his saddle!” Yet his own gallant spirit impelled him to lead his
  brigade into the bloody battle of Churubusco. But his exhausted
  physical nature was not strong enough to sustain the brave soul which
  animated it, and he sank insensible on the field in front of his
  brigade. Was this evidence of cowardice? These circumstances, so far
  from being an impeachment of his courage, prove conclusively that he
  possesses that high quality in an uncommon degree. Almost any other
  man, nay, almost any other brave man, in his weak and disabled
  condition, would have remained in his tent; but the promptings of his
  gallant and patriotic spirit impelled him to rush into the midst of
  the battle. To what lengths will not party rancor and malignity
  proceed when such high evidences of indomitable courage are construed
  into proofs of cowardice? How different was General Scott’s opinion
  from that of the revilers of Franklin Pierce! It was on this very
  occasion that he conferred upon him the proud title of “the gallant
  Brigadier-General Pierce.”

  The cordial union of the Democratic party throughout the country
  presents a sure presage of approaching victory. Even our political
  opponents admit that we are in the majority when thoroughly united.
  And I venture now to predict that, whether with or without the vote of
  Pennsylvania, Franklin Pierce and William R. King, should their lives
  be spared, will as certainly be elected President and Vice President
  of the United States on the first Tuesday in November next, as that
  the blessed sun shall rise on that auspicious day. We feel the
  inspiration of victory from the infallible indications of public
  opinion throughout our sister States.

  Shall this victory be achieved without the voice or vote of
  Pennsylvania? No President has ever yet been elected without her vote.
  Shall this historical truth be reversed, and shall Pierce and King be
  elected in November, despite the vote of the good old Keystone? God
  bless her! No—never, never, shall the Democracy of our great and
  glorious State be subjected to this disgrace.

  And yet, strange to say, the Whigs at Washington and the Whigs
  throughout every State of the Union claim the vote of Pennsylvania
  with the utmost apparent confidence. To secure her vote was one of the
  main inducements for the nomination of General Scott over the head of
  Millard Fillmore. Is there one unprejudiced citizen of any party in
  the United States, who can lay his hand upon his heart and declare
  that he believes General Scott would make as good and as safe a
  President as Mr. Fillmore? No, fellow-citizens, all of us must concur
  in opinion with Mr. Clay, that Fillmore had superior claims and
  qualifications to those of Scott for the highest civil station.
  Availability, and availability alone, produced the nomination of
  Scott.

  The Whigs well knew that the Democrats of the Keystone were in the
  majority. What must then be done to secure her vote? Pennsylvania
  Democrats must be seduced from their party allegiance—they must be
  induced to abandon the political altars at which they have so long
  worshipped—they must be persuaded to renounce the principles of
  Jefferson and of Jackson, by the nomination of a military hero; and
  this hero, too, a most bitter and uncompromising Whig. General Scott
  is none of your half-way Whigs—he is not like General Taylor, a Whig,
  but not an ultra Whig. He goes the whole. Is there a single Whig
  doctrine, or a single Whig principle, however odious to the Democracy,
  to which he is not devoted, which he has not announced and taught
  under his own hand? If there be, I have never heard it mentioned. Nay,
  more: these odious doctrines are with him not merely strong opinions,
  but they are absolute convictions, rules of faith and of practice. The
  Bank of the United States, the Bankrupt Law, the distribution of the
  proceeds of the public lands among the States, the abolishment of the
  veto power from the Constitution; in short, all the Whig measures
  against which the Democracy of the country have always waged incessant
  war—are so many articles of General Scott’s political creed. When
  asked, in October, 1841, whether, “if nominated as a candidate for the
  Presidency, would you accept the nomination?” after expressing his
  strong approbation of all the Whig measures to which I have just
  referred, as well as others of a similar character, he answers: “I beg
  leave respectfully to reply—Yes; provided that I be not required to
  renounce any principles professed above. My principles are
  convictions.”

  I will do him the justice to declare that he has never yet recanted or
  renounced any one of these principles. They are still convictions with
  him; and yet the Democracy of Pennsylvania are asked to recant and
  renounce their own most solemn and deliberate convictions, and vote
  for a candidate for the Presidency, merely on account of his military
  fame, who, if elected, would exert the power and influence of his
  administration to subvert and to destroy all the essential principles
  which bind us together as members of the great and glorious Democratic
  party of the Union. Is not the bare imputation, much more the
  confident belief, that the Democrats of Pennsylvania will renounce
  their birthright for such a miserable mess of pottage, the highest
  insult which can be offered to them? The Whigs, in effect, say to you:
  We know you are Democrats—we know you are in the majority; but yet we
  believe you will renounce the political faith of your fathers, that
  you may shout hosannas to a successful general, and bow down before
  the image of military glory which we have erected for the purpose of
  captivating your senses.

  Thank Heaven! thus far, at least, these advocates of availability have
  been disappointed. The soup societies and the fuss and feather clubs
  have yet produced but little impression on the public mind. They have
  failed even to raise enthusiastic shouts among the Whigs, much less to
  make any apostates from the Democratic ranks.

  What a subject it is for felicitation in every patriotic heart, that
  the days have passed away, I trust, forever, when mere military
  services, however distinguished, shall be a passport to the chief
  civil magistracy of the country!

  I would lay down this broad and strong proposition, which ought in all
  future time to be held sacred as an article of Democratic faith, that
  no man ought ever to be transferred by the people from the chief
  command of the army of the United States to the highest civil office
  within their gift. The reasons for this rule of faith to guide the
  practice of a Republican people are overwhelming.

  The annals of mankind, since the creation, demonstrate this solemn
  truth. The history of all the ruined republics, both of ancient and
  modern times, teaches us this great lesson. From Cæsar to Cromwell,
  and from Cromwell to Napoleon, this history presents the same solemn
  warning,—beware of elevating to the highest civil trust the commander
  of your victorious armies. Ask the wrecks of the ruined republics
  scattered all along the tide of time, what occasioned their downfall;
  and they will answer in sepulchral tones, the elevation of victorious
  generals to the highest civil power in the State. One common fate from
  one common cause has destroyed them all. Will mankind never learn
  wisdom from the experience of past generations? Has history been
  written in vain? Mr. Clay, in his Baltimore speech of 1827, expressed
  this great truth in emphatic terms, when he implored the Almighty
  Governor of the world, “to visit our favored land with war, with
  pestilence, with famine, with any scourge other than military rule, or
  a blind and heedless enthusiasm for a military renown.” He was right
  in the principle, wrong in its application. The hero, the man of men
  to whom it applied, was then at the Hermitage,—a plain and private
  farmer of Tennessee. He had responded to the call of his country when
  war was declared against Great Britain, and had led our armies to
  victory; but when the danger had passed away, he returned with delight
  to the agricultural pursuits of his beloved Hermitage. Although, like
  Franklin Pierce, he had never sought civil offices and honors, yet he
  was an influential and conspicuous member of the convention which
  framed the constitution of Tennessee, was their first Representative
  and their first Senator in Congress,—afterwards a Judge of their
  Supreme Court,—then again a Senator in Congress, which elevated
  station he a second time resigned, from a love of retirement. He was
  brought almost literally from the plough, as Cincinnatus had been, to
  assume the chief civil command. The same observations would apply to
  the illustrious and peerless Father of his Country, as well as to
  General Harrison. They were soldiers, only in the day and hour of
  danger, when the country demanded their services; and both were
  elevated from private life, from the shades of Mount Vernon and the
  North Bend, to the supreme civil magistracy of the country. Neither of
  them was a soldier by profession, and both had illustrated high civil
  appointments. General Taylor, it is true, had been a soldier, and
  always a soldier, but had never risen to the chief command. It
  remained for the present Whig party to select as their candidate for
  the Presidency the commanding General of the army, who had been a man
  of war, and nothing but a man of war from his youth upwards. This
  party is now straining every nerve to transfer him from the
  headquarters of the army, to the chair of state, which has been
  adorned by Washington, Jefferson, Madison and Jackson, without even a
  momentary resignation of his present high office,—without the least
  political training,—without any respite, without any breathing time
  between the highest military and the highest civil honor. With what
  tremendous force does the solemn warning of Mr. Clay apply to the case
  of General Scott!

  Far be it from me to say or to insinuate that General Scott would have
  either the ability or the will to play the part of Cæsar, of Cromwell,
  or of Bonaparte. Still, the precedent is dangerous in the extreme. If
  these things can be done in the green tree, what will be done in the
  dry? If the precedent can be established in the comparative infancy
  and purity of our institutions, of elevating to the Presidency a
  successful commander-in-chief of our armies, what may be the
  disastrous consequences when our population shall number one hundred
  millions, and when our armies in time of war may be counted by
  hundreds of thousands. In those days, some future military chieftain,
  desirous of obtaining supreme power by means of an election to the
  Presidency, may point back to such a precedent and say, that in the
  earlier and purer days of the Republic, our ancestors did not fear to
  elevate the commander of their conquering armies to this, the highest
  civil station. Let us not forge chains in advance for our descendants.

  The fathers of the Republic were deeply alive to these great truths.
  They were warned by the experience of past times that liberty is
  Hesperian fruit, and can only be preserved by watchful jealousy. Hence
  in all their constitutions of government, and in all their political
  writings, we find them inculcating, in the most solemn manner, a
  jealousy of standing armies and their leaders, and a strict
  subordination of the military to the civil power. But even if there
  were no danger to our liberties from such a precedent, the habit of
  strict obedience and absolute command acquired by the professional
  soldier throughout a long life, almost necessarily disqualifies him
  for the administration of our Democratic Republican Government. Civil
  government is not a mere machine, such as a regular army. In
  conducting it, allowance must be made for that love of liberty and
  spirit of independence which characterize our people. Such allowances
  can never be made,—authority can never be tempered with moderation and
  discretion, by a professional soldier, who has been accustomed to have
  his military orders obeyed with the unerring certainty of despotic
  power.

  Again:—What fatal effects would it not have on the discipline and
  efficiency of the army to have aspirants for the Presidency among its
  principal officers? How many military cliques would be formed—how much
  intriguing and electioneering would exist in a body which ought to be
  a unit, and have no other object in view except to obey the lawful
  command of the President and to protect and defend the country? If all
  the political follies of General Scott’s life were investigated, and
  these are not few, I venture to say that nearly the whole of them have
  resulted from his long continued aspirations for the Presidency. At
  last, he has obtained the Whig nomination. He has defeated his own
  constitutional commander-in-chief. The military power has triumphed
  over the civil power. The Constitution declares that “the President
  shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United
  States,” but the subordinate, the actual commander of the army, has
  supplanted his superior. What a spectacle is this; and how many
  serious reflections might it inspire! In times of war and of danger,
  what fatal consequences might result to the country from the fact,
  that the President and the commanding General of the army are rival
  and hostile candidates for the Presidency! But I shall not pursue this
  train of remark. It is my most serious conviction, that General Scott
  would have stood far higher, both before the present generation and
  posterity, had he never been a candidate for the Presidency. The
  office which he now holds, and deservedly holds, ought to satisfy the
  ambition of any man. This the American people will determine by a
  triumphant majority on the first Tuesday of November next. This will
  prove to be one of the most fortunate events in our history—auspicious
  at the present time, and still more auspicious for future generations.
  It will establish a precedent, which will, I trust, prevent future
  commanders-in-chief of the American army from becoming candidates for
  the Presidential office.

  Again:—To make the army a hot bed for Presidential aspirants will be
  to unite the powerful influence of all its aspiring officers in favor
  of foreign wars, as the best means of acquiring military glory, and
  thus placing themselves in the modern line of safe precedents, as
  candidates for the Presidency and for other high civil offices. The
  American people are sufficiently prone to war without any such
  stimulus. But enough of this.

  I shall now proceed to discuss more minutely the civil qualifications
  of General Scott for the Presidency. It is these which immediately and
  deeply concern the American people, and not his military glory. Far be
  it from me, however, to depreciate his military merits. As an American
  citizen, I am proud of them. They will ever constitute a brilliant
  page in the historical glory of our country. The triumphant march of
  the brave army under his command, from Vera Cruz to the city of
  Mexico, will be ever memorable in our annals. And yet he can never be
  esteemed the principal hero of the Mexican war. This distinction
  justly belongs to General Taylor. It was his army which at Palo Alto,
  Resaca de la Palma, and Monterey, first broke the spirit of the
  Mexican troops; and the crowning victory of Buena Vista completely
  disorganized the Mexican army. There Santa Anna, with 20,000 men, the
  largest, the best and the bravest army which Mexico has ever sent into
  the field, was routed by less than five thousand of our troops. To the
  everlasting glory of our volunteer militia, this great, this glorious
  victory, was achieved by them, assisted by only four hundred and
  fifty-three regulars. The Mexican army was so disorganized—the spirit
  of the Mexican people was so subdued, by the unparallelled victory of
  Buena Vista, that the way was thus opened for the march from Vera Cruz
  to Mexico. Yet God forbid that I should, in the slightest degree,
  detract from the glory so justly due to Scott’s army and its
  distinguished commander in the battles which preceded their triumphant
  entry into the capital of Mexico.

