been set forth should not, purely for reasons of expediency, be
    taken into consideration from the very beginning when organizing
    the administration of the territory on a basis of war economy.
    In view of the vast spaces and the difficulties of
    administration which arise from that alone, and also in view of
    the living conditions created by Bolshevism, which are totally
    different from those of Western Europe, the whole question of
    the U.S.S.R. would require different treatment from that which
    has been applied in the individual countries of Western Europe.”

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is that signed?

MR. ALDERMAN: It is not signed. No, Sir.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is it in the Defendant Rosenberg’s
handwriting?

MR. ALDERMAN: It was in the Rosenberg file.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is there anything to indicate that he wrote
it?

MR. ALDERMAN: No. I said it was evidently prepared by Rosenberg or under
his authority. We captured the whole set of Rosenberg files, which
constitutes really a large library.

It is evident that the “presently envisaged administration operating on
a purely economic basis” to which this memorandum objects was the
Economic Staff Oldenburg, which I have already described as having been
set up under Göring and General Thomas.

Rosenberg’s statement—if this be his statement—of the political
purpose of the invasion and his analysis of the achieving of it
apparently did not fall on deaf ears. By a Führer order, dated 20 April
1941, Rosenberg was named commissioner for the central control of
questions connected with the east European region. This order is part of
the correspondence regarding Rosenberg’s appointment, which has been
given the Number 865-PS in our series. I ask that this file, all
relating to the same subject and consisting of four letters, all of
which I shall read or refer to, be admitted in evidence as Exhibit
USA-143.

The order itself reads as follows—it is the first item on the English
translation of 865-PS:

    “I name Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as my commissioner for the
    central control of questions connected with the east European
    region. An office, which is to be furnished in accordance with
    his orders, is at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the
    carrying out of the duties thereby entrusted to him. The
    necessary money for this office is to be taken out of the Reich
    Chancellery Treasury in a lump sum.

    “Führer’s headquarters, 20th April 1941. The Führer, signed,
    Adolf Hitler; Reich Minister and Head of Reich Chancellery,
    signed, Dr. Lammers.”

This particular copy of the Führer’s order was enclosed in a letter
which Dr. Lammers wrote to the Defendant Keitel requesting his
co-operation for Rosenberg and asking that Keitel appoint a deputy to
work with Rosenberg. This letter reads as follows—it is on the
stationery of the Reich Minister and the Head of the Reich Chancellery,
Berlin, 21 April 1941. I omit the salutation:

    “Herewith I am sending you a copy of the Führer’s decree of the
    20th of this month by which the Führer appointed Reichsleiter
    Alfred Rosenberg as his commissioner for the central control
    connected with the east European region. In this capacity
    Reichsleiter Rosenberg is to make the necessary preparations for
    the probable emergency with all speed. The Führer wishes that
    Rosenberg shall be authorized for this purpose to obtain the
    closest co-operation of the highest Reich authorities, receive
    information from them, and summon the representatives of the
    highest Reich authorities to conferences. In order to guarantee
    the necessary secrecy of the commission and the measures to be
    undertaken, for the time being, only those of the highest Reich
    authorities should be informed on whose co-operation
    Reichsleiter Rosenberg will primarily depend. They are: The
    Commissioner for the Four Year Plan”—that is Göring—“the Reich
    Minister of Economics, and you yourself”—that is
    Keitel—“Therefore, may I ask you in accordance with the
    Führer’s wishes to place your co-operation at the disposal of
    Reichsleiter Rosenberg in the carrying out of the task imposed
    upon him. It is recommended in the interests of secrecy that you
    name a representative in your office with whom the office of the
    Reichsleiter can communicate and who, in addition to your usual
    deputy, should be the only one to whom you should communicate
    the contents of this letter.

    “I should be obliged if you would acknowledge the receipt of
    this letter.

    “Heil Hitler, Yours very sincerely, signed, Dr. Lammers.”

In the next letter Keitel writes Lammers acknowledging receipt of his
letter and telling of his compliance with the request. Keitel also
writes Rosenberg telling him of the action he has taken. Now, the letter
to Dr. Lammers—I shall read the text:

    “Dear Reich Minister:

    “I acknowledge receipt of the copy of the Führer’s decree in
    which the Führer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his
    commissioner for the central control of questions connected with
    the east European region. I have named General of the Artillery
    Jodl, head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, as my
    permanent deputy, and Major General Warlimont as his deputy to
    Reichsleiter Rosenberg.”

And the letter to Reichsleiter Rosenberg on the same date:

    “The head of the Reich Chancellery has sent me a copy of the
    Führer’s decree, by which he has appointed you his commissioner
    for the central control of questions connected with the east
    European region. I have charged General of the Artillery Jodl,
    head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, and his deputy,
    Major General Warlimont, with the solving of these questions as
    far as they concern the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Now
    I ask you, as far as your office is concerned, to deal with them
    only.”

Immediately upon receipt of the order from Hitler Rosenberg began
building his organization, conferring with the various ministries,
issuing his instructions, and generally making the detailed plans and
preparations necessary to carry out his assigned mission. Although
Rosenberg’s files, which were captured intact, were crowded with
documents evidencing both the extent of the preparation and its purpose,
I believe that the citation of a small number which are typical should
be sufficient for the Tribunal and the record. All of those I shall now
discuss were found in the Defendant Rosenberg’s files.

Our document numbered 1030-PS is a memorandum, dated 8 May 1941,
entitled, “General Instructions for all Reich Commissioners in the
Occupied Eastern Territories.” I offer that in evidence as Exhibit
USA-144.

In these instructions to his chief henchmen Rosenberg outlines the
political aims and purposes of the attack. In the second and third
paragraphs of the English translation, which appear on Page 2 of the
German, the following remarks appear:

    “The only possible political goal of war can be the aim to free
    the German Reich from the ‘grossrussisch’ pressure for centuries
    to come. This does not only correspond with German interests but
    also with historical justice, for Russian imperialism was in a
    position to accomplish its policy of conquest and oppression
    almost unopposed, whilst it threatened Germany again and again.
    Therefore, the German Reich has to beware of starting a campaign
    against Russia with a historical injustice, meaning the
    reconstruction of a great Russian empire, no matter of what
    kind. On the contrary, all historical struggles of the various
    nationalities against Moscow and Leningrad have to be
    scrutinized for their bearing on the situation today. This has
    been done on the part of the National Socialist movement to
    correspond to the Leader’s political testament as laid down in
    his book, that now the military and political threat in the East
    shall be eliminated forever.

    “Therefore this huge area must be divided according to its
    historical and racial conditions into Reich commissions each of
    which bears within itself a different political aim. The Reich
    Commission Eastland”—Ostland—“including White Ruthenia, will
    have the task to prepare, by way of development into a
    Germanized protectorate, a progressively closer cohesion with
    Germany. The Ukraine shall become an independent state in
    alliance with Germany, and Caucasia with the contiguous northern
    territories a federal state with a German plenipotentiary.
    Russia proper must put her own house in order for the future.
    These general viewpoints are explained in the following
    instructions for each Reich commissioner. Beyond that there are
    still a few general considerations which possess validity for
    all Reich commissioners.”

The fifth paragraph of the English translation, Page 7 of the German,
presents a fascinating rationalization of a contemplated robbery. It
reads:

    “The German people have achieved, in the course of centuries,
    tremendous accomplishments in the eastern European area. Nearly
    all its land and houses were confiscated without
    indemnification; hundreds of thousands (in the south on the
    Volga) starved or were deported or, as in the Baltic
    territories, deprived of the fruits of their cultural work
    during the past 700 years. The German Reich must proclaim the
    principle that after the occupation of the Eastern Territories
    the former German assets are the property of the people of
    Greater Germany, irrespective of the consent of the former
    individual proprietors, where the German Reich may reserve the
    right (assuming that it has not already been done during
    resettlement) to arrange a just settlement. The manner of
    compensation and restitution of this national property will be
    subject to different treatment by each Reich commission.”

Document Number 1029-PS in our series is an “Instruction for a Reich
Commissioner Ostland.” It is typical of the type of instruction which
was issued to each of the appointed commissioners (or Kommissars), and
is amazingly frank in outlining intentions of the Nazi conspirators
toward the country they intended to occupy in the course of their
aggression. I offer this document in evidence as Exhibit USA-145. I
should like to read into the record the first three paragraphs. It
begins:

    “All the regions between Narva and Tilsit have constantly been
    in close relationship with the German people. A 700-year-old
    history has moulded the inner sympathies of the majority of the
    races living there in a European direction and has in spite of
    all Russian threats added this region to the living space of
    Greater Germany.

    “The aim of a Reich commissioner for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
    and White Ruthenia”—last words added in pencil—“must be to
    strive to achieve the form of a German Protectorate and then
    transform the region into part of the Greater German Reich by
    germanizing racially possible elements, colonizing Germanic
    races, and banishing undesirable elements. The Baltic Sea must
    become a Germanic inland sea under the guardianship of Greater
    Germany.

    “For certain cattle-raising products the Baltic region was a
    land of surplus; and the Reich commissioner must endeavor to
    make this surplus once more available to the German people and,
    if possible, to increase it. With regard to the process of
    germanizing or resettling, the Estonian people are strongly
    germanized to the extent of 50 percent by Danish, German, and
    Swedish blood, and can be considered as a kindred nation. In
    Latvia the section capable of being assimilated is considerably
    smaller than in Estonia. In this country stronger resistance
    will have to be reckoned with and banishment on a larger scale
    will have to be envisaged. A similar development may have to be
    reckoned with in Lithuania, for here too the immigration of
    racial Germans is called for in order to promote very extensive
    germanization (on the East Prussian border).”

Skipping a paragraph, the next paragraph is also interesting and reads
as follows:

    “The task of a Reich commissioner with his seat of office in
    Riga will therefore largely be an extraordinarily positive one.
    A country which 700 years ago was captured by German Knights,
    built up by the Hanseatic League, and by reason of a constant
    influx of German blood together with Swedish elements was a
    predominantly germanized land, is to be established as a mighty
    German borderland. The preliminary cultural conditions are
    available everywhere; and the German Reich will be able to
    guarantee the right to a later settlement to all those who have
    distinguished themselves in this war, to the descendants of
    those who gave their lives during the war, and also to all who
    fought in the Baltic campaign, never once lost courage, fought
    on in the hour of despair, and delivered Baltic civilization
    from Bolshevism. For the rest the solution of the colonization
    problem is not a Baltic question but one which concerns Greater
    Germany, and it must be settled on these lines.”

These two directives are, I think, sufficiently typical of the lot to
show the Tribunal the extent of the planning and preparation for this
phase of the aggression as well as the political purpose it was hoped
would be achieved thereby. However, on 28 June 1941, less than a week
after the invasion, Rosenberg himself prepared a full report of his
activities since his appointment on the 20th of April. One might almost
think he had so meticulously recorded his activities in order to be of
assistance to this prosecution.

This report is numbered 1039-PS, and I now offer it in evidence as
Exhibit USA-146. To me the most interesting things about this report are
its disclosures concerning the number of these defendants who worked
with and assisted Rosenberg in the planning and preparation for this
phase of the aggression and the extent to which practically all of the
ministries and offices of both state and Party are shown to have been
involved in this operation. The report was found in the Defendant
Rosenberg’s files; and although it is rather long, it is of sufficient
importance in implicating persons, groups, and organizations, that it
must, I believe, be read in full in order that it may be made part of
the record. It is headed, “Report on the Preparatory Work in Eastern
European Territories”:

    “Immediately after the notification of individual supreme Reich
    offices regarding the Führer’s Decree of 20.4.41 a conference
    with the Chief of the OKW”—Armed Forces High Command—“took
    place”—That is the Defendant Keitel—“After presentation of the
    various political aims in the proposed Reich commissions and
    presentation of personal requirements for the East, the chief of
    the OKW explained that reservation”—UK-Stellung—“would be too
    complicated in this case and that this matter could be carried
    out best by direct assignment”—Abkommandierung—“by command of
    the Chief of the OKW. General Field Marshal Keitel then issued
    an appropriate command which established the basis for the
    coming requirements. He named as deputy and liaison officer
    General Jodl and Major General Warlimont. The negotiations which
    then commenced relative in all questions of the Eastern
    territory including personal needs”—relative to, I suppose it
    is—“were carried on by the gentlemen of the OKW in
    collaboration with officials of my office.

