consideration in the Reichstag, the representative of the German
government, upon being interrogated as to the effect of Sections
25 and 26 upon the Bancroft treaty between the United States and
Germany, replied, in so many words, that the German government was
obliged to look upon every German naturalized in the United States
as an American and nothing else.[30] Space is not available here for
further discussion of the real significance of the Delbrück Law;
suffice it to say that it is the subject of considerable difference
of opinion among the authorities.[31] But it may be said, in general,
that the best American authorities seem to be of the opinion that the
specific renunciation of each and every former allegiance required by
our naturalization process makes it substantially impossible for the
disputed section or any other enactment to operate as creating a dual
allegiance. Such allegiance could exist only in theory at most; in
no practical way could any foreign government enforce it as against
any person living in America. The United States, under the Bancroft
treaty and its own naturalization law, would not tolerate such an
interpretation, and as the “War Encyclopedia” of the American
Committee on Public Information said, “it would be impossible for
a German applicant for citizenship in the United States to avail
himself of this section [Section 25 of the Delbrück Law] without
committing perjury.”

So far as the “declarant” of any nationality is concerned, it
should be added that our Department of State has always sought to
maintain that a declarant is in a position different from that of
the ordinary alien, has extended a limited degree of protection, and
now issues passports under the authority of an Act passed March 2,
1907--provided he has resided in the United States for three years;
at the same time protecting itself from imposition by such persons
by limiting the validity of such passports to a term of six months,
and providing that an extended residence or domicile abroad shall
be construed as an abandonment of the declared intention. Moreover,
the naturalizing judges and the Bureau of Naturalization examine
with great strictness the reasons for any absence whatever from the
country after the declaration, and usually construe “intention” with
regard to continuous residence with emphasis against the applicant.
Many judges permit no absence, however brief, some going so far as to
rule against any absence from the very county in which the applicant
resides. And during the European War the issuance of such passports
to natives of the belligerent countries was altogether suspended.[32]

The United States was early committed not only by specific utterances
and practices, but by the whole psychology and tradition of its
being, to the principle of free expatriation; nevertheless, great
confusion existed in the interpretation of the right as it related
to efforts of American citizens to become citizens or subjects of
other countries. The policy was finally crystallized in the Act
of March 2, 1907, which provides definitely that “any American
citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself when he has been
naturalized in any foreign state in conformity with its laws, or
when he has taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign state.” This
is the Act which, in the same section, provides for the extension
of naturalization by presumption upon two years’ residence in “the
country from which he came,” or upon five years’ residence “in any
foreign state.” But it is provided that “such presumption may be
overcome on the presentation of satisfactory evidence to a diplomatic
or consular officer of the United States, under such regulations as
the Department of State may prescribe.” It is stipulated, however,
that “no American citizen shall be allowed to expatriate himself when
the country is at war.”

During the Great War many American citizens imperiled, and in fact
technically lost, their American citizenship by entering the military
service of the various belligerent nations. After the entry of the
United States into the conflict this was remedied by the enactment of
Section 12 of the Act of May 9, 1918, in which it is provided that

  ... any person who, while a citizen of the United States and during
  the existing war in Europe, entered the military or naval service
  of any country at war with a country with which the United States
  is now at war, who shall be deemed to have lost his citizenship
  by reason of any oath or obligation taken by him for the purpose
  of entering such service, may resume his citizenship by taking
  the oath of allegiance to the United States prescribed by the
  naturalization law and regulations; ...

such oath to be taken here or abroad, before any state or Federal
court authorized to naturalize aliens, or before any United States
consul.

CITIZENSHIP TAKES NO ACCOUNT OF SEX

Basic citizenship in the United States takes no account of sex.
_Every_ child, male or female, white, black, brown, red, or yellow,
“born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,”
is _ipso facto_ a citizen. And every unmarried woman of that nativity
is, and continues to be such, as long as she remains unmarried. Upon
marriage she takes forthwith, whether she will or no, so far as our
law is concerned, the nationality of her husband--even if he be an
alien. It is the unbroken tradition of our law, and of the laws of
nearly all other nations--in so far as they recognize women as being
individual citizens at all--that the nationality of a wife follows
that of her husband. Of that tradition was born a section of the law
of 1907 which seeks to confer upon any American woman marrying a
foreigner the nationality of her husband. When an alien man becomes a
citizen of the United States by naturalization, his wife, in ordinary
circumstances, becomes a citizen with him; the law says specifically
that “a woman who is now, or may hereafter be married to a citizen
of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized,
may be deemed a citizen.” But, generally speaking, she must, unless
herself American born, be resident in this country. The practice in
this regard has not been wholly consistent; the State Department
has held repeatedly that the naturalization of a husband does not
reach the wife if she continue to reside in the old country; but a
very uniform line of decisions is to the effect that her husband’s
naturalization makes her a citizen wherever she may be, and that
she remains a citizen even after his death unless she takes action
to repatriate herself. The Act of 1907 makes it necessary for such a
foreign-born widow resident abroad to register with a United States
consul within a year after the termination of her marriage; otherwise
her citizenship lapses.

The phrase, “who might herself be lawfully naturalized,” has
given rise to much controversy, and its significance has not been
definitively declared. Some authorities hold it to apply only to the
Oriental races excluded as such from citizenship; others hold that it
should be interpreted to call for an examination of the wife as to
her views on the subject of anarchism, polygamy, etc. But the general
tendency seems still to hold that the family is one, _and the husband
that one_; that, therefore, _any_ sort of wife comes into citizenship
automatically with the naturalization of her husband.

“A WOMAN WITHOUT A COUNTRY”

The nonresident American-born wife of a foreigner may, upon his death
or the termination of the marriage in any other legal manner, resume
her American citizenship by registration with a United States consul.
But what of the woman, born an American citizen, married to an alien
who continues to live? The United States statute of 1907 undertakes
to expatriate her--“any American woman who marries a foreigner shall
take the nationality of her husband.” But, in absence of specific
treaty, or of legislation in the husband’s country to that effect,
that pronouncement is without force or validity outside of the United
States; Congress has no power to confer or inflict the citizenship of
any other nation upon anybody. “The operation of this statute might
easily deprive a woman of her American citizenship--even if she had
it by right of birth--and leave her with none.”[33] It seems rather
extraordinary that of all the judges of American naturalization
courts replying to the questionnaire of the Americanization Study,
whose results are discussed elsewhere in this volume,[34] not one
referred directly to this aspect of the citizenship of the American
woman.

The person without a country is an alien everywhere his foot may
fall--no matter under what roof or flag he may seek shelter. He is
subject to the local laws and limitations governing aliens; but
he has no homeland whose flag he may call his own; no government
anywhere to which he may appeal for protection; he is dependent
without recourse upon the hospitality, grace, and mercy of the public
authorities and the people of the land where he chances to make his
habitation.

THE AMERICAN UNDER THREE JURISDICTIONS

In notable contrast with this dismal prospect, the American citizen,
native or naturalized, is quite otherwise. He is subject to _three_
concurrent jurisdictions. This fact is a source of great puzzlement
to many an applicant for citizenship, and constitutes one of the
stumbling-blocks which beset him in his initial understanding of our
system of government.

First, the nature of his relation to the United States. In the case
of Minor _vs._ Happersett,[35] decided in 1875, the Supreme Court of
the United States said:

  Before its adoption, the Constitution of the United States did not
  in terms prescribe who should be citizens of the United States,
  yet there were necessarily such citizens without such provision.
  There cannot be a nation without a people. The very idea of a
  political community, such as a nation is, implies an association
  of persons for the promotion of their general welfare. Each one
  of the persons associated becomes a member of the nation formed
  by the association. He owes it allegiance and is entitled to its
  protection. Allegiance and protection are, in this connection,
  reciprocal obligations. The one is a compensation for the other;
  allegiance for protection and protection for allegiance.

  For convenience it has been found necessary to give a name to this
  membership. The object is to designate by a title the person and
  the relation he bears to the nation. For this purpose the words
  “subject,” “inhabitant,” and “citizen” have been used, and the
  choice between them is sometimes made to depend upon the form of
  government. “Citizen” is now more commonly employed, however, and
  as it has been considered better suited to the description of one
  living under a republican government, it was adopted by nearly
  all of the states upon their separation from Great Britain, and
  was afterward adopted in the Articles of Confederation and in the
  Constitution of the United States. When used in that sense it is
  understood as conveying the idea of membership of a nation, and
  nothing more.

  To determine, then, who were the citizens of the United States
  before the adoption of the [Fourteenth] amendment it is necessary
  to ascertain what persons originally associated themselves together
  to form the nation, and what were afterward admitted to membership.

The effect of this decision, and of the Fourteenth Amendment whose
meaning it declared, was to determine definitively that National
Citizenship is paramount to State Citizenship. But it did not
entirely absorb the latter into the former. In the famous “Slaughter
House Cases”[36] the Supreme Court three years before had held that
there might be citizens of the United States who were not citizens
of any state, and that the Fourteenth Amendment applied particularly,
if not solely, to the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States, _as such_, and did not necessarily limit the right of
a state to inflict disabilities upon its own citizens.

The distinction between the two citizenships was thus stated in the
Slaughter House cases:[37]

  The distinction between citizenship of the United States and
  citizenship of a State is clearly recognized and established. Not
  only may a man be a citizen of the United States without being
  a citizen of a State, but an important element is necessary to
  convert the former into the latter. He must reside within the
  State to make him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that
  he should be born or naturalized in the United States to be a
  citizen of the Union. It is quite clear, then, that there is a
  citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of a State,
  which are distinct from each other, and which depend upon different
  characteristics or circumstances in the individual.

  It is therefore decided that while a State may no longer decide the
  question of who shall be or become its citizens, the citizen of the
  United States must, before becoming a citizen of a State, take up
  his residence within the State. The term of residence is nowhere
  fixed, but a permanent residence or domicile is understood, “with
  intent that it shall continue until subsequent removal with the
  intent of abandoning such residence and acquiring another.”

These momentous adjudications did not, however, address themselves
to the matter of political participation. Although a state might
not determine who should constitute its citizen body, there was
no curtailment of its full authority to determine what political
privileges should exist, or who should enjoy them. Neither Federal
nor state citizenship, _per se_, entitles a man or woman to vote
or to hold office; these are matters of state legislation and a
number of states have accorded, and two still accord, to aliens
who have merely declared their intention to seek citizenship, the
right to vote. Moreover, respected authorities[38] hold the opinion
that, while no state can prevent a citizen of the United States
from becoming a citizen of the state, a state may grant its own
citizenship to one who is not--perhaps to one who cannot become--a
citizen of the United States.[39] But the Act of Congress, May 6,
1882, expressly prohibits the naturalization of any Chinese person.

The courts from the beginning have recognized the existence of two
concurrent, if not more or less separable, citizenships. In the
Cruikshank case in 1875,[40] the Supreme Court said:

  The people of the United States resident within any State are
  subject to two governments; one State and the other national; but
  there need be no conflict between the two. The powers which one
  possesses the other does not. They are established for different
  purposes, and have different jurisdictions. Together they make
  one whole, and furnish the people of the United States with one
  government, ample for the protection of all their rights at home
  and abroad. True, it may sometimes happen that a person is amenable
  to both jurisdictions for one and the same act.... This does not,
  however, necessarily imply that the two governments possess powers
  in common, or bring them into conflict with each other. It is the
  natural consequence of a citizenship which owes allegiance to two
  sovereignties and claims protection from both. The citizen cannot
  complain because he has voluntarily submitted himself to such a
  form of government. He owes allegiance to the two departments, so
  to speak, and within their respective spheres must pay the penalty
  which each exacts for disobedience to its laws. In return he can
  demand protection from each within its own jurisdiction.

There is still another jurisdiction to which citizens must give
attention, and to the foreigner it is an added perplexity in the
understanding of our system: the purely local laws, ordinances, and
rulings of city, health, police; of country, town, and village; and
sometimes these seem to run counter to one another, and leave him in
a maze of fear and uncertainty--to say nothing of those mysterious
exceptions, exemptions, and immunities which seem to be accorded
for the benefit of those who, by political loyalty or subserviency,
favoritism--and even cash payments upon occasion--have got themselves
“in right,” as the saying goes.

