, 1781.

  Sir,

Doctor Putnam, whose letter is enclosed, by the uniformity of his
attachment to our public cause, merits your patronage. And I enclose
for your information some former proceedings of Congress, in which
this same gentleman is interested; requesting, Sir, that you would
obtain a knowledge of the proceedings consequent upon efforts which M.
Gerard has undoubtedly made to obtain compensation for the sloop,
which Count d'Arband restored to the Governor of Antigua, after it had
been taken by Doctor Putnam and others.

  Your most humble servant,
  JAMES LOVELL.

COUNT DE VERGENNES TO B. FRANKLIN.

Translation.

  Versailles, June 8th, 1781.

  Sir,

I have received the letter you did me the honor to write me on the 4th
instant. I do not know whether Mr Laurens has purchased the clothing
in Holland on account of Congress; I only know (and you were likewise
informed of it at the same time) that this officer was _to employ for
his purchases in France_ part of the six millions, which the King has
granted to Congress, and that the residue of this sum was intended to
be sent to America, with a view of re-establishing the credit of the
United States.

If Mr Laurens, instead of paying ready money in Holland, has
contented himself with giving bills on you, I have no concern in it,
and the King can furnish no means for your reimbursement.

As to the monies arising from the loan opened in Holland, we have no
pretensions to regulate the employment of them, as they belong to the
United States. You must, therefore, Sir, apply to Congress for the
power of disposing of them, in discharge of the drafts drawn on you
from all quarters.

  I have the honor of being, &c.

  DE VERGENNES.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

  Passy, June 11th, 1781.

  Sir,

I have lately done myself the honor of writing largely to your
Excellency by divers conveyances, to which I beg leave to refer. This
is chiefly to cover the copy of a letter I have just received from the
Minister, relative to the disposition of the late loans, by which will
be seen the situation I am in with respect to my acceptances of the
quantities of bills drawn by Congress on Mr Jay, Mr Laurens, Mr Adams,
and myself, which I entered into, in the expectation, which both
Colonel Laurens and myself entertained, that a part of these loans
might be applied to the payment of these bills, but which I am now
told cannot be done without an express order from Congress.

I shall endeavor to change the sentiments of the Court in this
respect, but I am not sure of succeeding. I must therefore request
that a resolution of Congress may immediately be sent, empowering me
to apply as much of those loans as shall be necessary for the
discharge of all such drafts of Congress, or for the repayment of such
sums, as I may in the meantime be obliged to borrow for the discharge
of those drafts.

  I have the honor to be, &c.

  B. FRANKLIN.

TO JOHN ADAMS.

  Passy, June 11th, 1781.

  Sir,

Mr Grand has communicated to me a letter from your Excellency to him,
relating to certain charges in your account, on which you seem to
desire to have my opinion. As we are all new in these matters, I
consulted, when I was making up my account, one of the oldest foreign
Ministers here, as to the custom in such cases. He informed me, that
it was not perfectly uniform with the Ministers of all Courts, but
that in general, where a salary was given for service and expenses,
the expenses understood were merely those necessary to the man, such
as housekeeping, clothing, and coach; but that the rent of the hotel
in which he dwelt, the payment of couriers, the postage of letters,
the salary of clerks, the stationary for his bureau, with the feasts
and illuminations made on public occasions, were esteemed the expenses
of the Prince, or State that appointed him, being for the service or
honor of his Prince or nation; and either entirely, or in great part,
expenses that, as a private man, he would have been under no necessity
of incurring. These, therefore, were to be charged in his accounts. He
remarked, it was true that the Minister's housekeeping as well as his
house was usually, and in some sort necessarily more expensive, than
those of a private person, but this he said was considered in his
salary to avoid trouble in accounts; but that where the Prince or
State had not purchased or built a house for their Minister, which was
sometimes the case, they always paid his house rent.

I have stated my own accounts according to this information; and I
mention them, that if they seem to you reasonable, we may be uniform
in our charges, by your charging in the same manner; or if objections
to any of them occur to you, that you would communicate them to me for
the same reason.

Thus you see my opinion, that the articles you mention of courtage,
commission, and port de lettres, are expenses that ought to be borne,
not by you, but by the United States. Yet it seems to me more proper,
that you should pay them, and charge them with the other articles
abovementioned, than that they should be paid by me, who, not knowing
the circumstances, cannot judge (as you can) of the truth or justice
of such an account when presented, and who, besides, have no orders to
pay more on your account, than your net salary.

With regard to that salary, though your receipts to Fitzeaux and
Grand, shown to me, might be quite sufficient to prove they had paid
you the sums therein mentioned, yet, as there are vouchers for them,
and which they have a right to retain, I imagine it will be clearest,
if you draw upon me, agreeably to the order of Congress, and if this
is quarterly, it will be the most convenient to me.

  With great respect, I have the honor, &c.

  B. FRANKLIN.

THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS TO B. FRANKLIN.

  In Congress, June 19th, 1781.

  Sir,

Congress have received your letter of the 12th of March last, with the
papers enclosed. The prospect of conferences being soon opened in
Europe, under the mediation of the imperial Courts of Petersburgh and
Vienna, for accommodating the disputes between the belligerent powers,
which must necessarily involve the essential interests of these United
States, has determined us to increase the number of our ministers for
negotiating a peace with Great Britain. We have, therefore, added
yourself, Messrs Jay, H. Laurens, and Thomas Jefferson to Mr Adams, to
repair to such place as shall be fixed on for transacting this
important business.

A compliance with your request to retire from public employment would
be inconvenient at this particular juncture, as it is the desire of
Congress to avail themselves of your abilities and experience at the
approaching negotiation. Should you find repose necessary after
rendering the United States this further service, Congress, in
consideration of your age and bodily infirmities, will be disposed to
gratify your inclination.

You will present the letter to His Most Christian Majesty, and
communicate to him the instructions to our Ministers for negotiating a
peace, attended with such a memorial as your prudence shall suggest,
and the importance of the subject requires.

  With great esteem, I am, &c.

  SAMUEL HUNTINGTON,
  _President of Congress_.

TO MAJOR WILLIAM JACKSON.

  Passy, June 28th, 1781.

  Sir,

Since my acceptance of your bills, I have applied to the Ministry for
more money to discharge the other engagements I entered into for
payment of the Congress bills drawn on Holland and Spain. I find so
much difficulty, and even impossibility of obtaining it at this time,
that I am under the absolute necessity of stopping the cash that is in
Holland, or of ruining all the credit of the States in Europe, and
even in America, by stopping payment.

This is therefore to order, that, in case the said cash has been
delivered to you by Messrs Fizeaux and Grand, you would immediately
return it into their hands to remain there at my disposal. I am sorry
that this operation is necessary, but it must be done, or the
consequences will be terrible.

  I have the honor to be, &c.

  B. FRANKLIN.

MAJOR WILLIAM JACKSON TO B. FRANKLIN.

  Amsterdam, June 29th, 1781.

  Sir,

I have the honor to inform your Excellency that I got to Amsterdam on
Tuesday morning. It has been thought advisable to wait a few days,
that we may sail with a Dutch squadron of fourteen sail, destined as a
convoy to the Baltic. The loss of the ship Marquis de Lafayette, which
is confirmed by Lloyd's list, renders every precaution necessary, and
essential to prevent a further disappointment in supplies.

I hope your Excellency will approve of the reasons for delaying our
departure, which must be amply compensated by the benefit of a convoy
through the North Sea. I beg leave to request that Colonel Laurens's
servant may be informed, should he apply to your Excellency, that, if
he leaves Paris immediately and travels with despatch, he will reach
this place in time to embark with us for America. Any commands, which
your Excellency may please to honor me with, and which may be
transmitted by him, will be faithfully attended to.

I beg you will present my best respects to your grandson.

I have the honor to be, with profound respect, &c.

  W. JACKSON.

TO DAVID HARTLEY.

  Passy, June 30th, 1781.

I received my dear friend's kind letter of the 15th instant, and
immediately communicated your request of a passport to the Count de
Vergennes. His answer, which I have but just received, expresses an
opinion, that the circumstance of his granting a passport to you, as
you mention the purpose of your coming to be the discoursing with me
on the subject of peace, might, considering your character, occasion
many inconvenient reports and speculations, but that he would make no
difficulty of giving it, if you assured me that you were authorised
for such purpose by your ministry, which he does not think at all
likely; otherwise he judges it best that I should not encourage your
coming. Thus it seems I cannot have at present the pleasure you were
so kind as to propose for me. I can only join with you in earnest
wishes for peace, a blessing which I shall hardly live to see.

With the greatest esteem and respect, I am ever, dear Sir,

  B. FRANKLIN.

MAJOR WILLIAM JACKSON TO B. FRANKLIN.

  Amsterdam, July 2d, 1781.

  Sir,

I was yesterday honored with your Excellency's letter of the 28th ult.
while at the Texel, superintending some matters relating to the ship.
Equally concerned for the cause, as surprised at the manner in which
Mr Fizeaux was resolved to execute it, in case the money had been
already shipped, I must beg leave to inform you fully of this
business, and to request your Excellency's final determination
thereon.

Colonel Laurens, as your Excellency knows, was sent by Congress to the
Court of Versailles, with a special commission; the purport of his
mission you are well acquainted with; it was to obtain certain
supplies in specie and military stores.

By the most unremitting assiduity, he so far succeeded as to procure,
amongst others, a sum of money to be shipped in Holland by the South
Carolina frigate, which was deemed, by the Court of France, a safe and
convenient conveyance, as it would divide the risk which must have
been incurred by placing the whole on board of one vessel. That sum
was sent to this place by M. Necker, and lodged in the house of
Fizeaux and Grand, to be by them delivered to me, agreeably to the
following order, the original of which is now in my possession,
having very fortunately for me recovered it from them after they
received your instructions.

Translation.

  "Paris, May 12th, 1781.

  "Gentlemen,

"This letter will be delivered to you by Mr William Jackson, captain
of infantry in the service of the United States, to whom I request you
to deliver the 130,655 dollars, and the 720,000 livres in crowns,
which you have received on my account by the way of Brussels. Mr
Jackson will give you a receipt for it, in which he will express that
these two sums have been delivered to him pursuant to the intention of
Mr John Laurens, an American officer now at Paris, whose orders he
will follow on this subject. You will be pleased to send me afterwards
this receipt, with a statement of all the expenses due to you. I will
have them reimbursed here to M. Grand.

  "I am, Gentlemen, &c.

  NECKER.

  M. M. Grand, Fizeaux, & Co. Amsterdam."

Messrs Fizeaux and Grand have, in pursuance of your Excellency's
directions, refused to deliver it. This, Sir, being a distinct
transaction, executed altogether at the instance of the honorable John
Laurens, special Minister at the Court of Versailles from the United
States, and by him committed to my further care, I conceive myself
indispensably bound to remonstrate to your Excellency, on the late
order given by you to Messrs Fizeaux and Grand, directing the
detention of that money, and to inform you that if they are not
repealed, I must embark without it; and however I may lament the
disappointment and distress in which this measure must involve
Congress, whose arrangements are undoubtedly taken on the certainty of
this supply being sent from Europe; however much I may regret Colonel
Laurens's absence which induces it, I shall possess the pleasing
reflection of having done my duty, in demanding, conformably to the
intentions of M. Necker, and by his order, that money which the Court
of France had accorded to the United States by the application of
Colonel Laurens, in virtue of his special commission, and which was
particularly and expressly destined to reanimate the credit of the
continental currency.

