have been better entrusted. Moreover, this appointment not only secured
to Colonel Dick-Cunynghame his promotion, but also secured for the
Division a continuance of his services--unfortunately, however, for but
a few days.

Colonel Dick-Cunynghame was succeeded as G.S.O. 1 by Colonel A. Symons,
C.M.G., 13th Hussars, who had recently been employed at the War Office,
and later on the staff of the IVth Corps.

The country in which the Division was billeted and in which it was to
become engaged was typical of Flanders--low-lying, studded with hamlets,
farms, and orchards, and intersected by dykes, ditches, and fences. In
some places it was marshy, and nowhere could trenches be dug to a depth
of more than three feet without water being reached.

At 4.5 A.M. on 9th April an intense bombardment broke out on the front
of the Portuguese Divisions in the line about Richebourg l'Avoue, Neuve
Chapelle, Fauquissart. At 10 A.M. information was received that the
Portuguese had broken.

At 6.30 A.M. the 152nd Brigade, in accordance with instructions issued
by the corps, had ordered its battalions to move to positions of
reserve--the 5th Seaforth Highlanders to Huit Maisons, the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders to Lacouture, the 6th Gordon Highlanders being in reserve at
Zelobas and La Croix Marmuse.

At 11.30 A.M. the 152nd Brigade had established its headquarters near La
Croix Marmuse, where its battalions were waiting for guides from the
units which they were to relieve in Huit Maisons and Lacouture--the
Corps Cyclists and King Edward's Horse.

The 152nd Brigade was at this time directly under the orders of the XIth
Corps.

As soon as definite information from the front was received, and it
became evident that the German attack was making considerable progress,
the 154th Brigade was ordered into the 55th Division area east of the
Aire-La Bassée Canal, the Divisional artillery to Gonnehem, and the
153rd Brigade to the Le Cornet Malo-Pacaut area. The 51st Division
Machine Gun Battalion was also ordered to send one company to join each
of the three brigades.

At this time the information concerning the progress of the battle was
extremely vague. It was, however, appreciated that the Portuguese had
been overwhelmed, and could no longer be considered a fighting force,
and that the only troops opposing the Germans in front of the Division
were King Edward's Horse and the Corps Cyclists. The 50th Division were
known to be on a line east of the river Lawe from Bout de Ville
northwards.

At 12.45 P.M. the 5th and 6th Seaforth Highlanders began their advance,
guided by troops of King Edward's Horse. It was the intention of the
officer commanding 6th Seaforth Highlanders to place two companies in
Lacouture. The leading company had, however, only reached the
foot-bridge east of the Vert Lannot (subsequently called Boundary
Bridge) when it came under hostile rifle and machine-gun fire. In spite
of the brisk fire which was engaging them, an attempt was made to
continue the advance, but without success. Two companies were therefore
placed in position along the western bank of the river Lawe, from 200
yards south of Boundary Bridge up to the southern bridge at Vieille
Chapelle: one was disposed on the western outskirts of that village; one
in reserve at Les Lobes. An attempt to blow up Boundary Bridge
unfortunately ended only in its partial destruction.

On the front of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders, King Edward's Horse were
offering a stubborn resistance against great pressure on a line from a
point some 300 yards north of Lacouture to just south of Bout de Ville.
The situation was, however, desperate. Both flanks had been turned, the
enemy having occupied both Lacouture and Bout de Ville. The cavalry
nevertheless held on in their isolated position, and maintained
themselves with the greatest gallantry.

At this time Le Marais post was held by troops of the 50th Division. Two
companies of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders were therefore ordered to hold
the west bank of the river Lawe, while the remaining two companies
crossed the river. They reached Huit Maisons, two platoons of the
leading company reinforcing the cavalry garrison there, while two
platoons lay in support of them. The remaining company was diverted so
as to form a flank facing north-east along the road to Fosse. At this
period the shelling was intense, being particularly violent on Fosse
village and on both banks of the Lawe.

Some desperate fighting ensued, almost immediately after the troops were
in position. King Edward's Horse had already been heavily engaged, and
had defeated repeated attempts to envelop their left flank. The arrival
of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders was most timely, and considerably
relieved the pressure, the garrison being able to retain its hold on
Huit Maisons for another three hours. In fact, it was not until Le
Marais post had fallen, and the enemy appeared to be surrounding Huit
Maisons, that the garrison fell back in face of heavy enfilade
machine-gun fire and bombing. These troops withdrew to Fosse post,
which, with the assistance of the battalion headquarters of the 5th
Seaforth Highlanders, they occupied on three sides.

While this action was in progress "A" Company of the 8th Gordon
Highlanders, under the command of Captain J. E. Christie, was sent to
Vieille Chapelle to reinforce the garrison there of King Edward's Horse
under Lieutenant Stein. This company placed one platoon just west of
the bridge across the Lawe, the remainder taking up defensive positions
in Vieille Chapelle, in spite of a terrific bombardment to which the
village was being subjected.

The remaining three companies of the 6th Gordon Highlanders deployed on
a line west of the Lawe due north of La Tombe Willot.

Meanwhile on the left the 153rd Brigade had also been ordered forward.
The roads were, however, so congested with Portuguese troops and
refugees moving westwards that it was not until as late as 5.45 P.M.
that the battalions could move off from Pacaut. At that hour the 7th
Gordon Highlanders, with four machine-guns, moved forward to take up a
line east of the river Lawe north of the village of Fosse. These
battalions, however, during their advance, learnt from troops of the
50th Division whom they met that there was considerable uncertainty as
to the situation. Moreover, a change in dispositions became necessary,
as the Divisional front was suddenly extended so as to include the whole
of Lestrem. As a result, practically none of the 153rd Infantry Brigade
were able to cross the river, except for one platoon of the 7th Gordon
Highlanders, which formed a bridgehead protecting the bridge just south
of the Lestrem Loop.

The 7th Gordon Highlanders and the 6th Black Watch ultimately took up a
position on the west bank of the Lawe from just north of Fosse to
Lestrem inclusive, the 7th Gordon Highlanders being on the right.

On the right of the Division the 154th Brigade, until the morning of the
10th, was under orders of the 55th Division, the 4th Seaforth
Highlanders remaining with the 166th Brigade until 13th April.

The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had moved off at 11.40 A.M. on
the 9th, and after various vicissitudes and alterations of plans, due to
rapidly changing circumstances, were finally disposed with the 7th
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders along the west bank of the Lawe from
Pont Tournant inclusive to Boundary Bridge. The 4th Gordon Highlanders
remained in reserve about Les Caudrons.

At 7 P.M. the Divisional artillery came into action between the villages
of Paradis and La Croix Marmuse.

Thus at nightfall the Division was in position in the same order of
battle as in the operations about Bapaume: 154th Brigade on the right,
152nd Brigade in the centre, and 153rd Brigade on the left. On the
flanks touch was maintained on the right with the 55th Division, who
were still in their original front line, but had been compelled to form
a defensive flank to connect up with the river Lawe; on the left with
the 50th Division, who were being heavily engaged about Estaires.

The 51st Division was entirely west of the Lawe, except for the 6th
Gordon Highlanders at Vieille Chapelle, the 5th Seaforth Highlanders at
Fosse, and the one platoon of the 7th Gordon Highlanders south of the
Lestrem Loop.

By dawn on 10th April the whole Division, less the 4th Seaforth
Highlanders, had reverted to the command of General Carter-Campbell. No
changes had been made in dispositions during the night except that half
the reserve company of the Divisional machine-gun battalion had been
sent forward to reinforce the 153rd Brigade front, while two companies
of the 39th Machine Gun Battalion, due to arrive at Calonne during the
day, were placed at the disposal of the Division.

Throughout the day the 152nd Brigade experienced the most sanguinary
fighting. The enemy during the night had, in a brilliant enterprise,
managed to dribble across Boundary Bridge and push machine-guns and
riflemen into the farms just west of it. These he covered by other
machine-guns on the eastern bank of the Lawe. From the farms and
out-buildings he inflicted numerous casualties to the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders by close-range machine-gun fire. When daylight came, he
attempted to reinforce them by pushing parties across the bridge, over
which only one man could advance at a time. The Seaforths put a stop to
this manœuvre by rifle and Lewis-gun fire, and many Germans shot on the
bridge were drowned in the river. A counter-attack was launched against
the farms by two platoons of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, supported by
covering fire from the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, but it
broke down under the intense volume of machine-gun fire directed against
it.

At 3 P.M. a more deliberately prepared counter-attack was delivered by
one company of the 6th Gordon Highlanders sent forward for the purpose.
Three of its platoons attacked and successfully occupied the northern of
the two farms. The troops were, however, held up in the open in front of
the second farm. In this position they were in their turn attacked by
some fifty of the enemy. The Gordons held their ground until dusk, when
fifteen men out of an original total of ninety-seven rejoined the
remaining platoon of their company.

Meanwhile the 6th Gordon Highlanders and King Edward's Horse in Vieille
Chapelle, resisting with the utmost vigour, were repeatedly attacked,
but gave no ground. A Lewis-gun team on the roof of a cottage remained
in action and inflicted many casualties on the enemy, in spite of the
building being several times hit by shells.

Throughout the whole day, while the enemy's grip was continuously
tightening on them, this company and the cavalry defeated every attempt
made by the enemy to drive them in. On the night of the 10th
communication between battalion headquarters and Vieille Chapelle was no
longer possible. Captain Christie therefore decided to destroy the
bridges. An R.E. officer and one sapper were available to carry out the
work; but the explosives, for a reason which has never been explained,
had been dumped half a mile west of the village.

A party of the 6th Gordon Highlanders, however, made their way under
heavy fire to the dump, and successfully carried the charges back to the
village. The main bridge was blown up the same night, but the fire
directed against the other bridges was so accurate that they had to be
left intact.

On the left attempts were also made to blow up the bridges in the
Lestrem Loop; but these were only partially successful, and none of the
bridges were totally destroyed. At 8 A.M. the enemy, being admirably led
by his officers, managed to rush the crossings at the Lock de la Rault
and at Pont Riqueul, a subaltern officer being mentioned by name in the
German official communiqué for the gallantry and initiative displayed by
him in this enterprise. The defenders of the bridges were then driven
back, and became absorbed in the line, held as a chord line to the
Lestrem Loop, along the Lestrem-Fosse road.

About 10.30 A.M. the enemy also crossed the Lestrem Bridge and entered
the village. He was, however, counter-attacked by the 6th D.C.L.I. of
the 50th Division and driven back across the river, the bridge remaining
in the hands of neither side.

Throughout the afternoon the enemy made repeated attempts to break
through the chord line; but the 6th Black Watch, with ten Lewis guns,
and the 7th Gordon Highlanders, with eight machine-guns, broke up every
attack, and inflicted great losses on the attackers.

During these operations, 2nd Lieutenant R. Scott, 256th Brigade, B.F.A.
(since killed in action), observed a party of the enemy digging-in close
to the river bank. He at once sent a runner back to his battery to ask
for a single gun to be sent forward. He then selected a position for it,
and made all arrangements for opening fire on its arrival. The gun came
into action at 5.30 P.M., and fired ninety-four highly-effective rounds
at close range, causing many casualties, and remaining in action for
three hours.

This and many other cases in which a bold use was made of the artillery
considerably strengthened the infantry's powers of resistance.

During the night of the 10th orders were received for the Division to
extend its front to a point 400 yards north of Lestrem, two companies of
the 7th Black Watch being sent forward to take over the additional
frontages from the 50th Division. Meanwhile the 61st Division was moving
forward in rear of the 50th and 51st, to ensure that no gap should exist
between their flanks. Two battalions of the 61st Division, the 2/6
Warwicks and the 1/5 D.C.L.I., were to come under orders of the 51st
Division on their arrival.

For some time before nightfall the enemy had been observed collecting,
obviously for a renewal of the attack; the artillery had in consequence
been harassing all the approaches to the river Lawe from the east.
Shortly after dark a heavy attack was launched from the village of Fosse
northwards. At Fosse post the enemy managed, after a short struggle, to
drive in the north flank, the remainder of the garrison being compelled
to fight their way back to the Fosse Bridge. They, however, resisted the
enemy's attempt to advance with such vigour that they were able to
withdraw in good order, cross the bridge, and successfully destroy it
after they had crossed.

In the chord line Lestrem post was also rushed soon after the opening of
the attack. The enemy, having thus gained a lodgment in the chord line,
developed a strong series of attacks northwards and southwards. In each
case he met with some success; to the north the chord line was cleared
as far as the northern outskirts of Lestrem, but here he was brought to
a standstill by the 7th Black Watch. To the south he reached the village
of Fosse, where a defensive flank formed by the 7th Gordon Highlanders
held its ground, and stopped his further advance until midnight.

The defenders of this flank, after a gallant resistance in the dark for
over three hours, were finally driven back on to a party of about 150 of
King Edward's Horse and the 5th Seaforth Highlanders. Here the enemy was
again checked, the troops maintaining themselves against several attacks
until the pressure became too much for them, and they were driven back
on to the Zelobes-Croix Marmuse road.

