corner from which he had driven us, we found our wounded stabbed to
death.

Thus was the battle of Inkerman fought and won by small bodies of the
British and French armies, over an overpowering hostile force of more
than 35,000 infantry, amply supported by artillery; who, having stolen
in during the night up to our outposts, endeavoured to break through the
Allied line round Sevastopol, at a point where we were weakest, and
where we had absolutely no defences.[290] The result proved the immense
superiority of our arms over those of Russia; so also does it give us
some indication of what would have happened if we had boldly attacked
Sevastopol at the end of September, before, or immediately after, the
flank march, or even during the bombardment in October. The British
fought with a valour and constancy that surpassed even the glorious
traditions of the past. Led by Officers who hurled themselves like the
old Knight Errants into the thick of every danger, they nobly followed
on with that unflinching steadiness produced by constitutional bravery,
by devotion to their leaders, and by the splendid discipline that was
the predominant characteristic of our Crimean troops. Their bold
extension and their courage in maintaining it, even without supports and
when opposed to heavy columns, made the Russians think that the line of
red-coats was but a fringe of our strength, and they hesitated when they
ought to have acted boldly. We were, moreover, provided with a superior
rifle, and so when the enemy, emerging from the ravines, found himself
met by a heavy and shattering fire, his columns were brought to a
standstill, and he lost the advantage which his solid formation might
have given him. He was far from being imbued with the spirit that
animated our men, and he lacked the determination to close with them.

-----

Footnote 290:

  It cannot be insisted too often that the Sandbag battery was a battery
  only in name; and that its importance consisted in the fact that it
  served as a rallying-point, on account of its being a conspicuous
  object, round which the main struggle on the Kitspur raged. Russian
  exaggerations have given it a wholly fictitious value; even Todleben,
  describing the fight a little after eight o’clock, says that the
  Okhotsk regiment (3000 strong) attacked the Sandbag battery held by
  their “worthy rivals—the intrepid Coldstream,” that they expelled the
  latter, and that nine guns were the reward of this brilliant feat of
  arms! (see Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 160).

-----

  “Had he, at the commencement of the battle, pushed these columns
  resolutely forward, it follows nearly as a matter of course that, by
  sheer momentum of his heavy masses, the British lines would have been
  broken through and trampled down utterly. It would have been a
  question of weight alone. As it was, no devotion, no exertions on the
  part of the Russian Officers, could at the outset spur their
  battalions to one grand combined rush. Time was frittered away in a
  series of persevering but desultory attacks, which were invariably
  repulsed, thanks to English valour and English firearms.”[291]

-----

Footnote 291:

  _Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 309. It is proper to add that the Russian
  Rifle corps, 1800 strong, were armed with as good a weapon as our
  Minié, also that some of the British battalions (the 20th Regiment,
  for instance, who distinguished themselves greatly in the battle)
  carried the old smooth-bore musket, known as “Brown Bess” (see
  Kinglake, v. 475).

-----

[Illustration: N.R. Wilkinson del.    PRIVATE 1742.    Mintern Bros.
Chromo.]

                               CHAPTER X.
                  THE WINTER OF 1854-55 IN THE CRIMEA.

Prostration of both sides after the battle of Inkerman—Sevastopol not to
    be taken in 1854—Tardy arrangements to enable the army to remain in
    the Crimea during the winter—Violent hurricane of the 14th of
    November; stores scattered and destroyed—The winter begins in
    earnest—How the Government at home attended to the wants of army at
    the seat of war—Absence of a road between the base at Balaklava and
    the front—Miserable plight to which the army was reduced—Indignation
    in England, and the measures taken to relieve the troops—Admirable
    manner in which the misfortunes were borne by the British
    soldiers—Operations on both sides during the winter—The Turks occupy
    Eupatoria; successful action fought there—The Guards Brigade sent to
    Balaklava.

The battle of Inkerman exhausted the energies of the combatants, and for
a few days they recoiled from each other, stunned by its effects. The
Allies had gained a Pyrrhic victory; another such victory, and their
forces must be annihilated. The enemy also had received a crushing
defeat, which shattered his military prestige and ruined the _morale_ of
his army. Neither side was in a condition to operate against the other,
and each faced his opponent listlessly, almost helplessly. But
Menshikoff, though disgraced in the field, deserved the gratitude of his
Imperial Master, and had every reason to be content with what he had
achieved; for, he had gained an advantage of supreme importance. He had
put it out of the power of the Anglo-French invaders to finish the war
during the year 1854, and thus, while chaining them fast to the bleak
and narrow upland of the Chersonese, he had the satisfaction of knowing
that they would be exposed to the rigours of the approaching winter.
This result was all the more disastrous to us, since, not having
foreseen it, we were in no position to meet it, and were unprovided with
the means of maintaining our troops in the inhospitable region to which
we had become committed. In short, the Allies were about to be handed
over to foes far more destructive and terrible than those they had
hitherto met. Instead of contending against Russian weapons, they were
now also to struggle with the forces of nature and the fury of the
elements. On the 6th of November it was finally determined to put off
the bombardment, and to winter in the Crimea. The Commissariat
Department, informed of this decision, was then, and then only, ordered
to make such preparations as would enable the army to remain on the
upland. But the tardy order came too late, for in less than ten days the
winter began in earnest, and nothing could then be got ready to save the
troops from the cruel trials that awaited them.

On the day after the battle, the Allies were engaged in burying the
dead, in removing the Russian wounded who still lay on the ground, and
in clearing the field of the traces of the struggle. An invitation
addressed to General Menshikoff to agree to a truce, and to send out his
men to bury their own dead, was refused, for that prudent commander was
naturally disinclined to give his troops so sombre and depressing an
object-lesson of their utter inefficiency in the field. His army,
however, met this invitation in another fashion, and, whether in error
or by design, they answered it by firing upon our burying parties. As
another attack was feared, the front was cleared of incumbrances as soon
as possible, and the wounded were promptly taken to Balaklava. Their
sufferings were considerable; there was a scarcity of hospital comforts
and appliances at the seat of war, and the ambulances in use were
unfitted for the purpose of conveying injured men.

Much affected by the heavy losses sustained by his “First Brigade,” the
Duke of Cambridge came early into the Guards camp, where the few men
present turned out to cheer him.

  “Accompanied by his Aide-de-camp, the brave and popular Macdonald, the
  Royal General was assiduous in his attentions to the wounded
  Guardsmen, sympathizing in cheering tones with the livid wretches that
  still breathed, and shedding tears of manly sorrow upon the mangled
  clay of those who had completed their last tour of earthly duty.”[292]

-----

Footnote 292:

  _Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 314.

-----

The funeral of the numerous Coldstream Officers formed a most sad
procession. Seven—Dawson, Cowell, MacKinnon, Eliot, Ramsden, Disbrowe,
and Greville—were laid to rest in one grave, in a small rocky ravine
near the Windmill. Bouverie’s body was only recovered late on the 6th,
and he was buried by the side of Lieut.-Colonel Hunter-Blair of the
Scots Fusilier Guards, who survived the action twenty-four hours.

  “It was really enough to unman anybody; poor fellows! far away from
  all their friends and relations; poor Greville, whose death killed his
  mother, everybody loved him; we laid them side by side, and I remember
  the earth pattering on their poor bodies with dull hollow sound.”[293]

-----

Footnote 293:

  Tower, _Diary_ . All the Guards Officers were buried in this spot.
  During the winter of 1855, more than a year later, their bodies were
  exhumed, and were properly interred on Cathcart’s Hill, where they now
  lie.

Colonel Upton, though badly hurt, was able to remain at his post till
the middle of November, and he assumed the command of the Brigade,
_vice_ General Bentinck, wounded, and of the First Division from the
7th, when the Duke of Cambridge was sent to Balaklava, on the sick list.
The command of the Battalion thus devolved upon Colonel Lord F. Paulet.
The Coldstream was, in truth, a mere skeleton of the fine body which
embarked at Portsmouth in the spring of 1854. It only mustered now 11
Officers and 307 men, while no draft,—except a small one of 58 men,
which, having left London on the 26th of October, reached the Crimea on
the 22nd of November,—was on the road to compensate for this serious
deficiency of strength in the field. When news of the battle arrived in
England, strenuous efforts were made to fill up the attenuated ranks of
the army, by sending out fresh battalions and reinforcements to those
already at the seat of hostilities. But the campaign, ever since July,
when we were first encamped near the pestilential lake of Devna, had
sadly drained our resources—far more rapidly, indeed, than the home
authorities had anticipated,—and though recruiting had been actively
going on, the large demands which this war created could not be
satisfied. In this way, the next draft sent to the Coldstream only
amounted to 153 men, and could do little to restore our depleted ranks
to an efficient state. This draft started on the 24th of November, and
arrived in the Crimea on the 18th of December.[294] In France, however,
there was not such a dearth of fighting men as seems to have been the
case in England, and considerable reinforcements were despatched to the
east, so that somewhat later (in February) our allies were able to
extend the siege-works that surrounded the south side of Sevastopol.

-----

Footnote 294:

  The average age of the small draft of 58 men reaching the seat of war
  in November, was twenty-one, and their service nearly two years. The
  averages of the next draft arriving in December, were twenty-one and a
  half years and eight months, respectively. Lieutenants Whitshed and
  Julian Hall accompanied the first; and Lieut.-Colonel C. Burdett,
  Captains F. Burton and J. Le Couteur, and Lieutenants G. Wigram, A.
  Lambton, G. Rose, and G. Ives the second. Assistant-Surgeon C. V. Cay
  reached the Crimea on November 28th.

-----

We have seen that the omission to strengthen the unguarded flank at
Inkerman by earthworks had led to serious consequences. The critical
nature of the battle made this so clear, that, when the fight was over,
though we had fewer men to spare than were available before, this vital
position was at once placed in a state of defence. English, French, and
even Turks—held hitherto to be an incumbrance—were set to perform this
duty, and Fore Ridge and Shell Hill were soon crowned with works,
commanding the approaches to the scene of the recent struggle, and
securing it at last, as far as possible, from further molestation.[295]

-----

Footnote 295:

  Recent events having opened the eyes of authority, the shoulder was
  put vigorously to the wheel. Hence the fortification of an
  all-important point which, previous to the battle, had either been
  considered unnecessary, or had been pronounced impossible of
  achievement with the means at disposal, was actually executed with
  sorely straitened means after the battle. In a word, few hands
  contrived to do what comparatively many hands had been judged
  incapable of doing. “Where there’s a will there’s a way” (_Our
  Veterans, etc._ , p. 325).

-----

The ordinary routine of siege life had hardly recommenced after the rude
shock which interrupted it on the 5th, when the winter burst upon the
Crimean peninsula with a suddenness and violence that marked a distinct
feature in the story of the war, and brought innumerable troubles upon
the Allies engaged in it. The weather lately had been cold and stormy,
varied upon occasions by short gleams of sunshine and partial warmth. At
daybreak on the 14th, however, a violent hurricane, accompanied by a
deluge of rain, unexpectedly arose, and swept with terrific force over
the country, and not only blew away every tent standing on the upland,
scattered the stores upon which the army depended, and stopped all
communications, but also dashed to pieces or disabled much of the
shipping laden with supplies that were then very urgently needed.[296]
The ground was speedily converted into a deep and impassable sea of
sticky mud, which flew about in large quantities; the temperature fell,
and snow came down. The men of the various regiments huddled together
like sheep, behind bushes or rocks, or wherever they could find some
protection against the violence of the elements. The condition of the
houseless troops was miserable in the extreme, both during the day and
long afterwards, for they had nothing wherewith to repair their losses;
but it was worse with the sick and wounded, who were exposed to the full
force of the cyclone, and to the cold and the rain. A considerable
amount of shipping had been left outside the harbour of Balaklava,
instead of being safely berthed inside the landlocked bay. Of the
vessels anchored in this dangerous position, many went to pieces on the
rocks forming the iron-bound coast; altogether twenty-one were sunk, and
their valuable cargoes were all lost. H.M.S. _Retribution_, with the
Duke of Cambridge on board, narrowly escaped destruction. On that fatal
first day of a severe Crimean winter, the troops were deprived of vast
quantities of ammunition, food, clothing, and forage, and there was no
reserve at hand from whence they could be replaced.

-----

Footnote 296:

  It is said that only three tents remained upright in the English camps
  (Nolan, i., p. 650). But a fourth, belonging to Lieut.-Colonel
  Carleton, also survived, and it was the only one that did so in the
  Guards camp. The Turkish tents, placed in a sheltered position, made a
  better resistance than ours, and comparatively few were swept away.

-----

The difficulties and sufferings that now overwhelmed the army began with
this storm, but they are clearly to be traced to the aimless manner in
which the campaign had been conducted. The original intention had been
to surprise Sevastopol, but it soon disappeared out of sight, and no
step was taken to capture the town in accordance with the conditions
under which the expedition landed on Russian soil. On the contrary, a
regular siege was gradually commenced, and a completely new plan was
thereby adopted. But the change was never recognized, its bearing upon
the fortunes of the war was not appreciated, and no stores were
accumulated at the base of operations to meet the requirements of the
lengthy proceedings into which the invaders had drifted. This was the
more unfortunate, since, when the allied Commanders undertook the flank
march, and shifted their ground from the north to the south side of
Sevastopol, they found themselves obliged to operate upon a barren
upland which afforded no supplies, and very soon they even lost the
advantage of drawing forage from the valley of the Tchernaya. Thus,
after the 25th of October, if not before, nothing whatsoever was to be
obtained from the land in which the army was established, and every
single article had to be transported by sea from a distance. The battle
of Inkerman at last revealed the true position in which we stood; but it
was then too late, and when the storm destroyed the vessels lying
outside the harbour, which contained considerable addition to our scanty
stores, it must be acknowledged that this position was indeed
deplorable.

