of litigation as far as his interests will permit and perhaps even a
little farther. For it is not only generous occasionally to abate a
little of one's rightful claims, but it is sometimes even advantageous.
We should, however, have a care for our personal property, for it is
discreditable to let it run through our fingers; but we must guard it in
such a way that there shall be no suspicion of meanness or avarice. For
the greatest privilege of wealth is, beyond all peradventure, the
opportunity it affords for doing good, without sacrificing one's
fortune.

#Another expression of beneficence is hospitality.#

Hospitality also is a theme of Theophrastus's praise, and rightly so.
For, as it seems to me at least, it is most proper that the homes of
distinguished men should be open to distinguished guests. And it is to
the credit of our country also that men from abroad do not fail to find
hospitable entertainment of this kind in our city. It is, moreover, a
very great advantage, too, for those who wish to obtain a powerful
political influence by honourable means to be able through their social
relations with their guests to enjoy popularity and to exert influence
abroad. For an instance of extraordinary hospitality, Theophrastus
writes that at Athens Cimon was hospitable even to the Laciads, the
people of his own deme; for he instructed his bailiffs to that end and
gave them orders that every attention should be shown to any Laciad who
should ever call at his country home.

*65* XIX. Quae autem opera, non largitione beneficia dantur, haec tum in
universam rem publicam, tum in singulos cives conferuntur. Nam in iure
cavere [,consilio iuvare,][230] atque hoc scientiae genere prodesse quam
plurimis vehementer et ad opes augendas pertinet et ad gratiam.

Itaque cum multa praeclara maiorum, tum quod optime constituti iuris
civilis summo semper in honore fuit cognitio atque interpretatio; quam
quidem ante hanc confusionem temporum in possessione sua principes
retinuerunt, nunc, ut honores, ut omnes dignitatis gradus, sic huius
scientiae splendor deletus est, idque eo indignius, quod eo tempore hoc
contigit, cum is esset, qui omnes superiores, quibus honore par esset,
scientia facile vicisset. Haec igitur opera grata multis et ad
beneficiis obstringendos homines accommodata.

*66* Atque huic arti finitima est dicendi [gravior] facultas[231] et
gratior et ornatior. Quid enim eloquentia praestabilius vel admiratione
audientium vel spe indigentium vel eorum, qui defensi sunt, gratia? Huic
[quoque] ergo[232] a maioribus nostris est in toga dignitatis[233]
principatus datus. Diserti igitur hominis et facile laborantis, quodque
in patriis est moribus, multorum causas et non gravate et gratuito
defendentis beneficia et patrocinia late patent.

*67* Admonebat me res, ut hoc quoque loco intermissionem eloquentiae, ne
dicam interitum, deplorarem, ni vererer, ne de me ipso aliquid viderer
queri. Sed tamen videmus, quibus exstinctis oratoribus quam in paucis
spes, quanto in paucioribus facultas, quam in multis sit audacia. Cum
autem omnes non possint, ne multi quidem, aut iuris periti esse aut
diserti, licet tamen opera prodesse multis beneficia petentem,
commendantem iudicibus, magistratibus, vigilantem pro re alterius, eos
ipsos, qui aut consuluntur aut defendunt, rogantem; quod qui faciunt,
plurimum gratiae consequuntur, latissimeque eorum manat industria.

*68* Iam illud non sunt admonendi (est enim in promptu), ut
animadvertant, cum iuvare alios velint, ne quos offendant. Saepe enim
aut eos laedunt, quos non debent, aut eos, quos non expedit; si
imprudentes, neglegentiae est, si scientes, temeritatis. Utendum etiam
est excusatione adversus eos, quos invitus offendas, quacumque possis,
quare id, quod feceris, necesse fuerit nec aliter facere potueris,
ceterisque operis et officiis erit id, quod violatum videbitur,[234]
compensandum.

    [230] _consilio iuvare_ MSS., Ed.; bracketed by Muther,
    Müller, Heine.

    [231] _dicendi gravior facultas_ B H b; _gravior facultas_ L
    c p; _dicendi_ [_gravior_] _facultas_ Ed.; _dicendi facultas_
    Lambinus.

    [232] _huic quoque ergo_ B H L b c, Bt.; _huic ergo_
    Facciolati; _huic_ [_quoque_] _ergo_ Ed.

    [233] _in toga dignitatis_ L c p, Edd.; _in tota dignitatis_
    B H b; _in tota dignitate_ a.

    [234] _videbitur_ L c p, Edd.; not in B H b; _est_ a.

#(2) personal service.#

*65* XIX. Again, the kindnesses shown not by gifts of money but by
personal service[AU] are bestowed sometimes upon the community at large,
sometimes upon individual citizens. To protect a man in his legal rights
[,to assist him with counsel,] and to serve as many as possible with
that sort of knowledge tends greatly to increase one's influence and
popularity.

#The profession of the law.#

Thus, among the many admirable ideas of our ancestors was the high
respect they always accorded to the study and interpretation of the
excellent body of our civil law. And down to the present unsettled times
the foremost men of the state have kept this profession exclusively in
their own hands; but now the prestige of legal learning has departed
along with offices of honour and positions of dignity; and this is the
more deplorable, because it has come to pass in the lifetime of a
man[AV] who in knowledge of the law would easily have surpassed all his
predecessors, while in honour he is their peer. Service such as this,
then, finds many to appreciate it and is calculated to bind people
closely to us by our good services.

#Eloquence at the bar.#

*66* Closely connected with this profession, furthermore, is the gift of
eloquence; it is at once more popular and more distinguished. For what
is better than eloquence to awaken the admiration of one's hearers or
the hopes of the distressed or the gratitude of those whom it has
protected? It was to eloquence, therefore, that our fathers assigned the
foremost rank among the civil professions. The door of opportunity for
generous patronage to others, then, is wide open to the orator whose
heart is in his work and who follows the custom of our forefathers in
undertaking the defence of many clients without reluctance and without
compensation.

#The decline of eloquence.#

*67* My subject suggests that at this point I express once more my
regret at the decadence, not to say the utter extinction, of eloquence;
and I should do so, did I not fear that people would think that I were
complaining on my own account. We see, nevertheless, what orators have
lost their lives and how few of any promise are left, how far fewer
there are who have ability, and how many there are who have nothing but
presumption. But though not all--no, not even many--can be learned in
the law or eloquent as pleaders, still anybody may be of service to many
by canvassing in their support for appointments, by witnessing to their
character before juries and magistrates, by looking out for the
interests of one and another, and by soliciting for them the aid of
jurisconsults or of advocates. Those who perform such services win the
most gratitude and find a most extensive sphere for their activities.

#A warning to eloquence.#

*68* Of course, those who pursue such a course do not need to be warned
(for the point is self-evident) to be careful when they seek to oblige
some, not to offend others. For oftentimes they hurt those whom they
ought not or those whom it is inexpedient to offend. If they do it
inadvertently, it is carelessness; if designedly, inconsiderateness. A
man must apologize also, to the best of his ability, if he has
involuntarily hurt anyone's feelings, and explain why what he has done
was unavoidable and why he could not have done otherwise; and he must by
future services and kind offices atone for the apparent offence.

    [AU] Acts of kindness and personal service mean to Cicero
    throughout this discussion the services of the lawyer, which
    were voluntary and gratis.

    [AV] This eminent jurist was Servius Sulpicius Lemonia Rufus,
    a close friend of Cicero, author of the well-known letter of
    condolence to Cicero on the death of his daughter Tullia.

*69* XX. Sed cum in hominibus iuvandis aut mores spectari aut fortuna
soleat, dictu quidem est proclive, itaque volgo loquuntur, se in
beneficiis collocandis mores hominum, non fortunam sequi. Honesta oratio
est; sed quis est tandem, qui inopis et optimi viri causae non anteponat
in opera danda gratiam fortunati et potentis? a quo enim expeditior et
celerior remuneratio fore videtur, in eum fere est voluntas nostra
propensior. Sed animadvertendum est diligentius, quae natura rerum sit.
Nimirum enim inops ille, si bonus est vir, etiamsi referre gratiam non
potest, habere certe potest. Commode autem, quicumque dixit, "pecuniam
qui habeat, non reddidisse, qui reddiderit, non habere, gratiam autem
et, qui rettulerit, habere[235] et, qui habeat, rettulisse."

At qui se locupletes, honoratos, beatos putant, ii ne obligari quidem
beneficio volunt; quin etiam beneficium se dedisse arbitrantur, cum ipsi
quamvis magnum aliquod acceperint, atque etiam a se aut postulari aut
exspectari aliquid suspicantur, patrocinio vero se[236] usos aut
clientes appellari mortis instar putant. *70* At vero ille tenuis, cum,
quicquid factum sit, se spectatum, non fortunam putet,[237] non modo
illi, qui est meritus, sed etiam illis, a quibus exspectat (eget enim
multis), gratum se videri studet neque vero verbis auget suum munus, si
quo forte fungitur, sed etiam extenuat. Videndumque illud est, quod, si
opulentum fortunatumque defenderis, in uno illo aut, si[238] forte, in
liberis eius manet gratia; sin autem inopem, probum tamen et modestum,
omnes non improbi humiles, quae magna in populo multitudo est,
praesidium sibi paratum vident. *71* Quam ob rem melius apud bonos quam
apud fortunatos beneficium collocari puto.

Danda omnino opera est, ut omni generi satis facere possimus; sed si res
in contentionem veniet, nimirum Themistocles est auctor adhibendus; qui
cum consuleretur, utrum bono viro pauperi an minus probato diviti filiam
collocaret: "Ego vero," inquit, "malo virum, qui pecunia egeat, quam
pecuniam, quae viro." Sed corrupti mores depravatique sunt admiratione
divitiarum; quarum magnitudo quid ad unum quemque nostrum pertinet?
Illum fortasse adiuvat, qui habet. Ne id quidem semper; sed fac iuvare;
utentior[239] sane sit, honestior vero quo modo? Quodsi etiam bonus erit
vir, ne impediant divitiae, quo minus iuvetur, modo ne adiuvent, sitque
omne iudicium, non quam locuples, sed qualis quisque sit!

Extremum autem praeceptum in beneficiis operaque danda, ne quid contra
aequitatem contendas, ne quid pro iniuria; fundamentum enim est
perpetuae commendationis et famae iustitia, sine qua nihil potest esse
laudabile.

    [235] _gratiam ... habere_ L c p, Edd.; not in B H a b.

    [236] _vero se_ B H a b; _vero tuo se_ L c p.

    [237] _putet_ Ed.; _putat_ MSS.

    [238] _si_ L c p, Edd.; not in B H a b.

    [239] _utentior_ MSS., Bt.^1, Heine; _potentior_ later MSS.;
    _opulentior_ one MS. (C. Lange), Lambinus, Bt.^2, Müller.

#The basis for personal service is character not fortune.#

*69* XX. Now in rendering helpful service to people, we usually consider
either their character or their circumstances. And so it is an easy
remark, and one commonly made, to say that in investing kindnesses we
look not to people's outward circumstances, but to their character. The
phrase is admirable! But who is there, pray, that does not in performing
a service set the favour of a rich and influential man above the cause
of a poor, though most worthy, person? For, as a rule, our will is more
inclined to the one from whom we expect a prompter and speedier return.
But we should observe more carefully how the matter really stands: the
poor man of whom we spoke cannot return a favour in kind, of course, but
if he is a good man he can do it at least in thankfulness of heart. As
some one has happily said, "A man has not repaid money, if he still has
it; if he has repaid it, he has ceased to have it. But a man still has
the sense of favour, if he has returned the favour; and if he has the
sense of the favour, he has repaid it."

On the other hand, they who consider themselves wealthy, honoured, the
favourites of fortune, do not wish even to be put under obligations by
our kind services. Why, they actually think that they have conferred a
favour by accepting one, however great; and they even suspect that a
claim is thereby set up against them or that something is expected in
return. Nay more, it is bitter as death to them to have accepted a
patron or to be called clients. *70* Your man of slender means, on the
other hand, feels that whatever is done for him is done out of regard
for himself and not for his outward circumstances. #The poor man's
gratitude.# Hence he strives to show himself grateful not only to the
one who has obliged him in the past but also to those from whom he
expects similar favours in the future--and he needs the help of many;
and his own service, if he happens to render any in return, he does not
exaggerate, but he actually depreciates it. This fact, furthermore,
should not be overlooked--that if one defends a wealthy favourite of
fortune, the favour does not extend further than to the man himself or,
possibly, to his children. But if one defends a man who is poor but
honest and upright, all the lowly who are not dishonest--and there is a
large proportion of that sort among the people--look upon such an
advocate as a tower of defence raised up for them. *71* I think,
therefore, that kindness to the good is a better investment than
kindness to the favourites of fortune.

We must, of course, put forth every effort to oblige all sorts and
conditions of men, if we can. But if it comes to a conflict of duty on
this point, we must, I should say, follow the advice of Themistocles:
when some one asked his advice whether he should give his daughter in
marriage to a man who was poor but honest or to one who was rich but
less esteemed, he said: #Wealth no inducement nor a bar to personal
service# "For my part, I prefer a man without money to money without a
man." But the moral sense of to-day is demoralized and depraved by our
worship of wealth. Of what concern to any one of us is the size of
another man's fortune? It is, perhaps, an advantage to its possessor;
but not always even that. But suppose it is; he may, to be sure, have
more money to spend: but how is he any the better man for that? Still,
if he is a good man, as well as a rich one, let not his riches be a
hindrance to his being aided, if only they are not the motive to it; but
in conferring favours our decision should depend entirely upon a man's
character, not on his wealth.

The supreme rule, then, in the matter of kindnesses to be rendered by
personal service is never to take up a case in opposition to the right
nor in defence of the wrong. For the foundation of enduring reputation
and fame is justice, and without justice there can be nothing worthy of
praise.

*72* XXI. Sed, quoniam de eo genere beneficiorum dictum est, quae ad
singulos spectant, deinceps de iis, quae ad universos quaeque ad rem
publicam pertinent, disputandum est. Eorum autem ipsorum partim[240]
eius modi sunt, ut ad universos cives pertineant, partim, singulos ut
attingant; quae sunt etiam gratiora. Danda opera est omnino, si possit,
utrisque, nec minus, ut etiam singulis consulatur, sed ita, ut ea res
aut prosit aut certe ne obsit rei publicae. C. Gracchi frumentaria magna
largitio; exhauriebat igitur aerarium; modica M. Octavi et rei publicae
tolerabilis et plebi necessaria; ergo et civibus et rei publicae
salutaris.