The ship waits for nothing else but this money. I shall attend your
Excellency's ultimate decision thereon, which I expect to receive by
return of the express, who only waits your commands.

  I have the honor to be, &c.

  W. JACKSON.

_P. S._ M Fizeaux informed me that he had resolved to arrest the ship,
had the money been on board, I need not inform your Excellency that a
like opportunity may not again offer to transport this essential
supply, rendered still more so by the capture of the ship Marquis de
Lafayette.

  W. J.

My fever, which was greatly increased by my late jaunt to Passy, will
not admit of my waiting upon your Excellency in person, and I am
persuaded your justice will render it unnecessary, after this
representation.

  W. J.

MAJOR WILLIAM JACKSON TO B. FRANKLIN.

  Amsterdam, July 2d, 1781.

  Sir,

Since the departure of my express, I find myself obliged, in
conformity to Colonel Laurens's instructions (from which, as his agent
I cannot recede, unless compelled thereto by forcible means, and which
unless such are practised against me, I must carry into execution) to
retain the money, which he has confided to my care, and which the
Minister of Finance's order makes deliverable to me specially; and to
arrest it in the hands of M. Fizeaux, should he continue to refuse the
delivery of it but by your Excellency's orders.

I rely upon your Excellency's attachment to the welfare of America, to
prevent this painful operation, which must inevitably take place
should your determination decide otherwise, for as this money is
subject to no other control in Europe, but the immediate order of the
Court of France, I cannot relinquish my charge of it, but by their
special order.

  I have the honor to be, &c.

  W. JACKSON.

MAJOR WILLIAM JACKSON TO B. FRANKLIN.

  Amsterdam, July 2d, 1781.

  Sir,

Your Excellency will not wonder at the determination which I have
adopted, to arrest the money now in M. Fizeaux's hands, (and which I
have communicated to you by a second express this afternoon) when you
reflect, that this money is absolutely committed to my charge for a
special purpose, and that I stand accountable for the execution of
this commission. Your Excellency must likewise be sensible, that you
cannot have the disposal of it, as it was obtained without either your
knowledge or concurrence by Colonel Laurens, appointed special
Minister for that purpose. These considerations, and the knowledge I
have how much America must suffer from a disappointment in this
supply, about to be transported by so excellent a conveyance, must
plead my excuse individually for this plain and candid avowal of
circumstances, and my determination thereon. I am further persuaded,
that the Court of France is not disposed, was there even a shadow of
an excuse for an alteration of the allotment of this money, to
infringe their honor and injure the essential interests of America by
detaining it. I must therefore again entreat your Excellency's repeal
of those orders to M. Fizeaux, which now detain the ship and supplies
so much required in America.

I have the honor to be, &c.

  W. JACKSON.

TO MAJOR WILLIAM JACKSON.

  Passy, July 5th, 1781, at 6 in the morning.

  Sir,

I have this, instant received your letter of the 2d, urging the
delivery of the money. I must be short in my reply, as your express
waits.

Colonel Laurens indeed obtained a promise of ten millions, to be
raised by a loan in Holland. I understood while he was here, that that
loan was in train, and that the million and a half to be sent with
you was a part of it. I since learn, that nothing has yet been
obtained in Holland, that the success is not yet certain, and that the
money in question is a part of the six millions I had obtained before
his arrival, upon the strength of which I accepted the bills drawn on
his father, and on Mr Jay, and without which acceptances the Congress'
credit in America would have been ruined, and a loss incurred of
twenty per cent upon the protests. I cannot obtain more money here at
present, and those bills being accepted must be paid, as well as those
I accepted on your earnest request, for the great unexpected purchase
you made in Holland.

Colonel Laurens has carried two millions and a half of that six
millions with him, which will serve till the loan in Holland produces
a further supply. In the meantime I cannot suffer the credit of our
country to be destroyed, if by detaining this money it may be saved.
And if I were to consent to its going, our banker would be obliged to
arrest great part of it as belonging to the States, he being in
advance for them, which would occasion much disagreeable noise, and
very ill consequences to our credit in Europe.

I find by Mr Viemerange's account just received, that Mr Laurens's
orders have more than absorbed all the money he did not take with him.
I applaud the zeal you have both shown in the affair, but I see, that
nobody cares how much I am distressed, provided they can carry their
own points. I must, therefore, take what care I can of mine, theirs
and mine being equally intended for the service of the public. I am
sorry to learn, that the vessel is detained for this express. I
understood by your last, that she waited for convoy. I heartily wish
you a good voyage, and am, with great esteem, &c.

  B. FRANKLIN.

TO MAJOR WILLIAM JACKSON.

  Passy, July 5th, 1781.

  Sir,

I received your letter of the 2d instant, by your first express, this
morning at six, answered it, and sent him away immediately. I have
just now received your second express of the same date, in which you
threaten me with a proceeding, that I apprehend exceedingly imprudent,
as it can answer no good end to you, must occasion much scandal, and
be thereby very prejudicial to the affairs of the Congress.

But I cannot, therefore, consent to suffer their bills, to the amount
of more than a million accepted and expected, to go back protested for
want of this money. I have nothing to change in the answer
abovementioned. You will however follow your own judgment, as I must
follow mine, and you will take upon yourself the consequences.

  I have the honor to be, &c.

  B. FRANKLIN.

TO MAJOR WILLIAM JACKSON.

  Passy, July 6th, 1781.

  Sir,

I received and answered two of your expresses yesterday morning, and
in the evening I received a third letter from you, all dated the 2d
instant.

In this last you tell me, "that I must be sensible I cannot have the
disposal of the money, as it was obtained without either my knowledge
or concurrence, by Colonel Laurens, appointed special Minister for
that purpose." I do not desire to diminish the merit of Colonel
Laurens. I believe he would have been glad, if it had been in his
power to have procured ten times the sum; and that no application or
industry on his part for that purpose would have been wanting. But I
cannot let this injurious assertion of yours pass, without expressing
my surprise, that you, who were always with that gentleman, should be
so totally ignorant of that transaction. The six millions, of which he
took with him two and a half, of which one and a half were sent to
Holland, and of which more than the remainder is ordered in stores
from hence, was a _free gift_ from the King's goodness (not a _loan_
to be _repaid with interest_,) and was obtained by _my application_,
long before Colonel Laurens's arrival.

I had also given in a list of the stores to be provided, though on his
coming I cheerfully gave up the further prosecution of that business
into his hands, as he was better acquainted with the particular wants
of the army, than I could be, and it was one of the purposes of his
appointment.

Thus no part of the affair was done without my "_knowledge and
concurrence_," except the sending a million and a half of the specie
to Holland. This was indeed a secret to me. I had heard of that sum's
being ready there to embark, but I always till lately understood it to
be a part of the Dutch loan, which I am about to mention, or I should
certainly have opposed that operation. What Colonel Laurens really
obtained, and a great service I hope it will prove, was a loan upon
interest of ten millions, to be borrowed on the credit of this Court
in Holland. I have not heard, that this loan has yet produced
anything, and, therefore, I do not know that a single livre exists, or
has existed in Europe, of his procuring for the States. On the
contrary, he and you have drawn from me considerable sums, as
necessary for your expenses, and he left me near forty thousand livres
to pay for the Alliance, and, moreover, engaged me in a debt in
Holland, which I understood might amount to about fifteen thousand
pounds sterling, and which you contrived to make fifty thousand
pounds.

When I mentioned to him the difficulty I should find to pay the
drafts, he said, you have the remainder of the six millions. He gave
me no account of the dispositions he had made, and it is but lately I
have learnt that there is no remainder. To gratify you, and to get
that ship out, which could not have stirred without me, I have engaged
for the vast sum abovementioned, which I am sure I shall be much
distressed to pay, and therefore have not deserved at your hands the
affront you are advised to menace me with.

And since I find you make it a point of reflection upon me, that I
want to apply money to the payment of my engagements for the Congress,
which was obtained by Colonel Laurens for other purposes, I must
request, that you will upon this better information take occasion to
correct that error, if you have communicated it to any other person.

By the letters you showed me, that had passed between Mr Adams and
you, I perceived he had imbibed an opinion, that Colonel Laurens had,
as he expressed it, done more for the United States in the short time
of his being in Europe, than all the rest of their Diplomatic Corps
put together. I should never have disputed this, because I had rather
lend a little credit to a friend, than take any from him, especially
when I am persuaded he will make a good use of it; but when his
friends will make such suppositious credit a matter of reproach to
me, it is not right to continue silent.

As to the safety of the excellent conveyance you mention, I must own,
I have some doubts about it, and I fear I shall hear of the arrival of
that ship in England, before she sees America. Be that as it may, I am
clear that no use can possibly be made of the money in America for
supporting the credit of the States, equal in any degree to the effect
it must have for the same purpose, when applied to the payment of
their bills here, which must otherwise go back protested. And I am
sure it will be exceedingly prejudicial to their credit, if by the
rash proceeding you threaten, this situation of their affairs becomes
the subject of public talk and discussion in Europe.

  I am, &c.

  B. FRANKLIN.

_P. S._ I request you would read again and consider well my first
letter to you on this subject. The reasons therein contained subsist
still in their full force.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

  Passy, July 11th, 1781.

  Sir,

The number of Congress bills that have been drawn on the Ministers in
Spain and Holland, which I am by my acceptances obliged to pay, as
well as those drawn upon myself, the extreme importance of supporting
the credit of Congress, which would be disgraced in a political, as
well as a pecuniary light, through all the Courts of Europe, if those
bills should go back protested, and the unexpected delays arising with
regard to the intended loan in Holland, all those considerations have
compelled me to stop the one million five hundred thousand livres,
which were to have been sent by way of Amsterdam. As soon as more
money can be furnished to me by this Court, I shall take care to
replace that sum, and forward with it as great an addition as
possible. I am now soliciting supplies of clothing, arms, ammunition,
&c. to replace what has been unfortunately lost in the Marquis de
Lafayette; and hope to succeed.

Captain Jackson, who is truly zealous for the service, has been
exceedingly solicitous and earnest with me to induce me to permit the
money to go in this ship, but for the reasons abovementioned, I find
it absolutely necessary to retain it for the present, which I doubt
not will be approved by Congress.

  With great respect, I have the honor to be, &c.

  B. FRANKLIN.

JAMES LOVELL TO B. FRANKLIN.

  Philadelphia, July 21st, 1781.

  Sir,

It does not appear that the resolutions of June 26th, affecting
yourself and colleagues, as well as Mr Dana, have been transmitted. Mr
President Mc'Kean will take other opportunities of writing. I think it
essential, however, in the meantime, to forward duplicates, which may
serve for information, and perhaps authority, to all concerned.

  Your humble servant,
  JAMES LOVELL,
  _For the Committee of Foreign Affairs_.

_P. S._ Please to give copies where proper.

TO C. W. F. DUMAS.

  Passy, August 6th, 1781.