Nor should it be forgotten that requisitions put forward were
imperfectly attended to by the authorities in England, and that there
was often confusion at the base (Scutari and Balaklava), which appears
to have been incompletely organized. Owing to these circumstances, many
misfortunes overtook the British army, some of which may be cited.
Though a request was made early in September for 2000 tons of hay, only
228 tons were received in the Crimea by the 1st of February, 1855.[297]
In November an application was forwarded for 3000 tents, and for a steam
mill and bakery, but more than six months elapsed before they arrived at
the seat of war.[298] Again, we have seen that a substantial portion of
the kits were left behind in the squad bags, at Scutari, at the end of
May; also that, on landing at Old Fort, the packs were taken away from
the men. The former seem to have been allowed to remain where they were
stored. But an effort was made in the middle of October, just a month
after they had been left on board ship, to recover the knapsacks, though
apparently with very indifferent success; and the troops remained,
exposed to the severe inclemency of the weather, without any change of
clothing, in the worn-out and tattered garments that had uninterruptedly
done duty day and night from the beginning of June, when they landed at
Varna. Lastly, biscuit and salt pork formed the usual, indeed the
never-varying ration served out to the British soldier. This diet was
his only food, and it produced scurvy, as was only to be expected. To
counteract this plague, limejuice and vegetables were thus urgently
required, but neither was available. It is true that small quantities of
vegetables were sometimes to be had, but then they were sold to the
starving men at famine prices.[299] A tardy requisition was made in
October for limejuice, and half the quantity demanded (20,000 lbs.)
reached Balaklava on the 19th of December; but there it remained almost
unnoticed, and this antidote against the scourge of scurvy was only
unearthed on the 29th of January following; nor was it apparently
ordered to be issued to the troops as a ration, until the middle of
February.[300]

-----

Footnote 297:

  Kinglake, vi. 128, note.

Footnote 298:

  _Ibid._ , pp. 98, 138.

Footnote 299:

  _General Order, Memo._ , Nov. 1st: “Commanders of divisions will send
  to-morrow at 9 a.m. to the Quartermaster-General’s office, on the
  wharf at Balaklava, for potatoes.... They must be paid for at the spot
  at the price of £1 1_s._ per cwt.” _Ibid._ , Nov. 6th: “Those corps or
  divisions which desire potatoes should send to Balaklava for them; the
  price is £1 1_s._ per cwt.... The money required to pay for them must
  be sent at the same time.” It appears that later, after December 10th,
  whenever vegetables were available they were supplied to the men
  gratis; but as they had to fetch them from Balaklava under
  circumstances of extreme difficulty (as will presently appear), it is
  scarcely to be wondered that the wearied troops did not always avail
  themselves of the boon (see Kinglake, vi. 138, note). It should
  further be stated here, that Lord Raglan, “in consideration of the
  length of the siege operations, the constant labour the men have been
  called upon to perform, the inclemency of the weather, and the
  cheerfulness and good will they have manifested in discharge of their
  duty,” granted the unusual issue of working pay to the troops employed
  in digging, etc., in the trenches, at the rate of, for
  Non-commissioned officers as overseers, one for every twenty men,
  1_s._ by day, 1_s._ by night; for rank and file, 8_d._ by day, 10_d._
  by night (_General Order_ , Nov. 14, 1854).

Footnote 300:

  Wyatt, pp. 41, 55. Limejuice, after February 16th, was issued three
  times during the month.

-----

Arising directly out of the incomprehensible manner in which this
extraordinary war was conceived and carried on, another circumstance,
more powerful for evil than the apathy with which the necessities of the
army were regarded by the Government, caused famine and distress to
oppress our troops. We had no road between Balaklava and the front; and
hence, when supplies reached the former place, we were without means of
conveying them to the spot where they were to be consumed. And yet the
distance to be traversed was under eight miles. It has been shown that,
of the two roads connecting the English before Sevastopol and the base,
one, the Woronzoff road, was metalled; the other, over the Col, was but
a mere pathway or cart-track: also that on the 25th of October, we lost
the use of the former, and were restricted to the latter. During the
autumn this pathway was serviceable; indeed, so firm and open was the
country, that waggons and guns could easily move across it anywhere. But
when the torrents of rain flooded the ground on the 14th of November,
the whole aspect of the upland became altered, and the track as well as
the plain were converted into a deep morass, over which communications
were rendered almost impossible. The French, with proper forethought,
constructed a good road between Kamiesh Bay and their camps, directly
they occupied the Chersonese; but as all the British troops were
required to push forward vigorously the siege-works, and as we indulged
in the misplaced confidence that Sevastopol would fall immediately after
the bombardment of the 17th of October, we never even thought of
securing our communications, until after the 5th of November, when it
was decided to winter in the Crimea. The rejected Turks, offered by Omar
Pasha, might certainly have performed this important service while the
weather was clear and dry, but the prejudice against them has already
been mentioned, and their assistance was refused. After the battle of
Inkerman we took measures to construct the road, and we acted as we did
with respect to the defences near Home Ridge; tools were hastily
procured from Constantinople, and Turks were at last employed. But it
was then too late. The unfortunate men were unprovided with food and
shelter, and the weather was severe; they died so rapidly that the
living were all required to bury the dead, and in a short time this
ill-fated contingent disappeared altogether.

The scarcity of forage and the want of a road acted and reacted on each
other, and formed the principal causes of the winter troubles. The
horses and mules died of starvation, and it was useless to replace them,
as there was not wherewithal to feed them. The transport, miserably
insufficient as it always had been, dwindled into nothing, and all but
disappeared; troop horses of the cavalry were impressed into this
service, but they too perished. Carriage traffic soon ceased, and an
attempt was then made to convey supplies on the backs of the wretched
beasts that survived. This expedient also failed; the quagmire of
tenacious clay intervening between the port and the front, the famine,
and the exposure to cold and wet, all operated together, and the animals
could work no more. Thenceforward there was nothing for it but to make
the men themselves wade through the deep mud, and fetch up such things
from the base as they required, to keep body and soul together. The duty
was no inconsiderable addition to their ordinary toil, for while they
were decreasing fast in numbers, the labour in the trenches did not
abate. The journey also sometimes took twelve hours to accomplish, and
during the time it lasted they were without food, shelter, or rest.[301]
This miserable makeshift was, of course, entirely inadequate to supply
the troops, and the more bulky or heavy articles, however necessary to
the well-being of the army, could not be brought to camp at all. The
serious error by which magazines had not been established in time at the
seat of war, was repaired quickly by the great energy displayed at
head-quarters, and in December considerable quantities of every kind of
stores were available at Balaklava, but there most of them remained
unused, because, as Government would not supply forage (and it seems it
was not easily procured out of England), there was no transport, and as
there was no road to span the morass, means did not exist of crossing it
and of reaching the front.

-----

Footnote 301:

  Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 170.

-----

The winter all through Europe was a peculiarly severe one, and there was
no exception to its inclemency in the Crimea, where the season was
specially cold. All the combatants suffered from its effects; even the
Russians felt it acutely, though housed and provided with a tolerably
fair transport service from their well-stored magazines on the Sea of
Azof. Our French allies also underwent many privations, due to the
general difficulties that affected the invaders established on the
barren upland and exposed to the wind, the snow, and the rain; but more
especially on account of the small _tente d’abri_ which sheltered them
at night, and which was not so useful as our bell tent. But the British
army suffered most. Like the French, our men were sent to trenches
filled with water, where they remained wet to their knees for many hours
during the day and night; but, unlike them, these hardships were of
constant recurrence. Reinforcements were rapidly sent to General
Canrobert, and his force was strong enough to enable him to give his
soldiers rest when their tour of service in the siege-works was
finished. But the British had no such exemption; their numbers were
insufficient for the purposes of the campaign; and they practically were
always at work. Lord Raglan computed that they were “on duty five nights
out of six, a large proportion of them constantly under fire.”[302] If
we add, that they were seldom dry; that they had little or no fuel
except brushwood and roots; that they could not cook their food; that
the coffee served out was in the form of the green unroasted berry;[303]
that the ration of rice failed from the 15th of November to the end of
December; that the boots were defective and bad; and that there was no
warm clothing available until the beginning of the latter month;—it will
be readily seen that the hardships undergone were of no trivial
character.[304]

-----

Footnote 302:

  Letter to the Duke of Newcastle, Dec. 26th.

Footnote 303:

  Many of the men now existed almost entirely upon the biscuit and
  ration of spirit; the camp was often strewed with portions of uncooked
  salt meat, and partially roasted or green coffee (Wyatt, p. 40). The
  green coffee ceased on February 22nd, and compressed vegetables were
  supplied for the first time on the 26th (_ibid._, p. 56).

Footnote 304:

  In the Coldstream some warm clothing and blankets were issued to the
  men early in December, more were obtained later, and in January a
  further supply was procured. Lord Raglan directed (January 6th) that
  each soldier should receive a pair of boots gratuitously (_General
  Order_ ). The following is the clothing served out to the Battalion
  (including the Regimental hospital) between the 6th of December and
  the 28th of February: Great coats, 392; trousers, 100 pairs; sheepskin
  coats, 459; tweed coats, 29; fur caps, 503; flannel shirts, 147;
  jersey frocks, 861; pairs of socks, 1527; flannel drawers, 994; mitts,
  993; boots, long and short, 532; comforters, 446; gregos, 55 (Wyatt,
  pp. 41, 45, 57). The long boots appear to have given little
  satisfaction. On account of the cold—the thermometer sometimes ranging
  from eleven to fifteen degrees Fahrenheit,—it was not easy to make the
  men take off their boots at night; their wet feet often being swollen,
  were pressed by the leather, and thus frost-bite was induced (_ibid._,
  p. 42).

-----

Nor did the men’s sufferings end here, for when exhausted by toil and
privations there was no alleviation to those whose health and strength
had given way. So badly organized were the hospital arrangements, that
we are told the climax of misery was only reached in the places set
apart for the sick. Circumstances necessarily made the field-hospitals
in the front rude habitations for numerous patients seized and tormented
by painful complaints.[305] The transport of invalids to Balaklava was,
moreover, a difficult proceeding and an agonizing ordeal; but arrived at
the port, their troubles should surely have come to an end. It was not
so, however, for such was the confusion prevalent at the time, so great
the number of the sick, that they were subjected, if possible, to worse
treatment during the voyage across the Black Sea and in the great
hospital established at Scutari. In short, this hospital was a loathsome
lazarette, “crammed with misery, overflowing with despair,” until Miss
Nightingale and a number of Nuns and Sisters, having arrived on the
scene early in November, acquired such influence and acted with such
admirable prudence and energy, that gradually—the evil was too great to
be arrested at once—order was restored, sanitary conditions were
introduced, and the sick were well tended and cared for by the gentle
and able nursing of kindly ladies.[306]

-----

Footnote 305:

  The indefatigable Surgeon of the Coldstream in the Crimea, Dr. Wyatt,
  tells us that a marquee was applied for (November 17th) to replace the
  ill-ventilated bell tents used as a Regimental hospital. It arrived
  next day, but without ropes, and these, though repeatedly demanded,
  were only obtained a fortnight later, through Colonel Steele, Lord
  Raglan’s Military Secretary, who at last procured them from a
  man-of-war. On the 18th of December another marquee was required (the
  sick were becoming very numerous), and it arrived on the 29th, also
  without ropes and deficient of five pieces of canvas; in this case the
  error was only rectified on the 30th of January.

Footnote 306:

  Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 172, 179, etc. After the battle of
  Inkerman, the depôt which had been established at Scutari early in
  June, was re-organized and placed under the able command of Colonel
  Lord William Paulet (November 23rd), through whose energy many
  improvements in the hospitals were effected (see Kinglake, vi. 437).
  An acting Sergeant-Major (Sergeant White of the Coldstream) was
  appointed there (November 19th).

-----

The British forces before Sevastopol were rapidly melting away in
consequence of the combination of misfortunes that overwhelmed them.
Diseases of a violent type broke out, and cholera, typhus, diarrhœa,
dysentery, scurvy swept away the ranks; frost-bites were common, and
even men reported fit for duty, were so weakened as to be scarcely able
to continue their labours under the hard circumstances that surrounded
them. The drain was excessive upon our strength in the field, and the
small army was in truth threatened with extinction. Between the 1st of
November and the 28th of February we lost as many as 22,506 men, not
including the killed in action; of whom 8898 had died in hospital, while
the remainder, 13,608, were lying there sick on the latter date. In
spite of fresh regiments and drafts which reached the Crimea after
Inkerman, the total effectives all told at the seat of war, reckoning
the troops at Balaklava, amounted then to only 17,311 men. In January
there would have been about 3000 to 4000 men of the infantry available
to repel another attack of the enemy, had he attempted to repeat the
operation of the 5th of November.[307] The British would have had a
smaller force at the end of February.

-----

Footnote 307:

  Kinglake, vi. 202, etc.

