as the substance of Dr. Williamson’s Address to the freemen of
    Edenton and the County of Chowan when assembled to instruct their
    representatives.”

Remarks.

State Gazette Of North Carolina.

Though I am conscious that a subject of the greatest magnitude must suffer
in the hands of such an advocate, I cannot refuse, at the request of my
fellow-citizens, to make some observations on the new plan of government.

It seems to be generally admitted, that the system of government which has
been proposed by the late convention, is well calculated to relieve us
from many of the grievances under which we have been laboring. If I might
express my particular sentiments on this subject, I should describe it as
more free and more perfect than any form of government that has ever been
adopted by any nation; but I would not say it has no faults. Imperfection
is inseparable from every device. Several objections were made to this
system by two or three very respectable characters in the convention,
which have been the subject of much conversation; and other objections, by
citizens of this state, have lately reached our ears. It is proper you
should consider of these objections. They are of two kinds; they respect
the things that are in the system, and the things that are not in it. We
are told that there should have been a section for securing the trial by
Jury in civil cases, and the liberty of the press: that there should also
have been a declaration of rights. In the new system, it is provided, that
“_the trial of all crimes_, except in cases of impeachment, _shall be by
jury_” but this provision could not possibly be extended to all _civil_
cases. For it is well known that the trial by jury is not general and
uniform throughout the United States, either in cases of admiralty or of
chancery; hence it becomes necessary to submit the question to the general
Legislature, who might accommodate their laws on this occasion to the
desires and habits of the nation. Surely there is no prohibition in a case
that is untouched.

We have been told that the liberty of the press is not secured by the new
Constitution. Be pleased to examine the Plan, and you will find that the
liberty of the press and the laws of Mahomet are equally affected by it.
The new government is to have the power of protecting literary property;
the very power which you have by a special act delegated to the present
congress. There was a time in England, when neither book, pamphlet, nor
paper could be published without a license from government. That restraint
was finally removed in the year 1694: and, by such removal, their press
became perfectly free, for it is not under the restraint of any license.
Certainly the new government can have no power to impose restraints. The
citizens of the United States have no more occasion for a second
declaration of rights, than they have for a section in favour of the
press. Their rights, in the several states, have long since been explained
and secured by particular declarations, which make a part of their several
constitutions. It is granted, and perfectly understood, that under the
government of the assemblies of the states, and under the government of
the congress, every right is reserved to the individual which he has not
expressly delegated to this, or that legislature. The other objections
that have been made to the new plan of government, are: That it absorbs
the powers of the several states; that the national judiciary is too
extensive; that a standing army is permitted; that congress is allowed to
regulate trade; that the several states are prevented from taxing exports
for their own benefit.

When Gentlemen are pleased to complain, that little power is left in the
hands of the separate states, they should be advised to cast an eye upon
the large code of laws, which have passed in this state since the peace.
Let them consider how few of those laws have been framed for the general
benefit of the nation. Nine out of ten of them are domestic; calculated
for the sole use of this state or of particular citizens. There must still
be use for such laws, though you should enable the congress to collect a
revenue for national purposes; and the collection of that revenue includes
the chief of the new powers, which are now to be committed to the
congress.

Hitherto you have delegated certain powers to the Congress, and other
powers to the Assemblies of the states. The portion that you have
delegated to Congress, is found to have been useless, because it is too
small: and the powers that are committed to the Assemblies of the several
states are also found to be absolutely ineffectual for national purposes,
because they can never be so managed as to operate in concert. Of what use
is that small portion of reserve powers? It neither makes you respectable
nor powerful. The consequence of such reservation is national contempt
abroad, and a state of dangerous weakness at home. What avails the claim
of power, which appears to be nothing better than the empty whistling of a
name? The Congress will be chosen by yourselves, as your members of
Assembly are. They will be creatures of your hands, and subject to your
advice. Protected and cherished by the small addition of power which you
shall put into their hands, you may become a great and respectable nation.

It is complained that the powers of the national judiciary are too
extensive. This objection appears to have the greatest weight in the eyes
of gentlemen who have not carefully compared the powers which are to be
delegated, with those that had been formerly delegated to Congress. The
powers now to be committed to the national legislature, as they are
detailed in the 8th section of the first article, have already been
chiefly delegated to the Congress, under one form or another, except those
which are contained in the first paragraph of that section. And the
objects that are now to be submitted to the supreme judiciary, or to the
inferior courts, are those which naturally arise from the constitutional
laws of Congress. If there is a single new case that can be exceptional,
it is that between a Foreigner and a Citizen, or that between the Citizens
of different States. These cases may come up by appeal. It is provided in
this system, that there shall be no fraudulent tender in the payments of
debts. Foreigners with whom we have treaties will trust our citizens on
the faith of this engagement; and the citizens of different states will do
the same. If the Congress had a negative on the laws of the several
states, they would certainly prevent all such laws as might endanger the
honor or peace of the nation, by making a tender of base money; but they
have no such power, and it is at least possible that some state may be
found in this union, disposed to break the constitution, and abolish
private debts by such tenders. In these cases the courts of the offending
state would probably decide according to its own laws. The foreigner would
complain, and the nation might be involved in war for the support of such
dishonest measures. Is it not better to have a court of appeals in which
the judges can only be determined by the laws of the nation? This court is
equally to be desired by the citizens of different states. But we are told
that justice will be delayed, and the poor will be drawn away by the rich
to a distant court. The authors of this remark have not fully considered
the question, else they must have recollected that the poor of this
country have little to do with foreigners or with the citizens of distant
states. They do not consider that there may be an inferior court in every
state; nor have they recollected that the appeals being with such
exceptions, and under such regulations as Congress shall make, will never
be permitted for trifling sums or under trivial pretences, unless we can
suppose that the national legislature shall be composed of knaves and
fools. The line that separates the powers of the national legislature from
those of the several states is clearly drawn. The several states reserve
every power that can be exercised for the particular use and comfort of
the state. They do not yield a single power which is not absolutely
necessary to the safety and prosperity of the nation, nor one that could
be employed to any effect in the hands of particular states. The powers of
judiciary naturally arise from those of the legislature. Questions that
are of a national concern, and those cases which are determinable by the
general laws of the nation, are to be referred to the national judiciary;
but they have not anything to do with a single case either civil or
criminal which respects the private and particular concerns of a state or
its citizens.