    “A conference took place with Admiral Canaris to the effect that
    under the given confidential circumstances my office could in no
    way deal with any representatives of the people of the east
    European area. I asked him to do this insofar as the military
    intelligence required it and then to name persons to me who
    could count as political personalities, over and above the
    military intelligence, in order to arrange for their eventual
    commitment later. Admiral Canaris said that naturally also my
    wish not to recognize any political groups among the emigrants
    would be considered by him and that he was planning to proceed
    in accordance with my indications.

    “Later on I informed General Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch and
    Grossadmiral Raeder about the historical and political
    conceptions of the Eastern problem. In further conferences we
    agreed to appoint a representative of my office to the Supreme
    Commander of the Army, respectively to the Chief Quartermaster,
    and to the Army groups for questions relative to political
    configuration and requests of the OKW. In the meantime this has
    been done.

    “Already at the outset there was a discussion with Minister of
    Economics”—Reichswirtschaftsminister—“Funk”—the Defendant
    Funk—“who appointed as his permanent deputy Ministerial
    Director Dr. Schlotterer. Almost daily conferences were then
    held with Dr. Schlotterer with reference to the war economic
    intentions of the Economic Operational Staff East. In this
    connection I had conferences with General Thomas, State
    Secretary Körner, State Secretary Backe, Ministerial Director
    Riecke, General Schubert, and others.

    “Far-reaching agreement was reached in the eastern questions as
    regards direct technical work now and in the future. A few
    problems regarding the general relationship of the proposed
    Reich ministry toward the Four Year Plan are still open and will
    be subject, after submission, to the decision of the Führer. In
    principle I declared that I in no way intended to found an
    economic department in my office; economics would rather be
    handled substantially and practically by the Reich
    Marshal”—that is the Defendant Göring—“and the persons
    appointed by him. However, the two responsible department heads,
    namely, Ministerial Director Dr. Schlotterer for industrial
    economy and Ministerial Director Riecke for food economy, would
    be placed in my office as permanent liaison men to co-ordinate
    here political aims with the economic necessities in a
    department which would still have to unite with other persons
    for such co-ordinating work, depending on labor conditions as
    they may arise later on (political leadership of labor unions,
    construction, _et cetera_).

    “After notification of the Reich Foreign Minister, the latter
    appointed Geheimrat Grosskopf as permanent liaison man to my
    office. For the requested representation in the political
    department of my office (headed by Reichsamtsleiter Dr.
    Leibbrandt), the Foreign Ministry released Consul General Dr.
    Bräutigam, who is known to me for many years, speaks Russian,
    and worked for years in Russia. Negotiations, which if necessary
    will be placed before the Führer, are under way with the Foreign
    Office regarding its wishes for the assignment of its
    representatives to the future Reich commissioners (or
    Kommissars).

    “The Propaganda Ministry”—that is Goebbels—“appointed State
    Secretary Gutterer as permanent liaison man, and a complete
    agreement was reached to the effect that the decisions on all
    political and other essays, speeches, proclamations, _et
    cetera_, would be made in my office; a great number of
    substantial works for propaganda would be delivered and the
    papers prepared by the Propaganda Ministry would be modified
    here, if necessary. The whole practical employment of propaganda
    will undisputedly be subject to the Reich Ministry of Public
    Enlightenment and Propaganda. For the sake of closer
    co-operation the Propaganda Ministry assigns yet another person
    directly under my department, ‘Enlightenment and Press,’ and in
    addition appoints a permanent press liaison man. All these
    activities have been going on for some time, and without
    attracting attention to my office in any way this co-ordination
    on contents and terminology takes place continually every day.

    “Thorough discussions took place with Reich Minister Ohnesorge
    concerning future transmission of communication and setting up
    of all technical necessities in future occupied territories;
    with Reich Minister Seldte on the supply of labor forces, with
    Reich Minister Frick”—that is the Defendant Frick—“(State
    Secretary Stuckart) in detailed form on the assignment of
    numerous necessary officials for the commissions. According to
    the present estimate there will be four Reich commissions as
    approved by the Führer. I shall propose to the Führer for
    political and other reasons to set up a suitable number of
    general commissions (24), main commissions (about 80), and
    regional commissions (over 900). A general commission would
    correspond to a former general government; a main commission to
    a main government.

    “A regional commission contains three or four
    districts”—Kreise—“In view of the huge spaces that is the
    minimum number which appears necessary for a future civil
    government or administration. A portion of the officials has
    already been requested on the basis of the above-named command
    of the Chief of the OKW.”

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, speaking for myself I don’t understand why
it is necessary to read this document in full. You have already shown
that there was a plan for dividing Russia up into a number of
commissions.

MR. ALDERMAN: Quite true. I should like merely to point out two of three
other individual defendants who are referred to in this document and as
to whom the document shows that they were in immediate complicity with
this whole scheme. The first of those, about three paragraphs further
down, the Reich Youth Leader—that is the Defendant Baldur Von Schirach.
Then of course Gruppenführer SS Heydrich, about the next paragraph . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Well, he is not a defendant.

MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir. His organization is, however, if the Tribunal
please, charged as a criminal organization.

In the next paragraph, the Defendant Ministerial Director Fritzsche, who
worked under Goebbels.

Without a long discussion of further evidence I might summarize the
individual implication in this fashion. Those of the individual
defendants now on trial which this report personally involves are
Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Funk, Göring, Ribbentrop, Frick, Schirach, and
Fritzsche. The organizations involved by this report include the
following:

OKW, OKH, OKM, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Economics, Reich
Foreign Ministry, Propaganda Ministry, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of
Communications, the Reich Physicians’ Union, Ministry of Munitions and
Armaments, Reich Youth Leadership, Reich Organization Leadership, German
Labor Front, the SS, the SA, and the Reich Press Chief.

At a later stage in the Trial, and in other connections, I should like
to ask the Tribunal to consider that that document with which I have
just been dealing be considered a part of the record to the extent that
it involves these individuals.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you can treat it as all being in evidence.

MR. ALDERMAN: At a later stage in the Trial and in other connections,
evidence will be introduced concerning the manner in which all of this
planning and preparation for the elimination of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics as a political factor was actually carried out. The
planned execution of intelligentsia and other Russian leaders was, for
example, but a part of the actual operation of the program to destroy
the Soviet Union politically and make impossible its early resurrection
as a European power.

Having thus elaborately prepared on every side for the invasion of the
Soviet Union, the Nazi conspirators proceeded to carry out their plans;
and on 22 June 1941 hurled their armies across the borders of the
U.S.S.R. In announcing this act of perfidy to the world Hitler issued a
proclamation on the day of the attack. The text of this statement has
already been brought to the Tribunal’s attention by my British
colleagues, and I should like merely to refer to it in passing here by
quoting therefrom this one sentence, “I have therefore today decided to
give the fate of Europe again into the hands of our soldiers.”

This announcement told the world that the die had been cast—the plans
darkly conceived almost a full year before and secretly and continuously
developed since then, had now been brought to fruition. These
conspirators, having carefully and completely planned and prepared this
war of aggression, now proceeded to initiate and wage it.

That brings us to the consideration of the motives for the attack.
Before going into the positive reasons I should like first to point out
that not only was Germany bound by a solemn covenant not to attack the
U.S.S.R., but throughout the entire period from August 1939 to the
invasion in 1941 the Soviet Union was faithful to its agreements with
Germany and displayed no aggressive intentions toward territories of the
German Reich. General Thomas, for example, points out in his draft of
“Basic Facts for a History of the German War and Armaments Economy,”
which is our Document Number 2353-PS and which I put in evidence earlier
as Exhibit USA-35, that insofar as the German-Soviet Trade Agreement of
11 August 1939 was concerned, the Soviets carried out their deliveries
thereunder up to the very end.

Thomas points out that deliveries by the Soviets were usually made
quickly and well; and since the food and raw materials being thus
delivered were considered essential to the German economy, efforts were
made to keep up their side too. However, as preparations for the
campaign proceeded, the Nazis cared less about complying with their
obligations under that agreement. At Page 315 of his book Thomas says,
and I read from Page 9 of the English translation:

    “Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries diminished, as
    preparations for the campaign in the East were already under
    way.”

By that, clearly he speaks of German deliveries to Russia, not as to
what the Russians delivered.

    “The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned right up
    to the start of the attack; even during the last few days
    transports of india-rubber from the Far East were completed by
    express transit trains.”

Again at Page 404 this author brings this point out even more forcefully
when he states—and I shall read the first paragraph on Page 14 of the
English translation:

    “In addition to the Italian negotiations until June 1941, the
    negotiations with Russia were accorded a great deal of
    attention.

    “The Führer issued the directive that, in order to camouflage
    German troop movements, the orders Russia has placed in Germany
    must be filled as promptly as possible. Since the Russians only
    made grain deliveries when the Germans delivered orders placed
    by the Russians and since, in the case of the individual firms,
    these deliveries to Russia made it impossible for them to fill
    orders for the German Armed Forces, it was necessary for the Wi
    Rü office to enter into numerous individual negotiations with
    German firms in order to co-ordinate Russian orders with those
    of the Germans from the standpoint of priority. In accordance
    with the wishes of the Foreign Office German industry was
    instructed to accept all Russian orders even if it were
    impossible to fill them within the limits of the time set for
    manufacture and delivery. Since, in May especially, large
    deliveries had to be made to the Navy, the firms were instructed
    to allow the equipment to go through the Russian Acceptance
    Commission, then however, to make such a detour during its
    transportation as to make it impossible for it to be delivered
    over the frontier prior to the beginning of the German attack.”

Not only was the Soviet Union faithful to the treaty obligations with
Germany but the evidence shows that she had no aggressive intentions
toward any German territory. Our Document Number C-170, which is in
evidence as Exhibit USA-136, is as I have previously stated, a file on
Russo-German relations found in the files of the Naval High Command
covering the entire period from the treaty to the attack. The entries in
this file demonstrate conclusively the point I have just stated. It
will, I think, be sufficient to read to the Tribunal a few entries which
include reports from the German Ambassador in Moscow as late as June
1941. I shall read the first entry, 165 on Page 21 of the English
translation; that is 4 June:

    “Outwardly, no change in the relationship Germany-Russia;
    Russian deliveries continue to full satisfaction. Russian
    Government is endeavoring to do everything to prevent a conflict
    with Germany.”

In entry 167 on Page 22 of the English translation, it says:

    “6 June. Ambassador in Moscow reports . . . Russia will only
    fight if attacked by Germany. Situation is considered in Moscow
    much more serious than up to now. All military preparations have
    been made quietly—as far as can be recognized, only defensive.
    Russian policy still strives as before to produce the best
    possible relationship to Germany.”

The next one is entry 169, also on Page 22; the date, 7 June:

    “From the report of the Ambassador in Moscow . . . all
    observations show that Stalin and Molotov, who alone are
    responsible for Russian foreign policy, are doing everything to
    avoid a conflict with Germany. The entire behavior of the
    Government as well as the attitude of the press, which reports
    all events concerning Germany in a factual, indisputable manner,
    support this view. The loyal fulfillment of the economic treaty
    with Germany proves the same thing.”

Now, that is the German Ambassador talking to you.