  Dear Sir,

I have received several letters from you lately, enclosing others for
the President of Congress, and for Spain, all of which are sealed and
forwarded, except the last for the President, contained in yours of
the 26th past, which shall go by the first opportunity. The reading of
those letters gave me much information, and therefore pleasure; though
since the fixing of Mr Adams there I do not attend so much to the
affairs of your country as before, expecting indeed but little from it
to our advantage; for though it was formerly in the same situation
with us, and was glad of assistance from other nations, it does not
seem to _feel_ for us, or to have the least inclination to help us; it
appears to want magnanimity.

Some writer, I forget who, says, that Holland is no longer a _nation_,
but _a great shop_; and I begin to think it has no other principles or
sentiments but those of a shopkeeper. You can judge of it better than
I, and I shall be happy to find myself mistaken. You will oblige me,
however, by continuing the history either directly to me, or in your
letters to Congress; but when you enclose a sealed letter in another
to me, please to observe to place the second seal on one side, and not
directly over the first; because the heat of the second is apt to
deface the impression of the first, and to attach the paper to it, so
as to endanger tearing the enclosed in opening the cover.

With best wishes for your health and prosperity, I am ever, dear Sir,
&c.

  B. FRANKLIN.

_P. S._ I pity the writer of the enclosed, though I have no other
acquaintance with him, than having seen him once at Hanover, where he
then seemed to live genteely and in good credit. I cannot conceive
what should reduce him to such a situation, as to engage himself for a
soldier. If you can procure him any friends among the philosophers of
your country, capable of relieving him, I wish you could do it. If
not, and he must go to the Indies, please to give him three or four
guineas for me, to buy a few necessaries for his voyage.

  B. F.

TO C. W. F. DUMAS.

  Passy, August 10th, 1781.

  Dear Sir,

Enclosed I send you a late paper received from Rhode Island. You will
see in it the advantages our troops have gained in South Carolina.
Late advices directly from Philadelphia say, that the enemy have now
nothing left in Georgia, but Savannah; in South Carolina, but
Charleston; nor in North Carolina, but Wilmington. They are, however,
in force in Virginia, where M. de Lafayette has not sufficient
strength to oppose them, till the arrival of the reinforcements, which
were on their march to join him from Maryland and Pennsylvania.

In looking over my last to you, I apprehend I may have expressed
myself perhaps a little too hardly of your country; I foresee you will
tell me that we have many friends there; I once thought so too; but I
was a little out of humor when I wrote, on understanding that no loan
could be obtained there for our use, though the credit of this kingdom
was offered to be engaged for assuring the payment, and so much is
lent freely to our enemies. You can best tell the reason; it will be
well not to let my letter be seen.

  I am ever, dear Sir, &c.

  B. FRANKLIN.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

  Passy, September 13th, 1781.

  Sir,

I duly received the two letters your Excellency did me the honor of
writing to me, both dated the 19th of June, together with the letter
addressed to the King and the three Commissioners, with the
instructions relative to the negotiations for peace. I immediately
went to Versailles and presented the letter, which was graciously
received. I communicated also to Count de Vergennes a copy of your
instructions after having decyphered them. He read them while I was
with him, and expressed his satisfaction with the unreserved
confidence placed in his Court by the Congress, assuring me that they
never would have cause to regret it, for that the King had the honor
of the United States at heart, as well as their welfare and
independence. Indeed this has already been manifested in the
negotiations relative to the Plenipotentiaries, and I have had so much
experience of His Majesty's goodness to us, in the aids afforded us
from time to time, and of the sincerity of this upright and able
Minister, who never promised me anything which he did not punctually
perform, that I cannot but think the confidence well and judiciously
placed, and that it will have happy effects.

I have communicated to Mr Adams and to Mr Jay the purport of your
despatches. Mr Adams already had received the same; by the first safe
conveyance I shall acquaint the Congress with the steps that have been
taken in the negotiation. At present I would only say, that the
settling of preliminaries meets with difficulty, and will probably
take much time, partly from the remoteness of the mediators, so that
any relaxation of our warlike preparations in expectation of a speedy
peace, will be imprudent as it may be pernicious.

I am extremely sensible of the honor done me by the Congress in this
new appointment. I beg they would accept my thankful acknowledgments;
and since they judge I may be serviceable, though I had requested
leave to retire, I submit dutifully to their determination, and shall
do my utmost to merit in some degree the favorable opinion they appear
to have of me. I am the more encouraged in this resolution, as within
the last three months I find my health and strength considerably
re-established.

I wish, however, that a consul general may soon be appointed for this
kingdom; it would ease me of abundance of troublesome business to
which I am not equal, and which interferes with my own important
functions.

The King having graciously complied with my request, of replacing the
supplies lost in the Marquis de Lafayette, many hands are employed in
providing them, who work hard to have them ready and shipped, so that
they may arrive before winter.

With the highest respect, I have the honor to be, &c.

  B. FRANKLIN.

_P. S._ The copying machine for Mr Secretary Thompson is in hand, and
will soon be finished and sent to him.

JOHN ADAMS TO B. FRANKLIN.

  Amsterdam, October 4th, 1781.

  Sir,

Your Excellency's letter of June 11th, is yet unanswered. I have the
honor to agree with your Excellency in opinion, that it is reasonable
that articles of rent of the hotel, payment of couriers, postage of
letters, salaries of clerks, stationary for the bureau, and feasts and
illuminations made upon public occasions, should be deemed expenses of
the States. Indeed, otherwise it will be impossible for American
Ministers to live in any such manner as is expected of them, both by
Europeans and Americans.

I have the honor to be, with the greatest respect, Sir, &c. &c.

  JOHN ADAMS.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO B. FRANKLIN.

  Philadelphia, October 20th, 1781.

  Dear Sir,

Congress having lately thought it advisable to alter the arrangement
of their great executive departments, and to dissolve the Boards and
Committees under whose direction they formerly were, I am to inform
you, that they have done me the honor to appoint me their Secretary of
Foreign Affairs; in which capacity they have made it my duty, as it
will always be my inclination, to maintain an intimate and regular
correspondence with you. I have this day taken the oaths of office,
and as the recital of fortunate events is the most pleasing task
annexed to it, I shall give you a short sketch of the state of our
military operations.

When General Washington was fully apprized, that Count de Grasse was
to visit this Continent, he made every provision for the attack of New
York, where the enemy had about six thousand troops, and seven ships
of the line, which were thought inadequate to its defence. He
collected the troops, as well those of allies as our own, and made a
movement towards New York. The delay of our recruits in coming in, a
small reinforcement to the enemy from Europe, and some other
circumstances, gave us reason to be apprehensive for the event of this
attempt, though the magnitude of the object still urged the General to
undertake it. It was the enemy's place of arms, the repository of
their magazines, and the only harbor for large ships left them on this
side of Halifax. Every preparation was accordingly made, when some
circumstances deemed unfortunate at the time, but which like many
others of our supposed evils have in the end been productive of good,
occasioned an alteration in the destination of Count de Grasse. He
sailed for the Chesapeake. The General still appearing to prosecute
his first design moved his army, and made such preparations as induced
the enemy to believe, that he meant to possess himself of Staten
Island, as preparatory to his design upon New York.

In the meantime the army filed off through Hackensack and Newark, to
keep up the deception, and arrived by expeditious marches at the head
of the Elk. Count de Grasse arrived at the critical moment, and
Cornwallis, at the head of about seven thousand men, found himself
completely invested at Yorktown by an army of near fourteen thousand
regular troops. The British fleet, which arrived at New York about the
time that Count de Grasse reached the Chesapeake, made an ineffectual
attempt to relieve their army. They were defeated and compelled to
return to New York, after losing the Terrible, a seventyfour, and two
frigates; by which means, a junction of the fleet from Rhode Island
was formed with that under the Count de Grasse. It arrived the day
after the action, and narrowly escaped falling in with the English
fleet.

Our batteries were opened on the 7th. The enemy having evacuated their
principal outworks and been repulsed in one or two sallies, our second
parallel was begun on the 11th, within three hundred yards of their
lines, and the least sanguine among the officers fix the end of the
month as the era of Cornwallis's captivity. His whole force at York,
and on the opposite side of the river, including seamen and regulars,
amounts to about seven thousand men.

The enemy sailed from Sandy Hook yesterday, with twentythree ships of
the line, and three fiftys, with several frigates, and a number of
fire ships. They have nine thousand of their best troops, if we are
rightly informed, on board their ships of war. They are resolved to
make some attempt for the relief of Cornwallis, whose capture must
draw after it the loss of all the posts they hold in the Southern
States, and the total ruin of their affairs in America. Georgia has
re-established her government, where the enemy have no other footing
than in Savannah. South Carolina is about doing the same. General
Greene has very prudently wasted the strength of the enemy, and raised
the confidence of the militia, by fighting them in detail. His late
victory, which I enclose you an account of, in his own words, affords
the most promising prospect of speedily recovering the possession of
that country.

Congress are, however, looking forward to another campaign. They have
voted twentyfive thousand men for the ensuing year. These, when raised
and appointed, together with the success which has hitherto, and which
we may promise ourselves will still continue to attend the allied
arms, will enable you to open your diplomatic campaign with great
advantage, and permit you, Sir, to rejoice in the close of that great
work, to which you have so sedulously and ably contributed.

I need not tell you, Sir, how anxious I shall be to hear from you on
every occasion. Nothing short of the most constant and regular
information will satisfy the expectations of Congress. We have much to
learn, and but few opportunities of acquiring information. Your
situation enables you not only to let us know what passes with you,
but to extend your inquiries to Courts where we have no Ministers, and
of whose politics we would not choose to be ignorant, though they may
but remotely concern us at present. For my own part, I freely confess,
that I rely much upon your knowledge and experience to supply my want
of both.

I propose to write so frequently to you as to keep you fully informed,
not only of what is, but of what is not done, since the last may
sometimes be as important to you as the first.

As far, Sir, as you may find a similar task consistent with your
health, your leisure, and your various avocations, you will render us
essential services in imposing it upon yourself.

Congress having resolved, that all communications with their
Ministers abroad, shall pass through this office, you will do me the
honor, Sir, to direct in future all your public letters to me.

I have the honor to be, &c.

  ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO B. FRANKLIN.

  Philadelphia, October 24th, 1781.

  Dear Sir,

I three days since did myself the honor to write to you, informing you
of my appointment to the Secretaryship of Foreign Affairs; and
preparing you for the happy event which has taken place. Enclosed you
have the capitulation of Yorktown and Gloucester, by which a British
army of 5600 men was surrendered to the allied arms of France and
America; and no inconsiderable fleet, with 800 seamen, to the navy of
His Most Christian Majesty.

Since my last, which was written the day after I entered upon office,
I have seen yours of the 14th of May. There are many things in it
which deserve the attention I mean to pay it, when the first hurry
that the intelligence I communicate occasions is over. But, Sir, there
is a part which I cannot delay to take notice of, because I feel
myself interested in opposing the resolution that you seem to have
formed of quitting the station, which, for the honor of the United
States, you now hold. I shall be impatient till I hear, that you
comply with the wishes of Congress on this subject, as communicated
long since. Though the new powers with which you are invested impose
additional burthens upon you, yet as they at once contain the amplest
testimonials of the approbation of Congress, and directly lead to the
completion of the great cause in which you so early engaged, I cannot
but flatter myself that you will take it upon you. I sent with my
first letter to you one to the Count de Vergennes, informing him of my
appointment. You will do me the honor to present it.

