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                             THE JOURNALS

                                  OF

                    MAJOR-GEN. C. G. GORDON, C.B.,

                             _AT KARTOUM_.

[Illustration: MAJOR-GEN. C. G. GORDON, C.B.]

                             THE JOURNALS
                                  OF
                    MAJOR-GEN. C. G. GORDON, C.B.,
                              AT KARTOUM.

                   _PRINTED FROM THE ORIGINAL MSS._

                        INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

                                  BY

                            A. EGMONT HAKE,
             AUTHOR OF “THE STORY OF CHINESE GORDON,” ETC.

   WITH PORTRAIT, TWO MAPS, AND THIRTY ILLUSTRATIONS AFTER SKETCHES
                          BY GENERAL GORDON.

[Illustration: LOGO]

                                LONDON:
           KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, & CO., 1 PATERNOSTER SQUARE.
                                 1885.

                                LONDON:

             PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED.
                  STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.

     _The rights of translation and of reproduction are reserved._

PREFACE.

THE work of editing these Journals is at an end; it only remains
now for me to thank one of my oldest and most valued friends, whose
assistance in every way I wish most thoroughly to acknowledge: this
is Mr. Godfrey Thrupp. When it became obvious that the public demand
for the work made its completion in so short a time impossible—as the
conscientious achievement of one man—he generously came forward. His
knowledge of the East and his deep interest in the subject made him an
invaluable colleague.

  A. EGMONT HAKE.

  _June 11, 1885._

                          TABLE OF CONTENTS.

                                PAGE

  Editor’s Preface                                                   v

  Introduction by the Editor                                        ix

  General Gordon’s Position at Kartoum. By Sir Henry W.Gordon,
        K.C.B.                                                      lv

  The Mission of Colonel Sir Charles Wilson, R.E. By Sir Henry
        W. Gordon, K.C.B.                                          lxi

  Description of the Journal. By Sir Henry W. Gordon, K.C.B.      lxiv

  Position of the Steamers, Dec. 14, 1884                         lxvi

  Journal, Book   I.—Sept. 10 to Sept. 23, 1884                     3

  Journal, Book  II.—Sept. 23 to Sept. 30, 1884                    83

  Journal, Book III.—Oct. 1 to Oct. 12, 1884                      121

  Journal, Book  IV.—Oct. 12 to Oct. 20, 1884                     183

  Journal, Book   V.—Oct. 20 to Nov. 5, 1884                      213

  Journal, Book  VI.—Nov. 5 to Dec. 14, 1884                      279

  APPENDICES:—

  BOOK I.

  APPENDIX

  A.  Letter from Abdel Kader Ibrahim to General Gordon, and
      General Gordon’s reply                                       399

  A². Letters from Abderrahman en Najoomi and Abdullah en Noor
      to General Gordon, and his reply                             404

  B.  Letter from George Calamatino to General Gordon, and his
      reply                                                        409

  D.  Letter from the Ulema of Kartoum to the Mahdi                410

  E.  Letter from Faki Mustapha to Cassim el Moos                  420

  E¹. Upon the Slave Convention                                    425

  F. Memorandum upon the defeat of Hicks’s army                    426

  G. Letter from General Gordon to Ibrahim Abdel Kader             428

  K. Letter from Abdel Kader to General Gordon                     430

  L. Letters from Abderrahhman en Najoomi and Abdullah en Noor to
     General Gordon                                                432

  M. Letter from General Gordon to Sheikh Abderrahhman en Najoomi,
     with his reply                                                438

  N. Letters from Colonel Stewart and M. Herbin to General Gordon  442

  BOOK IV.

  P. Letter from Abou Gugliz to General Gordon                     447

  Q. Letters from Fakirs, and from Faki Mustapha, to the
     Commandant of Omdurman Fort                                   447

  R. Two letters from Slatin Bey to General Gordon                 452

  S. Letter from Slatin Bey to the Austrian Consul                 455

  The Insurrection of the False Prophet, 1881-83                   456

  BOOK V.

  Q. Letters from Saleh Ibrahim of Galabat and Greek Consul at
     Adowa to General Gordon and Greek Consul at Kartoum           511

  R. Letter from Slatin Bey to General Gordon                      519

  T. Letter from the Mudir at Sennaar to General Gordon            520

  U. Letter from the Mahdi to General Gordon with two enclosures,
     with General Gordon’s answer; and letters from General Gordon
     to the Mudir of Dongola                                       522

  V. Manifesto of the Mahdi to the inhabitants of Kartoum          539

  X. Letter from Major Kitchener to General Gordon, enclosing one
     from Herr Roth, and a telegram                                546

  BOOK VI.

   Y. Towfik’s Firman, and notice by General Gordon                550

  AB. Letter from Khalifa Abdullah Mahomed to General Gordon       553

  CD. Petition of the Ulema at Kartoum to the Khedive              556

  EF. Organisation of the Soudan under Zubair                      557

INTRODUCTION.

  “Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears;
  I come to bury Cæsar, not to praise him.
  The evil that men do lives after them;
  The good is oft interred with their bones.

  Good friends, sweet friends, let me not stir you up
  To such a sudden flood of mutiny.
  They that have done this deed are honourable;
  What private griefs they had, alas! I know not,
  That made them do it; they are wise and honourable,
  And will no doubt, with reasons answer you.

                          But were I Brutus,
  And Brutus Antony, there were an Antony
  Would ruffle up your spirits, and put a tongue
  In every wound of Cæsar, that should move
  The stones of Rome to rise and mutiny.”

THESE grand lines force themselves upon me, though maybe their analogy
is incomplete. Mark Antony was a casuist, and pleaded the cause of
revenge; I am only earnest in the cause of justice. Yet I trust in
my pleading to enable Englishmen to realise how great and how sad
is the loss of Charles Gordon, not only to those who loved him, but
to the cause of suffering humanity. Gordon is dead. We cannot bring
him back to life. Yet from his death we may learn at least how fit
he was to teach us while he lived, how fit to hold his country’s
honour in his hand, how fit to judge of what was right and what was
wrong. His journals are his last words to the world as much as they
are instruction and information to his Government, and Englishmen who
value England’s honour may well read them with a heavy heart—with eyes
dimmed by tears. I say Gordon is dead, and we cannot bring him back
to life, but we can do much he would have done for us _had he been
allowed to live_. His journals tell us how we can best repair mischief
already done (and I understand his words to apply rather to the English
people than to the Government which represents them), and they tell us
what is best for the Soudan. In the interest of this unhappy land he
devoted much of his life; in its interest he died. Let us then compare
the opposite conditions under which the people existed during Gordon’s
presence and absence, and in doing this let us mark well what Gordon
said during his life, and what his journals say for him now that he is
dead.

Gordon used to tell the story of how, when Said Pasha, Viceroy
of Egypt before Ismail, went up to the Soudan, so discouraged and
horrified was he at the misery of the people, that at Berber he threw
his guns into the river, declaring he would be no party to such
oppression. In this spirit Gordon went there as Governor of the Equator
in 1874, and in this spirit he expressed his views on the duties of
foreigners in the service of Oriental States. His ardent and unstudied
words are worthy of the deepest study. They breathe the kindliest
wisdom, the most prudent philanthropy; and it would be well if those
whose lot is thrown in barbarous lands would take them for a constant
guide. To accept government, only if by so doing you benefit the race
you rule; to lead, not drive the people to a higher civilisation;
to establish only such reforms as represent the spontaneous desire
of the mass; to abandon relations with your native land; to resist
other governments, and keep intact the sovereignty of the State whose
bread you eat; to represent the native when advising Ameer, Sultan
or Khedive, on any question which your own or any foreign government
may wish solved; and in this to have for prop and guide that which is
universally right throughout the world, that which is best for the
people of the State you serve.

Such were Gordon’s sentiments when he first entered upon his task;
well would it have been for Egypt, England, and the world, had his
successors taken them to heart and made them their ideal. In such a
case the peace, the happiness he brought to the Soudan might still have
been preserved.

Never perhaps in the histories of barbarous rule were the ideals of
justice and truth more needed than at this date (1874). Seven-eighths
of the population were slaves; the country swarmed with slave-hunters
and slave-dealers; and district governors, greedy for pelf, aided and
abetted them in their raids. So crushed were the remaining population
that they regarded all comers as their foes; so destitute that they
were ready and willing to exchange their own kin for cattle or for
grain. Their flocks and herds, like their kindred, had been robbed.
To sow they were afraid, for governors and slave-hunters never let
them reap; and if perchance they cultivated ground, it was a mere
patch hidden in some distant nook out of the enemy’s way. The maxims
of their rulers, prior to Gordon’s advent, had been that if the
natives—poor unenlightened blacks—did not act in the most civilised
fashion, then must they be punished; and when these rulers for their
own acts were brought to book, they cited the native custom of “plunder
no offence” in their own excuse. How the governors, in league with
dealers and hunters, had acted up to these precepts, was apparent
enough in the desolation which reigned around, for amid the jungle of
stunted trees and tall grasses not a soul was to be seen—all driven
away by the slavers in past years. With the Egyptian Government such
was the estimate of this waste, that it did service as a colony for
misdemeanants among Arab troops; and hundreds of these died from the
damp and the dulness of the scene. In other parts less than 100 men
dared not move from one station to another, in fear of the retaliating
tribes, and so far were these stations apart that it took six weeks to
communicate one with the other. In addition to this certain chieftains
who inhabited the borders of the great lakes were engaged in wars in
which the capture of slaves was the main motive.

Such, in brief, was the state of affairs between Kartoum and the
Lakes when Gordon made his journey thither; yet it afforded in no way
the only instance of oppression, anarchy or misrule in these lands.
In Kordofan and Darfour the slave-traffic was even more formidable
than here. In the latter province a war between the slave-dealers and
the Sultan’s troops was just concluded, and the two vast lands, with
Darfertit, had been made into a Homkumdircat, or Governor-General’s
district responsible to Cairo, and separated from the Soudan. But
Gordon’s work was for the present confined to laying down a chain of
posts between Gondokoro and the Lakes, and by this and other means
contributing to the welfare of the tribes and the confusion of the
slavers. To gain the confidence of the natives was his first care; and
to this end he ventured alone and unarmed into those isolated spots,
whither not less than a hundred men had dared to go. Then he showed
the people how they might sow their grain without fear, supplying them
with enough to live on until their wants were met; he also taught them
the use of money, and gave them task-work. It was infinitely little, he
said, among such a mass, but it was at any rate something, and might
perhaps enable him to solve the question whether the negroes would work
sufficiently to keep themselves if life and property were secured.
To give them this protection, he seized all convoys of slaves, and
ivory and cattle coming from the south, punished the slave-dealers, or
converted them into troops, for they were hard, active fellows, the
remnant of an ancient race; and designing and despotic governors he
despatched to Cairo or Kartoum. The slaves themselves, until he could
deliver them over to their kinsfolk, he kept, the cattle and the ivory
he confiscated, and with the proceeds swelled the Government treasury.

It would seem the fate of those who devote their lives to the cause of
humanity to be foiled instead of aided in their aim. In all his efforts
for the good of these blacks Gordon met with every form of interference
whence he might at least expect support. Ismail Pasha Yacoub, the
Governor-General of the Soudan, jealous of the new Governor of the
Equator and fearful of exposure from so conscientious a servant of the
State, put every obstacle in Gordon’s way; and the Khedive himself was
not always mindful of the many difficulties to be encountered. But
Gordon said, to blame the Khedive for his actions you must blame his
people, and blame their Creator; they act after their kind, and in the
fashion they were made. So that he took little heed of all this. He was
content to let it be widely known that the motto of his province would
henceforth be Hurryat (liberty); and this meant that no man should
interfere with another, that there should be an end to kidnapping
and all plunder, an end to despotic Pashas; and those who objected
were told that the motto included _their_ liberty to quit. Moreover,
he was of opinion that those who annexed the province needed as much
civilisation as those they attempted to civilise; and, whenever it was
necessary, in the interests of his people, he never hesitated to show
them that this was his view.

Still, though he succeeded in giving peace and happiness to the
people, in reforming the cruelties of Mudirs and Pashas, in settling
the disputes of warring chiefs, and in laying down the chain of posts
between Gondokoro and the Lakes: in making all these beneficent
reforms, his heart was ever burdened with the thought of how this new
and unaccustomed good would affect the people and their lands when,
as time went on, himself and his influence were removed, and his
successors, who understood his high intent as little as they understood
the people themselves, ruled in his stead. “I think, what right have
I to coax the natives to be quiet for them to fall into the hands of
rapacious Pashas? I think sometimes that through my influence I am
seducing the natives into a position where they will be a prey to my
Arab successor. They would never do for an Arab what they do for me. I
make friends with the tribes right and left.”

But, apart from these feelings, he was not satisfied; his success
in his own province had been complete, but, instead of meeting with
co-operation from the adjoining Soudan, he had encountered nothing
but interference from its then Governor-General, Ismail Pasha Yacoub,
to whose interests it was to let slavery go on. For this reason,
therefore, Gordon, after three years’ labour, resigned his post as
Governor of the Equator. But the step was taken in a wavering spirit;
and these are among his last words ere he left: “By retiring I do not
aid anything; by staying I keep my province safe from injustice and
cruelty in some degree. Why should I fear? Is man stronger than God?
Things have come to such a pass in these Mussulman countries that a
crisis must come about soon.”

These significant words, so terribly confirmed less then ten years
later, were uttered in September of 1876.