At this stage the Division still formed a continuous line of resistance.
The 154th Brigade, the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, and the company of the
6th Gordon Highlanders at Vieille Chapelle, remained as they had been at
check. The remainder of the 6th Gordon Highlanders had been disposed in
and about Zelobes, three companies of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders in
and about Croix Marmuse, one company of the 8th Royal Scots and the 7th
Gordon Highlanders between Croix Marmuse and L'Epinette, the 6th and 7th
Black Watch between L'Epinette and the Divisional northern boundary. In
rear of this line 500 reinforcements of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders
were at Les Croquaux; the 4th Gordon Highlanders at La Tombe Willot; one
company of the 8th Royal Scots at Paradis and one at Pacaut; the 39th
Machine Gun Battalion with a half company at Paradis, one and a half
companies at Pacaut, and two companies at Calonne sur Lys; the 6th
Warwicks at Pacaut; and two companies 5th D.C.L.I. at La Pierre au
Beurre.

It must, however, be appreciated that though there was a continuous line
of resistance opposed to the enemy, the units forming it were in many
cases in a state of great disorganisation. They had gone into action
considerably deficient of officers, and the continuous fighting in the
dark had resulted in not only platoons and companies, but also in men of
different battalions, becoming intermingled. Control was therefore
becoming increasingly difficult to exercise.

In this position, and before anything in the nature of reorganisation
could be completed, a further attack broke out at dawn on the 11th
throughout the greater part of the Divisional front.

The enemy pursued his attack along the front with sufficient vigour to
find out any weak spots in the defences, with the result that he had
soon penetrated to the road between L'Epinette and Croix Marmuse. From
this point, as was his usual custom, he made every effort to extend his
gains to the north and to the south. After considerable fighting, in
which the enemy supported these flank attacks with heavy frontal
attacks, our troops were forced back on to the Zelobes-Paradis road. The
ground was, however, only given up after desperate fighting, in which
the enemy was compelled to pay heavily for his successes. The Jocks
were, in fact, in spite of their disorganisation, offering a gallant and
stubborn resistance in circumstances in which control was almost
entirely dependent on the initiative and leadership of N.C.O.'s.

Owing to the progress made by the enemy, it became evident soon after
dawn that the positions in which the field batteries were in action
would soon become untenable. Orders were therefore given for both
brigades to withdraw to positions previously reconnoitred, 255th Brigade
to near the eastern edge of Pacaut Wood, and the 256th Brigade to near
Le Cornet Malo. To effect this retirement gun-fire was opened
immediately on the advancing enemy, while batteries withdrew singly from
both brigades to their new positions, and at once came into action. This
covering fire, being mostly over open sights, was highly effective; and
though isolated portions of the enemy closed to within 600 yards of some
of the batteries and opened fire on them with machine-guns, their main
line was checked about 500-600 yards west of the Zelobes-L'Epinette
road. Two companies of the 8th Royal Scots established themselves just
short of this line, and assisted materially not only in covering the
withdrawal of the guns, but also in salving the ammunition of both
brigades, very few unexpended rounds being left on the ground.

At about 6.45 A.M. the headquarters of 152nd and 153rd Brigades moved
back to the cottages facing one another half-way between Le Cornet Malo
and Riez-du-Vinage. At this time Lieut.-Colonel L. M. Dyson, D.S.O.,
commanding the 256th Brigade, R.P.A., was ordered to take over command
of the 153rd Infantry Brigade from Brigadier-General A. T. Beckwith,
C.M.G. D.S.O. The latter had been gassed during the operations in
March, and was suffering considerably from the effects. He, however,
gallantly continued to carry out his duties until his condition became
so serious that he had to be admitted to hospital.

Meanwhile at Vieille Chapelle a company of the 6th Gordon Highlanders
and King Edward's Horse were offering a resistance which should become
historical. The garrison had denied the enemy passage over the river for
two days and two nights, but only by dint of continuous heavy fighting.

They were now completely isolated, the enemy's troops and guns being
pushed across the river in large numbers both north and south of them. A
German battery of field-guns was in action 600 yards from them to the
west. At 7.45 A.M. a pigeon message was received from Captain J. B.
Christie, stating that his situation was "almost unbearable." Christie,
however, decided with his men that, in view of their orders, surrender
was out of the question, and they resolved to make a desperate effort to
extricate themselves.

Their best chance seemed to be to make a sortie towards their right,
where the enemy did not appear to be in so great strength as he was
elsewhere. Machine-guns were posted to cover the withdrawal while the
remnants of the garrison emerged on the opposite side of the village.
Here they were met by a storm of close-range machine-gun and rifle
bullets. Captain Christie was at once hit by a bullet in the right knee,
but he managed to rejoin the survivors of his party by crawling to the
farmhouse, in which the survivors had been compelled to shelter. Six men
in succession advanced to knock out a machine-gun which was pinning
them to the farm, each in his turn being shot dead. Captain Christie,
unable to walk owing to his wound, next crawled forward himself to
attempt to put the gun out of action. He was, however, immediately hit
again, his right arm being shattered by a bullet. The enemy then entered
Vieille Chapelle and captured the remnants of the garrison, a handful of
wounded men.

As Lieut.-Colonel Lionel James, commanding the King Edward's Horse,
wrote in his report: "It is impossible to speak temperately of Captain
J. R. Christie, 6th Gordon Highlanders, and his officers, and of
Lieutenants Stein, Pinckney, and Laurenson of King Edward's Horse."

At 5.15 P.M. on 9th April Lieutenant Pinckney, King Edward's Horse, left
Vieille Chapelle with a message to Colonel James, stating that the
situation was desperate. This gallant officer made his way back again
into Vieille Chapelle, with instructions that the bridgehead was to be
held to the end. Thirty-six hours later, at 8 A.M. on 11th April, the
bridgehead was still held.

Captain Christie fortunately recovered from his wounds in the hands of
the Germans, and for his gallant leadership and devotion to duty was
awarded the D.S.O.

During the action at Vieille Chapelle the enemy was struggling to extend
his hold on the Lestrem-Fosse-Locon road southwards. In this attempt
heavy casualties were inflicted on him. On one occasion a large body of
Germans marching in close order along the road was shattered by the
artillery, while again and again machine-guns and Lewis guns took full
advantage of splendid targets offered to them as the enemy's troops
advanced to the attack.

Gradually, however, in spite of his losses, he forced a way between
Zelobes and Vieille Chapelle. Here he isolated and cut off two platoons
of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders guarding the western end of the Vieille
Chapelle bridge, who continued to resist while completely surrounded in
an attempt to force an exit from Vieille Chapelle for the 6th Gordon
Highlanders and King Edward's Horse inside the village.

Having effected a lodgment between Vieille Chapelle and Zelobes, the
enemy finally, after having suffered numerous casualties at the hands of
the 6th Gordon Highlanders, forced his way into Zelobes, throwing the
garrison back on Les Lobes.

As a result of these operations, the defending troops had become still
more disorganised; but though units were considerably intermingled, and
the number of officers and N.C.O.'s still surviving had further
diminished, the men remained disposed in such a manner that the Division
continued to maintain an uninterrupted line of resistance.

At noon (11th April) the line was held as follows: from the Canal de la
Lawe on the Divisional right boundary to north of Le Vert Lannot lay
three companies of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, supported
by the fourth company with a company of the 4th Gordon Highlanders. The
line was then continued towards the north-east corner of La Tombe Willot
by two companies of the 4th Gordons and 200 reinforcements of the 4th
Seaforth Highlanders. The line then curved round to the north of La
Tombe Willot, and was held for a distance of 600 yards by elements of
the 5th and 6th Seaforth Highlanders, and of the 6th Gordon Highlanders,
disposed in depth. The remainder of the reinforcements of the 4th
Seaforth Highlanders held the line along the Le Cornet Malo-Croix
Marmuse road. Two companies of the 8th Royal Scots then linked up the
4th Seaforth reinforcements to the 2/6 Warwicks, who were holding the
line from the church at Paradis to a point 300 yards south of Le
Bouzateux farm, held by elements of the 6th and 7th Black Watch and 7th
Gordon Highlanders. On their left came the 5th D.C.L.I., holding the
line as far northwards as the railway crossing west of Merville, while
further elements of the 6th and 7th Black Watch and some of the 8th
Royal Scots manned the railway on the left flank of the D.C.L.I. facing
southwards.

The reserves were now reduced to one company of the 39th Machine Gun
Battalion and the 404th Field Company, R.E., about Pacaut Wood, the
remaining three companies of the 39th Machine Gun Battalion being
already in position between Le Cornet Malo and Calonne.

It will thus be seen that though the line, as has been stated, was
continuous, it can only be described as patchwork; and it had become
evident that no orders as regards a properly co-ordinated advance or
retirement, which either the Divisional or brigade commanders might
issue, were likely to be put into operation successfully. All that could
be expected was that each unit would conform to the movement of the
troops on its flanks, the success of this conformation being dependent
on the leadership of the local commanders, who in many cases were junior
officers if not junior N.C.O.'s.

The enemy continued his efforts during the afternoon, with the result
that the line was forced back so as to run through Le Vert Lannot and La
Tombe Willot. On the left, however, the fighting was not so severe,
though the enemy succeeded in occupying the whole of Paradis.

Meanwhile a large number of men of all regiments who had become detached
from their units had during the morning been collected at the
headquarters of the 153rd Brigade. They were, however, entirely without
officers, and almost entirely without N.C.O.'s. Volunteers were
therefore called for from the 256th and 12th Australian Brigades of
field artillery to officer these infantrymen. Of those that came forward
Captain Rickard, M.C., and Lieutenant Seton, M.C., of the 12th
Australians, and 2nd Lieutenants Inkson and Gordon of the 256th Brigade
were selected to reorganise the men and to lead them forward into
action. These four gunner officers, acting as platoon commanders, did
admirable work under very difficult conditions. Having led their
commands forward, they remained in action with them until the 13th inst.
Throughout this period they kept their troops well under control,
particularly during the series of withdrawals in the face of vastly
superior forces in the rearguard action which took place on the 12th
inst. They, indeed, all proved themselves highly capable infantry
leaders.

In the first instance the men were formed into a reserve, and took up a
position in rear of the line Pacaut-Bouzateux Farm, as further
battalions of the 61st Division were now arriving with orders to take
over all ground north of an east and west line through L'Epinette. At
4.30 P.M. the first of these battalions, the 5th Gordon Highlanders,
late of the Highland Division, took up its position along the stream
L'Ancienne Lys, with its left flank in contact with the 50th Division.

The situation now appeared to be improving: an additional reserve had
been improvised; the reinforcing Division had substantially joined up
with the 50th Division on the north; Givenchy on the south still held
out owing to the magnificent resistance of the 55th Division, and the
154th Brigade was maintaining itself on the right flank in the same
gallant and efficient manner as it had done three weeks earlier at
Hermies and Beaumetz. Moreover, another Division, the 3rd, was moving up
to support the 154th Brigade and 55th Division.

In these circumstances General Carter-Campbell decided to make a firmer
line by withdrawing his foremost troops north of Bouzateux Farm on to
the Paradis-Merville road, so as to join up satisfactorily with the line
held by the 5th Gordon Highlanders.

In the course of these operations the fighting had necessitated further
withdrawals by the artillery brigades, the 255th Brigade taking up
positions in Riez-du-Vinage, the 256th Brigade in Carvin, and the
Australians west of the river Clarence in Calonne.

During the night of the 11th-12th a further adjustment in the infantry
took place, the 76th Brigade of the 3rd Division having arrived and
relieved the 154th Brigade up to and including La Tombe Willot, leaving
only a very small portion of the front line held by the 4th Seaforth
reinforcements, under the command of General Buchanan.

The order of battle in the front line was now as follows: the 4th
Seaforth reinforcements extended from La Tombe Willot half-way to
Pacaut, the 2/6 Warwicks and 8th Royal Scots continued the line thence
up to but excluding Bouzateux Farm. Elements of the 153rd Brigade next
held the line along the Pacaut-Merville road just west of Bouzateux
Farm. On the left lay the 5th D.C.L.I., who were in touch with the 5th
Gordon Highlanders on the Ancienne Lys.

At dawn on the 12th a sudden and disastrous collapse occurred. The enemy
launched an attack on the centre of the position, which came in the
nature of a surprise. Patrols of the 2/6 Warwicks were covering the
front, but they did not return with information that the enemy was
advancing, doubtless having been cut off.

[Illustration: MAP XI.--THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE. (THE BATTLE OF THE RIVER
LAWE.) DISPOSITIONS OF 51ST (HIGHLAND) DIVISION, DAWN, 12TH APRIL 1918.]

At 5.15 A.M. it was reported from an artillery O.P. at Pacaut that the
enemy could be seen advancing. At the same time numbers of men were
found falling back about the headquarters of the 2/6 Warwicks on the
west of Pacaut and at the headquarters of the 8th Royal Scots in the
village, the officer commanding and the adjutant of the latter battalion
already having been cut off.

Five minutes after this report had been received from the O.P. in
Pacaut, close-range rifle and machine-gun fire were brought to bear on
Riez-du-Vinage from the east, south, and south-west.

