provisional government under General Herrera, president of the council.
This person is represented to have been a discreet officer, whose
judgment naturally led him to see the wisdom of a pacific course towards
the United States, but whose destiny was finally controlled by the rash
and unprincipled conduct of insurrectionary demagogues.

Meanwhile the congress of the United States reconsidered the Texan
question, and after a long and ardent debate, finally passed a joint
resolution for annexation, with an alternative permission to the
executive to negotiate; provided he thought proper to adopt that course.
This was a solemn decision of the question by the representatives of the
people, and it was sustained by the president who did not permit himself
to be influenced by the threats of Mexico or the hostile preparations
made by that country. In fact, Mr. Tyler had been careful to guard
against military surprises, for, in consequence of the early menaces of
Mexico, he deemed it his duty, as a precautionary measure, to
concentrate in the gulf and its vicinity a large portion of the Home
squadron under the command of Commodore Conner, and, at the same time to
assemble at fort Jesup on the Texan border, as large a military force as
the demands of the service at other encampments would allow.

Thus, the joint resolution for annexing Texas to the United States, with
its alternative power to negotiate, came to President Tyler and was
approved by him on the 1st of March, 1845. On the fourth of the same
month, James K. Polk, who had been chosen president of the United
States, at the last election, was to assume the reins of government.
President Tyler believed that the necessity for annexation was immediate
and urgent in consequence of the reasons he had already presented to
congress in his several messages. The only doubt therefore, that he
experienced in making his selection, arose from a point of delicacy to
his successor. The first section of the joint resolution authorized the
erection of a new State of our Union out of the republic of Texas under
certain conditions contained in the second section; whilst the third
authorized the president to negotiate with that republic for admission
either by treaty to be submitted to the senate, or by articles of
agreement to be presented to our houses of congress, as the president
might direct.

Under these circumstances a cabinet council was summoned for the 2nd of
March, and the point was resolved by informing the president's
successor, Mr. Polk, of the proposed action, and, if he desired it,
submitting to his perusal the despatch to Texas. Mr. Calhoun, our
secretary of state, at the president's request, accordingly waited upon
Mr. Polk, explained to him Mr. Tyler's selection of the first and second
sections of the joint resolution, and expressed a readiness to exhibit
the despatch to Mr. A. J. Donelson, who had been appointed chargé to
Texas.[60] Mr. Polk courteously declined expressing an opinion
concerning the executive action, accompanying his remark with some
complimentary declaration; and, on that evening, a bearer of despatches
with the requisite documents, was on his way to Mr. Donelson.[61]

This is a brief and accurate summary of the history of annexation so far
as the action of our government is involved, and as is necessary for
this narrative. The terms of annexation which were offered by the United
States were accepted by Texas, and the public faith of both nations was
solemnly pledged to a compact of union, which was finally consummated at
the following session of congress, when Texas became a member of our
confederacy.

There were other circumstances, however, which properly induced the
prompt course of President Tyler in sending the joint resolution for the
action of Texas; but, in order to understand these perfectly, it is
necessary for us to direct our attention to the French and English
negotiations between that republic and Mexico. In 1840, as we have seen,
England preferred separate action on behalf of Texas, but she was now
willing to unite with France against the aggrandizement of the United
States. Monsieur de Saligny and the Hon. Mr. Elliott were the
representatives of these European courts in Texas, and to the former of
them was entrusted the active part of the diplomacy. Whilst the
discussions were going on in the United States Mr. Elliott was never at
rest. He was heard of in Charleston, in New Orleans, in Havana, in
Mexico, and, again, in Texas. The restlessness of the agent denoted the
anxiety of his government and of France.

The rejection of the annexation treaty by congress, in 1844, had almost
deprived Texas of hope. She believed it impossible to expect a union
with the United States, and was prepared to receive the mediation of
France and England which would secure her independence. This was surely
gratifying to the emissaries of these powers and they eagerly undertook
the task of obtaining the coveted boon from Mexico. The Mexican
ministry, ever anxious to thwart the union with our confederacy, was
equally pleased to avert it by any diplomatic _ruse_ that would save the
point of honor, and place her erect before the world. Besides this, the
Mexicans relied on a hope that increasing difficulties between the
United States and England upon the Oregon boundary question, would make
us loath to undertake a war with a southern neighbor whilst our north
and our sea board were menaced by Great Britain. This hope of a
counter-menace from England inspirited the Mexican cabinet and made it
solicitous to resist us successfully. Herrera's ministry was composed of
discreet and patriotic men; but, in the first moments of their power,
they dared not oppose popular prejudices. The revolution which
overthrew Santa Anna was one of the few that sprang from the popular
branches of the nation, and originated neither in factions, the army, or
the church, but derived its success from the universal feeling that
existed against the oppressive misrule of the executive.[62]
Nevertheless popular feeling was against our country, and the cabinet
took its tone from its patrons.

There can be little doubt of the fact, that the notion of probable
difficulties between the United States and England on the boundary
question, was studiously fostered by emissaries who were hostile to us.
Herrera's cabinet therefore hailed with delight the propositions which
were brought to Mexico by Mr. Elliott, and were presented by the Hon.
Charles Bankhead and Baron Alleye de Cyprey, the British and French
ministers. These propositions, Señor Cuevas laid before the Mexican
congress on the 21st of April, 1845. The preliminary conditions offered
by Texas, under French and English mediation, and transmitted from that
republic by President Jones, on the 29th of March, were the following:

1st. That Mexico shall consent to acknowledge the independence of Texas.

2nd. That Texas shall engage and stipulate in the treaty _not to annex
herself to or become subject to any country whatever_.

3rd. The limits and other conditions shall be matter of arrangement by
final treaty.

4th. That Texas should be willing to remit disputed points _concerning
territory and other matters to the arbitration of umpires_.

These spiteful stipulations, evidently aimed against the United States,
and bearing the marks of their European parentage, suited the taste of
Mexico precisely. Her congress, therefore, at once deemed it advisable
to entertain the Texan proposals, and to proceed to the celebration of a
treaty. But when the Baron de Cyprey announced this assent to the
president of Texas, on the 20th of May, it was already too late for the
success of European diplomacy. Our congress had passed the
joint-resolution, our president had approved it, and our minister, Mr.
Donelson, was in Texas preparing the cabinet to act favorably upon our
propositions. Accordingly when Mr. Elliott returned in June to Texas in
a French corvette, the public mind was already manifesting its anxiety
to accede to our liberal offers, which were finally sanctioned by the
Texan convention on the 4th of July, 1845.

Had the resolution for annexation not been adopted at the preceding
session of congress, the pretensions of Mexico, instead of being
lowered, would have been raised still higher than they were on the
receipt of the propositions from President Jones. The mediatorial powers
of Mr. Elliott would, in all probability, have been employed in
negotiating truces and treaties until the foundation was laid for the
operation of those peaceful means by which Lord Aberdeen declared it his
intention to promote his philanthropic views. "Abandoned by the United
States, oppressed by debt, and wearied by the increasing burthens and
privations of war, Texas would have been at the mercy of Britain, and
her statesmen would have accepted almost any terms to secure
independence and peace."[63]

FOOTNOTES:

[55] Senate doc. No. 341, 28th cong. 1st sess. p. 95.

[56] Senate doc. No. 1, 28th cong. 2d sess. p. 53.

[57] General Almonté, the Mexican envoy, in a conversation in New York,
confessed to the writer, in the spring of 1843, that Texas was lost to
Mexico, but that all then desired by his countrymen was to save the
point of honor before they acknowledged its independence.

[58] Mexico as it was and as it is, 4th Ed. Letter XXV. p. 367.

[59] Id. page 382.

[60] House of Rep., doc. No. 2, 29th cong. 1st sess. p. 125.

[61] The election of the 1st and 2nd sections of the joint resolution
made by President Tyler was subsequently approved by President Polk, as
he declares both in his negotiations and in his message to congress of
the 2nd December, 1845. H. of R., Doc. No. 2, 29th cong. 1st session, p.
3.

[62] Mexico as it was and as it is--p. 390, 4th ed.

[63] Letter from Mr. Donelson to Mr. Buchanan, 2nd June, 1845, H. of R.,
doc. No. 2, 29th cong. 1st sess. p. 52. I do not discuss the question of
the _mode_ of annexation, whether by treaty, joint resolution, or
negotiation, as that would require almost a volume by itself to present
a true sketch of the debate that occurred upon it. It is my purpose
rather to narrate events than to discuss all the various subordinate
questions arising from them. "Annexation," is made one of the great
motives or causes for war by Mexico, no matter in what way it is
effected or attempted. "_Mexico would never agree to annexation_;"--said
Señor Cuevas, the Mexican secretary of foreign affairs, in April,
1845.--Mexico as it was and as it is. p. 391, 4th ed.

CHAPTER VI.

General Almonté demands passports and leaves--Shannon and Rejon and
     Cuevas--Views of the Mexican cabinet and people--Animosity--Revolt
     in Mexico--Political condition of Mexico--Her right of reconquering
     Texas--Mr. Buchanan despatches Mr. Slidell as envoy--Rejection of
     all accommodation between us--The reason why Mexico refused to
     negotiate, after promising to receive a commissioner from the United
     States--Subterfuges--Ill feeling in Mexico on the Texas question--
     Herrera overthrown by Paredes--Paredes and the monarchical party--
     Unpopularity of his scheme--Miserable state of Mexican affairs--
     Review of the Texas question.

In March, 1845, as soon as congress passed the joint-resolution, Gen.
Almonté demanded his passports and departed. A correspondence which took
place in Mexico between Mr. Shannon, our envoy, and Señor Rejon, the
minister of foreign affairs, relative to the projected union resulted
fruitlessly; and, on the 2d of April, Señor Cuevas, who had succeeded
Rejon in office, announced to our legation that his government could
neither continue diplomatic intercourse with ours, nor maintain
friendship with a republic that violated her obligations and usurped a
portion of Mexican territory. He declared, moreover, that the relations
between the two countries could not be re-established before a complete
reparation of that injury should be made.[64]

This violent and denunciatory language, together with the hint to our
minister to depart, was of course not calculated to allay ill-feeling in
either country. The Mexican congress was not less bitter in its
animadversions, thereby spreading the animosity among the people. It
promptly seconded the wishes of the cabinet, and offered two projects,
both of which asserted the unalienated rights of Mexico over Texas, and
the national resolve to maintain them by force.

Meantime, however, domestic discontent was again brewing. A certain Gen.
Rangel attempted to revolutionize the government, and is said to have
been favored by the partizans of the late administration. The insurgents
seized the palace, capturing the president and three of his ministers of
state; but they were speedily overpowered and the insurrection
suppressed. In June and July of this year all the Mexican papers were
loud in their clamors for vengeance. The minister of war, Garcia Condé,
wrote despatch after despatch; and, with the usual spirit of national
gasconade, denounced our "perfidy," and continually alluded to "the war
which Mexico waged against the United States," in consequence of our
"treachery." On the 16th of the latter month, he despatched to the
minister of foreign relations and justice a note detailing a plan for
covering the national frontiers, and asserted that Mexico would maintain
her rights by force, or fall in the struggle. "She will not consent,"
says he, "to give up one half of her territory from the base fear of
losing the other!"

Patriotic and stirring as are these declarations, they cannot but be
regarded otherwise than as the most inflated bombast when we recollect
that they were made in defiance of the United States, and after a
failure for seven years to reconquer even Texas, feeble as she was. What
just hope could distracted Mexico reasonably entertain of ultimate
victory? Several years before this period, her discreet statesmen and
reflecting citizens privately acknowledged that Texas was lost forever.
Pecuniary embarrassments, political misrule, and repeated revolutions
had still more impaired her national strength, and yet, an obstinacy as
inveterate as it was silly, forced her to make declarations of intended
hostilities which only served to kindle and spread the excitement among
the masses.

It is just that we should concede to national pride and honor all they
reasonably demand of respect, yet I have greatly misunderstood this
spirit of our century, if it does not require nations to be as
reasonable in their quarrels as individuals. Empires, kingdoms, states,
republics, and men, are equally amenable to the great tribunal of the
world's common sense, and all are obliged, if they consult their
interests, to yield to the force of circumstances they cannot control.
What then becomes of the mere abstract and visionary "right of
reconquest" which Mexico asserted, even if she really possessed it after
the central usurpation, and destruction of the federal system in 1824?
What hope was there in a war with the United States, after a failure in
that with Texas? It is true that Mexico had the power to annoy us, and
procrastinate her fate; she might oppose and resist; she might develope
all the evil passions of her people and let them loose on our armies in
irregular warfare; but these, after all were nothing more than spiteful
manifestations of impotent malice, disgraceful to the nation that
encouraged them. The cause of genuine humanity, which, I believe, in our
age, truly seeks for peace, demanded the pacification of Texas. The
cruelty with which the war was waged, and the brutal treatment received
by some of the prisoners of the Santa Fé expedition in 1841 and 1842,
convince us that a strong power should have imposed peace on Mexico.
National propriety demanded it; for how long was the "right of
reconquest" to continue? England, the proudest nation on earth,
acknowledged the independence of the United States after a seven years
war. The great powers of Europe interfered to protect oppressed Greece.
England has several times interposed in the affairs of Spain and
Portugal; and our geographical as well as political affinity to Texas
clearly indicated that it was our national interest to establish a firm
and friendly government on our border.