  But I repeat, my present purpose is to deal with General Scott as a
  civilian—as a candidate for the Presidency, and not as a military
  commander.

  The sun presents dark spots upon its disc; and the greatest men who
  have ever lived, with the exception of our own Washington, have not
  been without their failings. Surely General Scott is not an exception
  to the common lot of humanity. In his temper he is undoubtedly
  irritable and jealous of rivals; whilst the Presidency, above all
  other stations on earth, requires a man of firm and calm temper, who,
  in his public conduct, will never be under the control of his
  passions.

  General Scott has quarrelled with General Wilkinson—he has quarrelled
  with General Gaines—he has quarrelled with General Jackson—he has
  quarrelled with De Witt Clinton—he has quarrelled with the
  administration of John Quincy Adams—he has quarrelled with the people
  of Florida to such a degree that General Jackson was obliged
  reluctantly to recall him from the command of the army in the Seminole
  war—he has quarrelled with General Worth, the Marshal Ney of our
  military service—he has quarrelled with General Pillow—he has
  quarrelled with the gallant and lamented Duncan—and unless report
  speaks falsely, he has quarrelled with General Taylor. Whenever any
  military man has approached the rank of being his rival for fame, he
  has quarrelled with that man. Now, I shall not pretend to decide,
  whether he has been in the right or in the wrong, in all or in any of
  these quarrels; but this I shall say, that a man possessing such
  forethought, discretion and calm temper as the Presidential office
  requires, might and would have avoided many or most of these
  difficulties. A plain and sensible neighbor of mine asked me, in view
  of these facts, if I did not think, should General Scott be elected
  President, he would play the devil and break things?

  General Scott is, beyond all question, suspicious, when the President
  of the United States, above all other men, ought to look upon events
  with no prejudiced or jaundiced eye. No man ever exhibited this trait
  of character in a stronger light than he has done towards the
  administration of Mr. Polk. He was selected by the President to lead
  our armies in Mexico, with my humble though cordial assent. The
  political life or death of the administration depended upon his
  success. Our fate, both in the estimation of the present times and
  throughout all posterity, depended upon his success. His defeat would
  have been our ruin. And yet he most strangely conceived the notion,
  that for the purpose of destroying him we were willing to destroy
  ourselves. Hence his belief of a fire in the rear more formidable than
  the fire in the front. Hence his belief that, jealous of his glory, we
  did not exert ourselves to furnish him the troops and munitions of war
  necessary for the conquest of Mexico. Did unjust and unfounded
  suspicion ever extend thus far in the breast of any other mortal man?
  The admirable and unanswerable letter of Governor Marcy, of April 21,
  1848, in reply to his complaints, triumphantly vindicates the
  administration of Mr. Polk against all these extraordinary charges.
  Let any man carefully and dispassionately read that letter, and say,
  if he can, that General Scott, in self-control, temper and
  disposition, is fit to become the successor to General Washington, in
  the Presidential chair.

  The world knows, everybody who has approached him knows, that General
  Scott is vainglorious to an excessive degree. Indeed, his vanity would
  be strikingly ridiculous, had he not performed so many distinguished
  military services as almost to justify boasting. This, however, is an
  amiable weakness; and whilst it does not disqualify him from
  performing the duties of a President, this itself renders it morally
  impossible that he should ever reach that station. Modesty combined
  with eminent merit always secures popular applause; but the man who
  becomes the trumpeter of his own exploits, no matter how high his
  deserts may be, can never become an object of popular enthusiasm and
  affection. General Scott’s character, in this respect, is perfectly
  understood by the instinctive good sense of the American people. “Fuss
  and Feathers!” a volume could not more accurately portray the vanity
  of his character than this soubriquet by which he is universally
  known. His friends affect to glory in this title, but with all their
  efforts they can never render it popular. Napoleon was endeared to his
  army by his designation of “the little Corporal;” General Jackson, by
  that of “Old Hickory;” and General Taylor was “Rough and Ready;” but
  what shall we say to “Fuss and Feathers?” Was such a soubriquet ever
  bestowed upon a General who enjoyed the warm affections of his army?
  It raises no shout,—it awakens no sympathy,—it excites no
  enthusiasm,—it falls dead upon the heart of an intelligent people.

  In order further to illustrate the want of civil qualifications of
  General Scott for the Presidency, I propose next to discuss his famous
  political letters. In these he has written his own political history.
  “Oh! that mine enemy would write a book!” was an exclamation of old.
  General Scott’s epistles have accomplished this work, though I deny
  that he has any enemies among the American people.

  In 1848, when speaking of these letters, Thurlow Weed, who at the
  present moment is one of General Scott’s most able, distinguished, and
  efficient supporters, employs the following language: “In the
  character of General Scott there is much, very much to commend and
  admire. But the mischief is, there is weakness in all he says or does
  about the Presidency. Immediately after the close of the campaign of
  1840, he wrote a gratuitous letter, making himself a candidate, in
  which all sorts of unwise things were said ‘to return and plague his
  friends, if he should be a candidate.’ And since that time, with a
  fatuity that seizes upon men who get bewildered in gazing at the White
  House, he has been suffering his pen to dim the glories achieved by
  his sword.”

  The letter to which special allusion is made must be his famous letter
  of October 25, 1841. Though not an “old Fogy,” I retain a vivid
  recollection of the circumstances under which this letter was written.
  It made its appearance the month after the termination of the famous
  extra session of Congress, which had been convened by the proclamation
  of General Harrison. This session commenced on the 31st May, and
  terminated on the 13th September, 1841.

  And here, permit me to say, that I do not believe the history of
  legislative bodies, in this or any other country, ever presented more
  argumentative, eloquent, and powerful debating than was exhibited
  throughout this session. Nearly all the important political questions
  which had divided the two great parties of the country from the
  beginning were most ably discussed. Never did any public body of the
  same number present a stronger array of matured talent than the Senate
  of that day. There were Clay, Berrien, Clayton, Mangum, Archer,
  Preston, and Southard on the Whig side; and Benton, Calhoun, Wright,
  Woodbury, Walker, Pierce, and Linn on the side of the Democrats, and
  these men were in the meridian of their glory. I would advise every
  young Democrat within the sound of my voice to procure and carefully
  study the debates of this session.

  Mr. Clay was, as he deserved to be, the lord of the ascendant in the
  Whig ranks. The Whig majority of both houses was controlled by his
  spirit. He was their acknowledged leader, and went to work in dashing
  style. Within a brief period, he carried all the great Whig measures
  triumphantly through Congress. The Independent Treasury was repealed;
  the proceeds of the public lands were distributed among the States;
  the Bankrupt Law was passed; and an old-fashioned Bank of the United
  States would have been established, had it not been for the veto of
  John Tyler, a man who has never been as highly estimated as he
  deserves, either by the Democratic party or the country.

  Mr. Clay left the Senate, at the close of the session, the
  acknowledged leader and the favorite Presidential candidate of the
  great Whig party. Under these circumstances, it became necessary for
  General Scott to do something to head his great rival and prevent him
  from remaining master of the field. He must prove himself to be as
  good a Whig as Henry Clay, and in addition a much better Anti-Mason.
  It was the common remark of the day, when his letter of October, 1841,
  appeared, that he had out-whigged even Henry Clay. This is the
  “gratuitous letter, making himself a candidate, in which all sorts of
  unwise things were said to ‘return and plague his friends, if he
  should be a candidate.’”

  This letter is not addressed to any individual, but is an epistle
  general to the faithful; and I must do him the justice to say that in
  it he has concealed nothing from the public eye. After some
  introductory remarks, it is divided into seven heads, which, with
  their subdivisions, embrace all the articles of Whig faith as
  understood at that day; and in addition, the author presents his views
  on “secret or oath-bound societies.”

  I shall briefly review some of these articles of General Scott’s
  political faith:

  1. “The Judiciary.” General Scott expresses his convictions that the
  decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, on all
  constitutional questions, should be considered final and conclusive by
  the people, and especially by their functionaries, “except, indeed, in
  the case of a judicial decision enlarging power and against liberty.”
  And how is such a decision to be corrected? Why, forsooth, “any
  dangerous error of this sort, he says, can always be easily corrected
  by an amendment of the Constitution, in one of the modes prescribed by
  that instrument itself.” Easily corrected! It might be so if a
  military order could accomplish the object; but an amendment of the
  Constitution of the United States, whether fortunately or
  unfortunately for the country, is almost a political impossibility. In
  order to accomplish it, in by far the least impracticable of the two
  modes prescribed, the affirmative action of two-thirds of both Houses
  of Congress and of the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several
  States is required. With these obstacles in the way, when will an
  amendment of the Constitution ever be made?

  But why did such a reverence for the decisions of the Supreme Court
  become an article of General Scott’s faith? Simply because General
  Jackson had vetoed the Bank of the United States, believing in his
  conscience, such an institution to be unconstitutional. He had sworn
  before his God and his country to support the Constitution; and he
  could not, without committing moral perjury, approve a bill, which in
  his soul he believed to be a violation of this great charter of our
  liberties. He could not yield his honest convictions, simply because
  the Supreme Court had expressed the opinion that Congress possesses
  the power to charter such a bank.

  But, according to the logic of General Scott, General Jackson and Mr.
  Tyler, when bills to charter a Bank of the United States were
  presented to them, had no right to form or express any opinion on the
  subject of their constitutionality. The Supreme Court had done this
  for them in advance. This court is to be the constitutional
  conscience-keeper of the President. “Practically, therefore (says
  General Scott), for the people and especially their functionaries (of
  whom the President is the highest) to deny, to disturb, or impugn,
  principles thus constitutionally established, strike me as of evil
  example, if not of a direct revolutionary tendency.” A Bank of the
  United States must be held constitutional, by the people and their
  functionaries, as an article of faith, until two-thirds of both Houses
  of Congress and three-fourths of the State legislatures shall reverse
  the decision of the Supreme Court by an amendment of the Constitution.
  The President must then wait before he can exercise the right of
  judging for himself until doomsday. On the same principle, we must all
  now hold, as an article of faith, that the odious and infamous
  sedition law of the reign of terror is constitutional, because the
  judiciary have so affirmed, and this decision never has been, and
  never will be, reversed by a constitutional amendment. This is
  double-distilled Whiggery of the most sublimated character. Truly,
  “there is weakness in all that General Scott says or does about the
  Presidency.”

  Let us never forget that a Bank of the United States is a fixed idea
  with the Whig party, which nothing can ever remove. On this subject,
  like the old Bourbons, they forget nothing and learn nothing. They are
  inseparably joined to this idol. They believe that a concentration of
  the money power of the country, in the form of such a bank, is
  necessary to secure the ascendency of the Whig party in the
  Government; and there is nothing more certain in futurity than that
  they will establish such a bank, should they ever obtain the power.
  Experience has taught us a lesson on this subject which we ought never
  to forget. Throughout the political campaign of 1840, which resulted
  in the election of General Harrison, it was nowhere avowed by the
  Whigs, that they intended to charter a Bank of the United States. This
  was carefully concealed from the public eye. On the contrary, many of
  their distinguished leaders declared themselves hostile to such an
  institution, and one of them, Mr. Badger, afterwards a member of the
  cabinet, indignantly pronounced the assertion that General Harrison
  was in favor of such a bank to be a falsehood. But mark the sequel. No
  sooner was Harrison elected and a majority secured in both Houses of
  Congress, than the Whigs immediately proceeded in hot haste, at the
  extra session, to pass a bill establishing a Bank of the United
  States, which would have become a law, but for the veto of John Tyler.
  What we have witnessed in 1841, we shall again witness in 1853, _the
  veto_ only excepted, should General Scott be elected President and be
  sustained by a Whig majority in both Houses of Congress.

  2. “The Executive Veto.” To abolish this veto power is another article
  of General Scott’s political faith, as announced in his letter of
  October, 1841. To be more precise, the General would have the
  Constitution amended for the second time, in the same epistle, so as
  to overcome the Executive veto “by a bare majority in each House of
  Congress of all the members elected to it—say for the benefit of
  reflection, at the end of ten days from the return of the bill.” What
  a farce! An Executive veto to be overcome and nullified by a bare
  majority of the very Congress which had but ten days before sent the
  same bill to the President for his approval! Better, far better, adopt
  the manly course of abolishing the veto altogether, than to resort to
  this subterfuge.

