October 1, 1908. Because of the persistent failure of the Cuban Congress
hitherto to enact new municipal legislation these were the first local
officials chosen by the people since the municipal elections which were
held under the first American Government of Intervention of 1901. Since
1901 all vacancies occurring in municipal offices had been filled either
by the votes of the municipal councils themselves or by appointment of
the national government. This was because no provision had been made for
their election by the people. Naturally this state of affairs gave great
dissatisfaction and repeated demands were made by the Liberals for the
removal of the holdover officials. It was also contended by the Liberals
that the election of members of the provincial councils in 1905 had
been illegal. Under the old law provincial governors and councilmen
were elected for four years and half of the council was renewed every
two years. Thus half of the council was elected in 1903 and these
members took their seats in 1904, and half were again elected in 1905
and took their seats in 1906. The contention of the Liberals was that
this latter half, of 1905-1906, were illegal. On April 6, 1908, the
terms of councilmen elected in 1903 and seated in 1904 expired, leaving
in office only those who had been elected in 1905 and seated in 1906,
whom the Liberals affected to regard as having been illegally elected,
and who in any case were not sufficient for a legal quorum. The Liberals
demanded therefore that all seats be declared vacant and that the powers
of the provincial assemblies be vested for the time in the Provisional
Government of Intervention. This was done, and the provincial governors
were also required to resign. These latter vacancies were filled
temporarily by the appointment of United States army officers, who
served until October 1, 1908, when they were succeeded by men elected by
the Cuban people.

There was undoubtedly great need for a thorough revision of the laws of
Cuba. Those existing at this time were for the most part a legacy of the
old Spanish government and it was quite obvious that laws which had been
enacted by a despotic government for the control of a subject colony
were not suited for a free and independent republic. They were certainly
not in harmony with the constitution which had been adopted. It was an
anomalous state of affairs that after the adoption of the constitution
Cuban municipalities should continue to be governed under the Spanish
provincial and municipal code of 1878. This code gave the Central
Government not only intimate supervision over but practical control of
all municipal affairs, even to the smallest details, and naturally was
very unsatisfactory to the people who were desirous of local home rule
as well as of national independence. In fact the efforts of the national
authorities to enforce these laws were regarded with displeasure and
actually caused strong local antagonism to the national government.

Under the second government of intervention, therefore, a commission was
organized in 1907 consisting of both Cubans and Americans, the former
being the majority, for the purpose of drafting elaborate codes of
electoral, municipal, provincial, judiciary and civil service laws. This
commission completed its work but all its recommendations were not
adopted. Its provincial and municipal codes were however put into effect
on October 1, 1908.

The general condition of the island during the second American
intervention was excellent so far as the maintenance of law and order
was concerned. This was largely due to the efficient work of the Rural
Guard, the operations of which were directed by a number of American
officers detailed for that purpose. While brigandage was not wholly
suppressed, it was much diminished and held in check.

One of the chief controversies with which the government of intervention
had to deal was that with the Roman Catholic church over various
properties formerly belonging to it which had been confiscated by the
Spanish government. There was some such property in the province of
Oriente, a part of extensive estates once held by certain monastic
orders. It had been taken by the Spanish government during the Ten
Years' War, and at the end of that conflict the government refused to
return it, but instead of doing so agreed to make an annual
appropriation for the benefit of the church. Upon the separation of
State and Church under American intervention in 1899 these
appropriations were discontinued, whereupon the church claimed that the
property should be restored to it. The validity of this claim was
recognized by the American government, but instead of complying with it
by actual restoration of the property that government purchased a part
of the property from the church at a price mutually agreed upon as
satisfactory. It was over the remainder of this property that the
controversy was renewed, and it was settled by a similar purchase in
1908. Another such controversy arose over valuable property in Havana,
which had been taken from the church by the government for the custom
house and other public offices; and it also was settled by fair purchase
on July 12, 1907.

After the installation of provincial and municipal officers on October
1, 1908, and after the successful conduct of the national election on
November 14 following, the American Government of Intervention busied
itself chiefly with preparations for withdrawing from the island and
returning the control and government to the representative of the Cuban
people. This was finally effected on January 28, 1909, when Governor
Magoon retired and Jose Miguel Gomez became President of Cuba. The total
cost to Cuba of the second American intervention was estimated at about
$6,000,000.

The general feeling of the responsible people of Cuba concerning the
second American intervention was one of extreme disappointment, owing to
the fact that they compared it with the intervention under General Wood,
or rather with the conduct of affairs under him. That first intervention
was under the control of military officers, and when they made up their
mind that a thing should be done, it was done, and as a rule well done,
and the example which was set in directing affairs of the government,
organizing public works, schools, in sanitation, and in auditing, made
the second intervention suffer by comparison.

CHAPTER XVI

Jose Miguel Gomez became President and Alfredo Zayas became
Vice-President of the Republic of Cuba on January 28, 1909. With a
substantial majority in Congress ready to do his will, and with the
immeasurable prestige of success, first over the Palma Administration
and later in the contest at the polls, the President was almost
all-powerful to adopt and to execute whatever designs he had, either for
the assumed welfare of Cuba or for the strengthening of his own
political position. He selected a Cabinet of his own supporters, as
follows:

    Secretary of State, Senor Garcia Velez.
    Secretary of Justice, Senor Divino.
    Secretary of Government, Senor Lopez Leiva.
    Secretary of the Treasury, Senor Diaz de Villegas.
    Secretary of Public Works, Senor Chalons.
    Secretary of Agriculture, Commerce and Labor, Senor Foyo.
    Secretary of Public Instruction and Arts, Senor Meza.
    Secretary of Sanitation and Charity, Senor Duque.
    Secretary to the President, Senor Damaso Pasalodos.

Not many of these men had hitherto been conspicuous in the affairs of
the island, in either peace or war, and their capacity for service was
untried. It cannot be said that they were regarded with any large degree
of enthusiastic confidence by the nation at large. Yet there was
indubitably a general purpose, even among the most resolute
Conservatives, to give them a fair trial and to wish them success. Men
who had the welfare of Cuba at heart cherished that welfare far above
any mere personal or partisan ambitions.

[Illustration: JOSE MIGUEL GOMEZ]

It would not be easy to imagine a man much more different from the first
President of Cuba than his successor, the second President; though
indeed the latter was a man of no mean record, especially in war. Jose
Miguel Gomez was born in Sancti Spiritus on July 6, 1858. He there
obtained his earlier education, which he continued at the Institute of
Havana, taking his degree of Bachelor of Arts and Sciences in 1875. He
joined the revolutionary forces shortly before the end of the Ten Years'
War. When, after the Zanjon Peace, the struggle broke out afresh, in the
Little War, Gomez took once more to the field and attained the rank of
Lieutenant Colonel. This outbreak having failed, he returned to his home
and devoted himself to managing his father's estate in Sancti Spiritus.
When once more the Cuban patriots resumed their struggle for the cause
of independence in 1895, he again answered the call to arms. The action
of Manajato won for him the rank of Colonel and the command of the
Sancti Spiritus brigade. He was subsequently promoted to Brigadier
General and then to the rank of Division General, after the battle of
Santa Teresa where he was wounded. By the year 1898 he was at the head
of the first division of the Fourth Army Corps which operated in Santa
Clara Province. In this command he figured in most of the battles fought
in that section at the time. The capture of the supposedly impregnable
ingenio Canambo in the Trinidad Valley was one of the feats of this
campaign. Also the attack and capture of Jibaro, a town defended by a
strong contingent, and the operation of strategical importance conducted
against Arroyo Blanco, are to the General's credit in this campaign, in
which he was effectively assisted by a remarkable staff of young men,
who won a reputation for their capability and courage. When the Santa
Cruz del Sur Assembly met, at the close of the war against Spain,
General Gomez was elected to represent Santa Clara. Shortly after, he
formed part of a delegation which was sent to Washington on a diplomatic
mission. On his return to Cuba he was appointed Civil Governor of the
Province of Santa Clara on March 14, 1899; which position he held until
September 27, 1905, when he resigned, having been nominated as the
candidate of the Liberal party for the Presidency. His years of office
as Governor of Santa Clara were interrupted by his attending the
sessions of the Constitutional Convention at Havana, as a delegate from
Santa Clara. When General Gomez was defeated by President Estrada Palma,
who ran for re-election, conspiracies and agitations were organized
which culminated in the revolt of August, 1906, against Estrada Palma's
administration. Of this conspiracy and agitation Gomez was the organizer
and leader. The Palma Government having proved its inability to quench
the uprising, the American authorities intervened, and at the close of
that intervention, on January 28, 1909, Gomez was installed as President
of Cuba.

Of different type entirely, yet not unsuited to work with Jose Miguel
Gomez whenever their mutual interests made cooperation desirable, was
the new Vice-President, Dr. Alfredo Zayas. He too was a man of
conspicuous record, in the War of Independence and afterward, though it
had not been made on the field of battle.

Alfredo Zayas was born on February 21, 1861, and took his degree of
licentiate in administrative law in 1882 at the University of Havana,
and the following year in civil and canonic law. He soon acquired a
reputation as a lawyer and in the world of letters. During the War of
Independence he was the delegate in Havana of the revolutionary party.
His activities in this connection having been discovered, he was
imprisoned in September, 1896, and was sent to Spain and incarcerated at
several of the prisons of the Spanish Government in Africa. After the
War of Independence, Dr. Zayas led an active political life. He was the
founder and Secretary of the Patriotic Committee, was a prominent member
of the Constituent Convention, of which he acted as Secretary, and was
foremost in organizing and leading the activities of the National,
Liberal-National and Liberal parties. He served as Senator from the
Province of Havana. He was one of the jurists who formed the
Consultative Committee, appointed to draw up the organic laws of the
executive and judicial powers, as well as the laws relating to the
provincial and municipal institutions. At different times he occupied
the posts of prosecuting attorney, municipal judge, and sub-secretary of
Justice. During the revolutionary movement which took place in 1906
against the Estrada Palma administration, Dr. Zayas was president of the
revolutionary committee. After the provisional administration which
followed the fall of President Palma, he was elected to the
Vice-Presidency of the Republic.

[Illustration: DR. ALFREDO ZAYAS]

Dr. Zayas's life in the world of letters is no less interesting. From
1890-93 he published various periodicals and collaborated in others. He
has written several books on Cuban history and studies on the language
of the primitive inhabitants of the Island, on bibliography, on
questions relating to law and political economy, etc. He is a member of
the Academy of History and for eleven years was President of the
Sociedad Economica.

The armed forces of the American government were of course withdrawn
from Cuba on January 28, 1909, at the same time with the retirement of
Governor Magoon and the second Government of Intervention, and the
maintenance of order was left for a time entirely with the Rural Guard.
That body of men had been very efficient during the American
intervention and was considered by many to be quite ample for all the
military purposes of the island. During 1909, however, President Gomez
decided to organize a permanent Cuban army. To the chief command of this
he appointed his friend Pino Guerra. The organization consisted of a
general staff, a brigade of two regiments of infantry of three
battalions each, amounting to about 2,500 officers and men; two
batteries of light field artillery and four batteries of mounted
artillery, amounting to about 800 officers and men; a machine gun corps
of four companies comprising 500 officers and men; and a corps of coast
artillery comprising 1,000 officers and men. This force was trained and
equipped under the direction of officers of the United States army who
were borrowed for the purpose by the Cuban government.

The administration of President Gomez was marked with the enactment of
many new laws, and of the undertaking of a number of enterprises. One
law granted amnesty to all persons excepting those who had been
convicted of certain peculiarly odious offenses. Another suspended the
duty on the export of sugar, tobacco and liquors which had been imposed
by the former Palma administration. On the other hand an additional tax
was imposed upon all imports. Early in the administration a perpetual
franchise was granted for telephone service throughout the entire
Island, an act which was severely criticized on the ground that the
President himself was believed to derive pecuniary profit from it. Laws
were also enacted in 1909, legalizing cock fighting and establishing the
national lottery.

In 1910, the second year of this administration, President Gomez began
to manifest marked sensitiveness toward the criticisms which were made
of his administration, and on February 3, two editors were convicted of
libelling him, because they had accused him of deriving profit from
governmental activities, and they were sentenced to terms of
imprisonment. In April, he appointed to a place in his cabinet Senor
Morua, a negro, and the first member of that race to hold cabinet office
in Cuba. In July an insurrection occurred in Oriente near the town of El
Caney, which was suppressed by the Rural Guards with little difficulty.