There can be no doubt that when General Herrera was, almost unanimously,
elected president in August, 1845, he saw things in this light, and was
prudently disposed to bend to inevitable fate. Notwithstanding the
warlike despatches, speeches, and proclamations of the Mexicans in the
earlier part of the year, our secretary of state seems to have
sufficiently understood their gasconading habits, to disregard these
inflated productions. He therefore authorized Mr. Black, who remained in
Mexico as consul, upon Mr. Shannon's withdrawal, to propose that we
should send an envoy with full powers to adjust all the questions in
dispute between the two countries. Mexico, notwithstanding her open
bravado, secretly assented to our proposal, declaring that she would
receive "the commissioner of the United States who might come to the
capital with full powers to settle the present dispute in a peaceful,
reasonable and honorable manner."

Accordingly, Mr. Slidell was hastily despatched so as to be sure of
meeting the same persons in power with whom the arrangement had been
made; for in Mexico, the delay of even a day may sometimes change a
government, and create new or unwilling negotiators. Nevertheless when
our minister presented himself in the capital early in December, having
travelled rapidly but unostentatiously, so as to avoid exciting ill
feeling among the Mexicans as to the purposes of his mission, he found
the secretary unprepared to receive him. It was objected that Mr.
Slidell's commission had not been confirmed by the senate of the United
States and that the president had no constitutional right to send him;
that Mexico agreed to receive a commissioner to settle the Texas
dispute, and not a resident envoy; that the reception of such an envoy
would admit the minister on the footing of a friendly mission during a
period of concord between nations, which would not be diplomatically
proper so long as our amity was in the least interrupted;--and, finally,
that the government had not expected a commissioner until after the
session of congress began in January, 1846.

There may be some force in technical diplomacy, between the mission as
agreed on by Messieurs Black and Peña, and the one despatched by Mr.
Buchanan, for the letter of credence declares that Mr. Slidell is "_to
reside_ near the government of the Mexican republic in the quality of
envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, and that he is well
informed of the president's desire to _restore_, cultivate, and
strengthen friendship and good correspondence between us." A point of
extreme etiquette raised at such a moment, when both parties were
confessedly anxious for peace, naturally excites some inquiry as to its
probable origin. Accordingly we find that it was a mere subterfuge,
urged by a tottering administration to avert its ruin. The violence of
the cabinet against annexation had done its work among the people. When
Herrera and Peña accepted, in October, our proposal to treat, they hoped
the popular elections, as well as judicious overtures to the departments
and citizens, would so modify national opinion as to permit their
independent and liberal action. But such forbearance could scarcely be
expected from the watchfulness of Mexican intriguers. Herrera was a
federalist, but his failure to proclaim the federal system, and to throw
himself on that party as soon as he attained power, alienated a large
portion of it and made the rest but feeble supporters. The church and
the centralists soon coalesced in hostility to his government; and,
although his measures were moderate, and all his efforts designed to
correct abuses, yet every political symptom denoted his speedy fall. Of
all the popular clamors, probably none was louder in the mob and the
army, than that which arose in consequence of his effort to negotiate a
peace with our Union. General Paredes took advantage of this
unpopularity, and, at the head of five thousand of the soldiery,
pronounced against the government of the president.

It will be perceived from this sketch how completely this Texas question
and the war with our country have been made electioneering and
revolutionary elements in Mexico: not, however, with patriotic hopes, or
reasonable expectations of reconquest, but with the contemptible anxiety
of usurping a temporary power which, for a while, enabled the aspirant
to govern the country without the least prospect of settling the
difficulty with us or of regaining Texas.[65]

This revolution commenced with the army of reserve stationed at San Luis
Potosi, and was seconded by the military men generally. On the 15th of
December, 1845, Paredes issued a bombastic proclamation[66] from his
headquarters; and, in the latter part of the month the revolutionary
forces reached the capital, when a portion of the garrison pronounced in
favor of the insurgent chief. This induced an early accommodation
between the parties, and finished the outbreak without bloodshed. Yet
Paredes, having overthrown Herrera, partly in consequence of his
friendly disposition for peace with us, could not now attempt
negotiations successfully. Mr. Slidell renewed his offers to the
cabinet, but was repulsed and left the country. The lame reliance of
Mexico upon bombastic proclamations was again adopted. Yet the people
were discontented with Paredes who soon began to manifest the despotic
tendency of his nature and education. The military life of this
chieftain naturally inclined him towards centralism, but he was
altogether unfit either by character or habits for civil authority. As
soon as he assumed the reins of government, a party which had long
drooped began again to lift its head. The monarchists, led by the
Archbishop Manuel Posada y Garduño, and the wily Don Lucas Alaman, soon
got possession of the insurgent general. They were joined by a large
portion of the higher clergy, some influential men of fortune, a few
soldiers, and a number of silly citizens, who promised themselves a
futurity of progress and felicity by calling to the Mexican throne a
monarch from beyond the sea. This party of royalists was strengthened by
dissensions at home, and by the expected attack from the United States.
Many reflecting men cherished no hope of national progress so long as
the turbulent army was unrestrained by paramount authority. They desired
at once to crush freedom and domestic despotism by a foreign prince
supported by European soldiery, whilst they believed that the
continental sovereigns would greedily seize the opportunity of throwing
their forces into America so as to check the aggressive ambition of the
United States.[67] As soon as this scheme of Paredes was disclosed, his
unpopularity increased. His intemperate habits were well known and
destroyed confidence in his judgment. The financial condition of the
country was exceedingly embarrassed, and foreigners, who were the usual
bankers of the government, refused loans on any terms. Payment was
denied by the treasury to all employed in the civil departments, while
money was disbursed to none but the army. The freedom of the press
moreover was suspended; and, to crown the national difficulties, it was
at this very moment that Mexico dreamed of overthrowing the republic at
home and establishing a monarchy in its stead, whilst it simultaneously
encountered our armies abroad in order to reconquer Texas! With such
deplorable fatuity was Mexico misruled, and entangled in a double war
upon the rights of her own people and against the United States. It was
unfortunate that she fell at this crisis into the hands of a despot and
drunkard, whose mind, perplexed between ambition and intemperance, gave
a permanent direction to that false public sentiment, which Herrera had
been anxious to convert into one of peace and good will towards the
United States.

I have thus succinctly narrated the events that led to the war between
the United States and Mexico. The annexation of Texas, without the
previous assent of Mexico, may have annoyed that government. It was
mortifying to patriotic pride, and we should laud the republic for
manifesting a proper sensibility. But true national pride is always
capable of manly and dignified opposition. It does not expend itself in
bravado, petulance or querulousness. It does not assail by threats, but
by deeds; and never provokes an attack until it is prepared to return
the blow with earnest force. It is silent as the storm until it bursts
forth in overwhelming wrath. All other kinds of resistance are nothing
but miserable exhibitions of mortified vanity, and invoke the world's
contempt instead of respectful compassion.

Our government, from the beginning, desired and attempted to allay
excitement, whilst that of Mexico, revolutionary, disorganized and
impotent as it was at home, and as it subsequently proved itself to be
in the field of battle, did all it could to foment animosity between the
two countries. This sturdy resistance of Mexico did not arise from
prudence, patriotism or courage, but from intestine factions,
exasperated by rival usurpers. Our efforts to make peace and establish a
boundary upon the most liberal principles were rejected with
disdain.[68] The authorities, basing their refusal upon a frivolous
subterfuge of diplomatic etiquette, would not even hear our proposals,
or receive our minister. Our presidents were disposed to concede every
thing reasonable in negotiation that could have saved the honor of
Mexico and placed our future relations on the salutary foundation of
alliance.[69] Instead of meeting us with the pacific and compromising
temper of our age, her demagogue chieftains stimulated the passion and
vanity of the mob, until the stormy natures of an ignorant people became
so completely excited that they were unable to control the evil spirit
raised by their wicked incantations.

Blundering onward and blinded by passion, this unfortunate nation
reminds us of that passage in the Ænead wherein the sightless giant is
described:--

              "Summo quum monte videmus
    Ipsum inter pecudes vastâ se mole moventem
    Pastorem Polypheum, et littera nota petentem;
    _Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptum!_

                                         Ænead, B. 3, v. 655.

FOOTNOTES:

[64] Mexico as it was and as it is--see original letter in 4th ed. p.
387.

[65] See Mexico as it was and is, 4th ed. p. 396--and Slidell's
correspondence with our government. Senate doc. No. 337, 29th cong. 1st
sess.

[66] See Mexico as it was and as it is, p. 400.

[67] Tributo á la verdad, Vera Cruz, p. 3.

[68] See Wheaton's Elements of international law. ed. of 1836, part 2d
chap. 1, pp. 88, 89, 90, 91. On the right of interference of governments
for the pacification of belligerent nations.

[69] Mr. Slidell was fully empowered to negotiate on liberal terms.

BOOK SECOND:

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN TEXAS AND ON

THE RIO GRANDE.

BOOK II.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN TEXAS AND ON THE RIO GRANDE.

CHAPTER I.

Boundary of Texas defined by Almonté--Description of Texas--Rivers of
     Texas--Army of observation--General Taylor--Army of occupation--How
     formed--Difficulty of landing in Texas--Aransas bay--Army lands at
     St. Joseph's island--Kinney's rancho--Corpus Christi--State of the
     army during the winter--Sufferings of the troops--Alarms of war--
     General Gaines's views--Necessity of ample preparation--Our first
     aggressive war.

The scene of our observation is now about to change from the cabinet to
the field. The theatre of war properly attracts our attention, and the
spot of earth which was the chief cause of dispute between Mexico and
the United States, and where our armies assembled, justly demands our
first notice.

Texas, until she attained the rank of an independent State, seems to
have been almost an unknown country even to the Mexicans. This was
natural for a people who are not essentially agriculturists, but pass
their lives as herdsmen, miners, or merchants, and whose central
government is far removed from its outposts.

In the year 1834, General Almonté was deputed by the Mexican authorities
to visit this northern province, and prepare a statistical report upon
its extent and character. According to this valuable document, Texas
proper lies between 28° and 35° of north latitude, and 17° and 25° of
longitude, west from Washington. It is bounded on the north by the
territory of Arkansas; east by Louisiana; south by the Gulf of Mexico
and State of Tamaulipas; and west by Coahuila, Chihuahua, and New
Mexico. Almonté was informed, by the State government of Coahuila and
Texas, that instead of the Rio de las Nueces forming the boundary
between Coahuila and Texas, as the map denoted, the true limit commenced
at the embouchure of the Rio Aransaso which it followed to its source,
whence it continued by a direct line until it reached the junction of
the Medina with the San Antonio, and thence proceeded along the eastern
bank of the Medina to its source, terminating, finally, on the borders
of Chihuahua. The territory comprised within these limits is estimated
at near two hundred thousand square miles--a surface almost as extensive
as that of France.[70] But, since Texas receded from the Mexican central
government, these confines have been changed. By an act of her congress,
in December, 1836, the boundary was declared to begin at the mouth of
the Rio Grande, and thence to run up the principal stream of the said
river to its source; thence due north to the 42° of latitude, and
thence, along the boundary as defined in the treaty between the United
States and Spain, to the beginning.[71]

The great body of the territory of Mexico is rich in upland vallies,
extensive plains, noble mountains, fertile soil, beautiful groves, and
rich mines, but it is almost entirely deprived of rivers, whilst Texas
is singularly favored in this respect. On the east, the Gulf of Mexico
affords her an extensive sea coast indented by the mouths of the Sabine
river and lake, the Rio Naches, the Rio Trinidad, the Rio San Jacinto,
Galveston bay, the Rio Brazos, Matagorda bay, the Rio Colorado, the Rios
San Antonio and Guadalupe, Aransaso bay and the Rio Grande, besides
numerous smaller streams that drain her soil and almost cover it with an
interlacing network of water.

Texas presents to the traveller three distinct natural regions. Along
the shores of the gulf from the Sabine to the Rio Grande, a flat country
extends from thirty to one hundred miles in the interior, widening,
towards its centre on the Colorado, and gradually diminishing towards
the Nueces. The sandy wastes and lagunes of the coast give place, at
some distance in the interior, to a rich alluvial country, diversified
by skirts of timber, insulated groves, and open prairies. A large
portion of this part of Texas is described as being singularly free from
those large collections of stagnant water, which, combined with a
burning sun and prolific vegetation, create malaria in our southern
States.