The problems of national solidarity and loyalty raised so acutely
all over the country by the exigencies and conflicts of the war
have made the mass of the people of the United States keen as never
before about the standards and technical tests of citizenship. The
tendency, very marked now, is to establish and uphold the uniformity
of conditions which beyond a doubt shall represent the spirit, if not
the letter, of the law. We are now to consider the machinery and the
process which the aspirant for citizenship confronts as he knocks at
our wicket.

IV

DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATURALIZATION LAW

Naturalization, the legal ceremony by which the native or adopted
citizen of one country acquires citizenship in another, is in its
significance and essentials very ancient--it goes back to the blood
transfusion and other primitive ceremonials by which those of other
kin were admitted as brothers to full standing in family, clan,
or tribal membership. It registers and effectuates two distinct
things--a divorce and a new marriage, so to say. There are two
parties to the twofold process: the petitioner, who on his own
account renounces the old allegiance and professes his desire and his
intention to assume the new; and the adopting government which, on
its part, accepts the applicant and upon him confers the standing and
privileges and imposes the responsibilities and obligations attaching
to citizenship under its protection and authority. This is precisely
the nature of the process through which must go every foreign-born
person who becomes an active member of the United States.

OUR “CHARTER MEMBERS”

As in the case of other new organizations, we had at the beginning
what might be called “Charter Members.” We were not fussy about it.
There was no prejudice then against the newcomer--we “needed him
in our business!” The Constitution of the United States in its
inception took in as a matter of course everybody then resident
here who by any color of law could be construed to be entitled
to membership. Even the provision requiring native birth for the
Presidency limited it only to one natural born, “or a citizen of the
United States at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.”[41]
Martin van Buren was actually the first President born an American
citizen. The seven who preceded him all were born subjects of the
British crown.

Prior to 1700, few immigrants who were not British subjects had
sought homes in the American colonies; the few of other nationality
found no difficulty in being accepted as fellow citizens with those
who preceded them. For obvious reasons, the Colonial governments were
liberal in granting civil rights to newcomers of almost every sort.
It was absolutely vital to the preservation of the new civilization
here that there should be an increasing number of men to assist in
conquering the wilderness and in defending the fringe of settlements
against attack. How could the pioneer nation have maintained itself,
much less have advanced and spread westward until its feet were
stopped by the Pacific, without these adventurous souls of every race?

So the sieve was of coarse mesh.

FIRST NATURALIZATION LAWS

Generally speaking, except where a colony had legislated
independently in the matter, the British law was in effect. Under
this, an alien might be naturalized by the Act of Parliament, or
given partial rights by grant of the king, in “Letters of Denization.”

Prior to 1740, a number of naturalization laws were passed by
Colonial legislatures. General laws were passed by New York and
Pennsylvania in 1683, South Carolina in 1696, and Virginia somewhat
later. The use of the private Act of Naturalization was very
common, especially in Pennsylvania and New York. The general Act of
Pennsylvania was in fact revoked by Queen Anne, and from that time
until 1840 all naturalizations in that colony were by private or
special legislation.

Probably the first naturalization of aliens in the New World was
the collective acceptance of the Dutch inhabitants of New Amsterdam
(New York) by the articles of capitulation in 1664, by which they
with their territory passed under the British flag. Two years later
Augustine Herman of Prague, with his family, was naturalized by
Act of the Maryland Assembly. This appears to have been the first
naturalization law enacted in America.

The rights conferred by all of these Colonial Acts were limited
strictly to the colony in which each was passed. Political rights
varied in the different colonies, chiefly according to voting
qualifications in force in each. But since most of them provided
for a property qualification, the permission to foreigners to own
land usually carried with it the right of suffrage. However, in some
of the colonies the naturalized citizen was not eligible to public
office. For all practical purposes of social standing, the ownership
of land sufficed, and since that could be passed down by inheritance,
and it was always admitted that a child born on this soil was a
citizen regardless of his racial descent, the restrictions were
hardly irksome at that time.

In 1740 the English Parliament passed an Act for providing for
naturalization in the American colonies[42] of “foreign Protestants.”
Persons naturalized under this statute might enjoy all civil rights
except that of holding certain offices. A residence of seven years
was required, and certain oaths and rites were imposed, including
partaking of the sacrament of the Holy Communion in accordance with
the ritual of the Church of England. Quakers and Jews, however,
were the subject of exemption; Quakers were permitted to affirm,
rather than to swear, and Jews were permitted to omit the words, “on
the faith of a Christian.” This Act remained the basic law of the
American provinces until the Revolution, when all British statutes
were, at least constructively, superseded by Acts of the Congress of
the United States of America.[43]

Among the grievances recited against the government of George III was
the treatment of this subject of naturalization. It is thus set forth
in the Declaration of Independence:

  He has endeavored to prevent the population of these States; for
  that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners;
  refusing to pass others to encourage their migration hither, and
  raising the conditions of new Appropriation of Lands.

Under the Articles of Confederation, which served the new republic
until the adoption of the Constitution, no specific action was taken
by the Congress to provide for the naturalization, although certain
provision was made for an oath of allegiance for office-holders, and
to facilitate desertion from the British ranks by offers of land
and of citizenship. After the Revolution a number of individual
states enacted naturalization statutes: Massachusetts, 1783-89;
Delaware, 1788; Maryland, 1779; New York, 1789; South Carolina, 1784;
Virginia, 1779-85. These Acts generally provided very easy methods
for the acquisition of citizenship--usually requiring only an oath of
allegiance, without any specific length of residence; though Virginia
required a formal declaration of intention to remain here, and South
Carolina insisted upon a previous residence of at least one year.

EFFORTS TOWARD UNIFORMITY

The obvious and constant embarrassment arising from different
requirements under diverse jurisdictions was recognized and discussed
before the making of the Federal Constitution. James Madison, for
example, in 1782, urged the necessity of a uniform practice. So
general was the recognition of this need that the Constitutional
Convention took it for granted, and almost without discussion adopted
the provision which still stands, and under which all subsequent
legislation has gained its authority:[44]

  Congress shall have power ... to establish an uniform rule of
  naturalization....

And almost immediately (1790), President Washington having urged it
in his message in January of that year, Congress enacted a general
Naturalization Act.[45]

The considerable debate in Congress concerning this measure not
only throws an interesting light upon the policies prevailing at
that time, but shows that while the new government realized the
importance of desirable immigration, there was full realization of
the difficulty of so adjusting the process of naturalization as to
facilitate this while at the same time protecting the essentials of
the American spirit and institutions from the insidious influences
feared from certain types of newcomers. The conflicting attitudes of
the highly liberal Quakers in Pennsylvania and the austere Puritans
of New England--visible in many ways in all the legislation of the
early years in the contrasting jurisdictions of the northern Atlantic
colonies, appears clearly in the debates, from which emerged the Act
of 1790, whose essentials were as follows:

  I. Naturalization to be conferred by any court of record.

  II. A requirement of two years’ residence in the United States, and
  one year within the State.

  III. Proof required of good moral character, and oath to support
  the Constitution of the United States.

This Act was repealed in 1795 by another[46] introducing the
declaration of intention to become a citizen, and extending the
period of required residence from two years to five. This Act has
been the basis of our naturalization system ever since. Its main
provisions were these:

  I. A preliminary declaration of intention to become a citizen of
  the United States, to be made at least three years [the present law
  specifies two years] before final application for citizenship.

  II. Naturalization jurisdiction was vested in any “supreme,
  superior, district or circuit court” of the states or of the
  territories northwest or south of the River Ohio, or a circuit or
  district court of the United States.

  III. Five years’ residence in the United States, and one year’s
  residence in the state in which the application was made.

  IV. An oath of allegiance.

Aliens then residing in the United States might be naturalized after
_two_ years’ residence.

This Act was fathered by James Madison, then a member of Congress.

President Jefferson, in his first message to Congress, advocated a
revision of the Naturalization Law, to the end that “the general
character and capabilities of a citizen be safely communicated to
everyone manifesting a bona fide purpose of embarking his life and
fortunes permanently with us.”

Accordingly the Jeffersonian Congress of 1802 repealed the Act of
1795, and enacted one[47] which remained substantially in force for
more than a century. Its provisions, in the main, were as follows:

  I. Naturalization jurisdiction was vested in the supreme, superior,
  district and circuit courts (a district court meaning any court
  of record having common-law jurisdiction) in the states and
  territorial districts and in the circuit and district courts of the
  United States.

  II. The Declaration of Intention was still required, with the three
  years’ interval before final application.

  III. Five years’ residence in the United States and one in the
  State was still required.

  IV. Oath of allegiance to the United States, with specific
  renunciation of former allegiance.

  V. Proof of good moral character and attachment to the principles
  of the United States.

Under this Act the children of persons duly naturalized were, if
resident in the United States, to be considered citizens, and those
born elsewhere were to enjoy the same status, provided that the
citizenship should not descend to children whose fathers never
resided in the United States.

An Act passed in 1804 slightly modified the regulation in favor
of aliens residing in the United States between 1798 and 1802, and
provided also that in case a “declarant” should die before his
naturalization had been consummated, his widow and minor children
should be deemed citizens upon taking the prescribed oath.[48]

During the second war with England, in 1813, an Act was passed
requiring the five years’ residence to be absolutely unbroken by any
absence whatever from the United States, and prescribing penalties
for forgery or sale of naturalization certificates.[49] Later in the
same year another law was passed to permit the naturalization of
alien enemies (then Englishmen) who had declared intention prior to
June 18, 1812.[50] Another important amendment was made in 1816.[51]

In 1824, following a period of agitation for earlier naturalization,
Congress passed an Act, the most important provision of which[52]
reduced from three to two years the minimum interval between the
declaration of intention and final naturalization. It is interesting
to note that this agitation for more liberal conditions came, as
might be expected, at the time of the initial influx of aliens to the
Eastern cities, and the beginnings of the political exploitation of
the “foreign vote.”

Further slight changes were made in 1828,[53] and after twenty
years more, in 1848, Congress abolished the restriction of 1813
which forbade any absence whatever from the country during the five
years’ period of “continuous residence.”[54] But during all of
the period between 1820 and the Civil War there was an increasing
“Native American” agitation for narrower, rather than more liberal,
restrictions, even to the point of abolishing naturalization
altogether. Innumerable bills were introduced reflecting this
agitation; but, owing both to the increasing importance of the
foreign-born element in politics, and to the underlying realization
that the nation must have a constant accretion of population, no such
legislation reached the statute books. The three minor amendments
enacted during and immediately after the Civil War were designed to
meet conditions arising out of the state of war.[55]

In 1876 the Act of 1802 was amended so that the declaration of
intention could be made, as it is now, before the clerk of any of
the courts having naturalization jurisdiction.[56] And in 1872 and
1894 provision was made for the easier naturalization of the United
States soldiers, sailors, marines, and merchant seamen, about whose
permanency of residence there was embarrassment.[57]

BARS UP AGAINST ALIEN ANARCHISTS

The assassination of President McKinley, in 1901, by a professed
anarchist brought to a head the feeling against foreign
ultra-radicals, and resulted in the enactment in 1903[58] of the
restriction against the admission to this country of persons
believing in the abolition of organized government or the removal
of public officers by violence. This test is widely applied now
by judges and by the Naturalization Service in the examination of
applicants for citizenship.

VARIOUS PRESIDENTS DISCUSSED NATURALIZATION

The importance of the subject of the absorption of foreign-born
persons into our life is reflected all through the records of the
government; allusions to it may be found in a large proportion of the
messages of the Presidents to Congress. John Adams found occasion to
express abhorrence of “intrigues of foreign agents to alienate the
affections of the Indians and to arouse them to acts of hostility.”

The liberal sentiments of Thomas Jefferson appeared in his early
recommendation of a revision of the law requiring fourteen years’
residence: “Shall we refuse the refuge extended to our fathers,”
said he, in substance, “to the unhappy fugitives from distress
arriving in this land? Shall oppressed humanity find no asylum on
this globe?” But at the same time he remarked that for admission to
certain offices of trust, a residence should be required sufficient
to develop character and an appreciation of the design of our
institutions.

James Madison’s interest in the subject was exhibited throughout his
administration, and especially in his activities on the floor of
Congress.