The active participation of government officers in party politics led to
a disturbing incident at the beginning of August. At that time the
Secretary of the Treasury, Senor Villegas, attended a convention of the
Liberal party where he became involved in a violent quarrel. In
consequence, the president ordered that thereafter no member of the
Cabinet should be permitted to attend political meetings, or engage in
active political work; whereupon Villegas resigned his place in the
Cabinet.

In November, congressional elections were held to elect half of the
members of the House of Representatives. During the campaign the former
quarrel in the Liberal party became acute. One faction started a violent
agitation for the suppression of all religious orders in the Island, for
the abolition of trusts in business, and for the prohibition of the
holding of property in Cuba by foreign corporations. The other faction
took for the chief plank in its platform the repudiation of the Platt
Amendment. An attempt was also made by the negro members of the party to
organize a third faction, comprising exclusively the members of their
race. Because of these dissensions in the Liberal party the
Conservatives made a somewhat better showing at the election than they
had done in 1908, but the Liberals were generally successful and secured
a majority in Congress.

At the opening of the session, President Gomez urged revision of the
tariff in order to provide fuller protection for certain manufacturing
industries; the building of a new Palace of Justice; and the
establishment at state expense of public libraries in the chief cities.
During this year an attempt was made to assassinate General Pino Guerra,
but it was unsuccessful. The would-be assassin was arrested and Guerra
professed to recognize in him an officer of the police who had had some
grudge against him. Alfredo Zayas and Frank Steinhart, the former United
States Consul General, also made public complaints of attempts to
assassinate them, and reported the matter to the Supreme Court, but that
tribunal declined to investigate their charges. An attempt was made to
connect the attempted assassination of General Guerra with a bill
pending before Congress, which provided that the head of the army should
not be removed excepting for cause. It was said that this bill was
strongly opposed by the Commander of the Rural Guards, and that he had
in consequence incited the attempt to assassinate Guerra. There was
much public discussion and agitation of this matter, but nothing
practical resulted from it.

Charges continued to be made increasingly of the profligacy and
corruption of the Gomez administration. It was charged, doubtless with
much truth, that the number of public offices and office holders had
been unnecessarily multiplied to a scandalous extent for the sake of
giving profitable jobs to the friends of Liberal leaders. It was also
intimated that the Government had subsidized the press to suppress the
truth concerning these and other charges, and thus to avoid an open
scandal which might result in a third American intervention. Taxation
was declared to be excessive and oppressive, amounting in some cases to
as much as 30 per cent. of the value of the property. Other charges were
that public offices, executive, legislative and even judicial, were
practically sold to the highest bidder for cash; that concessions for
public utilities were similarly disposed of for the profit not of the
public but of members of the Government, and that then extortionate
prices were charged to the public for the service rendered; that the
natural resources of Cuba were thus being parceled out to speculators
for cash; that a bill purporting to be for the improvement of the ports
had increased four-fold the expenses of those ports, for the enrichment
of a speculative company, and that in general the functions of the
government were being perverted to the uses and the personal enrichment
of a ring of Liberal politicians.

As the date of the electoral campaign of 1912 drew near, the conduct of
the administration became such as to incur the menace of another
intervention. In January of that year an arbitrary attempt was made by
President Gomez to thwart the activities and impair the influence of the
Veterans' Association, by forbidding army officers and members of the
Rural Guard to attend any of its meetings, on the pretended ground that
they were engaged in factional political agitation. As the organization
was in no sense a partisan affair, but was composed of men of varying
shades of political opinion who had the good of Cuba at heart, and who
strove to avert the danger of further intervention by making and keeping
the Cuban government above reproach, this decree of the President's was
sharply resented and was openly disobeyed by many army officers. When on
the evening of Sunday, January 14, 1912, many officers and Rural Guards
attended a meeting of the National Council of the Veterans' Association,
and were received with much enthusiasm, the situation caused so much
disquiet that the United States government felt constrained to send a
note of warning to President Gomez, stating that it was much concerned
over the state of affairs in Cuba; that the laws must be enforced and
order maintained; and that the President of the United States looked to
the President and government of Cuba to see to it that there was no need
of a third intervention.

This note evoked from President Gomez the declaration that matters in
Cuba were not in as bad a state as had been reported, and that he had
the whole situation well in hand. General Emilio Nunez, the head of the
Veterans' Association, declared that that organization would remain firm
in its object to guarantee peace, to moralize the Administration, and to
spread patriotism in the hearts of the people; and that it protested
against that which might be a menace to the freedom and independence of
Cuba, with confidence that the people of the United States would never
regard its unselfish and patriotic campaign as an excuse for unwarranted
intervention. He added that the Association had not sought to annul the
law against participation in politics by the army, but resented the
charge in the Presidents' decree that it was "playing politics."
"Patriotically we shall make every sacrifice, but we shall never resign
ourselves to be miserable slaves dominated by irresponsible power
untrammelled by laws or principles."

The leaders of the Liberal party were by no means a unit in attitude
toward the crisis, the antagonism already mentioned between President
Gomez and Vice-President Zayas flaming up anew. The newspaper organ of
the Zayista faction openly declared: "We are on the brink of an abyss,
whither we have been brought by the stubborn stupidity of a portion of
the administration and by flagrant contempt for Congress and its
enactments. These things have brought on all our existing ills." Orestes
Ferrara, Speaker of the House of Representatives, much alarmed at the
menace of intervention which might on this occasion have been as
disastrous to the Liberals as the former intervention had been to the
administration of Estrada Palma, declared that party differences must be
dropped and that "We must resign our passions and ambitions to save Cuba
from another shameful foreign domination."

Meantime the masses of thoughtful, patriotic citizens, disgusted with
what they regarded as governmental extravagance and corruption, held
themselves in admirable restraint, hoping that the peril of intervention
would be in some way avoided until they could have an opportunity of
permanently averting it through the election of a government which would
give the United States no further cause for anxiety or for even a
thought of resuming control of Cuban affairs. The crisis was thus
fortunately passed, and the settlement of the Cuban people with the
administration of Jose Miguel Gomez was postponed, as was fitting, until
the fall elections.

There followed a little later another ominous incident, for which
President Gomez was largely responsible, but which he repudiated and
dealt with in an energetic and efficient manner. The attempt, already
referred to, at the organization of a negro party in the election
campaign of 1910 was followed in May, 1912, by the outbreak of what
seemed to be a formidable negro revolt. The leaders of this movement
were two negro friends of Gomez, General Estenoz and General Ivonnet.
They had been officers in the War of Independence, and it was said that
Gomez had promised them and their negro followers great rewards if they
would support him in his campaign for the presidency. When these
promises were unfulfilled, these two men went through the Island urging
the negroes to organize a political party of their own, which would
probably hold the balance of power between the Conservatives and
Liberals. Because of their violent agitation to this end they were
arrested and imprisoned for a time. Then they were released and treated
with much consideration. Indeed, they were offered appointment to
offices, which, however, they declined. Instead, they renewed their
agitation, and on May 22 an open revolt under their leadership occurred.
So serious did the situation appear that an appeal was made to the
United States Government, and preparations were actually made to send a
naval and military expedition to protect the lives and property of
Americans in the Island. President Gomez, however, rallied his military
forces with much energy, and on June 14 completely routed the main body
of the insurgents, capturing all their supplies of ammunition and
provisions. This practically ended the trouble. Estenoz was killed in
the fighting, and Ivonnet was captured and then killed; "in an attempt
to escape."

Another embarrassment for the passing administration occurred in August,
1912, when the United States government called upon President Gomez to
make prompt settlement of certain claims which had been pending for two
years, amounting to more than $500,000, and growing out of contracts for
the waterworks and sanitation of the city of Cienfuegos. President Gomez
protested that the Cuban treasury was without funds for the purpose, and
that it would be necessary to wait until Congress could make a special
appropriation. This reply was not convincing, seeing that payment of
these identical claims had been made in a loan of $10,000,000 which the
Cuban government had made in New York with the approval of the United
States; and it was naturally assumed at Washington either that the money
had been spent for other purposes or that it was being purposely
withheld by President Gomez on some technicality or for some ulterior
motive.

As an incident of this controversy, in the closing days of August, the
Liberal press of Havana conducted a campaign of vilification against
Hugh S. Gibson, the American Chargé d'Affaires in Cuba, which culminated
in a personal assault upon that gentleman by Enrique Maza, a member of
the staff of one of the papers. This outrage provoked a sharp protest
from the Washington government, in terms which implied a menace of
action if reparation were not made. This alarmed President Gomez, and
caused him to make at least a show of punishing the offender, and to
write a long message of apology and pleading to President Taft, in which
he promised to deal with Maza and with the newspapers which had been
slandering Mr. Gibson, to the full extent of the law, and begged for a
reassuring statement of friendship from the United States government.
Ultimately Maza was punished by imprisonment, and the penalty of the law
was also applied to Senor Soto, the responsible editor of one of the
papers which had most libelled the American Charge d'Affaires. The
Cienfuegos claim was also paid; but because of it an attempt was made to
enact a law excluding all foreign contractors from participation in
Cuban public works!

The Presidential election occurred on November 1, and resulted, as we
shall hereafter see, in assurance that the Liberal party would be
retired from power in May of the following year, and that the government
of the island would be confided to the hands of those who had striven to
uphold the wise and patriotic administration of Estrada Palma. In the
few remaining months of his administration President Gomez pursued
substantially the same policy that had marked the preceding years. In
March, 1913, Congress enacted an Amnesty bill which would have meant a
general jail delivery throughout the Island, and which President Gomez
was strongly inclined to sign. He was restrained at the last moment from
doing so, however, by the energetic protests of the United States
government, which indeed were tantamount to an ultimatum; and instead
returned the measure to Congress with his veto, and with a
recommendation that it be revised so as to avoid the objections of the
United States--though he did not directly mention the United States--and
then repassed. This was done and the modified bill became a law at the
middle of April.

In addition to the general extravagance of the Gomez administration, the
overcrowding of all government offices with superfluous and incompetent
placeholders, and the expenditure of more than $140,000,000 within two
and a half years, there were several specific performances which
provoked severe censure. One of these was the installation of the
National Lottery, which was done by vote of Congress at the dictation of
the President. The pretext given for this was that Cubans loved to
gamble, and that if they had no lottery of their own they would send
their money to Madrid, for chances in the lottery there; and it was
better to keep their money in Cuba than to have it sent to Spain.

Another act of the administration which incurred strong censure and
which was ultimately repealed by the government of President Menocal,
with the approval of the courts, was what was commonly known as the
"Dragado deal." This was the granting to a speculative corporation
composed chiefly of Liberal politicians and called the Ports Improvement
Company of Cuba, of an omnibus concession for the dredging of harbors,
reclaiming of coastal swamp lands, and similar works; for which the
corporation was authorized to collect port fees, including a heavy
surtax on imported merchandise, of which a small proportion would go to
the government and the remainder to the coffers of the corporation. This
concession was granted by President Gomez in 1911, against the advice of
the United States government, and against strong and widespread protests
from the people and press of Cuba, by whom it was regarded as a
monstrous piece of corrupt jobbery. While it was in force, this
concession paid millions of dollars a year to its holders, with an
almost undiscernible minimum of advantage to the nation.

Following this came a bargain with the railroads centering in Havana, by
which the arsenal grounds belonging to the Republic and comprising a
large and valuable tract lying immediately on the Bay of Havana were
given to those companies in exchange for two comparatively small plots
which had been occupied by them as a terminal station and warehouse. In
addition the railroad companies agreed to build, or to provide the money
for building, a new Presidential Palace, which President Gomez hoped to
have finished in time for his own occupancy. This exchange was, in
itself, undoubtedly a good thing. It gave the railroads an admirable
site for the great terminal which they needed and which is now one of
the valuable assets of Havana and indeed of Cuba. But the manner in
which the bargain was made, the exercise of political influence, and the
strong and unrefuted suspicion of the corrupt employment of pecuniary
considerations, brought upon the transaction strong reprobation. An
ironic sequel was that the work which was done on the proposed new
palace was so bad that it presently had all to be torn down.

Fortunately there was no relaxation in the maintenance of sanitary
measures for the prevention of epidemics, and while there was little or
no road building or other such public works those already constructed
were generally well maintained. The judgment of thoughtful and impartial
men upon the administration of José Miguel Gomez was therefore that it
had contained some good and much evil, and that even the good had been
done too often in an unworthy if not an actually evil way. It had been
the administration of an astute and not over-scrupulous politician, who
sought to serve first his own interests, next those of his party and
friends, and last those of the nation, and not that of an enlightened
and patriotic statesman, seeking solely to promote the welfare of the
people who had chosen him to be their chief executive.

