DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: As you will understand, that is what the defendant
told him. That was told the witness by the defendant directly.

STRÖLIN: Von Neurath told me so repeatedly. He told me...

THE PRESIDENT: It will be all extremely cumulative.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I do not believe so. The witness himself needs
only to corroborate this to the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, the Tribunal imagines that the
Defendant Von Neurath will give this evidence himself, and the Tribunal
does not wish to hear evidence from witnesses that was told to them.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Very well, I shall dispense with any further
questions along those lines. I should like to ask only one more
question.

[_Turning to the witness._] Did not Von Neurath, with you and other
people, make an effort to put an end to the war and to the Hitler
regime, or at least consider the possibility of doing so?

Now these are facts that the witness knows from his own observation.

STRÖLIN: Von Neurath discussed this question with me on several
occasions after his return from Prague. He tried particularly to bring
about a meeting of the Reich Cabinet, as did the other ministers, but he
did not succeed, since Hitler disapproved of this Reich Cabinet as a
“defeatists’ club.” As a preliminary step for ending the war Von Neurath
tried to bring about a change of ministers and the appointment of a
Reich Chancellor, which was also widely demanded. This also failed.
During the year 1943 Neurath became more and more convinced...

THE PRESIDENT: This is the same thing over again—nothing about what Von
Neurath did but all about what Von Neurath said to this witness.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I beg your pardon; these are only preliminary
remarks to clarify what is to follow.

THE PRESIDENT: I thought you said you had one last question?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, we come to that now. The question shows the
attempts he made to carry out his intentions.

STRÖLIN: When Von Neurath failed in his attempts at reform, that is,
when he saw that it had miscarried and that Hitler’s attitude was
negative and intransigent, Von Neurath came to the conviction, at the
beginning of 1944, that the saving of Germany from complete destruction
must not be wrecked because of Hitler. He considered the question of how
to speak to Hitler once more and persuade him to end the war. He thought
of Field Marshal Rommel and asked me to discuss the matters with him.
Rommel was at that time very popular in Germany and abroad, and Von
Neurath believed that due to the position he held, Rommel was the right
person to replace Hitler, if necessary. In the beginning of March 1944,
I went to Field Marshal Rommel and discussed the matter with him. Rommel
was just as critical of the situation. I knew him from the first World
War, so that I could speak to him frankly. He was also of the opinion
that if the war could not be won on a military basis, unnecessary
bloodshed and senseless destruction...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, we really do not want all this
conversation between this witness and Rommel. We do not want it. We will
not hear the conversation between this witness and Rommel.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Nor do I want the witness to discuss this matter.

THE PRESIDENT: Why don’t you stop him then? Why don’t you stop him?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I did not want to hear it from the defendant
himself, but from the person who was employed by the defendant to take
these steps. That in my opinion has more weight than if the defendant
makes the statement himself. That is why I asked the witness about it.
But it is almost finished now.

THE PRESIDENT: When we come to the defendant then we will not hear him
on these subjects.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: No, that is not intended—moreover, as far as I
know, the matter will be finished with just a few words. Please,
Witness.

STRÖLIN: Upon Von Neurath’s instigation, Rommel wrote a letter to Hitler
saying that because of the military situation he believed that it would
not be possible to continue the war, and that he, Rommel, suggested to
Hitler that he start political negotiations. Consequently, as he told
me, after his accident Rommel fell from favor for this reason, and thus
Von Neurath’s attempt to end the war with Rommel’s aid also failed.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And then came 20 July and soon afterwards the end.

I have no more questions, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other defendants’ counsel want to ask
questions of this witness?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May the witness be handed GB-262 (Document
Number 3258-PS). My Lord, that is the same document of which an extract
has already been handed up to the Tribunal while I was cross-examining
the last witness.

Witness, I want to be quite clear as to what you say about the Deutsches
Auslands-Institut. Do you say that that institute had no connection with
either Hess or the Auslands-Organisation?

STRÖLIN: The Deutsches Auslands-Institut had no connection with Hess.
The connection with the Auslands-Organisation was due to the fact that
the Auslands-Organisation had its meetings at Stuttgart.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: So that the fact that the Auslands-Organisation
and the Deutsches Auslands-Institut both had their meetings at
Stuttgart, that is the only connection between the two organizations; is
that so?

STRÖLIN: The Auslands-Organisation, to my knowledge, did not consult the
German Auslands-Institut on practical matters, for it had its own
collection of material. The Auslands-Organisation was, as far as I know,
created in the year ’32, and...

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I do not want to stop you, but if you can
answer my question “yes” or “no” it will save us all a great deal of
time. I will repeat my question in case you are not quite clear about
it. Do you say that the fact that both those organizations held their
meeting in Stuttgart is the only connection between the two? Now you can
answer that “yes” or “no.”

STRÖLIN: I cannot answer that with “yes” or “no.” I must say that the
connecting link was the fact that Stuttgart was the city of foreign
Germans and so to speak the representative of Germans abroad, because of
its past history.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you read English?

STRÖLIN: A little.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 461 of the book that you
have? At the bottom of Page 461 you will see reproduced a copy of an
article from the _Stuttgarter Neues Tagblatt_ of 21 September 1933.

The Tribunal will find the extract on Page 4 of the translation.

That article describes the annual meeting of your institution, after its
reorganization in 1933 when the Nazi Party came to power. I want to read
just four short extracts from that article 2 and ask you for your
comments.

    “The chairman of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut, Lord Mayor,
    Dr. Strölin, opened the celebration.”

That is yourself presumably; is that so?

STRÖLIN: Yes.

    LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “Among those present, he greeted in
    particular, Minister President and Minister of Religion in
    Württemberg, Mergenthaler, as the representative of the
    supervisory authorities; General Haushofer of Munich as
    representative of Rudolf Hess, who has been entrusted by the
    Führer with the supreme direction of all matters concerning
    Germans in foreign countries....”

Did you say that?

STRÖLIN: I cannot remember having said that. Haushofer was for me the
representative of the VDA, and I cannot conceive how he could have been
the deputy of Hess at this occasion. However, it is probably true.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you think the Tribunal is safe in taking it
that the _Stuttgarter Neues Tagblatt_ on the day after that celebration
would accurately report what you said in your opening address?

You need not look at the rest of it for the moment. It is not likely
that that article is untrue or incorrect, is it?

STRÖLIN: No, the article is probably correct, but I did not
remember—now looking back—that Haushofer was at that time the deputy
of Hess, for Rudolf Hess had no connection with the Deutsches
Auslands-Institut as such.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It appears that you are saying there, and you
are saying it in a speech, that Haushofer is representing Hess, and that
Hess has been charged by the Führer with the supreme command of all
matters concerning Germans in foreign countries. Do you understand what
you are saying there?

STRÖLIN: Yes, it may have been put that way at that time, but in
practice, it never happened that I received a directive of any kind from
Rudolf Hess.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Your institution could correctly be said to
concern itself in matters concerning Germans in foreign countries, could
it not?

STRÖLIN: I did not understand the question.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did your institution, the Deutsches
Auslands-Institut, concern itself in matters concerning Germans in
foreign countries?

STRÖLIN: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, I shall leave that. Will you look
down the page and omit the next...

STRÖLIN: I would like to add to this point. It was the first time that I
made a speech for the Deutsches Auslands-Institut and the speech was, of
course drafted with the approval of the personalities who were to be
welcomed there. I cannot longer remember that Haushofer was present in
that capacity on that occasion and can merely repeat my statement that
as the honorary president of the Institute I know nothing of Rudolf Hess
having given directives to the Deutsches Auslands-Institut.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You may have known nothing about it, but you
were the new chairman of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut at that time,
were you not?

STRÖLIN: No, I was not the chairman. The chairman of the Institute was a
special leader. In my capacity as Lord Mayor it was merely one of my
many extra duties to act as president of the Institute. It is quite
impossible for me to remember which personalities I greeted at the time,
and how I did it.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Please confine yourself to answering the
particular question I put to you: Were you or were you not the chairman
of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut on 20 September 1933?

STRÖLIN: Yes, I was appointed to that position at that time.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You had just been appointed because you were a
good Nazi and the Nazi Party had come to power and was reorganizing this
institution.

STRÖLIN: I was appointed to this post because I was Lord Mayor of
Stuttgart and because later the city of Stuttgart was called the “City
of Germans Abroad” since, because of its history and tradition it had
always had very close connection with Germans abroad.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, now, we will go on. Will you miss
out the next short paragraph and look at the paragraph which starts off,
“Deputy Gauleiter Schmidt, representing Dr. Goebbels, stated the local
Party leadership...”

STRÖLIN: What page is that on?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is on the same page.

STRÖLIN: Page 461?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon, it is on Page 462. And it is
the third paragraph in the center of the page.

STRÖLIN: Yes, I found the place.

    LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “Deputy Gauleiter Schmidt, representing
    Dr. Goebbels, stated, ‘The local Party leadership (Gauleitung)
    is prepared to co-operate through thick and thin with the new
    officers of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut.’”

Hess, you know, was in charge of the Party leadership, wasn’t he—the
Gauleiter? We will go on:

    “National Socialism will demand the blood unity of all Germans
    as its historic right.”

Will you look now at Page 463—we will leave that—Will you look now...

STRÖLIN: May I say something in connection with this?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If you please, yes.

STRÖLIN: The Deputy Gauleiter, Schmidt, was here purely in his capacity
as a deputy of the Gauleiter, but he was not the Deputy of Rudolf Hess.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No. But the point I am putting—I will make it
quite clear—is that the Gauleitung which came under Hess was going to
co-operate with your institution through thick and thin. You appreciate
that?

STRÖLIN: That is obvious.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Would you look at Page 463, and on the second
paragraph:

    “In his address the new director of the DAI, Dr. Csaki, stated:
    ‘We followed with deep distress the inner disunity of the German
    people. Now since all that has been overcome, since we see that
    all the German Folk (Volksdeutsche) organizations are standing
    in one line, we are filled with a feeling of pride for our
    German mother-country, a feeling of happiness: Germany is
    united.’

    “‘The feeling of adherence to the German people gives us a happy
    consciousness. In the course of centuries this or that position
    has been lost. We must prevent any from being lost. It gives us
    a feeling of pride and self-confidence that we are bridges for
    the German Lebensraum.’”

Was that in fact what the purpose of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut
was?

STRÖLIN: Dr. Csaki said in this quotation that the Germans abroad were
bridges to the German Lebensraum. This German Lebensraum also applied,
for instance, to the Germans in Hungary and Romania and to that extent
it is true when he says the Germans are “bridges” to this Lebensraum,
that is, the space in which Germans live. This has also always been the
attitude of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut; to build bridges to the
Lebensraum in which these Germans live.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Now, have you ever read a book by
Dr. Emil Ehrlich, or seen it, entitled: _Die Auslands-Organisation der
NSDAP_? You need not look at that. Have you ever read that book? A title
of that kind?

STRÖLIN: I do not think so.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you know that Dr. Emil Ehrlich was the
personal adviser to Bohle?

STRÖLIN: I believe he was Bohle’s adjutant at one time.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 305 of the book that you
have in front of you—My Lord, this passage appears on Page 5 of the
document the Tribunal has—and that is a reproduction of Dr. Emil
Ehrlich’s book. Would you look at the second paragraph on Page 305, half
way down that paragraph, starting:

    “On 27 August 1936 the Führer designated Stuttgart as the ‘City
    of Germans Abroad,’ and the Gauleiter of the
    Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP assumed protection of this
    beautiful city, which also houses within its walls the German
    Auslands-Institut, which works in hearty co-operation with the
    Auslands-Organisation.”

Would I be right in saying that throughout the whole history, from 1933
onwards, the Deutsches Auslands-Institut was working in the heartiest
co-operation with the Auslands-Organisation?

STRÖLIN: This is not correct, inasmuch as there was no practical or
scientific co-operation between the Deutsches Auslands-Institut and the
Auslands-Organisation. The hearty co-operation, as I have already
mentioned, referred to the fact that the Ausland Germans had their
meetings in Stuttgart. That was the hearty co-operation between them.
There was no co-operation in practical matters since it was not
necessary.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 127 of this book? I want
you to tell me, looking at the last paragraph, whether that is an
accurate report, “All persons who in the future...” this is, I beg your
pardon, a confidential report on the special schooling work conducted by
the DAI for the foreign organizations. You did in fact, did you not,
assist the foreign organizations in training their Landesgruppenleiter
and other leaders abroad?