The enemy during this advance had all but surrounded the headquarters of
the 152nd and 153rd Brigades on the eastern outskirts of the village.
Colonel Dyson, Captain Wrathall, the brigade-major, and the remainder of
the staff of the 153rd Brigade managed to extricate themselves and
escape just as the leading German troops were entering the front of the
cottage that had been used as brigade headquarters.

On the opposite side of the road the 152nd Brigade were not so
fortunate, and just as they were preparing to leave the cottage they
were occupying, the Germans closed in on it from all sides.
Brigadier-General J. Dick-Cunynghame, Captains Berney-Fiklin and W.
Drummond, the brigade-major and staff-captain, Lieutenants Cummings and
Simpson, the signal and intelligence officers, and the whole of the
headquarters personnel, with Colonel Fleming commanding the 255th
Brigade, R.F.A., who was acting as artillery liaison officer to the
brigade, fell into the hands of the enemy. They had delayed their
attempt to escape from their headquarters by less than a minute after
the 153rd Brigade, who had made good their escape, only to find the
Germans entering their cottage.

Meanwhile the Divisional artillery was adding possibly the greatest
chapters to its history. Gunners have few opportunities of engaging the
enemy at close quarters, and their work is for the most part of a nature
that precludes them from performing outstanding acts of valour that
attract the public eye. This occasion, on which the enemy broke through
the infantry and with little warning appeared in close proximity to
portions of our gun line, was an exception of which they took full
advantage.

In spite of the complete surprise, "A" and "B" Batteries of the 255th
Brigade in the vicinity of Riez-du-Vinage managed to limber up and
withdraw south-west across the canal, although they suffered severe
casualties amongst their horses from machine-gun fire. "C" and "D"
Batteries of the same brigade could not get their guns away in spite of
many gallant attempts, as the teams were all knocked out by machine-gun
fire; but they remained in action, keeping up a rapid rate of fire to
cover the withdrawal of "A" and "B," and did not leave their guns until
the enemy were almost amongst them. The headquarters of 255th Brigade
just managed to escape with the loss of all its horses.

Farther north the 256th Brigade were in equal danger of falling into the
enemy's hands. The officers of the 153rd Brigade headquarter staff, who
themselves had only recently escaped from the enemy by a hair's-breadth,
collected stragglers and formed a line to protect the withdrawal of the
batteries. The gunners remained in action engaging targets at close
range with direct observation though under rifle and machine-gun fire at
some 500 yards' range. They finally withdrew in succession, the last
battery, "D" 256, only clearing its position when the enemy was 300
yards from it on the left front. Sergeant V. Illidge was partly
responsible for the successful withdrawal of this battery. He cut out
several killed and wounded horses from the different teams, assisted in
their hooking-in, and remained in the position until the last gun had
left.

Lieutenant M'Farlane of the same battery, who was acting as liaison
officer with the 6th Black Watch, was last seen emptying his revolver
into the enemy at close quarters.

The 12th Australian Army Brigade, R.F.A., also found themselves in an
awkward situation, heavy close-range rifle and machine-gun fire suddenly
being opened on them from their left.

The limbers were brought up at the gallop just as the enemy opened on
the position with his artillery, and in spite of the machine-gun and
shell fire, the guns were got safely away through Robecq. The gunners
with a few infantry stragglers provided their own covering parties, and
with their battery Lewis guns checked the enemy's advance until the
positions were successfully evacuated.

"A" and "B" Batteries, 255th Brigade, crossed the canal by the bridge
due south of Riez-du-Vinage, closely followed by the enemy. Majors
Davidson and Jack, the two battery commanders, however, each dropped the
last of their guns within 300 yards of the bridge to cover the
withdrawal of their remaining guns. Of these one gun covered a
foot-bridge and the other a drawbridge.

The Germans were so close on the heels of the artillery that they were
able to rush the drawbridge and establish themselves in a house on the
west side of it. Major Jack, however, brought such effective shell-fire
on to this house that the enemy fled from it and recrossed the canal,
whereupon Major Fairlie, Lieutenant Mackay, and Driver Boyd took up
rifles, occupied the bridgehead, and by their fire forced the enemy to
retire down the road.

In the meantime Major Davidson with his gun was firing on enemy
machine-guns which had been brought up close to the Canal, and by the
accuracy of his fire effectually covered the withdrawal of two heavy
batteries which were coming up out of action under heavy fire.

A description of this action, in which Major Davidson and Major Jack
were mentioned by name, was included in the Commander-in-Chief's
despatches dealing with the battle, Major Davidson being subsequently
awarded a bar to the D.S.O. and Major Jack the D.S.O.

It would be difficult to overestimate the valuable part played by these
two guns and the gallant conduct of all concerned in restoring a
situation at so critical a stage. Undoubtedly had it not been for the
prompt action of Davidson and Jack, the enemy would have succeeded in
establishing himself on the southern bank of the La Bassée Canal.

The enemy, opening fanwise from his area of penetration, had been
rapidly pressing his attack north, west, and southwards. Numerous
attempts were made to improvise lines of defence, but in the absence of
officers these all broke down until the infantry had withdrawn across
the Clarence river, where they linked up with the 5th D.C.L.I. in front
of Calonne. The line was then continued northwards along the Turbeaute
and Ancienne Lys rivers.

Southwards, as has already been described, the enemy reached the
northern bank of the La Bassée Canal.

The 154th Brigade farther eastwards had, however, formed a defensive
flank, which prevented the enemy from extending his gains in this
quarter. The 4th Seaforth reinforcements throughout these operations had
held their ground about La Tombe Willot, the remnants of the 152nd
Brigade were disposed facing north about La Vertbois Farm, extending
from La Tombe Willot almost to Pacaut Wood. Here they joined part of the
8th Royal Scots and 404th Field Company in Pacaut Wood facing north.
Meanwhile patrols of the 1st Gordon Highlanders, 3rd Division, were
entering Pacaut Wood from the south.

The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who had been relieved and
were just withdrawing from the line, took up the lines of the La Bassée
Canal from Pacaut Wood to Robecq.

After the infantry had all been withdrawn behind some natural obstacle
such as the canal or the streams on the left, in spite of the
disorganisation that had resulted from the enemy's successful surprise
and the depth of his advance, the line began to harden again.

The 154th Brigade were adequately safeguarding the canal, and were in
touch with the 55th Division.

One battalion of the 61st Division was already moving forward to occupy
the line of the Clarence river from the canal at Robecq to Carvin. This
section of the line had at one time been seriously threatened, as the
enemy had reached the outskirts of Robecq, thus somewhat precipitating
the departure of Divisional headquarters to Busnes. He had, however,
withdrawn, and Robecq was occupied by elements of the 189th Brigade,
61st Division, the 400th Field Company, R.E., and elements of the 404th
Field Company, R.E., who were disposed on an extended front covering the
eastern approaches to the village.

North of Carvin the 61st Division had one battalion already in position
on a line running from that village to Baquerolles Farm, and a second
battalion continuing the line towards Calonne.

North of Calonne remnants of the 5th D.C.L.I. and elements of the 153rd
Brigade had withdrawn beyond the Lys canal, and were engaged during the
remainder of the day in the fighting about Merville.

By 1 P.M. the three brigades of artillery were all established in new
positions: the 256th Brigade on the Robecq-St Venant road, the 255th
Brigade at L'Ecleme, and the 12th Australian Brigade at La Pierrière.
While in these positions the artillery drew its ammunition from an army
ammunition dump, in spite of the fact that one end of it had been set on
fire and was blazing furiously.

It will thus be seen that General Carter-Campbell had been able to
restore his battle line with the help of these additional battalions
from the 61st Division in such a manner that the enemy was not likely to
make further serious progress, at any rate until he could move a
considerable number of his guns forward. Thus valuable time was secured
in which troops could be reorganised, and which enabled other battalions
of the 61st Division to arrive on the scene.

The line from La Tombe Willot to Pacaut was not seriously threatened
during the morning, but throughout the afternoon the pressure against it
steadily increased.

The 4th Seaforth reinforcements north of the Vertbois Farm were well in
advance of the remainder of this line; the 4th Gordon Highlanders, who
had been concentrated on the south side of the canal, were therefore
ordered to join up the left flank of the Seaforth reinforcements with
the canal by forming a line through Pacaut Wood.

While the 4th Gordon Highlanders were moving forward to carry out these
orders, information was received that the 3rd Division, to shorten their
frontage, were falling back on to the line Locon-La Bassée Canal, and
that all troops were to conform to this movement.

This withdrawal was therefore begun; but the 4th Seaforth
reinforcements, under the command of Major Jobson, either never received
these orders or received them too late, and were left in the air by the
troops on their flanks. The enemy, discovering their position, pressed
round them on either flank, and Major Jobson realised that their only
hope of escape was to cut their way out. In this attempt Major Jobson
was wounded, and with the remainder of his party, being completely
surrounded, was captured.

Those Seaforth reinforcements, who had not even joined their battalion,
but had been employed as a separate unit, with four officers to weld it
into shape, had stubbornly fought for many hours, and had maintained
themselves on their ground in spite of strong attempts made by the
enemy to drive them in. They remained fighting gamely to the end in an
isolated position, cut off from all hopes of relief. Many of them were
only boys who had just arrived in France for the first time, and the
steadiness with which they conducted themselves in their first and last
fight was worthy of the highest praise.

The remainder of the line gradually withdrew, but in good order, and it
was not until 8.40 P.M. that the 4th Gordon Highlanders, who had moved
forward to the vicinity of Le Cornet Malo and had fallen back fighting
through Pacaut Wood, crossed with elements of the 152nd Infantry Brigade
to the south side of the canal.

Meanwhile the defence of the La Bassée Canal was handed over to the Ist
Corps, the 51st Division being ordered to cover the junction between the
XIth and Ist Corps. A composite brigade was therefore formed under the
command of Lieut.-Colonel A. Fleming, D.S.O., the C.R.E., known as
Fleming's Force, which took up a line from the bridge over the canal
south of Robecq, east of Robecq, to the hamlet of Les Amusoires.
Fleming's Force, as it took over this line, was composed of the
following:--

      Echelons B (transport men, quartermasters' staffs, bands,
      &c.) and further reinforcements of the 154th Brigade.

      One hundred officers and men, details of the 152nd Brigade.

      Two hundred officers and men, details of the 153rd Brigade.

      Nos. 1 and 2, special companies, R.E., 300 strong (gas
      projector companies).

      Two companies, 11th Canadian Railway Construction Battalion,
      250 strong.

      One company, 51st Division M.G. Company.

      One company, 39th Division M.G. Company.

Some further elements of the 152nd Brigade were collected in reserve at
Hollanderie.

The 154th Brigade was ordered to withdraw to Busnes as soon as it was
relieved by the 3rd Division.

By 3 A.M. on the 13th Colonel Fleming had organised his force into two
sectors, the right being commanded by Major Campbell of the 6th Black
Watch, and the left by Major Stein, 4th Gordon Highlanders.

The night of the 13th passed quietly, and was employed by Colonel
Fleming in advancing his line by 700 yards and in reorganising his
force. The railway companies and some elements of the Berkshire
Regiment, who had become attached to the Division, were withdrawn. Their
place in the line was taken by the 7th Gordon Highlanders, who had by
this time been collected and reorganised. The remnants of the 152nd and
153rd Brigades were also collected and formed into a composite battalion
under Lieut.-Colonel J. M. Scott, D.S.O., commanding the 5th Seaforth
Highlanders.

On 14th April orders were issued for the 154th Brigade to relieve
Fleming's Force during the coming evening. Shortly before this relief
took place the 4th Division, which had recently arrived in the area,
attacked northwards from the canal bank and established themselves on a
line from the canal through Riez-du-Vinage to Carvin. Thus when at 2
A.M. the relief of Fleming's Force was completed, the actual firing line
was for the most part well to the east of the line actually held by the
154th Brigade.

The situation then remained unchanged until the night of 23-24th April,
when the 154th Brigade was withdrawn.

Throughout this engagement the 4th Seaforth Highlanders had been
attached to the 55th Division, and had taken part in the obstinate and
successful defence of the defensive flank which that Division had formed
from Givenchy to Le Touret.

On the morning of the 9th April the 4th Seaforth Highlanders had been in
billets at the Ferme du Roi near Bethune, in close proximity to the 55th
Divisional front. In consequence, when the sudden break through the
Portuguese lines occurred, they were placed under the orders of the
166th Infantry Brigade under the command of General Kentish.

Their first move was to the banks of the Canal de Lawe. Later, during
the same day, it was discovered that a gap existed in the line held by
the 166th Infantry Brigade, north of Le Touret. The battalion was
therefore moved forward under cover of darkness and disposed so as to
fill this gap, their headquarters being established at Les Faucons.

During the day (10th April) the enemy did not attack in force, but he
made several local attempts to penetrate the line held by the 4th
Seaforth Highlanders. On each occasion he was repulsed, and the position
was maintained intact throughout.

On 11th April, about 11 A.M., the German attacked in force. The 4th
Seaforth Highlanders resisted all his attempts to drive back their line.
Later in the day, the battalion on their left was driven in. The
Seaforths, however, formed a defensive flank, and in spite of numerous
attempts made by the enemy to roll up their line, maintained themselves
in their position and inflicted heavy losses on him. Subsequently the
Northumberland Fusiliers, on the left of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders,
delivered a counter-attack, which successfully restored the situation.
The Seaforths assisted this attack by giving covering fire from the
right flank, and inflicted serious losses on the enemy as he fell back
in front of the Northumberland Fusiliers.