CHAPTER XVII

The fourth Presidential campaign in Cuba began in the spring of 1912.
The Liberal administration had given the nation a thorough taste of its
quality, with the result that there was a strong reaction against it on
the part of many who had been its zealous upholders. The compact between
José Miguel Gomez and Alfredo Zayas was, however, carried out, the
former not seeking re-election but standing aside in favor of the
latter, who accordingly received the Presidential nomination at the
convention which was held on April 15. Before this, on April 7, the
Conservative convention by unanimous vote and with great enthusiasm
nominated General Mario G. Menocal for President, and Enrique José
Varona for President. The campaign was conducted with much determination
on both sides, but in a generally orderly fashion, and the election,
which occurred on November 1, was also conducted in a creditable manner.
Although the Liberals had made extravagant claims in advance, the result
of the polling was a decisive victory for General Menocal, who easily
carried every one of the six provinces. This result was due in part to
the popular revulsion against the corruption of the Liberal
administration, and partly to the immense popularity of the Conservative
candidate and his admirable record as a useful public servant in various
capacities.

[Illustration: MARIO G. MENOCAL

The third President of the Republic of Cuba, General Mario G. Menocal,
comes of one of the most distinguished families in Latin America. He was
born at Jaguey Grande, Cuba, on December 17, 1866, was educated at
Cornell University, New York, and became associated in professional and
business work with his uncle, Aniceto G. Menocal, the distinguished
canal and railroad engineer. He entered the War of Independence at the
beginning and served to the end with distinction. He was defeated for
the Presidency in 1908, but was elected in 1912 and reelected in 1916.
His history is the history of Cuba for the last seven years.]

Mario G. Menocal, who was thus chosen to be the head of the Cuban
Republic, came of an old Havana family, traditionally revolutionary, and
was born in Jaguey Grande, Matanzas, in December, 1866. When his family
emigrated, as a consequence of his father having taken part in the Ten
Years' War, Mario Menocal began his education in the United States. He
was graduated at Cornell University with the Class of 1888 and took his
degree as Civil Engineer. No sooner was he graduated than his uncle,
Aniceto G. Menocal, the distinguished engineer of the Isthmian Canals,
summoned him to his side to work with him at Nicaragua. In 1893 he went
to Cuba as engineer of a French Company to exploit a salt mine at Cayo
Romano. He was working on the construction of the Santa Cruz railway in
Camaguey when the War of Independence broke out in 1895. On June 5 of
that year he joined the forces of Commander Alejandro Rodriguez as a
private. At the attack on Fort Ramblazo he was promoted to sergeant, and
it was not long before his military talents had won for him the rank of
Lieutenant Colonel.

[Illustration: BIRTHPLACE AND BOYHOOD HOME OF PRESIDENT MARIO G.
MENOCAL, JAGUEY GRANDE, MATANZAS]

When the Revolutionary Government was constituted on September 15, 1895,
Colonel Menocal was appointed Assistant Secretary of War, and in that
capacity assisted Generals Gomez and Maceo in organizing the "invasion"
contingent. He later joined the Third Army Corps under Mayia Rodriguez,
and remained with it until the beginning of 1896 when he was called by
General Calixto Garcia, who had just reached the Island and who made
Menocal his Chief of Staff. Thereafter his name was associated with
Garcia's brilliant campaign in Oriente.

Among the many battles in which Colonel Menocal took part were the
hard-fought engagements of La Gloria, Bellezas, Moscones, Hierba de
Guinea, and the great struggle at Guantanamo, in July, 1896, against two
Spanish columns which were cut apart and were obliged to abandon the
Ramon de las Yaguas zone. In August the agricultural regions of Holguin
were invaded and the Loma de Heirro fort seized, artillery being used
for the first time in the war. This feat caused his promotion to the
rank of Colonel. He then was active in the Sierra Maestra Mountains to
meet Mendez's expedition. In October, Menocal seized Guaimaro,
conducting personally the assault on Fort Gonfan, having captured which,
he was made Brigadier General.

In November, 1896, he took part in the battles of Alta Conchita and
Lugones against Gen. Pando. Later he was present at the siege of Jiguani
(April 13, 1897) and at Tuaheque, Jacaibama and Jucaibanita against Vara
del Rey and Nicolas Rey, and at Baire he fought at the battle of
Ratonera. It was at this time that Gen. Calixto Garcia made him Chief of
the 3rd Division of the 2nd Corps, which included the western part of
Holguin and Tunas. At the head of these forces he organized the attack
and capture of Tunas, which was achieved by Gen. Calixto Garcia, August
30, 1897, Menocal having been wounded in a trench assault.

This strategic success won for him an immediate promotion to Division
General. In November, 1897, he attacked Fort Guamo on the Cauto River,
one of the bloodiest events of the war, and took part in the battles of
Cayamos, Monte Oscuro, Nabraga and Aguacatones, succeeding in this
latter in seizing Tejeda's supply train.

In March, 1898, he was appointed Chief of the 5th Army Corps, to join
which he marched at the head of 200 select men, among whom were many
prominent figures of the war--many still alive--as General Sartorius,
Colonels Aurelio Hevea, Enrique Nunez, Federico Mendizabal, Pablo,
Gustavo and Tomas Menocal, Rafael Pena, Carlos Manuel de Cespedes,
Commander Manuel Secades, Miguel Coyula, Ignacio Weber, Alberto de
Cardenas, Antonio Calzades and Domingo Herrera. With this brave
contingent, and assisted by the forces of Gen. Agramonte, Gen. Menocal
passed the Trocha at its most dangerous point between Ciego de Avila and
Jucaro. After a fifty days' march from Holguin, they reached Havana,
relieving Gen. Alejandro Rodriguez of his command as Chief of the 5th
Army Corps.

Gen. Menocal was in this command when the American Intervention came,
and cooperated with the American authorities in maintaining public order
in Havana while the evacuation of the Spanish troops took place. Then
General Ludlow appointed him Chief of the Havana Police, which body he
organized, giving posts under him to the most distinguished chiefs of
the Province of Havana. In 1899 he was appointed Inspector of Light
Houses and subsequently Inspector of Public Works, which offices he
resigned to manage Central Chaparra, in June, 1899.

It is difficult to speak without danger of apparent exaggeration of the
incommensurable work of General Menocal at Chaparra, as a true "captain
of industry." There what were formerly barren fields have been
transformed by something more than the touch of a magician's wand into
the greatest sugar-producing establishment in the world. Nor does it
consist merely of the gigantic mills. Houses for homes, schools, stores,
churches, surround it, forming a city of no fewer than 30,000 prosperous
inhabitants, devoted to the manufacture of sugar. Of this unique
community, General Menocal was the chief creator and for years the
responsible head. Even it, however, did not monopolize his attention,
for he organized and managed also great sugar mills at San Manuel, Las
Delicias, and elsewhere.

In 1903 General Menocal was appointed by President Palma to be one of a
Commission for the negotiation of a loan for the payment of the soldiers
of the army in the War of Independence, together with Gonzalo de Quesada
and D. Mendez Capote. Three years later he was conspicuous and active in
the Veteran movement which strove to avert the necessity of the second
American intervention. In 1908, as we have seen, he was nominated for
the Presidency, with Dr. Montoro for the Vice-Presidency, but was
defeated. Again he was nominated for the Presidency, with Enrique José
Varona as candidate for the Vice-Presidency, and was elected for the
term of 1913-1917; at the expiration of which he was reelected, with
General Emilio Nunez as Vice-President.

[Illustration: ENRIQUE JOSÉ VARONA

Poet, philosopher and statesman, Enrique José Varona y Pera was born in
Camaguey in 1849. Before attaining his majority he had published a
volume of poems. Later he was the author of "Philosophical Lectures,"
"Commentaries on Spanish Grammar and Literature," "The Intellectual
Movement in America," "Cain in Modern Literature," "Idealism" and
"Naturalism." He was a Deputy from Cuba to the Spanish Cortes; editor of
_The Cuban Review_ and _Patria_, the latter the organ of the
patriots--in New York--in the War of Independence; Secretary of Finance
and Public Instruction during the Governorship of Leonard Wood; and
Vice-President of the Republic during the first administration of
President Menocal, in 1913-1917. For many years he has been Professor of
Philosophy in the University of Havana.]

Enrique José Varona, who thus became Vice-President of Cuba in 1913,
ranked as one of the foremost scholars and writers of the nation. He was
born in Camaguey on April 13, 1849, and in early life adopted the career
of a man of letters in addition to serving the public in political
matters. He was at once an orator of rare eloquence, a philosopher of
profound learning, and a poet of exceptional charm. He served,
before the War of Independence, as a Deputy in the Spanish Cortes from
Cuba; he wrote the famous plea for Cuban independence entitled "Cuba
contra España," which was translated into a number of languages; and
under the administration of General Wood was Secretary of Public
Instruction and of the Treasury. He was once President of the
Anthropological Society of Cuba, and was a Member of the Academy of
History. He has written numerous books, comprising philosophical
disquisitions, essays on nature and art, and lyrical poetry.

Dr. Rafael Montoro, who was refused election to the Vice-Presidency in
1908, has since that date been kept in the service of his country in
highly important capacities, and now, as Secretary to the Presidency, is
most intimately associated with President Menocal, and exerts an
exceptional degree of usefulness in many directions to the national
welfare of the Cuban Republic.

Rafael Montoro was born in Havana on October 24, 1852. He received his
primary education in Havana and in his tenth year was taken to Europe
and to the United States. He was a pupil of the Charlier Institute in
New York until 1865. Having returned to Havana he took up his
preparatory studies at the school of San Francisco de Asis. In 1867 he
returned to Europe with his family, which settled in Madrid. Here he
spent his youth until 1878, devoting himself to literary and
intellectual activities; he contributed to various periodicals, was
editor of the "Revista Contemporanea"; second secretary of the Ateneo de
Madrid; vice president of the Moral and Political Sciences Section of
that institution; second secretary of the Spanish Writers' and Artists'
Association, etc. On his return to Cuba he took an active part in
constituting and organizing the Liberal Party, which seized the first
opportunity to uphold the cause of Colonial Autonomy, calling itself the
Autonomist Liberal Party. In 1879 he was elected a member of the Central
Junta of the party and in the first elections after Cuba had been
granted the right of representation at the Cortes took place, he was
elected a Deputy from the province of Havana. Later he continued working
for his party as editor of its organ _El Triunfo_, which became _El
Pais_, and as an orator in meetings and assemblies. In 1886 he was
reelected Deputy to the Cortes from the province of Camaguey and yearly
went to Spain during the period of the Legislature, being a member of
the Autonomist minority headed by Rafael Maria de Labra. The Sociedad
Economica de Amigo del Pais appointed Dr. Montoro a Special Delegate to
the Junta de Information which met at Madrid in 1890, the principal
economic institutions of Cuba having been previously invited by the
Spanish Colonial Department. The purpose of this Junta was to report on
the tariff regime of the Island and on the proposed commercial treaty
with the United States, as suggested by the famous McKinley Bill of
1890. Towards the middle of 1895 he returned to his activities in Havana
as editorial writer of _El Pais_ and member of the Central Junta of the
Party.

When autonomy was granted in 1898, he formed part, as Secretary of the
Treasury, of the Cabinet organized by José Maria Galvez, the head of the
party since its foundation in 1878. When Spanish rule came to an end, as
a consequence of the war and of the American intervention, and the
Autonomist Government ceased, Dr. Montoro retired to private life. In
1900 and 1901 he was appointed to but did not accept the professorship
of philosophy and history in the University of Havana. He was a member
of the Committee which was to undertake the reform of the Municipal
suffrage legislation under Governor Brooke and of the Committee charged
by General Wood with the revision of the legislation on the importation
tariff.

In 1902 Dr. Montoro was appointed by the Palma administration as Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of St. James. In
1904 he was appointed also Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary in Germany, which caused him to reside alternately in
both countries until 1906 when he was appointed with Gonzalo de Quesada
and Gonzales Lanuza a delegate of the Republic to the Third Pan-American
International Conference held at Rio de Janeiro. In the same year he was
confirmed in both his posts, at London and Berlin, by Governor Magoon,
as were the other members of the diplomatic and consular corps, but
later he was appointed a member of the Consultive Committee on Laws. In
1907 he was one of the founders of the National Conservative Party, of
which he was appointed second vice-president, and was nominated as the
Party's candidate for the Vice-Presidency of the Republic, with General
Menocal as Presidential Candidate.