The reasons, therefore, which led to the attack on the Soviet Union
could not have been self-defense or treaty breaches. In truth, no doubt,
as has been necessarily implied from the materials presented on planning
and preparation, more than one motive entered into the decision of the
Nazi conspirators to launch their aggression against the U.S.S.R. All of
them, however, appear to blend into one grand motive of Nazi policy. The
pattern into which these various reasons impelling the decision to
attack may be said to fall is the traditional Nazi ambition for
expansion to the East at the expense of the U.S.S.R. This Nazi version
of an earlier imperial imperative—the “Drang nach Osten” (or the drive
to the East)—had been a cardinal principle of the Nazi Party almost
since its birth and rested on the twin bases of political strategy and
economic aggrandizement. Politically such action meant the elimination
of the powerful country to the east, which might constitute a threat to
German ambitions, and acquisition of Lebensraum; while on the economic
side, it offered magnificent opportunities for the plunder of vast
quantities of food, raw materials, and other supplies, going far beyond
any legitimate exploitation under the Geneva Convention principles for
military purpose. Undoubtedly the demands of the German war economy for
food and raw material served to revive the attractiveness on the
economic side of this theory while the difficulties Germany was
experiencing in defeating England reaffirmed for the Nazi conspirators
the temporarily forgotten Nazi political imperative of eliminating, as a
political factor, their one formidable opponent on the continent.

As early as 1923 Hitler outlined this theory in some detail in _Mein
Kampf_ where he stated, and I quote from Page 641 of the Houghton
Mifflin English edition, as follows:

    “There are two reasons which induce me to submit to a special
    examination the relation of Germany to Russia: (1) Here perhaps
    we are dealing with the most decisive concern of all German
    foreign affairs; and (2) this question is also the touchstone
    for the political capacity of the young National Socialist
    movement to think clearly and to act correctly.”

And again at Page 654 of the same edition:

    “And so we National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath
    the foreign policy tendency of our pre-war period. We take up
    where we broke off 600 years ago. We stop the endless German
    movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze toward the
    land in the East. At long last we break off the colonial and
    commercial policy of the pre-war period and shift to the soil
    policy of the future.

    “If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in
    mind only Russia and her vassal border states.”

The political portion of this economy or purpose is clearly reflected in
the stated purposes of the organization which the Defendant Rosenberg
set up to administer the Occupied Eastern Territories. I have already
discussed this material and need not repeat it now. In a speech,
however, which he delivered 2 days before the attack to the people most
interested in the problem of the East, Rosenberg re-stated in his usual
somewhat mystic fashion the political basis for the campaign and its
inter-relationship with the economic goal. I should like to read a short
extract from that speech, which is Document Number 1058-PS and which I
now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-147. The part I read is from Page 9
of the German text:

    “The job of feeding the German people stands this year, without
    a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany’s claims in the East;
    and here the southern territories and the northern Caucasus will
    have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people.
    We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part to
    feed also the Russian people with the products of that surplus
    territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any
    feelings. A very extensive evacuation will be necessary, without
    any doubt, and it is sure that the future will hold very hard
    years in store for the Russians. A later decision will have to
    determine to what extent industries can still be maintained
    there (wagon factories, _et cetera_). The consideration and
    execution of this policy in the Russian area proper is for the
    German Reich and its future a tremendous and by no means
    negative task, as might appear, if one takes only the harsh
    necessity of the evacuation into consideration. The conversion
    of Russian dynamics towards the East is a task which requires
    the strongest characters. Perhaps this decision will also be
    approved by a coming Russia later, not in 30 but in a 100
    years.”

As I have indicated, the failure of the Nazi conspirators to defeat
Great Britain had served to strengthen them further in their belief of
the political necessity of eliminating the Soviet Union as a European
factor before Germany could completely achieve her role as the master of
Europe.

The economic motive for the aggression was brought out clearly in our
discussion of the organization set up under Göring and General Thomas to
carry out the economic exploitation of the territories they occupied.
The purely materialistic basis for the attack was unmistakable; and if
any doubt existed that at least one of the main purposes of the invasion
was to steal the food and raw material needed for the Nazi war machine
regardless of the horrible consequences such robbery would entail, that
doubt is dispelled by a memorandum, which bears our Number 2718-PS and
which I introduced earlier during my opening statement as Exhibit
USA-32, showing clear and conscious recognition that these Nazi plans
would no doubt result in starving to death millions of people by robbing
them of their food.

Along the similar line, on June 20, 1941 General Thomas wrote a
memorandum in which he stated that General Keitel had confirmed to him
Hitler’s present conception of the German economic policy concerning raw
material. This policy expressed the almost unbelievably heartless theory
that less manpower would be used in the conquest of sources of raw
materials than would be necessary to produce synthetics in lieu of such
raw materials. This is our Document Number 1456-PS, and I offer it in
evidence as Exhibit USA-148. I should like to read the first two
paragraphs.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we better do that after the adjournment.

                [_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]

                          _Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: I understand that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner is now in
court. Will you stand up, please?

[_The Defendant Kaltenbrunner rose in the dock._]

THE PRESIDENT: In accordance with Article 24 of the Charter, you must
now plead either guilty or not guilty.

ERNST KALTENBRUNNER: I plead not guilty. I do not believe that I have
made myself guilty.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had just put in evidence our
Document 1456-PS as Exhibit USA-148. I now read from that document on
Page 17:

    “The following is a new conception of the Führer, which Minister
    Todt has explained to me and which has been confirmed later on
    by Field Marshal Keitel:

    “I. The course of the war shows that we went too far in our
    autarkical endeavors. It is impossible to try to manufacture
    everything we lack by synthetic procedures or other measures.
    For instance, it is impossible to develop our motor fuel economy
    to a point where we can entirely depend on it. All these
    autarkical endeavors demand a tremendous amount of manpower, and
    it is simply impossible to provide it. One has to choose another
    way. What one does not have but needs, one must conquer. The
    commitment of men which is necessary for one single action will
    not be as great as the one that is currently needed for the
    running of the synthetic factories in question. The aim must
    therefore be to secure all territories which are of special
    interest to us for the war economy by conquering them.

    “At the time the Four Year Plan was established I issued a
    statement in which I made it clear that a completely autarkical
    economy is impossible for us because the need of men will be too
    great. My solution, however, has always been directed to
    securing the necessary reserves for missing stocks by concluding
    economic agreements which would guarantee delivery even in
    wartime.”

On this macabre note I come to the end of the story of this aggression.
We have seen these conspirators as they planned, prepared, and finally
initiated their wanton attack upon the Soviet Union. Others will carry
on the tale and describe the horrible manner in which they waged this
war of aggression and the countless crimes they committed in its wake.
When I consider the solemn pledge of non-aggression, the base and
sinister motives involved, the months of secret planning and
preparation, and the unbelievable suffering intentionally and
deliberately wrought—when I consider all of this, I feel fully
justified in saying that never before—and, God help us, never again—in
the history of relations between sovereign nations has a blacker chapter
been written than the one which tells of this unprovoked invasion of the
territory of the Soviet Union. For those responsible—and they are here
before you, the defendants in this case—it might be just to let the
punishment fit the crime.

I now turn to the final phase of the detailed presentation of the
aggressive-war part of the case: German collaboration with Italy and
Japan, and aggressive war against the United States. The relevant
portions of the Indictment are set forth in Subsection 7 under Section
IV (F) of Count One, appearing at Pages 9 and 10 of the printed English
text of the Indictment. The materials relating to this unholy alliance
of the three fascist powers and to the aggressive war against the United
States have been gathered together in a document book, marked with the
letter “Q,” which I now submit to the Tribunal.

Before moving on to the subject matter of this tripartite collaboration,
I should like to invite the attention of the Tribunal to the
significance of this phase. In the course of the joint presentation by
the British and American Prosecution in the past several days, we have
seen the swastika carried forward by force of arms from a tightly
controlled and remilitarized Germany to the four corners of Europe. The
elements of a conspiracy that I am now about to discuss project the Nazi
plan upon a universal screen, involving the older world of Asia and the
new world of the United States of America. As a result, the wars of
aggression that were planned in Berlin and launched across the frontiers
of Poland ended some six years later, almost to the day, in surrender
ceremonies upon a United States battleship riding at anchor in the Bay
of Tokyo.

The first formal alliance between Hitler’s Germany and the Japanese
Government was the Anti-Comintern Pact signed in Berlin on 25 November
1936. This agreement, on its face, was directed against the activities
of the Communist International. It was subsequently adhered to by Italy
on 6 November 1937.

I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these official state
documents in accordance with Article 21 of the Charter. The German text
of these treaties—the original German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact and
the subsequent Protocol of Adherence by Italy—is to be found in Volumes
4 and 5 of the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, respectively. The
English translation of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of 25
November 1936 is contained in our Document 2508-PS; the English
translation of the Protocol of Adherence by Italy of 6 November 1937 is
contained in our Document 2506-PS. Both of these documents are included
in the document books which have just been handed up to the Tribunal.

It is an interesting fact, especially in the light of the evidence I
shall submit regarding the Defendant Ribbentrop’s active participation
in collaboration with the Japanese, that Ribbentrop signed the
Anti-Comintern Pact for Germany at Berlin even though at that time,
November 1936, Ribbentrop was not the German Foreign Minister but simply
Hitler’s special Ambassador Plenipotentiary.

On 27 September 1940 some four years after the Anti-Comintern Pact was
signed and one year after the initiation of war in Europe, the German,
Italian, and Japanese Governments signed another pact at Berlin, a
10-year military-economic alliance. Again I note that the Defendant
Ribbentrop signed for Germany, this time in his capacity as Foreign
Minister. The official German text of this pact, as well as the Japanese
and Italian texts together with an English translation, is contained in
our Document 2643-PS, which has been certified by the signature and seal
of the United States Secretary of State. I now offer in evidence
Document 2643-PS as Exhibit USA-149.

The Tripartite Pact pledged Germany, Italy, and Japan to support of, and
collaboration with, one another in the establishment of a New Order in
Europe and East Asia. I should like to read into the record parts of
this far-reaching agreement:

    “The Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan consider it as a
    condition precedent of a lasting peace, that each nation of the
    world be given its own proper place. They have, therefore,
    decided to stand together and to co-operate with one another in
    their efforts in Greater East Asia and in the regions of Europe,
    wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a
    new order of things calculated to promote the prosperity and
    welfare of the peoples there. Furthermore, it is the desire of
    the three Governments to extend this co-operation to such
    nations in other parts of the world as are inclined to give to
    their endeavors a direction similar to their own, in order that
    their aspirations towards world peace as the ultimate goal may
    thus be realized. Accordingly, the Governments of Germany,
    Italy, and Japan have agreed as follows:

    “Article 1. Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of
    Germany and Italy in the establishment of a New Order in Europe.

    “Article 2. Germany and Italy recognize and respect the
    leadership of Japan in the establishment of a New Order in
    Greater East Asia.

    “Article 3. Germany, Italy, and Japan agree to co-operate in
    their efforts on the aforesaid basis. They further undertake to
    assist one another with all political, economic, and military
    means, if one of the three contracting parties is attacked by a
    power at present not involved in the European war or in the
    Chinese-Japanese conflict.”

I now skip to the first sentence of Article 6.

    “The present pact shall come into force immediately upon
    signature and remain in force for 10 years from the date of its
    coming into force.”

The Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940 thus was a bold announcement to
the world that the fascist leaders of Germany, Japan, and Italy had
cemented a full military alliance to achieve world domination and to
establish a New Order presaged by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in
1931, the ruthless Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935, and the Nazi
overflow into Austria early in 1938. I might also comment that this fact
introduces the Führerprinzip into world politics.

