privileges, wherein God’s love to Jacob, and his posterity, was
principally expressed; it was this which is so often signified by God’s
being the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob: In other respects, Esau was
blessed as well as Jacob; for the apostle, speaking concerning that part
of Isaac’s prediction, which respected the temporal advantage of their
posterity, says, that _he blessed Jacob and Esau, concerning things to
come_, Heb. xi. 20. yet Esau was rejected, as to what concerns the
spiritual part of the blessing, which was his birth-right, that he is
said to have _despised_, Gen. xxv. 34. and, for this reason, he is
styled, by the apostle, a _profane person_, Heb. xii. 16. If it had been
only a temporal privilege that he contemned, it might have been a sin;
but it could not then have been properly said to have been an instance
of profaneness, for that has respect only to things sacred; therefore it
evidently appears, that the blessings which Esau despised, and God had
before designed to confer on Jacob, and his seed, as a peculiar instance
of his love, were of a spiritual nature.

_Object._ 2. It will be farther objected, that men’s enjoying the
external privileges of the covenant of grace, has no immediate reference
to their salvation, or election to it.

_Answ._ Since salvation is not to be attained, but by and under these
means of grace, we must conclude, that whenever God bestows and
continues them, to a church or nation, he has a farther view therein,
namely, the calling some, by his grace, to partake of those privileges
that accompany salvation. If there were no such blessings to be
conferred on the world, there would be no means of grace, and
consequently no external dispensation of the covenant of grace; for it
is absurd to suppose that any thing can be called a means, where all are
excluded from the end which they refer to; therefore the sum of this
argument is, that God had a peculiar love to the posterity of Jacob, and
accordingly he designed to give them those privileges which were denied
to others, namely, the means of grace, which he would not have done, had
he not intended to make them effectual to the salvation of some of them;
and this purpose, relating hereunto, is what is called election, which,
though it be not applicable to all the seed of Jacob; for all, as the
apostle says elsewhere, are not Israel who are of Israel; yet, inasmuch
as there was a remnant of them, to whom it was applied, they are that
happy seed, who are represented, by the apostle, as the objects of God’s
compassion, or _vessels unto honour, in whom he designed to make known
the riches of his glory, having_, in this respect, _afore prepared them
unto glory_, Rom. ix. 15, 21, 23.

Thus having considered that God has chosen a part of mankind to
salvation, we may, without being charged with a vain curiosity, enquire
whether this privilege belongs to the greater or smaller part of
mankind, since the scripture goes before us in this matter. If we judge
of the purpose of God by the execution thereof, it must be observed,
that hitherto the number of those, who have been made partakers of the
special privileges of the gospel, has been comparatively small. If we
look back to those ages before our Saviour’s incarnation, what a very
inconsiderable proportion did Israel bear to the rest of the world, who
were left in darkness and ignorance! And, after this, our Saviour
observes, that _many were called_, in his time, _but few were chosen_,
Matt. xx. 16. and he advises to _enter in at the strait gate_, chap.
vii. 13, 14. by which he means the way to eternal life, concerning which
he says, that _there are_, comparatively, _few that find it_. And when
the gospel had a greater spread, and wonderful success attended the
preaching thereof, by the apostles, and many nations embraced the
Christian faith, in the most flourishing ages of the church, the number
of Christians, and much more of those who were converted, and
effectually called, was comparatively small. Whether the number of true
believers shall be greater, when there is a greater spread of the
gospel, and a more plentiful effusion of the Spirit, to render it more
successful, as we hope and pray for that time, and that not altogether
without scripture-warrant; I say, whether then the fewness of those who
have hitherto been chosen and sanctified, shall not be compensated, by a
far greater number, who shall live in that happy age of the church, it
is not for us to be over-curious in our enquiries about: However, we may
determine this from scripture, that, in the great day, when all the
elect shall be gathered together, their number shall be exceeding great,
if what the apostle says refers to this matter, as some suppose it does,
when he speaks of a _great multitude, which no man could number, of all
nations, and kindreds, and people and tongues, who stood before the
throne, and before the Lamb, clothed with white robes, and palms in
their hands_, Rev. vii. 9. But these things are no farther to be
searched into, than as we may take occasion, from thence, to enquire
whether we are of that number; and, if we are, we ought to bless God for
his discriminating grace, which he has magnified therein. And this leads
us to consider,

2. That they who are chosen to salvation, are also chosen to
sanctification, as the means thereof: As the end and means are not to be
separated in the execution of God’s decree, so they are not to be
separated in our conception of the decree itself; for, since God brings
none to glory, but in a way of holiness, the same he determined to do
from all eternity, that is, to make his people holy, as well as happy;
or first to give them faith and repentance, and then, the end of their
faith, the salvation of their souls.

There are many scriptures, in which the purpose of God, relating
hereunto, is plainly intended; as when it is said, _He hath chosen us
that we should be holy, and without blame, before him in love_, Eph. i.
4. and elsewhere the apostle tells others, that _God had, from the
beginning, chosen them unto salvation, through sanctification of the
Spirit, and belief of the truth_, 2 Thes. ii. 13. and the apostle James
saith, that _God hath chosen the poor of this world, rich in faith, and
heirs of the kingdom_, James ii. 5. and elsewhere the apostle Paul
speaks of persons being _predestinated to be conformed to the image of
his Son_, which he explains of their being _called_, _justified_, and
_glorified_, Rom. viii. 29. and it is also said, speaking of those who
were converted under the apostle Paul’s ministry, _as many as were
ordained unto eternal life believed_, Acts xiii. 48. accordingly they
were ordained to one as well as the other.

The argument, which seems very plainly contained in these, and such-like
scriptures, is, that God’s eternal purpose respects the grace that his
people are made partakers of here, as well as the glory that they expect
hereafter, which are inseparably connected; this cannot reasonably be
denied by those who are not willing to give into the doctrine of
election: But if the inseparable connexion between faith and salvation
be allowed, as having respect to the execution of God’s purpose, it will
be no difficult matter to prove that this was determined by him, or that
his purpose respects faith, as well as salvation. Therefore the main
thing in controversy between us is, whether this grace, that accompanies
salvation, is wrought by the power of God, or whether it depends on the
free-will of man. That which induces them to deny that God has chosen
persons to faith, is this supposition; that that which is the result of
man’s free-will, cannot be the object of God’s unchangeable purpose, and
consequently that God has not chosen men to it. This is the hinge on
which the whole controversy turns, and if the doctrine of special
efficacious grace be maintained, all the prejudices against that of
election would soon be removed; but this we must refer to its proper
place, being obliged to insist on that subject in some following
answers;[193] and, what may be farther considered, concerning the
absoluteness of election, as one of the properties that belong to it,
under a following head, will add some strength to our present argument.
All that we shall do, at present, shall be to defend our sense of the
scriptures, but now referred to, to prove that election respects
sanctification, as well as salvation; and that it does so, is plain from
the first of them, in Eph. i. 4. which proves that holiness is the end
of election, or the thing that persons are chosen to, as appears from
the grammatical construction of the words: It is not said he had chosen
us, considered as holy, and without blame, but that we should be
holy;[194] that which is plainly intended, as the result of election,
cannot be the cause and reason of it.

As to what the apostle says, in 2 Thess. ii. 13. _God hath, from the
beginning, chosen you unto salvation, through sanctification of the
Spirit, and belief of the truth_, that plainly intimates, that
sanctification is the end of election; and therefore the principal
answer that some give to it, which appears to be an evasion, is, that
the apostle does not speak of eternal election, because God is said to
have done this from the beginning, that is, as one explains the words,
from the beginning of the apostle’s preaching to them: But if we can
prove that there is such a thing as a purpose to save, it will be no
difficult matter to prove the eternity of the divine purpose; and this
is not disagreeable to the sense, in which the words, _From the
beginning_, are elsewhere used.[195]

As for that other scripture, in James ii. 5. where it is said, _God hath
chosen the poor of this world, rich in faith, and heirs of the kingdom_;
here the words, _That they may be_,[196] (which are inserted by the
apostle, in the scripture but now mentioned) may, without any strain on
the sense thereof, be supplied, and so the meaning is, God hath chosen
them, _that they might be rich in faith, and heirs of the kingdom_: But
if it will not be allowed, that these words ought to be supplied, the
sense is the same, as though they were these, “God has chosen the poor
of this world, who are described as rich in faith, to be heirs of the
kingdom;” and so we distinguish between election’s being founded upon
faith, and faith’s being a character by which the elect are described;
and, if faith be a character by which they are described, then he who
enabled them to believe, purposed to give them this grace, that is, he
chose them to faith, as well as to be heirs of the kingdom.

As for that other text, in Rom. viii. 29. _He hath predestinated us to
be conformed to the image of his Son_; these words, _to be_, are
supplied by our translators, as I apprehend they ought, for the reason
but now mentioned, taken from the parallel scripture, in Eph. i. 4. But,
to evade the force of the argument, to prove that we are predestinated
to grace, as well as to glory, they who deny this doctrine, give a very
different turn to the sense of this text, as though the apostle only
intended hereby, that the persons, whom he speaks of, were predestinated
to an afflicted state in this life, a state of persecution, in which
they are said to be conformed to the image of Christ;[197] But though it
is true that believers are said to be made partakers of the sufferings
of Christ, and, by consequence, are predestinated thereunto, yet that
does not appear to be the sense of this text, as not well agreeing with
the context; for the apostle had been describing those, whom he speaks
of, as loving God, and called according to his purpose, and then
considers them as predestinated, to be conformed to the image of his
Son, which must be meant of their being made partakers of those graces,
in which their conformity to Christ consists, as well as in sufferings;
and then he considers them, in the following verse, as _called_,
_justified_, and _glorified_; and all this is the result of their being
predestinated.

As for that scripture, in Acts xiii. 48. _As many as were ordained to
eternal life believed_; their faith is here considered as the result of
their being ordained to eternal life, or they are represented as
predestinated to the means, as well as the end.

_Object._ 1. But it will be objected by some, that this is not agreeable
to the sense of the Greek word here used;[198] partly, because it is not
said they were fore-ordained to eternal life, but _ordained_; and the
genuine sense thereof is, that they were disposed to eternal life, and
consequently to faith, as the means thereof. And this is also taken in a
different sense; some suppose that it imports a being disposed, by the
providence of God, or set in order, or prepared for eternal life;
others, agreeably to the exposition which Socinus, and some of his
followers, give of the text, (which sense a late learned writer falls in
with[199]) understand the words, as signifying their having an internal
disposition, or being well inclined, as having an earnest desire after
eternal life, for which reason they believed; or were fitted and
prepared for eternal life, by the temper of their minds, and accordingly
they believed.

_Answ._ 1. If the word, which we render _ordained_, be justly
translated, the thing which they were ordained to, being something that
was future, it is, in effect, the same, as though it were said they were
fore-ordained to it, as Beza observes.[200]

2. Suppose the word ought rather to be translated, they were disposed
unto eternal life; that seems to contain in it a metaphor, taken from a
general’s disposing, or ordering his soldiers to their respective posts,
or employments, to which he appoints them, and so it is as though he
should say, as many as God had, in his providence, or antecedent
purpose, intended for salvation, believed, inasmuch as faith is the
means and way to attain it; and that amounts to the same thing with our
translation. But,

3. As to that other sense given of it, _viz._ their being internally
disposed for eternal life, it seems very disagreeable to the import of
the Greek word; and those texts, that are generally brought to justify
this application thereof, appear to be very much strained and forced by
them, to serve their purpose;[201] and, indeed, if the word would bear
such a sense, the doctrine contained therein, namely, that there are
some internal dispositions in men, antecedent to the grace of God,
whereby they are fitted and prepared for it, does not well agree with
the sense of those scriptures, which set forth man’s natural opposition
to the grace of God, before he is regenerate and converted, and his
enmity against him; and others that assert the absolute necessity of the
previous work of the Spirit, to prepare for, as well as excite the acts
of faith.