Westward of this level skirt, begins the rolling region. The land
gradually swells in gentle undulations, "covered with fertile prairies
and valuable woodlands, enriched with springs and rivulets." Farther
westward still, these beautiful hills tower up into the steeps of the
_Sierra Madre_, that great chain of gigantic mountains, which, broken at
the junction of the Rio Grande with the Puerco, takes thence a
north-easterly course, and enters Texas near the source of the Nueces.
These elevations are of the third and fourth magnitude, and abound with
forests of pine, oak, cedar, and an extraordinary variety of shrubbery.
Wide vallies of alluvial soil, commonly susceptible of irrigation from
copious streams in the highlands, wind through the recesses of these
mountains and afford a delightful region for the purposes of
agriculture. The table lands beyond these ranges have been but little
explored, and still less is known of the northern region extending to
the 42° of north latitude, as well as of that portion lying between the
Nueces and the Rio Grande. But such, in brief, is Texas from the gulf to
the mountains;--a country adapted alike to the planter, the grazier and
the farmer, while it offers to commerce a wide extent of sea coast whose
harbors may be made perfectly secure by the skill of modern science.[72]

I have already stated that in 1844 President Tyler stationed an army of
observation under General Taylor, at fort Jesup, as soon as he
negotiated the annexation treaty.[73] This corps, but poorly sheltered
from the weather, and in an inhospitable climate, was, for a long time,
left inactive on the banks of the Sabine. In midsummer of 1845, after
the joint resolution was passed, and when our difficulties with Mexico
began to thicken, it was at length ordered to advance, under the same
commander, towards the southern frontier of Texas. The army then
consisted of but two regiments of infantry, one of dragoons, and a
single company of artillery, in all about fifteen hundred efficient men.
As the climate was known to the sickly, the war department despatched
only such an unacclimated force as was deemed absolutely necessary to
protect a tropical region in the month of July, awaiting the colder
months before its numbers were increased. This body was called the army
of occupation, whose appointments seem to have been extremely imperfect.
"The dragoon regiment had just been formed from a rifle corps; half of
its men were raw, undisciplined recruits, and many of them unable to
ride, while their recently purchased horses were small, weak and
undrilled. The infantry regiments were enfeebled by their long
exposure, in miserable tents, to the withering heats and drenching rains
of a low southern latitude; and the artillerists were without their
guns. Towards the end of June, 1845, a company of the last mentioned arm
of the service, equipped as infantry, at fort Moultrie, was ordered to
New Orleans. This body, armed only with muskets, sailed from Charleston
on the 26th of the month, and on its arrival in Louisiana on the 19th of
July, found that it was destined for service in Texas. The instructions
to the commanding officer informed him that his company was to be
mounted and equipped as flying artillery for the campaign under Taylor;
that horses would be sent him and a battery shipped from New York, upon
the arrival of which he was to join his general at the mouth of the
Sabine."[74] Fortunately for these troops they encountered General
Taylor in New Orleans, though they were obliged to depart without their
ordnance, which did not reach them for two months afterwards, while
their horses were even still longer in attaining their destination.

The war in Texas, and the unsettled state of that country, had prevented
the preparation of an accurate map, or indeed, even of a survey of the
coasts or interior. It was difficult, therefore, to find any one in New
Orleans acquainted with the harbors and rivers of the new State, or who
was willing to incur the responsibility of directing the army's steps.
The topographical bureau at Washington had, with infinite pains and
ingenuity, constructed a map of the country from the scant materials in
its possession; but this chart has since been proved to be almost
entirely useless as a guide.

However, after considerable difficulty, General Taylor procured a pilot
for large wages, who professed a thorough acquaintance with the Texan
waters, and a particular knowledge of his destination at Aransas bay.
This individual was immediately put in charge of one of the transports
loaded with troops, and under his lead, the commander in chief sailed
from New Orleans with three ships and two steamers in search of the port
of his disbarkation. The blundering pilot grounded his vessel among the
breakers where it would inevitably have been wrecked, had it not been
extricated by timely assistance, while the captain of another transport
coasted the low shores of the gulf for several days, in sight of land,
seeking an inlet, and when his ship was at length anchored off St.
Joseph's, he asserted that it was the island of Espiritu Santo.[75]

This bay of Aransas was perhaps one of the most unsuitable for the
disbarkation of troops on the coast of Texas, and was selected in utter
ignorance of the country. Indeed we seem to have committed two great and
often fatal errors in warfare when we contemplated hostilities with
Mexico--first, in despising our foe; and secondly, in failing to inform
ourselves of his country's geography.

Aransas bay lies between the south end of St. Joseph's and the northern
point of Mustang island, quite close to the latter, and almost at right
angles with the coast. It has a narrow but shifting sand bar at its
entrance, upon which the depth of water varies according to the action
of the winds. The bay is about twenty-five miles in length and twelve in
width, but is obstructed by a shoal and a range of islands that traverse
it.[76]

On the third of August our whole army had landed on St. Joseph's island,
about thirty miles from the Rio Nueces, across which it was to pass to
its proposed encampment on Corpus Christi bay, near a smuggling village
known as Kinney's _rancho_. As Corpus Christi and Aransas bays are
connected by a shallow and winding channel, it was at once discovered
that steamers were altogether inadequate for the transportation of
troops from the islets to the mainland; and our forces would have
remained where they disembarked had not a few skiffs of light draft,
together with some sail and row boats, been obtained in the neighborhood
at considerable expense. In these frail vessels a detachment of forty
men, armed only with muskets, crossed the Nueces, and landed on the
stormy coast as pioneers in a country asserted to be Mexican. Had the
authorities of that republic been prepared to resist our landing, a few
field pieces might have presented the alleged invasion, as our general
was unable to protect the disembarkation of his troops by cannon. In
addition to these mistakes, the 2d regiment of dragoons was not
despatched from fort Jesup in time to co-operate with our forces when
they first landed at Corpus Christi; and, as the artillery had not yet
been forwarded from our arsenals, the campaign may be said to have
commenced with _infantry alone_. This was a novelty in military science,
and indicated an ignorance of war, an unpardonable imprudence, or a
conviction that the whole drama was got up only to intimidate an enemy
we despised.

It is impossible to narrate every circumstance of interest that occurred
during the encampment of our forces west of the Nueces, a position taken
by General Taylor with the concurrence of the war department. But a
history of this war would be incomplete were not the position as well as
the condition of our army accurately stated. Our government, relying
probably on the acknowledged feebleness of Mexico, and on the fact that
she had not yet declared war, imagined that the mere presence of
American troops would pacify Texas or prevent hostilities. This was an
unfortunate mistake, especially in the unsettled condition of things;
for in May, 1845, Mr. Donelson, our chargé to Texas, had warned the
government to be prepared for an immediate blow upon Mexico, if she
should unfortunately declare war against us, and that declaration might
have been expected at any moment.

The details of the organization of our forces seem, nevertheless, to
have been sadly neglected. Sailing vessels, alone, were relied on to
convey despatches to General Taylor; and, from the wreck of one of them,
a drummer boy, strolling along the beach, on the 15th of August, rescued
a valuable package containing the proclamation of the Mexican government
in which the people were summoned to unite in an army for national
preservation, under the sonorous title of "Defenders of independence and
the laws."[77] The day after this despatch was received, the smugglers
along the coast reported that Arista was rapidly advancing to attack us
with three thousand choice troops. Without artillery to defend the camp,
or dragoons to act as scouts, our general could do nothing but order
entrenchments to be thrown up. Entrenching tools, however, had not been
furnished; and, with only a few old and broken spades the troops labored
briskly, and erected, in a few days, a solid field-work a few yards from
the beach, protected in the rear by the bay. But the battery had not yet
arrived, nor was Gen. Taylor able to obtain from the sloop of war St.
Mary's, which was on the station, any guns of a suitable calibre.
Fortunately, however, he procured three pieces, indifferently equipped,
and a small supply of ammunition, from the citizens of Corpus Christi.
These guns added materially to the strength of our position in case we
were attacked, but were entirely unsuitable for field service.[78]

The proclamation to which we have alluded, and the rumors of vigorous
hostility on the part of Mexico, produced great alarm in the United
States, especially along our southern frontier. In New Orleans,
indignation was openly expressed that our gallant men had been
despatched on this forlorn enterprize without the amplest means of
defence and attack, while our arsenals were filled with all the
munitions of war. A large force of volunteers was, therefore, ordered
out in the south, while two companies of artillery were immediately
despatched to Taylor's succor under the command of Maj. Gally.

The report of Arista's progress, however, proved to be false, so that we
were fortunately saved from attack. Yet the sufferings of our army did
not cease with those military inconveniences. "Two thirds of the tents
furnished our soldiers were worn out or rotten, and had been condemned
by boards of survey appointed by the proper authorities in accordance
with the army regulations. Transparent as gauze, they afforded little or
no protection against the intense heat of summer or the drenching rains
and severe cold of winter. Even the dews penetrated the thin covering
almost without obstruction. Such were the tents provided for campaigners
in a country almost deluged three months in the year, and more variable
in its climate than any other region, passing from the extreme of heat
to that of cold in a few hours. During the whole of November and
December, either the rains were descending with violence, or the furious
"northers" which ravage this coast were breaking the frail tent-poles or
rending the rotten canvas. For days and weeks every article in hundreds
of tents was thoroughly soaked; and during these terrible months, the
sufferings of the sick, in the crowded hospital tents, were
indescribably horrible. Every day added to the frightfulness of the
mortality. At one time a sixth of the entire camp was on the sick list,
and at least one-half unfit for service, in consequence of dysentery and
catarrhal fevers which raged like a pestilence."[79] The camp was
without fires, and, being situated on the edge of a vast prairie
sparsely covered with muskeet trees, was but scantily supplied with wood
even for the most needful purposes. The quarter-master's department
furnished only the weak and stunted _mustangs_ of the country; and the
little and inefficient ponies, geared in the large harness made at the
north for American horses, looked as if they would jump through their
collars instead of use them for traction. With such teams only a
sufficiency of wood could be drawn for cooking, and none for camp fires
to comfort the sick and suffering soldiers. "As winter advanced, the
prairie became a quagmire, the roads almost impassable, and as the
_mustangs_ died in large numbers, wood enough for cooking even, could
not be procured. The encampment now resembled a marsh, the water, at
times, being three or four feet deep in the tents of whole wings of
regiments. All military exercises were suspended, and the bleak gloomy
days were passed in inactivity, disgust and sullenness. The troops,
after being thoroughly drenched all day, without fires to dry them, lay
down at night in wet blankets on the soaked ground, as plank for tent
floors was not furnished by the quarter-masters until the rainy season
was over. At times the men, at tattoo, gasped for breath in the sultry
night air, and, at reveille, found their moist blankets frozen around
them and their tents stiff with ice. A portion of the men were kept
without pay for six months, and the rest for four months, although the
law strictly requires payment every two months.

"Officers and soldiers, destitute of funds, were compelled to borrow,
upon the strength of pay due, of their more fortunate companions, or of
the Shylocks, in search of victims, that polluted the camp. Sick
soldiers, directed by their surgeons to return to the United States, had
either to remain and die, or to submit to exorbitant exactions from
unfeeling villains in their pension certificates and pay accounts,
though the law requires the paymasters to cash them in specie.

"On the first landing of the 3d and 4th infantry at Corpus Christi,
"Kinney's Rancho," though a lawless, smuggling town, under the vigorous
sway of its martial proprietor, was as quiet and peaceful as a village
in New England. But every fresh arrival of troops was followed by some
portion of that vast horde of harpies, that are ever to be found in the
train of all armies, ready to prey upon the simple and unsuspecting
among the soldiers. In a short time, hundreds of temporary structures
were erected on the outskirts of the "Rancho," and in them, all the
cut-throats, thieves, and murderers of the United States and Texas, seem
to have congregated. No sight could have been more truly melancholy than
that of their bloated and sin-marked visages, as they lounged through
the purlieus of this modern Pandemonium. The air, by day, was polluted
with their horrid oaths and imprecations,--and the savage yells,
exulting shouts, and despairing groans of their murderous frays, made
night hideous. But, not content with confining their hellish deeds to
their own worthy fraternity, they laid their worthless hands on the
troops. Many of the soldiers, enticed to their dram-shops, were drugged
with stupefying potions, and then robbed of their hard earnings, or
murdered in cold blood."

General Taylor, looking to the probability of a movement against Mexico,
warned the department that a ponton train was indispensable in a country
wherein streams abounded and wood for bridges was scarce; but it was not
despatched until after the next meeting of congress.

"Six months after the army had taken the field, there were not teams and
wagons enough to transport one half of the troops; so that, in case of
hostilities, had a forward movement been ordered, it could only have
been effected by detachments, and, in consequence, that most fatal of
all military errors would have been committed, of permitting the enemy
to attack and beat in detail. The few teams furnished, it is natural to
think, were the choicest to be found in the west. For, it had been said,
that though the "Army of occupation" was small, the great celerity of
its movements, from the superiority of the American horses, would
contribute, as well as the greater bravery of its men, to make it more
than a match for the largest Mexican force. Ninety yoke of oxen and
several hundred mustangs were therefore bought, but not a single
American horse!

"Three batteries of artillery were added to the one which, at length
reached the company from Charleston. Horses were sent with two of them,
to manoeuvre them rapidly on the field of battle, and to transport
them wherever the army might go. But the third came unprovided with
cavalry.