  I am, Sir, &c.

  ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

TO THOMAS MC'KEAN, PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

  Passy, November 5th, 1781.

  Sir,

Herewith you will receive a copy of my last; since which I have been
honored with two letters from the late President, the one dated March
2d, relating to Captain Jones's cross of merit, which I have
communicated as directed; the other, dated July 5th, respecting the
release and exchange of Mr Laurens.

Having no direct communication with the British Ministers, and Mr
Burke appearing, by a letter to me, warmly interested in favor of his
friend, General Burgoyne, to prevent his being recalled I have
requested and empowered him to negotiate that exchange, and I soon
expect his answer. The late practice of sending to England prisoners
taken in America, has greatly augmented the number of those
unfortunate men, and proportionally increased the expense of relieving
them. The subscriptions for that purpose in England have ceased. The
allowance I have made to them of sixpence each per week during the
summer, though small, amounts to a considerable sum; and during the
winter, I shall be obliged to double, if not treble it. The Admiralty
there will not accept any English in exchange, but such as have been
taken by Americans, and absolutely refuse to allow any of the paroles
given to our privateers by English prisoners discharged at sea, except
in one instance, that of fiftythree men taken in the Snake sloop, by
the Pilgrim and Rambler, which was a case attended, as they say, with
some particular circumstances. I know not what the circumstances were,
but shall be glad to see the fiftythree of our people, whom they
promised to send me by the first cartel. I have above five hundred
other paroles solemnly given in writing, by which the Englishmen
promised either to send our people in exchange, or to surrender
themselves to me in France, not one of which has been regarded, so
little faith and honor remain in that corrupted nation. Our
privateers, when in the European seas, will rarely bring in their
prisoners when they can get rid of them at sea. Some of our poor brave
countrymen have been in that cruel captivity now near four years. I
hope the Congress will take this matter into immediate consideration,
and find some means for their deliverance, and to prevent the sending
more from America. By my last accounts, the number now in the several
prisons amounts to upwards of eight hundred.

I request also some direction from Congress (having never received
any) respecting the allowance to be made to them while they remain
there. They complain that the food given them is insufficient. Their
petition to the English government to have an equal allowance with the
French and Spanish prisoners has been rejected, which makes the small
pecuniary assistance I can send them more necessary. If a certain
number of English prisoners could be set apart in America, treated
exactly in the same manner, and their exchange refused till it should
be agreed to set these at liberty in Europe, one might hope to succeed
in procuring the discharge of our people. Those, who escape and pass
through France to get home, put me also to a great expense for their
land journies, which could be prevented if they could be exchanged, as
they would be landed here in ports.

The Ambassador of Venice told me, that he was charged by the senate to
express to me their grateful sense of the friendly behavior of Captain
Barry, commander of the Alliance, in rescuing one of the ships of
their State from an English privateer, and setting her at liberty; and
he requested me to communicate this acknowledgment to Congress. There
is a complaint from Holland against Captain Jones, for having taken
the brigantine Berkenbosch and sending her to America, and I have been
desired to lay before Congress the enclosed depositions relating to
that capture, and to request their attention to it.

The Ambassador of Portugal also frequently asks me if I have received
any answer to their complaint, long since sent over. I wish it was in
my power to give one of some kind or other. But none has yet come to
my hands. I need not mention the importance of attending to the
smallest complaints between nations, the neglect of them having
sometimes very serious consequences.

The mediation proposed is not agreed to by England, who refuses to
treat with our United States but as a Sovereign with subjects, and I
apprehend that a change in that resolution is only to be expected from
time, the growing insupportable expense of the war, or a course of
misfortunes in the progress of it. The spirits of that nation have
been continually kept up by the flattering accounts sent over, of our
being weary of the contest, and on the point of submission. Their
Ministers, as appears by their intercepted letters, have been
themselves so far deceived as to expect daily those submissions, and
to have the pleasure of laying them before the King. We may, perhaps,
be able to guess a little by the King's speech at the approaching new
session of Parliament, whether they still continue under this
delusion. As long as it subsists peace is not to be expected.

A loan has been proposed to be obtained for us of the States of
Holland on the credit of this government. All public operations are
slow in that country, and though the affair is at length said to be
concluded, it is not yet executed. Considerable advances have,
however, been made here in expectation of being reimbursed by it. The
last aids granted us have been so absorbed by my payment of the drafts
on Mr Jay and Mr Adams, and acceptance of those for the enormous
unexpected purchases in Holland, which were to have gone in Captain
Gillon's ship, but left behind, that I shall have nothing to spare for
extraordinaries, unless some of the Holland loan comes soon into my
hands. I am now told from Amsterdam, that the two ships freighted
there to carry those goods are detained, as their contract was to sail
under convoy of the South Carolina, which left them; and they must now
take more men to defend them, and of consequence claim a higher
freight, and to have it paid before they sail, unless I will buy the
ships, and send them on account of Congress, neither of which is in my
power to do. It was with reluctance I engaged in that affair, having
little confidence in Captain Gillon's management, and fearing some
embarrassment of our credit. I consented in fine to engage for the
payment of ten thousand pounds sterling, being the value of the goods
suitable for Congress, said to be already shipped in that vessel, and
as there was said to be still some room, and she was thought a safe
conveyance, I concluded to furnish an additional sum to fill that
supposed vacancy, which I limited to five thousand pounds sterling
more. You will judge of my surprise, when I saw the accounts of that
additional purchase, which amounted, instead of five, to fifty
thousand pounds sterling. I at first absolutely refused to pay for
them. But Captain Jackson came to me from thence express, urged that
the purchase was made by order of Colonel Laurens; that the goods were
on board; that if I would not undertake to pay for them, they must be
relanded, and returned or sold, which would be a public disgrace to
us; that they were all articles exceedingly wanted in America, &c. &c.
In fine, I was prevailed on, and accepted the bills, and was obliged
to go with this after-clap to the Ministers, a proceeding always
disagreeable, after the dispositions of the funds of the year have
been arranged; and more so in this case, as the money was to be paid
for the manufactures of other countries, and not laid out in those of
this kingdom, by whose friendship it was furnished. This fresh grant
was at first absolutely refused; at length I obtained it, and I hoped
the difficulty was over.

But after all, the officers declare the ship was overloaded, that
there was not room to lodge the people and provisions, nor to act in
fighting her; the goods are turned out into two other ships, those are
left, and it is now proposed to me, either to buy them, or to advance
a freight nearly equal to their value. I cannot make a new demand for
this purpose; and I shall not wonder if this government, observing how
badly our shipping and transporting the supplies are managed, should
take that business for the future entirely into their own hands, as
they have begun to do in the case of replacing the cargo of the
Marquis de Lafayette, and indeed, till some active, intelligent
person, skilled in maritime affairs, is placed here as consul, I
cannot but think it will be much better executed, and more for our
advantage. Some considerable parts of that new cargo are already
shipped, and the rest I hear are in great forwardness.

The very friendly disposition of this Court towards us still
continues, and will, I hope, continue forever. From my own
inclination, as well as in obedience to the orders of Congress,
everything in my power shall be done to cultivate that disposition;
but I trust it will be remembered, that the best friends may be over
burthened; that by too frequent, too large, and too importunate
demands upon it, the most cordial friendship may be wearied, and as
nothing is more teazing than repeated, unexpected large demands for
money, I hope the Congress will absolutely put an end to the practice
of drawing on their Ministers, and thereby obliging them to worry
their respective Courts for the means of payment. It may have
otherwise very ill effects in depressing the spirit of a Minister, and
destroying that freedom of representation, which, on many occasions,
it might be proper for him to make use of.

I heartily congratulate you, Sir, on your being called to the
honorable and important office of President, and wish you every kind
of prosperity.

Be pleased to present my dutiful respects to the Congress, and believe
me to be, with great and sincere esteem and respect, &c.

  B. FRANKLIN.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO B. FRANKLIN.

  Philadelphia, November 24th, 1781.

  Sir,

Major General du Portail will have the honor to present this.
Congress, in consideration of their long and faithful services in this
country, have granted permission to him and Colonels de Laumoy and de
Gourion, to revisit their friends in Europe for the winter.

As the merit of these gentlemen has procured for them particular marks
of the esteem of Congress, they wish them to be distinguished by the
notice of their sovereign, and for that purpose have directed that
they be recommended to you, and that you be requested to present them
at Court, in such a manner as will bespeak for them the attention they
justly merit.

Congress are persuaded that this task will be particularly agreeable
to you, as they are indebted to your care for the useful services of
these gentlemen, and as nothing is more acceptable to a man of real
merit, than to be made the means of displaying it in others.

This is the third letter I have had the honor to write to you since my
entering upon office, and you will find it numbered in the margin
accordingly. I beg you will be pleased to number all your letters to
me in the same manner, that I may know those which by any means may
be prevented from coming to hand.

  I have the honor to be, &c.

  ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO B. FRANKLIN.

  Philadelphia, November 26th, 1781.

  Dear Sir,

The Marquis de Lafayette, who has obtained leave to revisit his family
for the winter, does me the honor to be the bearer of this, and
duplicates of two former letters to you. The degree of estimation in
which he is held here, you will collect from the enclosed resolutions
relative to him, so that you may converse freely with him, and I doubt
not that he will be able to satisfy your inquiries on many important
questions relative to this country, on which account I may confine
myself more to general heads than I would otherwise do.

As to intelligence, there is little of importance, the army all having
gone into winter quarters, after the late glorious campaign, the enemy
having been defeated on every hand. A party of about six hundred of
them, who fell upon the western frontier of New York, were the last
that quitted the stage; having been driven off by an inferior number
of militia, with the loss of their leaders, and many privates killed,
and about fifty, including the wounded, made prisoners. A body of
troops is detached to the southward to reinforce General Greene, with
orders to attempt Wilmington on their way, which the enemy occupy with
about five hundred men, and keep up a connexion with the disaffected
counties in North Carolina.

We have not in a long time heard either from you or Mr Jay, so that we
are much in the dark respecting the probable prospect of a negotiation
this winter, or rather are led to conclude from your silence, that the
prospect is extremely remote; in which case, all your objects will
concentre in preparing for the ensuing campaign, and directing the
operations as far as possible to this country. The success of the
combined operations this summer will give great weight to your
arguments, especially as they are such as would deserve, independent
of that, the most serious attention. But, Sir, you will have a
difficult card to play, to induce France to do what not only our but
her interests essentially require. Never was there a time in which
money was more necessary to us than at present. The total abolition of
paper, the length of the war, the restricted commerce we have carried
on for the first five years of it, the arrears of debts, and the
slender thread by which public credit hangs, put it totally out of our
power to make any great exertions without the immediate supply of
money. Taxation will be carried as far as it can go, but this will
fall very far short of our wants. The richest nations in Europe,
unable to carry on a war by taxation only, are compelled to borrow.
How then will it be expected that a nation, which has had every
difficulty to struggle with, an enemy in the heart of its country, and
all its considerable towns at one time or another in their possession,
a superior navy on its coasts, and the consequential ruin of its
agriculture and commerce, how, I say, can it be expected that such a
nation should find resources within itself for so long and bloody a
war? And yet in this situation, we are alarmed by our advices from
you, by representations from the Minister of France, by assurances
from every quarter, that we must expect no further assistance in
money. Surely it is not possible that France, after having done so
much for us, after having brought us within view of the desired haven,
should oblige us to lose the advantage of all she has done; and yet be
assured that the most serious consequence may attend her stopping her
hand at this critical time. Public credit, which is growing very fast,
will drop to the ground. The contracts made for the ensuing campaign
must be given up; the troops, who were made to expect pay in specie,
will be dissatisfied; and upon the least ill fortune, a failure in
supplies will show their discontents; recruiting will be checked, and
the conclusion of the war on those advantageous terms, which one
vigorous exertion next spring in this country would secure, will be
postponed to a later period, when in fact all we wish, to enable us to
accomplish these great objects, is less than one year's continuance of
the war will cost France. You will, therefore, show the necessity of
setting our credit upon a firm basis, the prospect we have of
accomplishing it, from the great confidence in the integrity and
abilities of the financier, from the economy which is introduced into
our departments, from the industry which money excites, and which a
fluctuating medium had destroyed, and from the total debility which
much attend another shock to public credit.