_Object._ 2. It is farther objected, that it cannot respect their being
ordained, or chosen to eternal life, who believed, inasmuch as none that
plead for that doctrine suppose that all, who are elected in one place,
believe at the same time; had it been said, that all, who believed at
that time, were ordained to eternal life, that would be agreeable to
what is maintained by those who defend the doctrine of election; but to
say, that all, who are elected to eternal life, in any particular city,
are persuaded to believe at the same time, this is what they will not
allow of: besides, it is not usual for God to discover this to, or by,
the inspired writers, that, in any particular place, there are no more
elected than those who are, at any one time, converted; and, indeed, it
is contrary to the method of God’s providence, to bring in all his elect
at one time, therefore we cannot suppose that this was revealed to the
inspired writer, and consequently something else must be intended, and
not eternal election, namely, that all those that were prepared for
eternal life, or who were disposed to pursue after it, believed.[202]

_Answ._ When the apostle says, as many as were ordained to eternal life
believed, we are not hereby led into this hidden mystery of the divine
will, so as to be able to judge, whether more than they that then
believed, were ordained to it in that place; but the meaning is, that
there were many that believed, and that all of them were ordained to
eternal life; and so it is as though he should say, that God has a
people in this place, whom he has ordained to eternal life, who were to
be converted, some at one time, others at another: some of them were
converted at this time, to wit, a part of those who were ordained to
eternal life, if more were ordained to it; so that the objection
supposes that the words, which we render, _as many as_, imports the
whole number of the elect in that place; whereas, we think that the
meaning is, that there were many who believed, and these were only such
who were ordained to eternal life, of which there might be many more,
who then did not believe, but hereafter should; but this remained a
secret, which the inspired writer was not led into, nor we by him.

_Object._ 3. There is another objection, which the learned author,[203]
(whose paraphrase on the New Testament, and discourse on election, I am
sometimes obliged to refer to in considering the objections that are
made against this doctrine) proposes with a great deal of warmth; and if
no reply can be given to it, it will be no wonder to find many
prejudiced against it; his words are these: “If the reason why these men
believed be only this, that they were men ordained to eternal life, the
reason why the rest believed not, can be this only, that they were not
ordained by God to eternal life: and, if so, what necessity could there
be that the word of God should be first preached to them, as we read,
ver. 46. was it only that their damnation might be the greater? This
seems to charge that Lover of souls, whose tender mercies are over all
his works, with the greatest cruelty, seeing it makes him determine,
from all eternity, not only that so many souls as capable of salvation
as any other, shall perish everlastingly; but also to determine, that
the dispensations of his providence shall be such towards them, as
necessarily tends to the aggravation, of their condemnation; and what
could, even their most malicious and enraged enemy, do more? What is it
the very devil aims at, by all his temptations, but this very end,
_viz._ the aggravation of our future punishment? And therefore to assert
that God had determined that his word should be spoken to these Jews,
for this very end, is to make God as instrumental to their ruin, as the
very devil, and seemeth wholly irreconcileable with his declarations,
that he would have all men to be saved, and would not that any man
should perish.”

_Answ._ According to this author, we must either quit the doctrine we
are maintaining, provided it be the same as he represents it to be, or
else must be charged by all mankind, with such horrid blasphemy, as is
shocking to any one that reads it, as charging the Lover of souls with
the greatest cruelty, and with acting in such a way, as their greatest
enemy is said to do; determining, that the dispensations of his
providence should tend to aggravate their condemnation, and that the
gospel should be preached for this end, and no other. But let the
blasphemy rest on his misrepresentation, and far be it from us to
advance any such doctrine; therefore that which may be considered, in
answer to it, is,

1. The immediate reason why men believe to eternal life, is, because God
exerts the exceeding greatness of his power, whereby he works faith; and
the reason of his exerting this power, is, because he determined to do
it, as it is the execution of his purpose.

2. It does not follow, from hence, that the only reason why others do
not believe, is, because they were not ordained to eternal life. It is
true, indeed, that their not having been ordained to eternal life, or
God’s not having purposed to save them, is the reason why he does not
exert that power that is necessary to work faith: and unbelief will
certainly be the consequence thereof, unless man could believe without
the divine energy; yet the immediate spring and cause of unbelief, is
the corruption and perverseness of human nature which is chargeable on
none else but man himself. We must certainly distinguish between
unbelief’s being the consequence of God’s not working faith, whereby
corrupt nature takes occasion to exert itself, as being destitute of
preventing grace; and its being the effect hereof. Is God’s denying the
revengeful person, or the murderer, that grace, which would prevent his
executing his bloody designs, the cause thereof? Or his denying to
others the necessary supply of their present exigencies, the cause of
their making use of unlawful means, by plundering others to subsist
themselves? No more is his denying special grace, which he was not
obliged to give to any, the cause of men’s unbelief and impenitency; for
that is to be assigned only to that wicked propensity of nature, which
inclines us to sin, and not to the divine efficiency; and how farsoever
this may be the result of God’s determining to deny his grace, it is not
to be reckoned the effect of that determination.

3. The design of the word’s being preached, is not to aggravate the
damnation of those that shall not believe, according to this vile
suggestion; but that men might be hereby led to know their duty and that
the sovereignty of God, and the holiness of his law, which requires
faith and repentance, as well as man’s obligation hereunto might be made
known to the world. I do not deny, but that unbelief, and the
condemnation consequent thereupon, is aggravated by the giving of the
gospel, for that appears from many scriptures, Matt. xi. 21. Luke x. 13.
as when our Saviour upbraids Chorazin, Bethsaida, Capernaum, and other
places, amongst whom he was conversant, with their unbelief, and
represents their condemnation as greater than, that of others, who were
destitute of those privileges: But yet it is a malicious insinuation, to
suppose we conclude that the gospel was given for this end; and we must
still distinguish between the greater aggravation of condemnation’s
being the result of giving the gospel, or the remote consequence
thereof, and its being the effect of it in those that reject the gospel,
and much less the design of God in giving it.

4. God’s denying that grace, which would have enabled men to believe, is
not to be charged as an instance of cruelty, any more than his denying
it to fallen angels, but it is rather a display of his justice. He was
not obliged to give grace to any of the apostate race of man; shall
therefore his denying the grace of faith be reckoned an instance of
cruelty, when we consider the forfeiture that was before made thereof,
and man’s propensity to sin, which is chargeable only on himself?

5. God’s purpose to deny the grace of faith to those whom he has not
ordained to eternal life, is not inconsistent with that scripture, 1
Tim. ii. 4. in which it is said, that _he will have all men to be
saved_; so that, as will be farther observed elsewhere,[204] it respects
either God’s determining that salvation should be applied to all sorts
of men, or else his declaring by his revealed will, that it is the duty
of all men to believe, and to acknowledge the truth, as made known to
them in the gospel.

6. They who are elected to salvation, are chosen in Christ: thus it is
expressly said, in Eph. i. 4. _He hath chosen us in him, before the
foundations of the world._ We are not to suppose that the apostle
intends hereby, that we are chosen for the sake of Christ, as though any
of his mediatorial acts were the ground and reason thereof; for election
is an act of sovereign grace, or is resolved into the good pleasure of
the will of God, and is not to be accounted a purchased blessing;
therefore when we speak of the concern of the Mediator, with relation
hereunto, this is to be considered as a means ordained by God, to bring
his elect to salvation rather than the foundation of their election.
This proposition necessarily follows from the former; for if they, who
are chosen to the end, are chosen to the means, then Christ’s
mediatorial acts being the highest and first means of salvation, God’s
eternal purpose respects this, as subservient thereunto.

There are some very considerable divines,[205] who distinguish between
our being chosen in Christ, as an Head, and being chosen in him as a
Redeemer; and accordingly, they conclude, that there are two distinct
relations, in which the elect are said to stand to Christ, both which
are mentioned by the apostle, when he says, _Christ is the Head of the
church, and the Saviour of the body_, Eph. v. 23. and they are also
mentioned distinctly elsewhere, _He is the Head of the body, the
church_, and then it follows, that he _made peace through the blood of
the cross_, Col. i. 18, 19, 20. and they add, that the elect are
considered as his members, without any regard had to their fallen state;
and that the blessings contained therein, are such as render their
condition more honourable and glorious, than otherwise it would have
been, had they been only considered as creatures, without any relation
to him as their Head; and this Headship of Christ they extend not only
to men, but to the holy angels, whom they suppose to be chosen, in this
respect, in Christ, as well as men, and that it is owing hereunto that
they have the grace of confirmation conferred upon them; and it also
follows, from hence, that Christ would have been the Head of the
election of grace, though man had not fallen, and that our fallen state
rendered that other relation of Christ to his elect necessary; so that
as they are chosen to salvation, they are chosen in him as a Redeemer,
designed to bring about his great work for them, and, for this end, set
up, as it is expressed, _from everlasting_, Prov. viii. 23.

This distinction of Christ’s double relation to the elect, is,
doubtless, designed by those who thus explain this doctrine to advance
his glory; notwithstanding it remains still a matter of doubt to me,
whether Christ’s Headship over his church be not a branch of his
Mediatorial glory; and, if so, it will be very difficult to prove that a
Mediator respects any other than man, and him more particularly
considered as fallen; and accordingly, God did not design hereby to
advance him to an higher condition, than what was barely the result of
his being a creature, but to deliver him from that state of sin and
misery, into which he foresaw that he would plunge himself. Therefore,
in considering the order of God’s eternal purpose, relating to the
salvation of his people, we must suppose that he first designed to
glorify all his perfections in their redemption and salvation; and, in
order hereunto, he fore-ordained, or appointed Christ to be their great
Mediator, in whom he would be glorified, and by whom this work was to be
brought about: He appointed him to be their Head, Surety, and Redeemer;
first, to purchase salvation for them; and then, to make them meet for
it, in the same order in which it is brought about by him in the
execution thereof; so that, as the glory of God, in the salvation of the
elect, was the end, Christ’s redemption was the means more immediately
conducive thereunto, and, as such, he is said to be fore-ordained, to
wit, to perform those offices that he executes as Mediator, 1 Pet. i.
20. and as Christ, when he was manifested in the flesh, did all things
for his people, that were necessary to bring them to glory, he is, in
God’s purpose, considered as the great Mediator, by whom he designed
this work should be brought about: thus he is set forth in the gospel,
as a propitiation for sin; and the apostle seems to speak of it, as what
was the result of God’s purpose, in Rom. iii. 25. whom God hath _set
forth_ to be a propitiation; the Greek word[206] properly signifies, as
it is observed in the marginal reference, _fore-ordained_ so to be; and
accordingly, we must consider him as from all eternity in God’s purpose,
appointed to be the federal Head of those who are said to be chosen in
him, and to have all the concerns of the divine glory, relating to their
salvation, committed to his management.

V. We shall now consider the properties of election, and how the divine
perfections are displayed therein, agreeably to what is said concerning
it in scripture.

1. As it is taken for the purpose of God, relating to the sanctification
or salvation of men, as distinguished from the execution thereof, it is
eternal: This is evident, because God is eternal, his purposes must be
concluded to be of equal duration with his existence; for we cannot
suppose that an infinitely wise and sovereign Being existed from all
eternity, without any fore-thought, or resolution what to do, for that
would be to suppose him to have been undetermined, or unresolved, when
he first gave being to all things; nor is it to be supposed that there
are any new determinations in the divine will, for that would argue him
to be imperfect, since this would be an instance of mutability in him,
as much as it would be for him to alter his purpose; but neither of
these are agreeable to the idea of an infinitely perfect Being.

Moreover, if God’s purpose, with respect to the salvation of men were
not eternal, then it must be considered as a new after-thought arising
in the divine mind, which, as to its first rise, is but, as it were, of
yesterday, and consequently he would have something in him that is
finite. If it be contrary to his omniscience to have new ideas of
things, it is equally contrary to the sovereignty of his will to have
new determinations, therefore all his purposes were eternal.

2. God’s purpose relating to election, is infinitely wise and holy. This
appears from the footsteps of infinite wisdom, and holiness, which are
visible in the execution thereof, namely, in bringing men to grace and
glory; nothing is more conspicuous than the glory of these perfections
in the work of redemption, and the application thereof; as hereby the
salvation of man is brought about in such a way, that the glory of all
the divine perfections is secured, and the means made use of, as
conducive thereunto, the most proper that could have been used,
therefore it is a work of infinite wisdom. And inasmuch as herein God
discovers the infinite opposition of his nature to sin, and thereby
advances the glory of his holiness, it follows from hence, that these
perfections of the divine nature had their respective concern, if we may
so express it, in the purpose relating hereunto; for whatever glory is
demonstrated in the execution of his purpose, that was certainly before
included in the purpose itself.

3. The purpose of God, relating to the final state of man, is secret, or
cannot be known, till he is pleased to discover it. Nothing is more
obvious than this; for even the purposes or resolutions of creatures are
secret, till they are made known by them: thus the apostle says, _What
man knoweth the things of a man_, that is, what he designs to do, _save
the spirit of a man, which is in him_? and infers, in the following
words, _so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God_, 1
Cor. ii. 12. and elsewhere he says, _Who hath known the mind of the
Lord? or who hath been his councellor?_ Rom. xi. 34. And, for this
reason, it is called, _The mystery of his will_, Eph. i. 9. and this
also follows from its being eternal, therefore it was hid in God, from
before the foundation of the world, and consequently would for ever have
been so, had he not, by his works, or word, made some discoveries
thereof, to those whom he first brought into being, and then gave some
intimations of his purpose to them.