The possibility of keeping regular troops in the public service, has been
urged as another objection against the new constitution. It is very
remarkable that the same objection has not been made against the original
confederation, in which the same grievance obtains without the same
guards. It is now provided, that no appropriation of money for the use of
the army shall be for a longer time than two years. Provision is also made
for having a powerful militia, in which there never can be occasion for
many regular troops.

It has been objected in some of the southern states, that the Congress, by
a majority of votes, is to have the power to regulate trade. It is
universally admitted that Congress ought to have this power, else our
commerce, which is nearly ruined, can never be restored; but some
gentlemen think that the concurrence of two-thirds of the votes in
Congress should have been required. By the sundry regulations of commerce,
it will be in the power of government not only to collect a vast revenue
for the general benefit of the nation, but to secure the carrying trade in
the hands of citizens in preference to strangers. It has been alleged that
there are few ships belonging to the southern states; and that the price
of freight must rise in consequence of our excluding many foreign vessels:
but when we have not vessels of our own, it is certainly proper that we
should hire those of citizens in preference to strangers; and though the
price of freight should rise for two or three years, this advantage is
fully due to our brethren in the eastern and middle states, who, with
great and exemplary candour, have given us equal advantages in return. A
small increase in the price of freight would operate greatly in favour of
the southern states: it would promote the spirit of ship-building; it
would promote a nursery for native seamen, and would afford support to the
poor who live near the sea coast; it would increase the value of their
lands, and, at the same time, it would reduce their taxes.

It has finally been objected that the several states are not permitted to
tax their exports for the benefit of their particular treasuries. This
strange objection has been occasionally repeated by citizens of this
state. They must have transplanted it from another state, for it could not
have been the growth of North Carolina.

Such have been the objections against the new constitution.

Whilst the honest patriot who guards with jealous eye the liberties of his
country, and apprehends danger under every form—the placeman in every
state, who fears lest his office should pass into other hands—the idle,
the fractious, and the dishonest, who live by plunder or speculation on
the miseries of their country—while these, assisted by a numerous body of
secret enemies, who never have been reconciled to our independence, are
seeking for objections to this constitution—it is a remarkable
circumstance, and a very high encomium on the plan, that nothing more
plausible has been offered against it; for it is an easy matter to find
faults.

Let us turn our eyes to a more fruitful subject; let us consider the
present condition of the United States, and the particular benefits that
North Carolina must reap by the proposed form of government. Without money
no government can be supported; and Congress can raise no money under the
present constitution. They have not the power to make commercial treaties,
because they cannot preserve them when made. Hence it is, that we are the
prey of every nation. We are indulged in such foreign commerce as must be
hurtful to us; we are prohibited from that which might be profitable; and
we are accordingly told, that in the last two years, the thirteen states
have hardly paid into the treasury as much as should have been paid by a
single state. Intestine commotions in some of the states—paper money in
others—a want of inclination in some, and a general suspicion throughout
the union that the burden is unequally laid—added to the general loss of
trade—have produced a general bankruptcy, and loss of honor. We have
borrowed money of Spain—she demands the principal, but we cannot pay the
interest. It is a circumstance perfectly humiliating, that we should
remain under obligations to that nation. We are considerably indebted to
France; but she is too generous to insist upon what she knows we cannot
pay, either the principal or interest. In the hour of distress, we
borrowed money in Holland; not from the government but from private
citizens. Those who were called the patriots, were our friends, and they
are oppressed in their turn by hosts of enemies. They will soon have need
of money. At this hour, we are not able to pay the interest of their loan.
What is to be done? Will you borrow money again from other citizens of
that oppressed republic, to pay the interest of what you borrowed from
their brethren? This would a painful expedient: but our want of government
may render it necessary. You have two or three ministers abroad; they must
soon return home, for they cannot be supported. You have four or five
hundred troops scattered along the Ohio to protect the frontier
inhabitants, and give some value to your lands; those troops are ill paid,
and in a fair way for being disbanded. There is hardly a circumstance
remaining—hardly one external mark—by which you can deserve to be called a
nation. You are not in a condition to resist the most contemptuous enemy.
What is there to prevent an Algerine pirate from landing on your coast,
and carrying your citizens into slavery? You have not a single sloop of
war. Does one of the states attempt to raise a little money by imposts or
other commercial regulations? A neighbouring state immediately alters her
laws, and defeats the revenue by throwing the trade into a different
channel. Instead of supporting or assisting, we are uniformly taking the
advantage of one another. Such an assemblage of people are not a nation.
Like a dark cloud, without cohesion or firmness, we are ready to be torn
asunder, and scattered abroad by every breeze of external violence, or
internal commotion.

Is there a man in this state, who believes it possible for us to continue
under such a government? Let us suppose but for a minute, that such a
measure should be attempted. Let us suppose that the several states shall
be required and obliged to pay their several quotas according to the
original plan. You know that North Carolina, in the last four years, has
not paid one dollar into the treasury for eight dollars that she ought to
have paid. We must increase our taxes exceedingly, and those taxes must be
of the most grievous kind; they must be taxes on land and heads, taxes
that cannot fail to grind the face of the poor; for it is clear that we
can raise little by imports and exports. Some foreign goods are imported
by water from the northern states: such goods pay a duty for the benefit
of those states, which is seldom drawn back. This operates as a tax upon
our citizens. On this side, Virginia promotes her revenue to the amount of
twenty-five thousand dollars every year, by a tax on our tobacco that she
exports. South Carolina, on the other side, may avail herself of similar
opportunities. Two-thirds of foreign goods that are consumed in this
state, are imported by land from Virginia or South Carolina. Such goods
pay a certain impost for the benefit of the importing states, but our
treasury is not profited by this commerce. By such means our citizens are
taxed more than one hundred thousand dollars every year; but the state
does not receive credit for a shilling of that money. Like a patient that
is bleeding at both arms, North Carolina must soon expire under such
wasteful operations. Unless I am greatly mistaken, we have seen enough of
the state of the union, and of North Carolina in particular, to be assured
that another form of government is become necessary. Is the form of
government now proposed well calculated to give relief? To this we must
answer in the affirmative. All foreign goods that shall be imported into
these states, are to pay a duty for the use of the nation. All the states
will be on a footing, whether they have bad ports or good ones. No duties
will be laid on exports; hence the planter will receive the true value for
his produce, wherever it may be shipped. If excises are laid on wine,
spirits, or other luxuries, they must be uniform throughout the states. By
a careful management of imposts and excises, the national expenses may be
discharged without any other species of tax; but if a poll tax or land tax
shall ever become necessary, the weight must press equally on every part
of the union. For in all cases such taxes must be according to the number
of inhabitants. Is it not a pleasing consideration that North Carolina,
under all her natural disadvantages, must have the same facility of paying
her share of the public debt, as the most favoured, or the most fortunate
state? She gains no advantage by this plan, but she recovers from her
misfortunes. She stands on the same footing with her sisters, and they are
too generous to desire that she should stand on lower ground. When you
consider those parts of the new system which are of the greatest
import—those which respect the general question of liberty and safety—you
will recollect that the states in convention were unanimous; and you must
remember, that some of the members of that body have risqued their lives
in defence of liberty: but the system does not require the help of such
arguments; it will bear the most scrupulous examination.

