The indifference of the only man higher up than Secretary Boutwell--the
only man who had power to remove Collector Murphy or to choke off
Leet--was incomprehensible. Schurz made comments on the case which the
Administration Senators could not answer and dared not leave unanswered.
On the 18th of December, Conkling introduced a resolution directing the
Committee on Investigation and Retrenchment to make an inquiry into the
Leet and Stocking scandal. This resolution was preceded by a preamble
quoting the words of Schurz as a reason for making the inquiry, in the
following form:

     Whereas it has been declared in the Senate that at the port of
     New York there exists and is maintained by officers of the
     United States under the name of the "General Order business" a
     monstrous abuse fraudulent in character, and whereas the
     following statement has been made by a Senator: "It was
     intimated by some of the witnesses that Mr. Leet, who pockets
     the enormous profits arising from that business, had some
     connection with the White House; but General Porter was
     examined, Mr. Leet himself was examined, and they both
     testified that it was not so, and, counting the number of
     witnesses, we have no right to form a different conclusion. But
     the fact remains that this scandalous system of robbery is
     sustained--is sustained against the voice of the merchants of
     New York--is sustained against the judgment and the voice of
     the Secretary of the Treasury himself. I ask you how is it
     sustained? Where and what is the mysterious power that sustains
     it? The conclusion is inevitable that it is stronger than
     decent respect for public opinion, nay, a power stronger than
     the Secretary of the Treasury himself":

     Therefore resolved, that the Committee of Investigation and
     Retrenchment be instructed to inquire into the matter fully and
     at large, and particularly whether any collusion or improper
     connection with said business exists on the part of any officer
     of the United States, and that said committee further inquire
     whether any person holding office in the custom-house at New
     York has been detected or is known or believed by his superior
     officer to have been guilty of bribery or of taking bribes or
     of other crime or misdemeanor, and said committee is hereby
     empowered to send for persons and papers.

The Committee of Investigation and Retrenchment had not been appointed
when Conkling offered this resolution. It had been agreed upon in the
Republican Caucus, but had not been reported to the Senate. Senator
Anthony immediately reported the names: Buckingham (Connecticut), Pratt
(Indiana), Howe (Wisconsin), Harlan (Iowa), Stewart (Nevada), Pool
(North Carolina), Bayard (Delaware). Sumner expressed mild surprise that
no Senator who had favored an investigation of the New York
Custom-House, or of frauds in general, was a member of the committee,
unless Bayard (Democrat) might be counted as such. He quoted from
Jefferson's "Manual of Parliamentary Law" to show that the proper course
was to give the leading place in such a committee to the prime mover of
it, who was, in this case, undoubtedly Trumbull, but that nobody who had
shown any interest in the matter to be investigated, not even the
Senator from New Hampshire (Patterson), whose investigation of the
previous session had uncovered the alleged frauds, and whose familiarity
with the case would be most useful now, had any place on it. Anthony
contended that inasmuch as all the Senators had voted to raise the
Committee, the vote having been unanimous, all the requirements of
parliamentary law were satisfied by the appointment of the seven
Senators named, or any other seven. Thurman, of Ohio, thought that
Anthony was "sticking in the bark" and not reaching the sound wood of
the tree. Considerable time was spent in the debate on the composition
of the committee, but in the end the list reported by Anthony was
adopted, as was Conkling's resolution, with its bulky preamble. The
preamble was doubtless intended to convince Grant that Schurz (not
Conkling) made the investigation necessary. The committee went to work
early in 1872 and eventually furnished a solution of the Leet and
Stocking mystery.

Leet learned in 1868, soon after Grant's election, that he intended to
appoint Moses H. Grinnell collector of the port of New York. He procured
from Grant a letter of introduction to Grinnell, but Grant cautioned
him, when he gave it, not to use it for the purpose of getting an
office. When Leet handed the letter to Grinnell he remarked to him that
he (Grinnell) was to be appointed collector of the port. Grinnell had
not received any intimation of the fact before, and he inferred that
Leet had been designated by the President to inform him of it. He asked
Leet what he could do for him, and Leet replied that he wanted the
"general order" business of the custom-house. Grinnell thought that this
also was a message from the President, and he arranged as soon as
possible to give Leet a portion of it. Leet farmed out this portion to a
man named Bixby for $5000 per year, plus one half of all the profits in
excess of $10,000. Then he went back to Washington and resumed his place
as a clerk in the War Department; but he complained bitterly to Grinnell
that his share in the "general order" business was not large enough, and
he told Grinnell that he would be removed from office if he did not give
him the whole of it. After much threatening, Grinnell did give him the
whole of it, but he was removed, nevertheless, after holding the office
about one year, and Murphy was appointed collector in his place. Murphy
kept the "general order" business in the hands of Leet and Stocking
until March, 1872, when the committee made its report. On the 14th of
March, the newspapers announced that Murphy had been removed as
collector and General Arthur appointed in his place, that the "general
order" business had been radically reformed, and that Leet and Stocking
had disappeared from history. In making this announcement the _Nation_
called the attention of the editor of _Harper's Weekly_ (George William
Curtis), who was still a little deaf to the shortcomings of the
Administration, to some things hard to understand.

     When the President [it said] became aware that Leet had abused
     his confidence, disregarded his wishes, made false
     representations as to his influence over him, and concealed his
     doings from him,--facts which were revealed by the repeated
     complaints of prominent merchants and by Leet's appearance in
     public as owner of the "plum," and finally by a congressional
     investigation,--he took no notice of them whatever. So far as
     we know he gave no sign of displeasure, paid no attention to
     the complaints against him, and let him go on for nearly two
     years preying on the commerce of the port, till a second
     congressional investigation, obtained with great difficulty,
     and the savage assaults of the press on the eve of an election,
     made the change we have just witnessed imperatively necessary.
     It has been the custom of the friends of the Administration
     hitherto, whenever charges of this kind are brought up, instead
     of answering them, to tell you that they endear the President
     more than ever to the American people; that his renomination is
     a sure thing, etc.; and that Horace Greeley is a friend of Hank
     Smith. Now is this satisfactory? Let us have a candid answer,
     without allusions to cigars, or fast horses, or investments, or
     summer vacations, Hank Smith, or Horace Greeley.

No dollar of the Leet and Stocking "plum" ever reached President Grant
or any member of his family. We are left to conjecture what were his
reasons for allowing the scandal to continue so long after the facts
became known. Judging his course here by his second term, we are forced
to conclude that his combativeness was aroused by the criticisms of
Schurz, Trumbull, and others, which he interpreted as marks of personal
hostility to himself. In fact, his senatorial supporters so interpreted
them in public discussions. He probably upheld Leet for the same reasons
that he shielded Babcock in the greater scandal of the St. Louis Whiskey
Ring in 1876.[124] It was a mistake, however, to suppose (if he did
suppose) that Trumbull was moved by any personal hostility. An interview
with the latter, dated December 3, 1871, published in the Louisville
_Courier-Journal_,[125] shows that he was still on friendly terms with
the President. His interlocutor began by asking him if he would consent
to the use of his name as a conservative candidate for the Presidency
against General Grant, to which the "Illinois statesman replied with
more than usual emphasis, 'No sir, I would not.'"

Then the following conversation ensued:

     Why not?

     For many reasons. In the first place, I am satisfied where I
     am. I consider a seat in the Senate of the United States a
     position in which I can be more useful than in any other, and I
     believe it to be as honorable as any under the Government if
     its duties be efficiently and properly discharged. In the next
     place, I do not agree with the programme which has been marked
     out by those who refuse to support the candidacy of the
     President for reëlection. I am conscious of the need for many
     reforms, and I am daily striving to accomplish them. But I do
     not believe that a revolution of parties would be salutary. I
     do not believe that either the people of the North or of the
     South are ready to profit by such a change.

     And why not?

     Because the people of the South have really accepted nothing,
     and are not willing to coöperate with the Liberals of the North
     in settling the practical relations of society on a sure and
     generous basis. I know that the South has much to complain of.
     But so have the Liberal Republicans. It is not the rebel
     element, perhaps, but the nature of things, that the South
     should not realize the complete overthrow of the old order and
     the necessity for a complete change of the domestic policy. I
     believe that the defeat of General Grant would involve a
     reaction at the South whose consequences would be even worse
     than the present state of affairs.

     Don't you think General Grant meditates the permanent
     usurpation of the Executive office?

     No, I do not. My opinion is that General Grant is, in the main,
     a conservative man. He has made mistakes. But I cannot say they
     justify his removal.

     What are your personal relations?

     Very friendly. I have opposed some of his measures, but I have
     no personal feeling, and, indeed, this is one of the reasons
     why it is disagreeable to have my name mentioned in the
     connection you name.

The interview closed with the writer's assurance that the views of
Senator Sumner coincided with those of Trumbull. A Washington letter in
the _Nation_ of December 28 said:

     From what I see and hear, the conviction is forced upon me that
     there will be no lead given by men like Trumbull voluntarily.
     They may be forced by the Administration party into opposition,
     but they will go reluctantly and timidly.

Among the letters received by Trumbull at this time was the following
from a man of high repute and influence in Ohio:

    COLUMBUS, December 15, 1871.

     You may remember me sufficiently to know who I am and my
     position in Ohio. My special object in this writing is to
     congratulate you for your proper and patriotic position on the
     Retrenchment Resolution. Messrs. Morton, Sherman _et al_, are
     grievously mistaken as to the state of public sentiment in
     regard to the Administration and the President. I am bold to
     say that outside of the Grand Army of the Republic and the
     office-holders (an _imperium in imperio_), more than one half
     of the Republicans are intensely dissatisfied with General
     Grant. His indecent interference in Missouri and Louisiana, his
     disgusting nepotism, his indefensible course in regard to San
     Domingo, and his recent complimentary letter to Collector
     Murphy have produced the conviction that he is intellectually
     and morally unqualified for his present position. He will hear
     deep and alarming thunder before the Kalends of November, 1872.

     Go forward with your associates, Schurz, Sumner, Patterson, and
     Tipton, in your exposure of the faults and frauds of the
     Administration, and the best class of Republicans will honor
     your magnanimity and patriotism. I know General Grant
     personally. I have not asked him for any favor. As Senatorial
     Elector I traversed the state, and advocated the Republican
     principles and policy, but I have the pleasant consciousness
     and delightful remembrance that I never eulogized General Grant
     nor recommended him as suitable for the place. As long as he is
     under the special superintendence of Morton, Chandler, and
     Cameron, he must necessarily deteriorate, as none of them has
     ever been suspected of having any profound sense of right or
     wrong.

    Confidentially yours,

    SAM'L GALLOWAY.

    HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL, U.S.S.

FOOTNOTES:

[122] _Cong. Globe_, 1871, p. 51.

[123] See House report No. 50, 37th Congress, 3d session, page 38.

[124] Rhodes, _History of the United States_, VII, 182-89.

[125] This interview was reprinted in the New York _Times_ of December
6. It is corroborated in sentiment by the Trumbull manuscripts of that
date, but it was probably not intended for publication. It purports to
be a conversation between Trumbull and an ex-Senator.

CHAPTER XXV

THE CINCINNATI CONVENTION

The Liberal Republicans of Missouri held a state convention at Jefferson
City, January 24, 1872. They adopted a platform which affirmed the
sovereignty of the Union, emancipation, equality of rights,
enfranchisement, complete amnesty, tariff reform, civil service reform,
local self-government, and impartial suffrage. They also called a
national mass convention to meet at Cincinnati on the first Monday in
May.

This call was at once endorsed by General J. D. Cox, George Hoadley,
Stanley Matthews, and J. B. Stallo, four of the most eminent citizens of
Ohio, the first of whom had been a member of President Grant's Cabinet.
Mr. Matthews, in an interview, expressed the hope that the Democrats
would join in nominating a candidate for the presidency of the type of
Charles Francis Adams, William S. Groesbeck, Lyman Trumbull, or Salmon
P. Chase.

The movement spread like wildfire. Groups of Republicans, eminent in
character and in public service in all the states, proclaimed their
adhesion to it and declared their intention to participate in the
convention. It had also the active support of the Springfield
_Republican_, the Cincinnati _Commercial_, and the Chicago _Tribune_,
and the sympathy of the New York _Evening Post_, the _Nation_, and the
New York _Tribune_. Democratic sympathy was manifested early and found
expression in the columns of the Louisville _Courier-Journal_, whose
editor, Henry Watterson, took a keen interest in the preliminaries of
the Cincinnati meeting and whose coöperation was gladly welcomed. The
New York _World_, edited by Manton Marble, gave passive support to the
movement by advising Democrats to conform to present facts and not seek
to revive or sustain the dead issues of the war and Reconstruction.