Therefore it could not have been known that God had purposed to save
any, had he not revealed this in the gospel: much less have any
particular persons ground to conclude themselves to be elected, without
first observing those intimations which God has given, whereby they may
arrive at the knowledge thereof. This head ought to be duly considered,
by those who deny, and are prejudiced against this doctrine, though it
be generally neglected in the methods they take to oppose it; for they
will not consider the distinction we make between God’s having chosen a
person to eternal life, and a person’s having a right to conclude that
he is thus chosen; but take it for granted, that if there be such a
thing as election, that we must necessarily determine ourselves to be
the objects thereof, and ought to regulate our future conduct
accordingly. It is from thence they conclude, that the doctrine of
election leads men to presumption, or gives them occasion to say, that
they may live as they list; whereas we suppose that it is an instance of
presumption in any one to determine that he is elected, unless there be
some discovery hereof made to him; and this discovery cannot take its
rise from God, unless it be accompanied with that holiness, which is,
from the nature of the thing, inconsistent with our being led hereby to
licentiousness. And here we take occasion to consider, that God does not
make known his secret purpose, relating to this matter, to any, by
inspiration, especially since that extraordinary dispensation of
providence is ceased; and, indeed, it never was his ordinary way to
discover it hereby to those, who, in other instances, were favoured with
the gift of inspiration. The means therefore by which we come to the
knowledge hereof, is, by God’s giving certain marks, or evidences of
grace, or by shewing us the effects of the divine power, in calling and
sanctifying us, whereby we have a warrant to conclude that we were
chosen to eternal life; and, whilst we make a right improvement thereof,
and conclude that our judgment, concerning our state, is rightly
founded, or not, by the holiness of our lives, we are in no danger of
abusing this great and important doctrine, to the dishonour of God, or
our own destruction.

This leads us to consider a distinction, which we are often obliged to
make use of, when we speak concerning the will of God, as secret or
revealed, by which we account for the sense of many scriptures, and take
occasion from it to answer several objections that are brought against
this doctrine. I am sensible that there is nothing advanced in defence
thereof, which they, who are in the other way of thinking, are more
prejudiced against, than this distinction, which they suppose to contain
a reproachful idea of the divine Majesty, and is the foundation of many
popular prejudices against the doctrine we are defending, as though we
hereby intended that God has a secret meaning, different from what he
reveals; or that we are not to judge of his intentions by those
discoveries which he makes thereof, which it would be the highest
reproach to charge any creature with, and contrary to that sincerity
which he cannot be destitute of, but he is hereby rendered the object of
detestation; therefore no one, who conceives of an holy God, in such a
way as he ought to do, can entertain a thought, as though the least
appearance thereof were applicable to him. However, this is the common
misrepresentation that is made of this distinction. Whether it arises
from its being not sufficiently explained by some; or a fixed resolution
to decry the doctrine of election, and render it odious, as it must
certainly be, if supported by a distinction, understood in so vile a
sense, I will not determine. However, that we may remove this prejudice,
and consider how it is to be understood, in a sense more agreeable to
the divine perfections, we shall proceed to explain it; and here we may
observe,

_First_, That the will of God is sometimes taken, in scripture, for that
which he has, from all eternity, determined, which is unchangeable, and
shall certainly come to pass, which is impossible for any creature to
disannul, resist, or render ineffectual; and it is such a branch of
divine sovereignty, that to deny it, would be, in effect, to deny him to
be God. This the apostle intends, when he represents the malicious and
obstinate sinner as replying against God, and defending himself in his
bold crimes, by saying, _Why doth he yet find fault; for who hath
resisted his will?_ Rom. ix. 19, 20, 21, 22. In answer to which, he
asserts the sovereignty of God, and that he is not accountable to any
for what he does, nor to be controuled by them; and this is also
intended in another scripture, in Eph. i. 11. where it is said, that
_God worketh all things after the counsel of his own will_; and
elsewhere he says, _My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my
pleasure_, Isa. xlvi. 10. This will of God is the rule of his own
acting, and, as it determines the event of things, it is impossible for
him to act contrary to it; and it is equally disagreeable to his
perfections, to signify to his creatures, that he determines to do one
thing, but will do another; therefore, in this sense, we are far from
asserting that there is a revealed will of God, which contradicts his
secret.

_Secondly_, We often read, in scripture, of the will of God, as taken
for what he has prescribed to us, as a rule of duty; and also of our
judging concerning the apparent event of things.

(1.) The will of God may be considered as a rule of duty, which is a
well-known and proper sense of his revealed will: thus our Saviour
teaches us to pray, _Let thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven_;
by which he principally intends his revealed will, _or law_. Enable us
to yield obedience to thy law, in our measure, as thou art perfectly
obeyed in heaven. So our Saviour says, _Whosoever shall do the will of
God, the same is my brother, and my sister, and mother_, Mark iii. 35.
which can be meant of no other than his revealed will, or of his law, in
which it is contained; because no one can act contrary to God’s
determination, which is that sense of his will, contained in the
foregoing head; and, consequently, a doing his will, in that sense,
would not have been laid down as a distinguishing character of those
whom Christ preferred above all, who were related to him in the bonds of
nature.

Again the apostle understands the will of God in this sense, when he
says, _Thou knowest his will_, Rom. ii. 18. where he speaks to the Jews,
who were instructed out of the law, in which it is contained; and
elsewhere, Eph. vi. 6. he speaks of his will, as what is to be obeyed,
and therefore gives this description of faithful servants, that they _do
the will of God_, namely, what he has commanded, _from the heart_. And
there are many other scriptures thus to be understood; and this we call
his revealed will, as it is the rule of duty and obedience.

(2.) The revealed will of God may be considered as a rule which he has
given us, whereby we are to judge of the apparent event of things. I
make this a branch of God’s revealed will, inasmuch as sometimes he
condescends to discover future events to his creatures, which otherwise
they could never have known; but yet there is a difference, as to the
manner of their judging thereof, pursuant to the intimations which he
has given them. Accordingly, when God has told us expressly, that this
or that particular thing shall come to pass, then we are infallibly sure
concerning the event, and need no other rule to judge of it, but by
considering it as revealed: As when God has said, that there shall be a
general resurrection of the dead, and that Christ shall come to
judgment, and receive his redeemed, and sanctified ones, to heaven, to
behold his glory, we are infallibly assured of these events, because
they are expressly revealed; and, when we speak of the secret and
revealed will of God, as applicable to things of this nature, we intend
nothing else hereby but what all will allow of, _viz._ that what would
have been for ever a secret, had it not been discovered, is now
revealed, and therefore ceases to be so; and in that sense, the revealed
will of God, in all respects, agrees with his secret; in this case, we
suppose that God expressly revealed the event.

But there are other instances, in which the event of things is not
expressly revealed; as when God has only discovered to us what is the
rule of our duty. Nevertheless, since it is natural for man, when any
duty is commanded, to pass some judgment concerning the event thereof;
and, inasmuch as we suppose the event not expressly revealed, it
follows, that the judgment, which we pass concerning it, is only what
appears to us, or what, according to our rule of judging, seems to be
the probable event of things. In this case we are not infallibly assured
concerning it; and when we pass a judgment relating thereunto, we may
conclude that some consequences may attend our present duty, which,
perhaps, will never come to pass. As if a general of an army gives forth
a command to his soldiers, to march towards the enemy, they will readily
conclude, that he designs, by this command, that they should enter on
some action, which, had he expressly told them, he must either change
his purpose, or else the event must certainly happen; but, inasmuch as
he has not discovered this to them, all the judgment that they can form,
at present, concerning it, is only such, as is founded on the appearance
of things, and the event might probably afterwards shew, without any
impeachment of his veracity or conduct herein, that his only design was
to try whether his soldiers would obey the word of command, or not. Or
if a king should order a number of malefactors to the place of
execution, without discovering the event thereof, the apparent event is
their immediate death; but if, pursuant to his secret purpose, he
resolved, there to give forth a pardon to them, it cannot be supposed
that he changed his purpose; but the event makes it appear, that his
purpose was not then known; whatever the apparent event might be, his
real design was to humble them for their crimes, and afterwards to
pardon them.

It is only in such-like instances as these, that we apply this
distinction to the doctrine that we are maintaining; and therefore it
must be a very great stretch, of malicious insinuation, for any one to
suppose, that hereby we charge God with insincerity in those
declarations of his revealed will, by which we pass a probable judgment
concerning the event of things. But to apply this to particular
instances. God commanded Abraham to offer up his son Isaac, Gen. xxii.
2. whereas it is certain, unless we suppose that he altered his purpose,
that he intended, not that he should lay his hand upon him, but, when
Isaac was upon the altar, to forbid him to do it. Here was a great and a
difficult duty, which Abraham was to perform pursuant to God’s revealed
will, which was the rule of his obedience; had Abraham known, before
this, that God designed to hold his hand, and prevent him from striking
the fatal blow, it had been no trial of his faith; for it would have
been no difficult matter for him to have done every thing else. The holy
patriarch knew well enough that God could prevent him from doing it; but
this he had no ground to conclude, because he had no divine intimation
concerning it; therefore that which appeared to him to be the event, was
the loss of his son, and he reconciled this with the truth of the
promise before given him, that _in Isaac his seed should be called_, by
supposing that God, at some time or other, would _raise him from the
dead_, as the apostle observes, Heb. xi. 19. therefore that which
Abraham concluded as judging, not by an express revelation, but by the
voice of providence, was, that Isaac must be slain by his hand: But this
was contrary to the real event, as is evident, from the account thereof
in scripture; and, consequently since the real event was agreeable to
the divine determination, as all events are, it follows, that there is a
difference between the will of God, determining the event of things,
which shall certainly come to pass accordingly; and the revelation of
his will, relating to what is the creatures present duty, which may, at
the same time, appear to them, when judging only by the command, which
is the rule of duty, and some circumstances that attend it, to be
contrary to what will afterwards appear to have been the real design of
God therein. God’s real design was to try Abraham’s faith, and to
prevent him from slaying his son, when he had given a proof of his
readiness to obey him; but this remained, at first, a secret to Abraham,
and the apparent design was, that he should slay him. Therefore there is
a foundation for this distinction, as thus explained, concerning the
secret and revealed will of God; the former belongs not to us, nor are
we to take our measures from it, as being unknown: and, when the latter
appears contrary to it, we must distinguish between two things, that are
contrary in the same, and different respects; or between the judgment
which we pass concerning events, which are apparent to us, and, at most,
are only probable and conjectural, as we judge of the consequence of a
duty commanded; and those events, which, though they are infallibly
certain, yet are not revealed, nor can be known, till they come to pass.
In this sense we understand the distinction between God’s secret and
revealed will, when they seem to oppose each other; which it was
necessary for us thus to explain, inasmuch as we shall frequently have
occasion to mention, and apply it, when we account for the difference
that there seems to be, between the purpose of God, relating to the
event of things, and our present views thereof, whereby we may
understand and account for the difficulties contained in several
scriptures, which I would have mentioned in this place, for the farther
illustration hereof, had it been necessary. But this is sufficient to
explain and vindicate it from the prejudices entertained against it, by
those who are disposed to misrepresent what is said in defence of this
doctrine.

From what has been said, concerning God’s secret and revealed will, we
may infer,

_1st_, That it is a great boldness, and unwarrantable instance of
presumption, for any one to enter into, or judge of God’s secret
purpose, so as peremptorily to determine, beyond the present appearance
of things, that this or that shall certainly come to pass, till he makes
them known; for _secret things belong unto the Lord our God, but those
things which are revealed belong unto us, and to our children forever_,
Deut. xxiv. 29. Therefore no one ought to determine that he is elected
to salvation, before the work of grace is wrought, and, some way or
other, made visible to him; or, on the other hand, to determine that he
is rejected or reprobated, when he has no other ground to go upon, but
uncertain conjecture, which would be a means to drive him to despair:
that some are, indeed, elected, and others rejected, is no secret
because God has revealed this in his word; so that we may assert it as a
proposition, undoubtedly true, when we do not apply it to particular
persons; and therefore this doctrine has not that pernicious tendency,
which many pretend that it has.

_2dly_, The first act of saving faith does not consist in our believing
that we are elected; neither is it the duty of unregenerate persons, as
such to apply this privilege to themselves any more than to conclude
themselves rejected: But our business, is, so long as the purpose of God
remains a secret to us, to attend on the means of grace, hoping and
waiting for the display of divine power, in effectually calling us; and
afterwards for the Spirit’s testimony, or seal, to be set to it, whereby
he discovers his own work; and then it may, in some measure, be reckoned
a branch of his revealed will and will afford us matter of thanksgiving
and praise to him, and a foundation of peace and comfort in our own
souls. But this may be farther insisted on, when we come to consider the
improvement we ought to make of this doctrine. We proceed to consider
the next property of election.