President Buchanan insisted upon the full status for naturalized
citizens.

  Our Government is bound [said he] to protect the rights of our
  naturalized citizens everywhere to the same extent as though they
  had drawn their first breath in this country. We can recognize no
  distinction between our native and naturalized citizens.

Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson touched upon the question of the
French and Russian claims upon immigrants who came here merely to
escape military service; Lincoln pointing out that there should be
a time limit beyond which the United States would not attempt to
protect persons who came here for that reason and then returned to
their native countries claiming to be American citizens; Johnson,
on the other hand, emphasizing the effect of naturalization in
absolving the individual from all former allegiance. President
Grant urged Congress to define the conditions of expatriation,
and to regulate by law the status of children of aliens becoming
naturalized, and that of American women marrying noncitizens. He also
drew attention to the growing evil of fraudulent naturalization,
and urged the establishment of a system of uniform certificates and
records.

President Arthur also called for a central bureau of registry, and
for a general revision of the naturalization law, pointing out that
much of it now had only historical interest, that the provisions
regarding children of naturalized parents were ambiguous, and that
the constitutional authority to establish “an uniform rule” called
for a clear definition of the status of “persons born within the
United States subject to a foreign power, and minor children of
fathers who have declared their intention but have failed to perfect
their naturalization.”

President Cleveland devoted a good deal of attention to the subject.
He, too, emphasized the need of centralized Federal control over the
records, and repeatedly called for a general revision of the law,
insisting that the “privilege and franchise of American citizenship”
should be granted with scrupulous care. He gave warning against “the
easy and unguarded manner in which certificates of naturalization can
now be obtained,” and the growth of a class of persons who availed
themselves of it for political purposes.

Benjamin Harrison emphasized the need of an investigation of the
moral character of the applicant for citizenship, to make more
certain the existence of a “good disposition toward our government”;
calling also for a more particular system of court hearings, with
proper opportunity for representatives of the government to appear.
He declared that “avowed enemies of social order” should be denied
not only citizenship, but even domicile here. He also adverted to the
evils of fraudulent naturalization.

DEFINITE REFORM AT LAST

It was the growing realization of this general condition, of the
notorious ease with which naturalization could be acquired; the
wholesale issue and sale of fraudulent certificates; the debauching
of elections through the manipulation of the “foreign vote,” and
the general cheapening of the franchise, that brought the subject
to a head. It was common knowledge that these frauds were prevalent
wherever there were large numbers of foreign-born people, and
that both of the great political parties vied with each other in
exhausting ingenuity to devise methods for the exploitation of the
alien population. Which party excelled in the business depended
almost entirely upon which was dominant in any particular community.
The situation was a scandal in any event, and the sober sentiment of
the nation realized increasingly that something must be done about it.

NATURALIZATION COMMISSION APPOINTED

It was not until the administration of President Roosevelt,
however, that definite steps were taken. During the years 1903-05
the Department of Justice became very active in unearthing and
prosecuting violations of the naturalization laws. Hundreds of
cases of fraudulent naturalization were discovered, and nearly
seven hundred convictions were obtained. A special examiner of the
Department of Justice, A. C. van Deusen, made an extensive report on
the subject in 1905.[59]

By Executive Order, March 1, 1905, President Roosevelt created
a special commission, consisting of Milton D. Purdy, Assistant
Attorney-General representing the Department of Justice, chairman;
Gaillard Hung, chief of the Bureau of Citizenship in the Department
of State, representing that department, and Richard K. Campbell,
attorney for the Immigration Bureau in the Department of Commerce
and Labor (now Commissioner of Naturalization in the Department of
Labor), “to investigate and report on the subject of naturalization
in the United States,” and to recommend changes in the naturalization
laws.[60] The commission’s report is invaluable in any study of the
subject of Naturalization Law and Procedure.

The average citizen scarcely realizes how completely the
Naturalization Law of 1906, which was the fruit of the labors of
this commission, has revolutionized the whole business. Whatever
may be the defects of the law, or of the practice which has grown
up under it, they are in the main due to “leaning over backward”
in the honest effort to clean and keep clean the flow of new blood
into our citizenship. Generally speaking, it is to be said that the
enforcement of this statute has abolished most of the evils of fraud
and exploitation which before that were a scandal and a menace in
American political life.

By this act the Naturalization Service was established and an
absolutely new era initiated. As Mr. Campbell, who forthwith
became chief of the Division of Naturalization in the Bureau of
Immigration,[61] said in his report for the fiscal year ending June
30, 1908, the process of becoming naturalized as an American citizen

  ... has acquired (even after so short an operation of the
  new system) a formality and dignity which is in some measure
  commensurate with the importance of the Act and the gravity of
  its consequences; it is no longer possible to “railroad” aliens
  in groups to the naturalization courts, in defiance of the law
  and in disregard of even an appearance of propriety; the courts
  which have jurisdiction are no longer such as are “devoted largely
  to the trifling and indecent affairs of the community,” and the
  conferring of citizenship is, in this respect, no longer “ranked
  with disturbing the peace or keeping an unlicensed dog,” as it was
  expressed by a judge of a court in describing the conditions under
  the old law.

And in his seventh report, for 1913-14, to the Secretary of Labor,
Mr. Campbell remarked that:

  To those who will take the trouble to compare the chaotic and
  disorderly conditions which characterized the procedure for
  more than a century of our national existence with the dignity,
  uniformity, and regularity of the present system, it must appear to
  be a matter of inexplicable carelessness that the reform should so
  long have been delayed.

In the same report, the Commissioner of Naturalization points to one
reform embodied at least potentially in the present system, which
alone would have justified it:

  There is, too, for the person naturalized, a security of title
  to his political or national status never before enjoyed by him.
  The title to citizenship is the recorded order of the court. The
  certificate is simply the conclusive evidence of such order. If
  there was no written record made, as was often the case, or if that
  record was destroyed, as happened not infrequently, the title to
  citizenship hung by the slender thread of a piece of paper carried
  by the owner and subject to all the risks attendant upon such
  possessions. If lost, to all practical intents his citizenship was
  also lost. Now the duplicate written record, one in the court and
  one in the Bureau [of Naturalization], is an ample defense against
  all such accidents.

It _would_ be, indeed; but what if in course of time these records in
the Bureau should have come into such condition, owing to inadequate
clerical force and increasing absorption of the Bureau in other
activities, that the record there could not be traced!

However, any criticism or consideration of the present system, to be
intelligent or fair, must take into account, first, the incredibly
chaotic conditions which formerly prevailed, and second, the fact
that never--not even now--has the naturalization system, as a problem
in public administration, received even superficial attention of the
public.

WHAT THE LAW REQUIRES

Before we proceed to consider the naturalization process as in action
it has affected annually upward of one hundred thousand human beings
seeking admission to citizenship in the United States, let us see the
principal provisions of the law with which they come into contact.
Section 4 of the Naturalization Law[62] provides that an alien may
be admitted to become a citizen of the United States in the following
manner “and not otherwise.”

  First. He shall declare on oath before the clerk of any court
  authorized by this Act to naturalize aliens, or his authorized
  deputy, in the district in which such alien resides, two years
  at least prior to his admission, and after he has reached the
  age of eighteen years, that it is his bona fide intention to
  become a citizen of the United States and to renounce forever
  all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate,
  state, or sovereignty, and particularly, by name, to the prince,
  potentate, state, or sovereignty of which the alien may be at the
  time a citizen or subject. And such declaration shall set forth the
  name, age, occupation, personal description, place of birth, last
  foreign residence and allegiance, the date of arrival, the name
  of the vessel, if any, in which he came to the United States, and
  the present place of residence in the United States of said alien:
  _Provided_, however, that no alien who, in conformity with the law
  in force at the date of his declaration, has declared his intention
  to become a citizen of the United States, shall be required to
  renew such declaration.

  Second. Not less than two years, nor more than seven years, after
  he has made such declaration of intention he shall make and file,
  in duplicate, a petition in writing, signed by the applicant in his
  own handwriting and duly verified, in which petition such applicant
  shall state his full name, his place of residence (by street and
  number, if possible), his occupation, and, if possible, the date
  and place of his birth; the place from which he emigrated, and the
  date and place of his arrival in the United States, and, if he
  entered through a port, the name of the vessel on which he arrived;
  the time when, and the place and name of the court where he
  declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States; if
  he is married he shall state the name of his wife and, if possible,
  the country of her nativity and her place of residence at the time
  of filing his petition; and if he has children, the name, date,
  and place of birth and place of residence of each child living at
  the time of the filing of his petition: _Provided_, That if he has
  filed his declaration before the passage of this Act he shall not
  be required to sign the petition in his own handwriting.

  The petition shall set forth that he is not a disbeliever in, or
  opposed to, organized government, or a member of or affiliated
  with any organization or body of persons teaching disbelief in,
  or opposed to, organized government; a polygamist or believer
  in the practice of polygamy; and that it is his intention to
  become a citizen of the United States and to renounce absolutely
  and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
  potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly by name to the
  prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of which he at the time
  of filing of his petition may be a citizen or subject; and that it
  is his intention to reside permanently within the United States;
  and whether or not he has been denied admission as a citizen of
  the United States, and, if denied, the ground or grounds of such
  denial, the court or courts in which such decision was rendered,
  and that the cause for such denial has since been cured or removed;
  and every fact material to his naturalization and required to be
  proved upon the final hearing of his application.

  The petition shall also be verified by the affidavits of at least
  two credible witnesses, who are citizens of the United States, and
  who shall state in their affidavits that they have personally known
  the applicant to be a resident of the United States for a period of
  at least five years continuously, and of the State, Territory, or
  the District of Columbia, in which the application is made, for a
  period of at least one year immediately preceding the date of the
  filing of his petition, and that they each have personal knowledge
  that the petitioner is a person of good moral character, and that
  he is in every way qualified, in their opinion, to be admitted as
  a citizen of the United States.

  At the time of filing his petition there shall be filed with the
  clerk of the court a certificate from the Department of Labor,
  if the petitioner arrives in the United States after the passage
  of this Act, stating the date, place, and manner of his arrival
  in the United States, and the declaration of intention of such
  petitioner, which certificate and declaration shall be attached to
  and be made a part of said petition.

  Third. He shall, before he is admitted to citizenship, declare
  on oath in open court that he will support the Constitution of
  the United States, and that he absolutely and entirely renounces
  and abjures all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
  potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly by name to
  the prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of which he was
  before a citizen or subject; that he will support and defend the
  Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies,
  foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the
  same.[63]

  Fourth. It shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court
  admitting any alien to citizenship that immediately preceding
  the date of his application he has resided continuously within
  the United States five years at least, and within the State or
  Territory where such court is at the time held one year at least,
  and that during that time he has behaved as a man of good moral
  character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the
  United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of
  the same. In addition to the oath of the applicant, the testimony
  of at least two witnesses, citizens of the United States, as to
  the facts of residence, moral character, and attachment to the
  principles of the Constitution shall be required, and the name,
  place of residence, and occupation of each witness shall be set
  forth in the record.

  Fifth. In case the alien applying to be admitted to citizenship
  has borne any hereditary title, or has been of any of the orders
  of nobility in the kingdom or state from which he came, he shall,
  in addition to the above requisite, make an express renunciation
  of his title or order of nobility in the court to which his
  application is made, and his renunciation shall be recorded in the
  court.

  Sixth. When any alien who has declared his intention to become a
  citizen of the United States dies before he is actually naturalized
  the widow and minor children of such alien may, by complying with
  the other provisions of this Act, be naturalized without making any
  declaration of intention.

Section 8 of the Naturalization Law gives still further requirements:

  That no alien shall hereafter be naturalized or admitted as a
  citizen of the United States who cannot speak the English language:
  _Provided_, That this requirement shall not apply to aliens who
  are physically unable to comply therewith, if they are otherwise
  qualified to become citizens of the United States: _And provided
  further_, That the requirements of this section shall not apply to
  any alien who has, prior to the passage of this Act, declared his
  intention to become a citizen of the United States in conformity
  with the law in force at the date of making such declaration:
  _Provided further_, That the requirements of section eight shall
  not apply to aliens who shall hereafter declare their intention
  to become citizens and who shall make homestead entries upon the
  public lands of the United States and comply in all respects with
  the laws providing for homestead entries on such lands.