You are perfectly acquainted, Sir, with the natural resources of the
country, you know the value of our exports, and the security they
afford for any debt that we may contract; in short, there are a
thousand arguments on this subject, which will suggest themselves to
you, not one of which will you, upon this occasion, omit to urge,
since you must be perfectly convinced of its importance in every
view, both to France and to us. The Superintendent will write more
fully upon this subject, which relates so particularly to his
department.

I would beg leave to remind you of another want, which we depend on
your representations, and the good dispositions of the Court of
Versailles, to remove. The chase here seems to be pretty well over,
the enemy, tired of running across the country, have taken to their
burrows, and the whole business that remains to us, is to take
measures for unearthing them next spring. In order to this, ships are
absolutely necessary. The situation of New York and Charleston renders
them untenable against a naval force, and extremely strong against an
attack by land; besides that success in such an operation would not be
decisive, since, after putting us to immense expense of men and
ammunition of every kind, while they keep the command of the water,
they might change their position and be as troublesome as ever. At any
rate, the reduction of both these places, from their distance, and the
difficulty of removing the men and stores, cannot be effected the same
campaign without a naval force, and with it, it will be the business
of a few weeks. The advantage to France, independent of her interests
as they stand connected with ours, in keeping a great naval force on
this continent is obvious.

_1st._ The expense to which they put the English, by obliging them to
maintain an equal force at this distance from home, at four times the
cost at which the French navy may be maintained in this country;
which, with proper management, need not exceed what they expend even
in France.

_2dly._ The number of seamen they employ in the transport service,
being so many deducted from what might supply their navy, with the
same expense as if so employed.

_3dly._ The protection afforded to the trade on this coast, and the
prospect of capturing the enemy's victuallers, and the consequent ruin
of their affairs.

_4thly._ But above all, the decided advantage it will afford our
combined operations, and the speedy termination of the war, by an
advantageous peace. It is true, France may have other objects, which
may interfere with these. To this we can say nothing; she must judge
for herself. All we can do is to point out what we conceive will be
most useful to her as well as to us, and submit to her determination.
It would be well, however, if we were apprized of it as soon as
possible.

If a negotiation should open this winter, or there should be a
probable prospect of it, you will do me the favor to give me the
earliest advices of it. There are many delicate points, on which you
would like to know the sentiments of people on this side of the water,
which I will endeavor to acquaint you with.

I should inform you, that Congress, have discharged the commission for
negotiating a treaty of commerce with Great Britain, and taken that
burthen from Mr Adams's shoulders; that in compliment to the Marquis
de Lafayette, they have made him the bearer of a letter to the King of
France, which I enclose; that in answer to your favor of the 11th of
June, they have passed the enclosed resolution.

Mr Morris will write to you on this subject, and enable you to
discharge the bills. Should France send a fleet next spring, it would
be advantageous to have it unincumbered with such orders, as may
prevent its taking advantage of circumstances. This has unhappily
prevented this campaign from being absolutely decisive. But neither
this, nor any other great object can escape your observation, bent as
it is upon promoting the happiness of your country.

In order to enable you to meet the claim of the tories to the property
that has been confiscated, I am endeavoring to collect for you an
accurate account of the damages wantonly done by the enemy in this
country, which will at least serve to set against that claim.

Congress are preparing for an active campaign. They have directed
eight millions of dollars to be raised by tax. There is not, however,
the least idea that this, or even one half of it, will be collected in
the time specified; you will not, therefore, suffer the Court to
deceive themselves, by hopes of exertions founded on this measure, but
urge again and again the absolute necessity of supplying money.

I have conversed so freely with the Marquis de Lafayette on the
general state of our politics, that I would rather refer you to him,
than trouble you with a longer letter on the subject.

I cannot however close this, without desiring you to inquire whether
any intercepted letters from Mr Deane to persons in this country have
been published in Europe. Rivington has given us many, which are
generally believed to be his.

The Marquis will satisfy your inquiries about them.

I am, dear Sir, with sentiments of the highest respect and esteem, &c.

  ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

WILLIAM ALEXANDER TO B. FRANKLIN.

  Paris, December 15th, 1781.

  My Dear Sir,

I told you the last time I had the pleasure of seeing you at Passy,
that I would make a trip to London, but had no notion it would be so
soon. On coming to town last evening, I found such pressing letters,
that I propose setting off this evening, or tomorrow at latest. I
would have called, if possible, to receive your commands, but as I am
pinched in time, I must content myself with sending for them. The
bearer will call for them an hour after receiving this letter.

I shall probably be interrogated about the dispositions in this
country to peace. My own idea is, that you seek only your
independence, and that _this_ country, were that secured, will be
moderate in other matters, as the object of the war does not seem to
be conquest. Let me know if this is proper language. I notice that a
courtly argument has been used in Parliament for continuing the
continental war, that withdrawing would make you insolent, and give
France exclusive advantages. Were it not proper that this were
contradicted flatly? Any commissions you may have will be taken care
of, and I shall be back, barring accidents, in three weeks.

Wishing you everything that is good, I remain, with equal esteem and
respect, dear Sir, your most obedient humble servant.

  W. ALEXANDER.

TO WILLIAM ALEXANDER.

  Passy, December 15th, 1781.

  Dear Sir,

I thank you for informing me of your intended journey. You know so
well the prevailing sentiments here, and mine in particular, that it
is unnecessary for me to express them; and having never been believed
on that side of the water, it would be useless. I will say, however,
that I think the language you mention very proper to be held, as it is
the truth; though the truth may not always be proper.

Wishing you a good voyage, and happy return to your children, I am,
with great esteem, dear Sir, yours, &c. &c.

  B. FRANKLIN.

TO DAVID HARTLEY.

  Passy, December 15th, 1781.

  My Dear Friend,

I received your favor of September 26th, containing your very
judicious proposition of securing the spectators in the opera and play
houses from the danger of fire. I communicated it where I thought it
might be useful. You will see by the enclosed, that the subject has
been under consideration here. Your concern for the security of life,
even the lives of your enemies, does honor to your heart and your
humanity. But what are the lives of a few idle haunters of play
houses, compared with the many thousands of worthy men and honest
industrious families, butchered and destroyed by this devilish war! O!
that we could find some happy invention to stop the spreading of the
flames, and put an end to so horrid a conflagration!

  Adieu, I am ever yours most affectionately,
  B. FRANKLIN.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO B. FRANKLIN.

  Philadelphia, December 16th, 1781.

  Dear Sir,

Since my last, of which I send you a duplicate by this conveyance,
nothing material has happened here, unless it be the evacuation of
Wilmington, which is, perhaps, the most important post of
communication with the disaffected people of the country of any they
have held in America. The tories of North Carolina possessed a
boldness and spirit, which were not found elsewhere, and upon occasion
appeared openly in arms. They are by these means abandoned to the
enemy, and the resentment of their country.

The cypher, which I shall use with you, is No. 4 of those sent by Mr
Morris; in that, the duplicate is written which went uncyphered by the
Marquis de Lafayette.

I enclose a resolution of Congress for erecting a pillar to
commemorate the victory at Yorktown. I must request your assistance in
enabling me to carry it into effect, so far as it relates to me, by
sending the sketch they require, with an estimate of the expense with
which it will be attended. I could wish it to be such, as may do honor
to the nations, whose union it designs to celebrate, and for that
reason should think the execution ought to be deferred till our
finances are in a better situation than they are at present; but as
this lies with Congress only, you will be so obliging as to enable me
to do my duty, by laying the sketch before them as soon as you can
conveniently get the same executed.

I have also the honor to enclose an ordinance of Congress, which
comprises all their former resolutions with respect to captures, with
the addition of some others; among them, one for "prohibiting the
importation of British goods," unless such as may have been taken from
the enemy. This will make some arrangements with the Court of France
necessary. The high duties upon prize goods consumed in France render
them considerable articles of exportation, and unless some mode is
fallen upon to evidence their having been captured, they will be
liable to seizure here. I would propose that the Lieutenants of the
Admiralty, or some other officers in the seaport towns, should, to an
inventory of the goods shipped, annex a certificate under hand and
seal, of their having been captured from the enemy, and that this
should be done without any charge to the purchaser. You, Sir, who are
better acquainted with the interior of the government of France, than
I can be supposed to be, will be pleased to suggest some mode of
executing this business; or if none better presents itself, to use
means for carrying what I propose into effect. I send by this
conveyance a number of American papers, and beg in return to be
favored with those of France, or any new publication that may deserve
attention.

I am, dear Sir, with great respect and esteem, &c.

  ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

_Enclosed._

1. An ordinance, ascertaining what captures on the waters shall be
lawful.

2. Resolve, directing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to prepare a
sketch of emblems, &c.

3. Resolves for raising eight millions of dollars, and the proportion
of each State.

4. Recommendations to the several States for enacting laws against the
infraction of the laws of nations.

5. Letter to Messrs Wallace, Johnson, and Muir, at Nantes.

DAVID HARTLEY TO B. FRANKLIN.

  London, January 2d, 1782.

  My Dear Friend,

I have received the favor of yours of the 15th of December by Mr
Alexander. I most heartily join with you in the wish, that we could
find some means to stop the spreading flames of this _devilish war_. I
will not despair. The communications, which he has imparted to me from
you, have revived my hopes of peace. I laid them before the Minister
immediately. We are at a suspense for the present upon a very material
preliminary. I did intend writing to you at the present pause, that we
might make our ground good as we go on, but an accident which has
happened obliges me to do it without delay. For having had a most
essential question transmitted to me from Lord North for explanation,
when I would have applied to Mr Alexander, I could not find him; and
now I find that he has left his hotel these four or five days, and his
return being uncertain, I must apply to you. I will state to you what
has passed.