*73* In primis autem videndum erit ei, qui rem publicam administrabit,
ut suum quisque teneat neque de bonis privatorum publice deminutio fiat.
Perniciose enim Philippus, in tribunatu cum legem agrariam ferret, quam
tamen antiquari facile passus est et in eo vehementer se moderatum
praebuit--sed cum in agendo multa populariter, tum illud male, "non esse
in civitate duo milia hominum, qui rem haberent." Capitalis oratio est,
ad aequationem bonorum pertinens; qua peste quae potest esse maior? Hanc
enim ob causam maxime, ut sua tenerentur, res publicae civitatesque
constitutae sunt. Nam, etsi duce natura congregabantur homines, tamen
spe custodiae rerum suarum urbium praesidia quaerebant.

*74* Danda etiam opera est, ne, quod apud maiores nostros saepe fiebat
propter aerarii tenuitatem assiduitatemque bellorum, tributum sit
conferendum, idque ne eveniat, multo ante erit providendum. Sin quae
necessitas huius muneris alicui rei publicae obvenerit (malo enim[241]
quam nostrae ominari; neque tamen de nostra, sed de omni re publica
disputo), danda erit opera, ut omnes intellegant, si salvi esse velint,
necessitati esse parendum. Atque etiam omnes, qui rem publicam
gubernabunt, consulere debebunt, ut earum rerum copia sit, quae
sunt[242] necessariae. Quarum qualis comparatio fieri soleat et debeat,
non est necesse disputare; est enim in promptu; tantum locus attingendus
fuit.

*75* Caput autem est in omni procuratione negotii et muneris publici, ut
avaritiae pellatur etiam minima suspicio. "Utinam," inquit C. Pontius
Samnis, "ad illa tempora me fortuna reservavisset et tum essem natus,
quando Romani dona accipere[243] coepissent! non essem passus diutius
eos imperare." Ne illi multa saecula exspectanda fuerunt; modo enim hoc
malum in hanc rem publicam invasit. Itaque facile patior tum potius
Pontium fuisse, siquidem in illo tantum fuit roboris. Nondum centum et
decem anni sunt, cum de pecuniis repetundis a L. Pisone lata lex est,
nulla antea cum fuisset. At vero postea tot leges et proximae quaeque
duriores, tot rei, tot damnati, tantum [Italicum][244] bellum propter
iudiciorum metum excitatum, tanta sublatis legibus et iudiciis expilatio
direptioque sociorum, ut imbecillitate aliorum, non nostra virtute
valeamus.

    [240] _partim_ L c p, Edd.; _quae_ (_que_ = _quae_ H)
    _partim_ B H a b.

    [241] _malo enim_ B H L b p; _malo enim alii_ a; _malo enim
    aliene_ (_alienae_) c.

    [242] _sunt_ B H b, Bt.^2; _sunt ad victum_ L c p, Bt.^1,
    Heine.

    [243] _dona accipere_ B H L a p c; _accipere dona_ b, Ed.

    [244] _tantum [Italicum]_ Bake, Edd.; _tantum Italicum_ L c
    p; _tantum Iliacum_ B H; _tanti militari cum_ b.

#Service to the state through personal service to individuals.#

*72* XXI. Now, since we have finished the discussion of that kind of
helpful services which concern individuals, we must next take up those
which touch the whole body politic and the state. Of these public
services, some are of such a nature that they concern the whole body of
citizens; others, that they affect individuals only. And these latter
are the more productive of gratitude. If possible, we should by all
means attend to both kinds of service; but we must take care in
protecting the interests of individuals that what we do for them shall
be beneficial, or at least not prejudicial to the state. Gaius Gracchus
inaugurated largesses of grain on an extensive scale; this had a
tendency to exhaust the exchequer. Marcus Octavius inaugurated a
moderate dole; this was both practicable for the state and necessary for
the commons; it was, therefore, a blessing both to the citizens and to
the state.

#The statesman's duty toward#

#(1) property rights,#

*73* The man in an administrative office, however, must make it his
first care that every one shall have what belongs to him and that
private citizens suffer no invasion of their property rights by act of
the state. It was a ruinous policy that Philippus proposed when in his
tribuneship he introduced his agrarian bill. However, when his law was
rejected, he took his defeat with good grace and displayed extraordinary
moderation. But in his public speeches on the measure he often played
the demagogue, and that time viciously, when he said that "there were
not in the state two thousand people who owned any property." That
speech deserves unqualified condemnation, for it favoured an equal
distribution of property; and what more ruinous policy than that could
be conceived? For the chief purpose in the establishment of
constitutional state and municipal governments was that individual
property rights might be secured. For although it was by Nature's
guidance that men were drawn together into communities, it was in the
hope of safeguarding their possessions that they sought the protection
of cities.

#(2) taxation,#

*74* The administration should also put forth every effort to prevent
the levying of a property tax, and to this end precautions should be
taken long in advance. Such a tax was often levied in the times of our
forefathers on account of the depleted state of their treasury and their
incessant wars. But if any state (I say "any," for I would rather speak
in general terms than forebode evils to our own; however, I am not
discussing our own state but states in general)--if any state ever has
to face a crisis requiring the imposition of such a burden, every
effort must be made to let all the people realize that they must bow to
the inevitable, if they wish to be saved. #(3) necessities of life,# And
it will also be the duty of those who direct the affairs of the state to
take measures that there shall be an abundance of the necessities of
life. It is needless to discuss the ordinary ways and means; for the
duty is self-evident; it is necessary only to mention the matter.

#(4) official integrity.#

*75* But the chief thing in all public administration and public service
is to avoid even the slightest suspicion of self-seeking. "I would,"
says Gaius Pontius, the Samnite, "that fortune had withheld my
appearance until a time when the Romans began to accept bribes, and that
I had been born in those days! I should then have suffered them to hold
their supremacy no longer." Aye, but he would have had many generations
to wait; for this plague has only recently infected our nation. And so I
rejoice that Pontius lived then instead of now, seeing that he was so
mighty a man! It is not yet a hundred and ten years since the enactment
of Lucius Piso's bill to punish extortion; there had been no such law
before. But afterward came so many laws, each more stringent than the
other, so many men were accused and so many convicted, so horrible a
war[AW] was stirred up on account of the fear of what our courts would
do to still others, so frightful was the pillaging and plundering of the
allies when the laws and courts were suppressed,[AX] that now we find
ourselves strong not in our own strength but in the weakness of others.

    [AW] The Italian or Social War, B.C. 100-88.

    [AX] During the dictatorships of Sulla and Caesar.

*76* XXII. Laudat Africanum Panaetius, quod fuerit abstinens. Quidni
laudet? Sed in illo alia maiora; laus abstinentiae[245] non hominis est
solum, sed etiam temporum illorum. Omni Macedonum gaza, quae fuit
maxima, potitus [est][246] Paulus tantum in aerarium pecuniae invexit,
ut unius imperatoris praeda finem attulerit tributorum. At hic nihil
domum suam intulit[247] praeter memoriam nominis sempiternam. Imitatus
patrem Africanus nihilo locupletior Carthagine eversa. Quid? qui eius
collega fuit in censura, L. Mummius, numquid copiosior, cum
copiosissimam urbem funditus sustulisset? Italiam ornare quam domum suam
maluit; quamquam Italia ornata domus ipsa mihi videtur ornatior.

*77* Nullum igitur vitium taetrius est, ut eo, unde egressa est, referat
se oratio, quam avaritia, praesertim in principibus et rem publicam
gubernantibus. Habere enim quaestui rem publicam non modo turpe est, sed
sceleratum etiam et nefarium. #Plut. Inst. Lacon. 239 F# Itaque, quod
Apollo Pythius oraclum edidit, Spartam nulla re alia nisi avaritia esse
perituram, id videtur non solum Lacedaemoniis, sed etiam omnibus
opulentis populis praedixisse. Nulla autem re conciliare facilius
benivolentiam multitudinis possunt ii, qui rei publicae praesunt, quam
abstinentia et continentia.

*78* Qui vero se populares volunt ob eamque causam aut agrariam rem
temptant, ut possessores pellantur suis sedibus, aut pecunias creditas
debitoribus condonandas putant, labefactant fundamenta rei publicae,
concordiam primum, quae esse non potest, cum aliis adimuntur, aliis
condonantur pecuniae, deinde aequitatem, quae tollitur omnis, si habere
suum cuique non licet. #§ 73# Id enim est proprium, ut supra dixi,
civitatis atque urbis, ut sit libera et non sollicita suae rei cuiusque
custodia. *79* Atque in hac pernicie rei publicae ne illam quidem
consequuntur, quam putant, gratiam; nam cui res erepta est, est
inimicus, cui data est, etiam dissimulat se accipere voluisse et maxime
in pecuniis creditis occultat suum gaudium, ne videatur non fuisse
solvendo; at vero ille, qui accepit[248] iniuriam, et meminit et prae se
fert dolorem suum, nec, si plures sunt ii, quibus inprobe datum est,
quam illi, quibus iniuste ademptum est, idcirco plus etiam valent; non
enim numero haec iudicantur, sed pondere. Quam autem habet aequitatem,
ut agrum multis annis aut etiam saeculis ante possessum, qui nullum
habuit, habeat, qui autem habuit, amittat?

    [245] _abstinentiae_ L c p, Edd.; _sapientiae_ B H a b.

    [246] _potitus_ J. F. Heusinger; _potitus [est]_ Edd.;
    _potitus est_ MSS.

    [247] _intulit_ B H b, Edd.; _detulit_ L c p.

    [248] _accepit_ L c, Edd.; _accipit_ B H a b p.

*76* XXII. Panaetius praises Africanus for his integrity in public life.
Why should he not? But Africanus had other and greater virtues. The
boast of official integrity belongs not to that man alone but also to
his times. When Paulus got possession of all the wealth of Macedon--and
it was enormous--he brought into our treasury so much money[AY] that the
spoils of a single general did away with the need for a tax on property
in Rome for all time to come. But to his own house he brought nothing
save the glory of an immortal name. Africanus emulated his father's
example and was none the richer for his overthrow of Carthage. And what
shall we say of Lucius Mummius, his colleague in the censorship? Was he
one penny the richer when he had destroyed to its foundations the
richest of cities? He preferred to adorn Italy rather than his own
house. And yet by the adornment of Italy his own house was, as it seems
to me, still more splendidly adorned.

#Integrity _vs._ avarice.#

*77* There is, then, to bring the discussion back to the point from
which it digressed, no vice more offensive than avarice, especially in
men who stand foremost and hold the helm of state. For to exploit the
state for selfish profit is not only immoral; it is criminal, infamous.
And so the oracle, which the Pythian Apollo uttered, that "Sparta should
not fall from any other cause than avarice," seems to be a prophecy not
to the Lacedaemonians alone, but to all wealthy nations as well. They
who direct the affairs of state, then, can win the good-will of the
masses by no other means more easily than by self-restraint and
self-denial.

#The menace of agrarian laws.#

*78* But they who pose as friends of the people, and who for that reason
either attempt to have agrarian laws passed, in order that the occupants
may be driven out of their homes, or propose that money loaned should
be remitted to the borrowers, are undermining the foundations of the
commonwealth: first of all, they are destroying harmony, which cannot
exist when money is taken away from one party and bestowed upon another;
and second, they do away with equity, which is utterly subverted, if the
rights of property are not respected. For, as I said above, it is the
peculiar function of the state and the city to guarantee to every man
the free and undisturbed control of his own particular property. *79*
And yet, when it comes to measures so ruinous to public welfare, they do
not gain even that popularity which they anticipate. For he who has been
robbed of his property is their enemy; he to whom it has been turned
over actually pretends that he had no wish to take it; and most of all,
when his debts are cancelled, the debtor conceals his joy, for fear that
he may be thought to have been insolvent; whereas the victim of the
wrong both remembers it and shows his resentment openly. Thus even
though they to whom property has been wrongfully awarded be more in
number than they from whom it has been unjustly taken, they do not for
that reason have more influence; for in such matters influence is
measured not by numbers but by weight. And how is it fair that a man who
never had any property should take possession of lands that had been
occupied for many years or even generations, and that he who had them
before should lose possession of them?

    [AY] Nearly two million pounds sterling.

*80* XXIII. Ac[249] propter hoc iniuriae genus Lacedaemonii Lysandrum
ephorum expulerunt, Agim regem, quod numquam antea apud eos acciderat,
necaverunt, exque eo tempore tantae discordiae secutae sunt, ut et
tyranni exsisterent et optimates exterminarentur et praeclarissime
constituta res publica dilaberetur; nec vero solum ipsa cecidit, sed
etiam reliquam Graeciam evertit contagionibus malorum,[250] quae a
Lacedaemoniis profectae manarunt latius. Quid? nostros Gracchos, Ti.
Gracchi summi viri filios, Africani nepotes, nonne agrariae contentiones
perdiderunt?

*81* At vero Aratus Sicyonius iure laudatur, qui, cum eius civitas
quinquaginta annos a tyrannis teneretur, profectus Argis Sicyonem
clandestino introitu urbe est potitus, cumque tyrannum Nicoclem
improviso oppressisset,[251] sescentos exsules, qui locupletissimi
fuerant eius civitatis, restituit remque publicam adventu suo liberavit.
Sed cum magnam animadverteret in bonis et possessionibus difficultatem,
quod et eos, quos ipse restituerat, quorum bona alii possederant, egere
iniquissimum esse arbitrabatur et quinquaginta annorum possessiones
moveri[252] non nimis aequum putabat, propterea quod tam longo spatio
multa hereditatibus, multa emptionibus, multa dotibus tenebantur sine
iniuria, iudicavit neque illis adimi nec iis non satis fieri, quorum
illa fuerant, oportere. *82* Cum igitur statuisset opus esse ad eam rem
constituendam pecunia, Alexandream se proficisci velle dixit remque
integram ad reditum suum iussit esse, isque celeriter ad Ptolomaeum,
suum hospitem, venit, qui tum regnabat alter post Alexandream conditam.
Cui[253] cum exposuisset patriam se liberare velle causamque docuisset,
a rege opulento vir summus facile impetravit, ut grandi pecunia
adiuvaretur. Quam cum Sicyonem attulisset, adhibuit sibi in consilium
quindecim principes, cum quibus causas cognovit et eorum, qui aliena
tenebant, et eorum, qui sua amiserant, perfecitque aestimandis
possessionibus, ut persuaderet aliis, ut pecuniam accipere mallent,
possessionibus cederent, aliis, ut commodius putarent numerari sibi,
quod tanti esset, quam suum recuperare. Ita perfectum est, ut omnes
concordia constituta sine querella discederent.

*83* O virum magnum dignumque, qui in re publica nostra natus esset! Sic
par est agere cum civibus, non, ut bis iam vidimus, hastam in foro
ponere et bona civium voci subicere[254] praeconis. At ille Graecus, id
quod fuit sapientis et praestantis viri, omnibus consulendum putavit,
eaque est summa ratio et sapientia boni civis, commoda civium non
divellere atque omnis aequitate eadem continere. Habitent gratis in
alieno. Quid ita? ut, cum ego emerim, aedificarim, tuear, impendam, tu
me invito fruare meo? Quid est aliud aliis sua eripere, aliis dare
aliena? *84* Tabulae vero novae quid habent argumenti, nisi ut emas mea
pecunia fundum, eum tu habeas, ego non habeam pecuniam?