I should like to read in this connection a statement by Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State of the United States, at the time of the signing of
this Tripartite Pact. This statement appears in the official United
States publication, _Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy,
1931-1941_, which has already been put in evidence as Exhibit USA-122.
Mr. Hull’s statement is Number 184 therein. It is also our Document
Number 2944-PS, and both the English text and a German translation
thereof are included in the document books. I now quote a statement by
the Secretary of State, 27 September 1940:

    “The reported agreement of alliance does not, in view of the
    Government of the United States, substantially alter a situation
    which has existed for several years. Announcement of the
    alliance merely makes clear to all a relationship which has long
    existed in effect, and to which this Government have repeatedly
    called attention. That such an agreement has been in process of
    conclusion has been well known for some time, and that fact has
    been fully taken into account by the Government of the United
    States, in the determining of this country’s policies.”

That ends the quotation.

I shall not attempt here to trace the relationships and negotiations
leading up to the Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940. I shall note,
however, one example of the type of German-Japanese relationship
existing before the formalization of the Tripartite Pact. This is the
record of the conversation of 31 January 1939 between Himmler and
General Oshima, Japanese Ambassador at Berlin, which was referred to by
the United States Chief of Counsel in his opening address. This
document, which is signed by Himmler in crayon, is our Document Number
2195-PS. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-150. I now quote the file
memorandum:

    “Today I visited General Oshima. The conversation ranged over
    the following subjects:

    “1) The Führer speech, which pleased him very much, especially
    because it has been spiritually well founded in every respect.

    “2) We discussed the conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the
    triangle Germany-Italy-Japan into an even firmer mold. He also
    told me that, together with German
    counter-espionage”—Abwehr—“he was undertaking long-range
    projects aimed at the disintegration of Russia and emanating
    from the Caucasus and the Ukraine. However, this organization
    was to become effective only in case of war.

    “3) Furthermore, he had succeeded up to now in sending 10
    Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These
    Russians had the mission to kill Stalin. A number of additional
    Russians whom he had also sent across had been shot at the
    frontier.”

Whatever the beginning and the course of development of the fascist
triplice, the Nazi conspirators, once their military and economic
alliance with Japan had been formalized, exhorted the Japanese to
aggression against those nations with whom they were at war and those
with whom they contemplated war. In this the conspirators pursued a
course strikingly parallel to that followed in their relationship with
the other member of the European Axis. On 10 June 1940 in fulfillment of
her alliance with Germany, Italy had carried out her “stab in the back”
by declaring war against France and Great Britain. These Nazi
conspirators set about to induce similar action by Japan on the other
side of the world.

As I shall show, the nations against whom the German-Japanese
collaboration was aimed at various times were the British Commonwealth
of Nations, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United
States of America. I shall deal with each of these nations in the order
named.

At least as early as 23 February 1941—on the basis of documents
available to us—these conspirators undertook to exploit their alliance
with Japan by exhortations to commit aggression against the British
Commonwealth. Again the figure of the Defendant Ribbentrop appears. On
that date, 23 February 1941, he held a conference with General Oshima,
the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, at which he urged that the Japanese
open hostilities against the British in the Far East as soon as
possible.

The report of that conference, our Document 1834-PS, has already been
offered in connection with the presentation of the case on aggression
against the Soviet Union as Exhibit USA-129. A part of it has already
been read into the record and I now intend to read other portions. I
shall again come back to this document when dealing with the
German-Japanese collaboration as regards the United States.

As can be seen on the cover page of the English translation, Ribbentrop
on 2 March sent copies of an extract of the record of this conference to
his various ambassadors and ministers for their strictly confidential
and purely personal information with the further note that—and I quote:

    “These statements are of fundamental significance for
    orientation in the general political situation facing Germany in
    early spring 1941.”

I shall now quote from the top of Page 2 of the English translation of
1834-PS, to the end of the first paragraph on that page, and then skip
to the last three sentences of the second paragraph:

    “Extract from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign
    Minister with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941.

    “After particularly cordial mutual greetings the RAM (Reich
    Foreign Minister) declared that Ambassador Oshima had been
    proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in
    the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany’s victory in
    the West these policies had been fully vindicated. He (the
    RAM)”—that is Ribbentrop—“regretted that the alliance between
    Germany and Japan, for which he had been working with the
    ambassador for many years already, had come into being only
    after various detours; but public opinion in Japan had not been
    ripe for it earlier. The main thing was, however, that they are
    together now.”

Then, skipping:

    “Now that the German-Japanese alliance has been concluded,
    Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from the
    Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question of
    its further development now stands in the foreground. How is the
    situation in this respect?”

Ribbentrop, thereafter in the conference, proceeded to shape the
argument for Japanese intervention against the British. First outlining
the intended air and U-boat warfare by Germany against England, he
said—and I now quote the last two sentences in Paragraph 4, on Page 2,
of the English translation:

    “Thereby England’s situation would take catastrophic shape
    overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution,
    however, depends on various factors, above all on weather
    conditions.”

And then skipping and picking up at the first full paragraph on Page 3
of the English translation, I quote the Defendant Ribbentrop again:

    “The Führer will beat England wherever he encounters her.
    Besides, our strength is not only equal but superior to a
    combined English-American air force at any time. The number of
    pilots at our disposal is unlimited. The same is true of our
    airplane production capacity. As far as quality is concerned,
    ours always has been superior to the English—to say nothing
    about the American—and we are on the way to enlarge even this
    lead. Upon order of the Führer the antiaircraft defense, too,
    will be greatly reinforced. Since the Army has been supplied far
    beyond its requirements and enormous reserves have been piled
    up—the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the
    immense stock of material—production now will be concentrated
    on submarines, airplanes, and antiaircraft guns.

    “Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won
    today, militarily, economically, and politically. We have the
    desire to end the war quickly, and to force England to sue for
    peace soon. The Führer is vigorous and healthy, fully convinced
    of victory, and determined to bring the war as quickly as
    possible to a victorious close. To this end the cooperation with
    Japan is of importance. However, Japan, in her own interest,
    should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy England’s
    key position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, would
    thus secure her position in the Far East, a position which she
    could acquire only through war. There were three reasons for
    quick action:

    “1) Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the
    center of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser warfare,
    _et cetera_). The effect upon the morale of the British people
    would be very serious and this would contribute toward a quick
    ending of the war.

    “2) A surprise intervention by Japan is bound to keep America
    out of the war. America, which at present is not yet armed and
    would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks west of
    Hawaii, could then less likely do this. If Japan would otherwise
    respect the American interests, there would not even be the
    possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige
    to make war plausible to the Americans. It is very unlikely that
    America would declare war if she then would have to stand by
    helplessly while Japan takes the Philippines without America
    being able to do anything about it.

    “3) In view of the coming New World Order it seems to be in the
    interest of Japan also to secure for herself, even during the
    war, the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the time
    of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed entirely with this
    line of thought and said that he would do everything to carry
    through this policy.”

I should like to note at this point the subtlety of Ribbentrop’s
argument. First he told the Japanese Ambassador that Germany had already
practically won the war by herself. Nevertheless he suggested that the
war could be successfully terminated more quickly with Japan’s aid and
that the moment was propitious for Japan’s entry. Then referring to the
spoils of the conquest, he indicated that Japan would be best advised to
pick up by herself during the war the positions she wanted, implying
that she would have to earn her share of the booty, which is reminiscent
of that statement I read to you earlier from the Führer, that “those who
wished to be in on the meal must take a part in the cooking.”

Continuing Ribbentrop’s argument to show the real nature of the
German-Japanese alliance, I shall now read the top two paragraphs on
Page 5 of the English translation of 1834-PS:

    “The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was
    Japan’s friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the
    Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan had
    been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of
    influence in China. Germany’s victory on the continent has
    brought now, after the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, great
    advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was eliminated in the
    Far East (Indo-China). England, too, was considerably weakened;
    Japan had been able to close unsteadily on Singapore. Thus,
    Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the
    future fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical
    situation, we should have to carry the main burden of the final
    battle in the future, too. If an unwanted conflict with Russia
    should arise, we should have to carry the main burden also in
    this case. If Germany should ever weaken, Japan would find
    herself confronted by a world coalition within a short time. We
    would all be in the same boat. The fate of both nations would be
    determined for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy.
    The interests of the three countries would never intersect. A
    defeat of Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese
    imperialistic idea.

    “Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements and
    emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep her
    imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the
    great problems which would arise after the war for the parties
    of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in
    Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require a
    bold solution. Thereby no over-centralization should take place;
    but a solution should be found on a basis of parity,
    particularly in the economic realm. In regard to this the Reich
    Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a free exchange of
    trade should take place between the two spheres of influence on
    a liberal basis. The European-African hemisphere under the
    leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East Asian sphere of
    interest under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for
    example, Japan would conduct trade and make trade agreements
    directly with the independent states in the European hemisphere
    as heretofore, while Germany and Italy would trade directly and
    make trade agreements with the independent countries within the
    Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indo-China,
    _et cetera_. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres,
    each should fundamentally grant the other preferences with
    regard to third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with
    this thought.”

In the document I have just quoted from we have seen the instigation to
war by the Defendant Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister. I shall
return to him again in this connection.

I now wish to show, however, the participation of the so-called military
representatives in the encouragement and provocation of further wars of
aggression. I therefore offer in evidence our Document Number C-75 as
Exhibit USA-151.

This document is a top-secret order signed by the Defendant Keitel as
Chief of the OKW and entitled, “Basic Order Number 24 regarding
Collaboration with Japan.” It is dated 5 March 1941, about a week and a
half after Ribbentrop’s conference with Oshima that I have just
discussed. It was distributed in 14 copies to the highest commands of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as to the Foreign Office. We have
turned up two copies of this order, identical except for handwritten
notations, presumably made by the recipients. C-75, the document I have
introduced, is copy Number 2 of the order distributed to the naval war
staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the OKM. We also have Copy
number 4, designed for the Wehrmacht Führungsstab (the Operations Staff
of the High Command of the Armed Forces). The head of this Operations
Staff was the Defendant Jodl. Copy Number 4 was found in the OKW files
at Flensburg. It is our Document Number 384-PS, and was referred to by
the United States Chief of Counsel in his opening address. I shall not
burden the Tribunal and the record by introducing two identical copies
of the same order.

Basic Order Number 24 was the authoritative Nazi policy on collaboration
with Japan. I shall, therefore, propose to read it in its entirety, some
two pages of English translation:

    “The Führer has issued the following order regarding
    collaboration with Japan:

    “1. It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three
    Power Pact to induce Japan, as soon as possible, _to take active
    measures in the Far East_”—The underscoring is in the original
    document—“Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and
    the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of
    America will be diverted to the Pacific. The sooner she
    intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of success for
    Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness for war on
    the part of her adversaries. The Barbarossa operation will
    create particularly favorable political and military
    prerequisites for this.”

Then there is a marginal note, “Slightly exaggerated.”

THE PRESIDENT: Do you have any idea when that marginal notation was put
in?

MR. ALDERMAN: I assume that was written by the recipient of this copy of
the order.

THE PRESIDENT: By whom?

MR. ALDERMAN: By the recipient of this particular copy of the order,
which was the naval war staff.

    “2. To prepare the way for the collaboration it is essential to
    strengthen the Japanese military potential with all means
    available. For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of
    the Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous
    manner with Japanese desires for information regarding German
    war and combat experience, and for assistance in military
    economics and in technical matters. Reciprocity is desirable,
    but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations.
    Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese requests
    which would have the most immediate application in waging war.
    In special cases the Führer reserves the decisions for himself.

    “3. The harmonizing of the operational plans of the two parties
    is the responsibility of the Naval High Command. This will be
    subject to the following guiding principles:

    “a. The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed as
    forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the
    United States out of the war. Beyond this Germany has no
    political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which
    would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese
    intentions.

    “b. The great successes achieved by Germany in mercantile
    warfare make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong
    Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every
    opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be
    exploited.

