date amounted to 241 million bushels. Never during the whole of the
time I have followed these figures back have the stocks been so low or
even nearly so. The same applies to stocks of maize. Against a supply
of 1,138,000 bushels on March 1, 1916, we have for this year only
789,000 bushels.

"The extraordinary scarcity of supplies is nearing the panic limit.
The movement of prices during the last few weeks is simply fantastic.
Maize, which was noted in Chicago at the beginning of January, 1917,
at 95 cents, rose by the end of April to 127 cents, and by April 25
had risen further to 148 cents. Wheat in New York, which stood at 871/4
cents in July, 1914, and by the beginning of 1917 had already risen to
1911/2 cents, rose at the beginning of April to 229 cents, and was noted
at no less than 281 on April 2. This is three and a half times the
peace figure! In German currency at normal peace time exchange, these
281 cents represent about 440 marks per ton, or, at present rate of
exchange for dollars, about 580 marks per ton.

"That, then, is the state of affairs in the country which is to help
England in the war of starvation criminally begun by itself!

"In England no figures are now made public as to imports and stocks of
grain. I can, however, state as follows:

"On the last date for which stocks were noted, January 13, 1917,
England's visible stocks of wheat amounted to 5.3 million quarters, as
against 6.3 and 5.9 million quarters in the two previous years. From
January to May and June there is, as a rule, a marked decline in the
stocks, and even in normal years the imports during these months do
not cover the consumption. In June, 1914 and 1915, the visible stocks
amounted only to about 2 million quarters, representing the
requirements for scarcely three weeks.

"We have no reason to believe that matters have developed more
favourably during the present year. This is borne out by the import
figures for January--as published. The imports of bread-corn and
fodder-grain--I take them altogether, as in the English regulations
for eking out supplies--amounted only to 12.6 million quarters, as
against 19.8 and 19.2 in the two previous years.

"For February the English statistics show an increase in the import
value of unstated import quantity of all grain of 50 per cent., as
against February, 1916. This gives, taking the distribution among the
various sorts of grain as similar to that of January, and reckoning
with the rise in prices since, about the same import quantity as in
the previous year. But in view of the great decrease in American grain
shipments and the small quantity which can have come from India and
Australia the statement is hardly credible. We may take it that March
has brought a further decline, and that to-day, when we are nearing
the time of the three-week stocks, the English supplies are lower than
in the previous years.

"The English themselves acknowledge this. Lloyd George stated in
February that the English grain supplies were lower than ever within
the memory of man. A high official in the English Ministry of
Agriculture, Sir Ailwyn Fellowes, speaking in April at an agricultural
congress, added that owing to the submarine warfare, which was an
extremely serious peril to England, the state of affairs had grown far
worse even than then.

"Captain Bathurst, of the British Food Controller's Department
(_Kriegsernährungsamt_), stated briefly on April 19 that the then
consumption of breadstuffs was 50 per cent. in excess of the present
_and prospective_ supplies. It would be necessary to reduce the
consumption of bread by fully a third in order to make ends meet.

"Shortly before, Mr. Wallhead, a delegate from Manchester, at a
conference of the Independent Labour Party in Leeds had stated that,
according to his information, England would in six to eight weeks be
in a complete state of famine.

"The crisis in which England is placed--and we can fairly call it a
crisis now--is further aggravated by the fact that the supplies of
other important foodstuffs have likewise taken an unfavourable turn.

"The import of meat in February, 1917, shows the lowest figures for
many years, with the single exception of September, 1914.

"The marked falling off in the butter imports--February, 1917, showing
only half as much as in the previous year--is not nearly
counterbalanced by the margarine which England is making every effort
to introduce.

"The import of lard also, most of which comes from the United States,
shows a decline, owing to the poor American crops of fodder-stuffs.
The price of lard in Chicago has risen from 151/2 cents at the beginning
of January, 1917, to 211/2 cents on April 25, and the price of pigs in
the same time from 9.80 to 16.50 dollars.

"Most serious of all, however, is the shortage of potatoes, which at
present is simply catastrophic. The English crop was the worst for a
generation past. The imports are altogether insignificant. Captain
Bathurst stated on April 19 that in about four weeks the supplies of
potatoes in the country would be entirely exhausted.

"The full seriousness of the case now stares English statesmen in the
face. Up to now they have believed it possible to exorcise the danger
by voluntary economies. Now they find themselves compelled to have
recourse to compulsory measures. I believe it is too late."

The Secretary of State then gives a detailed account of the measures
taken up to date in England for dealing with the food question, and
thereafter continues:

"On March 22 again the English food dictator, Lord Devonport, stated
in the House of Lords that a great reduction in the consumption of
bread would be necessary, but that it would be _a national disaster_
if England should have to resort to compulsion.

"His representative, Bathurst, stated at the same time: 'We do not
wish to introduce _so un-English a system_. In the first place,
because we believe that the patriotism of the people can be trusted to
assist us in our endeavours towards economy, and, further, because, as
we can see from the example of Germany, the compulsory system promises
no success; finally, because such a system would necessitate a too
complicated administrative machinery and too numerous staffs of men
and women whose services could be better employed elsewhere.'

"Meantime the English Government has, on receipt of the latest
reports, decided to adopt this un-English system which has proved a
failure in Germany, declaring now that the entire organisation for the
purpose is in readiness.

"I have still something further to say about the vigorous steps now
being taken in England to further the progress of agriculture in the
country itself. I refrain from going into this, however, as the
measures in question cannot come to anything by next harvest time, nor
can they affect that harvest at all. The winter deficiency can hardly
be balanced, even with the greatest exertions, by the spring. Not
until the 1918 crop, if then, can any success be attained. And between
then and now lies a long road, a road of suffering for England, and
for all countries dependent upon imports for their food supply.

"Everything points to the likelihood that the universal failure of the
harvest in 1916 will be followed by a like universal failure in 1917.
In the United States the official reports of acreage under crops are
worse than ever, showing 63.4, against 78.3 the previous year. The
winter wheat is estimated at only 430 million bushels, as against 492
million bushels for the previous year and 650 million bushels for
1915.

"The prospects, then, for the next year's harvest are poor indeed, and
offer no hope of salvation to our enemies.

"As to our own outlook, this is well known to those present: short,
but safe--for we can manage by ourselves. And to-day we can say that
the war of starvation, that crime against humanity, has turned against
those who commenced it. We hold the enemy in an iron grip. No one can
save them from their fate. Not even the apostles of humanity across
the great ocean, who are now commencing to protect the smaller nations
by a blockade of our neutral neighbours through prohibition of
exports, and seeking thus to drive them, under the lash of starvation,
into entering into the war against us.

"Our enemies are feeling the grip of the fist that holds them by the
neck. They are trying to force a decision. England, mistress of the
seas, is seeking to attain its end by land, and driving her sons by
hundreds of thousands to death and mutilation. Is this the England
that was to have sat at ease upon its island till we were starved into
submission, that could wait till their big brother across the Atlantic
arrived on the scene with ships and million armies, standing fast in
crushing superiority until the last annihilating battle?

"No, gentlemen, our enemies have no longer time to wait. Time is on
our side now. True, the test imposed upon us by the turn of the
world's history is enormous. What our troops are doing to help, what
our young men in blue are doing, stands far above all comparison. But
they will attain their end. For us at home, too, it is hard; not so
hard by far as for them out there, yet hard enough. Those at home must
do their part as well. If we remain true to ourselves, keeping our own
house in order, maintaining internal unity, then we have won existence
and the future for our Fatherland. Everything is at stake. The German
people is called upon now, in these weeks heavy with impending
decision, to show that it is worthy of continued existence."

4

=Speech by Count Czernin to the Austrian Delegation, January 24,
1918.=

"Gentlemen, it is my duty to give you a true picture of the peace
negotiations, to set forth the various phases of the results obtained
up to now, and to draw therefrom such conclusions as are true, logical
and justifiable.

"First of all it seems to me that those who consider the progress of
the negotiations too slow cannot have even an approximate idea of the
difficulties which we naturally had to encounter at every step. I will
in my remarks take the liberty of setting forth these difficulties,
but would like first to point out a cardinal difference existing
between the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk and all others which
have ever taken place in the history of the world. Never, so far as I
am aware, have peace negotiations been conducted with open windows. It
would be impossible that negotiations of the depth and extent of the
present could from the start proceed smoothly and without opposition.
We are faced with nothing less than the task of building up a new
world, of restoring all that the most merciless of all wars has
destroyed and cast down. In all the peace negotiations we know of the
various phases have been conducted more or less behind closed doors,
the results being first declared to the world when the whole was
completed. All history books tell us, and indeed it is obvious enough,
that the toilsome path of such peace negotiations leads constantly
over hill and dale, the prospects appearing often more or less
favourable day by day. But when the separate phases themselves, the
details of each day's proceedings, are telegraphed all over the world
at the time, it is again obvious that nervousness prevailing
throughout the world must act like an electric current and excite
public opinion accordingly. We were fully aware of the disadvantage of
this method of proceeding. Nevertheless we at once agreed to the wish
of the Russian Government in respect of this publicity, desiring to
meet them as far as possible, and also because we had nothing to
conceal on our part, and because it would have made an unfavourable
impression if we had stood firmly by the methods hitherto pursued, of
secrecy until completion. _But the complete publicity in the
negotiations makes it insistent that the great public, the country
behind, and above all the leaders, must keep cool._ The match must be
played out in cold blood, and the end will be satisfactory if the
peoples of the Monarchy support their representatives at the
conference.

"It should be stated beforehand that the basis on which
Austria-Hungary treats with the various newly-constituted Russian
states is that of 'no indemnities and no annexations.' That is the
programme which a year ago, shortly after my appointment as Minister,
I put before those who wished to talk of peace, and which I repeated
to the Russian leaders on the occasion of their first offers of peace.
And I have not deviated from that programme. Those who believe that I
am to be turned from the way which I have set myself to follow are
poor psychologists. I have never left the public in the slightest
doubt as to which way I intended to go, and I have never allowed
myself to be turned aside so much as a hair's breadth from that way,
either to right or left. And I have since become far from a favourite
of the Pan-Germans and of those in the Monarchy who follow the
Pan-German ideas. I have at the same time been hooted as an inveterate
partisan of war by those whose programme is peace at any price, as
innumerable letters have informed me. Neither has ever disturbed me;
on the contrary, the double insults have been my only comfort in this
serious time. I declare now once again that I ask not a single
kreuzer, not a single square metre of land from Russia, and that if
Russia, as appears to be the case, takes the same point of view, then
peace must result. Those who wish for peace at any price might
entertain some doubt as to my 'no-annexation' intentions towards
Russia if I did not tell them to their faces with the same complete
frankness that I shall never assent to the conclusion of a peace going
beyond the lines just laid down. If the Russian delegates demand any
surrender of territory on our part, or any war indemnity, then I shall
continue the war, despite the fact that I am as anxious for peace as
they, or I would resign if I could not attain the end I seek.

"This once said, and emphatically asserted, that there is no ground
for the pessimistic anticipation of the peace falling through, since
the negotiating committees are agreed on the basis of no annexations
or indemnities--and nothing but new instructions from the various
Russian Governments, or their disappearance, could shift that basis--I
then pass to the two great difficulties in which are contained the
reasons why the negotiations have not proceeded as quickly as we all
wished.

"The first difficulty is this: that we are not dealing with _a single_
Russian peace delegation, but with various newly-formed Russian
states, whose spheres of action are as yet by no means definitely
fixed or explained among themselves. We have to reckon with the
following: firstly, the Russia which is administered from St.
Petersburg; secondly, our new neighbour proper, the great State of
Ukraine; thirdly, Finland; and, fourthly, the Caucasus.

"With the first two of these states we are treating directly; that is
to say, face to face; with the two others it was at first in a more or
less indirect fashion, as they had not sent any representative to
Brest-Litovsk. We have then four Russian parties, and four separate
Powers on our own side to meet them. The case of the Caucasus, with
which we ourselves have, of course, no direct questions to settle, but
which, on the other hand, is in conflict with Turkey, will serve to
show the extent of the matter to be debated.

"The point in which we ourselves are most directly interested is that
of the great newly-established state upon our frontiers, Ukraine. In
the course of the proceedings we have already got well ahead with this
delegation. We are agreed upon the aforementioned basis of no
indemnities and no annexations, and have in the main arrived at a
settlement on the point that trade relations are to be re-established
with the new republic, as also on the manner of so doing. But this
very case of the Ukraine illustrates one of the prevailing
difficulties. While the Ukraine Republic takes up the position of
being entirely autonomous and justified in treating independently with
ourselves, the Russian delegation insists that the boundaries between
their territory and that of the Ukraine are not yet definitely fixed,
and that Petersburg is therefore able to claim the right of taking
part in our deliberations with the Ukraine, which claim is not
admitted by the members of the Ukraine delegation themselves. This
unsettled state of affairs in the internal conditions of Russia,
however, gave rise to very serious delays. We have got over these
difficulties, and I hope that in a few days' time we shall be able
once more to resume negotiations.