STRÖLIN: May I ask who signed this article or report?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No, I cannot tell you who signed that report. I
asked you a question. Did the Deutsches Auslands-Institut assist in
training leaders for the Auslands-Organisation abroad?

STRÖLIN: I am not informed on that point.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, just turn over to Page 128, second
paragraph, which I read to you quite shortly:

    “The Auslands-Institut plays a part in determining the
    curriculum for the training camps (Schulungslager) as well as
    serving as an intermediary between the party authorities who run
    these camps and the Germans from abroad who attend them.”

You still say that that report is...

STRÖLIN: May I ask the date of this report?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I told you it is a report...

STRÖLIN: I had no knowledge of this report.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, I just want to ask you one or two
very short questions on the evidence that you have given about the
Defendant Von Neurath. You have told us that he was a man of peace, with
an excellent, kind character. Do you know that on the 5th of November
1937 he attended a meeting at which Hitler addressed the leaders of his
Armed Forces? Did you ever hear of that meeting, on the 5th of November
1937?

STRÖLIN: No, I did not hear of this meeting, at least not until I was
imprisoned.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well then, perhaps I could tell you quite
shortly what took place. Hitler said at the meeting, among other things,
that the only way out of the German difficulties was to secure greater
living space, and he said that that problem could be solved only by
force. And, having said that, he then went on to say that he had decided
to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia. You never heard of that meeting?

STRÖLIN: No, I have not heard anything of that meeting, and concluded
only later that...

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But...

STRÖLIN: May I finish my sentence?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only wanted to know...

STRÖLIN: I said just that Von Neurath indicated to me that he had
serious differences of opinion with Hitler. That was toward the end of
1937. It was only later that I realized that he must have meant the
conference with Hitler and the attitude which he took on 5 November;
however, it was only when I was in prison that I heard through the
newspapers that such a conference actually took place.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I shall come to all that in a moment. I just
want you to get a picture of what happened at this meeting, and I quote
four lines from the minutes of that meeting:

    “Hitler believed that very probably England and presumably
    France had already secretly abandoned Czechoslovakia and were
    satisfied that this question would one day be cleared up by
    Germany.”

And Hitler then went on to say that the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and
Austria would constitute a conquest of food for 5 or 6 million people,
and that he visualized the compulsory immigration of 2 million people
from Czechoslovakia.

Now, that is what took place at that conference. Do you know that some 4
months later—on 12 March 1938—Von Neurath was giving an assurance to
M. Masaryk, and among other things he assured him, on behalf of Herr
Hitler, that Germany still considered herself bound by the
German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention of 1925? Do you know that he
said that?

STRÖLIN: I do not recall it.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Can you understand, now that I have told you
that that is a fact, can you understand anybody who had been at that
conference and had heard what Hitler had said on 5 November giving an
assurance to Czechoslovakia 4 months later in terms of that kind? Can
you understand any honest man doing that?

STRÖLIN: I cannot judge the situation prevailing at that time. I do not
know from whom Von Neurath might have received an order.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am not asking you to judge at that time. I am
asking you now what your opinion is of a man who can do that sort of
thing. I want you to tell the Tribunal.

STRÖLIN: I cannot answer that because I do not have a comprehensive
picture of that situation.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I must under any circumstances
object to this type of suggestive question. It is not permissible to put
such a question to the witness without giving him the complete picture
of how this assurance was given. The fact is, and it is correct, that in
the speech of 5 November 1937, Hitler for the first time developed plans
which were no longer in accord with the peace policy of Herr Von
Neurath, and Von Neurath took the opportunity—I believe in December or
early in January—to discuss this thoroughly with Hitler and point out
to him the impossibility of the policy which he apparently wanted to
embark upon and to persuade him not to carry it out. When from Hitler’s
reply he was forced to the conclusion that Hitler would nevertheless
insist on this policy which would lead to aggression in the future he
submitted his resignation. On 4 February 1938 Herr Von Neurath was
permitted to resign. He no longer participated in active politics.

On 11 or 12 March, when the invasion of Austria took place, an invasion
of which Herr Von Neurath had no inkling until that day, Hitler called
him...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, will you kindly wait? The question was
put about the 5th of March 1938, whether a man who had heard the
conference of the 5th of November 1937 could have given the assurance of
the 5th of March.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, I can also clarify that statement, if I may.
The question put by Minister Mastny was whether any military action
against Czechoslovakia was intended immediately or soon after the
invasion of Austria, and Herr Von Neurath believed that he could,
honestly and as a gentleman, answer this question in the negative.

We have to take into consideration the circumstances under which this
statement was made. First, Hitler, in his speech of 5 November 1937,
spoke of the years to come. When he marched into Austria on 12 March,
that is at a time which from 5 March...

THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment. We do not want to have all this
argument. The question was what was this witness’ opinion of a man who
had done that. That was all the question that was asked, and that
question is put to credit...

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I beg your pardon; no one can
answer that question unless he knows in what connection it was put. Mr.
Mastny asked whether the march into Austria would entail any aggressive
action against Czechoslovakia and Von Neurath answered that question. No
more and no less. He did not want to give an answer regarding the
future. The Minister wanted to know whether in connection with the march
of the German troops into Austria any military actions against
Czechoslovakia were intended. According to the information which my
client had, he could in the given situation answer this question in the
negative with a clear conscience. This question is admissible only if
the witness is informed about what I have just said. The point is not
that he declared once and for all Germany will never march into
Czechoslovakia, but that he merely answered the Czech Minister Mastny’s
question: Is there any danger that in connection with the march into
Austria, military measures will also be taken against Czechoslovakia?
This question he could answer the way he did. Therefore, the question in
the form in which it was put by the British Prosecution is in my opinion
not admissible.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question properly admissible.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, we will not pursue the matter. I ask you
just this one further question, so that I make myself quite clear. You
said in your evidence, as I wrote it down, that the Defendant Von
Neurath was well thought of, dignified and of noble character. Having
heard what I have told you, are you still prepared to tell the Court
that you think he is well thought of, dignified, and of noble character?
Is that your opinion now? I just want to get the value of your evidence;
do you see? After what you have been told is that your opinion?

STRÖLIN: It is still my opinion that Herr Von Neurath is a man of
distinguished and decent character. I cannot judge under what
circumstances he acted at the time and what considerations prompted him
to act this way.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You say that he was in favor of peace and did
all he could to avoid a war. Do you call a deceit of that kind doing
everything possible to avoid war? Is that what your idea of a peaceful
policy is—giving assurance 4 months after you know perfectly well that
the German intention is to overrun their country? Is that what you call
doing everything to avoid war?

STRÖLIN: I would like to state once more that I do not sufficiently
understand the essential points and ramifications of this question to
form a proper opinion on it. But obviously things cannot be as simple as
they have been pictured here.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me turn to another aspect of this matter.
We have been told at great length that he disapproved of Hitler’s
policy, and that he resigned. Do you know that, having resigned, he was
appointed Reich Protector of Bohemia-Moravia in March 1939? Do you know
that?

STRÖLIN: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That was after the remainder of Czechoslovakia
had been overrun, occupied.

STRÖLIN: I said previously that Von Neurath told me that he accepted
this post very reluctantly; that he had twice refused to accept it but
later he believed that he had to make a sacrifice in order to achieve
his ends; and, as the State President Hacha told me later, Von Neurath’s
personal influence was of great benefit because, as Hacha told me, Von
Neurath’s activity undoubtedly had a balancing and conciliatory effect.
As I said before, he was recalled because he was too mild.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, you have already said it, and we have
heard it, and we have remembered it, so it is quite unnecessary for you
to say it again. Do try to answer my question shortly. Let me ask you
this question. Have you ever thought that the reason for that
appointment might have been as a reward for his assistance in the
occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia that had followed so shortly
before?

STRÖLIN: No, I never thought of that. However, if I may mention it, I
have read quite a different version in the book by Henderson, that is,
that Von Neurath had been put into that post so that his international
prestige could be discredited. I wanted to bring in this version in
order to point out that there were other possibilities that might come
into question.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you remember that you described him as a
disciplined, humane, and conscientious man?

STRÖLIN: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at that poster.

[_The poster was submitted to the witness._]

My Lord, I regret that I have not got a copy of this for the Tribunal.
It is a very short matter. It has been introduced in the Czechoslovak
report on the German occupation. I will give Your Lordship the number:
Document Number USSR-60.

[_Turning to the witness._] Do you see that this is signed by the
Defendant Von Neurath, the humane and conscientious man?

STRÖLIN: Yes, I see that the Czech universities were closed for a period
of 3 years, and that nine culprits were shot. This announcement,
however, does not say, as far as I can see, exactly why this was done.
Consequently I cannot pass judgment on the announcement, because I do
not know what Von Neurath proclaimed in it. The announcement does not
tell me anything, if I do not know the reason why the announcement was
issued. That universities were closed and nine culprits shot must have
been for convincing reasons.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I add the following? I would
like to say this in order to save time. This question of Czechoslovakia
and of this poster, with which I am also familiar, will, of course, be
dealt with, in connection with Von Neurath’s case, and at that stage of
the proceedings. I will then have the opportunity to bring the proof
that this poster did not originate with the Defendant Von Neurath. This
witness was not in Prague and can relate only things which he did not
know of his own experience, but which Herr Von Neurath told him.
Therefore, I believe that this question is not appropriate and is taking
up time unnecessarily, for I would have to raise objections and describe
the actual situation. We should not put questions to the witness which,
though put in good faith, are positively incorrect, that is, questions
which are based on inaccurately reported facts which actually occurred
in a different manner. I shall prove that at the time when this poster
was drafted and put up, Herr Von Neurath was not in Prague and was not
informed of what was going on during his absence.

Therefore I believe that we should not deal with this question today,
since, as I have said, the witness cannot know anything about it from
his own observation.

THE PRESIDENT: It will be open to you to show that this poster was put
up when Von Neurath was not at Prague, and that he gave no authority for
it. That would clear him with reference to this poster; but what is
being put to this witness is: Assuming that this poster was put up by
Von Neurath, is it right to describe him as a humane man? That is all
the cross-examination means.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But, the witness knows nothing of this poster. He
cannot answer the question correctly if he does not know the
ramifications, if he does not know that this poster actually did not
originate with Herr Von Neurath.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness was examined at great length by you to show
he was a humane man and had a very good character. Under such
circumstances it is up to the Prosecution to put to the witness
circumstances which would indicate that he was not of that humane
character. That is all that is being done.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In that case the most this witness could say would
be “I do not know,” or “if it is true, one cannot call it humane.” Any
one of us can say that. The witness does not need to say it.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can say, “If this is correct it is
inconsistent with what I knew of Von Neurath.”

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: He cannot and he will not say that either, for the
simple reason that he does not know the circumstances under which this
poster was published. Frankly I cannot see the purpose of this question,
for if the question is put in that way, every decent individual will say
that it is inhumane; but this would not alter the fact that the witness
would be judging facts which do not exist and which are not true.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Griffith-Jones, don’t you think this is really
taking up unnecessary time, if this witness doesn’t know anything about
it? I quite see that it is the proper purpose of cross-examination to
discredit the witness.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am much obliged to the Tribunal. The point of
that cross-examination was, perhaps I might be allowed to say, this:
This defendant has produced a witness to give evidence on his oath
before this Tribunal. If that evidence is unchallenged, then it goes
down on the record, and there is nothing to stop this Tribunal from
regarding this witness as a man who is in a position to give reliable
evidence of that kind. This cross-examination is rather to show that
this witness, whether he is saying it truthfully or untruthfully, is
certainly inaccurate. The evidence he has given as to the good character
of this defendant does not bear investigation—that is quite clear—and
the Tribunal is not saying we are not entitled to cross-examine as to
character. However, I do not think I need occupy the time of the
Tribunal with that.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

COL. AMEN: Witness, when were you last in New York City?

STRÖLIN: I was in New York in 1936.

COL. AMEN: At that time you made a speech at Madison Square Garden; is
that correct?

STRÖLIN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: That was a rally in the Garden?

STRÖLIN: It was for “German Day,” on 6 October 1936.

COL. AMEN: A “German Day” rally, correct?

STRÖLIN: It was the annual meeting of the Germans which took place on 6
October.

COL. AMEN: And a great percentage of the German-American Bund, is that
correct?

STRÖLIN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: In fact, that whole rally was held under the auspices of the
German-American Bund, was it not?