The final hearing must be public, in open court, and the judge must
pass upon the petition personally:

  Section 9. That every final hearing upon such petition shall be had
  in open court before a judge or judges thereof, and every final
  order which may be made upon such petition shall be under the
  hand of the court and entered in full upon a record kept for that
  purpose, and upon such final hearing of such petition the applicant
  and witnesses shall be examined under oath before the court and in
  the presence of the court.

Attention needs to be drawn especially to the following section,
which, however innocuous in appearance, has given rise to a vast
deal of vexation and injustice, and has caused the exclusion from
citizenship of a large number of persons otherwise perfectly
qualified and desirable:

  Section 10. That in case the petitioner has not resided in the
  State, Territory, or the District of Columbia for a period of
  five years immediately preceding the filing of his petition he
  may establish by two witnesses, both in his petition and at the
  hearing, the time of his residence within the State, provided that
  it has been for more than one year, and the remaining portion of
  his five years’ residence within the United States required by law
  to be established may be proved by the depositions of two or more
  witnesses who are citizens of the United States, upon notice to the
  Bureau of Naturalization.

It will become evident as we proceed that the interpretation which
has been placed by the courts and the Naturalization Service upon
the distinction between the phrases, “two witnesses,” “at least two
witnesses,” and “two or more witnesses,” has in practice caused
a palpable absurdity from the point of view of common sense, and
inflicted crying hardships and wrongs from the point of view of bare
justice. Upon the humanity and good sense of the court, interacting
with the same on the part of the representatives of the government,
has depended to a very great degree the sensible interpretation of
these and other provisions of the law; but in general both are bound
by its letter, and in many instances they have been forced to reject
petitions which, on the sane merits of the case, should have been
accepted.

V

THE LAW IN OPERATION

Commissioner Campbell, in his annual report for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1914, described in some detail the operations of the
field service of his Bureau in the handling of the applicant for
citizenship:

  The headquarters of the various districts are located in the
  large cities, where the greatest number of aliens apply for
  naturalization, and in the public buildings or in close proximity
  to the courts.[64] In many of the cities where the examiners are
  in the same building with the court, it is the practice of the
  alien to appear with his witnesses first in the office of the chief
  examiner. Here an examination is made in advance of any work in the
  office of the clerk of court. The examiners, specially trained in
  the work, first ascertain whether the alien arrived in the United
  States prior to the passage of the Act of 1906. If he arrived
  prior to the passage of the Act, the examiner then ascertains,
  before assisting him in taking the second step in the process of
  naturalization, whether the alien has a declaration of intention
  that has matured.[65] If he has arrived subsequent to the passage
  of the Act, he ascertains whether the alien has been notified by
  the Bureau that the certificate of arrival required by law to
  be filed with the clerk of the court at the time of filing the
  petition for naturalization has been placed there by the Bureau.
  It may be stated here that when an alien applies for a certificate
  of arrival, the Bureau notifies him when it has been obtained and
  forwarded to the clerk of the court selected by the alien in which
  to file his petition for naturalization, and he is directed to
  proceed with the filing of his petition at the earliest practicable
  moment.

  Upon learning that the certificate of arrival has been obtained,
  the examiner interrogates the candidate to learn his qualifications
  for citizenship and records the results of his examination. He
  then examines the witnesses to be reasonably certain that they are
  American citizens, that they are credible and of good character,
  that they have personally known the applicant for the statutory
  period, and can intelligently testify both as to his residence
  and good behavior during the period required by the statute to be
  ascertained and shown to the satisfaction of the court.

  The examiner also sees that the blank form furnished by the
  Bureau for setting forth the statements required to be embodied
  in the petition for naturalization is correctly prepared. When
  the examiner finds affirmatively in all of these respects, he
  marks the filled-out blank with his initials and sends it with the
  petitioner and his witnesses to the office of the clerk of the
  court, where nothing further is to be done than the simple clerical
  work of filling in the petition, original and duplicate, from the
  blank, securing the signatures and affidavits of the petitioner
  and his witnesses, filing the triplicate copy of the declaration
  of intention and the certificate of arrival with the petition, and
  notifying them as nearly as may be of the date of the hearing.

  This method prevails in large cities where the examiners are
  located in the buildings with the courts. The advantage to the
  residents of these large cities, in the saving of time and money
  to the petitioners and their witnesses, is readily discerned when
  it is considered that probably fifty thousand applicants for
  citizenship annually might follow this course if the conditions
  in each large center admitted of its being done. The advantage
  to be derived from having the candidate and his witnesses appear
  before the naturalization examiner in advance of his appearance
  before the clerk of the court were early recognized by one of the
  United States district courts, where a large number of petitions
  for naturalization are filed annually, and an order of court was
  entered accordingly. In other courts, while the practice has not
  received this formal recognition, the consistency with which it
  is observed is none the less definite. This practice prevails in
  at least one city where the office of the chief examiner is not
  located in the building with the court.

Further emphasizing the advantages of this practice, the Commissioner
remarks that it enables the examiner to dispose of a large number
of cases, and tends to obviate denials on such grounds as “that
the petitioner is already a citizen”; “incompetent witnesses,”
“insufficient residence,” “no certificate of arrival,” “declaration
invalid,” “premature petition,” etc.--“unless, as is sometimes the
case, a petitioner is obstinate and insists on taking his chance
of admission by the court against the advice of the examiner.” The
Commissioner goes on to say:

  In some cities, by reason of the lack of proximity of the office of
  the examiner to that of the clerk of the court, the system does not
  prevail of having the candidate appear first before the examiner,
  ... but efforts have constantly been made to augment the prevalence
  of the practice, and since the great bulk of the naturalization
  work is in the large centers ... the plan described, with the
  restricted means provided therefor, admirably accomplishes the
  effective disposal of the mass of work arising under the operation
  of the law wherever it has been adopted.

Referring to the work in regions apart from the great cities, the
Commissioner said, in his report for 1912-13:

  In a few of the districts there are what may be called
  sub-stations, where an examiner is located by his chief to attend
  to work in the vicinity of such sub-station, ... to reduce the
  travel expense and to bring the service in actual personal contact
  with the public and the courts as intimately as possible.

For the rest, and the far-outlying, sparsely-settled regions, where
a person desiring citizenship must travel with his witnesses perhaps
even hundreds of miles not once, but twice in any event, and in some
cases several times, to and from the court having jurisdiction over
the territory in which he lives, the situation is not so simple.
To persons completing by the essential of American Citizenship
their title to a homestead on the public lands--necessarily and
characteristically in such sparsely settled regions--this item
of travel, expense in both money and time for three persons, to
say nothing of other hardships and exasperations involved in the
meticulous technicalities of the law and practice, not infrequently
is a raw tragedy. Neither provision by Congress nor administrative
arrangement or concession in enforcement by the Naturalization Bureau
or the courts has materially mitigated the hardships involved in such
cases.

RESTRICTIONS OF RACE

Not every alien, whatever his character or good disposition toward
the “good order and happiness” of the United States, or his
willingness to “support and defend the Constitution and bear true
faith and allegiance to the same,” can become a citizen of the United
States. He, or she, must be either white, or black--or, in the case
of the American Indian, red. And if black, he, or she, must be of
_African_ descent. A long series of decisions has been necessary to
define exactly what races are excluded; with the result that it is
now, for practical purposes, well established that naturalization
cannot, under existing laws, be granted to Chinese, Japanese,
Hawaiians, Burmese, or the black or brown natives of India.

It is not our province here to discuss the merits either of the
racial limitation or of the somewhat vague definition that has
been arrived at; it must suffice to outline the situation. The
Naturalization Law of 1870 limited naturalization to “aliens being
free white persons; and to aliens of African nativity and to
persons of African descent.” This was enacted in the tense days of
Reconstruction after the Civil War, and was a natural but wholly
unnecessary fling at the South. All American negroes are citizens
of the United States by virtue of their birth in this country,
and those who come here from Africa are likely to be incapable of
passing the naturalization tests. Congress never has enacted a
clear definition of the term, “white person,” and endless confusion
has existed. Hawaiians, Afghans, Chinese, Syrians, Turks, and Fiji
Islanders, all have been admitted by some courts and excluded by
others. The Commissioner of Naturalization at one time directed the
field force to oppose vigorously the admission of any Asiatic. A
non-Mongolian Turk, married to a white woman literally Caucasian,
would be surprised to have his son excluded as not a white person;
but such folk, and many others white by any common-sense definition,
were excluded, the courts usually accepting as the judgment of
experts the contention of the naturalization examiners; until finally
the ruling was rescinded, and the matter has since then been left
largely to the discretion of the courts, which have substantially
settled the question so far as it may be settled in absence of a
clear constitutional or legislative definition, such as exists
specifically in the Act of 1882 excluding the Chinese by name. As the
law and decisions stand now, the same definition which will admit
an African deckhand or cook excludes a Japanese prince or a Hindu
university graduate.[66]

As for the Filipinos, it was held, in 1915, by the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia, that a Filipino is neither an alien nor an
African, and that, therefore, he did not come within the provisions
of the law limiting naturalization to white aliens, or black ones of
African descent; that the Filipino then before the court could and
would be naturalized under the section providing:

  That all the applicable provisions of the naturalization laws of
  the United States shall apply to and be held to authorize the
  admission to citizenship of all persons not citizens who owe
  permanent allegiance to the United States, and who may become
  residents of any State or organized Territory of the United States.

In another case (not, however, involving clearly the question of
racial color) a native of the Philippine Islands, of full Spanish
paternity, but of half-breed blood on his mother’s side, was admitted
by the same court.[67]

There was a dubious situation regarding Porto Ricans; for it was
held at first that, when the United States acquired Porto Rico and
the Philippines by the Spanish War, these peoples came under the
“protection” of the United States, but did not thereby acquire status
as citizens. The Act of Congress, March 2, 1917, cleared up this
situation, however, declaring permanently resident Porto Ricans to be
citizens, unless they owed allegiance to a foreign country, or within
six months after the passage of the Act specifically refused American
citizenship. This Act created the judicial “district of Porto Rico,”
and definitely vested naturalization jurisdiction in the United
States District Court for that district, declaring residence in Porto
Rico to be tantamount, for naturalization purposes, to residence
anywhere else in the United States.

The Act of May 9, 1918, which swept into eligibility for immediate
citizenship upward of two hundred thousand aliens serving in the
army, navy, marine corps, and merchant marine, definitely extended
the privilege to several classes, including Filipinos and Porto
Ricans, regardless of every consideration other than military
service, and it has been interpreted in favor of even Chinese and
Japanese in those branches of the national war employ.[68]

LIMITATIONS REGARDING AGE

The present law says clearly that an alien may not make a declaration
of intention until he is eighteen years old. The old law contained
a provision to the effect that anyone who arrived in the United
States before the age of eighteen could, after he had been here the
required five years, become naturalized by virtue of one proceeding,
which was held to constitute both declaration and final petition.
Otherwise, nothing was said in the old law regarding the age required
for declaration; an alien must be twenty-one, however, in order to
be naturalized. There was a good deal of uncertainty and confusion
on this point, both the Naturalization Service and the courts
taking varying and inconsistent positions from time to time and in
various jurisdictions. This is of only academic interest now; but
the situation is still somewhat dubious, because an alien can file
his declaration at the age of eighteen, and in a strict construction
of the law he can file his petition two years later at the age of
twenty. Some courts have so construed it. It is generally customary,
however, for the courts to insist upon the age of twenty-one
before granting citizenship; although one should bear in mind that
citizenship does not necessarily involve the suffrage, and all states
of the United States require attainment of twenty-one years before
the citizen can vote.

THE DECLARATION OF INTENTION

So far as anything in the law goes to prevent, the immigrant can
make his way immediately from the vessel that brings him, after
the immigration authorities have admitted him to these shores, or
across the Canadian or the Mexican border, to the clerk’s office in
“any court having a clerk, a seal, and jurisdiction over actions at
law or equity, or law and equity, without limit as to amount,” and
within an hour of arrival file his declaration of intention to become
an American citizen. Of course, he doesn’t do that--unless in very
rare instances. The available statistics go to show that, in the
average case, he waits nearly seven (6.8) years.[69] But whenever he
files it, it will be good (unless some blunder of the clerk, or some
technical defect which the clerk overlooks, makes it invalid from the
outset) for seven years. It cannot be made the basis of a petition
for citizenship until two years after its date, and there must have
been, before or after its date, at least three years’ additional
residence in the United States to make up the required five years,
and the last year of the five must have been passed “continuously”
within the state or territory in which the final petition is filed.