When you refer the proposed system to the particular circumstances of
North Carolina, and consider how she is to be affected by this plan, you
must find the utmost reason to rejoice in the prospect of better times.
This is a sentiment that I have ventured with the greater confidence,
because it is the general opinion of my late honourable colleagues,(63)
and I have the utmost reliance in their superior abilities. But if our
constituents shall discover faults where we could not see any—or if they
shall suppose that a plan is formed for abridging their liberties, when we
imagined that we had been securing both liberty and property on a more
stable foundation—if they perceive that they are to suffer a loss, where
we thought they must rise from a misfortune—they will, at least do us the
justice to charge those errors to the head, and not to the heart.

The proposed system is now in your hands, and with it the fate of your
country. We have a common interest for we are embarked in the same vessel.
At present she is in a sea of trouble, without sails, oars, or pilot;
ready to be dashed to pieces by every flaw of wind. You may secure a port,
unless you think it better to remain at sea. If there is any man among you
that wishes for troubled times and fluctuating measures, that he may live
by speculations, and thrive by the calamities of the state, this
government is not for him.

If there is any man who envies the prosperity of a native citizen—who
wishes that we should remain without native merchants or seamen, without
shipping, without manufactures, without commerce—poor and contemptible,
the tributaries of a sovereign country—this government is not for him.

And if there is any man who has never been reconciled to our independence,
who wishes to see us degraded and insulted abroad, oppressed by anarchy at
home, and torn into pieces by factions—incapable of resistance, and ready
to become a prey to the first invader—this government is not for him.

But it is a government, unless I am greatly mistaken, that gives the
fairest promise of being firm and honourable; safe from foreign invasion
or domestic sedition—a government by which our commerce must be protected
and enlarged; the value of our produce and of our lands must be increased;
the labourer and the mechanic must be encouraged and supported. It is a
form of government that is perfectly fitted for protecting liberty and
property, and for cherishing the good citizen and honest man.

LETTER OF A STEADY AND OPEN REPUBLICAN, WRITTEN BY CHARLES PINCKNEY.

Printed In
The State Gazette Of South Carolina,
May, 1788.

Note.

In the file of the _State Gazette of South Carolina_ in the possession of
the Charleston Chamber of Commerce, a slip is inserted opposite this
essay, on which is writing contemporary with the paper, stating that it
was written by Charles Pinckney. It is almost the only essay on this
subject contained in the file, which is not merely extracted from some
northern paper; and Pinckney was, indeed, almost the only South Carolinian
who had given any attention to the subject involved, or who wrote for the
press.

A Republican.

The State Gazette Of South Carolina, (Number 3610)

MONDAY, MAY 5, 1788.

MRS. TIMOTHY:

The enclosed,(64) copied from a paper sent me by a friend, seems so
peculiarly adapted to our present situation, that I cannot forbear
selecting it from the crowd of publications since the appearance of the
proposed Federal Constitution, and recommending it, thro’ your paper, to
the most serious attention of all our fellow-citizens; but previously a
few HINTS, by way of introduction, will not, I hope, be impertinent.

New Hampshire and Georgia are the two extreme barriers of the United
States, if the latter can with any propriety be called a barrier without
this state in conjunction; and both together, we know, are not, in point
of force, ready for any sudden emergency, to be compared to New Hampshire.

It cannot be doubted that Great Britain has her busy emissaries throughout
the states, and not a few amongst us; and should the Constitution be
rejected, how long can we flatter ourselves to be free from Indian
cruelties and depredations, some time since begun in Georgia, and if at
this moment warded off from us, ’tis principally owing to the dread of an
efficacious union of the states by the adoption of the Federal
Constitution. The three southern states particularly, we have had for
several years past, good grounds to think Great Britain wishes to separate
from the rest, and to have reverted to her if possible.

Mr. Martin’s(65) long mischievous detail of the opinions and proceedings
of the late general convention, (already occupying a large space in six of
your Gazettes, and still unfinished,) with all his colourings and uncandid
insinuations, in regard to General Washington and Doct. Franklin, may suit
the short-sighted selfish wishes of _an individual_ of a state situated
almost in the centre of the rest, and much safer by that means from sudden
alarms. But the generous, manly _and truly federal sentiments of Maryland_
are well known, and ’tis not doubted will be unequivocally shewn at her
convention very shortly to be held—and that New Hampshire, early in her
first meeting on that important subject, has only by consent taken farther
time to consider of it, and will at her next meeting adopt it, is the
general opinion.

What pity the salutary caution of Doct. Franklin, just previous to his
signing the constitution recommended by the convention, had not been
strictly attended to! If we split, it will in all probability happen in
running headlong on the dangerous rock he so prophetically (as it were)
warned us from, “That the opinions of the errors of the constitution born
within the walls of the convention, should die there, and not a syllable
be whispered abroad.” This Hint is full of that foresight and penetration
the Doctor has always been remarkable for.

When the general convention met, no citizen of the United States could
expect less from it than I did, so many jarring interests and prejudices
to reconcile! The variety of pressing dangers at our doors, even during
the war, were barely sufficient to force us to act in concert, and
necessarily give way at times to each other. But when the great work was
done and published, I was not only most agreeably disappointed, but struck
with amazement. Nothing less than that superintending hand of Providence,
that so miraculously carried us through the war (in my humble opinion),
could have brought it about so complete, upon the whole.