-----

The Coldstream shared to the full the calamity which has just been so
imperfectly described. Taking part in the constant duty which exhausted
the army, exposed to the cruel suffering that the winter brought about,
and conspicuously displaying the virtues of strict discipline and of
uncomplaining fortitude which enabled our men to preserve a bold and
defiant front against the Russians, the lot of the Battalion can
scarcely be separated from that which afflicted and honoured its
brethren in arms standing before Sevastopol. Its fate was the same as
theirs, its sorrows were equally acute, its bearing likewise was proud
and dauntless, its glory bright and lasting. But its losses were heavy,
as the following table will show:—

 ┌────────────────┬────────────────────┬─────────────┬────────────────────────┐
 │                │Regimental Hospital.│    Sick     │       Remarks.         │
 │                ├───────────┬────────┤ Transferred │                        │
 │                │Admissions.│ Deaths.│ to Scutari. │                        │
 ├────────────────┼───────────┼────────┼─────────────┼────────────────────────┤
 │Nov. (including │    277    │   22   │     153     │ Eight died of cholera  │
 │  at Inkerman)  │           │        │             │  and eleven of wounds. │
 │December        │    221    │   17   │      99     │          ——            │
 │January         │    186    │   37   │      91     │The average daily       │
 │                │           │        │             │  sick was more than    │
 │                │           │        │             │  sixty-three per cent. │
 │                │           │        │             │  of strength present.  │
 └────────────────┴───────────┴────────┴─────────────┴────────────────────────┘

On the 1st of November the effective strength of all ranks in the field
was 600 Officers and men; 1st of December, 451; 1st of January, 353; 1st
of February, 173; and at the end of February there were fewer than
100.[308]

-----

Footnote 308:

  Wyatt, p. 58. It should not be forgotten that the two drafts which
  reached the Battalion on November 22nd and December 18th, numbered
  together 211 men. It appears that there was considerable sickness and
  mortality among the young and unseasoned soldiers who composed the
  drafts. Of the Officers invalided during the winter (November to
  February), were Captain Wilson (November 22nd) and Captain Strong
  (January 1st); Captain Hardinge, moreover, had to leave the Crimea on
  account of his health (December 24th), and returned the following May.

-----

But there was an end at last to these mournful circumstances that
oppressed our forces fighting in the Crimea; and with the first peep of
spring a new era of hope dawned upon the army. The news of the winter
troubles roused a strong feeling in England, and the nation was stirred
to its depths with sympathy for its brave and suffering soldiers, of
whom no country had more reason to be proud, and with resentment against
the supposed delinquents who were accused of bringing about the
disaster. Greater activity and energy were displayed at home, and a
railway was begun to connect Balaklava with the front, so that by the
end of March it reached the Col on the edge of the upland, at a time
when the road, constructed by ourselves and the French, was made to the
same place. A Land transport service was also at length organized.
Subscriptions were collected, and clothing, food, stores, and even
luxuries poured into the Crimea, and into the hospitals established at
and near Scutari. The Government was overturned, and a Commission of
inquiry was instituted, both in England and at the seat of hostilities,
to report upon every circumstance connected with the war. The result of
these investigations, as well as the conclusions arrived at by another
that sat later (in 1856), need not be alluded to in this volume. But one
point cannot be omitted which deals with the conduct of the troops, who,
in the dark hour of trial, did honour to their Queen, to their country,
and to their noble profession.

  “Great Britain,” says the report of the Commissioners sent to the
  Crimea, “has often had reasons to be proud of her army, but it is
  doubtful whether, the whole range of military history furnishes an
  example of an army exhibiting, throughout a long campaign, qualities
  as high as have distinguished the forces under Lord Raglan’s command.
  The strength of the men gave way under excessive labour, watching,
  exposure, and privation; but they never murmured, their spirit never
  failed, and the enemy, though far outnumbering them, never detected in
  those whom he encountered any signs of weakness. Their numbers were
  reduced by disease and by casualties to a handful of men, compared
  with the great extent of the lines which they constructed and
  defended, yet the army never abated its confidence in itself, and
  never descended from its acknowledged military pre-eminence. Both men
  and Officers, when so reduced that they were hardly fit for the
  lighter duties of the camp, scorned to be excused the severe and
  perilous work of the trenches, lest they should throw an undue amount
  of duty upon their comrades; yet they maintained every foot of ground
  against all the efforts of the enemy, and with numbers so small that,
  perhaps, no other troops would even have made the attempt. Suffering
  and privation have frequently led to crime in armies as in other
  communities, but offences of a serious character have been unknown in
  the British army in the Crimea ... intemperance has been rare. Every
  one who knows anything of the constitution of an army must feel that,
  when troops so conduct themselves throughout a long campaign, the
  Officers must have done their duty and set the example.”[309]

-----

Footnote 309:

  First Report, 1855, pp. 2 and 3.

-----

The Russians, on the other hand, except for the great labour and care
expended on the fortress, remained almost quiescent during the winter
months. Restricting their energies to the defences of Sevastopol and to
the annoyance of the besiegers, they made the fortress exceedingly
strong, and pushed advanced works in front of the line they had already
occupied. The greater portion of their field army was brought into the
town to reinforce the garrison, the remainder being quartered in the
neighbouring villages, or in the Tchernaya Valley. But no offensive
operations were undertaken, notwithstanding their immensely superior
numbers; and this was the more fortunate, since in the midwinter our
forces were so weakened that the English trenches were guarded by only
350 men. This extraordinary inactivity on the part of the enemy has
excited astonishment, and it may well be asked—

  “how it was that an enemy who possessed such enormously superior
  forces in men and material, and who could, at any time during a period
  of months, have directed on some selected point of the siege-works
  thousands of troops that would have found only hundreds to meet them,
  did not muster the courage for such an enterprise, when it promised
  deliverance to the fortress and ruin to their foes.”[310]

-----

Footnote 310:

  Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 194. Whether the Russians were
  destitute of the necessary courage to take advantage of the obviously
  favourable chances that the winter offered them of sweeping away the
  feeble residue of frozen and plague-stricken Englishmen that still
  survived before Sevastopol, or whether their conduct was the result of
  a deliberate design, may perhaps be revealed at some future time, when
  eventual consequences of the Crimean war have been fully developed. It
  may easily be imagined that the Government of St. Petersburg shrank
  from converting the existing war of cabinets, hitherto purely local,
  into a general struggle of nations and principles (Klapka, _War in the
  East_ , p. 101). For had Great Britain been driven from the Crimea,
  she would surely have taken her revenge, and have removed the contest
  from a barren and useless fortress, where unhappily she became
  involved, to a vital point in the armour of her foe. If there were to
  be a war at all, it is obvious that the struggle for Sevastopol was
  the least expensive and the most advantageous form of hostilities that
  the Tsar could engage in; he lost comparatively little if the contest
  should prove adverse to his arms, more especially if he could prolong
  his resistance against the united efforts of the two great Powers of
  Europe. The more he succeeded in doing this, the more he gained a
  fictitious prestige, the more he exhausted our resources, by the
  dissolving process which the winter must surely effect, and the more
  he made the Western nations beware for the future how they again
  attempt to thwart his plans.

-----

On the part of the Allies, the approaches to the fortress were pushed
forward with considerable activity, both by ourselves and by the French,
but there was little actual fighting except what was brought about by
the siege operations. In the beginning of February, the French, who,
thanks to the liberal supply of men sent to the seat of war, were
growing in numbers, undertook to extend the siege-works on our
right;[311] thus continuing the line of trenches towards the roadstead
of Sevastopol. Bosquet’s Corps was employed for this purpose. Another
element of strength was brought into the field during the winter, to
which brief allusion must be made. It was at last determined that Omar
Pasha’s army should be removed to the Crimea from Bulgaria, where it was
unable to influence the course of hostilities; the concentration was
effected at Eupatoria, and, on the 17th of February, before the movement
was complete, the Turkish force there amounted to 23,000 men. The
Russians, having reinforced the troops they had in this part of the
peninsula to 20,000 men, attacked the place on that date, and were
repulsed with a loss of some 800 men. This success seems to have been
decisive, in so far that the Allies now held firmly a point within
striking distance of the enemy’s communications through the isthmus of
Perekop; but its value was considerably lessened by the following fact.
In the autumn of 1854, General Menshikoff was dependent upon this line
to draw reinforcements from Bessarabia, and, as he found it open, he
advanced freely along it, and reached Sevastopol before the 5th of
November, as has been already related. This advantage gained, the road
through Perekop became of comparatively minor importance, and the enemy
thenceforward relied upon the line from the Sea of Azof. His
communications in this quarter could, of course, only be threatened by a
force based somewhere in the neighbourhood of Kertch; but that place was
avoided, and Eupatoria was selected. Hence the achievement of the 17th
of February, while it might have been followed by satisfactory results
had it taken place early in October, was, to a certain extent, a barren
victory, and served only to show that our Turkish auxiliaries were
capable of performing some service in the war.[312]

-----

Footnote 311:

  Our allies had 56,000 men in the Crimea in November, 65,000 in
  December, and 78,000 in January (Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p.
  176).

Footnote 312:

  Colonel (now Field-Marshal Sir Lintorn) Simmons was present with Omar
  Pasha as British Commissioner with the Turkish army. He served in that
  capacity from the summer of 1853, until the end of the war.

-----

The Guards Brigade, having suffered so severely at Inkerman, and being
the only infantry force in the front composing the First Division (the
Highlanders occupied Balaklava since the 25th of October), it was
necessary to reinforce that division by adding thereto the 97th Regiment
(November 23rd). This regiment was armed with the old smooth-bore
musket, but as sickness diminished the ranks, the Minié rifles of
non-effective Guardsmen were handed over to the survivors of the 97th
and of other corps similarly situated. On the 22nd of November the
position of the camps of the Grenadiers and Scots Fusiliers were moved
to the spot where the Coldstream was established. Two days later, a new
disposition of the piquets was ordered; of the eight furnished by the
division, six were found by the Brigade and two by the 97th. The
strength of these piquets, 50 men each, allowed a double sentry every
fifty paces of the entire front; three piquets were placed in reserve,
and all were “to be encouraged in making fires, as it is desirable that
our full strength should be estimated.”[313] On the 25th of December the
piquets were reduced to 30 rank and file each.

-----

Footnote 313:

  _Divisional Memo._ , Nov. 24, 1854.

-----

During Colonel Upton’s absence at Balaklava on sick-leave, Colonel
Lockyer commanded the Division until the 15th of January, when the
former returned to the front; the senior Guards Officer present
commanded the Brigade during this interval. Colonel Lord Frederick
Paulet was also away on the sick-list until the 16th of January, and the
Battalion during this time was under Lieut.-Colonel Newton; Captain
Armytage was appointed acting Adjutant, vacant by the death of Captain
Eliot. On the 17th of January the Brigade lost the services of their
Paymaster, Captain South (late 20th Regiment), who, having been present
with them ever since they left England, was obliged to leave the Crimea
through ill-health. His duties were undertaken by a committee, composed
of Colonel Hamilton (Grenadiers), president, and Lieut.-Colonel
Stephenson (Scots Fusilier Guards), and Captain Sir J. Dunlop
(Coldstream), members.

On the 26th of November the Household Brigade furnished a detachment of
200 men, under a Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel, to the neighbourhood of
the monastery of St. George, on the coast west of Balaklava, for the
purpose of making gabions, which were required for the siege-works. Of
these, the Coldstream provided 70 men with Officers, and
Non-commissioned officers in proportion. The detachment was relieved by
a similar party on the 21st of December, and again on the 20th of
January by 150 men, each Battalion finding a Subaltern Officer and 50
men, with the usual number of Non-commissioned officers.

Major-General Lord Rokeby arrived in the Crimea on the 2nd of February,
and assumed the command of the First Division and of the Brigade, when
Colonel Upton reverted to the Battalion. But not for long, for, owing to
the promotion of the Lieut.-Colonel of the Regiment (Colonel Hon. A.
Upton), he was gazetted to that command (February 20th), and left soon
after to take up his duties in London.[314] By this change Lord
Frederick Paulet

-----

became Major of the 2nd Battalion, and Colonel Gordon Drummond obtained
the command of the 1st; at the same time Lieut.-Colonels Daniell and
Perceval were posted to the latter, and Newton to the former (Acting
Majors, mounted).[315]

-----

Footnote 314:

  In parting from the Battalion when it was still before the enemy, and
  after having held the command during a very eventful period, Colonel
  Upton issued an order of which the following is an extract: “He has
  known their gallantry and firmness before the enemy, their endurance,
  and their discipline under every trial and pressure.... To the young
  soldiers one word at parting: let them ever hold in view the conduct
  and bearing which have characterized their older comrades, that they
  in their turn may pass them on to others, and so uphold and carry
  forward the name of the distinguished Regiment of which they now form
  a part.”

Footnote 315:

  Lieut.-Colonel Stepney, Captains Markham, Blackett, and Caulfeild, and
  Lieutenant Lane-Fox, joined the Battalion in January, February, and
  March.

-----

When the sick of the Battalion left the front for Scutari, no
information regarding them was obtained by the Regimental authorities,
and to correct this serious inconvenience, a Captain and
Lieutenant-Colonel from each Battalion of the Brigade was sent to
inspect the hospitals where Guardsmen were treated, and to arrange a
more proper system for future adoption (February 16th). Lieut.-Colonel
Dudley Carleton, who represented the Coldstream, reported that the
admission of men into hospital, as well as the patients' death or
discharge, were imperfectly registered:

  “their kits were either stored or condemned without regular authority,
  or were left in the hold of transports, carried up and down during
  many voyages, and not unfrequently plundered. When a man died, no
  regular record was kept or transmitted to his regiment, although
  professedly done. No returns whatever had been sent to the Battalion
  of men dead, invalided home, or otherwise employed.”[316]

-----

Footnote 316:

  Wyatt, 53. The three Officers were, Lieut.-Colonels Hon. C. Lindsay,
  D. Carleton (now Lord Dorchester), and Hon. S. Jocelyn (now Earl of
  Roden).