Mr. Alien would better be very careful that his declaration is
properly made out, on the identical printed form furnished by the
Bureau of Naturalization; he must file it in the office of the
clerk, and not deliver it to him at his house or on the street
corner. He may not hear anything about this at the time; but seven
years afterward he may be brought up standing by the fact that
it is invalid because of just such a defect. In the case _in re_
Brefo (217 Fed., 131-134) it was held, in 1914, that a declaration
otherwise correct, but in typewriting, not on “the form furnished for
that purpose by the government,” was a “legal nullity.” Were such
an enormity permitted, the court said, there would be “an end to
uniformity”; government control and supervision could not exist! And
in the case _in re_ Langtry (31 Fed., 879), as long ago as 1887 the
court declared that the clerk had no authority to take acknowledgment
of declaration of intention at the home of an alien. Numerous other
cases in Pennsylvania, Illinois, Kentucky, North Carolina, Florida,
have settled the fact that the clerk’s office, or open court, is the
only place where a valid declaration can be filed.

If the clerk is without the proper blank forms, because he neglects
to keep himself supplied, or because the Naturalization Bureau at
Washington fails to heed his request for them, there is nothing for
the would-be declarant to do but go home--perhaps many, or in some
cases as much as two hundred and fifty miles--and subsequently try
again.

As has been said, he must be very particular about the words that
he or anyone else writes on the blank when he does get it. If he
files his declaration in a court which has much naturalization
business, it is likely that the clerk or his deputy will see that it
is letter-perfect; but if it is his fortune to reside in a district
where naturalizations are few, or where the clerk regards the whole
transaction as a nuisance, he may be permitted to make a fatal
mistake or omission and remain in blissful ignorance of that fact for
anywhere from two to seven years--until he goes before the court with
his final petition and finds that because his declaration was from
the beginning technically defective he must file a new one and wait
at least two years more.

“DECLARATION INVALID”

This, in fact, has been a very common occurrence. During the period
1908-18, 8.5 per cent of all denials of naturalization petitions in
the United States were on the ground of “declaration invalid”; that
this percentage is made up of figures[70] tragically high in some
districts may be recognized in the fact that in Nebraska it was 23.8,
in Indiana 21.3, in Oregon 18.7, in Kansas 18.6, in Massachusetts
14.4, in Montana 13.2, in Iowa 12.5, in Arkansas and Idaho 11.3, in
Washington 10.9, in Oklahoma 10.4. The petition of an Englishman
applying for citizenship in Colorado was denied upon motion of the
government’s representative, because in his declaration seven years
before he had renounced “King Albert,” when, in fact, the name of the
then potentate of Great Britain was “Albert Edward”![71] As the court
in that case truly said:

  The act of renouncing the allegiance which one owes to a government
  or sovereign, and taking upon himself a new allegiance, is too
  solemn and important an act to be loosely performed, or to be
  surrounded by any uncertainty or doubt. No presumptions are
  indulged with respect to it.... The declaration of intention must
  in all material matters comply with the strict letter of the Act.

The court may not rectify _nunc pro tunc_, as in most other kinds of
litigation, technical blunders made in good faith or inadvertently
by the declarant, or even by the clerk of the court in which the
declaration was filed. All the responsibility lies upon the alien.

In the unreported case of John Pollock, in the Philadelphia Court
of Quarter Sessions, in 1915, the petitioner had honestly believed
himself to have acquired German nationality from the flag of the
German ship on which he was born, en route to the United States, of
Russian parents coming here with intent to abandon their Russian
nationality, and in his declaration had forsworn the German
sovereignty; but the court held that the honesty of his mistake
could not avail him--“Unfortunately it is impossible to amend
his declaration; ... the application must be denied.” Through a
misunderstanding of the intricacies of political geography in the
then Austria-Hungary, a petitioner who actually was born under that
sovereignty erroneously renounced the German Emperor. In that case,
when, three years later, upon his final petition for naturalization,
the court undertook to amend the declaration, its power to do this
was denied upon the government’s appeal.[72]

Five Austrians went in a body to the office of the clerk of the Court
of Common Pleas in Hudson County, New Jersey, to file declarations of
intention. Doubtless they were very glad, and very grateful, to have
the clerk on duty fill out the required blanks for them! Two years
or more later, when they marched proudly and anxiously into court to
complete their citizenship, their petitions were denied--“declaration
invalid,” because, forsooth, as the court in its decision explained:

  ... The clerk who filled out their papers _assumed them all to
  be German_, and noted this in the declaration accordingly. The
  applicants contend that the error was a clerical error on the part
  of the clerk, and that their renunciation also included other
  sovereigns, rulers, or potentates. This, however, is not sufficient
  under the statute.

There are many other cases, in widely separated jurisdictions, to
similar effect, showing, in general, that the courts sustain the
contention of the Naturalization Service that the law does not permit
the rectification of even innocent blunders in the declaration, no
matter by whom or in what circumstances they are made.

Who, then, is to see that the technicalities thus insisted upon in
the enforcement of the law as it reads are duly and truly observed?
Surely not the alien! His care of his own interests is, in the
nature of the case, ill-informed, and under the existing conditions,
improved as they are in comparison with those prevailing in former
times, he is at the mercy not only of the sometimes careless,
begrudging, or perhaps well-intending, but better-informed clerk of
the court, but of many kinds of extra-legal assistants who, whether
with good or with sordid motives, undertake to give, or maybe to
sell, advice or instruction--to say nothing of pretended “influence”
which, anywhere up to seven years later, when the mischief cannot be
remedied, may turn out to have been worse than worthless.

Of vital importance and significance, far beyond what would be
gleaned from a superficial reading of the words, becomes in this
connection what the Commissioner of Naturalization said in his annual
report of July 1, 1912:

  The great bulk of the work of the Division [now the Bureau of
  Naturalization] consists of the examination of the naturalization
  papers filed in or issued out of the courts. It has never been
  possible, with the clerical aid supplied, to keep abreast of this
  work. Concluding the first year with a large number of papers not
  examined, that condition has grown more and more serious.... At the
  present time it must be stated that no examination of declarations
  of intention has been made since October, 1910, and not more than
  30,000 certificates have even been examined. Correction of errors
  in the latter papers, [final] certificates of naturalization, are
  perhaps less necessary, but the declarations are used as the basis
  of petitions for naturalization, and defects in them may result
  in the denial of such petitions and a further delay of two years
  to the applicants for citizenship. Beginning with October, 1912,
  declarations which have not been examined will mature, and these
  aggregate 298,000 in number.[73]

That the Bureau of Naturalization is aware of the desperate
importance of this matter to the aliens appears not only in so many
words in the Commissioner’s own utterances, but in legislation
proposed by the Bureau which would tend to remedy it. In the same
report (1912), after describing the strenuous efforts of the clerical
force to catch up in particular cases with the dates of final
hearings, Commissioner Campbell said:

  To any easy assumption that errors in a declaration may be
  corrected at the hearing of the petition, the answer is
  plain--that no change can be made if the declaration was filed, as
  it frequently is, in a court other than that in which such hearing
  is held. It has also been decided judicially that a declaration,
  complete in every respect, cannot be changed because of even
  conceded error in its averments. It is therefore important that the
  discovery by prompt administrative examination, of a defect, either
  in the way of omission or error, be brought to the attention of a
  declarant and the clerk of the court in which his declaration is
  filed, so that either the paper may be corrected or the declarant
  may file a new declaration, and thus save time, expense, and
  ultimate disappointment.

All of which has the color of mockery in the light of the fact that
at the date of that report there lay in the files of the Bureau
nearly three hundred thousand unexamined declarations, all of which
would mature within the ensuing three months!

The legislative proposals to remedy conditions so far as inadvertent
errors in the declaration are concerned, include, for instance,
a proposed amendment[74] to Section 4 of the Naturalization Law,
providing that

  ... any averment required to be made in the declaration of
  intention that may be shown to have been made erroneously, but
  with no intention to violate or evade the requirements of the
  naturalization law, may be corrected by order of the court in which
  the declaration was filed, or by the court in which it is presented
  as a basis for a petition for naturalization.

SHOULD DECLARATION BE ABOLISHED?

Some belated survival of Commissioner Campbell’s earlier belief, as a
member of the Naturalization Commission of 1905, that the declaration
of intention should be abolished as superfluous and as a prolific
source of errors, appears in his concluding paragraph under this
head, wherein, after alluding to the increasingly urgent appeals for
more clerical assistance, which had characterized virtually every one
of his reports since the establishment of the Naturalization Service,
he adds:

  If the object to be obtained does not justify the additional
  expenditure that it involves, then the declaration, as a matter
  of common justice to applicants for citizenship, if not for the
  practical reasons stated ... in the Report of the Commission of
  Naturalization to the President, dated November 8, 1905, should
  be stricken from the law. It may be suggested that the effect of
  such action upon the exercise by alien declarants of the elective
  franchise in certain states would be merely to cut off future
  supplies of such voters.

It is indeed true that many careful, experienced, and judicious
students of the naturalization problem have on many grounds favored
the abandonment of the declaration of intention. The arguments in
this behalf are plausible while there are states in which aliens
holding “first papers” (declarations of intention) are entitled to
vote. As for the others, the reasons to the contrary seem to the
present writer to outweigh them. Regardless of the suffrage, in
many states the declaration entitles the holder to certain property
rights; many employers, and even municipalities, require at least the
declaration before they will permit employment. The best reason of
all, regarded by a majority of the naturalizing judges as of vital
importance, is that the declaration, and the interval of at least
two years which must elapse before the declarant can file his final
appeal for admission to citizenship, afford a period of probation,
not only of substantial psychological value as affecting the alien
himself, but giving the government opportunity to observe the conduct
of the individual and to investigate his antecedents, and the
person’s neighbors and the public generally due notice that he is an
aspirant for active membership in the community.

On more than one occasion Mr. Campbell, who more than perhaps anyone
else might be regarded as an expert on the subject of naturalization,
favored the abolition of the declaration of intention. As late
as 1910, testifying before the Committee on Immigration and
Naturalization of the House of Representatives, he said:

  I think I am on record as advocating the abolition of the
  declaration of intention, anyhow.

That this is no longer his view, or that of the Bureau, appears
somewhat emphatically in the following excerpt of the annual report
bearing his signature, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1917:[75]

  Many theorists in the United States, when there was no Federal
  supervision of the naturalization law, conceived the idea that
  the declaration of intention was a purely superfluous act; that
  the certificate of the declaration of intention was a superfluous
  document. Many of them still retain that idea, having made no
  advance in their studies, or being unacquainted with the experience
  of the Federal administrative force. There is nothing that has
  arisen in the experience of the Bureau of Naturalization, in the
  ten years of Federal supervision, that justifies this idea that the
  declaration of intention should be abolished.

  The Americanization work of the Bureau, based as it is upon the
  declaration of intention, is the only point of contact the Federal
  Government has with the individual alien from the time he lands
  upon our soil. The use of the declaration of intention by the
  Bureau in sending the names to the public schools and bringing the
  aliens of every community into close relationship with them has
  forever settled the question of the value of the declaration of
  intention.

  This is only a new use to which this “first paper” (an instrument
  which is peculiarly an American institution)[76] has been put.
  If this were the only use to be made of it, it would justify its
  continued existence. As it is, it is used and interwoven into the
  administrative fabric of the Government in its contact with aliens
  throughout the United States. It is a means of identification by
  which the alien makes known his right to take up Government land;
  by which he may secure employment in municipalities and in State
  improvement work; by which membership in many organizations may
  alone be secured. It is the indication of the announced purpose of
  the alien to forswear his allegiance to his sovereign and to choose
  the Constitution of the United States as his new allegiance. It is
  woven throughout the warp and woof of our national laws and our
  social and economic organizations.