"As to the position to-day, I cannot say what this may be. I received
yesterday from my representative at Brest-Litovsk the following two
telegrams:

"'Herr Joffe has this evening, in his capacity as President of the
Russian Delegation, issued a circular letter to the delegations of the
four allied Powers in which he states that the Workers' and Peasants'
Government of the Ukrainian Republic has decided to send two delegates
to Brest-Litovsk with instructions to take part in the peace
negotiations on behalf of the central committee of the workers',
soldiers' and peasants' councils of Pan-Ukraine, but also to form a
supplementary part of the _Russian_ delegation itself. Herr Joffe adds
with regard to this that the Russian delegation is prepared to receive
these Ukrainian representatives among themselves. The above statement
is supplemented by a copy of a "declaration" dated from Kharkov,
addressed to the President of the Russian Peace Delegation at Brest,
and emanating from the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the
Ukrainian Republic, proclaiming that the Central Rada at Kiev only
represents the propertied classes, and is consequently incapable of
acting on behalf of the entire Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian
Workers' and Peasants' Government declares that it cannot acknowledge
any decisions arrived at by the delegates of the Central Rada at Kiev
without its participation, but has nevertheless decided to send
representatives to Brest-Litovsk, there to participate as a
supplementary fraction of the Russian Delegation, which they recognise
as the accredited representatives of the Federative Government of
Russia.'

"Furthermore: 'The German translation of the Russian original text of
the communication received yesterday evening from Herr Joffe regarding
the delegates of the Ukrainian Government at Kharkov and the two
appendices thereto runs as follows:

"'To the President of the Austro-Hungarian Peace Delegation.

"'Sir,--In forwarding you herewith a copy of a declaration received by
me from the delegates of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the
Ukrainian Republic, W.M. Schachrai and J.G. Medwjedew, and their
mandates, I have the honour to inform you that the Russian Delegation,
in full agreement with its frequently repeated acknowledgment of the
right of self-determination among all peoples--including naturally the
Ukrainian--sees nothing to hinder the participation of the
representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the
Ukrainian Republic in the peace negotiations, and receives them,
according to their wish, among the personnel of the Russian Peace
Delegation, as accredited representatives of the Workers' and
Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic. In bringing this to
your knowledge, I beg you, sir, to accept the expression of my most
sincere respect.--The President of the Russian Peace Delegation:
A. JOFFE.'

"'Appendix 1. To the President of the Peace Delegation of the Russian
Republic. Declaration.

"'We, the representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of
the Ukrainian Republic, People's Commissary for Military Affairs, W.M.
Schachrai, and the President of the Pan-Ukrainian Central Executive
Committee of the Council of the Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants'
Deputation, J.G. Medwjedew, delegated to proceed to Brest-Litovsk for
the purpose of conducting peace negotiations with the representatives
of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, in full agreement
with the representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of
the Russian Federative Republic, thereby understood the Council of
People's Commissaries, hereby declare as follows: The General
Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central Rada can in no case be
acknowledged as representing the entire Ukrainian people. In the name
of the Ukrainian workers, soldiers and peasants, we declare
categorically that all resolutions formed by the General Secretariat
without our assent will not be accepted by the Ukrainian people,
cannot be carried out, and can in no case be realised.

"'In full agreement with the Council of People's Commissaries, and
thus also with the Delegation of the Russian Workers' and Peasants'
Government, we shall for the future undertake the conduct of the peace
negotiations with the Delegation of the four Powers, together with the
Russian Peace Delegation.

"'And we now bring to the knowledge of the President the following
resolution, passed by the Central Executive Committee of the
Pan-Ukrainian Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies,
on the 30th December, 1917/12th January, 1918:

"'The Central Committee has decided: To delegate Comrade Medwjedew,
President of the Central Executive Committee, and People's Secretary
Satonski and Commissary Schachrai, to take part in the peace
negotiations, instructing them at the same time to declare
categorically that all attempts of the Ukrainian Central Rada to act
in the name of the Ukrainian people are to be regarded as _arbitrary
steps_ on the part of the bourgeois group of the Ukrainian population,
against the will and interests of the working classes of the Ukraine,
and that no resolutions formed by the Central Rada will be
acknowledged either by the Ukrainian Soviet Government or by the
Ukrainian people; that the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government
regards the Council of People's Commissaries as representatives of the
Pan-Russian Soviet Government, and as accordingly entitled to act on
behalf of the entire Russian Federation; and that the delegation of
the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government, sent out for the
purpose of exposing the arbitrary steps of the Ukrainian Central Rada,
will act together with and in full agreement with the Pan-Russian
Delegation.

"'Herewith: The mandate issued by the People's Secretariat of the
Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Republic, 30th December, 1917.

"'Note: People's Secretary for Enlightenment of the People, Wladimir
Petrowitch Satonski, was taken ill on the way, and did not therefore
arrive with us.

"'January, 1918.

"'The President of the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian
Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, E. Medwjedew.

"'The People's Commissary for Military Affairs, Schachrai.

"'A true copy of the original.

"'The Secretary of the Peace Delegation, Leo Karachou.'

"Appendix 2.

"'On the resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Council
of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies of Ukraina, the People's
Secretariat of the Ukrainian Republic hereby appoints, in the name of
the Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraina, the President of the
Central Executive Committee of the Council of Workers', Soldiers' and
Peasants' Deputies of Ukraina, Jesim Gregoriewitch Medwjedew, the
People's Secretary for Military Affairs, Wasili Matwjejewitch
Schachrai, and the People's Secretary for Enlightenment of the People,
Wladimir Petrowitch Satonski, in the name of the Ukrainian People's
Republic, to take part in the negotiations with the Governments of
Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria as to the terms of peace
between the mentioned states and the Russian Federative Republic. With
this end in view the mentioned deputies, Jesim Gregoriewitch
Medwjedew, Wasili Matwjejewitch Schachrai and Wladimir Petrowitch
Satonski are empowered, in all cases where they deem it necessary, to
issue declarations and to sign documents in the name of the Workers'
and Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic. The accredited
representatives of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government are
bound to act throughout in accordance with the actions of the
accredited representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of
the Russian Federative Republic, whereby is understood the Council of
People's Commissaries.

"'In the name of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the
Ukrainian People's Republic, the People's Secretary for International
Affairs, for Internal Affairs, Military Affairs, Justice, Works,
Commissariat.

"'The Manager of the Secretariat.

"'Kharkov, 30th December, 1917/12th January, 1918.

"'In accordance with the copy.

"'The President of the Russian Peace Delegation, A. Joffe.'

"This is at any rate a new difficulty, since we cannot and will not
interfere in the internal affairs of Russia.

"This once disposed of, however, there will be no further difficulties
to encounter here; we shall, in agreement with the Ukrainian Republic
determine that _the old boundaries between Austria-Hungary and the
former Russia will also be maintained as between ourselves and the
Ukraine._

=Poland=

"As regards Poland, the frontiers of which, by the way, have not yet
been exactly determined, _we want nothing at all from this new state_.
Free and uninfluenced, the population of Poland shall choose its own
fate. For my part I attach no great weight to the _form_ of the
people's vote in this respect; _the more surely it expresses the
general wish of the people, the better I shall be pleased_. For I
desire only the _voluntary_ attachment of Poland; only in the express
_wish_ of Poland itself toward that end can I see any guarantee for
lasting harmony. It is my unalterable conviction that _the Polish
question must not be allowed to delay the signing of peace by a single
day_. If, after peace is arrived at, Poland should wish to approach
us, we will not reject its advances--_the Polish question must not and
shall not endanger the peace itself_.

"I should have been glad if _the Polish Government had been able to
take part in the negotiations_, since in my opinion Poland is _an
independent state_. The Petersburg Government, however, takes the
attitude that the present Polish Government is not entitled to speak
in the name of the country, and does not acknowledge it as competent
to represent the country, and we therefore gave way on this point in
order to avoid possible conflict. The question is certainly one of
importance, but it is more important still in my opinion _to set aside
all difficulties likely to delay the negotiations_.

=German-Russian Differences as to the Occupied Areas=

"The second difficulty to be reckoned with, and one which has been
most widely echoed in the Press, is the _difference of opinion between
our German allies and the Petersburg Government_ anent the
interpretation of _the right of self-determination among the Russian
peoples_; that is to say, in the areas occupied by German troops.
Germany maintains that it _does not aim at any annexation of territory
by force_ from Russia, but, briefly stated, the difference of opinion
is a double one.

"In the first place, Germany rightly maintains that _the numerous
expressions of desire for independence_ on the part of _legislative
corporations, communal representations_, etc., in the occupied areas
should be taken as the _provisional_ basis for the will of the people,
to be _later_ tested by _plebiscite on a broader foundation_, a point
of view which the Russian Government at first was indisposed to agree
to, as it did not consider the existing administrations in Courland
and Lithuania entitled to speak for those provinces any more than in
the case of Poland.

"In the second place, Russia demands that this plebiscite shall take
place _after all German troops and officials have been withdrawn from
the occupied provinces_, while Germany, in reply to this, points out
that if this principle were carried to its utmost limits it would
create a vacuum, which could not fail to bring about at once a state
of complete anarchy and the utmost misery. It should here be noted
that everything in these provinces which to-day renders possible the
life of a state at all is _German property_. Railways, posts and
telegraphs, the entire industry, and moreover the entire
administrative machinery, police, law courts, all are in German hands.
The sudden withdrawal of all this apparatus would, in fact, create a
condition of things which seems _practically impossible to maintain_.

"In both cases it is a question of finding a _middle way_, which
moreover _must be found_.

"_The differences between these two points of view are in my opinion
not great enough to justify failure of the negotiations_.

"But such negotiations cannot be settled from one day to another; they
take time.

"_If once we have attained peace with Russia, then in my opinion the
general peace cannot be long delayed_, despite all efforts on the part
of the Western Entente statesmen. I have learned that some are unable
to understand why I stated in my first speech after the resumption of
negotiations that it was not now a question at Brest of a general
peace, but of a _separate peace with Russia_. This was the necessary
recognition of a plain fact, which Herr Trotski also has admitted
without reserve, and it was necessary, since the negotiations would
have been on a different footing--that is to say, _in a more limited
sphere_--if treating with Russia alone than if it were a case of
treating for a general peace.

"Though I have no illusions in the direction of expecting the fruit of
general peace to ripen in a single night, I am nevertheless convinced
that the fruit _has begun to ripen_, and that it is now only a
question of holding out whether we are to obtain a general honourable
peace or not.

=Wilson's Message=

"I have recently been confirmed in this view by the offer of peace put
forward by the President of the United States of America to the whole
world. This is _an offer of peace_, for in fourteen points Mr. Wilson
sets forth the principles upon which he seeks to establish a general
peace. Obviously, an offer of this nature cannot be expected to
furnish a scheme acceptable in every detail. If that were the case,
then negotiations would be superfluous altogether, and peace could be
arrived at by a simple acceptance, a single assent. This, of course,
is not so.

"_But I have no hesitation in declaring that these last proposals on
the part of President Wilson seem to me considerably nearer the
Austro-Hungarian point of view_, and that there are among his
proposals some which we can even agree to _with great pleasure_.

"If I may now be allowed to go further into these proposals, I must,
to begin with, point out two things:

"So far as the proposals are concerned with _our Allies_--mention is
made of the German possession of _Belgium_ and of the _Turkish
Empire_--I declare that, in fulfilment of our duty to our Allies, I am
firmly determined _to hold out in defence of our Allies to the very
last. The pre-war possessions of our Allies we will defend equally
with our own_. This standpoint is that of all four Allies in complete
reciprocity with ourselves.