    “c. The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that
    Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it
    needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United
    States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even
    after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital
    importance to Germany.

    “d. The seizure of Singapore as the key British position in the
    Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire conduct of
    war of the three powers.

    “In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval
    power—extending to those of American naval power only if the
    entry of the United States into the war cannot be
    prevented—will result in weakening the enemy’s system of power
    in that region and also, just like the attack on sea
    communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds
    (Australia). A date for the beginning of operational discussions
    cannot yet be fixed.

    “4. In the military commissions to be formed in accordance with
    the Three Power Pact, only such questions are to be dealt with
    as equally concern the three participating powers. These will
    include primarily the problems of economic warfare. The working
    out of the details is the responsibility of the main commission
    with the co-operation of the Armed Forces High Command.

    “5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the
    Barbarossa operations.”

It is signed by Keitel as Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.

If the Tribunal will glance at the distribution list, you will see that
it went to the heads of all the Armed Forces, Armed Forces High Command:
Joint Operation Staff, Intelligence divisions, and to the chief of
foreign affairs, simultaneously for the Foreign Office.

It appears from what I have just read that the Nazis’ cardinal
operational principle in collaboration with Japan was, as early as March
1941, the inducement of Japan to aggression against Singapore and other
British far eastern bases. I shall pass over, for the moment, other
references to the United States in Basic Order Number 24 and take up
that point later.

I now wish to refer to our Document Number C-152, which has already been
introduced by the British prosecution as Exhibit GB-122. This document
is the top-secret record of a meeting on 18 March 1941, about 2 weeks
after the issuance of Basic Order Number 24; a meeting attended by
Hitler, the Defendant Raeder, the Defendant Keitel, and the Defendant
Jodl. We are concerned only with Paragraph 11 in this phase, where
Raeder, then Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, is speaking. I quote:

    “Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible,
    since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (tie-up
    of the whole English Fleet; unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war
    against Japan; inferiority of the United States Fleet in
    comparison with the Japanese). Japan is indeed making
    preparations for this action; but according to all declarations
    made by Japanese officers, she will only carry it out if Germany
    proceeds to land in England. Germany must, therefore,
    concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act
    immediately. If Japan has Singapore, all other East Asiatic
    questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved
    (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

    “Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against the U.S.A. She
    can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as
    possible.”

The fact clearly appears from these minutes that military staff
conferences had already been held with the Japanese to discuss the
activation of Japanese military support against the British and to urge
their immediate attack on Singapore. I quote again the second sentence
in that paragraph:

    “Japan is indeed making preparations for this action; but
    according to all declarations made by Japanese officers, she
    will carry it out only if Germany proceeds to land in England.”

Apparently the Nazis were subsequently able to persuade the Japanese to
eliminate this condition precedent to their performance under the
contract.

I now turn to further efforts by the Defendant Ribbentrop to induce the
Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth. On the 29th of
March 1941 he met with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, who was
then in Berlin. A report of their conversations found in the German
Foreign Office archives is contained in our Document 1877-PS, which I
now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-152.

Relevant portions of this document have been translated into English. I
shall now read from the top of Page 1 of the English translation:

    “The RAM”—that is Ribbentrop—“resumed, where they had left
    off, the preceding conversation with Matsuoka about the latter’s
    impending talks with the Russians in Moscow. He expressed the
    opinion that it would probably be best, in view of the whole
    situation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians too
    far. He did not know how the situation would develop. One thing
    was certain, however, namely that Germany would strike
    immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to
    give Matsuoka this positive assurance so that Japan could push
    forward to the south on Singapore without fear of possible
    complications with Russia. The largest part of the German Army
    was on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich anyway and fully
    prepared to open the attack at any time. He (the RAM), however,
    believed that Russia would try to avoid developments leading to
    war. Should Germany, however, enter into a conflict with Russia,
    the U.S.S.R. would be finished off within a few months. In this
    case Japan would have, of course, even less reason to be afraid
    than ever, if she wants to advance on Singapore. Consequently,
    she need not refrain from such an undertaking because of
    possible fears of Russia.

    “He could not know, of course, just how things with Russia would
    develop. It was uncertain whether or not Stalin would intensify
    his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM)
    wanted to point out to Matsuoka in any case that a conflict with
    Russia was at least within the realm of possibility. In any
    case, Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor, upon
    his return, that a conflict between Russia and Germany was
    impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such that such a
    conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be
    considered possible.”

I now skip five pages of the German text and continue directly with the
English translation:

    “Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view
    of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible attacks by
    submarines based on the Philippines, and of the intervention of
    the British Mediterranean and home fleets, he had again
    discussed the situation with Grossadmiral Raeder. The latter had
    stated that the British Navy during this year would have its
    hands so full in the English home waters and in the
    Mediterranean that it would not be able to send even a single
    ship to the Far East. Grossadmiral Raeder had described the
    United States submarines as so poor that Japan need not bother
    about them at all.

    “Matsuoka replied immediately that the Japanese Navy had a very
    low estimate of the threat from the British Navy. It also held
    the view that, in case of a clash with the American Navy, it
    would be able to smash the latter without trouble. However, it
    was afraid that the Americans would not take up the battle with
    their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might
    perhaps be dragged out to 5 years. This possibility caused
    considerable worry in Japan.

    “The RAM replied that America could not do anything against
    Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this
    reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on
    active measures against Japan. For while on the one hand he
    could not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand
    there was the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan;
    for the American President, of course, this would mean a
    considerable loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate
    rearmament, he would have nothing to offset such a loss.

    “In this connection Matsuoka pointed out that he was doing
    everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as
    if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of
    England in the East. Therefore it might be possible that his
    attitude toward the British would appear to be friendly in words
    and in acts. However, Germany should not be deceived by that. He
    assumed this attitude not only in order to reassure the British,
    but also in order to fool the pro-British and pro-American
    elements in Japan just so long, until one day he would suddenly
    open the attack on Singapore.

    “In this connection Matsuoka stated that his tactics were based
    on the certain assumption that the sudden attack against
    Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow.
    (‘Nothing succeeds like success,’ the RAM remarked.) He followed
    here the example expressed in the words of a famous Japanese
    statesman addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the
    Russo-Japanese war: ‘You open fire, then the nation will be
    united.’ The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After all,
    as an Oriental, he believed in the fate which would come,
    whether you wanted it or not.”

I then skip again in the German text, and continue with what appears in
the English translation:

    “Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in
    the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to
    him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written
    promise of assistance.

    “The RAM replied that he had already discussed these questions
    with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of
    Singapore in order that the Führer—who probably must be
    considered the greatest expert on military questions at the
    present time—could advise Japan on the best method of attack
    against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would
    be at her disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their
    European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of
    dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British
    Fleet in Singapore. Thus, the British Fleet would be forced to
    disappear from Singapore immediately.

    “Matsuoka remarked that Japan was less concerned with the
    British Fleet than with the capture of the fortifications.

    “The RAM replied that here, too, the Führer had developed new
    methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions,
    such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben-Emael, which he could
    make available to the Japanese.

    “Matsuoka replied in this connection that some of the younger
    expert Japanese Naval officers, who were close friends of his,
    were of the opinion that the Japanese Naval forces would need 3
    months until they could capture Singapore. As a cautious Foreign
    Minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed he could
    stave off any danger which threatened from America for 6 months.
    If, however, the capture of Singapore required still more time
    and if the operations would perhaps even drag out for a year,
    the situation with America would become extremely critical; and
    he did not know as yet how to meet it.

    “If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherlands East
    Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack on
    this area, the oil fields would be set afire. They could be
    brought into operation again only after 1 or 2 years.

    “The RAM added that Japan would gain decisive influence over the
    Netherlands East Indies simultaneously with the capture of
    Singapore.”

On the 5th of April, about a week after the conference from whose
minutes I have just quoted, Ribbentrop again met with Matsuoka and again
pushed the Japanese another step along the road to aggressive war. The
notes of this conference, which were also found in the German Foreign
Office archives, are contained in our Document 1882-PS, which I now
offer as Exhibit USA-153. I shall read a few brief extracts from these
notes, starting with the third paragraph on Page 1 of the English
translation:

    “In answer to a remark by Matsuoka that Japan was now awakened
    and, according to the Japanese temperament, would take action
    quickly after the previous lengthy deliberation, the Reich
    Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary, of course, to
    accept a risk in this connection just as the Führer had done
    successfully with the occupation of the Rhineland, with the
    proclamation of sovereignty of armament and with the resignation
    from the League of Nations.”

I now skip several pages of the German text and continue on with the
English translation.

    “The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich
    would actually be built up on the basis of the ancient
    traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, which
    in its time was the only dominant power on the European
    continent.

    “In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized
    the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan with him
    from his trips:

    “1) Germany had already won the war. With the end of this year,
    the world would realize this. Even England would have to concede
    it, if she had not collapsed before then, and America would also
    have to resign herself to this fact.

    “2) There were no conflicting interests between Japan and
    Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated for the
    long run on the basis that Japan should predominate in the Far
    East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa.

    “3) Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it
    would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry
    into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than
    in that of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity, which
    would hardly ever return, for the fulfillment of the national
    objectives of Japan—a chance which would make it possible for
    her to play a really leading role in East Asia.”

Here again, in the portion just quoted, we see Ribbentrop pursuing the
same track I have previously noted. Germany has already won the war for
all practical purposes. Japan’s entry will hasten the inevitable end.
But Japan had better get the positions she wants during the war.

I also invite the Tribunal’s attention to Ribbentrop’s assurances,
expressed in the quotation I read from 1877-PS previously, that Japan
likewise had nothing to fear from the Soviet Union if Japan entered the
conflict. The references to the weaknesses of the United States,
scattered throughout the quotations I have read, were also an ingredient
in this brew which was being so carefully prepared and brought to a
boil.

I should like to introduce one more document on the part of the case
dealing particularly with exhortation of the Japanese to aggression
against the British Commonwealth. This is our Document 1538-PS, which I
now offer as Exhibit USA-154. This document is a top-secret report,
dated 24 May 1941, from the German Military Attaché in Tokyo to the
Intelligence Division of the OKW. I wish merely to call attention, at
this point, to the last sentence in the paragraph numbered 1, wherein it
is stated—I quote: “The preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila
stand.”

I shall return to this document later. I point out here, however, the
fact which appears from the sentence I have just read, that the German
military were keeping in close touch with the Japanese operational plans
against Singapore, which the Nazi conspirators had fostered.

Next, exhortations by the Nazis to Japanese aggression against the
U.S.S.R.

I invite the Tribunal’s attention, at this point, to the language of the
Indictment on Page 10 of the English edition. I quote, beginning with
the eighth line from the top of the page:

    “The Nazi conspirators conceived that Japanese aggression would
    weaken and handicap those nations with whom they were at war and
    those with whom they contemplated war. Accordingly, the Nazi
    conspirators exhorted Japan to seek a ‘new order of things’.”

The evidence I have just adduced showed the Nazi exhortations with
particular reference to the British Commonwealth of Nations. We now turn
to their efforts to induce the Japanese to commit a “stab in the back”
on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Here again the Defendant
Ribbentrop appears as the central figure.

For some months prior to the issuance of Basic Order Number 24 regarding
collaboration with Japan, the conspirators had been preparing Fall
Barbarossa, the plan for the attack on the U.S.S.R. Basic Order Number
24 decreed, however, that the Japanese “must not be given any intimation
of the Barbarossa operation.”