Gordon’s resignation soon led to his reinstatement on terms more
fitted to his views. In the new position he felt strongly that, great
as was the trust and the almost superhuman work expected of him, if
he did not entirely succeed at least he would not be hampered. He was
not only appointed Governor-General of the Soudan in Ismail Pasha
Yacoub’s stead; he was given authority such as none had previously
enjoyed—complete power, civil and military, with the life or death of
his subjects in his hand; and no man dare enter his dominions without
special leave. He had stipulated that this supreme command should
be independent of Cairo, for he knew the Egyptian authorities to be
in favour of the slave-trade. The undefined territory now his had
hitherto been subject to several governments—Arab, Egyptian, Turkish.
Henceforth Soudan was to mean the vast territory limited on the north
by Upper Egypt, on the south by the Lakes, on the east by Abyssinia and
the Red Sea, and on the west extending beyond Kordofan and the newly
acquired sultanate of Darfour—the whole roughly estimated at more than
1600 miles in length, and 700 miles in width. There were to be three
Vakeels or Sub-Governors: one for the original Soudan, another for
Darfour, and a third for the Red Sea, or Eastern Soudan.

The suppression of slavery, in which he had been so far successful
in his own province, and the improvement of communications, which he
had long declared to be the one means by which that traffic could
be effectually checked, were the two objects to which Gordon was to
specially direct his aim.

Remembering his recent experiences, he was fully prepared for the
condition of his new subjects. In his predecessor, Ismail Pasha Yacoub,
he had already recognised the quintessence of Egyptian cupidity and
Turkish misrule—the main cause of the people’s ruin. The experiences
of the first months of his administration only served to confirm his
worst fears; whithersoever he looked he saw an enlarged picture of
native misery and destitution, of alien cruelty and oppression he had
before witnessed. He saw that the Circassian Pashas, the Bashi-Bazouks,
the Arab soldiery, the slave-hunters, were by their acts fast goading
the people to revolt; that tribes which without their interference
would have been at peace were now at war; that towns which under
proper rule would have flourished were starving or besieged; and that
the land, otherwise fertile, was a waste. On every hand he found
caravans of packed slaves hungering and parching in the sun, far from
their homes and far from their goal, unless that goal were death;
deserts strewn with innumerable bones; armed bands of slave-hunters,
dogged by the vulture-like dealers, waiting and watching for further
prey; and over all these reigned the miscreant spirit of Zubair, the
slave-king, now ostensibly a prisoner at Cairo for past deeds, but
actually aiding and abetting this cruel war against man through his
son Suleiman, the chief of his deserted band. To remove Zubair’s
influence was as impossible of achievement as to cut off the demand
for slaves at Cairo, Constantinople, or Stamboul; but to break up
Suleiman and his band lay within Gordon’s grasp, and, as one of the
main causes of trouble, he made it his foremost aim. How he did this
by the simple power of his presence, and how Suleiman and his six
thousand, after signal submission, again broke out into open revolt so
soon as Gordon’s presence was required elsewhere, affords one of the
most striking examples of the personal influence he had acquired. Alone
and himself unarmed he had temporarily succeeded in disarming these
rebels; but, this failing in permanent use, he effectually quelled them
in battle; then, to show his people, his Government, and the world
how great a wrong this slavery was, he ordered the summary execution
of the ringleaders. “With the death of Zubair’s son,” he said, “there
is an end of the slave-trade.” Never had the Government such a chance
of preventing its renewal. He had disbanded the Bashi-Bazouks, he
had dismissed the peculating Mudirs and Pashas; and when he left the
country, after a three years’ reign, the people blessed him, and begged
him to return.

Had he been allowed to act according to the letter and the spirit of
the Firman he received, it is most probable that he would never this
second time have resigned; but the overthrow of Ismail at Cairo and
the dissolution of the Dual Control had with other changes brought
new law-makers for the Soudan. Ismail, though in many respects an
imprudent ruler, had at least the merit of believing in his English
Governor-General, and of supporting him whenever it lay in his power.
Gordon’s lonely ride into the slavers’ camp at Shaka had fired the
ex-Khedive’s imagination, and it was observed that, whenever the Court
Pashas attempted to criticise Gordon’s methods of rule, the Khedive
referred them to this deed. Moreover, he openly acknowledged him as
his superior, and fought his battles as those of one who was above the
murmur of men. Gordon has, indeed, himself recorded how the Khedive
sent him a congratulatory letter on the suppression of Suleiman,
adding that during the time of his rule the ex-Khedive supported him
through thick and thin against his own Pashas and his own people;
and certain it is that to the files of petitions sent to him against
Gordon he would never listen. But when Towfik was set up it was a
different affair. Never was he heard to mention Zubair’s name. As
for the slave-trade, it was equally ignored. Nay, worse than this,
the Cairo Pashas, powerless in Ismail’s time, had now full sway, and
it being in their interests that the slave-trade should revive, the
choice of Gordon’s successor was settled among themselves. It fell
to Réouf Pasha, a man whom Sir Samuel Baker had already exposed as a
murderer, and whom Gordon had in 1877 turned out of Harrat for acts of
oppression. The appointment, therefore, meant nothing more nor less
than a declaration in favour of the slavers; and it was because Gordon
feared this result that he had said six months before, viz., in April
1879, that “If the liberation of slaves takes place in 1884, and _if
the present system of government goes on, there cannot fail to be a
revolt of the whole country_.” And again he says in 1878, “There is no
doubt that if the Government of France and England pay more attention
to the Soudan and see that justice is done, the disruption of the
Soudan from Cairo is only a matter of time. This disruption, moreover,
will not end the troubles for the Soudanese, though their allies in
Lower Egypt will carry on their efforts in Cairo itself.”[1]

How prophetic these words have since proved to be it is needless to
say. In April 1880, just a year later, Gordon wrote, as he left for
India:—

 I have learned with equal pain and indignation that the Khedive
 and his subordinate officers have permitted the resuscitation of
 the slave-trade in Darfour and the other provinces of central and
 equatorial Africa, and that fresh parties of slave-hunters are forming
 at Obeyed in Kordofan, and that every order which I gave concerning
 the suppression of this abomination has been cancelled.

 The two missionaries—Wilson and Felkin—who have lately come down
 from Uganda, passed through these districts, and they tell me that the
 slave-hunters are all ready to start once more upon their detestable
 trade, and that there is a very strong feeling abroad that all the
 Europeans, including of course Gessi and the other officers who acted
 under me, are about to be turned out of the country. This report, even
 if it be untrue, will largely serve to lower the authority of the
 European officers, and to render their work more difficult.

 This news is very disheartening, especially when one realises the
 immense misery which will ensue to the remains of these poor tribes of
 helpless negroes.

The events which followed on these first examples of a wholesale
perversion of Gordon’s methods have proved over and over again the
value of his warning words; it is worthy of special remark that among
the causes of the great rebellion which ensued, as interpreted by
the English Government in their history and the insurrection of the
False Prophet,[2] not the religious fanaticism of the native tribes
has a foremost place, but the venality and oppression of by Egyptian
officials, the unjust manner of collecting the taxes, and, _above all,
the suppression of the slave-trade, which Gordon had repeatedly said
must lead to future troubles, unless accompanied by a proper system of
government_.

Thus the condition into which the Soudan drifted during Gordon’s
absence was due to deliberate neglect of the precautions he had urged.
Had the Egyptian Government watched and warded off the regeneration of
the slavers after Gordon dealt his final blow in Suleiman’s death; had
they set their face against the oppression and cupidity of their own
officials, the Soudan might still have been at peace, as Gordon left
it in 1879. But the new rulers were in favour of slavery, in favour
of oppression, in favour of _backsheesh_; and “a revolt of the whole
country” was their reward.

It is needless to do more than briefly recall the events preceding
those related by Gordon himself in these Journals. Every one remembers
his going, and the triumph of his journey and reception in the Soudan;
the wide welcome which his first Proclamation received, and the
fortunes of the peace policy he at first endeavoured to pursue. Every
one remembers how, before he had been in Kartoum a week, he issued
a further Proclamation, warning the rebellious against forcing him
to severe measures. The Sheikhs and people were anxious to be loyal;
without Government protection they would be forced, in self-defence,
to join the Mahdi. This Colonel Stewart had discovered in his journey
up the White Nile. For this reason Zubair was asked for, the only man
of enough prestige to hold the country together. A Pasha among the
Shaggyeh irregulars, a tribe wavering between loyalty and revolt, and
blockaded at Halfyeh, outside the city,—to him were open sources of
information closed to the English Governor-General. Zubair would prove
stronger than the Mahdi, and the Mahdi must be “smashed up;” otherwise,
not only would peace and the evacuation of Kartoum be impossible,
but Egypt itself would be in danger. This state of affairs and the
measures necessary for a new departure being alike unacceptable to Her
Majesty’s Government, Gordon thereupon used, as he had every right to
do, the resources to his hand. His predictions as to what would result
if Zubair were not sent up were soon realised. The rebels gradually
gathered round the city, besieged its outlying suburbs, and cut the
communications. His suffering subjects, unable to hold out, were
either killed or, escaping, went over to the enemy. In some cases he
managed to drive the rebels from the trenches of Kartoum, and even to
relieve the beleagured villages, and return loaded with ammunition and
stores; in others, his army of defence, composed largely of Egyptians
and Bashi-Bazouks, encountered miserable defeat. These expeditions
were made in small steamers, armoured with boiler plates and carrying
mountain guns, with wooden mantlets of his own contriving. On one
occasion the rebels so harassed the city that Gordon resolved on a
sortie; but no sooner had the rebels retired to a place of safety
than five of his own commanders charged back on their men and aided
the rebels, who suddenly leaped from their hiding-place, driving the
affrighted army back to Kartoum. In this treacherous and cowardly
affair the loss on both sides was great; but the disgrace was the
besiegers’, and of it they showed their sense by crying out for justice
on the traitors. Two of them were tried and found guilty, and were
shot by the men they had outraged. Henceforth the city was exposed to
the attacks of the Mahdi’s troops; the streets, the Mission House, the
Palace were hourly shelled; citizens died as they passed from end to
end; but the Governor-General, always exposed as in old days, though
daily inspecting the lines or pacing the Palace roof, escaped unhurt.

Meantime the strength of the rebellion grew with every day; the Mahdi,
still at El Obeyed, had despatched his emissaries in all directions;
around Suakin, Berber, Shendy, Kassala, the rebels rapidly recruited
their ranks. The would-be loyal fell from sheer collapse; they were
unable to help themselves. All chance of relief was gone, and the rebel
leaders re-echoed in jeering tones the Governor-General’s reiterated
words, “The English are coming.” Then Berber, the main link between
Kartoum and Cairo, cried out for help, but like those at Tokar and
those at Sinkat, it cried out in vain. To do as he pleased was the
answer sent to its hitherto loyal Governor; and, to save his people
and himself, he joined the Mahdi’s hordes. In his triumph, the False
Prophet despatched two dervishes to Kartoum, to ask if Gordon would
himself become a follower of the Imam, the Expected One; but they were
told that no terms could be made while Kartoum held its ground.

All hope of a peace, all hope of aid from his own Government or
country, being at an end, Gordon forthwith began to provision the
town, and to take such steps as would ensure a safe means of defence
and attack. Money was scarce, so a paper currency was established,
and three of the wealthier citizens were called upon to advance sums
on the Governor-General’s security. Their arrears were paid, the poor
were succoured, and rations issued. All possible precautions were taken
for the safety of the people. Mines were contrived, torpedoes laid,
and broken glass and wire entanglements arranged, and watchers posted
everywhere. The blacks quartered in the poorer district of the town
were made to serve, and all men ordered to bear arms; the staple food
of officers was biscuit, and dhoora was given the men. Having made all
his arrangements on land, he now turned his attention to the Nile; and,
as in the campaign against the Taipings, so in this desperate struggle
with the Arabs, he organized out of the wretched materials at hand a
fleet such as the rebels could not withstand. Thus he avenged defeat,
drew in stores and guns, and held the enemy at bay. So that for eleven
long months, spite of mutiny, cowardice and treachery within, and the
constant attacks from the enemy without, he held his own; and to spare,
out of the little navy he had built, a steamer for the conveyance of
his comrades, Stewart, Power, Herbin, and the Greeks. Moreover, when at
last the news of the English Expedition arrived, he was further able
to send down three other boats to Metemma for their use. It is at this
point, when vainly watching day and night for English help, that the
Journals begin. How his time was passed till we should come, how he
viewed our chances of success, and how he proposed to act if we at last
did arrive—this is a story which the Journals tell themselves.

