[Cover Illustration]

                                 TRIAL
                                   OF
                        THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

                                 BEFORE

                           THE INTERNATIONAL
                           MILITARY TRIBUNAL

                              _NUREMBERG_
                    14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946

                   _PUBLISHED AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY_
                                 _1948_

        This volume is published in accordance with the
        direction of the International Military Tribunal by
        the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction
        of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.

                               VOLUME XVI

                            _OFFICIAL TEXT_

                                _IN THE_

                            ENGLISH LANGUAGE

                             _PROCEEDINGS_

                       11 June 1946-24 June 1946

                              CONTENTS

     One Hundred and Fifty-second Day, Tuesday, 11 June 1946,
                  Morning Session                                   1
                  Afternoon Session                                32

     One Hundred and Fifty-third Day, Wednesday, 12 June 1946,
                  Morning Session                                  61
                  Afternoon Session                               106

     One Hundred and Fifty-fourth Day, Thursday, 13 June 1946,
                  Morning Session                                 141
                  Afternoon Session                               160

     One Hundred and Fifty-fifth Day, Friday, 14 June 1946,
                  Morning Session                                 204
                  Afternoon Session                               239

     One Hundred and Fifty-sixth Day, Monday, 17 June 1946,
                  Morning Session                                 263
                  Afternoon Session                               288

     One Hundred and Fifty-seventh Day, Tuesday, 18 June 1946,
                  Morning Session                                 312
                  Afternoon Session                               338

     One Hundred and Fifty-eighth Day, Wednesday, 19 June 1946,
                  Morning Session                                 378
                  Afternoon Session                               417

     One Hundred and Fifty-ninth Day, Thursday, 20 June 1946,
                  Morning Session                                 447
                  Afternoon Session                               477

     One Hundred and Sixtieth Day, Friday, 21 June 1946,
                  Morning Session                                 513
                  Afternoon Session                               551

     One Hundred and Sixty-first Day, Saturday, 22 June 1946,
                  Morning Session                                 592

     One Hundred and Sixty-second Day, Monday, 24 June 1946,
                  Morning Session                                 621
                  Afternoon Session                               646

                    ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SECOND DAY
                          Tuesday, 11 June 1946

                           _Morning Session_

[_The Defendant Seyss-Inquart resumed the stand._]

MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): Mr.
President, I should like to clear up the matter that I raised yesterday
with respect to the notes of the conference between this defendant and
Hitler. I had the investigation made and I think these are the facts.
Apparently, Colonel Williams of our staff, who interrogated this
defendant late in October, was handed these notes by the defendant; and
somehow or other they never did reach our files and have been misplaced.
So the defendant was quite right in saying that he turned them over, but
I think in error in saying that he turned them over to me.

DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Yesterday
we had reached one of the most important points in the Indictment, the
question of the evacuation of Jews from the Netherlands. Witness, what
did you do when you learned of this removal of the Jews from the
Netherlands? Did you write any letters?

ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART (Defendant): Yesterday I stated that I had people
sent from the Netherlands to the Auschwitz Camp in order to ascertain
whether there were accommodations and, if so, what kind. I have given
you the result of this inspection. I asked the Security Police, that is,
Heydrich, whether it would not be possible for the evacuated Jews to
keep up correspondence with the Netherlands. This concession was made.
For about three-quarters of a year or a year correspondence was
maintained; not only short post cards but long letters were permitted. I
do not know how the camp administration did this; but the letters were
identified as authentic by the addressee. When the number of letters
dropped off later—it never stopped completely—the Security Police told
me that the Jews in Auschwitz now had fewer acquaintances in the
Netherlands, meaning other Jews, because most of them were already in
Auschwitz.

DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, did you turn to Bormann, too?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yesterday I stated that, after learning of Heydrich’s
order, I requested Bormann to inquire of the Führer whether Heydrich
actually had such unlimited power. Bormann confirmed this. I admit
frankly that I had misgivings about the evacuation.

DR. STEINBAUER: Did you do anything to alleviate these misgivings?

SEYSS-INQUART: My misgivings—which increased in the course of the
war—were that the hardships of the war would be a heavy burden, above
all for the Jews. If there were too little food in the Reich, the Jewish
camps in particular would receive little, while probably the Jews would
be treated severely and for comparatively slight reasons heavy
punishment would be imposed upon them. Of course, I also thought of the
unavoidable tearing apart of families, to a certain extent, at least, in
the case of labor commitment. That also was the reason why we brought
forward difficulties for 3 or 4 months.

The decisive argument, however, was the declaration of the competent
authority, the Security Police, that in case of a landing attempt the
Jews were not to be in the immediate theater of operations.

I ask the Court to consider that the most important and most decisive
motive for me was always the fact that the German people were engaged in
a life-and-death struggle. Today looking at it from another perspective
the picture looks different. At that time, if we told ourselves that the
Jews would be kept together in some camp, even if under severe
conditions, and that after the end of the war they would find a
settlement somewhere, the misgivings caused by this had to be cast aside
in view of the consideration that their presence in the battle area
might weaken the German power of resistance.

In the course of 1943 I spoke with Hitler and called his attention to
this problem in the Netherlands. In his own convincing way he reassured
me and at the same time admitted that he was thinking of a permanent
evacuation of the Jews, if possible, from all of Europe with which
Germany wanted to maintain friendly relations. He wanted to have the
Jews settled on the eastern border of the German sphere of interest
insofar as they were not able to emigrate to other parts of the earth.

At the beginning of 1944 I spoke with Himmler, whom I happened to meet
in southern Bavaria. I asked him in a determined manner about the Jews
in the Netherlands. The fact that our Eastern Front was being withdrawn
meant that the camps would be in the battle area in the course of time,
or at least in the rear area. I was afraid that the lot of the Jews
would become even more serious then. Himmler said something to the
following effect: “Do not worry; they are my best workers.” I could not
imagine that the Jews capable of labor were working while their
relatives were being destroyed. I believed that in that case one could
expect nothing else than that every Jew would attack a German and
strangle him.

DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, so you did learn of these evacuations? In your
capacity as Reich Commissioner did you help carry out these evacuations
through your administration?

SEYSS-INQUART: Since the evacuation was a fact, I considered it proper
to concern myself with it to the extent that was possible for me as
Reich Commissioner. I gave my deputy in Amsterdam, Dr. Boehmke, power to
carry out the evacuation, to exercise control, and to take steps if
excesses occurred other than unavoidable difficulties, or to report such
to me. Dr. Boehmke was in constant opposition to the so-called Central
Office for Jewish Emigration. We had to intervene again and again, but I
am convinced that we did not put an end to all hardships.

The Jews were collected in the Westerborg Camp. When the first
transports left, I received a report that the trains were overcrowded. I
vigorously remonstrated with the commander of the Security Police and
asked him to see that the transport was carried out in an orderly
manner. The Netherlands Report states that at the beginning the
transports were made under tolerable conditions; later, conditions
generally became worse. But that such excessive overcrowding of trains
occurred as indicated in the report did not come to my knowledge. It is
true that the Security Police made it very difficult to have the
execution of these measures controlled. At the suggestion of some Dutch
secretaries general, especially Van Damm and Froehlich, I effected an
exception for a number of Jews. One could effect individual exceptions;
the basic measures could not be changed. I believe that the number of
exceptions is greater than indicated in the Netherlands Report, at least
according to my reports.

These Jews were, in the final stage, in the Westerborg Camp. When the
invasion began Himmler wanted to remove them. Upon my objections this
was not done. But after the battle of Arnhem he removed them, as he
said, to Theresienstadt; and I hope that they remained alive there.

DR. STEINBAUER: Did you also release property on this occasion?

SEYSS-INQUART: These Jews who were made exceptions retained control of
their property.

DR. STEINBAUER: In closing this chapter I should like once more to call
the attention of the Tribunal to Document 1726-PS, USA-195, in the
document book of the Prosecution. This document sums up the whole Jewish
problem in the Netherlands, and on Page 6 it gives all the agencies
which dealt with the Jewish problem. Under Number 3 you will find the
General Commissioner for Security, the Higher SS and Police Leader H.
Rauter, General of Police. Under Number 4 is the Central Office for
Jewish Emigration, Leader Aus der Funte—under the “General
Commissioner,” as under 3. The report says about this:

    “Apparently an organization for Jewish emigration; in reality,
    an organization to rob the Jews of their rights, to segregate
    them, or to deport them.”

This was the most important office, which was directly under Himmler’s
Higher Police Leader, and not under the defendant.

SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to point out that Rauter functioned as
Higher SS and Police Leader in this case, and not as “General
Commissioner for Security,” for the measures were carried out by the
German Police, and not by the Netherlands police.

DR. STEINBAUER: The witness in a speech also spoke about his views on
the Jewish problem at one time. The Prosecution has submitted a part of
this speech.

THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Dr. Steinbauer, you
are putting this Document 1726-PS to the witness, which contains a
historical statement, apparently. Does the witness agree that the
historical statement is accurate?

Do you, Defendant, agree that this historical statement is accurate?

SEYSS-INQUART: May I see the document?

[_The document was handed to the defendant._]

DR. STEINBAUER: It is Appendix 2.

THE PRESIDENT: You see, Dr. Steinbauer, you put forward the document and
it is for you to ascertain from the witness whether he agrees with the
document or whether he challenges it.

SEYSS-INQUART: The presentation of facts is accurate, except for the
addition of the correction which I made with reference to the “General
Commissioner for Security.”

THE PRESIDENT: There are certain passages in the document which your
attention ought to be drawn to: February 1941, for instance. You have
the document before you, Dr. Steinbauer?

DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you look at the last entry under the heading
February 1941? Do you see that?

DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: You have to put that to the witness. He said that the
facts are accurate.

DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, you will find under “February 1941” a
statement—I have only the English here—saying that Jews were arrested
and then sent to Buchenwald and Mauthausen.

SEYSS-INQUART: I discussed this case yesterday. That was a measure at
the direct order of Himmler, which only came to my knowledge after it
had been carried out and against which I protested. To my knowledge,
mass deportations to Mauthausen did not occur again after that.

THE PRESIDENT: Then what I understand the defendant to say is that that
document is accurate except where you referred to under the Numbers 3
and 4, on the last page. Is that right?

SEYSS-INQUART: In my testimony yesterday I confirmed the orders
contained in this document, but not all the details of the actual
events.

DR. STEINBAUER: The presentation on Page 6 of the individual agencies is
correct?

SEYSS-INQUART: The actual presentation, too, is basically correct.
Yesterday I spoke also of the burning of synagogues and of the
prevention of the destruction of synagogues in The Hague and Amsterdam.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Steinbauer. Go on.

DR. STEINBAUER: Now, I should like to refer to Document 79, Page 203,
from Exhibit Number USA-708. That is a speech which Seyss-Inquart made
on the Jewish question. The Prosecution submitted this document. Since
it needs a little explaining I shall begin by reading the last sentence:

    “The only thing we can discuss is the creation of a tolerable
    transitional state while maintaining our point of view that the
    Jews are enemies, and thus applying every precaution customarily
    observed against enemies. As regards the time when Germany will
    not be here as an occupational force to maintain order in public
    life, the Dutch people will have to decide for themselves
    whether they want to endanger the comradely union with the
    German people for the sake of the Jews.”

Witness, I should like to ask you about this speech. Were you thinking
of the complete elimination and destruction of the Jews?

SEYSS-INQUART: I never thought of that at all, and in this speech I was
not even thinking of evacuation. At that time I held the point of view
that the Jews should be confined in the Netherlands, as is done with
enemy aliens, for the reasons which are given in the preceding part of
this speech, which the American Prosecution has submitted. The idea
still prevailed of treating them as enemy aliens, even though
Englishmen, for example, were also transported to the Reich. I have
already pointed out that that viewpoint later changed to conform to the
measures against Jews, which were customary in the Reich.

DR. STEINBAUER: We now come to...

THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of the speech?

SEYSS-INQUART: This speech is of March 1941. Only once again did I
express my point of view, and that was on 20 April 1943, when I made the
somewhat, I admit, fantastic suggestion that all belligerent powers
should pool 1 percent of their war costs in order to solve the Jewish
problem from the economic standpoint. I was thus of the opinion that the
Jews still existed; incidentally, I never called the Jews inferior.

DR. STEINBAUER: I believe I can conclude this topic and go on to another
charge which is made against you—violations of international law, the
subject of spoliation.

Who confiscated raw materials and machinery in the Netherlands?

SEYSS-INQUART: The initiative for this, and the extent to which it was
to be done, originated with the Reich offices. The operations were
carried out either by my offices, by the Wehrmacht, by the armament
inspection offices, or even by the Police and the Waffen-SS; but from
the middle of 1944 on they were carried out in the main by the office of
the Armament Minister, which was also my office, and by the field
economic commands of the High Command of the Army. At that time control
was extremely difficult.