-----

Colonel Carleton remained absent six weeks, and during this time he
established a system of fortnightly returns, which thenceforward were
regularly despatched to the Crimea, and he placed a sergeant of the
Coldstream on the staff of the hospital at Scutari to carry it out.

It has already been mentioned that the winter troubles added to the
losses incurred at Inkerman, and, in the absence of sufficient
reinforcements from home, had destroyed the efficiency of the Brigade at
the seat of war. At the end of January the three Battalions could hardly
muster a tenth of their proper strength, and numbered only some 312 men
able to do duty.[317] Lord Rokeby seems to have been so struck with
their exhausted appearance, that he endeavoured to obtain for them an
exemption from trench duty for a time; but as the Order book shows them
to be still continually at work, it is evident that it was not possible
to comply with the proposal. Towards the end of February, however, it
was found absolutely necessary to make a complete change, and to move
them to Balaklava, there to rest and to recruit their strength after the
very arduous labours in which for so long they had been engaged.
Accordingly, on the 22nd, the Grenadiers marched there, followed by the
Coldstream on the 24th, and by the Scotch Fusilier Guards about the same
time. In the Regiment there were less than 100 men of all ranks on
parade. For some time previously it had become manifest that, if the men
continued to live under existing conditions, it was but a question of
time how long the Battalion could survive except on paper. Of the sick
left behind, 41 followed on the 27th, and 75 were conveyed next day by
French mule transport (the usual conveyance lent us by our allies, and
indeed the only transport procurable, since our own arrangements had
broken down), but the last detachment was not removed to Balaklava until
the 28th of March.[318] The Guards remained at the base till June, 1855,
and though absent more than three months from the front, they missed
little chance of performing any useful military service.

-----

Footnote 317:

  Kinglake, vi. 204, quoting from the _Report of the Sevastopol
  Commission_ .

Footnote 318:

  Wyatt, pp. 54, 65.

-----

  REGIMENTAL
  1669
  COLONEL      LIEUT: COLONEL      MAJOR      N^o. IV COMP^S.
  1684
  COLONEL      LIEUT: COLONEL      N^o. VI COMPANY
  1685
  N.R. Wilkinson del.      A.D. Innes & C^o. London.      Mintern Bros.
    Chromo.
]

                              CHAPTER XI.
                        THE FALL OF SEVASTOPOL.

Stay of the Brigade at Balaklava—Improvement in the condition of the
    men—Return of the Guards to the front, June 16th—Changed aspect of
    affairs before Sevastopol—Review of events during the time spent at
    Balaklava—Second bombardment—Interference by Napoleon III. in the
    course of the war; operations paralysed—General Canrobert resigns,
    and is succeeded by General Pélissier—Energy displayed by the
    latter—Third bombardment—Fourth bombardment; assault on
    Sevastopol—Its failure—Death of Lord Raglan; succeeded by General
    Simpson—Siege operations continued—Battle of the Tchernaya—Fifth
    bombardment—Sixth bombardment; second assault—The Malakoff is
    captured—Fall of the south side of Sevastopol—The Russians evacuate
    the town, and retreat to the north side—State in which the Allies
    found Sevastopol.

There are few incidents of Regimental interest to record during the stay
at Balaklava. The men were lodged in huts, but as these were situated
near a burial ground and close to the stables of the Land Transport
Corps, the advantages gained by a change from the fatigues and hardships
of the siege to the base of operations were sadly diminished, and
several cases of maculated fever for the first time appeared. In March,
another site having been selected on the west side of the harbour, in a
more favourable and sanitary position, and huts having been constructed,
the Battalion moved there towards the end of the month. The better food,
the shelter, the increased comfort, and the rest now enjoyed by the men,
produced a satisfactory effect upon their health, to which the
improvement in the weather also contributed; for, the short, though
terribly severe winter had passed away, and with the spring the
temperature became warm and pleasant. During March, 101 men were
admitted into hospital, of whom 24 were suffering from typhus, and the
mortality amounted to 10; while next month, 53 men only were admitted,
and but 5 deaths occurred.[319]

-----

Footnote 319:

  Wyatt, p. 65.

-----

The Battalion were employed principally in the ordinary duties performed
at the base of operations, guarding the stores and buildings or other
places set apart for the use of the army, and unloading the ships that
arrived in Balaklava. Drills were carried out, and the troops practised,
in occupying the trenches at night, to meet any sudden attack which the
enemy might contemplate. The danger of such an attack was lessened by
the fact that the enemy had relaxed his hold, as far back as the end of
December, upon the heights on the left bank of the Tchernaya, captured
by him on the 25th of October, though he continued to occupy the line of
the river. It was still necessary to restrain his activity in this
quarter, and several reconnaissances took place to prevent his advance.
As was only natural, the Officers at Balaklava, when off duty, rode
frequently to points where operations of interest were being undertaken,
but the Brigade itself was not engaged at this period.

The gabion-making detachment was continued near Balaklava, to supply the
siege-works before Sevastopol.

Early in March, convalescents from Scutari, wounded at the Alma and at
the Inkerman, returned to the Battalion, but the next draft did not
arrive until the 1st of May, when 7 Officers and 307 men, whose average
age and service were 22-1/12 years and 7 months respectively, landed in
the Crimea.[320] Owing to the Regimental promotion which had taken
place, Colonels Lord F. Paulet (commanding the 2nd Battalion) and
Newton, and Lieut.-Colonel Wood were now ordered home to the 2nd
Battalion; while Colonel Gordon Drummond assumed the command of the 1st
Battalion, Colonels Daniell and Perceval being Acting Majors (mounted),
as has already been stated. About this time, also,[321] Officers were
posted to companies as follows:—

No. 1 Company: Captains F. Burton, H. Tower, and C. Blackett.
    (Subsequently Lieut.-Colonel Lord C. FitzRoy.)

No. 2 Company: Lieut.-Colonel C. Burdett; Captain M. Heneage; Lieutenant
    St. V. Whitshed.

No. 3 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Herbert Stepney; Captain Le Couteur;
    Lieutenant Rose.

No. 4 Company: Lieut.-Colonel W. Dawkins; Captain Hon. R. Drummond;
    Lieutenant H. Lane.

No. 5 Company: Major P. Crawley; Lieutenants A. Lambton, Lane-Fox.

No. 6 Company: Captain Sir J. Dunlop; Lieutenant A. Adair. (Subsequently
    Major C. Baring.)

No. 7 Company: Lieut.-Colonel C. Cocks; Captain J. Caulfeild; Lieutenant
    G. Ives.

No. 8 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Dudley Carleton; Captains A. Thellusson,
    Gerald Goodlake; Lieutenant Godfrey Wigram.

-----

Footnote 320:

  The Officers were: Colonels Gordon Drummond, Daniell, and Perceval;
  Lieut.-Colonel Cocks; Captain Thellusson; and Lieutenants Adair, and
  Lane. Shortly afterwards Lieut.-Colonel Lord C. FitzRoy (wounded at
  Inkerman) and Major C. Baring (wounded at the Alma) reached the seat
  of war; Assist.-Surgeon T. Rogers arrived on June 15th.

Footnote 321:

  _Battalion Order_ , May 4, 1855.

-----

As the summer approached, the weather became extremely hot, and towards
the middle of May, 90 degrees were registered in the shade. Cholera
again broke out among the troops, but, warned by the visitation of this
plague in the previous year, every precaution then known to medical
science was taken to avert it. The number of sick increased during May
and June, the admissions into hospital being in the first month 134, and
the deaths 5, and in the second month 267 and 36 respectively; of the
latter, 24 men died of cholera.

On the 16th of June, the Brigade returned to the front to join in the
operations which were intended to be undertaken by the Allies on the
18th, the anniversary of the battle of Waterloo.[322] The Battalion was
488 strong (excluding Officers). Three Officers and 61 men were left
behind sick, as well as 15 convalescents; altogether 111 men were
abstracted from the effective strength. On reaching the upland the old
positions were scarcely to be recognised by the rank and file who had
remained more than three months at Balaklava. The French having already
extended the British Right Attack, occupied the ground in front of the
Karabelnaya from the Dockyard Ravine, past the Careenage Ravine, and
along Mount Inkerman to the heights overlooking the roadstead.
Innumerable siege-works cut up the plateau, the lines were pushed
further forward, a large force was concentrated on the spot, and the
face of the country—so bleak and barren in February—was now covered with
the green carpet of a luxuriant vegetation.

-----

Footnote 322:

  The Highland Brigade marched up with the Guards, and thus the First
  Division, under Lieut.-General Sir Colin Campbell, was once more
  complete before Sevastopol. Shortly afterwards the following changes
  were made in the British army. The Highlanders were separated from the
  Guards, and having several battalions added to them, formed the
  “Highland Division,” commanded by Sir Colin Campbell. Lord Rokeby,
  promoted locally Lieut.-General, commanded the First Division, formed
  of the Guards Brigade, under Brigadier-General Craufurd; and of the
  2nd Brigade, viz. a battalion of the 9th, 13th, 31st Regiments, and of
  the Rifle Brigade, under Colonel Ridley. About the same time, the
  Second, Third, Fourth, and Light Divisions were commanded by
  Major-Generals Markham, Eyre, H. Bentinck, and Lieut.-General Sir W.
  Codrington respectively. The Cavalry, under Lieut.-General Sir J.
  Scarlett, was divided into three brigades: the Heavy, Light, and
  Hussar brigades.

-----

We must now take a hasty glance at the state of affairs prevailing
before Sevastopol and elsewhere, which controlled the war, while the
Guards were at Balaklava. In spite of the united efforts of the British
and French occupying the ground before the Malakoff, the enemy succeeded
in extending his works to his front, and in materially strengthening the
lines that covered the Karabelnaya. The fact was becoming more apparent
that General Canrobert, gallant soldier though he was, was not disposed
to risk the chances of making a bold move against the Russians; and that
the latter, under the distinguished leadership of Colonel Todleben, were
enabled thereby to prolong the struggle.

But Canrobert was not entirely his own master in this matter, for
towards the beginning of the year 1855 the Emperor Napoleon interfered
with the conduct of the operations in the Crimea, in a manner to impede
seriously the progress of hostilities. Declaring himself to be
dissatisfied with the course pursued, the Emperor conceived the idea of
delaying the siege until he could isolate Sevastopol from the rest of
the peninsula; and he even proposed to go himself to the Crimea to carry
out his design. He was happily dissuaded from undertaking this latter
part of the project—dangerous both on account of his inexperience in
war, and because of the instability of his authority in Paris,—and it
was finally abandoned, after he had been received as a guest at Windsor
(April 25th); but he still adhered to his determination to enforce some
hazy plan which his vanity had formed, and thereby he increased
considerably the difficulties of the Allies.

Added to this, there was a renewal of negotiations at Vienna. The Tsar
Nicholas died early in March, and though his successor Alexander II. was
clearly in the hands of the war faction, some feeble attempt was made to
patch up a peace. The negotiations failed; but the events alluded to
could not but exercise some influence over the fortunes of the war, by
fettering the action of the French army engaged in it.

This appears to be shown by the results that followed the second
bombardment of Sevastopol, which commenced on the 8th of April. Immense
preparations had been made to ensure its success, and it was confidently
expected by the Allied hosts that this bombardment would at last lead to
an immediate and triumphal assault of the fortress.

  “Ten days did the terrific storm of iron hail endure; ten days did the
  Russian reliefs, holding themselves ready to repel attack, meet wounds
  and death with a constancy which was of necessity altogether passive.
  On the 19th they saw the fire of the Allies decline, and settle into
  its more ordinary rate; they saw too, that the sappers were again at
  work with their approaches, and reading in this the signs of a
  resumption of the siege, and the abandonment of the policy of assault,
  they once more withdrew their sorely harassed infantry to places of
  shelter and repose. Then they began to reckon their losses, which
  amounted for the ten days, in killed and wounded, to more than 6,000
  men. The French lost in killed and disabled, 1,585 men; the English,
  265.”[323]

-----

Footnote 323:

  Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 212.

-----

All this expenditure of lives and of war _matériel_ effected just
nothing, nor was anything even attempted against the enemy; for the
French, though having an opportunity to assault, not possessed at that
time by their British allies, were “kept waiting for Louis Napoleon, and
were restrained from engaging in any determined attack.”[324]

-----

Footnote 324:

  Kinglake, vii. 195; compare Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 225.

-----

In order to accomplish the views of the Emperor Napoleon, a French army
of reserve was being collected near Constantinople, and as it was
expected soon to reach the Crimea—to undertake the plans which had been
sketched out in Paris,—two important operations against the enemy were
delayed. First, a further bombardment, arranged to take place at the end
of April, and to be followed by an assault, was put off; and secondly,
an expedition, at last agreed to, against the Russian communications in
the Sea of Azof, and which had actually started to Kertch (May 3rd), was
recalled.[325] Both these events caused much embarrassment to Lord
Raglan, who, understanding imperfectly even then the Emperor’s
proposals, found his own plans thwarted by the supine and unintelligible
conduct of his colleague. The confidence reposed in the latter was
naturally shaken; and when, a few days later, Napoleon’s scheme was
fully revealed to the allied Commanders, was discussed, and was found to
be impossible of execution, General Canrobert felt his position to be
intolerable, and he resigned the chief command of the French army. It is
right to add that, though Canrobert’s character unfitted him to direct
the difficult operations which lay before him, he was well suited to
assume the lower functions of a commander of a division or army-corps.
Being of a loyal and soldierlike disposition, and unwilling to leave the
seat of war, he begged that he might revert to the position he
originally occupied in the French army when the war broke out, and
recommended that General Pélissier (who had reached the Crimea in
January) should be appointed the new Commander-in-chief. These proposals
were sanctioned in Paris by telegram, and were immediately carried into
execution (May 19th).