"In the second place, I have to point out that I must _politely but
definitely decline_ to consider the Point dealing with our internal
Government. We have in Austria _a parliament elected by general,
equal, direct and secret ballot_. There is not a more democratic
parliament in the world, and this parliament, together with the other
constitutionally admissible factors, has the sole right to decide upon
matters of _Austrian internal affairs_. I speak of _Austria_ only,
because I do not refer to _Hungarian_ internal affairs in the
_Austrian Delegation_. I should not consider it constitutional to do
so. _And we do not interfere in American affairs; but, on the other
hand, we do not wish for any foreign guidance from any state
whatever._ Having said this, I may be permitted, with regard to the
remaining Points, to state as follows:

"As to the Point dealing with the abolition of 'secret diplomacy' and
the introduction of full openness in the negotiations, I have nothing
to say. From my point of view I have _no objection to such public
negotiations so long as full reciprocity_ is the basis of the same,
though I do entertain _considerable doubt_ as to whether, all things
considered, _it is the quickest and most practical method_ of arriving
at a result. Diplomatic negotiations are simply a matter of business.
But it might easily be imagined that in the case, for instance, of
commercial treaties between one country and another it would not be
advisable _to publish incomplete results beforehand_ to the world. In
such negotiations both parties naturally commence by setting their
demands as high as possible in order to climb down gradually, using
this or that expressed demand as matter for _compensation in_ other
ways until finally an _equilibrium of the opposing interests is
arrived at_, a point which must necessarily be reached if agreement is
to be come to at all. If such negotiations were to be carried on with
full publicity, nothing could prevent the general public from
passionately defending every separate clause involved, regarding any
concession as a defeat, even when such clauses had only been advanced
_for tactical reasons_. And when the public takes up any such point
with particular fervour, ultimate agreement may be thereby rendered
impossible or the final agreement may, if arrived at, be regarded as
in itself _a defeat_, possibly by both sides. And this would not
conduce to peaceable relations thereafter; it would, on the contrary,
_increase the friction_ between the states concerned. And as in the
case of commercial treaties, so also with _political_ negotiations,
which deal with political matters.

"If the abolition of secret diplomacy is to mean that _no secret
compacts are to be made_, that no agreements are to be entered upon
without the public knowledge, then I have no objection to the
introduction of this principle. As to how it is to be realised and
adherence thereto ensured, I confess I have no idea at all. Granted
that the governments of two countries are agreed, they will always be
able to make a secret compact without the public being aware of the
fact. These, however, are minor points. I am not one to stick by
formalities, and _a question of more or less formal nature will never
prevent me from coming to a sensible arrangement_.

"Point 1, then, is one that can be discussed.

"Point 2 is concerned with the _freedom of the seas_. In this
postulate the President speaks from the hearts of all, and I can here
_fully and completely share America's desire_, the more so as the
President adds the words, 'outside territorial waters'--that is to
say, we are to understand the freedom of _the open sea_, and there is
thus, of course, no question of any interference by force in the
sovereign rights of our faithful _Turkish_ Allies. Their standpoint in
this respect will be ours.

"Point 3, which is definitely directed against any _future economic
war_, is so right, so sensible, and has so often been craved by
ourselves that I have here again nothing to remark.

"Point 4, which demands _general disarmament_, sets forth in
particularly clear and lucid form the necessity of reducing after this
present war the free competition in armaments to a footing sufficient
for the _internal security_ of states. Mr. Wilson states this frankly
and openly. In my speech at Budapest some months back I ventured to
express the same idea; it forms _part of my political creed_, and I
am most happy to find any other voice uttering the same thought.

"As regards the _Russian clause_, we are already showing in deeds that
we are endeavouring to bring about friendly relations with our
neighbours there.

"With regard to _Italy, Serbia, Roumania and Montenegro_, I can only
repeat my statement already made in the Hungarian Delegation.

"I am not disposed to effect any insurance on the war ventures of our
enemies.

"I am not disposed to make any one-sided concessions to our enemies,
who still obstinately adhere to the standpoint of fighting on until
the final victory; to prejudice permanently the Monarchy by such
concessions, which would give the enemy the invaluable advantage of
being able to carry on the war indefinitely without risk.
(_Applause._)

"Let Mr. Wilson use the great influence he undoubtedly possesses among
his Allies to persuade them on their part to declare _on what
conditions they are willing to treat_; he will then have rendered the
enormous service of having set on foot the _general peace
negotiations_. I am here replying openly and freely to Mr. Wilson, and
I will speak as openly and freely to any who wish to speak for
themselves, but it must necessarily be understood that _time, and the
continuation of the war, cannot but affect the situations here
concerned_.

"I have already said this once before; Italy is a striking example.
Italy had the opportunity before the war of making great territorial
acquisitions without firing a shot. It declined this and entered into
the war; it has lost hundreds of thousands of lives, milliards in war
expenses and values destroyed; it has brought want and misery upon its
own population, and all this _only to lose for ever an advantage which
it might have won_.

"Finally, as regards Point 13, it is an open secret that we are
adherents to the idea of establishing 'an independent Polish State to
include the areas undoubtedly occupied by Polish inhabitants.' On this
point also we shall, I think, soon agree with Mr. Wilson. And if the
President crowns his proposals with the idea of a universal _League of
Nations_ he will hardly meet with any opposition thereto on the part
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

"As will be seen from this comparison of my views with those of Mr.
Wilson, we are not only _agreed in essentials as to the great
principles_ for rearrangement of the world after this war, but _our
ideas as to several concrete questions bearing on the peace are
closely allied_.

"The differences remaining do not appear to me so great but that a
discussion of these points might lead to a clearer understanding and
bring us closer still.

"The situation, then, seems to be this: Austria-Hungary on the one
hand, and the United States of America on the other, are the two Great
Powers in the hostile groups of states whose interests are least
opposed one to the other. It seems reasonable, then, to suppose that
_an exchange of opinion between these two Powers might form the
natural starting point for a conciliatory discussion_ between all
those states which have not yet entered upon peace negotiations.
(_Applause._) So much for Wilson's proposals.

=Petersburg and the Ukraine=

"And now, gentlemen, I hasten to conclude. But this conclusion is
perhaps the most important of all I have to say; I am endeavouring to
bring about peace between the Ukraine and Petersburg.

"The conclusion of peace with Petersburg alters nothing in our
definitive situation. Austro-Hungarian troops are nowhere opposed to
the Petersburg Government--we have the Ukrainian against us--and it is
impossible to export anything from Petersburg, since they have nothing
there themselves but _revolution and anarchy, goods which the
Bolshevists, no doubt, would be glad to export, but which I must
politely decline to receive_.

"In spite of this, I wish to make peace with Petersburg as well, since
this, like any other cessation of hostilities, brings us nearer to the
_general peace_.

"It is otherwise with Ukraine. For the Ukraine has supplies of
provisions which they will export if we can agree on commercial terms.
The question of food is to-day a matter of anxiety throughout the
world; among our opponents, and also in the neutral countries, it is a
burning question. I wish to profit by the conclusion of peace with
those Russian states which have food to export, in order to help our
own population. _We could and would hold out without this assistance._
But I know my duty, and my duty bids me do all that can be done to
lighten the burden of our suffering people, and I will not, therefore,
from any hysterical nervousness about getting to final peace a few
days or a few weeks earlier, throw away this possible advantage to our
people. Such a peace takes time and cannot be concluded in a day. For
such a peace must definitely state whether, what and how the Russian
party will deliver to us, for the reason that the Ukraine on its part
wishes to close the business not after, but at the signing of peace.

"I have already mentioned that the unsettled conditions in this newly
established state occasion great difficulty and naturally considerable
delay in the negotiations.

=Appeal to the Country=

"_If you fall on me from behind, if you force me to come to terms at
once in headlong fashion, we shall gain no economic advantage at all_,
and our people will then be forced to renounce the alleviation which
they should have gained from the peace.

"A surgeon conducting a difficult operation with a crowd behind him
standing watch in hand may very likely complete the operation in
record time, but in all probability the patient would not thank him
for the manner in which it had been carried out.

"If you give our present opponents the impression that we must have
_peace at once, and at any price_, we shall not get so much as a
single measure of grain, and the result will be more or less platonic.
It is no longer by any means a question principally of terminating the
war on the Ukrainian front; neither we nor the Ukrainians themselves
intend to continue the war now that we are agreed upon the
no-annexation basis. It is a question--I repeat it once again--not of
'imperialistic' annexation plans and ideas, but of securing for our
population at last the merited reward of their endurance, and
procuring them those supplies of food for which they are waiting. Our
partners in the deal are good business men and are closely watching to
see _whether you are forcing me to act or not_.

"_If you wish to ruin the peace_, if you are anxious to renounce the
supply of grain, then it would be logical enough to force my hand by
speeches and resolutions, strikes and demonstrations, but not
otherwise. And there is not an atom of truth in the idea that we are
now at such a pass that we must prefer a bad peace without economic
gain rather than a good peace with economic advantages to-morrow.

"The difficulties in the matter of food of late are not due solely to
lack of actual provisions; it is the crises in coal, transport and
organisation which are increasing. _When you at home get up strikes
you are moving in a vicious circle; the strikes increase and aggravate
the crises concerned and hinder the supplies of food and coal._ You
are cutting your own throats in so doing, and all who believe that
peace is accelerated thereby are terribly mistaken.

"It is believed that men in the country have been circulating rumours
to the effect that the Government is instigating the strikes. I leave
to these men themselves to choose whether they are to appear as
_criminal slanderers or as fools_.

"If you had a Government desirous of concluding a peace different
from that desired by the majority of the population, if you had a
Government seeking to prolong the war for purposes of conquest, one
might understand a conflict between the Government and the country.
_But since the Government desires precisely the same as the majority
of the people--that is to say, the speedy settlement of an honourable
peace without annexationist aims--then it is madness to attack that
Government from behind, to interfere with its freedom of action and
hamper its movements._ Those who do so are fighting, not against the
Government, they are fighting blindly against the people they pretend
to serve and against themselves.

"As for yourselves, gentlemen, it is not only your right, but your
duty, to choose between the following alternatives: either you trust
me to proceed with the peace negotiations, and in that case you must
help me, or you do not trust me, and in that case you must depose me.
I am confident that I have the support of the majority of the
Hungarian delegation. The Hungarian Committee has given me a vote of
confidence. If there is any doubt as to the same here, then the matter
is clear enough. The question of a vote of confidence must be brought
up and put to the vote; if I then have the majority against me I shall
at once take the consequences. No one of those who are anxious to
secure my removal will be more pleased than myself; indeed far less
so. Nothing induces me now to retain my office but the sense of duty,
which constrains me to remain as long as I have the confidence of the
Emperor and the majority of the delegations. A soldier with any sense
of decency does not desert. But no Minister for Foreign Affairs could
conduct negotiations of this importance unless he knows, and all the
world as well, that he is endowed with the confidence of the majority
among the constitutional representative bodies. There can be no half
measures here. You have this confidence or you have not. You must
assist me or depose me; there is no other way. I have no more to say."

5

=Report of the Peace Negotiations at Brest-Litovsk=

The Austro-Hungarian Government entered upon the peace negotiations at
Brest-Litovsk with the object of arriving as quickly as possible at a
peace compact which, if it did not, as we hoped, lead to a general
peace, should at least secure order in the East. The draft of a
preliminary peace was sent to Brest containing the following points:

1. Cessation of hostilities; if general peace should not be
concluded, then neither of the present contracting parties to afford
any support to the enemies of the other.

2. No surrender of territory; Poland, Lithuania and Courland retaining
the right of determining their own destiny for the future.

3. No indemnity for costs of war or damages due to military
operations.

4. Cessation of economic war and reparation of damages sustained by
private persons through the economic war.

5. Resumption of commercial intercourse and the same provisionally on
the basis of the old commercial treaty and twenty years' preference
subject to restriction in respect of any Customs union with
neighbouring countries.

6. Mutual assistance in raw materials and industrial articles.

A further point was contemplated, dealing with the evacuation of the
occupied areas, but the formulation of this had to be postponed until
after consultation with the German Supreme Military Command, whose
co-operation was here required owing to the mingling of German and
Austro-Hungarian troops on the Russian front. The Army Command has
indicated a period of at least six months as necessary for the
evacuation.

In discussing this draft with the German delegates two points in
particular were found to present great difficulty. One was that of
evacuation. The German Army Command declared categorically that no
evacuation of the occupied districts could be thought of until after
conclusion of the general peace. The second difficulty arose in
connection with the question as to treatment of the occupied
districts. Germany insisted that in the peace treaty with Russia it
should be simply stated that Russia had conceded to the peoples within
its territory the right of self-determination, and that the nations in
question had already availed themselves of that right. The plain
standpoint laid down in our draft we were unable to carry through,
although it was shared by the other Allies. However, in formulating
the answer sent on December 25, 1916, to the Russian peace proposals a
compromise was, after persistent efforts on our part, ultimately
arrived at which at least prevented the full adoption of the divergent
German point of view on these two points. In the matter of evacuation
the Germans agreed that the withdrawal of certain bodies of troops
before the general peace might be discussed.

In the matter of annexations a satisfactory manner of formulating this
was found, making it applicable only in the event of general peace.
Had the Entente then been disposed to make peace the principle of "no
annexations" would have succeeded throughout.