STRÖLIN: The fact is, a festival committee had been commissioned by all
German clubs—I believe there are all in all two thousand of them in New
York—and these 2,000 German clubs had united in one festival committee
which organized the “German Day.” I did not know the composition of this
committee in detail.

COL. AMEN: And it was at the solicitation of the German-American Bund
that you made your speech, was it not?

STRÖLIN: No, it was at the solicitation of the festival committee of the
German clubs of New York.

COL. AMEN: Yes, and on that committee were numerous members of the
German-American Bund; is that true? “Yes” or “no.”

STRÖLIN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And as a matter of fact, there were many of the members of
your organization at that time who were active members of the
German-American Bund; is that correct?

STRÖLIN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And you personally had had several conferences with them,
both here in Germany and in New York City, correct?

STRÖLIN: No, that is not correct.

COL. AMEN: Well, what is correct?

STRÖLIN: It is correct that I was invited, but there were no further
conferences.

COL. AMEN: But you do not dispute that many of the members of your
organization were at that time members of the German-American Bund?

STRÖLIN: I am not informed on that point.

THE PRESIDENT [_To the witness_]: I have just taken down that you have
said that was so.

COL. AMEN: Precisely.

STRÖLIN: Please repeat the question.

COL. AMEN: Did you not just tell me a few moments ago, in response to a
previous question, that many members of your organization were members
of the German-American Bund at the time of your speech at the rally in
Madison Square Garden?

STRÖLIN: When you speak of an “organization,” do you mean members of the
German Auslands-Institut?

COL. AMEN: “Your organization” is the way I put it.

STRÖLIN: I had no organization; I had an institute.

COL. AMEN: Exactly. And under whose auspices were you making this speech
in Madison Square Garden?

STRÖLIN: I was asked to make this speech because I had shortly before
been appointed Lord Mayor of the City of Germans Abroad. I was Lord
Mayor of that city, and therefore I was asked to deliver the address.
Stuttgart was made the City of Germans Abroad, since the Swabians
furnished most of the emigrants, and for that reason Stuttgart was to be
the home city of foreign Germans.

COL. AMEN: Well, is it not a fact that many members of the
Auslands-Organisation were at that time also members of the
German-American Bund? “Yes” or “no.”

STRÖLIN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Is it not also a fact that at that time many members of the
Institute were also members of the German-American Bund? Yes or no.

STRÖLIN: Yes, some of these Germans had come from America; they were
students who had studied in America and returned to Germany.

COL. AMEN: And is it not also a fact that many of these members of the
German-American Bund, who were likewise members of the
Auslands-Organisation and of the Institute, were indicted and tried and
convicted for various espionage offenses in the Federal courts of the
United States? Yes or no.

STRÖLIN: No, I know nothing about that.

COL. AMEN: You never heard that?

STRÖLIN: No, I never heard about it. I know of the case of Kappe, but
that has no connection with the Deutsche Auslands-Institut.

COL. AMEN: That is one case, as a matter of fact; now, you know some
others too, don’t you?

STRÖLIN: I wonder if you could give me particulars.

COL. AMEN: I could, but I am asking you the questions rather than trying
to tell you the answers.

STRÖLIN: I cannot remember any other case. Please question me.

COL. AMEN: No, I will go to another subject now, because it is getting
late. Are you acquainted with a Mr. Alfred Weninger—W-e-n-i-n-g-e-r?

STRÖLIN: I did not understand the name. Alfred...

COL. AMEN: Alfred Weninger, W-e-n-i-n-g-e-r, or however you pronounce
it.

STRÖLIN: Weninger—yes I am familiar with that name.

COL. AMEN: Who is he?

STRÖLIN: Alfred Weninger is, to my knowledge, at present in France. I
believe he is a jurist.

COL. AMEN: Well, don’t you know? Don’t you know whether he is a jurist
or not?

STRÖLIN: Yes, he is employed as a jurist.

COL. AMEN: What is his nationality?

STRÖLIN: He is a Frenchman.

COL. AMEN: Is he a friend of yours?

STRÖLIN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Did you intervene on his behalf on at least one occasion?

STRÖLIN: I provided for his release from prison.

COL. AMEN: That was in March 1943?

STRÖLIN: No, there must be some misunderstanding. I mean the Alfred
Weninger who is a Frenchman and whom I helped during the war so that he
was not sentenced to death, and was later released from prison. However,
that took place during the period from 1942 to 1944. I do not know
another Alfred Weninger. There may be two Alfred Weningers.

COL. AMEN: No, that is correct. He was sentenced along with 12 other
comrades for espionage and intelligence with the enemy.

STRÖLIN: Yes, and he is the one whom I helped.

COL. AMEN: And you intervened with the Attorney General at the People’s
Court?

STRÖLIN: Yes, I intervened with Freisler.

COL. AMEN: And also, at the Ministries of the Interior and Justice in
Berlin?

STRÖLIN: I submitted to the Ministry of the Interior a memorandum
regarding conditions in Alsace, at the time, in order to have the
Alsatians pardoned.

COL. AMEN: And as a result of your efforts, these people received
temporary suspension of their sentences; is that correct?

STRÖLIN: Yes. I would like to mention expressly that I asked Herr Von
Neurath to intervene and it is due to a letter which he wrote to Hitler
that these Alsatians were pardoned.

COL. AMEN: So that this individual, to put it mildly, is under a
considerable obligation to you at the present time? Correct?

STRÖLIN: Yes, I imagine so.

COL. AMEN: Well, you saved his life in effect, did you not?

STRÖLIN: I also saved the lives of many others; I do not know if the
people are grateful for it or not.

COL. AMEN: Well, in any event, I take it you do not question the truth
of what he might report as a conversation with you, correct?

STRÖLIN: I do not doubt that he would remember this.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall having a conversation with him in June of 1940?

STRÖLIN: At the moment I cannot say unless you tell me what it was
about.

COL. AMEN: Well, I will tell you what you are reported by him to have
said and I ask you whether you recall having said that to him, either in
the exact words which I put to you, or in substance. Do you understand?

STRÖLIN: Yes, I understand.

    COL. AMEN: Here are the words: “I warn you against National
    Socialism, which does not recoil before anything, and which
    makes justice its servile agent. They are criminals and I have
    but the one wish—to get out of it.”

Did you say that to Weninger in words or in substance? “Yes” or “no”?

STRÖLIN: I did not quite understand what you said. Will you please
repeat it?

COL. AMEN: You understand English, don’t you, Witness?

STRÖLIN: Some. I understand just a little.

COL. AMEN: As a matter of fact, you were interrogated in English by one
of our interrogators, were you not?

STRÖLIN: I spoke a little English only on one occasion, but I believe
that he did not understand me correctly.

COL. AMEN: And you understood perfectly well what I just read to you,
did you not?

STRÖLIN: I did not fully understand the German translation of what you
said and the substance of your question is not clear to me.

COL. AMEN: Well, I shall read it to you again. But I suggest that you
are merely taking this time in order to find out what answer you want to
make. I ask you again whether you said to Weninger in words or in
substance, in June of 1940, the following:

    “I warn you against National Socialism, which does not recoil
    before anything, and which makes justice its servile agent. They
    are criminals and I have but the one wish—to get out of it.”

Do you understand?

STRÖLIN: Yes, I understand but I do not recall having made that
statement.

COL. AMEN: Do you deny having made that statement when I tell you that
Weninger so states—Weninger, whom you have just told us has every
obligation to you?

STRÖLIN: I do not remember it. It may be true that I made critical
statements, but I do not recall the wording.

COL. AMEN: Do you deny having made that statement? Answer yes or no.

STRÖLIN: I deny the statement. I deny that I made it in this form.

COL. AMEN: Did you make it in substance; did you make that statement?

STRÖLIN: I cannot remember the conversation at all.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall having made another statement to Weninger in
1936 in Strasbourg—were you in Strasbourg with Weninger in 1936?

STRÖLIN: At the moment I cannot recall.

COL. AMEN: But you do not deny it?

STRÖLIN: I cannot recall.

COL. AMEN: It is quite possible?

STRÖLIN: It is possible, but I cannot recall it. I cannot at a moment’s
notice recall the date I was there.

COL. AMEN: And did you not say to Weninger in Strasbourg in 1936, in
words or in substance, the following: “When I am abroad I am ashamed to
be a German”? “Yes” or “no.”

STRÖLIN: It was entirely out of the question at that time, since in the
year of 1936 I was very proud of the fact that I was a German.

COL. AMEN: And then, do you deny having made that statement to Weninger?

STRÖLIN: I am quite certain that I did not make that statement in the
year 1936.

COL. AMEN: When did you make it?

STRÖLIN: I do not recall having made such a statement to Weninger at
all, at least not in 1936.

COL. AMEN: When did you make that statement to Weninger or anybody else?
In what year did you decide to make statements like that?

STRÖLIN: I cannot recall having made such a statement at all.

COL. AMEN: But you do not deny it?

STRÖLIN: I frankly admit that there was a time when one was no longer
proud of Germany.

THE PRESIDENT: Do the other Prosecutors wish to cross-examine?

DR. SEIDL: I have no questions to put to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire. [_The witness left the
stand._]

Does that conclude your case, Dr. Seidl, or have you got any other
evidence to offer?

DR. SEIDL: Yes. First, I have to read into the record the questionnaire
of the witness Alfred Hess which has arrived in the meantime. The
Tribunal has admitted his testimony in the form of a questionnaire. I
would then like to refer to various documents in Document Book Number 3,
but before going into that and to conclude today’s proceedings, I would
like to establish upon the request of the Defendant Hess—this refers to
Volume 2 of the document book—that Lord Simon came to the meeting as
the official representative of the British Government; I therefore read
a few sentences from Page 93 (Volume II, Page 93):

    “Lord Simon said: ‘Herr Reichsminister, I was informed that you
    had come here feeling charged with a mission and that you wished
    to speak of it to someone who would be able to receive it with
    Government authority. You know I am Dr. Guthrie and therefore I
    come with the authority of the Government and I shall be willing
    to listen and to discuss with you as far as seems good anything
    you would wish to state for the information of the Government.’”

That was what I wished to state in completion of my reading of the Simon
minutes.

THE PRESIDENT: Would you be able to finish tonight if we went on for a
few minutes or not?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the answers on this questionnaire are rather
long. The witness was cross-examined and I assume that the Prosecution
also intend to read the particulars of the cross-examination and I do
not believe this would be possible today.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn.

     [_The Tribunal adjourned until 26 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]

                            NINETY-FIRST DAY
                         Tuesday, 26 March 1946

                           _Morning Session_

MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, Defendant Streicher will be absent
from this session of the Court.

PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Seidl.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Your Honors, I now turn to the reading of the
interrogation of the witness Alfred Hess.

THE PRESIDENT: Where shall we find it?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I received this transcript of the
interrogation of the witness only last Saturday, and it has thus not
been possible for me to incorporate it into the document book as yet.
This witness was interrogated at Bad Mergentheim on 19 March.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that we haven’t got copies of it?

DR. SEIDL: I do not know whether the General Secretary, from whom I
received this transcript, has supplied a copy for the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you had better go on then. Go on.

DR. SEIDL: Yes. Before answering the first question, the witness made a
few preliminary remarks which are as follows:

    “It should be noted that I had to terminate my activity in the
    Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP after the flight to England
    of my brother Rudolf Hess, Deputy of the Führer. Therefore, the
    following statements are valid only for the period up to 12 May
    1941.

    “Question 1: ‘What were the tasks and the purpose of the
    Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP?’

    “Answer: ‘The purpose of the Auslands-Organisation was the
    cultural, social, and economic care of all German nationals in
    foreign countries, regardless of whether they were Party members
    or not. The Auslands-Organisation in this sense was to be a
    bridge between Germans abroad and the home country. Its purpose
    was to foster and maintain love for and ties with the distant
    home country and to keep alive understanding for the fatherland,
    as well as to awaken the understanding of Germans at home for
    the hard battle for existence of their compatriots all over the
    world. The German abroad, through his dignified, upright
    bearing, was to make himself popular in the country of his
    adoption, and thus act as the best representative of his
    fatherland.’

    “Question 2: ‘Who could become a member of the
    Auslands-Organisation?’

    “Answer: ‘The question is not understandable. There was no such
    thing as a membership in the Auslands-Organisation; just as
    little, for example, as there was a membership in the Foreign
    Office of the Reich or in a Gau of the NSDAP in the Reich.’