-----

Footnote 325:

  “I merely record that both armies were certainly, if not discontented,
  amazed, when an expedition which started on the 3rd of May to Kertch,
  to destroy Russian magazines and stores, was recalled three days
  later, on the receipt of a telegram from Paris” (Wood, _Crimea in 1854
  and 1894_ , p. 264).

-----

The change in the French command completely altered the state of affairs
in the Crimea. The vacillating weakness of Canrobert and his
subserviency to the foibles of his Imperial Master, were at last
replaced by the hardy daring of Pélissier and by his manly disregard of
an ill-timed interference in the conduct of the war, which could only
end in disaster. The forces fighting against Russia, moreover, were
increasing; while the strength of that Empire was ebbing fast. In April
nearly half of Omar Pasha’s Turks, about 45,000 strong, were taken from
Eupatoria to the Chersonese, and next month a compact division of 15,000
Sardinians—who had joined the confederacy against Russia—landed in the
Crimea, under the command of General La Marmora. The enemy about this
time, by reason of his immense losses, had little more than 100,000 men
in the peninsula; the Allies were more numerous, and could dispose of
about 180,000 men.[326] Thus, it was becoming apparent, that by
vigorously pushing on the siege, Sevastopol must fall, and that the
resources of Russia—so fatally allowed to accumulate in the early stages
of the war—were beginning to fail.

-----

Footnote 326:

  English, 28,000; French, 100,000; Turks, 45,000; Sardinians, 15,000
  (Kinglake, viii. 7).

-----

Immediate arrangements were made to storm the advanced works which
Todleben had constructed, to occupy the Tchernaya and the plain of
Baidar that lay beyond it, and to attack Kertch and the Russian base of
supplies formed on the coast of the Sea of Azof. On the 23rd of May,
after severe fighting, the French gained an important advantage over the
enemy near Quarantine Bay; and, two days later, he was also attacked on
the Tchernaya and driven out of Tchorgun. About the same time, the
expedition to Kertch, composed of 15,000 English, French, and Turks,
started for its destination. Operations in this quarter were entirely
successful, and by the middle of June the Allies, having struck deep
into the resources of the Russians, cut their chief line of supply, and
in no small degree carried out practically the policy of investment
which the Emperor professed to desire.[327]

-----

Footnote 327:

  Hamley, _Crimea_ , p. 242. Established now at last on the shores of
  the Sea of Azof, the Allies might even at this late period have
  inflicted a crushing blow on the enemy in the direction of Circassia,
  and so have brought about the end of the war, and a severe check to
  Russia’s advance through Central Asia and towards India—the objects
  that Great Britain had in view when she undertook to curb the Tsar’s
  pretensions in the East. It appears that the attention of the Foreign
  Secretary (Lord Clarendon) was directed at that time to this most
  important point; but there was a difficulty with the French, who,
  conceiving that they would be giving assistance to a purely English
  policy, would not concur in any such scheme (see Rawlinson, _England
  and Russia in the East_ , 272 note). It must not be forgotten that
  Louis Napoleon disapproved of the expedition to Kertch—the one
  operation in the war which was crowned with complete and immediate
  success, and which cost the Allies nothing,—and that he peremptorily
  ordered Pélissier to take no part in the attack on Anapa on the
  Circassian coast (Kinglake, viii. 79).

-----

The allied Commanders now directed their efforts to the Russian advanced
works covering the Karabelnaya, and, determining to attack them, they
prepared for the assault by a fierce cannonade (the third bombardment),
which opened on the 6th of June with tremendous violence and effect, and
lasted until the 10th. On the evening of the 7th, the French advanced
against the White works (situated on Mount Inkerman, to the east of
Careenage Ravine), and the Kamskatka Lunette (on the Mamelon, covering
the Malakoff and some 500 yards in front of it); and the English moved
against the Quarries (covering the Redan and about 400 yards from it).
These attacks were successful, and the enemy, driven from all these
outworks, was restricted to his main line of defence. The captured
positions were occupied and held by the Allies. Between the 6th and the
10th the Russians lost altogether, in killed, wounded, and prisoners,
8500 men and 73 guns; the Allies nearly 7000 men.

These advantages were now to be pressed home, and a great effort made to
assault the main line round the Karabelnaya; the Malakoff and the Redan
were to be attacked, and the fortress so long besieged was at last to
fall. The final act of the long drama was fixed for the 18th of June,
when the Anglo-French allies, having shared so many dangers and
hardships in common, might reap the reward of their arduous labours, and
obliterate the memories of the day of Waterloo.

The fourth bombardment opened on the 17th, and the fleets once more
joined their fire to the numerous great siege guns planted before
Sevastopol. The devastating force of the artillery soon obtained a
mastery over that of the fortress, and the usual results followed: the
enemy’s works were knocked to pieces, his defences ruined, and he lost
4000 men. Now, therefore, was the time for the assault to take place,
and, as we have seen, the Guards Brigade were brought up to the front
from Balaklava to participate in the operations about to ensue. But the
ardent expectations of the besiegers were not yet to be realized, and
the attack ended unfortunately. Neither in the Malakoff nor in the
Redan, were the French or ourselves able to effect a lodgment; the only
consolation was the capture of a position in front of our Left Attack.
Among the blunders that occurred to account for the failure, perhaps the
most unfortunate was that of Pélissier himself. It had been settled that
the bombardment was to continue for two hours after dawn on the 18th, so
as to shatter the repairs which the Russians invariably made to their
works during the night, and that then the assault was to commence at
about 5.30 in the morning. But this plan was altered at the last moment,
by Pélissier, who wished the advance to begin at dawn, without any
previous preparation by artillery fire. Lord Raglan was not consulted,
and, when he heard of it, he submitted to the change most reluctantly.
The enemy, therefore, was ready, behind parapets hastily renewed and
armed with field guns during the night, and thereby he was enabled to
repel the attack. That this was probably the main cause of the failure,
may perhaps be inferred from the fact that when, after the assault, the
bombardment recommenced, the soldierlike spirit of the Russians gave
way, and many of them, unable to stand against the terrific fire poured
upon them, fled to the harbour, and endeavoured to escape to the north
side of Sevastopol.[328] The Guards Brigade were not engaged upon this
occasion; they remained in reserve, and were not brought forward. In
fact, the attack had failed, and further expenditure of lives had to be
avoided. The losses were great on that fatal day; that of the English
amounted to 1500, of the French to 3500, and of the enemy only to 1500.

-----

Footnote 328:

  Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 261.

-----

Two Officers occupying very conspicuous positions in their respective
armies disappeared from the scene of their labours about this time.
General Todleben was slightly wounded on the 18th, and more gravely hurt
a few days later, so that he had to leave Sevastopol, and the Russians
lost the services of that master mind to whose conspicuous ability,
energy, and courage the prolonged and successful defence of the fortress
was primarily due. The Allied armies also were plunged into mourning by
the unexpected death of Lord Raglan, who never recovered from the grief
and disappointment which oppressed his mind after the events of the
18th. This reverse, added to the labours and anxieties of the previous
fifteen months, during which time he discharged his high but onerous
duties without intermission, undermined his constitution, and he died on
the 28th, surrounded by his personal friends and his military staff. He
was succeeded by General Simpson.[329] His body was removed to England,
and was taken to the Bay of Kazatch with full military honours, on the
3rd of July; and, in accordance with General Orders, the troops not
engaged in the funeral or on duty in the field, remained in their tents
during the afternoon. While the ceremony lasted, the Allied forces
before Sevastopol were passive in the trenches, and, whether owing to
chance or to a graceful act of courtesy on the part of the Russian
Commander, the guns of the garrison also kept silence.[330]

-----

Footnote 329:

  See Appendix No. X., containing General Orders on Lord Raglan’s death.

Footnote 330:

  Kinglake, viii. 299.

-----

The siege was pushed forward with great activity after the 18th, and in
this portion of the weary operations the Guards Brigade took their full
share. Seeing the mistake committed by advancing over open ground for a
distance of 400 to 500 yards, against the _enceinte_ covering the
Karabelnaya, General Pélissier now proposed to sap up close to the
fortress. The soil near his own siege-works favoured such an
undertaking; but not so, that which lay in front of our positions, where
a thin layer of earth only covered the solid rock. Thus, while the
French were able to get close to the ramparts of the Malakoff, the
British were prevented from pushing through the ground much beyond the
Quarries, or from lessening to any considerable extent the distance that
separated them from their objective—the Redan.

These siege operations lasted without intermission until early in
September. On the night of June 18th, the Brigade found 30 Officers and
1000 men for the trenches, of which the Coldstream, furnished 8 Officers
and 263 men; and so on, from day to day, in varying numbers, according
to the requirements of the moment. It was ordered on the 21st, that “in
future the proportion of Officers and men in the trenches will be one
Captain and one Subaltern to every 100 men;” and also “should any part
of the guard of the trenches be called upon to work, they are positively
forbidden to take off their accoutrements or to go far from their
arms.”[331] Commencing July 10th, the duties were found by divisions—the
First, Second, and Light in the Right, the Third and the Fourth in the
Left Attack,—and during that night the Battalion furnished 7 Officers
and 312 men, also 21 men more as a special working party.[332]

-----

Footnote 331:

  _First Divisional Morning Order_ , June 21st.

Footnote 332:

  Special and other working parties and shot-loading fatigues in the
  trenches were frequently ordered at this time. The following, relating
  to the duties in the trenches, may be of interest:—

  _Head-quarter Memo._  , July 10th: “General Officers of divisions will
  be so good as to detail not less than a Brigadier-General, three Field
  Officers, and two Adjutants for duty in the trenches on the days that
  their divisions furnish the guard, Right Attack.”

  _Divisional Order_ , July 12th: “The troops will be told off to their
  places in the trenches before they leave their camp, and they will
  move off from the parade in front of the camp, after being so told
  off, at 6.15, so that they may all be in their places in the trenches
  and the relief completed by 8 o’clock, according to the General Order
  on the subject.”

  _Head-quarter Memo._ , July 24th: “Until further orders the guard in
  the trenches by night, will be 2400 men, under a General of the day
  with three Field Officers; of this number 600 men will work if
  required by the Royal Engineers, from 4 to 8 a.m., and return to their
  camp at 8 a.m. if it should seem prudent to the senior Officer in the
  trenches to dispense with them.... The remainder of the guard will
  furnish working parties as usual during the day, when required by the
  Royal Engineers.... There will be a special working party, consisting
  of 400 men under a Field Officer, independent of the guard of the
  trenches, except in case of an attack, when they will be available to
  be called upon by the Officer commanding in the trenches.... General
  Officers of divisions furnishing the guards in the trenches are to
  consider the remainder of their division as a support ready to
  reinforce the guard, with which they will proceed in case of alarm,
  and resume the command of the whole force in the trenches.”

  Later, in the middle of August, a reserve of 600 men was ordered “to
  remain in the trenches the twenty-four hours, and will be planted
  during the day in such spots in the 1st parallel or other places of
  security as may be pointed out by the Generals of the Attacks. Troops
  not on duty are to remain in camp till further orders” (_Head-quarter
  Memo._ , Aug. 16th).

  _Head-quarter Memo._ , Aug. 17th: “A steady fire of musketry, by
  riflemen and good shots, must be kept up during the night, from the
  advanced trenches of both Attacks on the Redan and works in rear and
  flank. The object being to prevent the enemy from repairing the damage
  done to their works. The artillery should assist this as much as
  possible by throwing light balls.”

  Colonel Tower says that, on August 21st, he was in the 5th parallel,
  and that he was ordered to keep up a heavy fire all night on the
  embrasures. 75,000 rounds were fired from the trench in which he was
  stationed. He also says that the custom in the middle of August, was
  to withdraw the guards of the trenches to a position in rear, and to
  leave an Officer and small party in the advanced line to watch the
  enemy’s works, and to fire at the embrasures when any one showed
  himself (Tower, _Diary_ ).

  Towards the end of August, and during the beginning of September, more
  men were employed. There was a party for the trenches 2800 strong, the
  guard as before 2400, and the special working party, 400 men. During
  this period, more than one division furnished the necessary daily
  number required.

-----

It should be noticed here, that the Guards Brigade, on August 31st,
exchanged the whole of their arms and ammunition for the new Enfield
rifle then introduced, and that, at this time, there were two patterns
in use by the troops of the British army standing before
Sevastopol.[333]

-----

Footnote 333:

  “After 5 p.m. on the 28th inst. the small-arm ammunition magazine on
  the right of the eight-gun battery in the Right Attack will contain
  only Enfield rifle ammunition, pattern 1853, bore ·577; the three
  other magazines will still be supplied with Minié rifle ammunition,
  pattern 1851, bore ·᛫702.”

-----

Notwithstanding the interest which the operations undertaken between
June and September excited, and the high hopes generally entertained
that the fortress would soon fall, the little-varying duty in the
trenches became monotonous in the extreme, and all wished earnestly that
this phase of the war might quickly pass away. Some cricket matches
served to while away a few of the weary hours; but the weather was
extremely hot and oppressive, and the season was sickly. There was, of
course, much to distract the minds of men who, for the first time, found
themselves in the presence of an enemy; but it was different for those
who had been almost constantly at work for many months on the same spot
and at the same object, and thus even these distractions lost much of
their novelty and interest.