  But why has the abolishment of the Executive veto become an article of
  Whig faith? Simply because General Jackson and Mr. Tyler each vetoed
  bills to establish a Bank of the United States! “Still harping on my
  daughter.” The Whigs have determined to destroy the veto power, which
  has twice prevented them from creating an institution which they love
  above all other political objects. The veto power has saved the
  country from the corrupt and corrupting influence of a bank; and it is
  this alone which has rendered it so odious to the Whig party.

  This power is the least dangerous of all the great powers conferred by
  the Constitution upon the President; because nothing but a strong
  sense of public duty and a deep conviction that he will be sustained
  by the people can ever induce him to array himself against a majority
  of both Houses of Congress. It has been exercised but in comparatively
  few instances since the origin of the Federal Government; and I am not
  aware that it has ever been exercised in any case, which has not
  called forth the approving voice of a large majority of the American
  people. Confident I am, it is highly popular in Pennsylvania.

  “Rotation in office” is the next head of General Scott’s letter.
  Throughout the Presidential contest, which resulted in the election of
  General Harrison, it was the fashion of the Whigs to proscribe
  proscription; and to denounce Democratic Presidents for removing their
  political enemies and appointing their political friends to office.
  General Scott, in his letter, comes up to the Whig standard in this,
  as in all other respects. In his profession of faith, he could not
  even avoid a fling against the hero and the sage then in retirement at
  the Hermitage. He says: “I speak on this head from what I witnessed in
  1829-30 (the commencement of General Jackson’s administration), of the
  cruel experiments on a large scale, then made upon the sensibilities
  of the country, and the mischiefs to the public interests which early
  ensued.”

  But what was the Whig practice upon the subject after they had
  obtained power? General Jackson was magnanimous, kind-hearted and
  merciful, and to my own knowledge he retained a very large proportion
  of Whig clerks in the public offices at Washington. I ask how many
  Democrats now remain in those offices? Nay, the present administration
  has even proscribed old widows whose husbands had been Democrats. In
  the city of Lancaster, they removed from the post-office an old lady
  of this character, who had performed her duties to the entire
  satisfaction of the public of all parties, to make way for a political
  (I admit a respectable political) friend. To the credit of General
  Taylor’s memory be it spoken, he refused to make war upon this old
  lady.

  But in this respect, a change has come over the spirit of General
  Scott’s dream. Of this the Whigs are satisfied. If they were not,
  small would be his chance—much smaller even than it now is, of
  reaching the Presidential chair. In his letter, accepting the
  nomination, he says:—“In regard to the general policy of the
  administration, if elected, I should, of course, look among those who
  may approve that policy, for the agents to carry it into execution;
  and I would seek to cultivate harmony and fraternal sentiment
  throughout the Whig party, without attempting to reduce its members by
  proscription to exact conformity to my own views!”

  “Harmony and fraternal sentiment throughout the Whig party!” His
  charity, though large for Whigs, does not extend to Democrats. He
  knows, however, that his own party are divided into supporters of
  himself for his own sake, whilst spitting upon the platform on which
  he stands—and those who love the platform so well that for its sake
  they have even consented, though reluctantly, to acquiesce in his
  nomination—into those Free Soil Whigs who denounce the Fugitive Slave
  Law, and those Whigs who are devoted heart and soul to its
  maintenance. In this dilemma, he will not attempt to reduce the
  discordant brethren by proscription to exact conformity to his own
  views. Southern Whigs and Northern Free Soilers are therefore both
  embraced within the broad sweep of his charity. He seeks to cultivate
  harmony and fraternal sentiment among the Seward Whigs and the
  National Whigs by seating them all together at the same table to enjoy
  the loaves and the fishes. But woe to the vanquished—woe to the
  Democrats! They shall not even receive a single crumb which may fall
  from the table of the Presidential banquet.

  “One Presidential Term,” is the subject which he next discusses. Here
  he boggles at one Presidential term. He seems reluctant to surrender
  the most elevated and the most lucrative office, next to that of
  President, and this, too, an office for life, for the sake of only
  four years in the White House. He again, therefore, for the third
  time, in the same letter, proposes to amend the Constitution, just as
  if this were as easy as to wheel a division of his army on a parade
  day, so as to extend the Presidential term to six years. Four years
  are too short a term for General Scott. It must be prolonged. The
  people must be deprived of the power of choosing their President at
  the end of so brief a period as four years. But such an amendment of
  the Constitution, he ought to have known, was all moonshine. The
  General, then, declines to pledge himself to serve but for one term,
  and this for the most extraordinary reason. I shall quote his own
  words; he says:—“But I do not consider it respectful to the people,
  nor otherwise proper, in a candidate to solicit favor on a pledge
  that, if elected, he will not accept a second nomination. It looks too
  much like a bargain tendered to other aspirants—yield to me now; I
  shall soon be out of your way; too much like the interest that
  sometimes governs the cardinals in the choice of a Pope, many voting
  for themselves first, and, if without success, finally for the most
  superannuated, in order that the election may sooner come round
  again.”

  He was, then, you may be sure, still a Native American.

  To say the very least, this imputation of selfishness and corruption
  against the cardinals in the election of a Pope, is in bad taste in a
  political letter written by a candidate for the Presidency. It was in
  exceedingly bad taste, in such an epistle, thus to stigmatize the
  highest dignitaries of the ancient Catholic church, in the performance
  of their most solemn and responsible public duty to God, on this side
  of eternity. From my soul, I abhor the practice of mingling up
  religion with politics. The doctrine of all our Constitutions, both
  Federal and State, is, that every man has an indefeasible right to
  worship his God, according to the dictates of his own conscience. He
  is both a bigot and a tyrant who would interfere with that sacred
  right. When a candidate is before the people for office, the inquiry
  ought never even to be made, what form of religious faith he
  professes; but only, in the language of Mr. Jefferson, “Is he honest;
  is he capable?” Far be it from me to charge or even insinuate that
  General Scott would desire to introduce religion into party politics;
  and yet I consider it exceedingly improper for him, in a political
  letter, when a candidate for the Presidency, to have made this charge
  against the venerable cardinals of the Catholic church. Such a charge,
  emanating from so high a source, could not fail to wound the feelings
  of a large and highly respectable Christian community. This has
  necessarily, to some extent, brought religious discussions into the
  Presidential contest.

  “Leading measures of the late extra session of Congress.” This is the
  next head of General Scott’s epistle, to which I advert. He swallows
  all those leading measures at a single gulp. “If,” says he, “I had had
  the honor of a vote on the occasion, it would have been given in favor
  of the Land Distribution Bill, the Bankrupt Bill, and the second bill
  for creating a Fiscal Corporation, having long been under a conviction
  that in peace, as in war, something efficient in the nature of a Bank
  of the United States, is not only ‘necessary and proper,’ but
  indispensable to the successful operations of the Treasury!”

  The Land Distribution Bill. This is emphatically a high toned Whig
  measure, which had been once crushed by General Jackson’s message of
  December, 1833. Mr. Clay, its illustrious author, was the very
  essence, the life and soul of Whiggery. It proposes to distribute the
  proceeds of the public lands among the several States. It proposes to
  surrender to the several States that immense and bountiful fund
  provided by our ancestors, which is always our surest resource, in
  times of war and danger, when our revenue from imports fails. In the
  days of Jackson, Van Buren and Polk, the Democratic doctrine was,—I
  fear it is not so at present,—to preserve this fund in the common
  Treasury, as a sacred trust, to enable Congress to execute the
  enumerated powers conferred upon them by the Constitution, for the
  equal benefit of all the States and the people. Should Congress give
  away the public lands to the States, they will deprive themselves of
  the power of bestowing land bounties upon the soldiers and the sailors
  who fight the battles of your country, and of granting liberal terms
  of purchase to those hardy pioneers who make the wilderness to bloom
  and to blossom as the rose. What will become of this policy if you
  distribute the proceeds of these lands among the States? Then every
  State will have a direct interest in preventing any donations of the
  public lands, either to old soldiers or actual settlers; because every
  acre thus given will so much lessen the dividend to each of the States
  interested. Should this Distribution Bill ever prevail, it will make
  the States mere dependencies upon the central Government for a large
  portion of their revenue, and thus reduce these proud Democratic
  sovereignties to the degrading position of looking to the Treasury of
  the United States for their means of support. In the language of
  General Jackson, “a more direct road to consolidation cannot be
  devised.” Such a state of dependence, though exactly in accordance
  with the centralizing Whig policy, has ever been abhorred by the
  Democrats. But the Distribution Bill is one of the principles, one of
  the “convictions,” of General Scott; and so let it pass.

  We come now to the Bankrupt Bill, a purely Whig measure, to which
  General Scott gives his adhesion.—And such a bill! In no legitimate
  sense of the word, was this a bankrupt law. It was merely a new mode
  of paying old debts; and the easiest mode which was ever devised for
  this purpose in any civilized country. The expansions and contractions
  of the Bank of the United States,—the inundations of bank paper and of
  shinplasters which spread over the country, had given birth to a wild
  and reckless spirit of speculation, that ruined a great number of
  people. The speculators wanted to pay their debts in the easiest
  manner, and the Whigs wanted their votes. This was the origin of the
  bankrupt law. It ruined a great many honest creditors; it paid off a
  great many honest debts with moonshine. If my memory serves me, debts
  to the amount of $400,000,000 were discharged in this manner. The law,
  however, from its practical operation, soon became so odious to the
  people, that they demanded its repeal. It was stricken from the
  statute book, amidst the execrations of the people, by the very same
  Congress which had enacted it, in one year and one month from the day
  on which it went into effect. And this is the bill for which General
  Scott declares he would have voted, had he been a member of Congress.

  Next in order, we come to the Bank of the United States. If General
  Scott “had had the honor of a vote, it would have been given for the
  second bill creating a Fiscal Corporation.”

  Surely the General could never have carefully read this bill. In
  derision, it was termed at the time, the “Kite Flying Fiscality.” It
  was a mere speculators’ bank, and no person believed it could ever
  become a law. In truth, it was got up merely for the purpose of
  heading John Tyler, and when reported to the House, it was received,
  according to the _National Intelligencer_, with shouts of laughter.

  It originated in this manner. A bill had at first passed Congress to
  create a regular old-fashioned Bank of the United States. This bill
  was vetoed by John Tyler. Afterwards the second bill, or Kite Flying
  Fiscality, was prepared by the Whigs to meet some portions of Mr.
  Tyler’s veto message, and if possible render it ridiculous. The bill
  was passed and was vetoed by President Tyler, as everybody foresaw it
  would be. But how General Scott got his head so befogged as to prefer
  this thing to the first bill, is a matter of wonder. I venture to say
  he was the only Whig in the United States who held the same opinion.

  This closes General Scott’s confession of Whig faith; and surely it is
  sufficiently ample and specific to gratify the most rabid Whig in the
  land. But the General had another string to his bow. It was necessary
  not only that he should be as good a Whig as Henry Clay, but that he
  should be something besides, something over and above a mere Whig, in
  order to render himself more available than his great rival. Hence the
  concluding head of his famous epistle, which, like the postscript of a
  lady’s letter, contains much of the pith and marrow of the whole. It
  is entitled “Secret or Oath-bound Societies.” In it he declares,
  although a Mason, that he had “not been a member of a Masonic lodge
  for thirty odd years, nor a visitor of any lodge since, except
  one,—now more than sixteen years ago.” And such is his abhorrence for
  secret societies, that for twenty-eight years he had not even visited
  one of those literary societies in our colleges, whose practice it is
  to adopt a few secret signs by which their members in after life can
  recognize each other.

  In order, then, to render himself a more available candidate than
  Henry Clay, it was necessary that his net should have a broader sweep
  than that of the great Kentuckian. It was necessary that he should be
  as good a Whig and a far better Anti-Mason. The Anti-Masonic party was
  then powerful in Pennsylvania as well as in other Northern States.
  This party numbered in its ranks many old Democrats, and to these Mr.
  Clay was not very acceptable. The Anti-Masons were more active and
  more energetic than the Whigs. A distinguished Anti-Mason of our State
  is reported once to have said, that they were the locomotive, and the
  Whigs the burden train. How were they to be enlisted in the ranks of
  Scott? The great Kentuckian, with that independent spirit which
  characterized him, never yielded to the advances of the Anti-Masons.
  He was a Mason himself as well as General Scott; but the General lent
  a far more kindly ear to this new party. Hence his remarks on secret
  or oath-bound societies. This confession of his faith proved to be
  entirely satisfactory; and the Anti-Masons have ever since proved to
  be his devoted friends. He thus captured a large division of the
  forces which were unfriendly to Mr. Clay. But for the purpose of
  embracing the new recruits, it became necessary to coin a more
  comprehensive name than simply that of Whigs.