    “Question 3: ‘Is it correct that on the membership card of each
    Reich German Party member the following principle was printed as
    a ruling principle of the Auslands-Organisation: “Follow the
    laws of the country whose guest you are, let its people make the
    internal policy of that country, do not interfere in this, not
    even in conversation”?’

    “Answer: ‘It is correct that the above principle, among similar
    ones, was printed on the membership card or on its cover. If I
    am not mistaken, underneath this principle there was the warning
    even of expulsion from the NSDAP if this principle was not
    observed. This latter is to be ascertained without great
    difficulty by procuring a cover, which was in the possession of
    every Party member in a foreign country.’

    “Question 4: ‘Did the Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP develop
    any activity which could appear as Fifth Column?’

    “Answer: ‘“Fifth Column” is not a clear concept, uniformly used.
    In general, it would probably mean secret espionage or sabotage
    activity. According to its guiding principles, the
    Auslands-Organisation could not have carried on any such
    activity.’

    “‘I remember that the slogan “Fifth Column” of the foreign press
    was considered in the Auslands-Organisation as a clever bluff of
    the antifascist propaganda, and it caused genuine amusement.
    Seriously, no state could conceive that such a widely known,
    rather suspect and vulnerable organization could be suited for
    any service in the nature of the Fifth Column. I consider it
    natural that some individual Germans abroad had secret missions,
    services such as other nationals performed likewise for their
    fatherland, but the Auslands-Organisation was certainly not the
    giver of such assignments nor the intermediary for such agents.’

    “Question 5: ‘What kind of instructions and directives did the
    Deputy of the Führer give the Auslands-Organisation for its
    activity?’

    “Answer: ‘The instructions and directives of the Deputy of the
    Führer for the activity of the Auslands-Organisation are such as
    those mentioned in my answers to Questions 1 and 3. He pointed
    out again and again, with special emphasis, his strict
    instructions that the groups abroad were not to do anything
    which could be detrimental to the countries affording them
    hospitality, or which could be considered an interference in the
    affairs of those countries. The basic principle must also be
    that National Socialism was a purely German movement, not an
    article for export which one wanted to force on other countries
    as suitable for them.’

    “Question 6: ‘Did the Deputy of the Führer give the
    Auslands-Organisation any directions or orders which could have
    caused them to carry on an activity similar to that of the Fifth
    Column?’

    “Answer: ‘The Deputy of the Führer not only never issued any
    such directions or orders, but as stated above in Answer 5, laid
    down principles which absolutely prohibited any activity of the
    sort carried on by the so-called Fifth Column.’

    “Question 7: ‘Is it correct that, on the contrary, the Deputy of
    the Führer took meticulous care that in all circumstances
    interference in the internal affairs of the country of adoption
    was to be avoided?’

    “Answer: ‘I can repeat only that it was a chief concern of the
    Deputy of the Führer to direct the work of the
    Auslands-Organisation abroad in such a way that no interference
    of any kind should take place in the internal affairs of the
    country of residence. The few insignificant offenses, which were
    unavoidable with the then very large number of German nationals
    abroad—already amounting to several million—were
    correspondingly severely punished.’

    “Question 8: ‘What were the tasks and the aims of the Volksbund
    für das Deutschtum im Ausland (League for Germans Abroad)?’

    “Answer: ‘The Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland had the
    cultural care of the so-called Volksdeutsche. Volksdeutsche are
    racial Germans who had lost their German citizenship either
    voluntarily or through the laws of other countries, that is, had
    acquired the citizenship of another country, for instance,
    America, Hungary, Transylvania, _et cetera_.’

    “Question 9: ‘Did the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland
    ever, in particular however before 10 May 1941, develop any
    activity which could have given it the appearance of a Fifth
    Column?’

    “Answer: ‘I must state in this connection that the activity of
    the Auslands-Organisation did not have anything to do with the
    Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland, so I can have no
    insight into its work. But I consider it entirely out of the
    question that my brother could have given the Volksbund tasks of
    a Fifth Column nature. It would neither have fallen within the
    jurisdiction of the Deputy of the Führer, nor have corresponded
    with his views as to the mission of the Volksbund für das
    Deutschtum im Ausland.’

    “Question 10, and last question: ‘What kind of directions and
    instructions did the Deputy of the Führer give as to the
    activity of this Bund?’

    “Answer: ‘Directions, _et cetera_, which my brother gave as to
    the activity of this Bund are unknown to me, for, as already
    stated, my activity in the Auslands-Organisation was in no way
    connected with the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im
    Ausland.’”—Signed—“Alfred Hess. Sworn to and subscribed on 19
    March 1946.”

The witness Alfred Hess was then cross-examined in connection with his
interrogation. I assume that the Prosecution want to submit this
cross-examination themselves to the Tribunal. But if this
cross-examination and the questions belonging to it have not yet been
translated, it might perhaps be practicable if it were done directly, in
this connection.

MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): If
it please the Tribunal, we have received the cross-interrogatories but I
suggest respectfully that, rather than take the time to read them, we
offer them and if the Court will permit us, have them translated into
the four languages. It will take another 10 minutes or so to read them
and we are not interested in doing it unless the Tribunal feels that we
should.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Mr. Dodd.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President and Gentlemen, I do not know whether the
affidavit of Ambassador Gaus submitted by me yesterday has been
translated and whether the Tribunal has received these translations
already. Yesterday at midday I gave six copies to the information office
and have heard nothing further since.

THE PRESIDENT: Can the Prosecution inform the Tribunal what the position
is?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution has not had a copy of
this affidavit yet so we do not know what is in it. We suggest that
perhaps Dr. Seidl could postpone the reading of that until we have had a
chance to consider it.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I am afraid that must be postponed.

DR. SEIDL: Yes. Now I turn to Volume 3 of the document book.

If it please the Tribunal, this volume of the document book contains, in
substance, statements and quotations taken from books and speeches of
foreign statesmen, diplomats, and political economists, regarding the
history and origin of the Versailles Treaty, the contents of the
Versailles Treaty, the territorial changes made by this treaty, such as
the question of the Polish Corridor, and above all the disastrous
economic consequences which this treaty had for Germany and also for the
rest of the world.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Sir David?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have read the documents in this book
and I should like just to say one or two words about them.

They are opinions expressed by a great variety of gentlemen, including
politicians, economists, and journalists. They are opinions that are
expressed polemically and some of them journalistically, and with most
of them one is familiar and knew them when they were expressed 15 to 25
years ago.

Now, while I submit, as I have submitted to the Tribunal, that the whole
subject is too remote, I have a suggestion which I hope the Tribunal
will consider reasonable, that the Prosecution should, as I suggested
yesterday, let this book go in at the moment _de bene esse_ and that
when Dr. Seidl comes to making his final speech he can adopt the
arguments that are put forward by the various gentlemen whom he quotes,
if he thinks they are right. He can use the points as illustrations,
always provided the thesis that he is developing is one which the
Tribunal thinks relevant to the issues before it. That will preserve for
Dr. Seidl the advantage of the right to use these documents subject, as
I say, to the relevancy of the issues, but I suggest that it would be
quite wrong to read them as evidence at the moment. They are merely
polemical and journalistic opinions and directed to an issue which the
Prosecution has submitted, and I do submit, is too remote.

However, I am most anxious that Dr. Seidl should have every advantage
for his final speech. Therefore, I suggest it would be convenient if
they were put in without being read at the moment and were left subject
to the limitation of relevancy, which can be considered when all the
evidence is before the Tribunal, for him to make use of in his final
speech.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, may I shortly...

THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment, Dr. Seidl. We will hear you in a
moment—perhaps it would be better to hear what you have to say now. Do
you think the suggestion made by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe would be one
which would be acceptable to you?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, at first glance the suggestion of Sir David
Maxwell-Fyfe seems to be very reasonable. But I believe I must say that
if the matter is treated in that way great difficulties will arise for
the Defense. For example the arguments on relevancy, which in their
nature belong in the presentation of evidence and must be heard there,
will be postponed until the final speech of the Defense. This would mean
that the defense counsel in his final speech would be interrupted again
and again; that he would have to argue for the relevancy of his
quotations; that perhaps whole parts of his speech would fall by the
wayside in that manner; and that in that way the danger would arise that
the cohesion of the speech will be broken completely.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Sir David.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is a danger which every advocate
has to meet, that certain portions of his speech may not be deemed
relevant, but I thought that that might be a helpful way out. But if it
is not accepted, then the Prosecution must respectfully but very
strongly submit that the issues of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles
are not relevant to this Tribunal.

I have already argued that and I do not want to develop it at great
length. I do want to make it clear that the questions which are raised
by the quotations here were, of course, the subject of political
controversy in practically every country in Europe, and different
opinions were expressed as to the rightness and the practicality of the
provisions, especially the economic provisions of the Treaty of
Versailles. I am not disputing that that is a matter of controversy, but
I am saying that it is not a controversy that should come before this
Tribunal. I myself have replied to practically all the quotations from
the English statesmen here as a politician over the past years, and I am
sure many people in this Court must have taken one view or the other,
but that is not a relevant issue to this Tribunal, and, of course,
especially is it wrong in my view to put forward as evidential matter
opinions expressed by one side in the controversy. Every one of these
speeches, as far as they were English, was either preceded by matters to
which it was a reply or was followed by a reply, and I should think the
same applies to those of Senator Borah in the United States.

These matters—this is my second point—are not really evidential, and
this is a point for argument; and it will have to be decided what is a
convenient time for the Tribunal to decide on whether this is a relevant
issue. But that was why I put forward this suggestion that it was better
to decide it when the whole of the true evidence of fact had been put
before the Tribunal. But I do want, apart from my suggestion, to make
quite clear that as regards relevance, the Prosecution unitedly submit
that the rightness or practicality of the provisions of the Treaty of
Versailles is not a relevant matter. The other argument—I want to
distinguish between the two—the other argument has been adumbrated by
Dr. Stahmer as to the actual terms of the preamble to the military
clauses. That is quite a different point which we can discuss when, as I
understand, certain propositions of law are to be put forward by one of
the defense counsel on behalf of the Defense. But, as I say, the
rightness and practicality of the Treaty and especially the economic
clauses is a subject of enormous controversy on which there are
literally thousands of different opinions from one shade to the other,
and I submit it is not an issue before this Court, and, secondly, I
submit this is not evidence. It is not evidential matter, even if it
were an issue.

DR. SEIDL: May I perhaps reply briefly?

THE PRESIDENT: Then, Sir David, your proposition would be that Dr. Seidl
could not quote from any of these documents?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, certainly, yes, on my premise that it
is irrelevant matter, he could not.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. They are not admissible.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They are not admissible.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My original suggestion was of course, leaving
over the discussion of whether they are admissible until all the
evidence had been filed, but if that is not accepted, I submit bluntly
if I may use the word with all respect—that they are not admissible.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Seidl.

DR. SEIDL: May I reply briefly, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes.

DR. SEIDL: It would indicate a complete misinterpretation of my
intentions if one were to assume that by the submission of this document
book I wanted to show whether or not the Treaty of Versailles is an
expression of statesmanly wisdom. I am not concerned with that here.

With the submission of this document it is to be shown, or rather there
is to be brought under discussion:

Firstly: Whether the opposite side at the conclusion of the Treaty, in
the preliminary negotiations—I call your attention to Wilson’s Fourteen
Points—was not guilty for its part, of violation of the general treaty
obligations, whether a _culpa in contrahendo_ is not to be assumed here.

Secondly: The presentation of the documents should show whether the
opposite side complied with the obligations arising from the treaty, in
order to establish—that is, to give the Tribunal the opportunity of
establishing—in this way the legal inferences which Germany might draw
from this.

Thirdly: The Treaty of Versailles and its violation by the defendants
forms the nucleus of Count One of the Indictment, namely, the Conspiracy
charged by the Prosecution. The Prosecution, in replying to a question
of the Tribunal as to when the conspiracy may be said to have started,
has said that the date might be set as far back as 1921.

Fourthly: The Prosecution has extensive...

THE PRESIDENT: I have not the least idea what you meant by the last
point. I do not understand what you said in the last point in the least.

DR. SEIDL: I wanted to say that for the beginning of the Conspiracy
alleged by the Prosecution, the Treaty of Versailles played a decisive
part, and that there is at least some causal nexus between the origin of
this treaty and the alleged Conspiracy. Before there can be talk of
illegality and of guilt, the facts have to be established which were
causative for the Conspiracy charged by the Prosecution.