  “The siege was really getting too fearfully tedious now,” writes
  Colonel Tower, about August 28th. “The weather was hot and sultry; our
  camp was a long way from the works. We used to parade about 5 p.m.,
  having crammed in all the victuals we could get. We toiled down three
  miles in the sun, carrying great coat, haversack, revolver, and
  defiled into the zigzags before sundown; all night (if in the advance)
  we were straining our eyes over the parapet, momentarily expecting a
  sortie, being graped and shelled the whole time, and losing a good
  many of our party. The sun got up very early, and often a breeze with
  it, and from sunrise to sunset we had to sit in a dusty ditch, being
  shelled, our food—salt pork and biscuit—covered with dust and sand.
  The men could not show their noses over the parapet.... The deep blue
  sea stretching away, dotted with ships coming in and going out, looked
  so cool and nice in the distance, I used to think of home far away,
  and long for the siege to be over. It really seemed now as if it were
  drawing to a close. The bridge across the harbour had been constructed
  some time, and could be for no other purpose than as a means for the
  enemy to retire. The French pressed the enemy at the bastion Du Mât
  [the Flagstaff Battery] and the Malakoff; I used to spend a good deal
  of time in the French trenches, and knew the whole position as well as
  any one in the army.”

The casualties in the Battalion were not very severe during these three
months, and amounted to 47 wounded, of whom 6 died of their injuries.
Besides this number, an Officer of the Regiment, Captain Hon. R.
Drummond, was wounded, on August 25th, in the trenches, having been shot
through the chest; he left the Crimea on September 6th, but died before
he reached England, unfortunately, indeed, just before the steamer
anchored at Spithead. The general health of the Battalion may be seen
from the following table:—

+————-+——————————————-+————————+ | |Admissions into Hospital from|
Deaths from | | |———————+———————+————————+ | | Disease. | Wounds.
|Disease.|Wounds.| +————-+———————+———————+————+———-+ |July | 138 | 20 |
8 | 1 | |August | 132 | 15 | 5 | 3 | |September| 65 | 12 | 2 | 2 |
+————-+———————+———————+————+———-+

Between June 20th and September 21st, 78 men returned to duty from the
hospital at Balaklava; but, _per contra_, 95 men were sent down from the
front for treatment during the same period.[334]

-----

Footnote 334:

  Wyatt, p. 86.

-----

The Russians could do little to resist the formidable preparations made
by the Allies to bring about the capture of Sevastopol. They lost
heavily every day, even under the ordinary fire which the besiegers
poured upon them, and, perceiving that the end of the long struggle was
imminent, they resolved to make one final effort to free themselves from
the forces that were closing nearer and nearer to their defences. After
much consideration, General Michael Gortchakoff[335] determined to bring
down the field army, which was established on the Mackenzie heights and
on the Belbek, into the valley of the Tchernaya, and to attack the
French, Sardinians, and Turks holding that portion of the field. On
August 15th, accordingly, a general action took place in that quarter,
known as the battle of the Tchernaya, between a Russian army of 48,000
infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 272 guns, and a somewhat smaller force of
the Allies, who, though they massed as many as 60,000 men, did not
deploy their whole strength upon that occasion. The enemy displayed much
bravery, but showed little skill; he was routed, and fell back slowly
towards Mackenzie Farm, losing 69 Officers and 2300 men killed, 160
Officers and 4000 men wounded, and 31 Officers and 1700 men
missing—total 8260. The French had 1500 killed and wounded, and the
Sardinians 200.[336] The besieging armies expected that this battle
would be accompanied by a general sortie from Sevastopol; but it did not
take place, for, the Russians were getting exhausted, and their
resources were almost entirely at an end. In order to prevent any such
attempt, and also to enable the French to sap up quite close to the
defences of the Karabelnaya opposite to them, the Allies opened another,
though only a partial, bombardment (the fifth) on August 16th, and
continued their fire for some days with great violence; but no assault
followed, for they were not yet ready to enact the final scene that was
soon to begin.

-----

Footnote 335:

  General Menshikoff had been replaced in his command in the Crimea by
  General Gortchakoff in the spring of 1855; the same who fought on the
  Danube, and whose curious movements, on the day of Inkerman, have
  already been adverted to.

Footnote 336:

  Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 271.

-----

General Gortchakoff might now have yielded the fortress which had been
held so tenaciously and gloriously by the armies of the Tsar; but, after
a full inspection of the town, of its ruins, and of the miseries and
horrors it contained, he came to the resolution that it was to be held
to the last extremity, and that the honour of his Sovereign prevented
him from either evacuating it or capitulating. He determined, therefore,
to bring into Sevastopol all he could spare of his field army, and to
resist to the end. Hopeless as the outlook was at this moment, he still
professed to believe that he could hold out for another month.

The last and sixth bombardment commenced on September 5th, and
continued, if possible, with even greater fierceness and intensity than
before, till the 8th, the day set apart for the grand assault. Pélissier
guarded himself this time against advancing at dawn; and, having
observed that at noon the Malakoff was usually more weakly occupied than
at any other hour of the day or night, he resolved to take advantage of
this circumstance, and to deliver the attack then. At noon therefore,
the French, under Bosquet, were to storm the Malakoff, the Curtain near,
and the little Redan; while the English, under General Codrington, were
to attack the Redan. The town defences, moreover, were to be assailed by
the French opposite to them, aided by a Sardinian brigade under General
Cialdini; but this movement was subject to further orders.

A very fierce fight took place at all these places, of which one alone
was successful; for the French, having entered the Malakoff, secured a
firm footing there, and gained that important position in the enemy’s
main line. Their losses were immense, not less than 3087 in killed and
wounded out of 7446 men engaged in this portion of the battle-field.
Everywhere else the assaults were beaten back, and the Allies could only
believe at first that they had but gained an indecisive victory.

The attack on the Redan was made, as has been seen, under very
difficult—almost impossible—circumstances; but, if it was only
undertaken to relieve the pressure which the enemy brought to bear upon
our allies near the Malakoff, our purpose was fulfilled. It is, however,
difficult to believe that a diversion was all we intended to effect,
since this assault was to be the final act of the great military drama
which had been going on for a whole year in the Crimea, and which
riveted the eyes of Europe upon Sevastopol. The troops engaged comprised
the Second and Light Divisions, 6200 strong—1700 in the first line, 1500
in support, and 3000 in reserve in the 3rd parallel; the Third and
Fourth Divisions formed a main reserve; but neither the Highland nor the
First Division, to which the Guards Brigade belonged, was called up to
share in the action. The Brigade was posted in rear, about half a mile
from the Malakoff, where a splendid view of the fighting was obtained.
There was much regret among all ranks composing it that they were not
allowed to advance and take part in the attack; more especially since,
when the French (according to Colonel Tower) asked General Simpson to
send some of his troops to help them to hold the Malakoff, the request
was refused, and the First Division, or, at least, the Guards, who were
close by, were not told off to perform this duty. If this is more than
camp gossip, it is, indeed, to be regretted that no British troops were
enabled to participate in the glory of inflicting a final reverse upon
the enemy’s position in the Karabelnaya.

General Simpson explains that he determined to give the honour of
leading the assault to the Second and Light Divisions, because they had
defended the trenches and approaches to the Redan for many months, and
because of the intimate knowledge they possessed of the ground. Military
critics believe that this was a “cruel kindness to the army.” The two
divisions were exhausted by the siege, and the knowledge of the ground
is considered upon this occasion to have been a positive disadvantage,
“for, in acquiring it, the troops generally lost the dash which is
essential to success.” Moreover, these divisions were now filled with
young and only partially trained soldiers, “who paid no attention to the
orders that were given;” “the companies lost all formation and cohesion
from the irregular manner in which they ran forward, and they stood in
confused groups behind the parapets;” “the battalions got mixed up;” in
fact, “the young, raw recruits failed to follow their leaders in the way
in which the soldiers had done at the Alma and Inkerman.”[337] On the
other hand, there were fresh troops available; the Guards had only
shortly before come up to the front from Balaklava, where they passed
three and a half months, and the Highlanders had been there between
October and June. Neither, as we know, were employed in the assault,
much to their disappointment and chagrin.

-----

Footnote 337:

  Wood, _Crimea in 1854 and 1894_ , pp. 370-378.

But all this is only one side of the story. The task before the British
was, under any circumstances, most difficult to fulfil. They had to
advance over the open for a considerable distance, against a strong
work, covered in front by obstacles, whose rear was unenclosed, and
whose fire was unsubdued. It had been impossible to construct _places
d’armes_ in our trenches, owing to the rocky nature of the soil, and
hence the reserves could not be concentrated in suitable positions
whence to push forward at the proper moment and feed the attack.
Nevertheless, the leading British troops advanced with the utmost
gallantry and spirit, notwithstanding the furious fire to which they
were exposed; they penetrated into the Redan, and clung to the position
they had gained. But they could not maintain themselves there; for, the
Russians, hurrying up in immense numbers, forced them to retire before
the reserves—hampered in the narrow trenches—were able to advance to
their support. The French, moreover, having spiked the guns they found
in the Malakoff, had none to turn

-----

upon the enemy as he entered the Redan in force to drive out our
storming parties. After this failure, the attack was put off to the
following day; our losses amounted to 2271 Officers and men, those of
the French to 7567, and of the Russians to 12,913.[338]

-----

Footnote 338:

  Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , pp. 278-285. The 23rd Royal Welsh
  Fusiliers, in support, lost, in killed and wounded, 15 Officers out of
  18, and 197 men out of five companies (Wood, _Crimea_ , loc. cit.).

-----

But there was no necessity to renew the combat; for the enemy, aware of
the strength of the Malakoff position, which commanded the whole of the
defences of Sevastopol, evacuated the south side during the night of the
8th-9th, and withdrew to the northern bank of the roadstead, blowing up
their magazines, and firing the town in several places. The Allies had
thus early intimation of the impending fall of the fortress which for so
long had withstood their valour; but the full extent of the victory was
scarcely appreciated before the morning of the 9th, when the enemy’s
retreat became known to the armies engaged. The evacuation of the Redan
was first ascertained by some Highlanders in the trenches in the night,
who, stalking up to the ditch and abatis that was near it, found the
work tenanted only by spiked guns and by dead men.

  “N——, who knew my wandering tendencies, came to me in the middle of
  the night before daybreak, and told me to get up at once, that some
  one had come out of the trenches, and that the Redan was evacuated. I
  got on Bono Johnnie and galloped off about daylight. I arrived at our
  trenches, which I found occupied by the Highland Division; they were
  fast putting out a line of sentries to prevent any one going over to
  the Russian works.... I went across the hill towards the Malakoff, the
  ground literally paved with iron; the great high parapet was already
  broken down, and in the afternoon the ditch was filled in with gabions
  and a regular road made into the work. Dead and dying inside the work;
  such a scene of devastation and confusion impossible to conceive: guns
  broken and upset; powder in the embrasures, two or three inches deep,
  all loose on the ground; wounded men, French and Russians, still
  crawling about, and the trenches full of Russians who had crept in....
  From the top of the parapet our trenches were spread out like a map. I
  was wild with delight at thinking the siege was over, and all the
  country opened to us. I posted off to the White barracks, and
  ransacked the whole place, coming back through the Redan.”[339]

-----

Footnote 339:

  Tower, _Diary_ , Sept. 9, 1855.

-----

The Allies did not enter the town on the 9th, for Sevastopol was a
blazing mass of ruins, and the frequent explosions showed the place to
be undermined: the garrison having escaped under cover of the night,
when we were unaware of their intention, could not be further pressed at
that moment, so there was no object to serve by sending the troops into
a fire-trap. A terrible conflagration raged, and to this was added the
burning and the final destruction of the Russian Black Sea fleet. The
minds of our men could be well filled with awe and joy at the wonderful
sights that met their gaze—awe at the fiery furnace the enemy kindled to
mark his departure from the stronghold he had held so audaciously and
bravely, and joy that the protracted siege was at last concluded.[340]
Early on the 10th, the fires had ceased, and the conquerors, advancing
to secure their prize, found one great building intact. Having
penetrated into it, they were amazed to discover that it was a hospital
containing no less than 2000 dead and dying men, who had been left to
their fate without food or treatment for two days and nights, in the
midst of the dire confusion and chaos that prevailed in the town; among
them were three English Officers.[341] At midday on the 13th, a fatigue
party of 500 men of the First Division, under Major Ponsonby, Grenadier
Guards, were ordered into the town to help to cleanse it, and to bury
the numerous dead. The duty was a disagreeable one, as may well be
imagined; it was well performed, as can be seen from the following
Divisional Memorandum, dated September 15th:—

  The General Commanding the Forces expresses, through Lieut.-General
  Lord Rokeby, his regret at being obliged to employ the Brigade on the
  disagreeable fatigue duty of Thursday last, but which, for the health
  of the army, was absolutely necessary; and he was fully satisfied with
  the manner in which that duty was performed.

-----

Footnote 340:

  The Battalion Order dated the 9th, “The Battalion will parade for
  inspection of necessaries at 9 a.m. to-morrow, Officers in blue coats,
  etc.,” shows that the ordinary routine of military duty was never
  relaxed.

Footnote 341:

  Hamley, _Crimea_ , p. 286; Nolan, ii. 473.

-----

The French now occupied Sevastopol, and the English the Karabelnaya,
where regular guards were established. The British troops (500 each day
from the Brigade) were employed, with a working pay of 1_s._ 6_d._ a
day, in making a main road from Balaklava to the front, and others in
the neighbourhood, under the superintendence of Lieut.-Colonel Hon. A.
Hardinge, Coldstream Guards.