  He doubtless thought that a rose by any other name would smell as
  sweet. Hence, in his famous letter, he announced himself to be a
  Democratic Whig. A white blackbird—a Christian unbeliever. This name
  was sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all men of all parties. He
  became all things to all men, that he might gain proselytes. I say
  what I know, when I declare that this letter, and attempt to supplant
  the veteran statesman of Kentucky, was a subject of severe criticism
  at the time in Washington city, among men of all parties. Surely, in
  the language of Thurlow Weed, “there is weakness in all he says or
  does about the Presidency.”

  But a good general is always fertile in expedients. His coup-d’œil
  embraces the whole field of battle, and he is ever ready to take
  advantage of any occurrence which may enable him to seize the victory.
  A new political party styling itself the Native American party, began
  to loom up in an imposing manner and to present a formidable aspect.
  This party must be conciliated. The Native Americans must be prevailed
  upon to unite their forces with the Whigs and Anti-Masons, and thus to
  form a grand combined army. It therefore became necessary for General
  Scott to write a second epistle, which he seems to have done with all
  the ardor and enthusiasm of heartfelt sincerity. This is dated from
  Washington city, on the 10th of November, 1844, and is in answer to a
  letter addressed to him, “in behalf of several hundred Native American
  Republicans,” by Geo. W. Reed, Esq., of Philadelphia. This second
  epistle proved to be as successful in enlisting the Native Americans
  under his banner, as the first epistle had been in enlisting the
  Anti-Masons. And why should it not? The General pledged himself, in
  the strongest terms, to every dogma which this new party had most at
  heart.

  He dates his Native Americanism back more than eight years, to “the
  stormy election in the spring of 1836,” and his views “were confirmed
  in the week [Nov. 1840] when Harrison electors were chosen in New
  York.” It was on this occasion in 1840, that, “fired with
  indignation,” he sat down with two friends in the Astor House, “to
  draw up an address, designed to rally an American party.” What has
  become of this address? How precious would it be? I fear it is forever
  lost to the world! It would be one of the greatest curiosities of
  modern literature. How withering must have been its attack upon the
  poor foreigners! We can judge somewhat of its spirit by his epistle to
  Mr. Reed. Other Native Americans were satisfied to restore the
  naturalization law of “the reign of terror,” and to prohibit
  foreigners from becoming citizens until after a residence of fourteen
  years. Not so with General Scott. He went a bow-shot beyond. His mind
  inclined to “a total repeal of all Acts of Congress on the
  subject,”—to a total denial forever of all political rights to every
  human being, young, middle-aged, and old, who had happened to be born
  in a foreign country.

  Having thus placed himself rectus in curia, as the lawyers would say,
  with the Native American party, he then proceeds, as their god-father,
  to give them a proper name. In this I do not think his choice was
  fortunate. It was a difficult task. It must embrace within its ample
  outline both Whigs and Anti-Masons, and yet have so much of the odor
  of Native Americanism as to make its savor sweet in the nostrils of
  the new party. He says, “I should prefer assuming the designation of
  American Republicans, as in New York, or Democratic Americans, as I
  would respectfully suggest. Democratic Americans would include all
  good native American citizens devoted to our country and its
  institutions; and would not drive from us naturalized citizens, who,
  by long residence, have become identified with us in feelings and
  interest.”

  “Democratic Americans!” What a name for a Native American party! When
  all the records of our past history prove that American Democrats have
  ever opened wide their arms to receive foreigners flying from
  oppression in their native land, and have always bestowed upon them
  the rights of American citizens, after a brief period of residence in
  this country. The Democratic party have always gloried in this policy,
  and its fruits have been to increase our population and our power with
  unexampled rapidity, and to furnish our country with vast numbers of
  industrious, patriotic and useful citizens. Surely the name of
  ‘Democratic Americans’ was an unfortunate designation for the Native
  American party!

  But General Scott was not content to be considered merely as a
  proselyte to Native Americanism. He claimed the glory of being the
  founder of the party. He asserts his claim to this distinguished
  honor, which no individual will now dispute with him, in the
  postscript to his letter of November, 1844, which was read on the 4th
  of February, 1847, before the National Convention of Native American
  Delegates, at Pittsburg. In this he says, “writing, however, a few
  days ago, to my friend Mayor Harper of New York, I half jocosely said,
  that I should claim over him and others the foundership of the new
  party, but that I had discovered this glory, like every other American
  excellence, belonged to the Father of his Country.”

  The Native American party an ‘American excellence,’ and the glory of
  its foundership, belongs to George Washington! No, fellow-citizens,
  the American people will rise up with one accord to vindicate the
  memory of that illustrious man from such an imputation. As long as the
  recent memory of our revolutionary struggle remained vividly impressed
  on the hearts of our countrymen, no such party could have ever
  existed. The recollection of Montgomery, Lafayette, De Kalb,
  Kosciusko, and a long list of foreigners, both officers and soldiers,
  who freely shed their blood to secure our liberties, would have
  rendered such ingratitude impossible. Our revolutionary army was
  filled with the brave and patriotic natives of other lands, and George
  Washington was their commander-in-chief. Would he have ever closed the
  door against the admission of foreigners to the rights of American
  citizens? Let his acts speak for themselves. So early as the 26th of
  March, 1790, General Washington, as President of the United States
  approved the first law which ever passed Congress on the subject of
  naturalization; and this only required a residence of two years,
  previous to the adoption of a foreigner as an American citizen. On the
  29th January, 1795, the term of residence was extended by Congress to
  five years, and thus it remained throughout General Washington’s
  administration, and until after the accession of John Adams to the
  Presidency. In his administration, which will ever be known in history
  as the reign of terror, as the era of alien and sedition laws, an act
  was passed on the 18th of June, 1798, which prohibited any foreigner
  from becoming a citizen until after a residence of fourteen years, and
  this is the law, or else perpetual exclusion, which General Scott
  preferred, and which the Native American party now desire to restore.

  The Presidential election of 1800 secured the ascendency of the
  Democratic party, and under the administration of Thomas Jefferson,
  its great apostle, on the 14th of April, 1802, the term of residence
  previous to naturalization was restored to five years, what it had
  been under General Washington, and where it has ever since remained.
  No, fellow-citizens, the Father of his Country was never a ‘Native
  American.’ This ‘American excellence’ never belonged to him.

  General Scott appears to have been literally infatuated with the
  beauties of Native Americanism. On the 12th November, 1848, he
  addressed a letter in answer to one from a certain “Mr. Hector Orr,
  printer,” who appears to have been the editor of a Native American
  journal in Philadelphia. This letter is a perfect rhapsody from
  beginning to end. Among other things equally extravagant, the General
  says: “A letter from him (Benjamin Franklin) were he alive, could not
  have refreshed me more than that before my eyes. It gives a new value
  to any little good I have done or attempted, and will stimulate me to
  do all that may fall in the scope of my power in the remainder of my
  life.” What a letter must this have been of Mr. Hector Orr, printer!
  What a pity it has been lost to the world! The General concluded by
  requesting Mr. Orr to send him “the history of the Native party by the
  Sunday School Boy,” and also to consider him a subscriber to his
  journal.

  But soon there came a frost—a chilling frost. Presto, pass, and
  General Scott’s Native Americanism is gone like the baseless fabric of
  a vision. Would that it left no trace behind! The celebrated William
  E. Robinson, of New York, is the enchanter who removes the spell.

  The Whig National Convention of 7th June, 1848, was about to assemble.
  General Scott was for the third time about to be a candidate before it
  for nomination as President. This was an important—a critical moment.
  Native Americanism had not performed its early promise. It was not
  esteemed “an American excellence,” even by the Whig party. General
  Scott was in a dilemma, and how to extricate himself from it was the
  question. The ready friendship of Mr. Robinson hit upon the lucky
  expedient. On the 8th May, 1848, he addressed a letter to General
  Scott, assuming that the General entertained “kind and liberal views
  towards our naturalized citizens.” The General answered this letter on
  the 29th May, 1848, just ten days before the meeting of the Whig
  Philadelphia Convention; and what an answer! After declaring in the
  strongest terms that Mr. Robinson had done him no more than justice in
  attributing to him “kind and liberal views toward our naturalized
  citizens,” he proceeds: “It is true that in a case of unusual
  excitement some years ago, when both parties complained of fraudulent
  practices in the naturalization of foreigners, and when there seemed
  to be danger that native and adopted citizens would be permanently
  arrayed against each other in hostile faction, _I was inclined to
  concur in the opinion then avowed by leading statesmen, that some
  modification of the naturalization laws might be necessary_, in order
  to prevent abuses, allay strife and restore harmony between the
  different classes of our people. But later experience and reflection
  have entirely removed this impression, and dissipated my
  apprehensions.”

  The man who had warmly embraced Native Americanism so early as 1836,
  and had given it his enthusiastic support for twelve years
  thereafter—who next to Washington had claimed to be the founder of
  this “American excellence;” who, “fired with indignation,” had in
  conjunction with two friends in 1840, prepared an address in his
  parlor at the Astor House in New York, designed to rally an American
  party; who had, in 1844, hesitated between extending the period of
  residence before naturalization to fourteen years, and a total and
  absolute exclusion of all foreigners from the rights of citizenship
  forever, his mind inclining to the latter; who had in the same year
  elevated Hector Orr, the Native American printer, to the same level
  with our great revolutionary statesman and patriot, Benjamin
  Franklin—this same individual, in 1848, declares to Mr. Robinson, that
  he had formerly been merely “_inclined to concur in the opinion then
  avowed by leading statesmen_, that some modification of the
  naturalization laws might be necessary.”

  “Oh! what a fall was there, my countrymen!”

  And what caused this sudden, this almost miraculous change of opinion?
  Why, forsooth, in his recent campaign in Mexico, the Irish and the
  Germans had fought bravely in maintaining our flag in the face of
  every danger. But had they not fought with equal bravery throughout
  our revolutionary struggle, and throughout our last war with Great
  Britain? General Scott could not possibly have been ignorant of this
  fact. Chippewa and Lundy’s Lane both attest their gallant daring in
  defence of the stars and stripes of our country.

  The General now seems determined, if possible, to efface from the
  memory of man that he had ever been a Native American. His present
  devotion to our fellow-citizens of foreign birth knows no bounds. He
  is determined to enlist them under his banner, as he formerly enlisted
  the Anti-Masons and Native Americans.

  Official business, it seems, required him to visit the Blue Licks of
  Kentucky; but yet, it is passing strange, that he chose to proceed
  from Washington to that place by the circuitous route of the great
  Northern Lakes. This deviation from a direct military line between the
  point of his departure and that of his destination has enabled him to
  meet and address his fellow-citizens on the way, at Harrisburg,
  Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and other points both in
  Pennsylvania and Ohio. Should the published programme of his route be
  carried into effect, he will, on his return to Washington from the
  Blue Licks, pass through Buffalo, and throughout the entire length of
  the Empire State. Nobody, however, can for a single moment
  suspect—this would be uncharitable—that his visit to the small and
  insignificant States of Pennsylvania, Ohio and New York, when merely
  on his way from Washington city to Kentucky could at this particular
  period have had any view to the Presidential election! Far be it from
  me to indulge such a suspicion; and yet it is strange that General
  Scott, throughout his whole route, speaks and acts just as General
  Scott would have done had he been on an electioneering tour. He has
  everywhere bestowed especial favor upon our adopted fellow-citizens;
  but at Cleveland he surpassed himself, and broke out into a rhapsody
  nearly as violent as that in which he had indulged in favor of Hector
  Orr, the Native American printer. At Cleveland, an honest Irishman in
  the crowd shouted a welcome to General Scott. Always ready to seize
  the propitious moment, the General instantly exclaimed: “I hear that
  rich brogue; I love to hear it. It makes me remember noble deeds of
  Irishmen, many of whom I have led to battle and to victory.” The
  General has yet to learn that my father’s countrymen, (I have ever
  felt proud of my descent from an Irishman,) though they sometimes do
  blarney others, are yet hard to be blarneyed themselves, especially
  out of their Democracy. The General, unless I am greatly mistaken,
  will discover that Irish Democrats, however much, in common with us
  all, they may admire his military exploits, will never abandon their
  political principles, and desert their party, for the sake of
  elevating him or any other Whig candidate to the Presidency.

  One other remark:—Were it within the limits of possibility to imagine,
  which it is not, that our Washingtons, our Jeffersons, or our
  Jacksons, could have set out on an electioneering tour for themselves,
  when candidates for the Presidency,—I ask, would they have met and
  addressed their fellow-citizens on such topics, and in such a style,
  as General Scott has selected? No! friends and fellow-citizens,
  gravity, solemnity, and the discussion of great questions of public
  policy, affecting the vital interests of the country, would have
  illustrated and marked their progress.