"When the New Orleans volunteers left Corpus Christi, their artillery
horses were turned over to the company from Charleston. This company,
having always acted as infantry, had never even seen a flying artillery
drill,--half of the men could not ride,--many had never ridden at all,
and, in mounting for the first time, made Mr. Winkle's mistake as to
which stirrup to use. It was certainly an original idea, to convert,
_in a single day_, a company of foot into light artillery. However, as
horses had at length been given to the company from Charleston, it was
the ardent desire of the lieutenant commanding, to teach his men to ride
and drive, and the sabre exercise. This the loyal quarter-masters
resolved to prevent, and, at the same time, to show the world how
economical they were. They, therefore, refused to purchase any more hay
and told the dragoons and light artillery, that they, themselves, must
cut and haul the dry and sapless broom straw of the prairie, and forage
their horses on that."[80]

Such is a picture of the sufferings of our army of occupation, drawn by
an eye-witness, and scarcely colored by the warmth of his feelings. If
the advice of military men, and the opinion of persons whose experience
as campaigners entitled them to respect, had been heeded, this war would
have been speedily ended. Ever since the rumor of annexation in 1843,
but, especially, since the inaugural address of President Polk in 1845,
in which he pronounced so emphatic an opinion as to our right to the
whole of Oregon, our political firmament had been clouded. Prudent men
thought it probable that there would be war with Mexico or hostilities
with England, and that the two sources of irritation, by distracting our
powers, would materially increase each other's virulence.

At this time, General Gaines, a chieftain who has become venerable in
the service of his country, and whose skill and bravery on many a field
have manifested his character in actions that no citizen can ever
forget, commanded on our south-western frontier. The delicate character
of our foreign relations, to which allusion has just been made,
attracted his anxious attention in 1845; and his responsibility as
Chief on a long, exposed frontier, compelled him to give timely warning
to the department. It seemed to this officer, if we engaged hastily in
war with Mexico or England, at such a crisis, and with no preparations
either for an army or its instruction, that the conflict would be
disastrous or procrastinated, especially as the latter power had so far
surpassed us in applying steam to naval purposes. Long years of peace
had rendered us indifferent to war; and unvarying success in other
conflicts had made us confident. Accordingly, he recommended the
concentration of a large force of volunteers on the borders of the
probable theatre of war, where they should be trained in military
science, together with the regulars commanded by General Taylor, until
the spring of 1846. If war could not be averted before that period, we
might then be able to march against the enemy with a powerful and
disciplined army. He contended that the true policy of our country, in
such an assault, was to pursue with relentless energy the military
bandits who swayed the destinies of Mexico, whilst, on all sides, we
protected the persons and property of non-combatants; so that in pushing
onward to the capital we would leave throughout the country traversed an
indelible impression of our justice. Thus the confidence of the best
portions of Mexico would be secured, the _prestige_ of her army promptly
destroyed, and peace obtained before she was able to rally. On the other
hand, General Gaines believed that if we began war without large and
instructed forces, we might count on a protracted struggle, as in the
Seminole campaigns from 1836 to 1842. The precipices upon the doubtful
verge of whose summits we tottered during the war, prove the wisdom of
these suggestions. The faithful page of history admonishes that nations
as well as individuals who recklessly disregard the essential maxims
that prescribe their prudent duties, must sooner or later pay the
penalty of neglect. But politicians, uneducated even in the pleasant
discipline of militia trainings, do not view matters in the same light
as military men whose knowledge of detail, and of the responsibilities
of real service, make them unwilling to engage in war, or even to
threaten hostilities, without the amplest preparation to perform all
they promise. Without such true and earnest discipline warlike array is
but a military cheat.

It is vain to predict what might have been the result had the advice of
the gallant and prudent Gaines been adopted; yet it cannot be doubted
that a well equipped body of twenty-five or thirty thousand men would
have marched to the city of Mexico and dictated peace at the cost of one
fourth the blood and treasure that were subsequently expended. A
lingering policy of hesitation together with the acknowledged
inefficiency of Mexico, may palliate the errors of our cabinet; but wise
politicians will not henceforth fail to be impressed with the necessity
of military preparation which this conflict has taught us.

A war which was originally supposed to be one exclusively of defence,
was suddenly changed to an aggressive conflict, and is, perhaps, an
additional excuse for our unpreparedness. Most of the events in this
narrative derive peculiar interest from the fact that it is the first
and only offensive war into which we have been forced. With every known
principle of defence we had been long acquainted; for, in the school of
Washington, we acquired a sound, practical knowledge, which subsequent
experience, under the most perfect system of self-government, enabled us
to improve. But it is to be hoped that many years will elapse before our
volunteers will be again called from their peaceful duties to take part
in an aggressive war, and especially against a government whose theory
of rule is the same as our own.

      NOTE.--General Gaines, who commanded the western division,
      was censured by the War department for having made a
      requisition on the governor of Louisiana for State troops
      to be sent to the army in Texas under Taylor's command, at
      the moment of apprehended danger described in this chapter.
      General Taylor, for more than a year previous to September,
      1845, commanded one of the brigades of Gaines's division,
      and the latter never knew _by authority_ that the former had
      been disconnected from him, except upon temporary service,
      until advised by the secretary of war on the 13th of
      September. He never received a copy of the authority given
      to Taylor to go to Texas until after the date of his
      requisition for Louisiana volunteers, on the 15th of August,
      1845; consequently he _then_ considered himself responsible
      for the strength and support of one of his own brigades, and
      bound to succor it speedily when he believed it to be in
      imminent danger.--See Senate doc. No. 378, for his
      correspondence, and especially p. 48.

FOOTNOTES:

[70] Almonté's report. Kennedy's Texas, chap. 1.

[71] Senate doc. 341, 28th cong. 1st sess. p. 56.

[72] Kennedy's Texas, chap. 1.

[73] Senate doc. No. 341, 28th cong. 1st sess. p. 76.

[74] An account of the army of observation and occupation, written by
one of its officers, in the Southern Quarterly Review for April, 1846.

[75] S. Q. Review, _ut antea_, p. 442. (April, 1846.)

[76] Kennedy's Texas, chap. 2d.

[77] Niles' Reg. vol. 68, p. 305.

[78] S. Q. Rev. _ut antea_. Senate doc. No. 337, 29th cong. 1st sess. p.
93.

[79] S. Q. Rev. _ut antea_.

[80] Southern Quarterly Review, _ut antea_. These statements are made by
an able and distinguished officer of our army, who was on the field, and
is perfectly versed in all the matters he discusses.

CHAPTER II.

Our position at Corpus Christi--Instructions to Taylor as to the boundary
     of the Rio Grande--Taylor's views--Review and history of the boundary
     question--Letter from Mr. Adams--Santa Anna's agreements with Texas,
     &c.--March to the Rio Grande ordered--Justification in a military
     point of view of the occupation of the disputed territory--Anecdote
     of Frederick the Great--War in Silesia and Austria--Madison's conduct
     to Spain in 1810--Right of declaration of war--Justifiable causes of
     war--Opinion of Sir J. Mackintosh--War and diplomacy contrasted.

One of the most inclement winters in the Gulf of Mexico had passed in
the comfortless manner described in the last chapter. Our attempts to
negotiate with Mexico were repulsed, and although our minister had not
yet returned to the United States--having delayed at Jalapa with the
hope of finding Paredes more accessible than Herrera--every thing
indicated an ultimate defeat of diplomacy.

Meanwhile our forces at Corpus Christi were gradually augmenting, under
the command of Generals Taylor and Worth. In October, 1845, the troops
amounted to near four thousand, and General Taylor made every
preparation, by reconnoissances between the Nueces and the Rio Grande
for the ultimate defence of soil which had been claimed by our
government as part of Texas.[81]

As a military man it was not his duty to affix the boundaries that were
to be the subject of negotiation or war; but simply to ascertain
precisely the extent of defence required along a disputed territory, and
to dispose his troops accordingly.[82]

In October, 1845, therefore, General Taylor reviewed the instructions
from the war department, and, seeing that he had been ordered to select
and occupy near the Rio Grande such a site as would consist with the
health of the troops, and was best adapted to repel invasion, he
ventured to suggest an advance of his army. This however, was done by
him whilst he felt great diffidence in touching topics that might become
matter of delicate diplomacy. Nevertheless, taking a soldier's view of
the topographical and not the diplomatic question, he informed our
government, that if it made the Rio Grande an _ultimatum_ in adjusting a
boundary, he doubted not that the settlement would be facilitated by
taking possession, at once, of one or two suitable points on, or quite
near, that river. At these spots, our strength would be displayed in a
manner not to be mistaken, while the position of our troops at the
remote camp of Corpus Christi, with arid wastes between them and the
outposts of Mexico, altogether failed to impress that government with
our readiness to vindicate by force of arms our title to the country as
far as the Rio Grande.[83] Moreover, General Taylor felt encumbered by
the orders from our war department of the 8th July, in which he was told
that Mexico held military establishments on the east side of the Rio
Grande, whose forces he should not disturb until our peaceful relations
were finally destroyed.[84]

Accordingly, on the 13th of January, 1846, our commander-in-chief was
directed to advance with his troops to the Rio Grande.[85] This movement
was made in consequence of the anticipated failure of our negotiations,
clearly indicated by the conduct of the Mexican government immediately
upon the arrival of Mr. Slidell in the capital. But before these orders
were despatched to General Taylor, he had already in August, 1845, been
apprised of his duties in the event of hostile demonstrations on the
part of the enemy. In case of an invasion of Texas by the Mexicans, he
was directed to drive them back beyond the Rio Grande; and, although it
was desirable that he should confine himself as much as possible to
defensive measures, yet, in the event of such a repulse, he was
authorized to seize and hold possession of Matamoros and other places on
the soil of Mexico.

This resolution of our government was made the subject of grave
complaint by persons who opposed the war. The order to advance from
Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande was alleged to be an act of invasion,
and consequently, that _hostilities_ were commenced by us and not by
Mexico.

It may be pardoned if we pause awhile to consider a subject of such
vital importance. The solution of the question was placed by one party
upon the determination whether the Rio Grande was the boundary between
Texas and Mexico before the battle of San Jacinto; and, if not, whether
it has been made so since by competent authority. Up to that period it
was asserted to be a recognized fact that the Nueces was the western
boundary of Texas. Mr. John Quincy Adams, in his controversy with Don
Luis De Onis, upon the Spanish boundary question, in March, 1818;[86]
and Messieurs Pinckney and Monroe, in their argument with Cevallos at
Madrid in April, 1805,[87] claimed the Rio Grande as the true limit
between the United States and Mexico, by virtue of the ancient rights of
France and the treaties between that sovereignty and the Spanish
king.[88] It was asserted, therefore, that by the cession of Louisiana
all the rights of France over Texas, as an integral part of her
territory, accrued to us; and consequently that when the State of Texas
was united to this country it was only _re_-annexed with what were
_claimed_ to be its ancient limits. But this was not a true statement
of the controversy, for after our treaty with Spain the aspect of the
affair changed. The question then was no longer what had been the
boundary under the laws between France and Spain, or between Spain and
the United States,--but what were the limits either under the colonial
government of the Mexican viceroyalty, or under the laws of Mexico, when
she became an independent republic. It was asserted that no map or
geography existed since the establishment of the republic that did not
lay down the boundary north of the Rio Grande. The map of Texas,
compiled by Stephen H. Austin, the parent of Texan colonization,
published at Philadelphia in 1835, and setting forth all the Mexican
grants in Texas, represents the Rio Nueces as the western boundary.
General Almonté in 1834, as I have previously stated, alleged, upon the
authority of the State government of Coahuila and Texas that the
boundary between them was even east of the Nueces. This was probably in
accordance with the ancient Spanish division; for, in 1805 Cevallos
declared to our ministers at Madrid that the province of Texas, "where
the Spaniards have had settlements from the 17th century, was bounded on
the east by Louisiana, and contains the extensive country which lies
between the river Medina _where the government of Coahuila ends_, and
the post now abandoned." Authorities to this effect might be
extensively multiplied.[90] Brazos de Santiago was a Mexican port of
entry, which continued to be held up to the period of hostilities, and
Laredo was a small Mexican town, occupied by a Mexican garrison. If such
was the geographical division between Texas and Mexico on the lower Rio
Grande, near its mouth in the gulf, it was asserted that there could be
infinitely less right to claim it as a limit nearer its source, since
Santa Fé, the capital of New Mexico, had never been within the
jurisdiction of Texas, and since the boundaries of Chihuahua commenced
near the head waters of the Nueces.

These were some of the arguments used by individuals who deemed the
march to Point Isabel an invasion of Mexican territory. It is just that
a few reasons should also be presented on behalf of those who believed
it to be lawful or expedient.