Fourthly: The Prosecution has submitted extensive evidence on the
development of the NSDAP. Numerous document books were submitted to the
Court to show the growth in membership, to demonstrate the increase in
the Reichstag mandates. Now, if this evidence was relevant, it is my
assertion that also the circumstances and the facts that first enabled
this rise of the Party at all must be relevant, if only from the
viewpoint of causal nexus.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it your contention that the opinion of a journalist
after the Treaty of Versailles was made, stating that, in his opinion,
the Treaty of Versailles was unjust to Germany, would be admissible
either for the interpretation of the Treaty or for any other purpose
with which this Tribunal is concerned?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I admit that of course the isolated opinion of
a foreign journalist has not in itself to be a relevant document. But I
do maintain that the opinion of Secretary of State Lansing on the coming
about of the Treaty of Versailles and his connection with the history of
this treaty must be of some evidential relevance. What weight attaches
to his opinion is a question which cannot yet be established at this
point. This question can be decided by the Tribunal only when the
complete evidence has been submitted. I maintain further that the
opinion of the Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the
Senate of the United States on the Treaty of Versailles, about its
formulation, about its effects within the Conspiracy alleged by the
Prosecution which purportedly is said to be directed chiefly against the
Treaty of Versailles can _prima facie_ have value as evidence. The same
applies to most of the other statements quoted in this document book. I
would like to call attention to Gustav Cassel, to John Maynard Keynes,
the official financial advisor of the British Government, and to a
number of others.

THE PRESIDENT: It is your contention that because of the provisions of
the Versailles Treaty or because of an infraction of those provisions by
the signatory powers, Germany was justified in making an aggressive war?

DR. SEIDL: I cannot answer that now definitely, so long as I have not
heard the evidence of the other defendants. I do assert, however, that
by violation of the Treaty of Versailles by the opposite side, under
certain circumstances Germany or the defendants could infer the right to
rearm, and that is an infraction of the Treaty of Versailles with which
the defendants are charged. As far as the right to an aggressive war is
concerned, I should not like to make any positive statements at least
until such time as the Tribunal has taken official notice of the
affidavit of Ambassador Gaus.

THE PRESIDENT: One more question I should like to ask you: Are you
saying that the Fourteen Points which were laid down by President Wilson
are admissible evidence to construe the written document of the
Versailles Treaty?

DR. SEIDL: I do not say that the Fourteen Points of Wilson, _per se_,
are admissible evidence. I do assert, on the other hand, that the
connection between these Fourteen Points of Wilson and the Treaty of
Versailles, and the contradiction resulting therefrom are of causal
significance for the Conspiracy alleged by the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Then you are really saying that the Versailles Treaty,
insofar as it departed from the Fourteen Points, was an unjust treaty?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, whether the treaty was just or not is a point
which I do not wish to prove with this document at all. Whether the
treaty was unjust or not is in my opinion a fact which perhaps is beyond
the scope of these proceedings. I do assert, however, that the treaty,
at least in many of its terms, did not bring that which the victorious
states themselves expected of it.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to add anything more, Dr. Seidl?

DR. SEIDL: Not at this point.

DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Since it is a very
fundamental question which has been raised now for discussion by Sir
David, and since the Defense must always calculate on the possibility
that the Tribunal, even at this point, may make a decision on the
question of whether and how far such documentary material as that
discussed can be produced, I consider myself duty-bound to add to the
statements of my colleague, Dr. Seidl, with whom I agree fully, just a
few supplementary words. And I would like to reply to the very precise
question of Your Lordship which starts, “Do you consider it
relevant...?” I believe—and I will avoid any repetition—that a very
vital point as far as relevancy is concerned has not been brought out
yet, and that is the subjective aspect; that is the relevancy of the
investigation of evidence and of facts regarding the subjective state of
the individual defendant, that is, of the facts as seen from within.

If, for example, one of the defendants committed an act which was,
considered purely objectively, a breach of the Treaty of Versailles,
then, as far as criminal law is concerned and looking at it from the
subjective view, it is of great significance whether in the opinion of
reasonable, just, and educated men of all nations, he acted with an
attitude and with a viewpoint which was not merely his special
viewpoint, but that of the most serious men of the various nations and
also of those nations which fought against Germany in the years 1914-18.
In order not to be too abstract, I should like to cite a concrete
example:

A defendant holds the opinion that he is entitled to rearmament—not to
aggressive war; I will not touch this question. He considers rearmament
justified, either because the treaty has not been kept by the other side
or because owing to _expressis verbis_, or to some action, it is to be
considered obsolete. In my opinion it is of decisive relevancy whether
this defendant with this point of view, which explains his action, is
alone in all the world, or whether the opinion which guides his action
is held by men who are to be taken seriously, and who belonged to other
nations, even to those who in the years 1914-18 stood on the other side
and were his enemies.

Rearmament according to the Prosecution, as I understand, is not a
crime, as such, but is merely used by the Prosecution as a charge for
the proving of the crime of having carried on an aggressive war. If,
now, a defendant can prove that he acted from clean and decent views,
views which, as stated, were held by such men of other nations as I have
described, and acted conscientiously and with a clear conscience both as
regards international law and international morals and also as regards
the needs of his country, then this material, which contains opinions,
literary statements, speeches, that coincide with the views of the
defendant in question, is not only of relevant, but of entirely decisive
significance. This viewpoint I ask the Tribunal to bear in mind, if it
desires to decide now the question of principle which Sir David has just
now raised for debate, and which he had to raise, as I fully recognize.
Moreover I am also now in the agreeable position of being able to agree
with Sir David in the practical handling of this matter. I too—and I am
speaking now for myself only—would prefer to have the decision on this
question postponed until the time suggested by Sir David. As far as I am
concerned I will accept the disadvantages, which Dr. Seidl is right in
seeing, because an advantage will result if the Tribunal decides this
question at that time, since it will then have a much larger view on all
questions and shades which are important for the decision. And at this
point I am not at all in a position to speak comprehensively about them,
for I do not want to make any summarizing speech, but just to treat one
aspect of this question of evidence.

DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): I should like to
add a few remarks to those made by my colleague Dr. Dix. I request the
Tribunal...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know how many of the Defense
Counsel think that they are entitled to address them. If Dr. Horn wishes
to add a short argument, the Tribunal are prepared to hear it, but they
are not prepared to hear all the defendants’ counsel upon points such as
this, at this stage, and if any of the other defendants’ counsel desires
to address them, they will decide now whether they will hear any more or
not.

It is understood, then, that Dr. Horn alone will address a short
argument to the Tribunal. If it is not, then the Tribunal will decide
whether they will hear any more argument upon the subject.

DR. HORN: I cannot encroach on the rights of my colleagues in this
question, naturally, Mr. President. I should like personally to make
only a very brief statement on the legal points.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you must consult your colleagues then.

DR. HORN: If you wish a decision on this question now, Mr. President, I
must ask my colleagues beforehand, of course.

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Defense conferred._]

DR. HORN: May I make first a preliminary remark, Mr. President, to what
has just been said to me by my colleagues. Firstly, this decision has
for the Counsel for the organizations a very particular interest.

For myself personally I would like to make the following remarks: The
Prosecution...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I asked you to consult the other defendants’
counsel and ascertain whether they were willing that you should be
heard, and you alone. That is the only terms upon which I am prepared to
hear you.

[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Defense conferred._]

DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, my colleagues are agreed that I shall make
the last statements on this point.

THE PRESIDENT: One moment—very well. Go on.

DR. HORN: There is no doubt that the Prosecution, as far as vital
questions are concerned, base their case on infractions of the
Versailles Treaty. To these treaty infractions, it is absolutely
necessary, in my opinion, to submit the facts which allow the legality
of this treaty to be judged. There is no doubt that this treaty was
signed under duress. It is recognized in international law that such
treaties from the legal point of view have grave deficiencies and are
infamous. In my opinion we must be allowed to submit the facts that
serve to show the soundness of this assertion and legal viewpoint. A
further question—and if I have understood correctly, this is Sir
David’s point—is that of the polemic analysis of the legal, political,
and economic consequences of this treaty.

I do not wish to make any further statements on this point, but I would
like to ask that my first request be granted, that the legal documentary
facts be allowed which would permit a judgment on the legal value of the
Versailles Treaty.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please the Tribunal, if I might deal
first with the argument which Dr. Dix has put forward. As I understood
his first main proposition, it was this: That if a defendant has
committed an act which is an infraction of the treaty and can show that
in the opinion of reasonable and just and educated men in the states who
were the other parties to the treaty, the treaty was so bad that an
infraction was justifiable, that is a permissible argument.

I submit that it is, with great respect to Dr. Dix, an unsound argument
and baseless, from any principle either of law or of materiality. Once
it is admitted that there is a treaty and that an infraction is made,
and it follows from the example that Dr. Dix was dealing with that,
these are the conceded facts. It is no answer to say that a number of
admirable people in the countries which were parties to the treaty
believed that its terms were wrong. The treaty is there and the person
who knowingly makes an infraction is breaking the treaty, however strong
is his support.

In his second point Dr. Dix moved to quite different grounds. He said
that this evidence might be relevant in the special reference to the
question of rearmament because it might show that the treaty was
considered obsolete. Now, it is a rare but nonetheless existing doctrine
of international law that treaties, usually minor treaties, can be
abrogated by the conduct of the contracting parties. I would not contest
that you cannot get examples of that, although they are very rare and
generally deal with minor matters. But this evidence which is before the
Tribunal at the moment is not directed to that point at all. This is, in
the main, contemporary polemic evidence saying that certain aspects of
the treaty were bad, either as regards political standards or economic
standards. That is a totally different argument from the one which Dr.
Dix admirably adumbrated—which is one which if it came up would have to
be faced—that a treaty has become obsolete or that the breaches have
been condoned and that, therefore, the terms have really ceased to
exist.

My answer to that is that this evidence is not directed to that point at
all.

Now, if Dr. Dix will forgive me, and I am sure the fault was mine, I did
not quite appreciate what he termed his subjective argument. But insofar
as I did appreciate it, there seems to be a very good answer: that if he
seeks to suggest that a defendant’s guilt may be less because he, that
defendant, believed that the treaty was bad, that is essentially a
matter which can be judged by the Tribunal who will hear that defendant
and appreciate and evaluate his point of view. It really does not help
in deciding whether the Defendant Hess acted because he thought that the
Treaty of Versailles was a bad treaty, to know what the editor of the
_Observer_, which is a Sunday paper in England, expressed as his views
some twenty years ago, or the _Manchester Guardian_ or indeed, with all
respect to them, what distinguished statesmen have said in writing their
reminiscences years after a matter occurred. The subjective point
is—this is my submission—an important point in deciding on evidence.
The subjective point can be answered by the defendant himself, and the
view of the defendant which the Tribunal will receive.

Now, Dr. Horn has opened up a much wider question, and one which I
submit is entirely irrelevant and beyond the scope of these proceedings.

He wishes the Tribunal to try whether the Treaty of Versailles was
signed under duress. Well, that, of course, would involve the whole
consideration of the Government of the German Republic, the position of
the plenipotentiaries, and the legal position of the persons who
negotiated the treaty.

The answer to that is that this Tribunal is concerned with certain quite
clearly stated offenses, fully particularized, which occurred at the
time that is stated in the Indictment; and all the evidence that is
given as to the actions of the pre-Nazi German Government, and indeed of
the Nazi Government, shows that for years Versailles was accepted as the
legal and actual basis on which they must work, and various different
methods were adopted in order to try to secure changes of the treaty,
and I need not go into, with the Tribunal, the whole frame work of the
Locarno Treaties, recognizing Versailles, which were signed in 1925, and
which were treated as existing and in operation by the Nazi Government
itself.

With that, these actual facts, it would, in my submission, be completely
remote, irrelevant, and contrary to the terms of the Charter, for this
Tribunal to go into an inquiry as to whether the Treaty of Versailles
was signed under duress.