Upon my first interview with Mr Alexander, he told me, that the late
events would make no difference in the prospect of peace; that America
had no other wish than to see a termination of this war; that no
events would make them unreasonable on that subject, which sentiments
likewise your letter expresses; and that no formal recognition of
independence would be required. I thought this a very fair opening;
but the next point, which he explained to me, seemed to be still more
material towards peace, viz. that America was disposed to enter into a
separate treaty with Great Britain, and their allies were disposed to
consent to it. I believe that it has been the unfortunate union of
common cause between America and France, which has for the last three
years turned aside the wish of the people of England for peace. I
verily believe (so deep is the jealousy between England and France,)
that this country would fight for a straw to the last man, and the
last shilling, rather than be dictated to by France. I therefore
consider this as the greatest rub out of the way. I have often argued
this point with you upon former occasions, having at all times
foreseen, that it would be the greatest rub in the road to peace, and
I have often stated it to you as an act of _justice_ due to America
from her allies, not to drag her through a war of European resentments
and jealousies, beyond her original views and engagements; and
moreover, I think the separation of the causes in the negotiation
promises much the shortest road to a general peace.

Upon Mr Alexander's opening thus much to me, I told him I would apply
for the earliest opportunity of laying these matters before the
Minister. Accordingly on Friday morning, December the 21st, I applied
through the means of the Earl of Guilford, father to Lord North, a
nobleman of a most respectable character, advanced in years, and
attached by every possible tie to a son now in the most arduous
situation, I therefore requested the favor through his hands, as
giving me the most conciliatory access to the Minister, to whom I was
preparing to make an application for peace. After the appointment was
made with Lord North for Friday evening, I returned to Mr Alexander,
to consider the specific manner and terms in which I should make my
application. It had occurred to me, from what Mr Alexander had stated
to me, that the Conciliatory Bill,[27] which I had moved in the last
Parliament, on June the 27th, 1780, would still serve as a foundation
to proceed upon; I therefore carried it with me.

  [27] See this bill above, pp. 157, 158.

He told me, that he and you knew the sense of the bill very well, and
that it would be entirely consonant to your sentiments, that I should
state it to Lord North, as drawing an outline for a negotiation of
peace. However, to avoid all errors, I read the bill through to him,
and explained the view of each clause, viz. the style of _Provinces of
North America_, a general phrase, to avoid any term denoting
dependence or independence; the truce for an indefinite term; the
articles of intercourse for ten years certain; to restore an amicable
correspondence, and to abate animosities; the suspension of certain
acts of Parliament; to avoid every possible question of dependence or
independence; and to finish the work, by a ratification of each
article of intercourse as agreed to, thereby to prevent all possible
return of war. I compared the articles of intercourse for a short
term, and their ratification into a permanent peace, to a well known
mode of proceeding in the laws of England, by lease and release, from
temporary to perpetual amity and peace.

Upon these grounds I took my commission from him for Lord North, viz.
the question of dependence or independence _sub silentio_, a separate
treaty with America, and to state the Conciliatory Bill of June, 1780,
as, the outline of negotiation. I saw Lord North in the evening, and
stated the foregoing propositions to him, as I have now stated them to
you. After having stated the compromise _sub silentio_ and the
separate treaty, I left with Lord North the copy of the bill of June,
1780, together with a paper, entitled, _Conciliatory Propositions_, as
explanatory of that bill, both enclosed with this. The next morning,
viz. Saturday, December the 22d, I saw Mr Alexander, and reported to
him what I had stated to Lord North, and showed him a copy of the
paper, entitled _Conciliatory Propositions_. He told me, that I had
executed my commission perfectly to his intelligence of the matter. I
should tell you, that at the conclusion of my conversation with Lord
North, we both settled jointly the result thus; "I recommend to your
Lordship the propositions which I have had the honor of stating to
you, as _general grounds of a proposed negotiation, leading towards
peace, under liberal constructions_." Lord North said in answer, "so I
understand them."

Upon this footing, matters rested for some days. On Sunday last,
December the 30th, I received a message from Lord North, through the
means of Lord Guilford, requesting an explanation of this point, viz.
"Who is authorised to treat on the part of America? whether you or Mr
Adams, or both jointly; and whether the propositions above stated
would be acknowledged, as general grounds of negotiation towards
peace, by the person or persons authorised to treat; because it was
necessary, before he could lay a matter of so great importance before
the Cabinet Council, that he should be entitled to say, these
propositions and general outlines come to me from responsible and
authorised persons." The moment I received the request of Lord North,
I agreed entirely with the necessity of an explanation on that head. I
had partly expected such an inquiry, and it gave me satisfaction when
it came, as I thought it the first reply towards a parley. If the
propositions had not gained some attention, it would have been of very
little importance to have inquired whence they came. As to the
caution itself, it appears to me not only prudent but indispensable.
The forms of caution in such cases are the essentials of caution. I
had determined on my own account before this message to have written
to you, that I might have received your sentiments directly from
yourself without any other intervention, that we might proceed with
caution and certainty in a matter of such infinite importance. This
message has only quickened my despatch. The two points of explanation
requested, I take to be these; whether the outlines above recited are
properly stated, always considering that they imply no further than
_general grounds of negotiation towards peace, under liberal
constructions_; and secondly, by what authorised person or persons any
answer on this subject would be accepted; in short, a requisition of
credentials preparatory to a formal answer, which is so much the more
necessary on the supposition of a favorable reception of the first
hint towards negotiation.

When I last saw Mr Alexander, viz. about four or five days ago, he had
met with some desponding impressions, as if the Ministry were
indisposed to peace, and that things would not do, &c. He did not tell
me upon what ground he had formed such apprehension; however, lest he
should have imparted any such by letter to you, I will state that
point to you, because it may have infinite ill consequences to be too
touchy on such occasions. A premature jealousy may create the very
evil it suspects. The Ministry in this country are not everything. The
sense of the people, when really expressed and exerted, would be most
prevalent. Suppose then it were a proved point, that every man in the
Ministry were in his heart adverse to peace. What then? withhold all
overtures! By no means. I should advise the very contrary in the
strongest manner. I should say, let the overtures be made so much the
more public and explicit by those who do wish for peace. It is the
unfortunate state of things, which has hitherto bound the cause of
France to any possible treaty with America, and which has thereby
thrown a national damp upon any actual public exertions to procure a
negotiation for peace with America. I have the strongest opinion, that
if it were publicly known to the people of England, that a negotiation
might be opened with America, upon the terms above specified, that all
the Ministry together, if they were ill disposed to a man, would not
venture to thwart such a measure.

But why should it be supposed, that the Ministry, to a man, are ill
disposed to a peace? Suppose them to be half and half, and the public
wish and voice of the people in favor of negotiation, it is evident on
which side the balance would incline. But why should we seek to throw
a damp prematurely upon any chance? Why presume even against any
individual? I grant, that it would be a bitter trial of humility to be
brought to a formal recognition of independence at the haughty command
of France, and I believe every part of the nation would proceed to
every extremity before they would submit to that. But if that touchy
point can be provided for, _sub silentio_, and if the proposed treaty
with America may be carried on free from control by France, let us
give the cause of peace a fair trial; at the worst we should but be
where we were if we should fail. But why should we expect to fail,
when the greatest rub is removed, by the liberty of entering
separately into a treaty? I think it a most favorable event, leading
towards peace. Give us a truce with its concomitants, and a little
time so given for cooling will have most excellent effects on both
sides. Eternal peace and conciliation may then follow.

I send this to you by the quickest despatch, that we may bring this
point to a fair issue before the meeting of Parliament. God prosper
the blessed work of peace.

I am ever yours most affectionately,

  D. HARTLEY.

_P. S. January 8th, 1782._ Since writing this letter, I have seen Mr
Alexander, and shall see him from time to time to communicate with
him. I do not suppose I shall have an answer from Lord North till the
preliminary points are so settled, as to enable him to give an answer
in form. The Ministry might undoubtedly give a short negative, if they
thought proper; but I do not expect that. You may be assured, that I
have and shall continue to enforce every argument in the most
conciliatory manner to induce a negotiation. I am very sorry for Mr
A.'s confinement, on his own account, and on that of his friends, and
because probably in the future state of this business his personal
exertions may be very serviceable in the cause of peace. Every
assistance and every exertion of mine will always be most heartily
devoted to that cause. I have nothing further to add, either upon my
own reflections or from my subsequent conversations with Mr Alexander,
to what I have stated in the foregoing letter. If we once make a good
beginning upon the plan there stated, I should hope that such a
negotiation, founded on such principles, would promise fair to produce
every salutary and pacific concequence in the event.

  D. H.

REMARKS ON THE CONCILIATORY BILL

_In the title and preamble_ of the bill, the words _Provinces of North
America_ are used as general words, neither implying dependence or
independence.

CLAUSE I. _The Truce_ is taken from the Conciliatory Act of 1778, and
is indefinite as to the proposed duration of the truce. Under this
clause it might be proposed to negotiate three points, viz. the
removal of the British troops from the Thirteen Provinces of North
America, and connectedly with this article, a stipulation for the
security of the friends of the British government. The third article
might be a stipulation, that the respective parties, during the
continuance of the truce, should not either directly or indirectly
give assistance to the enemies of each other.

CLAUSE II. _Articles of Intercourse and Pacification._ Under this
clause some arrangements might be settled, for establishing a free and
mutual intercourse, civil and commercial, between Great Britain and
the aforesaid Provinces of North America.

CLAUSE III. _Suspension of certain Acts of Parliament._ By this clause
a free communication may be kept open between the two countries,
during the negotiation for peace, without stumbling against any claim
of rights, which might draw into contest the question of dependence or
independence.

CLAUSE IV. _The Ratification by Parliament._ The object of this clause
is to consolidate peace and conciliation, step by step, as the
negotiation may proceed; and to prevent, as far as possible, any
return of war, after the first declaration of a truce. By the
operation of this clause, a temporary truce may be converted into a
perpetual and permanent peace.

CLAUSE V. _A Temporary Act._ This clause, creating a temporary act for
a specific purpose of negotiation in view, is taken from the act of
1778.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO B. FRANKLIN.

  Philadelphia, January 7th, 1782.

  Dear Sir,

As it does not appear improbable, that the humiliation and misfortunes
of Great Britain may produce the same sentiments, which a spirit of
moderation dictates to the other belligerent powers, and lead her to
concur with them in their wishes for peace, it cannot be improper to
acquaint you with the objects America most wishes to attain, and to
furnish you with the arguments on which they found their claim to
them. For such is the confidence, not only in the justice of His Most
Christian Majesty, but in his friendship, that they firmly persuade
themselves, that he will not only preserve for them their undoubted
rights, but that he will even go so far as to procure for them those
advantages they may reasonably demand, on the close of a successful
war; and I am perfectly satisfied, that the loose hints that a detail
of their sentiments may afford you, and our other Commissioners, will
be strengthened and improved by your lights in such manner, as to come
before his Majesty in the most advantageous form.

The first point of discussion will be the limits of the United States.
The instructions given Mr Adams on the ---- day of ---- last, explain
the wishes of Congress on that subject, nor can they admit of many
doubts, except so far as they relate to our southern extent. The
boundary between us and Canada being very well ascertained by grants,
charters, proclamations, and other acts of government, and more
particularly by the settlements of people, who are engaged in the same
cause with us, and who have the same rights with the rest of the
subjects of the United States.

Our western and northwestern extent will probably be contested with
some warmth, and the reasoning on that subject be deduced from general
principles, and from proclamations and treaties with the Indians.