Under date, New Orleans, April 23, Marble wrote to Schurz:

     It is due to you that I should say, before you go to
     Cincinnati, that in my clear judgment the nomination of Charles
     Francis Adams would defeat the reëlection of Grant. It has
     always been obvious that Mr. Adams would be among the best of
     Presidents. He has been growing, during the last few months, to
     be the best of candidates. I could not name another so safe to
     win. Adams and Palmer would be a quite perfect ticket.--This is
     founded on careful consideration.

August Belmont, of New York, the most influential Democrat in that state
not holding any public office, took an active part, both by
correspondence and by personal solicitation, in the endeavor to secure
the nomination by the Cincinnati Convention of a candidate whom the
Democrats could support, and to induce the latter to abstain from making
a separate nomination. From Vincennes, Indiana, April 23, he wrote to
Schurz that, after having seen many prominent men of both parties, he
had found the Cincinnati movement even stronger with them, and the
people, than he had anticipated. He added:

     Everybody looks for the action of your convention, and if you
     make a good _national_ platform denouncing the abuses and
     corruption of the Executive, the military despotism of the
     South, the centralization of power and the subordination of the
     civil power to the military rule, and declare boldly for
     general amnesty and a revenue tariff, you will find every
     Democrat throughout the land ready to vote for your candidate,
     provided you name one whom our convention can endorse.... I
     found in the West and in New York an overwhelming desire for
     Charles F. Adams. Adams is the strongest and least vulnerable
     man; he will draw more votes from Grant than will any other
     candidate. The whole Democratic party will follow him.

There was a full delegation from Pennsylvania, composed of honorable
men, who were not office-seekers. The meeting which appointed them was
presided over by Colonel A. K. McClure, who announced, when taking the
chair, that inasmuch as the Cincinnati Convention was a mass meeting,
the persons attending it would not be entangled in the usual political
machinery. The movement was on the lines of the Republican party; it was
a movement of Republicans by necessity, who did not mean to be bound by
the Government party as it then stood. General William B. Thomas said
that he and other gentlemen had issued the call for this meeting to send
a delegation to Cincinnati. He was engaged in work looking to the
annihilation of the Republican party. He had helped to build up that
party, but now he was free to say that it was the most corrupt party on
the face of the earth. He was opposed to any candidate to be nominated
by the coming Philadelphia Convention; Grant, or any other man. Colonel
McClure said that the plain English of the whole thing was rebellion
against the party and the bringing of it to the dignity of a revolution.
Five years ago there might have been a necessity for the exercise of
military power in the South, but not now. The South, to his mind, had
been more desolated since the close of the war than before.

The Pennsylvanians had fifty-six votes in the convention. On the first
roll-call they cast all of them for Governor A. G. Curtin. On all
subsequent ones they gave a plurality for Adams.[126]

Numerous letters reached Trumbull before the call for the Cincinnati
Convention was issued suggesting that he be a candidate for the
presidency in opposition to Grant. One of these, dated Roslyn, Long
Island, November 30, 1871, was from John H. Bryant, brother of William
Cullen Bryant, who said that both himself and his brother desired to see
him elected President and that if he should be a candidate he could
count on the support of the _Evening Post_.

Silas L. Bryan, of Salem, Illinois, the father of William Jennings
Bryan, wrote under date, December 19, 1871, that he considered Trumbull
the Providential man for the present crisis and that if he would consent
to be a candidate for the highest office he (Bryan) would take steps to
promote that desirable end. To this letter Trumbull replied that to be
talked about for the presidency impaired the influence he might
otherwise have to promote the reforms which he labored to bring about.
He did not, however, refuse Judge Bryan's offer of assistance.

Joseph Brown, Mayor of St. Louis, wrote that he would rather see
Trumbull nominated for the presidency than any other man of either
party. To this letter Trumbull made a reply similar to that given to
Judge Bryan.

Walter B. Scates, ex-judge of the supreme court of Illinois, wrote: "You
saved the Republican party in the impeachment trial and I now hope you
may save the country from corruption, pillage, high tax, class
legislation, and central despotism."

Jesse K. Dubois, auditor of Illinois, perhaps the most sagacious and
experienced politician in the state, wrote, after signing the call for
the Cincinnati Convention: "With you as our candidate I would wager we
carry this state anywhere from 30,000 to 50,000 majority as against
Grant."

On February 23, Trumbull made a speech in the Senate defending the
Missouri Convention's platform against the objections of Senator Morton,
who had stigmatized it as a Democratic movement, because that party in
Connecticut had endorsed it in their state convention. In this speech
Trumbull took up each resolution in the platform and showed that it was
either in accord with Republican doctrine as affirmed in the national
platforms of the party, or had been commended by President Grant in
official messages to Congress. On the subject of civil service reform,
to promote which Grant had appointed the George William Curtis
Commission, he said:

     The great evil of our civil service system grows out of the
     manner of making appointments and renewals and the use which is
     made of the patronage, treating it as mere party spoils. Often
     the patronage is used for purposes not rising to the dignity of
     even party purposes, but by certain individuals for individual
     and personal ends. It would be bad enough if the patronage were
     used as mere spoils for party, but it is infinitely worse than
     that under our present system.

     The Senator from Indiana, in his speech the other day,
     undertook to create the impression that I was opposed to civil
     service reform. Why, sir, I offered the very bill in this body
     which became a law under which the Civil Service Commission was
     organized. I introduced bills here years ago in favor of a
     reform in the civil service and especially to break up the
     running of members of Congress to the departments begging for
     offices. In my judgment there is nothing more disreputable, or
     which interferes more with the proper discharge of public duty,
     than this hanging around the skirts of power begging for
     offices for friends.

The growth of the Cincinnati movement was signalized by a meeting at the
Cooper Union in New York City on the evening of April 12, of which the
_Nation_ said: "We believe that it was the most densely packed meeting
which ever met there. All approach within fifty yards of the entrance
was next to impossible in the early part of the evening, so great was
the crowd in the street." Both Trumbull and Schurz spoke here to
enthusiastic hearers.

Among the letters received by Trumbull prior to the convention the most
thoughtful and weighty was the following written by Governor John M.
Palmer, of Illinois:

    SPRINGFIELD, April 13, 1872.

     I have felt considerable apprehension in regard to the
     Cincinnati movement for the reason that I have doubted the
     ability of men of the right stamp to control the action of the
     proposed convention, and I have believed that it would be
     better to endure the abuses and weaknesses and follies of
     Grant's Administration for another four years than to
     crystallize them by the mistake of making a bad nomination of
     his successor. Grant is an evil that we can endure if we retain
     the right to point out his faults in principle and practice,
     but if some ancient Federalist should be elected to succeed him
     what is now usurpation would be accepted by the people as the
     proper theory of the government. But if the Cincinnati
     Convention nominates a statesman I will support him, and you if
     you are selected as the candidate.

    JOHN M. PALMER.

Among the names mentioned as desirable candidates that of Charles
Francis Adams was the most prominent. After him came Lyman Trumbull,
Horace Greeley, David Davis, B. Gratz Brown, and Andrew G. Curtin. Adams
had been Minister to Great Britain during the war, and was now one of
the arbitrators of the Geneva Tribunal under the Alabama Claims Treaty.
He had written a letter to David A. Wells which showed that he did not
desire the nomination, was perfectly indifferent to it, but that if it
were given to him without pledges of any kind he would not refuse. He
said among other things:

     If the call upon me were an unequivocal one based upon
     confidence in my character earned in public life, and a belief
     that I would carry out in practice the principles I professed,
     then indeed would come a test of my courage in an emergency;
     but if I am to be negotiated for, and have assurances given
     that I am honest, you will be so kind as to draw me out of that
     crowd.

This phrase was interpreted erroneously by some as an expression of
contempt for "that crowd," but, of course, it was not so intended. The
letter was not written for publication. Not only did Mr. Adams not seek
the nomination, but his son, Charles Francis, Jr., refused to go to the
convention, or to invite any of his Boston friends to go.

Greeley was an anti-slavery leader, founder of the New York _Tribune_,
book-writer, lecturer, foremost journalist in the country, distinguished
both for intellectual power and personal eccentricity. Davis was a
member of the Supreme Court of the United States, by Lincoln's
appointment. Brown was governor of Missouri, and next to Schurz the most
prominent leader of the Liberal movement. Curtin had been the war
governor of Pennsylvania and was a man of high ability and unblemished
character. The name of Sumner had been frequently mentioned as one
suitable for the presidency, but he had not yet given his adhesion to
the Liberal movement.

The New York _Herald_ of May 1 tells what I thought of the outlook when
I first arrived in Cincinnati, thus:

     CINCINNATI, April 27, 1872.--Mr. Horace White, who arrived this
     morning, says that the Liberal movement has as yet only
     penetrated the crust of public sentiment and that the masses of
     the people are waiting in a half-curious way to see what will
     be done here before they will make up their minds.

Trumbull did not authorize the presentation of his name to the
convention until one week before its meeting. Then a qualified
acquiescence came in a letter to myself, dated Washington, April 24,
saying:

     I do not think I ought to be nominated unless there is a
     _decided_ feeling among those who assemble, and are outside of
     rings and bargains, that I would be stronger than any one else.
     Unless this is the feeling, I think it would not be wise to
     present my name at all.... D. A. Wells has enclosed me a letter
     written on the 20th by John Van Buren, Governor Hoffman's
     secretary, which he thinks undoubtedly represents the feelings
     of the Hoffman wing of the New York Democracy. In this letter
     Van Buren says the convention must not touch the question of
     free trade, that the persons pushing this question are not
     unanimous on the question, and that a non-committal resolution
     would do harm in both directions. Grosvenor is very strenuous
     about having such a resolution as will commit the convention
     distinctly to revenue reform, and I fear will be a little
     unreasonable about it. I had thought that a resolution might be
     adopted which would assert the principle without being
     offensive to anybody; perhaps something like the resolution
     adopted by the last Illinois State Convention. Free-traders and
     protectionists differ more about the application of principles
     than the principles themselves in their efforts. Wells and
     other reformers of the East will be reasonable on this
     question. Van Buren further says in his letter: "One thing rely
     upon--you need do nothing at Cincinnati except with reference
     to drawing Republicans into the movement. Disregard the
     Democrats. The movement of that side will take care of itself.
     There will be no cheating nor holding back on their side. They
     will go over in bulk and with a will."

My reply to this letter, written immediately after the adjournment of
the convention, was the following:

     My judgment was from the beginning of our arrival here that you
     could not be nominated, but I did not tell anybody so. Dr.
     Jayne and Governor Koerner thought you could be; and their
     judgment, I thought, should be set before mine. So I held my
     tongue and did what I could. If I had taken the responsibility
     of withdrawing your name as suggested by your letter, I should
     never have had any standing in Illinois again--certainly not
     among your friends.

As this convention did not consist of delegates chosen by primary
meetings, any person of Republican antecedents or attachments was
permitted to attend and take part in it. To bring order out of chaos it
was necessary for the men of each state to come together and choose a
number corresponding to its population to cast its votes on all
questions arising, including the nomination of candidates. In states
which presented more than one candidate, as in Illinois, there was some
difficulty in making the proper division as between Davis and Trumbull;
but all such troubles were adjusted before the hour for assembling
arrived. The streets of Cincinnati had never beheld a more orderly,
single-minded, public-spirited crowd. At least four fifths had come
together at their own expense for no other purpose than the general
good. There was, however, a small minority of office-seekers among them.
The movement in its inception was altogether free from that class, but
when it began to assume formidable proportions and seemed not unlikely
to sweep the country, it attracted a certain number of professional
politicians, including a few estrays from the South.

The office-seeking fraternity were mostly supporters of Davis, whose
appearance as a candidate for the presidency was extremely offensive to
the original promoters of the movement. As a judge of the Supreme Court
his incursion into the field of politics, unheralded, but not
unprecedented, was an indecorum. Moreover, his supporters had not been
early movers in the ranks of reform, and their sincerity was doubted.
They were extremely active, however, after the movement had gained
headway, and they were able to divide the vote of Illinois into two
equal parts (21 to 21), so that Trumbull's strength in the convention
was seriously impaired. Davis's chances were early demolished by the
editorial fraternity, who, at a dinner at Murat Halstead's house,
resolved that they would not support him if nominated, and caused that
fact to be made known.

Greeley's candidacy had not been taken seriously by the editors at
Halstead's dinner-party. As an individual he was generally liked by them
and his ability and honesty were held in the highest esteem; but he was
looked upon as too eccentric and picturesque to find much support in
such a sober-minded convention as ours. Adams and Trumbull were the only
men supposed by us to be within the sphere of nomination, and the
chances of Adams were deemed the better of the two. We had yet to learn
that there are occasions and crowds where personal oddity and a flash of
genius under an old white hat are more potent than high ancestry or
approved statesmanship, or both those qualifications joined together.