As I gathered, Dr. Horn was not so much interested in the economic
clauses and their rightness or wrongness; but I should respectfully
remind the Tribunal that that is a matter which is before them at the
moment—that here we have, as I have pointed out before—and I do not
want to repeat myself—a number of opinions expressed by people of
varying eminence and with varying degrees of responsibility at the time
that they expressed them. And while strongly maintaining the position
which I have endeavored to express with regard to the treaty, I do
equally impress my second point: That to accept as matters of evidence
statements which in the main are made from a polemical standpoint,
either in answer to an attack or in an attack with background of the
politics of the state in which they were made, is simply a misuse of the
term “evidence”. That is not evidence of any kind, and I equally—not
equally because the first point is one of primary importance, which I
respectfully urge to the Tribunal—but I also suggest that to tender in
evidence matters of that kind is a misuse of the term “evidence,” that
they are matters of argument which an advocate may adopt if the argument
is a relevant one, but they should not be received in evidence by the
Tribunal for that reason.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): Sir
David, is there anything in the Versailles Treaty that either calls for
disarmament by the signatories other than Germany or which looks to such
disarmament; and, if there is, could you give us the reference to it?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, it is the preamble to the Military Clauses.
That is the point which is usually relied on. It is about four lines at
the beginning of the Military Clauses, and, in quite general terms, it
looks to a general disarmament after Germany has disarmed. Of course,
the position was that—I think I have got the dates right—disarmament
was accepted. Whether, in view of the evidence in this case, it should
have been accepted does not matter; it was accepted in 1927. After that,
you may remember, there were a number of disarmament conferences which
examined that question, and eventually in 1933 Germany left the then
existing disarmament conference.

Now, I am trying to be entirely objective. I do not want to put the
Prosecution view or the Defense view, but that is the position.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am not quite clear. When you say
“accepted,” you mean that the extent of the disarmament called for had
been accepted by Germany?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, the other way around: that Germany’s
response to the demand of Versailles was accepted by the Allies in 1927,
and the Disarmament Commission which had been in Germany then left
Germany under, I think, a French General Denoue.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then, what I understand you to argue is that
nothing contained in this folder has anything to do with that possible
issue.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is the point.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is not on that issue. I mean we will deal
with that issue when we come to it. I rather thought from some words
that Dr. Stahmer dropped that that would be one of the points which we
should meet in the general argument on law which will be presented,
which the Defense Counsel...

DR. SEIDL: I believe that Sir David is under a slight misconception. In
Book 3 of the document book for the Defendant Hess there are also a
number of citations of foreign statesmen that refer to this military
clause in the Versailles Treaty and in which it is stated that Germany
fulfilled her obligations in the Versailles Treaty, but that the
reciprocal obligations in it for the opposite side were not fulfilled.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am sorry. I did not remember any. I have
read it through, and there may be some collateral matters dealing with
that, but—and I do not think that I am doing Dr. Seidl’s great industry
in collecting these matters an injustice in saying that if they do exist
they are collateral and the main point of this is an attack on the
political and economic clauses of the treaty. I hope that I have done
him justice. I certainly intended to do so. That is the impression made
on me.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

                          _Afternoon Session_

MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, may I report that the Defendant
Streicher will be absent from this session of Court.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that evidence as to the injustice of
the Versailles Treaty or whether it was made under duress is
inadmissible, and it therefore rejects Volume 3 of the documents on
behalf of the Defendant Hess.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Your Honors. Since Volume 3 of the document
book for the Defendant Rudolf Hess is not admissible as documentary
evidence, I am, so far as the submission of documents is concerned, at
the end of my submission of evidence. Now, we are further concerned only
with the affidavit of Ambassador Gaus, which I have already submitted,
and I ask you not to decide on the admissibility of this document until
I have had opportunity to present arguments on the relevance of it and
of the secret treaty. But I should like to point out that with this
affidavit only the facts and the contents of this secret treaty are to
be proved; and therefore I shall read only excerpts from it, so that
other events and the history prior to the treaty are not to be
demonstrated by me.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, we understand that this affidavit of the
witness Gaus is now being translated and is going to be submitted to the
various prosecutors. They will then inform us of their position, and we
shall be able to see whether it is admissible or not, and the
Prosecution will likewise be able to tell us whether they want to have
the Ambassador here for the purpose of cross-examining him.

DR. SEIDL: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: So we must postpone that until we get the translations.

DR. SEIDL: I had then the further intention of calling the defendant
himself as a witness. In view of his attitude as to the question of the
competency of this Court, he has asked me, however, to dispense with
this procedure. I therefore forego the testimony of the defendant as a
witness and have no further evidence to put in at this point.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

Then the Tribunal will now deal with the case against the Defendant
Ribbentrop.

DR. HORN: Your Lordship, Your Honors, my client, Joachim von Ribbentrop,
had instructed me to make the following statement for him at the
beginning of the evidence:

    “As Foreign Minister for the Reich, I had to carry through the
    directions and orders of Adolf Hitler concerning foreign policy.
    For the measures of foreign policy undertaken by me I accept
    full responsibility.”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I thought defendants’ counsel knew that the
rule which we have laid down is that at this stage no speeches shall be
made, but that the evidence should be called, the oral evidence should
be called, and the documents should be briefly referred to and offered
in evidence. Did you not understand that?

DR. HORN: I did not know, Mr. President, that one might not submit a
statement on behalf of his client.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal has laid down on several occasions, I
think, verbally and certainly once in writing, that no speeches can be
made now, but that speeches can be made at the time laid down in the
Charter. The present opportunity is for all evidence to be given and for
documents to be offered in evidence, with such explanatory observations
upon the documents as may be necessary.

DR. HORN: The former Foreign Minister for the Reich, Joachim von
Ribbentrop, is, according to the general Indictment and according to the
trial brief of the British Delegation and the verbally presented special
charges, held responsible for all crimes cited in Article 6 of the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal.

Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, in the session of the International Military
Tribunal of 8 January 1946, described the facts of the case against my
client as follows:

Firstly, the using of his offices and of his personal influence and
intimate connection with Hitler to facilitate the seizure of power
through the NSDAP and the preparation of wars.

Secondly, the participation in the political planning, and preparation
of the National Socialist Conspiracy for Wars of Aggression...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, are you again making a speech or what are you
doing?

DR. HORN: No, Mr. President, I am just enumerating on one page how I
plan to arrange my evidence, and I ask to be allowed to divide it in
this way.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. HORN: Secondly, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe adduced the participation in
the political planning and preparation of the National Socialist
conspirators for aggressive war and the wars in violation of
international treaties. He accordingly bears the responsibility for the
execution of the foreign policy planned by the political conspirators.

Thirdly, participation in and approval of Crimes against Peace, War
Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, especially crimes against persons
and property in the occupied territories.

The Defendant Von Ribbentrop has declared himself not guilty of all
crimes charged against him. To refute the charges made against him, I
will begin now my presentation of evidence.

The honorable prosecutor at the beginning of his statements quoted from
Exhibit Number USA-5, Document Number 2829-PS, and brought out that the
Defendant Von Ribbentrop was an SS Obergruppenführer. The honorable
prosecutor asserted that this rank was not an honorary one. In
opposition to this, the defendant asserts that the rank of an SS
Gruppenführer and later of Obergruppenführer, bestowed by Hitler, was
bestowed upon him only on an honorary basis, because Hitler wished that
the members of the Government should appear on official occasions in
uniform, and the rank of an SS Gruppenführer appeared in keeping with
the official position of the defendant. The defendant neither served in
the SS nor led an SS unit. Neither did he have any adequate military
training and preparation for this high military position.

To demonstrate this I will submit evidence from the defendant himself as
a witness.

The Prosecution has asserted that Von Ribbentrop, after the taking over
of power, for a short period of time was adviser of the Party on foreign
political matters. This assertion is refuted by Document 2829-PS which
is contained in the document book in the hands of the Tribunal. I will
read Paragraph 3, where it says:

    “Foreign Policy Collaborator to the Führer, 1933-1938.”

This is the first document of the Ribbentrop document book. According to
it, in the years 1933 to 1938 Von Ribbentrop was only Hitler’s adviser
on foreign political questions. With reference to Document D-472,
Exhibit Number GB-130, the second document in the Document Book
Ribbentrop, which concerns an excerpt from the International
Biographical Archives, the honorable prosecutor claimed that the
defendant even before 1932 worked for the NSDAP, after he had entered
the Party service in 1930. The Prosecution cites Paragraph II, Lines
6-9, of this document, which says:

    “Following up his connection with foreign countries, he
    established new relations with England and France; having been
    in the service of the NSDAP since 1930, he knew how to extend
    them to political circles.”

The statement is not correct. The defendant was until 1932 not a member
of any political party in Germany, particularly not of the NSDAP. As far
as his political views were concerned, he leaned toward the Deutsche
Volkspartei—that is the party of Stresemann.

In the year 1932 the defendant came to know Hitler personally. His views
on domestic and foreign political matters brought him...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I do not want to interrupt you unnecessarily,
but I do not understand what you are doing now. You seem to me to be
stating a part of the evidence which presumably the Defendant Von
Ribbentrop will give, and, if so, when he gives it it will be cumulative
to your statement. Also, you seem to be referring to documents which
have been produced by the Prosecution and answering them yourself. Well,
that is not what the Tribunal desires at this stage. It quite
understands that at the appropriate time you will make whatever argument
you think right with reference to the evidence which has been brought
forward, on behalf of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. But, as I have
already said—I thought quite clearly—what the Tribunal wants done now
is to hear all the evidence on behalf of Von Ribbentrop and to have
offered in evidence the documents upon which you will rely, with any
short explanatory statement as to the meaning of the documents. And if
there is any part of a document which has been produced by the
Prosecution but not cited by them which you think it necessary to refer
to, as explanatory of the part of the document which has been used by
them, then you are at liberty to put in, to offer in evidence that part
of the document with any short explanatory words that you wish. But I do
not understand what you are doing now except making a speech.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, I was using the opposing fact which I wish to
present against the claims of the Prosecution, because according to my
information and according to my documents, they do not correspond to the
facts. As far as the establishment of Point 1 of what Mr. President has
just said, I would like to state the following: The health of the
Defendant Von Ribbentrop is quite poor at present. This morning the
doctor told me that Ribbentrop is suffering from so-called vasomotor
disturbances in his speech. I wanted to take a part of his evidence
statement from my client by making a statement of it here and thus
showing the position of the defendant to the Tribunal. I do not know
whether the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, in view of his present state of
health, that is, his impediment of speech, could make these explanations
as briefly as I myself can. Then, when the defendant is in the box, he
needs only to confirm these statements under oath.

THE PRESIDENT: If the Defendant Von Ribbentrop is too ill to give
evidence today, then he must give evidence on some future occasion. If
you have any oral witnesses to call other than the Defendant Von
Ribbentrop, then they can give evidence today; and with reference to the
documentary evidence, it is perfectly simple for you to offer those
documents in evidence in the way that it was done by Dr. Stahmer, in the
way that it was done by Dr. Seidl, and the way in which the Tribunal
have explained over and over again.

DR. HORN: I had intended to submit documents first and not to call my
witnesses until later. As far as Von Ribbentrop is concerned, I have
learned that his condition has become constantly worse. I do not know
therefore whether at the end of the presentation of evidence I will be
in a position to summon the Defendant Von Ribbentrop; but I must be
prepared for the possibility that I might not be able to call him. And
otherwise I am concerned with only a very few very general points for
rectification.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you cannot give evidence at any rate and if you
cannot call Von Ribbentrop, then you must, if it is possible to do so,
call some other witnesses who will give the evidence which he would have
given. If, unfortunately, it is not possible to do so, then his case may
suffer; but the Tribunal will give every possible facility for his being
called at any stage. If he is in fact so ill, as you suggest, that he
cannot give evidence, then his evidence may be put off until the end of
the defendants’ case, subject of course to a proper medical certificate
being produced.

DR. HORN: If the Court wants then later to hear the defendant, I will
postpone the matter with the request that if I cannot hear him, that is,
cannot hear him fully—for I emphasize again, there is a speech
disturbance—then he can at least confirm the evidence as a witness.

THE PRESIDENT: You may call any of the witnesses; the Tribunal has not
laid down that the defendant must be called first. You have applied for
eight witnesses, I think, in addition to the defendant and you can call
any of them or you can deal with your documents, but whichever you do,
you must do it in the way which the Tribunal has ordered.

DR. HORN: Then, I will turn now to the occupation of the Rhineland.

On 27 February 1936, there was ratified between the French Republic and
the Soviet Union a mutual-assistance pact, the content of which clearly
violated the Locarno Treaty and the covenant of the League of Nations,
and was solely directed against Germany. At the same time...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you have just said that something or other is
against international law. Now, that is not a reference to any document
which you are offering in evidence, nor is it any comment upon the
production of oral evidence. If you have a document to offer, kindly
offer it and then make any necessary explanatory remarks.