I have endeavoured to show the conditions under which the people of
the Soudan existed during Gordon’s absence and during his presence.
The contrast is sufficient to enable the world to believe that if
any man were capable of restoring order to the country, that man was
Gordon. But when he left England for the Soudan as the Envoy of Her
Majesty’s Government, he had no authority to _act_, for his mission was
only to advise. He was to report to Her Majesty’s Government on the
military situation in the Soudan, and on the measures which it might
be deemed advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garrisons
still holding positions in that country, and for the safety of the
European population in Kartoum; and, further, upon the manner in which
the safety and good administration of the Egyptian Government of the
ports on the sea coast could best be secured. So far then all _action_
lay in the hands of the Government to which Gordon was to make his
report: the administrators were to be Her Majesty’s Ministers and their
representative at Cairo, while Gordon was to be their informant, and
perhaps subsequently their agent, to carry out such measures as they
might think fit to adopt. With this arrangement in view, all who knew
Gordon’s character and antecedents felt that the only chance for the
Soudan lay in Her Majesty’s Government first accepting such suggestions
as he might append to his report, and, second, in their giving him
_carte blanche_ to carry out those suggestions in his own way. Little
heed was paid to the clause which said, “You will consider yourself
authorised and instructed to perform such other duties as the Egyptian
Government may desire to entrust to you,” for its possible value seemed
upset by the concluding sentence, “and as may be communicated to you by
Sir E. Baring.” Yet this clause, strangely enough, enabled Gordon to
hold a position over which even Her Majesty’s Government could have no
control, unless they openly declared the annexation of Egypt and the
Soudan. The Egyptian Government, that is the Khedive and his ministers,
elected again to appoint Gordon Governor-General of the Soudan; Gordon
elected to accept that appointment; and Her Majesty’s Government
elected to sanction the acceptance, in an official communication
forwarded to him through their representative, Sir E. Baring. From this
moment Gordon’s position was entirely altered. Her Majesty’s Government
and the Egyptian Government agreed that his mission was no longer to
be one of mere reporting. He was to “_evacuate the Soudan, and the
Egyptian Government had the fullest confidence in his judgment and
knowledge of the country, and of his comprehension of the general line
of policy to be pursued; and no effort was to be wanting on the part of
the Cairo authorities, whether English or Egyptian, to afford him all
the co-operation and support in their power_.”

When it became an established fact that General Gordon,
Governor-General of the Soudan, had been sent up to evacuate the
garrisons of the country, it also became an established fact that the
method of conducting that evacuation had passed out of the hands of
Her Majesty’s Government; and one may also say it had virtually passed
out of the hands of the Egyptian Government while Gordon held the
Firman of the Khedive. Therefore, as this Firman was never cancelled
from the day of Gordon’s departure from Cairo to the day of his death
at Kartoum, and as it said, amongst other things, “We do hereby
appoint you Governor-General of the Soudan, and we trust that you
will carry out our good intentions for the establishment of justice
and order, and that you will assure the peace and prosperity of the
people of Soudan by maintaining the security of the roads open, &c.,”
it is as unfair as it is illogical to talk about “_General Gordon
having exceeded the instructions conveyed to him by Her Majesty’s
Government_.” These instructions were neither more nor less than those
conveyed to him by the Khedive of Egypt, who actually delegated his
own power to his Governor-General. To exceed his instructions was an
impossibility; to fulfil or to disappoint all the hopes expressed in
them was a possibility dependent solely on the good or bad faith of the
Governments who employed him.

The fact that Gordon held his commission in Her Majesty’s service
and the Governor-Generalship of the Soudan at the same time, in no
way compromised him with Her Majesty’s Government in regard to their
wishes as to how this or that should be done, or as to how this or that
should be left undone: yet he tried earnestly to identify himself with
their wishes as far as in doing so he could keep faith with the people
he was endeavouring to assist, and with whom he began to compromise
himself. That he was justified in so doing there should be no shadow
of doubt even in the minds of Mr. Gladstone’s ministry. The wishes of
the Khedive were accepted by Gordon as the wishes of Her Majesty’s
Government, and he had begun to act, _i.e._ to compromise himself with
the Soudanese and the beleaguered garrisons before he reached Kartoum.

These are the Khedive’s wishes as expressed in a letter to Gordon,
dated January 26th, 1884:—

 EXCELLENCY,

 You are aware that the object of your arrival here and of your mission
 to the Soudan is to carry into execution the evacuation of those
 territories, and to withdraw our troops, civil officials, and such
 of the inhabitants, together with their belongings, as may wish to
 leave for Egypt. We trust that your Excellency will adopt the most
 effective measures for the accomplishment of your mission in this
 respect, and that, after completing the evacuation, you will take
 the necessary steps for establishing an organised Government in the
 different provinces of the Soudan, for the maintenance of order, and
 the cessation of all disasters and incitement to revolt.

 We have full confidence in your tried abilities and tact, and are
 convinced that you will accomplish your mission according to our
 desire.

The Khedive could hardly have written this letter had he imagined
Lord Granville would telegraph three months later to Gordon, saying
that “undertaking military expeditions was beyond the scope of the
commission he held, and at variance with the pacific policy which was
the purpose of his mission to the Soudan.”

Effective measures for the accomplishment of General Gordon’s mission
included the possibility and great probability of serious fighting in
the interest of a pacific policy, and it is strange if Lord Granville
were unable to grasp that fact when he endorsed the Khedive’s Firman.

So far I have advanced only a few of the innumerable proofs of Gordon’s
authority to act as he thought fit; as to his capabilities and his
judgment it is unnecessary to speak. Of those who subsequently would
not accept his judgment, one, Mr. Gladstone, said, “It was our duty,
whatever we might feel, to beware of interfering with Gordon’s plans,
and before we adopted any scheme that should bear that aspect (_i.e._
the aspect of interference), to ask whether _in his judgment_ there
would or would not be such an interference.” The other, Sir Charles
Dilke, said, “He is better able to _form a judgment_ than anybody.
He will have, I make no doubt, every support he can need in the
prosecution of his mission.”

Personally I do not believe that a single Cabinet Minister doubted
Gordon’s authority to act as he thought fit, nor do I believe a single
Cabinet Minister doubted either his capabilities or his judgment. It
was only when the Government realised how strong that authority was;
how significantly Gordon proposed to wield it, and how he meant to call
upon his country to support him in what was right, irrespective of
party feeling and of prejudiced public opinion, that references were
made to “_General Gordon’s peculiar views_” and to “_his disobedience
of orders_.” I would let the latter remark pass as unworthy of further
comment, were it not for the fact that it has become a common phrase
among the working classes in the North of England, when they are either
speaking of or are spoken to about General Gordon. Now I sincerely
trust and believe that the Journals will be read eagerly by the working
classes; they cannot occupy their leisure time better than in reading
them, and, indeed, in learning much of them by heart. I would say then,
to these people, _Do not believe that General Gordon was disobedient to
his Government._ His Government permitted him to accept the Khedive’s
Firman, appointing him Governor-General of the Soudan, with full
powers, civil and military, and the Khedive desired him to “evacuate
the garrisons of the country, and to restore order;” and the way in
which this was to be done was left to the discretion of the man who
had to do it. I would also ask these people to note particularly that
the Khedive did not tell him to evacuate the garrisons of Kartoum and
leave the other garrisons in the lurch; did not tell him to sacrifice
everything rather than engage in military operations against the Mahdi;
did not tell him to identify his interests with those of the people and
then to get away as best he could, and to leave the people to their
fate. Had the Khedive told him to do this, he would never have accepted
the Governor-Generalship of the Soudan; and, when his own Government
suggested this method as a way out of difficulties, the substance of
his numerous replies was, “Our relative positions do not justify you in
giving me such orders. I can only accept them as your wishes; and the
duty I owe to myself, as a God-fearing and an honourable man, prevents
me being able to comply with them.”

When Gordon telegraphed to Sir E. Baring, “You must see that you
could not recall me nor could I possibly obey until the Cairo employés
get out from all the places. I have named men to different places,
thus involving them with the Mahdi; how could I look the world in the
face if I abandoned them and fled? As a gentleman could you advise
this course?” he really telegraphed a bitter rebuke to the English
Government; and when he added, “It may have been a mistake to send
me up, but, having been done, I have no option but to see evacuation
through,” he merely pointed out, what the Government already knew,
namely, that the position they had allowed him to accept was one over
which they had no legal control, unless they announced the annexation
of Egypt. I, therefore, again most emphatically repeat, that Gordon
in no instance disobeyed his Government, though he frequently had
to tell them how utterly unable he was to execute their wishes. The
Governor-General of the Soudan had definite orders from the Khedive,
whose servant he was, and these orders could not be capsized by the
English Government, unless the Khedive were deposed or Egypt were
annexed.

I cannot conclude this portion of my subject in a better way than by
quoting what the Khedive said to Baron Malortie, after he had appointed
Gordon Governor-General of the Soudan. Speaking of his mission, he
remarked:—

 I could not give a better proof of my intention than by accepting
 Gordon as Governor-General with full powers to take whatever steps he
 may judge best for obtaining the end my Government and Her Majesty’s
 Government have in view. I could not do more than delegate to Gordon
 my own power and make him irresponsible arbiter of the situation.
 Whatever he does will be well done, whatever arrangements he will make
 are accepted in advance, whatever combination he may decide upon will
 be binding for us; and in thus placing unlimited trust in the Pasha’s
 judgment I have only made one condition: _that he should provide for
 the safely of the Europeans and the Egyptian civilian element_. He is
 now the supreme master, and my best wishes accompany him on a mission
 of such gravity and importance, for _my heart aches at the thought
 of the thousands of loyal adherents whom a false step may doom to
 destruction_. I have no doubt that Gordon Pasha will do his best to
 sacrifice as few as possible; and, should he succeed, with God’s help,
 in accomplishing the evacuation of Kartoum and the chief ports in
 the Eastern Soudan, he will be entitled to the everlasting gratitude
 of my people, who at present tremble that help may come too late.
 To tell you that he will succeed is more than I or any mortal could
 prognosticate, for there are tremendous odds against him. But let us
 hope for the best, and, as far as I and my Government are concerned,
 he shall find the most loyal and energetic support.[3]

The points I have already dwelt upon are all-important for the correct
interpretation of what Gordon says in his Journals. There are now two
other questions, with which I must deal. The first of these is “To
what extent were H.M. Government morally bound to support Gordon?” The
answer is to be found in the conditions laid down in the Khedive’s
Firman, which H.M. Government endorsed. Mr. Gladstone admitted as
much in the House of Commons on Feb. 14th, when he said: “The direct
actions and direct functions in which General Gordon is immediately
connected with this Government are, I think, pretty much absorbed in
the greater duties of the large mission he has undertaken under the
immediate authority of the Egyptian Government, _with the full moral
and political responsibility of the British Government_.” Therefore we
owed the same kind of responsibility to Gordon as it owed to Egypt,
moral and political. Gordon shows in his Journals what brought about
our responsibility to Egypt. First, we were morally to blame for
General Hicks’s defeat, for had we prevented the Fellaheen conscripts
being dragged in chains from their homes, and sent up to recruit
Hicks’s army, Hicks would not have left Kartoum, and his troops would
not have been annihilated. Through this disaster we became morally
responsible for the extended influence of the Mahdi, who, previous to
crushing a huge army, had merely defeated small detachments of troops
far inferior to his own. It was the crushing of Hicks’s force which led
the Mahdi to put forth his agents in all parts of the Soudan, and thus
to convert a trumpery local rising into a wide-spreading rebellion. So
much for our responsibility from a moral point of view. Our political
responsibility began with the order to abandon the Soudan (which was
unnecessary interference on our part, inasmuch as the Soudan was
practically lost), and was followed up by our objection to the despatch
of Egyptian or Turkish troops, our sending Gordon, and our operations
for the relief of Tokar and Sinkat. Right through we forced the hand of
the Khedive. Why did we not go one step further and force him to cancel
the Firman by which he appointed Gordon Governor-General of the Soudan?
Had we done this, Gordon would have reverted to his original position
as reporter to Her Majesty’s Government, or he could have endeavoured
to leave Kartoum at once, as his responsibilities towards the people of
the Soudan would have ceased. Until we did this we were as responsible
to him, morally and politically, as we were to the Egyptian Government.
A little decision here might have spared to us Gordon, Colonel Stewart,
and Mr. Power; might have prevented the loss of thousands of other
lives; might have saved us millions of money.

I am only endeavouring to place Gordon’s situation and action in a
fair light, and I cannot do this without pointing out how greatly
England has been to blame in not accepting a responsibility for
which she made herself liable. This brings me directly to the second
question, which deals with the reason why Gordon, with the promised
support of Egypt and England, failed not only to restore order to the
Soudan, but even to extricate the beleaguered garrisons. Volumes have
been already written on this subject, and there are probably volumes
yet to come, particularly those representing that Journal by Gordon
and Colonel Stewart, which was captured by a treacherous enemy, and
is now supposed to be in the hands of Mahomet Achmet, the Mahdi. I
will content myself then with an endeavour to supply what I feel is
the substance of the answer to be found, in this missing Journal, to
the question I have raised. _Gordon was constantly thwarted and never
supported_ is the summary of a whole which I will give in detail as
briefly as I can.

(1) Gordon wished to visit the Mahdi if he thought fit, but Sir E.
Baring gave him a positive order from Her Majesty’s Government that he
was on no account to do so. Of course, as I have already shown, Gordon,
in his position as Governor-General, need not have accepted this as an
order, but he was, as he always has been, most anxious to conform to
the wishes or desires expressed by Her Majesty’s Government, when those
wishes affected only a point of judgment, and not a point of duty or a
point of honour.

(2) Gordon proposed to go direct from Kartoum to the Bahr Gazelle and
Equatorial Provinces, but Her Majesty’s Government refused to sanction
his proceeding beyond Kartoum.

(3) Gordon desired 3000 Turkish troops, in British pay, to be sent to
Suakin, but Her Majesty’s Government, advised by Sir E. Baring, who
disapproved of the measure, declined to send these troops.

(4) Gordon, being convinced that some government was essential for
the safety of the Soudan, suggested the appointment of Zubair as his
successor, and gave the most cogent reasons why it was absolutely
necessary for the accomplishment of his mission that the appointment
should be made. He reiterated his request over and over again from
February to December. Her Majesty’s Government would not permit the
Khedive to make this appointment.

