ships for five hundred of the refugees who wanted to go to France. Genet
was able to do nothing more for them, as the $2,000 that he gave, were
out of his own pocket. It had been alleged that there was no precedent
for relieving these people. He mentioned two: The Americans in captivity
at Algiers had been assisted by the British Consul. Some years ago, the
crew of an American vessel had been shipwrecked on the coast of
Portugal. They were assisted with the utmost generosity by a private
gentleman. In both cases, Congress thankfully repaid the money advanced.
The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. NICHOLAS) had offered his salary, but
the idea had not been supported, so that it went for nothing. And are we
(said Mr. S.) to stand up here, and tell the world that we dare not
perform an act of benevolence? Is this to be the style of an American
Congress? The gentleman from Virginia had said that perhaps these people
would be considered as traitors by the Republic. Were women and
fatherless children to be regarded as traitors? Mr. S. was extremely
affected, and apologized more than once to the House for the warmth with
which he spoke. He said that himself and several others who had
witnessed the scene of distress, were surprised; the gentleman did not
feel as they did.

Mr. MADISON possessed constitutional scruples. He thought that the
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. S. SMITH) would not have injured his cause
by a greater moderation of language, nor his credit for benevolence by
not saying that his sympathy arose chiefly from being an eye-witness.

At last, the SPEAKER proposed to the committee an amendment, which met
the ideas of the members, and the resolution passed, as follows:

_Resolved_, That a sum not exceeding ---- dollars be appropriated for
the support of such of the inhabitants of St. Domingo, resident within
the United States, as shall be found in want of such support.

That a regular account of the moneys so expended be kept; and that the
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES be requested to obtain a credit therefor,
in the accounts between the French Republic and the United States.

_Ordered_, That a committee be appointed to bring in a bill in
conformity with the foregoing resolution, and providing for the due
application of the moneys aforesaid; and that Mr. AMES, Mr. TRACY, and
Mr. DENT, be the said committee.

THURSDAY, February 6.

_War with Algiers._

The resolution being read for building four ships of 44 guns and two
ships of 20 guns--

Mr. MADISON rose to inquire whether there was in the public stores of
the United States, a sufficient quantity of cedar and live oak for
building the proposed six vessels? He was answered that there was not.
Mr. M. then observed, that it was evident this fleet could not be ready
for effective service in the course of the present year. He imagined
that there was another resolution, precedent as to the time of voting
it, which ought to be before the committee. The resolution to which he
alluded, was that assigning a sum of money to buy a cessation of
hostilities from the Regency of Algiers. He was of opinion that the
project of fitting out an armed squadron was liable to many solid
objections. There were two points of light in which this subject might
be surveyed. The first of these was, whether the Algerines acted from
their own impulse in this matter? In that case, they were known to be in
the habit of selling a peace; and, if they are willing to do so, he
fancied that it might be purchased for less money than the armament
would cost. On the other hand, if they do not act from their own
impulse, but upon the instigation of Britain, we may depend upon it that
they cannot be bought. Britain will keep them hostile. There is
infinitely more danger of a British war from the fitting out of ships
than from the resolution on the report of the Secretary of State. The
distance which the ships would have to sail is not less than three
thousand miles, and their number is too small for a decisive advantage.
The combined powers would embrace the equipment of these ships as an
excellent opportunity to pick a quarrel with the United States. Mr. M.
expressed his doubts with regard to the propriety of this measure,
because the expense would be immense, and there was no certainty of
reaping any benefit from it.

Mr. CLARK was anxious to state his doubts on this subject, that
gentlemen, who, by their habits of life, had met with opportunities of
better information than he possessed, might correct him where he was
wrong. In the first place, the ships would be too small in point of
number to be of any kind of importance, amidst the numerous navies of
Europe. The distance from any friendly port, where, in case of
accidents, they might repair, was likewise very great. It was to be
expected that, when they fell in with British ships of war, that the
latter would endeavor to search them for prohibited cargoes, and for
seamen, because they were in the practice of impressing their own
countrymen wherever they could find them. This would produce a quarrel.
There was a scheme which occurred to him, and which he judged would be
less expensive and more effectual. This was, to hire the Portuguese to
cruise against the Algerines. He understood that the Court of Lisbon
desired to keep her ships of war in actual service. The British have
been in the habit of building frigates for the service of the Algerines,
and, as he was informed, mariners, at a distance upon sea could
distinguish in what country vessels were built by their construction.
Hence it would be difficult for the captain of an American frigate to
ascertain at sea a British ship of war from an Algerine. He had an
objection to the establishment of a fleet, because, when once it had
been commenced, there would be no end of it. We must then have a
Secretary of the Navy, and a swarm of other people in office, at a
monstrous expense. If we build six ships this year, we should next year
find it necessary to build six more, and so on. The combined powers
would find a much better pretence for a war by this armament than from
the resolutions on the Report of the Secretary. Mr. C. closed his
speech, which was heard with great attention, by observing that he rose
principally to submit his opinions on this question as hints for those
who were better qualified to form a judgment on the subject than
himself.

Mr. BALDWIN expressed his doubts as to every part of this subject. He
had not been able to gain any information that was satisfactory. To
block up the Mediterranean was, he believed, impracticable. Bribery
alone could purchase security from the Algerines. Spain and Britain had
always found this method the cheapest. He had much confidence in the
gentleman who had been employed to go as an Envoy to Algiers from this
country. He was a thorough man. Mr. B. had yet formed no decided
opinion, and could wish to suspend his judgment till he learned the
issue of the present application to the Dey. If bribery would not do, he
should certainly vote for equipping a fleet.

Mr. NICHOLAS feared that we were not a match for the Algerines. A small
number of sailors were sufficient to navigate one of their ships, and
they had a militia to man them who were innumerable. He had not been
able to form an exact opinion, but he was afraid that we were not a
match for them by sea.

Mr. S. SMITH rose chiefly to answer the interrogatories proposed by Mr.
CLARK, as to what harbors in Europe American ships could retire to for
shelter? In an early part of his life, Mr. S. said that he had been in
that part of the world, and could assure the House that there was no
want of proper harbors to refit or obtain provisions in. The first he
mentioned was Toulon; Marseilles, likewise, had a most excellent harbor,
and there was no doubt that our vessels would be received there in the
most friendly way, as the Algerines had lately declared war against the
Republic of France. Spain had, likewise, several excellent
ports--Malaga, Cadiz, Barcelona, and Ferrol. In all these the American
squadron would be heartily welcome, and meet with all kinds of naval
stores in the greatest abundance. Lisbon, also, was a fine harbor, and
Oporto would be proper for the same purpose. So that, in case of
accident, the armament had nothing to fear from wanting a place of
retreat. He had no doubt that our vessels and our sailors would both be
much superior to those of the Algerines. Their ships were old and
crazy, and were presents made them by the powers with whom they are not
at war. The American bottoms must be better; and our fleet will most
likely have its station between Oran and Malaga, and, stretching across
between those two ports, block up the mouth of the Straits. He adverted
to the mistake of Mr. BALDWIN, who had said that Spain never attempted
to block up the Straits; the proper answer to which was, that Spain had
an extensive coast, not less than four or five hundred miles, within the
Mediterranean; so that she was quite differently situated, with regard
to them, from America. Mr. S. mentioned, as a consolatory circumstance,
that our profit was twice as great at present, in commerce, as it was
before the war, in spite of all the spoliations committed by Britain,
and by Spain; and, if the war continues, the profits will continue to
multiply twice as fast as they would otherwise do. As an evidence of
this fact, he mentioned the high price of wheat at present in this
market, and asked whether any gentleman had heard of a price so high at
this season of the year before? A gentleman (Mr. NICHOLAS) had spoken of
an Algerine militia. Why, sir, (said Mr. S.,) I shall set down against
them the American militia, and so that account is settled. He estimated
that the whole American exports and imports, in round numbers, was
twenty millions of dollars each; and that the extra insurance on account
of the Algerines, from one end of the year to the other, would not be
less than five per cent. to the whole, which was altogether two millions
of dollars. From this Mr. S. inferred that it must be the very worst
kind of economy to hazard an expense of two millions of dollars of
insurance, for the sake of saving the charges of this armament. He did
not see it improbable that the Algerines might very soon be on our
coast, under the command of British or American renegadoes. It was
nothing uncommon, among seamen, for two captains to be in the greatest
friendship to-day, and plundering each other's vessels to-morrow. As an
example of what Americans, in particular, are capable of doing, he
repeated the history of a Mr. Cooper, of Virginia, who, some years ago,
fitted out a ship for the express purpose of cruising against American
vessels bound from or to the East Indies. He sent a person into the
harbor of Algiers to solicit a commission from the Dey, and this envoy
had very near been taken prisoner, as the Dey wanted to have made a
slave of him. Mr. S. said that Mr. Cooper was known to be a man of
courage, of perseverance, and as possessing that species of intellectual
resources which qualify an adventurer for bold undertakings. He
inferred, from this anecdote, that, if Mr. Cooper, a man of respectable
birth and connections, could form such a scheme, what was not to be
feared from the common set of seamen? He could not tell where the danger
might end; nor did he know whether Philadelphia itself would be in
safety. They might speak of their forts as much as they pleased; he knew
their force, and did not much value it. The British had gone past them,
and what was to hinder the Algerines, or such a man as Mr. Cooper, from
getting past them? Were he on the coast of an enemy, he should not have
the least scruple of engaging to run a ship by such forts, when there
was in view so great a prospect as the plunder of Philadelphia. He
strongly pressed the necessity of sending out the proposed fleet as
quickly as possible.

Mr. AMES attacked the mover of the resolutions on the Report of the
Secretary (Mr. MADISON) for not displaying in the affair of the
Algerines some part of the spirit which he had exerted on the other
occasion. He thought it shameful to buy a peace, and that there could be
no security, if we did. He recommended an armament. Portugal had shown
herself friendly; and, referring to what Mr. CLARK had stated, he was of
opinion she would give our ships shelter in her ports. He thought that
six stout frigates at the mouth of the Straits would do the business. He
went at considerable length into Mr. MADISON's resolutions, and
condemned, upon various grounds, the arguments and conduct of the
gentlemen who supported them. Yesterday, we were told that Britain durst
not quarrel with America, and to-day she is represented as ready to do
it. Our commerce is on the point of being annihilated, and, unless an
armament is fitted out, we may very soon expect the Algerines on the
coast of America.

Mr. GILES, in reply, said that Mr. AMES drew inconsistent pictures. One
day he represented the American commerce at the summit of prosperity;
the next, it was reduced to nothing. In defence of the commercial
regulations, he reminded the House that Britain, and not Algiers, was
the real object of alarm, and the real source of hostility. It was,
therefore, proper to provide remedies against both of these illustrious
confederates. Algiers was but the instrument, Britain was the cause. The
reliance of Britain upon this instrument plainly showed that she was not
equal to a war and a commercial contest. She had, therefore, turned
loose the Algerines upon us--a fact which is pretty generally
acknowledged on both sides of the House. It is, therefore, in the power
of Britain to prevent the progress of these pirates. The commercial
restrictions will reduce Britain to difficulty, and she will then, for
the sake of friendship with America, be glad to put a stop to the
Algerine ravages. Until some measure of this kind has been adopted,
Britain, as she has raised up Algiers, will keep her up. The cheapest
mode of getting peace will certainly be by embracing the commercial
regulations. Mr. G. was averse to the proposal of a fleet. He agreed
very much with the gentleman from New Jersey, (Mr. CLARK,) that it would
be a better expedient to hire the fleet of Portugal. He considered the
establishment of a maritime force as having a direct tendency to war;
whereas, the commercial restrictions had the same tendency to peace. The
sending of American armed ships into the midst of the fleets of Europe
would certainly produce a quarrel. It had been well remarked, (by Mr.
CLARK,) that, if an attempt was made to search our ships of war, like
our merchantmen, it would infallibly produce a public affront, and
consequent hostilities.

Mr. MADISON, in reply to some remarks which had fallen from Mr. SMITH,
respecting the present high price of wheat in the American market, said,
that he had been informed of a place where wheat sold for four shillings
and sixpence per bushel only, where the dollar passes for six shillings.
Mr. M. supposed that Britain could render very essential service to the
Algerines, without embarking in a war. She has not embarked in a war to
the north-west of the Ohio, but she has done the same thing, in
substance, by supplying the Indians with arms, ammunition, and, perhaps,
with subsistence. He did not assert that Britain directed the plan of
the Indian expeditions, for he had no explicit evidence that they
actually did so. In the same way that they gave underhand assistance to
the Indians, they would give it to the Algerines, rather than hazard an
open war.