DR. STEINBAUER: What was your own attitude toward this problem?

SEYSS-INQUART: I was of the opinion that the provisions of the Hague
Convention for Land Warfare applying to this were obsolete and could not
be applied to a modern war because the labor potential of the civilian
population is at least as important as the war potential of the soldiers
at the front. How much could be demanded seemed to me to depend on the
conditions prevailing in one’s own country. These doubtlessly varied in
each country. I therefore endeavored to obtain a statement from Reich
Marshal Göring to the effect that the Dutch were to live under the same
conditions as the German people. This promise, to be sure, was not kept
completely in the ensuing period.

DR. STEINBAUER: How was the confiscation carried out? By what
authorities?

SEYSS-INQUART: Until 1943, the Dutch offices carried out our
assignments. The technical experts had to provide me with factual
justification for confiscations, since I was not familiar with such
matters. I took steps when complaints reached me. For example, I
prevented the removal of margarine works in Dordrecht and of a brand new
electrical works in Leeuwarden.

Reich Minister Speer issued an important order that only the machines
from factories which delivered more than one-half of their total
production to the Reich, for example, Phillips in Eindhoven, could be
transferred to the Reich.

DR. STEINBAUER: The French Prosecution charges that you favored the
black market. What do you have to say about this?

SEYSS-INQUART: We combated the black market from the beginning. It was
therefore always a so-called “grey market” with us. I had prohibited the
purchase of food from the current production and likewise of other
important consumer articles on the black market. Every case was
investigated by the competent offices in conjunction with the Dutch
offices. If it was a business which had been forbidden by me, the goods
were confiscated and turned over to the Dutch offices. These measures
were 100 percent for the benefit of the Dutch, for what the German Reich
wanted officially it got anyhow. I see from the document that the
turnover in the Netherlands was the lowest anywhere. The figures are
deceptive, though, since prices on the black market were several times
higher than those on the normal market, so that the actual amount of
goods was much lower.

DR. STEINBAUER: In Document 1321-PS the charge is made that you turned
medical instruments over to the SS.

SEYSS-INQUART: That is true. Please judge that in connection with my
general statements. The SS needed microscopes for its hospitals at the
front, for all its hospitals which had been destroyed by bombings. In
the laboratories of the University of Utrecht there were microscopes
which were not being used. I had the case investigated by my office and
what seemed dispensable confiscated. In this connection I refer to a
case which was much more important for the Dutch. The Reich wanted to
tear down the Kammerlingh Institute at Leyden, which is one of the most
famous low-temperature research institutes in the world. I believe only
the Soviets and the Americans have one as well, especially suitable for
atomic research. I prevented the tearing down of this institute which
would have meant an irreparable loss for the Netherlands. Experiments
which seemed necessary were carried out by Professor Heisenberg himself
in Leyden.

DR. STEINBAUER: Document 1988-PS, RF-130, charges that you had the
rolling mill in Ymuiden removed.

SEYSS-INQUART: This rolling mill in Ymuiden was built up after May 1941
by a German firm, which in exchange was given a partnership in the blast
furnace joint stock company. The electrical installations of these works
were repeatedly destroyed by the English, not without the aid of the
intelligence service of the Dutch resistance movement. In my opinion the
Reich Marshal was right in ordering that they be moved to the Reich.
This was done. Why no indemnity was paid I do not understand, for I had
issued an order that all such demands had to receive full
indemnification, but perhaps the German concern relinquished its
partnership.

DR. STEINBAUER: The charge is further made that you turned over the
essential transportation means of the Netherlands to the Reich.

SEYSS-INQUART: I could not in substance dispose of the means of
transportation; that was the concern of the transport command of the
Armed Forces. Once I merely took part in demanding 50,000
bicycles—there were 4,000,000 bicycles in the Netherlands—for the
mobilization of troops in the Netherlands themselves.

DR. STEINBAUER: Another charge is that you had art objects removed from
public museums and collections.

SEYSS-INQUART: I most painstakingly took care that famous art objects,
especially pictures, in the Dutch public museums of Amsterdam,
Mauritshuis, and so forth were especially protected. But it is possible
that loans to these museums which belonged to Jewish persons were
claimed in connection with the liquidation of Jewish property. There was
just one case. A Kruller Foundation existed in the Netherlands which was
willed to the Netherlands State. Without my permission three pictures
from this foundation were taken to the Reich, for which I later
concluded a contract for sale with the museum authorities. I endeavored
to replace these pieces for the museum. They procured some beautiful Van
Goghs and a Corré from the German treasure list, and the head of the
museum once told me that the new pictures fitted better into the museum
than the old ones. The famous paintings were in a bombproof shelter on
the Dutch coast. When the coast was declared a fortified area, I induced
the Dutch authorities to have a new shelter built near Maastricht. The
pictures were taken there, always under Dutch care. No German had
anything to do with it. In the fall of 1944 Dr. Goebbels demanded that
the pictures be taken to the Reich. I definitely refused this and had
reliable guards placed at the shelter, and also sent an official from
the Dutch Ministry who was authorized to hand over the pictures to the
approaching enemy troops. I was convinced that the Dutch Government in
England would see to it that these pictures remained in the Netherlands.

DR. STEINBAUER: Did you yourself acquire any pictures?

SEYSS-INQUART: I did not buy any pictures for myself in the Netherlands,
except for two or three small etchings by a contemporary artist. As
Reich Commissioner I bought pictures by contemporary artists at
exhibitions when I liked them and when they seemed worth the price and
were offered for sale. I also bought old pictures and gave them to
public institutions in the Reich, especially to the Museum of Art
History in Vienna and the Reich Governor’s office in Vienna. They were
all purchases on the open market, as far as I am informed. Among them
was a picture attributed to Vermeer, although it was contested. On the
other hand I acquired an authentic Vermeer for the Dutch State by
preventing its sale to the Reich.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, there is no specific charge against this
defendant of having bought pictures.

DR. STEINBAUER: It was mentioned in the trial brief. May I continue? Let
us conclude this question.

THE PRESIDENT: We do not want details about it. It is sufficient if he
told us that he paid for the pictures. He need not give us details about
the pictures.

DR. STEINBAUER: I will go on to the next question. I submit to you
Document RF-136. It describes the confiscation of the property of Her
Majesty, the Queen of the Netherlands.

SEYSS-INQUART: To tell the full truth, I must add something to the
previous question. Pictures and art objects from Jewish fortunes or from
enemy fortunes, when there was a reason for it, were liquidated and sold
in the Reich. In this connection a very lively free trade developed with
the participation of the Dutch art dealers, doubtless favored by the
free transfer of foreign currency.

DR. STEINBAUER: Now I should like to go on to the question of the royal
property, RF-136. What do you know about the order for the liquidation
of this property?

SEYSS-INQUART: I myself ordered this liquidation. In the Netherlands we,
of course, had an order to confiscate enemy property, as in all occupied
territories. When we came to the Netherlands, the royal property was
merely placed under trusteeship, without any steps being taken to seize
it. Right after the outbreak of the campaign in the East, the Queen of
the Netherlands spoke personally on the radio in a very antagonistic
manner, severely accusing the Führer and making an express appeal for
active resistance. In view of this state of affairs the property of any
Dutch citizen might have been confiscated. I therefore decided to
proceed in this case in the same way in order to prevent an excessive
extension of this measure as had been demanded of me, while having the
conviction that I could not make any exceptions. I myself, as I said,
signed the order for confiscation, in order not to implicate anybody
else.

DR. STEINBAUER: What instructions did you give in the course of the
liquidation?

SEYSS-INQUART: I immediately issued liquidation orders which in practice
prevented the liquidation being carried out. I ordered estates or
castles to be turned over to the Netherlands State—with the exception
of one apartment house, I believe—and likewise bonds and securities and
archives, and that all historic or artistic or otherwise valuable
furniture be selected by a Dutch commission so that the Netherlands
State could take it over. The commission included almost everything at
all possible in its list. I realized that and did not strike out one
piece. In particular, I had the historical installations at Soestdyk and
Huis ten Bosch turned over in full, although Berlin wanted the Huis ten
Bosch installation as a memorial to the people of Brandenburg. Finally,
even the personal things...

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that the defendant need make this quite so
detailed, Dr. Steinbauer. He has made the point that some of the things
were turned over to the Netherlands State.

DR. STEINBAUER: Then I should like very briefly to ask in this
connection: Do you know to what extent the property was actually
liquidated?

SEYSS-INQUART: I had a survey given to me. It was reported to me that 3,
or at the most, 5 percent of the property was actually liquidated.

DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you, that is enough.

SEYSS-INQUART: The proceeds were turned over to a fund for the repairing
of war damages.

DR. STEINBAUER: Now I shall proceed to the question of the confiscation
of factories and raw materials. Who undertook this confiscation?

SEYSS-INQUART: I may refer to my previous statements. From the late
summer of 1944 on, this was done primarily by the economic field
commands. There are individual documents available with notations
referring to me. There were many unauthorized confiscations. People came
from the Reich with trucks and began to take away machinery. Together
with the Armed Forces commander and the Higher SS and Police Leader I
ordered that the strictest measures be taken against these methods.

DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to two
documents which I submitted but which I shall not read in order to save
time. These are Documents Number 80 and 81, Pages 205 and 208. It can be
seen from these that this was a task of the Armed Forces; that these
confiscations were all carried out by the occupation forces.

In Document RF-137, Witness, the charge is made that the removal of
furniture and clothing from Arnhem was sanctioned by you.

SEYSS-INQUART: The charge is correct. The situation was as follows: The
front was directly south of Arnhem. There were three or four resistance
lines built in Arnhem proper. The city had been completely evacuated. It
was being shelled and installations and goods in Arnhem were gradually
being ruined in the course of the winter. The Führer ordered at that
time through Bormann that textiles, particularly, be brought from the
Netherlands for German families who had suffered bomb damage. Without
any doubt the furniture and the textiles in Arnhem would probably either
have been looted or would have been ruined by the weather or would have
been burned in a battle at Arnhem. Although it was not in my territory
but at the front and the executive power thus lay with the Armed Forces,
I gave my approval that under the circumstances furniture and textiles
be brought to the Ruhr area. I ordered at the same time that the items
be listed for indemnification claims. I believe that Dr. Wimmer can
confirm this as a witness.

DR. STEINBAUER: I believe we can conclude that.

SEYSS-INQUART: The charge is also raised against me that I blew up
safes. I opposed this most strongly. When such a case was reported to
me, I had my prosecuting authority issue the indictment and the order
for arrest.

DR. STEINBAUER: Now I shall go on to the next question. How about the
blowing up and destruction of ports, docks, locks, and mines in the
Netherlands?

SEYSS-INQUART: Blastings were undertaken at the moment when the
Netherlands again became a theater of war. As for port and dock
installations and shipyards, the following is important: The port of
Antwerp fell almost undamaged into the hands of the enemy. I believe
that that was of decisive importance for the further development of the
offensive. Thereupon the competent military authorities in the
Netherlands began to blow up such installations as a precautionary
measure. I am only acquainted with the fact, not with the details; and I
refused to watch the explosions. But my commissioner and I intervened
with the Armed Forces offices, and I believe that in Rotterdam half of
the installations were not blown up. This is shown by the Dutch reports.
I had nothing whatever to do with the matter, aside from this
intervention.

When the English reached Limburg, an order was issued to blow up the
mines as being vital for war. I inquired with Reich Minister Speer about
this, and he issued an order not to blow them up but only to put them
out of commission for 3 or 4 months. The orders were issued to this
effect. I hope that they were not violated.

DR. STEINBAUER: We have heard in this Trial of “scorched earth” policy.
Did that apply to the Netherlands also?

SEYSS-INQUART: I received a “scorched earth” order from Bormann. Without
there being a military necessity for it, all technical installations
were to be blown up. That meant, in effect, the destruction of Holland,
that is, the western Netherlands. If explosions are carried out in 14 or
16 different places in Holland the country will be entirely flooded in 3
or 4 weeks. I did not carry out the order at first; instead I
established contact with Reich Minister Speer. I had a personal meeting
with him on 1 April in Oldenburg. Speer told me that the same order had
been given in the Reich; but that he was frustrating it, that he now had
full authority in this matter, and that he agreed that the order should
not be carried out in the Netherlands. It was not carried out.

DR. STEINBAUER: Now, to another chapter. Floods did occur. Did you have
anything to do with them?

SEYSS-INQUART: I know about this, and in a certain connection I did have
something to do with it.

There were previously prepared floodings by the Armed Forces for defense
purposes and there were so-called “battle” floodings, which suddenly
became necessary in the course of battle. The prepared ones were carried
out in closest contact with my office and the Dutch offices. Through
their intervention, about half of the area demanded was spared and
saved. The flooding was done mostly with fresh water so that less damage
would occur, and the outer dikes were spared. There were two battle
floodings in Holland, at the order of the commander of Holland. The
Wieringer Polder was mentioned in particular. At that time there was
great danger of a troop landing from the air which would outflank the
Dutch defense front. I was not actually informed of the execution of the
battle floodings. The commander had decided on it overnight.