Before nominations were made, a platform was to be framed and adopted.
There were three main issues to be considered: Universal amnesty, civil
service reform, and tariff reform. On the first and second there was no
difference of opinion. Without them the Cincinnati movement would never
have taken place; the convention would never have been called. As to the
third, there was a difference of opinion which divided the convention
and the Committee on Resolutions in the middle, and it soon became known
that "there was no common ground on which the protectionists and revenue
reformers could stand." So wrote E. L. Godkin from the convention hall
to the _Nation_. He continued:

     The Committee on Resolutions, after sitting up a whole night,
     were compelled to accept the compromise which he [Greeley]
     proposed--the reference of the whole matter to the people in
     the congressional districts. It is right to add that the
     sentiment of the convention was overwhelmingly in favor of this
     course. There is a touch of absurdity about it, it is true, but
     it is at least frank and honest, and at all events nothing
     else was possible. Even such outspoken free-traders as Judge
     Hoadley, of this city, were compelled to concur in this
     disposition of the question.

As chairman of the Committee on Resolutions, and a free-trader, I can
confirm all that Godkin wrote, and add that the committee considered the
expediency of reporting to the convention their inability to agree and
asking to be discharged. This plan was rejected lest it should cause a
bolting movement, on an issue which was rated only third in importance
among those which had brought us together. It was decided that tariff
reform could wait, while the pacification of the South and the reform of
the civil service could not.

Thursday night, May 2, I had gone to bed at the Burnet House when I was
aroused by a loud knock on my door and a voice outside which I
recognized as that of Grosvenor exclaiming: "Get up! Blair and Brown are
here from St. Louis." Without waiting for an answer he went on knocking
at other doors in the corridor and giving the same warning, but no other
explanation. I arose, dressed myself, and went down to the rotunda of
the hotel, where I found some of the supporters of Trumbull and of Adams
who were trying to discover why the arrival of Frank Blair and Gratz
Brown should produce a commotion in a convention of more than seven
hundred, of which Blair and Brown were not members. Blair was then the
Democratic Senator from Missouri. The two newcomers were not visible.
They had obtained a room and had called into it some of the Missouri
delegation and would not admit any uninvited persons. Presently
Grosvenor returned and told us that Brown intended to withdraw as a
candidate for the presidency and turn his forces over to Greeley, and
himself take the Vice-Presidency. Grosvenor considered this a dangerous
combination and said that steps should be taken to checkmate it at once.

The Adams and Trumbull men here collected remained till about two
o'clock trying to learn more about the expected _coup_, but as nothing
further could be obtained they retired one by one to uneasy slumber.
Grosvenor maintained to the last that great mischief was impending, but
could not suggest any way to meet it.

On the following day voting began, and the first roll-call showed Adams
in the lead with 205 votes; Greeley had 147, Trumbull 110, Brown 95,
Davis 92-1/2, Curtin 62, Chase 2-1/2. Carl Schurz, who was permanent
chairman of the convention and a supporter of Adams, then rose and with
some signs of embarrassment said that a gentleman who had received a
large number of votes desired to make a statement, whereupon he invited
the Hon. B. Gratz Brown to come to the platform. Brown advanced to the
front, and after thanking his friends for their support said that he had
decided to withdraw his name and that he desired the nomination of
Horace Greeley as the man most likely to win in the coming election.
There was great applause among the supporters of Greeley, but the
immediate result did not answer their expectations. Brown could not
control even the Missouri delegation. The first vote of the Missouri men
had been 30 for Brown. The second was, Trumbull 16, Greeley 10, Adams 4.

All the votes are shown in the following table:

    ----------------------------------------------------------
    Roll-Call|Adams|Greeley|Trumbull| Davis|Chase|Brown|Curtin
    ---------+-----+-------+--------+------+-----+-----+------
    First    | 205 |  147  |   110  |92-1/2|2-1/2|  95 |  62
    Second   | 243 |  245  |   148  |81    |     |   2 |
    Third    | 264 |  258  |   156  |44    |     |     |
    Fourth   | 279 |  251  |   141  |51    |     |     |
    Fifth    | 309 |  258  |    91  |30    |25   |     |
    Sixth    | 324 |  332  |    19  | 6    |32   |     |
    ----------------------------------------------------------

Although Greeley's plurality on the sixth roll-call was small, his gain
over the fifth was large, being 74 votes, that of Adams being only 15.
This was a signal to all who wished to be on the winning side to take
shelter under the old white hat. Changes were made before the result was
announced which gave Greeley 482 to 187 for Adams. Then Greeley was
declared nominated. The nomination of Gratz Brown for Vice-President
followed without much opposition.

The supporters of Adams and of Trumbull were stunned. The first impulse
of their leaders, and especially of Schurz, was to put on sackcloth, and
go into retirement. Prompt decision, however, was necessary to the
editors of daily newspapers. Other persons could go home and take days
or weeks to think the matter over, but those who, at Halstead's table,
had decided against David Davis, must needs make another prompt decision
before the next paper went to press. They decided to support Greeley,
because they had honestly led their readers to an honest belief that the
Cincinnati movement was for the best interests of the Republic; and they
deemed it unfair to turn against it on account of personal vexation
against a man whose candidacy had been tolerated through the whole
proceedings. That Greeley was an unbalanced man we all knew. That he was
liable to go off at a tangent and that his self-esteem and
self-confidence might put him beyond the reach of good counsel in
affairs of great pith and moment, was the unexpressed thought of most of
us. But we knew that his aims were patriotic, and we reflected that some
risks are taken at every presidential election. Greeley had not yet been
proved an unsafe President, and that was more than could be said for
Grant. In fact, Grant's second term proved to be worse than his first.

Schurz was more distressed by the "Gratz Brown trick," as it was
commonly called, than by anything else. This had the appearance of a
brazen political swap executed in the light of day, by which the
presidency and the vice-presidency were disposed of as so much
merchandise. He did not, however, in his thoughts connect Greeley with
the trade. It was physically impossible that the latter could have been
a party to it, if there was a trade. Nevertheless he considered the
German vote lost beyond recall by the bad look of it.[127] My own belief
is that Blair and Brown were jealous of Schurz's power in Missouri; that
they feared he would become omnipotent there, dominating both parties,
if Adams should be elected President; and that the only way to head him
off was to beat Adams. They chose Greeley for this purpose, not because
they had any bargain with, or fondness for, him, but because he was the
next strongest man in the convention.

The engineers of the Liberal Republican movement went their several
ways. Those who held tariff reform of more importance than all other
issues abjured Greeley at once. E. L. Godkin and William Cullen Bryant
declared war against him because they considered him dangerous and
unfit. The following correspondence which took place between Bryant and
Trumbull was illustrative of the feelings of many others:

    THE EVENING POST,
    41 NASSAU STREET, COR. LIBERTY,
    NEW YORK, May 8th, 1872.

    MY DEAR SIR,

     It has been said that you will support the nomination of Mr.
     Greeley for President. I have no right to speak of any course
     which you may take in politics in any but respectful terms, but
     I may perhaps take the liberty of saying that if you give that
     man your countenance, some of your best friends here will
     deeply regret it. We who know Mr. Greeley know that his
     administration, should he be elected, cannot be otherwise than
     shamefully corrupt. His associates are of the worst sort and
     the worst abuses of the present Administration are likely to be
     even caricatured under his. His election would be a severe blow
     to the cause of revenue reform. The cause of civil service
     reform would be hopeless with him for President, for Reuben E.
     Fenton, his guide and counselor, and the other wretches by whom
     Greeley is surrounded, will never give up the patronage by
     which they expect to hold their power. As to other public
     measures there is no abuse or extravagance into which that man,
     through the infirmity of his judgment, may not be betrayed. It
     is wonderful how little, in some of his vagaries, the scruples
     which would influence other men of no exemplary integrity,
     restrain him. But I need not dwell upon these matters--they are
     all set forth in the _Evening Post_ which you sometimes see.
     What I have written, is written in the most profound respect
     for your public character, and because of that respect. If you
     conclude to support Mr. Greeley, I shall, of course, infer that
     you do so because you do not know him.

    Yours truly,
    HON. L. TRUMBULL.
    W. C. BRYANT.

    UNITED STATES SENATE CHAMBER,
    WASHINGTON, May 10, 1872.

    WM. C. BRYANT, Esq.,

     MY DEAR SIR,--Your kind and frank letter is before me. I wish I
     could see something better than to support Mr. Greeley, but I
     do not. Personally, I know but little of him, but in common
     with most people supposed he was an honest but confiding man,
     who was often imposed upon by those about him. This would be a
     great fault in a President, I admit, but with proper
     surroundings could be guarded against, and almost anything
     would be an improvement on what we have. One of the greatest
     evils of our time is party despotism and intolerance. Greeley's
     nomination is a bomb-shell which seems likely to blow up both
     parties. This will be an immense gain. Most of the corruptions
     in government are made possible through party tyranny. Members
     of the Senate are daily coerced into voting contrary to their
     convictions through party pressure. A notable instance of this
     was the vote on the impeachment of Johnson, and matters in this
     respect have not improved since. If by Greeley's election we
     could break up the present corrupt organizations, it would
     enable the people at the end of four years to elect a President
     with a view to his fitness instead of having one put upon them
     by a vote of political bummers acting in the name of party.

     Having favored the Cincinnati movement and Greeley having
     received the nomination, I see no course left but to try to
     elect him, and endeavor to surround him, as far as possible,
     with honest men. Greeley had a good deal of strength among the
     people and was strong in the convention outside of bargain or
     arrangement. Many voted for him as their first choice, and in
     Illinois I feel confident he is a stronger candidate than Adams
     would have been.

    LYMAN TRUMBULL.

Sumner, although urged by many of his warmest friends both before and
after the convention, including Frank Bird, Samuel Bowles, and Greeley
himself (through Whitelaw Reid), to declare his position, did not break
silence until May 31, when he made his great speech against Grant. The
speech remains a true catalogue of the shortcomings of Grant as a civil
administrator up to that time. All his sins of omission and of
commission were there set forth in orderly array, together with the
proofs. Sumner thus spared future historians a deal of trouble in
searching the records, but the speech was not very effective in the way
of changing votes. Sumner sometimes mistook himself for a modern Cicero
impeaching Verres. He piled up the agony in the fashion customary in the
pleadings of the ancient forum. He overlooked the signal services
rendered by Grant before he held any civil office. He did not make
allowance for the transition of a tanner's clerk, earning fifty dollars
a month and having a family to support, first to the command of half a
million soldiers in war time, and then to the presidency of the United
States in time of peace, all within the period of eight years. The
mistakes naturally arising from such crude beginnings, when meeting
gigantic responsibilities in quick succession, ought to have excited
pathos as well as censure. By giving due consideration to Grant's whole
career, he would have secured a better hearing for the part of it which
he wished to impress upon the public mind.

Even now Sumner did not advise anybody to vote for Greeley. His omission
to do so was at once construed as an argument favorable to Grant. It was
said that the dangers involved in Greeley's eccentricities were so much
greater than anything that Grant had done, or could do, that Grant's
worst enemy (Sumner) would not advise people to vote for him. Not until
the 29th of July did the Massachusetts Senator publicly speak for
Greeley, and then only in a letter to some colored voters who had asked
his advice. It was then too late to exert much influence. It is doubtful
if even the colored men who had sought his advice gave any heed to it.
Probably the reason why Sumner did not speak earlier was that he
hesitated to break from his abolitionist friends, Garrison, Phillips,
and others, who had besought him not to join the Democrats. When he did
finally join the forces supporting Greeley, his old friend Garrison
turned upon him and chastised him severely in a series of open letters,
which Sumner declined to read.

FOOTNOTES:

[126] Chicago _Times_, April 22.

[127] Frank W. Bird, of Boston, who went to Cincinnati as an anti-Adams
delegate, wrote to Charles Sumner on May 7: "Don't believe a word about
the trade, in any discreditable sense, between Blair and Brown on the
one part and the Greeley men on the other. Undoubtedly Blair wanted to
head off Schurz, and equally truly an arrangement was made, or an
understanding reached, on Thursday night, in a certain contingency to
unite a portion of the Brown and Greeley forces: but, except perhaps in
the motives of the leading negotiators on one side, there was nothing
unusual in the affair, nothing that is not usually--indeed, almost
necessarily--done in such conventions; nothing that was not contemplated
and even proposed by the Adams men." (Sumner papers in Harvard
University Library.)