In his conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, on 29
March 1941, almost 3 weeks after the issuance of Basic Order Number 24,
Ribbentrop nevertheless hinted at things to come. The report of this
conference, contained in 1877-PS, has already been introduced as Exhibit
USA-152 and read into the record. I wish to invite the Tribunal’s
attention again to the first two paragraphs of the English translation
of 1877-PS, where Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that the largest part of
the German Army was on the eastern frontiers of the Reich fully prepared
to open the attack at any time. Ribbentrop then added that although he
believed that the U.S.S.R. would try to avoid developments leading to
war, nevertheless a conflict with the Soviet Union, even if not
probable, would have to be considered possible.

Whatever conclusion the Japanese Ambassador drew from these remarks in
April of 1941 can only be conjectured. Once the Nazis had unleashed
their aggression against the U.S.S.R. in June of 1941, the tenor of
Ribbentrop’s remarks left no room for doubt. On 10 July 1941 Ribbentrop
dispatched a coded telegram to Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo. The
telegram is our Document 2896-PS, which I now introduce as Exhibit
USA-155. I quote from numbered Paragraph 4 of that telegram, which is
the first paragraph of the English translation:

    “Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese Foreign
    Minister for conveying the cable report of the Japanese
    Ambassador in Moscow. It would be convenient if we could keep on
    receiving news from Russia this way. In summing up, I should
    like to say I have now, as in the past, full confidence in the
    Japanese policy and in the Japanese Foreign Minister; first of
    all because the present Japanese Government would really act
    inexcusably toward the future of their nation if they would not
    take this unique opportunity to solve the Russian problem, as
    well as to secure for all time its expansion to the south and
    settle the Chinese matter. Since Russia, as reported by the
    Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect close to collapse—a
    report which coincides with our own observations as far as we
    are able to judge the present war situation—it is simply
    impossible that Japan should not settle the matter of
    Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon as her military
    preparations are completed.”

Skipping now to the middle of the second paragraph on Page 1 of the
English translation—the sentence beginning “However . . .”:

    “However, I ask you to employ all available means in further
    insisting upon Japan’s entry into the war against Russia at the
    earliest possible date, as I have mentioned already in my note
    to Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the better. The
    natural objective still remains that we and Japan join hands on
    the trans-Siberian railroad before winter starts. After the
    collapse of Russia, however, the position of the
    Three-Power-Pact States in the world will be so gigantic that
    the question of England’s collapse or the total destruction of
    the British Isles will be only a matter of time. An America
    totally isolated from the rest of the world would then be faced
    with our taking possession of the remaining positions of the
    British Empire which are important for the Three-Power-Pact
    countries. I have the unshakeable conviction that a carrying
    through of the New Order as desired by us will be a matter of
    course, and there would be no insurmountable difficulties if the
    countries of the Three Power Pact stand close together and
    encounter every action of the Americans with the same weapons. I
    ask you to report in the near future, as often as possible and
    in detail, on the political situation there.”

We have Ott’s reply to this telegram, dated 13 July 1941. This is our
Document Number 2897-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-156.
After reading the heading, I shall skip to the last paragraph on Page 3
of the German text, which is the paragraph appearing in the English
translation:

    “Telegram; secret cipher system”—Sent 14 July from Tokyo;
    arrived 14 July 1941—“As fast as possible.

    “I am trying with all means to work toward Japan’s entry into
    the war against Russia as soon as possible, especially using
    arguments of personal message of Foreign Minister and telegram
    cited above to convince Matsuoka personally, as well as the
    Foreign Office, military elements, nationalists, and friendly
    businessmen. I believe that according to military preparations,
    Japanese participation will soon take place. The greatest
    obstacle to this against which one has to fight is the disunity
    within the activist group which, without unified command,
    follows various aims and only slowly adjusts itself to the
    changed situation.”

On subsequent occasions Ribbentrop repeated his exhortations to induce
the Japanese to aggression against the U.S.S.R. I shall present three
documents covering July of 1942 and March and April of 1943. The first
is our Document 2911-PS which contains notes of a discussion between
Ribbentrop and Oshima, Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, on 9 July 1942. As
a matter of background I note that at this time German armies were
sweeping forward in the U.S.S.R. and the fall of Sevastopol had just
been announced.

I now offer our Document 2911-PS as Exhibit USA-157, and I quote the
relevant extracts appearing in the English translation thereof:

    “He, the German Minister, had asked to see the Ambassador at
    this time, when the situation was as described, because now a
    question of fateful importance had arisen concerning the joint
    conduct of the war. If Japan felt herself sufficiently strong
    militarily, the moment for Japan to attack Russia was probably
    now. He thought it possible that if Japan attacked Russia at
    this time, it would lead to her (Russia) final moral collapse;
    at least it would hasten the collapse of her present system. In
    any case, never again would Japan have such an opportunity as
    existed at present to eliminate once and for all the Russian
    colossus in eastern Asia.

    “He had discussed this question with the Führer, and the Führer
    was of the same opinion; but he wanted to emphasize one point
    right away: Japan should attack Russia only if she felt
    sufficiently strong for such an undertaking. Under no
    circumstances should Japanese operations against Russia be
    allowed to bog down at the half-way mark, and we do not want to
    urge Japan into an action that is not mutually profitable.”

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now, for 10 minutes.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I now offer in evidence our
Document Number 2954-PS as Exhibit USA-158. This is a record of a
conference between Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima on 6 March 1943.

I note again for background that the strategic military situation in the
broad expanses of the U.S.S.R. had changed somewhat.

In the previous month, February 1943, the Soviet armies had completely
defeated the German forces at Stalingrad and inflicted very severe
losses. Further north and west their winter offensive had removed large
areas from the hands of the invader. Combined United States and British
forces had already landed in North Africa.

You will remark as I read that the tone of Ribbentrop’s argument at this
time reflects the changed military situation. The familiar Japanese
refrain of “So sorry, please,” likewise appears to have crept in.

I note in this record that the month of February 1943 had also seen the
end of the organized Japanese resistance on the Island of Guadalcanal.

I now quote the relevant extracts from the minutes of the discussion
between Ribbentrop and Oshima on 6 March 1943, which appear in the
English translation in the document book:

    “Ambassador Oshima declared that he received a telegram from
    Tokyo, and he is to report by order of his Government to the
    Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs the following: The suggestion
    of the German Government to attack Russia was the subject of a
    common conference between the Japanese Government and the
    Imperial headquarters during which the question was discussed in
    detail and investigated exactly. The result is the following:
    The Japanese Government absolutely recognize the danger which
    threatens from Russia and completely understand the desire of
    their German ally that Japan on her part will also enter the war
    against Russia. However, it is not possible for the Japanese
    Government, considering the present war situation, to enter into
    the war. They are rather of the conviction that it would be in
    the common interest not to start the war against Russia now. On
    the other hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard
    the Russian question.

    “The Japanese Government have the intention to become aggressive
    again in the future on other fronts.

    “The RAM brought up the question, after the explanation by the
    Ambassador, how the continued waging of the war is envisaged in
    Tokyo. At present Germany wages the war against the common
    enemies, England and America, mostly alone, while Japan mostly
    behaves more defensively. However, it would be more correct that
    all powers allied in the Three Power Pact would combine their
    forces not only to defeat England and America, but also Russia.
    It is not good when one part must fight alone. One cannot
    overstrain the German national strength. He was inwardly
    concerned about certain forces at work in Tokyo, who were of the
    opinion, and propagated the same, that doubtless, Germany could
    emerge from the battle victoriously and that Japan should
    proceed to consolidate her forces before she should further
    exert herself to the fullest extent.”

I now skip several pages in the German text and resume the quotation:

    “Then the RAM again brought up the question of the attack on
    Russia by Japan and he declared that, after all, the fight on
    the Burma front as well as in the south is actually more of a
    maritime problem; and on all fronts except those in China at
    best very few ground forces are stationed. Therefore the attack
    on Russia is primarily an Army affair, and he asked himself if
    the necessary forces for that would be available.”

Ribbentrop kept on trying. He held another conference with Oshima about
3 weeks later on 18 April 1943. The top-secret notes of this conference
are contained in our Document 2929-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit
USA-159. I shall quote only one sentence:

    “The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again
    that, without any doubt, this year presented the most favorable
    opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had
    sufficient anti-tank weapons at her disposal, to attack Russia,
    which certainly would never again be as weak as she was at the
    moment.”

I now wish to come to that aspect of this conspiracy which is in a large
measure responsible for the appearance of millions of Americans in
uniform all over the world.

The Nazi preparations and collaboration with the Japanese against the
United States, as noted by the United States Chief of Counsel in his
opening statement, present a two-fold aspect; one of preparations by the
Nazis themselves for an attack from across the Atlantic, and the other
of fomenting war in the Pacific.

In the course of my presentation of the Nazi exhortations to the
Japanese to war against the British Commonwealth and the U.S.S.R., I
have referred to some documents and quoted some sentences relating to
the United States. I shall take those documents up again in their
relevant passages to show their particular application. I have also, in
the treatment of Ribbentrop’s urging the Japanese to war against the
U.S.S.R., gone beyond the dates of 7 December and 11 December 1941, when
the Japanese and German Governments respectively initiated and declared
aggressive war against the United States.

Apart from the advantage and convenience of presentation, these
documents have indicated the Nazi awareness and acceptance of the
direction in which their actions were leading, as well as the universal
aspects of their conspiracy and of their alliance with the Japanese.
Their intentions against the United States must be viewed in the focus
of both their over-all plan and their immediate commitments elsewhere.
That their over-all plan involved ultimate aggressive war against the
United States was intimated by the Defendant Göring in a speech on 8
July 1938, when these conspirators had already forcibly annexed Austria
and were perfecting their plans against Czechoslovakia.

This speech was delivered to representatives of the aircraft industry,
and the copy that we have was transmitted as the enclosure to a secret
memorandum from Göring’s adjutant to General Udet, who was then in
charge of experimental research for the Luftwaffe. It is contained in
our Document R-140, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-160.

I invite the Tribunal’s attention to the statement in the covering
memorandum that the enclosure is a copy of the shorthand minutes of the
conference. I shall not go through the long speech in which Göring
called for increased aircraft production and pointed to the necessity
for full mobilization of German industrial capacity. I wish to quote
just two sentences, which appear on Page 33 of the German text and Page
11 of the English translation. Quoting from the second full paragraph on
Page 11 of the English translation, starting with the third sentence
from the end of the paragraph:

    “I still lack these rocket-motors which could make such flights
    possible. I completely lack the bombers capable of round-trip
    flights to New York with a 5-ton bomb load. I would be extremely
    happy to possess such a bomber which would at last stuff the
    mouth of arrogance across the sea.”

Göring’s fervent hope, of course, was not capable of realization at that
time, either technically or in the fact of the Nazi conspirators’
schedule of aggression that has been outlined here in the past several
days.

During the period of their preparation for and the waging of aggressive
war in Europe, up to the launching of the campaign against the U.S.S.R.,
it is only reasonable to believe that these conspirators were not
disposed to involve the United States in war at that time. Nevertheless,
even in the fall of 1940 the prosecution of war against the United
States of America at a later date was on the military agenda. This is
clearly shown in a document which we have found in the files of the OKL,
the German Air Force files. It is Document 376-PS, which I now offer as
Exhibit Number USA-161. This document is a memorandum marked
“Chefsache,” the German designation for top secret, from a Major Von
Falkenstein to an unspecified general, presumably a Luftwaffe general.

Falkenstein, who was a major of the General Staff, was at that time the
Luftwaffe liaison officer with the Operations Staff of the OKW, which
was the staff headed by the Defendant Jodl. His memorandum, which he
characterizes as a “brief résumé on the military questions current
here,” is dated the 29th of October 1940. It covers several questions. I
shall quote to you numbered Paragraph 5, which appears at the bottom of
the first page of the English translation and carries over to the
reverse side of the one-sheet document:

    “5) The Führer is at present occupied with the question of the
    occupation of the Atlantic islands with a view to the
    prosecution of a war against America at a later date.
    Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here.
    Essential conditions are at the present:

    “(a) No other operational commitment; (b) Portuguese neutrality;
    (c) support of France and Spain.