DR. HORN: Then, I wanted next to refer to Document Number 1 in the
Document Book Ribbentrop. We are concerned with a memorandum of the
German Government to the signatory powers of the Locarno Pact, of 7
March 1936.

THE PRESIDENT: Which page is that?

DR. HORN: That is on Page 6 of the document book. In explanation I may
add that this memorandum was submitted to the signatory powers, because
between the French Government and the Republic of the Soviet Union a
treaty of mutual assistance had been ratified and at the same time, the
German Foreign Office received knowledge of a plan which the French
General Staff had worked out and which arranged that the French Army was
to advance along the line of the Main, so that North and South Germany
in this way would be separated, and even to join hands with the Russian
Army across Czechoslovakia.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, for the formality of the record, it is
necessary to offer each document in evidence and the document should be
given a number. You have not yet offered any of these documents in
evidence or given them any numbers, so far as I know.

DR. HORN: I gave this document the number, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 1.
The number is in the upper right hand corner of the document.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. HORN: And I ask—perhaps I may say this in order to save time—I ask
that all these documents quoted as Ribbentrop exhibit number be accepted
in evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, and in the order in which you quote them?

DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: They will be numbered that way. Very well.

DR. HORN: As to the particulars just submitted on the reason for this
memorandum being lodged, and as evidence of the fact just cited
regarding the arrangement of the French General Staff, I will call Von
Neurath as a witness. I will question him on this one point, when he is
called into the box. In order to justify the German view, which is
contained in the memorandum and which consists in the fact that the
Locarno Pact and the League of Nations covenant were considered
infringed upon, I would like to refer to Page 3 of the document and wish
to quote the following—this is on Page 8 of the document book:

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, was this document Exhibit Number Ribbentrop-1,
one of the documents for which you applied and which you were allowed in
the applications?

DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President. This document is concerned with excerpts
from the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_ (_Documents of German
Politics_), Volume 4.

I want to stress that this collection of documents was granted to me at
the same time as the two evidence books.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to see the original document.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, we are not in a position to present original
documents, since the Foreign Office was confiscated by the victorious
powers and with it a great part of the documents. Then I would have to
make an application now that the signatory powers concerned produce
these original documents, for we simply are not able to. We can only
refer to document collections.

THE PRESIDENT: Where does the copy come from?

DR. HORN: This copy, Mr. President, is from the _Dokumente der Deutschen
Politik_, Volume 4, as is shown in the document book which the President
has before him. The document is found on Page 123 of this document
collection.

I should like, Mr. President, to add an explanatory remark: If the Court
is interested in seeing the original, I should have to have the
collection, which is up in the document room now, brought down. It is in
German, and I do not believe that it would be of any value to the
Tribunal at this time. May I mention further...

THE PRESIDENT: You see, Dr. Horn, as a matter of formality and
certainty, the Tribunal ought to have in its record every document which
forms part of the record, whether it is an original or whether it is a
copy; and whatever the document is that is offered in evidence, it ought
to be handed in to the Tribunal and kept by the Tribunal. It ought to be
put in evidence, offered in evidence, and handed to the General
Secretary or his representative, and then the Tribunal has a full record
of every document which is in evidence.

But we cannot have documents such as this, which is a mere copy of the
original document which ought to be offered in evidence. If it is at the
Information Center, then it is quite capable of being produced here.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, the Court decided that we are justified in
copying documents and certifying to the authenticity in order that these
documents may be submitted as evidence to the Tribunal. Therefore, we
have compared every document with the original we had on hand, or with
the printed copy of the document and at the end of the document we
attested the authenticity of the copy. This document, certified with my
own signature, is in the hands of the Tribunal, I believe in five
copies.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn—Yes, Mr. Dodd.

MR. DODD: We thought that we might be helpful. We say that we are
willing to accept this quotation from the volume referred to, and I do
think that we did put in some documents ourselves and asked the Court’s
indulgence at the time in something of the same fashion.

I think the Court, if I may suggest respectfully, might take this
document on that same basis.

I have conferred only with Sir David, but I feel quite sure that our
French and Russian colleagues will agree as well.

THE PRESIDENT: I think, Mr. Dodd, the point is—and, of course, it is
probably only a formal point—that the only document which is offered in
evidence or put in evidence is a copy which does not contain Dr. Horn’s
signature and therefore there is nothing to show that it is in fact a
true copy. Of course, if we had had Dr. Horn’s signature, we would be
prepared to accept that it was a true copy of the original. What we have
before us is a mere mimeograph, I suppose, of some document which has
not been produced to us.

MR. DODD: Very well, Your Honor. I have not had an opportunity to
examine it carefully. We did not get these documents, by the way, until
pretty late last night. We have not had the usual period of time to
examine it, but in any event, I have suggested it might go in, and if
Dr. Horn would verify it, as suggested by the President, and later
furnish the original copy, it might be all right.

THE PRESIDENT: That would be all right, certainly.

Dr. Horn, you understand what I mean. If you will produce to us at some
future date the actual document which you signed yourself, to show that
it was a true copy, that will be quite satisfactory.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, in the entire document book there is no
document which I have not signed and given in five copies to be
translated. Of course, I cannot also sign all the translations. This
document which is contained in the document book submitted to the
President has my signature in the German text.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean that you have handed your documents in to be
translated, in German, with your signature at the bottom, saying it is a
true extract, and you do not know where those documents are because they
have gone into the Translation Division? That is right, is it not?

DR. HORN: Only partially, Mr. President. I know that I handed in these
documents, to the proper office, in German, and with my signature. Then
that office kept them and had them translated. From the moment I handed
them in I naturally have had no further control of what happened.

I may also point out that the document books which we used were
available only in a single copy and must be used by all attorneys, even
now, for their future work. Because of that, I cannot produce the
original for the Tribunal since it is not my property. That can be done
in agreement only with the person in charge of the document section,
Lieutenant Commander Schrader.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, if, in the future, you and the other
defendants’ counsel could get your document books ready in sufficient
time, you could perhaps then make the arrangement that you hand in the
document book, when you are offering it in evidence, and then it would
be capable of being handed to the officer of the Court.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, I do not believe that that possibility exists
at all, for these _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_—just to use this
example—are available only in one copy for the use of all Defense
Counsel attorneys; I cannot take these books away, if they wish to
continue work with them, in order to submit them to the Tribunal as
evidence. I would not receive them. I receive these books only to use
them, and make excerpts from them, and then I have to return them.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but you are putting in evidence now a certain
extract from the book, and all the Tribunal wants is that that extract
be certified, either by you or by some other person who can be trusted,
as a correct extract from the book, and that that document, so signed,
can be produced. It may be difficult to produce it at the moment because
you have handed it in to some official or to somebody in the Translation
Division and therefore you cannot produce it, but it could be arranged
that it should be produced in the future. I do not mean this particular
one, but in the future other defendants’ counsel can produce their
documents certified by themselves or by some other person of authority.

DR. HORN: That has already been done, Mr. President. Five document books
of the same type, signed by me, were handed to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, the rule of the Tribunal happens to be that
they should be handed in, in this Court, at the time that they are being
used, as well as their being handed in to somebody for the purpose of
translation. That is the rule.

But now perhaps we had better get on as we are taking up too much time
over this.

DR. HORN: I have just heard that the German documents which I signed are
being procured from the Secretariat General, so I will be able to submit
them to the Tribunal with signature, in the German.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. HORN: I should like to continue and explain the afore-mentioned
opinion of the legal consequences of the Pact made between France and
Russia in 1936, and I refer to Page 3, that is, Page 8 of the document
book. I quote:

    “Consequently, the only question is whether France, in accepting
    these treaty obligations, has kept within those limits which, in
    her relation to Germany have been laid on her by the Rhine Pact.

    “This, however, the German Government must deny.

    “The Rhine Pact was supposed to achieve the goal of securing
    peace in Western Europe by having Germany on the one hand, and
    France and Belgium on the other, renounce for all time employing
    military force in their relations to each other. If, by the
    conclusion of the pact, certain reservations to this
    renunciation of war, going beyond the right of self-defense,
    were permitted, the political reason for this was, as is
    generally known, solely the fact that France had already taken
    on certain alliance obligations towards Poland and
    Czechoslovakia which she did not want to sacrifice to the idea
    of absolute peace security in the West. Germany at that time
    accepted in good faith these reservations to the renunciation of
    war. She did not object to the treaties with Poland and
    Czechoslovakia, placed on the table at Locarno by the
    representative of France, only because of the self-understood
    supposition that these treaties adapted themselves to the
    structure of the Rhine Pact and did not contain any provisions
    on the application of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League
    of Nations, such as are provided for in the new French-Soviet
    agreements. This was true also of the contents of these special
    agreements, which came to the knowledge of the German Government
    at that time. The exceptions permitted in the Rhine Pact did, it
    is true, not expressly refer to Poland and Czechoslovakia, but
    were formulated generally. But it was the sense of all
    negotiations about this matter to find a compromise between the
    German-French renunciation of war and the desire of France to
    maintain her already existent pact obligations. If, therefore,
    France now takes advantage of the abstract formulation of war
    possibilities allowed for in the Rhine Treaty in order to
    conclude a new pact against Germany with a highly armed state,
    if thus in such a decisive manner she limits the scope of the
    renunciation of war mutually agreed upon with Germany, and if,
    as set forth above, she does not even observe the stipulated
    formal juridical limits, then she has created thereby a
    completely new situation and has destroyed the political system
    of the Rhine Pact both in theory and literally.”

I will omit the next paragraph and will quote from Page 9 of the
document book as follows:

    “The German Government have always emphasized during the
    negotiations of the last years that they would maintain and
    carry out all obligations of the Rhine Pact as long as the other
    partners to the Pact also were willing on their part to adhere
    to this Pact. This natural supposition cannot any longer be
    regarded as fulfilled by France. In violation of the Rhine Pact,
    France has replied to the friendly offers and peaceful
    assurances, made again and again by Germany, with a military
    alliance with the Soviet Union, directed exclusively against
    Germany. Therefore the Rhine Pact of Locarno has lost its inner
    meaning and has ceased to exist in any practical sense. For that
    reason Germany also on her side does not consider herself bound
    any longer by this pact which has become void.”

In consideration of the Franco-Russian pact and the intentions of the
French General Staff, Hitler had the Defendant Von Ribbentrop come to
him in order to question him about the presumable attitude of England to
a possible German reoccupation...

THE PRESIDENT: You are reading from the document, are you not, Dr. Horn?
You begin to tell us something about Hitler.

DR. HORN: Yes, I interrupted at the phrase “as bound by this pact which
has become void,” in order to bring in the role of Ribbentrop briefly.
On the basis of this pact and of the intentions of the French General
Staff, Hitler then had the Defendant Von Ribbentrop...

THE PRESIDENT: We shall hear that from Von Ribbentrop, shall we not?

DR. HORN: Mr. President, we are permitted to add a few connecting words
to the documents. I can now...

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Colonel Pokrovsky.

COL. POKROVSKY: As far as I can understand, the Tribunal has already
explained to Ribbentrop’s Defense Counsel, Dr. Horn, that the Defense is
now submitting a document. Although Dr. Horn does not consider it
necessary to state when he deviates from the document and when he quotes
from it, I have had the opportunity of noting that in the document he
has just quoted, numbered Ribbentrop-1, there is a complete absence of
any reference to the plans of the French General Staff. Among the
documents in the document book submitted by Ribbentrop’s Defense Counsel
I could not find any copies of the plans of the French General Staff. It
is therefore quite incomprehensible to me how Dr. Horn happens to be
informed about the plans of the French General Staff, and on what
grounds he refers to these plans while presenting evidence, in
Ribbentrop’s case, since they appear to be completely absent among the
documents to which he refers.

DR. HORN: Mr. President...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what you appeared to the Tribunal to be doing
then was not anything explanatory of the document, but telling us what
Hitler did, and what the Defendant Ribbentrop did, in consequence of
what Hitler did. That is not in evidence. You cannot tell us what is not
in evidence. You can only give us explanatory remarks to make the
document itself intelligible.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, the Defendant Von Ribbentrop is accused on
account of the conduct of the entire foreign policy. The Prosecution
have presented the foreign political activity as they see it, and we
have been permitted, not to give a speech, but, in connection with the
documents submitted, to present our opposing view, as the Defense see
it. In order to do that, I must refer to certain facts, documents and
quotations. I can never give a complete picture if I may just submit a
document without giving a large frame to this matter, a certain
development in the entire policy.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Horn, the Tribunal is not expecting you to give
a complete picture at this stage. All you are doing at the present
moment is introducing the evidence. You are going to give the complete
picture when you make your final speech. It is intelligible, this
document. It is a document which is well known; it is perfectly
intelligible without telling us what Hitler or what the Defendant
Ribbentrop did.