On the night of the 11th the 4th Seaforth Highlanders were relieved by
the 1st Division, and took up a reserve position in rear of the stream
south-west of Les Faucons. Here in the course of the fighting on 12th
April they were attacked about 5 P.M., the enemy everywhere being
completely repulsed. On the 13th they were relieved and moved back to
billets at Oblingham.

The 4th Seaforth Highlanders had conducted themselves magnificently.
They had been in action for five days, had been repeatedly attacked, but
had not yielded a yard of ground to the enemy. General Kentish, in a
telegram to the officer commanding, expressed his great appreciation of
the splendid resistance offered by the battalion when fighting under his
command. General Jeudwine, commanding the 55th Division, also wired:
"Please accept from all ranks 55th Division our hearty thanks for
the willing co-operation of the 4th Seaforths. Their help and plucky
fighting have been an invaluable aid to maintaining our line through a
long period of strain."

The battle of the Lys was perhaps the most trying ordeal through which
the Highland Division passed in the whole course of its service in
France and Flanders.

It had just emerged from the operations round Bapaume, in which numbers
of officers and irreplaceable N.C.O.'s had become casualties. It had
received large numbers of reinforcements, mostly boys of eighteen and a
half and nineteen years of age, with no previous experience of war.

With its units incomplete in their organisation and under-officered, the
Division moved forward to stem the tide after the Portuguese had been
driven from their trenches. Information as regards the progress of the
enemy's advance was scanty, so that he was encountered in unexpected
places, with the result that in the initial stages of the attack a solid
front was not opposed to the German advance until the enemy had reached
the line of the river Lawe.

To increase the difficulties attending these operations, not only were
the roads in the early stages of the fight so congested with the
retiring Portuguese that forward movement, particularly for vehicles,
became at times absolutely impracticable, but also the whole area was
covered with civilians evacuating their homes, constantly under
shell-fire, and at times under machine-gun fire. Indeed, the advance of
the Germans had been so rapid, and the penetration made by them so deep,
that in many cases fighting took place in farms and cottages still
occupied by old men, women, and children. The sufferings of these poor
people were deplorable; many were killed and wounded, as were also their
beasts; others became involved in gas-shelling, and with no knowledge of
anti-gas defence, were overcome by the poisonous fumes. Of the
survivors, some fled from their houses as they stood, while others
packed their household effects, surmounted by the inevitable
box-mattress, on their waggons, and driving their beasts before them,
congested every road and track in the area. Others, again, particularly
the more elderly, overcome by the suddenness of the arrival of the
German infantry, were stupefied, and could not be persuaded to take any
action beyond sitting in their houses in a helpless state of collapse.

Later the capture of a complete brigade headquarters, in the course of a
prolonged rearguard action, was itself sufficient to break down the
organisation. The loss sustained by the Division in this unfortunate
incident was a grave one. No better successor to General Pelham Burn
could have been selected than General Dick-Cunynghame. That he should
have fallen into the hands of the enemy within a few days of having
taken over command was a piece of cruel ill-fortune, felt as acutely by
the brigade itself as by its commander. Moreover, in Captains
Berney-Fiklin and Drummond, two most reliable staff officers had been
lost to the Division; the latter was the embodiment of efficiency as a
staff captain, and had held every rank in the British army from private
soldier to captain.

In this battle the part played by the 55th Division on the right of the
51st was a memorable one. The Division, after all the troops on its left
had given, formed a defensive flank and brought the German advance to a
complete standstill, in spite of many violent attacks. The 51st was only
able finally to hold up the German advance by the fact that its right
was always thus secured.

On completion of the relief the 154th Brigade moved back to join the
Division, which was resting in the Norrent-Fontes area.

On 16th April, General Sir H. S. Home, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., commanding
the First Army, sent the following message to General Carter-Campbell:
"I must write you a line to tell you how highly I appreciate the
splendid fight that you and the 51st (Highland) Division have put up,
not only against very superior numbers, but under particularly trying
circumstances. You have done wonders. I am proud to be a Scotsman
at any time, but more than ever now. Tell all ranks I know how well
the Division has done, and what splendid fighting qualities and
determination they have displayed. It is this determination to 'stick
it out' that makes all the difference, and will win this war."

General Harper wired his congratulations to the Division on its recent
splendid fighting, and also General Lukin, commanding the 64th
(Highland) Division.

The results of the battle of the Lys were far-reaching. The decision of
the German Higher Command to exploit to the full the Portuguese debacle
resulted in the using up of nearly the whole German reserve, and
undoubtedly led towards their final collapse.

                            CHAPTER XVI.

                   WITH THE FRENCH IN CHAMPAGNE.

When the Division was resting in the Norrent-Fontes area two new
brigadiers were appointed to it, in place of Generals Dick-Cunynghame
and Beckwith. The command of the 153rd Brigade was assumed by
Lieut.-Colonel W. Green, D.S.O., Black Watch. Colonel Green at the time
of his appointment was commanding the 9th Royal Scots, and thus was well
known to the Division. He had been in command of this battalion when it
had been transferred from the 51st to the 61st Division, and had proved
himself a most capable battalion commander. It was, in fact, felt at the
time of his departure that the Division was losing in Colonel Green one
of the best infantry leaders that had served with it. It was therefore
with the greatest satisfaction to all that news was received that he was
rejoining his Division as commander of the 153rd Brigade.

On 16th April Brigadier-General E. I. de S. Thorpe, D.S.O., Bedfordshire
Regiment, was appointed to the command of the 152nd Infantry Brigade. On
28th April he was, however, transferred to the command of another
brigade, Colonel B. Laing, D.S.O., M.C., Seaforth Highlanders, being
appointed in place of him.

Colonel Laing had not previously served with the Division, but he had
been in close contact with it in the Arras fighting in 1917, in which he
commanded his battalion in the 4th Division with considerable
distinction.

On 3rd May the Division began moving to familiar areas north of Arras,
the 153rd Brigade group moving to the Mont St Eloi-Neuville St Vaast
area, the 152nd and 154th Brigades to Ecoivres-Bray areas, Divisional
headquarters opening at Marœuil.

On the 6th and 7th May the 152nd and 153rd Brigades went into the line,
relieving the 10th and 12th Brigades of the 4th Canadian Division in the
sector stretching from Bailleul on the right to Willerval on the left,
the front line trenches being situated at the foot of the eastern slopes
of the Vimy Ridge.

The sector was well known to the older veterans of the Division, as it
covered in its reserve area the greater part of the front held from
March to July in 1916, and practically the whole of the front held in
February and April 1917.

On the right of the Division were the 15th (Scottish) Division and on
the left the 52nd (Lowland) Division, so that on this occasion the line
from the river Scarpe on the south almost up to Lens on the north was
held by Scottish troops.

The area occupied by the Division had been the scene of a great German
attack on 28th March 1918. The 56th (London) Division had, however,
offered a magnificent resistance, and apart from the loss of the
foremost trenches held by their outposts had held their ground in spite
of repeated attacks delivered by the Germans in great strength.

The actual line taken over by the 51st Division as the front line had
before the attack been the reserve line, or, rather, the front line of
the reserve system. The whole scheme of defence had therefore to be
recast so as to transform this reserve system into an outpost system and
to create a new reserve system in rear. There was not the same amount of
new work required as had been the case in the sector astride the
Bapaume-Cambrai road, since numerous trenches and dug-outs existed which
could be incorporated into the new scheme. As, however, the Division was
now primarily composed of boys, who were unable to carry out a daily
task equal to that of the old trained soldiers, the work contemplated
was more than sufficient to keep the Division fully occupied for many
months.

In the new scheme of defence the system of holding a position by a
series of trench lines was abandoned. The experience of the last two
months had proved that the Germans were conducting their attacks in the
main according to a stereotyped plan. This plan was to attack frontally
with a great weight of artillery and trench-mortars on a narrow front,
and thus blast open by an intense bombardment an area of penetration
through which the attacking troops could pass and operate outwards
against the flanks thus created. In this manner they had been able to
roll up one trench line after another in a series of flank attacks.

To meet this form of advance a trench system was planned which consisted
of a number of localities, sited checkerwise, each locality being
capable of all-round defence. Thus if the enemy penetrated any portion
of the defences, whichever way he turned he would be met by entrenched
troops facing the direction of his advance.

The introduction of this system necessitated the laying out of a
complete new system of defence, which, though existing trenches were
largely utilised, entailed a vast amount of new work in the sector.

In carrying out this work much difficulty was at first encountered owing
to the inexperience of the troops, and the fact that the bulk of them
were not fully developed men. The Jocks, however, played up
magnificently, almost surpassing their efforts in the early part of the
year; and in a few weeks the defences, though not actually completed,
contained the framework of a series of well-wired localities, in which
the troops could have offered a stubborn resistance.

It was, in fact, evident from the manner in which the work was carried
out that, in spite of the immense number of casualties sustained in the
last two months, the traditions established in the Division for hard
work were being well maintained by the new drafts.

On one occasion while this work was in progress, a party was working at
night in front of Bailleul when a machine-gun opened, and a boy slid
from the berm into the trench and lay on the duck-board groaning
heavily. The platoon sergeant jumped down beside him and said, "What are
ye groaning for, laddie?" "I've a bullet in the fleshy part of my leg,"
was the reply. "Fleshy part of the leg!" said the war-weary sergeant,
with visions of a peaceful spell at home, "what the h----l are you
complaining about?"

Throughout this period there were occasions on which the enemy's
artillery was extremely active. High-velocity guns paid considerable
attention to the back areas, particularly to Ecurie, Ecoivres, and
Marœuil. On one occasion a shell from one of them landed in the
machine-gun battalion camp at Ecurie, killing two men and wounding Major
Clarke and Captain Biddulph, the second in command and adjutant
respectively, and wounding seven other ranks.

The battery positions of the heavy artillery and the Concrete Road, a
famous overland route made of concrete running from Roclincourt to the
Arras-Lens Railway, received a daily ration of heavy shells.

The enemy also occasionally carried out intense bombardments with gas
shells. On one particular occasion, the night 16-17th May, he fired
three half-hour violent bursts of mustard-gas shell at intervals of
three hours, causing casualties to 3 officers and 139 other ranks of the
7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.

On 25th May over 800 shells were fired into the area near Thelus by 4·2,
5·9, and 8-inch howitzers without a single casualty being caused.

Shellings of this nature continued until 9th June, gas shells frequently
being mixed with high explosive; but the dug-out system had been so
rapidly improved under the directing energy of Colonel Fleming, the
C.R.E., that only slight casualties were caused.

After 9th June, the hostile artillery slackened off considerably.
High-velocity guns ceased to trouble the back areas, and the front
trenches, except for occasional intense bursts, received little
attention. On the 23rd the casualties in the entire Division for
twenty-four hours had dropped to one man killed and two wounded.

On 10th June a new form of gas attack was delivered on the Divisional
front, known as a "gas beam" attack. Forty truck-loads of cylinders were
run up to the most advanced point on the light railway, which lay in
front of Bailleul and just behind the support line.

Those cylinders were arranged so that they could all be opened
simultaneously by an electrical device. This was a marked improvement on
the old system, in which each cylinder required four men to carry it up
to the front line, and then had to be left in position until a wind of
the right velocity was blowing in the required direction, in danger of
being burst by shell-fire and flooding our own trenches with gas. In the
case of the "gas beam" the train was not moved up to the position of
discharge until the wind was suitable, so that the gas could be released
immediately on arrival, and was thus stored in the trench area for the
shortest possible time.

Prior to the discharge the front and support lines in the area liable to
be affected by the gas were evacuated by their garrisons. The train
carrying the cylinders was then moved into position without incident. A
machine-gun bullet penetrated one of the cylinders, but the escape of
gas was quickly stopped by the presence of mind of one of the gas
personnel, who plugged the holes made in the cylinder with clay.

The discharge then took place, and as far as could be seen the "gas
beam" rolled slowly over to the German lines, the wind at the time
having dropped to about four miles an hour.

In the morning the Flying Corps observers reported that a broad belt of
discoloured grass showed that the beam had travelled some 4000-5000
yards into the enemy's country towards Douai. What effect it had on the
Germans is not known. No kind of alarms seem to have been given from the
German front-line trenches. The German batteries in the area affected by
the gas were, however, silent for several days.

When the troops returned to the front and support lines after the
discharge, they found numbers of rats, moles, and beetles dead at the
bottom of the trenches, while the brass shell-cases hung up as gas-gongs
were coated with a deposit of verdigris about the depth of a half-crown
piece, evident signs that the gas was a fairly powerful mixture.

During this period General Carter-Campbell had a heavy task to perform.
Not only had a new system of defence to be planned and put into effect,
but the Division itself required time and opportunity to recuperate.
As the official despatch says: "All battalions were urgently in need
of rest, and contained large numbers of young, partially trained, and
wholly inexperienced recruits, and subordinate commanders had had
little or no opportunity of becoming acquainted with their men."