The constitution recommended, in all respects, takes its rise where it
ought, from the people; its President, Senate, and House of
Representatives, are sufficient and wholesome checks on each other, and at
proper periods are dissolved again into the common mass of the people:
longer periods would probably have produced danger; shorter, tumult,
instability and inefficacy. Every article of these and other essentials to
a republican government, are, in my opinion, well secured; were it
otherwise, not a citizen of the United States would have been more
alarmed, or more early in opposition to it, than

A STEADY AND OPEN REPUBLICAN.

_Charleston, May 2d, 1788._

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

[This list is only of those essays to which some clue of authorship has
been found. When written over a pen name the pseudonym is added.—_Ed._]

Brackenridge, Hugh Henry.
Pittsburg Gazette.

Bryan, Samuel. “Centinel.”
Independent Gazetteer.

Carroll, Daniel. “A Friend to the Constitution.”
Maryland Journal.

Chase, Samuel. “Caution.”
Maryland Journal.

Clinton, De Witt. “A Countryman.”
New York Journal.

Clinton, George. “Cato.”
New York Journal.

Coxe, Tench. “A Freeman.”
Pennsylvania Gazette.

Coxe, Tench. “An American.”
Independent Gazetteer.

Coxe, Tench. “A Pennsylvanian.”
Pennsylvania Gazette.

Duer, William. “Philo-Publius.”
Daily Advertiser.

Davie, William Richardson. “Publicola.”
North Carolina State Gazette.

Dickinson, John. “Fabius.”
Humphrey’s Mercury.

Ellsworth, Oliver. “A Landholder.”
Connecticut Courant.

Findley, William. “An Officer of the Continental Army.”
Independent Gazetteer.

Gerry, Elbridge.
Massachusetts Centinel.

Gerry, Elbridge.
American Herald.

Hamilton, Alexander. “Publius.”
Various papers.

Hamilton, Alexander. “Cæsar.”
Daily Advertiser.

Hanson, Alexander Contee. “Aristides.”
Maryland Journal.

Hopkinson, Francis. “A. B.”
Independent Gazetteer.

Iredell, James. “Marcus.”
North Carolina State Gazette.

Jay, John. “Publius.”
Various papers.

Lamb, John. “Conciliator.”
New York Journal.

McKnight, Dr. Charles. “The Examiner.”
Daily Advertiser.

Martin, Luther.
Maryland Journal.

Madison, James. “Publius.”
Various papers.

Nicholas, John. “Decius.”
Virginia Independent Chronicle.

Pinckney, Charles. “A Steady and Open Republican.”
State Gazette of South Carolina.

Randolph, Thomas Mann. “A Republican Federalist.”
Virginia Independent Chronicle.

Roane, Spencer. “A Plain Dealer.”
Virginia Independent Chronicle.

Sherman, Roger. “A Countryman.”
New Haven Gazette.

Sherman, Roger. “A Citizen of New Haven.”
New Haven Gazette.

Sullivan, James. “Cassius.”
Massachusetts Gazette.

Tucker, St. George. “A State Soldier.”
Virginia Independent Chronicle.

Williams, William.
American Mercury.

Williamson, Hugh.
North Carolina State Gazette.

Winthrop, James. “Agrippa.”
Massachusetts Gazette.

Workman, Benjamin. “Philadelphiensis.”
Independent Gazetteer.

Yates, Robert. “Brutus.”
New York Journal.

Yates, Robert. “Sydney.”
New York Journal.

INDEX.

“A. B.,” pseudonym of, 416.

Adams, John, 117, 231.

“Agrippa,” pseudonym of, 22, 29, 49, 417.

“American,” pseudonym of, 415.

American Herald, 123, 416.

American Mercury, 417.

American Museum, 315.

Anarchy, danger of, 15, 165;
  predicted, 18.

Anti-Federalists, character of, 25.

“Aristides,” pseudonym of, 372, 416.

Aristocracy, favorers of, 5;
  small danger of, 165;
  southern, 258;
  causes of, 298;
  tendencies to, 223.

Articles of Confederation, 238;
  advantages of, 77;
  amendment of, 80, 98;
  defects in, 255;
  ease of amendment of, 117;
  proposed amendment to, 84.

Baldwin, Simeon, 213.

Ballot, 305.

Baltimore, 327, 333.

Bill of rights, 28, 95, 113, 117, 119, 163, 219, 299, 320, 325, 364.

Blair, John, 162.

Bowdoin, James, 3, 6.

Brackenridge, H. H., 315, 415.

“Brutus,” pseudonym of, 269, 295, 417.

Bryan, George, 221.

Bryan, Samuel, 415.

“Cæsar,” pseudonym of, 245, 250, 279, 416.

Canada, 191;
  dangers from, 157.

Capital, 262;
  place for, 73, 321.

Capitation tax, 272.

“Capt. M’Daniel,” pseudonym of, 122.

Carroll, Daniel, 325, 329, 415.

Carthage, 93.

“Cassius,” pseudonym of, 1, 51, 416.

“Cato,” pseudonym of, 243, 281, 415.

“Caution,” pseudonym of, 323, 415.

“Centinel, The,” pseudonym of, 218, 415.

“Charles James Fox,” pseudonym of, 51.

Chase, Samuel, 323, 415;
  promises of, 333;
  speech of, 325.

Childs, Francis, 250.

“Citizen of New Haven,” pseudonym of, 229, 416.

Citizenship, 270;
  rights of, 42.

Clinton, De Witt, 415.

Clinton, George, 173, 243, 281, 415.

Coinage, uniformity of, 35.

Coke, 266.

Commerce of America, 95;
  inter-state, congressional power over, 118;
  regulation of, 97.

Commercial treaties, power to make, 234.

“Conciliator,” pseudonym of, 416.

Congress, Continental, action on the Constitution, 253, 289;
  retrospective view of, 298;
  inadequate powers of, 34.