The committee now rose, without coming to the question.

FRIDAY, February 7.

JOHN PAGE, from Virginia, appeared, produced his credentials, and took
his seat in the House.

_Algerine War._

THE NAVAL FORCE.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the
state of the Union. The Chairman read the resolution before the House
for equipping a Naval force.

Mr. MADISON thought this expedient unlikely to answer the purpose, and
liable to many objections. Before the American squadron can be equipped,
the truce between Algiers and Portugal must expire. When that expiration
shall take place, she either will not renew the truce at all, or she
will stipulate that the United States shall be comprehended in it. He
would save the money intended for the fleet, and hire the Portuguese
ships of war with it, as soon as the truce ends. He wished that the
committee might reject the present motion, and when they did so, he
would move a resolution, a copy of which he read to the committee. It
was in substance:

      "That the sum of ---- dollars be provided to be employed in
      such a manner as should be found most effectual for
      obtaining a peace with the Regency of Algiers; and failing
      of this, that the sum should be applied to the end of
      obtaining protection from some of the European Powers."

Mr. M. considered the armament at present proposed, as quite too small
to answer any efficient purpose.

A member here observed, that it would be hazardous to rely on Portugal;
because, though the truce might expire in about six months, it would
possibly be renewed at the end of that time, or converted into a peace.

Mr. FITZSIMONS wished that gentlemen would pay some attention to
attested facts, before they so abruptly declare that the six ships
proposed by the committee to be built and put into commission, were
incompetent to the end for which they were designed. The committee had
bestowed considerable time in deliberating upon the best information
which could be obtained, before they specified the force requisite to be
employed, and they had been satisfied, that what was now proposed would
be equal to the end. Here Mr. F. read a different statement of the ships
of war in the service of the Regency of Algiers, at different times. One
of these shows that in the year 1789, there were nine xebecs, from
thirty-six to ten guns, and one ship of forty guns upon the stocks; but
that several of the xebecs were laid up or unfit for service. A second
estimate of the Algerine maritime force, had been transmitted by Mr.
Humphries. He specified four frigates, two xebecs, and one brig. By
advices still more recent, the fleet consisted of one vessel of
forty-four guns, one of thirty-six, one of twenty-eight, three xebecs,
and a brig. Mr. F. observed, that gentlemen had objected to the sending
out an American fleet; that they could not always keep together. He
reminded them, that from November to March or April, the corsairs of
Barbary never go out to sea. There were two months during that time,
when they were restrained by their religion from piratical excursions.
The committee had been told, that the Portuguese are ready to assist us.
There is ground to expect this assistance, but not to depend upon it.
Two American frigates, along with the Portuguese vessels, would be fully
equal to the task of curbing the Algerines. As to militia, he could not
see of what consequence they could be in a naval contest. With regard to
expense, he stated a very important fact. The United States import,
annually, two millions of bushels of salt from these countries, which
the Algerines will cut off from our commerce. The rise on that article
must then be at least one dollar per bushel; which is a tax of two
millions of dollars at once, or three times the expense of the armament.
Probably, however, the loss may extend to four millions of dollars on
this single article of salt, in one year only; a sum which would keep up
the fleet a long time. We have been trying to buy a peace, but without
success; and if we are not able to enforce it, the price of buying it
must be so much the higher. As soon as Portugal is left to herself, she
will certainly protect us, because it is much for her interest to do so.
At present, she cannot, perhaps, from the influence of the combined
powers. Mr. F., therefore, recommended an armament in the mean time.

Mr. SMILIE objected to this measure, because it was unequal to the task.
Britain would assist the Algerines underhandedly, as she did an enemy in
another quarter, and would continue to do so. He did not think she was
shameless enough to own it, but she would do it.[49]

Mr. NICHOLAS went on the same ground. He said that Britain had not been
content with striking up a truce for Portugal, that the Algerines might
be let loose on American commerce, but her Minister at the Court of
Lisbon had endeavored to prevent our vessels from obtaining a Portuguese
convoy. Not content with insuring a loss to America, she had striven to
make that loss immediate. As to the duration of the truce, it could not
last long, for the Queen of Portugal had, in fact, broken it already.
She had declared that the trade to that country should pass unmolested;
to which condition it was not likely that the Algerines would consent.
The Portuguese nobility had clamored at the acceptance of a truce. So
that, on the whole, it could hardly last long. A naval force was a very
expensive affair. The greater part of the immense debt of England had
been lavished on her navy. He was against building a navy.

Mr. SWIFT had been always sensible that the situation of this country
was not fit for war. We have a very heavy debt; but still it is better
to bear debts than depredations. A gentleman of extensive information
(Mr. S. SMITH, in yesterday's debate) had stated the rise of insurance
as much less than the armament would cost. Britain had always more
dependence on her navy, than on the immense sums that she pays to these
barbarians. Mr. S. had no doubt that the proposed fleet would have its
intended effect. He despaired of either buying a truce or buying an
ally. As to the militia of Algiers, they could not be brought into
action against frigates. He considered the charge of hiring the
Algerines, as an unfounded accusation on the honor of Britain. He could
not bring himself to believe that she was capable of a conduct so
exceedingly disgraceful. He had no direct evidence to convince. It might
be objected to this armament, that it would augment the national debt,
and throw too much influence into the hands of the Executive Government.
But the same objection might be started against every armament whatever.

Mr. MURRAY said, the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. MADISON,) yesterday,
observed that he was not a little surprised that those who a few days
since had appeared so alarmed at the phantom of war, should on this
question appear so willing to meet it. He would remark that those
gentlemen were alarmed at a shadow which appeared followed by the
substance of war, and were unwilling to do any thing that might lead to
a war that did not yet exist. But we were now at war with Algiers, and
had no choice. They had been at war with the United States ever since
the end of the Revolutionary war. The Spaniards and Portuguese kept them
within the Mediterranean. Gentlemen who are averse to the report, hold
up two substitute measures: one, which was suggested, and has been
argued by the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. MADISON,) is, that we ought
to grant a sum to Portugal for her protection of our trade. The other
is, that commercial regulations will accomplish our protection. He liked
neither. The last, if permanent, will withdraw all temptation from Great
Britain to interpose her good offices. The first is worse; it is
subsidizing Portugal at the expense of our own people, and that too
without security. Gentlemen would make it the interest of Portugal to
make such breaches of truce as would occasionally withdraw protection,
and oblige us to subsidize her higher. It would create a disgraceful
dependence on a foreign power, and weaken the spirit of our marine;
whereas, if you fit out frigates, you employ your money in nourishing
the roots of your own industry; you encourage your own ship-building,
lumber, and victualling business. He believed, that however true might
be the suspicion of British interference in Indian affairs, and he
feared it was too true, he did not believe the evidence as to Algerine
interference strong enough to induce an argument against the report,
under a supposition that as Great Britain had effected the truce, so she
would aid Algiers against us. He thought so, because it was not now as
much her interest as it was in times of peace. In times of peace, had
she let loose the Algerines, her own navigation would have been enabled
to carry for us, but now it would be molested by the French. He did not
believe nations, more than persons, would do wrong purely out of evil
designs, devoid of interest; the greatest villain would not. At present,
their ships are liable to attack from the French, and he had it from
good authority, that so far were the British from having advantaged
themselves if they had been so base, that scarcely a British ship had
appeared since in our ports. The ship frigates would be able to blockade
the Gut of Gibraltar; the Algerines did not sail in fleets; they wanted
plunder, not glory; when they discovered they had to get the first by
hard fighting, they would listen to peace, accompanied by money. Spain,
it was true, had purchased a peace, but there was an hereditary
inveteracy against Spain, and a facility of attacking her shores which
we need not fear; so it was her interest to buy a peace when war could
bring her nothing but a glory that almost disgraced her armies; as to
jealousy of power in the Executive, he hoped to see a proper equipoise
in the powers of this Government; but, when proper occasions occurred,
he hoped Congress would never refuse the adequate means to enable the
Executive to discharge its constitutional duties.

Mr. GOODHUE observed, that the committee had carefully looked over the
statement of the marine force of Algiers for several years back, and had
no reason to doubt that the six vessels would be equal to the purpose
intended. There was no ground to suppose Algiers would have more force
at present than she had during her war with Portugal. He had no doubt
that the Algerines were let loose on the American commerce to prevent
supplies going to France, and while the war lasts, we shall not be able
to buy a peace. It is said, that the truce was but for a year, and in
six months it will expire. He did not wish to depend on that, when the
evil is so great. And why depend on Portugal? She is more under the
influence of Britain than any other nation in Europe. When Britain has
been at the trouble of stipulating a peace for Portugal, will she suffer
that nation to assist us? Certainly not. Or is it wise to stand by and
depend upon such a resource?

Mr. MADISON said, that gentlemen thought so differently on this subject,
and advanced arguments against his side of the question of such a
different nature, that it was difficult or impossible to give them an
answer. He then proceeded to quote the speech of Mr. GOODHUE; when that
gentleman rose to explain. Mr. M. then proceeded to notice the speeches
of Mr. FITZSIMONS and Mr. S. SMITH. Both of these gentlemen were up more
than once to explain, as having been misquoted. In a speech of
considerable length, he was not suffered long to proceed without
interruptions of explanations. This produced a scene of altercation. One
circumstance, however, was mentioned by Mr. FITZSIMONS that deserves
particular notice. From April to December next, he said, the insurance
on American ships from England and the rest of Europe, will not be less
than twenty-five per cent. of their value on account of the Algerines.

The House now adjourned, without taking any question.

TUESDAY, March 4.

_Estimate of Appropriations._

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on
the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury of the sums necessary to be
appropriated for the service of the year one thousand seven hundred and
ninety-four; and after some time spent therein, the Chairman reported
that the committee had again had the said report under consideration,
and come to a resolution thereupon; which he delivered in at the Clerk's
table, where the same was twice read, and agreed to by the House, as
follows:

_Resolved_, That, for the support of the Military Establishment of the
United States, for the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-four,
there be appropriated a sum of money, not exceeding one million four
hundred and fifty-seven thousand nine hundred and thirty-six dollars
and one cent; that is to say:

For the pay of the Legion of the United States,    $303,684 00
For subsistence,                                    312,567 75
For forage,                                          31,632 00
For clothing,                                       112,000 00
For equipments for the cavalry,                       7,314 05
For horses for the cavalry,                          16,000 00
For bounty,                                           5,000 00
For the Hospital Department,                         20,000 00
For the Ordnance Department,                          6,715 32
For repairs and articles directed to be made
  and purchased by the PRESIDENT OF THE
  UNITED STATES,                                    202,783 34
For defensive protection of the frontiers,          130,000 00
For the Indian Department,                           50,000 00
For the Quartermaster's Department,                 150,000 00
For contingencies of the War Department,             30,000 00
And for Invalid Pensions,                            80,239 55
                                                  ------------
                                                 $1,457,936 01

_Ordered_, That a bill or bills be brought in, pursuant to the said
resolution; and that Mr. BOUDINOT, Mr. TRUMBULL, and Mr. GILLESPIE, do
prepare and bring in the same.

THURSDAY, March 6.

_Slave Trade._

The House went into Committee of the Whole on the bill to prohibit the
carrying on the slave trade from the ports of the United States, Mr.
BOUDINOT in the chair.

The two first sections of the bill were agreed to, with one alteration
moved by Mr. TRUMBULL, which was to give the District Court as well as
the Circuit Courts cognizance of the offence.

The third section which relates to the penalty &c., it was moved should
be struck out. This motion was negatived. It was then moved to insert
the word _foreign_ before "ship or vessel;" which was agreed to.

The committee proceeded through the bill, which was reported to the
House with sundry amendments; these were agreed to by the House, and the
bill ordered to be engrossed for a third reading.

MONDAY, March 10.

_Algerine War._

NAVAL ARMAMENT.