When Santa Anna was captured after the battle of San Jacinto in 1836,
the leading men in Texas had great difficulty in rescuing him from
popular vengeance for the massacres he had committed. The victory over
the central chief--the despot and dictator of Mexico--was generally
believed to be a crowning measure of success, for the bitter persecutor
soon dwindled into the humble supplicant, and pledged his name and his
oath to secure the independence of the rebellious State. Accordingly,
with every appearance and promise of good faith and honor, he executed
contracts with the Texan authorities which deserve consideration in
discussing this question. On the 14th of May, 1836, at Velasco, two of
these documents were signed by Santa Anna, Burnet, Collingsworth,
Hardiman and Grayson,--the first being a public, and the second a secret
convention between the parties. The third article of the first paper
stipulates that the Mexican troops shall evacuate the _territory_ of
Texas, _passing to the other side of the Rio Grande_, while the fourth
article of the secret agreement declares that a treaty of amity,
commerce and limits shall be made between Mexico and Texas, _the
territory of the latter power not to extend beyond the Rio Bravo del
Norte, or Rio Grande_. In conformity with these contracts, Texas set
free the prisoner, whose "prompt release and departure for Vera Cruz,"
according to their tenor, "were necessary for the fulfilment of his
_solemn oath_," to obtain a recognition of the independence of Texas,
and to dispose the Mexican cabinet for the reception of
commissioners.[91]

Santa Anna returned to his country in disgrace after his disastrous
campaign, and lurked in retirement at his farm until the French attacked
Vera Cruz, when he threw himself again at the head of the departmental
forces. In the action he fortunately lost a limb, and by the skilful
display of his mutilation in defence of Mexico, he renewed his claims
to national gratitude. Instead, however, of using his influence to
obtain the treaty, promised as the boon for his life, he became at once
the bitterest foe of Texas, and pledged himself to fight "forever for
its reconquest." Texas, meanwhile, acting in good faith, and presuming
to adopt the spirit and letter of the convention with Santa Anna, whom
she naturally regarded as the dictator of Mexico, passed the act of
December 19, 1836, establishing the Rio Grande as her boundary from the
gulf to its source. Besides this, her congress created senatorial and
representative districts west of the Nueces; organized and defined
limits of counties extending to the Rio Grande; created courts of
justice; spread her judicial system over the country wherever her people
roamed, and performed other acts of sovereignty which we are compelled
not to disregard. It cannot be contended that these acts and agreements
were alone sufficient, under the laws of nations, to confer upon Texas
unquestionable rights over the soil between the Nueces and the Rio
Grande, for a contract with the captive president and general was not
legally binding; but it is equally clear that all these arguments of the
old authorities as to the original boundary, and all the new claims set
up by Texas, under her statutes, as well as stipulations with Santa
Anna, made that territory a disputed ground whose real ownership could
only be equitably settled by negotiation. The strong language of both
the contracts, just recited, seems to _concede_ the fact that the
president of Mexico regarded, at least the lower Rio Grande, as already
the real boundary between Mexico and Texas, notwithstanding the opinion
of Almonté in 1834; and consequently that it was neither the subject of
treaty or agreement at that moment, nor could it become so afterwards
when commissioners were appointed.

When Texas was annexed to the United States she was received with these
asserted limits, though she did not join the Union with any specific
boundaries.[92] It was thought best by both parties to leave the
question of confines open between Mexico and our country, so as not to
complicate the national entanglements. After the congress of the United
States and convention in Texas had acted upon the joint resolution it
was impossible for us to recede. The course of our presidents,
therefore, was at once pacific and soothing towards Mexico. For although
they believed that republic had no right to be consulted as to the
annexation of Texas, a free and independent State, they nevertheless
admitted all her natural and just privileges in regard to boundary. Mr.
Tyler and Mr. Polk therefore despatched envoys to Mexico with the offer
of liberal negotiations as soon as a favorable opportunity presented
itself. But the chargé and minister of Mr. Tyler were scornfully
rejected, while Mr. Slidell, as has been already related, was refused an
audience upon frivolous pretences at a moment when the Mexican secretary
was secretly craving to receive him.[93]

In such a juncture what was the duty of the United States? It is an easy
matter for speculative philosophers or political critics to find fault
with the conduct of statesmen and to become prophets of woe _after_ the
occurrence of events they deprecate. But such men are timid actors on
the world's stage, and especially in such a theatre of folly as the
Mexican republic. Governments have but two ways of settling
international disputes,--either by negotiation or war,--and, even the
latter must be concluded by diplomacy, for nations rarely fight until
one of them is completely annihilated. Negotiation, or the attempt to
negotiate, had been completely exhausted by us. Meanwhile Mexico
continued to excite our curiosity by spasmodic struggles in nerving her
people for the war, as well as by gasconading despatches which breathed
relentless animosity to our country for the annexation of Texas.
Nevertheless, this sensitive and vaunting nation would neither make
peace, establish boundaries, negotiate, nor declare war. Was it
reasonable that such a frantic state of things should be permitted to
continue? Could this perverse aversion to fighting or friendship be
tolerated? Were our countries to conclude an eternal compact of mutual
hatred and non intercourse? Was such childish obstinacy and weakness to
be connived at in our country? Was it due to common sense, justice, or
the preservation of a good neighborhood that we should remain supine
under insane threats and dishonorable treatment? We asserted that, upon
the Texas question, we had rightly no dispute with Mexico, except as to
the boundary involved in the territory our forces were then occupying or
about to cross. We did not design discussing our right to annex Texas.
That was an act accomplished and unalterable. It was, doubtless,
exceedingly convenient for Mexico to maintain this pacific state of
_quasi-war_ and to reject, alike, our amity and hostilities, as long as
she owed us many millions of dollars and refused either to pay principal
or interest, or to conclude a treaty for the settlement of unadjusted
claims. Whilst her government was able to enforce non-intercourse, it
was free from importunity and payment. But this adroit scheme of
insolvency was unjust to our citizens, and only served to augment the
liabilities of Mexico. What then remained to be done? The reply may be
found in a significant anecdote related by Mr. Adams in a speech in
congress on the Oregon question, on the 2d of January, 1846.

"After negotiating"--said he--"for twenty years about this matter we may
take possession of the subject matter of negotiation. Indeed, we may
negotiate after we take possession, and this is the military way of
doing business. When Frederick the Great came to the throne of Prussia
he found that his father had equipped for him an army of a hundred
thousand men. Meeting soon after the Austrian minister, the latter said
to him: "Your father has given you a great army, but ours has seen the
wolf, whilst your majesty's has not." "Well--well!" exclaimed Frederick,
"I will soon give it an opportunity to see the wolf!" Frederick then
added, in his memoirs:--"I had some excellent old _pretensions_ to an
Austrian province, which some of my ancestors owned one or two centuries
before; accordingly I sent an ambassador to the court of Austria stating
my claim, and presenting a full exposition of my right to the province.
The same day my ambassador was received in Vienna, I entered Silesia
with my army!"[94]

Such would be a prompt and impulsive answer to the manifold
prevarications of seditious Mexico. But the army we advanced and the
country we occupied, were neither the army of Frederick nor the pleasant
vales of rich and populous Silesia. A nearly desolate waste, stretched
from the Nueces to the Rio Grande, barren alike in soil and inhabitants,
and tempting none to its dreary wilderness but nomadic _rancheros_ or
outlaws who found even Mexico no place of refuge for their wickedness.
It was, surely, not a land worthy of bloodshed, and yet, in consequence
of its sterility, it became of vast importance on a frontier across
whose wide extent enemies might pass unobserved and unmolested. With the
entire command of the Rio Grande from its source to its mouth in the
hands of our enemy, and the whole of this arid region flanking the
stream and interposing itself between Mexico and our troops, it is
evident that our adversaries would possess unusual advantages over us
either for offensive or defensive war. The mere control of the
embouchure of the river was no trivial superiority, for, on a stormy and
inhospitable coast, it was almost impossible to support an effectual
blockade and thus prevent the enemy from being succored along his whole
frontier with arms and provisions from abroad. By seizing, however, the
usual points of transit and entrance on the lower Rio Grande many of
these evils might be avoided; and, if Mexico ultimately resolved on
hostilities, we should be enabled to throw our forces promptly across
the river, and by rapid marches obtain the command of all the military
positions of vantage along her north-eastern boundary.

The foresight of Frederick the Great disclosed to him the military value
of Silesia in the event of a war with Austria, and it was probably that
circumstance, quite as much as his alleged political rights, that
induced him to enter it with an army on the day when he commenced
negotiations. He began the war with Austria by surprising Saxony, and,
during all his difficulties, clung tenaciously to the possession of
Silesia. Saxony was important as a military barrier covering Prussia on
the side of Austria, while Silesia indented deeply the line of the
Austrian frontier and flanked a large part of Bohemia.[95] Thus Saxony
and Silesia formed a natural fortification for Prussia, just as the
deserts of the disputed land, when in our rear, covered the undefended
confines of Texas at the same time that they gave us the keys to the
enemy's country at Point Isabel and Matamoros.

It may be asserted that, when vacant or nearly vacant territory is in
controversy between two nations, and forms the only subject of real
dispute between them, it would be better for both to refrain from an
attempt to occupy it, provided they are willing to arbitrate the
quarrel, or settle it by diplomacy. But, when both parties assert
claims, both have equal rights to enter it, when negotiation fails. The
decision is then to be made only by intimidation or war. There is no
alternative by which collision can be escaped, and it is the duty of the
wiser of the disputants to place his national forces in such an
advantageous position as either to defend his acknowledged territory or
force himself to be driven from the soil he claims. "I do not consider
the march to the Rio Grande to have been the cause of the war"--said a
distinguished statesman, "anymore than I consider the British march on
Concord or Lexington to have been the cause of the American revolution,
or the crossing of the Rubicon to have been the cause of the civil war
in Rome. The march to the Rio Grande brought on the _collision of arms_,
but, so far from being the cause of the war, it was itself the effect of
those causes."

The power of declaring war is expressly reserved by the constitution to
congress, and, though the president is commander in chief of the army
when called into actual service, he should be extremely cautious in
issuing orders or doing acts which may lead to hostilities resulting in
war. Our congress was in session in January, 1846, when Mr. Slidell was
rejected by Mexico, when our international relations were complicated as
I have described, and when the secretary of war, by the president's
direction, gave the order for Taylor's advance to the Rio Grande. This
was an act that brought the armies of Mexico and the United States in
front of each other; and although there can be no doubt that congress
would have authorised the movement of our troops under the military
advice of General Taylor,--provided the Rio Grande was to be made an
ultimatum in the ratification of a treaty by our senate,--it is,
nevertheless, to be profoundly regretted that the question was not
previously submitted to our national representatives. At that moment the
public mind was distracted between Mexico and England; but the Oregon
question nearly absorbed the apparently minor difficulties with our
restive neighbor. Congress contemplated the solemn probability of war
with one of the mightiest nations of our age, and even some of our
experienced statesmen,--as we have seen in the example of Mr.
Adams,--recommended the most stringent measures of armed occupation. At
such a crisis, and with a confidential knowledge of all our foreign
relations, it was the duty of the president to represent these matters
frankly to congress and to ask the opinion of his constitutional
advisers, as he subsequently did in the settlement of the dispute with
Great Britain. This prudent act would have saved the executive from
needless responsibility, whilst it indicated a sensitive devotion to the
behests of our constitution. Congress met whilst our troops were
encamped at Corpus Christi, as an army of observation, whose hostile,
though protective character, was unquestionable; yet our representatives
neither ordered its return nor refused it supplies. This denoted a
willingness to sanction measures which might either pacify Mexico, or
impose upon that republic the immediate alternative of war. It is not
improbable that congress would have adopted such a course, because,
according to the pretensions of Mexico, our troops had already invaded
her domains. This is an important view of the question which should not
be passed by silently. Mexico, it must be remembered, never relinquished
her right to reconquer Texas, but always claimed the _whole_ province as
her own, asserting a determination to regard its union with our
confederacy as justifiable cause of war. The joint-resolution, alone,
was therefore a belligerent act of the congress of the United States,
sufficient, according to the doctrine of Mexico, to compel hostile
retaliation. But, moreover, as the entire soil of Texas, from the Sabine
to the Nueces or Rio Grande was still claimed by Mexico as her
unsurrendered country, the landing of a single American soldier anywhere
south of our ancient boundary with Spain, was quite as hostile an
invasion of Mexican territory as the passage of our army from Corpus
Christi to Point Isabel.

Occasions upon which the eminent right of self protection has been
adopted as a principle of action in the United States, are not wanting
in our political history. The circumstances in all, are of course not
precisely the same, but the policy is identical. The conduct of our
government in regard to General Jackson's invasion of Florida for the
suppression of Indian cruelties may be referred to. But congress might
have found a still more analogous case, in the dispute between Spain and
the United States as to the eastern limits of Louisiana. Spain alleged
that Florida extended to the Mississippi, embracing what was then a
wilderness, but, now, forms the populous States of Alabama and
Mississippi; while our government asserted that all the territory
eastward of the Mississippi and extending to the Rio Perdido belonged of
right to us by virtue of the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of
April, 1803. By acts of congress in 1803 and 1804 the president was
authorized to take possession of the territory ceded by France, to
establish a provisional government, to lay duties on goods imported into
it; and, moreover, _whenever he deemed it expedient_, to erect the bay
and river Mobile into a separate district, in which he might establish a
port of entry and delivery.