Congress, difference between state legislature and, 224;
  length of session of, 239;
  members of, 225;
  character of, 227;
  character from South, 258;
  election of, 86;
  privileges of, 33;
  restriction on, 234;
  interest of, 220;
  journal of, 33;
  nature of, 267;
  powers of, 27, 32, 34, 41, 98;
  to alienate territory, 80;
  to coerce the states, 184;
  over delinquent states, 358;
  over citizens, 80;
  over elections, 30, 37, 118, 276;
  over inter-state commerce, 118;
  over judiciary, 66;
  over militia, 184;
  law-making powers of, 45;
  of taxation, 235;
  over territories, 43;
  over trade, 61;
  representation in, 151.

Connecticut, 183, 355;
  address to, 215;
  constitution of, 148;
  Courant, 135, 415;
  convention, 178, 207;
  legislature of, 219;
  manufactures of, 202;
  taxation in, 74, 148;
  tribute to New York from, 180.

Constituents, instructions from, 28.

Constitution, a creation of power, 145, 147;
  adequacy of, 35;
  adopting clause of, 131, 184, 362;
  advantages of, 21;
  amendment of, 44, 100, 118, 200, 233, 251, 284, 334;
  attempts to surprise the people with, 327;
  character of opposers of, 11, 143;
  comparison of, 339;
  with constitution of N. Y., 297;
  with English, 381;
  consolidating tendencies of, 65, 69, 70, 158, 258, 297;
  construction of, 43;
  objections to, 25, 53, 132, 151;
  definition of, 116;
  despotic power of, 28;
  effect of, 95;
  excellence of language of, 156;
  expense of, 60;
  general clauses of, 83, 96, 119;
  importance of, 248;
  judicial power under, 39;
  laws made under, 360;
  merits of, 27;
  new powers granted by, 238;
  powers under, 153, 156, 163, 220;
  opposition to, 39;
  preamble of, 208;
  reasons for not submitting to state legislature, 139;
  reception of, 9;
  rejection of, 100;
  remarks on, 237, 395;
  supreme law of the land, 184;
  want of explicitness in, 155, 260, 265;
  should be tried before amending, 235;
  writers against, 12.

Convention, Federal, 238, 247, 284, 287;
  appeals to the people, 140;
  character of the members of, 20;
  committees of, 348;
  dissenting members of, 104;
  harmony of, 191;
  ignorance of the members of, 22;
  illegal action of, 104;
  irritated condition of, 367;
  journals of, 347;
  large vs. small states in, 355;
  meetings of, 345;
  meetings of members of, 355;
  object of, 35;
  powers of, 252, 290;
  proceedings in, 130, 174, 183, 341;
  secrecy of, 252, 298;
  spirit of, 167;
  wisdom of, 252.

Convention, second, 62, 235, 375.

Council, lack of, 162.

“Countryman, A,” pseudonym of, 211, 415, 416.

Courts, Federal, 36, 40, 83.

Courts, State, 54.

Coxe, Tench, 415.

Credit, public, 73, 197.

Creditors, public, 60;
  justice to, 35.

Criminal prosecution, laws for, 67.

Daily Advertiser, 250, 279, 415, 416.

Davie, William Richardson, 415.

Debt, Continental, 60, 73, 77, 95, 97, 127.

Debtors, opposition of, to constitution, 144.

“Decius,” pseudonym of, 416.

Delaware, 163, 355.

Dickinson, John, 415.

Duer, William, 415.

Duties, 77;
  Massachusetts’ share of, 84;
  paid by consumers, 271;
  uniformity of, 35.

Eastern states, carrying trade of, 162.

Elections, 116;
  frequency of, 227;
  power of Congress over, 30, 118, 276;
  provisions for, 37.

Ellsworth, Oliver, 135, 415.

England, laws of, against treason, 42;
  religious freedom in, 168.

Europe, governments of, 256;
  treaties with, 89.

“Examiner,” pseudonym of, 18, 416.

Excise forbidden, 118.

Executive, 158, 260, 310;
  advice of, 38;
  blended with legislative, 240, 275;
  council for, 163;
  impeachment of, 39;
  ineligible, after service, 234;
  may be a woman, 319;
  method of electing, 263;
  not specified, 319;
  objections to, 162;
  powers of, 39, 261;
  power over pardon, 234, 240;
  power to convene Congress, 275;
  re-eligibility of, 354, 374;
  to be elected annually, 119;
  under constitution, 37;
  vote of, 38;
  veto power of, 34.

Ex post facto law, 163.

“Fabius,” pseudonym of, 415.

Federal Government, necessity for, 141.

Federalists, aristocratic tendencies of, 89.

Findley, William, 100, 321, 415.

Fisheries, 194;
  power over, 234.

Flax, 202.

Foreign influence, 103.

Foreign nations, intercourse with, 80.

Forests, value of, 194.

France, public debt to, 73.

Franchise, 226.

Frankland, 258.

Franklin, Benjamin, 23, 26, 218, 321, 370.

“Freeman,” pseudonym of, 415.

“Friend to the Constitution,” 329, 415.

Georgia, 164, 190, 259, 355.

Gerry, Elbridge, 25, 51, 53, 104, 123, 127, 130, 137, 161, 172, 182, 186,
            339, 341, 350, 416;
  conciliating conduct of, 174;
  hypocrisy of, 174;
  objections to constitutions, 132;
  remarks on, 150.

Goddard, William, 341.

Government, divisions of, 116;
  encroaching tendencies of, 376;
  General and State linked, 153;
  Greek and Roman, 55;
  importance, 247;
  necessity of, to society, 111;
  opposition to, 24;
  a strong one necessary for liberty, 147.

Great Britain, dangers from, 190;
  resentment of, 89.

Habeas corpus, suspension of, 36.

Hamilton, Alexander, 245, 279, 416.

Hampshire Gazette, 5.

Hancock, John, 3, 5, 10.

Hanson, Alexander Contee, 372, 416.

Hartford, 216.

Harvard College Library, 40.

Holland, public debt due, 73.

Hopkinson, Francis, 416.

Humphrey’s Mercury, 415.

Impeachment, 39, 233, 312, 391;
  in Massachusetts, 41;
  methods of, 30;
  powers of Senate in, 29.

Independent Chronicle, 5.

Independent Gazetteer, 218, 415, 416, 417.

India, trade with, 109.

Indian affairs, 301;
  lands, 300.

Iredell, James, 416.