(5) Gordon requested that in the interests of England, Egypt, and the
Soudan, he should be provided with a Firman which recognised a moral
control and suzerainty over the Soudan. This was peremptorily refused.

(6) Gordon asked for Indian Moslem troops to be sent to Wady Halfa.
They were refused him.

(7) In March Gordon desired 100 British troops to be sent to Assouan
or to Wady Halfa. In making known this desire to Her Majesty’s
Government, Sir E. Baring said he would not risk sending so small a
body, and the principal medical officer said the climate would exercise
an injurious effect on the troops. These troops were not sent.

(8) Gordon, for the sake of everything and everybody concerned, showed
that the Mahdi’s power must be smashed. Her Majesty’s Government
declined to assist in, or even to countenance, the process.

(9) Gordon, in a series of eleven telegrams, explained his
difficulties, and said that if Her Majesty’s Government would not send
British troops to Wady Halfa, an adjutant to inspect Dongola, and
then open up the Berber-Suakin route by Indian Moslem troops, they
would probably have to decide between Zubair or the Mahdi, and he
concluded these telegrams by saying he would do his best to carry out
his instructions, _but felt convinced he would be caught in Kartoum_.
Sir Evelyn Baring, in his reply to these telegrams, recommended Gordon
_to reconsider the whole question carefully, and then to state in one
telegram what he recommended_!

(10) Gordon telegraphed: “_The combination of Zubair and myself is an
absolute necessity for success. To do any good we must be together, and
that without delay;_” and he supplemented this by another telegram,
saying: “_Believe me, I am right; and do not delay._” The combination
was not permitted.

(11) Sir Evelyn Baring telegraphed to Lord Granville that General
Gordon _had on several occasions_ pressed for 200 British troops to be
sent to Wady Halfa, but that he (Baring) did not think it desirable to
comply with the request.

(12) Gordon desired a British diversion at Berber, but Sir Evelyn
Baring replied that there was no intention to send an English force to
Berber.

(13) Gordon, foiled on every point, telegraphed a graceful adieu to
Her Majesty’s Government. Then came the fall of Berber, upon which
Sir Evelyn Baring at once telegraphed to Lord Granville that it _had
now become of the utmost importance not only to open the road between
Suakin and Berber, but “to come to terms with the tribes between
Berber and Kartoum_”; and Lord Granville telegraphed to Sir E. Baring
that “_General Gordon had several times suggested a movement on Wady
Halfa, which might support him by threatening an advance on Dongola,
and, under the present circumstances at Berber, this might be found
advantageous._”!!

After this, may we not well echo Gordon’s sentiments, “What a farce
if it did not deal with men’s lives”? If Gordon, instead of being
_thwarted_, had only been _not supported_, how different might have
been the result of his mission to the Soudan! Indeed, one may say how
different _would_ have been the result! for Gordon has practically
said this, and he was a competent and a reliable judge. If England and
Egypt had only said, “We will give you no help at all; do what you can
with the material you have about you, and do not refer to us until
you have succeeded, or until you have failed,” I confidently believe
Gordon would have at least relieved the beleaguered garrisons of the
Soudan, and would have sent down all who wished to leave the country.
His weakness was that of trustfulness—the besetting weakness of an
honourable man: it had stood him in good stead through his campaigns
in China, and through his previous operations in the Soudan; through
terrible sufferings which had often made him wish for death. Then he
trusted enemies, and they always enabled him to save life. Now he
trusted friends, and they only enabled him to die.

  “The evil that men do lives after them,
   The good is oft interred with their bones.”

Gordon tells us plainly in his Journals how great is the evil done by
the policy of Her Majesty’s Government, and for how long that evil will
live when the Government is dead. Is it not possible to avert something
of what is about to happen? Her Majesty’s Government are, I believe,
beginning to realise how thoroughly correct Gordon was in his views,
and how mistaken they were in not following his advice at the time he
gave it. At all events after he was dead they expressed their intention
of doing much he recommended while he lived. They have been always very
late: too late to save Gordon’s life, and too late to save the lives of
many thousands. May they not be yet in time to prevent some of the evil
that must live after them? I think Gordon tells them in his Journals
they may, and I think he also tells them how. It is impossible to read
carefully what he says without feeling that he did not expect to live
long, and that he had a distinct presentiment he would die at Kartoum.
At all events there is a strong undercurrent of this presentiment all
through, and it even rises to the surface every now and then when
he appears to be taking a hopeful and almost a cheerful view of the
situation. At times it carries all before it, as for example when he
emphasises the possibility of the fall of Kartoum under the nose of the
expedition, and again in the words with which he concludes his sixth
and last volume; but then, on the other hand, it is often quite out
of sight, especially at such times as he is discussing his position
as Governor-General, and turning over in his mind the expediency of
appointing Lord Wolseley or Sir Evelyn Baring as his successor. But,
whether on the surface or deep down, I think it is always there, and
I feel sure that some of his numerous efforts at a solution of the
Soudan problem were intended as final instructions for Her Majesty’s
Government, to be read after his death or after the fall of Kartoum.
The days of prophecy are gone, and I do not at all wish to place Gordon
in the light of the ancient orthodox and professional seer, but in
considering his career one cannot avoid being struck by the remarkable
way in which the lost gift of prophecy has been replaced by the power
of combining knowledge with judgment. It would be well if Her Majesty’s
Government would bear this in mind, and lay down a distinct line of
policy and action with regard to the Soudan, which should be based
upon what Gordon recommends. The recall of the troops from the Soudan
may have been necessary to meet the exigencies of the moment, or it
may not; but it is a pity it did not precede Lord Wolseley’s letter to
Cassim el Mousse Pasha:—

 We mean to destroy the power of Mohammed Achmet at Kartoum, no matter
 how long it may take us to do so; you know Gordon Pasha’s countrymen
 _are not likely to turn back from any enterprise they have begun until
 it has been fully accomplished_. When that happy event takes place I
 hope to be able to establish you amongst your own people, and that you
 and all others will realise that the _English nation does not forget
 those who serve it faithfully_.[4]

General Gordon’s Journals are sufficiently characteristic to enable
those who read them with care to know their author perfectly. The
first volume is alone a very complete introduction, in which each
succeeding page brings you to a closer intimacy. If a friendship is
not established before reaching the sixth, then all that is noble and
chivalrous in man can have no charm. Examples of his rare genius,
his nobility, his honesty and his marvellous energy are to be found
throughout, but, in pointing out a few characteristics, I will confine
myself to the first volume, as I propose to refer chiefly to special
points of military and political interest in the others.

In this first volume then we have an interesting instance of Gordon’s
nobility, when he declines to have anything to do with certain doubtful
proposals made by the apostate Europeans in the Mahdi’s camp, for he
declares “treachery never succeeds; and it is better to fail with clean
hands than to be mixed up with dubious acts and dubious men. Maybe it
is better to fall with honour than to gain the victory with dishonour,
and in this view the Ulemas are agreed, for they will have nought to do
with the proposals of treachery.”

The generosity of his feeling towards the enemy is shown when he says:
“I do not call our enemy rebels, for it is a vexed question whether we
are not rebels, seeing I hold the Firman restoring the Soudan to its
chiefs.” His consideration is apparent in his regret at not being more
considerate; and his tolerance in the desire to spare even the lives of
traitors.

His views on hypocrisy are humorously expressed when he is speaking
of the Mahdi’s trick of bringing tears to his eyes by the use of
pepper under his finger-nails, and, as tears are considered a proof of
sincerity, he recommends the recipe to Cabinet Ministers who wish to
justify some job.

His severity is evident in his remarks on diplomatists, whom he
considers most unsatisfactory men to have anything to do with in
their official capacity; and his irritability peeps out when he says:
“Egerton must have considered I was a complete idiot to have needed
permission to contract with tribes to escort down the refugees. I hope
he will get promoted, and will not be blamed for overstraining his
instructions.”

His religious earnestness is everywhere apparent, and he delights in
endeavours to interpret Scriptural passages, especially such as are
more or less paradoxical.

As example of his humility I select the passage where he says: “If we
will be with our Master we must be like Him, who from His birth to
His death may be said to have been utterly miserable as far as things
in this world are concerned. Yet I kick at the least obstacle to my
will.” His desire to help every one is to be seen on almost every page,
and his forethought, energy and judgment are also everywhere. His
notions of chivalry do not permit him to countenance the distribution
of honours to men who only do what he considers to be their duty, and
he does not approve of the Victoria Cross being given in cases of
_noblesse oblige_.

His determination often prompts him to speak very plainly: “If you
remove me from being Governor-General, then all responsibility is off
me; but if you keep me as Governor-General then I will, _at the cost
of my commission_ in Her Majesty’s service, see all refugees out of
this country.” His satire is generally severe, but there is nearly
always a cheerful or a good-natured ring in it. The following is a fair
example:—

 I am sure I should like that fellow Egerton; there is a big-hearted
 jocularity about his communications, and I should think the cares of
 life sat easily on him. He wishes to know exactly, “day, hour, and
 minute,” that I expect to be in difficulties as to provisions and
 ammunition.

 Now I really think if Egerton was to turn over the “archives”
 (a delicious word) of his office, he would see we had been in
 difficulties for provisions for some months. It is as a man on the
 bank, having seen his friend in river already bobbed down two or three
 times, hails, “I say, old fellow, let us know when we are to throw
 you the life-buoy; I know you have bobbed down two or three times,
 but it is a pity to throw you the life-buoy until you really are _in
 extremis_, and I want to know _exactly_, for I am a man brought up
 in a school of exactitude, though I did _forget_ (?) to date my June
 telegram about _that Bedouin escort contract_.”

He is a strict disciplinarian, and never hesitates to rebuke laxness
in others. “If Abdel Kader is at Kassala,”[5] he says, “what on earth
are our people about not to tell me! for of course I could help him. We
seem to have lost our heads in the Intelligence Department, though it
costs enough money.”

His bluntness and honesty are often combined with subtle humour, and
an excellent notion of all three may be gathered from the last words in
this volume of the Journals:—

 As for “_evacuation_” it is one thing; as for “_ratting out_” it is
 another. I am quite of advice as to No. 1 (as we have not the decision
 to keep the country), but I will be no party to No. 2 (this “rat”
 business), 1st, because it is _dishonourable_; 2nd, because it is not
 _possible_ (which will have more weight); therefore, if it is going
 to be No. 2, _the troops had better not come beyond Berber till the
 question of what will be done is settled_.

The interest of the second volume is great from a military point of
view, but its value is somewhat lessened by the fact that Gordon’s
instructions and suggestions were based on the assumption that the
relieving force would reach him some two months earlier than it did.
During those two months the conditions around Kartoum materially
changed, and with these altering conditions Gordon had to reconsider
many of the manœuvres he at first suggested. The political interest
chiefly consists in the strong recommendation that the country
should be given to the Turks, or that Zubair should be established
as Governor-General at Kartoum, and that the Equator should be given
to himself. “I will (D.V.) keep it,” he says, “from Zubair;” that is
to say, he will guard the country against all slave-hunters. In this
volume Gordon declines the imputation that the Expeditionary Force
has come for him, and shows how, to save our national honour, it has
come to extricate the garrisons of the Soudan. Of the troubles these
garrisons were causing him we get a fair notion, but his complaints
seem to be only a safety-valve for his humour. He knows the men about
him are treacherous and liars, but he almost seeks excuse for them when
he says: “Man is essentially a treacherous animal; and although the
Psalmist said in _his haste_ ‘all men are liars,’ I think he might have
said the same at his leisure.” This volume concludes with a new effort
to solve the Soudan problem by suggesting the Khedive should replace
him at once by appointing Abdel Kader Governor-General.

This solution is fully discussed in the opening of Vol. III. It is not
one in which Gordon will participate, but it may prevent his being
antagonistic to the relieving force. Unless he is deposed nothing will
induce him to leave the Soudan until he can extricate the garrisons.
In removing him from the Governor-Generalship and in replacing him by
Abdel Kader, the Government would be utilising a man whom they could
mould to their own shape. Of course this solution was, as Gordon says,
in some degree “a trap,” but it recommended itself as the only way out
of the difficulty, if the Government decided to abandon the garrisons.

The only creditable solution, Gordon still affirms, is to be found in
handing the country over to the Turks with a subsidy or a sum down;
and he supplements his argument by a programme showing how by this
action Her Majesty’s troops could leave the Soudan with honour before
January 1885. “I think this would read well in history,” he says. “Her
Majesty’s Government, having accepted duties in Egypt, and consequently
in the Soudan, sent up a force to restore tranquillity, which having
been done, Her Majesty’s Government handed over the government of the
Soudan to the Sultan.” The necessity for this solution is the result,
in Gordon’s opinion, of the indecisions of Her Majesty’s Government,
and he enumerates with great care the causes which have hampered his
action and thus required the despatch of a relieving force. This volume
is perhaps more cheerful in its tone than any of the others. The
presentiment that the expedition will be too late to prevent disaster
is rarely evident, and the advance of the Mahdi promises to decide,
at all events, the fate of those who are shut up in Kartoum. “A month
will see him defeated or victorious, as God may will it,” and with this
philosophical consolation Gordon ceases to discuss the future of the
Soudan, and begins an interesting detailed account of the offensive and
defensive manœuvres which are taking place in and around Kartoum.