Even allowing for the conciliatory form given through our endeavours
to this answer by the four Powers to the Russian proposals, the German
Headquarters evinced extreme indignation. Several highly outspoken
telegrams from the German Supreme Command to the German delegates
prove this. The head of the German Delegation came near to being
recalled on this account, and if this had been done it is likely that
German foreign policy would have been placed in the hands of a firm
adherent of the sternest military views. As this, however, could only
have had an unfavourable effect on the further progress of the
negotiations, we were obliged to do all in our power to retain Herr
Kühlmann. With this end in view he was informed and invited to advise
Berlin that if Germany persisted in its harsh policy Austria-Hungary
would be compelled to conclude a separate peace with Russia. This
declaration on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs did not
fail to create a certain impression in Berlin, and was largely
responsible for the fact that Kühlmann was able to remain.

Kühlmann's difficult position and his desire to strengthen it rendered
the discussion of the territorial questions, which were first
officially touched upon on December 27, but had been already taken up
in private meetings with the Russian delegates, a particularly awkward
matter. Germany insisted that the then Russian front was not to be
evacuated until six months after the general peace. Russia was
disposed to agree to this, but demanded on the other hand that the
fate of Poland was not to be decided until after evacuation. Against
this the Germans were inclined to give up its original standpoint to
the effect that the populations of occupied territories had already
availed themselves of the right of self-determination conceded, and
allow a new inquiry to be made among the population, but insisted that
this should be done during the occupation. No solution could be
arrived at on this point, though Austria-Hungary made repeated efforts
at mediation. The negotiations had arrived at this stage when they
were first interrupted on December 29.

On resuming the negotiations on January 6 the situation was little
changed. Kühlmann's position was at any rate somewhat firmer than
before, albeit only at the cost of some concessions to the German
military party. In these circumstances the negotiations, in which
Trotski now took part as spokesman for the Russians, led only to
altogether fruitless theoretical discussions and the right of
self-determination, which could not bring about any lessening of the
distance between the two firmly maintained points of view. In order to
get the proceedings out of this deadlock further endeavours were made
on the part of Austria to arrive at a compromise between the German
and Russian standpoints, the more so as it was generally, and
especially in the case of Poland, desirable to solve the territorial
question on the basis of complete self-determination. Our proposals to
the German delegates were to the effect that the Russian standpoint
should so far be met as to allow the plebiscite demanded by the
Russians, this to be taken, as the Germans insisted should be the
case, during the German occupation, but with extensive guarantees for
free expression of the will of the people. On this point we had long
discussions with the German delegates, based on detailed drafts
prepared by us.

Our endeavours here, however, were again unsuccessful. Circumstances
arising at the time in our own country were responsible for this, as
also for the result of the negotiations which had in the meantime been
commenced with the Ukrainian delegates. These last had, at the first
discussion, declined to treat with any Polish representatives, and
demanded the concession of the entire Cholm territory, and, in a more
guarded fashion, the cession of Eastern Galicia and the Ukrainian part
of North-Eastern Hungary, and in consequence of which the negotiations
were on the point of being broken off. At this stage a food crisis
broke out in Austria to an extent of which the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs was hitherto unaware, threatening Vienna in particular with
the danger of being in a few days devoid of flour altogether. Almost
immediately after this came a strike movement of threatening
proportions. These events at home weakened the position of the Foreign
Minister both as regards his attitude towards the German Allies and
towards the opposing parties in the negotiations--with both of which
he was then in conflict--and this, at a most critical moment, to a
degree that can hardly be appreciated from a distance. He was required
to exert pressure upon Germany, and was now forced, not merely to ask,
but to entreat Germany's aid in sending supplies of food, or Vienna
would within a few days be in the throes of a catastrophe. With the
enemy, on the other hand, he was forced, owing to the situation at
home, to strive for a settlement of peace that should be favourable to
Austria, in spite of the fact that our food situation and our labour
troubles were well known to that enemy.

This complete alteration of the position changed the whole basis and
tactics of the Foreign Minister's proceedings. He had to obtain the
supplies of grain asked for from Germany and thus to diminish
political pressure on that country; but at the same time he had to
persuade the Soviet delegates to continue negotiations, and finally to
arrive at a settlement of peace under the most acceptable conditions
possible with the Ukraine, which would put an end to the still serious
difficulties of the food situation.

In these circumstances it was impossible now to work on the German
delegates by talking of Austria-Hungary's concluding a separate peace
with Russia, as this would have imperilled the chance of food supplies
from Germany--the more so as the representative of the German Army
Command had declared that it was immaterial whether Austria-Hungary
made peace or not. Germany would in any case march on Petersburg if
the Russian Government did not give way. On the other hand, however,
the Foreign Minister prevailed on the leader of the Russian delegation
to postpone the carrying out of the intentions of his Government--to
the effect that the Russian delegation, owing to lack of good faith on
the part of German-Austro-Hungarian negotiators, should be recalled.

At the same time the negotiations with the Ukrainian delegation were
continued. By means of lengthy and wearisome conferences we succeeded
in bringing their demands to a footing which might just possibly be
acceptable, and gaining their agreement to a clause whereby Ukraine
undertook to deliver at least 1,000,000 tons of grain by August, 1918.
As to the demand for the Cholm territory, which we had wished to have
relegated to the negotiations with Poland, the Ukrainian delegates
refused to give way on this point, and were evidently supported by
General Hoffmann. Altogether the German military party seemed much
inclined to support Ukrainian demands and extremely indisposed to
accede to Polish claims, so that we were unable to obtain the
admission of Polish representatives to the proceedings, though we had
frequently asked for this. A further difficulty in the way of this was
the fact that Trotski himself was unwilling to recognise the Polish
party as having equal rights here. The only result obtainable was that
the Ukrainians should restrict their claims on the Cholm territory to
those parts inhabited by Ukrainian majority and accept a revision of
the frontier line, as yet only roughly laid down, according to the
finding of a mixed commission and the wishes of the population, i.e.
the principle of national boundaries under international protection.
The Ukrainian delegates renounced all territorial claims against the
Monarchy, but demanded from us on the other hand a guarantee as to the
autonomous development of their co-nationals in Galicia. With regard
to these two weighty concessions, the Foreign Minister declared that
they could only be granted on the condition that the Ukraine fulfilled
the obligation it had undertaken as to delivery of grain, the
deliveries being made at the appointed times; he further demanded that
the obligations on both sides should be reciprocal, i.e. that the
failure of one party to comply therewith should release the other.
The formulation of these points, which met with the greatest
difficulties on the part of Ukraine, was postponed to a later date.

At this stage of the proceedings a new pause occurred to give the
separate delegates time to advise their Governments as to the results
hitherto attained and receive their final instructions. The Foreign
Minister returned to Vienna and reported the state of the negotiations
to the proper quarters. In the course of these deliberations his
policy of concluding peace with Russia and Ukraine on the basis of the
concessions proposed was agreed to. Another question dealt with at the
same time was whether the Monarchy should, in case of extreme
necessity, conclude a separate peace with Russia if the negotiations
with that state should threaten to come to nothing on account of
Germany's demands. This question was, after full consideration of all
grounds to the contrary, answered _in thesi_ in the affirmative, as
the state of affairs at home apparently left no alternative.

On resuming the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk further endeavours were
made to persuade Germany to give way somewhat by pointing out what
would be the consequence of its obstinate attitude. In the course of
the deliberations on this point with Herr Kühlmann we succeeded after
great difficulty in obtaining the agreement of the German delegates to
a final attempt at compromise, to be undertaken by the Foreign
Minister. The proposals for this compromise were based on the
following considerations:

For months past conflicting views had been expressed as to:

1. Whether in the territories where constitutional alterations were to
be made owing to the war the right of self-determination should be
taken as already exercised, or whether a plebiscite should be taken
first;

2. Whether such plebiscite, if taken, should be addressed to a
constituent body or in the form of a referendum to the people direct;

3. Whether this should be done before or after evacuation; and

4. In what manner it was to be organised (by general franchise, by a
vote of the nobles, etc.). It would be advisable, and would also be in
accordance with the principles adopted by Russia, to leave the
decision on all these points to the people themselves, and deliver
them over to the "temporary self-administrative body," which should,
also according to the Russian proposal (Kameneff), be introduced at
once. The whole of the peace negotiations could then be concentrated
upon a single point: the question as to the composition of this
temporary body. Here, however, a compromise could be arrived at, as
Russia could agree that the already existent bodies set in the
foreground by Germany should be allowed to express a part of the will
of the people, Germany agreeing that these bodies should, during the
occupation, be supplemented by elements appointed, according to the
Russian principles, by free election.

On February 7, immediately after Herr Kühlmann had agreed to mediation
on this basis, the Foreign Minister saw the leader of the Russian
delegation, Trotski, and had a series of conversations with him. The
idea of compromise on the lines just set forth was little to Trotski's
taste, and he declared that he would in any case protest against the
handling of the self-determination question by the Four Powers. On the
other hand, the discussion did lead to some result, in that a new
basis for disposing of the difficulties which had arisen was now
found. There was to be no further continuance of the conflict as to
whether the territorial alterations involved by the peace should be
termed "annexations," as the Russian delegates wished, or "exercise of
the right of self-determination," as Germany wished; the territorial
alterations were to be simply noted in the peace treaty ("Russia notes
that ..."). Trotski, however, made his acquiescence to the conclusion
of such a compact subject to two conditions: one being that the Moon
Sound Islands and the Baltic ports should remain with Russia; the
other that Germany and Austria-Hungary should not conclude any
separate peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic, whose Government
was then seriously threatened by the Bolsheviks and, according to some
reports, already overthrown by them. The Foreign Minister was now
anxious to arrive at a compromise on this question also, in which he
had to a certain degree the support of Herr von Kühlmann, while
General Hoffmann most vehemently opposed any further concession.

All these negotiations for a compromise failed to achieve their end
owing to the fact that Herr Kühlmann was forced by the German Supreme
Army Command to act promptly. Ludendorff declared that the
negotiations with Russia must be concluded within three days, and when
a telegram from Petersburg was picked up in Berlin calling on the
German Army to rise in revolt Herr von Kühlmann was strictly ordered
not to be content with the cessions already agreed to, but to demand
the further cession of the unoccupied territories of Livonia and
Esthonia. Under such pressure the leader of the German delegation had
not the power to compromise. We then arrived at the signing of the
treaty with Ukraine, which had, after much trouble, been brought to an
end meanwhile. It thus appeared as if the efforts of the Foreign
Minister had proved fruitless. Nevertheless he continued his
discussions with Trotski, but these still led to no result, owing to
the fact that Trotski, despite repeated questioning, persisted in
leaving everything vague till the last moment as to whether he would,
in the present circumstances, conclude any peace with the Four Powers
at all or not. Not until the plenary session of February 10 was this
cleared up; Russia declared for a cessation of hostilities, but signed
no treaty of peace.

The situation created by this declaration offered no occasion for
further taking up the idea of a separate peace with Russia, since
peace seemed to have come _via facta_ already. At a meeting on
February 10 of the diplomatic and military delegates of Germany and
Austria-Hungary to discuss the question of what was now to be done it
was agreed unanimously, save for a single dissentient, that the
situation arising out of Trotski's declarations must be accepted. The
one dissentient vote--that of General Hoffmann--was to the effect that
Trotski's statement should be answered by declaring the Armistice at
an end, marching on Petersburg, and supporting the Ukraine openly
against Russia. In the ceremonial final sitting, on February 11, Herr
von Kühlmann adopted the attitude expressed by the majority of the
peace delegations, and set forth the same in a most impressive speech.
Nevertheless, a few days later, as General Hoffmann had said, Germany
declared the Armistice at an end, ordered the German troops to march
on Petersburg, and brought about the situation which led to the
signing of the peace treaty. Austria-Hungary declared that we took no
part in this action.

6

=Report of the Peace Negotiations at Bucharest=

The possibility of entering upon peace negotiations with Roumania was
considered as soon as negotiations with the Russian delegations at
Brest-Litovsk had commenced. In order to prevent Roumania itself from
taking part in these negotiations Germany gave the Roumanian
Government to understand that it would not treat with the present King
and the present Government at all. This step, however, was only
intended to enable separate negotiations to be entered upon with
Roumania, as Germany feared that the participation of Roumania in the
Brest negotiations would imperil the chances of peace. Roumania's idea
seemed then to be to carry on the war and gain the upper hand. At the
end of January, therefore, Austria-Hungary took the initiative in
order to bring about negotiations with Roumania. The Emperor sent
Colonel Randa, the former Military Attaché to the Roumanian
Government, to the King of Roumania, assuring him of his willingness
to grant Roumania honourable terms of peace.