Jay, John, 416.

Judiciary, 54, 159, 235, 241;
  appeals to, 130, 184, 361;
  appointment of, 69;
  dangers from, 66, 164;
  federal, 83;
  limits of 67, 118;
  national, 309;
  oppressiveness of, 159;
  powers of, 96;
  restrictions on federal, 119;
  state, 241.

“Junius,” pseudonym of, 51.

Jury, trial by, 41, 131, 308.

“Kempis, O’Flanagan,” pseudonym of, 51.

Lamb, John, 173, 245, 416.

“Landholder, A,” 129, 135, 205, 339, 344, 415;
  replies to, 123.

Land grants, power of courts over, 75.

Lands, western, 60, 63, 73.

Lansing, John, Jr., 104.

Lee, Gen. Charles, 161.

Lee, Henry, 162.

Lee, Richard Henry, 161, 177, 390.

Liberty of the press, 365.

Locke, 257.

Loyalists, opposition of, to constitution, 143.

M’Henry, James, 131, 187, 347, 350.

McKean, Thomas, 90, 100.

McKnight, Dr. Charles, 416.

MacLaughlin, Neil, 321.

Madison, 162, 231, 325, 387, 416.

Magna Charta, 219.

Maine, secession of, 257.

Manufactures in America, 201.

“Marcus,” pseudonym of, 416.

Martin, Luther, 104, 130, 137, 182, 185, 337, 416.

Maryland, 188;
  convention, 327;
  Legislature, petition to, 334.

Maryland Journal, 182, 323, 329, 337, 415, 416.

Mason, George, 104, 161, 164, 165, 172, 355.

Massachusetts, 258;
  Constitution of, 16;
  convention, 105, 187, 349;
  proposed resolution for, 84;
  debt of, 60;
  delegates from, 29;
  disadvantages of government for, 102;
  early history of, 56;
  feebleness of, 257;
  impeachment in, 30, 41;
  Legislature, action on constitution of, 17;
  means of taxation of, 13;
  origin of opposition in, 176;
  plan to aggrandize, 182;
  position of, 61;
  public lands of, 63;
  share of the Continental debt, 77;
  taxation in, 74;
  tender law of, 36, 59;
  warning to, 10.

Massachusetts Centinel, 3, 123, 416.

Massachusetts Gazette, 1, 12, 18, 49, 51, 416, 417.

Mercer, James Francis, 104.

Militia, 358;
  powers of Congress over, 184;
  power over, 342, 354;
  State control of, 118.

Minority, powers of, 33.

Monarchy, small danger of, 165.

Money, receipts and expenditures of public, 36.

Monopolies, power of Congress to create, 70;
  prevention of, 80.

Montesquieu, 256, 261.

Nails, manufacture of, 202.

Naturalization, 313;
  powers of Congress over, 79.

Navigation act, 161;
  motion against, 173;
  right to make, 234.

Netherlands, condition of, 249.

New England, manufactures of, 201.

New Hampshire, 189, 259;
  interest of, 190, 192;
  lands in, 75.

New Haven, 216.

New Haven Gazette, 211, 229, 416.

New Jersey, 183, 355.

New Spain, dangers from, 157.

Newspapers, scribblers in, 25.

New York against constitution, 61;
  Assembly, 245;
  colonial parties, 306;
  constitution of, 297, 299;
  violation of, 301;
  draft of a constitution for, 307;
  impost of, 173;
  opposition in, 176;
  proposed property qualification in, 307;
  State convention of 1776, 298;
  State debt of, 60;
  Executive, 310;
  taxation in, 74;
  tribute from Connecticut to, 180.

New York Journal, 125, 243, 269, 293, 415, 416, 417.

Nicholas, John, 416.

North Carolina, 258.

North Carolina, State Gazette of, 395, 415, 416, 417.

Northern States, character of people of, 92.

Nova Scotia, 191;
  condition of, 89.

“Numa,” pseudonym of, 5, 10.

Oath, 207, 369;
  character of, 17, 168;
  of President, 38.

“Ocrico,” pseudonym of, 52.

Officers, federal, privileges of, 119.

Office holders, 145;
  multiplication of, 88.

“Officer of the Continental Army,” pseudonym of, 415.

“Old Fog,” pseudonym of, 3.

Paper money, 127, 131, 196, 341, 348;
  motion to redeem, 174, 186;
  states to emit, 119.

Parties, colonial, 306.

People, dangers from, 179;
  not to elect representatives, 183;
  rights of, 115.

Pennsylvania, 369;
  Assembly, 53, 369;
  Convention of, 90, 100;
  future seat of government, 98;
  naturalization in, 79;
  opposition in, 176.

Pennsylvania Gazette, 415.

“Pennsylvanian,” pseudonym of, 415.

“Philadelphiensis,” pseudonym of, 417.

“Philo-Publius,” pseudonym of, 415.

Pinckney, C. C., 183.

Pinckney, Charles, 416.

Pittsburg Gazette, 317, 415.

“Plain Dealer, A,” pseudonym of, 385, 416.

Poll tax, 272;
  forbidden, 118.

Population, destiny of, 193.

Press, liberty of, 164, 239.

Prices, depressed state of, 142.

Private opinion, freedom of, 170.

“Publicola,” pseudonym of, 415.

“Publius,” pseudonym of, 145, 416.

Quorum, dangers from, 32;
  powers of, 33.

Randolph, Edmund, 104, 231, 346, 387.

Randolph, Thomas Mann, 416.

Religion, freedom of, 168, 313;
  misuse of, 8.

Religious test, 207, 235;
  nature of, 169;
  necessity of, 168.

Representation, 54, 269, 391;
  best mode of, 151;
  difference of opinion concerning, 354;
  smallness of, 236, 240;
  want of, 151.

Representatives, House of, 54;
  electors of, 28;
  insufficiency of, 29;
  length of residence necessary, 28;
  method of choosing, 152;
  method of electing, 27, 357;
  people should not elect, 183;
  term of, 28;
  weakness of, 273.

Republics, Greek and Roman, 94.

“Republican Federalist,” pseudonym of, 416.

Republican government, guarantee of, 43, 106.

Revenue bills, origination of, 34.

Revenue, method of collecting, 193;
  Massachusetts’ share of, 102;
  sources of, 239.