When, on 30 April, I talked to Lieutenant General Bedell Smith, General
Eisenhower’s Chief of the General Staff, he told us: “What has been
flooded so far can be justified from the military point of view; if you
flood any more now, it is no longer justifiable.”

After 30 April there were no more floodings.

DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to Document
86, Page 221, without reading it. It shows that these floodings were of
a purely military character.

Another charge which was made against you, Witness, is the question of
the food supply for the Netherlands population. What measures did you
take to maintain the food supply of the Dutch people?

SEYSS-INQUART: The food question in the Netherlands was doubtless the
most difficult question of the whole administration; and I believe,
because of the special aspects of the case, it was one of the most
difficult in all the occupied territories.

In the Netherlands there is a density of population of 270 people per
square kilometer, in Holland specifically there are more than 600 per
square kilometer to be fed. The food economy is highly cultivated as a
processing economy dependent upon the importation of hundreds of
thousands of tons of food. With the occupation and the blockade all that
had disappeared. The whole food economy had to be put on a new basis, as
well as the production of food for immediate human consumption. It was
certainly a great achievement of Dutch agriculture and its leadership
that this was successful. However, I may say that my experts aided very
effectively, and we got a great deal of support from the Reich.

Food distribution in the Netherlands was also very carefully regulated,
more so almost than in any other occupied territory. The most important
thing for me was to maintain this food system, although its leader,
Generaldirektor Louwes, and his entire staff of helpers were definitely
hostile to the Germans. Against the will of the Reich Central Office, I
nevertheless retained him, because otherwise I would not have been able
to bear the responsibility for the nourishment of the people.

DR. STEINBAUER: Did you also deliver food to the Reich?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, the troops, above all, claimed the right to live off
the land, I believe, but grain was supplied from the Reich to an extent
of 36,000 tons, vegetables being demanded in exchange. The Reich
demanded in addition more vegetables and also the delivery of cattle,
canned meat, seeds, and some other products. Vegetables and meat would
not have made so much difference, but the seeds caused trouble. I am
convinced that the Dutch food system did its utmost to prevent
deliveries.

DR. STEINBAUER: I believe that that is enough on this theme, and I
should like to ask how the general food situation was in the fall of
1944?

SEYSS-INQUART: During most of the occupation period we had a caloric
value at first of 3,000, and then of about 2,500 calories, and in 1944
about 1,800 calories. Experience today will show what that meant.

In September of 1944 the Netherlands became a theater of war again. At
about the time that the first British airborne divisions landed at
Arnhem, a general strike of the Dutch railroads began on order of the
Dutch Government in England; and it was carried out almost completely.
At the same time ships vanished from the internal waterways. It was not
a formal strike, but it amounted to the same thing.

Through this situation the defense possibilities for the German Armed
Forces were most severely endangered. The German Armed Forces then began
to confiscate ships and, in effect, interrupted all traffic. I got in
touch with the Armed Forces and was told that if the railroad strike
stopped they would not have to proceed so rigorously. I reported this to
Secretary General Hirschfeld and Generaldirektor Louwes. No result was
achieved, and I had to consider how I could restore shipping. I
discussed it with the Armed Forces, and I suggested that I would give
them 3 or 4 weeks’ time in which they could secure their necessary
shipping space. Out of about 2 million tons available, they needed
450,000 tons. During this time I forbade all ship traffic, because the
Armed Forces was confiscating all ships anyhow. I permitted traffic of
small ships in Holland.

THE PRESIDENT: How is all this relevant to the charges made against the
defendant?

DR. STEINBAUER: The Report of the Netherlands Government, which the
Prosecution also mentioned, states in great detail that the defendant,
as Reich Commissioner, is responsible for the famine which began in
September of 1944 and lasted until the spring of 1945 and for the great
mortality, especially of children—whole tables of statistics have been
submitted—because, on the occasion of the shipping and railroad strike,
he prohibited the importing of food. That is one of the most important
and serious charges made against him. I have asked for witnesses on this
subject, and perhaps I might cut it short now so that the witnesses may
speak about it.

SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to be allowed to comment on this matter.
This is the charge which seems the most serious to me, too.

DR. STEINBAUER: Perhaps we can have a brief recess now, if Your Honor
agrees.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

DR. STEINBAUER: In the Government Report it is asserted that at the time
50,000 Dutch people died of starvation; and, therefore, I should like to
ask you what reason you had for establishing this traffic embargo at
that time?

SEYSS-INQUART: I believe I have already explained that in the main. The
traffic situation was such that the Wehrmacht had to make sure of its
shipping space. As long as it did that there was no ship traffic as such
possible. I wanted to limit this to as short a period of time as
possible so that afterwards ship traffic could again be assured and
Holland regularly supplied with food. Ship traffic was not interrupted
primarily by my embargo, but rather—the witnesses will confirm this—by
the fact that all ships that could be found were confiscated. Naturally,
I asked myself whether the Dutch food supply would be endangered; and I
said to myself that the Dutch people themselves were responsible for
this state of emergency, and that the military interests of the Reich
were, anyhow, equally important. I thought that if in the second half of
October I could establish an orderly ship traffic, then, according to my
experience, I would have 2 months’ time in which to take care of the
food supply for the Dutch people. Then I could bring in between 200,000
and 250,000 tons of food. And that would be sufficient to maintain
rations of 1400 to 1800 calories. I believe I can recollect that between
15 and 20 October I gave the order to establish ship traffic again.

DR. STEINBAUER: And what did you do?

SEYSS-INQUART: Ship traffic was not established because the Dutch
traffic authorities, for the most part, had disappeared, perhaps because
they were afraid that they would be made responsible for the general
railroad strike. For weeks on end our efforts were fruitless; and
finally I talked with Secretary General Hirschfeld and gave him complete
authority, particularly...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal does not think that this
matter can be gone into extreme detail like this.

DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, perhaps you can be very brief about this and
tell us what you did to alleviate conditions.

SEYSS-INQUART: I am practically finished. I gave Secretary General
Hirschfeld full authority in the field of transportation. He then,
although very hesitantly, re-established traffic. He will confirm that I
supported him in every possible way. Food supplies were brought into
Holland. But many weeks had passed in vain. Within my sector, I then
provided additional aid, about which witness Van der Vense and, I
believe, witness Schwebel can give you information in their
interrogatories.

DR. STEINBAUER: Now, I should like to submit as the next document an
affidavit deposed by the witness Van der Vense. It has just arrived, but
the translations are already finished and will probably be given to the
Tribunal this afternoon or tomorrow morning. I shall now submit the
original. I do not believe it necessary to read this document which has
been translated into four languages. It describes exclusively the food
situation in this critical period of time.

SEYSS-INQUART: May I also call your attention to the fact that the Dutch
Government...

THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of it?

DR. STEINBAUER: Number 105.

SEYSS-INQUART: ...that the Dutch Government changed the figure of 50,000
deaths to the correct one of 25,000.

DR. STEINBAUER: Now I shall turn to the last period of your activity as
Reich Commissioner. I should like to ask you, when did you realize that
military resistance in the Netherlands was in vain?

SEYSS-INQUART: That we had to reckon with the possibility that Germany
might not win the war will be seen in my letter to the Führer in 1939.
Actual fear that this might happen arose at the time of Stalingrad.
Therefore one had to consider that possibility, and in due time I feared
that things would take this turn; I definitely and reliably knew it
through a statement which Reich Minister Speer made to me on 1 April
1945...

DR. STEINBAUER: 1945?

SEYSS-INQUART: April 1945. Up until that time I did not want to believe
it; but faced with the prospect of an unconditional surrender and
complete occupation, I naturally believed that in every respect I should
have to prepare for the worst because the consequences were
unpredictable. Speer at that time told me that the war, for Germany,
would end in a relatively short period of time because armament
production simply could not be kept up. He said 2 to 3 months.

DR. STEINBAUER: When you realized this fact, what did you do?

SEYSS-INQUART: I decided to end the defensive occupation of Holland
without violating my duties to the Reich and to the Führer. I went to
The Hague and discussed the methods with Secretary General Hirschfeld.
We agreed to get in touch at once with the confidential agents of the
Government in The Hague—which was illegal for me—and to ask them to
start negotiations on the basis that the Allied troops should not
advance against Holland, in which case no further destruction would
occur and the Allies could take over the feeding of the Dutch population
through direct contact with the Dutch authorities for food supply. Then
we would wait for the end of the war.

DR. STEINBAUER: Was this not an arbitrary act on your part as far as the
German Government was concerned?

THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of this?

DR. STEINBAUER: What was the date of this?

SEYSS-INQUART: This conversation with Secretary General Hirschfeld took
place on 2 April 1945. Then the negotiations dragged on, and on 30 April
I had the conversation with Lieutenant General Bedell Smith. I purposely
did not ask for authorization from Berlin in order to avoid a refusal or
be prohibited from carrying out my intention. I did this on my own.
General Blaskowitz, the commander of the Netherlands, was very
apprehensive. He called me during the night, because his superiors had
asked him just what was going on. Nevertheless, I was determined to
carry through this matter, for it seemed the only reasonable step I
could take in this situation. I stated that I would assume all
responsibility. On 30 April the conference took place and the result
that I had desired in effect materialized—the giving up of the military
defense of Holland.

DR. STEINBAUER: Then what did you personally do?

SEYSS-INQUART: Admiral Dönitz, as head of State, called me to Flensburg.
I went by speedboat across the North Sea and reported to him, and the
Admiral will confirm this as my witness; I succeeded in having the
demolition decree rescinded and tried my very best to return to the
Netherlands. Finally I plunged ahead and was arrested in Hamburg.

DR. STEINBAUER: Just why did you want to return to the Netherlands?

SEYSS-INQUART: First of all, I wanted to take care of my co-workers; in
the second place, I always was of the opinion that I should answer for
my administration there; and finally, I was of the opinion that since we
had been out in front in the hour of triumph we could lay claim to being
out in front in the hour of disaster as well.

DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have concluded my examination of the
witness.

DR. CARL HAENSEL (Counsel for SS): Did you belong to the SS?

SEYSS-INQUART: I had an honorary position in the General SS. As such I
was not a regular member of the General SS, but I was very much
interested in the SS as an ideological and a political formation.

DR. HAENSEL: Did you exercise any functions in the SS, or did you just
have a title?

SEYSS-INQUART: _De jure_ I had only a title. Politically I tried to
exert a certain influence on the SS in the Netherlands, insofar as it
was not the Waffen-SS, the Security Police, and so on; and in April of
1945 I believe I can say that _de facto_ I was the foremost SS Führer in
the Netherlands.

DR. HAENSEL: Did you have the impression that the SS was a closed,
unified organization, or were there great divergences within the
organization itself?

SEYSS-INQUART: To outward appearances it was an extremely closed system.
Internally there were two factions. One wanted the SS to be just a
political training unit. Obergruppenführer Heissmeyer belonged to this
school. The other faction wanted to make a state executive organ out of
the SS. Heydrich belonged to this group. At first Himmler vacillated,
but later he went over completely to Heydrich’s camp. The SS ideal
disappeared, because Himmler misused it for executive powers.

DR. HAENSEL: Can you limit that as to time? When approximately, in what
year, did this ideal die out?

SEYSS-INQUART: I believe the first signs were evident in 1938. The
process continued with giant strides at the time of the Eastern
campaign.

DR. HAENSEL: Did not the General SS come a little to the fore ever since
1939, whereas only the executive office groups or the Waffen-SS were
active?

SEYSS-INQUART: In any event from this time on Himmler transferred people
from the General SS and put them into his various executive
organizations. The General SS, for me anyway, did not come to the fore
after that time.

DR. HAENSEL: Do you think that the SS man could know about the struggle
for power in the leadership, that he had insight into this at all; or
was he unconscious of this?

SEYSS-INQUART: I do not believe that the ordinary SS man knew this, but
there were many SS men who felt very uncomfortable and who remained with
their organization only because they felt it was their duty.

DR. HAENSEL: You said in your interrogation that a decree of Heydrich’s
caused you to have Jews transported from Holland. Did you see Hitler’s
decree to Heydrich?

SEYSS-INQUART: I think so—a decree from Hitler to Heydrich alone would
not have been for Heydrich.

DR. HAENSEL: You picture the situation as if Heydrich had told you that
he had this decree.

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, he told me that, and a few weeks later he sent me
this decree.

DR. HAENSEL: Was it in writing?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, it was in writing.

DR. HAENSEL: And what did the decree say?

SEYSS-INQUART: That he had complete charge of the final solution of the
Jewish question as well as other matters dealing therewith.