Mr. GILES observed, that, from the sense of the House several times
manifested on this subject, there remained no doubt but that the bill
would pass. In that event, he most earnestly hoped that the success of
the measure would, at least, equal the expectations of its advocates.
Indeed, he hoped that their expectations would be disappointed and
exceeded; for it did not seem to him that even they were very positive
as to its full competency to the end proposed. He even wished that
every ship could be furnished with the cap of Fortunatus and the shield
of Hercules; for he was persuaded that, in the present state of things,
some magical influence would be found essential to enable them to effect
their undertaking. He observed, that, at present, the wisdom or folly of
the proposed measure was mere matter of opinion; that the passage of the
bill will furnish futurity with a complete experiment of its true
character.

He intended to offer his reasons against the passage of the bill, not
with a hope of making proselytes, but as a testimony of the real motives
which influenced his opposition. With this view, he should only mention
some of the general impressions produced on his mind by this subject,
without fatiguing the House with minute exemplifications of them.

The subject had presented itself to him in two points of view--1st, as
affording a protection to our commerce against the Algerine
depredations; 2d, as the foundation of a permanent naval establishment.

He could not help premising that, in the course of discussion, the
advocates of the bill had censured its opponents with a want of
disposition for the protection of commerce, whilst they claimed a
monopoly of all good intention towards this object. He did not mean to
derogate from the good intention of the favorers of the bill, but he
believed its opponents possessed as pure a zeal for the protection and
due encouragement of commerce as its advocates. It is not a question
whether commerce is, or is not, to be protected; but whether the plan
proposed be the most effectual and the least exceptionable that can be
devised for that purpose? The difference of opinion does not consist in
the end to be produced, but in the means proposed to effect the end.

The first objection he should make to the bill would be, the obvious
inadequacy of the means contemplated to effect the end proposed by them.
The object proposed is an effectual resistance, not only to the whole
present naval force of Algiers, but to their whole naval ability. The
bill contains, in itself, essentially a declaration of war. Our
calculations, therefore, should be extended to the utmost limit of the
naval ability of the hostile nation. The means to be employed consist of
four frigates of forty-four guns each, and two ships of thirty-six guns
each. To decide with propriety upon the objection, this force should be
compared with the naval ability of Algiers. He did not mean to go into a
minute history of Algiers. He should only observe, in general, that it
was a populous country; that it had furnished at one time one hundred
thousand fighting men; that its power at this day was as great as at any
preceding period; that they were a warlike people, accustomed to naval
enterprises and desperate in naval engagements; that, for some time
past, they had been subsidized for peace by almost every European
nation. He could not help concluding, from these circumstances, that
the naval ability of the nation either was or might, without any
uncommon exertions, he rendered superior to four forty-four gun frigates
and two thirty-six gun ships, the force contemplated by the bill; and,
if the conclusions were just, the bill is unwise.

Mr. G. proceeded to consider the bill as the foundation of a permanent
naval establishment. He said there was a clause in the bill authorizing
the PRESIDENT to suspend all proceedings in the equipment of the
armament, in case of a peace with Algiers, which gave him some
consolation; but it did not altogether relieve his apprehensions from
this operation of the measure, because he knew that a permanent naval
establishment was a favorite policy with some gentlemen, and because the
argument had been urged in favor of the present bill.

He observed that a permanent naval establishment could be recommended to
the United States but from one or both of the following considerations:
either upon the principle of entering into a competition for naval power
with the Powers of Europe; or as affording security to the collection of
our own revenue.

He thought the question of a permanent naval establishment was one of
the most important which could be presented to the consideration of the
House, and that the most serious consequences were necessarily connected
with it. In the first place, he viewed the establishment of a navy as a
complete dereliction of the policy of discharging the principal of the
public debt. History does not afford an instance of a nation which
continued to increase their navy and decrease their debt at the same
time. It is an operation exceeding the ability of any nation. The naval
competition of the Powers in Europe has produced oppression to their
subjects and ruin to themselves. The ruin of the French Monarchy, he
believed, might be ascribed very much to that cause. A navy is the most
expensive of all means of defence, and the tyranny of governments
consists in the expensiveness of their machinery. The expensiveness of
the French Monarchy is the true cause of its destruction. The navy of
France furnished the principal item of that expense. The navy produced
expense, the expense exceeded the revenue, new contributions became
necessary, the people saw the tyranny, and destroyed the tyrant. The
same effect, by the same policy, will probably be produced in great
Great Britain. The Government is not yet destroyed, but the people are
oppressed, liberty is banished. The extensiveness of the Government is
the true ground of the oppression of the people. The King, the Nobility,
the Priesthood, the Army, and, above all, the Navy.

All this machinery lessens the number of the productive and increases
the number of unproductive hands of the nation in Great Britain. The
operation has been extended so far that the poor rates alone probably
afforded a greater tax per _capita_ than the whole taxes paid in the
United States. He was astonished with these fatal examples before our
eyes, that there should be any gentlemen who would wish to enter into
this fashionable system of politics. He said the United States had
already progressed full far enough into this system; for, exclusively of
the ordinary expense of the Civil List, a debt had been funded upon
principles of duration. An army had been raised, at an immense expense,
and now there was a proposition for a navy. He observed that, for
several years past, the appropriations for the support of the Military
Establishment had exceeded a million of dollars per annum--from one
million to one million and a half annually. He believed that, if the
expense had been foreseen, there would have been more active efforts to
have avoided it. It was a policy, at this day, very generally condemned;
yet we are now to exhibit a counterpart of this policy upon the ocean,
with this aggravation--that it will commence with greater certain
expense, and with a more uncertain object. The system of governing by
debts he conceived the most refined system of tyranny. It seems to have
been a contrivance devised by politicians to succeed the old system of
feudal tenures. Both systems were tyrannical, but the objects of their
tyranny were different. The system of feuds operated upon the person of
the individual--the system of debts operates upon the pockets of the
individual. In the feudal system, the tenant often received some
indulgence and lenity from the martial generosity which generally
characterized the lord. The lord was gratified with the acknowledgment
of the tenant that he was a slave, and the rendition of a peppercorn as
an evidence of it. The product of the tenant's labor was left for his
own support. The system of debts affords no such indulgences. Its true
policy is to devise objects of expense, and to draw the greatest
possible sum from the people in the least visible mode. It boasts not of
economizing in calls upon the people for contributions. It boasts not of
economizing in the objects of expenditure. It consults the obedience,
and not the happiness of the people. There is no device which
facilitates the system of expense and debts so much as a navy. And he
declared, from that consideration, he should value his liberty at a
lower price than he now did, if the policy of a permanent Naval
Establishment should obtain in the United States.

Mr. W. SMITH remarked, that though it was not probable any proselytes
were to be expected at this late period of the business, and after so
ample a discussion as the question had received in its different stages,
yet he considered it necessary to make a reply to some of the various
objections which had just been made to the passing of the bill. Many of
those objections appeared to him totally inapplicable to the subject,
which he should pass over in silence. If it were the design of the House
to incur a vast expense in the establishment of a navy, merely for the
idle purposes of vain parade, there would be force in some of the
objections; but, as this was not the case, and as the measure was a
measure not of choice, but of necessity, extorted by the pressure of
unavoidable events, he did not feel their force in any respect. The
question was, simply, whether our commerce required protection against
the Algerine corsairs, and whether this was the best mode of protection.
The first part of the question was admitted on all sides. For himself,
he had always considered the second equally clear. But in the course of
the discussion, various difficulties had been started against the mode
of protection, and various substitutes had been proposed, as offering a
remedy more prompt, more effectual, and less expensive. He would first
consider the proposed substitutes for a naval armament, and then answer
the objections to it. The substitutes were: 1st. To purchase a peace of
the Algerines. 2d. To depend on Portugal breaking her truce with
Algiers, and shutting up their cruisers within the Straits. 3d. To pass
commercial regulations against Great Britain. 4th. To subsidize other
nations to protect our commerce.

To these several substitutes, he might, in a few words, object that the
first was impracticable, the second precarious, the third inoperative,
and the fourth dishonorable.

Mr. S. next reviewed the principal objections to the bill. These were,
he said, 1st. That the force contemplated was incompetent. 2d. That
sending an armed force on the ocean would be the means of involving us
in a war with some of the maritime powers. 3d. That we had no friendly
ports in Europe, which our frigates could resort to for supplies or
refitment. 4th. That the expense would exceed the object to be
protected. 5th. That our trade would be deprived of the seamen required
to man the frigates. 6th. That it was now so late in the season we could
not protect our vessels the ensuing summer, and that some favorable
events might occur before the frigates could be equipped, which would
render them unnecessary. 7th. That this was the beginning of a Naval
Establishment, which would hereafter involve this country in immense
debts and maritime wars.

      [To the arguments against a Naval Establishment, Mr. SMITH
      answered:]

The dangers resulting from a large Navy Establishment, and the immense
debts they have created in other countries, had been depicted, and the
House had been warned against such evils. How a bill providing six
frigates, which were to exist only during the war with Algiers, could
excite an apprehension of a large and permanent navy, and an enormous
debt, Mr. S. said he was at a loss to discover. The clause which
authorized the PRESIDENT, in the event of a peace with the Regency of
Algiers, to discontinue the armament, was a complete answer to all the
reasoning which had been indulged on the subject of navies and debts.
Admitting there had been no such clause, he did not feel the weight or
applicability of the reasoning.

This country is peculiarly fitted for a navy: abounding in all kinds of
naval resources, we have within ourselves those means which other
maritime nations were obliged to obtain from abroad. The nature of our
situation, and the navigating disposition of a considerable proportion
of our citizens, evince still more the propriety of some Naval
Establishment. Perhaps the country is not yet mature for such an
establishment, to any great extent; but he believed the period was not
far distant, when it would be. Sweden, with a population not greater
than that of the United States, and with more slender resources,
maintained a large navy. He saw no reason why the United States, with an
increasing population, much individual wealth, and considerable national
resources, might not, without ruin, do as much, or why the equipment of
a squadron, inferior to that of any of the petty nations of Italy,
should involve us in an insupportable expense.

The question was then taken on the passage of the bill, and it was
resolved in the affirmative--yeas 50, nays 39, as follows:

      YEAS.--Messrs. Fisher Ames, John Beatty, Elias Boudinot,
      Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Lambert Cadwalader,
      David Cobb, Peleg Coffin, Joshua Coit, Henry Dearborn,
      George Dent, Samuel Dexter, Thomas Fitzsimons, Dwight
      Foster, Ezekiel Gilbert, Nicholas Gilman, Henry Glenn,
      Benjamin Goodhue, James Gordon, Samuel Griffin, George
      Hancock, James Hillhouse, William Hindman, Samuel Holten,
      John Wilkes Kittera, Amasa Learned, Richard Bland Lee,
      William Lyman, Francis Malbone, Peter Muhlenberg, William
      Vans Murray, Josiah Parker, Thomas Scott, Theodore
      Sedgwick, Jeremiah Smith, Samuel Smith, William Smith,
      Thomas Sprigg, Zephaniah Swift, Silas Talbot, George
      Thatcher, Uriah Tracy, Jonathan Trumbull, John E. Van
      Allen, Peter Van Gaasbeck, Peleg Wadsworth, Jeremiah
      Wadsworth, Artemas Ward, John Watts, and Richard Winn.

      NAYS.--Messrs. Theodorus Bailey, Abraham Baldwin, Thomas
      Blount, Thomas P. Carnes, Gabriel Christie, Thomas
      Claiborne, Isaac Coles, William Findlay, William B. Giles,
      James Gillespie, Christopher Greenup, William Barry Grove,
      Carter B. Harrison, John Heath, Daniel Heister, John
      Hunter, William Irvine, Matthew Locke, Nathaniel Macon,
      James Madison, Joseph McDowell, Alexander Mebane, William
      Montgomery, Andrew Moore, Joseph Neville, Anthony New, John
      Nichols, Nathaniel Niles, John Page, Francis Preston, John
      Smilie, Israel Smith, Thomas Tredwell, Philip Van
      Cortlandt, Abraham Venable, Francis Walker, Benjamin
      Williams, Paine Wingate, and Joseph Winston.

THURSDAY, March 27.

_Sequestration of British Debts._

Mr. DAYTON submitted the following resolutions:

      "_Resolved_, That provision ought to be made, by law, for
      the sequestration of all the debts due from the citizens of
      the United States to the subjects of the King of Great
      Britain.