NATURALIZATION JUDGES FAVOR ITS RETENTION

Of 323 judges of naturalizing courts all over the United States
who answered definitely on this point the questionnaire of the
Americanization Study, 241 opposed, more or less emphatically, the
abolition of the declaration of intention, only 82 favoring its
abolition on one ground or another, but principally because they were
aware of no good purpose served by it.

One United States district judge rather picturesquely described its
function:

  This country cannot afford to have it said that we are urging
  citizens of other countries to renounce their allegiance and take
  up citizenship with us. That would be wrong from every standpoint.
  On the other hand, if they do want to become American citizens,
  it is our duty ... to help them fit themselves. If you take away
  the declaration of intention you will destroy our opportunity in
  that regard. The young lady who meets a young man and likes him,
  would be very much out of place if, without any other tie between
  them, she began to tell him what she wanted him to do, what she
  wanted him to study, and how she wanted him to study, what she
  wanted him to drink, and how she wanted him to dress. It would
  be very immodest and impolite, to say the least. If that young
  man had made her a proposal of marriage, and she were considering
  it, these suggestions from her would be entirely proper, and she
  would be performing her duty to the young man and to herself. This
  illustrates, I believe, the proper limits within which our country
  can guide, advise, and direct aliens who through the declaration
  of intention have made, as it were, a proposal of marriage, with
  reference to preparation for citizenship.

Sound objections to abolition of the declaration appear also in
connection with the property rights as regards homestead entry and
other matters under both Federal and state laws--a complicated
matter in addition to the great confusion existing by reason of the
laws of those states which conferred the right to vote upon holders
of so-called “first papers.” With the removal of this right, much
of the objection to the declaration of intention disappears. As it
was, under such laws, an alien might file a declaration of intention
every seven years as they expired _seriatim_, and, without any proper
inquiry, judicial approval, or supervision whatever, retain his right
to vote--citizenship for all practical purposes.

Many of the judges would permit no renewal of a declaration after
the expiration of the first; some would substitute registration upon
entry, annual, or even more frequent reports by the alien regarding
his whereabouts and behavior, and constant governmental _espionage_.

The declaration of intention, particularly if it be properly guarded
and solemnized, puts everybody, at least constructively, upon notice
that a new member is applying, and requires the declarant himself
to keep that application in mind for two years. He cannot suddenly
decide, by reason of some special condition or inconvenience, to
apply for citizenship and consummate the process in three months,
as he could do if the declaration were abolished without extending
the interval between petition and certificate. The defects in the
present system are found in the fact that he can file his declaration
anywhere at will, in a form so defective that two years or more
later it nullifies his petition; he can be grafted upon and bled
_ad libitum_ by all manner of exploiters claiming to be able to
assist him. However valuable in theory, in practice it is far too
hit-or-miss.

The declaration should be surrounded by a very much greater degree
of care and solemnity than at present. Not only should it be made
under oath and on properly guarded printed forms; when it is filed it
should be scrutinized and accepted as to substance, and by no means
be subject long afterward to rejection because of clerical or other
technical errors which ought to have been detected at the outset.

The St. Louis office of the Naturalization Service has taken a long
step in this direction, by securing the co-operation of many of the
courts in that district in the establishment of a custom by which
the declaration is accepted for filing only after it has been viséd
by the naturalization officers. This has no authority in law, but it
nevertheless is a wholesome practice, chiefly in the interest of the
alien declarant; incidentally it goes far to put out of business the
various kinds of parasites who exploit the ignorance and helplessness
of the aspirant for citizenship.

THE SEVEN-YEAR LIMITATION

The law of 1906 limited the life of a declaration of intention to
seven years. Prior to that there was no limit, and even after the
passage of that Act it was held in practice that it did not apply to
declarations made previously. But in 1913 the question was raised,
in the United States Court in New York City, whether it was not
the intent of Congress to apply the seven-year limitation to _all_
declarations. In 1914 the court ruled that it was. The effect of that
decision was to invalidate all declarations made prior to September
27, 1906, notwithstanding the express provision in the law that “no
alien who, in conformity with the law in force at the date of his
declaration, has declared his intention to become a citizen of the
United States, shall be required to renew such declaration.”

This decision was soon affirmed by the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals; but even then it was not uniformly observed, until January,
1919, when the United States Supreme Court put an abrupt stop to
the practice of accepting “old-law declarations” by affirming the
decision of the District Court at New York.

The effect of this final ruling by the highest court in the land was
tragic. Hundreds, if not thousands, of pending petitions, of aliens
altogether fit from every other point of view, forthwith became
invalid simply because based upon “old-law declarations” blighted
by the newly applied seven-year restriction. In one session of the
State Supreme Court in New York County a batch of more than seventy
otherwise acceptable petitions was denied for this reason alone.
The question of the effect of the decision upon certificates of
naturalization granted theretofore between its date and September 27,
1913, was met by Congress in the Act of May 9, 1918, by the following
provision:

  Section 3. That all certificates of naturalization granted by
  courts of competent jurisdiction prior to December 31, 1918, upon
  petitions for naturalization filed prior to January 31, 1918,
  upon declaration of intention filed prior to September, 27, 1906,
  are hereby declared to be valid in so far as the declaration of
  intention is concerned, but shall not be by this Act further
  validated or legalized.

THE CERTIFICATE OF LAWFUL ENTRY

Assuming, now, that our alien is of the proper racial descent, the
accepted age, and that his declaration of intention will pass muster;
that he has lived in the United States for at least two years since
the declaration was filed, and at least three years besides that--a
total of not less than five years in all, including the final fifth
year in the state--what must he do, and what may be done to him,
when he comes up at last with his request for admission to Active
Membership?

If he arrived in this country since June 29, 1906, he must produce a
Certificate of Arrival. In theory, at least, all arriving aliens are
registered at the port of entry by the Immigration Service of the
Department of Labor. Under existing law they cannot get in at all if
they are of certain excluded races and classes; if they are under
contract to get a particular job; if they are insane or afflicted
with certain diseases; if they are recognizable as anarchists,
polygamists (or believers in either anarchy or polygamy), criminals,
or, in the opinion of the immigration authorities, likely to become a
public charge--a burden upon the community. They must, with certain
exceptions for age and family relationship, be able to read and write
in some language.

Aliens may properly enter the United States only through some
officially designated port of entry, designated by the Commissioner
of Immigration, if an alien enters elsewhere along our enormous
border line he is deemed to be “unlawfully present,” is subject to
deportation, and when he tries to become a citizen he must give a
very good excuse for having “climbed up some other way.” A good many
Canadians and Mexicans have found very embarrassing, eventually, the
fact of their ignorance or evasion of this requirement.

The Act of Congress, approved June 29, 1906, went into effect in most
respects on the 27th of September following, but this provision was
to take effect immediately:

  That it shall be the duty of the Bureau of Immigration to provide,
  for use at the various immigration stations throughout the United
  States, books of record, wherein the Commissioner of Immigration
  shall cause an entry to be made in the case of each alien arriving
  in the United States from and after the passage of this Act of the
  name, age, occupation, ... and the date of arrival of said alien,
  etc.

Unfortunately for the aliens subsequently embarrassed by the fact,
the books for record of entries were not promptly installed, and in
some instances since they were installed the immigration officials at
the ports of entry have not always been scrupulous in the making of
the required entries.

No certificate is given to the alien at the time of his arrival, even
if he is properly registered; nothing of the sort is required of him
anywhere; he does not have to show it when he makes his declaration
of intention to become a citizen, nor at any other time or for any
other purpose--until after he has been here at least five years and
comes to the point of filing his petition for final naturalization.
Then he must have it--unless he arrived before June 29th, 1906; in
that event it is not required of him.

He is not to go for it to the Immigration Service. He must get it in
the most roundabout fashion. He must address a written application,
through the clerk of the court in which his petition for
naturalization is to be filed, to the Commissioner of Naturalization,
who in turn requests it of the Immigration Service. The Immigration
Service, if it can find the original entry (and sometimes--quite
frequently in fact--it cannot), sends the certificate to the
Commissioner of Naturalization, who sends it to the clerk of the
court, at the same time notifying the alien that now he may proceed
to file his petition.

But what if the arrival entry cannot be found? What if the alien
cannot remember the name of the vessel, or other important facts
relating to his entry, and thus give the necessary clews for the
search? What if it was his misfortune to arrive at a port after the
law took effect and before the registry system was in operation? Both
the Immigration and the Naturalization Service take a good deal of
pains to care for such situations; but frequently without success.
All this involves delay, not only vexatious and discouraging, but
likely to prove fatal in the case of an alien whose declaration
is at the edge of expiration. Not infrequently an application for
certificate of arrival is bandied back and forth between the two
Bureaus for months.

There was a case in 1919 in which the alien described himself
as having arrived on a certain date and vessel at New York; the
immigration records showed no such arrival, and, what was worse,
no such vessel entering New York at that time. After long delay it
turned out that the alien did arrive on that date and vessel, but at
_Boston_, whence, upon admission, he came by a domestic coastwise
vessel from Boston to New York. Many other cases are by no means so
simple.

A petition accepted for filing without the requisite certificate
of arrival is regarded as incomplete, and may not be completed
subsequently by attachment of the certificate, but must be marked
“spoiled”; the four dollars paid as fee may be returned to the
petitioner by the clerk, or can be applied to the filing of a new
and sufficient petition. It has been the practice of the Bureau
of Naturalization, after it appears impossible to find record of
the applicant’s admission to the country, to refer him to the
nearest immigration inspector for what is known as a _nunc pro
tunc_ inspection, for the purpose of satisfying the inspector that
the alien should not be deported as “unlawfully present.” If the
inspector is satisfied, he issues what is known as a “provisional
certificate of arrival,” whose acceptance as sufficient for purposes
of naturalization is subject to the discretion of the court. This
would appear a reasonable way out; but in the case of petitioners
living a very long distance from the office of an immigration
inspector, it involves an extra, and perhaps prohibitively expensive,
journey to the distant city for that purpose alone, and this
difficulty has in fact been to some extent relieved by permission to
handle such cases by correspondence and affidavits.

THE VEXATIOUS QUESTION OF NAMES

Another obstruction goes to the question of our treatment of the
foreign-born laborer in industry--especially if he bear what we
choose to regard as a “queer” name, difficult for us to spell or
pronounce. The courts have, properly, no doubt, no patience with
assumed names--particularly in a case where the alien cannot remember
the name under which he entered the country. But it is a very common
practice, in concerns employing a large number of immigrants, for
the minor officials of the company, superintendents and foremen, to
attach a name to a job, and insist upon calling the man who occupies
it, “Mike Murphy,” or what not else, because that was the name of
the first incumbent, and it is easier to pronounce than “Bahaoud,”
“Behrensmayer,” or “Przybylski.” This, and the even more common
practice of calling a man by a number, rather than a name, results
in a vast deal of confusion, in a substantial discouragement of
self-respect, and in the ultimate establishment of the neighborhood
identity of a polysyllabic Greek or Armenian, perhaps, with a fine
old Irish name. This will not do in the naturalization court. The
petitioner must come in under at least the same name that he bore
when he entered the country, and there must be no suspicion as to its
not being his own.

But he does not have to keep that name. It is prescribed as lawful
for the court in its discretion, “at the time and as a part of the
naturalization of any aliens, ... upon the petition of such alien,
to make a decree changing the name of said alien.” The fact of which
the court must be convinced is that the petitioner is not attempting
to conceal his real identity for the purpose of escaping payment
of just debts or punishment for crime. Many aliens do thus change
their names, and there have been cases in which the judge virtually
compelled them to do so.

A naturalization judge said to the writer:

  I have heard of a high-handed old judge, somewhere in the
  Northwest, who was in the habit of “suggesting” to every alien who
  came before him with a complicated mouthful of name that he change
  it to “Abraham Lincoln,” “Benjamin Franklin,” “George Washington,”
  or “Grover Cleveland.” No doubt you could find many a Pole or Swede
  naturalized as “Thomas Jefferson” or “Alexander Hamilton,” whose
  father, living in the same town, was known as “Konrad Kowalewski,”
  or “Ole Johanssen.”