In connection with the peace negotiations a demand was raised in
Hungarian quarters for a rectification of the frontier line, so as to
prevent, or at any rate render difficult, any repetition of the
invasion by Roumania in 1916 over the Siebenbürgen, despite opposition
on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The strategical
frontier drawn up by the Army Command, which, by the way, was
influenced by considerations not conducive to peace, followed a line
involving the cession to Hungary of Turnu-Severin, Sinaia and several
valuable petroleum districts in Moldavia. Public opinion in Hungary
voiced even further demands. The Hungarian Government was of opinion
that the Parliament would offer the greatest hindrances to any peace
not complying with the general desire in this respect, and leading
Hungarian statesmen, even some among the Opposition parties, declared
the rectification of the frontier to be a condition of peace _sine qua
non_. Wekerle and Tisza in particular took this view. Despite this
serious difference of opinion, the Foreign Minister, in entire
agreement with the Emperor, even before the commencement of the
negotiations in the middle of February, took up the position that
demands connected with the frontier line should not offer any obstacle
to the conclusion of peace. The rectification of the frontier should
only seriously be insisted on as far as could be done on the basis of
a loyal and, for the future, amicable relations with Roumania. Hungary
regarded this lenient attitude on the part of the Foreign Minister
with increasing disapproval. We pointed out that a frontier line
conceding cities and petroleum districts to Hungary would be
unfortunate in every respect. From the point of view of internal
politics, because the number of non-Hungarian inhabitants would be
thereby increased; from the military point of view, because it would
give rise to frontier conflicts with unreliable Roumanian factions;
and, finally, from the point of view of foreign policy, because it
would mean annexations and the transference of population this way and
that, rendering friendly relations with Roumania an impossibility.
Nevertheless, it would be necessary for a time to hold fast by the
frontier line as originally conceived, so that the point could be used
to bring about the establishment in Roumania of a régime amicably
disposed toward the Central Powers. The Foreign Minister was
particularly anxious to see a Marghiloman Cabinet formed, inaugurating
a policy friendly to ourselves. He believed that with such a Cabinet
it would be easier to arrive at a peace of mutual understanding, and
was also resolved to render possible such a peace by extensive
concessions, especially by giving his diplomatic support in the
Bessarabian question. He informed Marghiloman also in writing that he
would be prepared to grant important concessions to a Cabinet of which
he, Marghiloman, was the head, in particular as regards the cession of
inhabited places such as Turnu-Severin and Ocna, on which points he
was willing to give way. When the Marghiloman Cabinet was formed the
Austro-Hungarian demands in respect of the frontier line would,
despite active opposition on the part of the Hungarian Government, be
reduced almost by half. The negotiations with Roumania were
particularly difficult in regard to the question of two places, Azuga
and Busteni. On March 24 Count Czernin prepared to terminate these
negotiations, declaring that he was ready to renounce all claim to
Azuga and Busteni and halve his demands as to the much-debated Lotru
district, provided Marghiloman were willing to arrange the frontier
question on this basis. Marghiloman declared himself satisfied with
this compromise. On the next day, however, it was nevertheless
rejected by the Hungarian Government, and not until after further
telegraphic communication with the Emperor and Wekerle was the assent
of all competent authorities obtained. This had, indeed, been widely
considered in Hungarian circles as an impossibility.

Another Austro-Hungarian demand which played some part in the
Bucharest negotiations was in connection with the plan of an
economical alliance between Austria-Hungary and Roumania. This was of
especial interest to the Austrian Government, whereas the frontier
question, albeit in some degree affecting Austria as well, was a
matter of indifference to this Government, which, as a matter of fact,
did not sympathise with the demands at all. The plan for an economical
alliance, however, met with opposition in Hungary. Immediately before
the commencement of the Bucharest negotiations an attempt was made to
overcome this opposition on the part of the Hungarian Government and
secure its adherence to the idea of an economical alliance with
Roumania--at any rate, conditionally upon the conclusion of a customs
alliance with Germany as planned. It proved impossible, however, at
the time to obtain this assent. The Hungarian Government reserved the
right of considering the question later on, and on March 8 instructed
their representatives at Bucharest that they must dissent from the
plan, as the future economical alliance with Germany was a matter
beyond present consideration. Consequently this question could play no
part at first in the peace negotiations, and all that could be done
was to sound the leading Roumanian personages in a purely private
manner as to the attitude they would adopt towards such a proposal.
The idea was, generally speaking, well received by Roumania, and the
prevalent opinion was that such an alliance would be distinctly
advisable from Roumania's point of view. A further attempt was
therefore made, during the pause in the peace negotiations in the
East, to overcome the opposition of the Hungarian Government; these
deliberations were, however, not concluded when the Minister for
Foreign Affairs resigned his office.

Germany had, even before the commencement of negotiations in
Bucharest, considered the question of imposing on Roumania, when
treating for peace, a series of obligations especially in connection
with the economical relations amounting to a kind of indirect war
indemnity. It was also contemplated that the occupation of Wallachia
should be maintained for five or six years after the conclusion of
peace. Roumania should then give up its petroleum districts, its
railways, harbours and domains to German companies as their property,
and submit itself to a permanent financial control. Austria-Hungary
opposed these demands from the first on the grounds that no friendly
relations could ever be expected to exist with a Roumania which had
been economically plundered to such a complete extent; and
Austria-Hungary was obliged to maintain amicable relations with
Roumania.

This standpoint was most emphatically set forth, and not without some
success, on February 5 at a conference with the Reichskansler. In the
middle of February the Emperor sent a personal message to the German
Emperor cautioning him against this plan, which might prove an obstacle
in the way of peace. Roumania was not advised of these demands until
comparatively late in the negotiations, after the appointment of
Marghiloman. Until then the questions involved gave rise to constant
discussion between Germany and Austria-Hungary, the latter throughout
endeavouring to reduce the German demands, not only with a view to
arriving at a peace of mutual understanding, but also because, if
Germany gained a footing in Roumania on the terms originally
contemplated, Austro-Hungarian economical interests must inevitably
suffer thereby. The demands originally formulated with regard to the
Roumanian railways and domains were then relinquished by Germany, and
the plan of a cession of the Roumanian harbours was altered so as to
amount to the establishment of a Roumanian-German-Austro-Hungarian
harbour company, which, however, eventually came to nothing. The
petroleum question, too, was reduced from a cession to a ninety years'
tenure of the state petroleum districts and the formation of a
monopoly trading company for petroleum under German management.
Finally, an economic arrangement was prepared which should secure the
agricultural products of Roumania to the Central Powers for a series of
years. The idea of a permanent German control of the Roumanian finances
was also relinquished owing to Austro-Hungarian opposition. The
negotiations with Marghiloman and his representatives on these
questions made a very lengthy business. In the economic questions
especially there was great difference of opinion on the subject of
prices, which was not disposed of until the last moment before the
drawing up of the treaty on March 28, and then only by adopting the
Roumanian standpoint. On the petroleum question, where the differences
were particularly acute, agreement was finally arrived at, in face of
the extreme views of the German economical representative on the one
hand and the Roumanian Foreign Minister, Arion, on the other, by a
compromise, according to which further negotiations were to be held in
particular with regard to the trade monopoly for petroleum, and the
original draft was only to apply when such negotiations failed to lead
to any result.

The German demands as to extension of the period of occupation for
five to six years after the general peace likewise played a great part
at several stages of the negotiations, and were from the first stoutly
opposed by Austria-Hungary. We endeavoured to bring about an
arrangement by which, on the conclusion of peace, Roumania should have
all legislative and executive power restored, being subject only to a
certain right of control in respect of a limited number of points, but
not beyond the general peace. In support of this proposal the Foreign
Minister pointed out in particular that the establishment of a
Roumanian Ministry amicably disposed towards ourselves would be an
impossibility (the Averescu Ministry was then still in power) if we
were to hold Roumania permanently under our yoke. We should far rather
use every endeavour to obtain what could be obtained from Roumania
through the medium of such politicians in that country as were
disposed to follow a policy of friendly relations with the Central
Powers. The main object of our policy to get such men into power in
Roumania, and enable them to remain in the Government, would be
rendered unattainable if too severe measures were adopted. We might
gain something thereby for a few years, but it would mean losing
everything in the future. And we succeeded also in convincing the
German Secretary of State, Kühlmann, of the inadvisability of the
demands in respect of occupation, which were particularly voiced by
the German Army Council. As a matter of fact, after the retirement of
Averescu, Marghiloman declared that these demands would make it
impossible for him to form a Cabinet at all. And when he had been
informed, from German sources, that the German Supreme Army Command
insisted on these terms, he only agreed to form a Cabinet on the
assurance of the Austrian Foreign Minister that a solution of the
occupation problem would be found. In this question also we did
ultimately succeed in coming to agreement with Roumania.

One of the decisive points in the conclusion of peace with Roumania
was, finally, the cession of the Dobrudsha, on which Bulgaria insisted
with such violence that it was impossible to avoid it. The ultimatum
which preceded the preliminary Treaty of Buftea had also to be altered
chiefly on the Dobrudsha question, as Bulgaria was already talking of
the ingratitude of the Central Powers, of how Bulgaria had been
disillusioned, and of the evil effects this disillusionment would have
on the subsequent conduct of the war. All that Count Czernin could do
was to obtain a guarantee that Roumania, in case of cession of the
Dobrudsha, should at least be granted a sure way to the harbour of
Kustendje. In the main the Dobrudsha question was decided at Buftea.
When, later, Bulgaria expressed a desire to interpret the wording of
the preliminary treaty by which the Dobrudsha "as far as the Danube"
was to be given up in such a sense as to embrace the whole of the
territory up to the northernmost branch (the Kilia branch) of the
Danube, this demand was most emphatically opposed both by Germany and
Austria-Hungary, and it was distinctly laid down in the peace treaty
that only the Dobrudsha as far as the St. George's branch was to be
ceded. This decision again led to bad feeling in Bulgaria, but was
unavoidable, as further demands here would probably have upset the
preliminary peace again.

The proceedings had reached this stage when Count Czernin resigned his
office.

7

=Wilson's Fourteen Points=

I. Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall
be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy
shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial
waters alike in peace and in war except as the seas may be closed in
whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of
international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the
establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations
consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its
maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will
be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all
colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle that
in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the
populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims
of the Government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory, and such a settlement of
all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest
co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an
unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent
determination of her own political development and national policy,
and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations
under institutions of her own choosing; and more than a welcome
assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself
desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the
months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their
comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests,
and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and
restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys
in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve
as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws
which they have themselves set and determined for the government of
their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole
structure and validity of international law is for ever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed, and the invaded portions
restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the
matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world
for nearly 50 years, should be righted in order that peace may once
more be made secure in the interests of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along
clearly recognisable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we
wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the first
opportunity of autonomous development.

XI. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated, occupied
territories restored, Serbia accorded free and secure access to the
sea, and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another
determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of
allegiance and nationality, and international guarantees of the
political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the
several Balkan States should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be
assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are
now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life
and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development,
and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to
the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish State should be erected which should
include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations,
which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose
political and economic independence and territorial integrity should
be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific
covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political
independence and territorial integrity to great and small States
alike.

8

=Ottokar Czernin on Austria's Policy During the War=

_Speech delivered December 11, 1918_

GENTLEMEN,--In rising now to speak of our policy during the war it is
my hope that I may thereby help to bring the truth to light. We are
living in a time of excitement. After four years of war, the bloodiest
and most determined war the world has ever seen, and in the midst of
the greatest revolution ever known, this excitement is only too easily
understood. But the result of this excitement is that all those rumours
which go flying about, mingling truth and falsehood together, end by
misleading the public. It is unquestionably necessary to arrive at a
clear understanding. The public has a right to know what has really
happened, it has the right to know why we did not succeed in attaining
the peace we had so longed for, it has a right to know whether, and if
so where, any neglect can be pointed out, or whether it was the
overwhelming power of circumstances which has led our policy to take
the course it did. The new arrangement of relations between ourselves
and Germany will make an end of all secret proceedings. The day will
come then when, fortunately, all that has hitherto been hidden will be
made clear. As, however, I do not know when all this will be made
public, I am grateful for the opportunity of lifting the veil to-day
from certain hitherto unknown events. In treating of this theme I will
refrain from touching upon those constitutional factors which once
counted for so much, but which do so no longer. I do so because it
seems to me unfair to import into the discussion persons who are now
paying heavily for what they may have done and who are unable to defend
themselves. And I must pay this honourable tribute to the
Austro-Hungarian Press, that it has on the whole sought to spare the
former Emperor as far as possible. There are, of course,
exceptions--_exceptiones firmant regulam_. There are in Vienna, as
everywhere else, men who find it more agreeable to attack, the less if
those whom they are attacking are able to defend themselves. But,
believe me, gentlemen, those who think thus are not the bravest, not
the best, nor the most reliable; and we may be glad that they form so
insignificant a minority.