  General Scott, in his political opinions, is prone to extremes. Not
  content with having renounced Native Americanism, not satisfied to
  occupy the broad, just and liberal platform in favor of
  naturalization, on which the Democratic party have stood, ever since
  the origin of the Government, he leaves this far behind. In his
  letter, accepting the nomination of the Whig Convention, he declares
  himself in favor of such an alteration in our naturalization laws, as
  would admit foreigners to the rights of citizenship, who, in time of
  war, had served a single year in the army or navy. This manifests a
  strange, an unaccountable ignorance of the Federal Constitution. Did
  he not know that the power of Congress was confined to the
  establishment of “an uniform rule of naturalization?” “Uniform” is the
  word. Congress have no power to make exceptions in favor of any class
  of foreigners; no power to enact that one man shall be naturalized
  after a residence of a single year, and that another shall reside five
  years before he can attain this privilege. What uniformity would there
  be in requiring five years residence from the honest and industrious
  foreigner, who remains usefully employed at home, and in dispensing
  with this requisition in favor of the foreigner who has enlisted and
  served for one year in the army or navy? General Scott, in order to
  accomplish his object, must resort to a fourth amendment of the
  Constitution. He would make this sacred instrument a mere nose of wax,
  to be twisted, and turned, and bent in any direction which the opinion
  or caprice of the moment might dictate.

  After this review, I ask you, fellow-citizens, what confidence can be
  reposed in the political opinions of General Scott? Is there anything
  in them of that firm, stable, consistent and enlightened character
  which ought to distinguish the man into whose hands you are willing to
  entrust the civil destinies of our great, glorious and progressive
  country? What security have our adopted citizens that he may not
  to-morrow relapse into Native Americanism? For twelve long years, and
  this, too, at a period of life when the judgment ought to be mature,
  he remained faithful and true to the Native American party; giving it
  all the encouragement and support which his high character and
  influence could command; and he only deserted it in 1848, at the
  approach of the Whig National Convention. And what opinion must the
  Native Americans hold of the man, who, after having been so long one
  of their most ardent and enthusiastic leaders, abandoned them at the
  time of their utmost need? Above all, does Winfield Scott possess that
  calm and unerring judgment, that far-seeing sagacity, and that
  prudence, never to be thrown off its guard, which we ought to require
  in a President of the United States?

  That General Scott is a great military man, the people of this country
  will ever gratefully and cheerfully acknowledge. History teaches us,
  however, that but few men, whose profession has been arms and arms
  alone from early youth, have possessed the civil qualifications
  necessary wisely to govern a free people. Of this we have had some
  experience in the case of General Taylor, who was both an honest man
  and a pure patriot; but like General Scott, had always been a soldier
  and nothing but a soldier. It is true that a few favored mortals,
  emancipating themselves from the military fetters by which they had
  been bound, have displayed high talents as statesmen. Napoleon
  Bonaparte is the most remarkable example of this class; but his
  statesmanship was unfortunately displayed in the skill with which he
  forged fetters for his country.

  As an American citizen, proud of the military exploits of General
  Scott, I wish from my soul he had never become a candidate for the
  Presidency. The defects in his character as a statesman, which it has
  now become an imperative duty to present to the people of the country,
  would then have been forgotten and forever buried in oblivion. But for
  this, he would have gone down to posterity without a cloud upon his
  glory. And, even now, it is fortunate for his future fame, as well as
  for the best interests of his country, that he can never be elected
  President of the United States.

  A few words on the subject of General Scott’s connection with the Free
  Soilers, and I shall have done. And in the first place, let me say
  that I do not believe, and therefore shall not assert, that he is
  himself a Free Soiler. On the contrary, I freely admit we have
  satisfactory proof, that whilst the Compromise Measures were pending
  before Congress and afterwards, he expressed his approbation of them,
  but this only in private conversations among his friends. But was this
  all the country had a right to expect from General Scott?

  The dark and portentous cloud raised by the Abolitionists and
  fanatics, which had for many years been growing blacker and still
  blacker, at length seemed ready to burst upon our devoted heads,
  threatening to sweep away both the Constitution and the Union. The
  patriots of the land, both Whigs and Democrats, cordially united their
  efforts to avert the impending storm. At this crisis, it became the
  duty of every friend of the Union to proclaim his opinions boldly.
  This was not a moment for any patriot to envelop himself in mystery.
  Under such appalling circumstances, did it comport with the frankness
  of a soldier, for General Scott to remain silent; or merely to whisper
  his opinions to private friends from the South? A man of his elevated
  station and commanding influence ought to have thrown himself into the
  breach. But the Presidency was in view; and he was anxious to secure
  the votes of the Free Soil Whigs of the Seward school, in the National
  Convention. Mr. Fillmore, his competitor, had spoken out like a man in
  favor of the Compromise, and had thus done his duty to his country. He
  was, for this very reason, rejected by the Whig National Convention,
  and General Scott was nominated by the votes and influence of the
  Northern Free Soil Whigs.

  But the Northern Free Soilers had not quite sufficient strength to
  secure his nomination. To render this certain, it was necessary to
  enlist a small detachment of Southern Whig delegates. This task was
  easily accomplished. To attain his object, General Scott had merely to
  write a brief note to Mr. Archer.

  This was evidently not intended for the public eye, certainly not for
  the Free Soilers. It was, therefore, most reluctantly extracted from
  the breeches pocket of John M. Botts, and was read to the Convention,
  as we are informed, amid uproarious laughter. In this note, General
  Scott, with characteristic inconsistency, whilst declaring his
  determination to write nothing to the Convention, or any of its
  individual members, at this very moment, in the same note, does
  actually write to Mr. Archer, a member of the Convention, that should
  the honor of a nomination fall to his lot, he would give his views on
  the Compromise Measures in terms at least as strong in their favor, as
  those which he had read to Mr. Archer himself but two days before.
  This pledge which, on its face, was intended exclusively for Governor
  Jones, Mr. Botts, and Mr. Lee, etc., all of them Southern Whigs,
  proved sufficient to detach a small division of this wing of the party
  from Mr. Fillmore, and these, uniting with the whole body of the
  Northern Free Soilers, succeeded in nominating General Scott. After
  the nomination had been thus made, the General immediately proceeded
  to accept it, “with the resolutions annexed;” and one of these
  resolutions is in favor of the faithful execution of all the measures
  of the Compromise, including the Fugitive Slave Law.

  Now, fellow-citizens, I view the finality of the Compromise as
  necessary to the peace and preservation of the Union. I say finality;
  a word aptly coined for the occasion. The Fugitive Slave Law is all
  the South have obtained in this Compromise. It is a law founded both
  upon the letter and the spirit of the Constitution; and a similar law
  has existed on our statute book ever since the administration of
  George Washington. History teaches us that but for the provision in
  favor of the restoration of fugitive slaves, our present Constitution
  never would have existed. Think ye that the South will ever tamely
  surrender the Fugitive Slave Law to Northern fanatics and
  Abolitionists?

  After all, then, the great political question to be decided by the
  people of the country is, will the election of Scott, or the election
  of Pierce, contribute most to maintain the finality of the Compromise
  and the peace and harmony of the Union?

  Scott’s Northern supporters spit upon and execrate the platform
  erected by the Whig National Convention. They support General Scott,
  not because of their adherence to this platform, but in spite of it.
  They have loudly expressed their determination to agitate the repeal
  of the Fugitive Slave Law, and thus bring back upon the country the
  dangerous excitement which preceded its passage. They will not suffer
  the country to enjoy peace and repose, nor permit the Southern States
  to manage their own domestic affairs, in their own way, without
  foreign interference.

  Who can doubt that these dangerous men will participate largely in the
  counsels of General Scott, and influence the measures of his
  administration? To them he owes his election, should he be elected. He
  is bound to them by the ties of gratitude. He is placed in a position
  where he would be more or less than a man, if he could withdraw
  himself from their influence. Indeed, he has informed us in advance,
  in the very act of accepting the nomination, that he would seek to
  cultivate harmony and fraternal sentiment throughout the Whig party,
  without attempting to reduce its numbers by proscription to exact
  conformity to his own views. What does this mean, if not to declare
  that the Free Soil Whigs of the North, and the Compromise Whigs of the
  South, shall share equally in the honors and offices of the
  Administration? In the North, where by far the greatest danger of
  agitation exists, the offices will be bestowed upon those Whigs who
  detest the Compromise, and who will exert all the influence which
  office confers, to abolish the Fugitive Slave Law. To this sad dilemma
  has General Scott been reduced.

  On the other hand, what will be our condition should General Pierce be
  elected? He will owe his election to the great Democratic party of the
  country,—a party truly national, which knows no North, no South, no
  East, and no West. They are everywhere devoted to the Constitution and
  the Union. They everywhere speak the same language. The finality of
  the Compromise, in all its parts, is everywhere an article of their
  political faith. Their candidate, General Pierce, has always openly
  avowed his sentiments on this subject.

  He could proudly declare, in accepting the nomination, that there has
  been no word nor act of his life in conflict with the platform adopted
  by the Democratic National Convention. Should he be elected, all the
  power and influence of his administration will be exerted to allay the
  dangerous spirit of fanaticism, and to render the Union and the
  Constitution immortal. Judge ye, then, between the two candidates, and
  decide for yourselves.

  And now, fellow-citizens, what a glorious party the Democratic party
  has ever been! Man is but the being of a summer’s day, whilst
  principles are eternal. The generations of mortals, one after the
  other, rise and sink and are forgotten; but the principles of
  Democracy, which we have inherited from our revolutionary fathers,
  will endure to bless mankind throughout all generations. Is there any
  Democrat within the sound of my voice—is there any Democrat throughout
  the broad limits of good and great old Democratic Pennsylvania, who
  will abandon these sacred principles for the sake of following in the
  train of a military conqueror, and shouting for the hero of Lundy’s
  Lane, Cerro Gordo, and Chapultepec?

              “Remember, O my friends! the laws, the rights,
              The gen’rous plan of power deliver’d down,
              From age to age, by your renown’d forefathers,
              So dearly bought, the price of so much blood;
              O! Let it never perish in your hands,
              But piously transmit it to your children.”

                              CHAPTER III.
                               1852-1853.

PERSONAL AND POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT ELECT AND WITH MR.
    MARCY, HIS SECRETARY OF STATE—BUCHANAN IS OFFERED THE MISSION TO
    ENGLAND—HIS OWN ACCOUNT OF THE OFFER, AND HIS REASONS FOR
    ACCEPTING IT—PARTING WITH HIS FRIENDS AND NEIGHBORS IN
    LANCASTER—CORRESPONDENCE WITH HIS NIECE.

The private correspondence between Mr. Buchanan and the new President,
General Pierce, and his Secretary of State, will best explain his
relations to this administration; and he has himself left a full record
of the circumstances under which he accepted the mission to England in
the summer of 1853.

                          [FROM GENERAL PIERCE.]

                                   CONCORD, N. H., November 1, 1852.

  MY DEAR SIR:—

  Your kind letter of the 26th instant was received yesterday.

  Your conclusion as to attending the meeting at Tammany Hall was what I
  should have expected, marked by a nice sense of the fitness of things.

  The telegraphic despatches received late this evening would seem to
  remove all doubt as to the result of the election. Your signal part in
  the accomplishment of that result is acknowledged and appreciated by
  all. I hope to have the pleasure of meeting you at no distant day.

                                             Your friend,
                                                       FRANK PIERCE.

                          [FROM GENERAL PIERCE.]

                                    CONCORD, N. H, December 7, 1852.

  MY DEAR SIR:—

  I have been hoping ever since the election that I might have a
  personal interview with you, if not before, certainly during the
  present month. But the objections to such a meeting suggested by you
  while I was at the sea-shore now exist, perhaps even with greater
  force than at that time. With our known pleasant personal relation a
  meeting would doubtless call forth many idle and annoying speculations
  and groundless surmises.

  An interchange of thoughts with Colonel King (whose returning health
  is a source of great joy to me) would also be peculiarly pleasant and
  profitable, but here, again, there are obstacles in the way. He cannot
  come North, and I cannot go to Washington. Communication by letter is
  still open. My thoughts for the last four weeks have been earnestly
  turned to the formation of a cabinet. And although I must in the end
  be responsible for the appointments, and consequently should follow my
  own well-considered convictions, I cannot help saying often to myself
  how agreeable it would be to compare conclusions upon this or that
  point with Mr. Buchanan. I do not mean to trouble you with the many
  matters of difficulty that evidently lie in my path. So far as I have
  been able to form an opinion as to public sentiment and reasonable
  public expectation, I think I am expected to call around me gentlemen
  who have not hitherto occupied cabinet position, and in view of the
  jealousies and embarrassments which environ any other course, this
  expectation is in accordance with my own judgment, a judgment
  strengthened by the impression that it is sanctioned by views
  expressed by you. Regarding you with the confidence of a friend, and
  appreciating your disinterested patriotism as well as your wide
  experience and comprehensive statesmanship, I trust you will deem it
  neither an intrusion nor annoyance when I ask your suggestions and
  advice.