When General Jose M. Gomez took possession of the Government as
President, Dr. Montoro was confirmed in his posts as Minister at Berlin
and London, returning to Europe to remain there until 1910, in which
year he was appointed by President Gomez a delegate to the Fourth
Pan-American International Conference, which took place at Buenos Aires.
At this Conference he was elected to preside over the seventh section of
Consular documents, Tariff regulations, Census and Commercial
Statistics.

In 1910 and 1911, respectively, he ceased his posts as Minister at
Berlin and London to become Diplomatic Advisor of the State Department.
In 1913 he was appointed Secretary of the Presidency under General
Menocal to which post he gave an importance which it had lacked
theretofore. In this capacity he still is an assiduous and valuable
collaborator of the Menocal Administration.

Of Dr. Montoro's writings the following have been collected in book
form: "Political and Parliamentary Speeches; Reports and Dissertations"
(1878-1893), Philadelphia, 1894. "Elements of Moral and Civic
Instruction" (1903).

Dr. Montoro is a member of the National Academy of Arts and Letters of
which he was elected Director in 1812. He was President of the Executive
Committee at Havana of the 2nd Pan-American Scientific Congress (1915)
and was a member of the High Committee for Cuba of the Pan-American
Financial Congress (1917) and of the American Institute of International
Law (1916).

President Menocal gathered about himself a Cabinet of representative
Cubans, selected for their ability rather than on grounds of personal
favor or political advantage; two of them, the Secretaries of Justice
and Education, being members of the Liberal party. The places were
filled as follows:

    Secretary of Government, Cosimo de la Torriente.
    Secretary of the Interior, Aurelio Hevea.
    Secretary of the Treasury, Leopoldo Cancio.
    Secretary of Health and Charities, Enrique Nuñez.
    Secretary of Justice, Cristobal de la Guardia.
    Secretary of Agriculture, Emilio Nuñez.
    Secretary of Public Works, José Villalon.
    Secretary of Education, Ezequiel Garcia.

[Illustration: RAFAEL MONTORO

Called by Cabrera "Our Great Montoro" and by others the "Cuban
Castelar," Dr. Rafael Montoro has long been eminent in the public life
of Cuba as a scholar, writer, orator, statesman, diplomat,
administrator, and unwavering and resolute patriot The record of his
services to Cuba, as Ambassador to the foremost courts of Europe, as
Secretary to the Presidency, and in other distinguished capacities at
home and abroad, forms a brilliant passage elsewhere in this History of
Cuba.]

The spirit in which the new President began his work, and the spirit
which animated his associates in the government, was admirably expressed
by him soon after his election and before his inauguration, in a frank,
informal but very serious personal conversation. "What," he was asked,
"does Cuba need? And what do you expect to accomplish as her President?"

"Cuba," replied General Menocal, "needs an honest administration of its
governmental affairs; and that is what I can give it and will give it.
But more than that, Cuba needs more citizens anxious to develop its
marvellous resources and fewer citizens anxious to hold office. I was
not elected as a politician, and I have no ambition to succeed as a
politician."

[Illustration: DR. JUAN GUITERAS

One of the foremost physicians and scientists of Cuba, Dr. Juan Guiteras
is the son of the distinguished educator Eusebio Guiteras, and was born
at Matanzas on January 4, 1852. He collaborated with Dr. Carlos J.
Finlay in the discovery and demonstration of the transmission of yellow
fever by mosquitoes, and contributed much to the eradication of that and
other pestilences from Cuba. Under President Menocal's administration he
was made Director of Sanitation. He was a delegate to the second
Pan-American Scientific Congress at Washington in 1916.]

Reference being made to the menace of revolution, President Menocal
said, with emphasis:

"There will be no revolution under my administration. There may be
outbreaks headed by disappointed politicians or military adventurers,
but they will be crushed and their leaders will be punished. The day is
past when men of this class can arrest the orderly processes of
government. I shall have back of me not only a loyal army, but also a
loyal people who are determined to show to the United States and to the
world that Cuba realizes her responsibilities and is capable of
self-government. I shall appoint honest men, and will guarantee that
they honestly administer their duties. I shall urge the passage of
honest taxation laws, and have faith that the people will respond by
electing men who will assist me to make Cuba worthy of the favors which
God has lavished upon her."

With such purposes and with such expectations he entered upon his great
work. Unfortunately there was not a majority upon which he could depend
in Congress to enact the measures which were needed for the welfare of
Cuba. Indeed, there was a hostile majority, as we shall see, which
deliberately set itself to embarrass and thwart him in his undertakings.
But that had merely the effect which obstacles usually have upon men who
are really brave and strong. It indeed made his work more difficult, but
it did not turn him from his purpose nor defeat his efforts. Rather did
it give him all the greater credit and honor, to have achieved so much
in the face of so much opposition.

General Mario G. Menocal became President and Senor Enrique Jose Varona
became Vice-President of Cuba on May 20, 1913, the tenth anniversary of
the establishment of the independent Cuban Government. The President
delivered his first message to Congress on the following day. It was an
eminently practical, statesman-like and businesslike document, in which
he modestly promised a wise and prudent administration of his office,
and especially an immediate reform of the finances of the Government,
which was notoriously much needed. As a small beginning of this reform,
he offered to do away with the usual appropriation of $25,000 for
Presidential secret service. Many debts had been left over by the former
administration and he purposed to address himself to the liquidation of
these, so far as they had been honestly contracted. The notorious
Dragado concession was repealed on August 4, and a commission was
appointed to investigate the methods of the company. As a result of this
and other investigations, the former Secretary of Public Works, and
Auditor were indicted for misappropriation of public funds, and various
other officers were prosecuted.

The President desired to obtain a loan of $15,000,000 with which to pay
off the debts which had been left to him by his predecessor, and also
for urgent road work, and the paving and sewering of the streets of
Havana. This was, however, refused him by Congress, and that body, under
the domination of the Liberals, refused to pass any budget whatever.
President Menocal was therefore compelled to declare the budget of the
preceding year still in force, pending the adoption of new financial
provisions. Hoping to persuade or to compel Congress to perform its
constitutional duty, he called that body together in special session in
July and again in October, but on both occasions the Liberals all
absented themselves and thus prevented the securing of a quorum. These,
it will be observed, were similar to the tactics which the same party in
Congress had employed against President Palma in their malignant
campaign for the overthrow of his administration. But President Menocal
was not thus to be overthrown. When the Liberals in October, a second
time, refused to perform their duty he issued a manifesto in which he
seriously criticized them and made it plain that no such methods would
be permitted to interfere with the legitimate work of Government. Rumors
were indeed current that he would resort to compulsion if persuasion
failed. The Liberals attempted to reply with a countermanifesto
protesting against his action as a usurpation of congressional
authority, declaring their opposition to the making of the proposed
loan, and pretending that it would be illegal to hold the special
session which he had called for October.

The President exercised patience and waited until November 2, when the
regular session of Congress opened, and the Liberals took their seats.
At this time the Liberals practically stultified themselves by agreeing
to discuss and finally to approve the loan project which they had
formerly opposed. After transacting this and some other business,
Congress adjourned in December.

Among the reforms which President Menocal promptly undertook to effect
was the abolition of the national lottery which had been established
during the Gomez administration. In his messages and through the
influence of all legitimate presidential influence he strove to abolish
this form of legalized gambling. His arguments were that the low price
of the tickets, only 25¢, and the appeal which was thus made to the poor
and ignorant, to servants and working women as well as to men, had
caused great injury and had brought about a certain degree of moral
decline among the masses of the people. It had induced many individuals
to borrow money and even to steal in order to purchase lottery tickets,
in the delusive hope of winning one of the large prizes, which ran up to
$100,000, and thus exempting themselves from the necessity of work for
the rest of their lives. The lottery, it is true, yielded a considerable
revenue each year for the government, but General Menocal regarded this
as far more than counter-balanced by the social and moral evil which it
wrought, and by the reproach which it brought upon the good name of the
Republic. He was unable, however, to persuade Congress to abolish it,
partly because of the popular love of gambling which so largely pervades
Latin American countries, and partly--perhaps chiefly--because the
privilege of selling tickets at wholesale, at a handsome profit, was
farmed out to many members of Congress.

At the beginning of his administration, President Menocal found all the
Government offices crowded with the appointees of the former
administration. A great many of them were entirely superfluous and a
great many of them were also entirely incompetent to fill their places.
There was, therefore, a considerable clearing out of placeholders. There
might have been, of course, what is known in America as a "clean sweep,"
and this was urged by a few of the President's friends. But General
Menocal would listen to no such proposition. A Civil Service law had
indeed been formulated by the Consulting Commission presided over by
General Crowder, and had been in force since 1907, and while an
unscrupulous executive might have evaded its provisions, General Menocal
was a believer in the merit system, and in secure tenure of office for
men who were doing their duty. He therefore refused positively to remove
a single man merely because of his political affiliations. So far as
placeholders were dismissed, they were dismissed because of incompetence
or dishonesty, or because their services were superfluous. As a result
of this enlightened policy, it is true, President Menocal was compelled
to conduct his administration through the agency of a staff, the
majority of which was composed of his political opponents. He even
appointed two Liberals to his cabinet, while nearly all the foreign
ministers and consuls and important officers of the various departments
were members of that party, holding over from the Gomez administration.
It cannot be said that this policy was in all cases appreciated by those
who personally profited from it, for some of these officeholders did not
scruple to engage in intrigues against the President whose generosity
retained them in their places.

The United States Government retained a certain supervision over some of
the acts of the Cuban Government. Thus, as hitherto stated, in March,
1913, an amnesty bill had been passed at the instance of the Gomez
administration, which would have set at liberty several hundred
political and other prisoners, but it was objected to by Mr. Bryan, the
Secretary of State of the United States, and was accordingly vetoed. It
was again posed in a modified form on April 25, and was again similarly
vetoed. In November, 1913, it was once more taken up and revised so as
to extend the pardon to those who had participated in the negro
insurrection, and to some former officeholders of the Gomez
administration who had been indicted. It was also intended that it
should extend amnesty to General Ernesto Asbert, Governor of the
Province of Havana, to Senator Vidal Morales, and to Representative
Arias, who had been indicted for the murder of the Chief of Police of
Havana, General Armando Riva; a tragedy which occurred during a police
raid on a club, on the evening of July 7. This attempt to extend amnesty
to these men caused an acute and prolonged controversy. But on December
9, 1914, the bill was finally passed in a form which granted amnesty to
General Asbert, but not to Senator Arias. In this form the United States
Government sanctioned its enactment because of the belief that the real
burden of guilt rested upon the latter rather than upon the former.

This controversy over amnesty to General Asbert meanwhile had serious
political effects in Cuba. For a time the so-called Asbert faction of
the Liberal party allied itself with the Conservatives in Congress in
support of President Menocal and thus gave him a majority in that body.
But in the summer of 1914 this faction became reunited with the rest of
the Liberal party, and Conservative control of Congress was lost. The
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Senor Gonzales Lanuza, a
Conservative, resigned and was succeeded by Senor Urquiaga, a Liberal,
on August 31. When at last in February, 1915, the act of amnesty for
General Asbert was completed, and he was released and fully
rehabilitated, there was a great popular celebration of the event in the
City of Havana.

The first attempt at insurrection in President Menocal's administration
occurred on November 9, 1913, when Crecencio Garcia, a mulatto,
undertook to lead a revolt in the province of Santa Clara. It was
promptly suppressed by the Rural Guard in a manner which augured well
for the promise which the President had made, that there would be no
revolutions during his administration; and there were no more such
attempts until the great treason of ex-President Gomez.

CHAPTER XVIII

The fifth Presidential campaign of the Republic of Cuba occurred in
1916. The Conservative candidate for President was General Mario G.
Menocal, who was thus seeking reelection, and the candidate for
Vice-President was General Emilio Nuñez, of whom we have already heard
as the leader of the Veterans' Association in its legitimate and orderly
resistance to the corruption and despotism of the Gomez administration,
who had had a distinguished career in the Liberating Army in the War of
Independence, and who was at this time serving as Secretary of
Agriculture, Industry and Commerce in the cabinet of President Menocal.

[Illustration: GEN. D. EMILIO NUÑEZ]

On the Liberal side, in accordance with the compact formerly made
between him and José Miguel Gomez, the Presidential candidate was Dr.
Alfredo Zayas, and the Vice-Presidential candidate was Carlos Mendieta,
a journalist and Representative in Congress, who had long been
conspicuous in the practical management of the Liberal Party.