CHAPTER XXVI

THE GREELEY CAMPAIGN

My own feelings immediately after the nomination were set forth in a
telegram to the Chicago _Tribune_ published in its issue of May 4. The
chief part was in these words:

     CINCINNATI, May 3.--The nomination of Mr. Greeley was
     accomplished by the people against the judgment and strenuous
     efforts of politicians, using the latter word in its larger and
     higher sense. The Gratz Brown performance has given the whole
     affair the appearance of a put-up job, but it was merely a
     lucky guess. The Blairs and Browns do not like Schurz. To
     defeat a candidate who was likely to be on confidential terms
     with Schurz, as either Adams or Trumbull would have been, was
     the thing nearest to their hearts, and for this purpose Brown
     made his appearance here. His speech in the Convention fell
     like dish-water on the whole assemblage, and, being followed by
     the transfer of the Missouri votes to Trumbull, instead of
     Greeley, showed that he had no influence in his own delegation.
     The changes from Brown to Greeley were few and far between, and
     in a short time the convention only remembered that Brown had
     been a candidate once and was so no longer. But the personal
     popularity of Greeley was more than a match for the
     intellectual strength of Trumbull and the moral gravity of
     Adams. He was stealing votes from both of them all the time.
     When the Illinois delegation at last perceived that the heart
     of the convention was carrying away the head, and retired for
     consultation, the surprising fact was developed that fifteen of
     their own number preferred Greeley to any candidate not from
     their own state. The supporters of Adams, while entertaining
     the most cordial feeling for the friends of Trumbull, think
     that if the latter had come over to Adams's corner the result
     would have been different. I do not think so. If the Illinois
     vote could have been cast solid for Adams at an earlier stage,
     the result might have been different: but there was no time
     when Adams could have got more than the twenty-seven votes
     which were finally cast for him. The contingency of having to
     divide between Adams and Greeley had never been considered,
     and, therefore, no time had been allowed to compare views. The
     vote of the state being thus divided, its weight was lost for
     any purpose of influencing other votes. Then gush and hurrah
     swept everything down, and, almost before a vote of Illinois
     had been recorded by the secretary, the dispatches came rushing
     to the telegraph instruments that Greeley was nominated. For a
     moment, the wiser heads in the convention were stunned, though
     everybody tried to look perfectly contented. Of all the things
     that could possibly happen, this was the one thing which
     everybody supposed could not happen. Not even the Greeley men
     themselves thought it could happen. The only able politician
     who seemed to be really for Greeley was Waldo Hutchins, of New
     York, and even his sincerity was questioned by Greeley's
     backbone friends as long as the Davis movement was regarded as
     still alive.

How the news was received by Trumbull was told by the New York
_Herald's_ Washington dispatch of May 3:

     ... The scene in the Senate, when the news was received, was
     one of complacent dignity, such as only the members of that
     body could arrange, even if they had studied to prepare
     themselves for an art tableau. Mr. Fenton was the recipient of
     the dispatches, and his chair was consequently surrounded by a
     crowd of the less dignified Senators, who could not wait to
     have the telegrams passed around. Trumbull was the most
     undisturbed of all those on the floor. His equanimity
     astonished his friends as well as the numerous strangers in the
     galleries, who watched closely for indications of excitement in
     his parchment-like face. In truth, he seemed to get the news
     rather by some occult process of induction, if he got it at
     all, than by the course usual to ordinary men. Other members
     smiled, made comments, exchanged opinions and preserved their
     dignity with customary success; but he alone asserted an
     immobility of demeanor that will last for all time, in the
     memory of its witnesses, as a remarkable instance of
     self-possession. At last, when every one else had delivered
     himself of some criticism he remarked to those in his
     immediate vicinity: "If the country can stand the first
     outburst of mirth the nomination will call forth, it may prove
     a strong ticket."

Carl Schurz was slow in reaching a decision to support the ticket. His
first endeavor was to induce Greeley, in a friendly way, to decline the
nomination, by showing him the sombre aspects of the campaign ahead. In
a letter dated May 18, he told Greeley that the dissatisfaction of an
influential part of the Liberal Republican forces was such that a
meeting had been called to consider the question of putting another
ticket in the field before the Democrats should hold their convention.
Other discouraging features were presented and the letter concluded with
these words:

     I have, from the beginning, made it a point to tell you with
     entire candor how I feel and what I think about this business,
     and now if the developments of the campaign should be such as
     to disappoint your hopes, it shall not be my fault if you are
     deceived about the real state of things.

To this Greeley replied on the 20th, saying that his advices warranted
him in predicting that New York would give 50,000 majority for the
Cincinnati ticket, and that New England and the South would be nearly
solid for it, while in Pennsylvania and the Northwest the chances were
at least even. He ended by saying: "I shall accept unconditionally."

The meeting foreshadowed in Schurz's letter to Greeley took place at the
Fifth Avenue Hotel on the 20th of June. It was composed mainly of
persons who had participated in the Cincinnati Convention and had been
greatly disappointed by Mr. Greeley's nomination. William Cullen Bryant
presided, but fell asleep in the chair soon after the proceedings began.
The first speech was made by Trumbull, who said that his mind was made
up to support the Cincinnati ticket. He thought that Greeley had gained
strength during the first month of the campaign and that the chances of
his election were good. He could see no reason for nominating another
ticket. That would simply be playing into the hands of the supporters of
Grant.

Schurz's position, as reported by the _Nation_, was this:

     That he, more than any other man, was chagrined by the result
     of Cincinnati; that he does not consider Mr. Greeley a
     reformer, and has no expectations of any reforms at his hands,
     and will say so on the stump; that he believes him "to be
     surrounded by bad men"; that he (Mr. Schurz), however, is so
     satisfied of the necessity of defeating Grant and dissolving
     existing party organizations, that he is ready to use any
     instrument for the purpose, and will, therefore, support
     Greeley in the modified and guarded manner indicated above. He
     looks forward, with a hopefulness bordering on enthusiasm, to
     the good things which will grow out of the confusion following
     on Greeley's election, and is deeply touched by the Southern
     eagerness for Greeley.

A private letter from E. L. Godkin to Schurz, dated Lenox,
Massachusetts, June 28, gives reasons for deprecating the course that
the latter had decided to take in the campaign.

     He has considered Schurz's words about Greeley; would be most
     glad could he see any way to join in supporting Greeley, Schurz
     being the one man in American politics who inspires Godkin with
     some hope concerning them. He maturely considered what he could
     and would do when Greeley was first nominated. In view of his
     own share in bringing public feeling to the point of creating
     the convention, he would have stood by Greeley if possible; saw
     no chance to do so and sees none now; is satisfied he can have
     nothing to do with Greeley. If Greeley gave pledges, and broke
     them, "_as I believe he would_," it would be no consolation to
     Godkin that an opposition would thereby be raised up. He went
     through all this with Grant, who gave far better guarantees
     than Greeley offers, "and he made fine promises and broke them,
     and good appointments and reversed them, and I have in
     consequence been three years in opposition." Cannot afford to
     repeat this. "Greeley would have to change his whole nature, at
     the age of 62, in order not to deceive and betray you," and
     when he has done so it will be too late to atone for having
     backed him by turning against him, which would then merely
     discredit one's judgment, and invite suspicion of some personal
     disappointment. Moreover, the small band of political reformers
     will have fallen into disrepute and become ridiculous and the
     country will be worse off than before. Feels that Schurz is
     sacrificing the future in taking Greeley on any terms....

Parke Godwin was even more bitter against Greeley. He wrote to Schurz
under date May 28:

     "... I have so strong a sense of Greeley's utter unfitness for
     the presidency that I cannot well express it. The man is a
     charlatan from top to bottom, and the smallest kind of a
     charlatan,--for no other motive than a weak and puerile vanity.
     His success in politics would be the success of whoever is most
     wrong in theory and most corrupt in practice." All the most
     corrupt spoilsmen of either side are either with him now or
     preparing to go to him. It is the first of duties to expose him
     and his factitious reputation. Grant and his crew are bad,--but
     hardly so bad as Greeley and his would be. Besides, Grant,
     though in very bad hands, has his clutches full: Greeley's set
     would be newcomers.

The regular Republican Convention met at Philadelphia, June 5, and
nominated General Grant for President by unanimous vote. The names of
Henry Wilson, Schuyler Colfax, and several others were presented for
Vice-President. On the first roll-call Wilson had 361 votes and Colfax
306, and there were 66 for other candidates. Before the result was
announced, 38 votes from Southern States were changed to Wilson, giving
him 399, a majority of the whole number cast. This decision was brought
about by the wish of Grant himself, communicated to General Grenville
M. Dodge before the convention met. Grant had no liking for Colfax.[128]

The platform of the convention laid stress on the imperative duty of
"suppression of violent and treasonable organizations in certain lately
rebellious regions and for the protection of the ballot-box." This meant
the stern execution of the Ku-Klux Law, under suspension of the writ of
_habeas corpus_, which was already in progress. The remainder of the
platform was either "pointing with pride" at past achievements, or
clap-trap of various kinds, including a promise to take good care of
capital and labor, so as to secure "the largest opportunities and a just
share of the mutual profits of these two great servants of
civilization."

The Democratic National Convention met at Baltimore, July 9, and adopted
both the platform and the candidates of the Cincinnati Convention. This
involved a complete reversal of the party's principles as declared in
its last previous platform, but it was not inconsistent with inexorable
facts. There was nothing else to be done unless the party was determined
still to battle against the result of the Civil War. It was inevitable,
however, that there should be a remnant of the party that would never
vote for Greeley--the man who above all others had gored them most
savagely in the fights of a quarter of a century. The dissentients
called and held a convention at Louisville, September 3, where they
nominated Charles O'Conor of New York for President and John Quincy
Adams for Vice-President, both of whom declined. Other attempts to put a
third ticket in the field came to nothing. The recalcitrants either
voted for Grant or abstained from voting altogether.

Trumbull took an active part in the campaign, speaking to large crowds
and almost incessantly in Maine, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan,
Indiana, and Illinois. His first speech was made at Springfield,
Illinois, June 26, a synopsis of which will serve to indicate the views
which he advocated.

     He said that he was glad to explain to Illinoisans the position
     he had felt it his duty to take on many points. It was now more
     than seventeen years that he had represented the state in
     Washington. In that time the principles on which the Republican
     party was formed had all been settled. Nothing remained but the
     machinery, which had fallen into the hands of those who sought
     to use it for merely selfish ends. During his service he had
     sometimes not acted according to the views of all his
     constituents, but he had not failed to follow his own sense of
     duty and right. Within the last ten years many abuses had crept
     into the Government and numerous defalcations had occurred,
     perhaps the most noted being that of Hodge, paymaster, in the
     office of the Paymaster-General, "whose defalcations, occurring
     right under the eye of the Government, amounted to more than
     $400,000." An investigating committee had reported to a
     previous Congress great abuses in the New York
     Custom-House--bribery and demoralization. At the beginning of
     the recent session he [Trumbull] had introduced a resolution
     for a joint committee of investigation, with power to send for
     persons and papers; introduced it in good faith to unearth
     frauds, if existent, and to correct them, without design of
     injuring the party. "I was simple-minded enough to believe that
     the Republican party, ... with which I had been identified for
     so many years, would be lifted in public estimation ... if it
     had the virtue and the honesty to expose, even among its own
     members, wrong, corruptions, and fraud if fraud existed, and to
     apply the proper corrective. And I was very much astonished
     when that proposition was met by gentlemen in the Senate who
     constitute what, for brevity's sake, I may denominate a
     Senatorial Ring, denouncing me as unfaithful to the Republican
     party and as throwing dirt upon it by offering a resolution to
     inquire into the conduct of public officers."

     The public indignation aroused by this forced the Senatorial
     Ring to action. "A party caucus of Republican Senators was
     called, and a scheme devised to change the character of the
     resolution, and to organize and pack the committee, which,
     instead of going forth to uncover and expose corruption, should
     go forth to conceal and cover it up. The proposition for the
     joint committee of the two houses, with power to send for
     persons and papers, was voted down, and in its place a
     resolution was passed creating a committee of the Senate alone.
     The members of the committee were selected in a party caucus,
     and not a single Republican Senator who had originally favored
     the investigation was placed upon the committee. This was
     contrary to parliamentary law, and contrary to the plainest
     principles of common sense, if the object was to discover
     abuses, and contrary to that ordinary rule which says that a
     child must not be put to a nurse who cares not for it. This
     investigation was placed in the hands of the parties to be
     investigated...." Even this committee, going to New York, could
     not, however, shut their eyes to the enormous abuses there. But
     they did give public notice that any merchants who had paid
     bribe money to customs officials would be prosecuted to the
     extent of the law, thereby securing the non-appearance of any
     such merchant as a witness. They acted as if sent to
     investigate merchants, not officials.... And the Senate Ring
     would allow no measure to be considered tending to rectify
     these abuses, wanting to keep the spoils to carry next fall's
     elections. A bill from the House was referred to the Judiciary
     committee, which had a majority of Ring members,--a bill to
     inaugurate reforms and to protect merchants from plunder.
     Although it was before the committee two months it was never
     reported to the Senate. "I made two motions in the Senate to
     have the committee discharged and to bring the bill before the
     Senate, that it might receive its attention, but they were
     voted down under party drill."