DR. HAENSEL: And when was this? 1941? 1940?

SEYSS-INQUART: It was at about the time when the evacuations started.
That was in 1942.

DR. HAENSEL: That must be wrong. It was 1941; not later.

SEYSS-INQUART: Perhaps he showed me the decree later. I do not know the
date of the decree.

DR. HAENSEL: That must be the case. But this decree, you said, was
conceived in general terms?

SEYSS-INQUART: General terms.

DR. HAENSEL: It could be interpreted one way or another? I mean, you
know...

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I had the impression that in the occupied
territories Heydrich was to carry through the evacuation, and at that
time I was not quite sure whether that was to be a final
evacuation—which, however, was possible. The most extreme possibility
was that the Jews would be collected in camps and after the end of the
war settled somewhere.

DR. HAENSEL: I beg your pardon, Witness, the most extreme possibility
would certainly be that the Jews would be destroyed, is that not so?

SEYSS-INQUART: I am speaking of the most extreme possibility which I
thought of at the time.

DR. HAENSEL: And which you could imagine according to the words of the
decree?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.

DR. HAENSEL: Now, the question is: Is there a possibility that Heydrich
went beyond Hitler’s decree, that Himmler himself did not want these
acts which Heydrich committed?

SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot testify to that.

DR. HAENSEL: Did you talk with Hitler before 1943?

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think the witness can tell what the possibility
was as to what Heydrich would do any better than we can. He cannot give
evidence about that sort of thing.

DR. HAENSEL: Yes.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Before 1943 did you discuss these problems
with Hitler?

SEYSS-INQUART: I was merely present when Hitler talked about these
problems. It was always along this line, to eliminate the Jews from the
German population and to send them somewhere abroad.

DR. HAENSEL: But there was no talk at all about destruction of the Jews?

SEYSS-INQUART: Never.

DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): Witness, did
Sauckel cause raids in the Netherlands, and did he have churches and
motion picture houses surrounded?

SEYSS-INQUART: He could not have done that. I would not have allowed
that; and he did not ask to have that done.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have anything to do with the operations of
the Army in 1944?

SEYSS-INQUART: No, he did not know anything about that. When he heard
about it, one of his men arrived so that he could in any case recruit
skilled workers on this occasion; but this actually did not take place,
for the Armed Forces sent these men into the Reich right away.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did the regular worker transports to Germany, in
connection with the recruitment of workers by Sauckel, take place under
normal transport conditions or under very bad conditions?

SEYSS-INQUART: Whether the recruitment was voluntary or compulsory,
transport conditions were always normal. The same as for everybody else
in the Netherlands. They were not accompanied by Police, but by
officials of the Labor Employment Office, with the exception of the
2,600 whom the Police had arrested and who were sent to a camp of
Sauckel’s in the Reich.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have anything to do with the transporting of
internees or Jews?

SEYSS-INQUART: Not at all.

DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know what the working conditions were for the
workers who came from Holland to Germany?

SEYSS-INQUART: I knew about them in the main. They were the same
conditions as applied to workers in the Reich. But difficulties arose.
First of all, the employers in the Reich asserted that the Dutch people
had in part given false information at the time of their recruitment and
did not meet with requirements. Secondly, these labor contracts were for
a certain duration and the employers wanted to have the Dutch people
remain in the Reich for a longer period.

I saw to it that nothing was written into these labor contracts which
would not actually be observed in the Reich, no matter what one might
find out in the Reich.

DR. SERVATIUS: Then I have no further questions to put to the witness.

DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the
German Armed Forces): Witness, I wanted to put one question to you
regarding the floodings. What did you, your offices, or the Commander,
West undertake in order to prevent the pump stations from being flooded
and so avoid a great flooding of Holland?

SEYSS-INQUART: I do not quite understand the question. The pump stations
could not be flooded, only the polder area.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes.

SEYSS-INQUART: There were two dangers. One was that of blowing up, and
in that case the pump stations would not have been of any use; anyway it
was not done, as is known, but was prevented. The second danger was lack
of coal and oil. We tried, as long as possible, to supply the pump
stations with coal. This coal was listed as a top priority need. It was
thus placed in the same category as every other Armed Forces
requirement. When we received less and less coal, we allowed certain
very low-lying reclaimed areas to run full, so that others would not be
flooded. There was completely frictionless co-operation with the Dutch
offices; and a deputy of the Dutch Government in England, with whom I
spoke later, to whom I sent my expert, said that from the technical
point of view our flooding measures were not objectionable.

DR. LATERNSER: Now, a second point. In answer to a question from your
counsel, you said that you intervened against the destruction in the
harbor of Rotterdam. With whom did you intervene?

SEYSS-INQUART: With General Christiansen, who was then
commander-in-chief and Wehrmacht commander, who took my side
immediately.

DR. LATERNSER: Then you found him in agreement at once with regard to
your intervention with this military office?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.

DR. HANS FLÄCHSNER (Counsel for Defendant Speer): Witness, you mentioned
yesterday the protected industries (Sperrbetriebe). Can you tell me when
these industries were established in Holland and how they aimed to
affect the labor employment program, that is, the transportation of
workers from Holland to Germany?

SEYSS-INQUART: I believe the protected industries were established
during 1943, if I remember correctly in the second half of 1943. The
workers in these industries were protected. Thus, the recruiting and
transporting of Netherlands workers to the Reich was partly slowed down
and partly prevented altogether.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: When the protected industries began to function and work
was taken up, were raw materials brought from Germany to Holland, coal
in particular, so that the orders could be fulfilled?

SEYSS-INQUART: I believe all raw materials, with the exception of coal.
Coal was brought in from Limburg.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: You mentioned yesterday the Organization Todt. Do you
know to what extent this Organization Todt in Holland used Dutch
construction firms for construction work there on the Atlantic Wall and
to what extent this construction was carried out by Dutch construction
firms?

SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that the bulk of construction work in Holland,
Northern France, and Belgium was done by indigenous construction firms.
This is definitely true of Holland; and Dutch construction firms also
carried out work in Belgium and in Northern France. These firms brought
their workers along with them. In this manner some 35,000 to 40,000
Dutch workers who were not drafted by compulsion were working in Belgium
and Northern France in the middle of 1942.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Can you tell us what results this procedure had generally
on the recruitment of native labor?

SEYSS-INQUART: The indigenous workers naturally preferred to go into the
protected industries or the firms of the Organization Todt, for there
they were at least more certain of not being transported to the Reich.
And in addition, while they were with the Organization Todt they
received special food rations.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, when in August or September 1944, because of
enemy bombings on the distribution system, production in Holland was
hampered or even paralyzed, what measures were taken in order to protect
the unemployed workers of the protected industries?

SEYSS-INQUART: Three courses were open to us: First of all, to bring the
workers into the Reich; secondly, to dismiss these workers and give them
unemployment relief; and, thirdly, to retain these workers and to pay
them their wages even though they did little or no work.

I believe it was because of a decree issued by Reich Minister Speer that
the third course was chosen. The workers in those industries received
their pay, and I took care that the factory owners received a certain
compensation for wages which they paid those workers.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, you mentioned before a discussion which you had
on 1 April 1945 with Codefendant Speer. Can you tell us what the purpose
of this discussion was?

SEYSS-INQUART: I mentioned already that I, for my part, wanted to talk
with Minister Speer about the “scorched earth” decree. But Minister
Speer also had a purpose in mind. He wanted us to transport potatoes
from north Holland into the Ruhr region and in exchange to bring coal
from the Ruhr area into the Netherlands: In view of the potato supply in
north Holland this could readily have been done, but we did not have
enough transportation means at our command to carry out this plan.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did Speer tell you about precautionary measures for the
securing of food supplies during the period after the occupation?

SEYSS-INQUART: Minister Speer told me that behind the Ruhr area he had
stored trainloads of food and that he had appropriated the means of
transportation from the armament program, so that if the Ruhr area were
invaded there would be trains with food for this area available.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you very much.

THE PRESIDENT: Does Counsel for the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? I
am sorry, Dr. Kubuschok, did you have something to say?

DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): The Defendant
Kaltenbrunner has asked me, as the defense counsel sitting nearest him,
to state that he had discussed with his attorney a number of questions
which he would like to put to Seyss-Inquart. I just tried to reach Dr.
Kauffmann, Kaltenbrunner’s defense counsel; at present and probably all
this afternoon it will not be possible for us to reach him. The
Defendant Kaltenbrunner asks for permission to have these questions
asked of Seyss-Inquart tomorrow.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will expect some explanation from Dr.
Kauffmann as to why he is not here to cross-examine. He must have known
that the time was about to arrive for him to cross-examine. But the
Tribunal will assent to the suggestion that those questions may be put
at a later date, tomorrow, if possible.

Now, do Counsel for the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?

M. DELPHIN DEBENEST (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic):
Defendant, you have studied law, and you have told us that you had even
obtained the degree of Doctor of Law at the University of Vienna in
1917?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.

M. DEBENEST: You were a lawyer from 1929 to 12 February 1938, at which
date you became Minister for the Interior?

SEYSS-INQUART: From 1921.

M. DEBENEST: Very well. Now, was not your clientele mainly composed of
Jews?

SEYSS-INQUART: No, not mainly, but there were some among them.

M. DEBENEST: And yet you told us yesterday that you had been an
anti-Semite ever since the first World War.

SEYSS-INQUART: My clients knew that. It was widely known.

M. DEBENEST: Yes. But it did not, at the same time, cause you to despise
Jewish money.

SEYSS-INQUART: Neither did it prevent the Jews from coming to me.

M. DEBENEST: Were you a Catholic?

SEYSS-INQUART: What do you mean by that?

M. DEBENEST: I am asking you whether you were a Catholic.

SEYSS-INQUART: I am a member; that is, I belong to the Catholic Church.

M. DEBENEST: Were you not also a member of a Catholic fraternity when
you were a student?

SEYSS-INQUART: I never belonged to any student organization, Catholic or
national.

M. DEBENEST: Very well. You were appointed Reich Commissioner for
Holland by a decree of Hitler’s dated 18 May 1940; is that correct?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.

M. DEBENEST: Your orders, on reaching the Netherlands—as you told us
yesterday—were: To maintain the independence of the Netherlands and to
establish economic relations between that country and Germany. You added
that these orders were never afterwards modified by the Führer; is that
true?

SEYSS-INQUART: I did not quite understand one word, the reference to
economic relations.

M. DEBENEST: I said that you had arrived in the Netherlands with the
following orders: 1) to maintain the independence of the Netherlands and
2) to establish economic relations between that country and Germany. Is
that so?

SEYSS-INQUART: I would not put it that way exactly; rather, I was to try
and bring about as close an economic relationship between Holland and
Germany as possible. The economic stipulations, too, were, in the long
run and apart from war necessities, not intended to be dictatorial.

M. DEBENEST: But you did say that you had not come with the intention of
giving a definite political outlook to the people of the Netherlands. Is
that correct?

SEYSS-INQUART: Well, I would not put it that way. It was my intention to
further National Socialist policy wherever possible in Holland; not to
decree it, but to promote it as much as possible.

M. DEBENEST: Was it also your intention not to introduce but to impose
it?

SEYSS-INQUART: No, for one cannot force a political ideology on anyone.

M. DEBENEST: Very well. I am going to have a Document, Number 997-PS,
handed to you. This document has already been submitted both by the
Prosecution under Number RF-122, and yesterday by the Defense.

Will you kindly turn to Pages 7 and 8 of the German text? It is Page 7
of the French text, at the paragraph “Measures.” This document, as you
will note, is a report which you yourself made.

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.

M. DEBENEST: You write:

    “In view of this state of affairs it was necessary first of all
    to eliminate Winkelmann’s influence, which was done in the
    following manner: The secretaries general were expressly
    informed that from now on they would take orders only from the
    Reich Commissioner, which they expressly agreed to. The offices
    of secretaries general were retained and the same persons kept
    in office, since in the event of their resignation it would
    probably be impossible to find Dutch people who would be willing
    to take over the administration. In the rightist parties there
    were hardly any people qualified to do this; but it seemed
    necessary, from a political point of view, that a certain number
    of measures, above all economic measures, and indirectly, police
    measures as well, signed by the Dutch secretaries general, be
    made known to the Dutch nation.”

In short, according to this document, it appears that if you decided to
retain the secretaries general, it was because you needed them for
imposing certain measures on the Dutch people? Is that correct?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but what has that to do with politics? This is a
matter of administration.

M. DEBENEST: As far as I know, this refers to political as well as to
economic questions.

SEYSS-INQUART: No, in the German text it says “police question.”
Economic and police questions, not political; there is a difference.

M. DEBENEST: In that case, I will re-read the sentence, bearing your
answer in mind.

    “But it seemed necessary, from a political point of view...”

Now is that “political” or “police” which we see?