4. It is free, and sovereign, or absolute, and unconditional; for that
which would be a reflection on the divine perfections, if applied to
God’s method of working, is, by no means, to be said concerning his
purpose to work, or, (which is the same) his decree of election;
therefore if there are no obligations laid on him by his creatures, to
display or perform any of his works of grace, but they are all free and
sovereign, then it follows, that the fore-sight of any thing that shall
be done by them, in time, could not be the motive, or reason of his
purpose, or decree, to save them, or of his choosing them to salvation.

This may be farther argued, from the independence of the divine nature:
if his nature and perfections are independent, his will must be so. But
more particularly,

(1.) The displays of God’s grace, in time, are expressly resolved into
his sovereign pleasure, in scripture, in Rom. ix. 15. _He saith to
Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy; and I will have
compassion on whom I will have compassion._ And there are many other
scriptures, which might be referred to, where all merit, or motives,
taken from the creature, which might be supposed to induce him to bestow
spiritual and saving blessings, are entirely excluded, and the whole is
resolved in to the glory of his own name, and in particular, of those
perfections which he designed herein to illustrate. This is applied,
even to the common blessings of providence; _Nevertheless, he saved them
for his name’s sake, that he might make his mighty power to be known_,
Psal. cvi. 8. and it is also applied to sparing mercy, or the exercise
of God’s patience, _For my name’s sake will I defer mine anger, and for
my praise will I refrain for thee, that I cut thee not off_, Isa.
xlviii. 9. and to pardoning mercy, _For thy name’s sake, O Lord, pardon
mine iniquity, for it is great_, Psal. xxv. 11. And when he is
represented as doing great things for his people, he puts them in mind,
at the same time, of their own vileness and unworthiness, that the
freeness and sovereignty of his grace, to them, might be more
conspicuous: Thus, when he tells them how he delivered Israel out of
Egypt, he puts them in mind of their idolatry in that land; therefore no
motive could be taken, from their behaviour towards him, which could
induce him to do this for them; as it is said, _But they rebelled
against me, and would not hearken unto me; they did not every man cast
away the abominations of their eyes, neither did they forsake the idols
of Egypt; then I said, I will pour out my fury upon them, to accomplish
my anger against them, in the midst of the land of Egypt. But I wrought,
for my name’s sake, that it should not be polluted before the heathen,
among whom they were, in whose sight I made myself known unto them, in
bringing them forth out of the land of Egypt_, Ezek. xx. 8, 9.

(2.) If the grace of God, and consequently his purpose relating
thereunto, were not absolute, free, and sovereign, then all the glory
thereof could not be attributed to him, neither would boasting be
excluded; but as the creature might be said to be a worker together with
God, so he would lay claim to a share, if not to the greatest part of
the honour, that will redound to him from it; which is directly contrary
to the divine perfections, and the great design of the gospel. This will
farther appear, if we consider,

_1st._ That a conditional purpose to bestow a benefit, cannot take
effect till the condition be performed, and accordingly it is said to
depend on it. This is obvious, from the known idea affixed to the word
_condition_, and the common signification thereof; it follows therefore,

_2dly._ That the performance of the condition is the next, or immediate
cause of a conditional purpose’s taking effect; and, to apply this to
the case before us,

_3dly._ If, on our performing the condition of God’s purpose to save us,
it be rendered effectual, which otherwise it would not have been,
(agreeably to the nature of a conditional purpose) then we are more
beholden to our own conduct, than the divine purpose, and so the glory
thereof will be due to ourselves; which would not only cast the highest
dishonour on the divine perfections, but it is contrary to the design of
the gospel, which is to stain the pride of all flesh, and take away all
occasions of glorying, from the creature. Thus the prophet Isaiah,
fore-telling the glory of the gospel-state, considers its tendency to
humble the pride of man, when he says, _The loftiness of man shall be
bowed down, and the haughtiness of men shall be made low, and the Lord
alone shall be exalted in that day_, Isa. ii. 17. and the apostle,
describing the nature of faith, considers its tendency _to exclude
boasting_; Rom. iii. 27. and our Saviour, speaking concerning the
discriminating grace of God, that appears in election, either in his
purpose relating to it, or in the execution thereof, says, _Ye have not
chosen me, but I have chosen you_, John xv. 16. that is, you have done
nothing that has laid any obligation on me to choose you by that act of
faith, whereby you are inclined to prefer me to all others; for this is
the consequence and result of my discriminating grace.

We shall now proceed to consider those arguments, which are generally
made use of by those, who are in the other way of thinking, to support
the conditionality of God’s purpose, as well as of his works of grace,
in opposition to what has been said concerning the freeness and
sovereignty thereof. They generally allege those scriptures for that
purpose, that are laid down in a conditional form; as when the apostle
speaks of such a confession of Christ _with the mouth_, as is attended
with _believing in the heart, that God raised him from the dead_, and
_calling on the name of the Lord_, as connected with salvation, Rom. x.
9, 13. and our Saviour says, that _whosoever believeth on him should not
perish, but have everlasting life_, John iii. 15. and that _he that
believeth shall be saved_, Mark xvi. 16. and elsewhere, _Except ye
repent, ye shall all likewise perish_, Luke xiii. 3. and many other
scriptures of the like nature; from whence they argue, that since the
dispensations of God’s providence, the gifts of his grace, and the
execution of his purpose are all conditional, the purpose itself must be
so. Were it but allowed that election is conditional whether it respects
the purpose or providence of God, we should meet with no opposition from
those who are on the other side of the question; but as such a purpose
to save, as is not absolute, peremptory, or independent on the will of
man, has many absurd consequences attending it, which are derogatory to
the glory of the divine sovereignty, as has been already considered; so
this cannot be the sense of those scriptures, that are laid down in a
conditional form, as those and such-like are, that we have but now
mentioned; for no sense of scripture can be true or just, that has the
least tendency to militate against any of the divine perfections; so
that there may without any strain or violence offered to the sense of
words, be another sense put upon these, and all other scriptures, in
which we have the like mode of speaking, whereby they may be explained,
agreeably to the analogy of faith; therefore let us consider,

1. That all such scriptures are to be understood as importing the
necessary connexion of things, so that one shall not be brought about
without the other; accordingly, repentance, faith, and all other graces,
are herein no otherwise considered, than as inseparably connected with
salvation; which depends upon one of those propositions, which was
before laid down, _viz._ that God having chosen to the end has also
chosen to the means. We are far from denying that faith and repentance
are necessary to salvation, as God never gives one without the other,
and consequently they are inseparably connected in his eternal purpose
relating thereunto. If nothing else were intended by a conditional
purpose than this, we would not offer any thing against it; but
certainly this would be to use words without their known or proper
ideas; and the word _condition_, as applicable to other things, is never
to be understood in this sense. There is a necessary connection between
God’s creating the world, and his upholding it, or between his creating
an intelligent creature, and his giving laws to him; but none ever
supposed one to be properly a condition of the other: so a king’s
determining to pardon a malefactor, is inseparably connected with his
pardoning him, and his pardon given forth, with his having a right to
his forfeited life; but it is not proper to say, one is a condition of
the other; so a person’s seeing is inseparably connected with his
opening his eyes; and speaking, with the motion of his lips; but we do
not say, when he determines to do both of them, that one is a condition
of the other. A condition, properly speaking is that which is not only
connected with the privilege that follows upon the performance thereof,
but it must be performed by a subject acting independently on him who
made the conditional overture, or promise.

If it be said, that a duty, which we are enabled to perform by God, who
promised the blessing connected with it, is properly a condition, we
will not contend about the propriety, or impropriety, of the word; but
inasmuch as it is taken by many, when applied to divine things, in the
same sense as in matters of a lower nature, and so used to signify the
dependence of the blessings promised, or the efficacy of the divine
purpose, relating thereunto, on our performance of the condition, which
is supposed to be in our own power, whereby we come to have a right and
title to eternal life; it is this that we principally militate against,
when we assert the absoluteness of God’s purpose.

2. Whatever ideas there may be contained in those scriptures, which are
brought to support the doctrine we are opposing, that contain in them
the nature of a condition, nothing more is intended thereby, but that
what is connected with salvation is a condition of our claim to it, or
expectation of it: In this sense, we will not deny faith and repentance
to be conditions of salvation, inasmuch as it would be an unwarrantable
instance of presumption, for impenitent and unbelieving sinners, to
pretend that they have a right to it, or to expect the end without the
means, since these are inseparably connected in God’s purpose, as well
as in all his dispensations of grace. This being laid down, as a general
rule for our understanding all those scriptures, which are usually
brought to prove that God’s purposes are sometimes conditional, we shall
farther illustrate it, by applying it to three or four other scriptures,
that are often brought in defence thereof, which we shall endeavour to
explain, consistently with the doctrine we are maintaining.

One is taken from Gen. xix. 22. where the angel bade Lot _escape to
Zoar_, telling him, that _he could not do any thing till he came
thither_. If we suppose this to have been a created angel, as most
divines do, yet he must be considered as fulfilling the purpose of God,
or acting pursuant to his commission; and therefore it is all one, to
our present argument, as though God had told Lot, that he could do
nothing till he was gone from that place. It is plain, that he had given
him to understand, that he should be preserved from the flames of Sodom,
and that, in order thereunto, he must flee for his life; and adds, that
he could do nothing, that is, he could not destroy Sodom, consistently
with the divine purpose to save him, till he was escaped out of the
place; for God did not design to preserve him alive (as he did the three
Hebrew captives, in Daniel) in the fire, but by his escaping from it;
one was as much fore-ordained as the other, or was designed as a means
conducive to it; and therefore the meaning of the text is, not that
God’s purpose, relating to Sodom’s destruction, was founded on Lot’s
escape, as an uncertain and dubious condition, depending on his own
will, abstracted from the divine determination relating to it; but he
designed that those two things should be connected together, and that
one should be antecedent to the other; and both of them, as well as
their respective connection, were the object of God’s absolute and
peremptory determination.

There is another scripture, sometimes brought to the same purpose, in
Gen. xxxii. 26. where the angel says to Jacob, _Let me go, for the day
breaketh_; and Jacob replies, _I will not let thee go, except thou bless
me_, which does not infer, that God’s determinations were dependent on
Jacob’s endeavour to detain him, or his willingness to let him depart;
but we must consider Jacob as an humble, yet importunate suppliant, as
it is said elsewhere, _Weeping and making supplication_, Hos. xii. 4.
_Let me go_, says God, appearing in the form of an angel, and speaking
after the manner of men, that he might give occasion to Jacob to express
a more ardent desire of his presence and blessing, as well as to signify
how unworthy he was of it; not as though he was undetermined before-hand
what to do, but since the grace which Jacob exercised, as well as the
blessing which he received, was God’s gift, and both were connected in
the execution of his purpose, we must conclude that the purpose itself
was free, sovereign, and unconditional.

Again, there is another scripture, in which God condescends to use a
mode of speaking, not much unlike to the other, in which he says to
Moses, speaking concerning Israel, in Exod. xxxii. 10. _This is a
stiff-necked people; now therefore let me alone, that my wrath may wax
hot against them, and that I may consume them_; we are not to suppose
that the whole event was to turn upon Moses’s prayer, as though God’s
purposing to save his people were dependent on it; or that that grace,
which inclined him to be importunate with God, did not take its rise
from him. Moses, indeed, when first he began to plead with God, knew not
whether his prayer would be prevalent or no; however, he addresses
himself, with an uncommon degree of importunity, for sparing mercy; and,
when God says, _Let me alone_, it signifies, that his people were
unworthy that any one should plead their cause; and, if God should mark
iniquity, then Moses’s intercession would be altogether in vain, and so
he might as well let him alone, in that respect, as ask for his mercy.
He does not, indeed, at first, tell him what he designed to do, that he
might aggravate their crime, but afterwards he answers his prayer in
Israel’s favour, and signifies that he would work, not for their sakes,
but for his own name’s sake; so that he takes occasion, on the one hand,
to set forth the people’s desert of punishment; and, on the other, the
freeness of his own grace.