In the fourth volume—the shortest of all—Gordon continues his
narrative of events, and shows how numerous and how wearisome are the
internal troubles with which he has to contend at Kartoum. Treachery
is silently at work, while indolence, selfishness, and dishonesty make
those who are not treacherous almost useless. He is the referee of
every petty dispute, as much as he is chief justice, administrator,
and commander-in-chief. The people demand his decision on every point,
political or personal, and wish to leave it to him to do or not to do,
irrespective of his knowing anything of the merits of the case they
bring before him. His counsellers say: “Do what you think right, you
will do better than we;” and his reflection is, “I, poor devil, do not
know where to turn.” Then in sorrow he exclaims, “Oh, our Government,
our Government! What has it not to answer for? Not to _me_, but to
these poor people. I declare if I thought the town wished the Mahdi
I would give it up: so much do I respect free will.” It is doubtless
these internal troubles which lead him to say: “It is of course on the
cards that Kartoum is taken under the nose of the Expeditionary Force,
which will be just _too late_.”

In Vol. V., which begins on the first day of the Arab New Year, the
arrival of the Mahdi at Omdurman is reported. The treachery referred
to in the previous volume had led General Gordon to make numerous
arrests—a necessity he deplored; but these arrests in all probability
saved the fall of Kartoum on October 21st, for the Mahdi had evidently
speculated on either a rising in the town on that day, or on the gates
being opened to him by some of those who were then imprisoned. On this
day Gordon also received the news of the treaty concluded between King
John of Abyssinia and Admiral Sir William Hewitt, and his anger at the
injustice of such a treaty is as apparent as is the bitterness of his
satire: throughout the whole volume, indeed, he cannot get away from
this subject, and, though the frequent effort to dismiss it in disgust
from his mind is evident, he continually reverts to it. He considers it
discreditable, and does not hesitate to say so. Moreover, he contends
that by the Treaty of Paris, and also by that of Berlin, the integrity
of the Ottoman Dominion is guaranteed by the Powers, and that it is
therefore a farce to say Egypt ceded Kassala.

His views on the whole policy of Her Majesty’s Government are summed up
in an imaginary scene in the House of Lords. “The noble Marquis asked
what the policy of Her Majesty’s Government was? It was as if he asked
the policy of a log floating down stream—_it was going to sea_, as any
one with an ounce of brains could see. Well, that was the policy of it,
only it was a decided policy, and a straightforward one to drift along
and take advantage of every circumstance. His lordship deprecated the
frequent questioning on subjects which his lordship had said he knew
nothing about, and, further, did not care to know anything about.”

Fielding, had he been alive, would have envied Gordon the completeness
of this humorous satire. The results of the policy, as far as it has
gone, he shows to have been the loss of some 80,000 lives and the
effectual restoration of the slave-trade and of slave-hunting: “a
miserable end to diplomacy when it would have been so easy in 1880 to
have settled the Soudan with decency and quiet, giving up Kordofan,
Darfur, the Bahr Gazelle, and the Equator.”

In the latter part of Vol. V., but especially in the early part of
Vol. VI., Gordon fully realises the _Abbas_ catastrophe. He knows
Stewart and Power are dead. There is no expression of personal regret,
though he is “sorry for their friends.” He loved them both, and he
pays the highest tribute he can to their merits; but he is sure that
in their present they are happier than in their past. Moreover, he had
done his best, for every precaution human foresight could conceive he
had taken; having done this, the rest was in the hands of God, and
the disaster was “ordained.” But these views do not prevent him from
courting all inquiry; and he even holds a court-martial on himself. His
verdict is, that if the _Abbas_ was attacked and overpowered, _he is
to blame_; but that if she was captured by treachery, or if she struck
a rock, _he is not to blame_. In the one case he should have foreseen
the chance, and prevented her going; in the others he could foresee
nothing. It was out of his power to avert treachery; and the _Abbas_
drew under two feet of water, and was accompanied by two sailing boats.

He explains with care and clearness why Stewart and Power left him;
they went of their free will, not by his order; for he would not “put
them in any danger in which he was not himself.” If they went they did
him a service, for they could telegraph his views; if they stayed, they
could not help him. They could go in honour, for they had promised the
people nothing; he could not go in honour, for he had promised them
himself. If Gordon were alive, and thought any one could misinterpret
what he says, and thus cast a slur on the memory of either Stewart or
Power, he would be greatly pained. His love and admiration for them
both was evident; and he knew that, had it been their duty to remain,
they would have stayed to die with him at Kartoum. “If Zubair had been
sent in March, when I asked for him, we would not have lost Berber, and
would never have wanted an expedition;” and, if Berber had not fallen,
Stewart and Power would have been alive. Zubair had been his almost
first request, and he never ceases to regret that one who had devoted
his life to the Soudan should not have been allowed to comprehend its
requirements better than those who sat in Downing Street.

Within a week of beginning this volume of his Journal, Gordon expected
the town of Kartoum to fall; the recovery of an enormous quantity of
stolen biscuit enabled him to hold his own for more than another month.
During this time a notion of his troubles may be gathered from what
he says up to December 14th; his real suffering must for ever remain
unknown. That it depended upon the suffering of others we may feel
assured; he never knew what it was to feel for himself. He felt for his
country; he felt for all he tried to help, and if he was among such as
were killed first, his dying thought would have been, “What is to be
the future of all I leave behind?”

In his Journals—his last words—those familiar with his character and
life will see Charles Gordon true to himself to the very end. They
will see in him the same ardent passion for justice and for truth; the
same scorn for wrong-doing and deceit; the same gentle pity for the
sufferings of all, and the same mercy and forgiveness for his foes: and
with all this is combined the perfection of humility, and the sense of
imperfection. There is no impatience, save with those who wronged his
honour and the poor people for whom he died; there is no unrest, for he
neared that “life of action” for which he had long yearned; there is no
sorrow, no dark doubt, for Charles Gordon was with his God.

  A. EGMONT HAKE.

GENERAL GORDON’S POSITION AT KARTOUM.

Only a very few words on my part are necessary in laying these Journals
before the public.

On New Year’s Day, 1884, General Gordon arrived at Brussels from the
Holy Land, and at once commenced his arrangements with His Majesty the
King of the Belgians to proceed to the Congo.

After visiting England once or twice, he left this country for Belgium
and the Congo on the morning of the 16th January.

On the 17th January he was recalled by telegram. He reached London
on the morning of the 18th, and was on his road to Kartoum upon that
evening.

At this time, he felt quite confident of success, his instructions
being that, by restoring the ancient families, whose territories had
been seized by the Egyptian authorities, to their former power, he
would be able to extricate the Egyptian garrisons and civil _employés_
with their families, and remove them to Lower Egypt without difficulty.

During the voyage, however, from Brindisi to Port Said he prepared
a Report, or Memorandum, dated 22nd January, in which, reviewing
these instructions, he drew attention to some of the difficulties
and complications which were likely to arise in carrying out the
policy of Her Majesty’s Government, and asked for their support and
consideration in case of his being unable to fulfil their expectations
with exactness; and Colonel Stewart, in his separate observations of
the same date, pointed out that, in view of eventualities for which it
would be impossible to provide, the wisest course was “to rely on the
discretion of General Gordon and his knowledge of the country.”

General Gordon, it will be seen, accepted—and disclaimed the right
to express any opinion of his own upon it—the policy of leaving the
Soudan. It appeared to him then that to reconquer that country and
restore it to the Egyptian Government without securities for a just and
honest administration would be iniquitous; that, on the other hand, to
secure that object would involve an expenditure of time and money which
could not be afforded, and consequently he then came to the conclusion
that the Soudan might properly be restored to independence, and left to
itself.

It will be seen, however, that he did not, after his return to the
Soudan, remain long of that opinion. His heart warmed at once to the
people whom he had faithfully governed, and whose affections he found,
or at all events believed, were constant to him.

It is necessary here to explain that General Gordon had not intended to
go to Cairo, but to proceed _viâ_ Suakin and Berber. On the invitation,
however, of Sir Evelyn Baring, he went to Cairo and accepted at the
hands of the Khedive a firman appointing him Governor-General of the
Soudan, without which he could have exercised no control over the
Egyptian authorities employed in that province.

It was no part of General Gordon’s character to form a definite opinion
from imperfectly known facts, and to adhere obstinately to that
opinion, notwithstanding the evidence of altered circumstances and new
elements.

We need not therefore be surprised to find that, on arrival at Abu
Hamed, on the 8th February, finding the state of the country to be less
disorganised than he had supposed, and adverting to the confusion which
must ensue if all traces of the Khedive’s Government were suddenly
effaced, he made the suggestion that a sort of suzerainty should be
kept up, and that the chief officers of the Soudan should continue to
be appointed by the Khedive, a complete and abrupt separation being
thus postponed, although the control to be retained would be more
nominal than real.

This feeling in General Gordon’s mind grew rapidly stronger as time
went on. When he reached Berber he saw still more clearly the position
he was in, and became impressed with the impossibility of carrying out
his mission with credit, unless he was able to secure to the provinces
of the Soudan some sort of government in the place of the one it was
intended to withdraw.

Accordingly, upon the day of his arrival at Kartoum (the 18th
February), General Gordon, after pointing out to the Government the
difficulties that surrounded him, inasmuch as the garrisons and
_employés_ were to be removed, when all form of government would
disappear, urged in the strongest terms he could employ that power
should be placed in the hands of a single man, and that the man to be
chosen should be Zubair Pasha.

Now it may be remarked that although Zubair was one of the most noted
slave-hunters that had ever existed, yet his ability and influence
could not be surpassed, while even the Khedive could not lay claim
to any such proud descent—Zubair being a direct descendant of the
Abbassides.

This recommendation was rejected by the Government although renewed
over and over again in a most persistent manner by General Gordon,
backed up by Sir Evelyn Baring, who, on the 9th March, says: “I believe
that Zubair Pasha may be made a bulwark against the approach of the
Mahdi. Of course there is a certain risk that he will constitute a
danger to Egypt, but this risk is, I think, a small one; and it is
in any case preferable to incur it rather than to face the certain
disadvantages of withdrawing without making any provision for the
future government of the country, which would thus be sure to fall
under the power of the Mahdi.”

I must admit that, up to the end of July, I was of opinion that if
Zubair had been sent up General Gordon’s life would have been in
danger. On the other hand, I am aware that a Cabinet Minister of high
position was, from the first, in favour of sending Zubair up, and so
indeed was Lord Wolseley.

At the beginning of August, General Gordon, having again begged that
Zubair might be sent to Kartoum, I used my endeavours to secure the
attainment of that object, but without success. It was now apparent
that General Gordon could not in honour leave until some form of future
government had been determined upon.

Zubair’s appointment having been disallowed, the only alternative
seemed to be the Turks, and the suggestion was made that they should
occupy the Soudan. Anything, in fact, to secure the country against
anarchy and its reversion to barbarism.

In must be borne in mind General Gordon did not ask that an expedition
should be sent; on the contrary, he deprecated sending any, unless for
the purpose of saving the garrisons and of establishing some form of
government.

The proposed movement of two squadrons of cavalry from Suakin to Berber
is outside the question. It was to save Berber they were applied
for, not for the relief of Kartoum. General Gordon’s message was,
“Send troops (200) to Berber, or you will lose it!” It is fair to Sir
Evelyn Baring, to add that on the 24th March he said, “Under present
circumstances I think an effort should be made to help General Gordon
from Suakin, if it is at all a possible operation.”

If General Gordon had known how much in unison Sir Evelyn Baring’s
advice had been with his own, and what support he had received at Sir
Evelyn’s hands, he would have been eager, had his life been spared, to
acknowledge that co-operation.

Before concluding, I must say a few words with respect to the severe
comments which occur in places throughout the Diaries, upon the meagre
information he received from the Intelligence Department,[6] in
connection with which the names of Major Chermside and Major Kitchener
are mentioned. Now, with regard to the former of these officers, he was
at Suakin, and therefore does not come into the question. With respect,
however, to Major Kitchener, I am persuaded that he did all in his
power to get messengers into Kartoum, for just in the same way General
Gordon fancied he got them out, and yet how few succeeded in reaching
their destination. In the same way too as General Gordon fancied
his messengers had reached, so did Mr. Egerton fancy his had been
successful, for at the end of July he hinted that General Gordon could
have sent messengers out, in the same way as others had got in, and yet
at that date only one had done so. It is due to Major Kitchener to say
that from the time he went to Dongola he certainly kept us acquainted
with the position of affairs at Kartoum in a manner most reliable, and
deserving of much credit.

With these prefatory remarks I leave my brother’s Journals to speak
for themselves. He shows, to my mind, with the utmost clearness the
position in which he was placed, and reiterates over and over again
that nothing will induce him to leave Kartoum until he has secured
the safety of all those who have stood by him. He says, “I will end
these egotistical remarks by saying that no persuasion will induce me
to change my views; and that, as to force, it is out of the question,
for I have the people with me, at any rate, of the towns which hold
out; therefore, if Her Majesty’s forces are not prepared to relieve
the whole of the garrisons, the General should consider whether it is
worth coming up. In his place, if not so prepared, I would not do so.
I do not dictate; but I say, what every gentleman in Her Majesty’s
army would agree to, that it would be mean to leave men, who (though
they may not come up to our ideas as heroes) have stuck to me, though
a Christian dog in their eyes, through great difficulties, and thus
force them to surrender to those who have not conquered them, and to do
that at the bidding of a foreign Power to save one’s own skin. Why, the
black sluts would stone me if they thought I meditated such action.”