To meet this contingency intensive training was carried out by the
brigade and the battalions resting, in so far as the demands made upon
them for working parties would allow. Divisional classes were formed,
and every effort was made by commanders to turn their battalions into
trained units in the shortest possible time.

The inexperience on the part of the men, and the successful way in which
it was eliminated, is well illustrated by their efforts on patrol. Six
to eight patrols were out in No Man's Land covering the Divisional front
every night, but these were at first almost ineffective; not only did
they hesitate to engage enemy patrols and were inclined to avoid them,
but they allowed themselves to be outwitted by them. By 26th May the
Division had lost one officer and three men missing without a single
prisoner having been captured.

On 26th May an enemy patrol reached our lines, bombed a post, and
wounded two men. This date was, however, the turning-point; the next
night a similar attempt was made, but was defeated. The following night
a sergeant of the 100th Grenadiers was captured, on 9th June a second
N.C.O. was captured, and on the 12th a private. Finally, on 14th June, a
patrol of one officer and four other ranks of the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders waylaid an enemy patrol of seven men and captured it
complete.

By the end of the tour in this sector, the men had become really good on
patrol, completely dominated No Man's Land, and would immediately attack
and disperse any patrol they encountered.

In other directions the training of young officers and men was no less
successful, and, in spite of many obstacles, by the time the Division
left the area in July it was able to remain in action in a great battle
for eleven consecutive days and to add further to its laurels.

When it is considered that it had sustained 7480 casualties in the four
weeks ending 15th April 1918, it will be appreciated how much those
responsible for its efficiency are to be congratulated, particularly
since between 24th April and 11th July the Division was only completely
out of the line for ten consecutive days.

By 11th July 1918 the Division had been relieved in the Bailleul and
Willerval sector by the 4th Canadians, and had begun its move to the
Dieval-Monchy-Breton-Chelers area.

Shortly before this relief Lieut.-Colonel L. M. Dyson, who had commanded
the 255th Brigade, R.F.A., for some years, very reluctantly gave up
command of his brigade, ill-health and two severe wounds compelling him
to do so.

He may be said to represent the best type of modern gunner
lieut.-colonel. Always willing, cheerful, and untiring, he was the best
possible companion to the infantry brigade with which he worked. At the
same time, he kept well abreast of modern developments in artillery. It
is difficult to estimate the debt the Division owed to colonels like
Dyson, Dawson, and Rorie.

This latest move was due to a request from Marshal Foch that four
British Divisions might be transferred, two of them to areas south of
the Somme, and two to positions astride that river, so as to ensure the
connection between the French and British armies about Amiens, and to
enable him to move four French Divisions farther east to his right
flank.

On 13th July Sir Douglas Haig received a further request from Marshal
Foch that these four British Divisions might be placed unreservedly at
his disposal. This request was agreed to, and accordingly the 15th,
34th, 51st, and 62nd British Divisions were formed into the XXIInd Corps
under the command of Lieut.-General Sir A. Godley, and were ordered to
move down to the French front.

The entire Division moved to the new scene of operations by train, the
intended destination being the Chalons-sur-Marne area. It was estimated
that the journey _viâ_ the southern outskirts of Paris would take thirty
hours. The trains, of which thirty-four were employed, steamed off at
intervals of one hour, the first leaving Bryas at 5 P.M. on 14th July,
the last train, carrying the Divisional artillery, leaving Pernes at 3
A.M. on 16th July.

Before the first troops had reached their destination the Germans, on
the morning of the 14th July, launched an offensive on a front of eighty
kilometres east and south-west of Rheims, which carried them across the
Marne, but which was finally held by the French, American, and Italian
forces on this front. This attack was in the first instance checked east
and north of Rheims, but as it was making progress westwards along the
valley of the Marne towards Epernay and towards the Montagne de Rheims,
the destination of the Division was altered, and on the evening of the
15th the first of the Divisional units were detraining in the
Nogent-sur-Seine area.

As each unit arrived on the 16th it was moved by motor lorry towards the
south bank of the Marne in the Epernay area, the manner in which this
move was organised by the French being admirable and few delays
occurring.

During the night of the 16-17th Divisional headquarters opened at
Moussy, three miles south-west of Epernay. On the following day the
enemy continued his advance north and south of the Marne, and had also
further encroached on the Montagne de Rheims, his farthest point of
penetration in the Epernay area being Boursault, a village four and a
half miles north-west of Moussy on the other side of the forest of
Epernay.

During the night of the 17th the 152nd, 153rd, and 154th Brigades
established their headquarters at Le Mesnil, Pierry, and Chouilly
respectively, the infantry battalions, now almost complete, being
grouped in villages and woods about their brigade headquarters.

Regimental transport, field companies, and field ambulances, which were
marching from their detraining stations, had not yet arrived in their
brigade group area, the first being still many miles behind, while the
Divisional artillery was still detraining during the day.

On 18th July Marshal Foch opened his counter-offensive on the western
flank of the Rheims-Soissons salient, which, with a series of
counter-attacks delivered south of the Marne, arrested the enemy's
advance. While these operations were in progress, the Divisional
artillery were on the march from their detraining station,
Nogent-sur-Seine, and the bulk of the regimental transport, field
ambulances, and field companies were arriving in their brigade group
areas.

During the night 18-19th July the original plan of employing the
Division south of the Marne was changed, and orders were received at 1
A.M. for it to move to the Forêt de la Montagne de Rheims. This move was
carried out on the morning of the 19th, the troops crossing the Maine at
Epernay and moving to the south-western fringe of the Forêt de la
Montague.

By 9 A.M. Divisional headquarters had been established at Hautvillers,
152nd Brigade headquarters at Champillon, 153rd Brigade headquarters at
Romery, and 154th Brigade in woods one mile north of Bellevue.

The Divisional artillery had also concentrated on the Moussy-Pierry
area.

All these moves were carried out in a hilly country in days of intense
heat, broken on the 18th by a violent thunderstorm, and proved extremely
trying both to men and horses--to the former particularly after nine
weeks of continual trench warfare. The Divisional artillery had covered
eighty miles in three days by forced marches, and after the storm on the
18th had found the roads impassable in many places owing to trees which
had been blown down in the storm and which had to be cleared before the
batteries could pass on.

During the 19th heavy fighting went on throughout the day, in which the
balance was in favour of the French, though German patrols had
penetrated as far as Nanteuil le Fosse. As soon as night fell the
Division continued its march and passed through the 14th and 120th
French Divisions to positions in the valley of the Ardre and the Bois de
Courton, with orders to advance the following morning in conjunction
with the 62nd Division and drive the enemy back.

The area in which the Division was to operate was on the western edge of
the Montagne de Rheims, the great massif which the enemy had endeavoured
to seize in order to turn the Rheims defences from the south and to
dominate the Marne valley.

The sector allotted to the XXIInd British Corps covered a front of 8000
yards astride the Ardre river, a stream running northwards to the Vesle,
and consisting of an open valley bottom with steep wooded slopes on
either side. Both valleys and slopes were studded with villages and
hamlets, which were for the most part intact, and afforded excellent
cover.

The northern boundary of the 51st Division was the river Ardre, which at
the point where the attack began was little more than a ditch.

The most formidable obstacle in the path of the Division was the dense
wood, the Bois de Courton, which stretched for 3500 yards from the
jumping-off line in the direction of the attack. This wood was composed
of a thick tangle of trees traversed by rides and country tracks, both
laterally and from front to rear. On the slopes of the valley at the
edge of this wood lay the hamlets of Espilly, Les Haies, and Nappes,
which linked up the defenders in the wood with various _points d'appui_
in the valley.

The valley itself was also admirably suited for concealed defences,
consisting as it did of small woods, mills, banks, and sunken roads
hidden by standing corn.

During the 19th the course of the fighting had been such that in the
instructions received by the Division it was stated that the enemy
appeared to be retiring on a wide front covered by rear-guards.

The orders issued for the attack therefore provided for a deep advance
into enemy territory, the final objective selected, the Brown line,
being at its greatest distance nine and a half kilometres from the
jumping-off line. The first objective, the Blue line, corresponded
roughly with the old French front line, and was from four to six
kilometres from the jumping-off line. As far as the Division was
concerned, this line ran roughly north and south along the western edge
of the Bois d'Éclisse.

The troops formed up for the attack on a two-brigade front on a line
stretching four kilometres as the crow flies, from the Ardre just west
of Pourcy to a point in the Bois de Courton one kilometre south-east of
Paradis; the 154th Brigade on the right, the 153rd on the left, and the
152nd in reserve. The attack was to be continued on the right by the
62nd Division, and on the left by the 7th French Division.

Each attacking brigade advanced on a one-battalion front, the leading
battalions employing their companies in line and keeping one in reserve.
The objective allotted to the leading battalions was an intermediate
objective known as the Green line, which ran from Chaumuzy to the
north-western edge of the Bois de Courton. The plan was that after the
capture of the Green line, a second battalion on each brigade front
should pass on to the capture of the Blue line, and the third battalion
to the capture of the Brown.

[Illustration: MAP XII. THE COUNTER-ATTACK IN CHAMPAGNE: THE ADVANCE ON
27TH AND 28TH JULY 1918.]

The artillery covering the attack was placed in the hands of the C.R.A.,
and consisted, in addition to the Divisional artillery, of two groups
of French 155 mm. guns, and seven groups of 75's. It was arranged that
the French artillery should cover the advance of the infantry up to the
Green line, and that the Divisional artillery should then move forward
and cover the remainder of the advance.

The artillery, and indeed all arms, were considerably hampered by the
scanty supply of French maps. Those that were issued were difficult to
read for British troops, and appeared very inaccurate when compared with
those produced by the topographical section of the general staff.
Indeed, it was not until the French maps were issued that it was
appreciated what a valuable asset the accuracy of the British maps was,
and it was found that whereas a barrage could be accurately fired from a
British map, the French maps could not always be depended on to give
satisfactory results.

At the time of the attack three enemy Divisions were in line opposite
the 51st--the 103rd Hessian Division in the centre, the 123rd (Saxon)
Division on the German right, and the 22nd (Sachsen Meinigen) Division
on the German left, the two latter both overlapping the front attacked
by the 51st. All three were classified by Intelligence as of average
quality; but the 123rd had been badly cut up in the fighting of the
previous days, and on the 20th units of the 50th Division had already
begun to relieve it astride the Ardre.

The move to the jumping-off line through units of the 14th and 120th
French Divisions was laborious and of long duration. The troops were
considerably delayed by the congestion on the roads and tracks, and did
not reach their positions until 4 A.M. The shortage of French guides
considerably added to their difficulties. Moreover, touch was not
obtained between the leading troops of the two attacking brigades until
after the attack had begun.

So far, to the Jocks the move to Champagne had been a great adventure;
the entrainment of the complete Division, the passing through the
outskirts of Paris, the journey on the French lorries, as well as the
arrival in a country of new and beautiful scenery, had all been of deep
interest to them. Most of them for the first time saw the French army in
the field, and no doubt realised, as most men do on the first occasion
that they have dealings with an active French Division, what magnificent
men they are, and what a false impression of them is obtained from the
odd and rather bedraggled French soldiers that were occasionally seen on
leave in the zone of the British armies.

Great adventure, indeed, it was. Not only had the Highland Division the
privilege of taking part in the early phases of Marshal Foch's great
counter-stroke which turned the German invasion of France into a hasty
retirement, but it was to maintain itself for eleven days in the heat of
sanguinary fighting without relief, and to advance its line over four
and a quarter miles through a country heavy with dense woods and
magnificently adapted by nature for stubborn defence, and in which an
enemy only recently victorious was offering an heroic resistance.

At 8 A.M. the artillery barrage opened and the advance began, the 4th
Seaforth Highlanders leading on the right, and the 6th Black Watch on
the left. Nor had the battle long been in progress before it became
evident that the enemy, so far from retiring on this portion of the
front, was holding on to his position with great determination.

Immediately in front of the 154th Brigade lay a large and partially
wooded hill of which the slopes on the enemy's side were dominated by
Marfaux on the north bank of the Ardre and by the Bois de l'Aulnay. On
its eastern side this hill sloped steeply to the river Ardre.

In front of the 153rd Brigade lay the dense Bois de Courton, divided by
a main ride running in the direction of the attack.

Both brigades captured the enemy outpost line with a total of 150
prisoners without meeting serious resistance.

The 4th Seaforth Highlanders then carried the hill in front of them, and
were making their way down the slopes on the enemy's side when they came
in view of Marfaux, the Bois de l'Aulnay and Espilly, and heavy
machine-gun fire was opened on them, with the result that the advance
was checked. The right company had by this time occupied Bullin Farm,
and passed some 200 yards beyond it; the centre company had, however,
mistaken Marfaux for its true objective, Chaumuzy, and had edged its way
over towards that village, becoming intermingled with the right company.
The left company had reached the sunken road running from Espilly to
Bullin Farm. In this advance heavy fighting against machine-gun nests
had taken place, and the barrage was in consequence irretrievably lost,
so that for the present the attack could only be continued if the
infantry could subdue Marfaux and the Bois de l'Aulnay on the right and
Espilly in the centre with their own weapons. The battalion was,
however, much disorganised, as the centre company had lost its
direction, and the left company, in touch on neither of its flanks, was
being badly enfiladed from Espilly.