  If not mistaken in this, you will confer a great favor by writing me,
  as fully as you may deem proper, as to the launching (if I may so
  express myself) of the incoming administration, and more especially in
  regard to men and things in Pennsylvania. In relation to appointments
  requiring prompt action after the inauguration, I shall, as far as
  practicable, leave Concord with purposes definitely formed, and not
  likely to be changed.

  Should you deem that I ought not thus to tax you, burn the letter, but
  give me, as of yore, your good will and wishes.

  I shall regard, as you will of course, whatever passes between us as
  in the strictest sense confidential.

                                  Very truly, your friend,
                                                       FRANK PIERCE.

                    [MR. BUCHANAN TO GENERAL PIERCE.]

                       WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, December 11, 1852.

  MY DEAR SIR:—

  Your favor of the 7th instant reached me last evening.

  You do me no more than justice in “regarding me with the free
  confidence of a friend,” and I can say in all sincerity that, both for
  your own sake and that of the country, I most ardently desire the
  success of your administration. Having asked my suggestions and advice
  “as to the launching of the incoming administration,” I shall
  cheerfully give it, with all the frankness of friendship.

  Your letter, I can assure you, has relieved me from no little personal
  anxiety. Had you offered me a seat in your cabinet one month ago,
  although highly gratified as I should have been with such a
  distinguished token of your confidence and regard, I would have
  declined it without a moment’s hesitation. Nothing short of an
  imperative and overruling sense of public duty could ever prevail upon
  me to pass another four years of my life in the laborious and
  responsible position which I formerly occupied. Within the past month,
  however, so many urgent appeals have been made to me from quarters
  entitled to the highest respect, to accept the State Department, if
  tendered, and this, too, as an act of public duty, in view of the
  present perplexed and embarrassing condition of our foreign relations,
  that in declining it, I should have been placed in an embarrassing
  position from which I have been happily relieved by your letter.

  But whilst I say this in all sincerity, I cannot assent to the
  correctness of the general principle you have adopted, to proscribe in
  advance the members of all former cabinets; nor do I concur with you
  in opinion, that either public sentiment or public expectation
  requires such a sweeping ostracism. I need scarcely, therefore, say
  that the impression which you have derived of my opinion in favor of
  this measure, from I know not whom, is without foundation. I should be
  most unjust towards my able, enlightened and patriotic associates in
  the cabinet of Mr. Polk, could I have entertained such an idea. So far
  from it that, were I the President elect, I should deem it almost
  indispensable to avail myself of the sound wisdom and experienced
  judgment of one or more members of that cabinet, to assist me in
  conducting the vast and complicated machinery of the Federal
  Government. Neither should I be diverted from this purpose by the
  senseless cry of “Old Fogyism” raised by “Young America.”

  I think the members of Mr. Polk’s cabinet should be placed upon the
  same level with the mass of their fellow-citizens, and neither in a
  better nor a worse condition. I am not aware that any of them, unless
  it may be Governor Marcy, either expects or desires a cabinet
  appointment; and certainly all of them will most cheerfully accord to
  you the perfect right of selecting the members of your own cabinet.
  Still, to be excluded from your consideration, merely because they had
  happened to belong to Mr. Polk’s cabinet, could not be very gratifying
  to any of them.

  To apply your own metaphor, “the launching of the incoming
  administration” will, perhaps, be a more important and responsible
  duty than has ever fallen to the lot of any of your predecessors. On
  the selection of the navigators to assist you in conducting the vessel
  of State, will mainly depend the success of the voyage. No matter how
  able or skilful the commander may be, and without flattery, I
  cheerfully accord to you both ability and skill, he can do but little
  without the aid of able and skilful subordinates. So firmly am I
  convinced of this truth, that I should not fear to predict the result
  of your administration as soon as I shall learn who are the members of
  your cabinet. In former times, when the Government was comparatively
  in its infancy, the President himself could supervise and direct all
  the measures of any importance arising under our complex but most
  excellent system of government. Not so at present. This would no
  longer be possible, even if the day consisted of forty-eight instead
  of twenty-four hours. Hence, from absolute necessity, the members of
  your administration will exercise much independent power. Even in
  regard to those questions submitted more directly to yourself, from
  want of time to make minute examinations of all the facts, you must
  necessarily rely much upon the representations of the appropriate
  Secretary. My strong and earnest advice to you, therefore, is not to
  constitute your cabinet with a view to harmonize the opposite and
  fleeting factions of the day; but solely with the higher and nobler
  view of promoting the great interests of the country and securing the
  glory and lasting fame of your own administration. You occupy a proud
  and independent position, and enjoy a popularity which will render any
  able and honest Democrat popular who may be honored by your choice for
  a cabinet station, provided they are properly distributed over the
  Union. In this respect, you are placed in a more enviable position
  than almost any of your predecessors. It was a maxim of old Simon
  Snyder, the shrewd and popular Governor of our State, that the very
  best man ought to be selected for the office, and if not popular at
  the moment, he would soon render himself popular. In view of these
  important considerations, I would earnestly recommend to you the
  practice of General Washington, never finally to decide an important
  question until the moment which required its decision had nearly
  approached.

  I know that a state of suspense is annoying to the human mind; but it
  is better to submit to this annoyance for a season than to incur the
  risk of a more permanent and greater evil.

  You say that you will leave Concord “with purposes definitely formed
  and not likely to be changed.”

  But is Concord the best locality in the world for acquiring reliable
  information and taking extended views of our whole great country? To
  Boston I should never resort for this purpose. Pardon me for
  suggesting that you ought not to have your resolution definitely fixed
  until after your arrival in Washington. In that city, although you
  will find many interested and designing politicians, there are also
  pure, honest and disinterested Democratic patriots.

  Among this number is Colonel King, whom you so highly and justly
  commend. He is among the best, purest and most consistent public men I
  have ever known, and is also a sound judging and discreet counsellor.
  You might rely with implicit confidence upon his information,
  especially in regard to the Southern States, which I know are at the
  present moment tremblingly alive to the importance of your cabinet
  selections. I might cite the example of Mr. Polk. Although in council
  with General Jackson, he had early determined to offer me the State
  Department, yet no intimation of the kind was ever communicated to me
  until a short time before his arrival in Washington, and then only in
  an indirect manner; and in regard to all the other members of his
  cabinet, he was wholly uncommitted, until the time for making his
  selections had nearly approached.

  It is true, he had strong predilections in favor of individuals before
  he left Tennessee, but I do not think I hazard much in saying, that
  had these been indulged, his administration would not have occupied so
  high a place as it is destined to do in the history of his country.

  One opinion I must not fail to express; and this is that _the cabinet
  ought to be a unit_. I may say that this is not merely an opinion of
  mine, but a strong and deep conviction. It is as clear to my mind as
  any mathematical demonstration. Without unity no cabinet can be
  successful. General Jackson, penetrating as he was, did not discover
  this truth until compelled to dissolve his first cabinet on account of
  its heterogeneous and discordant materials. I undertake to predict
  that whoever may be the President, if he disregards this principle in
  the formation of his cabinet, he will have committed a fatal mistake.
  He who attempts to conciliate opposing factions by placing ardent and
  embittered representatives of each in his cabinet, will discover that
  he has only infused into these factions new vigor and power for
  mischief. Having other objects in view, distinct from the success and
  glory of the administration, they will be employed in strengthening
  the factions to which they belong, and in creating unfortunate
  divisions in Congress and throughout the country. It was a regard to
  this vital principle of unity in the formation of his cabinet which
  rendered Mr. Polk’s administration so successful. We were all personal
  and political friends, and worked together in harmony. However various
  our views might have been and often were upon any particular subject
  when entering the cabinet council, after mutual consultation and free
  discussion we never failed to agree at last, except on a very few
  questions, and on these the world never knew that we had differed.

  I have made these suggestions without a single selfish object. My
  purpose is to retire gradually, if possible, and gracefully from any
  active participation in public affairs, and to devote my time to do
  historical justice to the administration of Mr. Polk, as well as to
  myself, before the tribunal of posterity. I feel, notwithstanding, a
  deep and intense interest in the lasting triumph of the good old cause
  of Democracy and in that of its chosen standard bearer, to whose
  success I devoted myself with a hearty good will.

  The important domestic questions being now nearly all settled, the
  foreign affairs of the Government, and especially the question of
  Cuba, will occupy the most conspicuous place in your administration. I
  believe Cuba can be acquired by cession upon honorable terms, and I
  should not desire to acquire it in any other manner. The President who
  shall accomplish this object will render his name illustrious, and
  place it on the same level with that of his great predecessor, who
  gave Louisiana to the Union. The best means of acquiring it, in my
  opinion, is to enlist the active agency of the foreign creditors of
  Spain, who have a direct interest in its cession to the United States.
  The Rothschilds, the Barings, and other large capitalists now control,
  to a great extent, the monarchies of continental Europe. Besides,
  Queen Christina, who is very avaricious and exercises great influence
  over her daughter, the queen of Spain, and her court, has very large
  possessions in the island, the value of which would be greatly
  enhanced by its cession to the United States. Should you desire to
  acquire Cuba, the choice of suitable ministers to Spain, Naples,
  England and France will be very important. Mr. Fillmore committed a
  great outrage in publishing the Cuban correspondence. Had he, however,
  not suppressed a material portion of my instructions to Mr. Saunders,
  every candid man of all parties would have admitted, without
  hesitation, that under the then existing circumstances it was the
  imperative duty of Mr. Polk to offer to make the purchase. Indeed, I
  think myself, it was too long delayed.

  In my opinion, Mr. Clayton and Mr. Webster have involved our relations
  with England in serious difficulties by departing from the Monroe
  doctrine.

  In Pennsylvania we have all been amused at the successive detachments
  of those whom we call guerillas, which have visited Concord to assure
  you that serious divisions exist among the Democracy of our State.
  There never was anything more unfounded. The party is now more
  thoroughly united than it has ever been at any period within my
  recollection. Whilst the contest continued between General Cass and
  myself, many honest Democrats, without a particle of personal or
  political hostility to me, preferred him and espoused his cause simply
  because he had been the defeated candidate. That feeling is at an end
  with the cause which gave it birth, and these honest Democrats as
  heartily despise the ——, the ——, the ——, the ——, the ——, the ——, etc.,
  etc., as do my oldest and best friends. In truth the guerillas are now
  chiefs without followers. They are at present attempting to galvanize
  themselves at home through the expected influence of your
  administration. Their tools, who will nearly all be applicants for
  office, circulate the most favorable accounts from Concord. They were
  scarcely heard of previous to the October election, which was the
  battle of the 23d December; but if we are to believe them, they
  achieved the victory of the 8th January. These are the men who
  defeated Judge —— at the election in October, 1851, by exciting
  Anti-Catholic prejudices against him, and who have always been
  disorganizers whenever their personal interests came in conflict with
  the success of the party. Thank Heaven, they are now altogether
  powerless, and will so remain unless your administration should impart
  to them renewed vigor. Their principal apprehension was that you might
  offer me a seat in your cabinet, but for some time past they have
  confidently boasted that their influence had already prevented this
  dreaded consummation.

  Their next assault will be upon my intimate friend, Judge ——, who
  will, I have no doubt, be strongly presented to you for a cabinet
  appointment. The Judge is able, honest and inflexibly firm, and did,
  to say the very least, as much as any individual in the State to
  secure our glorious triumph. I might speak in similar terms of ——. To
  defeat such men, they will lay hold of ——, Mr. ——, or any other
  individual less obnoxious to them, and make a merit of pressing him
  for a cabinet appointment from Pennsylvania.

  They calculate largely upon the influence of General Cass, who,
  strangely enough, is devoted to them, although their advocacy rendered
  it impossible that he should ever be nominated or elected by the vote
  of the State.

  As a private citizen, I shall take the liberty of recommending to you
  by letter, at the proper time, those whom I consider the best
  qualified candidates for different offices within our State, and you
  will pay such attention to my recommendations as you may think they
  deserve. I would not, if I could, exclude the honest friends of
  General Cass from a fair participation.... They are and always have
  been good Democrats, and are now my warm friends. But I shall ever
  protest against the appointment of any of the disorganizers who,
  professing Democracy, defeated Judge ——, and not content with
  advocating General Cass in preference to myself, which they had a
  perfect right to do, have spent their time and their money in abusing
  my personal character most foully and falsely.