There is but one scripture more that I shall mention, among many that
might have been brought, and that is what is said concerning our
Saviour, in Matt. xiii. 58. that _he could not do many mighty works
there_, at that time, in his own country, _because of their unbelief_?
where he speaks either of their not having a faith of miracles that was
sometimes required, in those for whom they were wrought: or else of the
unaccountable stupidity of that people, who were not convinced, by many
others that he had wrought before them; therefore he resolves to put a
stop to his hand, and not, for the present, to work so many miracles
amongst them, as otherways might have been expected: If we suppose that
their want of faith prevented his working them, this is not to be
considered as an unforeseen event. And as he had determined not to
confer this privilege upon them, or to continue to work miracles amongst
them, if those, which he had already wrought, were disregarded and
despised by their unbelief, we must conclude that he had a perfect
knowledge of this before-hand, and that his determinations were not
dependent on uncertain conditions, though he had resolved to act in such
a way, as was most for his own glory; and that there should be an
inseparable connexion between that faith, which was their duty, and his
continuing to exert divine power, as an ordinance adapted to excite it.

5. God’s purpose concerning election is unchangeable; this is the result
of his being infinitely perfect. Mutability is an imperfection that
belongs only to creatures: As it would be an instance of imperfection,
if there were the least change in God’s understanding, so as to know
more or less than he did from all eternity; the same must be said with
respect to his will, which cannot admit of any new determinations. There
are, indeed, many changes in the external dispensations of his
providence, which are the result of his will, as well as the effects of
his power; yet there is not the least appearance of mutability in his
purpose. We have before considered, in speaking concerning the
immutability of the divine nature[207], that whatever may be a reason
obliging men to alter their purposes, it cannot, in the least, take
place, so that God hereby should be obliged to alter his: No unforeseen
occurrence can render it expedient for him to change his mind, nor can
any superior power oblige him to do it; nor can any defect of power, to
bring about what he had designed, induce him to alter his purpose.

If it be objected to this, that the obstinacy of man’s will may do it;
that is to suppose his will exempted from the governing influence of
divine providence, and the contrary force, that offers resistance,
superior to it, which cannot be supposed, without detracting from the
glory of the divine perfections. It would be a very unworthy thought for
any one to conclude that God is one day of one mind, and another day
forced to be of the contrary; how far this is a necessary consequence
from that scheme of doctrine that we are opposing, let any one judge. It
will be very hard to clear it of this entanglement, which they are
obliged to do, or else all the absurdities that they fasten on the
doctrine of election, which are far from being unanswerable, will not be
sufficient to justify their prejudices against it.

They who are on the other side of the question, are sensible that they
have one difficulty to conflict with, namely, the inconsistency of God’s
infallible knowledge of future events, with a mutability of will
relating thereunto; or how the independency of the divine fore-knowledge
is consistent with the dependence and mutability of his will. To fence
against this, some have ventured to deny the divine prescience; but that
is to split against one rock, whilst endeavouring to avoid another.
Therefore others distinguish concerning the objects of the divine
prescience, and consider them, either as they are necessary or
contingent, and accordingly suppose that God has a certain foreknowledge
of the former; but his knowledge of the latter, (from the nature of the
things known) is uncertain, and consequently the determination of his
will is not unalterable. But this is to set bounds to the fore-knowledge
of God, with respect to its object, and, indeed, to exclude the free
actions of the creature from being the objects thereof, which is a
limiting and lessening of this perfection, and is directly contrary to
the idea of omniscience; and therefore we must insist on their proving
this to be consistent with the infinite perfection of God, which they
will find it very difficult to do; and to suppose, on the other hand,
that any thing is the object of God’s certain fore-knowledge, about
which his will is no way conversant, or only so, in such a way, as that
it is subject to change, according to the mutability of things, is
altogether as indefensible, and equally subversive of the independency,
wisdom, and sovereignty thereof.

_Object._ The most material objection against this doctrine, is take
from some scriptures, which seem to represent God as repenting, and
therein, as it is supposed, changing his purpose. Thus he is sometimes
said to repent, that he had bestowed some blessings upon men, when he
perceives how they have been abused by them, and accordingly he purposes
to bring evil on them; as we read, in Gen. vi. 6, 7. _It repented the
Lord that he had made man, and it grieved him at his heart; and the Lord
said, I will destroy man, whom I have created_; and, at other times he
is said to repent of the evil that he designed to bring upon them, and
alter his purpose in their favour; thus it is said, in Deut. xxxii. 36.
_The Lord shall judge his people, and repent himself for his servants;
when he seeth that their power is gone, and there is none shut up, or
left_; and in Joel ii. 13. _Rend your hearts, and not your garments, and
turn unto the Lord your God; for he is gracious and merciful, slow to
anger, and of great kindness, and repenteth him of the evil_; and in
Psal. xc. 13, _Return, O Lord, how long? and let it repent thee
concerning thy servants_; and in Jer. xviii. 8. _If that nation, against
whom I have pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil
that I have thought to do unto them._ And we have a very remarkable
instance of this, in God’s sparing Nineveh, on their repentance, after
he had threatened, by the prophet Jonah, that _within forty days they
should be destroyed_.

_Answ._ It is true, there are many scriptures, in which repentance is
ascribed to God, which, if we consider nothing else but the grammatical
sense of the words, seem to favour the objection; but we are bound to
conclude, that such a sense of repentance, as that on which it is
founded, is inconsistent with the divine perfections, and therefore
those scriptures, referred to therein, cannot imply a change in God’s
purpose. And, indeed, there are other scriptures, which assert what is
directly contrary thereunto; as when it is said, in Numb, xxiii. 19.
_God is not a man, that he should lye, neither the son of man, that he
should repent; hath he said, and shall he not do it? or hath he spoken,
and shall he not make it good?_ And elsewhere, in 1 Sam. xv. 29. it is
said, _The strength of Israel will not lye, nor repent; for he is not a
man that he should repent_.

But we must have recourse to some methods to reconcile this seeming
contradiction, and so consider the sense thereof, in different respects,
as applicable to them both; in some scriptures, God is said to repent;
in others, it is said that he cannot repent. That these may not appear
inconsistent with one another, nor either of them infer any imperfection
in God, let it be considered, that God is sometimes represented, in
scripture, in condescension to our common mode of speaking, as though he
had human passions, as in others, he is described, as though he had a
body, or bodily parts: But such expressions are always to be taken in a
metaphorical sense, without the least supposition, that he is subject to
any such imperfections; and particularly we must not conclude, that
repentance is ever ascribed to God in the same sense as it is to men,
_viz._ as implying a change in his purpose, occasioned by an unforeseen
occurrence, which is the sense contained in the objection. Such a
repentance, as this, is a passion peculiarly belonging to the creature,
and therefore in this sense we must understand those words; _God is not
a man, that he should lye, nor the son of man, that he should repent_;
accordingly, he is said to repent, not by changing his purpose, but by
changing his work. Thus when it is said, that _he repented that he had
made man_, nothing is meant by it, but that he determined to destroy
him, as he did afterwards by the flood. And this was no new
determination arising from any thing in the creature, which God did not
foresee; he knew before-hand that all flesh would corrupt their way, and
therefore his determination to punish them for it, was not a new resolve
of the divine will, after the sin was committed; but God determined
things in their respective order, first to permit sin, and then knowing
what would be the consequence thereof, namely, that they would rebel
against him, he determined to punish it, or to destroy the old world,
which is, in effect, the same, as though he had repented that he made
it. He cannot be said to repent as we do, by wishing that he had not
done that which he is said to repent of, but by denying us the
advantage, which we might have otherwise expected from it. In this sense
we are to understand all those scriptures that speak of God, as
repenting of the good that he had bestowed on man.

And, on the other hand, when he is said to repent of the evil which he
threatened to bring on men, as in the case of Nineveh, this does not
argue any change in his purpose; for he determined that Nineveh should
be destroyed, provided they did not repent, and it was not uncertain to
him whether they would repent or no; for, at the same time, he
determined to give them repentance, as appears by the event, and so not
to inflict the judgment threatened; and therefore when Jonah was sent to
make a public proclamation to the people, that in forty days they should
be destroyed, it is plain that they understood the threatening in this
sense, that they had no ground to expect any thing else, except they
repented, which accordingly they did, and so were spared, without having
any reason to conclude that God changed his purpose relating thereunto.

If it be objected hereunto, that this is nothing less than to establish
a conditional purpose in God, and so overthrows the argument that we are
maintaining; the reply that may be made to it, is, that we distinguish
between a conditional purpose, in God’s secret will, and a conditional
proposition, which was to be the subject of the prophet’s ministry: The
prophet, it is plain, was not told, when he received his commission to
go to Nineveh, that God would give them repentance, but only, that,
without repentance, they should be destroyed; whereas God, as the event
makes it appear, determined that they should repent, and therefore that
they should not be destroyed; and, consequently, we must not suppose,
that, when God sent him, he was undetermined, in his own purpose,
whether to destroy them or not, or that there was any thing conditional
in the divine mind, that rendered the event uncertain to God, though
there was a condition contained in the subject-matter of the prophet’s
message, which the Ninevites very well understood, namely, that they had
no ground to expect deliverance without repentance, and therefore they
repented, in hope of obtaining mercy, which they supposed would be
connected with their repentance; and it is evident, that Jonah himself
suspected that this might be the event, though God had not told him that
it would be so, and therefore says, in chap. iv. 2. _For I knew that
thou art a gracious God, and merciful, slow to anger, and of great
kindness, and repentest thee of the evil._

6. The purpose of God, in choosing men to eternal life, renders their
salvation necessary; so that nothing shall defeat, or disannul it. What
God says concerning Israel’s deliverance from the Babylonish captivity,
may be applied to all his other determinations, and particularly to what
relates to the eternal salvation of his people; _My counsel shall stand,
and I will do all my pleasure; yea, I have spoken it, I will also bring
it to pass; I have purposed it, I will also do it_, Isa. xlvi. 10, 11.
The purposes of God, indeed, are distinguished from his bringing them to
pass; it is one thing to design to bring his people to glory, and
another thing to bring them to it. It is not to be supposed that the
decree of God has, in itself, a proper efficiency to produce the thing
decreed:[208] for then there would be no difference between an eternal
decree, and an eternal production of things; whereas the apostle plainly
distinguishes between man’s being predestinated to glory, and brought to
it, when he says, _Those whom he predestinated, them he glorified_, Rom.
viii. 30.

The purpose of God, is, indeed, the internal moving cause, or the first
ground and reason of the salvation of those who are elected to it; but
his power is the more immediate cause of it, so that his purpose is the
reason of his exerting this power, and both concurring to the salvation
of men, render it certain and necessary. Therefore some distinguish, for
the explaining of this, between the determining and powerful will of
God; the latter of which, is sometimes called the word of his power, and
renders the former effectual; this it must certainly do, otherwise God
would be said to will the existence of things, that shall never have a
being. In this respect, the purpose of God renders things necessary,
which are in themselves contingent, or arbitrary, and would otherwise
never come to pass.[209]

This is a great encouragement to those who are enabled to make their
calling and election sure; for their perseverance in grace,
notwithstanding all the opposition that they meet with, is the necessary
consequence of their election to eternal life. Thus, as we before
distinguished predestination into election and reprobation, we have
considered the former of these, and we proceed,

_Secondly_, To speak concerning the doctrine of reprobation;[210] which
is become obnoxious to those on the other side of the question, almost
to a proverb; so that if any doctrine is considered as shocking, and to
be answered no otherwise than by testifying their abhorrence of it, it
is compared to this of reprobation; and, indeed, if it were not a
consequence from the doctrine of election to eternal life, that doctrine
would not be so much opposed by them. How far some unguarded
expressions, or exceptionable methods of explication, may have given
occasion for this prejudice, it is not to our present purpose to
enquire; but we shall take occasion, from thence, to explain it in such
a way, as that a fair and unprejudiced disputant will not see just
reason to except against it, at least to reproach it, as though it were
a doctrine subversive of the divine glory, and to be defended by none
but those who seem to have a design to raise prejudices, in the minds of
men, against religion in general.

And here we shall take occasion to consider the meaning of the word, as
it is contained in, or deduced from scripture, where the same word that
is used to signify the execution of this decree, may be applied to
express the decree itself. Thus we read of God’s rejecting, or
disregarding men, as a punishment of their rebellion against him: and
these are compared by the prophet Jeremiah, chap. vi. 30. _To reprobate
silver, because the Lord hath rejected them_; or, as it is in the
margin, _The refuse of silver_; and, in the New Testament, the same
word[212] is sometimes translated reprobates; at other times,
disapproved or rejected, 1 Cor. iv. 27. 2 Cor. xiii. 5. Heb. vi. 8. and
when this disapprobation, or rejection, respects not only their actions,
as contrary to the holy nature of God, but their persons, as punished
for their iniquities; and when this punishment is considered as what
respects their eternal state, as the objects of vindictive justice, the
purpose of God, relating hereunto, is what we call reprobation.

But, that we may more particularly consider the sense of the word, it
seems, in scripture, to contain in it two ideas.