Up to the 14th December General Gordon could have got away at any time,
had he been so inclined; in fact, he says, “As for myself, I could
make good my retreat at any moment I wished.” After that date we know
nothing. No doubt Omdurman fell at once, and in all probability the
Island of Tuti followed soon after. General Gordon must then have seen
that no relief could reach him, provisions were rapidly running out,
treachery, as he well knew, was at work, and the end came.

He writes to his sister on the 14th December: “God rules all; and as
God will rule to His glory and our welfare, His will be done. I am
quite happy, and, like Lawrence, have tried to do my duty.”

In conclusion, I will add in General Gordon’s own words, “It is, of
course, on the cards that Kartoum is taken under the nose of the
Expeditionary Force, which will be just too late. The Expeditionary
Force will perhaps think it necessary to retake it; but that will be no
use, and will cause loss of life uselessly on both sides. It had far
better quietly return with its tail between its legs; for, once Kartoum
is taken, the sun will have set and the people will not care much for
the satellites. If Kartoum falls, then go quietly back to Cairo, for
you will only lose men and spend money uselessly in carrying on the
campaign.”

  H. W. GORDON.

THE MISSION OF COLONEL SIR CHARLES WILSON, R.E., K.C.M.G.

Very severe criticisms have been made upon the manner in which Sir
Charles Wilson carried out the duties that had been entrusted to him,
with regard to communicating with General Gordon at Kartoum.

The charges made against him may be with advantage restricted to two:—

First—The delay in not proceeding to Kartoum at the latest on the
morning of the 22nd; and

Second—In not having pushed on to Kartoum itself in order to ascertain
General Gordon’s fate beyond a doubt.

Sir Charles Wilson left England in order to assume the position of Head
of the Intelligence Department, and also with the tacit understanding
that he was to be specially employed in order to open direct
communication with General Gordon.

Having this special object in view, Sir Charles Wilson accompanied Sir
Herbert Stewart’s force towards the Nile; and, when that gallant and
highly-distinguished officer was wounded on the 19th January, he found
himself in command.

Now this force, which did not equal a British battalion upon its war
strength, was hampered with a number of wounded officers and men,
some of whom were with it, while others—the bulk—were in a zereba
constructed at some distance in its rear.

Sir Charles Wilson, however, advanced to the Nile, where he bivouacked
for the night; and on the morning of the 20th he returned to the
zereba, and brought back with him to Gubat the wounded who had been
left behind.

Early in the morning of the 21st, General Gordon’s steamers appeared,
and landed their soldiers, who took part in the operations of that day.

Reports now reached Sir Charles Wilson that, exclusive of the Arabs
in Metemma, large numbers were advancing from the North and from the
South. It therefore became imperatively necessary for him to secure the
safety of those who were under his orders before he could proceed upon
his mission.

Accordingly, on the morning of the 22nd, he made a reconnaissance
towards the North, and, finding no enemy, he turned his attention to
the South.

The whole of the 23rd was occupied in making arrangements for the
proper protection of his force, and he could not have left before the
morning of the 24th.

It may here be observed, in confirmation of the report of the Arabs
advancing from the south, that Sir Charles Wilson, on his road to
Kartoum, saw a body of men at a place on the left bank of the Nile,
about twelve miles south of Gubat.

It is really beyond the question to consider what General Gordon’s
position at this time was at Kartoum. When General Gordon sent down his
last journal, on the 14th December, he stated he could not hold out for
more than ten days, and he was in daily expectation that the Fort at
Omdurman would fall; while even then, with that Fort in his possession,
he considered it would be very hazardous for any steamer to attempt to
come up to Kartoum. On the 28th November he says: “I hope the officer
in command will clear Halfeyeh before he pushes on to this, for he may
get a shell from the works at Omdurman (not the Fort) into one of his
steamers. I do not like to risk sending the _Bordeen_ steamer down to
give the warning. If the steamers do come up, and have not the sense to
stop at Halfeyeh, I shall endeavour to warn them. The danger is at the
Ras or nose, on the junction of the Blue and White Niles. The proper
thing to do would be to clear Halfeyeh camp of the Arabs before coming
on here. You could then communicate with Kartoum by land, and avoid
running the gauntlet of Arab guns in penny steamboats.”

Now if General Gordon so expressed himself on the 28th November, two
months before Sir Charles Wilson got to Kartoum, and when the fort
at Omdurman and the island of Tuti were both in the General’s hands,
what must have been the state of affairs when both those positions had
fallen and were in the possession of the Arabs?

Returning to Sir Charles Wilson’s progress with his detachment of
only twenty men, when he got to the point of danger, as pointed out
by General Gordon, he found himself under a cross fire of artillery
and musketry from all points of the compass, including Kartoum itself.
Under such circumstances he had no alternative but to retire, since,
had he continued his journey, he could never have secured his retreat.

Consequently I cannot but express my feeling that on neither head of
charge does any blame attach to Sir Charles Wilson.

  H. W. GORDON.

DESCRIPTION OF THE JOURNAL.

 [Lieut.-Colonel Stewart kept a complete journal of events that
 occurred at Kartoum from the 1st March to the 9th September, upon the
 night of which day he left.]

General Gordon, who had assisted in great measure in the preparation of
this Journal, describes it as a perfect gem.

It was in duplicate, and was captured when Colonel Stewart was
murdered; and, according to Slatin Bey’s account (who at the time was
with the Mahdi), is now in his (the Mahdi’s) possession.

General Gordon’s Diaries are in six parts.

The First is from the 10th of September to the 23rd of September, and
contains 78 pages.

The Second is from the 23rd of September to the 30th of September, and
contains 41 pages.

The Third is from the 1st to the 12th of October, and contains 85 pages.

The Fourth is from the 12th to the 20th of October, and contains 32
pages.

The Fifth is from the 20th of October to the 5th of November, and
contains 93 pages.

The Sixth is from the 5th of November to the 14th of December, and
contains 104 pages.

The First, Second, Third, and Fourth Diaries are addressed to
Lieut.-Colonel Stewart, C.M.G., or the Chief of the Staff. The Fifth is
addressed to the Chief of the Staff of the Expeditionary Force for the
relief of the garrison, and the Sixth is addressed in the same way.

The First and Second Diaries were sent on the 30th of September by
steamer for Berber _viâ_ Shendy.

The Third was sent by the steamer _Towfikia_ on the 12th of October to
Metemma.

The Fourth was sent to Shendy in a steamer on the 21st of October.

The Fifth left in the steamer _Bordeen_ on the 5th of November for
Metemma;

And the Sixth also left in the steamer _Bordeen_ on the 15th of
December.

Each Diary has the same remarks—sometimes repeated three times, on the
outside of the Journal, to the effect that “it should be pruned down
prior to publication.”

The Journals or Diaries were handed over to Sir Charles Wilson on the
22nd of January, at Metemma, by the officer commanding General Gordon’s
steamers.

The Journals were, in my opinion, properly considered by the Government
as official documents (see letter accompanying the last Journal), and
were handed over to me with the remark that, “So far as Her Majesty’s
Government had a desire in the matter, it was for the publication of
the whole Diary; but they did not wish to interfere with my discretion.”

The note at the end of the first Journal evidently implies that when
the Government have done with the Journals, then Miss Gordon is to have
them.

The publication being, therefore, in my hands, I have arranged with
Messrs. Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. for their issue in a very nearly
entire state, only some six or seven pages being omitted, which
contain, in my opinion, no matter of public interest; while, with
regard to names, those who are well acquainted with the affairs of
Egypt can fill up the blanks without difficulty.

It is to be hoped that strenuous endeavours may be made in order to
obtain Colonel Stewart’s Journal, together with those of General Gordon
from the 15th of December to the day upon which Kartoum fell, as well
as that of the Doctor promised to the _Times_.

The Cairo telegrams alluded to in the Diaries have not been handed over
to me.

  H. W. GORDON.

POSITION OF THE STEAMERS,

DECEMBER 14, 1884.

  _Abbas_                Lost with Col. Stewart.
  _Bordeen_              Metemma, took down Journal VI.
  _Chabeen_              In dock, Kartoum.
  _Fascher_              Captured at Berber by Arabs.
  _Husseinyeh_           Sunk off Omdurman.
  _Ismailia_             At Kartoum.
  _Mahomet Ali_          Captured up Blue Nile by Arabs.
  _Mansowrah_            Metemma or Shendy.
  _Monsuhania_           Captured at Berber by Arabs.
  _Saphia_               Metemma or Shendy.
  _Talataween_              Ditto  ditto.
  _Towfikia_                Ditto  ditto.
  _Zubair_               Kartoum.

    _Resumé_—
  Lost                                   5
  At Kartoum                             3—1 in dock.
  At Metemma waiting for Lord Wolseley   5
                                        ——
                                        13

BOOK I.

_On outside wrapper (a glass-cloth):_

No secrets as far as I am concerned.

  C. G. GORDON.

  LT.-COLONEL STEWART, C.M.G.

  or

  Chief of the Staff, LORD WOLSELEY, G.C.B.
  Soudan Expeditionary Force.

JOURNAL OF EVENTS—KARTOUM, VOL. I.

From 10th Sept. to 23rd Sept., 1884.

_On Cover at back:_

GENERAL GORDON’S JOURNAL

From the 10th to 23rd September, 1884.

 N.B.—This Journal will want _pruning out_ if thought necessary to
 publish.

  C. G. GORDON.

  10/9/84.

  KARTOUM
  1884
  drawn from rough sketches
  made by the late
  M. GENERAL C.G.GORDON, C.B.

  _Population of Kartoum, 40,000_
  _A.A., Armed Boats (Santals)_
  _B.B., Breastworks._

  _E. Weller, lith._

  _London; Kegan Paul, Trench & Co._
]

JOURNAL.

 _Vide_ note as to pruning down on outside.—C. G. G.

_September 10._—Colonel Stewart, MM. Power and Herbin, left during the
night for Dongola, _viâ_ Berber.

Spy came in from south front, and one from Halfeyeh reports Arabs will
not attack, but will continue the blockade.

Sent off two sets of telegrams by a spy, who will go to Shendy.

Yesterday, when the messenger went out to deliver my answer to the
Arabs, in response to Mahdi’s letter, though he had a white flag, they
fired on him, and tried to capture him. They use the white flag, and
find it respected by us, and that we let their men go back. They chain
any men we send to them.

It is wonderful how the people of the town, who have every possible
facility to leave the city, cling to it, and how, indeed, there are
hundreds who flock in, though it is an open secret we have neither
money nor food.[7] Somehow this makes me feel confident in the future,
for it is seldom that an impulse such as this acts on each member of a
disintegrated mass without there being some reason for it, which those
who act have no idea of, but which is a sort of instinct. Truly I do
not think one could inflict a greater punishment on an inhabitant of
Kartoum than to force him to go to the Arabs.

Halfeyeh reports that Faki Mustapha, who was in command of the
Arabs on the west or left bank of the White Nile, wishes to join the
Government. He is informed we are glad of it, but wish him to remain
quiet, and to take no active part till he sees how the scales of the
balance go; if we rise, then he can act, if we fall he is not to
compromise himself; but what we ask him is to send up our spies, which
he can do without risk.[8] The same advice was given to the people of
Shendy, who wished to issue out and attack Berber.

The runaways of Tuti[9] wish to come back, which is allowed.

The “matches” used for the mines are all finished, and we are obliged
to go back to powder hose, and unite the mines in families of ten.

Rows on rows of wire entanglement are being placed around the lines.
General Gordon’s horse was captured by the Arabs in the defeat of El
foun; the other staff horse got a cut on the head, but is now all right.

The Mahdi is still at Rahad.[10] The answer to his letter (_vide_
Colonel Stewart’s journal) was sent open, so that the Arab leaders
could read its contents.

With respect to letters written to the Mahdi and to the Arab chiefs,
commenting on the apostacy of Europeans, they may, and are, no doubt,
hard, but it is not a small thing for a European, for fear of death,
to deny our faith; it was not so in old times, and it should not be
regarded as if it was taking off one coat, and putting on another.
If the Christian faith is a myth, then let men throw it off, but it
is mean and dishonourable to do so merely to save one’s life if one
believes it is the true faith. What can be more strong than these
words, “He who denies Me on earth I will deny in heaven.” The old
martyrs regarded men as their enemies, who tried to prevent them
avowing their faith. In the time of Queens Mary and Elizabeth, what
men we had, and then it was for less than here, for it was mainly the
question of the Mass, while here it is the question of the denial of
our Lord and of his passion. It is perhaps as well to omit this, if
this journal is published, for no man has a right to judge another.
Politically and morally, however, it is better for us not to have
anything to do with the apostate Europeans in the Arab camp. Treachery
never succeeds, and, however matters may end, it is better to fall with
clean hands, than to be mixed up with dubious acts and dubious men.
Maybe it is better for us to fall with honour, than to gain the victory
with dishonour, and in this view the Ulemas of the town are agreed;
they will have nought to do with the proposals of treachery.

No doubt the letters to the Arabs will make the Arab chiefs work on
the Europeans with them, to take an active part against us, by saying
to those Europeans, “You are cast out;” but the Arabs will never trust
them really, so they can do little against us.

We had a regular gaol delivery to-day, letting out some fifty, and are
sending to the Arabs about nine prisoners whom it is not advisable
to keep in the town. A donkey quietly grazing near the north fort,
exploded one of the mines there (an iron alembic which belonged to the
time of Mahomet Ali, and had been used for the reduction of gold; it
held some 10 lbs. of powder); the donkey, angry and surprised, walked
off unhurt! These alembics are of this shape, braced by iron straps
together. It is extraordinary that after a good deal of rain, and
three months’ exposure, the domestic matchbox should have retained its
vitality.