      "_Resolved_, That provision ought, in like manner, to be
      made for securing the payment of all such debts into the
      Treasury of the United States, there to be held as a pledge
      for the indemnification of such of the citizens of the said
      States as shall have suffered from the ships of war,
      privateers, or from any person, or description of persons,
      acting under the commission of authority of the British
      King, in contravention of the law of nations, and in
      violation of the rights of neutrality."

_Ordered_, That the said resolutions be committed to a Committee of the
whole House immediately.

The House accordingly resolved itself into said committee.

Mr. DAYTON then rose in support of his propositions. When he brought
them forward he did not accompany them (he said) with many observations,
because he was then laboring under indisposition. The same cause would
render him very concise now.

The injuries and insults we have suffered from Great Britain, he
conceived, need not be dwelt upon. They are well known, and it is
universally acknowledged that we ought to adopt such measures as would
screen us from a repetition of them, and secure to us reparation. The
resolutions he had brought forward he intended as part of that system of
defence and preservation, other portions of which had already received
the sanction of the House. These resolutions, he conceived, would not be
the least efficient part of that system.

He believed that, when the conduct of Great Britain is reviewed, it
would be found that it is treating their subjects with great lenity to
speak of sequestration only; we should be warranted in confiscating, for
they have subjected our property to condemnation, without an appearance
of an intention to indemnify.

As to restitution of the property of which we have been plundered on the
high seas, it is impossible. It is condemned, sold, and scattered, and
no hope can be entertained that they intend to indemnify our suffering
citizens. If it had been their intention to indemnify, their Court, in
explanation of the instruction of the 6th of November, would not have
given orders to condemn vessels detained in suspense in the West Indies
until that elucidation was received.

Since, then, restitution is impossible, and not a shadow of hope exists
that indemnification will be granted; we have only to determine whether
we shall give up the property of which we have been plundered, or claim
it with effect--claim it, and enforce the claim, by showing that we have
the means of retaliation within our power.

After the proceedings of the British towards us, he believed, we should
have been warranted in confiscating the property now proposed to be
sequestered, without negotiation. This would have been meting to them as
they meted to us. If sequestration is hostility, as he had heard it
called, what, he asked, is condemnation? Besides, they have impressed
American citizens into their service. We have reason to believe, (he
concluded by remarking,) from the negotiation of our Minister with Lord
Grenville, from private information on the tables of Congress, and from
the conduct of some of their officers high in command, that to make war
on us is part of their system.

Mr. S. SMITH said he always had wished for peace, as the first
desideratum. With this view, agreeably to the wise recommendation of the
PRESIDENT, he agreed to those measures calculated to put the country in
a posture of defence. This was the best mode of securing peace. With the
same view, he proposed an embargo to be laid, which would have drawn to
our ports the remainder of our maritime possessions, and have left them
no longer within the grasp of a nation whose only rule of right is the
measure of her power. He still wished, as long as a shadow of hope
exists, to secure the blessings of peace. With the resolutions now
offered, he was of opinion that we might yet have peace; but, without
them, we shall certainly have war. They will arrest twenty millions of
dollars in our hands, as a fund to reimburse the three or four millions
which we have been stripped of by that piratical nation, Great Britain,
according to the instructions of that king of sea robbers--that
leviathan, which aims at swallowing all that floats on the ocean--that
monster, whose only law is power, and who neither respects the rights of
nations nor the property of individuals! This character the nation he
had mentioned had long deserved. Many proofs might be cited in support
of the assertion. He would only refer to their conduct at St. Eustatia,
when they robbed their allies, the Dutch, and their generals and
admirals turned vendue-masters, and conducted the plundering, to collect
rewards for their exploits. Is it from such a nation (he asked) that we
are to hope for justice? They know not what justice is. It is said that
they showed their love of justice when they so liberally compensated the
Tories after their war with us. Though they despise traitors, yet
self-interest will lead them to reward the treachery, to encourage a
principle which may again be useful to them. Self-interest, then, and
not justice, actuated them on that as on every other occasion.

Let us pass the resolutions, then send an envoy to Great Britain, and we
shall have peace. We shall then be able to speak to them of their
interest. But if war should be the inevitable issue, Americans, he was
sure, would meet it like men, rather than submit to insult and suffer
the honor of the country to be prostrated.

If we were able, while in infancy as a nation, to assert our rights,
will it be said, that, now we have arrived at a state of manhood, we
shall fear them? No! our young men burn for an opportunity to defend the
liberty, rights, and property of their country. They will step out as
one, and meet the event like men.

He read a quotation from _Vattel_, to show that a nation has a right to
pay her citizens for losses inflicted by another nation, contrary to
right, by confiscating the property belonging to the citizens of that
nation. The tie of interest, he concluded by remarking, is the strongest
tie we have upon Great Britain. Let us pass the resolutions, and that
nation will never again give us cause to pass similar ones. The people
out of doors will say that we have done right. The nations of Europe
will rejoice to see this power, which is committing depredations on all
nations, humbled. The resolutions, he observed, do not regard the
property in the funds. To touch this is not one of the means of
retaliation warranted by the law of nations. Public contracts should be
sacred.

Mr. BOUDINOT said, he had not intended to take part in the debate at
this early stage of it; but what had fallen from the member last up,
convinced him that the House should not go into a consideration of the
subject at this time. It should be considered with coolness, and all
passions put out of the question.

No doubt we have a right to make reprisals, as the Legislature has a
right to declare war; but he doubted whether the United States, in their
present situation, would find it their interest to go into such
measures. The authority read from _Vattel_ by the member last up, he
observed, made against that member's opinion. _Vattel_ expressly says
that reprisals should not be made on property intrusted to public faith.
The debts of British subjects here are in that predicament. He had heard
that gentleman, not long since, with pleasure, expatiate with warmth on
the advantages of credit, especially to this country. Should that credit
be destroyed (he asked) by destroying the confidence of foreigners in
our faith? But, even if this retaliation is lawful, will it be the
interest of the citizens, or rather of the Government, to take such a
step at the present time? We have no doubt been cruelly treated; but we
have made proper application for redress, and received an answer? We
should first send a special envoy and insist on an immediate answer.
This would be the mode of securing peace; at least, it offers the best
chance of securing it.

The aggressions on our commerce made by Great Britain are no doubt
enough to rouse any American's feelings; but the Legislature ought not
to be swayed by passions; they should discuss the subject calmly and
deliberately. He hoped the committee would rise and allow time, at
least, to take the necessary measures of defence; for, could the
Legislature justify to their constituents this step of retaliation,
should immediate hostilities, warlike hostilities, be the consequence?
To justify a measure of this kind time should be given for the defensive
system adopted to be carried into operation.

Mr. MERCER next spoke. He owned the measures proposed appeared to him
great and momentous, and, had he any powers of declamation, he should
think it improper to give loose to them on a question of this kind. We
should weigh well our interest, examine carefully the situation in
which we stand, and determine calmly where we shall place our next step.
The proposition is, to arrest, not to confiscate, the debts due to
British subjects. From his recollection of the positions established by
the best jurisprudence writers, no doubt remained in his mind that we
have a clear right to secure to ourselves reparation in that way, and,
in our predicament, confiscation even would be warranted, and by a point
as firmly established as any principle which has the general practice of
nations for a basis.

One of the latest writers on national law (_Binkershoek_) is of opinion
that debts are property, as well as any thing else, and sees no reason
why they should not, as well as other kinds of property, be seized to
secure indemnity for injuries. This is the opinion of _Wolfius_, of
_Vattel_, _Grotius_, and of his commentators. He could go on with a long
list of authorities, and refer to actual treaties to show that it has
been the practice of nations. Having established the right, he proceeded
to consider the expediency of the propositions. Gentlemen, he hoped, did
not wish that we should make a solemn declaration of war before we
acted. This is no longer the custom among nations. It would be a pompous
display of candor which no longer exists. Have any nations in the
present European war, premised their operations by a declaration? No;
their first step was to do all the injury in their power to their
enemies. Then, we having taken what steps will best tend to our
security, and give us the best hold of our enemy, let us not, however,
lose sight of a settlement by negotiation. Let us show mankind that
peace is our first wish. When we are thus prepared, let us step forward
to an amicable negotiation. Let us call on the Executive to send forward
some proper person to the Court of Great Britain, to assure them that we
have a high sense of the injury done us; that we have it in our power to
resent it, but wish to see the difference settled by receiving an
indemnification. We shall thus make it their interest as well as duty to
allow it. This he conceived to be the line of conduct we should adopt if
we wished to preserve the Western Hemisphere from the scourges that
desolate the Old World. By some such measure as that proposed, we should
make their motives for peace more weighty, and we should give assurances
of our amicable disposition, by showing that all we wish is a just
compensation.

In a matter of this kind he was sensible of the danger of precipitation.
The best mode of arresting the property proposed should be calmly
weighed. He believed that something like the proposition made by Mr.
SMITH, of South Carolina, before the House resolved itself into a
committee--a stop to all transfers of British property--would be proper
as a preliminary step.

He concluded with some observations on the respect which nations,
however weak, will command from their superiors in strength, by showing
that they will not suffer imposition, by joining heart and hand in
defence of their rights. This spirit, he was sure, animates Americans,
and now their power is better able to keep pace with that spirit than
when we humbled that nation. At that time we were in our infancy--an
infancy by no means thriving under the trammels of the mother
country--and, when they turned us adrift, and began their hostile
spoliations, they carried with them all our means of defence; but now,
thank Providence, we have spirit and power to defend ourselves. If the
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SMITH) would modify his proposition,
and make the term thirty days, it should have his assent in preference
to that now before the committee.

Mr. SMITH (of South Carolina) said, that the proposition he had read
before the House went into committee was in the nature of an embargo on
debts, securing them from transfer until the necessity of sequestering
them more plainly appeared. The proposition did not then appear to meet
the wishes of the House. When the committee should rise he would again
bring it forward. The question now before the committee is, whether they
will agree to a sequestration of British debts. He wished this object
had not been coupled with the indemnification to our own citizens,
because it is fairer to decide each question upon its own merits. That
part of the resolutions which contemplates an indemnification may give a
weight to the first part which it might not intrinsically deserve.

He made some observations on the propriety of cool deliberation on the
present important subject. The passions should be banished, and calm
reason more than ever courted. It requires all the wisdom of the
Legislative body now to combine our national honor with our national
safety. He had doubts on the propriety of the resolutions proposed, but
acknowledged that the arguments used in their favor had great weight in
his mind. If the situation of this country be compared with that of
other commercial nations, the propriety of something like the present
resolutions would appear more evident. When other commercial nations
wish to quarrel with us, their navies enable them to seize our vessels,
and we cannot retaliate in the same way. Then we must fly to such means
of retaliation as are in our power. If they take our property of one
description, and we cannot lay our hands upon the same kind, we must
take any of theirs within our reach. This reasoning has, no doubt, great
force; but the sacredness with which the modern usages of nations has
shielded debts is a great bar to our proceeding in the present case.
Contracts between individuals are now considered as out of the reach of
governments, and it is the modern usage not to meddle with them. In the
beginning of our late war, debts were not confiscated. The State of
South Carolina, though certainly not wanting provocation, while
confiscating all other property, left debts untouched, under the idea
that private contracts are sacred. But this, in a case of war, and
urgent necessity, might be overlooked; but if we are not in a state of
war, perhaps meddling with private contracts might provoke it. Credit is
certainly important to this country. We should consider how far the
operation of the resolutions proposed would give a shock to it. Besides,
they might have a tendency to involve us in future wars. We shall yet
long be under the necessity of receiving certain supplies from Europe,
and shall have debtors among us for those supplies. These debtors may at
any time, when the burden weighs heavy, think of easing it by fomenting
dissensions with the foreign creditor nation, in expectation that a
confiscation of the debts may be an effect. It is true that, in such a
case, they will not be exonerated. But it cannot be supposed that the
government to whom the debts would be transferred could prosecute the
recovery of them with as much ardor as an individual.