The general prosperity which Cuba had been enjoying under the
administration of President Menocal excited the envy and cupidity of the
Liberal place-seekers and roused them to extraordinary efforts to regain
possession of the government. A shameless attempt was made to force a
bill through Congress disqualifying a President for reelection unless he
resigned his office at least sixty days before the election; but it
failed of success. Long in advance of the actual contest a vigorous
propaganda was started all over the island on lines similar to those
which had been successful in causing the overthrow of Estrada Palma.
While few ventured to asperse the character of President Menocal
himself, his administration was vilified as corrupt and inefficient. It
was charged that he did not, like Gomez, "divide the spoils" with his
party followers, that he was both selfish and weak, and that his fatal
weakness in office had been more than amply demonstrated, and would
justify them in overthrowing his government. The Liberal newspapers
asserted that at least three quarters of the inhabitants of the island
were not in sympathy with the Conservative position and with the
President, but had been deluded into voting for him; that they did not
approve of his persistent acquiescence in every little hint and
suggestion that might come from the United States; and that having been
graduated from an American University, he was more American in his ideas
and ideals than he was true Cuban, and deserved defeat at the next
election.

This was largely for the purpose of preparing the public for the claim,
which was made before the polls had been open two hours, that the
Liberals were sweeping the country, and that the Conservatives could
make no possible or effective showing in the election. In pursuance of
this propaganda, it was so arranged that the local boards of the larger
towns and cities, where there was an excess of the rank and file of the
Liberal party, should rush in their returns. These records were sent in
immediately and seemed to indicate a sweeping victory for the Liberal
party. The country districts, where were registered the votes of the
farmers, the sugar planters, and the people of property who believed in
work and the maintenance of law and order, being remote from the
capital, came in much later, and in many instances, owing to distance
and the uncertainty of travel, reliable returns from these districts
were delayed until the next day, so that at midnight it looked as though
the election had been carried by the Liberal party. On the following
day, however, as the returns began to arrive from the remote districts,
a decided change in the aspect of the situation became apparent, and by
that night it was seen that a very closely contested election had taken
place, and that the result would probably be in doubt, as it was in the
United States, for several days.

This delay gave occasion for charges and accusations of fraud on both
sides, and each prepared itself for a hard struggle. It was discovered
that the matter would have to be settled by electoral boards and courts
established for that purpose. In the meantime, the Liberals demanded
that General Menocal acknowledge his defeat and proclaimed the election
of Dr. Zayas on all sides, and openly demanded to have the government
immediately turned over to them, or there would be serious trouble in
store for the Conservatives and the country. In the meantime, pressure
was brought to bear on the United States government, and protection was
asked by the Liberals against the manifest danger that they would be
cheated of their success at the polls. Threats were also heard that a
revolution would undoubtedly follow as a protest against the usurpation,
as it was termed, of their legitimate right to take control of the
government, and Dr. Alfredo Zayas, in a private conversation with the
American minister, hinted at this, and predicted that if a revolution
should become necessary, it would undoubtedly be successful, since he
knew that two-thirds of the army was with him in sympathy, and would
follow the Liberal command to overthrow the Menocal government if he
should see fit to give such a command.

General Menocal stated very frankly that the determination of the
contest must be left to the local boards and to the courts for decision,
and whatever that might be, regardless of any injustice that might be
imposed upon him and his party, he would acquiesce, and would be the
first man to shake the hand of the successful candidate. A similar
statement was never made by the Liberals. They continued the cry of
fraud, and openly stated that if they did not succeed a revolution would
follow. The judges of the courts, excepting the chief justice of the
Supreme Court, Senor Pichardo, had been appointed by Gomez, and
naturally great pressure was brought to bear on them to "save the
constitution," as it was called, for the Liberals. In the decisions that
followed, the Conservatives stated frankly that they believed this
pressure was producing manifestly unfair decisions, but made at no time
any attempt to ignore them or set them aside.

The court decided that in two districts, Victoria de las Tunas, in the
province of Oriente, and another town in Santa Clara, new elections must
be held. In the first one the Liberals had, at four o'clock in the
morning previous to the day of election, set fire to the town hall,
burning all of the electoral lists, so that an election was absolutely
impossible. This was probably due to the fact that Victoria de las Tunas
held General Menocal in great esteem, since, owing to his personal valor
in leading the charges against the Spanish army, when in command of that
town, the Cubans had been victorious. In the city of Santa Clara
province, the frauds claimed by both sides rendered it so impossible to
determine the true result of the election that a second election was
deemed necessary. According to the records of the Liberal party, the
vote of these two towns, or possibly either one of them, would determine
the election, and Dr. Alfredo Zayas felt quite confident that he would
be the successor of General Menocal, and openly so stated.

The Conservatives, on the other hand, said, "We can only await and abide
by the decisions of the courts, and will surrender nothing until such
decisions are handed down." The supporters of Dr. Zayas stated that the
soldiers, who had been sent there to maintain order, had been sent there
for the sole purpose of preventing the Liberals from approaching the
polls. At this General Nuñez, the Vice Presidential candidate, invited
Dr. Zayas, the Liberal leader, to accompany him thither and to point out
any Liberal in that district who wished to vote, promising that he would
furnish a machine and any protection that might be necessary to see that
he and every Liberal in the district deposited his vote, and that they
together would witness the count.

Dr. Zayas never had an opportunity to bring this matter to a decision,
owing to the fact that General Gomez, who hated Dr. Zayas bitterly, and
who had opposed him in public print more strongly than any other man,
saw immediately the possibility of riding into power as the man of the
hour, as the real, dominating force of the republic, and as the only
man, as he expressed it, able to save the electoral campaign from
becoming one of protracted discord and dispute. So he forbade Dr. Zayas
to go to the town where the election was to be held, or to accept
General Nuñez's invitation, and stated that he was himself tired of the
whole thing, and that he was going to take his yacht and go on a fishing
trip, which he did, leaving at midnight with about thirty trusted
friends, including all of the prominent Liberal leaders. Passing around
Cape San Antonio, the yacht anchored off the coast near Tunas de Zaza,
and there met a group of men by previous arrangement, and started a
revolution or a "popular uprising," as he termed it, against the Menocal
government.

In the meantime, a carefully laid plot, that had been planned months
before, for seizing control of the armed forces of the island was put
into execution. On Saturday night, February 14, 1917, without warning,
two companies of men stationed at the Columbia barracks, at a previously
arranged signal of two shots, jumped from their beds, grabbed their arms
and ammunition, and started across the parade ground for the open
country, of the west. Although the details of this plot were known,
other loyal companies at the command of their officers were called into
immediate action, charged the Liberals and captured more than half of
them and killed a few of the remainder, who at first had succeeded in
escaping. This was the only apparent disloyalty in the western end of
the island. Matanzas, Pinar del Rio and Havana remained loyal to the
government. Among the forces stationed at the City of Santiago, far
removed from the immediate control of the commanding generals of the
army, seeds of sedition, which consisted largely of promises of
immediate promotion of all officers, were planted. Every sergeant was to
be made a captain, every captain a colonel, every lieutenant a major,
with promises of increased pay, and the incidental rewards that come to
the successful revolutionist. This was also true of the Province of
Camaguey, where, at almost the same hour that the uprising took place in
Camp Columbia barracks, several companies of men seized control, made
prisoners of their comrades who were loyal to the government or shot
them dead, captured and imprisoned the civil governors, intimidated the
police, or made them prisoners, and took charge of the customhouse and
the accumulated funds, and all moneys deposited in banks, belonging to
either the state or the federal government. Incidentally all moneys that
were accessible were seized at the same time, which belonged to said
banks, on the ground that there was no time to discriminate. In the City
of Santiago several millions of dollars were thus seized by the three or
four Liberal leaders in command. These men, when the failure of the
revolution became apparent, escaped from the island, carrying some two
or three millions in United States currency and Cuban gold with them,
and landed in Santo Domingo, where some of them were afterward captured,
while the others escaped to the United States.

Securing control of Santiago de Cuba, and having access to the cables,
the rebels immediately wired to the revolutionary headquarters in New
York, which had been established by Dr. Orestes Ferrara, one of the
moving figures in the previous uprising of 1906, in company with Dr.
Raimundo Cabrera, for the dissemination of news favorable to the Liberal
side. Matter was issued, to be used in the American papers, for the
purpose of preparing the United States for the usurpation of the
government of Cuba by General Gomez, and defending such action on the
ground that it was the only solution of a bad electoral muddle, and that
the real choice of the people was General Gomez, who should have been,
and was ultimately, the leader of their party. It was said that Dr.
Zayas, without justification, had usurped and endeavored to maintain the
permanent control of the Liberal party, and that his lack of popularity
had been indicated by his defeat four years before. The entire island
was represented, and especially the army, as having voluntarily gone
over to the side of the Liberals. General Gomez was pictured as having
landed and by previous arrangement placed himself at the head of 12,000
men, who were marching upon the City of Havana; while the President of
the republic was variously reported as having been shot, and afterward
as having fled in abject fear from the palace, and as having at last
found shelter in the home of the American minister, Mr. William E.
Gonzales. It was added that Havana was under the control of the
Liberals, as was the remainder of the island, and that all that was
necessary was the triumphant march of General Gomez into the capital,
where he would assume authority as Liberal Dictator until the island
should assume its normal and peaceful condition, when another election
would be called, in which the people would have an opportunity to choose
and place the power in the hands of the only real man of destiny,
General Gomez.

In the Province of Camaguey, the insurgents followed the same program as
did those in Oriente, intimidating the police, by firing two volleys
into police headquarters and assassinating those men who were forming a
council, the civil government and various other officers having been
imprisoned. They took immediate control of the railroads, and the
rolling stock, placed Liberal or disloyal troops on trains, and started
them across the border to Santa Clara, where they joined General Gomez,
who, with his men, was marching north to the railroad.

In the meantime, General Menocal and the loyal troops of the island, in
the west, started a vigorous campaign to prevent the island from falling
into the hands of the rebels. Officers whose loyalty was beyond question
were placed in command of troops, and sent at once into Santa Clara,
Camaguey and Oriente, and one of Cuba's gunboats, with a company of 300
men, was dispatched to the City of Santiago de Cuba, to drive the
disloyal element from that place. Colonel Pujol was sent to take
measures to restore order in Camaguey. Colonel Collazo and Lieutenant
Colonel Lozama and other officials known for their courage, efficiency
and valor were placed in command of three separate bodies of troops,
with orders to surround Gomez, and give him and his supporters immediate
battle, and capture or annihilate them. These men were equipped with
machine guns, well armed and prepared for a campaign of extermination,
if necessary. In the meantime, the Secretary of Government, Colonel
Hevea, who, according to the Cuban law has control over and is
responsible for order in the interior districts, traveled by locomotive
and automobile, day and night, reporting to the President all that
occurred, and giving those orders which seemed wise for suppressing the
uprising. The American Minister, representing the sentiment of the
United States, which seriously deprecated Cuba's falling into the
revolutionary habit, visited the palace every day, with his military
aide, then Major Wittemeyer, kept in close touch with Washington, and
reported every change in the drama that was being presented in Cuba. In
the meantime, one of the Cuban officials had effectively thwarted
General Gomez in his proposed triumphant march into Havana, by blowing
up the large bridge over the Zaza river, thus preventing the
insurrectionists from gaining control of the railroads in the western
half of the island.

Realizing the grave danger that threatened Cuba in the destruction of
the cane through fire, which had already begun on a large scale, and in
the stealing, and killing of both cattle and horses on the part of the
insurrectionists, Major Wittemeyer, with the authority of the War
Department in Washington, communicated to President Menocal the fact
that the United States government would gladly land whatever force was
deemed necessary to assist in the maintenance of order and the
protection of property. This offer the President refused, stating that
he believed that there was a sufficient force absolutely loyal to his
government to control the situation, adding that he was thoroughly aware
of the plans of the Liberals, that he was in close touch with his own
command and was confident that his officers would succeed in quelling
the insurrection in a comparatively short time. He added that he thought
it wise for the government of Cuba to demonstrate its ability to
maintain itself, and to suppress any uprising that might occur of that
nature, and thus avoid the rather unpleasant task, on the part of the
United States, of being compelled to interfere with the personal and
political affairs of their sister republic.

That General Menocal's prediction was based on sound logic was
demonstrated by the fact that within twenty-three days the forces of
ex-President Gomez were surrounded, defeated and captured. The General,
his son, his aides and his entire staff were taken prisoners and brought
to Havana and placed in the penitentiary on Principe Hill. In General
Gomez's saddle bags were found military orders instructing his chiefs to
burn every sugar plantation on the Island not known to be the property
of Liberals, and tear up every mile of railroad, together with
information demonstrating that he was preparing to blow up every bridge
through the island, thus attempting to prevent the government from
sending forces against him. This work of destruction, in so far as
possible before the capture, had been carried out to the letter. The
railroads along which the revolutionists had control were out of
commission for several months, and much valuable property was
destroyed.