    [249] _Ac_ Edd.; _at_ MSS.

    [250] _malorum_ L c p, Edd.; _maiorum_ B H a b.

    [251] _oppressisset_ L c p, Edd.; _pressisset_ B H a b.

    [252] _moveri_ L c p, Edd.; _movere_ B H a b.

    [253] _cui_ Edd.; _qui_ MSS.

    [254] _subicere_ L c p, Edd.; _subiacere_ B H a b.

#Instances of agrarian legislation.#

*80* XXIII. Now, it was on account of just this sort of wrong-doing that
the Spartans banished their ephor Lysander, and put their king Agis to
death--an act without precedent in the history of Sparta. From that time
on--and for the same reason--dissensions so serious ensued that tyrants
arose, the nobles were sent into exile, and the state, though most
admirably constituted, crumbled to pieces. Nor did it fall alone, but by
the contagion of the ills that, starting in Lacedaemon, spread widely
and more widely, it dragged the rest of Greece down to ruin. What shall
we say of our own Gracchi, the sons of that famous Tiberius Gracchus and
grandsons of Africanus? Was it not strife over the agrarian issue that
caused their downfall and death?

#Aratus of Sicyon.#

*81* Aratus of Sicyon, on the other hand, is justly praised. When his
city had been kept for fifty years in the power of its tyrants, he came
over from Argos to Sicyon, secretly entered the city and took it by
surprise; he fell suddenly upon the tyrant Nicocles, recalled from
banishment six hundred exiles who had been the wealthiest men of the
city, and by his coming made his country free. But he found great
difficulty in the matter of property and its occupancy; for he
considered it most unjust, on the one hand, that those men should be
left in want whom he had restored and of whose property others had taken
possession; and he thought it hardly fair, on the other hand, that
tenure of fifty years' standing should be disturbed. For in the course
of that long period many of those estates had passed into innocent hands
by right of inheritance, many by purchase, many by dower. He therefore
decided that it would be wrong either to take the property away from the
present incumbents or to let them keep it without compensation to its
former possessors. *82* So, when he had come to the conclusion that he
must have money to meet the situation, he announced that he meant to
make a trip to Alexandria and gave orders that matters should remain
as they were until his return. And so he went in haste to his friend
Ptolemy, then upon the throne, the second king after the founding of
Alexandria. To him he explained that he wished to restore constitutional
liberty to his country and presented his case to him. And, being a man
of the highest standing, he easily secured from that wealthy king
assistance in the form of a large sum of money. And when he had returned
with this to Sicyon, he called into counsel with him fifteen of the
foremost men of the city. With them he investigated the cases both of
those who were holding possession of other people's property and of
those who had lost theirs. And he managed by a valuation of the
properties to persuade some that it was more desirable to accept money
and surrender their present holdings; others he convinced that it was
more to their interest to take a fair price in cash for their lost
estates than to try to recover possession of what had been their own. As
a result, harmony was preserved, and all parties went their way without
a word of complaint.

#Justice the corner-stone of statecraft.#

*83* A great statesman, and worthy to have been born in our
commonwealth! That is the right way to deal with one's fellow-citizens,
and not, as we have already witnessed on two occasions, to plant the
spear in the forum and knock down the property of citizens under the
auctioneer's hammer. But yon Greek, like a wise and excellent man,
thought that he must look out for the welfare of all. And this is the
highest statesmanship and the soundest wisdom on the part of a good
citizen, not to divide the interests of the citizens but to unite all on
the basis of impartial justice. "Let them live in their neighbour's
house rent-free."[AZ] Why so? In order that, when I have bought, built,
kept up, and spent my money upon a place, you may without my consent
enjoy what belongs to me? What else is that but to rob one man of what
belongs to him and to give to another what does not belong to him? *84*
And what is the meaning of an abolition of debts, except that you buy a
farm with my money; that you have the farm, and I have not my money?

    [AZ] An assumed appeal to one of Caesar's edicts.

XXIV. Quam ob rem ne sit aes alienum, quod rei publicae noceat,
providendum est, quod multis rationibus caveri potest, non, si fuerit,
ut locupletes suum perdant, debitores lucrentur alienum; nec enim ulla
res vehementius rem publicam continet quam fides, quae esse nulla
potest, nisi erit necessaria solutio rerum creditarum. Numquam
vehementius actum est quam me consule, ne solveretur; armis et castris
temptata res est ab omni genere hominum et ordine; quibus ita restiti,
ut hoc totum malum de re publica tolleretur. Numquam nec maius aes
alienum fuit nec melius nec facilius dissolutum est; fraudandi enim spe
sublata solvendi necessitas consecuta est. At vero hic nunc victor, tum
quidem victus, quae cogitarat, ea[255] perfecit, cum eius iam nihil
interesset. Tanta in eo peccandi libido fuit, ut hoc ipsum eum
delectaret, peccare, etiamsi causa non esset.

*85* Ab hoc igitur genere largitionis, ut aliis detur, aliis auferatur,
aberunt ii, qui rem publicam tuebuntur, in primisque operam dabunt, ut
iuris et iudiciorum aequitate suum quisque teneat et neque tenuiores
propter humilitatem circumveniantur neque locupletibus ad sua vel
tenenda vel recuperanda obsit invidia, praeterea, quibuscumque rebus vel
belli vel domi poterunt, rem publicam augeant imperio, agris,
vectigalibus.

Haec magnorum hominum sunt, haec apud maiores nostros factitata, haec
genera officiorum qui persequentur,[256] cum summa utilitate rei
publicae magnam ipsi adipiscentur et gratiam et gloriam.

*86* In his autem utilitatum praeceptis Antipater Tyrius Stoicus, qui
Athenis nuper est mortuus, duo praeterita censet esse a Panaetio,
valetudinis curationem et pecuniae; quas res a summo philosopho
praeteritas arbitror, quod essent faciles; sunt certe utiles. Sed
valetudo sustentatur notitia sui corporis et observatione, quae res aut
prodesse soleant aut obesse, et continentia in victu omni atque cultu
corporis tuendi causa [praetermittendis voluptatibus],[257] postremo
arte eorum, quorum ad scientiam haec pertinent.

*87* Res autem familiaris quaeri debet iis rebus, a quibus abest
turpitudo, conservari autem diligentia et parsimonia, eisdem etiam rebus
augeri. Has res commodissime Xenophon Socraticus persecutus est in eo
libro, qui Oeconomicus inscribitur, quem nos, ista fere aetate cum
essemus, qua es tu nunc, e Graeco in Latinum convertimus. [258]Sed toto
hoc de genere, de quaerenda, de collocanda pecunia, (vellem[259] etiam
de utenda) commodius a quibusdam optimis viris ad Ianum[260] medium
sedentibus quam ab ullis philosophis ulla in schola disputatur. Sunt
tamen ea cognoscenda; pertinent enim ad utilitatem, de qua hoc libro
disputatum est.[258]

    [255] _cogitarat, ea_ B H a b, Bt.^2, Müller; _cogitarat, cum
    ipsius intererat, tum ea_ c p, Bt.^1, Heine.

    [256] _persequentur_ c; _persequuntur_ b, Bt.^2;
    _persecuntur_ B H p, Bt.^1, Heine.

    [257] _praetermittendis voluptatibus_ MSS.; del. Heine, Edd.

    [258] _Sed ... disputatum est_ transposed from § 90 by Unger,
    Edd.

    [259] _vellem_ c p, Bt.^1, Ed.; not in B H a b, Bt.^2

    [260] _Ianum_ c, Edd.; _ianuae_ B H a b p.

#Economics of debts.#

XXIV. We must, therefore, take measures that there shall be no
indebtedness of a nature to endanger the public safety. It is a menace
that can be averted in many ways; but should a serious debt be incurred,
we are not to allow the rich to lose their property, while the debtors
profit by what is their neighbour's. For there is nothing that upholds a
government more powerfully than its credit; and it can have no credit,
unless the payment of debts is enforced by law. Never were measures for
the repudiation of debts more strenuously agitated than in my
consulship. Men of every sort and rank attempted with arms and armies to
force the project through. But I opposed them with such energy that this
plague was wholly eradicated from the body politic. Indebtedness was
never greater; debts were never liquidated more easily or more fully;
for the hope of defrauding the creditor was cut off and payment was
enforced by law. But the present victor, though vanquished then, still
carried out his old design, when it was no longer of any personal
advantage to him.[BA] So great was his passion for wrong-doing that the
very doing of wrong was a joy to him for its own sake, even when there
was no motive for it.

*85* Those, then, whose office it is to look after the interests of the
state will refrain from that form of liberality which robs one man to
enrich another. #Administration of the courts in equity.# Above all,
they will use their best endeavours that every one shall be protected in
the possession of his own property by the fair administration of the law
and the courts, that the poorer classes shall not be oppressed because
of their helplessness, and that envy shall not stand in the way of the
rich, to prevent them from keeping or recovering possession of what
justly belongs to them; they must strive, too, by whatever means they
can, in peace or in war, to advance the state in power, in territory,
and in revenues.

Such service calls for great men; it was commonly rendered in the days
of our ancestors; if men will perform duties such as these, they will
win popularity and glory for themselves and at the same time render
eminent service to the state.

#Sanitation.#

*86* Now, in this list of rules touching expediency, Antipater of Tyre,
a Stoic philosopher who recently died at Athens, claims that two points
were overlooked by Panaetius--the care of health and of property. I
presume that the eminent philosopher overlooked these two items because
they present no difficulty. At all events they are expedient. Although
they are a matter of course, I will still say a few words on the
subject. Individual health is preserved by studying one's own
constitution, by observing what is good or bad for one, by constant
self-control in supplying physical wants and comforts (but only to the
extent necessary to self-preservation), by foregoing sensual pleasures,
and finally, by the professional skill of those to whose science these
matters belong.

#Finance.#

*87* As for property, it is a duty to make money, but only by honourable
means; it is a duty also to save it and increase it by care and thrift.
These principles Xenophon, a pupil of Socrates, has set forth most
happily in his book entitled "Oeconomicus." When I was about your
present age, I translated it from the Greek into Latin.

But this whole subject of acquiring money, investing money (I wish I
could include also spending money) is more profitably discussed by
certain worthy gentlemen on "Change" than could be done by any
philosophers of any school. For all that, we must take cognizance of
them; for they come fitly under the head of expediency, and that is the
subject of the present book.

    [BA] Caesar, it seems, had had some part in the schemes of
    Catiline in B.C. 63 and possibly in the plot of B.C. 66-65.
    When his conquests in Gaul had freed him from his debts and
    made him rich, his party, with his consent, passed (B.C. 49)
    the obnoxious legislation here referred to--that all interest
    in arrears should be remitted, and that that which had been
    paid should be deducted from the principal.

*88* XXV. Sed utilitatum comparatio, quoniam hic locus erat quartus, a
Panaetio praetermissus, saepe est necessaria. Nam et corporis commoda
cum externis [et externa cum corporis][261] et ipsa inter se corporis et
externa cum externis comparari solent. Cum externis corporis hoc modo
comparantur, valere ut malis quam dives esse, [cum corporis externa hoc
modo, dives esse potius quam maximis corporis viribus,][262] ipsa inter
se corporis sic, ut bona valetudo voluptati anteponatur, vires
celeritati, externorum autem, ut gloria divitiis, vectigalia urbana
rusticis. *89* Ex quo genere comparationis illud est Catonis senis: a
quo cum quaereretur, quid maxime in re familiari expediret, respondit:
"Bene pascere"; quid secundum: "Satis bene pascere"; quid tertium:[263]
"Male pascere"; quid quartum: "Arare"; et cum ille, qui quaesierat,
dixisset: "Quid faenerari?", tum Cato: "Quid hominem," inquit,
"occidere?"

Ex quo et multis aliis intellegi debet utilitatum comparationes fieri
solere, recteque hoc adiunctum esse quartum exquirendorum officiorum
genus.[264]

Reliqua deinceps persequemur.

    [261] [_et ... corporis_] bracketed by Unger, Edd.

    [262] [_cum corporis ... corporis viribus_] bracketed by
    Unger, Edd.

    [263] _quid tertium: "Male pascere"_ c p, Edd.; not in B H a
    b.

    [264] _officiorum genus._ Here follows in MSS. _Sed toto ...
    disputatum est_ transposed to § 87.

#Comparison of expediencies.#

*88* XXV. But it is often necessary to weigh one expediency against
another;--for this, as I stated, is a fourth point overlooked by
Panaetius. For not only are physical advantages regularly compared with
outward advantages [and outward, with physical], but physical advantages
are compared with one another, and outward with outward. Physical
advantages are compared with outward advantages in some such way as
this: one may ask whether it is more desirable to have health than
wealth; [external advantages with physical, thus: whether it is better
to have wealth than extraordinary bodily strength;] while the physical
advantages may be weighed against one another, so that good health is
preferred to sensual pleasure, strength to agility. Outward advantages
also may be weighed against one another: glory, for example, may be
preferred to riches, an income derived from city property to one derived
from the farm. *89* To this class of comparisons belongs that famous
saying of old Cato's: when he was asked what was the most profitable
feature of an estate, he replied: "Raising cattle successfully." What
next to that? "Raising cattle with fair success." And next? "Raising
cattle with but slight success." And fourth? "Raising crops." And when
his questioner said, "How about money-lending?" Cato replied: "How about
murder?"

From this as well as from many other incidents we ought to realize that
expediencies have often to be weighed against one another and that it is
proper for us to add this fourth division in the discussion of moral
duty.

Let us now pass on to the remaining problems.

CICERO DE OFFICIIS

BOOK III

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RIGHT AND THE EXPEDIENT

LIBER TERTIUS / BOOK III

*1* I. P. Scipionem, M.[265] fili, eum, qui primus Africanus appellatus
est, dicere solitum scripsit Cato, qui fuit eius fere aequalis, numquam
se minus otiosum esse, quam cum otiosus, nec minus solum, quam cum solus
esset. Magnifica vero vox et magno viro ac sapiente digna; quae declarat
illum et in otio de negotiis cogitare et in solitudine secum loqui
solitum, ut neque cessaret umquam et interdum colloquio alterius non
egeret. Ita duae res, quae languorem afferunt ceteris, illum acuebant,
otium et solitudo. Vellem nobis hoc idem vere dicere liceret; sed si
minus imitatione tantam ingenii praestantiam consequi possumus,
voluntate certe proxime accedimus; nam et a re publica forensibusque
negotiis armis impiis vique prohibiti otium persequimur et ob eam causam
urbe relicta rura peragrantes saepe soli sumus.