Each nationality has in this country name-complications of this
character peculiarly its own. The Swedes, for an example, have
a habit of taking for their own surname the Christian name of a
favorite aunt, uncle, or other relative, upon reaching the age
of twenty-one years. Sven Svensen--which means “Sven, the son of
Sven”--may undertake to compliment his uncle Olaf by calling himself
Sven Olafsen. Suppose he came to this country under the name of
Sven Svensen, before he was eighteen; but for several years before
filing his declaration came to be known to everybody--including
himself--as Sven Olafsen, and regarded his old name as a “childish
thing” of no consequence to anybody. He applies as Sven Olafsen
for his certificate of arrival, the immigration and naturalization
bureaus have great difficulty in finding it, and when it does come
along it is in the name of Sven Svensen. Often names are adopted
in affectionate memory of the town from which the alien comes.
Many Italians, for convenience, drop off a couple of syllables of
awkwardly long names. Among the Greeks a typical case would be that
of one, “Harris,” whose old-country name was Harralabopoulos.

Another kind of complication appears in the case of an alien whose
true name was Isaac Brody; but he came on a steamship ticket issued
to, and in the name of, his uncle, Isaac Boovris, and was recorded
under that name by the immigration authorities. When he filed his
declaration of intention he was advised to file under the name
Boovris, to facilitate his certificate of arrival when that should
be required. When he filed his final petition, after living and
doing business for several years in this country under his true name
of Brody, he asked to be naturalized under that name. The court
refused, requiring him to file a new declaration as Isaac Brody and
wait two years longer, calling attention to the penal statute which
makes it an offense to apply for naturalization under an assumed
or fictitious name; remarking that the court might have changed
the name or amended the petition “if the error in the original
declaration had been clerical, or had been innocent.”[77]

A Pennsylvania court said in the case of one Wicenty Pilipos, who
after arrival informally changed his name to William Phillips:

  We may concede that any person may change his name, and be
  naturalized under his new name; yet, if he does so, he must
  petition the court for that purpose, so that the record will show
  the whole transaction, and identify him as the person who has
  discarded his original name, under which he landed in this country.
  This is especially necessary to prevent any other person from
  perpetrating a fraud, by being naturalized under the discarded
  name.[78]

THE PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION

There are other technicalities with which the alien occasionally
collides--such, for example, as the question of jurisdiction where
there is a difference of definition in the term “judicial district,”
or where boundaries may conflict between states, counties, or
other distinct municipalities, with reference to the alien’s place
of residence; or where the court to which he could naturally and
conveniently repair by the shortest line of travel is in another
jurisdiction, and he and his witnesses must journey perhaps even
hundreds of miles to the court to which the letter of the law compels
him to go. Such cases are numerous, but comparatively uncommon. Let
us assume that he has reached the right court, has successfully
unearthed, through the clerk, the Naturalization Bureau and the
Immigration Service, his proper certificate of arrival, and has a
valid declaration of intention. What next?

In large cities or other places reasonably convenient in respect of
distance, the clerk is likely, as the Commissioner of Naturalization
says in his report already quoted, to send the alien to the office
of the Naturalization Service; there is filled out the “Facts Form,”
as it is called, on which the final petition for naturalization
is to be based. The petitioner is closely interrogated as to his
general eligibility, and the principal business is under way. If the
naturalization office is far distant, the petition is filled out by
or in the presence of the clerk.

As required by the law quoted at the beginning of this chapter,
the petition must set forth the full name, residence, occupation;
date and place of birth; port of emigration; name of vessel, if
any; port of arrival; date and court of declaration of intention;
whether married, single, or widowed; wife’s name, nativity, and
present residence; number, names, birthplaces, and residences of
minor children; assurances that the applicant is not a practicing
or believing anarchist or polygamist; intention to renounce former
national allegiance and make permanent residence in the United
States; attachment to the principles of the Constitution; ability to
speak the English language; dates upon which began residence in the
United States and in this state or territory; assertion that this
is his first petition for citizenship, or, if a former petition was
denied, the reasons for denial and the fact that these reasons have
since been cured or removed.

In addition there must be the affidavit of two witnesses (each of
whom must swear that he is himself a citizen of the United States),
who must declare on his oath that he knows the petitioner to have
been a resident of the United States at least since a certain
specified date five years ago, and of the particular state at
least since a certain specified date not less than a year ago; and
that he personally knows the petitioner to be a person of good
moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution,
well disposed toward the good order and happiness of the same, and
generally qualified in every way to be admitted as a citizen of the
United States.

To the petition _at the time of filing_ (that is rigidly required by
the law and the decisions of many courts) must be physically attached
the declaration of intention made at least two years before, and the
certificate of arrival.

For filing the declaration of intention the alien will have paid to
the clerk a fee of one dollar; upon filing his final petition he has
to pay another fee of four dollars. There are strict penal provisions
in the law for the punishment of clerks who charge or collect any
more. Under the law, one-half of each fee is retained by the clerk,
ostensibly for the purpose of reimbursing him for such additional
clerical assistance as the naturalization business may necessitate,
but not always used for that purpose. This subject is discussed
elsewhere.

The petitioner, with certain exceptions noted below, must sign his
petition in his own handwriting. It is, however, usually permitted
him to sign it by “his mark,” properly witnessed, and even this was
not required of those who filed their declarations of intention
before the passage of the Act; but lapse of time has made that
no longer a practical exception. It has usually been held that a
signature, even in another language, such as Arabic, is sufficient.
There has often been controversy as to whether the extraordinary
arrangement of marks constructed by the petitioner is in fact a
signature, the author insisting that he has achieved one when it is
utterly illegible to both judge and naturalization examiner. In
this, as in a host of other details, the fate of the petitioner hangs
upon the intelligence and humanity of the judge, who has to choose
between a strict insistence upon the technicality and a more generous
adjudication--in a case, for example, in which a poor old deaf woman
homesteader might lose all she has in the world, simply because he
cannot see an intelligible “signature” in the conglomeration of
hieroglyphics which she intends to represent her name.

The law requires the petitioner to state the name, nativity, and
residence of his wife, if any, and each of his minor children. The
wife, if she herself can lawfully be naturalized, becomes _ipso
facto_ a citizen of this country by virtue of the naturalization
of her husband. It is the practice of many naturalizing courts to
decline to admit to citizenship men whose wives are still in the old
country, seeing danger in conferring the status upon women who may
never come to the United States, or who, coming, may turn out to be
undesirable.

The petition must disavow belief in the so-called principles of
anarchism; under the law no one can be naturalized who himself
believes in or teaches or belongs to any organization or groups
believing in or teaching “the duty, necessity, or propriety” of
abolishing organized government, or “the lawful assaulting or killing
of any officers, either of individuals or officers generally, of
the government of the United States, or of any other organized
government, because of his or their official character.” Some judges
of naturalizing courts recognize little distinction between “anarchy”
and “Socialism.” The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
was more discriminating, reversing the naturalizing court in the
somewhat famous case of Leonard Olsen at Seattle, who was rejected,
ostensibly, on the ground that he was not “attached to the principles
of the Constitution,” but really because he avowed himself a
Socialist. There had been a somewhat similar case in Texas, in 1891,
but the Olsen decision settled the question of the lawfulness of
Socialist views as affecting naturalization.[79]

Both the declaration of intention and the petition for naturalization
are made out in duplicate; the original becomes a part of the record
of the court in the clerk’s office; the duplicate is sent to the
Naturalization Bureau at Washington.

NINETY DAYS’ INTERVAL BEFORE HEARING

Notice of each petition must be posted in a public and conspicuous
place in the office of the clerk for at least ninety days before
the hearing is had in open court. The Naturalization Bureau will
have been informed directly by the clerk; the purpose of the posting
is, of course, to give the public notice, so that anyone who
desires to do so may appear with objections. In actual effect, the
posting is without much value, because the public does not visit
the clerk’s office except upon business of its own, and there is no
other publication of the petition, save in such rare cases as local
newspapers make it a matter of news. It may be injurious to the
petitioner, because a good many hearings have been postponed simply
because the clerk forgot to post the notice at all!

THE FINAL HEARING IN COURT

Petitions may be heard only upon stated days, fixed by rule of the
court, so that the government and the public may attend the open
hearings which are required by the law. This works smoothly and well
enough in the great cities, where most naturalizations take place;
but there are districts, in sparsely settled regions, where there is
but one term of the court in a year; which, in practice, means that
the judge cannot be sure of being at any given point on any days
determinable in advance, except the opening day. In such cases a
great many courts will have but one hearing period in a year--usually
on the first, and perhaps the second, day of the term. Two hardships
may arise from such a situation; the alien and his witnesses may
be uncertain as to the length of time they must wait after a long
journey to the county seat, and if the clerk is careless and fails
to notify the petitioners that their cases are to be heard (a thing
which happens all too often) the judge and examiner are on hand, but
no one appears to be naturalized, and another year is lost before the
cases can be disposed of. That this can be a matter of very serious
import to the alien may be illustrated by the fact that a group of
Poles were classed as “nonresident aliens,” and subjected to the very
heavy income tax collected of such, simply because the clerk of the
court in which their petitions for naturalization were pending failed
to notify them of the hearing day.

MUST “SPEAK” THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

The applicant must be able to “speak the English language”--this is
required by the law. It is enforced with a great variety of degrees
of strictness. Many an alien can understand what is said to him in
English long before he has gained facility in speech. Also, in the
majority of cases, especially where he is confronted by a stern and
perhaps hostile judge, or one disposed to treat immigrants with
contempt or ridicule, and a fiercely zealous naturalization examiner
bent upon having the petition denied if possible, he is promptly
tongue-tied by stage fright. It is common for the petitioner to
tell the court, through his witnesses or the interpreter, that he
knows what a certain question means and the answer to it, but cannot
express it in English. Many of the questions call for a simple “Yes”
or “No,” but a frightened or unintelligent applicant, who has learned
certain things by rote, may glibly answer “Yes” to the questions
which ought to be answered by “No,” and vice versa. There was a
fellow in Leadville, Colorado, who for a long time occupied the
status of witness for nearly all the Austrians who applied in that
place for naturalization, and who to a large degree superintended
their training for the examinations. After a while it was discovered
that he had a system by which he dictated the answers to the
questions, kicking the petitioner in the ankle when the answer should
be “Yes,” and nudging him with his elbow when it should be “No.”

Both judges and examiners vary greatly in their interpretation
of what constitutes ability to “speak English.” Some give the
petitioner the benefit of doubt and make large allowance for
natural embarrassment and fright. Others, as one judge frankly
says, “construe everything against the applicant,” on the ground
that citizenship is a precious privilege which should be accorded
to as few as possible, and only to those about whom there can be no
question. The court may accept a grunt, a shrug, a gesture, a shake
of the head, as indicating a sufficient understanding of the question.

Generally the judge is humane. There was a case in Arizona in which
a mild-looking Mexican insisted that he was both an anarchist and a
polygamist--plainly showing that he imagined the terms, about which
he was sharply asked, to represent qualities which he must possess.
The judge knew the man; that he was of good conduct, conventional
ideas, and married to one wife.

“How many women are you married to?” he asked.

“Oh, only one!” cried the man, adding for good measure, “maybe one is
too many!”

“Would you kill a man you didn’t like? Would you blow up a house, or
shoot a sheriff?”

“No, no, no! Me never kill nobody! Me never blow up nobody’s house!
Me never hurt nobody!”

Between the morning and afternoon sessions of the court the Mexican
was quietly interrogated and readjusted, and the court admitted him.
In thousands of cases, not so picturesque, the applicant called upon
for relatively elaborate views about theories of government, and even
more abstruse matters, is either bewildered or on general principles
deems it safer to remain silent; in which case the impression of
the court, and his action upon it, depend very much on the personal
equation, the humanity, and common sense of the judge.

A deaf-mute is exempt from the requirement of ability to “speak”
English; so is an alien who has made entry for a homestead on the
public lands. The latter can make his entry immediately upon filing
his declaration of intention; but he cannot complete his title
until he is fully naturalized. A few courts virtually ignore this
exemption, and require the homesteader to speak English and pass the
other educational tests. Generally the judges are lenient with such
people.

The law does not require the applicant to be able to _read_ English;
but there is an increasing tendency in the courts to require it
regardless of the law. After all, the judge is the final arbiter; he
must be satisfied that the applicant is “in all respects qualified
to be a citizen,” and, if he chooses to regard a person who cannot
make sense out of a current newspaper as not thus qualified, he can
deny the application on general principles. The whole matter of
educational qualifications varies widely in different jurisdictions,
largely because of the absence of a definite standard of knowledge,
intelligence, and general ability established either by Act of
Congress or by the Naturalization Service.