SEYSS-INQUART: Just a moment, please. Yes, that is correct. But that
does not mean politics in the sense of party politics, but political in
respect to the treatment of the Dutch people as such. Whether they
thereby became National Socialists or not was quite immaterial to me.

M. DEBENEST: Was it in the interests of Dutch or of German policy?

SEYSS-INQUART: Well, I admit without any hesitation at all that I
followed a German policy. That was part of my task.

M. DEBENEST: But the German policy of that day was surely the policy of
the National Socialist Party?

SEYSS-INQUART: The German policy was, at that time, the policy of a
fight for existence on the part of the German people, and this struggle
was led by the National Socialist Party. But the basic concern was not
the carrying out of the 25 points of the Party program, but rather the
carrying through of our fight for existence, and that is what I think
this means.

M. DEBENEST: In your administration, in the Netherlands, you were helped
by four Commissioners General: Wimmer in Administration and Justice,
Fischböck in Finance and Economy, Rauter for Public Security, and
Schmidt for Special Questions.

The Commissioner General for Public Security, Rauter, was directly
subordinate to you, was he not?

SEYSS-INQUART: The four Commissioners General were immediately
subordinate to me; Rauter, insofar as he, as Commissioner General for
Security, headed the Dutch police, and not insofar as he was chief of
the German Police.

M. DEBENEST: You had decided to rule and administer the Netherlands
alone; to accomplish this you dissolved the two Assemblies which then
existed; and by the same decree, you restricted the powers of the State
Council to the juridical field.

SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember this decree, but it may very well have
been that way.

M. DEBENEST: You also seized control over the finances, and over the
Treasury of the Netherlands. For this purpose you issued a decree on 24
August 1940 authorizing you to appoint the president of the Bank of
Holland.

SEYSS-INQUART: I do not recall the date exactly, but I did issue such a
decree.

M. DEBENEST: When you arrived in the Netherlands, Mynheer Trip was
president of the Netherlands Bank and Secretary General for the
Treasury?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.

M. DEBENEST: For what reason did you have him replaced?

SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. Trip was replaced because he objected to the lifting
of the existing foreign currency and clearing limitations. I put it to
him that he could resign if he did not want to carry out my measures.

M. DEBENEST: And by whom did you replace him?

SEYSS-INQUART: By Mynheer Rost van Tonningen.

M. DEBENEST: You had known Mynheer Rost van Tonningen for a very long
time?

SEYSS-INQUART: I do not believe I knew him—only by name at the most. He
obviously had been judged capable of holding the same office for
Austria—in connection with the League of Nations—in Vienna.

M. DEBENEST: Since when did you know his name?

SEYSS-INQUART: Most probably since the time when he assumed his office
in Vienna. I do not know the date.

M. DEBENEST: You were not associated with him when he was in Vienna?

SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that I never saw him.

M. DEBENEST: Was Mynheer Rost van Tonningen not a member of the Dutch
National Socialist Party?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.

M. DEBENEST: Was that the reason why you appointed him?

SEYSS-INQUART: That was one of the reasons. Not so much the fact that he
was a member but rather that he represented our views.

M. DEBENEST: Will you kindly look again at the document which I have
just shown to you, 997-PS, Page 5 of the German text, and Page 5 of the
French text. This is what you say about Mynheer Rost van Tonningen:

    “Rost van Tonningen: Meets perfectly all the ideological
    requirements, is in line with the Germanic idea and National
    Socialism, speaks effectively and animatedly, has a strong
    desire to be active, does not find his strength in himself but
    seeks the support and backing of other people.”

As far as I can see, we do not find in what you write here about Rost
van Tonningen that he was particularly competent in financial matters.

SEYSS-INQUART: In reference to the other gentlemen as well, I never
described their technical qualifications but merely their political
attitude. I did not say that Mr. Mussert was really a recognized
engineer in the Netherlands and so forth. I described merely their
political attitude.

M. DEBENEST: Thank you. Therefore, you set up in the Netherlands a civil
government, a German civil government.

SEYSS-INQUART: My four Commissioners General could not be considered as
having the same offices as ministers normally have. Certain functions,
however, had been delegated to the secretaries general. But these
secretaries general did not represent a government or a ministry. I
mentioned yesterday that I took over the Government.

M. DEBENEST: But the secretaries general did represent the Government of
the Netherlands, did they not?

SEYSS-INQUART: No; the secretaries general were the supreme heads,
officials of certain ministries; but they were not what we call the
bearers of sovereignty in the State. Those gentlemen were in England.

M. DEBENEST: But you knew, nevertheless, that they had been left in the
Netherlands by the Government in order to carry on the duties of the
Government in its place?

SEYSS-INQUART: What intentions the Government which had gone to England
had in making this appointment, I do not know. I assumed that they
remained there in order to direct the administration technically. It is
within the jurisdiction of an occupying power, in the case of complete
occupation of a country, to determine just how the government is to be
carried on.

M. DEBENEST: But did you consider that the creation of a German civil
government in an occupied country was in conformity with international
conventions?

DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I object to this question. In my opinion,
it is a question which should be solved by the High Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question may be asked. The
defendant has already given his views of international law in his
examination-in-chief. We allow the question.

M. DEBENEST: Then answer me, please.

SEYSS-INQUART: May I please have the question repeated?

M. DEBENEST: Do you consider that the creation of a German civil
government in an occupied country is in conformity with international
convention?

SEYSS-INQUART: In the way in which it took place in Holland, certainly.

M. DEBENEST: And why?

SEYSS-INQUART: Because, as a result of the complete occupation, Germany
had assumed responsibility for the administration of this country and,
therefore, had to establish a responsible leadership in this country.

M. DEBENEST: You yourself created the secretariats general, particularly
the Secretariat for Information and Fine Arts?

SEYSS-INQUART: We call it the Propaganda Ministry.

M. DEBENEST: Yes.

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I did that.

M. DEBENEST: And whom did you put at the head of this Secretariat?

SEYSS-INQUART: I believe Professor Goedewaagen first. He, too, was a
member of the Dutch National Socialist Party.

M. DEBENEST: That is true. Was not the staff of the General Secretariat
mainly composed of members of the Dutch National Socialist Party?

SEYSS-INQUART: I am convinced of that, but I did not know them
individually.

M. DEBENEST: Do you also know that in one of the offices a member of the
SS even acted in an advisory capacity?

SEYSS-INQUART: The Dutch SS?

M. DEBENEST: No, the German SS.

SEYSS-INQUART: Then he was a consultant?

M. DEBENEST: He was a consultant for national education and national
development.

SEYSS-INQUART: I did not quite follow you—he was a consultant for...

M. DEBENEST: For national education.

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes; I did not know him. I consider it possible; but I do
not believe that he was there as an SS man in particular, but rather for
other reasons.

M. DEBENEST: You ordered the dissolution of the municipal and provincial
assemblies; why?

SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot say the dissolution of the administration. I
eliminated merely the elected representatives of the communities and the
provinces. I not only kept the administration itself, but also
strengthened it in its functions.

M. DEBENEST: You even turned out the mayors of the more important
municipalities?

SEYSS-INQUART: Certainly; and I am convinced, with the full right of an
occupying power. The burgomaster of Amsterdam did not prevent the
general strike but rather promoted it.

M. DEBENEST: But was that the same reason that made you turn out all the
mayors, or at least a certain number of them?

SEYSS-INQUART: I did not remove any mayors from office until they became
unbearable for me because of their actively hostile attitude. Otherwise
their political attitude was of no significance to me. Up to 1945 I kept
Herr Boraine’s brother as mayor in a Dutch city, even though he was a
very bitter enemy of National Socialism and of us Germans.

M. DEBENEST: Very well. And by whom did you replace all these mayors?

SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that until the year 1943, at least, the posts
were filled in agreement with Mr. Frederiks, the Secretary General of
the Interior, who was left behind for me by the Dutch Government to
administer interior affairs. There were National Socialists; there were
those who were not National Socialists. For instance, the son of the
province commissioner of Holland was a firm enemy of National Socialism
and of Germany, and yet I appointed him mayor of one of the largest
Dutch cities, Zwolle.

M. DEBENEST: You are not exactly answering my question. I am asking you
to tell me by whom you replaced all the mayors whom you had turned out?
Were they members of the NSB?

SEYSS-INQUART: In part they were members of the Dutch National Socialist
Party. In part they were nonpolitical men; and in part they were members
of political trends which were absolutely against National Socialism and
against Germany. In time there were more and more people of the Dutch
National Socialist Party, for other people did not put themselves at our
disposal any longer. That was the greatest success of the Dutch
resistance movement that politically it resisted us so completely. That
was Holland’s significance in this war.

M. DEBENEST: You therefore assert that it was the Dutch resistance
movement which led you to put a great number of NSB people in all the
important positions?

SEYSS-INQUART: No, that would be going a bit too far. The Dutch
resistance movement merely induced the population not to co-operate with
the occupying power at all, so that outside of the members of the Dutch
National Socialist Party there was no one who wanted to work with us.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

                          _Afternoon Session_

M. DEBENEST: Defendant, in the larger towns and in the provinces of the
Low Countries, you installed agents who were directly subordinate to you
and to whom you gave full powers. Were those agents not members of the
NSDAP?

SEYSS-INQUART: Will you please tell me what you mean by “agents”? I had
German representatives in the provinces and in the big cities. Do you
mean the German or the Dutch ones?

M. DEBENEST: No; I meant to speak of the Beauftragten (delegates).

SEYSS-INQUART: They were Germans, and I assume that all were members of
the NSDAP. I do not know for certain, but it is quite possible and I
believe that was the case.

M. DEBENEST: Well, then, in order to refresh your memory, will you
please take Document 997-PS, which I had handed to you this morning. I
refer to Page 9, in the French and German texts.

I would like to inform the Tribunal that I gave an incorrect reference
this morning. The document was submitted under the Number USA-708, but
it is RF-122.

[_Turning to the defendant._] At the top of Page 9 you write:

    “Delegates have been provided for the provinces which have a
    far-reaching independent administration. The creation of these
    posts was delayed due to the necessity of making a preliminary
    examination of the situation. It has now been shown that it must
    be less a question of administrative officers than of men who
    have had political experience. Therefore, through
    Reichsamtsleiter Schmidt, Reichsleiter Bormann (Hess’ staff) was
    asked for men who, coming mostly from the Party, are now on
    their way and can be installed in their functions in the
    provinces in a few days.”

That was true, wasn’t it?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, and I find my assertion confirmed that they were not
all from the Party.

M. DEBENEST: Very well, but I also notice that these men were specially
selected.

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, they were politically experienced men for I did not
want any administrative bureaucrats but men who were experienced and
skillful in public political life, not Party political life.

M. DEBENEST: On what basis did you organize the municipal councils and
the regional councils?

THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, it seems to the Tribunal—I don’t know
whether we are right—that it would be better if you would pause after
the sentence rather than after each word.

M. DEBENEST: Yes.

SEYSS-INQUART: Will you please tell me what you mean by municipal and
provincial councils? According to our concept, the word “council” means
a corporate body, but I did not establish any such bodies, I appointed
individual men to direct the administration.

M. DEBENEST: In the communes, in the Netherlands, there were municipal
councils and in the provinces provincial councils, however differently
you may have termed them.

SEYSS-INQUART: Thank you. I understand. In 1941 I dissolved the
provincial and community assemblies which had previously existed. I
provided for such councils in the community regulations which I issued
then, but never actually appointed such councils because the Netherlands
population did not co-operate and as a result these community councils
would have been only artificial bodies. This provision of my community
regulations did not go into effect.

M. DEBENEST: But on what basis did this regulation establish this
organization?

SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot recall any certain basis. I assume that it was
established by law, if it was provided for at all.

M. DEBENEST: Well, I will put the question in a different manner and
perhaps you will be able to answer it. Did you introduce, by means of
your regulations, the Führer Principle?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I called it the “one-man responsibility,” and I am
of the opinion that in times of crisis a “one-man responsibility” is the
correct thing.

M. DEBENEST: That was, in fact, the system which was also applied in
Germany?

SEYSS-INQUART: That is true. Perhaps it was not exactly the same, but
under the circumstances I considered it correct.

I repeat what I said yesterday: We committed an error here. We committed
the error of considering the order imposed by the occupational forces
better than that already existing in the occupied territory.

M. DEBENEST: Well, the introduction of this principle had a particular
importance, did it not?

SEYSS-INQUART: I certainly thought it did; especially in these
territorial districts I had to have a man who was responsible to me for
the administration and not an anonymous majority of a representative
body.

M. DEBENEST: I am having Document F-861 handed to you, which I submit
under Number RF-1524. From the last paragraph you will see the
importance which was attached to that in the Reich. It is a letter of
the Minister of the Interior dated 6 September 1941. It reads as
follows:

    “Particular importance must be accorded to the decree because it
    contains detailed regulations concerning the introduction of the
    Führer Principle in the municipal government of the
    Netherlands.”