The gentleman last up had relied on the authority of ancient and foreign
jurists. Some among this class of writers warrant putting prisoners to
death--a principle which modern custom has put a stop to. They also, it
is true, warrant the confiscation of debts; but _Burlamaqui_ says this
is not the practice of modern nations. None, or very few trifling
examples can be cited, he believed, of a departure from this principle,
in modern times, among nations where commerce is cherished. This country
depends on commerce, and credit is one of the means by which it
flourishes; we should, then, not endeavor to weaken it. If we are once
over the barrier, by trifling extensions of the principle we may be
carried to immoderate lengths, indeed. Some persons who are in favor of
sequestering private debts, speak with horror of touching the public
funds. For his part, he did not see much difference between confiscating
private and public debts. The object is the injury of an enemy, and to
retaliate for injuries. Again: if we go to war with Great Britain, it is
probable we shall be involved with her allies, then will it be said,
that we shall confiscate what the Dutch lent us at a time of distress or
since the peace. The Dutch have bought largely in our funds. The same
principle will lead us to lay our hands upon that property. It will be
difficult to draw a line, if we admit the principle.

Under these impressions, if called upon to give his vote, he should now
feel much embarrassment. It had been said that the adoption of the
present resolutions would be a means of obliging Great Britain to do us
justice; that it would strike a terror among the subjects of that
country, and make them clamorous for peace. It might, he feared, have a
very different effect exasperate them, and unite the people with the
Government against us. Some further forbearance on our part may separate
them. It will convince the people of Great Britain that we really wish
for peace, and then, if war is the issue, the impression will be
severely felt by that Government. We shall render the Administration
very unpopular, and hasten its dismission for one more friendly to this
country. He was of opinion this crisis was fast approaching.

He concluded by again adverting to his propositions for preventing the
transfer of British debts, which he hoped would be considered as a
sufficient provision in the present exigency, and would give time to
deliberate on further measures, and to watch the course of events in
Europe, which, he believed, would have great influence upon the conduct
of Great Britain towards us, and probably bring forward the change in
the Administration of Great Britain.

The committee now rose and reported progress.

FRIDAY, March 28.

_Sequestration of British Debts._

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of
the Union, and took up Mr. DAYTON's resolutions for the sequestration of
debts due to British subjects.

Mr. GILES commenced his remarks by observing, that he had intended to
have given a silent vote upon this question before the committee, and
probably should not have altered that intention, if it had not been from
the solicitous requests expressed yesterday by several gentlemen in the
opposition, that the favorers of the proposed measure should furnish the
committee with the reasons upon which it was founded. Although it
appeared to him to be rather unreasonable that some gentlemen should be
expected, not only to possess reasons for their own opinions, but to
furnish reasons for others; and, although he did not conceive that the
favorers of the measure were under any obligation to disclose the
reasons inducing it, provided they thought proper to hazard its fate
upon a silent vote, yet he was willing to indulge the gentlemen with
presenting to them the general course of reflection which the subject
had produced in his mind, and which had strongly suggested its
propriety. He had, however, a more powerful inducement to disclosing his
opinion, since the subject has become matter of discussion and its
propriety doubted.

The measure is deemed a bold one, and pregnant with the most serious
consequences; in all such cases, he was desirous that his responsibility
to the United States in general, and to his immediate constituents in
particular, would at all times be tested by the real motives which
should influence his conduct.

Several gentlemen in the opposition had earnestly admonished the
committee against the indulgence of their passions upon this subject,
and recommended the exercise of cool and deliberate reasoning. He should
not pretend to say how far such an admonition was necessary, or
justified by the temper of the committee, but he believed it applied as
strongly to the gentlemen who suggested the caution, as to those to whom
it was addressed; and he hoped, in the course of the future discussion,
the gentlemen would show an example in themselves of the precepts they
had prescribed to others.

As to himself, Mr. G. declared that, impressed with the awfulness of the
present crisis, he had never reflected upon a subject with more
coolness; and, if he understood his own situation, his mind was never in
a state more susceptible of conviction.

The proposed measure is expected to eventuate in a final explanation of
the relative state of things between the United States and Great
Britain. It will probably result, therefore, in an open hostility, with
the usual appeal to arms, or in a peace, with all the rights of
neutrality attached to it. For this purpose, the resolution proposes a
sequestration of the debts due to the subjects of Great Britain, to be
held as a pledge for the indemnification of the losses sustained by
American citizens under the orders of the British King, in contravention
of the laws of nations, and violation of every rule of morality and
justice. In the course of debate, this subject seems to have resolved
itself into two questions. First, as it respects the right of one nation
to sequester the property of the individuals of another in any possible
case. Second, the policy of exercising this right at this time, under
the existing circumstances of the United States.

He presumed that a state of things might exist between two nations in
which reprisal would not only become the right but the duty to the
nation sustaining the wrong. This happens where one nation, without
cause, forcibly seizes upon the effects of another, or of its citizens,
and withholds them without restitution or compensation, and when the
nation, whose effects shall be so seized and detained, shall possess no
other means of indemnification. The right of reprisal in the injured
nation, in such a case, grows out of its injury sustained, and its
inability to redress itself in any other way.

The duty of the injured nation to make reprisals, is founded on
self-preservation; and in case of the losses of its citizens, upon the
promise of the protection of property sacredly made by the nation to its
individual members.

This he believed to be the doctrine of the laws of morality and reason,
and he knew it to be the doctrine of the laws of nations, which were, in
fact, nothing more than the laws of morality and reason systematized and
reduced to writing.

Believing this principle to be a just one, he would apply it to the
existing state of things between the United States and Great Britain.
Almost as soon as Great Britain had taken part in the iniquitous war
against France, the Executive of the United States manifested their
regard for peace, by proclaiming their existing state of neutrality, and
recommending to their citizens, not only the observance of neutrality,
but of impartial neutrality--although the partiality of the American
people for the cause of France was well known--although, at that moment,
their affections for the French nation were addressed by the most
honorable and powerful considerations that ever existed between two
nations. The peculiar similarity between the existing French cause and
that which had just given birth to American liberty and independence;
the material agency which the French nation had exerted in bringing
about that event; and the existing principles of Government here, the
product of the Revolution, which are the great object of attack by the
combination against France.

A pure and laudable regard for peace, and a detestation of war, however,
had overcome all these sensations, and produced a neutrality, which he
believed, on the part of the United States, had been rigidly observed;
at least, he was sure, that such was the intention of Government. In
this state of things, Great Britain commenced an attack upon this state
of neutrality, which it was certainly her interest to preserve, and
which she ought to have deemed a favor to obtain. Great Britain
continued to keep possession of posts upon the acknowledged territory of
the United States, to carry on a contraband trade with our savage enemy.
She, shortly after our proclaimed neutrality, proceeded to interrupt our
lawful trade with our allies. She seized, condemned, and sanctioned the
complete transfer of the property of American citizens to her own
subjects; and, as if there could be no limits to her iniquity and
resentment, she has contrived to open upon our Eastern frontiers a
barbarous enemy to aid in making depredations upon our commerce.

These acts constitute injuries which amount to war, and they are
infinitely aggravated, both by the perfidy which attended the execution
of some of them, and the total want of provocation for the commission of
any of them.

If, then, Great Britain shall have committed acts towards the United
States which furnish just cause of war, the United States possess the
right, consistently with the laws of nations, to exercise any act
towards Great Britain which would be justifiable in a state of war. The
United States having received the injuries, are authorized to select
such measures and means as they may deem the most expedient for
self-preservation and indemnification. Reprisal is within their power.
All other means of redress are without their power. In such a state of
things, reprisal is a right--reprisal is a duty. An objection, more
plausible than solid, has been made to this course of reasoning, that
the individuals who will be the immediate objects of the reprisal, have
not been the immediate agents of the aggression. The laws of nations
state, that the property of individuals is as much a subject of reprisal
as the property of the aggressing nation; but, as the nation is the
immediate agent in the wrong, the individual who sustains an injury
thereby, becomes entitled to recompense from his nation. The nation
which commits the wrong, by this process, will ultimately sustain the
loss. Hence, in the present case, the innocent and unsuspecting victims
of the United States, have received losses from the lawless aggressions
of Great Britain, and the question is, whether they shall finally
sustain those losses, without any clear claim of indemnification upon
the Government of the United States? or, whether the losses shall be
transferred to British subjects, who will thereby possess the clearest
claim for recompense from the British Government? He thought the laws of
God, the laws of morality, the laws of reason, the laws of nations,
would all pronounce that the British Government which had done the
wrong, should afford the recompense.

Mr. G. said, that if the losses were to be ultimately borne by the
individual subjects of Great Britain, the remedy would seem to be a
harsh one; but, even in that case, the only alternatives left to the
United States would be to say whether their own citizens, to whom they
have promised protection, should finally sustain the losses, or the
British subjects, to whom they have promised no protection. But the
situation of the individuals who may be the subjects of reprisal, is
greatly meliorated, by the consideration of their just claim to
recompense from their own Government, which he had no doubt but they
would ultimately obtain, if they were put into a situation to demand it;
but if they should ultimately be denied justice, it would be a
consolation to reflect, that it was the injustice of their own
Government, not of the United States.

He observed, that a reprisal in the way proposed, stood upon the same
ground as the invasion of the property in every other case did, and was
justified upon the same principle, to wit, self-preservation. He
presumed, if there existed an acknowledged state of war, letters of
marque and reprisal, commissions to privateers, &c., would be deemed
justifiable and expedient, and that no discrimination would be made
between the property of individuals and the property of the nation; yet
the invasion of the rights of property in that case would be as palpable
as in the case of the reprisal proposed, with this aggravation; that, in
that case, the individual sustaining the loss would not be entitled to
ultimate recompense from the Government--in the case proposed, he would
be entitled to recompense. He observed, that the British nation had not
discovered this delicate discrimination between national and individual
property, in their late instructions given to their privateers and ships
of war, although they had sustained no wrong; and he thought their
conduct an example in point for the United States, who had received the
injury and committed none.

A gentleman (Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina) yesterday attempted to make a
distinction between vessels at sea and other property; although he
acknowledged that, at the first blush, he could discern no distinction
in principle.

Mr. G. said, that every species of property stood on the same
principle--the promise made by the Government to afford protection to
all property--the same rights are attached to every species of property,
and the Government is bound to afford an equal security to all. A
sentence read yesterday, by a gentleman, (Mr. S. SMITH), from a writer
upon the laws of nations, clearly shows the right of a nation to make
reprisal upon all the effects of individuals of an aggressing nation
indiscriminately, except stock in the public funds; which has been
exempted, under the idea of its being a pledge in the hands of
Government; the withholding of which would be a breach of public faith.
He believed that the practice and policy of some nations might have
given rise to this distinction, but he doubted whether the practice had
been uniform and universal, and he was clear that there was no rational
distinction in principle. The idea that the public funds are a pledge in
the hands of Government, and ought not, therefore, to be touched, is
equally applicable to every other species of property. In the case of
contracts between individuals, the Government guarantees the performance
upon the refusal of one party to pay, or comply. In the case of lands or
personal chattels, the Government guarantees the exclusive enjoyment to
the proprietor; it would be equally a violation of faith for the
Government to deny its obligation in the one case as in the other, and
nothing could justify an invasion of the rights of property, in any
case, but self-preservation--the first of all rights, and the highest of
all duties.

He positively denied that any pre-eminence was due to one species of
property over another. He said, however, that this discussion was not
immediately necessary, as the resolution under consideration did not
embrace the stock in the funds of the United States.

Mr. G. observed, that it had been said, and repeated in the committee,
that the proposed measure was war. He denied that the measure in itself
was war, or that it furnished a just cause of war. He believed, however,
that it was problematical whether it would eventuate in peace or war;
indeed, he remarked, that the crisis of affairs is already such, that,
whether the measure be adopted or not, he viewed war as a probable
event, peace as a possible event; but the point he contended for was,
that if the aggressions towards the United States be sufficient to
justify reprisal, the exercise of the right does not furnish a just
cause of war. The exercise of a right by one nation can never involve
the absurd consequence of giving another nation the right to exercise a
wrong. He said, that gentlemen on one side of this question seemed to
act upon an imaginary, instead of the real, state of things. He was not,
therefore, astonished at hearing the committee cautioned against the
violation of neutrality. He did not conceive that the present state of
things between the United States and Great Britain would justify the use
of the term neutrality. Neutrality is a term used to signify the
relation in which two nations stand towards each other. Neutrality,
therefore, requires parties--either party may destroy the relation
between the parties. It therefore appeared absurd to him to say that
Great Britain was in a state of depredation and war towards the United
States, and the United States in a state of neutrality towards Great
Britain. It has been said, that the United States have not abandoned
their neutrality; this is true, but it is no evidence that neutrality
exists. Great Britain has abandoned it for them.