ATTACHED TO THE CONSTITUTION

The applicant must be “attached to the principles of the
Constitution,” and “well disposed toward the good order and happiness
of the United States.” Can a man be “attached to the principles of
the Constitution” without having read it? If not, then the vast
majority of the native-born citizens of the United States are not
so “attached,” for it is a matter of the most notorious fact that
very few Americans, not professional lawyers, ever have read it or
could pass the most rudimentary examination upon its substance.
There is, however, a widely prevalent tendency on the part of the
courts to require petitioners not only to swear that they have read
the document, but to pass a pretty stiff examination, either before
the naturalization examiner who may certify the fact, or even in
open court. And it is upon the phrase “attached to the principles
of the Constitution” that the Naturalization Bureau has erected its
whole elaborate and ambitious campaign of education for citizenship.
But its interpretation is so vague and unsettled, so subject to
the whims, theories, prejudices, and intellectual limitations of
the individuals upon whom its enforcement devolves, that it seems
highly desirable for Congress to establish by law definite and simple
requirements embodying the minimum qualification to be demanded of
applicants for citizenship to demonstrate both their understanding of
our form of government and their “attachment to the principles of the
Constitution.”

One of the classic anecdotes of the Naturalization Service has
to do with this matter of attachment to and understanding of the
Constitution. In the court of a judge who insisted upon every
petitioner having at least read it, an Irish petitioner at the
morning session of court was ordered to read the Constitution, or
have it read to him, and to come back in the afternoon for further
hearing.

  “Well, did you read the Constitution to him?” demanded the judge of
  the citizen who was acting as mentor of the petitioner.

  “I did, your Honor; I read it to him--all of it.”

  “Is he ready to swear that he is attached to the principles of it?”

  “He is, your Honor; when I got through readin’ it to him he said he
  thought it was a blame fine Constitution.”

What more could be asked--even of a native?

An Italian petitioner in one of the Southern courts exhibited a
good knowledge of current political history, and at the same time a
realization of his own limitations.

  “Who is the President of the United States?” asked the judge.

  “Mist’ Wilson.”

  “Who is the Vice-President?”

  “Mist’ Marsh’.”

  “If the President should die, who would take his place?”

  “Mist’ Marsh’--he’s ready for that job.”

  “Very good, Tony, and quite correct. Now, let me ask you something
  else. Could you be President of the United States?”

  “Oh, no! no! Judge, please!” cried the dismayed petitioner, “you
  have to excuse me! I’m too busy!”

IN THE MATTER OF “CONTINUOUS RESIDENCE”

The fact of continuous residence within the United States for five
years, and within the particular state for one year next preceding
the filing of the petition, must be established to the satisfaction
of the court. To the layman this would seem simple enough; but there
is hardly anything connected with the process of naturalization
about which there has been so much variety of interpretation. What
constitutes “continuous residence”? It is said that a court in Utah
disqualified an applicant because once during the five years he
stepped across the Canadian border far enough and long enough to buy
a sandwich! Shall a man lose his “residence” because of a walk across
the International Bridge at Niagara Falls? Suppose he is a carpenter,
or a farm hand, and goes over into Canada, or Mexico, for the summer
months, or long enough to build a house? Suppose there is an estate
to be settled up in the old country, or that the alien’s aged mother
is dying in Copenhagen or Buda-Pesth, and yearns to see her son once
before she goes. Shall that invalidate his residence? There are many
judges who will not tolerate any absence whatever from the country,
on any pretext.

In the great bulk of practice, however, it has simmered down to
the question of “intention.” Reasonably carried out, as in other
matters, it meets the average case. If the petitioner always, and
everywhere, during the five years maintained his intention in good
faith to become a citizen, and especially if he preserved a specific
residence, both the courts and the Naturalization Service on the
whole have waived the literal words of the requirement. But within
that general situation there are degrees. There are judges who will
permit an absence as long as two years, if “intention” is clear; some
set a limit of one year, others of six months. Generally speaking,
any absence in excess of six months is viewed with suspicion.

There are two reasons, as the law stands, for insistence upon
residence virtually continuous. In the first place there is the
wording and evident intention of the law, which must be obeyed in
spirit, anyway. In the second place, in case of any protracted
absence, the witnesses hardly can know what he has been about, and
certainly cannot swear, as they must under the statute, to the fact
of continuous residence. If the petitioner has been out of the ken of
his witnesses in some other part of the United States, he can prove
good conduct and American residence by depositions; but the law does
not contemplate depositions regarding his conduct on any foreign
soil, however legitimate his reason for being there. And if he has
been in other parts of _the same state_, he cannot prove anything
about it, by witnesses, depositions, or otherwise.

THE ABSURDITY OF THE “INCOMPETENT WITNESS”

This brings us to one of the most extraordinary provisions of the
law--that regarding the proof of eligibility by witnesses and
depositions--a provision responsible for the exclusion of thousands
of perfectly fit persons, and for a vast deal of wholly unnecessary
hardship and injustice.

During the eleven years 1908-1918 inclusive, according to the
statistics given in the annual reports of the Commissioner of
Naturalization, of 107,484 petitions for naturalization denied,
more than one in four--28,262, or 26.3 per cent--were denied on the
ground of “incompetent witnesses.” The percentage in many states
is very much larger than that: Illinois, 38.3; New Jersey, 37.2;
Michigan, 36.5; Iowa, 36.4; Nebraska, 36.0; Kansas, 35.9; Colorado,
32.8; Arkansas, 32.4; Oregon, 32.2; North Carolina, 31.9; Indiana,
31.1; Wisconsin, 31.0; Missouri, 29.5; New Mexico, 29.3; Kentucky,
28.8; Montana, 28.4; Utah, 27.0. The low states in this respect
are few--Rhode Island, 5.9; New Hampshire, 8.0; Connecticut, 9.0;
Vermont, 9.1; Massachusetts, 9.2; South Carolina, 11.4; Florida, 11.5.

Now, what does this mean in human terms? To begin with, a petitioner
for naturalization may not prove his eligibility, as he would prove
any other set of facts in court, by such an exhibit of evidence
of various kinds as would satisfy a reasonable judge or jury. He
cannot bring a group of neighbors who have known him; his employer,
his priest or pastor; the village school-teacher who teaches his
children; a sheaf of affidavits from people who have known him in
various places where he has lived in the state. His exhibit of
evidence is rigidly and most absurdly restricted, and the restriction
is of no benefit to anybody--except, perhaps, the Naturalization
Service in somewhat simplifying their work of investigation.

His petition must be accompanied by the affidavits of precisely
_two_ witnesses, who must accompany him personally when he files his
petition, and must accompany him again, ninety days or more later,
when his case comes before the court for hearing. _Two, only two, and
the same two._ Only in case one of them dies, or moves out of the
jurisdiction of the court, is he allowed to substitute. Each witness
must be a native or naturalized citizen of the United States, and
must swear to that fact. And each must swear that he has known the
petitioner during the whole period of five years of residence within
the state, or of one year in the state if he lived previously in
other states, and satisfy the court that he has seen the petitioner
frequently enough to know that his residence has been continuous and
his conduct such as to warrant his admission to citizenship. Some
judges require the witnesses to have seen the petitioner virtually
every day, “constantly, as a neighbor”; “at least once a week,” for
five years. The examination of the witnesses is frequently more
severe, if possible, than that of the petitioner himself; for the
law requires them to be “credible.” If a witness can be shown by
the naturalization examiner to be of dubious moral character, the
court probably will deny the petition verified by him, and leave the
petitioner with only one witness. He must have two, and he cannot
substitute a better one!

In a state which has allowed aliens to vote upon their declaration
of intention, innumerable foreign-born persons have in good faith
believed themselves to be citizens. If such a person appears as a
witness for a petitioner, the petition is denied--properly enough,
except that the petitioner might easily produce a substitute who
could not be objected to; but no, he must have not only exactly two,
but _the same_ two, throughout the proceeding. Or, if one or both
of these particular witnesses turn out to be honestly mistaken in
thinking they have known the petitioner for the whole five years; if,
for example, it turns out that they could not have known him more
than four years and nine months--the petition is denied; “incompetent
witnesses.” In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1918, more than 2,300
petitions were denied for this cause, and it is safe to say that,
in a very large majority of the cases, the witnesses were acting in
perfect good faith.

The practice cuts very close. _In re_ Welch (159 Fed., 1014), decided
in 1908, reports a case in which it was shown that a witness had not
known the petitioner for five years at the time of the filing of the
petition, but had known him for five years by the time the hearing
was had. In that case the court permitted amendment of the date of
the petition, but required a fresh posting.

Congress took note of the difficulty an alien might labor under if
he were obliged to move about from state to state during the five
years’ period, and provided that four years of the time, in the event
of inability to bring witnesses who could swear to knowledge of the
whole period, the applicant might prove residence, etc., _in other
states_ by deposition. This helps a good deal, as far as it goes;
but in any event the last year, the year of residence required to be
within the state where the petition is filed, must be covered by “two
witnesses”--_two, only two, and the same two_. Suppose the case (and
there have been many such) of a Methodist minister, an Englishman
if you please, who, during the five years preceding his petition,
has been assigned to two or more pastorates within the same state at
points more or less distant from each other. He could produce almost
any desired array of witnesses to cover his residence in each of the
several places, and affidavits galore; but he must not. There is
virtually no chance at all of his being able to find two, only two,
and the same two, who can testify to personal, neighborly knowledge
of his residence in all places. What, then, of an average immigrant
who has been obliged to shift about in search of employment, resident
all through the year in the state, but never staying long enough in
one place to establish intimate relations with possible witnesses
under such restrictions?

JUDGES DENOUNCE THE ABSURDITY

The judges are all but unanimous in their denunciation of this
system. The comment of a United States district judge in the Middle
West represents the sentiments of most:

  I do not think it tends to raise the standard of citizenship or
  to do anyone any good to have the requirements such that, if a
  petitioner has lived in the state for the full five-year period,
  he must prove that entire residence and his good character and
  reputation during that entire period by the two petitioning
  witnesses. The two petitioning witnesses should have known him
  for at least a year, and be able to make a showing for at least
  the last year of the period. I know of nothing so sacred about a
  state line that this great difference should be made between the
  petitioner who moves here from another state and the petitioner who
  moves here from a distant part of the same state.

A Michigan judge gives a striking example of the injustice of the
discrimination:

  The greatest copper mines in the world are in the Upper Peninsula
  of Michigan. The greatest automobile factories in the world are
  in the city of Detroit in the same state. These sturdy miners of
  Houghton and Keweenaw counties in the Upper Peninsula hear of the
  automobile industry in the city of Detroit, and after three or four
  years’ residence up there, move to Detroit and take up residence
  there. Under the present law, they must find two witnesses who
  have known them for the entire five years. You will recognize how
  difficult it will be for them to find two witnesses who knew them
  in the Upper Peninsula, moved to Detroit when they did, and have
  known them ever since. The copper mines of the Upper Peninsula are
  five or six hundred miles from Detroit. Can anyone suggest any good
  reasons why these petitioners in Detroit should not be permitted
  to prove their Detroit residence by two witnesses who sign their
  petitions, and their Upper Peninsula residence by depositions or
  other witnesses? Why punish so unnecessarily the man who continues
  to reside for the full five years in the same state, while we
  justly permit another man, who moves here from another state,
  perhaps a distance of fifty or a hundred miles, to make his proof
  as to that state by deposition?

  Mind you, I would make them prove their residence in the particular
  city or county ... for the full period of their residence there, by
  the two witnesses who signed the petition; and, of course, I would
  require them to have resided in such municipality for at least a
  year.

Says one judge:

  In the far West, where the distances are so great and the expense
  of travel such a hardship, the matter might readily be handled
  on a mileage basis, so that the petitioner would prove a year’s
  residence by the witnesses who attest his petition, and a previous
  residence within the same state more than, say fifty miles, from
  the place of holding court, by depositions.

Of 334 judges of naturalizing courts in all parts of the country
who specifically addressed themselves to this question in reply to