Revolution, the American, 146.

Rhode Island, 105, 108, 115, 159, 196;
  junto in, 153;
  legislature of, 31, 36.

Rights, delegated, 113.

Roane, Spencer, 385, 416.

Russell, Benjamin, 127.

Scotland, union with England, 216.

Senate, 29, 273;
  blended with Executive, 275;
  method of choosing, 153;
  officers of, 29;
  powers of impeachment, 29;
  treaty power of, 165, 274;
  unspecified character of, 319.

Shay’s Rebellion, 5, 13, 57, 72, 157, 159, 257, 391.

Sheep raising, 201.

Sherman, Roger, 183, 211, 229, 416.

Shipbuilding, 61, 194;
  carpenters, 61.

Slavery, 258;
  responsibility for, 163.

Slaves, importation of, 163.

Smilie, John, 100, 321.

Smith, Melancthon, 173.

South Carolina, 164, 183, 265, 355;
  amendment of, 235;
  representation in, 108.

Southern States, character of people of 92;
  objections to commercial powers, 162.

“Spectator,” pseudonym of, 326.

States, coercion of, 184;
  influences, 297;
  courts, 54, 159;
  absorption of, 297;
  dangers to, 153;
  destruction of, 342;
  powers of, 98;
  negative on laws, 360;
  legislatures, action of, on constitution, 25;
  Congress a check on, 31;
  differences between Congress and, 224;
  powers of, 152;
  power over elections, 31;
  representation in, 152;
  officers, dangers from, 289;
  restrictions on, 36;
  rights, 68, 113, 118, 147, 184;
  admission of new, 42;
  advantages of, 66;
  bills of right valid in federal courts, 119;
  consolidation of, 97, 255;
  destruction of, 375;
  disputes between, 64, 100;
  equality of, in Senate, 29;
  interest of, 215;
  large vs. small, 216, 355;
  number to organize government, 184;
  rights to enforce laws of, 118.

State Gazette of North Carolina, 395.

State Gazette of South Carolina, 416.

State house, 355.

“State Soldier,” pseudonym of, 417.

“Steady and Open Republican,” pseudonym of, 416.

“Steady,” pseudonym of, 326.

Strong, Caleb, 105.

Sullivan, James, 1, 416.

“Sydney,” pseudonym of, 269, 293, 417.

Tax, poll, 273.

Taxation, 156, 193;
  dangers of, 81;
  direct, 235, 270;
  importance of, 271;
  in Connecticut, 148, 226;
  method of, 77, 358;
  powers of Congress over, 97.

Tender acts, 36, 59, 196.

Territory, right to alienate, 80, 118, 234.

Test law, 169, 171, 207, 235.

Town meetings, 226.

Trade, 61;
  condition of, 140;
  congressional control over, 161;
  foreign, 95;
  limitations of, 54;
  Massachusetts’ advantage for, 73;
  powers of Congress over, 79;
  regulation of, 70.

Trading companies, 70, 109;
  forbidden, 118.

Treason, punishment of, 41.

Treaty power, dangers from, 165.

Treaties, law of the land, 24;
  with Europe, 89.

Tucker, St. George, 417.

United States, an agricultural country, 200;
  condition of, 81, 121, 158;
  dangers to, 178;
  differences between the inhabitants of, 91;
  too large for government, 257;
  tranquillity of, 59.

Vermont, 258.

Vice-president, 240, 263;
  duties of, 158.

Virginia, 162, 390;
  house of delegates of, 166;
  plan to aggrandize, 182;
  qualifications of, 306;
  method of, 305;
  opposition in, 176.

Virginia Gazette, 387.

Virginia Independent Chronicle, 385, 416, 417.

“Vox Populi,” pseudonym of, 12, 16, 18.

Washington, George, 23, 26, 161, 177, 218, 251, 254, 285, 321, 347, 370.

West Indies, condition of, 89.

Western territory, 239.

Willetts, Marinus, 173.

Williams, William, 137, 168, 195, 202, 417.

Williamson, Hugh, 395, 417.

Wilson, James, 90, 96, 100, 112, 218, 335.

Winthrop, James, 40, 49, 417.

Woolen manufactures, 201.

Workman, Benjamin, 417.

Yates, Robert, 104, 173, 269, 293, 417.

FOOTNOTES

    1 A writer then attacking the Hancock party. See _The Independent
      Chronicle_ for Aug. 23, and Sept. 15, 20, 1787. _Ed._

    2 Shay’s Rebellion. _Ed._

    3 Massachusetts newspapers published in Northampton and Boston. _Ed._

    4 The administration of Governor Bowdoin. _Ed._

    5 The author of the productions under the signature of Numa, it is
      said, is a gentleman of the cloth, in one of the Western counties.

    6 John Hancock. _Ed._

    7 A writer in the _Massachusetts Gazette_, Oct. 30, Nov. 6, 13, 16,
      and 23. _Ed._

    8 The Legislature of Massachusetts was then so styled. _Ed._

    9 In the _Massachusetts Gazette_, for Nov. 2, 9, and 20, 1787. _Ed._

   10 See the letters of Agrippa in this work. _Ed._

   11 Probably Elbridge Gerry, delegate from Massachusetts to the Federal
      Convention. _Ed._

   12 Anti-federal scribblers in the Mass. Gazette.

   13 Referring to Rhode Island. _Ed._

   14 Harvard University Library, of which James Winthrop was
      librarian.—_Ed._

   15 Said to be by James Winthrop. See the letters, printed herein.—_Ed._

   16 Printed in _Elliot_, I, 492.—_Ed._

   17 “An Address of the subscribers, members of the late Houses of
      Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, to their
      constituents,” printed in the _Pennsylvania Packet_, Oct. 4,
      1787.—_Ed._

   18 Referring to Shay’s rebellion.—_Ed._

   19 Act of 1786, providing that executions issued for private debt may
      be satisfied by articles particularly enumerated, at an appraised
      value from impartial men.—_Ed._

   20 No attempt had been made by Massachusetts for several years to pay
      the interest on its debt, except by the State Treasurer’s issuing
      “consolidated notes” or “certificates” of indebtedness, bearing 6
      per cent. interest. Though these were by law receivable for taxes,
      they had sold as low as 4/ in the pound.—_Ed._