The Seaforths, however, made repeated attempts to close with the enemy;
but these were all held off by the great volume of the fire produced by
the vast number of machine-guns that were encountered. Even men trying
to make their way by creeping through the standing crops attracted so
much fire that this method of advance had to be abandoned.

In this position two companies of the 4th Gordon Highlanders advanced to
support the 4th Seaforth Highlanders along the valley of the Ardre, and
two along a track leading to Espilly. The latter automatically filled
the gap between the two brigades, and became heavily involved in the
fighting as they approached the road known as Bullin road, running
almost north and south across the position about 700 yards east of
Espilly. Here, finding the enemy in strength lining the road, they
immediately deployed and assaulted the position, and though they
suffered serious losses, they made their way forward with the greatest
gallantry. The enemy in face of these attacks finally broke, abandoned
the line of the road, and fell back into some woods in rear of it.

Lieut.-Colonel Bickmore, D.S.O., commanding the 4th Gordon Highlanders,
finding that all the officers in one company had become casualties,
immediately took command of it, and, supported by the second company,
personally led his troops against the enemy in the wood. Shortly after
crossing the road the companies came under a burst of close-range
machine-gun fire and rifle grenades, and the attack was shattered,
Colonel Bickmore being mortally wounded at the head of his men.

The remnants of the two companies then withdrew and lined the road they
had captured.

By 12 noon the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were advancing in
rear of the 4th Seaforth and 4th Gordon Highlanders. This battalion
captured a machine-gun still in action in the right rear of the 4th
Seaforth Highlanders, which had been causing them considerable trouble,
and subsequently combined with the Seaforths in their attempts to free
themselves from the machine-guns on their right front and centre.

In spite of many gallant attempts which were made during the continuous
fighting throughout this day, the volume of enemy fire never abated, and
no substantial advance could be made. An N.C.O. and a few men did,
however, manage to enter the outskirts of Marfaux.

Though these battalions, in spite of the fact that they had become much
intermixed and disorganised, never relaxed their efforts to get on and
maintained a continuous pressure against the enemy, their gallantry was
not rewarded by success.

The line thus remained as it stood for the remainder of the day, with
the exception that the company in the sunken road was subjected to so
much fire that it could not maintain itself in its isolated position,
and withdrew first to behind the crest, subsequently to move forward and
dig itself in in view of the enemy.

Meanwhile, on the left, the 153rd Brigade had experienced heavy fighting
throughout the day in particularly trying and difficult circumstances.

After they had captured the outpost line this leading battalion, the 6th
Black Watch, disappeared into the wood. At this point an unusual
incident occurred, which greatly added to the confusion which must
inevitably occur during an action fought in dense woods.

Shortly after the advance began the Germans opened a heavy barrage about
the jumping-off line. In consequence, the 7th Black Watch and 7th Gordon
Highlanders pressed forward close on the heels of the 6th Black Watch so
as to get clear of the barraged area as quickly as possible.

There was, however, a gap in this barrage between the main drive and the
south-western edge of the Bois de Courton, which resulted in the bulk of
the 7th Black Watch and 7th Gordon Highlanders being attracted into that
area.

Meanwhile the 6th Black Watch were with great difficulty forcing their
way through the wood. The enemy was, however, in considerable strength,
particularly as regards machine-guns, and everywhere offered a stubborn
resistance. The going in the wood was desperate, tangled undergrowth and
the numerous trees making the physical effort of advancing very
considerable. In addition, the country was so blind that it afforded the
enemy every facility for ambushing the most advanced troops.

In these circumstances the keeping of direction became a matter of the
greatest difficulty. Not only were the troops unable to see more than
fifty yards or so in front of them, but also they were constantly led
out of their true direction to deal with some hidden point of resistance
which suddenly engaged them. In fact, the wood fighting became a
question of isolated bodies of troops making their own way through the
wood as best they could, platoons and even sections of the enemy
completely detached and losing touch with their neighbours on both
flanks.

On the right the 6th Black Watch fought their way successfully through
the wood until they came under heavy fire from the vicinity of Espilly.
This village proved itself to be the centre of a strongly-defended
locality which, in spite of repeated attempts, could not be stormed by
the infantry. By the time the leading troops came under fire from the
Espilly defences, so much time had been spent in fighting in the wood
that the barrage had passed on, so that the infantry were here also
dependent on their own weapons alone to cover their forward movement.

On the left, as, owing to the density of the wood, it was impossible to
see the position of neighbouring troops, the 6th Black Watch, the 7th
Black Watch, and the 7th Gordon Highlanders all became involved in the
fighting and became split up into numerous detached parties.

On the extreme left elements of all these battalions, led by Lieutenant
M'Corquodale, 6th Black Watch, and accompanied by some French
Senegalese troops, reached the north-western edge of the Bois de
Courton, and even passed on to the southern edge of the Bois d'Éclisse.
They were, however, met with so heavy a fire in this advanced position,
and were entirely unsupported on either flank, and so fell back to the
edge of the Bois de Courton.

The remainder of these battalions were for the most part held up by the
western and south-western defences of the Espilly locality, though some
of them fought their way well beyond the La Neuville-Les Haies road.

Subsequently the Senegalese troops on the left, finding that they were
unsupported by the remainder of their battalion, and learning that
Paradis was still in the hands of the enemy, fell back to the line held
by the remainder of their unit. The foremost troops of the 153rd Brigade
were thus left holding a narrow front well in advance of all
neighbouring troops; and as the enemy were threatening to cut them off
from the rear, they were compelled to withdraw gradually to a line some
200 yards north of the La Neuville-Les Haies road.

The success of the 153rd Brigade was largely due to the gallantry and
leadership of the commanding officer of the 7th Black Watch,
Lieut.-Colonel J. C. Miller, M.C.

Colonel Miller, seeing that his attacking waves had lost direction owing
to the gap in the enemy barrage, pushed forward with his intelligence
officer, and passed through part of the heaviest of the barrage. He was
thus able to direct a company from his rear wave to fill the gap. In
passing through the barrage Colonel Miller lost his intelligence officer
and both orderlies, and was himself blown over by shells on more than
one occasion.

2nd Lieutenant J. B. Cable, 7th Black Watch, also showed fine qualities
of leadership. After his company commander had become a casualty, he
took over command of his company, and with his two leading platoons
succeeded in capturing an enemy lieutenant and twenty-five prisoners. He
then pushed forward and captured another twenty prisoners. Subsequently,
finding that he was being fired on from his unprotected right flank and
rear, he successfully withdrew his company. Later, hearing that troops
on his right flank were advancing, he again led his platoons forward and
captured several machine-gun nests.

As it was now evident that the three battalions of the 153rd Brigade
were seriously intermingled, orders were issued to consolidate the line
held, to obtain touch on the flanks, and to reorganise.

During the afternoon the French made a second attempt to capture Paradis
and so cover our left; they were, however, unable to gain their
objective.

At 6 P.M. the enemy, who had been reinforced, began to exert pressure.
He had already delivered a small counter-attack against the right of the
154th Brigade at 4.30 P.M., which had been shattered by rifle and
Lewis-gun fire, and he was now seriously threatening both flanks of the
153rd Brigade. As the battalions were considerably reduced in strength,
and could ill spare the men required to protect their exposed flanks,
they were withdrawn to the line of the road running from La Neuville to
Les Haies.

The 6th Seaforth Highlanders were then placed at the disposal of the
153rd Brigade, and moved forward to fill the gap between the left of the
brigade and the French, and also to take over the front line so that the
three battalions of 153rd Brigade could reorganise.

At 6.30 P.M. an intense bombardment against the right of the Division
broke out. As the enemy had launched a great premeditated attack on this
front a few days previously, he naturally had a large number of guns
available for this bombardment, and the shell-fire was therefore more
than usually severe. This was followed by an attack delivered by two
parties advancing from different directions and converging on the high
ground on the right, about one hundred men altogether being employed.
The parties advanced to within a few yards of the position held by the
7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, when they were caught in enfilade
fire.

The Germans winced for a moment under this burst of fire, whereupon an
N.C.O. led his section forward and charged them, with the result that
they immediately broke and fled in disorder down the hill.

During the day the artillery had begun to move forward, beginning about
9 A.M. By 11 A.M. the 256th Brigade were in action by Pourcy, and 255th
Brigade in front of Nanteuil.

As the enemy was found to be resisting much more strongly than had been
anticipated, and as counter-attacks appeared likely, the guns, except
the forward sections, moved back to behind Nanteuil. The forward guns
were left in close support of the infantry, in some cases 1200 yards
from the enemy, and continued harassing him all night. These forward
guns, as well as trench-mortars and machine-guns, had all been employed
in attempting to subdue the hostile machine-gun nests in close support
of the infantry. The first had proved themselves particularly useful;
but as regards the trench-mortars and machine-guns, the mere physical
labour of carrying the guns forward through the dense undergrowth made
it impossible to get them into action with the foremost troops until
late in the day. Even then, in the confusion that existed, one section
of the 153rd Brigade Trench-Mortar Battery found itself unexpectedly in
ground occupied by the enemy, and was dispersed by their fire.

During the day 8 officers and 360 other ranks were taken prisoners, 2
officers and 50 other ranks being taken from a single wired-in post in
the Bois de Courton. In addition, about thirty machine-guns and eight
trench-mortars were captured, and a battery of 75's and many
mitrailleuses that had been taken from the French were recovered.

In spite of the fact that a withdrawal had been anticipated, the
resistance had been stubborn. This was due to the fact that during the
day the enemy had withdrawn across the Marne at the southern end of the
salient, and was covering this movement by a desperate defence of the
flanks from Rheims to the Marne, on which the withdrawal was hinging.

During the night, while the relief by the 6th Seaforth Highlanders was
taking place on the left brigade front, the enemy maintained his
pressure, with the result that the line was again forced back about 1000
yards south of the Neuville-Les Haies road.

It was arranged that the 152nd Infantry Brigade should take over the
153rd Brigade front and carry out a second attack. The general plan
was that the brigade should advance on a one-battalion front, the 5th
Seaforth Highlanders leading, the 6th Gordon Highlanders next, and the
6th Seaforth Highlanders in the rear. Three objectives were selected
for the attack, the first being the north-west, edge of the Bois de
Courton, the second the southern slopes of the Bois d'Éclisse, and the
third the northern slopes.

The 153rd Brigade were to form such defensive flanks as became necessary
during the progress of the attack, the 7th Gordon Highlanders on the
right, and the 7th Black Watch on the left. On the right of the Highland
Division the 62nd Division were to attack with a view to encircling the
Marfaux locality from the north while the 9th French Division were
attacking on the left, the village of Paradis being the particular
stumbling-block in their path which they hoped to remove.

The artillery barrage fell, as had been planned, south of the Les
Haies-La Neuville road; but as the enemy had closely followed our troops
during their last withdrawal, he had been able to establish many
machine-gun posts close to the jumping-off line. The result was that the
barrage fell behind the enemy's foremost troops, and the machine-guns of
his outposts were untouched.

In consequence, the 6th Gordon Highlanders met with the stoutest
opposition from the outset of the attack, a storm of bullets greeting
them as soon as their advance began. Nevertheless, the troops on the
right, with fine determination, brushed back all resistance until they
had reached a point which was estimated to be about 200 yards from the
north-west edge of the Bois de Courton. Here the enemy were found to be
holding a carefully-prepared line of resistance supported by numerous
and well-sited machine-guns and trench-mortars.

In spite of many gallant attempts made by the battalion to carry this
line, it held firm, the Germans defending themselves skilfully and
courageously with rifles and hand-grenades. For an hour the 6th Gordon
Highlanders tried to come to close grips with them, and drive them from
their position, but without results.

Meanwhile the enemy displayed on his part the greatest initiative,
making repeated attempts to filter through gaps in our front line and on
the right flank, and ultimately became so threatening on the right rear
of the 6th Gordon Highlanders that they were compelled to fall back on
that flank to a position some 200 yards in advance of their jumping-off
line.

On the left the advance was held up after the wood had been cleared for
some 500 yards. Paradis had successfully withstood the repeated attempts
of the French to storm it, so that the left flank of the Division's
attack was again in the air. In consequence, the leading troops in this
part of the battlefield also fell back on to the same line as the right
flank had done, the 7th Black Watch forming a defensive flank to connect
the left of the 6th Gordon Highlanders with the right of the French.

A company of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders was also sent forward to fill
gaps which had occurred in the centre of the 6th Gordon Highlanders'
line.

As had been the case on the previous day, the difficulties of the
operation were greatly increased by the blindness of the country, it
being almost impossible to locate exactly the positions and flanks of
advanced parties in the wood.

However, by noon a continuous line had been formed joining the left of
the 154th Brigade to the right of the French.

The troops were closely engaged throughout the day, and it became
necessary to move forward companies from all three battalions of the
152nd Brigade to strengthen the line in places where it was becoming
weakened. On the left the successful resistance of the Germans in
Paradis had made it necessary to occupy a line which curved round the
eastern side of that village some 300 yards from it, while on the right
flank the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, after some fighting with enemy
machine-guns, established themselves on a line facing north some 700
yards south of Espilly.