    “A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding
    air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the
    GAF.”—or the German Air Force.

The Nazis’ military interest in the United States is further indicated
by Paragraph 7 which I read:

    “General Bötticher has made repeated reference, especially in
    his telegram 2314, dated 26th of October, to the fact that in
    his opinion too many details of our knowledge of American
    aircraft industry are being published in the German press. The
    matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme Command. I
    pointed out that the matter was specifically a GAF one but have
    taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its own
    merits.”

Again, in July 1941, in his first flush of confidence resulting from
early gains in the aggression against the U.S.S.R., the Führer signed an
order for further preliminary preparations for the attack on the United
States. This top-secret order, found in the files of the German Navy, is
our Document C-74, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-162. I read from the
first paragraph of that text just preceding the paragraph numbered (1):

    “By virtue of the intentions announced in Directive Number 32,
    for the further conduct of the war, I lay down the following
    principles to govern the strength of personnel and of material
    supplies:

    “(1) In general:

    “The military domination of Europe after the defeat of Russia
    will enable the strength of the Army to be considerably reduced
    in the near future. As far as the reduced strength of the Army
    will allow, the armored units will be greatly increased.

    “Naval armament must be restricted to those measures which have
    a direct connection with the conduct of the war against England
    and, should the case arise, against America.

    “The main effort in armament will be shifted to the Air Force,
    which must be greatly increased in strength.”

From these documents it appears that the Nazi conspirators were making
at least preliminary plans of their own against the United States. The
Nazis’ over-all plan with regard to the United States was, however, a
complex one involving, in addition, collaboration with the Japanese. In
the course of their repeated representations to the Japanese to
undertake an assault against British possessions in the Pacific Far
East, they again considered war against the United States.

I now refer again to Basic Order Number 24, regarding collaboration with
Japan. This is our Document C-75, which I have put in as Exhibit
USA-151. I have read it in its entirety into the record. The Tribunal
will recall that in that basic order, which was issued on 5 March 1941,
the Nazi policy was stated in Subparagraph (3) (a) as “forcing England
to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the
war.”

Nevertheless, the Nazi conspirators clearly contemplated, within the
framework of that policy, the possibility of the United States’ entry
into the Far Eastern conflict which the Nazis were then instigating.
This could result from an attack by Japan on possessions of the United
States practically simultaneously with the assault on the British
Empire, as actually happened. Other possibilities of involvement of the
United States were also discussed. This Basic Order Number 24
stated—and I am referring to Subparagraph (3) (c), on the top of Page 2
of the Document C-75:

    “(c) The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that
    Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it
    needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United
    States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even
    after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital
    importance to Germany.”

The order continues in an unnumbered paragraph, immediately below
Subparagraph (3) (d):

    “In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval
    power—extending to those of American naval power only if the
    entry of the United States into the war cannot be
    prevented—will result in weakening the enemy’s system of power
    in that region and also, just like the attack on sea
    communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds
    (Australia).”

In these passages there is a clear envisagement of United States
involvement, as well as a clear intent to attack. The vital threat to
United States interests, if Japan were to capture Singapore, was also
envisaged by the Defendant Raeder in his meeting of 18 March 1941 with
Hitler and the Defendants Keitel and Jodl. These minutes are contained
in our Document C-152, which has already been put in as Exhibit GB-122.
I wish now to repeat the four sentences of Item 11 of the minutes of
that conference, contained on Page 1 of the English translation. I am
quoting the Defendant Raeder:

    “Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible,
    since the opportunity will never again be so favorable (tie-up
    of the whole English Fleet; unpreparedness of the U.S.A. for war
    against Japan, inferiority of the United States Fleet in
    comparison with the Japanese). Japan is indeed making
    preparations for this action, but according to all declarations
    made by Japanese officers, she will carry it out only if Germany
    proceeds to land in England. Germany must, therefore,
    concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act
    immediately. If Japan has Singapore, all other East Asiatic
    questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved
    (Guam, the Philippines, Borneo, and the Dutch East Indies).

    “Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against the U.S.A. She
    can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as
    possible.”

The Defendant Ribbentrop also recognized the possibility of United
States involvement as a result of the course of aggression that he was
urging on the Japanese. I refer again to his meeting of 23 February 1941
with the Japanese Ambassador Oshima, the notes of which are contained in
our Document 1834-PS, which is in evidence as Exhibit USA-129.

The Tribunal will recall that in a passage I have already read,
Subparagraph (2) near the bottom of Page 3 of the English translation,
Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that a surprise by Japan was bound to keep
the United States out of the war since she was unarmed and could not
risk either her fleet or the possibility of losing the Philippines as
the result of a declaration of war. Two paragraphs later Ribbentrop
practically dropped the pretense that the United States would not be
involved. I quote here from the last paragraph at the bottom of Page 3
of the English translation:

    “The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that if America
    should declare war because of Japan’s entry into the war, this
    would mean that America had the intention to enter the war
    sooner or later anyway. Even though it would be preferable to
    avoid this, the entry into the war would, as explained above, be
    by no means decisive and would not endanger the final victory of
    the countries of the Three Power Pact. The Foreign Minister
    further expressed his belief that a temporary lift of the
    British morale caused by America’s entry into the war would be
    canceled by Japan’s entry into the war. If, however, contrary to
    all expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to
    send their navy, in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far
    East, this would represent the biggest chance for the countries
    of the Three Power Pact to bring the war to an end with the
    greatest rapidity. He—the Foreign Minister—is convinced that
    the Japanese Fleet would then do a complete job. Ambassador
    Oshima replied to this that unfortunately he does not think the
    Americans would do it, but he is convinced of a victory of his
    fleet in Japanese waters.”

In the paragraphs that follow, some of which have already been read into
the record, Ribbentrop again stressed the mutual inter-dependence of the
Tripartite Pact powers and suggested co-ordinated action.

I want to quote now only the last paragraph on Page 5, a difficult bit
of Nazi cynicism which by now is quite familiar.

    “The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question,
    explicitly designated as theoretical, that the contracting
    powers might be required, on the basis of new affronts by the
    U.S.A., to break off diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy
    were fundamentally determined on this. After signing of the
    Three Power Pact, we should proceed, if the occasion arises,
    also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should open the eyes
    of the people in the United States, and under certain conditions
    swing public opinion towards isolation. Naturally a situation
    had to be chosen in which America found herself entirely in the
    wrong. The common step of the signatory powers should be
    exploited correspondingly in propaganda. The question, however,
    was in no way acute at the time.”

Again, on 29 March 1941, Ribbentrop, this time in a conference with the
Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, discussed the possible involvement
of the United States. Notes of this conference are contained in our
Document 1877-PS, which I have already introduced as Exhibit USA-152;
and I have read it into the record. The relevant statements appear in
the bottom two paragraphs of Page 1 and the first full paragraph on Page
2 of the English translation. I shall not take the Tribunal’s time to
read them again.

I should like to refer to one more document to show that the Nazi
conspirators knew that the aggressive war they were urging the Japanese
to undertake both threatened the vital interests of the United States
and could lead to the United States’ involvement in the contemplated Far
Eastern conflict. This document is our 1881-PS, report of the conference
between Hitler and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on 4
April 1941. I have already offered, in my opening statement to the
Tribunal 2 weeks ago, Document 1881-PS as Exhibit USA-33; and I read at
that time a considerable portion of it into the record. Unless the Court
prefers that I do not do so, it seems to me desirable at this point to
re-read a few brief passages.

THE PRESIDENT: I think we might treat it as being in evidence.

MR. ALDERMAN: I wish to emphasize, however, that the passages which I
read 2 weeks ago and which I had expected to re-read at this point show
not only a realization of the probable involvement of the United States
in the Far Eastern conflict that the Nazis were urging, but also a
knowledge on their part that the Japanese Army and Navy were actually
preparing war plans against the United States. Furthermore, we have a
document that shows the Nazis knew at least a part of what those war
plans were.

I now refer again to Document Number 1538-PS, which has been offered in
evidence as Exhibit USA-154, the secret telegram from the German
Military Attaché in Tokyo, dated 24 May 1941. He talks about the
conferences he has had regarding Japan’s entry in the war in the event
Germany should become involved in war with the United States.

In the paragraph numbered 1 this sentence also appears—I quote the last
sentence in numbered Paragraph Number 1, “Preparations for attack on
Singapore and Manila stand.”

May I at this point review the Nazi position with regard to the United
States at this time, the spring of 1941. In view of their pressing
commitments elsewhere and their aggressive plans against the U.S.S.R.
set for execution in June of 1941, their temporary strategy was
naturally a preference that the United States not be involved in the war
at that time. Nevertheless, they had been considering their own
preliminary plan against the United States, as seen in the Atlantic
island document which I offered.

They were repeatedly urging the Japanese to aggression against the
British Commonwealth just as they would urge them to attack the U.S.S.R.
soon after the launching of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. They
were aware that the course along which they were pushing the Japanese in
the Far East would probably lead to involvement of the United States.
Indeed, the Japanese Foreign Minister had told Hitler this in so many
words, and their own military men had fully realized the implications of
the move against Singapore. They also knew that the Japanese Army and
Navy were preparing operation plans against the U.S. They knew at least
part of those plans.

The Nazi conspirators not only knew all these things; they accepted the
risk of the aggressive course they were urging on the Japanese and
pushed their eastern allies still further along that course.

In April 1941 Hitler told the Japanese Foreign Minister that in the
event Japan would have become involved in the war with the United
States, Germany would immediately take the consequences and strike
without delay.

I refer to our Document 1881-PS, the notes of the Hitler-Matsuoka
conference in Berlin on 4 April 1941, which has already been introduced
as Exhibit Number USA-33. I refer particularly to the first four
paragraphs on Page 2 of the English translation. I think that has been
read to you at least twice, and I perhaps need not repeat it.

Then, skipping two paragraphs, we see Hitler then encouraging Matsuoka
in his decision to strike against the United States; and I invite your
attention to the fourth paragraph on Page 2, which you have heard
several times and which I shall not re-read.

Here in those passages were assurance, encouragement, and abetment by
the head of the German State, the leading Nazi co-conspirator, in April
1941. But the Nazi encouragement and promise of support did not end
there.

I now offer our Document 2898-PS as Exhibit Number USA-163. This is
another telegram from the German Ambassador in Tokyo regarding his
conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister. It is dated the 30th of
November 1941, exactly 1 week before Pearl Harbor. I will read from the
first four paragraphs on Page 2 of the German text, which is the first
paragraph of the English translation; and this passage, I am sure, has
not been read to the Tribunal. No part of this document has been read.

    “The progress of the negotiations so far confirms his viewpoint
    that the difference of opinion between Japan and the U.S. is
    very great. The Japanese Government, since they sent Ambassador
    Kurusu, have taken a firm stand as he told me. He is convinced
    that this position is in our favor, and makes the United States
    think that her entry into the European war would be risky
    business. The new American proposal of 25 November showed great
    divergencies in the viewpoints of the two nations. These
    differences of opinion concern, for example, the further
    treatment of the Chinese question. The biggest”—and then the
    German text has the legend “one group missing,” indicating that
    one group of the secret code was garbled on transmission. It
    would appear from the text that the missing words are
    “difference of opinion”—“The biggest (one group missing),
    however, resulted from the United States attempt to make the
    three-power agreement ineffective. The United States suggested
    to Japan that she conclude treaties of non-aggression with the
    United States, the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and other
    countries in order to prevent Japan’s entry into the war on the
    side of the Axis Powers. Japan, however, insisted upon
    maintaining her treaty obligations, and for this reason American
    demands are the greatest obstacles for adjusting
    Japanese-American relations. He avoided discussing concessions
    promised by the United States and merely mentioned that grave
    decisions were at stake.