*2* Sed nec hoc otium cum Africani otio nec haec solitudo cum illa
comparanda est. Ille enim requiescens a rei publicae pulcherrimis
muneribus otium sibi sumebat aliquando et e[266] coetu hominum
frequentiaque interdum tamquam in portum se in solitudinem recipiebat,
nostrum autem otium negotii inopia, non requiescendi studio constitutum
est. Exstincto enim senatu deletisque iudiciis quid est quod dignum
nobis aut in curia aut in foro agere possimus? *3* Ita, qui in maxima
celebritate atque in oculis civium quondam vixerimus, nunc fugientes
conspectum sceleratorum, quibus omnia redundant, abdimus nos, quantum
licet, et saepe soli sumus. Sed quia sic ab hominibus doctis accepimus,
non solum ex malis eligere minima oportere, sed etiam excerpere ex his
ipsis,[267] si quid inesset boni, propterea et otio fruor, non illo
quidem, quo debebat is,[268] qui quondam peperisset otium civitati, nec
eam solitudinem languere patior, quam mihi affert necessitas, non
voluntas.

*4* Quamquam Africanus maiorem laudem meo iudicio assequebatur. Nulla
enim eius ingenii monumenta mandata litteris, nullum opus otii, nullum
solitudinis munus exstat; ex quo intellegi debet illum mentis agitatione
investigationeque earum rerum, quas cogitando consequebatur, nec otiosum
nec solum umquam fuisse; nos autem, qui non tantum roboris habemus, ut
cogitatione tacita a[269] solitudine abstrahamur, ad hanc scribendi
operam omne studium curamque convertimus. Itaque plura brevi tempore
eversa quam multis annis stante re publica scripsimus.

    [265] _M._ Nonius; _Marce_ MSS.

    [266] _e_ c, Edd.; _a_ a; not in B H b.

    [267] _ex his ipsis_ c, Edd.; _ex his_ a; _ex ipsis_ B H b.

    [268] _debebat is_ c, Edd.; _debeat_ B H b; _debeat is_ corr.
    in _debeat_ a.

    [269] _a_ c, Edd.; not in B H a b.

#Preface: Scipio and Cicero.#

*1* I. Cato, who was of about the same years, Marcus, my son, as that
Publius Scipio who first bore the surname of Africanus, has given us the
statement that Scipio used to say that he was never less idle than when
he had nothing to do and never less lonely than when he was alone. An
admirable sentiment, in truth, and becoming to a great and wise man. It
shows that even in his leisure hours his thoughts were occupied with
public business and that he used to commune with himself when alone; and
so not only was he never unoccupied, but he sometimes had no need for
company. The two conditions, then, that prompt others to
idleness--leisure and solitude--only spurred him on. I wish I could say
the same of myself and say it truly. But if by imitation I cannot attain
to such excellence of character, in aspiration, at all events, I
approach it as nearly as I can; for as I am kept by force of armed
treason away from practical politics and from my practice at the bar, I
am now leading a life of leisure. For that reason I have left the city
and, wandering in the country from place to place, I am often alone.

*2* But I should not compare this leisure of mine with that of
Africanus, nor this solitude with his. For he, to find leisure from his
splendid services to his country, used to take a vacation now and then
and to retreat from the assemblies and the throngs of men into solitude,
as into a haven of rest. #The orator's retirement.# But my leisure is
forced upon me by want of public business, not prompted by any desire
for repose. For now that the senate has been abolished and the courts
have been closed, what is there, in keeping with my self-respect, that I
can do either in the senate-chamber or in the forum? *3* So, although I
once lived amid throngs of people and in the greatest publicity, I am
now shunning the sight of the miscreants with whom the world abounds and
withdrawing from the public eye as far as I may, and I am often alone.
But I have learned from philosophers that among evils one ought not only
to choose the least, but also to extract even from these any element of
good that they may contain. For that reason, I am turning my leisure to
account--though it is not such repose as the man should be entitled to
who once brought the state repose from civil strife--and I am not
letting this solitude, which necessity and not my will imposes on me,
find me idle.

*4* And yet, in my judgment, Africanus earned the higher praise. For no
literary monuments of his genius have been published, we have no work
produced in his leisure hours, no product of his solitude. From this
fact we may safely infer that, because of the activity of his mind and
the study of those problems to which he used to direct his thought, he
was never unoccupied, never lonely. But I have not strength of mind
enough by means of silent meditation to forget my solitude; and so I
have turned all my attention and endeavour to this kind of literary
work. I have, accordingly, written more in this short time since the
downfall of the republic than I did in the course of many years, while
the republic stood.

*5* II. Sed cum tota philosophia, mi Cicero, frugifera et fructuosa nec
ulla pars eius inculta ac deserta sit, tum nullus feracior in ea locus
est nec uberior[270] quam de officiis, a quibus constanter honesteque
vivendi praecepta ducuntur. Quare, quamquam a Cratippo nostro, principe
huius memoriae philosophorum, haec te assidue audire atque accipere
confido, tamen conducere arbitror talibus aures tuas vocibus undique
circumsonare, nec eas, si fieri possit, quicquam aliud audire. *6* Quod
cum omnibus est faciendum, qui vitam honestam ingredi cogitant, tum haud
scio an nemini potius quam tibi; sustines enim non parvam exspectationem
imitandae industriae nostrae, magnam honorum, non nullam fortasse
nominis. Suscepisti onus praeterea grave et Athenarum et Cratippi; ad
quos cum tamquam ad mercaturam bonarum artium sis profectus, inanem
redire turpissimum est dedecorantem et urbis auctoritatem et magistri.
Quare, quantum coniti animo potes, quantum labore contendere, si
discendi labor est potius quam voluptas, tantum fac ut efficias neve
committas, ut, cum[271] omnia suppeditata sint a nobis, tute tibi
defuisse videare.

Sed haec hactenus; multa enim saepe ad te cohortandi gratia scripsimus;
nunc ad reliquam partem propositae divisionis revertamur.

*7* Panaetius igitur, qui sine controversia de officiis accuratissime
disputavit, quemque nos correctione quadam adhibita potissimum secuti
sumus, tribus generibus propositis, in quibus deliberare homines et
consultare de officio solerent, uno, cum dubitarent, honestumne id
esset, de quo ageretur, an turpe, altero, utilene esset an inutile,
tertio, si id, quod speciem haberet honesti, pugnaret cum eo, quod utile
videretur, quo modo ea discerni oporteret, de duobus generibus primis
tribus libris explicavit, de tertio autem genere deinceps se scripsit
dicturum nec exsolvit id, quod promiserat. *8* Quod eo magis miror, quia
scriptum a discipulo eius Posidonio est triginta annis vixisse
Panaetium, posteaquam illos libros edidisset. Quem locum miror a
Posidonio breviter esse tactum in quibusdam commentariis, praesertim cum
scribat nullum esse locum in tota philosophia tam necessarium.

*9* Minime vero assentior iis, qui negant eum locum a Panaetio
praetermissum, sed consulto relictum, nec omnino scribendum fuisse, quia
numquam posset utilitas cum honestate pugnare. De quo alterum potest
habere dubitationem, adhibendumne fuerit hoc genus, quod in divisione
Panaeti tertium est, an plane omittendum, alterum dubitari non potest,
quin a Panaetio susceptum sit, sed relictum. Nam qui e divisione
tripertita duas partes absolverit, huic necesse est restare tertiam;
praeterea in extremo libro tertio de hac parte pollicetur se deinceps
esse dicturum. *10* Accedit eodem testis locuples Posidonius, qui etiam
scribit in quadam epistula P. Rutilium Rufum dicere solere, qui
Panaetium audierat, ut nemo pictor esset inventus, qui in Coa Venere eam
partem, quam Apelles inchoatam reliquisset, absolveret (oris enim
pulchritudo reliqui corporis imitandi spem auferebat), sic ea, quae
Panaetius praetermisisset [et non perfecisset][272] propter eorum, quae
perfecisset, praestantiam neminem persecutum.

    [270] _uberior_ c, Edd.; _uerior_ B H a b.

    [271] _ut, cum_ c, Edd.; _ut ne, cum_ B H a b.

    [272] _et non perfecisset_ MSS.; del. Muretus; bracketed by
    Edd.

#Young Cicero admonished to diligence in his studies.#

*5* II. But, my dear Cicero, while the whole field of philosophy is
fertile and productive and no portion of it barren and waste, still no
part is richer or more fruitful than that which deals with moral duties;
for from these are derived the rules for leading a consistent and moral
life. And therefore, although you are, as I trust, diligently studying
and profiting by these precepts under the direction of our friend
Cratippus, the foremost philosopher of the present age, I still think it
well that your ears should be dinned with such precepts from every side
and that, if it could be, they should hear nothing else. *6* These
precepts must be laid to heart by all who look forward to a career of
honour, and I am inclined to think that no one needs them more than you.
For you will have to fulfil the eager anticipation that you will imitate
my industry, the confident expectation that you will emulate my course
of political honours, and the hope that you will, perhaps, rival my name
and fame. You have, besides, incurred a heavy responsibility on account
of Athens and Cratippus: for since you have gone to them for the
purchase, as it were, of a store of liberal culture, it would be a great
discredit to you to return empty-handed, thereby disgracing the high
reputation of the city and of your master. Therefore, put forth the best
mental effort of which you are capable; work as hard as you can (if
learning is work rather than pleasure); do your very best to succeed;
and do not, when I have put all the necessary means at your disposal,
allow it to be said that you have failed to do your part.

But enough of this. For I have written again and again for your
encouragement. Let us now return to the remaining section of our
subject as outlined.

#Panaetius on Moral Duties.#

*7* Panaetius, then, has given us what is unquestionably the most
thorough discussion of moral duties that we have, and I have followed
him in the main--but with slight modifications. He classifies under
three general heads the ethical problems which people are accustomed to
consider and weigh: first, the question whether the matter in hand is
morally right or morally wrong; second, whether it is expedient or
inexpedient; third, how a decision ought to be reached, in case that
which has the appearance of being morally right clashes with that which
seems to be expedient. He has treated the first two heads at length in
three books; but while he has stated that he meant to discuss the third
head in its proper turn, he has never fulfilled his promise. *8* And I
wonder the more at this, because Posidonius, a pupil of his, records
that Panaetius was still alive thirty years after he published those
three books. And I am surprised that Posidonius has but briefly touched
upon this subject in certain memoirs of his, and especially, as he
states that there is no other topic in the whole range of philosophy so
essentially important as this.

#Why Panaetius omitted the "Conflict" of the moral and the expedient.#

*9* Now, I cannot possibly accept the view of those who say that that
point was not overlooked but purposely omitted by Panaetius, and that it
was not one that ever needed discussion, because there never can be such
a thing as a conflict between expediency and moral rectitude. But with
regard to this assertion, the one point may admit of doubt--whether that
question which is third in Panaetius's classification ought to have been
included or omitted altogether; but the other point is not open to
debate--that it was included in Panaetius's plan but left unwritten. For
if a writer has finished two divisions of a threefold subject, the third
must necessarily remain for him to do. Besides, he promises at the close
of the third book that he will discuss this division also in its proper
turn. *10* We have also in Posidonius a competent witness to the fact.
He writes in one of his letters that Publius Rutilius Rufus, who also
was a pupil of Panaetius's, used to say that "as no painter had been
found to complete that part of the Venus of Cos which Apelles had left
unfinished (for the beauty of her face made hopeless any attempt
adequately to represent the rest of the figure), so no one, because of
the surpassing excellence of what Panaetius did complete, would venture
to supply what he had left undone."

*11* III. Quam ob rem de iudicio Panaeti dubitari non potest; rectene
autem hanc tertiam partem ad exquirendum officium adiunxerit an secus,
de eo fortasse disputari potest. Nam, sive honestum solum bonum est, ut
Stoicis placet, sive, quod honestum est, id ita summum bonum est, quem
ad modum Peripateticis vestris videtur, ut omnia ex altera parte
collocata vix minimi momenti instar habeant, dubitandum non est, quin
numquam possit utilitas cum honestate contendere. Itaque accepimus
Socratem exsecrari solitum eos, qui primum haec natura cohaerentia
opinione distraxissent. Cui quidem ita sunt Stoici assensi, ut et,
quicquid honestum esset, id utile esse censerent nec utile quicquam,
quod non honestum.

*12* Quodsi is esset Panaetius, qui virtutem propterea colendam diceret,
quod ea efficiens utilitatis esset, ut ii, qui res expetendas vel
voluptate vel indolentia metiuntur, liceret ei dicere utilitatem
aliquando cum honestate pugnare; sed cum sit is, qui id solum bonum
iudicet, quod honestum sit, quae autem huic repugnent specie quadam
utilitatis, eorum neque accessione meliorem vitam fieri nec decessione
peiorem, non videtur debuisse eius modi deliberationem introducere, in
qua, quod utile videretur, cum eo, quod honestum est, compararetur. *13*
Etenim quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, convenienter naturae vivere,
id habet hanc, ut opinor, sententiam: cum virtute congruere semper,
cetera autem, quae secundum naturam essent, ita legere, si ea virtuti
non repugnarent. Quod cum ita sit, putant quidam hanc comparationem non
recte introductam, nec omnino de eo genere quicquam praecipiendum
fuisse.

Atque[273] illud quidem honestum, quod proprie vereque dicitur, id in
sapientibus est solis neque a virtute divelli umquam potest; in iis
autem, in quibus sapientia perfecta non est, ipsum illud quidem
perfectum honestum nullo modo, similitudines honesti esse possunt. *14*
Haec enim officia, de quibus his libris disputamus, media Stoici
appellant; ea communia sunt et late patent; quae et ingenii bonitate
multi assequuntur et progressione discendi. Illud autem officium, quod
rectum idem appellant, perfectum atque absolutum est et, ut idem dicunt,
omnes numeros habet nec praeter sapientem cadere in quemquam potest.
*15* Cum autem aliquid actum est, in quo media officia compareant,[274]
id cumulate videtur esse perfectum, propterea quod volgus, quid absit a
perfecto, non fere intellegit; quatenus autem intellegit, nihil putat
praetermissum; quod idem[275] in poematis, in picturis usu venit in
aliisque compluribus, ut delectentur imperiti laudentque ea, quae
laudanda non sint, ob eam, credo, causam, quod insit in iis[276] aliquid
probi, quod capiat ignaros, qui quidem,[277] quid in una quaque re vitii
sit, nequeant iudicare; itaque, cum sunt docti a peritis, desistunt
facile sententia.

    [273] _Atque_ MSS., Bt.^1, Müller, Heine; _atqui_ Fleckeisen,
    Bt.^2, Ed.

    [274] _compareant_ Anemoecius, Edd.; _comparant_ B H a b;
    _appareant_ c; _comparent_ p.

    [275] _idem_ Nonius, Müller, Heine; _autem_ B H a b; _item_
    c, Bt.

    [276] _iis_ Baiter, Müller, Heine; _his_ B H a b; _hijs_ c.

    [277] _qui quidem_ many MSS., Bt.^1, Müller; _qui idem_ B H a
    b c; _qui [idem]_ Bt.^2, Heine.