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. The Minister of the Interior was interested in this.
I should only like to point out, to get things straight, that the Reich
Minister of the Interior exerted no influence, and in the second place
that these larger powers were given in 1941 to at least 80 percent of
the mayors, who belonged to the democratic party and were therefore my
political opponents.

MR. PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, haven’t you established, by the questions
that you have put to this defendant, that he did alter, to a
considerable extent, the form of government in the Netherlands, and that
he introduced a different form of government? Isn’t that all that you
really require for the argument which, no doubt, you intend to present?
The details of it don’t very much matter, do they?

M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I simply wish to demonstrate that, contrary
to what the defendant said, he had sought to impose the National
Socialist system upon the people of the Netherlands.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, to a large extent, I think he had admitted that. He
said just now that he introduced what he called “one-man
responsibility,” which is another phrase for the Führer Principle, and
that he had dissolved various organizations of the Netherlands
Government. All I am suggesting to you is that, having got those general
admissions, it isn’t necessary to go into details about the exact amount
that the Government of the Netherlands was interfered with or the exact
way in which it was replaced. Isn’t it really all stated in a document
drawn up by the defendant, namely, the document you have been putting,
997-PS?

M. DEBENEST: More or less, Mr. President, but not entirely.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the only question is whether the details are really
very important for the Tribunal.

M. DEBENEST: I thought that those details might have a certain
importance, since the governors of the Reich itself attached a great
deal of importance to it and, in fact, the whole was part of a plan
which had been definitely laid down.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal is inclined to think that you have got
all that is necessary for the argument which you are indicating that you
would present. If there are any particular details that you think
important to us, no doubt you can bring them out.

M. DEBENEST: Quite so, Mr. President.

[_Turning to the defendant._] For what purpose had you centralized the
police into a police directorate?

SEYSS-INQUART: I will repeat my testimony of yesterday. The Netherlands
police was under three or four different agencies, the Ministry of the
Interior, the Ministry of Justice, I believe the Army Ministry, and so
forth. For the sake of a clear police administration, I thought it
necessary to combine these various police organizations in one and to
place it under the Ministry of Justice.

M. DEBENEST: Did you not appoint as chief of this police a National
Socialist?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.

M. DEBENEST: In short, the end that you had in view—was it not to place
the Netherlands in the hands of the NSDAP and thus adapt the internal
organization of the Netherlands to that of the Reich? In other words, to
do something similar to what you had done in Austria?

SEYSS-INQUART: I do not believe that one can say that. In particular,
the policy of the NSB was not that of the NSDAP. The NSB was different
in many respects. In the second place, if I had wanted to do that, I
would have been able to make Herr Mussert Prime Minister; that would
have been less complicated. The simple explanation is that I used,
possibly in a somewhat schematic way, the example of the Reich as a
model in setting up an administration in the Netherlands, which, at
least in part, made it possible for me to carry out my task of watching
over safety and order. Yesterday I only asserted that I forced no Dutch
citizen to become a National Socialist. I did not deny that a certain
co-ordination was undertaken due to the mistakes which I have repeatedly
admitted.

M. DEBENEST: But you placed members of the NSB in all the administrative
bodies, the higher offices?

SEYSS-INQUART: Not exclusively, but I did it because in the last
analysis I could rely only on them; all others sabotaged my orders.

M. DEBENEST: You told the Tribunal yesterday of the dismissal of the
magistrates of the court of Leeuwarden. Would you tell us again the
exact causes of this dismissal?

SEYSS-INQUART: They were not the magistrates but the administrators of
the court. This court of Leeuwarden had said in a public judgment that
those Dutch citizens who were condemned by Dutch courts and sent to a
Dutch prison would be transferred to German concentration camps,
maltreated, and executed. As a result, the court no longer felt in a
position to sentence a Dutch citizen.

This statement of the court was wrong in my opinion. In my opinion Dutch
citizens have not been sent from Netherlands prisons to German
concentration camps to be executed there.

In the meantime I cleared up the situation at the suggestion of the
Amsterdam judges, and through the Secretary General for Justice I had
the court in Leeuwarden requested to continue passing sentence. The
court in Leeuwarden did not do so. Thereupon, I dismissed this court.

M. DEBENEST: Well, I have here the document “Verdict of the Court of
Appeal of Leeuwarden” and there is no question of Dutch prisoners being
sent to concentration camps or being tortured or otherwise put to death.
All that is mentioned is that the magistrates of that court do not wish
that the detainees be sent to concentration camps after they have served
their sentence.

I shall hand you the original of this document so that you can check it.
The document has already been submitted under Number RF-931.

SEYSS-INQUART: I did not receive a German translation or the original
German.

M. DEBENEST: Then I shall read you the translation of the judgment; you
may check it:

    “Considering that the court wishes to take into account the fact
    that for some time past various terms of imprisonment have been
    imposed by the Dutch judges upon the people contrary to the
    intentions of the legislation, and the penalties of the judges
    have been executed in a manner which aggravates those penalties
    to such an extent that it is impossible for the judge to foresee
    or even to suppose the penalty to be inflicted....”

THE PRESIDENT: Why not summarize the document to the witness, do it in
that way? You can give the effect of the judgment.

M. DEBENEST: Certainly, Mr. President.

This judgment sets out in detail that the judges no longer wish to
pronounce a penalty which might result in preventive detention.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you hear the question?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, Mr. President, but why did they not want to pass
sentence? I had the German translation here in my hands, and I took this
translation as my basis in this matter because I did not recall this
judgment. I read it here, and I remember that it stated there that these
Dutch prisoners were to go to German concentration camps to be tortured
and executed.

THE PRESIDENT: It doesn’t appear to say anything about that in the
judgment before us. There is nothing about that in the judgment, is
there?

M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, the defendant claims that the judges did not
wish to pronounce any such judgment any more so that people would not be
sent to concentration camps to be tortured or executed. There is no
question of that in the judgment. The only thing that is mentioned is
that the court did not want to inflict any penalty which would result in
the people being sent away to concentration camps. I do not see that
there is anything in this judgment which the defendant might consider as
a personal insult or injury.

SEYSS-INQUART: Now I have the German text. It reads:

    “The court wishes to take into consideration the fact that for
    some time judges have imposed penalties and that Dutch criminals
    of male sex, contrary to legal prescription and contrary to the
    intention of the legislator and the judge, have been executed
    and are being executed in the camp in a manner which”—and so
    forth.

Those are the concentration camps which the court meant. It concerns the
fact that prisoners were sent from Dutch prisons to German camps.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, M. Debenest.

M. DEBENEST: As regards education, did you not bring about very
extensive changes?

SEYSS-INQUART: I introduced the supervision of the curriculum of the
schools, and I made my influence felt in the appointment of teachers,
particularly in the very numerous private schools in the Netherlands.
Two-thirds of the Netherlands schools were private. I felt it necessary
because in these schools there was definitely an anti-German tendency
which was taught to the students. The Netherlands Education Ministry had
the supervision of these matters.

M. DEBENEST: You thereby prevented a large number of clergymen from
taking part in public education.

SEYSS-INQUART: I do not believe so. I ordered, or agreed to the order,
that clergymen should not be heads of schools. As for clergymen who were
teachers, I agreed to have their pay reduced by one-third. They were
able to continue to teach with two-thirds of their income, and with the
money which was saved I gave positions to 4,000 young teachers out of
work.

M. DEBENEST: Talking of teachers, did you not cause the creation of a
special school for teachers?

SEYSS-INQUART: No. I believe you mean courses which were given in
Amersfoort or for those who volunteered for them.

M. DEBENEST: No. What I mean is those teachers who were compelled to
take a course for a few months in Germany before their appointment.

SEYSS-INQUART: I do not recall the case. It might be those who were to
teach German in the Netherlands schools. In that case, it is possible
that I demanded that they first spend a certain time in Germany in order
to be employed.

M. DEBENEST: You did, as a matter of fact, make the study of the German
language in certain classes obligatory?

SEYSS-INQUART: In the 7th grade, and also in the 8th grade which I newly
introduced. But at the same time, I also had instruction in the Dutch
language increased in order to prove that I did not want to germanize
the Dutch, but only wanted to give them an opportunity to study the
German language.

M. DEBENEST: But they already had that opportunity. German was taught
simultaneously along with English and French. You imposed the teaching
of the German language at the expense of the other two foreign
languages.

SEYSS-INQUART: I spoke of the elementary schools in which the study of
German had not yet been introduced. It is conceivable that in the
secondary schools instruction in German was increased at the expense of
instruction in English and French.

M. DEBENEST: Did you not order the closing down of several universities?
And why did you do so?

SEYSS-INQUART: I recall only the closing of the University of Leyden.
When, according to my instructions, Jewish professors of the faculty
were dismissed, the students of the University of Leyden went on strike
for an extended period of time, and I thereupon closed its doors. I do
not recall having closed any other universities. The Catholic University
in Nijmegen and the Calvinistic University in Amsterdam, as far as I can
recall, closed of their own accord.

M. DEBENEST: And the Polytechnic Institute at Delft? You did not order
it to be closed either?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. That was a temporary measure. It was reopened, as
far as I recall.

M. DEBENEST: How about the Catholic Commercial College at Tilburg?

SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember that.

M. DEBENEST: It was in 1943.

SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember. It is quite possible that for some
reason or other it was closed, probably because it seemed to me to
endanger the interests of the occupation forces.

THE PRESIDENT: It is not necessary to investigate this in detail, is it?
If the defendant said that he closed one school without giving an
adequate reason why, isn’t that sufficient for you to develop your
argument?

M. DEBENEST: Certainly, Mr. President.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Later on you attempted to turn the
University of Leyden into a National Socialist university?

SEYSS-INQUART: If you consider the appointment of 2 or 3 professors out
of some 100 or 50 professors as such, I should have to say yes. I cannot
recall any other measures. Once it was suggested to me to establish a
university in Leyden at which German and Dutch students could study, and
that studies there should find suitable recognition in Germany. This did
not come about.

M. DEBENEST: Anyway, you admit that you had the intention of creating
this school?

SEYSS-INQUART: “Intention” is a little too strong. These ideas were
discussed. There was another idea. In the Netherlands, in the German
Wehrmacht, we had a number of university students who had not been able
to continue their studies for understandable reasons. It was considered
at that time to hold courses at Leyden for these university students in
the Wehrmacht, which would be a sort of continuation of their studies.

M. DEBENEST: I shall have Document F-803 presented to you, which I
submit under the Number RF-1525. This is a report from the Ministry of
National Education of the Netherlands. It is on Page 23 of the French
version and Page 16 of the German version.

I shall read the passage:

    “Attempts were made to make the University of Leyden a National
    Socialist university by appointing National Socialist
    professors. However, these attempts failed as a result of the
    firm attitude taken by the professors and by the students.
    Certain professors even....”

THE PRESIDENT: Is that on Page 15?

M. DEBENEST: That is on Page 23 of the French text, in the last
paragraph.

THE PRESIDENT: What is it?

M. DEBENEST: It is F-803.

THE PRESIDENT: I did not ask what document it was. I asked what is the
nature of the document.

M. DEBENEST: I pointed out to the Tribunal that it was a report of the
Minister for Education in the Netherlands.

THE PRESIDENT: Was he appointed by the defendant, or appointed before
the war?

M. DEBENEST: It is the present Minister for Education. I would point out
to the Tribunal that I am obliged to go into a certain amount of detail,
because when the French Prosecution presented its case, we did not have
all the documents at our disposal, and the Dutch Government is anxious
to have these facts presented in as detailed a manner as possible.

I might add that today I am producing documents which emanate from the
Dutch Government.

THE PRESIDENT: That is Page 23?

M. DEBENEST: Page 23 of the French text, six lines before the end of the
last paragraph.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

    M. DEBENEST: “Attempts were made to make the University of
    Leyden a National Socialist university by appointing National
    Socialist professors. However, these attempts failed as a result
    of the firm attitude taken by the professors and by the
    students. The professors even presented their collective
    resignation in May 1942, and as there was no reaction to it,
    they presented it a second time in September of the same year.”

THE PRESIDENT: Surely, the defendant has already said this, has he not?
This is Leyden University that you are speaking about, is it not?

M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President. If I understood correctly, I believe
the defendant said that there had been question of creating a National
Socialist school in Leyden but that he had not put this project into
effect. On the other hand, it appears from this document that it did not
depend upon him but that it was a result of the attitude of the
teachers. That is what I wanted to bring out.

SEYSS-INQUART: May I comment on that?

M. DEBENEST: Certainly.

SEYSS-INQUART: The fact that there was an attempt to make Leyden a
National Socialist university is stated only in this document. I repeat
my assertion that I appointed two, or at the most three, professors who
were National Socialists, and this document shows clearly what my
attitude was. I did nothing at all against the demonstrative gesture of
resignation of the professors. The second attempt was also unanswered.
The fact that arrests occurred then is connected with the fact that part
of the professors were otherwise suspected, and these professors were
sent to St. Michelsgestel. That is this concentration camp where the
inmates played golf.