1. God’s determining to leave a part of the world in that state of sin
and misery, which he from all eternity, fore-knew that they would bring
themselves into, or his decreeing not to save them; and, since all will
allow that a part of mankind shall not be saved, it cannot reasonably be
denied that this was determined by him before-hand; and this is what
divines generally call preterition.

2. There is another idea in the word _reprobation_, which is also
contained in scripture, or deducible from it, and that respects the
purpose of God to punish those for their iniquities, whom he will not
save. Not to be saved, is the same as to be _punished with everlasting
destruction, from the presence of the Lord, and the glory of his power_.
And God’s purpose, relating hereunto, is expressed in scripture by his
_appointing them to wrath_, 1 Thess. v. 9. for those sins which he
fore-saw they would commit. This is what some call _pre-damnation_, as
taken from that expression of the apostle, Jude, ver. 4, 13. concerning
some who had _crept into the church unawares_, whom he describes as
_ungodly men_, that is, notoriously so, _who turned the grace of God
into lasciviousness_, for whom _is reserved the blackness of darkness
forever_; of these he says, that they were _before of old, ordained to
this condemnation_, where God is represented as punishing sinners, in
proportion to their crimes; and this is considered as the result of that
eternal purpose, which was founded on his fore-sight of their
contracting that guilt whereby they would render themselves liable to
it.

If this doctrine be thus explained, it will appear agreeable, not only
to scripture, but to the divine perfections, and therefore too great a
truth to be treated with that abhorrence, with which it generally is,
without explaining, distinguishing or fairly entering into the merits of
the cause. It is a very easy matter to render any doctrine odious, by
misrepresentation, as they on the other side of the question, have done
this of reprobation, which we shall briefly consider, and therein take
leave to explain it in a different manner, whereby it will appear not
only worthy to be defended, as redounding to the glory of God, but a
plain and evident truth, founded on scripture.

If this doctrine were to be considered no otherwise, than as it is often
represented by them, we should dislike it, as much as they do; for when
they pretend that we herein suppose God to be severe and cruel to his
creatures, delighting himself in, and triumphing over them, in their
misery: and that he decreed, from all eternity, to damn the greatest
part of mankind, without any consideration of their sin, as the result
of his arbitrary will, or dominion, as he has a right to dispose of his
creatures, according to his pleasure, and that as a means to attain this
end, as though it were in itself desirable, he leaves them to
themselves, blinds their minds, and hardens their hearts, and offers
these occasions of, and inducements to sin, which are as
stumbling-blocks in their way, and that he determined that his
providence should be so conversant about the will of man, as that it
should be under a natural necessity, or kind of compulsion, to what is
evil, without considering the corruption and depravity of nature, as a
vicious habit, which they had contracted; and that all this is done in
pursuance of this decree of reprobation.

It is very probable that many who give this account of this doctrine,
have no other foundation for it, but the popular outcry of those who are
not apprised of the methods that are generally taken to explain and
defend it; or else they suppose that it cannot be defended, without
being exposed to those exceptions which are contained in the account
they give of it. But we shall take no farther notice of this, but
proceed to explain and defend it another way. And,

1. As to the former branch thereof, namely, preterition, or God’s
passing by, or rejecting those whom he hath not chosen to salvation, let
it be premised; that God, in his eternal purpose, considered all mankind
as fallen, which must be supposed to have been foreknown by him,
otherwise he would not be said to be omniscient, and the result of his
fore-knowledge is his determining to leave a part of them in their
fallen state, in which he might have left the whole world to perish
without being liable to the least charge of injustice. This is what we
call his rejecting them, and accordingly it is opposed to his having
chosen the rest to eternal life. These terms of opposition are plainly
contained in scripture: thus it is said, _The election hath obtained it,
and the rest were blinded_, Rom. xi. 7. not by God’s leading them into
mistakes, or giving them false ideas of things, but they were left to
the blindness of their minds, which was the result of their apostasy
from God; and elsewhere our Saviour says, _Thou hast hid these things
from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes_, Matt. xi.
25. Thou hast hid, that is, not revealed them; and that either
objectively, as respecting those who are destitute of the light of the
gospel; or subjectively, as he did not effectually, or savingly
enlighten them with the light of life, by _revealing Christ in them_, as
the apostle calls it, Gal. i. 16. and therefore it is as though he had
said, thou hast determined not to give to some the means of grace, nor
to others the saving efficacy thereof, such as they are partakers of,
who are chosen to salvation. Accordingly, he is said _to have suffered
all nations to walk in their own ways_, Acts xiv. 16. that is, not to
restrain or prevent the breaking forth of corruption, as he might have
done; and elsewhere, to have _winked at_, chap. xvii. 30. that is, as it
may be rendered, _over-looked_ the greatest part of the world, which is
no other than his rejecting or passing them by; and in this sense we are
to understand that difficult mode of speaking used by the apostle, _Whom
he will he hardeneth_, Rom. ix. 18. by which nothing else is intended
but his purposing to leave many to the hardness of their own hearts. God
forbid that any one should think that there is a positive act contained
in those words, as though God infused hardness into the hearts of any;
for the meaning is only this, that he determined to deny heart-softening
grace to that part of mankind, whom he had not fore-ordained to eternal
life. That there was such a purpose relating hereunto, is evident,
because whatever God does in the methods of his providence, is the
result of an eternal purpose. This no one, who observes the
dispensations of God’s providence, and allows as every one must do, that
all that he does was pre-concerted by him, can justly deny.

But that which must be farther enquired into, as to this matter, is,
whether God’s determining to pass by a part of mankind, be an act of
sovereignty or of justice. And this may also be judged of, by the
external dispensation of his providence; so far as there is sovereignty,
or justice, visible in them, we are to conclude that this purpose,
relating thereunto, was the result of one or other of these perfections.
In some respects it is an act of sovereignty: As, for instance, that God
should give one nation the gospel, or the means of grace, and deny it to
another; it is not because he sees any thing in one part of the world,
that obliges him thereunto, more than in the other; but the reason is,
as was observed in the scripture but now mentioned, _because it seemed
good in his sight_, Matt. xi. 26. Moreover, his giving special grace,
whereby some are effectually called and sanctified; and denying it to
others, is an act of sovereign pleasure.

But on the other hand, God is said sometimes, in the external
dispensations of his providence, to leave men to themselves, to give
them up to their own hearts lust, in a judicial way, which supposes not
only the commission of sin, but persons being obstinate and resolutely
determined to continue in it. Thus God saith concerning his people;
_Israel would none of me; so I gave them up to their own hearts’ lusts,
and they walked in their own counsels_, Psal. lxxxi. 11, 12. and the
Psalmist says elsewhere, _Add iniquity to their iniquity_, Psal. lxix.
27. which words I would rather consider as a prediction than a prayer,
or as an expression of the church’s acquiescence in God’s righteous
judgments, which they had ground to conclude, that he would inflict on
an impenitent, incorrigible people; these are expressed, by _adding
iniquity to iniquity_, not as though he designed to infuse any habit of
sin into them, for that is inconsistent with the holiness of his nature;
but that he would reject, and leave them to themselves, in a judicial
way, as a punishment inflicted on them for their iniquities, the
consequence whereof would be their own adding iniquity to iniquity.
Thus, in different respects, the purpose of God, in passing by a part of
mankind, may be considered, either as the result of his sovereign
pleasure, or as an act of justice.

2. We shall now proceed to consider the other branch of reprobation,
which some call _pre-damnation_, or (to use the scripture-expression
before referred to) God’s fore-ordaining those who shall not be saved,
to that condemnation, which they shall fall under, as exposing
themselves to it by their own wickedness; which is nothing else but his
determining, from all eternity, to punish those, as a judge, who should,
by their own crimes, deserve it, and thereby to vindicate the holiness
of his nature and law. Here let it be observed, that when this doctrine
is reproached or misrepresented, it is described as an act of divine
sovereignty, but that we are as ready to deny and oppose as they are,
since, according to the description we have given of it, it can be no
other than an act of justice; for, if to condemn, or punish, be an act
of justice, then the decree, relating hereunto, must be equally so, for
one is to be judged of by the other. If God cannot punish creatures as
such, but as criminals and rebels, then he must be supposed to have
considered them as such, when, in his eternal purpose, he determined to
punish them. No man can style this an act of cruelty, or severity in
God, but those who reckon the punishing of sin to be so, and are
disposed to charge the Judge of all with not doing right, or offering an
injury to his creatures, when he pours forth the vials of his wrath on
them, who, by their bold and wilful crimes, render themselves obnoxious
thereunto.

Here let it be considered, that God, in his actual providence, is not
the author of sin, though he suffer it to be committed in the world.
And, since his permitting, or not hindering it, cannot be said to be the
cause of its being committed, there being no cause thereof, but the will
of man; it follows, from hence, that God’s punishing sin, is not to be
resolved into his permission of it, as the cause thereof, but into the
rebellion of man’s will, as refusing to be subject to the divine law;
and thus God considered men, when, in his eternal purpose, he determined
to condemn those, whose desert of this punishment was foreseen, by him,
from all eternity. And is this a doctrine to be so much decried?

I cannot but wonder the learned author, whom I have before referred to,
as opposing this doctrine,[213] should so far give into the common and
popular way of misrepresenting it, unless he designed, by this way of
opposing it to render it detested; when he speaks concerning them,
mentioned in Jude, ver. 4. _who were before, of old, ordained to this
condemnation_, he says, “This cannot be meant of any divine ordination,
or appointment of them, to eternal condemnation, because it cannot be
thought, without horror, that God doth thus ordain men to perdition,
before they had a being.” If he had expressed his horror and resentment
against God’s ordaining men to perdition, as creatures, it had been
just; but to express this detestation against God’s ordaining men to
perdition, who are described as these are, is to expose this doctrine
without reason; and it is still more strange that he should cast this
censure upon it, when he owns in his farther explication of this text,
“That God ordaineth none to punishment but sinners, and ungodly men, as
these persons here are styled, and that these were men of whom it was
before written, or prophesied, that they should be condemned for their
wickedness;” since there is not much difference in the method of
reasoning, between saying that the condemnation of sinners, for their
wickedness, was before written, or prophesied, and saying, that God
fore-ordained them to eternal punishment.

I am sensible that many are led into this mistake, by supposing that we
give a very injurious and perverse sense of that text, in which the
doctrine of reprobation is contained, which, it may be, has occasioned
this reproach to be cast upon it. For when the apostle says, in Rom. ix.
22. _What if God willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known,
endured with much long-suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to
destruction_, some suppose that we understand this text, as though these
vessels of wrath were, from all eternity, prepared for destruction by
God, and that his eternal purpose, is his fitting them for it, as
intending to bring about that end, _viz._ his destroying them. But if
any have expressed themselves in such a way, as is equivalent thereunto,
let them be accountable for their own sense of the text; though this I
may say, that some, even of them, who give into the Supralapsarian way
of explaining the doctrine of predestination, have not understood it in
this sense;[214] and the sense which I would give of it is this, that
those, whom the apostle speaks of as vessels of wrath, are persons whom
God had rejected, and from the foresight of the sins which they would
commit, he had _appointed them to wrath_, which is an expression the
apostle uses elsewhere, 1 Thess. v. 9. but they were appointed to wrath,
not as creatures, but as sinners; they are described as fitted to
destruction, not by God’s act, but their own, and that is the reason of
their being fore-ordained to it.[215]

There is another scripture, which is generally cited by those who treat
on this subject, that we are to use the utmost caution in explaining,
lest we give just occasion, to those who oppose it, to express their
abhorrence of it, as inconsistent with the divine perfections, namely,
what the apostle says concerning those that were not elected, whom he
calls _the rest_ of the Jewish nation, in Rom. xi. 7-10. that _they were
blinded_, and that _God had given them the spirit of slumber, eyes that
they should not see, and ears that they should not hear_; and he speaks
of _their table being made a snare, and a trap and a stumbling-block,
and a recompense to them; let their eyes be darkened, that they may not
see, and bow down their back always_. The sense which they, who
misrepresent this doctrine, suppose that we put upon this scripture, is,
that they, who are reprobated, have, as a consequence thereof, occasions
of sin laid in their way, some things designed to blind their minds,
cast a mist before their eyes, and so lead them out of the way, and
other things, that prove a snare to them, a trap, and occasion of sin,
and all this with a design to bring about that damnation which God had
ordained for them, in this decree of reprobation; which sense of this
scripture never was, nor could be given, by any one, who has a due
regard to the divine perfections.