In 1810, President Madison believing that the United States had too long
acquiesced in the temporary continuance of this territory under Spanish
domain, and that nothing was to be gained from Spain by candid
discussion and amicable negotiation for several years, solved the
difficulty by taking possession of Mobile and Baton Rouge and extending
our jurisdiction to the Perdido. This possession, he took means to
ensure, if needful, by military force. Mr. Madison's conduct was
assailed in congress by the federalists who regarded it as an
unjustifiable and offensive demonstration against Spain, but it was
defended with equal warmth by the opposition,--especially by Mr.
Clay,--and the Rio Perdido has ever since continued to form the western
limit of Florida.[96]

When nations are about to undertake the dread responsibility of war, and
to spread the sorrow and ruin which always mark the pathway of
victorious or defeated armies, they should pause to contemplate the
enormity of their enterprise as well as the principles that can alone
justify them in the sight of God and man. Human life cannot be lawfully
destroyed, assailed or endangered for any other object than that of just
defence of person or principle, yet it is not a legal consequence that
defensive wars are always just.[97]

"It is the right of a State," said that profound moralist and statesman,
Sir James Mackintosh, "to take all measures necessary for her safety if
it be attacked or threatened from without: provided always that
reparation cannot otherwise be obtained; that there is a reasonable
prospect of obtaining it by arms; and that the evils of the contest are
not probably greater than the mischiefs of acquiescence in the wrong;
including, on both sides of the deliberation, the ordinary consequences
of the example as well as the immediate effects of the act. If
reparation can otherwise be obtained, a nation has no necessary, and
therefore no just cause of war; if there be no probability of obtaining
it by arms, a government cannot, with justice to their own nation,
embark it in war; and, if the evils of resistance should appear on the
whole greater than those of submission, wise rulers will consider an
abstinence from a pernicious exercise of right as a sacred duty to their
own subjects, and a debt which every people owes to the great
commonwealth of mankind, of which they and their enemies are alike
members. A war is just against the wrongdoer when reparation for wrong
cannot otherwise be obtained; but is then only conformable to all the
principles of morality when it is not likely to expose the nation by
whom it is levied to greater evils than it professes to avert, and when
it does not inflict on the nation which has done the wrong, sufferings
altogether disproportioned to the extent of the injury. When the rulers
of a nation are required to determine a question of peace or war, the
bare justice of their case against the wrongdoer never can be the sole,
and is not always the chief matter on which they are morally bound to
exercise a conscientious deliberation. Prudence in conducting the
affairs of their subjects is in them a part of justice."

These are the true principles by which Mexico should have judged the
controversy between us, before she rejected all our efforts to
negotiate, and forced our government to prepare for hostilities.

The idea of war, for mere conquest, seems now to be obsolete among
civilized nations. To political dominion, as exhibited in the various
governments of the old world, and in most of the new, geographical
limits are definitely assigned. This fact must, hereafter, greatly
modify the objects of war, by narrowing them to _principles_ instead of
_territory_. Principles, however, are always the fair subjects of
controversy for the diplomatic art. Yet such is the perversity of human
nature, that, although we are convinced of the propriety and possibility
of adjusting our disputes by reason, we nevertheless go to war for
these very principles, and, after having done each other an incalculable
amount of injury, at last sit down like cripples, to negotiate the very
matters which ought to have been treated and terminated diplomatically
at first. It is, perhaps, the folly of mankind to believe that there is
more wisdom in negotiators and diplomacy when nations are lame and
weakened by war than when they are full of the vigorous energy and
intelligence of peace!

      NOTE.--It may be useful to record the following proclamation
      of General Woll, before annexation, in order to show, that
      the agreements between Santa Anna and the Texans in 1836, are
      not the only Mexican documents in existence which seemed to
      open the boundary question between Texas and Tamaulipas.

     "_Headquarters of the Army of the North, Mier, June 20, 1844._

      "I, Adrian Woll, general of brigade, &c., make known:

      "1. The armistice agreed on with the department of Texas
      having expired, and the war being, in consequence,
      recommenced against the inhabitants of that department, all
      communication with it ceases.

      "2. Every individual, of whatever condition, who may
      contravene provisions of the preceding article, shall be
      regarded as a traitor, and shall receive the punishment
      prescribed in article 45, title 10, treatise 8, of the
      articles of war.

      "3. _Every individual who may be found at the distance of
      one league from the left bank of the Rio Bravo, will be
      regarded as a favorer and accomplice of the usurpers of that
      part of the national territory, and as a traitor to his
      country; and, after a summary military trial, shall receive
      the said punishment._

      "4. Every individual who may be comprehended within the
      provisions of the preceding article, and may be rash enough
      to fly at the sight of any force belonging to the supreme
      government, shall be pursued until taken, or put to death.

      "5. In consideration of the situation of the towns of La
      Reda and Santa Rita de Ampudia, as well as of all the _farm
      houses beyond the Rio Bravo_, I have this day received, from
      the supreme government, orders to determine the manner by
      which those interested are to be protected; but, until the
      determination of the supreme government be received, I warn
      all those who are beyond the limits here prescribed, to
      bring them within the line, or to abandon them; as those who
      disobey this order, will infallibly suffer the punishment
      here established.

      ADRIAN WOLL.

FOOTNOTES:

[81] On the 15th of June, 1845, Mr. Bancroft, as acting secretary of
state, wrote to General Taylor as follows:

"The point of your ultimate destination is the western frontier of
Texas, where you will select and occupy, on or near the Rio Grande del
Norte, such a site as will consist with the health of the troops, and
will be best adapted to repel invasion, and to protect what, in the
event of annexation, will be our western border."

On the 30th of July, 1845, the secretary of war, Mr. Marcy, declared to
him that "the Rio Grande is claimed to be the boundary between the two
countries, and up to this boundary you are to extend your protection,
only excepting any posts on the eastern side thereof which are in the
actual occupancy of Mexican forces, or Mexican settlements over which
the republic of Texas did not exercise jurisdiction at the period of
annexation, or shortly before that event. It is expected that, in
selecting the establishment for your troops, you will approach as near
the boundary line--the Rio Grande--as prudence will dictate. With this
view, the President desires that your position, for a part of your
forces, at least, should be west of the river Nueces."

This, and even more forcible language, was repeated in letters from the
same source on the 23d and 30th of August, and on the 16th of October,
1845. In the last letter the secretary of war states distinctly that the
western boundary of Texas is the Rio Grande. See Senate doc. No. 337,
29th cong. 1st sess. pp. 75, 77, 80, 81, 82.

[82] That this was General Taylor's view of the question is proved by a
remark in his letter to General Ampudia on the 12th of April, 1846, on
being warned by that officer to break up his camp and to retire to the
other bank of the Nueces. General Taylor says: I need hardly advise you
that charged as I am, _in only a military capacity, with the performance
of specific duties, I cannot enter into a discussion of the
international question involved in the advance of the American
army_.--id. p. 124.

[83] See Senate Doc. No. 337, 29th cong. 1st sess. p. 99.

[84] Id. p. 75.

[85] Id. p. 82.

[86] American State papers, vol. 4, p. 468.

[87] Id. vol. 2, p. 662.

[88] As it may be important that the reader should understand the title
to Louisiana under which the boundary of the Rio Grande was claimed, the
following is a summary of its history. Louisiana originally belonged to
France, but by a secret compact between that country and Spain in 1762,
and by treaties, in the following year, between France, Spain, and
England, the French dominion was extinguished on all the continent of
America. In consequence of the treaty between this country and England
in 1783, the Mississippi became the western boundary of the United
States from its source to the 31° of north latitude, and thence, on the
same parallel to the St. Mary's. France, it will be remembered, always
had _claimed_ dominion in Louisiana to the Rio Bravo or Rio Grande, by
virtue

1st. Of the discovery of the Mississippi from near its source to the
ocean.

2d. _Of the possession taken, and establishment made by La Salle, at the
bay of St. Bernard, west of the rivers Trinity and Colorado, by
authority of Louis XIV, in 1685_; notwithstanding the subsequent
destruction of the colony.

3d. Of the charter of Louis XIV, to Crozat in 1712.

4th. The historical authority of Du Pratz, Champigny, and the Count de
Vergennes.

5th. Of the authority of De Lisle's map, and of the map published in
1762 by Don Thomas Lopez, _geographer to the king of Spain_, as well as
of various other maps, atlases, and geographical and historical
authorities.

By an article of the secret treaty of San Ildefonso, in October, 1800,
Spain retroceded Louisiana to France; yet this treaty was not
promulgated till the beginning of 1802. The paragraph of cession is as
follows: "His Catholic majesty engages to retrocede to the French
republic, six months after the full and entire execution of the
conditions and stipulations above recited relative to his Royal
Highness, the Duke of Parma, the colony and province of Louisiana, with
the same extent that it already has in the hands of Spain, _and that it
had when France possessed it_, and such as it should be, after the
treaties passed subsequently between Spain and other powers." In 1803,
Bonaparte, the first consul of the French republic, ceded Louisiana to
the United States, as fully and in the same manner as it had been
retroceded to France by Spain in the treaty of San Ildefonso; and, by
virtue of this grant, Messieurs Madison, Monroe, Adams, Clay, Van Buren,
and Jackson contended that the original limits of the state had been the
Rio Grande. However, by the 3rd article of our treaty with Spain in
1819, all our pretensions to extend the territory of Louisiana towards
Mexico or the Rio Grande, were resigned and abandoned by adopting the
River Sabine as our southern confine in that quarter. See Lyman's
diplomacy of the United States. Vol. 1, p. 368, and vol. 2, p. 136.

The following extract from a valuable letter with which the author was
favored by Ex-President Adams, who, as secretary of state, conducted the
negotiations with Spain, will explain his opinions and acts upon a
subject of so much importance.

      QUINCY, 7th July, 1847.

      "Whoever sets out with an inquiry respecting the right of
      territories in the American hemisphere claimed by Europeans,
      must begin by settling certain conventional principles of
      right and wrong before he can enter upon the discussion.

      "For example what right had Columbus to Cat Island,
      otherwise called Guanahani? Who has the right to it now and
      how came they by it? The flag of St. George and the Dragon
      now waves over it; but who had the right to take possession
      of it because Christopher Columbus found it,--the paltriest
      island in the midst of the ocean. European statesmen,
      warriors, and writers on what are called the laws of
      nations, have laid down a system of laws upon which they
      found this right. Have the Carribee Indians, in whose
      possession that Island was discovered by Columbus, ever
      assented to that system of right and wrong?

      "You remember that Hume, in commencing his history of
      England by the Roman conquest says--"that without seeking
      any more justifiable reasons of hostility than were employed
      by the later Europeans in subjecting the Africans and the
      Americans, they sent over an army under the command of
      Plautius, an able general, who gained some victories, and
      made a considerable progress in subduing the inhabitants."
      Then, no European has ever had any better right to take
      possession of America, than Julius Cæsar and the Romans had
      to take possession of the island of Britain.

      "What then was the right either of France or Spain to the
      possession of the province of Texas? To come to any question
      of right between the parties upon the subject you must agree
      upon certain conventional principles: where and when your
      question of right must become applicable to the facts; and,
      as between them, it was a disputed question, and had been so
      from the discovery of the mouth of the Mississippi river by
      La Salle, and from his second expedition to find the mouth
      of the Mississippi coming from the ocean, in which he
      perished.

      "Spain had prior claims to the country, but the claim of
      France was founded upon the last voyage of La Salle, and by
      extending a supposed derivative right, from the spot where
      La Salle landed half way to the nearest Spanish settlement.

      "Mr. Monroe and Mr. Charles Pinckney, in their
      correspondence with Cevallos, assumed this as a settled
      principle between European nations, in the discussion of
      right to American territory. It was not contested, but was
      not assented to on the part of Spain; and, having found it
      laid down by Messieurs Monroe and Pinckney, I argued upon
      it, and it was never directly answered by Don Luis De Onis,
      who could not controvert it without going to the Pope's
      Bull.[89]

      "As between France and Spain therefore, I maintained that
      the question of right, had always been disputed and never
      was settled, from which opinion I have not since varied.
      That we had a shadow of right beyond the Sabine I never
      believed since the conclusion of the Florida treaty, and, it
      is from the date of that treaty, that Great Britain had not
      a shadow of right upon the Oregon territory until we have
      been pleased to confer it upon her."

      "I am, dear sir, with great respect, your very obedient
      servant,

      J. Q. ADAMS."

      To BRANTZ MAYER, ESQ., Baltimore."

[89] Alexander VIth's Bull of Donation.

[90] See "Matthew Carey's general map of the world,"--29th
map--published 1814.--Kennedy's Texas, p. 4.--Mrs. Holley's
Texas.--History of Texas, by D. B. Edwards, preceptor of Gonzales
Seminary, Texas, 1836, p. 14. He says:--"Texas is bounded on the north
by Red river, which divides it from Arkansas, Ozark District, and New
Mexico; on the south by the Gulf of Mexico and the Rio de las Nueces,
_which divides it from the States of Coahuila and Tamaulipas_; on the
east by the eastern branch of the river Sabine and the State of
Louisiana; on the west by the State of Coahuila and the territory of New
Mexico."