   21 The sales to the Ohio Company.—_Ed._

   22 By Act of July 5, 1786.—_Ed._

   23 Probably an allusion to the Phelps and Gorham purchase.—_Ed._

   24 An allusion to the proceedings in the Convention of
      Pennsylvania.—_Ed._

   25 Cf. with page 85.—_Ed._

   26 Robert Yates, John Lansing, Jr., Luther Martin, James Francis
      Mercer, Edmund Randolph, George Mason, and Elbridge Gerry.—_Ed._

   27 The speech of Caleb Strong in the State Convention, Jan. 16,
      1788.—_Ed._

   28 Delivered Oct. 6, 1787. Printed in _Ford’s Pamphlets on the
      Constitution_, p. 155.—_Ed._

   29 No record of this is given in the _Debates in the Massachusetts
      Convention_.—_Ed._

   30 Printed in _Elliot_, I, 492.—_Ed._

   31 Printed in Ford’s _Pamphlets on the Constitution_, p. 327.

   32 Richard Henry Lee.

   33 Saturday, September 15. See _Papers of James Madison_, III., 1593.

   34 The paragraph containing Mason’s objection to the mere majority
      power of Congress to regulate commerce, was included in all the
      southern papers, but omitted in copies furnished to the papers north
      of Maryland.—_Ed._

   35 Mason proposed in the convention that the President should have a
      privy council of six.—_Ed._

   36 This is an error. It was moved by Mason and seconded by Gerry. Cf.
      _Papers of James Madison, III._, 1578.

   37 See letter of William Williams in this collection.—_Ed._

   38 John Lamb, Marinus Willetts, Melancthon Smith, George Clinton and
      Robert or Abraham Yates, the principal anti-federalists of New
      York.—_Ed._

   39 See counter-statements of Gerry and Martin in their answers.—_Ed._

   40 Cf. _Papers of James Madison_, III, 1595.

   41 The Convention of Connecticut, which was to meet Jan. 4.—_Ed._

   42 The Landholder, IV-VIII, were reprinted in _The Maryland Journal_,
      and the attack on Gerry in them, drew from Luther Martin a defence
      of that gentleman, which is printed in this collection. To that the
      Landholder replied as above, but this one of the series was not
      printed in _The Connecticut Courant_, its place being taken by the
      number X., printed immediately after this letter.—_Ed._

   43 June 9.—_Ed._

   44 This is a misstatement. The motion to elect representatives as the
      state legislature should direct was made by C. C. Pinckney, was
      seconded by Martin, and approved of by Sherman, and on being put to
      a vote was favored by Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware and South
      Carolina. Cf. _Papers of James Madison_, II., 925.—_Ed._

   45 Mr. Gerry agreed with Mr. Martin on these questions.

   46 By direction of the General Assembly of Maryland, Martin reported
      the proceedings of the federal Convention to them, and this was
      afterwards printed in pamphlet form under the title of _Genuine
      Information_.—_Ed._

   47 June 9, according to Madison, the _Journal_ and Martin’s _Genuine
      Information_.—_Ed._

   48 Gerry, though defeated in an election to the Massachusetts
      Convention, was invited by them to attend, in order to furnish
      information to the members.—_Ed._

   49 To prevent any misconstruction the following is the publication
      entire:

      (This note is by the Landholder, and is followed by the article
      already printed at p. 127. It therefore seems unnecessary to add it
      here.—_Ed._)

      I will not say this writer makes a distinction between a thing done
      in convention and a thing done in committee. Be this as it may, he
      confesses more than Mr. Martin; for it seems that Mr. Gerry proposed
      that “the public debt should stand on the same ground it now stands
      on by the articles of confederation.” He might have subjoined that
      Mr. Gerry prefaced this motion by observing that it was the same in
      substance as his first, in as much as it included his first. But
      notwithstanding this motion was readily agreed to without his
      explanation being contradicted, yet he never afterwards favoured the
      convention with a look of peace, or a word of reconcilement.

   50 The convention of New Hampshire had met on the 13 of June, and after
      a discussion of seven days, had adjourned without voting upon the
      constitution.—_Ed._

   51 See Letter of William Williams in this Collection.—_Ed._

   52 This is a paraphrase of the arguments of “The Centinel” in _The
      Independent Gazetteer_.—ED.

   53 An attempt had been made in Congress, by the friends of the new
      government, for Congress to recommend its acceptance, but this
      produced protest from those opposed to it, and threats of an appeal
      to the people, so in order to prevent such action a compromise was
      eventually made, by which it was merely unanimously “transmitted to
      the several legislatures.”—_Ed._

   54 A series of articles in the _New York Journal_, written by Robert
      Yates.—_Ed._

   55 John Smilie, a prominent Anti-Federalist.—_Ed._

   56 William Livingston.—_Ed._

   57 See _Ante_, pages 182 and 189.—_Ed._

   58 The Maryland Delegates to the Federal Convention were required by
      the legislature to report the proceedings of that body to them, and
      it was in this connection that Martin’s _Genuine Information_ was
      prepared.—_Ed._

   59 According to this idea, I endeavored to obtain as an amendment to
      the system the following clause: “And whenever the legislature of
      the United States shall find it necessary that revenue shall be
      raised by direct taxation, having apportioned the same by the above
      rule, requisitions shall be made of the respective states to pay
      into the continental treasury their respective quotas within a time
      in the said requisition to be specified, and in case of any of the
      states failing to comply with such requisition, then, and then only,
      to have power to devise and pass acts directing the mode, and
      authorizing the same in the state failing therein.” This was
      rejected, and that power, which I wished to have given the
      government only in this particular instance, is given to it without
      any restraint or limitation in every case.

   60 How exactly agreeable to the sentiments of that honourable member
      has been the conduct of the friends of the Constitution in
      Pennsylvania and some other states, I need not mention.

   61 A reference to Alexander Contee Hanson’s pamphlet, written under the
      pseudonym of Aristides. It is reprinted in Ford’s _Pamphlets on the
      Constitution_.—_Ed._

   62 Printed in _Elliot_, 1, 503.—_Ed._

   63 Williamson was a member of the Federal Convention.—_Ed._

   64 Following this article was an essay from a New York paper.—_Ed._

   65 See page 339.—_Ed._