It should be stated here, that, on the 27th of August, Lord Stratford de
Redcliffe, Ambassador at Constantinople, reached the Crimea for the
purpose of investing several Officers with the Order of the Bath. The
ceremony took place at the British head-quarters, in the presence of
General Pélissier and his Staff. The Guards Brigade furnished a Guard of
Honour; the Coldstream, the Queen’s Colour, the Ensign and Lieutenant
(Lieutenant Whitshed), and 50 men; and the Scots Fusilier Guards, the
Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel, the Lieutenant and Captain, and 50 men.
Among those on whom the honour was conferred, connected with the
Regiment or to be connected with it, were Lieut.-Generals Sir Colin
Campbell, Sir H. Bentinck, and Sir W. Codrington.

The Brigade paraded in review order on the 20th of September, for the
purpose of receiving medals and clasps, which were distributed to the
Officers, Non-commissioned officers, and men who had landed in the
Crimea before the 1st of October, 1854.

Early in October, 1855, new reinforcements reached the Battalion. On the
2nd, 24 convalescents arrived for duty from Balaklava, as against 7
invalids sent to England next day. On the 4th, the fifth draft landed
from home, consisting of 8 Officers and 207 men, whose average age was
24 years, and service 15 months. “They were principally volunteers from
the Militia, and a remarkably fine body of men, not so tall as the
original Guardsmen, but in every way better adapted for the exigencies
of active service.”[342] Officers were posted to companies as follows,
October 7th:—

No. 1 Company: Major C. Baring, Captain H. Tower, Lieutenant Rose.

No. 2 Company: Lieut.-Colonel C. Burdett, Major Lord Bingham, Lieutenant
    Julian Hall.

No. 3 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Herbert-Stepney, Captain C. Blackett,
    Lieutenant Adair.

No. 4 Company: Captain Le Couteur, Captain Lord E. Cecil, Lieutenant
    Whitshed.

No. 5 Company: Captain Sir J. Dunlop, Lieutenant A. Lambton.

No. 6 Company: Lieut.-Colonel F. Newdigate, Captain W. Reeve, Lieutenant
    H. Lane.

No. 7 Company: Major H. Armytage, Captain Hon. W. Feilding, Lieutenant
    Godfrey Wigram.

No. 8 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Lord Dunkellin, Captain Heneage,
    Lieutenant Hon. W. Edwardes.[343]

-----

Footnote 342:

  Wyatt, 86.

Footnote 343:

  A few days later, Majors Baring and Armytage were invalided to
  England, and Captains Hon. H. Byng and Jervoise joined the
  Battalion—the former from home, the latter by transfer from the 42nd
  Highlanders.

-----

  COLONEL
  1750

  LIEUT. COLONEL      MAJOR

  QUEENS COLOUR 1^{ST}. BATT^L. 1893.

  N.R. Wilkinson del.      A.D. Innes & C^o. London.      Mintern Bros.
    Chromo.
]

                              CHAPTER XII.
                      THE END OF THE RUSSIAN WAR.

Home events during the war—Sympathy of Her Majesty with her Crimean
    soldiers—Badges of distinction added to the Colours—Inactivity of
    the Allies after the fall of Sevastopol—Expeditions against the
    Russian coast—Sir W. Codrington succeeds Sir J. Simpson as Commander
    of the Forces—The winter 1855-56—Negotiations for a peace, which is
    concluded, March 30th—Events after the cessation of hostilities—A
    British cemetery in the Crimea—Embarkation and return home—The
    Crimean Guards Brigade at Aldershot; visit of Her Majesty the
    Queen—Move to London, and cordial reception there—Distribution of
    the Victoria Cross—Summary of events connected with the
    war—Losses—Appointment of H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge as
    Commander-in-Chief, and of Major-General Lord Rokeby to command the
    Brigade of Guards.

The details of the great struggle in the Crimea have necessarily
occupied so much of the space of the last few chapters, that there has
been little opportunity to allude to the occurrences connected with the
Regiment which took place at home during this eventful period. It will
therefore be well to pause in the narrative of the war, and to devote a
few lines to that subject.

As soon as the Guards Brigade started for Malta in February, 1854, the
public duties in London were reduced; and later in the year, when the
requirements of active service necessitated a still further reduction,
they were fixed at 1 Captain, 4 Subalterns, 9 sergeants, 10 corporals, 6
drummers, and 144 men, to furnish the Queen’s Guard, Buckingham Palace,
the Tylt, the British Museum, and the Magazine Guards; and at 1
Subaltern, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, and 20 men, to furnish the Bank
piquet.[344]

-----

Footnote 344:

  _Brigade Order_ , Nov. 23, 1854.

-----

The principal duty of the home Battalion was naturally at this moment to
train and supply men to the 1st Battalion in the Crimea, and we have
already seen something of the quality of the drafts that were sent out
to the East.[345] But as the ordinary recruiting was not sufficient to
maintain the forces at the seat of war in a proper state of efficiency,
the militia—the true reserve of the British army at that time—was called
upon to perform its functions in the emergency. Not only was a portion
of the militia embodied and employed as garrisons in those places where
regular troops were not available, but volunteers were obtained from its
ranks to fill up the gaps which the war created in the active army
fighting before Sevastopol. In this manner men of good physique and
trained to military service were obtained, and were drafted into the
regular army. In April, 1854, the Non-commissioned officers and men of
the Brigade told off to assist in training militia regiments, were
ordered to use their best exertions to induce men to volunteer for their
Regiments.[346] In December, 1854, Officers of the Brigade were employed
to superintend recruiting from the militia. Men were also obtained from
the Irish Constabulary, and it was settled, December 18, 1855, that
volunteers to the Guards from that corps might reckon their previous
police service as military service.

-----

Footnote 345:

  See Appendix, No. XI.

Footnote 346:

  _Brigade Order_ , April 1, 1854.

-----

It appears that there was an intention to form a Brigade depôt at Malta,
in March, 1855, the companies to form which, were to be borne on the
strength of the Battalions in the East, from the date of embarkation.
But this plan was not carried out, and the home Battalions remained all
through the war with twelve companies, as against eight companies
belonging to the service Battalions; the drafts to the latter were
always furnished direct from London.

As soon as the three Guards Battalions had left England, the other four
were stationed in the West-end (St. George’s, Portman Street, and
Wellington barracks), and there they remained (subject to the ordinary
half-yearly change of quarters) until January, 1855, when the Tower was
again garrisoned by the Brigade. In May, room had to be found for 500
men of the Line passing through London, and a portion of the 2nd
Battalion Grenadier Guards then in Wellington barracks, were put into
billets in Westminster, for four days. This probably is the last time
that any men of the Brigade have been billeted in London. On the 13th of
June, the 2nd Battalions of the Coldstream and Scots Fusilier Guards
proceeded to Aldershot Camp, then newly established, until the 27th of
August, when they were relieved by the two Grenadier Battalions, left in
England.[347] The latter remained there until the middle of December,
when Windsor was again occupied by a Battalion of Guards, and there were
then less than three Battalions of the Brigade stationed in the
West-end, the head-quarters of one being in the Tower, with a detachment
only, in Portman Street.[348] During the absence of a portion of the
Brigade in Aldershot, the Depôt of the 66th Regiment furnished a part of
the public duties in London; but at the end of August, most of these men
having been moved out of town, temporary reductions in the duties were
made (September 16th, and October 9th) until the return of the
Grenadiers.

-----

Footnote 347:

  The following order was published upon this occasion, Aug. 27th: “The
  Major-General Commanding, [at Aldershot] desires to express to the
  Commanding Officer his sense of the general good conduct of the
  Battalion and the attention they have paid to their drill during the
  time they have been under his command, and to request them to accept
  his thanks accordingly.”

Footnote 348:

  For stations occupied by the Coldstream, see Appendix No. XV.

-----

It has been already stated that the Emperor Napoleon visited England in
April, 1855, where a cordial welcome awaited him and the Empress, who
accompanied him. A detachment of a Subaltern and 25 men from each
Battalion, under a Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel of the 2nd Grenadier
Guards (with the Queen’s Colour belonging to that Battalion), proceeded
to Windsor on the 14th, and were stationed there until the 19th, during
the period of the French Sovereign’s visit to the Queen. Numerous Guards
of Honour attended upon His Majesty, two of which were found by the 2nd
Battalion, both at Bricklayers' Arms Station, on the 16th and 21st, on
the arrival at, and departure from London, of the Imperial guest. On the
19th, the Emperor went to Guildhall, and the streets were lined by the
two Grenadier Battalions as he went to the City and returned back to the
West-end. Another Royal visit of one of Her Majesty’s Allies took place
on the 1st of December, when the King of Sardinia, Victor Emanuel,
arrived in London, and went to Windsor. Of the Guards of Honour
furnished upon that occasion, the Coldstream found four—two on the
arrival of the King at Bricklayers' Arms Station and at Paddington
Station on the 1st, one at Lord Palmerston’s house in Piccadilly on the
4th, and one at Bricklayers' Arms Station on the 6th, in the early
morning.

The dress of the Brigade occupied the attention of the military
authorities at this time. The white summer trousers were exchanged for
another pattern made of a light grey stuff; the coatee was done away
with, and the tunic was introduced (April, 1855). Epaulettes ceased to
be worn, and thereby the badge of the Rose, still worn by the men,
disappeared from the uniform of the Officers of the Coldstream. The
tunic at first was a double-breasted garment, but a year later (March,
1856), when Officers required new red coats, they were ordered to supply
themselves with single-breasted tunics, such as are still worn in the
Brigade. The bearskin caps had been cut down early in 1854, to nine
inches in height, and the plume was not to exceed six inches. Also, by
an order dated October 7, 1854, peaks to caps were to be discontinued by
sergeants, and were only to be worn by the Sergeant-Major, the
Quartermaster-Sergeant, the Armourer Sergeant, the Regimental Clerk, the
Drill Sergeants, and the Drum Major—a custom which still prevails in the
Brigade.

A curious means taken to test beer may be gathered from the following
Brigade Order, dated April 18, 1854, and shows the practical, though
perhaps unscientific, manner in which our predecessors went to work when
they wished to ascertain a matter of sanitary importance to the men:—

  Each Battalion will send to Wellington barracks on Thursday morning,
  to receive from the Quartermaster of the Scots Fusilier Guards some
  beer, which is to be delivered to six sergeants, who must undertake
  not to taste any other malt liquor during the time (10 days) they will
  be supplied with it, the object being to test its wholesome qualities.
  The Field Officer requests to be furnished with a report from each
  Battalion at the expiration of the period specified above.

We find that a few days previous to this order (April 13th), a committee
of Officers was appointed to consider the question of the general
introduction of gas into barracks.

Later (July 17, 1855), a Field Officer of the Brigade (Lieut.-Colonel
Wood, Grenadier Guards) was sent to the “end of Commercial Road,
Pimlico, near to the projected Chelsea Bridge, there to view, in
conjunction with a Medical Officer, a site for a barrack.” It will be
seen that this was the first step taken to construct Chelsea barracks,
which, when completed, removed the Foot Guards from the cramped quarters
in Portman Street and St. George’s barracks, which they occupied at this
time.

The Enfield rifle (pattern 1853), issued, as we have seen, to the
Brigade in the Crimea at the end of August, 1855, was served out to the
Guards Battalions on home service on the 26th of October of the same
year. Nine hundred and one stand constituted the armament of the 2nd
Battalion, and “on their receipt the smooth bore now in possession,
including the sergeants' fusils, are to be returned into the Ordnance
stores.”

It is well known to all her subjects that Her Majesty the Queen followed
the varying fortunes of the Russian war with the utmost attention,
interest, and concern; and that to none was her warm sympathy more
heartily and graciously expressed than to her gallant army, who, amid
unparalleled privations and difficulties, maintained intact the glory of
the British Crown and of the country. Frequently did Her Majesty,
surrounded by the Royal Family at Buckingham Palace, personally see such
of her wounded soldiers as were able to be brought into the presence of
their Sovereign, and there praise them for their merit, and condole with
them on their sufferings. This honour was freely bestowed on the men of
the Brigade, and on many occasions the Commanding Officers of Regiments
were ordered to furnish lists of Guardsmen who were well enough to
participate in it. In 1855, the Queen’s birthday was celebrated on the
18th of May, and on the Horse Guards parade, Her Majesty presented
medals for service in the Crimea to all Officers and to three
Non-commissioned officers and twenty privates per Regiment of the
Brigade, entitled to receive them. Next day the following Order was
published:—

  “The Field Officer in Brigade Waiting is commanded to express to the
  Officers and soldiers of the Brigade of Guards who were present
  yesterday at the ceremony of the presentation of medals, Her Majesty’s
  solicitude as to whether they have suffered from the effort which
  evidently many of them made, at the cost of much suffering and
  inconvenience, and requests that Officers Commanding Battalions will
  make the necessary inquiries, and forward the result of them to him
  with as little delay as possible.”

When the fall of Sevastopol was known in England, there was much
rejoicing that the Allied arms had captured the enemy’s stronghold and
great naval arsenal in the Black Sea. But hostilities were not at an
end, nor was an immediate peace in prospect. Nevertheless, certain
distinct stages in the war were concluded, and victory had more than
once smiled upon our standards. A General Order, therefore, was issued
on the 16th of October, 1855, giving authority to inscribe the words
“Alma,” “Inkerman,” “Balaklava,” and “Sevastopol” upon the Colours of
the regiments taking part in these actions and in the siege. On the
following December 28th the three badges of distinction, “Alma,”
“Inkerman,” and “Sevastopol,” were inscribed upon the Colours of the
Regiments of Foot Guards.