    “The United States is seriously preparing for war and is about
    to operate a considerable part of its navy from southern Pacific
    bases. The Japanese Government are busy working out an answer in
    order to clarify their viewpoint. But he has no particulars at
    that moment. He thinks the American proposals as a whole
    unacceptable.

    “Japan is not afraid of a breakdown of negotiations, and she
    hopes that if occasion arises Germany and Italy, according to
    the Three Power Pact, would stand at her side. I answered that
    there could be no doubt about Germany’s future position. The
    Japanese Foreign Minister thereupon stated that he understood
    from my words that Germany, in such a case, would consider her
    relationship to Japan as that of a union by fate. I answered,
    according to my opinion, Germany was certainly ready to have
    mutual agreement between the two countries over this situation.

    “The Minister of Foreign Affairs answered that it was possible
    that he would come back to this point soon. The conversation
    with the Minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed the impression
    that the United States note, in fact, is very unsatisfactory
    even for the compromise-seeking politicians here. For these
    circles America’s position, especially in the China question, is
    very disappointing. The emphasis upon the Three Power Pact as
    being the main obstacle between successful Japanese-United
    States negotiations seems to point to the fact that the Japanese
    Government are becoming aware of the necessity of close
    co-operation with the Axis Powers.”

The time is now fast approaching for that day of infamy. I offer our
Document 2987-PS as Exhibit USA-166. This document consists of extracts
from the handwritten diary of Count Galeazzo Ciano during the period 3
December to 8 December 1941. It consists of notes he jotted down in the
course of his daily business as Foreign Minister of Italy. The Italian
has been translated into both English and German, and copies of both the
English and the German are in the document books.

I now quote from the beginning of the entry of 3 December, Wednesday:

    “Sensational move by Japan. The Ambassador asks for an audience
    with the Duce and reads him a long statement on the progress of
    the negotiations with America, concluding with the assertion
    that they have reached a dead end. Then invoking the appropriate
    clause in the Tripartite Pact, he asks that Italy declare war on
    America immediately after the outbreak of hostilities and
    proposes the signing of an agreement not to conclude a separate
    peace. The interpreter translating this request was trembling
    like a leaf. The Duce gave fullest assurances, reserving the
    right to confer with Berlin before giving a reply. The Duce was
    pleased with the communication and said, ‘We are now on the
    brink of the inter-continental war which I predicted as early as
    September 1939.’ What does this new event mean? In any case it
    means that Roosevelt has succeeded in his maneuver. Since he
    could not enter the war immediately and directly, he entered it
    indirectly by letting himself be attacked by Japan. Furthermore,
    this event also means that every prospect of peace is becoming
    further and further removed and that it is now easy—much too
    easy—to predict a long war. Who will be able to hold out
    longest? It is on this basis that the problem must be
    considered. Berlin’s answer will be somewhat delayed because
    Hitler has gone to the southern Front to see General Kleist,
    whose armies continue to give way under the pressure of an
    unexpected Soviet offensive.”

And then December 4, Thursday—that is 3 days before Pearl Harbor:

    “Berlin’s reaction to the Japanese move is extremely cautious.
    Perhaps they will accept because they cannot get out of it, but
    the idea of provoking America’s intervention pleases the Germans
    less and less. Mussolini, on the other hand, is pleased about
    it.”

And December 5, Friday:

    “A night interrupted by Ribbentrop’s restlessness. After
    delaying 2 days, now he cannot wait a minute to answer the
    Japanese; and at three in the morning he sent Mackensen to my
    house to submit a plan for a triple agreement relative to
    Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a separate
    peace. He wanted me to awaken the Duce, but I did not do so, and
    the latter was very glad I had not.”

It appears from the last entry I have read, that of December 5, that
some sort of an agreement was reached.

On Sunday, 7 December 1941, Japan, without previous warning or
declaration of war, commenced an attack against the United States at
Pearl Harbor and against the British Commonwealth of Nations in the
Southwest Pacific. On the morning of 11 December, 4 days after the
Japanese assault in the Pacific, the German Government declared war on
the United States, committing the last act of aggression which was to
seal their doom. This declaration of war is contained in Volume IX of
the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, of which I now ask the Tribunal
to take judicial notice as Exhibit USA-164. An English translation is
contained in our document book, and for the convenience of the Tribunal
is Number 2507-PS.

The same day, 11 December, the fourth anniversary of which is tomorrow,
the Congress of the United States resolved:

    “That the state of war between the United States and the
    Government of Germany which has thus been thrust upon the United
    States, is hereby formally declared.”

This declaration is contained as Document 272 in the official
publication _Peace and War_, of which the Tribunal has already taken
judicial notice as Exhibit USA-122. The declaration itself has been
reproduced for the document books as our Document 2945-PS.

It thus appears that, apart from their own aggressive intentions and
declaration of war against the United States, the Nazi conspirators in
their collaboration with Japan incited and kept in motion a force
reasonably calculated to result in an attack on the United States. While
maintaining their preference that the United States not be involved in
war at the time, they nevertheless foresaw the distinct possibility,
even probability, of such involvement as a result of the action they
were encouraging. They were aware that the Japanese had prepared plans
for attack against the United States, and they accepted the consequences
by assuring the Japanese that they would declare war on the United
States should a United States-Japanese conflict result.

In dealing with captured documents of the enemy the completeness of the
plan is necessarily obscured, but those documents which have been
discovered and offered in evidence before this Tribunal show that the
Japanese attack was the proximate and foreseeable consequence of their
collaboration policy and that their exhortations and encouragement of
the Japanese as surely led to Pearl Harbor as though Pearl Harbor itself
had been mentioned.

I should like to read the Ciano diary entry for 8 December, the day
after Pearl Harbor:

    “A night telephone call from Ribbentrop. He is overjoyed about
    the Japanese attack on America. He is so happy about it that I
    am happy with him, though I am not too sure about the final
    advantages of what has happened. One thing is now certain, that
    America will enter the conflict and that the conflict will be so
    long that she will be able to realize all her potential forces.
    This morning I told this to the King who had been pleased about
    the event. He ended by admitting that, in the long run, I may be
    right. Mussolini was happy, too. For a long time he has favored
    a definite clarification of relations between America and the
    Axis.”

The final document consists of the top-secret notes of a conference
between Hitler and Japanese Ambassador Oshima on 14 December 1941, from
1300 to 1400 hours, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister
Ribbentrop. It is our Document 2932-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit
USA-165. The immediate subject matter is the Pearl Harbor attack, but
the expressions therein typify Nazi technique. I quote from the second
paragraph of the English translation which has not been previously read:

    “First the Führer presents Ambassador Oshima with the Grand
    Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in gold. With
    cordial words he acknowledges his services in the achievement of
    German-Japanese co-operation, which has now obtained its
    culmination in a close brotherhood of arms.

    “General Oshima expresses his thanks for the great honor and
    emphasizes how glad he is that this brotherhood of arms has now
    come about between Germany and Japan.

    “The Führer continues: ‘You gave the right declaration of war.’
    This method is the only proper one. Japan pursued it formerly
    and it corresponds with his own system, that is, to negotiate as
    long as possible. But if one sees the other is interested only
    in putting one off, in shamming and humiliating one, and is not
    willing to come to an agreement, then one should strike as hard
    as possible, indeed, and not waste time declaring war. It was
    heart-warming to him to hear of the first operations of the
    Japanese. He himself negotiated with infinite patience at times,
    for example, with Poland and also with Russia. When he then
    realized that the other did not want to come to an agreement, he
    struck suddenly and without formality. He would continue to go
    on this way in the future.”

If the Tribunal please, that ends my presentation of the various phases
of aggressive warfare charged as Crimes against Peace in Count One of
the Indictment. As I conclude this phase I hope the Tribunal will allow
me to express my deep sense of obligation to Commander Sidney J. Kaplan,
section chief, and to the members of his staff, who did the yeoman work
necessary to assemble and prepare these materials that I have presented.
These members of that staff, in the order in which the materials were
presented, are: Major Joseph Dainow, Lieutenant Commander Harold
Leventhal, Lieutenant John M. Woolsey, Lieutenant James A. Gorrell,
Lieutenant Roy H. Steyer.

Commander Kaplan and his staff have fully measured up to the famous
motto of his branch of the armed services, the United States Coast
Guard, “Semper Paratus” (Always Prepared).

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.

    [_The Tribunal adjourned until 11 December 1945 at 1000 hours._]

                            SEVENTEENTH DAY
                        Tuesday, 11 December 1945

                           _Morning Session_

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the United States next offers in
evidence some captured moving pictures through Commander Donovan, who
had charge of taking them.

COMMANDER JAMES BRITT DONOVAN (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United
States): May it please the Tribunal, the United States now offers in
evidence Document Number 3054-PS, United States Exhibit Number 167, the
motion picture entitled _The Nazi Plan_. This document contains several
affidavits with exhibits, copies of which have been furnished to Defense
Counsel. I ask the Tribunal whether it believes it to be necessary that
I formally read the affidavits at this time. Since the motion pictures
themselves will be presented to the Tribunal and thereafter be in its
permanent record, I respectfully submit that the reading be waived.

In the past 3 weeks the Prosecution has presented to this Tribunal a
vast amount of evidence concerning the nature of the Nazi conspiracy and
what we contend to be its deliberate planning, launching, and waging of
wars of aggression. That evidence has consisted of documentary and some
oral proof, but the Nazi conspirators did more than leave behind such
normal types of evidence. German proficiency in photography has been
traditional. Its use as a propaganda instrument was especially well
known to these defendants, and as a result the United States in 1945
captured an almost complete chronicle of the rise and fall of National
Socialism as documented in films made by the Nazis themselves. It is
from excerpts of this chronicle that we have compiled the motion picture
now presented, entitled _The Nazi Plan_, which in broad outline sums up
the case thus far presented under Counts One and Two of the Indictment.

The motion picture has been divided into four parts. This morning we
first offer to the Tribunal Parts 1 and 2, respectively entitled “The
Rise of the NSDAP, 1921 to 1933,” and “Acquiring Totalitarian Control of
Germany, 1933 to 1935.” These will be concluded by 11:20, at which time
we assume the Tribunal will order its customary morning adjournment. At
11:30 we shall present Part 3, entitled “Preparation for Wars of
Aggression, 1935 to 1939.” This will be concluded shortly before 1
o’clock. At 2 p.m. we will offer Part 4, “Wars of Aggression, 1939 to
1944,” and this will be concluded by 3 p.m.

Parts 1 and 2 now to be presented, enable us to re-live those years in
which the Nazis fought for and obtained the power to rule all life in
Germany. We see the early days of terrorism and propaganda bearing final
fruit in Hitler’s accession to the Chancellery in 1933, then the
consolidation of power within Germany, climaxed by the Parteitag of
1934, in which the Nazis proclaimed to the nation their plans for
totalitarian control. It is in simple and dramatic form the story of how
a nation forsook its liberty.

I wish again to emphasize that all film now presented to the Tribunal,
including, for example, pictures of early Nazi newspapers, is the
original German film, to which we have added only the title in English.
And now, if it please the Tribunal, we shall present Parts 1 and 2 of
_The Nazi Plan_.

THE PRESIDENT: It may be convenient for the United States Prosecutor to
know that the Tribunal propose to rise this afternoon at 4 o’clock
instead of 5.

 [_The film, The Nazi Plan, was then shown in the court room until 1125
               hours, at which time a recess was taken._]

COMMANDER DONOVAN: May it please the Tribunal, in the films which have
just been shown to the Tribunal we have watched the Nazi rise to power.
In Part 3 of our documentary motion picture now to be presented, we see
the use they made of that power and how the German nation was led by
militaristic regimentation to preparation for aggressive war as an
instrument of national policy. Part 3, “Preparation for Wars of