     "Let me tell you of another committee of investigation, raised
     in the House of Representatives, and packed also by an
     obsequious and partisan Speaker,--a committee, a majority of
     which consisted of the friends of the Secretary of the Navy
     whose conduct was about to be investigated. I want to tell you
     what that committee did, and I think you will be astonished
     when I state the fact that a committee of members of the House
     of Representatives could have been found, who were so blinded
     by party zeal, so full of bigotry or cowardice that they could
     not see, or were afraid to expose, violations of the law on the
     part of political associates. This committee was raised on the
     motion of Governor Blair, of Michigan, a high-minded,
     independent, and able Republican.... At his [Blair's] instance,
     a committee was raised to inquire into certain transactions in
     the Navy Department, presided over by Secretary Robeson....
     Among many of the things that the committee was instructed to
     inquire into ... was a claim for building certain vessels for
     the Government of the United States during the war. I have the
     precise figures here, giving the exact amounts which the
     Government contracted to pay for the construction of the three
     vessels, Tecumseh, Mahopac, and Manhattan. The contract was
     made in 1862, and the Government agreed to pay a contractor of
     the name of Secor $1,380,000 for the construction of these
     three vessels. After the contract was made, the Government
     desired some changes in the plans of the vessels, and a board
     of naval officers was appointed to superintend them and to
     certify bills for extra work, which they did to the amount of
     more than $500,000. The vessels were furnished, the contract
     price paid--the sum due for the extra work was paid, and it was
     all settled and closed in the Navy Department in 1865. But
     these contractors, who had received more than $1,900,000 for
     building the vessels and the extra work, came to Congress by
     petition, and complained that they still had not received as
     much as they ought, because they said that they were delayed in
     their contracts by the action of the Government; that while
     thus delayed the price of labor and of materials advanced, and
     they had met with great loss, and they, therefore, asked
     Congress to allow them something more. Congress, in 1867,
     passed a law directing the Secretary of the Navy to look into
     this matter and report to the next session. The Secretary
     appointed a board of Naval officers, who made the
     investigation, and reported to Congress that these Secors ought
     to be allowed $115,000 more (I use round numbers)--$115,000 in
     addition to what they had already received, and put into the
     law these words, 'which shall be in full discharge of all
     claims against the United States on account of the vessels upon
     which the Board made the allowance as per this report.' Now,
     do any of you, does any lawyer, ... know how to write a
     stronger clause than that to end this claim? If you do, I do
     not.... The Secors, in 1868, received the $115,000 and gave
     their receipt.... Would you believe it possible that the
     Secretary of the Navy would, after that, pay anything more?...
     Mr. Robeson, in 1870, ... on his own motion, without any act of
     Congress authorizing it, proceeds to reinvestigate this claim,
     and without coming to Congress at all pays over to these
     gentlemen $93,000 more. Well, that is not the worst of it. He
     might just as well have paid them $93,000,000. The Congress of
     the United States never appropriated any money to pay this
     $93,000, but the Secretary of the Navy took the money
     appropriated for other purposes and other years and paid it out
     of that. This is bad enough.... But when this packed committee
     came to examine this transaction, a majority of its members
     reported that the transactions only involved a mere difference
     of opinion as to the construction of the law, and, in their
     opinion, the Secretary had construed it rightly. And Mr.
     Robeson, instead of being rebuked, is commended by the
     committee, and is continued in office. It is due to the
     chairman of the committee--Governor Blair, of Michigan, and one
     of his associates--the committee consisted of five members--to
     say that they dissented from the majority report, and held that
     the transaction was not only without authority of law, but in
     direct violation of it....

     "I was never a party man to the extent of being willing to
     serve the party against my country and if, to-day, I am acting
     with the Liberal Republican party, if I have denounced these
     transactions at the hazard of being myself denounced, it was
     done in good faith on my part, for the purpose of correcting
     abuses, and appealing from a party tyranny established by a
     Senatorial Ring to the honest, intelligent, upright citizens of
     the country, who are bound by no such shackles as will compel
     them to cover up fraud and iniquity in any party...."

     He mentioned the encroachments of the Federal Government, as in
     the attempt to destroy the privilege of the writ of _habeas
     corpus_ in the last session of Congress, as a bill virtually
     placing the elections of the Southern States under the
     direction of the President. If the people have become so far
     indifferent to their rights as to permit the President to
     suspend the writ of _habeas corpus_ at will, and to control
     and supervise their elections, their liberties are gone, and
     "they have only to wait until a man sufficiently ambitious
     reaches the Presidency, for him to grasp and maintain absolute
     powers."

The speech was two hours long, and concluded with this tribute to
Greeley:

     ... Mr. Greeley [he said] is a man of the highest character and
     intelligence. No man in the land is better acquainted with the
     public men of the country than he. He is a man of purity of
     character, of strict honesty, who would not look upon
     corruption and official delinquency with the least degree of
     allowance. You may rely upon that and upon his bringing about
     him the ablest men of the land to form a strong and able
     Administration, because he knows who the able men are, and
     could have no other motive than to make his Administration a
     success, as he will not seek a reëlection. I am not in the
     habit of saying much about individuals, but I think I may say
     to you that you may trust Horace Greeley for an honest
     administration of the Government, and that is what the people
     of the country want. You may trust him above almost all other
     men in this land for bringing about that state of good feeling
     between the North and the South, so essential to the peace and
     prosperity of the nation.

The campaign started with considerable éclat among the ranks of
Greeley's supporters and corresponding depression on the other side.
Carl Schurz, who took the laboring oar, at first with reluctance
bordering on gloom, gathered confidence as he progressed in his stumping
tour. Enthusiasm for the old white hat seemed to be no figment of
imagination, but a living reality. All eyes were fixed upon North
Carolina which had an election for state officers on the 1st of August,
and which the Liberals expected to win. The early returns seemed to
justify their confidence, but there was a change when the western
mountain districts were heard from. The supporters of Grant carried the
state by about 2000 majority. This wound was not so deep as a well nor
so wide as a church door, but it answered one purpose. It ended the "old
white hat" enthusiasm and turned attention to the more sober and solid
aspects of the campaign. That Greeley was an unbalanced character, that
he was lacking in steadiness, in mental equipoise and ability to look at
both sides of any question where his feelings were strongly enlisted, it
was easy to show by many examples in his brilliant career. His
occasional controversies with Lincoln during the war, in which he was
invariably worsted, were now reproduced with effect by the orators on
the Grant side, and the old white hat and coat and the Flintwinch
neck-tie were savagely pictured by Tom Nast in _Harper's Weekly_. There
were satirical persons who said that Greeley took as much pains to make
himself a harlequin as another might take to make himself a dandy.

The attacks were not without effect upon people who had never seen
Greeley face to face. To his immediate friends in New York it seemed
necessary that he should show himself to the public so that people might
know he was a man of solid parts, of statesmanlike proportions and brain
power. He was persuaded to make a series of speeches in Indiana, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania in the month of September, as those states were likely
to have a decisive influence on the country in their local elections,
which took place in October. Accordingly he took the stump, beginning at
Jeffersonville, Indiana, and moving eastward. His speeches surprised
both friends and enemies by their high tone, argumentative force, good
temper, and versatility and vigor of expression. The main point which he
sought to enforce was the need of restored peace and brotherhood in all
the land. No pleading could be more persuasive or more touching. No
doubt can exist of the sincerity with which it was uttered.

It was somewhat droll that in the last speech of the series he was
confronted by a speaker on the Grant side at Easton, Pennsylvania,
September 28, who predicted that if Greeley were elected all the furnace
fires in the Lehigh Valley would be put out and their working-people
thrown upon the almshouses. This to the stoutest champion of the
protective tariff then living! He was not, however, struck dumb by the
prospect of the early impoverishment of the iron workers. He said:

     A recent speaker of the opposition has asserted that if I were
     made President all the furnace fires in the Lehigh Valley would
     presently be put out. This seems incredible. All men know I am
     a protectionist; but that I would not veto any bill fairly
     passed by the Congress of the United States modifying or
     changing the tariff is certainly true. I do not believe in
     government by selfish rings, but I believe just as little in
     government by the one-man power. I don't believe in government
     by vetoes. The veto power of the President is not given him to
     enable him to reject every bill for which he would have refused
     to vote if a member of Congress, but only to be employed in
     certain great emergencies where corruption or recklessness has
     passed a measure through Congress which would not stand the
     test of inquiry. I tell you, friends, I believe in legislation
     by Congress, not by Presidents, and I should myself approve and
     sign a bill which had a fair majority in Congress, although in
     my judgment it was not accordant with public policy--with the
     wisest policy.

Although Greeley's stumping tour raised him in the public estimation, it
is doubtful if it gained him any votes. It was now too late. People's
minds were made up and nothing could change them, not even the
Crédit-Mobilier scandal. General Grant was not concerned in this
scandal, but a number of his most distinguished supporters, the very
pillars of the Republican party, beginning with Vice-President Colfax,
were named as guilty of taking bribes to influence their votes in
Congress for the Union Pacific Railroad. This accusation was not made
public until September, and then by accident. Most of the persons
accused made denial, and since no investigation could be had until the
next session of Congress (a month later than the election), nobody was
bound to give credence to an unproved charge. The general answer of the
supporters of Grant was that they would not withhold their votes from
him even if the charge were true. Nor could they be blamed for so
saying. If the persons accused were really guilty, they would be
punished in due time, or at all events exposed, and exposure would
itself be punishment. It is needless to go into the details of the
Crédit-Mobilier scandal here. It was investigated by an able and
impartial committee of the House, and all the guilty ones were visited
with such punishment as Congress could legally inflict.

Of the three October states, Pennsylvania and Ohio gave large Republican
majorities and Indiana a small majority for Hendricks (Democrat) for
governor. This was decisive of the general result in November. Greeley
and Brown were overwhelmingly defeated. The only states that gave them
majorities were Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Tennessee, and
Texas, having altogether 66 electoral votes. The others gave Grant and
Wilson a total of 272 electoral votes. The state of New York, which
Greeley, in his letter to Schurz, had claimed by 50,000, gave 53,000
majority against him.

I have always held the opinion that either Adams or Trumbull could have
been elected if nominated at Cincinnati. I think also that Adams was the
stronger of the two, because he had incurred no personal ill-will during
the twelve years of war and Reconstruction and because the minds of the
Democratic leaders who had encouraged the Liberal movement were eagerly
expecting him. There would have been no bolting movement in that
quarter. The Germans also were enthusiastic for Adams, and although they
would have supported Trumbull willingly, there would have been perhaps a
trifle less of cordiality for him. Neither of the two was gifted with
personal "magnetism," but either of them had as much of that quality as
Grant had, or as the public then desired. The voters were not then in
search of the sympathetic virtues. There was a yearning for some
cold-blooded, masterful man to go through the temple of freedom with a
scourge of small cords driving out the grafters and money-changers.
Adams was qualified for this rôle. He was also the man of whom the
Republican leaders had the gravest fears as an opposing candidate.

The campaign and its result killed poor Greeley. The election took place
on the 5th of November. On the 10th he wrote a letter of two lines
marked "private forever" to Carl Schurz, saying:

     I wish I could say with what an agony of emotion I subscribe
     myself, gratefully yours, Horace Greeley.

He then took to his bed and his friends became alarmed. Frequent
bulletins were published in the _Tribune_ showing that he was a victim
of insomnia, from which, the paper said, he had been a sufferer, more or
less, at former periods of his life. He died on the 29th. His wife had
died one month earlier, October 30. History says that he died of a
broken heart.[129]

That Greeley had been eager for public office from an early period was
shown by his famous letter withdrawing himself as junior partner from
the firm of Seward, Weed, and Greeley. When the Cincinnati nomination
came to him his fondest dreams seemed to be on the eve of fulfillment.
Now all such dreams had vanished, a political party of noble aspirations
had foundered on him as the hidden rock, his self-esteem had received an
annihilating blow, and his beloved _Tribune_, the labor of his lifetime,
was supposed to be ruined pecuniarily. Whatever his faults may have
been, he received his punishment for them in this world. He was only
sixty-two years of age, of sound constitution and good habits, and had
never used liquor or tobacco. He ought to, and probably would, have
lived twenty years longer if he had put away ambition and contented
himself with the repute and influence he had fairly earned. He was the
most influential editor of his time and country, but as a political
writer E. L. Godkin was his superior, and in fact Godkin, in the columns
of the _Nation_, contributed more than any other writer, perhaps more
than any other person, to his overthrow.