On the 154th Brigade front no particular incidents occurred. Strong
patrols attempted to advance and make ground towards the enemy, but they
found him everywhere in strength, and were unable to get forward. For a
time the high ground on the extreme right was harassed by machine-guns.
However, a Stokes mortar from the 154th Trench-Mortar Battery was
brought into action against them, and after firing forty rounds silenced
them. A patrol subsequently found twelve dead Germans in one machine-gun
nest that had thus been dealt with.

So ended another day of severe fighting. The 152nd Brigade had taken
over the whole of the front on the left, the 5th and 6th Seaforth
Highlanders having been employed, either in strengthening the line held
by the 6th Gordon Highlanders, or in protecting their flanks, while the
153rd Brigade, which had been reorganised during the previous night, lay
in close support to it.

In the day's operations eighty-one prisoners with a number of
machine-guns and trench-mortars were captured. The forward guns of the
Divisional artillery had been constantly in action, moving continually
in close support to the attacking troops and making every effort to help
the infantry forward. Their activities were, however, equally hampered
by the blindness of the country.

On the following day no serious infantry action took place until 4 P.M.
During the morning the 4th Gordon Highlanders, who had extended their
left so as to take over the front as far as the main drive in the Bois
de Courton, attempted to make ground towards Espilly by means of strong
patrols.

They, however, found the enemy as alert and as strong as ever, and could
make no appreciable progress.

Early in the day it was arranged that the 7th Black Watch should operate
during the afternoon with a view to establishing themselves in a
position on the south-west edge of the Bois de Courton, north of
Paradis, from which they could cover with their fire an attack to be
delivered by the French against that village.

To make this operation possible, it was necessary to advance the left of
the line, so as to allow the 7th Black Watch to get into this position;
the 6th Black Watch were therefore detailed to carry out an operation
with this intention.

Accordingly at 4 P.M. the 6th Black Watch passed through the 6th Gordon
Highlanders in the front line and attempted to dribble forward by
individual rushes and establish a line behind which the 7th could reach
their position on the flank of the French attack.

The enemy machine-gun nests in the wood, however, appeared to have been
reinforced, for the volume of fire developed by them was such that the
advancing parties were knocked out or driven back again and again. In
spite of many determined efforts made by the 6th Black Watch, by five
o'clock they had not been able to make any progress.

At this hour the French attack on Paradis was launched, but it was
immediately met with such an intense volume of machine-gun fire from the
village that the troops, after having made their way forward with heavy
losses for 100 yards, were compelled to dig themselves in.

Night thus fell with the position materially unchanged on the front of
the 51st Division; the 62nd Division had, however, successfully attacked
the enemy's lines on their right on the Bois du Petit Champ and cleared
the wood.

It had now been decided that an attack should be delivered by the 152nd
Brigade on the following day on the front of the 154th Brigade, the
objective given being a line from the Bois de l'Aulnay inclusive to
Espilly. Accordingly the hours of darkness were taken up with a complete
re-arrangement of the troops, battalions of the 152nd Brigade having to
be relieved by the 153rd Brigade and transferred to the front of the
154th Brigade. These moves were successfully accomplished without
incident, except for the fact that one company of the 6th Gordon
Highlanders was relieved too late to take part in the initial attack.
The firing line of the left was taken over by two companies of the 8th
Royal Scots (Pioneers) who had been placed at the disposal of the 153rd
Brigade, and by two companies of the 7th Black Watch.

The 152nd Brigade assembled for the attack with the 5th and 6th Seaforth
Highlanders on the right and centre respectively, and with the 6th
Gordon Highlanders on the left. On the left of the 6th Gordon
Highlanders parties of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and 4th
Gordon Highlanders were ordered to push through the Bois de Courton to
the west of Espilly, and sweep up the enemy in the western defences of
the Espilly locality.

The barrage provided by the Divisional and French artillery was arranged
to come down at zero 200 yards ahead of the forming-up line, and to
advance 100 metres every five minutes. A barrage was also to be fired by
the Divisional machine-gun battalion.

At 6.10 A.M. the barrage opened, but unfortunately on the left a
considerable proportion of the shells fired by the French artillery fell
short amongst the infantry with serious results. All the officers in one
company of the 6th Gordon Highlanders became casualties before the
advance was fairly launched. The 6th Seaforth Highlanders also suffered
a number of casualties, while on the front of the 154th Brigade the 7th
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders suffered sufficiently to become
seriously disorganised.

Partly on account of this error in the firing of the barrage, and partly
on account of the great natural strength of Espilly, the attack
progressed in ratio to the distance of the troops engaged from that
village.

On the right the 5th Seaforth Highlanders had a brisk fight for half an
hour, captured six machine-guns which attempted to bar their way, and
were well up with the barrage when it passed on to the Bois de l'Aulnay.
The 6th Seaforth Highlanders were also close to the barrage at the
pause, but their left company were suffering severely from machine-gun
fire both from front and flank, and the reserve company had to be pushed
forward to help them.

Opposite Espilly the 6th Gordon Highlanders were working their way
slowly towards the village under a heavy shelling, and being badly
enfiladed by machine-gun fire. Farther to the left, the 4th Gordon
Highlanders and the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were heavily
shelled, and were faced from the start by strong machine-gun posts which
the barrage had failed to subdue, and so were unable to make ground.

On the other hand, the two companies of the 8th Royal Scots, pioneers
though they were, were operating magnificently as infantry. By 7 A.M.
they were well up with the barrage, and had captured two machine-guns;
they finally fought their way unsupported on either flank for 500 yards
into the Bois de Courton.

When the barrage moved forward after the pause, the enemy in the Bois de
l'Aulnay put up a poor fight, and by 8.30 A.M. the 5th Seaforth
Highlanders and a company of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders had reached
the northern edge of the wood. The 5th Seaforth Highlanders also formed
a defensive flank on the eastern edge of the wood, as the enemy were
still holding the ground on the opposite bank of the Ardre.

On the left a few men of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders reached the spur
south-west of the Bois de l'Aulnay, but the bulk of them, with the 6th
Gordon Highlanders, were checked in the sunken road running from the
wood to Espilly. From here men of both battalions strove to cross the
open and assault Espilly in face of a terrific fire. The open country
was, however, so swept by rifles and machine-guns that every attempt
broke down.

Farther to the left, though the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
and 4th Gordon Highlanders made similar efforts to get forward, the
enemy pinned them to the ground by the intensity of his fire, and
prevented them from making any headway.

Meanwhile, on the extreme left of the attack, the two platoons of the
8th Royal Scots, still unsupported on either flank, found themselves in
a precarious position 500 yards in advance of the remainder of the line.
They accordingly withdrew slowly with a bag of twenty-eight prisoners to
their jumping-off line.

At 11 A.M. a fresh attack by two companies of the 7th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders was carried out on the left of the 6th Gordon
Highlanders.

These companies, in an advance which demanded great physical efforts
from the men, carried the line forward through dense undergrowth for 400
yards, clearing up two enemy machine-gun posts. In this position a line
was established with great difficulty.

From noon to dusk repeated efforts were made to reach Espilly, but the
troops engaged were so scourged by machine-gun fire that every attempt
broke down.

During the day contact was obtained with the foremost troops of the 62nd
Division, which had also advanced their line.

At the end of the operation, the Bois de l'Aulnay was held. From its
southern end the line followed the course of the sunken road towards
Espilly to the point where it enters the Bois de Courton east of that
village. Here it joined up with the new position won by the 7th Argyll
and Sutherland Highlanders in the wood, which for the most part was
facing west, and thence to the original line as held in the morning.

In this operation the Divisional artillery suffered heavily. During the
previous night several of the batteries had been subjected to a heavy
gas bombardment, but in spite of it they continued to carry out a strong
harassing-fire programme.

In this operation "A" and "C" Batteries, 256th Brigade, then went
forward to positions west of Nanteuil to support the infantry advance.
Here they were subjected to intense bombardments, and suffered some
casualties to personnel and horses, particularly from mustard gas.

Little occurred during the evening and night except that the 7th Argyll
and Sutherland Highlanders, having located some enemy machine-gun nests
by patrols, forced them back, and advanced their line by an additional
100 yards.

Meanwhile, immediately north of the Marne, the enemy was being hard
pressed where his salient was becoming dangerously narrowed by the
Franco-American advance northwards from Chateau Thierry.

The 24th passed without any major operation taking place.

It had been intended to carry out an attack on the Bois de Courton on
the 24th, with a view to gaining the line of the Haies-Neuville road;
but it was decided in the afternoon of the 23rd to postpone this
operation until Espilly had fallen.

The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders therefore attempted to gain
ground by means of strong patrols south and south-east of Espilly, with
a view to forming the locality into a salient which would lend itself to
attack. In this they were partially successful, and though the enemy's
resistance was as strong as ever, they were able to establish posts, of
which the most northerly was about 350 yards south-east of Espilly.

On the right the 152nd Brigade spent the day reorganising. The character
of the fighting they had been engaged in is well illustrated by the fact
that battalions were so reduced in numbers that the 5th Seaforth
Highlanders were reorganised as two companies and the 6th as one. Each
of these battalions, in exchange for some reinforcements that had
arrived the night before, sent back to rest a hundred of its most
exhausted men.

During the night the 153rd Brigade was relieved by the French 35th
Regiment of the 14th Division, and encamped in woods near St Imoges.

Throughout the whole of these operations the enemy's defence had been
supported by a considerable artillery. He had concentrated on this front
a great number of batteries with which he had been supporting his
attacks, and when the Division checked his advance these guns were
still available to assist him in his defence.

He could therefore put down heavy barrages on back areas and across the
approaches to the front, so that troops in process of relief and in
moving to assembly positions were frequently caught in violent bursts of
shell-fire. In addition, during the actual attacks, a heavy volume of
fire was often directed against the area of the jumping-off line and on
tactical features that had been captured.

This shell-fire and the countless machine-guns that barred the advance
across the whole front had thus made the fighting of the last few days a
severe ordeal, which must have reminded the veterans of High Wood and
the chemical works, and which must have tried the young reinforcements
highly. They, however, stood the test like men. To take the case of the
153rd Brigade as an illustration. This brigade had lost 30 per cent of
its strength in casualties up to the time of its relief on the 24th, but
was able after twenty-four hours' rest to conduct itself gallantly
during a further four days of active operations in which it lost an
additional 500 officers and men.

After the relief of the 153rd Brigade by the French, the southern
boundary of the Divisional sector was found to run along the main drive
in the Bois de Courton and thence to Chantereine Farm on the south-west
corner of the Bois d'Éclisse, the 152nd Brigade remaining in position
on the right, the 154th on the left.

No attack was made on the 25th or 26th, but strong patrols maintained
continuous pressure against the enemy. As a result of successful
enterprises by these patrols the line was in certain parts of the front
sensibly advanced. On the right the 5th Seaforth Highlanders pushed out
eight posts sixty yards clear of the Bois de l'Aulnay; they also reached
the Moulin de Voipreux, and found it unoccupied. The 4th Seaforth
Highlanders advanced their line by some 100 yards in the wood, though
not without having some stiff fighting for their gains.

The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were continuously engaged in
the wood in trying to make headway, but the resistance they at all times
encountered was such as to deny them any substantial progress.

After further fighting on the 26th, the 4th Seaforth Highlanders made
good another fifty yards of ground. Both on this and the previous day
there were occasions on which our troops suffered considerably from the
enemy's artillery, which at times became intensely active both on his
forward and back areas.

The 26th was, however, the last day on which the enemy stood his ground
in Espilly and the Bois de Courton. On the north banks of the Marne he
had now been crushed into a small forward salient between
Belval-sous-Chatillon on the east and the Forêt de Riz on the west; and
while arrangements were being made to renew the attack on the Divisional
front, he was perfecting his plans to evacuate his position before it
was too late for him to disengage.

It had been intended to attack on the 26th, but it had been decided to
give the troops, all of whom had now been engaged for several days, the
benefit of twenty-four hours' rest--a rest which was unfortunately
denied to most of them by deluges of rain which fell incessantly through
the night.

The plan was to attack on a three-brigade front, 152nd being on the
right, 187th Brigade (from the 62nd Division) in the centre, and the
153rd Brigade on the left, the 154th Brigade being withdrawn to the
woods between Nanteuil and St Imoges. It would at first sight appear
abnormal that a brigade from the 62nd Division should attack between two
brigades of the 51st; but by this time the liaison with the 62nd
Division, commanded by General Braithwaite, had become so complete that
these dispositions caused no lack of cohesion in the attack.

A careful barrage programme was arranged, which allowed ample time for
the 153rd Brigade to fight their way through the difficulties of the
wood.

Two objectives were selected, the first being roughly the line Moulin de
Voipreux-Neuville within the Divisional boundaries, the second being a
line some 500-700 yards beyond this, including the village of Nappes.

At zero hour, 6 A.M. on 27th July, the artilleries of the 51st and 62nd
Divisions, with the attached French batteries and twenty-four guns of
the Divisional machine-gun batteries, opened the barrage.

The attack was met on the left by a light artillery barrage, and on the
right by a fairly heavy shelling of the banks of the river and the Bois
de l'Aulnay, but no infantry action beyond some long-range machine-gun
fire was encountered. The whole front, including the redoubtable
Espilly, had been evacuated.