The school here is most interesting, as the scholars get a certain
ration. It is always full, viz., two hundred. Each boy has a wooden
board, on which his lesson is written, and on visiting it the object of
each boy is to be called out to read his lesson, which they do with a
swaying motion of body, and in a sing-song way, like the Jews do at the
wailing place at Jerusalem and in their synagogues, from which we may
infer this was the ancient way of worship, for the lessons are always
from the Koran. Little black doves with no pretension to any nose, and
not more than two feet high, push forward to say the first ten letters
of the alphabet, which is all they know.

We have completed the census (_vide_ Colonel Stewart’s Journal),[11]
and have 34,000 people in the town.

_September 11._—Stewart’s steamers, which had been delayed at
Halfeyeh[12] owing to some machinery accident, left last night for
Berber.[13] Spy reports that one of captured steamers at Berber is
disabled by the Arabs.

When Cuzzi[14] came to the lines yesterday, the officer Hassan Bey
made him walk over on his knees in order to pass into lines, pointing
out to him that the lines were thickly spread with fearful mines. Cuzzi
asked what one would do when the Nile fell, and was told that these
new mines would be put down as the river fell. Hassan Bey put Cuzzi
into a hut, and questioned him as to the whereabouts of the Mahdi. He
said first he was at Duem,[15] and when pressed he agreed the Mahdi
was in Kordofan, and had not moved. He said the Mahdi had not more
than two regiments; that he had lost heavily in fighting the mountain
tribes of Nubia, and had not much ammunition left; that Waled a Goun
had some 200 regulars with him, 10 mountain guns, and 2 Krupps, but
only 5 boxes of mountain gun ammunition, and 3 boxes of Krupp, and 5
boxes of Remington. (The Arabs captured at our defeat at El foun 75,000
rounds, so that will help them.) Waled a Goun wanted to go to Giraffe,
where Abou Gugliz was defeated, but Abou Gugliz said it would never do.
Cuzzi looked pretty miserable. Outside the lines were three Arabs and
Zarada (a Greek); they waited for Cuzzi. Soon after Cuzzi had left for
the Arab camp, two dervishes came in with the Mahdi’s letter (_vide_
Colonel Stewart’s Journal), and a dervish dress from the Mahdi to me.
They were given the letters I had received for Slatin for Cairo, and my
answer to the Arabs; also the horse head-stall which Abou Gugliz had
lost, at which they were amused, and went off to the Arab camp. I sent
out my letter in answer to the Mahdi (_vide_ Colonel Stewart’s Journal)
with a slave, upon whom they fired. _Talataween_ and _Bordeen_ left for
Sennaar this morning to bring down dhoora.[16] Letter written to the
Sheikh el Obeyed[17] proposing “we should mutually remain quiet, &c.,
&c., with relation to one another, as we are rendering the country a
desert.”

Jer. xvii. 5. “Cursed (_thus saith the Lord_) is the man that
trusteth in man, and maketh flesh his arm, and whose heart departeth
from the Lord;” therefore _cursed is he of the Lord_, who hopes by any
arrangement of forces, or by exterior help, to be relieved from the
position we are in. Jer. xvii. 7. “Blessed (thus saith the Lord) is
he that trusteth in the Lord, and whose hope the Lord is,” therefore
blessed is he “of the Lord” who makes all his arrangements of forces,
without any reliance on such arrangements, or on any exterior help, but
trusts in the Lord.[18] How impossible for man alone to accept these
views, for with what heart can he make his arrangements if he does not
trust in their success! Curious verses, Ezekiel xxix. 10-14,[19] as to
Egypt being waste for forty years from the Tower of Syene (Assouan) to
frontier of Ethiopia; it is certainly the Soudan which is meant, and it
is in a fair way of being a desert.

A Dervish came in with a letter from Abdel Kader, the Sheikh on the
White Nile, which, with answer, is annexed;[20] he also brought a
letter from the messengers who brought in the Mahdi’s letter on 9th
September (_vide_ Col. Stewart’s journal). They said they had not
received my answer, which it will be remembered was sent out by a
slave, whom they fired upon. This man also brought in a letter from a
Greek, Calamatino,[21] who begs to come in and tell me important news
for all Europe. His letter and my answer are annexed.

It will be noticed that Cuzzi adds “he is going to Berber to-day,” so
he may meet with Stewart. They might have gone down together had they
mutually have known of one another’s departure.

A soldier captured at Obeyed came in, and reports that his comrades
would come in _en masse_ if we would let them come at night. Abou
Gugliz denies that the head-stall I sent to him is his.

I put down our defeat on the Dem or headquarters of Sheikh el Obeyed
to two things—1. A lot of Kartoum pedlars went out to loot, and they
broke the square. 2. Mahomet Ali Pasha captured a lad of twelve or
fourteen years of age, and the little chap spoke out boldly, and said
he believed Mahomet Achmet was the Mahdi, and that we were dogs. He was
shot! Before I heard of our defeat I heard of this, and I thought “THAT
will not pass unavenged.” There was an old belief among old Christians
that every event which happens on earth is caused by some action being
taken in heaven; the action in heaven being the cause of the event on
earth, _vide_ Revelations, when at the opening of seals the trumpet
sounds, &c., &c., all events exercised in heaven are followed by
events on earth. This being the case, how futile are our efforts to
turn things out of their course. Vials are poured out on earth whence
events happen. To me, it seems little what those events may be, but
that the great object of our lives is how we bear those events in our
individuality. If we trust in the flesh, thus saith the Lord, we are
cursed; if we trust in Him we are blessed. I cannot think that there
are any promises for answers to prayer made for temporal things; the
promises are to hear prayer, and to give strength to bear with quiet
what may be the Will of God. A vial is poured on earth; events happen;
one is furious with the British Government for these events; but if we
were logical, we should be furious with the pourer out of the vial, and
that we shrink from being, for He is the Almighty who pours out the
vial.

This afternoon another mine blew up at Tuti; the victim was another
donkey, who, however, did not get off so well as his colleague of the
North Fort, for he lost his hind quarters, and was killed.—R.I.P.

We cannot help thinking something has happened in Europe of a startling
nature, and which is known to the Arabs in an indistinct way, for they
evidently look on the game as theirs, and that without fighting, of
which they show no sign. Abou Gugliz (in remonstrating with Waled a
Goun, who wished to descend the river) told him “that his forts were
better than any at Cairo, but that the soldiers came over them, like
afreets;”[22] so says the Dervish who came in to-day.

We decided to-night to send out a letter to Arabs, saying that though
we will not admit any European into the place we will permit an
interview, with any European they may wish to send to a flag placed in
front of lines, with the Greek Consul and Greek Doctor.

_September 12._—It is most dispiriting to be in the position I am,
if it was not good for me, when I think that, _when I left_, I could
say, “no man could lift his hand or foot in the land of the Soudan”[23]
without me (Gen. xli. 44)[24] and now we cannot calculate on our
existence over twenty-four hours. The people are all against us, and
what a power they have; they need not fight, but have merely to refuse
to sell us their grain. The stomach governs the world, and it was the
stomach (a despised organ) which caused our misery from the beginning.
It is wonderful that the ventral tube of man governs the world, in
small and great things.

One of Seyd Mahomet Osman’s family, come in from Shendy, reports Osman
Digma, as writing to Berber, reporting the arrival of the English at
Suakin, their purchase of camels, and advance. The Arab chief of Berber
assembled his subordinates and told them this, also of the advance
of the troops from Debbeh commanded by English (Wood’s force) and
recommended them to collect their men. The two captured steamers at
Berber are on opposite sides of river.

Sent out letter to the Arabs to-day, saying I would let the Greek
Consul come out and meet the Greek who had written to me; the Arabs,
this time, did not fire on the flag of truce.

Church parade of Arabs on south front, but very far off.

The man from Shendy reports that all the right bank of the Nile is
quiet. We have sent out an escort to try and capture Cuzzi, who is on
his way to Berber.

It certainly is a curious exemplification of how very lightly religions
sit on men, and to note the fearful apostacy of both Mussulmans and
Christians, when their lives or property are menaced. There is scarcely
one great family of the Soudan, families who can trace their pedigree
for five hundred years, who have not accepted Mahomet Achmet as Mahdi,
to save their property, though they laugh at the idea afterwards. I
am using this argument with them, in saying, “You ask me to become a
Mussulman to save my life, and you yourself acknowledge Mahomet Achmet
as the Mahdi, to save your lives; why, if we go on this principle, we
will be adopting every religion whose adherents threaten our existence,
for you know and own, when you are safe, that Mahomet Achmet is _not_
the Mahdi.”[25]

One of our captured soldiers from Obeyed came in from Waled a Goun,
and four others with a woman came in from Faki Mustapha (two of the
last were men slaves of the unfortunate Hassan Pasha Ibrahim, who was
executed); they report food scarce in the Arab camp, and that many are
striving to run away, owing to the way they are bullied.

Ulemas are writing letters to Arab chiefs, protesting against their
acts, as being contrary to Muslim religion.

The Greeks and other prisoners in Obeyed, &c., complain bitterly of
their privations and ill-treatment by the Arabs, in the letters they
sent in here to other Greeks.

I was awakened this morning by a woman crying out, “My son has been
murdered, and I demand justice.” Her little _only_ boy had, it appears,
been in one of the Arab water-wheels, which are moved by oxen, and a
man had pushed him off; his skull was partially fractured, but he had
been in hospital for some days, and we hoped for his recovery, when
inflammation set in, and he died. He was a nice little bright-eyed,
chocolate-coloured child of eight years old—the mother is a widow.
One is drawn towards the children of this country, both browns and
blacks—the former are of a perfect bronze colour.

The browns and blacks bear their wounds without a murmur; the poor
fellaheen soldiers yell upon the slightest touch to their wounds.

One of the Arab chiefs came to the Shoboloha defile, and tried to
raise the people to occupy the passage; the people refused, and the
Arab chief went off.

There is a negro soldier in hospital with a cut on the nose from a
sword; the cut has entered the nostrils, giving him four openings
instead of two—it is on the bridge of the nose (if a negro nose can be
said to have a bridge), and the man’s cheeks are untouched.

One man received a wound in the chest; he lived eleven days, and died.
The doctor found a bullet lodged in the centre of his heart, in wall of
ventricle. The doctor has this heart in spirits. It was a ball weighing
the same as our Martini-Henri bullet.

The negro soldiers are wonderfully clean, while the fellaheen and
Turkish lot are just the reverse; the former have the gloss of a
well-cleaned and polished boot, such as the little London shoeblack
loves to turn out for a penny.

A Greek came in from the Arabs to-night; I sent the Greek Consul to see
him on the lines, where he will stop for the night.

I saw the Ulemas[26] to-day, and lamented to them the degeneracy of the
_Faith_, when Christians become Mussulmans to save their lives, and
Mussulmans become the followers of the False Prophet, to save their
property. They are going to preach against this, but I fear much that
when it is a question between Allah and their goats, &c., they will be
inclined to look after their goats, as a rule. I am afraid we are much
the same, and would prefer 50,000 men at our backs, than any Scripture
promises; it is only when we are pushed into a corner, and cannot get
the 50,000 men, that we turn to the promises—at least, that is so to a
great extent with me. There is no doubt that success makes men hard on
their fellows, while misfortune makes them soft. (One has only to study
the demeanour of a Cabinet Minister, or a Colonel while in office, or
out of office, to be convinced of this truth.)

I do not believe that fanaticism exists as it used to do in the world,
judging from what I have seen, in this so-called fanatic land. It is
far more a question of property, and is more like communism under the
flag of religion, which seems to excite and to give colour to acts
which men would otherwise condemn.[27]

I am sure it is unknown to the generality of our missionaries in
Muslim countries, that in the Koran no imputation of sin is made on our
Lord, neither is it hinted that He had need of pardon, and, further,
no Muslim can deny that the Father of our Lord was God (_vide_ Chapter
III. of Koran, “the Family of Touran”), and that He was incarnated
by a miracle. Our bishops content themselves with its being a false
religion, but it is a false religion professed by millions on millions
of our fellow creatures. The Muslims do not say Mahomet was without
sin, the Koran often acknowledges that he erred, but no Muslim will
say “_Jesus sinned_.” As far as self-sacrifice of the body, they are
far above Roman Catholics, and consequently above Protestants. It is
positive trouble when one calls one’s servant to be continually told he
is at his prayers, and one cannot think that this is an excuse, for it
can be no pleasure to be in a constrained position for a considerable
time, unless one had some faith in those prayers. The God of the
Muslims is _our_ God. And they do not believe that Mahomet exercises
any mediatorial office for them. They believe they will stand and fall
by their own deeds: in fact they are as much under the law as the Jews.

During our blockade, we have often discussed the question of being
frightened, which, in the world’s view, a man should never be. For my
part I am always frightened, and very much so. I fear the future of
all engagements.[28] It is not the fear of death, that is past, thank
God; but I fear defeat, and its consequences. I do not believe a bit
in the calm, unmoved man. I think it is only that he does not show
it outwardly. Thence I conclude no commander of forces ought to live
closely in relation with his subordinates, who watch him like lynxes,
for there is no contagion equal to that of fear. I have been rendered
furious, when, from anxiety, I could not eat, I would find those at
same table were in like manner affected.