The subject is undoubtedly intricate and delicate, yet, upon candid
investigation, I believe it will appear, that our extension to the
Mississippi is founded in justice; and that our claims are at least
such as the events of the war give us a right to insist upon. Your
situation, furnishing you amply with the various documents on which
Great Britain founded her claim to all the country east of the
Mississippi previous to the treaty of Paris, I will not trouble you
with references to them, which would at any rate be imperfect, from
the want which prevails here of books and papers. Taking it for
granted, that the King of Great Britain was entitled to that extent of
country, (which he at least cannot contravene) it only remains to
examine how far he considers it as within the limits of some of the
United States, because he can no more pretend to abridge those limits,
than claim any other right of which the United States are in
possession.

His idea of these limits is apparent from charters granted by the
crown, and from recent grants made by its representatives in several
of the States, it appears that they considered their authority to
grant lands to the westward, as coextensive with the right of Great
Britain, unless they were restricted by their interference with other
governments. Upon this principle, the servants of the crown in New
York granted land on the borders of Lake Erie, to the westward of
Niagara. And Virginia, even after the proclamation in 1763, patented
considerable tracts upon the Ohio, far beyond the Appalachian
mountains. It is true, the several governments were prohibited at
different times from granting lands beyond certain limits, but these
were clearly temporary restrictions, which the policy of maintaining a
good understanding with the natives dictated, and were always broken
through after a short period, as is evinced by the grants
abovementioned, made subsequent to the proclamation in 1763. And
indeed the proclamation itself furnishes a substantial argument of the
opinion of Britain, with respect to the right which some of the States
had to extend to the westward of the limits it prescribed, otherwise
it would not have been necessary to prohibit their governors from
granting, as their patents would, in such cases, have been invalid,
and themselves subjected to the censure of their master upon whom they
were dependent. Unless, therefore, these proclamations absolutely
destroyed the right, they must be considered as proofs of its
existence at least, and after they were issued. The slightest
examination of them shows, that they did not take away, but restrained
an existing right, and the subsequent grants by the governors evidence
that they were, as is before asserted, mere temporary restrictions.
The same reasoning applies to the treaty at Fort Stanwix, and to other
agreements taken from treaties with the Indians. Strong evidence in
our favor is also found in the map made by the King's geographer, in
which Virginia and the Carolinas are laid down as extending to the
Mississippi, shortly after the last war. Arguments may be drawn
against us by the Quebec Bill, but as this is one of the laws that
occasioned the war, to build anything upon it would be to urge one
wrong in support of another. But this matter may perhaps be seen in a
different light, and our pretensions placed upon a more extensive
basis by recurring to general principles, and asking whence Great
Britain derived her right to the waste lands in America.

Evidently, from the allegiance which a subject is supposed to carry
with him wherever he goes, even though he dislikes his constitution
and seeks one that pleases him better, upon this false principle, the
oppressed subjects of Great Britain, seeking freedom in the wilds of
America, were supposed to extend to it the sovereignty of the kingdom
they had left. The rights of the King of Great Britain then to America
were incident to his right of sovereignty over those of his subjects
that settled America, and explored the lands he claims. For the idea
of right derived from mere discovery, and the vain ceremony of taking
possession without planting and continuing that possession, is now
fully exploded. If then we admit what is necessary to our
independence, that the right of sovereignty over the people of America
is forfeited, it must follow, that all rights founded in that
sovereignty are forfeited with it; and that upon our setting up a new
sovereign in America, the rights which the first claimed as such,
devolve upon the second. Upon this principle, Great Britain is left
without a foot of land in America beyond the limits of those
governments which acknowledge her jurisdiction.

It is in vain to say, that the King of Great Britain holds these back
lands by a cession from other powers. Since those cessions were
grounded upon a prior claim, derived through the people of America,
and only served to confirm the right which they gave the King of Great
Britain while he was their sovereign, and which he loses with his
sovereignty over them. This mode of reasoning is warranted by the
practice Great Britain uniformly held of treating with the Indian
nations through their American governors, who have frequently executed
with them the most solemn acts, and sometimes extended the King's
protection to the nations who occupy the waste lands, which are the
subject of our present claim. The expense of retaining these in
friendship, almost always devolved upon the respective States, who,
till lately, particularly in New York, voted the sums necessary to
support smiths among them, and to procure the presents which were
annually made them. From hence, then, it follows, that if the King of
Great Britain has any right over the back lands in America, it must be
as King of the people of America; ceasing to be King of those people,
his right also ceases. If he has no right over the back lands, but
merely as protector of the savage nations that inhabit them, that
connexion and duty also devolve upon us, since they evidently claimed
that protection from him as King of the Colonies, and through the
governors of those Colonies, and not as sovereign of a country three
thousand miles from them. This country having chosen a new sovereign,
they may rightfully claim its protection.

There is some reason to believe, that Great Britain considered their
rights in many instances as extending no further than their right of
preemption and protection, as may be inferred from passages in the
negotiations for a peace with France in the year 1761, referred to in
the margin. This suggests a new idea, which, however, I am not
warranted by any act of Congress in mentioning, and therefore you will
only consider it as the sentiment of an individual. If the mediators
should not incline to admit our claim, but determine on restricting
our limits, either by the extent of our grants, the course of the
mountains, the sources of the rivers, or any other of those arbitrary
rules that must be sought for when solid principles are relinquished,
perhaps it would not be difficult to bring them to agree, that the
country beyond those limits belongs to the nations which inhabit it;
that it should enjoy its independence under the guarantee of France,
Spain, Great Britain, and America, and be open to the trade of those
whose lands border upon them.

This, though restrictive of our rights, would free us from the well
grounded apprehensions, that the vicinity of Great Britain and her
command of the savages would give us. They already possess Canada and
Nova Scotia; should that immense territory, which lies upon the rear
of the States, from the Gulf of St Lawrence to the Gulf of Mexico, be
acknowledged to be vested in Great Britain, it will render our
situation truly hazardous. The lands, as you know, are infinitely
better than those on the coast; they have an open communication with
the sea by the rivers St Lawrence and the Mississippi, and with each
other by those extensive inland seas with which America abounds. They
will be settled with the utmost rapidity from Europe, but more
particularly from these States. Attachment to the government, freedom
from taxes, a prospect of bettering their fortunes, and the fertility
of the soil, will invite numbers to leave us. This, co-operating with
the leaven of dissatisfaction, which will continue to work here for
many years, may produce the most dangerous effects, especially upon
the Southern States, which will, from the nature of their soil and
husbandry, be thinly settled for many years, while the lands, which
lie near them beyond the mountains, will soon be filled with a hardy
race of people inimical to them, who to their own strength will be
enabled to join that of the savages, subject to their command.

If it is an object with the maritime powers to lessen the power, and
by that means diminish the dangerous dominion that Great Britain has
in some measure usurped over the ocean, they must prevent her
possessing herself of the country in question, since, besides the
whole fur and peltry trade, that she will thereby engross, the demands
of this great country will give a new spring to her manufactures,
which, though the Floridas should be ceded to Spain, will find their
way into it by the river St Lawrence, and through the numerous lakes
and rivers which communicate with it. Add to this, that settlements
are already formed beyond the Appalachian mountains by people who
acknowledge the United States, which not only give force to our
claims, but render a relinquishment of their interest highly impolitic
and unjust. These, and a variety of other reasons, which will suggest
themselves to you and the gentlemen joined in the commission with you,
will doubtless be urged in such terms as to convince the Court of
France, that our mutual interests conspire to keep Great Britain from
any territory on this continent beyond the bounds of Canada. Should
the Floridas be ceded to Spain, she will certainly unite with you on
this point, as the security of that cession will depend upon its
success.

The _Fisheries_ will probably be another source of litigation, not
because our rights are doubtful, but because Great Britain has never
paid much attention to rights, which interfere with her views.

The arguments on which the people of America found their claim to fish
on the Banks of Newfoundland arise, first, from their having once
formed a part of the British empire, in which state they always
enjoyed, as fully as the people of Britain themselves, the right of
fishing on those Banks. They have shared in all the wars for the
extension of that right, and Britain could with no more justice have
excluded them from the enjoyment of it, (even supposing that one
nation could possess it to the exclusion of another,) while they
formed a part of that empire, than they could exclude the people of
London or Bristol. If so, the only inquiry is, how have we lost this
right. If we were tenants in common with Great Britain, while united
with her, we still continue so, unless by our own act we have
relinquished our title. Had we parted with mutual consent, we should
doubtless have made partition of our common rights by treaty. But the
oppressions of Great Britain forced us to a separation, (which must be
admitted, or we have no right to be independent) and it cannot
certainly be contended that those oppressions abridged our rights, or
gave new ones to Britain. Our rights then are not invalidated by this
separation, more particularly as we have kept up our claim from the
commencement of the war, and assigned the attempt of Great Britain to
exclude us from the fisheries as one of the causes of our recurring to
arms.

The second ground upon which we place our right to fish on the Banks
of Newfoundland, provided we do not come within such distance of the
coasts of other powers, as the law of nations allows them to
appropriate, is the right which nature gives to all mankind to use its
common benefit, so far as not to exclude others. The sea cannot in its
nature be appropriated; no nation can put its mark upon it. Though
attempts have sometimes been made to set up an empire over it, they
have been considered as unjust usurpations, and resisted as such, in
turn, by every maritime nation in Europe. The idea of such empire is
now fully exploded by the best writers.

The whale fishery in every sea, and even upon the coasts of princes,
who do not exercise it themselves, is considered as a common right,
and is enjoyed by those nations that choose to pursue it. The cod
fishery, upon the Dogger Bank, and other parts of the European seas,
is claimed exclusively by no nation. The herring fishery is carried on
daily by the Dutch on the coast of England, and if the Banks of
Newfoundland are not equally common, it is because some nations have
relinquished their rights, and others find it impossible to exercise
them, for want of harbors to receive their vessels, or shores to dry
their fish on.

When we say we are willing to exercise it under these inconveniences,
there can certainly be no further dispute about our right, and the
only remaining questions will be the distance that we ought to keep
from the shores possessed by the enemy; though, strictly speaking,
from our first principle, we have a common right in them.

This subject is treated so much at large by Grotius and Vattel, that I
do not think it necessary to detail arguments, which, though urged by
people here from their feelings, you will find much better stated
there. Give me leave however to urge some, that may arise from our
particular circumstances. All the New England States are much
interested in this point; the State of Massachusetts more
particularly; it has no staple; it does not raise its own bread; its
principal commerce consisted before the war in fish, which it supplied
to the rest of the continent in exchange for rice, flour, &c, and to
the West Indies for rum, sugar, and molasses. It shipped little to
Europe; first, because it could not fish so cheap as the people of
England; secondly, because their fish was not so well cured in
general, owing to their fishing at improper seasons, and to their
using salt which is said to be of a more harsh nature, than what the
European vessels bring out with them. Should this State and New
Hampshire, which is almost in similar circumstances, be excluded from
the fisheries, they must be reduced to great distress. It will be
impossible for them to pay for the necessaries they must receive from
abroad. They will see with pain their sister States in the full
enjoyment of the benefits, which will result from their independence,
while their own commerce is checked, and their State impoverished.
They will consider their interests as sacrificed to the happiness of
others, and can hardly forbear to foster that discontent, which may be
productive of disunion, and the most dangerous divisions.