DR. HORN: Regarding these questions raised by the Russian Prosecutor, I
have already asked for the Defendant Von Neurath as a witness. I can
interrogate him on this point only after the Defendant Von Neurath is in
the witness box. But I can still refer now to these facts that are
counterevidence.

THE PRESIDENT: But, you see, that would be his function. If you are
going to tell us what you think the Defendant Von Neurath is going to
say in answer to questions which you put to him, that would be making an
opening statement. Well, that has not been provided for by the Charter.
We must wait until you call Von Neurath or until you question Von
Neurath.

DR. HORN: Then I will read from this document just mentioned, Ribbentrop
Exhibit Number 1, on Page 10 of the document book:

    “The German Government are now forced to face the new situation
    created by this alliance, a situation which is made more
    critical by the fact that the Franco-Soviet pact has found its
    complement in a pact of alliance of exactly parallel nature
    between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. In the interest of
    the elementary right of a nation to safeguard its borders and to
    guarantee its defensive capacities, the German Government have
    therefore re-established the full and unrestricted sovereignty
    of the Reich in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland,
    effective today.”

I ask the Tribunal to accept the entire document as evidence. Through
this step of the German Government certain articles of the Treaty of
Versailles which were concerned with the demilitarization of the
Rhineland zone had become obsolete. Since this morning, by decision of
the Court, the taking of a position on the Versailles Treaty is not
permitted, I will omit the corresponding material from the document book
of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, and turn now to the document Ribbentrop
Exhibit Number 8, which is on Page 21 of the document book.

May I put another question first, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

DR. HORN: Is it permitted to submit the official documents on the Treaty
of Versailles that were exchanged between governments before the
conclusion of the treaty? These are purely government documents and not
any arguments on the treaty itself. May these documents be submitted
after the decision of the Tribunal today?

THE PRESIDENT: Which are they, the one on Page 21?

DR. HORN: This is in regard to the Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 3.

THE PRESIDENT: Where is that?

DR. HORN: It is on Page 14 of the document book.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal would like to know what issue in
this Trial this document is relevant to.

DR. HORN: I wanted to explain by it the German opinion of the Treaty of
Versailles. Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 2 is the note of Germany to the
United States that contains the offer for an armistice and conclusion of
peace. And I wanted further to show in the next note again that this
offer was one based on the Wilsonian Fourteen Points. Further, with
Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 4, I wanted to submit evidence that the peace
and the armistice were to be concluded on the basis of the Fourteen
Points with two exceptions. I also wanted to show through Ribbentrop
Exhibit...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I tried not to interrupt, but really
this is the issue that the Tribunal ruled on a fortnight ago when the
Defendant Göring, I think, applied for documents on exactly this issue;
and that also, as I understand, the Tribunal ruled on again this
morning. The issue is perfectly clear; the only issue to which this can
be directed is whether the Treaty of Versailles was in accordance with
the Fourteen Points and if not, was therefore an unjust treaty which
comes directly within the Tribunal’s ruling of an hour ago.

DR. HORN: May I add something more?

As far as I and my colleagues have understood the ruling of the Tribunal
today, the only prohibition is against making before this Tribunal
statements on the injustice of the treaty and on the fact that it
purportedly was concluded under duress. We have not understood the
decision in any other way.

THE PRESIDENT: That was why I asked you to what issue this was relevant,
and you said that it was relevant to showing what the German opinion on
the treaty was. Well, these are documents of the period before the
treaty was made, and they seem to be only relevant upon the question of
whether or not the treaty was a just treaty or not a just treaty.

DR. HORN: I personally did not want to demonstrate through this document
either that it was a just or an unjust peace, but only that it was a
treaty which had many legal inadequacies, since the main treaty was not
in line with the agreements of the preliminary treaty.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, if the main treaty was not in accordance with the
preliminary treaty then the main treaty would, according to that
argument be an unfair treaty. That is the very point upon which the
Tribunal has ruled.

DR. HORN: For that reason, Mr. President, I have just omitted these
documents also and said that I will not refer to them in view of this
ruling. I will now turn to Document Number 8.

THE PRESIDENT: As you are going through a lot of documents we might
break off for 10 minutes.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

MR. DODD: I do not want to take much of the Tribunal’s time, but in view
of the statement of Dr. Horn concerning the condition of the Defendant
Von Ribbentrop, I think it is required that we inform the Tribunal of
the situation as we understand it, which is something quite different
from the understanding of Dr. Horn.

I have talked with Colonel Andrus and with one of the Army doctors in
attendance. Colonel Andrus has talked with both of them, and our
understanding is that Ribbentrop is not ill and is able to take the
witness stand; that he is nervous, and appears to be frightened, but he
is not disabled in any sense and is capable of testifying.

DR. HORN: I come now to Page 21 of the document book, and ask the Court
to take judicial notice of the document appearing under Ribbentrop
Exhibit Number 8. It is a copy, again from the _Dokumente der Deutschen
Politik_, Volume 4, which I turned over, signed, to the Court. It is the
speech of Ambassador Von Ribbentrop at the 91st session of the League of
Nations Council in London, regarding the Soviet Pact, the Locarno Pact
and the German Peace Plan. The speech was delivered on 19 March 1936. I
refer to Page 3 of the speech and begin my quotation with Number 5. I
quote:

    “According to this alliance, France and Russia appoint
    themselves judges on their own affairs by independently
    determining the aggressor, if occasion arises without a
    resolution or a recommendation of the League of Nations, and
    thereby are able to go to war against Germany according to their
    own judgment.

    “This strict obligation of the two countries is clearly and
    unequivocally evident from Paragraph 1 of the signatory protocol
    to the Treaty of Alliance. That means: In a given case France
    can decide, on her own judgment, whether Germany or Soviet
    Russia is the aggressor. She merely reserves the right not to be
    exposed, on account of military action based on such an
    individual decision, to sanctions on the part of the powers
    guaranteeing the Rhine Pact, namely, England and Italy.

    “From the point of view of law and realistic politics, this
    reservation is meaningless.

    “In terms of law: How will France be able to foresee, when
    determining the aggressor herself, what attitude the guarantors
    of the Locarno Pact will afterwards assume towards her one-sided
    definition? The answer to the question of whether France would
    have to fear sanctions in such a case depends in practice not
    only on the faithful adherence to the pact by the
    guarantors—about which the German Government do not wish to
    raise doubts in any way—but also on the most various
    prerequisites of a purely factual nature, the probability or
    improbability of which is not to be perceived in advance. In
    addition, however, the evaluation of the relationship between
    the new Treaty of Alliance and the Rhine Pact cannot be made
    dependent on the treaty relationship between France and Germany
    on the one hand and the Guaranteeing Powers on the other, but
    only on the direct treaty relationship between France and
    Germany themselves. Otherwise one would have to expect Germany
    to tolerate silently every possible violation of the Rhine Pact
    by France, in confidence that the guarantors would have to
    provide for her security. That certainly is not the intention of
    the Rhine Pact.

    “In terms of realistic politics: When a country is attacked by
    such a superior military coalition as a consequence of a
    decision, incorrect because taken in advance in one of the
    party’s own interests, it is an empty consolation to obtain its
    right in subsequent sanctions against the aggressors condemned
    by the League of Nations Council. For what sanctions could
    actually hit such a gigantic coalition reaching from East Asia
    to the Channel? These two countries are such powerful and
    important members and especially militarily strong factors of
    the League of Nations that according to all practical
    considerations, sanctions would be unthinkable from the outset.

    “Therefore this second reservation dealing with the
    consideration of probable sanctions is of no consequence at all
    from a realistic political point of view.

    “I now ask the members of the Council to bear in mind not only
    the legal and practical political scope of this obligation of
    France’s to act independently, but to ask yourselves above all
    whether the opinion can be advocated that the German Government
    of that time, which signed the Locarno Pact, would ever have
    taken upon themselves the obligations of this Pact, had it
    contained such one-sided stipulations as have now later
    developed.”

I now go to Page 26 of the document book, and the same document, and to
clarify the German point of view, I add the following. I quote:

    “But the Franco-Soviet Russian alliance means, beyond that—in
    the German Government’s view of history—a complete elimination
    of the hitherto existing European balance and consequently of
    the fundamental political and legal conditions under which the
    Locarno Pact was concluded at that time.”

With this, Germany had expressed the legal basis of her attitude toward
the Locarno Pact and the Versailles stipulations regarding the
demilitarization of the Rhineland. In order to prove her will to disarm,
there is in the same document on Page 7, that is, Page 27 of the
document book, an exhaustive and detailed disarmament proposal.

I ask the Tribunal to accept in evidence the document just cited, so
that I may later refer to it.

With this exposition I conclude my presentation on Germany’s reasons for
reoccupying the Rhineland. Regarding the role of the Defendant Von
Ribbentrop in the occupation of the Rhineland, I shall enter upon that
when I call the Defendant to the witness stand.

After the occupation of the Rhineland, the Defendant Von Ribbentrop
returned to London, where he was then ambassador. On 4 February 1938 he
was appointed Foreign Minister, and from that time on, conducted the
foreign policy along the lines laid down by Hitler. In proof of this
statement I refer to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 10, to be found in the
document book. This is a very short document that I submit to the
Tribunal for judicial notice. It is an excerpt from the speech of the
Führer before the German Reichstag in the Kroll Opera House in Berlin on
19 July 1940. I quote:

    “I cannot conclude this appraisal without finally thanking the
    man who for years has carried out my foreign political
    directions in loyal, tireless, self-sacrificing devotion.

    “The name of Party member Von Ribbentrop will be linked for all
    time with the political rise of the German Nation as that of the
    Reich Foreign Minister.”

I submit this quotation to the Tribunal to show according to what
principles the Defendant Von Ribbentrop had to conduct the foreign
policy.

I should like now to ask the Tribunal to hear the witness State
Secretary Von Steengracht.

[_The witness Von Steengracht took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name, please?

ADOLF FREIHERR STEENGRACHT VON MOYLAND (Witness): Adolf von Steengracht.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.

DR. HORN: What was your last position in the Foreign Office?

VON STEENGRACHT: From May 1943 I was State Secretary of the Foreign
Office.

DR. HORN: What were your activities?

VON STEENGRACHT: In order to present my activities in a comprehensible
way, I must make the following prefatory remarks:

From the beginning of the war, the Foreign Minister had his office in
the neighborhood of Hitler’s headquarters; that is to say in most
instances several hundred kilometers distant from Berlin. There he
carried on business with a restricted staff. The Foreign Office in
Berlin had duties of a routine and administrative nature. But above all,
its duty was also the execution of the regular intercourse with foreign
diplomats.

Within the limits of this field of duties, I bore the responsibility, as
State Secretary, from May 1943. The molding of foreign political
opinion, the decisions and instructions in foreign policy, on the other
hand, originated from headquarters, mostly without any participation,
sometimes also without any subsequent information to the Foreign Office.

DR. HORN: Who determined the basic lines of the foreign policy?

VON STEENGRACHT: The foreign policy, not only on its basic lines, but
also usually down to the most minute details, was determined by Hitler
himself. Ribbentrop frequently stated that the Führer needed no Foreign
Minister, he simply wanted a foreign political secretary. Ribbentrop, in
my opinion, would have been satisfied with such a position because then
at least, backed by Hitler’s authority, he could have eliminated partly
the destructive and indirect foreign political influences and their sway
on Hitler. Perhaps he might then have had a chance of influencing
Hitler’s speeches, which the latter was accustomed to formulate without
Ribbentrop, even in the foreign political field.

DR. HORN: Were there other offices or personalities, in addition to the
Foreign Office, that concerned themselves with foreign policy?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, there was practically no office in the Party or
its organizations that, after 1933, had no foreign political ambitions.
Every one of these offices had a sort of foreign bureau through which it
took up connections with foreign countries in the attempt to gain its
own foreign political channels.

I should judge the number of these to be approximately thirty. For
example, the Hitler Jugend, the SA, the German Labor Front, the SS, the
Rosenberg office with its Foreign Political office, the Propaganda
Ministry, the office Waldeck, the Ribbentrop office, the Nordic Society;
further, the VDA, the German Academy, the Reich Railways (Reichsbahn)