#The conflict between Expediency and Moral Rectitude only apparent.#

*11* III. In regard to Panaetius's real intentions, therefore, no doubt
can be entertained. But whether he was or was not justified in adding
this third division to the inquiry about duty may, perhaps, be a matter
for debate. For whether moral goodness is the only good, as the Stoics
believe, or whether, as your Peripatetics think, moral goodness is in so
far the highest good that everything else gathered together into the
opposing scale would have scarcely the slightest weight, it is beyond
question that expediency can never conflict with moral rectitude. And
so, we have heard, Socrates used to pronounce a curse upon those who
first drew a conceptual distinction between things naturally
inseparable. With this doctrine the Stoics are in agreement in so far as
they maintain that if anything is morally right, it is expedient, and
if anything is not morally right, it is not expedient.

*12* But if Panaetius were the sort of man to say that virtue is worth
cultivating only because it is productive of advantage, as do certain
philosophers who measure the desirableness of things by the standard of
pleasure or of absence of pain, he might argue that expediency sometimes
clashes with moral rectitude. But since he is a man who judges that the
morally right is the only good, and that those things which come in
conflict with it have only the appearance of expediency and cannot make
life any better by their presence nor any worse by their absence, it
follows that he ought not to have raised a question involving the
weighing of what seems expedient against what is morally right. *13*
Furthermore, when the Stoics speak of the supreme good as "living
conformably to nature," they mean, as I take it, something like this:
that we are always to be in accord with virtue, and from all other
things that may be in harmony with nature to choose only such as are not
incompatible with virtue. This being so, some people are of the opinion
that it was not right to introduce this counterbalancing of right and
expediency and that no practical instruction should have been given on
this question at all.

And yet moral goodness, in the true and proper sense of the term, is the
exclusive possession of the wise and can never be separated from virtue;
but those who have not perfect wisdom cannot possibly have perfect moral
goodness, but only a semblance of it. *14* #The "absolute" and the
"mean."# And indeed these duties under discussion in these books the
Stoics call "mean duties"[BB]; they are a common possession and have
wide application; and many people attain to the knowledge of them
through natural goodness of heart and through advancement in learning.
But that duty which those same Stoics call "right" is perfect and
absolute and "satisfies all the numbers,"[BC] as that same school says,
and is attainable by none except the wise man. *15* On the other hand,
when some act is performed in which we see "mean" duties manifested,
that is generally regarded as fully perfect, for the reason that the
common crowd does not, as a rule, comprehend how far it falls short of
real perfection; but as far as their comprehension does go, they think
there is no deficiency. This same thing ordinarily occurs in the
estimation of poems, paintings, and a great many other works of art:
ordinary people enjoy and praise things that do not deserve praise. The
reason for this, I suppose, is that those productions have some point of
excellence which catches the fancy of the uneducated, because these have
not the ability to discover the points of weakness in any particular
piece of work before them. And so, when they are instructed by experts,
they readily abandon their former opinion.

    [BB] See note on I, 8.

    [BC] I.e., fills all the requirements of absolute
    perfection--an allusion to the Pythagorean doctrine that
    specific numbers stand for perfection of specific kinds;
    "absolute duty" combines them all.

IV. Haec igitur officia, de quibus his libris disserimus, quasi secunda
quaedam honesta esse dicunt, non sapientium modo propria, sed cum omni
hominum genere communia. *16* Itaque iis omnes, in quibus est virtutis
indoles, commoventur. Nec vero, cum duo Decii aut duo Scipiones fortes
viri commemorantur, aut cum Fabricius [aut Aristides][278] iustus
nominatur, aut ab illis fortitudinis aut ab hoc[279] iustitiae tamquam a
sapiente petitur exemplum; nemo enim horum sic sapiens, ut sapientem
volumus intellegi, nec ii, qui sapientes habiti et nominati, M. Cato et
C. Laelius, sapientes fuerunt, ne illi quidem septem, sed ex mediorum
officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque
sapientium.

*17* Quocirca nec id, quod vere honestum est, fas est cum utilitatis
repugnantia comparari, nec id, quod communiter appellamus honestum, quod
colitur ab iis, qui bonos se viros haberi volunt, cum emolumentis umquam
est comparandum, tamque id honestum, quod in nostram intellegentiam
cadit, tuendum conservandumque nobis est quam illud, quod proprie
dicitur vereque est honestum, sapientibus; aliter enim teneri non
potest, si qua ad virtutem est facta progressio.

Sed haec quidem de iis, qui conservatione officiorum existimantur boni.

*18* Qui autem omnia metiuntur emolumentis et commodis neque ea volunt
praeponderari honestate, ii solent in deliberando honestum cum eo, quod
utile putant, comparare, boni viri non solent. Itaque existimo
Panaetium, cum dixerit homines solere in hac comparatione dubitare, hoc
ipsum sensisse, quod dixerit, "solere" modo, non etiam "oportere."
Etenim non modo pluris putare, quod utile videatur, quam quod honestum
sit,[280] sed etiam haec inter se comparare et in his addubitare
turpissimum est.

Quid ergo est, quod non numquam dubitationem afferre soleat
considerandumque videatur? Credo, si quando dubitatio accidit, quale sit
id, de quo consideretur. *19* Saepe enim tempore fit, ut, quod turpe
plerumque haberi soleat, inveniatur non esse turpe; exempli causa
ponatur aliquid, quod pateat latius: Quod potest maius esse[281] scelus
quam non modo hominem, sed etiam familiarem hominem occidere? Num igitur
se astrinxit scelere, si qui tyrannum occidit quamvis familiarem? Populo
quidem Romano non videtur, qui ex omnibus praeclaris factis illud
pulcherrimum existimat. Vicit ergo utilitas honestatem? Immo vero
honestas utilitatem secuta est.[282]

Itaque, ut sine ullo errore diiudicare possimus, si quando cum illo,
quod honestum intellegimus, pugnare id videbitur, quod appellamus utile,
formula quaedam constituenda est; quam si sequemur in comparatione
rerum, ab officio numquam recedemus. *20* Erit autem haec formula
Stoicorum rationi disciplinaeque maxime consentanea; quam quidem his
libris propterea sequimur, quod, quamquam et a veteribus Academicis et a
Peripateticis vestris, qui quondam idem erant, qui Academici, quae
honesta sunt, anteponuntur iis, quae videntur utilia, tamen splendidius
haec ab eis disseruntur,[283] quibus, quicquid honestum est, idem utile
videtur nec utile quicquam, quod non honestum, quam ab iis,[284] quibus
et honestum aliquid non utile et utile[285] non honestum. Nobis autem
nostra Academia magnam licentiam dat, ut, quodcumque maxime probabile
occurrat, id nostro iure liceat defendere. Sed redeo ad formulam.

    [278] _aut Aristides_ (_Aristidesve_ p) MSS., Lactantius;
    bracketed by J. M. Heusinger, Edd.

    [279] _hoc_ Lactantius, Edd., _his_ MSS.

    [280] _sit_ c, Bt.^2, Müller; not in B H a b, Bt.^1; _est_
    Heine.

    [281] _esse_ c, Edd.; not in B H a b.

    [282] _utilitatem secuta est_ MSS., Müller, Heine;
    _utilitatem; honestatem utilitas secuta est_ Baiter, Ed.

    [283] _disseruntur_ certain MSS., C. Lange and Fr. Fabricius,
    Müller, Heine; _disserentur_ MSS., Bt.

    [284] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ (_hijs_ c) MSS.

    [285] _et honestum ... et utile_ Lambinus, Bt.^2, Müller,
    Heine, _et honestum ... aut utile_ B H a b; _aut honestum ...
    aut utile_ c, Bt.^1

#Absolute goodness and imperfect humanity.#

IV. The performance of the duties, then, which I am discussing in these
books, is called by the Stoics a sort of second-grade moral goodness,
not the peculiar property of their wise men, but shared by them with all
mankind. *16* Accordingly, such duties appeal to all men who have a
natural disposition to virtue. And when the two Decii or the two Scipios
are mentioned as "brave men" or Fabricius [or Aristides] is called "the
just," it is not at all that the former are quoted as perfect models of
courage or the latter as a perfect model of justice, as if we had in one
of them the ideal "wise man." For no one of them was wise in the sense
in which we wish to have "wise" understood; neither were Marcus Cato and
Gaius Laelius wise, though they were so considered and were surnamed
"the wise." Not even the famous Seven were "wise." But because of their
constant observance of "mean" duties they bore a certain semblance and
likeness to wise men.

*17* For these reasons it is unlawful either to weigh true morality
against conflicting expediency, or common morality, which is cultivated
by those who wish to be considered good men, against what is profitable;
but we every-day people must observe and live up to that moral right
which comes within the range of our comprehension as jealously as the
truly wise men have to observe and live up to that which is morally
right in the technical and true sense of the word. For otherwise we
cannot maintain such progress as we have made in the direction of
virtue.

So much for those who have won a reputation for being good men by their
careful observance of duty.

#Moral rectitude and apparent expediency.#

*18* Those, on the other hand, who measure everything by a standard of
profits and personal advantage and refuse to have these outweighed by
considerations of moral rectitude are accustomed, in considering any
question, to weigh the morally right against what they think the
expedient; good men are not. And so I believe that when Panaetius stated
that people were accustomed to hesitate to do such weighing, he meant
precisely what he said--merely that "such was their custom," not that
such was their duty. And he gave it no approval; for it is most immoral
to think more highly of the apparently expedient than of the morally
right, or even to set these over against each other and to hesitate to
choose between them.

#Occasion for doubt.#

What, then, is it that may sometimes give room for a doubt and seem to
call for consideration? It is, I believe, when a question arises as to
the character of an action under consideration. *19* For it often
happens, owing to exceptional circumstances, that what is accustomed
under ordinary circumstances to be considered morally wrong is found not
to be morally wrong. For the sake of illustration, let us assume some
particular case that admits of wider application: what more atrocious
crime can there be than to kill a fellow-man, and especially an intimate
friend? But if anyone kills a tyrant--be he never so intimate a
friend--he has not laden his soul with guilt, has he? The Roman People,
at all events, are not of that opinion; for of all glorious deeds they
hold such an one to be the most noble. Has expediency, then, prevailed
over moral rectitude? Not at all; moral rectitude has gone hand in hand
with expediency.

#Need of a rule for guidance.#

Some general rule, therefore, should be laid down to enable us to decide
without error, whenever what we call the expedient seems to clash with
what we feel to be morally right; and if we follow that rule in
comparing courses of conduct, we shall never swerve from the path of
duty. *20* That rule, moreover, shall be in perfect harmony with the
Stoics' system and doctrines. It is their teachings that I am following
in these books, and for this reason: the older Academicians and your
Peripatetics (who were once the same as the Academicians) give what is
morally right the preference over what seems expedient; and yet the
discussion of these problems, if conducted by those who consider
whatever is morally right also expedient and nothing expedient that is
not at the same time morally right, will be more illuminating than if
conducted by those who think that something not expedient may be morally
right and that something not morally right may be expedient. But our New
Academy allows us wide liberty, so that it is within my right to defend
any theory that presents itself to me as most probable. But to return to
my rule.

*21* V. Detrahere igitur alteri aliquid et hominem hominis incommodo
suum commodum augere magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas,
quam dolor, quam cetera, quae possunt aut corpori accidere aut rebus
externis. Nam principio tollit convictum humanum et societatem. Si enim
sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet aut
violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est, eam quae maxime est secundum
naturam, humani generis societatem. *22* Ut, si unum quodque membrum
sensum hunc haberet, ut posse putaret se valere, si proximi membri
valetudinem ad se traduxisset, debilitari et interire totum corpus
necesse esset, sic, si unus quisque nostrum ad se rapiat commoda aliorum
detrahatque, quod cuique possit, emolumenti sui gratia, societas hominum
et communitas evertatur necesse est. Nam sibi ut quisque malit, quod ad
usum vitae pertineat, quam alteri acquirere, concessum est non
repugnante natura, illud natura non patitur, ut aliorum spoliis nostras
facultates, copias, opes augeamus.

*23* Neque vero hoc solum natura, id est iure gentium, sed etiam legibus
populorum, quibus in singulis civitatibus res publica continetur, eodem
modo constitutum est, ut non liceat sui commodi causa nocere alteri; hoc
enim spectant leges, hoc volunt, incolumem esse civium coniunctionem;
quam qui dirimunt, eos morte, exsilio, vinclis, damno coërcent.

Atque hoc multo magis efficit ipsa naturae ratio, quae est lex divina et
humana; cui parere qui velit (omnes autem parebunt, qui secundum naturam
volent vivere), numquam committet, ut alienum appetat et id, quod alteri
detraxerit, sibi adsumat. *24* Etenim multo magis est secundum naturam
excelsitas animi et magnitudo itemque comitas, iustitia, liberalitas
quam voluptas, quam vita, quam divitiae; quae quidem contemnere et pro
nihilo ducere comparantem cum utilitate communi magni animi et excelsi
est. [Detrahere autem de altero sui commodi causa magis est contra
naturam quam mors, quam dolor, quam cetera generis eiusdem.][286]

*25* Itemque magis est secundum naturam pro omnibus gentibus, si fieri
possit, conservandis aut iuvandis maximos labores molestiasque suscipere
imitantem Herculem illum, quem hominum fama beneficiorum memor in
concilio caelestium collocavit, quam vivere in solitudine non modo sine
ullis molestiis, sed etiam in maximis voluptatibus abundantem omnibus
copiis, ut excellas etiam pulchritudine et viribus.

Quocirca optimo quisque et splendidissimo ingenio longe illam vitam huic
anteponit. Ex quo efficitur hominem naturae oboedientem homini nocere
non posse.

*26* Deinde, qui alterum violat, ut ipse aliquid commodi consequatur,
aut nihil existimat se facere contra naturam aut magis fugiendam[287]
censet mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, amissionem etiam liberorum,
propinquorum, amicorum quam facere cuiquam iniuriam. Si nihil existimat
contra naturam fieri hominibus violandis, quid cum eo disseras, qui
omnino hominem ex homine tollat? sin fugiendum id quidem censet,
sed[288] multo illa peiora, mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, errat in eo,
quod ullum aut corporis aut fortunae vitium vitiis animi gravius
existimat.

    [286] _Detrahere ... generis eiusdem_ MSS.; bracketed by
    Baiter, Edd.

    [287] _fugiendam_ b, Ed.; _fugienda_ B H a c.

    [288] _sed_ c, Edd.; _et_ B H a b.