An idea has also gone forth, and it is fomented by the disaffected,
that France wishes, from interested views, to monopolise the
fisheries; or, at least to exclude all other competitors but Great
Britain. Those, who have attended to the disinterested conduct of
France during the war, oppose to this sentiment the honor and good
faith of their ally, the little interest that he can have in excluding
a people from a right, which would not interfere with his, since
France does little more than supply herself; and the New England
fishery, for the most part, only supplies the continent and islands of
America. They see the care with which France has endeavored to
cultivate a good understanding between that Kingdom and these States,
and they are persuaded so inconsiderable an object will not be put in
competition with the harmony, which ought to subsist between them, or
administer food to those unworthy jealousies. And so much does this
sentiment prevail in Congress, that their prospects have not induced
them to alter your instructions; more particularly as they have
received through the Minister of France assurances, that his Majesty
was pleased with the proof Congress had given him of their confidence,
and that he would in no event make any sacrifices of their essential
interests, which necessity should not compel him to do; that he had no
reason to apprehend from the events of the war, that such necessity
would exist. These events have become so much more favorable since the
date of the letter, which contained these assurances, that Congress
persuade themselves his Majesty will not be driven to make sacrifices
equally painful to him and injurious to us; but that, as we owe our
success in war to his magnanimity and generosity, we may be equally
indebted to his justice and firmness for an honorable peace.

It is not improbable, that Great Britain will endeavor to make some
stipulations in favor of their American partisans, who have been
banished the country, or whose property has been forfeited. You will
doubtless be sensible of the inconvenience and danger, to which their
return will subject us, and the injustice of restoring to them what
they have so justly forfeited; while no compensation is made to us
for the loss of property, and the calamities they have occasioned.

There can be little doubt, that every society may rightfully banish
from among them those, who aim at its subversion, and forfeit the
property, which they can only be entitled to by the laws, and under
the protection of the society, which they attempt to destroy. Without
troubling you, therefore, on the point of right, I will just mention a
few of the consequences that would result from a stipulation in their
favor.

In the first place, it will excite general dissatisfaction and
tumults. They are considered here as the authors of the war. Those who
have lost relations and friends by it, those who have been insulted by
them while starving in prisons and prison-ships, those who have been
robbed and plundered, or who have had their houses burned and their
families ill treated by them, will, in despite of all law, or
treaties, avenge themselves, if the real or supposed authors of these
calamities ever put themselves in their power; nor will the government
be able to prevent what the feeling of the body of the people will
justify.

Should they be permitted to reside among us, they will neglect no
means to injure and subvert our constitution and government, and to
sow divisions among us in order to pave the way for the introduction
of the old system. They will be dangerous partisans of the enemy,
equally unfriendly to France and to us, and will show themselves such
upon every occasion. To restore their property in many instances is
now become impossible. It has been sold from hand to hand; the money
arising from it has been sunk by depreciation in the public treasury.
To raise the value by taxes, or to wrest the lands from the hands of
the proprietors, is equally unjust and impossible. Many of the very
people, who would demand the restitution, have grown rich by the spoil
and plunder of this country. Many others, who were beggars at the
beginning of this war, owe their present affluence to the same cause.

So that at least the account between the two nations should be
liquidated, before any claim can be set up by the aggressors. How far
it will be possible to obtain a compensation for the injuries wantonly
done by the enemy, you will be best able to judge; be assured that it
is anxiously desired.

Give me leave to mention to you the necessity of stipulating for the
safe delivery of all records, and other papers of a public and private
nature, which the enemy have possessed themselves of; particularly of
the records of New York, which Mr Tryon sent to England; and the
private papers of many gentlemen of the law in different parts of the
continent, by which the rights of individuals may be materially
affected.

Thus, Sir, I have touched upon the principal points, that America
wishes to attain in the peace, which must end this bloody war. Perhaps
in so doing I have given both you and myself unnecessary trouble,
since I have urged nothing but what your own knowledge of the country,
and that of the other gentlemen in the commission, would have
suggested to you. However, conceiving that circumstances might render
it necessary for you to declare, that you spoke nothing more than the
prevailing sentiments of your Court, this letter will serve to vouch
for the assertion.

Should the Floridas be ceded to Spain, as there is nothing Congress
have more at heart than to maintain that friendly intercourse with
them, which this revolution has happily begun, it will be essential to
fix their limits precisely, for which purpose the instructions to Mr
Adams will serve as your directions.

Affairs here are in the same state that they were when I last wrote,
except that the enemy in South Carolina have called in all their
outposts, and shut themselves up in Charleston, where they will be
closely invested when General St Clair joins, which must have happened
about the last of December. The brilliant expedition to St Eustatia
does the highest honor to the Marquis de Bouillé and the French
nation. I flatter myself that it will be of singular use to Mr Adam's
negotiations.

  I have the honor to be, dear Sir, &c. &c.

  ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

TO DAVID HARTLEY.

  Passy, January 15th, 1782.

  Dear Sir,

I received a few days since your favor of the 2d instant, in which you
tell me, that Mr Alexander had informed you, "America was disposed to
enter into a separate treaty with Great Britain." I am persuaded, that
your strong desire for peace has misled you, and occasioned your
greatly misunderstanding Mr Alexander; as I think it scarce possible
he should have asserted a thing _so utterly void of foundation_. I
remember that you have, as you say, often urged this on former
occasions, and that it always gave me more disgust than my friendship
for you permitted me to express. But since you have now gone so far
as to carry such a proposition to Lord North, as arising from us, it
is necessary that I should be explicit with you, and tell you plainly,
that I never had such an idea, and I believe there is not a man in
America, a few _English tories_ excepted, that would not spurn at the
thought of deserting a noble and generous friend, for the sake of a
truce with an unjust and cruel enemy.

I have again read over your Conciliatory Bill, with the manuscript
propositions that accompany it, and am concerned to find, that one
cannot give vent to a simple wish for peace, a mere sentiment of
humanity, without having it interpreted as _a disposition to submit to
any base conditions_ that may be offered us, rather than continue the
war; for, on no other supposition could you propose to us a truce of
ten years, during which we are to engage not to assist France, while
you continue the war with her. A truce too, wherein nothing is to be
mentioned that may weaken your pretensions to dominion over us, which
you may therefore resume at the end of the term, or at pleasure; when
we should have so covered ourselves with infamy, by our treachery to
our first friend, as that no other nation can ever after be disposed
to assist us, however cruelly you might think fit to treat us. Believe
me, my dear friend, America has too much understanding, and is too
sensible of the value of the world's good opinion, to forfeit it all
by such perfidy. The Congress will never instruct their Commissioners
to obtain a peace on such ignominious terms; and though there can be
but few things in which I should venture to disobey their orders, yet,
if it were possible for them to give me such an order as this, I
should certainly refuse to act; I should instantly renounce their
commission, and banish myself forever from so infamous a country.

We are a little ambitious too of your esteem; and as I think we have
acquired some share of it, by our manner of making war with you, I
trust we shall not hazard the loss of it, by consenting meanly to a
dishonorable peace.

Lord North was wise in demanding of you some authorised acknowledgment
of the proposition from authorised persons. He justly thought it too
improbable to be relied on, so as to lay it before the Privy Council.
You can now inform him, that the whole has been a mistake, and that no
such proposition as that of a separate peace has been, is, or is ever
likely to be made by me; and I believe by no other authorised person
whatever in behalf of America. You may further, if you please, inform
his Lordship, that Mr Adams, Mr Laurens, Mr Jay, and myself, have long
since been empowered, by a special commission, to treat of peace
whenever a negotiation shall be opened for that purpose; but it must
always be understood, that this is to be in conjunction with our
allies, conformably to the solemn treaties made with them.

You have, my dear friend, a strong desire to promote peace, and it is
a most laudable and virtuous desire. Permit me then to wish, that you
would, in order to succeed as a mediator, avoid such invidious
expressions as may have an effect in preventing your purpose. You tell
me that no stipulation for our independence must be in the treaty,
because you "verily believe, so deep is the jealousy between England
and France, that England would fight for a straw, to the last man and
the last shilling, rather than be _dictated to_ by France." And again,
that, "the nation would proceed to every extremity, rather than be
brought to a formal recognition of independence at the _haughty
command_ of France." My dear Sir, if every proposition of terms for
peace, that may be made by one of the parties at war, is to be called
and considered by the other as _dictating_, and a _haughty command_,
and for that reason rejected, with a resolution of fighting to the
last man rather than agree to it, you see that in such case no treaty
of peace is possible.

In fact we began the war for independence on your government, which we
found tyrannical, and this before France had anything to do with our
affairs; the article in our treaty whereby the "two parties engage,
that neither of them shall conclude either truce or peace with Great
Britain, without the formal consent of the other first obtained; and
mutually engage, not to lay down their arms until the independence of
the United States shall have been formally or _tacitly_ assured, by
the treaty or treaties, that shall terminate the war," was an article
inserted at our instance, being in our favor. And you see, by the
article itself, that your great difficulty may be easily got over, as
a formal acknowledgment of our independence is not made necessary. But
we hope by God's help to enjoy it; and I suppose we shall fight for it
as long as we are able.

I do not make any remarks upon the other propositions, because I think
that unless they were made by authority, the discussion of them is
unnecessary and may be inconvenient. The supposition of our being
disposed to make a separate peace I could not be silent upon, as it
materially affected our reputation and its essential interests. If I
have been a little warm on that offensive point, reflect on your
repeatedly urging it, and endeavor to excuse me.

Whatever may be the fate of our poor countries, let you and me die as
we have lived, in peace with each other.

Assuredly I continue, with great and sincere esteem, my dear friend,
yours most affectionately,

  B. FRANKLIN.

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

  Passy, January 18th, 1782.

  Sir,

I received the letter your Excellency did me the honor of writing to
me this day enclosing a Memorial,[28] which relates to the interests
of some subjects of the Emperor, residing at Ostend, who allege that a
ship of theirs has been taken by an American privateer, and carried
into Boston, on pretence that the property was English, &c. I shall
immediately transmit the Memorial to Congress, as desired. But there
being Courts of Admiralty established in each of the United States, I
conceive, that the regular steps to be taken by the complainants would
be an application for justice to those Courts by some person on the
spot, duly authorised by them as their agents, and in case the
judgment of the Court is not satisfactory, that then they appeal to
the Congress, which cannot well take cognisance of such matters in the
first instance.

  [28] See this Memorial in Franklin's Works, Vol. V p. 122

The merchants of Ostend may possibly not have as yet correspondents
established in all the States, but any merchant of credit in the
country would transact such business on receiving their request, with
the proper power of attorney; or if His Imperial Majesty should think
fit to appoint a Consul General to reside in those States, such an
officer might at all times assist his compatriots with his counsels
and protection, in any affairs that they might have in that country. I
am the more particular in mentioning this to your Excellency, because
I apprehend these cases may hereafter be frequent, and if the
complaints are to be addressed to you and me, we are likely to have a
great deal of trouble, as I am informed that it is become a daily
practice for outward bound English ships to put into Ostend, make a
formal pretended sale of ship and cargo to a merchant of the place,
who furnishes imperial papers for the voyage under his own name, and
receives a certain sum per cent for the operation.

This is said to be a branch of great profit to the Flemish merchants,