  Even ——, the editor of the ——, whose paper was almost exclusively
  devoted to the propagation of these slanders, to be circulated under
  the frank of Senator —— throughout the South, for they had no
  influence at home, is a hopeful candidate for office, as they profess,
  under your administration.

  I have now, from a sense of duty, written you by far the longest
  letter I ever wrote in my life, and have unburdened my mind of a
  ponderous load. I have nothing more to add, except a request that you
  would present me kindly to Mrs. Pierce, and believe me to be always,
  most respectfully,

                                          Your friend,
                                                     JAMES BUCHANAN.

                    [GENERAL PIERCE TO MR. BUCHANAN.]

                                  CONCORD, N. H., December 14, 1852.

  MY DEAR SIR:—

  Language fails me to express the sincere gratitude I feel for your
  kind and noble letter of the 11th inst. I cannot now reply as I ought,
  but lose no time in expressing my deep sense of obligation. I ought,
  in justice to the citizens of Pennsylvania who have visited Concord
  during the summer and autumn, to say that I do not recollect a single
  individual who has ventured to make a suggestion in relation to
  yourself, calculated in the slightest degree to weaken my personal
  regard.

  It is far from my purpose to hasten to any conclusion in relation to
  my cabinet.

  It is hardly possible that I can be more deeply impressed than I now
  am as to the importance of the manner in which it shall be cast, both
  for the interests of the country and my own comfort. I cannot,
  however, view the advantages of my presence at Washington in the same
  light with yourself, though having no object but the best interests of
  our party and the country; personal inclination and convenience will,
  if I know it, have no weight upon my course in any particular.

  I must leave for a future time many things I desire to say. Do you
  still anticipate passing a portion of the winter at the South?

                          With sincere regard, your friend,
                                                       FRANK PIERCE.

                           [MARCY TO BUCHANAN.]

                                          WASHINGTON, March 5, 1853.

  MY DEAR SIR:—

  If not a matter of strict duty, I choose to regard it as a proper
  thing to explain my movements to you. A few days after the late
  Presidential election, I went south with my son Edmund, about whose
  condition as to health I had become alarmed, and am still very
  solicitous. In the first week of February, he took a steamer for some
  of the West India Islands, and I concluded it to be my duty to return
  to my deserted family at Albany. I arrived at Richmond, Virginia,
  about the 20th of February, with a disposition to pass on to the North
  without going through Washington. As I had never done anything at that
  place for which I ought to be ashamed (or rather I thought I had not),
  it appeared to me it would be cowardly to run around or through it. I
  was very much inclined to go and perchance to stop there a few days.
  The doubts which distracted me in regard to my course were almost
  entirely removed by a letter from a person whom I had never seen,
  suggesting that it might be well for me to be in Washington about the
  20th ult. On my appearance there a rumor suddenly arose that I was
  certainly to be one of the new cabinet, and the same liberty was taken
  with the names of several other persons. I have heard in an
  unauthentic way that you had been wise enough to take precautions
  against such a use of your name. It is now generally believed here,
  and I believe it myself, that I may be in the cabinet of the incoming
  administration, and (to confess all) I have been weak enough to make
  up my mind to accept a seat if offered one in it. Should it be the
  place you filled with so much ability, I may be rash enough not to
  decline it. I have told you all; here I am and here I am likely to be,
  for a brief period at least.

  I do not think you will approve of what I have done. I hope you will
  not severely censure me, or the judgment which will put me where I
  expect to be. If it is an error, either on my part or that of another,
  there are some circumstances to excuse it, but I have not time to
  present them in detail.

  I hope to have a frank and free intercourse with you. I will go
  further, I hope to have—what I know I shall much need—the aid in some
  emergencies of your greater experience and better knowledge. It will
  give me sincere pleasure to hear from you.

                                              Yours truly,
                                                        W. L. MARCY.

On the 30th of March (1853), the President wrote to Mr. Buchanan and
requested him to accept the mission to England. In his reply, Mr.
Buchanan postponed a final answer, and what ensued appears from the
following detailed account, which remains in his hand-writing.

  Although gratified with this offer, I felt great reluctance in
  accepting it. Having consulted several friends, in whose judgment I
  have confidence, they all advised me to accept it, with a single
  exception (James L. Reynolds). I left Lancaster for Washington on
  Thursday, 7th April, wholly undecided as to my course. On Friday
  morning (8th April) I called upon the President, who invited me to
  dine with him “_en famille_” that day. The only strangers at the table
  were Mr. John Slidell and Mr. O’Conor. After the dinner was over the
  President invited me up to the library, where we held the following
  conversation:

  I commenced by expressing to him my warm and grateful acknowledgments
  for the offer of this most important mission, and said I should feel
  myself under the same obligations to him whether it was accepted or
  declined; that at my age, and contented and happy as I was at home, I
  felt no disposition to change my position, and again to subject myself
  to the ceremonious etiquette and round of gaiety required from a
  minister at a foreign court.

  Here the President interrupted me and said: “If this had been my only
  purpose in sending you abroad, I should never have offered you the
  mission. You know very well that we have several important questions
  to settle with England, and it is my intention that you shall settle
  them all in London. The country expects and requires your services as
  minister to London. You have had no competitor for this place, and
  when I presented your name to the cabinet they were unanimous. I think
  that under these circumstances I have a right to ask you to accept the
  mission.”

  To this I replied that Mr. Polk was a wise man, and after deliberation
  he had determined that all important questions with foreign nations
  should be settled in Washington, under his own immediate supervision;
  that he (President Pierce) had not, perhaps, seriously considered the
  question.

  He promptly replied that he had seriously considered the question, and
  had arrived at the conclusion that better terms could be obtained in
  London at the seat of power than through an intermediate agent in this
  country; and instanced the Oregon negotiation as an example.

  From this opinion I did not dissent, but asked: “What will Governor
  Marcy say to your determination? You have appointed him Secretary of
  State with my entire approbation; and I do not think he would be
  willing to surrender to your minister at London the settlement of
  these important questions, which might reflect so much honor upon
  himself.”

  He replied, with some apparent feeling, that he himself would control
  this matter.

  I interposed and said: “I know that you do; but I would not become the
  instrument of creating any unpleasant feelings between yourself and
  your Secretary of State by accepting the mission, even if I desired
  it, which is not the case.”

  He replied that he did not believe this would be the case. When he had
  mentioned my name to the cabinet, although he did not say in express
  terms I should be entrusted with the settlement of these questions,
  yet from the general tone of his remarks they must have inferred that
  such was his intention. He added, that after our interview he would
  address a note to Governor Marcy to call and see him, and after
  conversing with him on the subject he would send for me.

  I then mentioned to him that there appeared to me to be another
  insurmountable obstacle to my acceptance of the mission. I said: “In
  all your appointments for Pennsylvania, you have not yet selected a
  single individual for any office for which I recommended him. I have
  numerous other friends still behind who are applicants for foreign
  appointments; and if I were now to accept the mission to London, they
  might with justice say that I had appropriated the lion’s share to
  myself, and selfishly received it as an equivalent for their
  disappointment. I could not and would not place myself in this
  position.”

  His answer was emphatic. He said: “I can assure you, if you accept the
  mission, Pennsylvania shall not receive one appointment more or less
  on that account. I shall consider yours as an appointment for the
  whole country; and I will not say that Pennsylvania shall not have
  more in case of your acceptance than if you should decline the
  mission.” I asked him if he was willing I should mention this
  conversation publicly. He said he would rather not; but that I might
  give the strongest assurances to my friends that such would be his
  course in regard to Pennsylvania appointments.

  We then had a conversation respecting the individual appointments
  already made in Pennsylvania, which I shall not write. He told me
  emphatically, that when he appointed Mr. Brown collector, he believed
  him to be my friend, and had received assurances to that effect;
  although he knew that I greatly preferred Governor Porter. He also had
  been assured that Wynkoop was my friend, and asked if I had not
  recommended him; and seemed much surprised when I informed him of the
  course he had pursued.

  I then stated, that if I should accept the mission, I could not
  consent to banish myself from my country for more than two years. He
  replied, that at the end of two years I might write to him for leave
  to return home, and it should be granted; adding, that if I should
  settle our important questions with England at an earlier period, I
  might return at the end of eighteen months, should I desire it.

  The interview ended, and I heard nothing from the President on Friday
  evening, Saturday or Sunday, or until Monday morning. In the mean
  time, I had several conversations with particular friends, and
  especially with Mr. Walker (at whose house I stayed), Judge Campbell
  and Senator Bright, all of whom urged me to accept the mission. The
  latter informed me that if I did not accept it, many would attribute
  my refusal to a fear or an unwillingness to grapple with the important
  and dangerous questions pending between the United States and Great
  Britain.

  On Sunday morning, April 10th, the _Washington Union_ was brought to
  Mr. Walker’s, from which it appeared that the session of the Senate
  would terminate on the next day at one o’clock, the President having
  informed the Committee to wait upon him, that he had no further
  communications to make to the body. At this I was gratified. I
  presumed that the President, after having consulted Governor Marcy,
  had concluded not to transfer the negotiations to London; because it
  had never occurred to me that I was to go abroad on such an important
  mission without the confirmation of the Senate. Mr. Walker and myself
  had some conversation on the subject, and we agreed that it was
  strange the Senate had been kept so long together without submitting
  to them the important foreign appointments; as we both knew that in
  Europe, and especially in England, since the rejection of Mr. Van
  Buren’s appointment, a minister had not the proper prestige without
  the approbation of the co-ordinate branch of the Executive power.

  On Sunday morning, before dinner-time, I called to see Jefferson
  Davis.[6] We had much conversation on many subjects. Among other
  things, I told him it was strange that the foreign appointments had
  not been agreed upon and submitted to the Senate before their
  adjournment. He replied that he did not see that this could make any
  difference; they might be made with more deliberation during the
  recess. I said a man was considered but half a minister, who went
  abroad upon the President’s appointment alone, without the consent of
  the Senate, ever since the rejection of Mr. Van Buren. He said he now
  saw this plainly; and asked why Marcy had not informed them of
  it,—they trusted to him in all such matters. The conversation then
  turned upon other subjects; but this interview with Mr. Davis, sought
  for the purpose of benefiting my friend, John Slidell, who was then a
  candidate for the Senate, has doubtless been the cause why I was
  nominated and confirmed as minister to England on the next day.

Footnote 6:

    Mr. Davis was Secretary of War.

  On Sunday evening a friend informed Mr. Walker and myself that a
  private message had been sent to the Senators still in town,
  requesting them not to leave by the cars on Monday morning, as the
  President had important business to submit to them. This was
  undoubtedly the origin of the rumor which at the time so extensively
  prevailed, that the cabinet was about to be dissolved and another
  appointed.

  On Monday morning, at ten o’clock, I received a note from Mr.
  Cushing,[7] informing me that “the President would be glad to see me
  at once.” I immediately repaired to the White House; and the President
  and myself agreed, referring to our former conversation, though not
  repeating it in detail, that he should send my name to the Senate. If
  a quorum were present, and I should be confirmed, I would go to
  England; if not, the matter was to be considered as ended.
  Thirty-three members were present, and I was confirmed. On this second
  occasion, our brief conversation was of the same character, so far as
  it proceeded, with that at our first interview. He kindly consented
  that I should select my own Secretary of Legation; and without a
  moment’s hesitation, I chose John Appleton, of Maine, who accepted the
  offer which I was authorized to make, and was appointed. I left
  Washington on Tuesday morning, April 12th.

Footnote 7:

    Attorney General.

  At our last interview, I informed the President that I would soon
  again return to Washington to prepare myself for the performance of my
  important duties, because this could only be satisfactorily done in
  the State Department. He said he wished to be more at leisure on my
  return, that he might converse with me freely on the questions
  involved in my mission; he thought that in about ten days the great
  pressure for office would relax, and he would address me a note
  inviting me to come.

  I left Washington perfectly satisfied, and resolved to use my best
  efforts to accomplish the objects of my mission. The time fixed upon
  for leaving the country was the 20th of June, so that I might relieve
  Mr. Ingersoll on the 1st of July.

  I had given James Keenan of Greensburg a strong recommendation for
  appointment as consul to Glasgow. As soon as he learned my appointment
  as minister to England, he wrote to me on the 14th of April, stating
  that the annunciation of my acceptance of this mission had created a
  belief among my friends there that no Pennsylvanian could now be
  appointed to any consulship.

  On the 16th of April, I wrote to him and assured him, in the language
  of the President, that my appointment to the English mission would not
  cause one appointment more or one appointment less to be given to
  Pennsylvania than if I had declined the mission.