The state election of Louisiana in 1872 had resulted in a disputed
return for governor and legislature. One set of returns showed a
majority for John McEnery, the conservative candidate. Another set
showed a majority for William P. Kellogg, Republican. The sitting
governor, Warmoth, controlled the returning board and he favored
McEnery. A former returning board headed by one Lynch had been dissolved
by an act of the legislature. To this defunct board the supporters of
Kellogg appealed. The Lynch Board, without any actual returns before
them, declared Kellogg elected. They then procured an order from Judge
Durell, of the United States Circuit Court at New Orleans, to the United
States Marshal, Packard, who had a small military force at his command,
to seize the State House. This was done and the act was approved by
President Grant. An appeal to him from the better class of citizens of
New Orleans was rejected. The excitement in Congress growing out of this
usurpation was intense, even among Republicans. The Senate Committee on
Privileges and Elections was ordered to make an investigation, which it
did, and it reported, through Senator Carpenter on the 20th of February,
that the action of Judge Durell was illegal and that all steps taken in
pursuance of it were void. It recommended a new election and reported a
bill for holding it; but Senator Morton, who made a minority report,
prevented it from coming to a vote. Trumbull, who was also a member of
the committee, made a report more drastic than that of Carpenter and
supported his own view by a speech delivered on the 15th of February.

     Here you have [he said] an order sent from the city of
     Washington on the 3d day of December, which was before Judge
     Durell issued his order to seize the State House and organize a
     legislature, and directing that nobody should take part in the
     organization except such persons as were returned as members by
     what was known as the Lynch Board, a board which the committee,
     in their report drawn by the Senator from Wisconsin, say had
     been abolished by an act of the legislature, and had not a
     single official return before it. It undertook to canvass
     returns without having any returns to canvass. On forged
     affidavits, hearsay, and newspaper reports and verbal
     statements, the Lynch Returning Board, consisting of four men,
     without legal existence as a returning board, got together and
     without one official return, or other legitimate evidence
     before them, undertook to say who should constitute the
     Legislature of Louisiana.[130]

This was Trumbull's last speech in the Senate and was one of his best,
but other influences prevailed with Grant.[131]

Thus Kellogg and his crew became the masters of Louisiana, and four
years later became the deciding factor in the Hayes-Tilden presidential
contest.

FOOTNOTES:

[128] This fact was given to me by General Dodge, in writing.

[129] John Bigelow's Diary, under date Nov. 28, 1872, contains the
following entry:

"Greeley is now in a madhouse, and before morning will probably be
dead--so Swinton tells me to-day; and Reid, whom I saw to-day, confirms
these apprehensions." _Retrospections of an Active Life_, v, 91.

[130] _Cong. Globe_, 1873, p. 1744.

[131] Rhodes thinks that the influence which prevailed with Grant in
this instance was that of Morton. (_History of the United States_, VII,
111.)

CHAPTER XXVII

LATER YEARS

The defeat of the Liberal Republicans terminated Trumbull's official
career. His senatorial term expired on the 3d of March, 1873. The
regular Republicans carried the legislature of Illinois, and Richard J.
Oglesby was elected Senator in his stead. He was now sixty years of age
and he resumed the practice of his profession in the city of Chicago,
which had been his place of residence during the greater part of his
senatorial service. His law firm at the beginning was Trumbull, Church &
Trumbull, the second member being Mr. Firman Church and the third Mr.
Perry Trumbull, a son of the ex-Senator. Mr. William J. Bryan soon
afterward became a student in the office. Various changes took place in
the Trumbull law firm. Mr. Church removed to California, and his place
was taken by Mr. Henry S. Robbins, and the firm became Trumbull,
Robbins, Willetts & Trumbull. Mr. Hempstead Washburne, son of Hon. Elihu
B. Washburne, became a member of the firm later. Trumbull's reputation,
talents, and experience soon gave him a place in the front rank of his
profession, which he maintained till the end of his long life. I shall
not attempt to follow the details of his career at the bar except as
they touch upon public questions. The first affair of this kind was the
Hayes-Tilden disputed election of 1876.

The second Grant Administration was more lamentable than the first in
respect of military rule, turbulence, and bloodshed in the South and
corruption in the civil service in the North. These evils became so
glaring and intolerable that the Republican party suffered a disastrous
defeat in the congressional elections of 1874, and failed to secure a
majority of the popular vote in the presidential election of 1876. The
opposing candidates in this contest were Hayes (Republican) and Tilden
(Democrat). One hundred and eighty-five electoral votes were necessary
to a choice. The undisputed returns gave Tilden 184 and Hayes 166. Those
of Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina were in dispute. It was
necessary that Hayes should have all of them in order to be the next
President. All of these states were under military control, and the
returning boards who had the power of canvassing the votes, and the
governors who had the power of certifying the result to Congress, were
Republicans.

The excitement in the country when this condition became known was
extreme. No confidence was placed in the character of the Southern
returning boards. That of Louisiana consisted of three knaves and one
fool,[132] and the governor of the state was W. P. Kellogg, who had
acquired the office by the acts of usurpation described in the preceding
chapter. It was seen at once that unless some respectable tribunal could
be devised to decide between the conflicting claims the country might
drift into a new civil war. The first thing to be done was to endeavor
to secure a fair count of the ballots cast in the disputed states. To
this end a certain number of "visiting statesmen" were chosen by the
heads of their respective political parties to go to the scene of the
contest and watch all the steps taken by the canvassers of the votes.
President Grant appointed those of the Republican party and Abram S.
Hewitt, chairman of the National Democratic Committee, appointed the
others. Trumbull had voted for Tilden in the election, and he was
chosen by Hewitt as one of ten visiting statesmen for Louisiana. Senator
Sherman, of Ohio, was one of the Republican visitors. Congress passed a
law on the 29th of January, 1877, to create an Electoral Commission,
consisting of five Senators, five Representatives, and five judges of
the Supreme Court, to take all the evidence in regard to the disputed
elections and to render a decision thereon by a majority vote of the
fifteen members. Four of the five judges of the Supreme Court were named
in the act of Congress. They were Miller and Swayne, Republicans, and
Clifford and Field, Democrats, and the act provided that these four
should choose the fifth. It was the general expectation that they would
choose David Davis as the fifth member, as he was commonly classed as an
Independent, since he had been a candidate in the Cincinnati Convention,
which nominated Greeley. But, on the very day when the Electoral
Commission Bill passed, Davis was elected by the legislature of Illinois
as Senator of the United States, to succeed Logan whose term was
expiring. Davis accepted the senatorship and declined to serve as the
fifth judge. Thereupon Bradley was chosen in his stead.

Trumbull was chosen as one of the counsel on the Tilden side to argue
the Louisiana case. On the 14th of February he appeared before the
Commission and offered to show that the votes certified by the
commissioners of election in the voting precincts of Louisiana to the
supervisors of registration, who were the officers legally appointed to
receive the same, showed a majority varying from six to nine thousand
for the Tilden electors; that the returning board did not receive from
any poll, voting place, or parish, and did not have before them, any
statement, as required by law, of any riot, tumult, act of violence,
intimidation, armed disturbance, bribery, or corrupt influence tending
to prevent a free, fair, peaceable vote; that the supervisors of
registration, without any such statements of violence or intimidation,
omitted to include in the returns of election, or to make any mention of
the same, votes amounting to a majority of 2267 against W. P. Kellogg,
one of the Hayes electors; that the votes cast on the 7th of November,
1876, had never been compiled or canvassed; that the votes had never
been opened by the governor in the presence of the other state officers
required by law to be present, nor in the presence of any of them; that
the law of Louisiana required that both political parties should be
represented on the returning board, but that all the members, four in
number, were Republicans, and that although there was one vacancy on the
board they refused to fill it by choosing anybody; that the returning
board employed as clerks and assistants four persons, whose names were
given, all of whom were then under indictment for crime, to whom was
committed the task of compiling and canvassing the returns, and that
none but Republicans were to be present; and that all the decisions of
the returning board were made in secret session.

     Not to detain you [said Trumbull] as to this Government in
     Louisiana, I will only say that it is not a republican
     government, for it is a matter that I think this Commission
     should take official knowledge of, that the pretended officers
     in the state of Louisiana are upheld by military power alone.
     They could not maintain themselves an hour but for military
     support. Is that government republican which rests upon
     military power for support? A republican government is a
     government of the people, for the people, and by the people:
     but the Government in Louisiana has been nothing but a military
     despotism for the last four years, and it could not stand a day
     if the people were not overborne by military power.

His speech was about two hours long, and he was followed by Carpenter
and Campbell on the same side. The leading argument on the Hayes side
was made by Mr. E. W. Stoughton, of New York, who contended that neither
the Commission nor Congress itself could go behind the official returns
certified by the governor of the state of Louisiana, and that the
recognition of Kellogg as governor by the President of the United States
was conclusive evidence of the fact that he was the person empowered to
act in that capacity.

By a vote of eight to seven the Commission decided in favor of
Stoughton's contention, and the same rule was applied to all the other
disputed returns, and by this ruling the presidential office was awarded
to Rutherford B. Hayes.

Under the circumstances then existing, and with the characters then
holding office in Louisiana, it is obvious that the latter had power to
throw out an unlimited number of Tilden votes if necessary to make a
majority for Hayes. It is not obvious that the supporters of Tilden had
power to intimidate an unlimited number of negroes; the number of the
latter was slightly less than the number of whites in the State, and it
was known that some of the negroes had joined the conservative party.
Moreover, the Kellogg government was shamefully illegal, even as
measured by the standards then enforced upon the South. It is fair to
presume, therefore, that Tilden was justly entitled to the electoral
votes of Louisiana. That is my belief although I voted for Hayes.

It does not follow, however, that the decision of the Electoral
Commission was wrong. That body was bound to consider the remote as well
as the immediate consequences of its acts. It was engaged in making a
precedent to be followed in similar disputes thereafter, if such should
arise. If Congress, or any commission acting by its authority, should
assume the functions of a returning board for all the states in future
presidential elections, what limit could be set to their investigations,
or to the passions agitating the country while the same were in
progress? In short, the Electoral Commission was sitting not to do
justice between man and man, but to save the Republic. Even if it made a
mistake in the exercise of its discretion, the mistake was pardonable.

On the 3d of November, 1877, the subject of this memoir was married to
Miss Mary Ingraham, of Saybrook Point, Connecticut. The lady's mother
was his first cousin. Two daughters were born of this union, both of
whom died in infancy.

In 1880, when the next presidential campaign, that of Garfield and
Hancock, opened, the Democrats of Illinois nominated Trumbull for
governor of the State, without his own solicitation or desire. He was
now sixty-seven years of age, with powers of body and mind unimpaired.
In accepting the nomination he gave a brief account of his political
life extending over a period of nearly forty years. He acknowledged that
he had made mistakes, but said he had never given a vote or performed an
act in his official capacity which he did not at the time believe was
for his country's good. He made a vigorous campaign, but the traces left
of it in the newspapers contain nothing that need be recalled now. The
Republican majority in the state was between thirty and forty thousand.
The Republicans nominated Shelby M. Cullom for Governor and he was
elected.

The World's Columbian Exposition took place at Chicago in the year 1893.
During one of my visits to it I had the pleasure of dining with Mr.
and Mrs. Trumbull at their home on Lake Avenue. The only other guest was
William J. Bryan, whom I had not met before. The leading issue in
politics then was the free coinage of silver at the ratio of sixteen to
one. Mr. Bryan was an enthusiastic free-silver man and a firm believer
in the early triumph of that doctrine. Trumbull was inclined to the same
belief, although less confident of its success. We had an animated but
friendly discussion of that question. President Cleveland had just
called a special session of Congress to repeal the Silver Purchasing Act
then in force, which was not a free-coinage law. I ventured to predict
to my table companions that the purchasing law would be repealed and
that no free-coinage law would be enacted in place of it, either then or
later. None of us imagined that three years from that time Mr. Bryan
himself would be the nominee of the Democratic party for President of
the United States, on that issue. Trumbull's geniality and cordiality at
this meeting were a joy to his guests. Our conversation, ranging over a
period of nearly forty years, filled two delightful hours. He was then
eighty years of age, but in vigor of mind and body I did not notice any
change in him. We parted, not knowing that we should not meet again.