But, to come to the point. Before passing on to a consideration of the
various phases of the work for peace, I should like to point out two
things: firstly, that since the entry of Italy and Roumania into the
war, and especially since the entry of America, a "victorious peace"
on our part has been a Utopian idea, a Utopia which, unfortunately,
was throughout cherished by the German military party; and, secondly,
that we have never received any offer of peace from the Entente. On
several occasions peace feelers were put forward between
representatives of the Entente and our own; unfortunately, however,
these never led to any concrete conditions. We often had the
impression that we might conclude a separate peace without Germany,
but we were never told the concrete conditions upon which Germany, on
its part, could make peace; and, in particular, we were never informed
that Germany would be allowed to retain its possessions as before the
war, in consequence of which we were left in the position of having to
fight a war of defence for Germany. We were compelled by our treaty to
a common defence of the pre-war possessions, and since the Entente
never declared its willingness to treat with a Germany which wished
for no annexations, since the Entente constantly declared its
intention of annihilating Germany, we were forced to defend Germany,
and our position in Berlin was rendered unspeakably more difficult.
We ourselves, also, were never given any assurance that we should be
allowed to retain our former possessions; but in our case the desire
for peace was so strong that we would have made territorial
concessions if we had been able thereby to secure general peace. This,
however, was not the case. Take Italy, for instance, which was
primarily at war with ourselves and not with Germany. If we had
offered Italy concessions however great, if we had offered all that
Italy has now taken possession of, even then it could not have made
peace, being bound by duty to its Allies and by circumstances not to
make peace until England and France made peace with Germany.

When, then, peace by sacrifice was the only peace attainable,
obviously, as a matter of principle, there were two ways of reaching
that end. One, a general peace, i.e. including Germany, and the other,
a separate peace. Of the overwhelming difficulties attending the
former course I will speak later; at present a few words on the
question of separate peace.

I myself would never have made a separate peace. I have never, not
even in the hour of disillusionment--I may say of despair at my
inability to lead the policy of Berlin into wiser channels--even in
such hours, I say, I have never forgotten that our alliance with the
German Empire was no ordinary alliance, no such alliance as may be
contracted by two Emperors or two Governments, and can easily be
broken, but an alliance of blood, a blood-brotherhood between the ten
million Austro-Germans and the seventy million of the Empire, which
could not be broken. And I have never forgotten that the military
party in power at that time in Germany were not the German people, and
that we had allied ourselves with the German people, and not with a
few leading men. But I will not deny that in the moments when I saw my
policy could not be realised I did ventilate the idea of suggesting to
the Emperor the appointment, in my stead, of one of those men who saw
salvation in a separation from Germany. But again and again I
relinquished this idea, being firmly convinced that separate peace was
a sheer impossibility. The Monarchy lay like a great block between
Germany and the Balkans. Germany had great masses of troops there from
which it could not be cut off, it was procuring oil and grain from the
Balkans; if we were to interpose between it and the Balkans we should
be striking at its most sensitive vital nerve. Moreover, the Entente
would naturally have demanded first of all that we joined in the
blockade, and finally our secession would automatically have involved
also that of Bulgaria and Turkey. Had we withdrawn, Germany would have
been unable to carry on the war. In such a situation there can be no
possibility of doubt but that the German Army Command would have flung
several divisions against Bohemia and the Tyrol, meting out to us the
same fate which had previously befallen Roumania. The Monarchy,
Bohemia in particular, would at once have become a scene of war. But
even this is not all. Internally, such a step would at once have led
to civil war. The Germans of Austria would never have turned against
their brothers, and the Hungarians--Tisza's Hungarians--would never
have lent their aid to such a policy. _We had begun the war in common,
and we could not end it save in common._ For us there was no way out
of the war; we could only choose between fighting with Germany against
the Entente, or fighting with the Entente against Germany until
Germany herself gave way. A slight foretaste of what would have
happened was given us through the separatist steps taken by Andrassy
at the last moment. This utterly defeated, already annihilated and
prostrate Germany had yet the power to fling troops toward the Tyrol,
and had not the revolution overwhelmed all Germany like a
conflagration, smothering the war itself, I am not sure but that the
Tyrol might at the last moment have been harried by war. And,
gentlemen, I have more to say. The experiment of separate peace would
not only have involved us in a civil war, not only brought the war
into our own country, but even then the final outcome would have been
much the same. The dissolution of the Monarchy into its component
national parts was postulated throughout by the Entente. I need only
refer to the Conference of London. But whether the State be dissolved
by way of reward to the people or by way of punishment to the State
makes little difference; the effect is the same. In this case also a
"German Austria" would have arisen, and in such a development it would
have been hard for the German-Austrian people to take up an attitude
which rendered them allies of the Entente. In my own case, as Minister
of the Imperial and Royal Government, it was my duty also to consider
dynastic interests, and I never lost sight of that obligation. But I
believe that in this respect also the end would have been the same. In
particular the dissolution of the Monarchy into its national elements
by legal means, against the opposition of the Germans and Hungarians,
would have been a complete impossibility. And the Germans in Austria
would never have forgiven the Crown if it had entered upon a war with
Germany; the Emperor would have been constantly encountering the
powerful Republican tendencies of the Czechs, and he would have been
in constant conflict with the King of Serbia over the South-Slav
question, an ally being naturally nearer to the Entente than the
Habsburgers. And, finally, the Hungarians would never have forgiven
the Emperor if he had freely conceded extensive territories to Bohemia
and to the South-Slav state; I believe, then, that in this confusion
the Crown would have fallen, as it has done in fact. _A separate peace
was a sheer impossibility._ There remained the second way: to make
peace jointly with Germany. Before going into the difficulties which
rendered this way impossible I must briefly point out wherein lay our
great dependence upon Germany. First of all, in military respects.
Again and again we were forced to rely on aid from Germany. In
Roumania, in Italy, in Serbia, and in Russia we were victorious with
the Germans beside us. We were in the position of a poor relation
living by the grace of a rich kinsman. But it is impossible to play
the mendicant and the political adviser at the same time, particularly
when the other party is a Prussian officer. In the second place, we
were dependent upon Germany owing to the state of our food supply.
Again and again we were here also forced to beg for help from Germany,
because the complete disorganisation of our own administration had
brought us to the most desperate straits. We were forced to this by
the hunger blockade established, on the one hand, by Hungary, and on
the other by the official authorities and their central depots. I
remember how, when I myself was in the midst of a violent conflict
with the German delegates at Brest-Litovsk, I received orders from
Vienna to bow the knee to Berlin and beg for food. You can imagine,
gentlemen, for yourselves how such a state of things must weaken a
Minister's hands. And, thirdly, our dependence was due to the state of
our finances. In order to keep up our credit we were drawing a hundred
million marks a month from Germany, a sum which during the course of
the war has grown to over four milliards; and this money was as
urgently needed as were the German divisions and the German bread.
And, despite this position of dependence, the only way to arrive at
peace was by leading Germany into our own political course; that is to
say, persuading Germany to conclude a peace involving sacrifice. _The
situation all through was simply this: that any momentary military
success might enable us to propose terms of peace which, while
entailing considerable loss to ourselves, had just a chance of being
accepted by the enemy._ The German military party, on the other hand,
increased their demands with every victory, and it was more hopeless
than ever, after their great successes, to persuade them to adopt a
policy of renunciation. I think, by the way, that there was a single
moment in the history of this war when such an action would have had
some prospect of success. I refer to the famous battle of Görlitz.
Then, with the Russian army in flight, the Russian forts falling like
houses of cards, many among our enemies changed their point of view.
I was at that time still our representative in Roumania. Majorescu was
then not disinclined to side with us actively, and the Roumanian army
moved forward toward Bessarabia, could have been hot on the heels of
the flying Russians, and might, according to all human calculations,
have brought about a complete débâcle. It is not unlikely that the
collapse which later took place in Russia might have come about then,
and after a success of that nature, with no "America" as yet on the
horizon, we might perhaps have brought the war to an end. Two things,
however, were required: in the first place, the Roumanians demanded,
as the price of their co-operation, a rectification of the Hungarian
frontier, and this first condition was flatly refused by Hungary; the
second condition, which naturally then did not come into question at
all, would have been that we should even then, after such a success,
have proved strong enough to bear a peace with sacrifice. We were not
called upon to agree to this, but the second requirement would
undoubtedly have been refused by Germany, just as the first had been
by Hungary. I do not positively assert that peace would have been
possible in this or any other case, but I do positively maintain that
during my period of office _such a peace by sacrifice was the utmost
we and Germany could have attained_. The future will show what
superhuman efforts we have made to induce Germany to give way. That
all proved fruitless was not the fault of the German people, nor was
it, in my opinion, the fault of the German Emperor, but that of the
leaders of the German military party, which had attained such enormous
power in the country. Everyone in Wilhelmstrasse, from Bethmann to
Kühlmann, wanted peace; but they could not get it simply because the
military party got rid of everyone who ventured to act otherwise than
as they wished. This also applies to Bethmann and Kühlmann. The
Pan-Germanists, under the leadership of the military party, could not
understand that it was possible to die through being victorious, that
victories are worthless when they do not lead to peace, that
territories held in an iron grasp as "security" are valueless
securities as long as the opposing party cannot be forced to redeem
them. There were various shades of this Pan-Germanism. One section
demanded the annexation of parts of Belgium and France, with an
indemnity of milliards; others were less exorbitant, but all were
agreed that peace could only be concluded with an extension of German
possessions. It was the easiest thing in the world to get on well with
the German military party so long as one believed in their fantastic
ideas and took a victorious peace for granted, dividing up the world
thereafter at will. But if anyone attempted to look at things from
the point of view of the real situation, and ventured to reckon with
the possibility of a less satisfactory termination of the war, the
obstacles then encountered were not easily surmounted. We all of us
remember those speeches in which constant reference was always made to
a "stern peace," a "German peace," a "victorious peace." For us, then,
the possibility of a more favourable peace--I mean a peace based on
mutual understanding--I have never believed in the possibility of a
victorious peace--would only have been acute in the case of Poland and
the Austro-Polish question. But I cannot sufficiently emphasise the
fact that the Austro-Polish solution never was an obstacle in the way
of peace and could never have been so. There was only the idea that
Austrian Poland and the former Russian Poland might be united and
attached to the Monarchy. It was never suggested that such a step
should be enforced against the will of Poland itself or against the
will of the Entente. There was a time when it looked as if not only
Poland but also certain sections among the Entente were not
disinclined to agree to such a solution.

But to return to the German military party. This had attained a degree
of power in the State rarely equalled in history, and the rarity of
the phenomenon was only exceeded by the suddenness of its terrible
collapse. The most striking personality in this group was General
Ludendorff. Ludendorff was a great man, a man of genius, in
conception, a man of indomitable energy and great gifts. But this man
required a political brake, so to speak, a political element in the
Wilhelmstrasse capable of balancing his influence, and this was never
found. It must fairly be admitted that the German generals achieved
the gigantic, and there was a time when they were looked up to by the
people almost as gods. It may be true that all great strategists are
much alike; they look to victory always and to nothing else. Moltke
himself, perhaps, was nothing more, but he had a Bismarck to maintain
equilibrium. We had no such Bismarck, and when all is said and done it
was not the fault of Ludendorff, or it is at any rate an excuse for
him, that he was the only supremely powerful character in the whole of
Germany, and that in consequence the entire policy of the country was
directed into military channels. Ludendorff was a great patriot,
desiring nothing for himself, but seeking only the happiness of his
country; a military genius, a hard man, utterly fearless--and for all
that a misfortune in that he looked at the whole world through Potsdam
glasses, with an altogether erroneous judgment, wrecking every attempt
at peace which was not a peace by victory. Those very people who
worshipped Ludendorff when he spoke of a victorious peace stone him
now for that very thing; Ludendorff was exactly like the statesmen of
England and France, who all rejected compromise and declared for
victory alone; in this respect there was no difference between them.
The peace of mutual understanding which I wished for was rejected on
the Thames and on the Seine just as by Ludendorff himself. I have said
this already. According to the treaty it was our undoubted duty to
carry on a defensive war to the utmost and reciprocally to defend the
integrity of the State. It is therefore perfectly obvious that I could
never publicly express any other view, that I was throughout forced to
declare that we were fighting for Alsace-Lorraine just as we were for
Trentino, that I could not relinquish German territory to the Entente
so long as I lacked the power to persuade Germany herself to such a
step. But, as I will show, the most strenuous endeavours were made in
this latter direction. And I may here in parenthesis remark that our
military men throughout refrained from committing the error of the
German generals, and interfering in politics themselves. It is
undoubtedly to the credit of our Emperor that whenever any tendency to
such interference appeared he quashed it at once. But in particular I
should point out that the Archduke Frederick confined his activity
solely to the task of bringing about peace. He has rendered most
valuable service in this, as also in his endeavours to arrive at
favourable relations with Germany.

Very shortly after taking up office I had some discussions with the
German Government which left those gentlemen perfectly aware of the
serious nature of the situation. In April, 1917--eighteen months
ago--I sent the following report to the Emperor Charles, which he
forwarded to the Emperor William with the remark that he was entirely
of my opinion.