And shall this doctrine be judged of hereby, when it is very hard to
find any, how unguarded soever they are in their modes of speaking, that
understand this text as they represent it? We shall therefore consider
what is probably the meaning of this scripture, with which the doctrine
we have laid down is very consistent. It is not to be understood as
though God were the author of these sins, which they are said to be
charged with; but this blindness and stupidity, which is called, _A
spirit of slumber_ as it is connected with the idea of their being
rejected of God, and his determining not to give them the contrary
graces, is considered, as the consequence, not the effect thereof, and
that not the immediate, but the remote consequence thereof, in the same
sense as stealing is the consequence of poverty, in those who have a
vicious inclination thereunto. Thus when a person, who has contracted
those habits of sin, that tend to turn men aside from God, is destitute
of preventing and restraining grace, the consequence thereof, is, that
these corruptions will break forth with greater violence; and God is not
obliged to give this grace to an apostate, fallen creature, much less to
one who has misimproved the means of grace, by which a multitude of sins
might have been prevented; so that nothing is intended hereby but this,
that they are left to themselves, and permitted to stumble and fall, and
to commit those abominations, which, if they had not been thus
judicially left, would have been prevented, and as the consequence
thereof, they run into many sins, which they might have avoided; for
though we suppose that it is not in a man’s own power, as destitute of
the grace of God, to bring himself into a regenerate or converted state,
(as will be farther considered, in its proper place) nevertheless, we do
not deny but that men might, in the right use of the gifts of nature,
avoid many sins, which they, who are said to be thus blinded, and
hardened, run into, and so increase their guilt and misery, especially
where they are not prevented by the grace of God, which he may, without
any impeachment of his providence, deny to those whom he has not chosen
to eternal life, as he might, had he pleased, have denied it to the
whole world, and much more to those who have not improved the common
grace, which they received, but have, through the wickedness of their
nature, proceeded from one degree of sin unto another.

There is another scripture, which, some suppose we understand in such a
sense, as gives the like occasion of prejudice to many against this
doctrine, in 2 Thess. ii. 11, 12. _For this cause God shall send them
strong delusion, that they should believe a lie, that they all might be
damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness_;
the meaning whereof is this, that God suffered them to be deluded, who,
in the following verse, are represented as not receiving _the love of
the truth_; not that God was the author of these delusions, or deceived
them by a false representation of things to them, or by exciting or
inclining them to adhere to the suggestions of those who lie in wait to
deceive; but, since he did not design to give them grace under the means
of grace, or to enable them to receive the truth in the love thereof,
which he was not obliged to do to any, much less to those who rebelled
against the light that had been already given them; hereupon, through
the blindness of their own minds, they became an easy prey to those who
endeavoured to ensnare or delude them; so that the decree of God only
respects his denying preventing grace to those, who, through the
corruption of their own nature, took occasion, from thence, to run
greater lengths in their apostasy from, and rebellion against God. And
as for that mode of speaking here used, that _God shall send them strong
delusions_, that only respects his will to permit it, and not his design
to delude them.

There is another scripture to the same purpose, in Psal. lxxxi. 12. _So
I gave them up unto their own heart’s lust, and they walked in their own
counsels_; the meaning of which is, that God left them to themselves,
and then lust, or the corrupt habits of sin, which they had acquired,
conceived, and, as the apostle James speaks, _brought forth sin_, chap
i. 15. or greater acts of sin, which exposed them to a greater degree of
condemnation; and all this is to be resolved into God’s permissive will,
or purpose, to leave man, in his fallen state, to himself, which he
might do, without giving occasion to any to say, on the one hand, that
he is the author of sin; or, on the other, that he deals injuriously
with the sinful creature.

And to this we may add our Saviour’s words concerning the Jews, in John
xii. 39, 40. _Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias said
again, He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart; that they
should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be
converted, and I should heal them_. The sense which they, who
misrepresent this doctrine, suppose we put upon them, and conclude, that
no other is consistent with the argument we are maintaining, is, that
the unbelief, which the Jews are charged with, was principally, if not
altogether, resolved into God’s eternal purpose, to blind their eyes,
and harden their hearts, namely, by some positive act, as a cause
producing this effect, with this view, that they should not be
converted, and saved, that thereby his decree to condemn them, might
take effect. It is no wonder to find persons prejudiced against this
doctrine, when set in such a light; but as this is very remote from the
explication we have given thereof, so our Saviour’s design, in this
text, is to give an account why those miracles, which he wrought before
the Jews, were ineffectual for their conviction; the more immediate
cause whereof was the blindness of their mind, and the hardness of their
hearts, inasmuch as they had shut their eyes against the light, and,
through the corruption of their nature, had hardened their own hearts.
As to what God is said to have done, in a judicial way, agreeable to the
mode of speaking here used, when it is said, _He hath hardened their
hearts_, it imports nothing else but his leaving them to the hardness of
their own hearts, or denying them heart-softening grace, which would
have been an effectual remedy against it. And may not God deny his grace
to sinners, without being charged as the author of sin, or the blame
thereof devolved on him, and not themselves? And, since this judicial
act of providence cannot but be the result of an eternal purpose, is
there any thing, in this decree, that reflects on his perfections, any
more than there is in the execution thereof?

There is another scripture, in Prov. xvi. 4. _The Lord hath made all
things for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil_; from
whence they infer, that the doctrine of reprobation, which they suppose
to be founded on a perverse sense given of it, includes in it the divine
purpose to make man to damn him; for they conclude that we understand it
in that sense; and they proceed a little farther than this, and pretend
that we infer from it, that God made men wicked, or that he made them
wicked for his glory, as if he had need of sinful man for that end. I
should never have thought that so vile a consequence could be drawn from
this doctrine, if the learned writer, before mentioned, had not told the
world that we infer this from it;[216] and, to give countenance to this
suggestion, he quotes a passage out of Dr. Twiss;[217] his words are
these: “That all, besides the elect, God hath ordained to bring them
forth into the world in their corrupt mass, and to permit them to
themselves, to go on in their own ways, and so finally to persevere in
sin; and, lastly, to damn them for their sin, for the manifestation of
the glory of his justice on them.”

I am not ashamed to own my very great esteem of this excellently learned
and pious writer, who was as considerable for that part of learning,
which his works discover him to have been conversant in, as most in his
day; though I cannot think myself obliged, in every respect, to explain
this doctrine as he does; and Dr. Whitby knew very well, that if such an
inference, as what we have been speaking of, were to be deduced from the
writings of any, who maintain the doctrine of reprobation, it must be
from one who gives into the Supralapsarian way of explaining it; and
this expression, which, it may be, was a little unguarded, seems to bid
as fair for it as any other he could have found out: But any one that
reads it, without prejudice, and especially that compares it with what
is connected therewith, would not suppose that any thing is intended
hereby, that gives the least ground to conclude that God made men wicked
for the manifestation of his justice. The most obnoxious part of this
quotation, is, _God ordained to bring forth into the world the
non-elect, in their corrupt mass_, that is, that persons, who are every
day born into the world, are the seed of corrupt and fallen man, and so
have the habits of sin propagated with their nature, which many other
divines have endeavoured to maintain. What my sentiments are concerning
this matter, I shall rather choose to insist on, under a following
answer, in which we shall be lead to speak of the doctrine of original
sin, and of that corruption of nature, which is the consequence of it;
therefore, passing this by, there is nothing, in what remains of this
quotation, but what is very defensible, and far from making God the
author of sin; for we may observe, that all he says, concerning the
providence of God relating to this matter, is only, that he permits, or
leaves them to themselves, and he supposes them finally to persevere in
sin, without which they cannot be liable to damnation, or the display of
the justice of God therein; and if the author, who brings this
quotation, had duly considered the words immediately before, he might
have seen the reason to have saved himself the trouble of making this
reflection upon it; for Dr. Twiss, who, though a Supralapsarian, says,
“That he reckons that controversy, relating to the order of God’s
decrees, to be merely _Apex Logicus_, as he calls it, _a logical
nicety_;” and adds, “That his opinion about it is well known, namely,
that God doth not ordain any man to damnation, before the consideration
of sin;” and, a few lines after, he says, “That God, of his mere
pleasure, created all, but, of his mere pleasure, he damneth none; but
every one that is damned, is damned for his sin, and that wilfully
committed, and contumaciously continued in by them that come to ripe
years.” And if nothing more than this is intended by the doctrine of
reprobation, it ought not to be so misrepresented, with a design to cast
an odium upon it.

But to return to the scripture but now mentioned: When God is said _to
have made the wicked for the day of evil_, the meaning is not that man’s
damnation was the end designed by God, in creating him, for there are
some other ideas that intervene between God’s purpose to create and
condemn him; he must be considered not barely as a creature, but as a
sinner; now, as God did not create man that he might sin, he could not
be said to create him, that he might condemn him. Accordingly, the sense
which some give of this text, is, that God is said to have _made all
things for himself_, to wit, for his own glory. And inasmuch as some
will be ready to object, that God will have no glory from the wicked,
who oppose his name and interest in the world; the answer to this is,
that in them, from whom he shall have no glory, as a Saviour, he will,
notwithstanding, be glorified as a Judge; which judicial act, though it
be deferred for a time, while his long-suffering waits upon them, yet it
shall fall heavily on them, in the day of evil: which is very remote
from that supposition, that God made man to damn him. And there is a
sense given of it by some, who are on the other side of the question,
which seems equally probable, or agreeable to the mind of the Holy
Ghost, and is not in the least subversive of the doctrine we are
maintaining, namely, “That the Lord disposeth all things throughout the
world, to serve such ends as he thinks fit to design, which they cannot
refuse to comply withal; for if any man be so wicked as to oppose his
will, he will not lose their service; but when he brings a public
calamity upon a country, employ them to be the executioners of his
wrath: Of this there was a remarkable instance in the destruction of
Jerusalem, by the Roman soldiers, whom our Saviour used, to punish his
crucifiers, not that they undertook that war out of any design or desire
to do our blessed Saviour right, but out of an ambition to enslave the
world; yet God made use of them for another design, as public
executioners, by whom he punished the ungodly[218].” So the Assyrian is
said, in Isa. x. 5, 6. to be _the rod of God’s anger_, and to be _sent
against the people of Israel, and to lead them captive_, and therein _to
tread them down, like the mire in the streets_[219]. And as to what
concerns the purpose of God, on which these judicial proceedings depend,
this is to be judged of by the execution thereof, as is evidently to be
inferred from thence. And this is the sense in which we understand the
doctrine of _reprobation_, as in the foregoing argument.

Thus we have endeavoured to prove the doctrine of _election_ and
_reprobation_, and defend it from the reproaches and misrepresentations
cast upon it by considering it, not only as agreeable to the divine
perfections, but as founded on scripture. We shall therefore proceed,

VI. To enquire, whether the contrary doctrine as defended by some, be
not derogatory to the divine perfections, and therefore does not contain
greater absurdities; or, if expressions of detestation were a sufficient
argument to set it aside, whether we have not as much reason to testify
our dislike that way, as they have against the doctrine we are
maintaining? As to that part of the charge brought against us, as though
we represented God as severe and cruel to his creatures; or that it is
inconsistent with his goodness to suppose that he leaves any to
themselves in their fallen state, so as not to give them the means of
grace, when he knew that being destitute thereof, they could not
believe, and so would fall short of salvation, pursuant to his eternal
purpose relating thereunto: can this be said to be inconsistent with his
goodness, any more than all his other displays of vindictive justice? If
they suppose that it is, we might easily retort the argument upon them
since they will not assert, that the whole race of fallen man shall be
saved; and, if so, must we not suppose that God certainly fore-knew
this, otherwise where is his infinite understanding? And if he knew that
this would be the consequence of their being born, and living in the
world, where is his goodness in bringing them into it? If it be said
that they have a free-will to choose what is good, and so had a power to
attain salvation; therefore their not attaining it, is wholly owing to
themselves. Suppose this were taken for granted, without entering on
that subject at present; yet it must be farther enquired whether they
will allow that God fore-know that they would abuse this freedom of
will, or power to make themselves holy or happy; and, if so, could he
not have prevented this? Did he make a will that he could not govern or
restrain? Could he not have prevented the sin that he knew they would
commit? And, if he could, why did he not do it, and thereby prevent
their ruin, which he knew would be the consequence hereof? So that if
men are disposed to find fault with the divine dispensation, it is no
difficult matter to invent some methods of reasoning to give umbrage to
it; and, indeed this objection is not so much against God’s
fore-ordaining what comes to pass, as it is a spurning at his judicial
hand, and finding fault with the equity of his proceedings, when he
takes vengeance on sinners for their iniquities; or charging severity on
God, because all mankind are not the objects of his goodness, and
consequently not elected to eternal life.