He said, however, that this was disregarding the substance and entering
into a mere cavil about names. It was not material, in his opinion, what
name ought to be given to the existing relation of things between the
United States and Great Britain--whether it was called a state of peace,
a state of war, a state of neutrality, a state of reprisal, a state of
retortion, or a state of very uncivil conduct on the part of Great
Britain. Nor did he conceive it material to ascertain whether there was
any intermediate stage between a state of peace and a state of war, or
in which state the depredations of Great Britain should technically be
classed; but one thing was certain and material--that the United States
had sustained substantial wrongs, which required a substantial remedy.
Gentlemen who have regarded names and disregarded substances have also
been extremely alarmed at the idea of a discrimination of conduct by the
United States towards foreign nations. A gentleman (Mr. BOUDINOT)
observed yesterday, that the United States had sustained injuries from
France and Spain as well as Great Britain, and asked why there should be
any discrimination in their favor? Mr. G. said he was extremely hurt
that the conduct of France should be so unnecessarily and inopportunely
arraigned in that House. He submitted it to the gentleman to say, if the
United States should be compelled to enter into the war, which was at
this moment not an improbable event, why then it would be wise to
irritate the only nation in the world who could afford them any
substantial assistance! He said that this conduct was the less
justifiable, from the recollection that the conduct of France was the
result of necessity, and there was every reason to conclude that the
conduct of that nation would be explained in a satisfactory manner. But
a consideration mentioned by a gentleman, (Mr. SMITH, of Maryland,)
yesterday, was a conclusive answer--the United States owe to France a
pecuniary obligation, as well as one of a more sacred nature. This is at
all times sufficient for their indemnification. With respect to Spain,
if the gentleman would show the injury sustained, and point out a fund
for indemnification, Mr. G. declared he would not hesitate a moment to
apply it to that object.

But will the gentleman conclude, that because one nation has injured us,
in a degree against which we have no redress, that therefore we shall
not indemnify ourselves from a nation which has injured us in the
extreme, and against which we have the most ample redress?

He believed the gentleman's coolness, his wisdom, and his deliberation,
could not possibly lead him to such a result. With respect to
discrimination in the conduct of the United States towards foreign
nations, it necessarily grew out of the character of the conduct of
other nations towards the United States. Some gentlemen appeared to him
to have carried their ideas upon this subject to the most fanciful
absurdities. To keep France out of the comparison, let this
indiscriminate conduct, so much applauded, be applied to Great Britain
and Holland. Great Britain destroys our trade, plunders our property,
and, to her injuries, adds insult and contempt. Holland, engaged in the
same cause, fosters our trade, and respects us as a nation. Under these
circumstances, do gentlemen contend that an indiscriminate conduct is
due to Great Britain and to Holland? Or do they mean to carry this
delicate indiscriminate conduct so far as to refuse to themselves all
redress from one nation, because they would wish to deal out the same
conduct to all others, whether they had offended or not? He said, that
discrimination was stamped in the front of the conduct of foreign
nations towards us, and to make an indiscriminate return would be the
worst and most unjust of all discriminations. He hoped gentlemen would
pardon him, but he could not help thinking that they had carried their
ideas upon this subject to the most fanciful absurdities. A gentleman
(Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina) yesterday remarked, that of late the
condition of war had been much ameliorated as it regards the rights of
property, and he thought the amelioration ought to be extended rather
than abridged. Mr. G. declared, that he heartily joined him in his
wishes that the condition of war would ere long be ameliorated, both as
it regards property and persons. He hoped that mankind would soon learn
more wisdom than to butcher each other for the amusement or security of
the privileged orders of the world. From that source he believed all
wars arose, and until the cause was banished from the earth, he feared
the fatal effects resulting from it would continue to exist. He
declared, that he should view the banishment of the privileged orders
from the world as the surest harbinger of the approach of the
millennium. But this is not the happy period of the world; for, although
the United States are free from this pest of the human species in their
internal organization, yet the evils they at this moment experience
arise from their external intercourse with that part of the world which
is less fortunate. The attack made on the United States at this moment,
is an attack upon property. If there should be a war between the United
States and Great Britain, it will be a war of property. Unless there
should be a species of madness in the nation not to be calculated upon,
they cannot think of invasion and subjugation. It is known that the
United States cannot make an attack upon Great Britain, and territory
and conquest with them are no objects. Hence the war will be confined to
depredations upon property. This is the most dishonorable species of
warfare, and therefore the more to be regretted. There is this obvious
distinction, however, between the United States and Great Britain. With
Great Britain, at least with the privileged orders, it is matter of
choice; with the United States, it is matter of compulsion. The United
States despise this mode of warfare; they covet not the property of any
nation upon earth, but self-preservation demands it. They are under the
strong hand of a powerful nation, despising their rights, and regardless
of justice. In this state of things, there is but little hope of
strengthening the sacred ties of property; for, in the example of Great
Britain, her late conduct can furnish no consolation for these theoretic
speculations; and however the United States might be inclined to
practise upon them, yet the British depredations will forbid them--for
submission will be an invitation to new acts of aggression. He most
ardently wished the state of things were otherwise; but, exposed to
these inconveniences, the most effectual means ought to be adopted for
their resistance.

Mr. G. proceeded to observe, that having shown the right of reprisal to
be conformable to the laws of nations, and clearly justified by the
existing relation of things between the United States and Great Britain,
he would now submit a few remarks upon the policy of exercising the
right at this time. Under the existing circumstances of the United
States, he thought the policy of the measure was recommended by the
clearest and most obvious principles. The relation of things between the
United States and Great Britain is such as to demand a final and
unequivocal explanation, whether the proposed measure be adopted or not.
In all parts of this committee, in all parts of the United States, a
definitive explanation is called for. The present state of things
between the two nations cannot long exist.

It is to be hoped that, the tone of language to be used by the United
States will be adjusted to the nature of the injuries they have
sustained. Acquiescence and submission are no longer recommended. Hence,
matters are already reduced to extremities, and all the irritations
already exist which can grow out of an extreme state of things. The
proposed measure can add nothing to these irritations. The question,
therefore, appears to be reduced to this--whether, in demanding an
explanation and attempting negotiation, we shall use all the means in
our power to compel a favorable issue? or whether we shall tamely
supplicate for justice, and suffer the most effectual means of
compulsion to elude our grasp? He did not mean here to recapitulate the
conduct of Great Britain towards us; he hoped it was sufficiently
impressed upon the mind of every gentleman in the committee; but, after
the recent experience of her conduct, it would be madness, it would be
folly, to address our complaints to her justice or moderation. He
thought it would be wise to lay hold of every thing in our power, and
hold it as a pledge for her good behavior. This measure would put us in
the best possible situation for negotiation. It would authorize an
appeal to her interest, which she could not resist. He begged the
committee to reflect upon the argument which had been used here, to
prevent a late measure which had been adopted, and which had been
renewed upon the present resolution, that a great value in property,
belonging to the citizens of the United States, was in the power of the
British, and that any counteracting measures would place it in extreme
hazard. This seemed to him to have been the most prevailing argument
which had been urged, and for some time was irresistible. If, then, the
argument shall have been applied with so much force here, with how much
more force will it be applied in Great Britain, when they find that the
property of the individuals of that nation is placed in jeopardy here,
and that it greatly exceeds in value the whole of the property which
they have infamously detained and condemned? Besides, if, in the event
of a war, it should be a war of property, as is every where
contemplated. Great Britain will find that the war will be commenced
upon very unequal terms. Viewing this measure, therefore, as to its
probable tendency to peace or war, he thought the probability greatly in
favor of its producing peace. When Great Britain shall find that she is
entering into a contest upon unequal terms, when she shall find that it
may terminate in a permanent loss of the advantages of her commerce with
the United States, when she shall see before her a precipice, into which
if she should once enter she never can return, she would pause before
she acted, she would take time to count the probable loss and gain, and
peace would be the infallible consequence of such deliberate
calculations. This measure will convince Great Britain that the United
States possess a knowledge of their rights, a confidence in their
ability, and a determination in their disposition to assert and support
them.

A gentleman (Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina) observed yesterday, that a
pacific system would probably attach the people of Great Britain to the
United States, and detach them from their own Government. The gentleman
ought to recollect, that a pusillanimous conduct will not. It is with
nations as it is with individuals--to be respected by others, they
should respect themselves. The same gentleman remarked, that a change of
Ministry might be expected, and advised waiting for the event. The idea
is as undignified as it is chimerical.

Mr. G. said, he knew nothing of the change of the Ministry--the
principle was unknown here. The people here were their own governors. It
was immaterial to them who the Minister was. Even in the country where
the people were less fortunate, where Ministers govern, a change of
Ministers never produced any solid advantage to the nation. It was
merely an expedient of the moment, to smother a popular clamor. But,
even proceeding upon the gentleman's hypothesis, which Mr. G. thought
wholly inadmissible, he submitted to the gentleman to determine, whether
a positive submission by foreigners to the avaricious regulations of a
Minister, be the most likely mean to render him unpopular at home? On
the other hand, whether it was not the most effectual mean of preserving
his popularity, and of keeping him in office? He presumed the people at
home would never complain of injuries abroad, if those who sustained
them refused to complain. It is but by resistance, and throwing the
burden upon the people of England, that they can be brought to complain.
But, in cases of such extremities as the present, all appeals to the
people of England are futile and degrading. Our only resource should be
in our own exertions. They would be abundantly sufficient, if we could
be brought to believe it.

Mr. G. remarked, that the people of Ireland had lately afforded an
instructing lesson upon this point. They had arms in their hands for the
purpose of asserting their rights; under the idea of acquiescence and
submission they had surrendered them to the Government; perhaps, under
the expectation of a change of Ministry. Did this act of submission
render them more respectable in the eyes of the people of England? Did
it encourage the hopes of those who wished the establishment of
Government upon the principle of equal rights? Did it not rivet the
chains upon the people of England? Did it render the people of Ireland
more respectable in the eyes of the people of the United States? To
these questions it was unnecessary to give an answer. The people of
Ireland reaped the usual merits of submission--imposition and insult.

There was another consideration strongly in favor of the policy of the
proposed measure. Applications have been already made from different
parts of the United States by the immediate sufferers from the British
depreciations, for an indemnification of their losses. These
applications will, probably, be increased, repeated, and continued; the
agricultural and other interests of the United States will, probably,
never consent to equalize this burden. The claims of the sufferers upon
the Government will gain additional weight, unless this fund should be
offered to them for their indemnification. This is the obvious, the
natural and the rightful fund for their indemnification; and he thought
it was, at least, the duty of the Government to hold it as a pledge for
their security. If this measure should not now be adopted, the refusal
will lay a foundation for further parties in the United States, which
may ultimately have a serious effect upon the Government.

An objection, of a very delicate and influential nature, has been made
to the proposed measure, which required some consideration--that it
would affect the character and credit of the Government. He had viewed
this objection with the most deliberate attention, and felt the whole
force of its imposing delicacy; but was at length perfectly satisfied
that it was unfounded. This objection relates rather to the right than
the policy of the United States to adopt the measure. If the United
States possesses the right of reprisal upon an honest and sound
interpretation of the laws of nations; if the conduct of Great Britain
towards the United States be sufficient to justify the excess of the
right, he believed the policy of exercising the right could never
tarnish the American character, nor lessen the credit of American
citizens hereafter. The world of nations, as well as individuals, will
easily see, that it was a measure of compulsion, not of choice; that,
although the United States believed, they regretted the necessity; that
they were not the authors of the original wrongs; that they had borne
them with patience, had used their endeavors to prevent the commission
of them; and that, when these wrongs were committed and repeated, the
United States possessed no other means of redress.

Under these circumstances, in the exercise of a substantial right, he
did not believe there could flow any consequential wrong.

The motive would be looked at, and it would furnish a complete
exoneration from blame, whilst the original aggressors would become
justly responsible for all the consequences.