M. DEBENEST: Then that was a coincidence?

SEYSS-INQUART: I would not say that. Certainly after the second attempt
we checked up on the gentlemen a little.

M. DEBENEST: Did you not take measures to oblige the students to do
forced labor?

SEYSS-INQUART: I do not think that this was done as long as they were
studying, for I had issued express orders for the exemption of all
students. Advanced technical students were given exemption and
university students who were actually studying or had fulfilled the
requirements for study were not forced to work, either, as far as I
remember.

M. DEBENEST: Well, I shall give you briefly an account of Paragraph 2 of
your regulation. It is the Ordinance of 11 March 1943, Number 27.

    “Any student who, after the present regulation has been put into
    effect, has successfully passed the final examination or a
    similar test in one of the studies mentioned in Paragraph 1 and
    specified as such by orders of the Secretary General in the
    Ministry for Education, Science, and Culture, is compelled to
    work for a determined period within the scope of the allocation
    of labor.”

Is that your ordinance?

SEYSS-INQUART: Does it say labor service?

M. DEBENEST: I have not got the German version in front of me. It is
Ordinance Number 27.

SEYSS-INQUART: Ordinance Number 27. May I ask what paragraph it is?

M. DEBENEST: Second paragraph.

SEYSS-INQUART: That is correct. It says, “Students who have taken the
final examination,” that is, who are no longer studying but have
finished their studies. Members of the same age groups were meanwhile
drafted for labor commitment, and those exempted by me now had to make
this up. But their study was not disturbed or interrupted.

M. DEBENEST: Therefore, the students were able, freely, to continue
their studies?

SEYSS-INQUART: I do not recall any obstacles.

M. DEBENEST: Good. Will you please look at the next decree, that is,
Number 28, which is a decree of Secretary General Van Damm. This decree
forces the students to make a declaration of loyalty.

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that is correct.

M. DEBENEST: What were the consequences?

SEYSS-INQUART: I could not understand the consequences. The universities
were, at that time, the seat of anti-German activities. I demanded from
the university students a declaration promising they would uphold the
laws in effect in the occupied Netherlands territories, that they would
abstain from any action against the German Reich, the Wehrmacht, and the
Netherlands authorities, and that they would not interfere with public
order in the university.

I cannot understand why a university student could not make such a
statement. Those who did make it were able to continue their studies
without any hindrance. But the Dutch professors, by way of sabotage,
refused to give them any instruction.

M. DEBENEST: Well, then, those who did not subscribe to this
declaration, what happened to them?

SEYSS-INQUART: They were no longer university students, and if they
belonged to the age groups which I had called up for labor commitment,
they were drafted.

M. DEBENEST: Did you not apply the Führer Principle to the universities?

SEYSS-INQUART: I do not believe quite as strictly as in the community
administrations. But I gave the president of the university greater
power because I demanded greater responsibility from him.

M. DEBENEST: Very well. Was not a certain National Socialist propaganda
made in the universities?

SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that could not be entirely prevented.

M. DEBENEST: In particular, did not the students have to visit certain
exhibitions and be present at lectures organized by the Party or even by
the Reich offices?

SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know, but it is possible.

M. DEBENEST: In short, you interfered in the administrative domain, in
the realm of teaching, and you also interfered in a similar manner in
the cultural life of the Dutch people?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, to the extent which I stated yesterday.

M. DEBENEST: You did, in fact, create various professional syndicates,
is not that what you told us?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.

M. DEBENEST: You alleged that the acceptance into these syndicates was
not obligatory and that you never imposed payment of dues?

SEYSS-INQUART: That is not correct. Membership in these syndicates was
obligatory. I am also convinced that the head of the syndicates required
the members to pay their dues. I refused to conclude from the failure to
pay dues that a person was no longer a member of the syndicate, and
consequently could no longer practice his trade, or that his dues could
be collected by way of court action.

M. DEBENEST: However, do you not recall the difficulties which arose in
this manner with the medical profession?

SEYSS-INQUART: I was just thinking of the Medical Syndicate. Certain
circles therein desired that the members who did not pay their dues
should be prohibited from carrying out their profession, or that at
least the dues should be collected through court pressure. I told these
gentlemen that if it was not possible to persuade the members to pay
their dues, I, for my part, would not assert any force.

M. DEBENEST: What were these circles?

SEYSS-INQUART: Perhaps you can tell me, then we shall save more time.

M. DEBENEST: Was it not the NSB for instance?

SEYSS-INQUART: In what connection?

M. DEBENEST: Did you not yourself say that certain circles had demanded
the payment of dues? I am asking, what circles?

SEYSS-INQUART: Do you mean what friends or co-workers of mine urged me
to insist on payment? The question is not very clear to me.

M. DEBENEST: I am just asking you to say exactly what you mean by
“circles.” You yourself used the word—unless it is a mistranslation.

THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, the Tribunal thinks really that you are
spending too much time on these various small subjects. We have spent
the whole afternoon on these various measures which the defendant
introduced in the Netherlands. It is perfectly clear according to his
own admission that he was altering the whole force of administration in
the Netherlands.

M. DEBENEST: Did you not also take part in the persecution of the
churches?

SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know whether the measures could be called
“persecution of the churches,” but I took measures concerning the
churches.

M. DEBENEST: What measures in particular? What measures?

SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that the most serious, in your eyes, would be
the confiscation of various Netherlands monasteries. One of them was
turned into a German school and the church building was torn down.

M. DEBENEST: You alleged yesterday that priests or at least one priest
could visit concentration camps? Is that correct?

SEYSS-INQUART: No, I did not say that. I said only that in the Jewish
camp at Westerborg there were Catholic and Protestant Jews, who were
visited on Sundays by a clergyman from outside. I do not believe that
clergymen were allowed to pay visits to the concentration camps under
the control of German Police or were able to enter them.

M. DEBENEST: Just one question as regards the press. Did the press
retain a certain—I repeat, a “certain”—liberty during the time of the
occupation?

SEYSS-INQUART: From my point of view, much too little. The press was
under fairly strict control by the Propaganda Ministry. The editors were
employed after being judged suitable by the Netherlands Propaganda
Ministry. I believe that it is a matter of course for an occupying power
that for such an important instrument one takes only people who have a
certain positive attitude. I would have wished that these men could have
been given much more freedom of speech, and I believe that I can say
that so far as I exerted any influence, this was the case; but even the
Reich Commissioner in the Netherlands was not almighty.

M. DEBENEST: Were there not reprisal measures taken against certain
newspapers?

SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know...

THE PRESIDENT: We might get on a little bit more quickly. There is a
very long pause between the question and the answer.

SEYSS-INQUART: I must first recall the circumstances. If unexpectedly I
am questioned about something which happened 5 years ago I must think
over carefully what actually happened in individual cases. For example,
I can say “no” immediately, but I am sure that the answer is wrong.

Now, for instance, reprisals—I know that once in The Hague the editor’s
office of a newspaper was blown up. That was a measure taken by the
Security Police. It was the seat of an illegal propaganda group.

M. DEBENEST: You spoke yesterday of the sterilization of the Jews in
Holland. Who introduced this measure?

SEYSS-INQUART: If you say “introduced,” I believe that I can answer the
question correctly. The Security Police informed me that a number of
Jews had themselves sterilized by Jewish doctors and that thereupon
these Jews were freed of all restrictions and could dispense with the
wearing of the Jewish star. These were not Jews who otherwise would have
been evacuated, but who would have remained in Holland subject to
certain restrictions.

I asked the head of my health department to investigate the matter. He
informed me that this was a very serious operation in the case of women,
and thereupon I asked the Higher SS and Police Leader to forbid this
action, at least in the case of women. Then the Christian churches
protested to me. I answered the Christian churches—I assume you have
the letter in your files—describing the state of affairs and pointing
out expressly that no compulsion must be exerted here. Shortly
thereafter this action was finished. As I heard, the Christian churches
informed the Jews, and when they were sure that no compulsion would be
exerted on them they no longer submitted themselves to this operation.

I myself returned their property to the Jews in question, and the matter
was ended; although I must say today that the further away one is from
this period of time, the less understandable it is.

M. DEBENEST: But was it you who had the idea of this sterilization?

SEYSS-INQUART: No, the matter was reported to me by the Security Police.

M. DEBENEST: Very well, I shall have Document 3594-PS handed to you,
which I shall submit under Number RF-1526. It is an affidavit by
Hildegard Kunze, an agent of the RSHA. Third paragraph:

    “I remember that either in this report or in another report
    he”—that is, Seyss-Inquart—“suggested that all Jews who were
    privileged to remain in Holland should be sterilized.”

There is no question of police agencies there.

SEYSS-INQUART: This involves the correctness of the memory of a
stenographer. In the third point, moreover, she does not even assert
that the report in the third paragraph is the one she mentions in
Paragraph (2), and which she ascribes to me. It is out of the question
that she saw any report from me wherein I made such a suggestion. The
case was reported to me as a fact by the Security Police, as an already
existing fact or one in process of realization.

M. DEBENEST: So you contend that it was not you but the Police. In any
case, you tolerated it?

SEYSS-INQUART: As far as the male Jews were concerned I tolerated it for
a time; that is true. It was made clear to me that no direct compulsion
was exerted on these Jews, no threat to their disadvantage.

THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn for 10 minutes.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

M. DEBENEST: Defendant, do you claim that you forced no one to go and
work in Germany?

SEYSS-INQUART: On the contrary, I believe I enrolled 250,000 Dutch
people to work in Germany, and I testified to that yesterday.

M. DEBENEST: Good. I shall not dwell on that point.

Did you not also introduce certain legislative clauses as far as
nationality was concerned?

SEYSS-INQUART: You mean the nationality of Dutch citizens?

M. DEBENEST: Yes.

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I did that.

M. DEBENEST: Did you take part in the arrest, interning, and deportation
to concentration camps in Germany of Dutch citizens, and in what way?

SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to explain briefly the matter of
citizenship.

M. DEBENEST: Certainly.

SEYSS-INQUART: Quite a few Dutch enlisted in the Waffen-SS. It was the
intention of the Führer to give them German citizenship. However, with
that they would have lost their Dutch citizenship, and that was
something they certainly did not want to happen. Therefore, I issued a
decree that upon the acquisition of German citizenship, the Dutch
citizenship would not be lost for a year, during which time the person
involved could make his decision.

This should serve to clarify the purpose and the object of this decree
of mine.

M. DEBENEST: I am going to put to you again the question which I put to
you a few minutes ago. Did you take part in arresting, interning, and
deporting to concentration camps Dutch citizens, and under what
conditions?

SEYSS-INQUART: Bringing anybody into and keeping him in a concentration
camp was exclusively a matter for the Police. I do not recall a single
instance in which I requested the Police to put any Dutchman into a
German concentration camp. It may have happened that I ordered the
German Police to take Dutchmen to Hertogenbosch or Amersfoort.
Especially at the time when the Netherlands courts were very lenient
with black-market operators and slaughterers who supplied the black
market, I did demand their internment in a concentration camp for 2 or 3
months.

However, if you have specific cases in mind, please mention them and you
may be assured that I will tell you everything exactly as I remember it.

M. DEBENEST: No, your answer is sufficient.

Did you participate in the seizure of hostages and in their execution?

SEYSS-INQUART: I stated yesterday that I recall only one actual hostage
case, which took place in 1942, and I told you what I had to do with it.
The so-called shooting of hostages, beginning with July 1944, was not
actually shooting of hostages, but rather executions carried out by the
Police on the basis of a Führer decree.

I myself never ordered a single shooting. But I would like to repeat:
If, for instance, I called the attention of the Police to the fact that
in any certain locality of the Netherlands an illegal resistance
movement was causing much trouble, and gave the Police instructions to
investigate the case, it was perfectly obvious to me that the leaders of
the resistance movement could be arrested by the Police who, on the
basis of the Führer decree, would shoot them.

But I must repeat: I had to meet my responsibility, even in the face of
a difficult situation whereby those who were guilty—that is, legally
guilty and not morally, because morally I probably would have acted the
same way as they did—those who were guilty were not put before a court.

M. DEBENEST: As far as the facts which you mentioned yesterday are
concerned, this deals with hostages who were shot following an attempt
upon the railroad at Rotterdam?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.

M. DEBENEST: Who selected those hostages?

SEYSS-INQUART: Hostages were selected by the Security Police, and the
Higher SS and Police Leader submitted this list to me. As I testified
yesterday, I asked why he selected the people that he did and he
explained that to me. Then, in checking the matter over, I crossed off
the names of fathers who had several children. I returned the list to
the Higher SS and Police Leader and asked him to take my attitude into
consideration in the execution of this decree.