#Wrongful gains are against the laws:#

#(1) of nature,#

*21* V. Well then, for a man to take something from his neighbour and to
profit by his neighbour's loss is more contrary to nature than is death
or poverty or pain or anything else that can affect either our person or
our property. For, in the first place, injustice is fatal to social life
and fellowship between man and man. For if we are so disposed that each,
to gain some personal profit, will defraud or injure his neighbour, then
those bonds of human society, which are most in accord with nature's
laws, must of necessity be broken. *22* Suppose, by way of comparison,
that each one of our bodily members should conceive this idea and
imagine that it could be strong and well if it should draw off to itself
the health and strength of its neighbouring member, the whole body would
necessarily be enfeebled and die; so, if each one of us should seize
upon the property of his neighbours and take from each whatever he could
appropriate to his own use, the bonds of human society must inevitably
be annihilated. For, without any conflict with nature's laws, it is
granted that everybody may prefer to secure for himself rather than for
his neighbour what is essential for the conduct of life; but nature's
laws do forbid us to increase our means, wealth, and resources by
despoiling others.

#(2) of nations,#

*23* But this principle is established not by nature's laws alone (that
is, by the common rules of equity), but also by the statutes of
particular communities, in accordance with which in individual states
the public interests are maintained. In all these it is with one accord
ordained that no man shall be allowed for the sake of his own advantage
to injure his neighbour. For it is to this that the laws have regard;
this is their intent, that the bonds of union between citizens should
not be impaired; and any attempt to destroy these bonds is repressed by
the penalty of death, exile, imprisonment, or fine.

#(3) of gods and men.#

Again, this principle follows much more effectually directly from the
Reason which is in Nature, which is the law of gods and men. If anyone
will hearken to that voice (and all will hearken to it who wish to live
in accord with nature's laws), he will never be guilty of coveting
anything that is his neighbour's or of appropriating to himself what he
has taken from his neighbour. *24* Then, too, loftiness and greatness of
spirit, and courtesy, justice, and generosity are much more in harmony
with nature than are selfish pleasure, riches, and life itself; but it
requires a great and lofty spirit to despise these latter and count them
as naught, when one weighs them over against the common weal.
#Self-seeking _vs._ self-sacrifice.# [But for anyone to rob his
neighbour for his own profit is more contrary to nature than death,
pain, and the like.]

*25* In like manner it is more in accord with nature to emulate the
great Hercules and undergo the greatest toil and trouble for the sake of
aiding or saving the world, if possible, than to live in seclusion, not
only free from all care, but revelling in pleasures and abounding in
wealth, while excelling others also in beauty and strength. Thus
Hercules denied himself and underwent toil and tribulation for the
world, and, out of gratitude for his services, popular belief has given
him a place in the council of the gods.

The better and more noble, therefore, the character with which a man is
endowed, the more does he prefer the life of service to the life of
pleasure. Whence it follows that man, if he is obedient to nature,
cannot do harm to his fellow-man.

*26* Finally, if a man wrongs his neighbour to gain some advantage for
himself, he must either imagine that he is not acting in defiance of
nature or he must believe that death, poverty, pain, or even the loss of
children, kinsmen, or friends, is more to be shunned than an act of
injustice against another. If he thinks he is not violating the laws of
nature, when he wrongs his fellow-men, how is one to argue with the
individual who takes away from man all that makes him man? But if he
believes that while such a course should be avoided, the other
alternatives are much worse--namely, death, poverty, pain--he is
mistaken in thinking that any ills affecting either his person or his
property are more serious than those affecting his soul.

VI. Ergo unum debet esse omnibus propositum, ut eadem sit utilitas unius
cuiusque et universorum; quam si ad se quisque rapiet, dissolvetur omnis
humana consortio.

*27* Atque etiam, si hoc natura praescribit, ut homo homini, quicumque
sit, ob eam ipsam causam, quod is homo sit, consultum velit, necesse est
secundum eandem naturam omnium utilitatem esse communem. Quod si ita
est, una continemur omnes et eadem lege naturae, idque ipsum si ita est,
certe violare alterum naturae lege prohibemur. Verum autem primum; verum
igitur extremum. *28* Nam illud quidem absurdum est, quod quidam dicunt,
parenti se aut fratri nihil detracturos sui commodi causa, aliam
rationem esse civium reliquorum. Hi sibi nihil iuris, nullam societatem
communis utilitatis causa statuunt esse cum civibus, quae sententia
omnem societatem distrahit civitatis.

Qui autem civium rationem dicunt habendam, externorum negant, ii[289]
dirimunt communem humani generis societatem: qua sublata beneficentia,
liberalitas, bonitas, iustitia funditus tollitur; quae qui tollunt,
etiam adversus deos immortales impii iudicandi sunt. Ab iis enim
constitutam inter homines societatem evertunt, cuius societatis
artissimum vinculum est magis arbitrari esse contra naturam hominem
homini detrahere sui commodi causa quam omnia incommoda subire vel
externa vel corporis ... vel etiam ipsius animi, quae vacent
iustitia[290]; haec enim una virtus omnium est domina et regina
virtutum.

*29* Forsitan quispiam dixerit: Nonne igitur sapiens, si fame ipse
conficiatur, abstulerit cibum alteri homini ad nullam rem utili? [Minime
vero; non enim mihi est vita mea utilior quam animi talis affectio,
neminem ut violem commodi mei gratia.][291] Quid? si Phalarim, crudelem
tyrannum et immanem, vir bonus, ne ipse frigore conficiatur, vestitu
spoliare possit, nonne faciat?

*30* Haec ad iudicandum sunt facillima. Nam, si quid ab homine ad nullam
partem utili utilitatis tuae causa detraxeris, inhumane feceris
contraque naturae legem; sin autem is tu sis, qui multam utilitatem rei
publicae atque hominum societati, si in vita remaneas, afferre possis,
si quid ob eam causam alteri detraxeris, non sit reprehendendum. Sin
autem id non sit eius modi, suum cuique incommodum ferendum est potius
quam de alterius commodis detrahendum. Non igitur magis est contra
naturam morbus aut egestas aut quid eius modi quam detractio atque
appetitio alieni, sed communis utilitatis derelictio contra naturam est;
est enim iniusta. *31* Itaque lex ipsa naturae, quae utilitatem hominum
conservat et continet, decernet profecto, ut ab homine inerti atque
inutili ad sapientem, bonum, fortem virum transferantur res ad vivendum
necessariae, qui si occiderit, multum de communi utilitate detraxerit,
modo hoc ita faciat, ut ne ipse de se bene existimans seseque diligens
hanc causam habeat ad iniuriam. Ita semper officio fungetur utilitati
consulens hominum et ei, quam saepe commemoro, humanae societati.

*32* Nam quod ad Phalarim attinet, perfacile iudicium est. Nulla est
enim societas nobis cum tyrannis, et potius summa distractio est, neque
est contra naturam spoliare eum, si possis, quem est honestum necare,
atque hoc omne genus pestiferum atque impium ex hominum communitate
exterminandum est. Etenim, ut membra quaedam amputantur, si et ipsa
sanguine et tamquam spiritu carere coeperunt et nocent reliquis partibus
corporis, sic ista in figura hominis feritas et immanitas beluae a
communi tamquam humanitatis corpore[292] segreganda est.

Huius generis quaestiones sunt omnes eae, in quibus ex tempore officium
exquiritur.

    [289] _ii_ Bt., Ed.; _hi_ B a b; _hii_ H; _hij_ c.

    [290] _quae vacent iustitia_ MSS., Ed., Heine; _quae vacent
    iniustitia_ cod. Ubaldini, Bt.^1; _quae non v. iustitia_ O.

    [291] Bracketed by Unger, Edd.

    [292] _humanitatis corpore_ Muret, cod. Guelf., Ed., Bt.,
    Heine; _humanitate corporis_ MSS., Müller; Unger strikes out
    _corporis_.

#The interest of society is the interest of the individual.#

VI. This, then, ought to be the chief end of all men, to make the
interest of each individual and of the whole body politic identical. For
if the individual appropriates to selfish ends what should be devoted to
the common good, all human fellowship will be destroyed.

*27* And further, if nature ordains that one man shall desire to
promote the interests of a fellow-man, whoever he may be, just because
he is a fellow-man, then it follows, in accordance with that same
nature, that there are interests that all men have in common. And if
this is true, we are all subject to one and the same law of nature; and
if this also is true, we are certainly forbidden by nature's law to
wrong our neighbour. Now the first assumption is true; therefore the
conclusion is likewise true. *28* For that is an absurd position which
is taken by some people, who say that they will not rob a parent or a
brother for their own gain, but that their relation to the rest of their
fellow-citizens is quite another thing. Such people contend in essence
that they are bound to their fellow-citizens by no mutual obligations,
social ties, or common interests. This attitude demolishes the whole
structure of civil society.

#Better endure any loss than wrong a fellow man for gain.#

Others again who say that regard should be had for the rights of
fellow-citizens, but not of foreigners, would destroy the universal
brotherhood of mankind; and when this is annihilated, kindness,
generosity, goodness, and justice must utterly perish; and those who
work all this destruction must be considered as wickedly rebelling
against the immortal gods. For they uproot the fellowship which the gods
have established between human beings, and the closest bond of this
fellowship is the conviction that it is more repugnant to nature for man
to rob a fellow-man for his own gain than to endure all possible loss,
whether to his property or to his person ... or even to his very
soul--so far as these losses are not concerned with justice[BD]; for
this virtue is the sovereign mistress and queen of all the virtues.

*29* But, perhaps, some one may say: "Well, then, suppose a wise man
were starving to death, might he not take the bread of some perfectly
useless member of society?" [Not at all; for my life is not more
precious to me than that temper of soul which would keep me from doing
wrong to anybody for my own advantage.] "Or again; supposing a righteous
man were in a position to rob the cruel and inhuman tyrant Phalaris of
clothing, might he not do it to keep himself from freezing to death?"

*30* These cases are very easy to decide. For if merely for one's own
benefit one were to take something away from a man, though he were a
perfectly worthless fellow, it would be an act of meanness and contrary
to nature's law. #The interests of society must decide about
exceptions.# But suppose one would be able, by remaining alive, to
render signal service to the state and to human society--if from that
motive one should take something from another, it would not be a matter
for censure. But if such is not the case, each one must bear his own
burden of distress rather than rob a neighbour of his rights. We are not
to say, therefore, that sickness or want or any evil of that sort is
more repugnant to nature than to covet and to appropriate what is one's
neighbour's; but we do maintain that disregard of the common interests
is repugnant to nature; for it is unjust. *31* And therefore nature's
law itself, which protects and conserves human interests, will surely
determine that a man who is wise, good, and brave, should in emergency
have the necessaries of life transferred to him from a person who is
idle and worthless; for the good man's death would be a heavy loss to
the common weal; only let him beware that self-esteem and self-love do
not find in such a transfer of possessions a pretext for wrong-doing.
But thus guided in his decision, the good man will always perform his
duty, promoting the general interests of human society on which I am so
fond of dwelling.

#No duty due to a tyrant.#

*32* As for the case of Phalaris, a decision is quite simple: we have no
ties of fellowship with a tyrant, but rather the bitterest feud; and it
is not opposed to nature to rob, if one can, a man whom it is morally
right to kill;--nay, all that pestilent and abominable race should be
exterminated from human society. And this may be done by proper
measures; for as certain members are amputated, if they show signs
themselves of being bloodless and virtually lifeless and thus jeopardize
the health of the other parts of the body, so those fierce and savage
monsters in human form should be cut off from what may be called the
common body of humanity.

Of this sort are all those problems in which we have to determine what
moral duty is, as it varies with varying circumstances.

    [BD] I.e., there are no circumstances of loss or gain that
    can warrant a violation of justice.

*33* VII. Eius modi igitur credo res Panaetium persecuturum fuisse, nisi
aliqui casus aut occupatio eius consilium peremisset. Ad quas ipsas
consultationes superioribus libris satis multa praecepta sunt, ex
quibus[293] perspici possit, quid sit propter turpitudinem fugiendum,
quid sit, quod idcirco fugiendum non sit, quod omnino turpe non sit.

Sed quoniam operi inchoato, prope tamen absoluto tamquam fastigium
imponimus, ut geometrae solent non omnia docere, sed postulare, ut
quaedam sibi concedantur, quo facilius, quae volunt, explicent, sic ego
a te postulo, mi Cicero, ut mihi concedas, si potes, nihil praeter id,
quod honestum sit, propter se esse expetendum. Sin hoc non licet per
Cratippum, at illud certe dabis, quod honestum sit, id esse maxime
propter se expetendum. Mihi utrumvis satis est et tum hoc, tum illud
probabilius videtur nec praeterea quicquam probabile.

*34* Ac primum in hoc Panaetius defendendus est, quod non utilia cum
honestis pugnare aliquando posse dixerit (neque enim ei fas erat), sed
ea, quae viderentur utilia. Nihil vero utile, quod non idem honestum,
nihil honestum, quod non idem utile sit, saepe testatur negatque ullam
pestem maiorem in vitam hominum invasisse quam eorum opinionem, qui ista
distraxerint. Itaque, non ut aliquando anteponeremus utilia honestis,
sed ut ea sine errore diiudicaremus, si quando incidissent,[294] induxit
eam, quae videretur esse, non quae esset, repugnantiam. Hanc igitur
partem relictam explebimus nullis adminiculis, sed, ut dicitur, Marte
nostro. Neque enim quicquam est de hac parte post Panaetium explicatum,
quod quidem mihi probaretur, de iis, quae in manus meas venerunt.[295]

    [293] _superioribus ... ex quibus_ Walker, Bt.^2, Ed.; _ex
    superioribus ... quibus_ MSS., Bt.^1; _superioribus ...
    quibus_, Heine.

    [294] _ea ... incidissent_ MSS., Bt.^1, Heine, Ed.; _eam_
    [repugnantiam] ... _incidisset_ Unger, Bt.^2

    [295] _venerunt_ Manutius, Edd.; _venerint_ MSS.

*33* VII. It is subjects of this sort that I believe Panaetius would
have followed up, had not some accident or business interfered with his
design. For the elucidation of these very questions there are in his
former books rules in plenty, from which one can learn what should be
avoided because of its immorality and what does not have to be avoided
for the reason that it is not immoral at all.

We are now putting the capstone, as it were, upon our structure, which
is unfinished to be sure, but still almost completed; and as
mathematicians make a practice of not demonstrating every proposition
but require that certain axioms be assumed as true, in order more easily
to explain their meaning, so, my dear Cicero, I ask you to assume with
me, if you can, that nothing is worth the seeking for its own sake
except what is morally right. #Moral Right the only good or the chief
good.# But if Cratippus[BE] does not permit this assumption, you will
still grant this at least--that what is morally right is the object most
worth the seeking for its own sake. Either alternative is sufficient for
my purposes; first the one and then the other seems to me the more
probable; and besides these, there is no other alternative that seems
probable at all.[BF]

#Vindication of Panaetius: nothing can be expedient that is not morally
right.#

*34* In the first place, I must undertake the defence of Panaetius on
this point; for he has said not that the truly expedient could under
certain circumstances clash with the morally right (for he could not
have said that conscientiously[BG]), but only that what _seemed_
expedient could do so. For he often bears witness to the fact that
nothing is really expedient that is not at the same time morally right,
and nothing morally right that is not at the same time expedient; and he
says that no greater curse has ever assailed human life than the
doctrine of those who have separated these two conceptions. And so he
introduced an apparent, not a real, conflict between them, not to the
end that we should under certain circumstances give the expedient
preference over the moral, but that, in case they ever should get in
each other's way, we might decide between them without uncertainty. This
part, therefore, which was passed over by Panaetius, I will carry to
completion without any auxiliaries, but fighting my own battle, as the
saying is. For of all that has been worked out on this line since the
time of Panaetius, nothing that has come into my hands is at all
satisfactory to me.