[Illustration: _AET. 80_]

Trumbull's next appearance on the public stage was in the case of Eugene
V. Debs, who is still with us as a perpetual candidate of the
Socialistic party for President. In 1894 he was president of an
organization of railway employees known as the American Railway Union.
In the month of May a dispute arose between the Pullman Palace Car
Company and its employees in reference to the rate of wages, which
resulted in a strike. Debs and his fellow officers of the Railway Union,
for the purpose of compelling the Pullman Company to yield to the
demands of their employees, issued an order to the railway companies
that they should cease hauling Pullman cars, and, if they should not so
cease, that the trainmen, switchmen, and others working on the railways
aforesaid should strike also. As a consequence of this order twenty-two
railroads were "tied up." All passengers trains composed in part of
Pullman cars were brought to a standstill. Riots broke out in the
streets of Chicago. An injunction was issued against Debs by Judge
Woods, of the United States Circuit Court. Governor Altgelt, of
Illinois, was called upon to restore order in the city, but before he
did so President Cleveland, having been officially informed that the
movement of the mails was obstructed by violence in the streets of
Chicago, ordered a small body of troops to that city to break the
blockade. This they accomplished without delay and without bloodshed. In
the mean time Debs and his associates were put under arrest for
violating the injunction of the court. Debs employed Mr. Clarence Darrow
as his attorney, and Darrow applied for a writ of _habeas corpus_, which
was refused. Darrow appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States
and engaged Lyman Trumbull and S. S. Gregory as associate counsel. The
appeal was argued by Trumbull at the October Term in Washington City.
Trumbull had volunteered his service and refused a fee, accepting only
his traveling expenses. The court rejected the petition for a writ of
_habeas corpus_ and affirmed the jurisdiction of the circuit court.

Both President Cleveland and the court were sustained by public opinion
in this disposition of Debs. On the 6th of October, a large meeting was
held at Central Music Hall in Chicago to consider the recent exciting
events. It was addressed by Trumbull and Henry D. Lloyd. Trumbull's
speech was published in the newspapers and in pamphlet form as a
Populist campaign document. It was extremely effective from the Populist
point of view, and was not, on the whole, more radical than the
so-called Progressive platform of the present day. While expressing
decided opinions on the subject of "judicial usurpation" (referring to
the Debs case without mentioning it), he exhorted his hearers to seek a
remedy by the action of Congress. "It is to be hoped," he said, "that
Congress when it meets will put some check upon federal judges in
assuming control of railroads and issuing blanket injunctions and
punishing people for contempt of their assumed authority. If Congress
does not do it, I trust the people will see to it that representatives
are chosen hereafter who will." The recall of judges, as a remedy for
unpopular decisions, had not yet been discovered.

The testimony of persons who were present at this meeting is that
Trumbull showed no abatement of his powers as a speaker, and that the
audience "went wild with enthusiasm."

In the month of December following, the leaders of the People's party in
Chicago, ten in number, requested Trumbull to prepare a declaration of
principles to be presented by them for consideration at a national
conference of their party to meet at St. Louis on the 28th. This paper
was drawn up and delivered to them in his own handwriting a few days
before the meeting and was published in the _Chicago Times_ of December
27, in the following words:

     1. Resolved, That human brotherhood and equality of rights are
     cardinal principles of true democracy.

     2. Resolved, That, forgetting all past political differences,
     we unite in the common purpose to rescue the Government from
     the control of monopolists and concentrated wealth, to limit
     their powers of perpetuation by curtailing their privileges,
     and to secure the rights of free speech, a free press, free
     labor, and trial by jury--all rules, regulations, and judicial
     dicta in derogation of either of which are arbitrary,
     unconstitutional, and not to be tolerated by a free people.

     3. We endorse the resolution adopted by the National Republican
     Convention of 1860, which was incorporated by President Lincoln
     in his inaugural address, as follows: "That the maintenance
     inviolate of the rights of the states, and especially of the
     right of each state to order and control its own domestic
     institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, is
     essential to that balance of power on which the endurance of
     our political fabric depends, and we denounce the lawless
     invasion by armed force of the soil of any state or territory,
     no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes."

     4. Resolved, That the power given Congress by the Constitution
     to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of
     the Union, to suppress insurrections, to repel invasions, does
     not warrant the Government in making use of a standing army in
     aiding monopolies in the oppression of their employees. When
     freemen unsheathe the sword it should be to strike for liberty,
     not for despotism, or to uphold privileged monopolies in the
     oppression of the poor.

     5. Resolved, That to check the rapid absorption of the wealth
     of the country and its perpetuation in a few hands we demand
     the enactment of laws limiting the amount of property to be
     acquired by devise or inheritance.

     6. Resolved, That we denounce the issue of interest-bearing
     bonds by the Government in times of peace, to be paid for, in
     part at least, by gold drawn from the Treasury, which results
     in the Government's paying interest on its own money.

     7. Resolved, That we demand that Congress perform the
     constitutional duty to coin money, regulate the value thereof
     and of foreign coin by the enactment of laws for the free
     coinage of silver with that of gold at the ratio of 16 to 1.

     8. Resolved, That monopolies affecting the public interest
     should be owned and operated by the Government in the interest
     of the people; all employees of the same to be governed by
     civil service rules, and no one to be employed or displaced on
     account of politics.

     9. Resolved, That we inscribe on our banner, "Down with
     monopolies and millionaire control! Up with the rights of man
     and the masses!" And under this banner we march to the polls
     and to victory.

These resolutions were conveyed to the St. Louis meeting by Henry D.
Lloyd and F. J. Schulte and were adopted by the conference without
alteration.

FOOTNOTES:

[132] Rhodes, _History of the United States_, VII, 231.

CHAPTER XXVIII

CONCLUSION

On the 22d of March, 1896, Trumbull made an argument before the Supreme
Court at Washington City. On the 11th of April, although ailing from an
unknown malady, he went to Belleville to attend the funeral of his old
and faithful friend, Gustave Koerner, and to make a brief address over
the remains. This journey was made against the advice of his physician.
At the conclusion of his remarks he became ill at his hotel in
Belleville. There was a consultation of physicians, who reached the
conclusion that he would be able to go home if he should go at once. He
decided not to delay, and he reached home on the morning of April 13.
Here another consultation of physicians took place at which a surgical
operation was decided upon. This led to the discovery of an internal
tumor which, in their judgment, could not be removed without causing
immediate death. He lingered till the 5th of June. Before his death he
made a calm and careful adjustment of his business affairs and gave to
his children and grandchildren keepsakes that he had for years preserved
for them. He passed away at the age of eighty-two years, seven months,
and twelve days. His funeral, which was largely attended, took place
from his house, No. 4008 Lake Avenue, and his remains were interred in
Oakwoods Cemetery.

There was a meeting of the Bar Association of Chicago to prepare a
memorial on his life and services. On this occasion Hon. Thomas A.
Moran, former judge of the appellate court, said:

     At the end of his career in the United States Senate, Judge
     Trumbull became a member of the Chicago Bar. He was thereafter
     continuously, and up to the time of his death, engaged in the
     active and laborious practice of his profession. The great
     place that he had held in the councils of the nation, the
     influence that he had exerted upon national legislation, and
     the esteem in which he was held by the lawyers and the
     statesmen of the country, entitled him to a lofty mien; but as
     is well known to us all who had the privilege of his
     acquaintance at the bar, while his demeanor was grave it was
     also modest, and his manner was marked by a gentleness that was
     most grateful to everybody with whom he came in contact. His
     sincerity and honesty in the presentation of his case, his
     respectful demeanor to any court in which he was engaged in a
     legal contest, constituted him a model that the lawyers of our
     bar might well imitate. He was in practice at the bar
     forty-four years after he ceased to be a judge of the supreme
     court of this state.... He was preëminently the grand old man
     of this country. In his intercourse with his fellow citizens he
     was a quiet, sincere, frank, honest American gentleman. Lyman
     Trumbull was one of the very great men of the nation.

Eulogistic remarks were made also by Senator John M. Palmer, ex-Senator
James R. Doolittle, and Judge Henry W. Blodgett. Mr. Doolittle said that
of the sixty-six members of the United States Senate who were there when
Secession began, only four were then living. They were Harlan, of Iowa,
Rice, of Minnesota, Clingman, of North Carolina, and himself
(Doolittle).

Trumbull's forte was that of a political debater well grounded in the
law. Here he stood in the very front rank, both as a Senator addressing
his equals and as an orator on the hustings. He was always ready to
discuss the questions which he was required to face. He had a logical
mind, and the ability to think quickly and to choose the right words to
express his ideas. He never wasted words in ornament or display. He
never lost his balance when addressing the Senate, or a public audience.
He had perfect self-possession. He never stood in awe of any other
debater or hesitated to reply promptly to question or challenge. Nor did
he ever lose his dignity in debate. Once he came near to calling Sumner
a falsifier, when the latter had described him as recreant to the
principles of human liberty; but he restrained himself in time to avoid
an infraction of the rules of the Senate. And he afterwards came to the
defense of Sumner when the latter was deposed, by his more subservient
colleagues, from the chairmanship of the Committee on Foreign Relations.
On this occasion Sumner came forward holding out both hands, and with
tears in his eyes thanked him for his generosity.

His rare forensic gifts would have been unavailing without confidence in
the justice of his cause, and a clear conscience which shone in his face
and pervaded him through and through. Although not endowed with
oratorical graces he grasped the attention of his audience at once, and
he never failed to convince his hearers that he had an eye single to the
public good. It was hard for him to separate himself from the Republican
party in 1871-72, but he considered it a duty that he owed to the
country to expose the rottenness then pervading the national
administration. He did not have General Grant in mind when he moved the
investigation of custom-house frauds in New York. He did not aim at him
directly or indirectly, but at the system which had grown up before his
election. Grant's mental make-up was such that he considered any
fault-finding with federal office-holders a reproach to himself, as the
head of the Government, and accordingly braced himself against it; and
this habit grew on him through the whole eight years of his presidency.
Yet Trumbull uttered no reproach against him during the campaign of
1872, or later.

It was commonly said that Trumbull's nature was cold and unsympathetic.
This was a mannerism merely. He did not carry his heart upon his sleeve
for daws to peck at, but he was an affectionate husband and father and
grandfather, most generous to his parents, brothers, and sisters, and
one of the most unselfish men I ever knew. His poor constituents, who
were often stranded in Washington, needing help to get home, seldom
applied to him for assistance in vain, and this kind of drain was pretty
severe during his whole senatorial service. He was fond of little
children. He was often seen playing croquet with his own and others in
Washington City. Mr. Morris St. P. Thomas, a member of the Chicago Bar
who shared Trumbull's office during his later years, says that he never
knew a warmer-hearted man than Trumbull. He was kindness and
consideration itself to the people in his office. He was never cross or
short, and every young man there always felt that he could go into the
judge's room whenever he liked, and sit down and tell him his troubles.
Once it devolved upon Mr. Thomas to engage a stenographer for the
office. Of the several applicants the best was an unprepossessing,
hump-backed girl. "I told the judge about her--that she was the ablest
applicant, but very unprepossessing in appearance." "Why," said he, at
once, "that's the very reason to take her, poor girl!" And they kept her
for years.[133]

In short, he was a high-minded, kind-hearted, courteous gentleman,
without ostentation and without guile. In business affairs he was
punctual, accurate, and spotless. He never borrowed money, never bought
anything that he could not pay cash for, never gave a promissory note in
his life, not even in the purchase of real estate where deferred
payments are customary. The best blood of New England coursed in his
veins and he never dishonored it, in either private or public life.

It is perhaps too early to assign to Trumbull his proper place in the
roll of statesmen of the Civil War period. Those who come after us and
can look back one hundred years, instead of fifty, will doubtless have a
better perspective and a clearer vision than those who lived with the
actors of that momentous struggle. Some things, however, we may be sure
of. One is that the man who drew the Thirteenth Amendment of the
Constitution, abolishing slavery in the United States and all places
under the jurisdiction thereof, will never be forgotten as long as the
love of liberty survives in this land. Not that the Thirteenth Amendment
would not have been passed and incorporated in our system even if Lyman
Trumbull had not been a Senator, or if he had never been born. It was a
consequence of the taking-up of arms against the Union in 1861 that
slavery should come to an end somehow. All that Lincoln did, all that
Trumbull did, all that Congress did, was to seize the occasion to give
direction to certain irresistible forces then called into existence for
blessing or cursing mankind. There were different ways of bringing
slavery to an end. That of constitutional amendment was the best of all
because it removed the subject-matter from the field of dispute at once
and forever. Lincoln paved the way for it. He prepared the public mind
for it by his two proclamations of emancipation. Trumbull and Congress
and the state legislatures did the rest.