[This report is already printed in these pages. See p. 146.]

This led to a reply from the German Government, dated May 9, again
expressing the utmost confidence in the success of the submarine
campaign, declaring, it is true, their willingness in principle to
take steps towards peace, but reprehending any such steps as might be
calculated to give an impression of weakness.

As to any territorial sacrifice on the part of Germany, this was not
to be thought of.

As will be seen from this report, however, we did not confine
ourselves to words alone. In 1917 we declared in Berlin that the
Emperor Charles was prepared to permit the union of Galicia with
Poland, and to do all that could be done to attach that State to
Germany in the event of Germany making any sacrifices in the West in
order to secure peace. But we were met with a _non possumus_ and the
German answer that territorial concessions to France were out of the
question.

The whole of Galicia was here involved, but I was firmly assured that
if the plan succeeded Germany would protect the rights of the Ukraine;
and consideration for the Ukrainians would certainly not have
restrained me had it been a question of the highest value--of peace
itself.

When I perceived that the likelihood of converting Berlin to our views
steadily diminished I had recourse to other means. The journey of the
Socialist leaders to Stockholm will be remembered. It is true that the
Socialists were not "sent" by me; they went to Stockholm of their own
initiative and on their own responsibility, but it is none the less
true that I could have refused them their passes if I had shared the
views of the Entente Governments and of numerous gentlemen in our own
country. Certainly, I was at the time very sceptical as to the
outcome, as I already saw that the Entente would refuse passes to
their Socialists, and consequently there could be nothing but a "rump"
parliament in the end. But despite all the reproaches which I had to
bear, and the argument that the peace-bringing Socialists would have
an enormous power in the State to the detriment of the monarchical
principle itself, I never for a moment hesitated to take that step,
and I have never regretted it in itself, only that it did not succeed.
It is encouraging to me now to read again many of the letters then
received criticising most brutally my so-called "Socialistic
proceedings" and to find that the same gentlemen who were then so
incensed at my policy are now adherents of a line of criticism which
maintains that I am too "narrow-minded" in my choice of new means
towards peace.

It will be remembered how, in the early autumn of 1917, the majority
of the German Reichstag had a hard fight against the numerically
weaker but, from their relation to the German Army Command, extremely
powerful minority on the question of the reply to the Papal Note. Here
again I was no idle spectator. One of my friends, at my instigation,
had several conversations with Südekum and Erzberger, and encouraged
them, by my description of our own position, to pass the well known
peace resolution. It was owing to this description of the state of
affairs here that the two gentlemen mentioned were enabled to carry
the Reichstag's resolution in favour of a peace by mutual
understanding--the resolution which met with such disdain and scorn
from the Pan-Germans and other elements. I hoped then, for a moment,
to have gained a lasting and powerful alliance in the German Reichstag
against the German military plans of conquest.

And now, gentlemen, I should like to say a few words on the subject of
that unfortunate submarine campaign which was undoubtedly the beginning
of the end, and to set forth the reasons which in this case, as in many
other instances, forced us to adopt tactics not in accordance with our
own convictions. Shortly after my appointment as Minister the idea of
unrestricted submarine warfare began to take form in German minds. The
principal advocate of this plan was Admiral Tirpitz. To the credit of
the former _Reichskansler_, Bethmann-Hollweg, be it said that he was
long opposed to the idea, and used all means and every argument to
dissuade others from adopting so perilous a proceeding. In the end he
was forced to give way, as was the case with all politicians who came
in conflict with the all-powerful military party. Admiral Holtzendorff
came to us at that time, and the question was debated from every point
of view in long conferences lasting for hours. My then ministerial
colleagues, Tisza and Clam, as well as myself were entirely in
agreement with Emperor Charles in rejecting the proposal, and the only
one who then voted unreservedly in favour of it was Admiral Haus. It
should here be noted that the principal German argument at that time
was not the prospect of starving England into submission, but the
suggestion that the Western front could not be held unless the American
munition transports were sunk--that is to say, the case for the
submarine campaign was then based chiefly on a point of _technical
military importance_ and nothing else. I myself earnestly considered
the question then of separating ourselves from Germany on this point;
with the small number of U-boats at our disposal it would have made but
little difference had we on our part refrained. But another point had
here to be considered. If the submarine campaign was to succeed in the
northern waters it must be carried out at the same time in the
Mediterranean. With this latter water unaffected the transports would
have been sent via Italy, France and Dover to England, and the northern
U-boat campaign would have been paralysed. But in order to carry
on submarine war in the Adriatic we should have to give the Germans
access to our bases, such as Pola, Cattaro and Trieste, and by so doing
we were _de facto_ partaking in the submarine campaign ourselves. If we
did not do it, then we were attacking Germany in the rear by hindering
their submarine campaign--that is to say, it would bring us into direct
conflict with Germany. Therefore, albeit sorely against our will, we
agreed, not convinced by argument, but unable to act otherwise.

And now, gentlemen, I hasten to conclude. I have but a few words to
say as to the present. From time to time reports have appeared in the
papers to the effect that certain gentlemen were preparing
disturbances in Switzerland, and I myself have been mentioned as one
of them. I am doubtful whether there is any truth at all in these
reports; as for myself, I have not been outside this country for the
last nine months. As, however, my contradiction on this head itself
appears to have given rise to further misunderstandings, I will give
you my point of view here briefly and, as I hope, clearly enough. I am
most strongly opposed to any attempt at revolt. I am convinced that
any such attempt could only lead to civil war--a thing no one would
wish to see. I am therefore of opinion that the Republican Government
must be maintained untouched until the German-Austrian people as a
whole has taken its decision. But this can only be decided by the
German people. Neither the Republic nor the Monarchy is in itself a
dogma of democracy. The Kingdom of England is as democratic as
republican Switzerland. I know no country where men enjoy so great
freedom as in England. But it is a dogma of democracy that the people
itself must determine in what manner it will be governed, and I
therefore repeat that the final word can only be spoken by the
constitutional representative body. I believe that I am here entirely
at one with the present Government. There are two methods of
ascertaining the will of the people: either each candidate for the
representative body stands for election on a monarchical or a
republican platform, in which case the majority of the body itself
will express the decision; or the question of Monarchy or Republic can
be decided by a plebiscite. It is matter of common knowledge that I
myself have had so serious conflicts with the ex-Kaiser that any
co-operation between us is for all time an impossibility. No one can,
therefore, suspect me of wishing on personal grounds to revert to the
old régime. But I am not one to juggle with the idea of democracy, and
its nature demands that the people itself should decide. I believe
that the majority of German-Austria is against the old régime, and
when it has expressed itself to this effect the furtherance of
democracy is sufficiently assured.

And with this, gentlemen, I have finished what I proposed to set
before you. I vainly endeavoured to make peace together with Germany,
but I was not unsuccessful in my endeavours to save the
German-Austrians from ultimately coming to armed conflict with
Germany. I can say this, and without exaggeration, that I have
defended the German alliance as if it had been my own child, and I do
not know what would have happened had I not done so. Andrassy's "extra
turn" at the last moment showed the great mass of the public how
present a danger was that of war with Germany. Had the same
experiment been made six months before it would have been war with
Germany; would have made Austria a scene of war.

There are evil times in store for the German people, but a people of
many millions cannot perish and will not perish. The day will come
when the wounds of this war begin to close and heal, and when that day
comes a better future will dawn.

The Austrian armies went forth in the hour of war to save Austria.
They have not availed to save it. But if out of this ocean of blood
and suffering a better, freer and nobler world arise, then they will
not have died in vain, all those we loved who now lie buried in cold
alien earth; they died for the happiness, the peace and the future of
the generations to come.

FOOTNOTES:

[11] Translated from the German text given by Count Czernin, no English
text being available.

INDEX

Adler, Dr. Victor, a discussion with, 27
  and the Socialist Congress at Stockholm, 168
  and Trotski, 234, 235

Adrianople, cession of, 268

Aehrenthal, Franz Ferdinand and, 40
  policy of expansion, 5

Air-raids on England, cause of, 16
  their effect, 167

Albania, and the Peace of Bucharest, 6
  Queen Elizabeth of Roumania and, 92

Albrecht von Würtemberg, 39

Alsace-Lorraine, Bethmann on, 74
  cession of, demanded by Entente, 165
  conquest of, a curse to Germany, 15
  Emperor Charles's offer to Germany, 75
  France insists on restoration of, 170
  Germany and, 71, 158, 159

Ambassadors and their duties, 97, 110

America and the U-boat campaign, 116, 119, 120
  enters the war, 17, 148
  rupture with Germany, 127
  shipbuilding programme of, 291
  unpreparedness for war, 122
  (_Cf._ United States)

American Government, Count Czernin's Note to, 279 _et seq._

Andrassy, Count, and Roumanian peace negotiations, 260
  declares a separate peace, 24, 25
  German Nationalist view of his action, 25

Andrian at Nordbahnhof, 219

Anti-Roumanian party and its leader, 77

Arbitration, courts of, 171, 176, 177

Arion, Roumanian Foreign Minister, 322

Armaments, pre-war fever for, 3

Armand-Revertera negotiations, the, 164, 169

Asquith, a warlike speech by, 181

Austria-Hungary, a rejected proposal decides fate of, 2
  and Albania, 6
  and cession of Galicia, 145
  and question of separate peace, 27, 164, 170
  and the U-boat campaign, 124, 125, 149, 334
  ceases to exist, 179
  consequences of a separate peace, 24
  death-blow to Customs dues, 168
  declaration on submarine warfare, 279
  democratic Parliament of, 306
  enemy's secret negotiations for peace, 141, 162
  food troubles and strikes in, 238, 239, 241, 314
  her army merged into German army, 21
  her position before and after the ultimatum, 13
  heroism of her armies, 336
  impossibility of a separate peace for, 19, 21 _et seq._
  maritime trade obstructed by blockade, 280
  mobilisation and its difficulties, 8, 9
  obstinate attitude after Sarajevo tragedy, 8
  parlous position of, in 1917, 188
  peace negotiations with Roumania, 259, 318
  peace terms to, 179
  policy during war, Count Czernin on, 325
  racial problems in, 190
  separatist tactics in, 164
  Social Democracy in, 21, 31
  terms on which she could make peace, 29
  the Archdukes, 22
  views on a "tripartite solution" of Polish question, 201

Austrian Delegation, Count Czernin's speech to, 298 _et seq._

Austrian Government and the Ukrainian question, 242, 245

Austrian Navy, the, Franz Ferdinand and, 50

Austrian Ruthenians, leader of, 247

Austro-Hungarian demands at Bucharest negotiations, 319

Austro-Hungarian army, General Staff of, 22
  inferiority of, 21

Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the, and foreign policy, 134
  peace idea of, 174

Austro-Polish question, the, and the Ukrainian demands, 242
  no bar to peace, 331
  solution of, 200 _et seq._

Avarescu, interview with, 263
  retirement of, 323

=B=

Baernreither, his views of a separate peace, 230

Balkan Wars, the, 6

Balkans, the, troubles in: attitude of German Emperor, 68

_Baralong_ episode, the, 133

Bathurst, Captain, and consumption of breadstuffs, 295
  on an "un-English" system, 296

Bauer, Dr., German-Austrian Secretary of State, 18

Bauer, Herr, houses Trotski's library, 235

Bavarian troops enter into the Tyrol, 27

Belgian neutrality violated by Germany, 14

Belgian question, the, Germany ready for negotiations with England on, 180

Belgium, England's promise to, 14
  German entry into, 14
  Germany's views regarding, 157, 158

Belgium, invasion of, changes England's policy, 2

Benckendorff, Count, at London Conference, 275

Benedict XV, Pope, Austria's answer to peace Note of, 175
  German reply to, 333
  proposals for peace by, 167, 177

Berchtold, Count, and Franz Ferdinand, 43, 44
  and the Roumanian question, 77
  criticised by pro-war party at Vienna, 33
  ultimatum to Serbia, 7
  vacillation of, 10

Berlin, Byzantine atmosphere of, 62, 66
  the English Ambassador demands his passport, 14

Bessarabia, Bolshevism in, 265

Bethmann-Hollweg, and Austria's willingness to cede Galicia, 146
  and the Supreme Military Command, 156
  draws up a peace proposal, 139
  opposes U-boat warfare, 115, 334
  optimistic view of U-boat campaign, 151 _et seq._
  replies to author's _exposé_, 150
  requests Vienna Cabinet to accept negotiations, 8
  visits Western front, 73

Bilinski, Herr von, and the future of Poland, 205

Bismarck, Prince, and the invincibility of the army, 17
  and William II., 52
  dealings with William I., 65
  heritage of, becomes Germany's curse, 15
  his policy of "blood and iron," 15

Bizenko, Madame, murders General Sacharow, 220

Blockade, enemies feeling the grip of, 297
  of Germany, 280
  why established by Great Britain, 281

Bohemia as a possible theatre of war: author's reflections on, 24

Bolsheviks and the Kieff Committee, 245

Bolsheviks, dastardly behaviour of, 249
  destruction wrought in Ukraine, 252
  enter Kieff, 248, 249

Bolshevism, Czernin on, 216, 221
  in Bessarabia, 265
  in Russia, 211, 216, 229
  terrorism of, 226
  the Entente and, 273

Bosnia, as compensation to Austria, 207

Bozen, proposals for cession of, 170, 173

Bratianu, a tactless proceeding by, 112
  apprises author of Sarajevo tragedy, 86
  collapse of, 99
  Ministry of, 88
  on Russia, 263
  reproaches author, 96

"Bread peace," origin of the term, 257

Brest-Litovsk, a dejected Jew at, 225
  a victory for German militarism, 193
  answer to Russian peace proposals, 224
  arrival of Trotski at, 232
  conflict with Ukrainians at, 235
  episode of Roumanian peace, 260
  evacuation of occupied areas: difficulties of, 312
  first peace concluded at, 249
  frontier question, 208
  further Ukrainian representation at, 300
  heated discussions at, 228
  object of negotiations at, 305
  peace negotiations at, 218 _et seq._, 311
  Russians threaten to withdraw from, 227
  territorial questions at, 235, 236, 245
  Ukrainian delegation and their claims, 208, 231, 314

Briand, peace negotiations with, 182

Brinkmann, Major, transmits Petersburg information to German
  delegation, 230

British losses by submarines, 290
  trade, and result of submarine warfare, 291

Bronstein and Bolshevism, 211

_Brotfrieden_ ("Bread peace"), 257

Bucharest, fall of, 99
  report of peace negotiations at, 318
  Zeppelin attacks on, 101 et seq.