    [BE] As a Peripatetic, Cratippus insisted that there was
    _natural_ good as well as _moral_ good; thus health, honour,
    etc., were good and worth seeking for their own sake, though
    in less degree than virtue. But the Stoics (and Cicero is now
    speaking as a Stoic) called all those other blessings not
    "good" nor "worth seeking for their own sake," but
    "indifferent."

    [BF] With this he waves aside, without even the honour of
    mentioning them, the Epicureans, Cyrenaics, etc.

    [BG] Because he was a Stoic.

*35* VIII. Cum igitur aliqua species utilitatis obiecta est, commoveri
necesse est; sed si, cum animum attenderis, turpitudinem videas
adiunctam ei rei, quae speciem utilitatis attulerit, tum non utilitas
relinquenda est, sed intellegendum, ubi turpitudo sit, ibi utilitatem
esse non posse. Quodsi nihil est tam contra naturam quam turpitudo
(recta enim et convenientia et constantia natura desiderat aspernaturque
contraria) nihilque tam secundum naturam quam utilitas, certe in eadem
re utilitas et turpitudo[296] esse non potest.

Itemque, si ad honestatem nati sumus eaque aut sola expetenda est, ut
Zenoni visum est, aut certe omni pondere gravior habenda quam reliqua
omnia, quod Aristoteli placet, necesse est, quod honestum sit, id esse
aut solum aut summum bonum; quod autem bonum, id certe utile: ita,
quicquid honestum, id utile.

*36* Quare error hominum non proborum, cum aliquid, quod utile visum
est, arripuit, id continuo secernit ab honesto. Hinc sicae, hinc venena,
hinc falsa testamenta nascuntur, hinc furta, peculatus, expilationes
direptionesque sociorum et civium, hinc opum nimiarum, potentiae non
ferendae, postremo etiam in liberis civitatibus regnandi exsistunt
cupiditates, quibus nihil nec taetrius nec foedius excogitari potest.
Emolumenta enim rerum fallacibus iudiciis vident, poenam non dico legum,
quam saepe perrumpunt, sed ipsius turpitudinis, quae acerbissima est,
non vident.

*37* Quam ob rem hoc quidem deliberantium genus pellatur e medio (est
enim totum sceleratum et impium), qui deliberant, utrum id sequantur,
quod honestum esse videant, an se scientes scelere contaminent; in ipsa
enim dubitatione facinus inest, etiamsi ad id non pervenerint. Ergo ea
deliberanda omnino non sunt, in quibus est turpis ipsa deliberatio.

Atque etiam ex omni deliberatione celandi et occultandi spes opinioque
removenda est. Satis enim nobis, si modo in philosophia aliquid
profecimus, persuasum esse debet, si omnes deos hominesque celare
possimus, nihil tamen avare, nihil iniuste, nihil libidinose, nihil
incontinenter esse faciendum.

    [296] _re utilitas et turp._ c, Edd.; _re utili turpitudo_ B
    H a b.

#Expediency and immorality incompatible.#

*35* VIII. Now when we meet with expediency in some specious form or
other, we cannot help being influenced by it. But if upon closer
inspection one sees that there is some immorality connected with what
presents the appearance of expediency, then one is not necessarily to
sacrifice expediency but to recognize that there can be no expediency
where there is immorality. But if there is nothing so repugnant to
nature as immorality (for nature demands right and harmony and
consistency and abhors their opposites), and if nothing is so thoroughly
in accord with nature as expediency, then surely expediency and
immorality cannot coexist in one and the same object.

#The morally right is also expedient.#

Again: if we are born for moral rectitude and if that is either the only
thing worth seeking, as Zeno thought, or at least to be esteemed as
infinitely outweighing everything else, as Aristotle holds, then it
necessarily follows that the morally right is either the sole good or
the supreme good. Now, that which is good is certainly expedient;
consequently, that which is morally right is also expedient.

#The evils resulting from contrary view.#

*36* Thus it is the error of men who are not strictly upright to seize
upon something that seems to be expedient and straightway to dissociate
that from the question of moral right. To this error the assassin's
dagger, the poisoned cup, the forged wills owe their origin; this gives
rise to theft, embezzlement of public funds, exploitation and plundering
of provincials and citizens; this engenders also the lust for excessive
wealth, for despotic power, and finally for making oneself king even in
the midst of a free people; and anything more atrocious or repulsive
than such a passion cannot be conceived. For with a false perspective
they see the material rewards but not the punishment--I do not mean the
penalty of the law, which they often escape, but the heaviest penalty of
all, their own demoralization.

*37* Away, then, with questioners of this sort (for their whole tribe is
wicked and ungodly), who stop to consider whether to pursue the course
which they see is morally right or to stain their hands with what they
know is crime. For there is guilt in their very deliberation, even
though they never reach the performance of the deed itself. Those
actions, therefore, should not be considered at all, the mere
consideration of which is itself morally wrong.

#Moral rectitude and secret sin.#

Furthermore, in any such consideration we must banish any vain hope and
thought that our action may be covered up and kept secret. For if we
have only made some real progress in the study of philosophy, we ought
to be quite convinced that, even though we may escape the eyes of gods
and men, we must still do nothing that savours of greed or of injustice,
of lust or of intemperance.

#Rep. II, 359 C#

*38* IX. Hinc ille Gyges inducitur a Platone, qui, cum terra
discessisset magnis quibusdam imbribus, descendit in illum hiatum
aëneumque equum, ut ferunt fabulae, animadvertit, cuius in lateribus
fores essent; quibus apertis corpus hominis mortui vidit magnitudine
invisitata[297] anulumque aureum in digito; quem ut detraxit, ipse
induit (erat autem regius pastor), tum in concilium se pastorum recepit.
Ibi cum palam eius anuli ad palmam converterat, a nullo videbatur, ipse
autem omnia videbat; idem rursus videbatur, cum in locum anulum
inverterat. Itaque hac opportunitate anuli usus reginae stuprum intulit
eaque adiutrice regem dominum interemit, sustulit, quos obstare
arbitrabatur, nec in his eum facinoribus quisquam potuit videre. Sic
repente anuli beneficio rex exortus est Lydiae.

Hunc igitur ipsum anulum si habeat sapiens, nihilo[298] plus sibi licere
putet peccare, quam si non haberet[299]; honesta enim bonis viris, non
occulta quaeruntur.

*39* Atque hoc loco philosophi quidam, minime mali illi quidem, sed non
satis acuti, fictam et commenticiam fabulam prolatam dicunt a Platone;
quasi vero ille aut factum id esse aut fieri potuisse defendat! Haec est
vis huius anuli et huius exempli: si nemo sciturus, nemo ne suspicaturus
quidem sit, cum aliquid divitiarum, potentiae, dominationis, libidinis
causa feceris, si id dis hominibusque futurum sit semper ignotum, sisne
facturus. Negant id fieri posse. Nequaquam[300] potest id quidem; sed
quaero, quod negant posse, id si posset, quidnam facerent. Urguent
rustice sane; negant enim posse et in eo perstant; hoc verbum quid
valeat, non vident. Cum enim quaerimus, si celare possint, quid facturi
sint, non quaerimus, possintne celare, sed tamquam tormenta quaedam
adhibemus, ut, si responderint se impunitate proposita facturos, quod
expediat, facinorosos se esse fateantur, si negent, omnia turpia per se
ipsa fugienda esse concedant.

Sed iam ad propositum revertamur.

    [297] _invisitata_ B H^1, Edd.; _inusitata_ H^2 a b c.

    [298] _ni(c)hilo_ c, Edd.; _nihil_ B H a b.

    [299] _peccare ... haberet_ MSS.; bracketed by Madv., Bt.

    [300] _nequaquam_ Manutius, Bt., Ed., Heine; _quamquam_ (and
    yet it is possible) MSS., Müller.

#The story of Gyges and his ring.#

*38* IX. By way of illustrating this truth Plato introduces the familiar
story of Gyges: Once upon a time the earth opened in consequence of
heavy rains; Gyges went down into the chasm and saw, so the story goes,
a horse of bronze; in its side was a door. On opening this door he saw
the body of a dead man of enormous size with a gold ring upon his
finger. He removed this and put it on his own hand and then repaired to
an assembly of the shepherds, for he was a shepherd of the king. As
often as he turned the bezel of the ring inwards toward the palm of his
hand, he became invisible to every one, while he himself saw everything;
but as often as he turned it back to its proper position, he became
visible again. And so, with the advantage which the ring gave him, he
debauched the queen, and with her assistance he murdered his royal
master and removed all those who he thought stood in his way, without
anyone's being able to detect him in his crimes. Thus, by virtue of the
ring, he shortly rose to be king of Lydia.

Now, suppose a wise man had just such a ring, he would not imagine that
he was free to do wrong any more than if he did not have it; for good
men aim to secure not secrecy but the right.

*39* And yet on this point certain philosophers, who are not at all
vicious but who are not very discerning, declare that the story related
by Plato is fictitious and imaginary. As if he affirmed that it was
actually true or even possible! #The moral of the story.# But the force
of the illustration of the ring is this: if nobody were to know or even
to suspect the truth, when you do anything to gain riches or power or
sovereignty or sensual gratification--if your act should be hidden for
ever from the knowledge of gods and men, would you do it? The condition,
they say, is impossible. Of course it is. But my question is, if that
were possible which they declare to be impossible, what, pray, would one
do? They press their point with right boorish obstinacy: they assert
that it is impossible and insist upon it; they refuse to see the meaning
of my words, "if possible." For when we ask what they would do, if they
could escape detection, we are not asking whether they can escape
detection; but we put them as it were upon the rack: should they answer
that, if impunity were assured, they would do what was most to their
selfish interest, that would be a confession that they are criminally
minded; should they say that they would not do so, they would be
granting that all things in and of themselves immoral should be avoided.

But let us now return to our theme.

*40* X. Incidunt multae saepe causae, quae conturbent animos utilitatis
specie, non cum hoc deliberetur, relinquendane sit honestas propter
utilitatis magnitudinem (nam id quidem improbum est), sed illud,
possitne id, quod utile videatur, fieri non turpiter. Cum Collatino
collegae Brutus imperium abrogabat, poterat videri facere id iniuste;
fuerat enim in regibus expellendis socius Bruti consiliorum et adiutor.
Cum autem consilium hoc principes cepissent, cognationem Superbi
nomenque Tarquiniorum et memoriam regni esse tollendam, quod erat utile,
patriae consulere, id erat ita honestum, ut etiam ipsi Collatino placere
deberet. Itaque utilitas valuit propter honestatem, sine qua ne utilitas
quidem esse potuisset.

At in eo rege, qui urbem condidit, non item; *41* species enim
utilitatis animum pepulit eius; cui cum visum esset utilius solum quam
cum altero regnare, fratrem interemit. Omisit his et pietatem et
humanitatem, ut id, quod utile videbatur neque erat, assequi posset, et
tamen muri causam[301] opposuit, speciem honestatis nec probabilem nec
sane idoneam. Peccavit igitur, pace vel Quirini vel Romuli dixerim.

*42* Nec tamen nostrae nobis utilitates omittendae sunt aliisque
tradendae, cum iis[302] ipsi egeamus, sed suae cuique utilitati, quod
sine alterius iniuria fiat, serviendum est. Scite Chrysippus, ut multa:
"Qui stadium," inquit, "currit, eniti et contendere debet, quam maxime
possit, ut vincat, supplantare eum, quicum[303] certet, aut manu
depellere nullo modo debet; sic in vita sibi quemque petere, quod
pertineat ad usum, non iniquum est, alteri deripere ius non est."

*43* Maxime autem perturbantur officia in amicitiis, quibus et non
tribuere, quod recte possis, et tribuere, quod non sit aequum, contra
officium est. Sed huius generis totius breve et non difficile praeceptum
est. Quae enim videntur utilia, honores, divitiae, voluptates, cetera
generis eiusdem, haec amicitiae numquam anteponenda sunt. At neque
contra rem publicam neque contra ius iurandum ac fidem amici causa vir
bonus faciet, ne si index quidem erit de ipso amico; ponit enim personam
amici, cum induit iudicis. Tantum dabit amicitiae, ut veram amici causam
esse malit, ut orandae litis tempus, quoad per leges liceat, accommodet.
*44* Cum vero iurato sententia dicenda erit,[304] meminerit deum se
adhibere[305] testem, id est, ut ego arbitror, mentem suam, qua nihil
homini dedit deus ipse divinius. Itaque praeclarum a maioribus accepimus
morem rogandi iudicis, si eum teneremus, QUAE SALVA FIDE FACERE POSSIT.
Haec rogatio ad ea pertinet, quae paulo ante dixi honeste amico a iudice
posse concedi; nam si omnia facienda sint, quae amici velint, non
amicitiae tales, sed coniurationes putandae sint. *45* Loquor autem de
communibus amicitiis; nam in sapientibus viris perfectisque nihil potest
esse tale.

Damonem et Phintiam Pythagoreos ferunt hoc animo inter se fuisse, ut,
cum eorum alteri Dionysius tyrannus diem necis destinavisset et is, qui
morti addictus esset, paucos sibi dies commendandorum suorum causa
postulavisset, vas factus sit[306] alter eius sistendi, ut, si ille non
revertisset, moriendum esset ipsi. Qui cum ad diem se recepisset,
admiratus eorum fidem tyrannus petivit, ut se ad amicitiam tertium
ascriberent.

*46* Cum igitur id, quod utile videtur in amicitia, cum eo, quod
honestum est, comparatur, iaceat utilitatis species, valeat honestas;
cum autem in amicitia, quae honesta non sunt, postulabuntur, religio et
fides anteponatur amicitiae. Sic habebitur is, quem exquirimus, dilectus
officii.

    [301] _causam_ c, Edd.; _causa_ B H a b.

    [302] _iis_ Bt., Ed., Heine; _his_ B H a b; _hijs_ c.

    [303] _quicum_ MSS., Bt., Heine; _quocum_ Ed.

    [304] _erit_ Ed., Bt.^2, Heine; _sit_ MSS.; _est_ Bt.^1

    [305] _adhibere_ B H a, Bt., Ed.; _habere_ b c, Lact.,
    Müller.

    [306] _sit_ Manubius, Edd.; _est_ MSS., Nonius.