The disappointment in the Liberal ranks consequent upon the capture of
General Gomez and his staff, and the inevitable failure of the movement,
was general and profound, but the last desperate hope seemed to inspire
them to continue the struggle under the leadership of Carlos Mendieta,
who had been their candidate for Vice-President. The plan adopted by
them was to revert to the desperate methods of some former wars. In
brief, it was to divide into small bands, who were to carry on a reign
of terror and destruction throughout the island, the purpose of which
was solely to bring about another American intervention; the argument
was used that they had succeeded in doing this in 1906, and thus had
secured a tacit recognition of the Liberal party, and their ultimate
control of the government. "We were successful," they argued, "and since
the commercial, industrial and political relations between the two
republics are so intimate and the Platt Amendment authorizes the United
States to enter Cuba at any time when, in their estimation, the
circumstances justify such action, if we continue long enough, burn
enough, destroy enough, and succeed in keeping up this state of turmoil
long enough, the American authorities will, sooner or later, be
compelled to come here, and put an end to affairs that will undoubtedly
bring about the resignation of Menocal. His life will be made
intolerable and our several plans for his assassination, that have
heretofore met with misfortune, if followed, will later bear fruit."

At the middle of March, Carlos Mendieta, as leader of this bushranging
rebellion, issued a manifesto threatening the destruction of foreign
property and declaring that there would be no guarantee for the safety
of American lives unless the United States undertook the supervision of
the elections in Santa Clara and Oriente provinces.

In their manifesto the rebels promised to lay down their arms if the
government would hold new elections in Santa Clara Province. If the
government refused to hold such elections the rebels threatened to
continue the revolution and to proclaim Mendieta Provisional President.

The activities of the revolutionary conspirators and propagandists in
the United States, under the direction of Orestes Ferrara in New York,
meanwhile became so offensive that the United States government felt
compelled to take action. Accordingly on March 25, the State Department
at Washington warned Dr. Ferrara that unless he ceased his pernicious
operations he and his associate, Raimundo Cabrera, would be placed under
arrest. This had the result of tempering somewhat the zeal of the
conspirators, though their propaganda was still furtively maintained.

In passing, it may be stated that a part of the general plan--indeed the
first step in the proposed uprising--was to assassinate General Menocal,
while on his way from the palace to his estate, eight miles distant,
known as El Chico. The mayor of the suburb of Marianao, together with
the chief of police of that village, and four soldiers, who had agreed
for a consideration to take part in the assassination, were stationed at
a point carefully selected, with orders to fire a charge of buckshot
into the President's back from the step of his automobile, and then
behind the screen of trees and underbrush which lined the roadside to
make their escape. It was proposed to assassinate the chauffeurs and all
others who might be in the car in order to prevent immediate pursuit.
Since General Menocal was in the habit of going to his country home
every afternoon between five and six, the plan probably would have
succeeded, had it not been for an attack of conscience on the part of
one of the soldiers, who, after agreeing, lost heart, and a few hours
before the departure of the machine hastened to the palace and insisted
upon seeing the President, to whom he gave all the details of the plot.
The betrayal of the plot by the soldier, who was suspected when he did
not make his appearance in company with the others, and the machine not
leaving the palace at the usual hour, which was to have been telephoned
to the plotters, convinced them that discovery was more than probable.
The mayor, with the chief of police, and the others, immediately fled
from Marianao. Pursuit was given, in spite of which they resisted
capture for several days. Exhausted and wounded, they were finally taken
in an old sugar mill near Bahia Honda, in the Province of Pinar del Rio.

Not discouraged by this failure, numerous other plans for the
assassination of the President were arranged, among others the
manufacture of a highly explosive bomb, and an arrangement by which four
Liberals agreed to attempt to place or throw it under the President's
desk. In order to make this plan work, it was necessary to have some man
who could gain access to the palace, and to the office of the President,
and this could be done through the assistance of some one of the
soldiers who had been stationed on guard duty on the upper floor of the
executive mansion. After several months of careful study, one of these
soldiers was selected, and after another conference, the matter was
settled, and the man was intrusted with the bomb, which was delivered to
him at the appointed hour, and with which he ascended the palace stairs
and eventually succeeded in reaching the President, to whom he delivered
the bomb, with his evidence and the whole story. Of course, this second
betrayal of the plans of the conspirators brought about their capture,
and they were tried and condemned to various terms in prison. Various
other plots were formed, none of which was successful.

[Illustration: JOSÉ LUIS AZCARATA SECRETARY OF JUSTICE]

As a natural result of the revolution started a few days before, the two
additional elections ordered by the Supreme Court, were necessarily
postponed, since the island had been thrown into a turmoil by the action
of General Gomez. They were, however, afterwards held, and resulted in
decided Conservative majorities, which were carried by the electoral
boards to the Central Electoral Junta, presided over by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, Señor Pichardo, and justified that body in
announcing the election of General Menocal to a second term as
President. In spite of this decision of the courts, which General
Menocal had previously agreed to abide by, the insurrectionary elements
of the Liberal party still insisted that General Menocal's second term
was secured through deliberate and carefully planned frauds and
intimidation of the voters at the polls. The fact is that the election
laws of Cuba forbid and prevent any soldier from standing even in the
doorway of a polling place. He cannot approach nearer than the corner of
the building in which the votes are being deposited, nor can he leave
his post and come closer to the polls, unless some serious disturbance,
where lives are threatened, occurs, with which the police of the
district cannot cope. Since the minority is represented during the time
of voting, and during the count by a man selected for that purpose, no
fraud could well be perpetrated without the consent of someone
responsible to the opposition.

The army officers who had been led by José Miguel Gomez to revolt, had
been captured with arms in their hands, fighting to overthrow the
constitutional government of the island; a purpose of which they had
made no secret. They were therefore guilty of sedition and treason, and
were subject to trial by court martial and to capital punishment upon
conviction of their crime. They were thus tried, and some were condemned
to death and others to long terms of imprisonment; but the extreme
sentence was never executed upon one of them, while many of the prison
sentences were shortened and some of the men were pardoned outright.
This generous action of President Menocal's was performed through the
same spirit of magnanimity that moved Estrada Palma to like clemency,
years before; and it was as ill requited. Some of the men whom he had
thus saved from the gallows or the firing squad promptly resumed
criminal conspiracies against him; while the Liberal party as a whole
demanded that the pardoned officers should be at once reinstated in the
army with full rank and back pay for the time which they had spent in
insurrection and in prison, and railed against President Menocal for not
granting that additional act of grace!

The government of the United States is naturally always on the side of
law and order among its neighbors, and while it of course scrupulously
refrains from meddling in their affairs unless under intolerable
provocation, as in the case of Cuba in 1898, it has always given and
doubtless will always give its sympathy and moral support to those who
are striving for peace and progress and the security of life and
property. Toward Cuba its attitude is more marked than toward other
states, because of the special relations which exist between the two
countries. We have seen how it intervened in Cuban affairs for what it
supposed to be the restoration of tranquillity in 1906. While
unfortunately its influence was on that occasion made to appear as
though given to the revolutionary rather than the legitimate side, its
intent was unmistakable. In spite of the advantage which they took of
its intervention at that time, the Liberal leaders in Cuba have since
felt much aggrieved at it for standing in the way of their designs on
more than one occasion when they wished to revolt against constitutional
order.

The United States did not intervene in 1917. It was not, as President
Menocal confidently assured it, necessary for it to do so. But it is
pleasant to recall that it stood ready to do so, and there is of course
no possible doubt as to what the purport of its intervention would have
been. During that episode no fewer than five messages were addressed to
the people of Cuba by the government of the United States, warning them
against any attempt at forcible revolution. They breathed the spirit of
the epigram of John Hay in 1903: "Revolutions have gone out of fashion
in our neighborhood." Thus on February 19, 1917, the United States made
it known to the Cuban government and through it to the Cuban people
that--

"The American Government has in previous declarations defined its
attitude respecting the confidence and support it gives the
constitutional governments and the policy it has adopted toward any
disturbers of the peace through revolutionary ventures. The American
government again wishes to inform the Cuban people of the attitude it
has assumed in view of the present events:

"First--The government of the United States gives its support to and
stands by the Constitutional Government of the Republic of Cuba.

"Second--The present insurrection against the Constitutional Government
of Cuba is regarded by the American Government in the light of an
anti-constitutional and illegal act, which it will not tolerate.

"Third--The leaders of the revolt will be held responsible for the
damages which foreigners may suffer in their persons or their property.

"Fourth--The government of the United States will examine attentively
what attitude it will adopt respecting those concerned in the present
disturbance of the peace in Cuba, or those who are actually
participating in it."

At the beginning of March American Marines and Bluejackets were landed
at Santiago, Guantanamo, Manzanillo, Nuevitas, and El Cobre, for patrol
duty for the protection of American interests.

Again, on March 24 the American government sent a note saying:

"It has come to the knowledge of the United States Government that in
Cuba propaganda persists that in response to efforts of agents against
the constitutional government the United States is studying the adoption
of measures in their favor."

It was quite true. The remaining insurgents--Gomez and the other
principal leaders had already been captured--were declaring that just as
in 1906 American intervention had meant the success of the revolution,
so now the United States was about to intervene again to the same
effect. Wherefore this American note continued:

"The constitutional government of Cuba has been and will continue to be
sustained and backed by the government of the United States in its
efforts to reestablish order throughout the territory of the republic.

"The United States government, emphasizing its condemnation of the
reprehensible conduct of those rising against the constitutional
government in an effort to settle by force of arms controversies for
which existing laws establish adequate legal remedies, desires to make
known that until those in rebellion recognize their duties as Cuban
citizens, lay down their arms and return to legality, the United States
can hold no communication whatever with any of them and will be forced
to regard them as outside the law and unworthy of its consideration."

That was plain talk, and it had its effect. But the climax was yet to
come in a final message which stated that if destruction of property,
disturbance of public order and deliberate attempts to overthrow the
established government were continued, Cuba being an ally of the United
States, the United States would be compelled to regard the doers of such
deeds as enemies and to proceed against them as such. At that time both
the United States and Cuba were at war with Germany, and were therefore
allies in offense and defense, and it was quite logical for one ally to
regard as its enemy any enemy of the other ally. In brief, any one
waging war against the Cuban government was in effect waging war against
the government of the United States. That stern logic put a quietus upon
the attempted insurrection. "Our last recourse," said one of the rebel
leaders, "has been taken from us. There is no use in starting a
revolution if it is to be doomed to failure before it begins."

CHAPTER XIX

Cuba entered the Great War. That fact was the supreme seal to her
title-deeds to a place as peer among the nations; placing her in
blood-brotherhood with her neighbors. She entered the war almost
simultaneously with the United States, though with less delay than that
country. At Washington the President addressed Congress on April 2,
advising a declaration of war against Germany, and the declaration was
made on April 6. At Havana the President delivered his war message on
April 6, and on April 7 war was declared. In that impressive and epochal
message, the most momentous and solemn that any chief of state can ever
utter, President Menocal reviewed in dispassionate detail the criminal
record of Germany in her unrestricted submarine warfare, and then
continued:

"The government of the United States, to which country we are bound by
the closest ties, had during the last two years incessantly formulated
energetic protests and claims based on the most elemental principles of
justice in defence of its citizens who were victims on many occasions of
attacks by German submarines; of the liberty of the seas and the respect
due the lives and property of neutrals; and revindicating the right to
navigate and engage in commerce freely, without restrictions save those
sanctioned by international law, by treaties, and by the universal
practise of civilized nations.

"Since February 1 submarines have attacked and sunk without mercy. Such
acts of war without quarter, directed against all nations, to close
down the world's commerce under terrible penalties, cannot be tolerated
without accepting them as legitimate to-day and always.

"Cuba cannot appear indifferent to such violations, which at any moment
may be carried out at the cost of the lives and interests of its own
citizens. Nor can it, without loss of dignity and decorum, show
indifference to the noble attitude assumed by the United States, to
which we are bound by ties of gratitude and by treaties. Cuba cannot
remain neutral in this supreme conflict, because a declaration of
neutrality would compel it to treat alike all belligerents, denying them
with equal vigor entrance to our ports and imposing other restrictions
which are contrary to the sentiment of the Cuban people and which
inevitably in the end would result in conflict with our friend and ally.