Accompanying the work is a map of Texas with boundaries, as laid down
above. In a note on one corner of the map, speaking of the Rio Grande,
he says: "_If_ this river should ever become the western boundary of
Texas (as desired by the inhabitants) it will add a hundred miles to its
sea-coast and fifty thousand square miles to its superficies; the
southern section of the surface is sandy, barren prairie, almost
destitute of water; and its northern rocky, sterile mountains, nearly as
destitute of timber."

[91] Primera Campaña de Tejas: by Ramon Martinez Caro, secretary of
Santa Anna, pp. 122, 125.

[92] Mr. Donelson wrote to Mr. Buchanan on the 2d July, 1845, from
Washington, Texas, as follows: "_My position is_ that we can hold Corpus
Christi and all other points up the Nueces. If attacked, the right of
defence will authorise us to expel the Mexicans to the Rio Grande. It is
better for us to await the attack than incur the risk of embarrassing
the question of annexation with the consequences of immediate possession
of the territory on the Rio Grande. * * * The government left for treaty
arrangement the boundary question in the propositions for a definitive
treaty of peace. H. of R. doc. No. 2, 29th cong. 1st sess. pp. 78, 79.

[93] I am informed by Mr. Parrott, the secretary of legation who
accompanied Mr. Slidell, that no form of letters of credence--or
evidence of powers as "_commissioner to settle the Texan dispute_,"
would have secured a hearing for our envoy. The mob, the army, and
Paredes were determined that no missionary of peace should be received
from the United States.

[94] The _claim_ of Frederick the IInd to Silesia was considered
_plausible_. As Bohemia renounced not only the possession, but all its
rights to Silesia by the treaties of Breslau and Berlin and other
subsequent treaties, the kings of Prussia pretended, that by virtue of
the renunciation, they became sovereign dukes of the country and not
subject to the emperor in their new character. To this claim it was
replied that Bohemia being an imperial State, could not, of its own
authority, destroy the feudal tenure by which Silesia was attached to
it, and through it to the empire. The question was rendered more
intricate, for one party considered Bohemia feudal only as to the
electoral dignity, but as a kingdom free and independent of Germany. The
Germans argued that Silesia was part of the empire, the Prussians
considered it a separate and independent State. Frederick took advantage
of these "state right" doctrines to sustain his claim, as Texas took
advantage of her state right sovereignty when the central despotism of
Santa Anna overthrew the federal constitution of 1824.

[95] Arnold's fourth lecture on Modern History.

[96] Waite's State papers, 1809-11, p. 261; and Clay's speech on the
line of the Perdido.

[97] Pufendorf, Lib. VIII, c. 6.--Note by Barbeyrac.

CHAPTER III.

Army marches from Corpus Christi--Taylor prepares the Mexicans for his
     advance--Description of the march--Beautiful prairie and desolate
     sand wilderness--Rattlesnakes--Chapparal--The Arroyo Colorado--First
     hostile demonstrations of the Mexicans--Expected fight--Cross the
     Colorado--Worth and Taylor separate--True nature of discipline--
     Characters of Mexican and American soldiers contrasted.

On the 8th of March, 1846, the joyous news ran through the American
camp, at Corpus Christi, that the tents were at last to be struck. The
worn out soldiery had nothing to regret in quitting a spot where their
eyes were only relieved by looking from the dreary sea in front to the
desolate prairie in the rear. General Taylor had already taken means to
prepare the Mexicans for his advance, although he scarcely expected
resistance. Respectable citizens from Matamoros had frequently visited
his camp; and to all of those who were represented as possessing
influence at home he proclaimed the unhostile feelings of our government
towards their country, and that when our army marched southward it would
not pass the Rio Grande unless Mexico provoked war. He invariably
apprized these strangers of his resolution to protect the peaceful
inhabitants in all their rights and usages, as well as to pay for every
thing needed by his forces instead of plundering the country for
support.

Accordingly, on the morning of the 8th of the month, the advanced guard,
composed of the cavalry and Major Ringgold's light artillery,--the
whole under the command of Colonel Twiggs, and numbering twenty-three
officers and three hundred and eighty-seven men,--took up its line of
march towards Matamoros. This corps was succeeded by the brigades of
infantry, the last of which departed on the 11th followed immediately by
the commander in chief with his staff. The weather was favorable; the
roads in tolerable order; the troops in good condition notwithstanding
the winter's hardships; while a general spirit of animation pervaded the
whole body, inspired as it was with the hope of adventure in the
neighborhood of an enemy. All, therefore, departed on this day from
Corpus Christi by land, except the command of Major Monroe, who was to
reach the Brazos de Santiago in transports under convoy of the United
States brig Porpoise and the Woodbury. This officer was to embark with a
siege train and field battery, in season to reach his destination when
the army would be in the vicinity of Point Isabel.

The last adieus of our forces to their dreary winter quarter were by no
means tearful, as with colors flying and music playing, they crossed the
sandy hills that concealed it forever from their sight. The first day's
march passed through alternate patches of prairies and timber to the
Nueces; but, on the two next, these sad wastes were exchanged for
splendid fields blossoming with flowers of every hue. A delicious
fragrance filled the air, and the whole surface of the earth as far as
the eye could reach, seemed covered with a beautiful carpet. The edge of
the horizon, in every direction, was crowded with wild animals. On one
side thousands of mustangs curvetted over the gentle elevations of the
rolling prairie; on another herds of deer might be seen standing for a
moment filled with wonder at the unwonted sight of human beings, and
then bounding off until they were lost in the vast distance. Beautiful
antelopes, nimble as the wind, were beheld in countless numbers, while
pecarys and wild bulls rushed in droves across the path of our men. But,
on the fourth day of the march, this scene of enchantment suddenly
vanished. Uncultivated prairies and immense herds of savage beasts had
already testified the abandoned state of the country; yet the region our
forces now entered disclosed the frightful "nakedness of the land." The
water became exceedingly bad, and there was scarcely fuel enough for
culinary purposes. The blooming vegetation of the preceding days was
exchanged for sands through which the weary men and cattle toiled with
extreme difficulty. Salt lagunes spread out on every side. At each step
the fatigued soldier plunged ankle-deep in the yielding soil, while a
scorching sun shone over him and not a breath of air relieved his
sufferings. At times, a verdant forest loomed up along the heated
horizon, fringed by limpid lakes, and our wearied columns moved on
gaily, cheated, again and again, by the hope of shade and water.
Suddenly the beautiful groves dwindled into jagged clumps of thorns or
aloes, and the fairy lakes changed to salt and turbid lagunes. "The
wormwood star had fallen on every thing and turned the waters to
bitterness." The plant whose piercing spines and sword-like leaves have
entitled it to the name of the "Spanish bayonet," was the hermit shrub
of this dreadful Zaharah. Around its roots the snakes lurked and
crawled. Whenever the soldiers' path was unimpeded by these annoyances,
scarifying his limbs as he advanced, the ground seemed heated and
sinking like the _scoriæ_ of Vesuvius. Man and beast sank exhausted
and panting on the earth. The want and value of delicious water are
never known till we pass a day like this under the burning rays of a
tropical sun, toiling on foot over a scorched and arid soil without
refreshment! At length the word ran along the line that it was
approaching a lake whose waters were not salt. "Under the excitement of
hope the faint and exhausted infantry pressed onward with renewed life,
while, some miles ahead, the artillery were seen to halt enjoying the
luxury of _water_. As the soldiers reached it all discipline was
forgotten; their arms were thrown down, and they rushed boldly in,
thrusting their heads beneath the waves in their desire to quench the
thirst that was consuming their vitals."[98]

Such is the natural aspect and character of the desolate region between
the Nueces and the Rio Grande,--a chequered wilderness of sand and
verdure,--fit only for the wild beasts that inhabit it, and properly
described in former days, as a suitable frontier between the great
republics of North America.

On the 21st of March, all our forces concentrated on the Arroyo
Colorado,--a salt stream or lagune nearly one hundred yards broad, and
so deep as to be scarcely fordable,--situated about thirty miles north
of Matamoros. Had the enemy attacked us here his assault would have been
formidable, wearied as were our troops with the distressing marches of
previous days. Bold, bluff banks, twenty or thirty feet high, hem in the
stream, whose borders, on both sides, are lined, for a considerable
breadth, with impervious thickets of _chapparal_. These thorny groves
are to be found in all sections of the south, varying in size from a few
yards to a mile in thickness, so closely interlaced and matted with
briers and bushes as to prevent the passage of animals larger than a
hare. They are the sorest annoyances of travellers in Mexico, and often
force the wayfarer to make a long circuit to pass their limits, though
they reward him for his trouble by supplying an abundance of the
_tuna_--a luscious fruit of the prickly pear,--which grows luxuriantly
on these natural and impenetrable walls.

Such, with the barrier of the stream, was the fortification nature had
interposed for the safe guard of Mexico at the Arroyo Colorado. But the
inert natives seemed indisposed to take advantage of those rare
defences, though not without some hostile demonstration which the
resolute conduct of Taylor soon overcame.

When our advanced corps encamped near the banks of the stream on the
19th, an armed _reconnoisance_ was sent forward to examine the country.
On reaching the river, our scouts discovered that the opposite side was
lined with a body of _ranchero_ cavalry, from whom they learned,
although no opposition was made to our examination of the ford, that we
should be treated as enemies if we attempted to pass it. Impossible as
it was to ascertain accurately the amount of the opposing force, our men
were prepared for the worst, and, at an early hour of the 20th, the
cavalry and first brigade of infantry were thrown in position, at the
ford, while the batteries of field artillery were formed so as to sweep
the opposite bank. All was now anxiety and eagerness among our gallant
men. Far along the borders of the river, above and below, the bugles of
the enemy were heard ringing out in the clear morning air. But the hope
of frightening our men by overwhelming numbers was of no avail. Our
pioneers worked steadily on the road they were cutting to the brink of
the river; and, when all was ready for the passage, the adjutant general
of the Mexican forces appeared on the ground for a final effort of
intimidation. With Spanish courtesy, he informed our general that
positive orders were given to his men to fire upon our forces if they
attempted to cross, and that our passage of the river would be
considered a declaration of war. At the same time he placed in Taylor's
hands a warlike proclamation issued by Mejia at Matamoros on the 18th,
containing unequivocal manifestations of the intention of the Mexicans
to molest us.

Our commander-in-chief, however, was not to be deterred by these threats
from the fulfilment of the orders he had received to pass the Rio
Grande. He answered the officer that he would "_immediately_ cross the
river, and that if his hostile party showed itself on the other bank
after our passage was commenced, it would unquestionably receive the
fire of our artillery." In the meantime the second brigade, which had
encamped some miles in our rear, came up and formed on the extreme
right; and, as the road to the river bank was by this time completed,
the order to advance was given.

It was a moment of intense excitement. What forces might not lurk behind
the dense walls of _chapparal_, ready to dash upon our ranks as they
deployed on the other side? Our artillerists stood to their aimed and
loaded guns. The Mexicans were doubtless eager and panting for
resistance in the rear of the bristling plants that lined the lofty
parapet of the river's bank. Every eye was strained upon the first
daring rank that was to plunge into the stream as a "forlorn hope."
Mexico would fight now if ever; for her mettle was as yet untried! For
an instant, profound silence reigned along the anxious line which the
next moment might be involved in the fire of battle. Suddenly the
gallant Worth spurred to the head of our troops, and dashing boldly into
the flood, waved them on to the further shore. But not a shot was fired
by the recreant foe, and as our men rose shouting from the water and
rushed up the steeps of the opposite bank they beheld the valiant
Mexicans in brisk retreat towards Matamoros! The fugitives were
unmolested;--a laugh of scorn and pity ran through our ranks;--and,
before nightfall, the first and second brigades of infantry, with a
train of two hundred wagons had crossed the stream and encamped three
miles from its banks.

This was an important affair, as it was the first in which the Mexicans
showed themselves in a decidedly hostile attitude; and it furnished an
excellent opportunity to try the mettle of our men both in spirit and
discipline. Not a soldier faltered.

On the morning of the 23d of March, General Taylor departed with his
whole army from the camp near the Colorado. After a march of fifteen
miles he reached, on the 24th, a position on the route from Matamoros to
Point Isabel,--distant about eighteen miles from the former and ten from
the latter,--where he left the infantry brigades under the command of
General Worth, with instructions to press on in the direction of
Matamoros until a suitable position for encampment was obtained, at
which he might halt, holding the route in observation, whilst the
commander-in-chief proceeded with the cavalry to Point Isabel. At that
post General Taylor expected to meet the transports from Corpus Christi
with the force under Major Monroe, and to make the necessary
arrangements for the establishment and defence of a depot.