#Conflicts between:#

#(1) apparent Expediency and Justice,#

*40* X. Many cases oftentimes arise to perplex our minds with a specious
appearance of expediency: the question raised in these cases is not
whether moral rectitude is to be sacrificed to some considerable
advantage (for that would of course be wrong), but whether the apparent
advantage can be secured without moral wrong. When Brutus deposed his
colleague Collatinus from the consular office, his treatment of him
might have been thought unjust; for Collatinus had been his associate,
and had helped him with word and deed in driving out the royal family.
But when the leading men of the state had determined that all the
kindred of Superbus and the very name of the Tarquins and every reminder
of the monarchy should be obliterated, then the course that was
expedient--namely, to serve the country's interests--was so
pre-eminently right, that it was even Collatinus's own duty to acquiesce
in its justice. And so expediency gained the day because of its moral
lightness; for without moral rectitude there could have been no possible
expediency.

Not so in the case of the king[BH] who founded the city: *41* it was the
specious appearance of expediency that actuated him; and when he decided
that it was more expedient for him to reign alone than to share the
throne with another, he slew his brother.[BI] He threw to the winds his
brotherly affection and his human feelings, to secure what seemed to
him--but was not--expedient; and yet in defence of his deed he offered
the excuse about his wall--a specious show of moral rectitude, neither
reasonable nor adequate at all. He committed a crime, therefore, with
due respect to him let me say so, be he Quirinus or Romulus.[BJ]

#(2) individual and general interests,#

*42* And yet we are not required to sacrifice our own interests and
surrender to others what we need for ourselves, but each one should
consider his own interests, as far as he may without injury to his
neighbour's. "When a man enters the foot-race," says Chrysippus with his
usual aptness, "it is his duty to put forth all his strength and strive
with all his might to win; but he ought never with his foot to trip, or
with his hand to foul a competitor. Thus in the stadium of life, it is
not unfair for anyone to seek to obtain what is needful for his own
advantage, but he has no right to wrest it from his neighbour."

#(3) obligations to friends and duty,#

*43* It is in the case of friendships, however, that men's conceptions
of duty are most confused; for it is a breach of duty either to fail to
do for a friend what one rightly can do, or to do for him what is not
right. But for our guidance in all such cases we have a rule that is
short and easy to master: apparent advantages--political preferment,
riches, sensual pleasures, and the like--should never be preferred to
the obligations of friendship. But an upright man will never for a
friend's sake do anything in violation of his country's interests or his
oath or his sacred honour, not even if he sits as judge in a friend's
case; for he lays aside the rôle of friend when he assumes that of
judge. Only so far will he make concessions to friendship, that he will
prefer his friend's side to be the juster one and that he will set the
time for presenting his case, as far as the laws will allow, to suit
his friend's convenience. *44* But when he comes to pronounce the
verdict under oath, he should remember that he has God as his
witness--that is, as I understand it, his own conscience, than which God
himself has bestowed upon man nothing more divine. From this point of
view it is a fine custom that we have inherited from our forefathers (if
we were only true to it now) to appeal to the juror with this
formula--"to do what he can consistently with his sacred honour." This
form of appeal is in keeping with what I said a moment ago would be
morally right for a judge to concede to a friend. For supposing that we
were bound to do everything that our friends desired, such relations
would have to be accounted not friendships but conspiracies. *45* But I
am speaking here of ordinary friendships; for among men who are ideally
wise and perfect such situations cannot arise.

#Damon and Phintias.#

They say that Damon and Phintias, of the Pythagorean school, enjoyed
such ideally perfect friendship, that when the tyrant Dionysius had
appointed a day for the execution of one of them, and the one who had
been condemned to death requested a few days' respite for the purpose of
putting his loved ones in the care of friends, the other became surety
for his appearance, with the understanding that if his friend did not
return, he himself should be put to death. And when the friend returned
on the day appointed, the tyrant in admiration for their faithfulness
begged that they would enrol him as a third partner in their friendship.

#Rules of precedence.#

*46* Well then, when we are weighing what seems to be expedient in
friendship against what is morally right, let apparent expediency be
disregarded and moral rectitude prevail; and when in friendship requests
are submitted that are not morally right, let conscience and scrupulous
regard for the right take precedence of the obligations of friendship.
In this way we shall arrive at a proper choice between conflicting
duties--the subject of this part of our investigation.

    [BH] Romulus.

    [BI] Remus.

    [BJ] I.e., whether he be god or man.

XI. Sed utilitatis specie in re publica saepissime peccatur, ut in
Corinthi disturbatione nostri; durius etiam Athenienses, qui sciverunt,
ut Aeginetis, qui classe valebant, pollices praeciderentur. Hoc visum
est utile; nimis enim imminebat propter propinquitatem Aegina Piraeo.
Sed nihil, quod crudele, utile; est enim hominum naturae, quam sequi
debemus, maxime inimica crudelitas. *47* Male etiam, qui peregrinos
urbibus uti prohibent eosque exterminant, ut Pennus apud patres nostros,
Papius nuper. Nam esse pro cive, qui civis non sit, rectum est non
licere; quam legem tulerunt sapientissimi consules Crassus et Scaevola;
usu vero urbis prohibere peregrinos sane inhumanum est.

Illa praeclara, in quibus publicae utilitatis species prae honestate
contemnitur. Plena exemplorum est nostra res publica cum saepe, tum
maxime bello Punico secundo; quae Cannensi calamitate accepta maiores
animos habuit quam umquam rebus secundis; nulla timoris significatio,
nulla mentio pacis. Tanta vis est honesti, ut speciem utilitatis
obscuret.

*48* Athenienses cum Persarum impetum nullo modo possent sustinere
statuerentque, ut urbe relicta coniugibus et liberis Troezene depositis
naves conscenderent libertatemque Graeciae classe defenderent, Cyrsilum
quendam suadentem, ut in urbe manerent Xerxemque[307] reciperent,
lapidibus obruerunt. Atqui[308] ille utilitatem sequi videbatur; sed ea
nulla erat repugnante honestate.

*49* Themistocles post victoriam eius belli, quod cum Persis fuit, dixit
in contione se habere consilium rei publicae salutare, sed id sciri non
opus esse; postulavit, ut aliquem populus daret, quicum communicaret;
datus est Aristides; huic ille, classem Lacedaemoniorum, quae subducta
esset ad Gytheum, clam incendi posse, quo facto frangi Lacedaemoniorum
opes necesse esset. Quod Aristides cum audisset, in contionem magna
exspectatione venit dixitque perutile esse consilium, quod Themistocles
afferret, sed minime honestum. Itaque Athenienses, quod honestum non
esset, id ne utile quidem putaverunt totamque eam rem, quam ne audierant
quidem, auctore Aristide repudiaverunt. Melius hi quam nos, qui piratas
immunes, socios vectigales habemus.

    [307] _Xerxemque_ B H a b, Bt., Heine; _Xersenque_ c;
    _Xersemque_ Nonius, Ed.

    [308] _Atqui_ Victorius, Fl., Bt.^2, Ed.; _Atque_ MSS., Bt.^1

#(4) apparent political expediency and duty to humanity.#

XI. Through a specious appearance of expediency wrong is very often
committed in transactions between state and state, as by our own country
in the destruction of Corinth. A more cruel wrong was perpetrated by the
Athenians in decreeing that the Aeginetans, whose strength lay in their
navy, should have their thumbs cut off. This seemed to be expedient;
for Aegina was too grave a menace, as it was close to the Piraeus. But
no cruelty can be expedient; for cruelty is most abhorrent to human
nature, whose leadings we ought to follow. *47* They, too, do wrong who
would debar foreigners from enjoying the advantages of their city and
would exclude them from its borders, as was done by Pennus in the time
of our fathers, and in recent times by Papius. It may not be right, of
course, for one who is not a citizen to exercise the rights and
privileges of citizenship; and the law on this point was secured by two
of our wisest consuls, Crassus and Scaevola. Still, to debar foreigners
from enjoying the advantages of the city is altogether contrary to the
laws of humanity.

#Moral right far outweighs apparent expediency.#

There are splendid examples in history where the apparent expediency of
the state has been set at naught out of regard for moral rectitude. Our
own country has many instances to offer throughout her history, and
especially in the Second Punic War when news came of the disaster at
Cannae, Rome displayed a loftier courage than ever she did in success;
never a trace of faint-heartedness, never a mention of making terms. The
influence of moral right is so potent, that it eclipses the specious
appearance of expediency.

*48* When the Athenians could in no way stem the tide of the Persian
invasion and determined to abandon their city, bestow their wives and
children in safety at Troezen, embark upon their ships, and fight on the
sea for the freedom of Greece, a man named Cyrsilus proposed that they
should stay at home and open the gates of their city to Xerxes. They
stoned him to death for it. And yet he was working for what he thought
was expediency; but it was not--not at all, for it clashed with moral
rectitude.

*49* After the victorious close of that war with Persia, Themistocles
announced in the Assembly that he had a plan for the welfare of the
state, but that it was not politic to let it be generally known. He
requested the people to appoint some one with whom he might discuss it.
They appointed Aristides. Themistocles confided to him that the Spartan
fleet, which had been hauled up on shore at Gytheum, could be secretly
set on fire; this done, the Spartan power would inevitably be crushed.
When Aristides heard the plan, he came into the Assembly amid the eager
expectation of all and reported that the plan proposed by Themistocles
was in the highest degree expedient, but anything but morally right. The
result was that the Athenians concluded that what was not morally right
was likewise not expedient, and at the instance of Aristides they
rejected the whole proposition without even listening to it. Their
attitude was better than ours; for we let pirates go scot free, while we
make our allies pay tribute.[BK]

    [BK] The Cilician pirates had been crushed by Pompey and
    settled at Soli (Pompeiopolis). They gathered strength again
    during the distractions of the civil wars, and Antony is even
    said to have sought their aid in the war against Brutus and
    Cassius.

    Marseilles and King Deiotarus of Armenia had supported Pompey
    and in consequence were made tributary by Caesar's party.

XII. Maneat ergo, quod turpe sit, id numquam esse utile, ne tum quidem,
cum id, quod esse utile putes, adipiscare; hoc enim ipsum, utile putare,
quod turpe sit, calamitosum est. *50* #§ 40# Sed incidunt, ut supra
dixi, saepe causae, cum repugnare utilitas honestati videatur, ut
animadvertendum sit, repugnetne plane an possit cum honestate coniungi.
Eius generis hae sunt quaestiones: si exempli gratia vir bonus
Alexandrea Rhodum magnum frumenti numerum advexerit in Rhodiorum inopia
et fame summaque annonae caritate, si idem sciat complures mercatores
Alexandrea solvisse navesque in cursu frumento onustas petentes Rhodum
viderit, dicturusne sit id Rhodiis an silentio suum quam plurimo
venditurus. Sapientem et bonum virum fingimus; de eius deliberatione et
consultatione quaerimus, qui celaturus Rhodios non sit, si id turpe
iudicet, sed dubitet, an turpe non sit.

*51* In huius modi causis aliud Diogeni Babylonio videri solet, magno et
gravi Stoico, aliud Antipatro, discipulo eius, homini acutissimo.
Antipatro omnia patefacienda, ut ne quid omnino, quod venditor norit,
emptor ignoret, Diogeni venditorem, quatenus iure civili constitutum
sit, dicere vitia oportere, cetera sine insidiis agere et, quoniam
vendat, velle quam optime vendere.

"Advexi, exposui, vendo meum non pluris quam ceteri, fortasse etiam
minoris, cum maior est copia. Cui fit iniuria?"

*52* Exoritur Antipatri ratio ex altera parte: "Quid ais? tu cum
hominibus consulere debeas et servire humanae societati eaque lege natus
sis et ea habeas principia naturae, quibus parere et quae sequi debeas,
ut utilitas tua communis sit utilitas vicissimque communis utilitas tua
sit, celabis homines, quid iis adsit commoditatis et copiae?"

Respondebit Diogenes fortasse sic: "Aliud est celare, aliud tacere;
neque ego nunc te celo, si tibi non dico, quae natura deorum sit, qui
sit finis bonorum, quae tibi plus prodessent cognita quam tritici
vilitas[309]; sed non, quicquid tibi audire utile est, idem[310] mihi
dicere necesse est."

*53* "Immo vero," inquiet ille, "necesse est,[311] siquidem meministi
esse inter homines natura coniunctam societatem."

"Memini," inquiet ille; "sed num ista societas talis est, ut nihil suum
cuiusque sit? Quod si ita est, ne vendendum quidem quicquam est, sed
donandum."

    [309] _vilitas_ a, Edd.; _utilitas_, B H b c.

    [310] _idem_ B H a b; _id_ c, Bt.

    [311] _immo ... est_ c, Ed., Heine; _immo vero necesse est_
    p; _immo vero_ [_inquiet ille_] _necesse est_ Bt.

XII. Let it be set down as an established principle, then, that what is
morally wrong can never be expedient--not even when one secures by means
of it that which one thinks expedient; for the mere act of thinking a
course expedient, when it is morally wrong, is demoralizing. *50*
#Expediency _vs._ moral rectitude in business relations.# But, as I said
above, cases often arise in which expediency may seem to clash with
moral rectitude; and so we should examine carefully and see whether
their conflict is inevitable or whether they may be reconciled. The
following are problems of this sort: suppose, for example, a time of
dearth and famine at Rhodes, with provisions at fabulous prices; and
suppose that an honest man has imported a large cargo of grain from
Alexandria and that to his certain knowledge also several other
importers have set sail from Alexandria, and that on the voyage he has
sighted their vessels laden with grain and bound for Rhodes; is he to
report the fact to the Rhodians or is he to keep his own counsel and
sell his own stock at the highest market price? I am assuming the case
of a virtuous, upright man, and I am raising the question how a man
would think and reason who would not conceal the facts from the Rhodians
if he thought that it was immoral to do so, but who might be in doubt
whether such silence would really be immoral.

#Diogenes _vs._ Antipater.#

*51* In deciding cases of this kind Diogenes of Babylonia, a great and
highly esteemed Stoic, consistently holds one view; his pupil Antipater,
a most profound scholar, holds another. According to Antipater all the
facts should be disclosed, that the buyer may not be uninformed of any
detail that the seller knows; according to Diogenes the seller should
declare any defects in his wares, in so far as such a course is
prescribed by the common law of the land; but for the rest, since he has
goods to sell, he may try to sell them to the best possible advantage,
provided he is guilty of no misrepresentation.

"I have imported my stock," Diogenes's merchant will say; "I have
offered it for sale; I sell at a price no higher than my
competitors--perhaps even lower, when the market is overstocked. Who is
wronged?"

*52* "What say you?" comes Antipater's argument on the other side; "it
is your duty to consider the interests of your fellow-men and to serve
society; you were brought into the world under these conditions and have
these inborn principles which you are in duty bound to obey and follow,