"In full and firm consciousness that I am fulfilling one of my most
sacred duties, although with profound sentiment, because I am about to
propose a resolution which will plunge our country into the dangers of
the greatest conflagration in history, but without casting odium upon,
or without animosity toward, the German people, but convinced that we
are compelled to take this step by our international obligations and the
principles of justice and liberty, I appeal to the honorable Congress in
the use of its executive faculties, with full knowledge of all the
antecedents in the case and with the mature deliberation of its
important claim, to resolve, as a result of these unjustifiable and
repeated acts of aggression by submarines, notwithstanding the protests
of neutral governments, among them Cuba, that there has been created and
exists a state of war between Cuba and the imperial German government,
and adopt all measures necessary, which I reserve to myself the right to
recommend at the proper moment, for the maintenance of our rights; to
defend our territory; to provide for our security, and to cooperate
decidedly to these ends with the United States government, lending it
what assistance may be in our power for the defence of the liberty of
the seas, of the rights of neutrals, and of international justice."

The next day the Cuban Congress adopted the declaration of war, in the
exact words of the President's message. A resolution was at the same
time introduced and adopted, authorizing the President to organize and
to place at the disposal of the President of the United States a
contingent of 10,000 men, for military service in Europe.

It would be superfluous to dwell upon the causes which led Cuba thus
promptly and heartily to commit herself to the side of the Allies in the
war. They were largely identical with those which impelled other nations
to the same course. There was a resolution to vindicate the sanctity of
treaties and the majesty of international law. There was an abhorrence
of the infamous practices of the German government and the German army.
There was resentment against the gross violation of neutral rights of
which Germany had been guilty. There was recognition of the grave menace
to popular governments the world over which was presented by the
voracious and unscrupulous ambitions of Prussian militarism. There was a
feeling that as the war had first been directed against two small
nations, on the principle that small states had no rights that large
ones were bound to respect, it was incumbent upon other small states to
protest against that arrogant attitude. There was a desire to show that
Cuba, youngest and one of the smallest of the nations, was ready to take
her full part as a nation among nations, in war as well as in peace.
There was, also, no doubt a legitimate feeling that in this matter it
would be appropriate for Cuba--though of course under no compulsion--to
align herself with the great northern neighbor with whom she sustained
such close relations.

At the same time, backed undoubtedly by German money, and as a part of
the German propaganda, financial interests, banks and houses of long
standing in Cuba, all of which were eventually placed on a black list,
exerted a very strong influence among their customers and through their
connections, commercial, social and political, in favor of Germany. They
did succeed in influencing and directing the editorial policy of some
prominent newspapers, but the chief result of their pernicious
activities was to get themselves and their sympathizers into trouble.
One of the foremost bankers of Havana, where he had lived for many years
and was personally much liked and esteemed in society, while not openly
espousing the cause of Germany, after Cuba had declared war, was known
to be thoroughly in sympathy with Germany. He with over a hundred other
Germans was interned, or kept _incommunicado_, and in his house
documents were found demonstrating that he was not only an agent in
distributing German propaganda, but also a distributor of funds intended
to promote the cause of Germany in Cuba and the West Indies.

Another very strong influence that was exerted in Cuba against the
attitude of President Menocal and his government was that of many of the
clergy of the Roman Catholic church, who openly spoke to their
congregations in favor of Germany and against the cause of the Allies.
Nor was the Liberal party by any means as loyal to the Allies as the
unanimous vote in Congress might seem to suggest. Many of its members
either openly or secretly gave their sympathy and influence to the
German side. This was partly because of their inveterate opposition to
anything advocated by the Conservative government; and partly because of
the aid which German interests in Cuba had given, morally, politically
and pecuniarily, to the insurrection of José Miguel Gomez in 1917. It
was proved in trials in the courts of Cuba, which were held in
consequence of the damages wrought by that uprising, that Germans and
men of German parentage had conspired to give information to the rebels
and to supply them with munitions, and in other ways strove to aid that
movement in overthrowing the government. But these seditious and
disloyal elements in Cuba were probably no stronger in Cuba than in the
United States or other countries.

Cuba did not suffer from incendiarism and similar German outrages as did
the United States. On the other hand, the Cuban government was fully as
strict as that of the United States in taking possession of German
property, and in blacklisting all firms and individuals known to be in
sympathy with Germany. All trading of any kind with such parties was
forbidden; an arrangement being made by which open accounts with them
could be closed. A Custodian of Alien Property was also appointed.

Even before the declaration of war the Cuban government took strenuous
means to prevent violations of neutrality. A few weeks before the
declaration of war German agents fitted up a steamer in Havana harbor as
a commerce-destroying cruiser, and watched for an opportunity to take
her out to the high seas. Learning of these plans, the Cuban government
stationed a cruiser alongside that vessel, with guns trained upon her,
to prevent the purposed escape. Immediately upon the declaration of war
the four German ships which were lying interned in Havana harbor were
seized by the Cuban government. It was found that the German crews had
seriously damaged the machinery of the vessels, as they did at New York
and elsewhere; but the Cuban government had repairs made and then turned
the vessels over to the United States.

In what we may call the non-military activities of the war, Cuba was
notably energetic and efficient. There was close cooperation with the
United States government in the matter of food conservation and supply.
Cuba was naturally looked to for an increased supply of sugar, for which
there was great need; and as a result of inquiries by Mr. Hoover, the
United States Food Commissioner, as to what the island could do in that
respect, the Cuban Department of Agriculture sent the chief of its
Bureau of Information, Captain George Reno, to Washington to confer with
Mr. Hoover and to formulate plans for the exercise of the most efficient
cooperation possible between Cuba and the United States. Recognizing the
desirability if not the necessity that Cuba should not only be able to
feed herself during the war but should also export as much food as
possible, the insular government took steps at once for the increase of
food production to the highest attainable degree, and also for the
practice of thrift and economy. In consequence Cuba endured cheerfully
the same system of wheatless days and meatless days and rationing in
various articles of food that prevailed in the United States; with
excellent results.

President Menocal also made preparations, at the suggestion of and in
conjunction with the United States War Department, for the provision of
a detachment of troops for service either in Europe or in any part of
the world that the Department at Washington might deem expedient. The
best officers of the Cuban army accepted an invitation from the
military authorities of the United States to receive instruction in
modern military tactics, which had been brought out by the war, and
Senator Manuel Coronado patriotically gave a sum sufficient for the
building of a number of airplanes, to be used by Cuban aviators.
Volunteers for this division were easily secured and the instruction
began under the direction of Cuban aviators who had been in the service
of France. The War Department of the United States notified the Republic
of Cuba that owing to the severe exposure of the men to the freezing
water and mud of the trenches of Belgium and France, it was doubtful
whether soldiers of tropical countries could withstand the strain upon
their health necessarily endured during the winter campaign in Europe,
intimating that their services would be far more useful in taking the
place of other troops stationed in warmer climates, as the Porto Ricans
were taking the place of the marines that were stationed in the Panama
Canal Zone. This was a rather severe disappointment to General Pujol and
the other officers, who were very anxious to take their places in the
line of fire.

Noteworthy and most admirable were the achievements of Cuba in the
financial operations of the war. Subscriptions were eagerly made to
every one of the Liberty Loans, and to the final Victory Loan, with the
result that in every case the amount allotted to Cuba was far exceeded.
The quota for the third loan was subscribed twice over within five days.
In this work not only did banks and commercial houses take part, as a
matter of business, but also many private citizens volunteered as
canvassers; though indeed the eagerness of people to subscribe made
canvassing perfunctory and urging superfluous.

[Illustration: SEÑORA MENOCAL

It is not alone through the felicitous circumstance of her being the
wife of President Mario G. Menocal that Señora Marienita Seva de Menocal
is entitled to the distinction--never more appropriate than in her
case--of being the "first lady of the land." Her title rests equally
upon personal charm, the graces of social hospitality, and womanly
leadership of the most efficient kind in philanthropic and patriotic
endeavor for the advancement of the public welfare and the confirmation
of the integrity and promotion of the prosperity of the Republic; while
her indefatigable labors in the great war invested her name with
affectionate and grateful distinction in the camps and among the peoples
of the Allied nations.]

A similar interest was manifested in Red Cross contributions and Red
Cross work, with equally gratifying results. In both of these activities
a leading and most efficient part was taken by the women of Cuba. In
subscribing to the loans they were most generous; in canvassing for
subscriptions from others and in collecting and working for the Red
Cross they were indefatigable and irresistible. They made it a point of
patriotic honor, and almost a condition of social acceptability, to
respond in the fullest possible manner to every such call of the war. In
Cuba's domestic struggles, the women had suffered cruelly, and their
sympathies sprang spontaneously and generously toward the lands of
Europe where womanhood was suffering a thousand martyrdoms. Thus as the
manhood of Cuba with a unanimity which the few exceptions only
emphasized rallied to the call of the President to throw the material
and militant might of the Republic on the side of law, of civilization
and of democracy, the womanhood of Cuba, with no less unanimity and
zeal, followed Señora Menocal in the equally necessary and grateful
tasks of the campaign which women even better than men could perform.

No tribute could be too high to render to these devoted women, who were
always ready to make personal sacrifices of time, of strength, of money,
of work, for the cause of humanity. Amid all its historic fiestas and
pageants, Havana has seen no fairer or more inspiring spectacle than
that of the Red Cross women, Senora Menocal at their head, marching in
stately procession through her streets to manifest their devotion to the
cause and to arouse others to equal earnestness. The magnitude of the
sums raised by the women of Cuba for the war loans and for the Red
Cross, and for Cuban hospital units at the front, and the amount of
bandages and other hospital supplies and clothing prepared by them for
the armies "over there," made proud items in Cuban statistics of the
Great War.

Thitherto Cuba had often been engaged in war, but it was always in what
may be termed selfish war, for her own defence against an alien enemy or
for her own liberation from oppressors who, at first kin, had become
alien. Now for the first time it was her privilege to engage in a
greater struggle than any before, and one which was for her own
interests only to the extent to which those interests were involved with
and were practically identical with the interests of all civilized
nations and of world-wide humanity. Said Thomas Jefferson on a memorable
occasion, referring to the relations between America and Great Britain:

"Nothing would more tend to knit our affections than to be fighting once
more, side by side, in the same cause."

Thus we must reckon that affection and confidence between Cuba and the
United States were greatly strengthened and confirmed by the fact that
they were at least potentially and indeed to some degree actually
fighting side by side in the same cause, and that cause not exclusively
their own but that of the whole world. Nor was the event without a
comparable effect upon Cuba's relations to the world at large. Her
sympathies were broadened; her recognition by other powers was extended;
and as once she had been a mere pawn in the international game, now she
became a vital and potent factor in international affairs.

CHAPTER XX

"A revolution which comprehends the responsibilities incumbent upon the
founders of nations." Those were almost the last words of José Marti,
epigrammatically expressive of his purpose in fomenting the ultimate and
triumphant revolution of 1895-1898, and of the purpose of those devoted
men who caught the standard of liberty from his dying hand and through
labors and perils and tragedies incommensurable bore it on to victory.
How well that purpose has been served in these scarcely twenty years of
the independent Republic of Cuba, how true to Marti's transcendent ideal
his successors in Cuban leadership have been, the record which we have
briefly rehearsed must tell. On the whole, the answer to the implied
interrogatory is gratifying and reassuring.

The real leaders of the Cuban nation have comprehended the
responsibilities, unspeakably profound and weighty, that rest upon the
founders of a nation, and no less upon those who direct the affairs of a
nation after its foundation, to the last chapter in its age-long annals.
We should go far, very far, before we could find a statesman more
appreciative of that responsibility than Tomas Estrada Palma, or one who
more manfully strove to discharge its every duty with scrupulous
fidelity and with all the discretion and wisdom with which he had
himself been plenteously endowed and which he could summon to his
council board from among his loyal compatriots.

We must regard it as the supreme reproach of José Miguel Gomez that,
with all his ability and energy, he lacked that supreme quality, the
sense of civic responsibility, which Marti prescribed for Cuba and for
Cubans. His shameful and unpardonable treason--a double treason, to his
own party partner as well as to the government of his country--was not
inspired by the genius of Marti. It did not comprehend the gigantic
responsibilities which it so lightly sought to assume, but was marked
with the irresponsibility which has characterized so many revolutions in
other Latin American countries, and which has brought upon those lands
disaster and measureless reproach.

Under the third Presidency which Cuba has enjoyed that responsibility is
happily comprehended in complete degree. Not even Estrada Palma
possessed a higher sense of duty to the state and to the world than
Mario G. Menocal, nor gave to it more tangible and efficient exposition.
Nor shall we incur reproach of lack of reverence for a great name if we
perceive that in certain essential and potent particulars Cuba's third
President is even more capable of discharging that responsibility than
was the first. The younger, alert, practical man of affairs, expert in
the duties of both peace and war, has the advantage over the elder sage
whose life for many years had been cloistered in academic calm.