At 10 A.M. the final objective was reached on the right just in time for
the troops to see the last of the enemy transport hurriedly leaving
Chaumuzy.

By 10.40 A.M. it was apparent that a general retirement was taking place
on the whole front, and mounted patrols were sent forward to get into
touch with the German rearguard.

The attacking brigades were therefore ordered forward to the line from
Chaumuzy to the north-west corner of the Bois de Courton, and by 1 P.M.
the whole Division--infantry, artillery, and machine-gunners disposed in
depth, and well covered by strong infantry patrols as well as the
cavalry--were on the move, while the sappers were at work repairing the
communications.

The last fight in the much-hated Bois de Courton and in Espilly had been
fought, and those centres of resistance which had for so many hours
appeared almost impregnable had at last fallen into our hands almost
without a shot being fired.

It was with a sense of relief to all that it was found that the whole
Division was advancing practically unmolested through an area on which a
few hours previously the advance of even a section had been welcomed by
a shower of machine-gun bullets. This sense of relief lost nothing from
the fact that in the last two battles in which the Division had been
engaged the whole Division had similarly been on the move, but in the
wrong direction!

At 2 P.M. Chaumuzy was entered, and the artillery came into action near
the north-east corner of the Bois de l'Aulnay, engaging the enemy who
were reported by the mounted patrols to be falling back on the line of
the road from Bligny to Chambrecy. At this time the German artillery
from positions in rear of this road were becoming increasingly active on
the Divisional front.

By 3 P.M. the battalions ordered to the line beyond Chaumuzy were all
in position, and patrols were sent forward to the old French trench
line skirting the western edge of the Bois d'Éclisse and curving round
the Montagne de Bligny.

Later in the afternoon the mounted patrols definitely located the enemy
on a line from Montagne de Bligny to the south of Chambrecy.

Orders were therefore issued at 4 P.M. that as soon as patrols had
reported the wood clear brigades should advance and occupy the old
French trench line as the main defensive line--that is to say, that the
Division was to take up a position facing west. The Bligny-Chambrecy
road was to become the Divisional right boundary, and Chantereine Farm
the left. The 187th Infantry Brigade was to drop out of the Divisional
line and come under orders of the 62nd Division.

At midnight, 27-28th, patrols reported the Bois d'Éclisse clear, and
the forward move began in a downpour of rain.

Meanwhile the enemy were retreating in the Rheims-Soissons salient,
their line after passing the front of the French Division on our left
running almost due west, the Marne being some five to eight miles south
of it.

Throughout the night the troops were moving to their new positions,
suffering no casualties except from occasional bursts of shell-fire.

By 11 A.M., 28th, the 62nd Division, which had attacked at dawn, had
gained a footing on the Montagne de Bligny, while the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders, in touch with them, had successfully occupied the old
French trenches as far as La Garenne. In close support to them in the
wood lay the 5th Seaforth Highlanders; while on their left, also in the
French trenches, the 7th Gordon Highlanders connected the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders' left with the right of the French. The latter were still
advancing northwards, with patrols of the 153rd Brigade keeping in touch
with them.

It was reported at 9.45 A.M. that the French had taken Chambrecy, and at
1 P.M. the 152nd Brigade was ordered to advance to the line
Chambrecy-Michel Renaut Farm. It was, however, later discovered that the
Germans were still occupying Chambrecy, and the movement could not be
carried out.

It was then decided that the French should attack Ville en Tardenois at
3 P.M., and that the 51st should co-operate. The 153rd Brigade was
therefore ordered to advance to the high ground north of Chambrecy, with
the French on its left and the 62nd Division on its right.

The artillery brigades moved forward to support this attack from
positions about Chaumuzy. To reach this area they had to advance under
direct observation for half a mile over open ground. The gunners,
however, made their best pace, and as the shelling was erratic their
losses were small.

"B" 255th Battery, commanded by Major F. C. Jack, D.S.O., M.C., were
ordered to move to a position north of Chaumuzy. On arrival near the
village, Major Jack found it and its approaches being subjected to a
heavy bombardment by 5·9 howitzers. He therefore instructed his guns and
limbers to gallop through the village at intervals of a minute, he
himself galloping through with his orderly first. By this means his
whole battery passed successfully through the village. It was a very
gallant performance, and was much appreciated by the infantry.

The attack was launched by the French at 3 P.M., and failed under heavy
machine-gun, rifle, and shell fire. The 7th Gordon Highlanders and 6th
Black Watch, however, advanced at 4.20 P.M., and attacked across the
valley towards Chambrecy and east of the village. Violent machine and
shell fire was opened on the battalions soon after they left the
trenches in the Bois d'Éclisse; but in spite of their losses elements
of the 7th Gordon Highlanders carried on, crossed the Bligny-Michel
Renaut Farm road, and tried to make their way into the farm.

Similarly advanced parties of the 6th Black Watch passed through
Chambrecy to the north-east and north-west of it.

By 6 P.M. the two battalions were held up on a line roughly from a point
500 yards south-west of Michel Renaut Farm to the north-east outskirts
of Chambrecy. From here, unsupported on either flank and pounded by the
German artillery and machine-gunners, they were compelled to withdraw,
the 7th Gordon Highlanders to the old French trenches, while the 6th
Black Watch finally established a line from the Bois d'Éclisse to 200
yards south of Chambrecy.

During the night the 154th Brigade were ordered to take over the front;
the 4th Seaforth Highlanders accordingly relieved on the right, with
their right flank just south of the Montagne de Bligny, and the 4th
Gordon Highlanders relieved the line recently established by the 6th
Black Watch. The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were in support
on the Bois d'Éclisse.

The 154th Brigade was instructed to keep in touch with any forward
movement on the flanks, and to patrol actively with a view to preventing
the enemy from withdrawing unobserved. Chambrecy at this time and during
the following days remained in No Man's Land. It was visited constantly
by patrols, but the heavy enemy machine-gun fire drawn by their visits
forbade its occupation.

In these respects, apart from heavy enemy shelling, in which quantities
of gas shells were employed, the 29th July passed uneventfully.

In the evening the Divisional front was extended so as to include the
Montagne de Bligny. The 5th West Yorks, from whom this position was
taken over, had at 7 P.M. attacked the enemy position on the western
slopes of the hill. Though they had not been completely successful, they
had made ground on the crest, the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
taking over this new position.

On 30th July the situation remained stationary, though constant pressure
was maintained against the enemy by means of patrols, which at all times
found him alert. "Constant pressure," which played so large a part in
this and the following actions, is one of the most disagreeable features
of battle. To attack, supported by artillery, with units attacking on
either flank, produces its own attitude of mind which makes it
tolerable; to sit in trenches on a quiet front had come in those
strenuous years to be regarded as a holiday; to maintain "constant
pressure" required a considerable display of courage in cold blood. It
was a thing that might have to be maintained for many hours and perhaps
for many days, as had been the case during the last ten days. It meant
that any weakness on the part of the enemy had to be tested and
exploited. How could his weak points be discovered? Only by gallant men
working their way forward until they were shot at. His strength or
weakness was in direct ratio to the number of bullets this forward
movement provoked. The Division, when it had not been fighting actively,
had maintained constant pressure for ten days. It was a cold-blooded
operation which required resolute troops to perform it conscientiously
and effectively.

The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, situated on the bare and
exposed crest of the Montagne de Bligny, had employed the night 29-30th
in digging themselves in well. It was fortunate that they had done so,
for during the day they had to withstand a systematic and heavy
shelling; and at 8 P.M., after fifteen minutes intense bombardment, an
attack was launched against them. They, however, stood their ground, and
with rifles and Lewis guns shattered the fifty odd Germans who advanced
against them from the west.

This was the last incident of note that occurred. During the day of the
30th preparations had been made for the relief of the Division by the
14th French Division. The 255th Brigade, R.F.A., was relieved at noon,
and the 256th Brigade during the night. At dusk the relief of the 62nd
Division also began, and the most advanced troops of the Highland
Division were thus left with French battalions on either side of them.

Throughout the following day the 154th Brigade remained in position,
active patrolling continuing till dusk, when the Brigade was relieved by
the 14th Regiment, 14th French Division. Command of the sector passed to
the G.O.C. 14th Division at 10 P.M.

When the Highland Division moved north again, it left behind it 38
officers and 417 other ranks who had fallen, the total casualties in
killed, wounded, and missing being 173 officers and 3690 men. The total
of 3863 represents probably the largest number of casualties that the
Division ever sustained during a single period in the line.

It represents the losses that occurred in two attacks on a two-brigade
front, three on a one-brigade front, and in constant minor attacks
carried out by one or two battalions, and in maintaining constant
pressure for the whole eleven days to prevent the enemy from disengaging
and extricating himself unobserved from the increasingly awkward
situation in which Marshal Foch's counter-stroke was placing him.

In these eleven days the youth in the Highland Division, many of whom
were blooded for the first time in this battle, engaged six German
Divisions, stemmed their advance, and hurled them back four and a half
miles--days which were described in the following terms by General
Berthelot, commanding the Fifth French Army.

      "Order of the day No. 63 of the Fifth French Army
      (translation):--

      "Now that the XXIInd British Corps has orders to leave the
      Fifth (French) Army, the Army Commander expresses to all the
      thanks and admiration which the great deeds that it has just
      accomplished deserve.

      "The very day of its arrival, feeling in honour bound to
      take part in the victorious counter-attack which had just
      stopped the enemy's furious onslaught on the Marne and had
      begun to hurl him back in disorder to the north, the XXIInd
      Corps, by forced marches and with minimum opportunity for
      reconnaissance, threw itself with ardour into the battle.

      "By constant efforts, by harrying and driving back the enemy
      for ten successive days, it has made itself master of the
      valley of the Ardre, which it has so freely watered with its
      blood.

      "Thanks to the heroic courage and to the proverbial tenacity
      of the British, the combined efforts of the brave Army Corps
      have not been in vain.

      "Twenty-one officers and 1300 other ranks taken prisoners;
      140 machine-guns and 40 guns captured from the enemy, four
      of whose Divisions have been successively broken and
      repulsed; the upper valley of the Ardre with its commanding
      heights to the north and south reconquered; such is the
      record of the British share in the operations of the Fifth
      Army.

      "Highlanders under the orders of General Carter-Campbell,
      commanding the 51st Division; Yorkshire lads under the
      orders of General Braithwaite, commanding the 62nd Division;
      Australian and New Zealand mounted troops; all officers and
      men of the XXIInd Army Corps so ably commanded by Sir A.
      Godley, you have added a glorious page to your history.

      "Marfaux, Chaumuzy, Montagne de Bligny--all those famous
      names will be written in letters of gold in the annals of
      your regiments.

      "Your French comrades will always remember with emotion your
      splendid gallantry and your perfect fellowship in the fight.

                                                    BERTHELOT,
                                               le General Commandant
                                                 la V^{me} Armée."
        _30th July 1918._

The Corps Commander, Lieut.-General Sir A. Godley, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.,
addressed the following messages to the Divisional Commander:--

      "_21st July._--The Corps Commander wishes to convey to all
      ranks of your Division his appreciation of the great work
      that has been done by them during the past two days'
      fighting.

      "The French Army Commander told him to-day that he was
      entirely satisfied with the result and the good bag of
      prisoners obtained in face of most obstinate resistance by
      picked troops of the enemy, who are under special orders to
      hold the front in order to allow for the safe retreat of the
      German troops beaten and driven back by the French across
      the Marne and on the Soissons front.

      "Tactically, strategically, and politically the gallant
      fighting of your Division may have far-reaching results."

      "_28th July._--Will you please convey to all ranks of your
      Division my hearty congratulations on the most successful
      result of their hard week's fighting.

      "The valour and tenacity with which the troops have
      continuously engaged the enemy, and their endurance in face
      of exceptional difficulties of country and latterly of bad
      weather, have resulted in heavy losses to the Germans, and
      in their full retreat closely pursued by our victorious
      troops."

At the conclusion of these operations a special honour was conferred
upon the 6th Black Watch--namely, that of being mentioned in the orders
of the French army, "Cité à l'ordre d'Armée," and of being decorated
with the Legion of Honour.

The following is a translation of the Army Order:--

      "The general officer commanding the Fifth (French) Army
      hereby specially mentions in orders the 6th Battalion Royal
      Highlanders. This battalion d'élite, under the brilliant
      command of Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Rowland Tarleton, has
      given splendid proof of its dash and fury in the course of
      several hard-fought battles between the 20th and 30th July
      1918. After seven days of furious fighting, in spite of
      exhaustion and heavy losses caused by intense enemy
      machine-gun fire, it successfully stormed a wood splendidly
      fortified and stubbornly defended by the enemy.

                                              GUILLAUMAT,
                                       General Officer Commanding
                                         Fifth (French) Army."

The Jocks entraining on their departure from the French zone were a
memorable sight. They had exploited the resources of the country with
great industry, and every man appeared to have a tin of bully beef in
one hand and a bottle of champagne in the other.

                           CHAPTER XVII.

                   THE CAPTURE OF GREENLAND HILL.

On 4th August 1918 Divisional headquarters opened at Villers Chatel, and
the last of the trains conveying troops of the Division from Champagne