Therefore, through my direct intervention, I saved fathers of several
children from being shot.

M. DEBENEST: How many hostages were selected in this manner?

SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot recall that today, perhaps 12 or 15. Out of that
number, 5 remained. That was the number finally arrived at after cutting
down on the original figure of 50 or 25.

M. DEBENEST: I am going to have you shown a document concerning the
seizure of these hostages. It is Document F-886, which becomes RF-1527.
This is a statement made by General Christiansen, or rather, it is a
copy of a statement made by General Christiansen, which was taken from
an affidavit by the head of the Dutch Delegation. Will you please look
at the fourth paragraph before the end of the first statement?

THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the original?

M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I just said that this was only the copy of a
statement which comes from an affidavit of the head of the Dutch
Delegation. If the Tribunal desires, we can certainly have the original
submitted as soon as we have received it.

THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, there is no certificate at all identifying
the copy, is there?

M. DEBENEST: I thought, Mr. President, that an affidavit of the
representative of the Dutch Delegation existed in Nuremberg. On the
original—I beg your pardon; it was not reproduced, but the original
does contain the affidavit.

THE PRESIDENT: What are you going to prove by this affidavit? About the
hostages?

M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President. It says that the defendant himself
selected these hostages.

THE PRESIDENT: In what proceedings was the affidavit made?

M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, it was during the proceedings which were
taken against General Christiansen in the Netherlands.

THE PRESIDENT: How do you say it is admissible under the Charter?

M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I believe that we have already submitted
documents of this nature—that is, copies—to the Tribunal, copies which
have been certified as being copies of an original which is being kept
in the country where it originated.

THE PRESIDENT: If the original from which the copy was taken were a
document which is admissible under the Charter, that would probably be
so, if there were an authentic certificate saying it was a true copy of
a document which is admissible under the Charter. But is this document
admissible under the Charter?

M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I believe that it is admissible because it
is purely and simply an affidavit. It is an affidavit which has been
legally received in the Netherlands.

THE PRESIDENT: And you haven’t got a German edition of it?

M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President, this document has been translated into
German. I have had it translated into German.

THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, this appears to be a document which is in
Dutch, and General Christiansen, who gave the evidence, was a German,
was he not?

M. DEBENEST: No, Mr. President, the original affidavit is in Dutch.

THE PRESIDENT: The original is in Dutch, is it?

M. DEBENEST: The original is in Dutch, yes. That is according to the
information that I have. Yes, the original is in the Dutch language.

THE PRESIDENT: And what was the affidavit given in, what proceeding?

M. DEBENEST: In Dutch, with interpreters.

THE PRESIDENT: I mean what proceeding, before what court?

M. DEBENEST: I suppose before a Dutch Military Tribunal. Yes, before a
Dutch Military Tribunal.

M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): May
it please the Tribunal...

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, M. Dubost.

M. DUBOST: This document is an excerpt from criminal proceedings in the
Netherlands taken against General Christiansen upon the request of the
Dutch Government. The Minister of Justice of the Netherlands has let us
have an extract of the minutes which were taken in the Netherlands in
legal form during the proceedings which were carried on against General
Christiansen. The text was, therefore, made in the Dutch language.

THE PRESIDENT: This deposition, this affidavit is in Dutch. Now, General
Christiansen, is he a Dutchman?

M. DUBOST: General Christiansen is a German.

THE PRESIDENT: If he is a German why does he give his evidence in Dutch?
If he did not give it in Dutch, why isn’t the German copy here? You see,
we have a certificate here from a colonel, who is said to represent the
Government of the Netherlands, that this document is a true copy of
General Christiansen’s evidence. Well, the document which we have here
is in Dutch, and if General Christiansen gave his evidence in German,
then it can’t be a true copy and it is subject to the translation in
Dutch. What do you say to that?

M. DUBOST: The deposition made by General Christiansen was received
through an interpreter in conformity with Dutch procedure and was
transcribed in Dutch. It is not possible for a Dutch Tribunal to receive
minutes in a foreign language. The minutes are taken in the Dutch
language.

THE PRESIDENT: I see.

DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I just say a few words in this
connection, please? I know, for I am in contact with the defense counsel
for General Christiansen, that there was a court-martial proceeding on
the part of the English instituted against him. I have misgivings about
this document, since it is not confirmed, and we cannot judge whether
the interpreter who interpreted from German into Dutch was a suitable
and adequate interpreter; and also, since in this manner I do not have
the opportunity, as defense counsel, to cross-examine General
Christiansen. It seems to me that through the mere submission of this
document the rights of the Defense have been greatly infringed upon.

M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I have just been informed that General
Christiansen is right now imprisoned at Arnhem by the Dutch authorities.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Mr. Debenest, the Tribunal will admit the document
if you get a certificate from the court who tried General Christiansen.
But the only certificate you have at present that this is a true copy is
from a Colonel Van—some name that I can’t pronounce. There is nothing
to show, except his statement, that he is an official on behalf of the
Dutch Government. We don’t know who he is.

M. DEBENEST: Certainly, Mr. President, but we will get the original for
the Tribunal later on.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you will submit an original later on.

M. DEBENEST: Van—is the accredited representative of the Dutch
Government with the French Delegation.

DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have only a French translation in front
of me which reads as follows:

    “Christiansen is not here as a witness, but rather as a
    defendant, and he was interrogated as such, and he is not bound
    by oath to tell the truth. He can say whatever he pleases
    without being held responsible for what he says.”

For that reason alone, I believe the document is to be refused.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the reason why the Tribunal is prepared
to admit the document, when it is certain that it has got the document,
is that Article 21 provides that reports, including the acts and
documents of the committees set up in the various Allied countries for
the investigation of war crimes and the reports and findings of military
or other tribunals of any of the United Nations, shall be taken judicial
notice of. It is for that reason that the document is, in the opinion of
the Tribunal, admissible when the authentic document is before it.

[_Turning to M. Debenest._] Now, you undertake then to produce a
properly certified copy of the document.

M. DEBENEST: Certainly, Mr. President.

SEYSS-INQUART: May I please comment on this document?

M. DEBENEST: Will you kindly wait until I read to you the passage which
I wish to submit to you.

It is on Page 4 of the French text, the fourth paragraph before the end
of the first statement, the second paragraph of the page:

    “I think that I can recall that already upon that occasion
    Seyss-Inquart said that five hostages would be shot. I didn’t
    know any one among these hostages. I did not select these five
    men, and I had nothing whatsoever to do with their execution. It
    was a case of a purely political nature in which I became
    involved in my capacity as commander.”

Now you may give us your attitude if you choose to do so.

SEYSS-INQUART: The picture which is given here by General Christiansen
as a defendant, not as a witness, completely coincides with the picture
that I gave. In the beginning of this record General Christiansen says
that Field Marshal Von Rundstedt and the OKW gave him the order through
his chief of staff to take the hostages, and he says further that
through his legal department he had issued a proclamation that the
hostages would answer with their lives if further sabotage acts should
take place. He then says that they did take place, and he contacted the
Commander, West or the OKW and received the answer that the hostages
were to be used. Then he goes on to relate that he advised me of this
order, indicating that the original ruling with regard to the hostages
still applied, and so I said that 5 of them were to be executed. That is
what I have always maintained, and I also said that 25 were to have been
killed and that I negotiated for the lives of the remaining 20.

The report, therefore, is fundamentally correct and agrees with what I
have said.

M. DEBENEST: But in this document no mention is made of 25 hostages. We
are only dealing with the fact here it was you who chose these 5
hostages.

Take the following page of the statement of 5 March 1946. General
Christiansen declares:

    “I remember now that Lieutenant Colonel Kluter also took part in
    this conference. There were thus seven participants in all. I
    therefore transmitted the order to use hostages and
    Seyss-Inquart said immediately that five men were to be
    apprehended. You are asking why it was as simple as all that.
    Obviously Seyss-Inquart had authority to do this.”

It was therefore you, in fact, who designated and chose these hostages?

SEYSS-INQUART: The repetition of these words in no wise changes the fact
that 25 hostages were demanded, as the witnesses will confirm to you
tomorrow, and that I intervened so that only 5 were demanded, and that
altogether the entire matter was in the hands of the Army and the Higher
SS and Police Leader; the proclamations were issued in the names of both
of them. As Reich Commissioner I assumed the right to reduce the number
of hostages as much as possible. The final figure was determined by the
Commander and the Higher SS and Police Leader.

THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, did you read the last paragraph in the
affidavit, Page 4 at the bottom?

M. DEBENEST: That is right, Mr. President, I did not read it. I am going
to read it.

    “I will ask you to note that at this conference with
    Seyss-Inquart he expressly reserved the right to appoint
    hostages.”

SEYSS-INQUART: I can say nothing more than what I have already said. The
selection of hostages was probably made by the Higher SS and Police
Leader according to directives which he had received from the Armed
Forces commander, or, rather, from his superiors. I myself asked to be
shown this list, for I, as Reich Commissioner, was interested in knowing
who was to be selected, and I tried to exert influence to the effect, as
I have already said, that the fathers of many children were crossed off
this list.

Furthermore, I do not wish to be polemic in face of the subjective
descriptions of General Christiansen. We got along very well together in
our work. The Court will decide whether I am not telling the truth or
whether he is mistaken in this case.

M. DEBENEST: That is exactly what I was thinking. You therefore do
contend that this is the only case in which you intervened as far as the
seizure and execution of hostages is concerned?

SEYSS-INQUART: I believe so, yes.

M. DEBENEST: Did you know about the execution of hostages following the
assassination attempt made on Rauter?

SEYSS-INQUART: I stated the extent of my information yesterday. I did
not know the exact figure. It was known to me, however, that shootings
were taking place, the shooting of those men who, on the basis of their
demeanor and actions, were to be shot under the decree of the Führer by
the Security Police. The actual figure was made known to me later.

M. DEBENEST: Consequently, you did not intervene in this question of the
shooting of hostages at all?

SEYSS-INQUART: No, I cannot say that, for I discussed at length with the
deputy of the Higher SS and Police Leader what should be done in such a
case—for after all it was a very grave matter—and whether he should
carry out these executions; I said yesterday that I agreed. I declared
yesterday that I could not contradict him in his decision actually to
carry out the executions at this point.

M. DEBENEST: Who was this Police Leader?

SEYSS-INQUART: Dr. Schöngarth.

M. DEBENEST: What do you think of Dr. Schöngarth?

SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that Dr. Schöngarth was not a man who was
especially harsh and very eager to deal with this matter. He must
certainly have found the matter unpleasant.

M. DEBENEST: But was he a man whom one could trust?

SEYSS-INQUART: I always had confidence in him.

M. DEBENEST: Very well. In that case, I am going to have a document
shown to you, Document F-879, which I submit under Number RF-1528.

I wish to inform the Tribunal that once again this is a copy of
proceedings which was received at Amsterdam by the War Crimes agency. It
is signed by people who were questioned, and it also comes with an
affidavit as in the preceding case. Here again, if the Tribunal wishes
it, I shall obtain the original for the Tribunal later on.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you will submit the original as before.

M. DEBENEST: Certainly, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Or else get it from somebody in the Government.

M. DEBENEST: Very well, Mr. President.

Defendant, will you kindly look at Dr. Schöngärth’s statement on Page 5
of the French document; it is the third statement, the fifth paragraph.
Have you found it?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I have.

M. DEBENEST: This is what Dr. Schöngarth says:

    “After the investigation, I personally went to see Dr.
    Seyss-Inquart, the Reich Commissioner in Holland, with whom I
    discussed the matter. Seyss-Inquart then gave me the order to
    take increased measures of reprisal by executing 200 prisoners,
    who were condemned to death, at the place where the
    assassination attempt had been made.

    “This execution was aimed at intimidating the population. It was
    announced by a public notice that a large number of persons
    would be executed because of this assassination attempt.”

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.

M. DEBENEST: Well?

SEYSS-INQUART: In any event, it is confirmed that we are concerned here
with the shooting of Dutchmen who, as this man says, had been condemned
to death for having participated in some sort of sabotage or other
matter; they were, in line with the Führer decree, to be shot anyhow.
That is the first and most important point. The question is whether the
figure of 200 was mentioned; and the question further is whether I
demanded that number. I still maintain what I have already said in reply
to the testimony of former collaborators; but I also maintain my own
declaration to the effect that I never even would have had the power to
give an order like that to Dr. Schöngarth. He was not at all my
subordinate in such things. I certainly did state that we must act with
severity in this case. That is quite right. The figure of 200—I even
believe it was 230—only came to my knowledge later. The public notice
which he mentions here is signed by Dr. Schöngarth.

M. DEBENEST: You did not say “severe measures”; you said “stricter
measures of reprisal.” It’s not quite the same thing.

SEYSS-INQUART: I did not understand the question.