Mr. G. said, he could not sit down without making some remarks upon the
fruits of the conduct heretofore observed by the United States. The most
pacific system has heretofore marked the character of the Government.
All America looked upon the late proclamation of neutrality as a
competent guarantee for peace. He had no doubt but that it was dictated
by the purest regard for peace. But what have been the fruits of it? He
did not mean to condemn the conduct of the Executive. Perhaps it was
suggested by the then existing state of things. He only intended to
show, that it had not met with the return it merited, and which was
reasonably expected from it.

It has not produced peace. A regard for peace has been construed into a
fear of war. A resistance of the feelings of the people for the cause of
France has been a palatable food for British arrogance and presumption.
Submission to aggression has invited new aggressions; appeals for
justice have been deemed testimonies of debility, till at length the
United States, after having been stripped of their citizens and
property, are upon the eve of a war, because they have not exerted their
rights at an earlier period. If this conduct should have been heretofore
wise and pacific, experience has taught us that it is no longer so;
nothing can be expected from the justice, the honor, or the moderation
of a court which has proved itself equally a stranger to them all; but,
before such a tribunal, acquiescence will beget injuries, injuries will
beget insults, and insults will beget contempt, degradation, and war.

Mr. SWIFT remarked that, on the first view of the subject, he had been
inclined to favor the proposition, not having attended minutely to the
distinction made by the laws of nations respecting the property of an
enemy liable to reprisal; but on a full investigation of the subject,
and mature deliberation, he was convinced that the proposition under
consideration would be a direct and manifest violation of the laws of
nations; he was, therefore, clearly and decidedly opposed to its
adoption. Gentlemen have said much respecting the insults and the
injuries which we have received from the British nation; but Mr. S.
conceived it to be unnecessary that gentlemen should describe their
insults and injuries in the highest colors to inflame our passions, and
to animate our resentment. He believed that every gentleman in the
committee deeply felt the indignity which had been offered to their
country, and was convinced that Great Britain had been guilty of a
violation of the laws of nations; but, under such circumstances, it was
our duty to conduct with coolness, candor, and moderation. He thought
that the heat and passion which had been manifested in the course of the
debate were inconsistent with that dignity and propriety which ought to
mark the deliberations of the Legislature.

Mr. S. observed, that the conduct of the British Court in regard to
their concealing in such a singular manner the Order of the 6th of
November, and the equivocal terms in which it was expressed, was greatly
to their dishonor. But he thought that the words _legal adjudication_,
would fairly admit of a construction that no American vessel that should
be taken pursuant to that order, could be liable to be condemned, unless
warranted by the laws of nations. There was reason to apprehend that
such was the intention of the British Cabinet; and that the Courts of
Admiralty in the West Indies, in their condemnations, had exceeded their
jurisdiction, and contradicted the design of the Court of London. Recent
intelligence confirmed the idea. No information of these illegal
transactions had yet been communicated to them. It was possible that
when that court were made acquainted with the injuries we had sustained
that they would award restitution or compensation. Mr. S. remarked that,
by the laws of nations, no nation had a right to make reprisal for any
injury till all other means of obtaining justice had failed; that it was
our duty in the first place to represent to the Court of Great Britain
the spoliations that had been made on our commerce by the illegal
condemnation of our vessels; that, till we had done this, the laws of
nations would not warrant us to make reprisals on the goods and effects
of the British nation. That there was a possibility of obtaining a
satisfactory explanation of their conduct and reparation for the
injuries we had suffered. It was, therefore, a proper subject of
negotiation. But, he said, if that nation will not do us justice, then
we are authorized to make reprisals.

Mr. S. then observed that, when we had taken such steps as would
authorize reprisal, we should be precluded by the laws of nations from
adopting the proposition under consideration. He said that a gentleman
from Maryland (Mr. MERCER) had yesterday asserted that _Burlamaqui_ was
the only authority among the writers on the laws of nations against the
measure; and that the opinion of _Vattel_ was in favor of it. Another
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. SMITH) had read a passage from _Vattel_,
which he considered as an authority in point, to justify the seizing of
private debts; but not debts due from the public. But if these gentlemen
had thoroughly examined _Vattel_, they would have found, instead of his
being an authority in their favor, he had in the most direct terms
maintained a contrary opinion. He then read a passage from _Vattel_,
that showed that the effects of an enemy in a country at the time of a
declaration of war cannot be seized, but that the owner is entitled to a
reasonable time to remove them; and another passage, which expressly
declared that, by the usage and custom of modern nations, public and
private debts are not the subject of reprisal. Mr. S. conceived that
these rules were founded in the highest wisdom; that all debts were
contracted under a sanction of public faith, and an understanding that a
war should not render them liable to seizure or confiscation; that a
moral obligation existed between the contracting parties for the payment
of the debts; and that no government could ever have a right to violate
a moral obligation. That, therefore, by the law of nations in all
instances where property comes into the possession of a nation by a
confidence reposed in their honor and faith, as in case of public or
private debts, such property can never be the subject of reprisal,
because this would be to authorize a breach of public faith; but
reprisals are always to be made on property in possession of the nation
who has done the injury, and which may be taken without any violation of
those principles, which ought to be held sacred in time of war.

Mr. S. remarked, that it had been suggested that the British nation had
been guilty of a violation of the laws of nations in their treatment of
us; and that, therefore, we were not bound to govern ourselves by that
law in our conduct towards them. This argument, however plausible, he
said, would not bear the test of examination; that all reprisals were
justified only on the principle that the nation on whom reprisal is made
has been guilty of a previous violation of the laws of nations. When a
nation disregards that general law by which the conduct of all
independent communities towards each other is to be regulated, the same
law points out the mode of redress. If there has been no violation of
that law, there can be no reprisal. If there has been a violation, then
the reprisal must be pursuant to the law, for it is the highest
absurdity to say, that because there has been an infraction of a law
which authorizes a certain mode of redress, that we may pursue a
different mode of redress in violation of the law which gives us the
right. This would be at once to renounce the whole system of the laws of
nations, and throw mankind back into a state of savage barbarity and
ferocity.

Mr. S. then adverted to the policy of the measure. He said, upon a fair
calculation, it would be found that the adoption of the proposition
would be productive of far greater injury to this country than the
amount of the losses sustained by our citizens in consequence of the
spoliations committed upon our commerce. It is evident that this
country, even admitting that a war should take place, would wish to
renew their commercial connection with Great Britain. But if, in
contempt of the law of nations, we seize on private debts, we shall for
ever forfeit all credit; no trust can be reposed in our citizens, and no
faith in our Government. No foreign merchants will ever deal on credit
with our citizens, from a well-guarded apprehension that, in case of a
war between the countries, the sacred nature of private contracts will
not protect them against the hand of a Government which has exhibited
the example of a deliberate violation of the laws of nations. When we
consider the immense advantages that can be derived from private credit
and national honor, it will be easy to imagine the infinite mischief
that must result from a disregard of those principles.

Mr. S. objected to the measure on the ground that he considered it to be
a declaration of war; and he did not think that the circumstances
required or justified our taking that step. He said that notwithstanding
the unwarrantable proceedings of the British nation; yet, no act had
been done by the British Court that clearly indicated an intention to
make war directly upon us, or that could be considered as direct and
intentional war, though we might consider many of their acts as just
causes of making war on our part.

The revocation of the Order of the 6th of November, the new instructions
of the 8th of January, and the explanation given to the merchants of
London, clearly evidenced that a war might be avoided with that nation.
While there was the remotest possibility of preserving our peace we
ought not to do an act which might endanger a war. While then the
conduct of the British Cabinet would admit of an explanation, while
there was a prospect that we might obtain by negotiation restitution of
the property of our citizens or compensation for the losses they had
sustained, we ought to pursue that mode; but if we proceeded to make
reprisals by adopting an illegal measure, it must certainly be deemed a
declaration of war.

The omission of the regular means of obtaining satisfaction by
negotiation, and an unwarrantable mode of reprisal, would certainly be
just causes of war. If we must be driven into a war, it would be of the
highest advantage to us to conduct it in such a manner as to convince
the people of Great Britain that we sincerely wished to avoid it, and
that the unjust and illegal proceedings of their own court have been the
sole cause of the war. In such a case we have reason to think, that so
great is the interest of that nation in preserving our commercial
connection, that a powerful party will be formed in our favor to oppose
the injustice of the Government. The sentiments of the people will be
against the war, and the court will find it extremely difficult to
maintain it under such circumstances.

But if, without demanding an explanation, we proceed to adopt rash,
violent, and unwarrantable measures, the spirit of the nation will rise
against us, and the people will join the court in prosecuting a war
which will be then deemed just and necessary.

Mr. S. then observed that we ought to take into consideration the
present situation of Europe; that the late successes of the French
nation had materially changed the political prospect. It was possible
that these successes had been the cause which had produced an alteration
in the views of the British Court. If events had happened which had
rendered the disposition of that nation less unfriendly and hostile, we
ought to take advantage of that circumstance, and not do any thing to
check the progress of that favorable disposition. He most sincerely
hoped that these successes would convince the combined powers of the
impossibility to conquer France, and produce a general pacification.

While such were the prospects, he ardently wished that a measure
repugnant to the principles of common honesty and common justice might
be rejected; and he hoped that no gentleman in the committee would vote
in favor of a proposition which would fix an indelible stigma on our
national character.

The committee now rose, and had leave to sit again.

THURSDAY, April 10.

_Non-Intercourse with Great Britain._

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House, on
the motion of the 7th instant, to prohibit all commercial intercourse
between the citizens of the United States and the subjects of the King
of Great Britain, so far as the same respects articles of the growth or
manufacture of Great Britain or Ireland.

Mr. SEDGWICK said he was sorry to rise, unprepared as he was, as he had
yesterday occupied as great a portion of the time of the committee as
perhaps he was entitled to. He had hoped some other gentleman would have
risen, who, having better arranged his ideas than himself, had a
preferable claim to the attention of the committee. Unprepared as he
was, he could not permit a question so important as that under
consideration to pass, without entering against it his solemn protest: a
question involving the dearest interests of our country, and threatening
to exchange the unexampled prosperity it had for some years enjoyed, for
all the horrors of war. He said he the more regretted the part he was
obliged to take on this occasion, because he feared he should, in his
vote, divide from many gentlemen whom he much respected; but as his
opinion had been formed on mature deliberation, neither his honor, his
conscience, nor the duty he owed to his country, would permit him to be
silent. If the evils he foresaw should result from the measure under
consideration, he wished it might be known that no part of them could
with justice be imputed to him as their author. If, therefore, he should
be so unfortunate as to stand single and alone, he would not fail to
oppose, as far as he could, the measure before the committee.

That injuries unprovoked and inexcusable had been inflicted by Great
Britain on this country, was acknowledged by all. No man felt stronger
indignation than himself at the insults which had been offered to our
country, and the wrongs which had been done to our citizens; no man was
less disposed tamely to bear the haughty and unprovoked aggressions of
any foreign nation; no man would go further to procure redress for our
wounded honor, and indemnification for our injured citizens. If, after
seeking reparation in the way dictated by prudence and humanity, happily
prescribed by the modern usages of civilized nations and commanded by
the principle of religion; if fair negotiation should be tried, and
justice not obtained, he would then seek redress by the means which God
and nature had given us. He remembered well the miseries and vices of
war, a war in which he had taken a part. It was a war of honor and
interest: he well remembered its circumstances and effects. He had lived
to see the wastes of that war repaired; to see a state of order and
security; to see his country progressing in all the means of happiness.
No man who loved his country, and rejoiced in its prosperity, would
consent, but from inevitable necessity, to see it again plunged in the
horrors of war.

Although all combined in opinion that our injuries were great, that they
must be redressed, yet no one had suggested that war should precede
negotiation. Respecting this, there was happily but one opinion. On
every side of the House, it was acknowledged a duty indispensable in our
present situation, to state our complaints of injuries to the authors of
them, and to demand redress. We were only divided as to the manner of
our application, and the circumstances under which our demand should be
made. He had already, on another occasion, taken the liberty to declare
his opinion of the line of conduct which was dictated by our present
situation; that we should manifest that we are averse to war; but,
should it become inevitable, we should encounter it with that undaunted
spirit which became freemen, insulted in their honor and injured in
their rights. He had the most perfect confidence in the bravery of our
citizens. At the same time that he knew they would never surrender their
rights, he was sensible that they would avoid, if possible, an
unnecessary and wanton effusion of blood.