Bucharest, Peace of, 6, 82, 100, 258 _et seq._, 270

Budapest, author's address to party leaders at, 174
  demonstrations against Germany in, 233

Buftea, Treaty of, 323

Bulgaria, a dispute with Turkey, 268
  and the Dobrudsha question, 263, 323
  her relations with America, 125
  humiliation of, 6
  negotiations with the Entente, 162, 163, 269
  question of her neutrality, 10
  secession of, 183

Bulgarian representatives at Brest, 223

Bülow, Prince, exposes William II., 54

Burian, Count, 106, 200
  and the division of Galicia, 244
  draws up a peace proposal, 139
  his Red Book on Roumania, 98, 114
  succeeded by author, 114
  visits German headquarters, 210

Busche, von dem, and territorial concessions, 107

=C=

Cachin, his attitude at French Socialist Congress, 214

Cambon, M., attends the London Conference, 275

Capelle and U-boats, 132

Carmen Sylva (_see_ Elizabeth, Queen of Roumania)

Carol, King, a fulfilled prophecy of, 88
  and Serbia, 12
  last days of, 90
  peculiar policy of Government of, 81
  tactfulness of, 79
  Tsar's visit to, 88
  urges acceptance of ultimatum, 90
  visited by Franz Ferdinand, 79

Carp, 82, 87, 94

Catarau, and the crime at Debruzin, 89

Central-European question, the, 209
  the terror of the Entente, 172

Central Powers and the Bratianu Ministry, 97
  enemy blockade of, 132
  favourable news in 1917, 143
  why they adopted submarine warfare, 281 _et seq._

Charles VIII., Emperor, and Franz Ferdinand, 41
  and problem of nationality, 192
  and the principle of ministerial responsibility, 56
  and the Ukrainian question, 244
  apprised by author of critical condition of food supply, 237, 239
  cautions the Kaiser, 321
  communicates with King Ferdinand on Roumanian peace, 260
  confers a title on eldest son of Franz Ferdinand, 45
  correspondence with Prince Sixtus, 164
  frequent absences from Vienna, 61
  his ever friendly demeanour, 57, 58
  invites Crown Prince to Vienna, 75
  opposes U-boat warfare, 334
  reinstates Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, 61
  rejoices at peace with Ukraine, 249
  submits author's _exposé_ to William II., 146, 332
  suggests sacrifices for ending World War, 75
  visits South Slav provinces, 59

Clam-Martinic, Count, and the customs question, 168
  and U-boat campaign, 121
  attends conference on Polish question, 206
  opposes submarine warfare, 334

Clemenceau, M., and Germany, 182
  and the Peace of Versailles, 272
  dominant war aim of, 184, 186

Colloredo-Mannsfield, Count, at Brest-Litovsk, 236
  attends conference on U-boat question, 121
  meets author, 219

Compulsory international arbitration, 171, 176, 177

Conrad, Chief of the General Staff, 44

Constantinople, an Entente group in, 163

Corday, Charlotte, cited, 227

Cossacks, the, 212

Courland demanded by Germany, 249

Crecianu, Ambassador Jresnea, house damaged in Zeppelin attack
  on Bucharest, 103

Csatth, Alexander, mortally wounded, 89

Csicserics, Lieut. Field-Marshal, 219
  at Brest-Litovsk, 236

Czechs, the, attitude of, regarding a separate peace, 24

Czernin, Count Ottokar, a candid chat with Franz Ferdinand, 43
  a hostile Power's desire for peace, 141
  a scene at Konopischt, 39
  abused by a braggart and brawler, 83
  acquaints Emperor of food shortage, 237, 239
  activities for peace with Roumania, 258 _et seq._
  ambassador to Roumania, 7
  an appeal for confidence, 310
  and American intervention, 123
  and the reinstatement of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, 61
  and the Ukrainian question (_see_ Ukrainian)
  answers explanation of an American request, 128
  appeals to Germany for food, 238, 239, 329
  appointed Ambassador to Bucharest, 77
  apprises Berchtold of decision of Cabinet Council, 12
  attends conference on U-boat warfare, 121
  avoided by Pan-Germans, 160
  becomes Minister for Foreign Affairs, 114
  breakfasts with Kühlmann, 230
  confers with Tisza, 27, 28
  conflicts with the Kaiser, 335
  conversation with Trotski, 248
  converses with Crown Prince, 74
  criticises Michaelis, 160
  decorated by King Carol, 88
  disapproves of U-boat warfare, 115
  dismissal of, 183, 194, 266
  extracts bearing on a trip to Western front, 72
  friction with the Emperor, 210, 215
  his hopes of a peace of understanding, 20 _et seq._, 174,
    209, 217, 331, 333
  imparts peace terms to Marghiloman, 266
  informs Emperor of proceedings at Brest, 229
  interviews King Ferdinand, 264
  issues passports for Stockholm Conference, 168, 333
  journeys to Brest-Litovsk, 218
  learns of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, 86
  loss of a dispatch-case, 98
  loyalty to Germany, 327
  lunches with Prince of Bavaria, 222
  meets the Emperor William II., 54
  misunderstandings resulting from a speech by, 19, 23
  nominated to the Herrenhaus, 46
  note to American Government, 279
  obtains a direct statement from William II., 57
  on a separate peace, 327
  on Austria's policy during war, 325
  on Bolshevism, 216, 221
  on President Wilson's programme, 192
  on U-boat warfare, 148, 179, 334
  passages of arms with Ludendorff, 247
  peace programme of, 299
  persecution of, 208
  Polish leaders and, 205
  President Wilson on, 193
  private talk with the Emperor, 124
  sends in his resignation, 23
  sets interned prisoners at liberty, 95, 96
  speech to Austrian Delegation, 298 _et seq._
  threatens a separate peace with Russia, 228
  unfounded charges against, 162
  urges sacrifice of Alsace-Lorraine, 71
  William II.'s gift to, 64
  with Emperor Charles visits Eastern front, 57

=D=

Danube Monarchy, the, a vital condition for existence of
  Hungarian State, 202
  dangers of a political structure for, 202

Debruzin, sensational crime at, 88

Declaration of London, the, 280

D'Esperey, General Franchet, and Karolyi, 260

Deutsch, Leo, and the Marxian Social Democrats, 211

Devonport, Lord, on the food question, 296

Disarmament, negotiations respecting, 4
  international, 171, 176, 177, 308
  question of, 181

Divorces in Roumania, 85

Dobrudsha, the, acquisition of, 82
  assigned to Bulgaria, 268, 269
  cession of, at peace with Roumania, 323
  King Ferdinand and, 265
  Marghiloman's view on, 266
  question discussed with Avarescu, 263
  Turkish attitude concerning, 268

Dualism, the curse of, 137

=E=

East Galicia, cession of, demanded by Ukrainians, 240 _et seq._

"Echinstvo" group, the, 211

Edward VII., King, and Emperor Francis Joseph, 1, 2
  and William II., 63
  encircling policy of, 1, 63

Elizabeth, Queen of Roumania, a word-picture by, 91
  an operation for cataract, 93
  her devotion to King Carol, 92

Ellenbogen, Dr., and Socialist Conference at Stockholm, 168
  plain speaking by, 26

England, an effort at _rapprochement_ with Germany and its failure, 180
  and dissolution of military power in Germany, 184
  and the elder Richthofen, 246
  attitude of, at beginning of World War, 15, 16
  blockade of, by U-boats, 142, 151
  bread shortage in, 295
  declares war on Germany, 14
  discards Declaration of London, 280
  distress in, from U-boat warfare, 145
  distrust of Germany's intentions in, 185
  dread of gigantic growth of Germany in, 1
  Flotow's tribute to, 120
  food supply of, 293
  freedom in, 335
  her desire to remain neutral at opening of war, 2
  negotiates with Germany on naval disarmament, 4
  public opinion in, after Sarajevo tragedy, 8
  refusal to restore German colonies, 166, 170
  shortage of potatoes in, 296
  the Pacifist party in, 167
  "unbending resolve" of, to shatter Germany, 31, 32, 71

English mentality, a typical instance of, 4

English Socialists, 214

Entente, the, adheres to Pact of London, 209, 217
  and arming of merchant vessels, 286
  and Italy, 27
  and the trial of William II., 66
  answers President Wilson, 118, 120
  as instruments in a world revolution, 273
  Austria pressed to join, 2
  demands abolition of German militarism, 165, 170, 171, 173
  desire of final military victory, 164
  exterminates Prussian militarism, 273
  impression on, of author's speech at Budapest, 178
  mine-laying by, 130
  peace proposals to, 19, 20
  rejects first peace offer, 115
  suspicious of Germany's plans, 3
  their "unbending resolve" to shatter Germany, 31, 326
  views as to peace, 170

Enver Pasha, his influence in Turkey, 233, 269

Erzberger, Herr, agrees with "Czernin scheme", 185, 333
  and author's secret report to the Emperor, 155 (note)

Espionage in Roumania, 97

Esterhazy succeeds Tisza, 136

Esthonia demanded by Germany, 249, 317

Eugen, Archduke, 22

Europe after the war, 175

European tension, beginnings of, 1

=F=

Fasciotti, Baron, and Austro-Hungarian action in Belgrade, 12

Fellowes, Sir Ailwyn, admits success of U-boats, 295

Ferdinand, King of Roumania, author's interview with, 264
  German opinion of, 260
  Queen Elizabeth's fondness for, 93

Ferdinand of Bulgaria, King, anti-Serbian policy of, 51

Filippescu, Nikolai, a proposal by, 80

Fleck, Major, at Nordbahnhof, 219

Flotow, Baron, interview with Hohenlohe, 117
  reports on German attitude on U-boat warfare, 118

Fourteen Points, Wilson's, 190 _et seq._, 271, 305, 306, 323 _et seq._

France, and Austria: effect of Vienna troubles, 250
  Bethmann's tribute to, 153
  distrust of Germany's intentions in, 185
  insists on restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, 170
  opening of war a surprise to, 2
  the Pacifist party in, 167

Francis Joseph, Emperor, a tribute to, 47
  advised to accept negotiations, 8
  and Franz Ferdinand, 42, 46
  and the principle of ministerial responsibility, 56
  author's audience with, 12
  death of, 48
  gives audience to author, 47
  King Edward VII. and, 1, 2
  on the Peace of Bucharest, 6
  opposes Filippescu's scheme, 81

Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, a fortune-teller's prediction concerning, 44
  anti-Magyar point of view of, 38, 50
  antipathy to Hungary, 35, 37, 38
  as gardener, 35
  as husband and father, 44, 45
  dislike for the Germans of, 50
  false rumours concerning, 43
  fearlessness of, 45
  friendships of, 39
  Goluchowski and, 36
  Great-Austrian programme of, 41, 49
  his high opinion of Pallavicini, 5
  his sense of humour, 41
  makes advances to the Kaiser, 42
  marriage of, 41, 44
  mentality of, 35