We might not inappropriately gauge the extent of Cuba's discharge of her
responsibilities as a sovereign nation by the measure of her progress in
various paths of human welfare. This is not the place for a
comprehensive census of the island, or for a conspectus of its
statistics. _Ex pede Herculem._ From a few items we may estimate the
whole. In the days of unembarrassed Spanish rule, before that
sovereignty was challenged by revolutions, the island had a population
of a million souls. It had between two hundred and three hundred
teachers, and--in 1841--9,082 children enrolled in schools. That was one
schoolchild in every 110 of the population. To-day the island has a
population of 2,700,000, and it has 350,000 children enrolled in its
schools. That is one child in every eight of the population. The
contrast between one-eighth and one-one hundred and tenth is one valid
and expressive measure of Cuba's discharge of her responsibility.

Under the administration of President Menocal the annual appropriation
for public education is more than $10,000,000. There are six great
normal schools to train the 5,500 teachers who are needed to care for
the 350,000 pupils; and as the national government conducts all the
schools there is no discrimination between poor places and wealthy
communities, but an equal grade of teaching is maintained in all. Nor
does the state stop with primary education, but provides practically
free secondary and university education for all who desire it.

[Illustration: FRANCISCO DOMINGUEZ ROLDÁN SECRETARY OF PUBLIC
INSTRUCTION]

Shall we take public health as another measure of progress? In the half
dozen years just before the War of Independence the death rate in Havana
was 33 to the 1,000. By 1902 it was reduced to 22, or only a little more
than in New York. To-day, under President Menocal, the death rate for
all Cuba is only 11.2. In the registration area of the United States it
is 14. In the United Kingdom it is 14.2, and Britain vaunts herself
upon its lowness. In France it is 19.6; in Argentina it is 21.6; in
Chili it is 31.1. There are only three countries in the world with lower
rates of mortality than Cuba; and they are New Zealand, with 9.5,
Newfoundland with 10.5, and Australia with 10.6.

Again, consider what is still the chief industry of Cuba. Before the
administration of President Menocal, these were the yearly sugar crops,
in tons:

    1908      961,958
    1909    1,513,582
    1910    1,804,349
    1911    1,480,217
    1912    1,893,687

Compare or contrast those figures with these, under the administration
of a President who comprehends his responsibilities:

    1913    2,429,240
    1914    2,596,567
    1915    2,583,845
    1916    3,006,624
    1917    3,019,936
    1918    3,444,605
    1919    4,000,000

No less impressive and significant are the figures which indicate the
volume of trade between Cuba and the United States. The imports of
American goods into Cuba in 1903 were only $23,000,000; in 1908 they
were $48,577,000; in 1917 they were $189,875,000. The exports of Cuban
goods to the United States were in 1908 only $78,869,000, and in 1917
they were $225,275,000, and in 1919 more than $500,000,000. The balance
of trade is thus heavily in Cuba's favor. Small as Cuba is in
comparison with some of her neighbors, her commerce with the United
States far exceeds theirs. Thus in 1917 the commerce, in both
directions, of Brazil with the United States was $180,000,000; of Chili,
$205,000,000; of Argentina, $305,000,000; of Mexico, $248,000,000; and
of Cuba, $415,150,000.

[Illustration: BONEATO ROAD, ORIENTE

No country in the world, probably, is more amply equipped with good
road--for both industrial and pleasure purposes, than Cuba. Radiating
from the capital and other important cities splendid automobile highways
give access to all parts of the island, leading not only to cities and
ports but also for hundreds of miles through enchanting scenery. Of such
highways the Boneato Road, winding through the mountains of Santiago, in
the Province of Oriente, is a superb example.]

Financially, the administration of President Menocal is to be credited
with the cancellation of the heavy and largely unnecessary debts which
were left to it by the preceding administration; an achievement which
contributed greatly to the improvement of Cuba's international credit.
The foreign claims of Great Britain, France and Germany, which had been
an embarrassing problem for several years, have been so satisfactorily
adjusted that their complete settlement will be effected at a time
convenient to all parties concerned. The grave fiscal and economic
crisis which followed the beginning of the war of 1914, in practically
all the markets of the world was avoided in Cuba by the Economic Defense
Bill, and the establishment of a Cuban national monetary system has
facilitated exchange and all manner of transactions in Cuba, and has
redeemed the country from the reproach of being ridden by and dependent
upon foreign coin as its medium of exchange.

[Illustration: JOSÉ A. DEL CUETO PRESIDENT OF SUPREME COURT]

The sanitary redemption of Cuba was indeed effected under the
administration of Leonard Wood in the first American Government of
Intervention. But the fortunate condition then attained has been not
only fully maintained but constantly and materially bettered through
the activity of the public health department of the Menocal
administration. New problems in sanitation have arisen, only to be met
with promptness, thoroughness and success. One of the most severe tests
of the efficiency of the organization against disease occurred when the
dreaded bubonic plague was imported; and that efficiency was amply
vindicated by the complete eradication of that pestilence within a few
weeks.

[Illustration: DR. FERNANDO MÉNDEZ-CAPOTE, SECRETARY OF SANITATION]

[Illustration: GEN. JOSÉ MARTI, SECRETARY OF WAR]

Shortly after his accession to the Presidency, General Menocal effected
a complete reorganization of the military system. It was not his purpose
to burden the country with unnecessary armaments, but he realized the
necessity of a certain degree of militant preparation for emergencies
and therefore provided it with a small but efficient army and navy,
commensurate with the necessities of the country, and entirely subject,
of course, to the control and direction of the people through their
civil government. The efficiency of this arm of the Government was well
demonstrated at the time already described in these pages when, early in
1917, a widespread revolution was attempted for the purpose of
overthrowing the constitutional and legal government of the country. At
that time the President showed the same triumphant ability as a military
strategist that he had displayed as a civil administrator, in directing
the movements of the Government troops from the Palace in Havana. It was
due to his vigilance and energy in directing the campaign, as well, of
course, as to the able assistance of his staff, that the rebel forces
were promptly surrounded and captured and thus a death blow was struck
at what we may hope will prove to have been the last attempt at
revolution in Cuba.

No less remarkable than his energy in war was the President's
magnanimity in dealing with his vanquished enemies when peace had been
restored, though sometimes against the will of many of his foremost
advisers. He led the movement of opinion favorable to harmony and
reconciliation, which was finally confirmed by a law of congress
granting full amnesty to all civilians who participated in that ill
advised insurrection. Instead of using persecution, bitterness and
vindictive oppression against his enemies, President Menocal restored
good will through the Island by his magnanimous generosity and abundant
acts of grace.

We have already spoken of President Menocal's admirable course in
pointing out where the duty of his country lay in the great crisis of
the European war, and in confirming the traditional friendship between
Cuba and the United States by making the insular republic an ally of its
great northern neighbor in that world-wide conflict. His recommendation
of a declaration of war was immediately and unanimously adopted by the
Cuban Congress, and thereafter the policy of the republic, under his
direction, was one of close cooperation with the United States, and of
placing all the resources and energies of the Island at the disposal of
the Allied cause. It is worthy of record that the French Government
showed its appreciation, not only of his spirit and purpose but of his
actual achievements in the war, by conferring upon him the Grand Cross
of the Legion of Honor.

During these last few years the agricultural, industrial and economical
resources of Cuba have been developed to an extent hitherto unknown and
undreamed of in the history of the country. Industries have been
immensely stimulated, great new enterprises have been created, and an
expansion of foreign trade has been attained which makes Cuba in
proportion to its size the foremost commercial country of the world.

[Illustration: EUGENIO SANCHEZ AGRAMONTE

Bearing a name which has been identified with many high achievements in
medical and other science, Dr. Eugenio Sanchez Agramonte has added new
lustre to it by his own achievements for the health of humanity and for
the welfare of his fatherland. He was born in Camaguey on April 17,
1865, and had already attained enviable rank as a physician and
sanitarian when, still a young man, he entered the War of Independence.
His chief services were rendered as Director of the Sanitary Department
of the Army of Liberation, in which place he had the rank of General. He
was also Director of the great Casa de Beneficia. After the war he took
an active interest in civic affairs, and became the president of the
Conservative party. With the election of General Menocal to the
Presidency of the Cuban Republic, General Agramonte was elected
president of the Senate, which position he held until 1917, when
President Menocal appointed him Secretary of Agriculture, Commerce and
Labor.]

According to recent data the foreign trade of Cuba is $800,000,000.
Reckoning the population of the Island at about 2,700,000, that means a
foreign trade of more than $296 per capita. In the year immediately
preceding the outbreak of the European war, and before the great
disturbance of commerce caused by that conflict, the foreign trade of
the United States of America amounted to only $39 per capita, and even
that of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to only $170.

Before the enraptured vision of Columbus, Cuba baffled appreciation. To
the more discriminating vision of to-day, her future equally baffles
while it piques imagination. Louis Napoleon, meditating upon the
possibilities of an American Isthmian canal, once said:

"The geographical position of Constantinople rendered her the Queen of
the ancient world. Occupying, as she does, the central point between
Europe, Asia and Africa, she could become the entreport of the commerce
of all those countries, and obtain over them immense preponderance; for
in politics, as in strategy, a central position always commands the
circumference."

Then he pointed out the similarity of position of Nicaragua, where he
hoped to construct a canal, and argued that it similarly might obtain a
like status in the Western World. It needs little suggestion to point
out that Cuba fulfils those conditions in a supreme degree. It was not
vainly that Spaniards centuries ago called Havana the Key of the Gulf,
of the Caribbean, of the Indies, of the Western World. The position of
Cuba is unique and incomparable, with relation to the United States,
Mexico, Central America and South America, and the two enclosed seas
which form the Mediterranean of the American Continents. Of old the
treasure fleets of Spain passed by her coasts, and visited her harbors.
To-day she is similarly visited by the fleets which ply between North
America and South America, and between the Atlantic and the Pacific
oceans. Reckoned by routes of traffic on the charted seas, she is the
commercial centre of the world.

[Illustration: ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, HAVANA]

It is not with ambition for conquest or for political ascendancy that
Cuba exults in that proud position, but merely that she may in the
words of her President "show herself worthy of the favors which God has
lavished upon her," and make herself a joy unto herself and a
convenience and a benefaction to the peaceful world. It is into such an
estate that she has now found the sure way to enter, and is indeed
confidently and triumphantly entering, through achievements which,
though embraced in only half a dozen years, are worthy of a generation
of progress and are auspicious of immeasurable generations of progress
yet to come; achievements toward which her present Chief of State has
greatly and indispensably contributed.

The story of Cuba is from Velasquez to Menocal. That is the story which
we have tried to tell. But that is by no means the whole history of
Cuba. Even of that portion of it we have been able here to give only an
outline of the essential facts. But surely the span of four hundred and
seven years must not be reckoned as a finality. It is only the beginning
of the annals of a land and a people whose place among the nations of
the world in honorable perpetuity is now assured as far as it can be
assured by human purpose and achievement.

These pages are, then, in fact, merely the prologue to records of
progress and attainment which shall honor the name of Cuba and adorn the
story of the world, "far on, in summers that we shall not see."

From Velasquez to Menocal. The span is tremendous, in character as well
as in lapse of time. It is a span from the fanatical and ruthless
conqueror seeking only his own and his country's advantage, selfish and
sordid, to the broad-minded and altruistic statesman and philanthropist,
seeking the advantage and the advancement of his fellow men. It is a
span, in brief, from the Sixteenth Century age of force to the Twentieth
Century age of law.

Nevertheless, the span and the contrast involve a certain analogy. It
was the work of Velasquez, masterful man of vision that he was, to begin
the transformation of a land of aboriginal barbarians into at least a
semblance of civilization; the transformation from the primitive,
scarcely more than animal, existence of the Cuban autochthones, to the
strenuous if sophisticated life of Spain. It has been and is the work of
President Menocal and his accomplished and patriotic colleagues to
induct the land and people from the discredited remnants of a false
colonial system into the clearer light, the fuller life and the
immeasurably more spacious and elevated opportunities of a free and
independent people who "comprehend the responsibilities incumbent upon
the founders of nations."

INDEX

    Abarzuza, Sr. proposes reforms for Cuba, IV, 6.

    Abreu. Marta and Rosalie, patriotism of, IV, 25.

    Academy of Sciences, Havana, picture of, IV, 364.

    Adams, John Quincy, enunciates American policy toward Cuba, II, 258;
      portrait, 259;
      on Cuban annexation, 327.