Gentlemen had disclaimed any intention to adopt any measures tending to
war; they had said this measure had no tendency to such an event. This
assertion he could not believe, because this measure contained a threat
of inconvenience; and every threat of inconvenience was a cause of
irritation, and every irritation between nations who had already
differences to decide, undoubtedly tended to widen the breach, and of
course to produce war. If gentlemen were sincere in their declarations,
that all differences between America and Great Britain should be
terminated by peaceable negotiation, (and he would not call their
sincerity in question;) if Great Britain was proud, haughty, and
insolent, as she had been repeatedly denominated, was it probable, he
asked, that she would be more inclined to do us justice, by enlisting
her pride and insolence against us?

Mr. S. said, that the late violences by which the property of our
citizens had been plundered, were the immediate and avowed cause of the
present measure; that as yet no representation of these injuries--no
demand for compensation had been made; that such representation and
demand should precede hostility was conceded by all. It only then
remained to be considered, in what terms and manner such claim should be
exhibited. In terms, he said, doubtless firm and decided; but if it was
intended to produce the desired effect of peace, and to prevent
hostility, the language should be decent and conciliatory. He called on
gentlemen to show an instance, in modern times, where a nation
complaining of injuries, but desirous of peace, had accompanied their
demands of justice with threats of inconvenience? The opposite practice
was universally established, and on the known principles of human
nature. He appealed to the feelings of every honorable man in the
committee, whether demands for justice and reparation for injuries were
enforced by threats? whether repugnance to a compliance with such
demands was not created by such means? If every man felt the operation
of this principle, how much more powerful would it be on the minds of
the governors of a nation styled proud and insolent? He said he would
charge no man with an intention to involve this country in all the
horrors and desolating scenes of war. He could not, however, help
declaring, that war or amicable negotiation evidently must decide the
controversies between America and Great Britain, and that were his mind
determined on the former, he should recommend those measures which
gentlemen had brought forward to the consideration of the House, as the
most operative means of rendering the event certain, and of banishing
every prospect of accommodation. To seize on British property, to
confiscate or sequester British debts, to annihilate as far as in our
power her commerce, to starve her manufacturers, and to humble her
pride; these were infallible means of defeating negotiation, and of
uniting, as one man, that nation against us, in all the views of her
administration.

It had been said, that a principal benefit to be expected from the
institution of Republican Government was, that cool and temperate
reflection would direct the conduct of nations. How far our conduct on
this occasion had verified such an expectation, he wished gentlemen to
reflect. He had himself fondly hoped, in the Government of this country,
to have seen these principles exemplified, and all intemperance of
expression, and all the heat of passion, banished. It had been said,
that a statesman should be all intellect: never, surely, was a time or a
country, which more required than the present time, and by this country,
the exercise of cool temper, to the exclusion of passion, to conduct
with safety the political machine through surrounding dangers. He well
remembered a former non-importation agreement; he remembered, too, its
effects: they were such as might have been expected; they were such as
to convince every cool and considerate man, that the measure itself was
impolitic and unwise. It immediately raised the price of all articles of
importation to an exorbitant and extravagant height. Hence it was
immediately beneficial to importers and shopkeepers, and hence it may be
easy to understand why this measure was said to be so popular in
Philadelphia and other great towns. But as the Representatives of the
whole people of America, the Legislature ought to reflect, that in
proportion as this measure would operate beneficially to the dealers in
imported commodities, it would become burdensome and oppressive to those
who are best entitled to our regard--the substantial yeomanry of the
country--on whom we must principally depend for support, in the arduous
conflict which we had too much reason to apprehend. If we must
eventually support our claims by arms, the more property we could import
before the commencement of war, the more beneficial would it be. In that
case, the most wise and prudent policy would be, that which would give
the greatest extent to our credit; and, on the contrary, the most unwise
and wretched, that which would tend to deprive our people of the
ordinary means of supplies.

If this system should prevail, were we to receive British productions
through other countries? This would be injuring ourselves, without
affecting Great Britain. Was there any other country which could give us
the same supplies we wanted? There certainly was none. Were we to depend
on ourselves alone, the inconvenience would be great, if not
intolerable. What, he further asked, would become of our produce, in the
event contemplated? Without entering into a minute detail, he said, he
would venture to pronounce that a great part of it would perish on our
hands.

It was, he said, doubtful, how far at any time the proposed system might
go to distress Great Britain; but, at this time, it would afford
facility to her in recruiting her fleets and armies. Were manufacturers
and laborers thrown out of employment, and thereby deprived of bread,
they would be alike stimulated by want and despair to fight the battles
of their country against those who had reduced them to necessity. In
short, he saw nothing which should stimulate the Legislature to adopt
this measure, but passion without, and resentment within, these walls.
He saw nothing in the system itself, as it respected Great Britain, but
vain and ineffectual irritation; nothing in relation to our own country,
but defeat, wretchedness, and want.

He said he had taken the liberty to suggest to the committee certain
constitutional considerations. The answers which had been given had been
by no means satisfactory. It was incumbent on gentlemen who had so
frequently warned us of the danger of usurping power--who had so
frequently, and in language so animated, charged us to avoid grasping
power, by implication and construction; it was incumbent on those
gentlemen, would they preserve consistency of character, clearly to
demonstrate the authority which they assumed, that it might not be
supposed that their construction of the constitution was a convenient
accommodation to the existing circumstances. It was not now a question
whether the people had made a wise or prudent distribution of the powers
of their Government: they had declared their will, and that will we were
bound by every consideration of honor and duty to execute. In the
instrument under which we acted, they had declared that the PRESIDENT,
under certain modifications, should be their organ, to treat exclusively
with foreign powers. This authority, thus exclusively delegated,
includes all the terms on which a treaty could be formed. What was the
present measure? Prescribing the terms of treaty, and restraining the
constitutional power from treating on any other terms. If the
Legislature could prescribe those terms, in this instance, it may then
prescribe all the terms, in every instance; and of course control, in
all things, the exercise of that power.

To this reasoning two answers have been given; the one by a gentleman
from Pennsylvania, (Mr. SMILIE,) that the Legislature might make such a
law, because the Executive could repeal it. He really could not
comprehend the force of the reasoning; he was glad, however he could,
with perfect confidence, contradict the assertion, which he was sure
would be a very disgusting one to the people of America. There was, in
fact, in no instance, an authority given to the Executive to repeal a
constitutional act of the Legislature. The other answer was that given
by a gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. NICHOLAS,) that there could be no
objection to the exercise of this power, if it should be assented to by
the PRESIDENT and Senate. This was a still more extraordinary and
unsatisfactory answer than the other. It implied that the PRESIDENT and
Senate could make grants of power to this House not contained in the
constitution. To this he would answer, that all the powers which the
House could legally exercise, were expressed in the instrument under
which we acted; that those powers could be neither enlarged nor
abridged, by any man or body of men on earth, but in the way pointed out
by the instrument itself.

Mr. S. said these considerations he had expressed without any previous
preparation, as they occurred to his mind. Should gentlemen who viewed
the subject in the light he did remain silent, he would, in the further
progress of this measure, he pledged himself, with more orderly
arrangement, and he hoped with more perspicuity and force, address
himself to the consideration of this committee, or of the House. It
would avail little to tell him that his opposition would be unpopular;
no man more than himself wished the good opinion of his countrymen, but
no personal inconvenience, no loss of fame or popular affection, should
ever induce him to see his country threatened with evils incalculable in
number and duration, without warning her of her danger; a country which
he loved, and which he might, on this occasion, be permitted to say, he
had long served with honest fidelity, and without a single instance of
sinister or mere personal regard.

The committee now rose, and had leave to sit again.

FRIDAY, April 11.

_Non-Intercourse with Great Britain._

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on
the motion of the 7th instant, to prohibit all commercial intercourse
between the citizens of the United States and the subjects of the King
of Great Britain, so far as the same respects articles of the growth or
manufacture of Great Britain or Ireland.

Mr. BOUDINOT first rose this day, and said: Mr. Chairman, in a question
of so much national importance, there needed no apology from any member
of the committee for claiming their attention, while he gave the reasons
for his vote. The impatience shown by his colleague, (Mr. CLARK,) or any
other gentleman, for the question, ought not to influence any member of
the committee. When the fate of a nation of as much consequence as the
United States, appeared to be suspended on a vote, the least to be
expected from gentlemen was, to act with freedom, deliberation and
independence. He supposed he should be among those who, at the taking of
the question, would probably be found in the minority. That this would
be his vote, if he was convinced that he should be single and alone. He
felt himself deeply and seriously affected with a view of the precipice
on which, in his apprehension, his country seemed to stand, and he
wished, for his own part, to take a full and deliberate view of it,
before he joined in precipitating a leap, that might not add to her
safety or happiness. Reasoning and not declamation should be expected
from gentlemen in favor of the measure under consideration.

He said, he would address himself to the judgments, and not to the
passions of the committee. He acknowledged it might fall to his lot to
mistake the true and essential interests of his country; but, if this
should be the case, he had the satisfaction of knowing that it would
arise from the most honest and upright intentions. It was, therefore, on
these principles, that he should proceed in giving his opinion on the
important resolution on the table.

But, before he went further, he could not forget the respectful
compliment paid yesterday by his honorable friend from Maryland (Mr.
SMITH) to his moderation and gray hairs; indeed, he should not have
taken it to himself, as he had the honor of having white, instead of
gray hairs, had not Mr. S.'s attention been immediately fixed on him. If
either age or moderation would command his worthy friend's close
consideration of this subject, he besought him, as well as the other
gentlemen of the committee, to join in attending to it calmly and
seriously for a few moments, before the die was cast. He said, he owed
much, on behalf of his country, to that gentleman for his services in
the field during the late war, when both his zeal and his passions were
rendered so eminently useful, that he could with pleasure apologize at
all times for his warmth and animation on any subject when their common
country was not to be affected. But would he permit him, earnestly, to
request that, with other members, he would call to mind, that they were
now the Representatives of four millions of people? That perhaps the
lives of thousands of their fellow-citizens were depending on a single
vote. That the welfare of a country dearer to them than life was at
stake. Gentlemen must, therefore, agree, that the question was a serious
one, and deserved to be treated with the most serious and deliberate
consideration. Judgment, and not resentment, should direct the final
determination, let it be what it may, and give a sanction to all their
measures.

He observed, that gentlemen against the question had been accused of
want of propriety, in looking calmly, and without the exercise of their
passions, on the sufferings of the unhappy prisoners at Algiers, and the
piratical spoliations of our fellow-citizens in the West Indies. Yes,
sir, said he, when he knew that it was neither passion nor declamation
that could afford effective relief to these suffering members of the
political body, he should continue to persist in that steady, serious,
and deliberate line of conduct, that, in his estimation, was only
calculated to produce that permanent and efficient aid and relief, which
their extreme distress so loudly called for; but, in his turn, he asked
gentlemen to give up their warmth on this occasion, that they might also
reflect, even without passion, on the number of their fellow-citizens
that must fall a sacrifice in the most successful war. Will not
gentlemen weigh well that vote, that may possibly increase the number of
mourning widows and helpless orphans?

These considerations had led him to consider the measure now proposed,
as of great moment and importance, and to wish it might be reasoned on
and considered in a manner becoming Legislators and Representatives of
United America, who have been sent here as her counsellors and trustees,
and to whom she has committed her best and most sacred interests. He
said, for argument's sake, and to simplify the debate, lest he should be
drawn into unnecessary disputation, he should concede for the present:
the constitutionality of the resolution proposed; the right of the
committee to originate and determine on the measure; the unprovoked
aggressions of Great Britain to warrant and justify the prohibition.

These arguments had been repeated and urged with great apparent force,
by gentlemen in favor of the affirmative side of the question; but, were
the principles arising from these facts sufficient to justify a
determination in favor of so harsh and unprecedented a proceeding,
without previously demanding an explanation and full indemnification,
agreeably to the customs and usages of other nations?

Would arguments of this kind satisfy our constituents, if they should
find themselves suddenly plunged into an expensive and ruinous war?
Would it not very naturally be asked, why were not the true interests of
the United States under these existing circumstances carefully inquired
into, and made the principal and leading object of attentive
consideration? In his opinion, this should peculiarly be the sum of
their present inquiry--was it not the duty of the committee critically