The Greek Consul came back from seeing the Greek, who brought a
letter[29] from Waled a Goun, asking me to surrender. I answered as
per margin,[30] saying I did not see it. The Greek’s object was to get
us to surrender. He says: Lupton,[31] of Bahr Gazelle has come down to
Shaka, with his men to surrender, and that Emin Bey of the Equator is
said to be also captured. The Greek says, “Cuzzi left yesterday for
Berber. Slatin Bey[32] was in Kordofan. The Mahdi was on his way here.”
According to the Greek Consul, this man came in to get money for the
Greek prisoners, and for little else. I have left the Greek Consul to
do what he likes with regard to this.

There was an earthquake, lasting some seconds, at 9 P.M. to-night; like
the other ones, it was from south to north.

When one thinks of the enormous loss of life which has taken place in
the Soudan since 1880, and the general upset of all government, one
cannot help feeling vicious against Sir Auckland Colvin, Sir Edward
Malet, and Sir Charles Dilke, for it is on account of those three men,
whose advice was taken by Her Majesty’s Government, that all these
sorrows are due. They went in for the bondholders, and treated as
chimerical any who thought differently from them ... by letting Sir
Auckland Colvin and Sir Edward Malet stay in Egypt when he went there,
got let into their ways. Time has shown the result of their policy,
and we shall hear of them no more. In a minor degree the _Times_
correspondent at Cairo and Alexandria is a sinner, for he backed them.
We are an honest nation, but our diplomatists are conies, and not
_officially_ honest.

_September 13._—Sent out notifications to all the authorities in Egypt
and the Soudan to search Cuzzi closely, for I think he is an emissary
of the Mahdi; this can be done under pretence of customs. I am inclined
to think that Cuzzi betrayed Berber to the Arabs, for how else can the
different treatment he received from the Mahdi from all other Europeans
be accounted for?

Five of our soldiers captured at Obeyed came in to-day; they report the
Arabs not strong, and not meditating immediate action (they brought
their arms with them); they say the Arabs knew of our expedition to
Berber.

The Ulemas sent a letter[33] to the Mahdi to-day; these letters are
interesting, for they show the views of these people.

The steamers are reported to have passed the Shoboloha defile safely;
they ought to be at Berber to-day.

Note that I do not call our enemy rebels, but Arabs, for it is a vexed
question whether we are not rebels, seeing I hold the firman restoring
Soudan to its chiefs.

The Greek who came in yesterday told the Greek doctor here that the
superior of the mission at Obeyed _alone_ has kept his faith; his name
is “Luigi Bonorni;” the other priests and nuns all have become Muslims
(so he says); the nuns have nominally married Greeks to save themselves
from outrage. He says Cuzzi received two horses, a wife, a slave,
and $60[34] from the Mahdi, with whom he was on the closest terms of
intimacy. He says, Slatin had 4000 ardebs[35] of dhoora and 1500 cows,
and plenty of ammunition when he surrendered; he has been given eight
horses by the Mahdi (all this information must be taken with reserve).
The Greeks here made up £38 for their compatriots in captivity, and
the Austrian Consul sent $100 to the mission at Obeyed.[36] I gave the
Greek $5, which I expect was wasted, and I doubt if the Greek will not
keep all the money he has received. I grudge the $20 I gave Cuzzi,
for I expect he is a vile traitor. I expect he gave the Mahdi all
the cyphers; fortunately he had not the Foreign Office cypher, which
Stewart has carried off. Had I known this information about Cuzzi I
ought to have decapitated him, but it is as well I left him to his fate.

If what the Greek says is true about the apostacy of all but Don Luigi,
what a spectacle! for certainly these people came to this country with
more faith than those that stay at home; they could not expect any
comforts in it, but much self-denial. Some of those nuns had as much
as £1000 a year, which they left to come here. Of course the Greek’s
statement is open to much doubt.

Slatin’s name is Abdel Kadi; Cuzzi’s name is Mahomet Yusuf. Mahdi
proposes I should put myself, on my surrender (?) under Abou Gugliz,
who is a _notorious breaker_ of the Dervish rules. I forgot in my
letter to remark on this. It appears each of these men have a spiritual
adviser with them, who acts as a spy as well.

Two more of the Obeyed soldiers escaped this afternoon; they say the
Arabs meditate putting a gun on the Blue Nile above Bourré, and another
in front of south front of lines, with the idea of bombarding the town.

Psammitichus[37] besieged Azotus or Ashdod for twenty-nine years
(according to Herodotus). What a life for the people of Azotus! One is
tired enough of this, and we have only had six months of it. Azotus or
Ashdod is a miserable little village between Jafa (which, by the way,
is called after _Japhet_, the son of Noah) and Gaza.

The black soldiers who come in are generally old acquaintances of mine,
_i.e._ they know me, while their black pug faces are all alike to me.
I like the Chinese best, then the pug-faced blacks, then the chocolate
Soudan people. I do not like the tallow-faced fellaheen, though I feel
sorry for them.

Ezekiel xxix. and xxx. are interesting, for they show Egypt to be
doomed to be the basest of kingdoms, the slave of kingdoms, never
possessing a ruler of its own race (Mahomet Ali was a Sandjak[38] of
Salonica, and an alien to this land). The judgments on this land are on
account of its cruelties in respect to the slave trade. Berber (which
Colonel Stewart ought to pass to-night) is 200 miles from Merowé, where
the cataracts cease, thence there is open water to Dongola, 150 miles
distant from Merowé; he ought there to find the telegraph open, and so
on the 20th of September he ought to be in communication with Cairo and
Europe.

One thing puzzles me is, if it was really determined to abandon the
Soudan to its fate, why the people of Dongola and of Senheit were not
withdrawn, when the determination was taken; there could be no possible
object for keeping the peoples in those places. I think if, instead
of ‘Minor Tactics’ or books on art of war, we were to make our young
officers study ‘Plutarch’s Lives,’ it would be better; there we see men
(unsupported by any true belief, pure pagans), making, _as a matter of
course_, their lives a sacrifice, but in our days it is the highest
merit not to run away. I speak for myself when I say I have been in
dire anxiety, not for my own skin, but because I hate to be beaten,
and I hate to see my schemes fail; but that I have had to undergo a
tithe of what any nurse has to undergo, who is attached to a querulous
invalid, is absurd, and not to be weighed together. When I emerge all
are complimentary; when the invalid dies the question is, what should
be given to the nurse for her services. We profess to be followers of
our Lord, who, from His birth, when He was hunted, till His death, may
be said to have had no sympathy or kindness shown Him, yet we (and
I say myself especially) cry out if we are placed in any position
of suffering, whereas it is our _métier_, if we are Christians, to
undergo such suffering. I have led the officers and officials the
lives of dogs while I have been up here; it is spurs in their flanks
every day; nothing can obliterate this ill-treatment from my memory. I
may say that I have not given them a moment’s peace; they are conies,
but I ought to have been more considerate. It is quite painful to see
men tremble so when they come and see me, that they cannot hold the
match to their cigarette. Yet I have cut off no heads; I only killed
two Pashas, and I declare, had it not been for outside influences,
those two Pashas would have been alive now; they were judicially
murdered.[39] Happy, as far as we can see, are those men who swing in
small arcs; unhappy are those who, seeking the field of adventure,
swing from the extremes of evil and good. The neutral tint is the best
for wear.

What a contradiction is life! I hate Her Majesty’s Government for
their leaving the Soudan after having caused all its troubles; yet I
believe our Lord rules heaven and earth, so I ought to hate Him, which
I (sincerely) do not.

I hear Hansall, the Austrian Consul, is disposed to go with _his seven
female attendants_ to the Arabs. I hope he will do so.

Heaps of cattle come in every day, but very little grain. Seyd Mahomet
Osman has sent word to his people to go to Kartoum for refuge; this is
pleasant for us! but it shows his confidence in our future, and it is a
great honour to me, who (thank God) am given faith to outspeak “I am a
Christian,” to have obtained such confidence from a man, who would, in
the times of my glory, scarcely look at me.

One of his (Seyd Mahomet Osman’s) men going down to Shendy (where his
sister, a very plucky woman lives) was taking down a pair of slippers
for her, and he brought them here; I wrote my name on the inside of
each, and told him to tell the “Sitt,” or lady, when she put them on,
she put her claw on my head; the man came back the other day, and said
the “Sitt” was delighted with the idea.

What a row the Pope will make about the nuns marrying the Greeks! It
is the union of the Greek and Latin churches.

_September 14._—Yesterday evening the Arabs fired four cannon shots
towards lines on south front, but they did not reach the fortifications.

Halfeyeh[40] reports the assembly of the Arabs, with a view to
attacking that place. A party has gone out to see what truth there is
in this report.

Four other men came in from the Arabs to-day; they had little to say,
beyond that the Arabs meant to maintain a blockade, and not to attack
directly.

The Arabs killed four soldiers who tried to escape, but those who came
in say this will not stop their coming.

A man I sent out to Waled Mocashee, who fought with Waled a Goun
(_vide_ Stewart’s journal), was caught with my letters by Arabs, and
was on the eve of being hung, when my letter arrived, in which I
remonstrated with the Arabs for ill-treating my messengers, on which
they pardoned him, and let him go. This man says the Greek, who came
into the lines yesterday, was sent off to Kordofan on his return to
the Arab camp. The Arabs would have been quite justified in executing
the man above alluded to, for he was a genuine spy; my remonstrance to
them was with respect to their treatment of _direct_ messengers I sent
to them; there is considerable doubt that even Waled Mocashee ever did
fight with Waled a Goun.

In my letter to Sheikh Abdel Kader, I proposed to him to come in and
see me; the Arab chiefs asked him to go, but he would not; it is well
known we have refused to give in.

If it is possible to get rid of the bitter feelings existing between
the two great sections of the Soudan people,[41] it will go a great way
to pacify the country; by degrees this may be done.

Meat has fallen from 10_s._ per lb. to 2_s._ per lb.

The steamer _Towfikia_, which went up the Blue Nile to Giraffe, fell on
the Arabs, and drove them off from collecting grass and wood (one is
thankful for small mercies in these times).

The word “Islam” means the resigning or devoting oneself entirely
to God and His service, _i.e._ self-sacrifice: consequently a true
Christian is of the Islam religion, as far as the name goes (this is
Sale’s translation of the word Islam).

It is curious how quick the people forget their disasters and losses;
it is only ten days ago that we lost in killed nearly one thousand
men, yet no one speaks of it now; it takes about four or six days to
obliterate the bitterness of a disaster.

The old bugbear of the defection of the Shaggyeh has sprung up again.
Saleh Pasha, who is a prisoner with the Mahdi, has written to his
brother to say he and the Mahdi are coming, and that he is not to join
me. These sort of things, which are taken up as gospel truth by those
around me, are one of the most disagreeable parts of my position; those
who will one day declare that the Shaggyeh are faithful, will two days
after urge one to take the sharpest measures of repression against
them, which is, to my mind, just the way to push them into rebellion,
if they had any tendency that way (I mean by rebellion, joining the
Arabs).

Saleh Pasha’s brother came in to-day to see me; he has heard that his
brother is with the Mahdi at Schatt, a place inland from Duem, on White
Nile. He seems to think this is authentic; if so, we shall have the
Mahdi here ere long; he has been there nine days.

The news of the near approach of the Mahdi has not troubled me, for if
he fails he is lost, and there will be no necessity for an expedition
to Kordofan; if he succeeds, he may, by his presence, prevent any
massacre. I have always felt we were doomed to come face to face ere
the matter was ended.

I toss up in my mind, whether, if the place is taken, to blow up the
palace and all in it, or else to be taken, and, with God’s help, to
maintain the faith, and if necessary to suffer for it (which is most
probable). The blowing up of the palace is the simplest, while the
other means long and weary suffering and humiliation of all sorts. I
think I shall elect for the last, not from fear of death, but because
the former has more or less the taint of suicide, as it can do no good
to any one, and is, in a way, taking things out of God’s hands.

Schatt is twenty miles inland from Duem, which is one hundred miles
from here, on left bank of White Nile.

The Greek who came in told the Greek Consul that the Mahdi puts pepper
under his nails, and when he receives visitors then he touches his eyes
and weeps copiously; that he eats a few grains of dhoora openly, but
in the interior of the house he has fine feeding and drinks alcoholic
drinks.

The Greek says the Mahdi has lots of letters from Cairo,[42] Stamboul,
and India; that his constant conversation is Kartoum, and his chance of
its capture.

After this pepper business! I think I shall drop any more trouble in
writing him letters, trying to convince or persuade him to reasonable
measures.

The Greek told the Greek Consul that the Mahdi was perplexed to know
what on earth I was doing up here, as I had no part or lot in the
Soudan. I expect this question is more perplexing for others than the
Madhi (myself included). I must confess that the pepper business has
sickened me; I had hitherto hoped I had to do with a regular fanatic,
who believed in his mission, but when one comes to pepper in the finger
nails, it is rather humiliating to have to succumb to him, and somehow
I have the belief that I shall not have to do so. One cannot help being
amused at this pepper business. Those who come in, for pardon, come in
on their knees, with a halter round their neck. The Mahdi rises, having
scratched his eyes and obtained a copious flow of tears, and takes off
the halter! As the production of tears is generally considered the
proof of sincerity, I would recommend the Mahdi’s recipe to Cabinet
Ministers, justifying some job. The nails (so say the Greeks) must be
long! to contain the pepper.

_September 15._—Another escaped soldier came in this morning; reports
that they are waiting orders of the Mahdi, and do not mean to attack
the lines. Charity thinketh no evil. She was not in the Soudan, for I
declare, what with the tricks of the officials here, Charity would have
had a bad time of it.