  In answer, I received a letter from him, dated April 21st, in which he
  extracts from a letter from Mr. Drum, then in Washington, to him, the
  following: “I have talked to the President earnestly on the subject
  (of his appointment to Glasgow), but evidently without making much
  impression. He says that it will be impossible for him to bestow
  important consulships on Pennsylvania who has a cabinet officer and
  _the first and highest mission_. Campbell talks in the same strain;
  but says he will make it his business to get something worthy of your
  acceptance.”

  For some days before and after the receipt of this letter, I learned
  that different members of the cabinet, when urged for consulates for
  Pennsylvanians, had declared to the applicants and their friends that
  they could not be appointed _on account of my appointment to London_,
  and what the President had already done for the State. One notable
  instance of this kind occurred between Colonel Forney and Mr. Cushing.
  Not having heard from the President, according to his promise, I
  determined to go to Washington for the purpose of having an
  explanation with him and preparing myself for my mission. Accordingly,
  I left home on Tuesday, May 17th, and arrived in Washington on
  Wednesday morning, May 18th, remaining there until Tuesday morning,
  May 31st, on which day I returned home.

  On Thursday morning, May 19th, I met the President, by appointment, at
  9½ o’clock. Although he did not make a very clear explanation of his
  conversation with Mr. Drum, yet I left him satisfied that he would
  perform his promise in regard to Pennsylvania appointments. I had not
  been in Washington many days before I clearly discovered that the
  President and cabinet were intent upon his renomination and
  re-election. This I concluded from the general tendency of affairs, as
  well as from special communications to that effect from friends whom I
  shall not name. It was easy to perceive that the object in
  appointments was to raise up a Pierce party, wholly distinct from the
  former Buchanan, Cass, and Douglas parties; and I readily perceived,
  what I had before conjectured, the reason why my recommendations had
  proved of so little avail. I thought I also discovered considerable
  jealousy of Governor Marcy, who will probably cherish until the day of
  his death the anxious desire to become President. I was convinced of
  this jealousy at a dinner given Mr. Holmes, formerly of South
  Carolina, now of California, at Brown’s Hotel on Saturday, May 21st.
  Among the guests were Governor Marcy, Jefferson Davis, Mr. Dobbin, and
  Mr. Cushing. The company soon got into high good humor. In the course
  of the evening Mr. Davis began to jest with Governor Marcy and myself
  on the subject of the next Presidency, and the Governor appeared to
  relish the subject. After considerable _bagatelle_, I said I would
  make a speech. All wanted to hear my speech. I addressed Governor
  Marcy and said: “You and I ought to consider ourselves out of the list
  of candidates. We are both growing old, and it is a melancholy
  spectacle to see old men struggling in the political arena for the
  honors and offices of this world, as though it were to be their
  everlasting abode. Should you perform your duties as Secretary of
  State to the satisfaction of the country during the present
  Presidential term, and should I perform my duties in the same manner
  as minister to England, we ought both to be content to retire and
  leave the field to younger men. President Pierce is a young man, and
  should his administration prove to be advantageous to the country and
  honorable to himself, as I trust it will, there is no good reason why
  he should not be renominated and re-elected for a second term.” The
  Governor, to do him justice, appeared to take these remarks kindly and
  in good part, and said he was agreed. They were evidently very
  gratifying to Messrs. Davis, Dobbin, and Cushing. Besides, they
  expressed the real sentiments of my heart. When the dinner was ended,
  Messrs. Davis and Dobbin took my right and left arm and conducted me
  to my lodgings, expressing warm approbation of what I had said to
  Governor Marcy. I heard of this speech several times whilst I remained
  at Washington; and the President once alluded to it with evident
  satisfaction. It is certain that Governor Marcy is no favorite.

  I found the State Department in a wretched condition. Everything had
  been left by Mr. Webster topsy turvy; and Mr. Everett was not
  Secretary long enough to have it put in proper order; and whilst in
  that position he was constantly occupied with pressing and important
  business. Governor Marcy told me that he had not been able, since his
  appointment, to devote one single hour together to his proper official
  duties. His time had been constantly taken up with office-seekers and
  cabinet councils. It is certain that during Mr. Polk’s administration
  he had paid but little attention to our foreign affairs; and it is
  equally certain that he went into the Department without much
  knowledge of its appropriate duties. But he is a strong-minded and
  clear-headed man; and, although slow in his perceptions, is sound in
  his judgment. He may, and I trust will, succeed; but yet he has much
  to learn.

  Soon after I arrived in Washington on this visit, I began seriously to
  doubt whether the President would eventually entrust to me the
  settlement of the important questions at London, according to his
  promise, without which I should not have consented to go abroad. I
  discovered that the customary and necessary notice in such cases had
  not been given to the British government, of the President’s intention
  and desire to transfer the negotiations to London, and that I would go
  there with instructions and authority to settle all the questions
  between the two governments, and thus prepare them for the opening of
  these negotiations upon my arrival.

  After I had been in Washington some days, busily engaged in the State
  Department in preparing myself for the duties of my mission, Mr. Marcy
  showed me the project of a treaty which had nearly been completed by
  Mr. Everett and Mr. Crampton, the British minister, before Mr.
  Fillmore’s term had expired, creating reciprocal free trade in certain
  enumerated articles, between the United States and the British North
  American provinces, with the exception of Newfoundland, and regulating
  the fisheries. Mr. Marcy appeared anxious to conclude this treaty,
  though he did not say so in terms. He said that Mr. Crampton urged its
  conclusion; and he himself apprehended that if it were not concluded
  speedily, there would be great danger of collision between the two
  countries on the fishing grounds. I might have answered, but did not,
  that the treaty could not be ratified until after the meeting of the
  Senate in December; and that in the mean time it might be concluded at
  London in connection with the Central American questions. I did say
  that the great lever which would force the British government to do us
  justice in Central America was their anxious desire to obtain
  reciprocal free trade for their North American possessions, and thus
  preserve their allegiance and ward off the danger of their annexation
  to the United States. My communications on the extent and character of
  my mission were with the President himself, and not with Governor
  Marcy; and I was determined they should so remain. The President had
  informed me that he had, as he promised, conversed with the Governor,
  and found him entirely willing that I should have the settlement of
  the important questions at London.

  The circumstances to which I have referred appeared to me to be
  significant. I conversed with the President fully and freely on each
  of the three questions, viz: The reciprocal trade, the fisheries, and
  that of Central America; and endeavored to convince him of the
  necessity of settling them all together. He seemed to be strongly
  impressed with my remarks, and said that he had conversed with a
  Senator then in Washington, (I presume Mr. Toucey, though he did not
  mention the name,) who had informed him that he thought that the
  Senate would have great difficulty in ratifying any treaty which did
  not embrace all the subjects pending between us and England; and that
  for this very reason there had been considerable opposition in the
  body to the ratification of the Claims Convention, though in itself
  unexceptionable.

  The President said nothing from which an inference could be fairly
  drawn that he had changed his mind as to the place where the
  negotiation should be conducted; and yet he did not speak in as strong
  and unequivocal terms on the subject as I could have desired. Under
  all the circumstances, I left Washington, on the 31st of May, without
  accepting my commission, which had been prepared for me and was in the
  State Department. On the 5th of June I received a letter from Governor
  Marcy, dated on the first, requesting me to put on paper my exposition
  of the Clayton and Bulwer treaty. In this he says nothing about my
  instructions on any of the questions between this country and England,
  nor does he intimate that he desires my opinion for any particular
  purpose. On the 7th of June I answered his letter. In the concluding
  portion of my letter, I took the occasion to say: “The truth is that
  our relations with England are in a critical condition. Throw all the
  questions together into hotchpot, and I think they can all be settled
  amicably and honorably. The desire of Great Britain to establish free
  trade between the United States and her North American possessions,
  and by this means retain these possessions in their allegiance, may be
  used as the powerful lever to force her to abandon her pretensions in
  Central America; and yet it must be admitted that, in her history, she
  has never voluntarily abandoned any important commercial position on
  which she has once planted her foot. It cannot be her interest to go
  to war with us, and she must know that it is clearly her interest to
  settle all the questions between us, and have a smooth sea hereafter.
  If the Central American question, which is the dangerous question,
  should not be settled, we shall probably have war with England before
  the close of the present administration. Should she persist in her
  unjust and grasping policy on the North American continent and the
  adjacent islands, this will be inevitable at some future day; and
  although we are not very well prepared for it at the present moment,
  it is not probable that we shall for many years be in a better
  condition.”

  I also say in this letter to Governor Marcy, that “bad as the treaty
  (the Clayton and Bulwer treaty) is, the President cannot annul it.
  This would be beyond his power, and the attempt would startle the
  whole world. In one respect it may be employed to great advantage. The
  question of the Colony of the Bay of Islands is the dangerous
  question. It affects the national honor. From all the consideration I
  can give the subject, the establishment of this Colony is a clear
  violation of the Clayton and Bulwer treaty. Under it we can insist
  upon the withdrawal of Great Britain from the Bay of Islands. Without
  it we could only interpose the Monroe doctrine against this colony,
  which has never yet been sanctioned by Congress, though as an
  individual citizen of the United States, I would fight for it
  to-morrow, so far as all North America is concerned, and would do my
  best to maintain it throughout South America.”

  This letter of mine to Governor Marcy, up till the present moment,
  June 25, has elicited no response. It may be seen at length in this
  book.

  Having at length determined to ascertain what were the President’s
  present intentions in regard to the character of my mission, I
  addressed him a letter, of which the following is a copy, on the 14th
  June.

                  [TO HIS EXCELLENCY, FRANKLIN PIERCE.]

 (Private.)                          WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, June 14,
                                                                   1853.

  MY DEAR SIR:—

  I have this moment received yours of the 11th instant, and now enclose
  you Mr. Appleton’s resignation. I cannot imagine how I neglected to do
  this before. It will be very difficult to supply his place.

  If you have changed your mind in regard to the place where our
  important negotiations with England shall be conducted, you would
  confer a great favor upon me by informing me of this immediately. I
  stated to you, in our first conversation on the subject, that Mr.
  Polk, after due deliberation, had determined that such negotiations
  should be conducted under his own eye at Washington; and it would not
  give me the slightest uneasiness to learn, that upon reconsideration,
  such had become your determination. I should, however, consider it a
  fatal policy to divide the questions. After a careful examination and
  study of all these questions, and their mutual bearings upon each
  other and upon the interest of the two countries, I am fully convinced
  that they can only be satisfactorily adjusted all together. Indeed,
  from what you said to me of your conversation with a Senator, and from
  what I have since learned, I believe it would be difficult to obtain
  the consent of two-thirds of the Senate to any partial treaty. The
  South, whether correctly or not, will probably be averse to a
  reciprocity treaty confined to the British North American possessions;
  and it would be easy for hostile demagogues to proclaim, however
  unjustly, that the interests of the South had been bartered away for
  the fisheries. But the South might and probably would be reconciled to
  such a treaty, if it embraced a final and satisfactory adjustment of
  the questions in Central America.

  If you have changed your mind, and I can imagine many reasons for
  this, independently of the pressure of the British minister to secure
  that which is so highly prized by his government,—then, I would
  respectfully suggest that you might inform Mr. Crampton, you are ready
  and willing to negotiate upon the subject of the fisheries and
  reciprocal trade; _but this in connection with our Central American
  difficulties_;—that you desire to put an end to all the embarrassing
  and dangerous questions between the two governments, and thus best
  promote the most friendly relations hereafter;—and that you will
  proceed immediately with the negotiation and bring it to as speedy a
  conclusion as possible, whenever he shall have received the necessary
  instructions. Indeed, the treaty in regard to reciprocal trade and the
  fisheries might, in the mean time, be perfected, with a distinct
  understanding, however, that its final execution should be postponed
  until the Central American questions had been adjusted. In that event,
  as I informed you when at Washington, if you should so desire, I shall
  be most cordially willing to go there as a private individual, and
  render you all the assistance in my power. I know as well as I live,
  that it would be vain for me to go to London to settle a question
  peculiarly distasteful to the British government, after they had
  obtained, at Washington, that which they so ardently desire.

  I write this actuated solely by a desire to serve your administration
  and the country. I shall not be mortified, in the slightest degree,
  should you determine to settle all the questions in Washington.
  Whether [you do so] or not, your administration shall not have a
  better friend in the country than myself, nor one more ardently
  desirous of its success; and I can render it far more essential
  service as a private citizen at home than as a minister to London.

  With my kindest regards for Mrs. Pierce, and Mrs. Means,

                   I remain, very respectfully, your friend,
                                                     JAMES BUCHANAN.

  P.S.—I should esteem it a personal favor to hear from you as soon as
  may be convenient.

From the important character of this letter and the earnest and
reiterated request which I made for an early answer, I did not doubt but
that I should receive one, giving me definite information, with as