It may be fairly said that Trumbull took the lead in putting an end to
arbitrary arrests in the loyal states where the courts of justice were
open, and in prescribing the process of the suspension of the writ of
_habeas corpus_. This was a difficult problem to handle and it cost
Trumbull some popularity, since the loyal spirit of the North was very
touchy on the subject of Copperheads and easily inflamed against anybody
who was accused of sympathy with them. The law finally passed seems now
to be altogether just, and well suited to be put in practice again if
occasion for it should arise.

Trumbull's place as one of the "Seven Traitors" who voted not guilty on
the impeachment of Andrew Johnson is now universally considered a proud
position, and I think that that of his neighbor and friend, James R.
Doolittle, of Wisconsin, who earned the title of traitor a year or two
earlier, is entitled to a place in the same Valhalla. Both are deserving
of monuments at the hands of their respective states.

The reader of these pages cannot fail to discern a marked change in
Trumbull's course on Reconstruction about midway of the struggle on that
issue. Gideon Welles said, under date January 16, 1867, "He [Trumbull]
has changed his principles within a year.[134] The facts are that he
agreed with Lincoln's plan of Reconstruction, embodied it in the
Louisiana Bill, reported it favorably from the Judiciary Committee,
tried to pass it in the closing days of the Thirty-eighth Congress, but
was prevented by the filibustering tactics of Sumner. After Johnson
became President he adhered to that plan until Johnson vetoed the
Freedmen's Bureau and Civil Rights Bills. He then believed that Johnson
had betrayed the cause for which the nation had fought through a four
years' war and that the freedom of the blacks would be endangered if
Johnson were sustained by the loyal states. He accordingly went with his
party, but with misgivings, halting now and then, putting blocks in the
way of the radicals here and there. He ceased to be the leader of the
Senate as he had hitherto been, on this class of questions, and he
became a reluctant follower. When Sumner became angry and charged him in
1870 with betrayal of the cause of freedom, he hotly affirmed that he
had voted for every measure for the equal rights of the freedmen that
Congress had passed, including the three constitutional amendments. The
truth was that he had put obstacles in the way of several measures that
Sumner deemed indispensable, until it became plain that the Republican
party was determined to pass them and that further resistance would be
useless. Then he gave his assent to them. This course he pursued until
the Anti-Ku-Klux Bill was agreed to, by the Judiciary Committee, in
1871. Against this measure he voted in the committee and in the Senate.
He held it to be unconstitutional, and he used against it the same
arguments in substance that Bingham had used in the House against the
Civil Rights Bill; and both he and Bingham were right. Trumbull did not
change his principles, but he made an error in common with his party and
he corrected it as soon as he became convinced that it was an error. I
am open to the same criticism."

Among interviews with men of note published in the Chicago press
concerning the deceased was one with Mr. Joseph Medill, not a friendly
critic but a political seer of the first class, who thought that
Trumbull might have been President of the United States if he had voted,
in the impeachment case, to convict Andrew Johnson.

     If he had remained true to his party [said Mr. Medill], Judge
     Trumbull, I believe, would have died with his name in the roll
     of Presidents of the United States. I have always thought that
     he could have been the successor of Grant. He stood so high in
     the estimation of his party and the nation that nothing was
     beyond his reach. Grant, of course, came before everybody, but
     Trumbull was next, a man of great ability, undoubted integrity,
     and stainless reputation, pure as the driven snow and nearly
     as cold. He could have been President instead of Hayes, or
     Garfield, or Harrison.[1]

Following the interview with Mr. Medill is one with Mr. Henry S.
Robbins, a member of Trumbull's law firm from 1883 until 1890. Mr.
Robbins did not find Trumbull a cold man.

     All the time we were together [said Mr. Robbins] I never heard
     him speak a cross word to a clerk in the office. Among children
     he was a child again. He and his little grandson, the child of
     Walter Trumbull, who died several years ago, were inseparable
     companions when the grandfather was at home. They played
     together and talked together like two little boys. All the
     children in the neighborhood where he lived were wont to come
     to him with their little troubles and always found him one who
     could enter into fullest sympathy with them. Judge Trumbull had
     no worldliness. He seemed to practice law as a mission, not as
     a vocation by which to make money. With his reputation and his
     ability combined he might have died a millionaire. It always
     gave him a pang to charge a fee, and when he fixed the charge
     it was usually about half what a modern lawyer would charge.[1]

Another partner, Mr. William N. Horner, said:

     I came here from Belleville where Judge Trumbull formerly
     lived, and people down there--some of them at least--used to
     think that he was a cold man. I never found him so. I remember
     the first day we moved into these offices and while we were
     getting settled, Judge Trumbull worked harder than any of us.
     He was more solicitous for our comfort than he was for his own.
     He was always trying to do something for the comfort of others.
     He had all the gentleness and sweetness of disposition and
     patience of a woman.[135]

Mr. C. S. Darrow, who had charge of the Debs case in which Trumbull
volunteered his services, said that

     the socialistic trend of the venerable statesman's opinions in
     his later years sprang from his deep sympathies with all
     unfortunates; that sympathy that made him an anti-slavery
     Democrat in his early years, and afterwards a Republican. He
     became convinced that the poor who toil for a living in this
     world were not getting a fair chance. His heart was with
     them.[136]

A letter to myself from the widow of Walter Trumbull, who died in 1891,
says:

     After my husband died, I, with my two boys, lived with Judge
     Trumbull until his death; and I wish I could tell you how
     beautiful that home life was. He was so devoted to his family,
     so sweet and tender and thoughtful for us all. Others never
     realized this and often thought him cold. He was so great a man
     and yet so gentle and simple in his ways that little children
     clung to him.

Among the papers left by Trumbull was the following estimate of the
character and career of Abraham Lincoln. It was addressed to his son
Walter Trumbull and is here published for the first time:

     MY DEAR SON: I have often been requested to give my estimate of
     Mr. Lincoln's life and character. His death at the close of a
     great civil war in which the Government of which he was the
     head had been successful, and the manner of his taking off,
     were not favorable to a candid and impartial review of his
     character. The temper of the public mind at that time would not
     tolerate anything but praise of the martyred President, and
     even now it is questionable whether the truthful history of his
     life by Mr. Herndon, his lifelong friend, and law partner for
     twenty years, will be received with favor. As I could not give
     any other than a truthful narration of Mr. Lincoln's character,
     as he was known to me, I have hitherto declined to write
     anything for the public concerning him. Having known him at
     different times as a political adversary and a political
     friend, my opportunities for judging his public life and
     character were from different standpoints. We were members of
     the Illinois House of Representatives in 1840. He was a Whig
     and I a Democrat, but we had no controversies, political or
     otherwise. Indeed, Mr. Lincoln took very little part in the
     legislation of that session. It was the period when, as
     related by Mr. Herndon, he was engaged in love affairs which
     some of his friends feared had well-nigh unsettled his mental
     faculties. I recall but one speech he made during the session.
     In that he told a story which convulsed the House to the great
     discomfiture of the member at whom it was aimed. Mr. Lincoln
     was regarded at that time by his political friends as among
     their shrewdest and ablest leaders, and by his political
     adversaries as a formidable opponent. Contemporary with him in
     the legislature of 1840 were Edward D. Baker, William A.
     Richardson, William H. Bissell, Thomas Drummond, John J.
     Hardin, John A. McClernand, Ebenezer Peck, and others whose
     subsequent careers in the national councils, on the field of
     battle, and in civil life have shed lustre on their country's
     history. It is no mean praise to say of Mr. Lincoln that among
     this galaxy of young men convened at the capital of Illinois in
     1840, to whom may be added Stephen A. Douglas, although not
     then a member of the legislature, he stood in the front rank.

     As a lawyer Mr. Lincoln was painstaking, discriminating, and
     accurate. He mastered his cases, and had a most happy and
     fascinating way of presenting them. He was logical, fair, and
     candid. It was said of him by one of the most eminent judges
     who ever presided in Illinois, that after Mr. Lincoln had
     opened a case he [the judge] fully understood both sides of it.
     Some of Mr. Lincoln's contemporaries at the bar were more
     learned, and better lawyers, but no one managed a case, which
     he had time to thoroughly study and understand, more adroitly.
     The breaking-up of the Whig and Democratic parties in 1854,
     growing out of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and the
     opening of the territory to slavery, threw Mr. Lincoln and
     myself together politically. We were both opposed to the spread
     of slavery, and from the foundation of the Republican party
     till his death we were in political accord. I do not claim to
     have been his confidant, and doubt if any man ever had his
     entire confidence. He was secretive, and communicated no more
     of his own thoughts and purposes than he thought would subserve
     the ends he had in view. He had the faculty of gaining the
     confidence of others by apparently giving them his own, and in
     that way attached to himself many friends. I saw much of him
     after we became political associates, and can truthfully say
     that he never misled me by word or deed. He was truthful,
     compassionate, and kind, but he was one of the shrewdest men I
     ever knew. To use a common expression he was "as cunning as a
     fox." He was a good judge of men, their motives, and purposes,
     and knew how to wield them to his own advantage. He was not
     aggressive. Ever ready to take advantage of the public current,
     he did not attempt to lead it. He did not promulgate the
     article of war enacted by Congress forbidding army and navy
     officers from employing their forces to return slaves to their
     masters, under penalty of dismissal from the service, till more
     than six months after its passage. It was more than nine months
     after the enactment of a law by Congress declaring free all
     slaves of rebels captured, or coming within the Union lines, or
     found in any place occupied by rebel forces and afterwards
     occupied by the forces of the Union, that he issued the
     proclamation declaring free the slaves then within the rebel
     lines, all of whom, belonging to persons in rebellion, were
     made free by the act of Congress as soon as the Union forces
     occupied the country, and till then the proclamation could not
     be enforced. When applied to by a friend, just previous to the
     meeting of the convention at Baltimore which nominated him for
     a second term, to indicate what resolutions or policy he
     desired the convention to adopt, he declined to suggest any.
     These and many other illustrations might be given to show that
     Mr. Lincoln was a follower and not a leader in public affairs.
     Without attempting to form or create public sentiment, he
     waited till he saw whither it tended, and then was astute to
     take advantage of it. Some of Mr. Lincoln's admirers, instead
     of regarding his want of system, hesitancy, and irresolution as
     defects in his character, seek to make them the subject of
     praise, as in the end the rebellion was suppressed, and slavery
     abolished, during his administration, ignoring the fact that a
     man of more positive character, prompt and systematic action,
     might have accomplished the same result in half the time, and
     with half the loss of blood and treasure.

     Mr. Lincoln was by no means the unsophisticated, artless man
     many took him to be. Mr. Swett, a lifelong friend and admirer,
     writing to Mr. Herndon, says: "One great public mistake of his
     character, as generally received and acquiesced in, is that he
     is considered by the people of this country as a frank,
     guileless, and unsophisticated man. There never was a greater
     mistake. Beneath a smooth surface of candor, and apparent
     declaration of all his thoughts and feelings, he exercised the
     most exalted tact, and the widest discrimination.... In dealing
     with men he was a trimmer, and such a trimmer as the world has
     never seen."[137]

     Herndon in his "Lincoln," at page 471, says: "He had a way of
     pretending to assure his visitor that in the choice of his
     advisers he was free to act as his judgment dictated, although
     David Davis, acting as his manager at the Chicago Convention,
     had negotiated with the Pennsylvania and Indiana delegations,
     and assigned places in the Cabinet to Simon Cameron and Caleb
     Smith, besides making other arrangements which Mr. Lincoln was
     expected to satisfy."

     Another popular mistake is to suppose Mr. Lincoln free from
     ambition. A more ardent seeker after office never existed. From
     the time when, at the age of twenty-three, he announced himself
     a candidate for the legislature from Sangamon County, till his
     death, he was almost constantly either in office, or struggling
     to obtain one. Sometimes defeated and often successful, he
     never abandoned the desire for office till he had reached the
     presidency the second time. Swett says, "He was much more eager
     for it [a second nomination] than for the first," and such was
     known to his intimate friends to be the fact, though his manner
     to the public would have indicated that he was indifferent to a
     second nomination. When first a candidate for the presidency
     Mr. Herndon tells us, "He wrote to influential party workers
     everywhere," promising money to defray the expenses of
     delegates to the convention favoring his nomination.

     While ardently devoted to the Union, Mr. Lincoln had no
     well-defined plan for saving it, but suffered things to drift,
     watching to take advantage of events as they occurred. He was a
     judge of men and knew how to use them to advantage. He brought
     into his Cabinet some of the ablest men in the nation, and left
     to them the management of their respective departments. This
     country never had an abler head of the Treasury Department than