As soon as the army left the Colorado a new object, of more interest in
natural history than military memoirs, presented itself to the notice of
our troops. The soil was covered with a long wiry grass among which
glided immense numbers of huge rattlesnakes, more appalling to our
soldiers than the Mexicans. The country literally swarmed with serpents.
From the Colorado to within a few miles of Point Isabel their warning
rattle was heard on all sides. They crept between the ranks as our men
marched through the long herbage, and at night coiled themselves
comfortably under their blankets for warmth.

Familiar as we are with the campaigns of Frederick and Napoleon, and
willing to record as classical the great deeds of the old world's
heroes, we are still often loath to do justice to the brave men in our
own country who have served the State so zealously in Florida and
Mexico. It is not simple bravery in battle that commends a soldier to
admiration, for few are cowards when the excitement of action hurries
them headlong among their foes amid the shouts and thunder of actual
carnage. But it is the preparatory discipline that tests a military
character. The camp and the march are the soldier's training. The dreary
winter-quarter passed in patient service, and the wearying advance over
burning plains or snowy mountains, are the real touchstones of courage,
and prove those powers of _endurance and subordination_ which make
resistance staunch and stubborn. These are the sources of discipline;
and it was with troops that had borne the winter hardships at Corpus
Christi, I have described, and made the short but arduous march to Point
Isabel, that Taylor felt sure of victory. They had encountered
extraordinary fatigue, and yet were ready at a moment's notice for
battle without flinching. With such schooling an army becomes a gigantic
instrument moving with the accuracy of clock-work, put in motion by the
general's genius. It can endure as well as perform all he requires, and
he knows that the result of a battle depends alone on his numbers, his
position, or his individual skill in military combination. The common
soldier and the officer thus react upon each other, and the electric
chain of mutual _confidence_ makes success an impulse.

The American and the Mexican soldier are essentially different, though
both, according to the report of distinguished officers, are almost
equally brave. In the anglo-saxon race bravery is the balance between
prudence and courage, exercised with an indomitable resolution to
achieve a desired end. The American soldier is fearless, yet he values
life and seeks to protect it. His object is to subdue or slay his foe,
still he determines to avoid, if possible, a fatal catastrophe. This
renders him intrepid while it teaches the importance of discipline and
obedience to resolute and skilful officers. He perceives at once the
object to be secured or the thing to be done, and he marches on with the
mingled caution and spirit requisite for success.

It may be said that a certain degree of timidity is necessary in every
balanced character in order to ensure reflection, for natural courage,
unaided by sensitiveness, would render it rash. But the Mexican soldier
seems to be guided by a different system, and to be brave without either
prudence or enduring discipline. He is trained in manoeuvres; and,
believing that when he masters his manual he is equal to all military
emergencies, he supposes that a battle is little more than a parade. As
Mexican troops are rather political engines, designed for the domestic
police of cities, than for actual service in the field, the soldier is
more of a plaything than a tool or weapon. Vague, ideal notions of Roman
patriotism, are infused into his mind by the demagogues of the army in
bombastic proclamations, and he imagines it better to perish than
surrender to his foe. But this murderous doctrine of "revenge or death"
serves rather to animate him _before_ battle than to carry him steadily
through its perils. He has the ability to perceive the beauty of
abstract virtue, but lacks the sustained energy, the profound
endurance, to realize it. He rushes onward without deliberation, or
regard of consequences. An international war is, in his estimation, a
personal not a political quarrel. A brutal ferocity marks every headlong
movement, and deprives him of the control of reason. Besides this,
_life_, has not the same value to a Mexican as to an American warrior,
for the objects and hopes of their lives are incapable of comparison.
One lives for practical liberty and progress, the other's existence is a
mere strife for bread under military despotism. A Mahomedan
fatalism--derived, perhaps, from his Moorish kindred--tinges the nature
of a Mexican, and the impulsive blood of a tropical climate subjects him
almost exclusively to his instincts. Hence Spanish wars have been long
and sanguinary butcheries, while their civil dissensions are the feted
ferment of corruption.

The Mexican, hot and fretful in controversy, is ever quick and sometimes
secret, in ridding himself of his foe;--the American is equally prompt
with his pistol, but gives his insulting enemy an equal chance. A sudden
conflict with knives ends a Spanish rencontre or dispute; while periods
of deliberation and cool arrangements precede the fatal field between
our countrymen. The American officer is scientifically educated in
military schools and _leads_ his men to battle. The Mexican is ignorant
of all but ordinary drills, and either _follows_ his impulsive
squadrons, or, flies at the approach of personal danger. The one has
nerve and endurance, the other impulse and passion; hence, while the
Mexican strikes his blow and retreats to his lair if foiled, the
American, equally unchanged by victory or defeat, moves onward with
indomitable purpose until his object is successfully accomplished. The
one dwindles too often into the cruel assassin or relentless
persecutor,--the other, as frequently, attains the dignity of a clement
hero.

These general observations apply, of course, only to the masses, for
truly brave and patriotic men exist in all countries, and nowhere are
the examples of heroic qualities more conspicuous than among the Spanish
races. The fault lies more in temperament than in soul. An equipoise
between intellect and passion is alone deficient in the nature of the
Mexican people, for the savage has not been entirely extirpated from the
mingled blood of Indian and Spaniard.

When the remarkable energy of men, born in genial climates, is tempered
by self restraint, it produces that urbane and chivalrous character
which once made war the school of gentlemen. But the modern ideas of
liberty and patriotism have deprived standing armies of all exclusive
claim to national protection; and, as long as each citizen feels that
the defence of his native land or of his country's rights depends upon
himself, the volunteer as well as the regular will be prompt to
discharge his military duty with skill, alacrity and irresistible
resolution.

FOOTNOTES:

[98] Army on the Rio Grande, p. 13.

CHAPTER IV.

Character of Mexican diplomacy--Genius of the Spanish language--Paredes's
     proclamation--Hostilities authorized by him--Taylor goes to Isabel--
     Description of the Brasos St. Jago and Point Isabel--burning of the
     custom-house--Made a depot and fortified--Taylor and Worth unite and
     plant the American flag opposite Matamoros--Worth's interview with
     La Vega and Césares--Fruitless efforts of our generals to establish
     amity--Description of the country round Matamoros--appearance of the
     town.

The qualities which characterize the Mexican soldier, as described in
the last chapter, mark also the statesman of that country. Their loud
and vain-glorious professions of resolve; their bombastic proclamations;
their short, passionate and revolutionary governments; their personal
rivalries and universal anarchy, denote impulsive tempers utterly
incapable of sustained self-rule or resistance. To those who are
familiar with Mexican history, this is not a novel fact, yet it has been
astonishingly manifested in the war between our countries. It would be a
tedious task to recount the various manifestos and despatches that were
written to control and satisfy public sentiment in regard to the pending
difficulties. Diplomacy is the weapon of weak powers, and the pen is a
most important implement when defeat, inaction or incompetency are to be
excused to the Mexicans. There is something perhaps in the genius of the
Spanish language that renders it peculiarly appropriate to appease the
vanity of those who speak it. The natural vehicle of eloquence, its
magic words, its magnificent phrases and its sonorous sentences march
along in solemn and pompous procession, and compel the attention of
every listener. Simple sentiments, clothed in the expressions of this
beautiful tongue assume new and striking shapes, and the judgment is
charmed or swayed by sympathy with the ear.

The statesmen of Mexico are aware of these extraordinary advantages, and
whether they have to account for a lost battle, tranquillize a
passionate mob, or satisfy an importunate _diplomat_, they are equally
ready to resort to the armory of their resounding language for defence.

We have already seen that Paredes overthrew Herrera's administration by
means of the Texan question and opposition to negotiation with our
government. When General Taylor advanced towards the Rio Grande this
chieftain was still president and quite as unable to fulfil the promises
to repel us as his predecessors had been in 1844 and 1845. Feeling,
under the peculiar views of the controversy they entertained, that the
honor of their country required our expulsion from Texas, they had
announced and pledged this auspicious result to the people. But at the
moment when all these extraordinary boasts were made, they were,
doubtless, designed only to serve a temporary purpose, under the hope
that some fortuitous circumstance might occur which would exonerate them
from war. I have heretofore stated that the Mexicans were encouraged in
resistance by the belief of impending difficulties with England. In
addition to this, Paredes probably relied on foreign interference in
consequence of his monarchical schemes; nor was it until the spring and
summer of 1846, that all these prospects were blighted by the energetic
course of our senate and the discretion the British cabinet in regard to
Oregon. But it was then too late to retreat, for hostilities had already
commenced.

Loud as were the Mexicans in their fulminations against our alleged
usurpation, I am inclined to believe they never seriously contemplated
the invasion of Texas, but hoped either to let the question sleep for
many years in the portfolios of negotiators whilst a rigorous
non-intercourse was preserved, or to solicit, finally, the mediatorial
influence of Great Britain and France in order to prevent war if our
congress intimated a disposition to declare it. This opinion is founded
upon the remarkable proclamation issued in Mexico on the 21st of March,
1846, by General Paredes.[99] His language is still decided in regard to
Mexican rights over Texas; but he asserts that "_the authority to
declare war against the United States is not vested in him_," and that
the congress of the nation, which is about to assemble, must consider
what is necessary in the approaching conflict. This proclamation was
issued in the capital after it was known that our army was advancing to
the Rio Grande, and on the very day when Mr. Slidell's passports were
sent him at Jalapa by the Mexican government. But between the 21st of
March and the 23d of April the provisional president's opinion of his
rights underwent a change, for, on that day, he published another
proclamation in which he asserts that he had "sent orders to the general
in chief of the division of the northern frontier to _act in hostility_
against the army which is in hostility against us; to oppose war to the
enemy which wars upon us;" though, in conclusion, he announces that
still he "does _not declare war_ against the government of the United
States of America."[100] Thus, under the masked name of _hostilities,
the Mexican government authorised the first warlike blows to be struck_,
because, as it alleged, we had invaded the national domain by marching
to Matamoros. It was the forced realization of all those gasconading
manifestos, which for the last two years had breathed war and defiance
against the United States. Such, then, was the actual origin of the
collision, for the troops and officers of General Taylor religiously
abstained from acts of military violence, and confined themselves
exclusively to the defence of the territory they were directed to hold.
That mere _protection_ was the undoubted purpose of our government, will
not be questioned by the reader when he recollects the smallness of our
army, and its entire want of preparation to molest or invade a nation of
more than seven millions of inhabitants.

In the last chapter, General Taylor was left on his way to Point Isabel,
while Worth moved in the direction of Matamoros.[101] During the march
of our column towards the sea shore it was approached, on its right
flank, by a party of Mexicans bearing a white flag, which proved to be a
civil deputation from Matamoros desiring an interview with the
commander-in-chief. General Taylor apprised the representatives of
Tamaulipas that he would halt at the first suitable place on the road to
afford them a reception; but it was found necessary to pass on to Point
Isabel without delay in consequence of the want of water elsewhere on
the route. The deputation, however, declined accompanying our forces
towards their destination, and halting a few miles from the Point, sent
a formal protest of the prefect of the northern district of Tamaulipas
against our occupation of the disputed country. At this moment it was
discovered that the buildings of Point Isabel were in flames. The
retreating Mexicans had set fire to the edifices to prevent our
occupation; and, as General Taylor considered this a direct and
vexatious evidence of hostility, and was unwilling to be trifled with by
the tools of the military authorities of Matamoros, he dismissed the
deputation with the information that he would answer the protest when he
was opposite the city.

The cavalry was forthwith pushed on to the burning town in time to
arrest the fire which consumed but three or four houses; yet the
inhabitants had already fled, and the officer, who committed the
incendiary act under the orders, it is said, of General Mejia, was
nowhere to be found.

As our troops entered the village they were gratified to find that the
transports from Corpus Christi had exactly answered their land movement,
and that the steamers had arrived in the harbor with the convoy close in
their rear, only a few hours before our forces entered from the desert.
General Taylor immediately directed the engineers to examine the ground
with a view of tracing lines of defence and strengthening a position,
which he decided should form the great depot of our forces.

Point Isabel is approached from the sea through the Brazos de Santiago.
It is a wild and desolate sea coast, defended by bars and strewn with
wrecks. In former years, a small Mexican village and fort, containing a
couple of cannons, stood upon the Brazos Point, but during one of those
terrific storms which ravage the Mexican coast, the sea rose above the
frail barrier of shifting sand, and when the tempest subsided, it was
discovered that the village and fortification had been engulfed beneath
the waves. Few places are more inhospitable on the American coast than
the bar of Brazos. There is no friendly shore under whose protecting lee
ships may seek safety during the awful hurricanes that so often descend
upon them without a moment's warning. But when a vessel has fairly
passed the entrance, she moves along securely over the waters of the
bay, and anchors under cover of the sand hills to the left whilst her
passengers and freight are landed in boats or lighters.

On a bluff promontory jutting out into the bay and sloping gradually
inland, stands the village of Isabel. Its houses denoted the character
of its people. The spars of wrecked vessels, a few reeds, and the
_debris_ of a stormy shore, thatched with grass and sea weed, formed the