The Allied armies, having captured the fortress that so long resisted
their skill and courage, found themselves placed in considerable
embarrassment. The question naturally arose as to what should now be
done. But that question was not readily answered, because no steps had
been taken beforehand to decide it. The northern side was still held by
the Russians, and their forces there were closely united to their field
army, which occupied defensive positions on the Mackenzie heights. The
undertaking to clear the two banks of the Sevastopol roadstead of the
enemy, and to drive him out of the peninsula had the outward appearance
of a difficult operation, and no measures had been concerted to proceed
with it.[349] The Anglo-French armies made no attempt to follow up the
victory of the 8th of September, but hung listlessly on the ground they
had won, deliberating as to their future movements, and doing nothing to
secure success. In short, though the capture effected brought prestige
to the besiegers, and placed in their power the fleet, the docks, and
most of the forts at Sevastopol, no further advantage seemed likely to
accrue, and we found ourselves almost as far as ever from exercising a
coercive control over the councils of the Tsar.

-----

Footnote 349:

  It will be remembered that the north side of Sevastopol commands the
  south side. The capture of the former would have jeopardized the
  latter; but the fall of the south side left the other intact.

-----

As a matter of fact, General Gortchakoff was by no means as strong as he
was supposed to be, and could scarcely have maintained himself in the
Crimea had he been vigorously attacked by the brave forces that had
invariably beaten his troops whenever they met them in the field. His
position, indeed, was very precarious—so precarious was it, in the
opinion of his own Government, that he had the fullest liberty given him
to evacuate the peninsula if he found it necessary to do so. But he was
not obliged to resort to this painful and humiliating measure; for the
Allies never pressed him. Far from making any effort to dislodge him, or
from even manœuvring against him to ascertain how he was
circumstanced, they kept almost entirely aloof, and they left him alone
in peace.

The British Government, sincerely desirous to achieve a more important
success than had been gained, urged that the war should be vigorously
prosecuted. They poured troops into the Crimea, so that our army there
in November numbered as much as 51,000 men, of whom 4000 were cavalry,
and 96 guns, besides a Turkish legion, raised by England, of 20,000, and
a German legion of 10,000. The transport was now completely
re-organized, and the medical service in good working order; and, added
to this, the fleet, always overwhelmingly strong, was more powerful than
it had been before.[350] A campaign was now at last possible against an
enfeebled enemy under far better conditions than had been the case in
the same season of the previous year, when we invaded Russia, whose
resources then were practically unimpaired. The English people, also,
were at one with their Government, and were anxious for a vigorous
prosecution of hostilities, if the enemy could not be otherwise
subjugated. But they and their rulers could effect nothing, for our
allies would not move, and above all things was it necessary that the
alliance should be cordially maintained. Hence, our political relations
with the French interfered with our national interests, and controlled
our military operations against the enemy: and, as has happened in the
past, and will again happen, in wars conducted by several nations, the
common foe reaped no inconsiderable benefit by having a confederation of
Powers ranged against him.

-----

Footnote 350:

  Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 296. These forces continued to
  increase, and by Christmas, 1855, the British army in the Crimea was
  still more numerous than is stated in the text, and there were 120
  guns; besides, a reserve force was collected at Aldershot, and
  amounted to over 18,000 men in April, 1856; at which time it appears
  we had in the East about 60,000 men (excluding transport, etc.).

-----

In short, the fall of Sevastopol practically brought the drama to a
close. The efforts of the besiegers to take the town, after they had
allowed it to grow into military importance, seemed to exhaust the
further zeal and ardour of the Emperor Napoleon: it was impossible for
us to re-kindle them into activity. Nor could Marshal Pélissier be
roused to action; his enthusiasm for the success of the struggle had now
grown cold, and his former energy had evaporated. His troops had taken
the Malakoff, the key of the fortress, and, proud of their victory over
the enemy, the French were content with the glory their army had
achieved. So, also, had the Emperor gained all he wanted to secure; and,
the war having established him firmly on the throne, he was anxious for
peace with Russia, and for some new and more profitable adventure.

And yet something had to be done to preserve the semblance of war. The
Turks, already at Eupatoria, were therefore reinforced, and some
successful reconnaissances were effected in that important quarter:
operations were, moreover, continued on the shores of the Sea of Azof,
with advantage to the Allies; and lastly, after threatening Odessa, a
descent was made upon Kinburn and its neighbourhood. These desultory
expeditions served to keep up the illusion that the fight was still
earnestly maintained. But they led to no permanent results, and they
need not be further described; because, under the circumstances and
conditions in which they were undertaken, they only exercised, and could
only exercise, a very minor influence on the war. Omar Pasha had at last
(end of September) been allowed to take a portion of his hitherto
inactive army—chained for no useful purpose in the Crimea—to attempt the
relief of Kars, a Turkish stronghold in Armenia, then besieged by the
Russians. He was only barely supported by the Allies, if indeed he was
not hampered by them, and he failed to accomplish his object. Kars fell
on the 28th of November, and the victory gained there by the enemy
compensated him not a little for the reverse he sustained at Sevastopol.
The French might view the incident with unconcern; but to England,
having vital interests in Asia, the loss of this place was of far
greater moment.[351]

-----

Footnote 351:

  While this important event was taking place, the bulk of the British
  army was engaged in improving the communications of the Chersonese—a
  work which cost us much labour and was of little use to us, though
  shortly afterwards, when the peace was signed, it was of great value
  to the Russians.

-----

Officers of the 1st Battalion were posted to companies as follows on
December 17, 1855:—

No. 1 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Hon. P. Feilding; Captain H. Jervoise;
    Lieutenant G. Rose.

No. 2 Company: Lieut.-Colonel C. Burdett; Captain Whitshed; Lieutenant
    Hall.

No. 3 Company: Major Thellusson; Captain Blackett; Lieutenant Adair.

No. 4 Company: Captain Reeve; Captain Heneage.

No. 5 Company: Captain Hon. H. Byng; Lieutenant A. Lambton.

No. 6 Company: Lieut.-Colonel F. Newdigate; Captain Lord E. Cecil;
    Lieutenant Lane.

No. 7 Company: Major Le Couteur; Lieutenant Hon. W. Edwardes.

No. 8 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Lord Dunkellin; Captain Hon. W. Feilding;
    Lieutenant Wigram.

Colonel Gordon Drummond still commanded the Battalion, while Major Lord
Bingham was appointed Adjutant about that time (21st December).

The Brigade remained on the upland of the Chersonese, with the bulk of
the British army, guarding the Karabelnaya, constructing roads,
drilling, practising musketry, and performing the ordinary duties of
camp life.[352] A tent had been converted into a Crimean Guards Club,
“where we used all to meet, read the newspapers, talk, and smoke,” and
there the first anniversary of the battle of the Alma was duly
celebrated by a dinner. There were races at Kamara on the 17th of
October, shooting expeditions, and other expedients to pass away the
time. Occasionally an interchange of shots took place across the
roadstead that divided the hostile armies; but they were rather signals
to show that the war had not yet officially come to an end than anything
else, and they never produced any important results.

-----

Footnote 352:

  The duties in the Karabelnaya district were composed of seven guards,
  amounting all told to 2 Captains, 4 Subalterns, 12 sergeants, 2
  drummers, 12 corporals, and 249 privates.

  At first the Brigade supplied 500 men daily for road-making; but later
  in the year these parties were frequently double that strength. It
  also furnished large fatigue-parties of several hundred men to bring
  up huts from Balaklava, wherein to lodge the troops.

  Musketry was carried out with considerable energy during the winter
  months, and special orders on the subject were issued by the Commander
  of the Forces.

-----

The monotony of these proceedings during an inactive campaign, and in
the presence of an unsubdued enemy, was one day electrified into new
life by a terrible explosion that occurred in the lines of our allies.
On the 15th of November, 100,000 lbs. of powder blew up in the French
artillery park, and kindled a fire that placed one of the principal
English magazines in imminent danger. Looking from the British camp, a
huge column of smoke was seen to ascend high in the air; it then spread
out like a tree,[353] broke, and sent down a shower of iron, stones,
rubbish, broken side arms, guns, gun carriages, and every conceivable
appurtenance of war; shells burst in all directions, and other
combustibles added their flames to the conflagration. Happily the fire
was got under without further mishap, but many Officers and men, mostly
French, were killed and wounded.[354]

-----

Footnote 353:

  Pliny describes the great eruption of Vesuvius which overwhelmed
  Pompeii, as having at first the appearance of a gigantic pine tree
  emerging from the volcano.

Footnote 354:

  Nolan, ii. 638. Assistant-Surgeons Wyatt and Trotter of the Coldstream
  gained the special thanks of the French authorities for the assistance
  they afforded to the wounded upon that occasion.

  It appears that our troops had cause to be somewhat accustomed to this
  class of misadventure. Under date Nov. 14th, Colonel Tower writes, “On
  guard in the Redan; as I was walking about inside the works, I met two
  of my men who were off duty, with pipes in their mouths, wandering
  about. I cautioned them, and told them there had been many accidents.
  A short time afterwards my sergeant came rushing up to me with all his
  eyebrows singed off, to tell me Goodram and Bates (the two men) were
  buried alive in a Russian magazine. I got Engineers, and we dug for a
  long time in smoking ruins; at last we came upon them, burnt to
  cinders, and hardly a bone in either of their bodies that was not
  broken.... They died soon after we got them out. Goodram was a most
  gallant fellow, and would have got the V.C. for going into the Redan
  with the assaulting party on the 8th of September. They had trodden on
  a fougasse left, probably on purpose, by the enemy when he evacuated.”

  Private Goodram, it appears, slipped out of camp at night, September
  7th-8th, crept close to the Redan in the dark, and joined the leading
  files of the storming party. He greatly distinguished himself during
  the assault, and is said to have been the first man to reach the
  parapet of the work.

-----

On the 11th of November, a few days before the accident just mentioned,
General Sir James Simpson having resigned, Lieut.-General Sir William
Codrington was appointed by Her Majesty the Queen to the chief command
of the British army in the Crimea. This Officer, a Coldstreamer, served
in the Regiment from 1823 until July, 1854, when, as junior Acting-Major
of the 1st Battalion, and present with it in Bulgaria, he was promoted
Major-General. Remaining at the seat of war, he very soon obtained the
command of a brigade in the Light Division, as has been previously
recorded. At the head of this gallant brigade he greatly distinguished
himself at the battle of the Alma by his cool and intrepid bearing; the
part he played at Inkerman has already been mentioned. He was with the
army from start to finish of the war against Russia, being present on
the upland before Sevastopol throughout the whole of the first severe
winter (except once for the space of a very few days, when on the sick
list), and engaged in all the fights (usually in executive command) that
took place round and in the Redan. Few Officers in the British army were
more exposed to the dangers and the privations of this war than Sir W.
Codrington, and he survived both without a scratch and without even a
temporary illness of a serious nature.

The second winter was now approaching, and hostilities, while they
showed no sign of coming to an end, still languished. But it was passed
under very different conditions to those which prevailed during the
terrible season that overtook us in 1854-55. The autumn was fine and
enjoyable, and the real cold weather was not felt until the end of
November. We were then quite prepared for it, so that the army did not
suffer. The health of the troops was excellent, and for some time prior
to the end of 1855 there was such an abundance of every kind of supply,
that scarcely any requirement remained for the Medical Officer in charge
to suggest.

  “During the six months which ensued from the commencement of January,
  1856, until the period of embarkation from the Crimea to England, the
  condition of the men, in every respect, both as regards amount of
  sickness and duties performed, was so much allied to a similar period
  passed in any garrison, that a detailed notice would be useless,
  except so far as it would display an almost unprecedented amount of
  good health, compared with a period passed at any of the out-quarters
  at which the Guards are stationed in England, and far better than
  obtains in the close and confined barracks of the Metropolis.”[355]

-----

Footnote 355:

  Wyatt, 91. Written in 1858, before the small barracks in Portman
  Street and St. George’s ceased each to contain the head-quarters and
  the main portion of a Guards Battalion.

-----

Both in respect to the comfort and the good administration which our men
now enjoyed, we contrasted very favourably with the French, who, though
they were better off than we had been in the winter 1854-55, did not
improve their services as we had done; they consequently fared worse
than the British army in the cold season of 1855-56, and suffered
considerably in the spring of 1856.

When Sevastopol was in the power of the Allies, they destroyed its
value, as much as they could, as a naval arsenal, and thus the docks,
all the forts in their possession, the barracks, and the aqueducts that
led into the town were demolished. These tasks were accomplished in the
mid-winter.

On the 1st of March the sixth and last draft reached the 1st Battalion,
consisting of 8 Officers and 263 men, whose average age and service
amounted to 23½ years and 18 months respectively. The men were stout and
robust, and, like the preceding draft, well adapted for all the possible
requirements of active service.[356]

-----

Footnote 356:

  _Ibid._ , p. 91.

Next day Officers were posted to companies as follows:—

No. 1 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Hon. P. Feilding; Captains Tower;
    Jervoise; Lieutenant Rose.

No. 2 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Burdett; Major Crawley; Captain Hall.

No. 3 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Newdigate; Captain Hon. H. Byng;
    Lieutenant A. Adair.

No. 4 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Reeve; Captain Lord E. Cecil; Lieutenant
    Sir W. Forbes, Bart.