But passing by this, we shall proceed to consider how, in several
instances, the methods used to oppose the doctrine, which we are
maintaining, are attended with many absurd consequences, derogatory to
the divine perfections; which farther discovers the unreasonableness of
their opposition to it; particularly,

1. It represents God as indeterminate, or unresolved what to do, which
is the plain sense of their asserting that he has not fore-ordained
whatever comes to pass. To suppose him destitute of any determination,
is directly contrary to his wisdom and sovereignty, and it would argue
that there are some excellencies and perfections belonging to
intelligent creatures, which are to be denied to him, who is a God of
infinite perfection: but if, on the other hand, they suppose that every
thing, which comes to pass, is determined by him; nevertheless, that his
determinations, as they respect the actions of intelligent creatures,
are not certain and peremptory, but such as may be disannulled, or
rendered ineffectual as taking his measures from the uncertain
determinations of man’s will; this is, in effect to say, that they are
not determined by God; for an uncertain determination, or a conditional
purpose, cannot properly be called a determination. Thus for God to
determine, that he that believes shall be saved, without resolving to
give that faith which is necessary to salvation, is, in effect, not to
determine that any shall be saved; for, since they suppose that it is
left to man’s free-will to believe or not, and liberty is generally
explained by them, as implying that a person might, had he pleased, have
done the contrary to that which he is said to do freely; it follows that
all mankind might not have believed, and repented, and consequently that
they might have missed of salvation, and then the purpose of God,
relating thereunto, is the same as though he had been indeterminate, as
to that matter. But, if, on the other hand, they suppose that to prevent
this disappointment, God over-rules the free actions of men, in order to
the accomplishment of his own purpose, then they give up their own
cause, and allow us all that we contend for; but this they are not
disposed to do; therefore we cannot see how the independency of the
divine will can be defended by them, consistently with their method of
opposing this doctrine.

Again, if it be supposed, as an expedient to fence against this absurd
consequence, that God fore-knew what his creatures would do, and that
his determinations were the result thereof, and, consequently, that the
event is as certain as the divine fore-knowledge, this is what is not
universally allowed of by them; for many are sensible that it is as hard
to prove, that God fore-knew what must certainly come to pass, without
inferring the inevitable necessity of things, as it is to assert that,
he willed or determined them, whereby they are rendered eventually
necessary. And if they suppose that God fore-knew what his creatures
would do, and, particularly, that they would convert themselves, and
improve the liberty of their will, so as to render themselves objects
fit for divine grace, without supposing that he determined to exert that
power and grace, which was necessary thereunto; this is to exclude his
providence from having a hand in the government of the world, or to
assert that his determinations rather respect what others will do, than
what he will enable them to do, which farther appears to be inconsistent
with the divine perfections.

2. There are some things, in their method of reasoning, which seem to
infer a mutability in God’s purpose which is all one as to suppose, that
he had no purpose at all relating to the event of things: Thus, in
opposing the doctrine of election, they refer to such-like scriptures as
these, namely, that _God will have all men to be saved, and come to the
knowledge of the truth_, 1 Tim. ii. 4. applying this act of the divine
will to every individual, even to those who shall not be saved, or come
to the knowledge of the truth; and they understand our Saviour’s words,
_How often would I have gathered thy children together as a hen
gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not? Behold your
house is left unto you desolate_, Mat. xxiii. 37, 38. as implying, that
God purposed to save them, but was obliged afterwards, by the
perverseness of their actions, to change his purpose. What is this, but
to assert him to be dependent and mutable?

3. They, who suppose that salvation is not to be resolved into the power
and will of God, must ascribe it to the will of man, by which we
determine ourselves to perform those duties, which render us the objects
of divine mercy; and then what the apostle says, _It is not of him that
willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy_, Rom.
ix. 16. would hardly be intelligible, or a defensible proposition; and
when it is said, _We love him, because he first loved us_, 1 John iv.
19. the proposition ought to be inverted, and it should rather be said,
He loved us, because we first loved him; and that humbling question,
which the apostle proposes, _Who maketh thee to differ_, 1 Cor. iv. 7.
should be answered, as one proudly did, I make myself to differ.

4. As to what concerns the doctrine of discriminating grace, which
cannot well be maintained, without asserting a discrimination in God’s
purpose relating thereunto, which is what we call election; if this be
denied, there would not be so great a foundation for admiration, or
thankfulness, as there is, or for any to say, as one of Christ’s
disciples did, speaking the sense of all the rest, _Lord, how is it,
that thou wilt manifest thyself unto us, and not unto the world_, John
xiv. 22. Nor is there so great an inducement to humility, as what will
arise from the firm belief, that, when no eye pitied the poor helpless
and miserable sinner, he was singled out of a ruined and undone world,
among that remnant whom God first designed for, and then brought to
glory.

VII. We shall now consider those methods of reasoning, by which the
contrary doctrine is defended, and enquire into the sense of those
scriptures, which are generally brought for that purpose; and shall
endeavour to make it appear, that they may be explained, in a different
way, more consistently with the divine perfections. It is plain that the
main design of those, who oppose the doctrine of election, is to advance
the goodness of God; and, since all mankind cannot be said to be equally
partakers of the effects of this goodness, inasmuch as all shall not be
saved, they suppose that God has put all mankind into a salvable state;
and, accordingly, as the gospel-overture is universal, so God’s purpose
to save, includes all to whom it is made; but the event, and
consequently the efficacy of the divine purpose relating hereunto,
depends on the will of man; and, that there may be no obstruction which
may hinder this design from taking effect, God has given him a power to
yield obedience to his law, which, though it be not altogether so
perfect as it was at first, but is somewhat weakened by the fall; yet it
is sufficient to answer the end and design of the gospel, that is to
bring him to salvation if he will, and the event of things is wholly put
on this issue; so that, though there be not an universal salvation,
there is a determination in God to save all upon this condition. How far
this is inconsistent with the divine perfections has been already
considered; and we are farther to enquire, whether there be any
foundation for it in scripture, and what is the sense of some texts,
which are often brought in defence thereof.

One text referred to, is, those words of the apostle, in 1 Tim. ii. 4.
_Who will have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the
truth_; and another scripture, to the same purpose, in 2 Pet. iii. 9.
_The Lord is not willing that any should perish, but that all should
come to repentance_; and several others, from whence they argue the
universality of the divine purpose relating to the salvation of mankind,
or that none are rejected, or excluded from it, by any act of God’s
will, and consequently that the doctrine of election and reprobation is
to be exploded, as contrary hereunto.

That the sense of these scriptures cannot be, that God designed that all
men should be eventually saved, or come to the knowledge of the truth,
so that none of them should perish, is evident, from many other
scriptures, that speak of the destruction of ungodly men, which,
doubtless, will be allowed by all; therefore it follows, that the
meaning of these two scriptures, is not that God purposed, or
determined, what shall never come to pass, which is inconsistent with
the glory of his wisdom and sovereignty, as has been before observed;
but they are to be understood with those limitations, which the word
_all_, which refers to the persons mentioned, as designed to be saved,
is subject to in other scriptures; as will be more particularly
considered, when we treat of universal and particular redemption, under
a following answer[220]. And therefore, at present, we need only
observe, that these scriptures may be set in a true light, that the word
_all_ is oftentimes taken for all sorts of men, or things; as when it is
said, that _of every thing that creepeth upon the earth, there went in
two and two unto Noah into the ark_, Gen. vii. 8, 9. that is all the
_species_ of living creatures, not every individual; so, Acts x. 12. in
the vision that Peter saw of the sheet let down from heaven, in which
_there were all manner of four-footed beasts_[221], &c. and it is said
concerning our Saviour, that he _went about, healing all manner of
sickness, and all manner of diseases among the people_[222]; and
elsewhere God promises, that _he will pour out his Spirit on all flesh_,
Acts ii. 17. that is, persons of all ages and conditions, young and old.

There are many instances of the like nature in scripture, which justify
this sense of the word _all_; and it seems plain, from the context, that
it is to be so taken in the former of the scriptures, but now referred
to, when it is said, _God will have all men to be saved_; for he
exhorts, in ver. 1. that _prayer and supplication should be made for all
men_, that is, for men of all characters and conditions in the world,
and, in particular, for _kings, and all that are in authority_, and
thereby he takes occasion to resolve a matter in dispute among them,
whether those kings that were tyrants and oppressors, ought to be prayed
for, when he tells them, that all sorts of men are to be prayed for; and
the reason of this is assigned, namely, _because God will have all men_,
that is, all sorts of men, _to be saved_.

Moreover, they whom God will save, are said to be such as _shall come_,
that is, as he will bring _to the knowledge of the truth_. Now it is
certain, that God never designed to bring every individual to the
knowledge of the truth; for, if he did, his purpose is not fulfilled, or
his providence runs counter to it, for every individual of mankind have
not the gospel; therefore it follows, that since God did not purpose
that all men should come to the knowledge of the truth, the foregoing
words, _Who will have all men to be saved_, are not to be understood in
any other sense, but as signifying _all sorts of men_. Neither can it
well be proved, whatever may be attempted in order thereto, that the
following words, which speak of Christ’s being _a Mediator between God
and men_, intend, that he performs this office for every individual man,
even for those that shall not be saved; for then it would be executed in
vain for a great part of them, as will be farther considered in its
proper place; therefore we must conclude, that, in the former of these
scriptures, nothing else is intended, but that God determined to give
saving grace to all sorts of men.

And as for the latter, in which the apostle Peter says, that _God is not
willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance_;
there the word _all_ is expressly limited, in the context, as referring
only to those who are elect and faithful; and therefore he says,
including himself among them, that _the Lord is long-suffering to
us-ward_. Now if we observe the character which he gives of the church,
to which he writes, in the beginning of both his epistles, (which, as he
says, in ver. 1. of this chapter, were directed to the same persons) it
is as great as is given of any in scripture; and they are distinguished
from those profane _scoffers, who walked after their own lusts_, and
other ungodly men, whose perdition he speaks of, as what would befal
them in the dissolution of the world, by fire, in the day of Judgment;
and they are described not only as _elect unto obedience_, and as having
_obtained like precious faith_ with the apostles, but they were such as
God would _keep, through faith, unto salvation_; therefore the apostle
might well say, concerning them, that God determined that none of them
should perish, without advancing any thing that militates against the
doctrine we are maintaining.

_Object._ The apostle, in this verse, speaks of God, as willing that
_all should come to repentance_; therefore they are distinguished from
that part of the church, who had obtained like precious faith, and were
included in the character that he gives of some of them, in both his
epistles, which infers their being then in a state of salvation;
therefore the word, _all_, in this text, is not subject to the
limitation before mentioned, but must be applied to _all the world_, and
consequently the meaning is, that God is not willing that any of mankind
should perish, but that all should come to repentance.

_Answ._ The apostle, in this text, speaks of God’s deferring the day of
judgment, and perdition of ungodly men, and so exercising his
long-suffering towards the world in general; not that he designed to
bring them all to repentance hereby, for that would be to intend a thing
which he knew should never come to pass: But the end of his patience, to
the world in general, is, that all whom he designed to bring to
repentance, or who were chosen to it, as well as to obedience, and
sprinkling of the blood of Jesus, should be brought to it.

There are other arguments, which they bring in defence of their sense of
the doctrine of election, as supposing that it is not peremptory,
determinate, or unchangeable, and such as infers the salvation of those
who are the objects thereof, taken from those scriptures, which, as they
apprehend, ascribe a kind of disappointment to God; as when he says, in
Isa. v. 4. concerning his vineyard, to wit, the church of the Jews,
_Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it
forth wild grapes?_ and our Saviour’s words, in Luke xiii. 6. that _he
sought fruit on the fig-tree_, meaning the church of the Jews in his
day, _but found none_; and, speaking concerning Jerusalem, he says, in
Matth. xxiii. 37, 38. _How often would I have gathered thy children
together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye
would not! Behold, your house is left unto you desolate_; therefore they
conclude, that God’s purpose, or design of grace, may be defeated; so
that these, and many other scriptures, not unlike to them, are
inconsistent with the doctrine of election, as ascertaining the event,
to wit, the salvation of those who are chosen to eternal life; which
leads us, particularly to consider the sense thereof.

As to the first of them, in which God says, by the prophet, _What could
have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done in it?
Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it
forth wild grapes?_ He condescends therein to speak of himself after the
manner of men, as he often does in scripture, and is said to look for
what might reasonably have been expected, as the consequence of all the
means of grace, which he had vouchsafed to them; the reasonableness of
the thing is called his looking for it, as though he should say, it
might have been expected, from the nature of the thing, that they, who
had been laid under such obligations, should express some gratitude for
them, and so have brought forth some fruit, to the glory of God. And
those words, which seem to attribute disappointment to him, when it is
said, _I looked_, &c. signifying nothing else but the ingratitude of the
people, that they did not walk agreeably to the obligations they were