having been narrated (Polit. v, 1, 5). But Plutarch, as well as
  K. O. Müller (Hist. of Dorians, iv, 9, 5) and others, erroneously
  represent the intrigues with the oracle as being resorted to
  after Lysander returned from accompanying Agesilaus to Asia;
  which is certainly impossible, since Lysander accompanied
  Agesilaus out, in the spring of 396 B.C.—did not return to
  Greece until the spring of 395 B.C.—and was then employed,
  with an interval not greater than four or five months, on that
  expedition against Bœotia wherein he was slain.

  The tampering of Lysander with the oracle must undoubtedly have
  taken place prior to the death of Agis,—at some time between 403
  B.C. and 399 B.C. The humiliation which he received in 396 B.C.
  from Agesilaus might indeed have led him to revolve in his mind
  the renewal of his former plans; but he can have had no time to
  do anything towards them. Aristotle (Polit. v, 6, 2) alludes
  to the humiliation of Lysander by the kings as an example of
  incidents _tending_ to raise disturbance in an aristocratical
  government; but this humiliation, probably, alludes to the manner
  in which he was thwarted in Attica by Pausanias in 403 B.C.—which
  proceeding is ascribed by Plutarch to both kings, as well as to
  their jealousy of Lysander (see Plutarch, Lysand. c. 21)—not to
  the treatment of Lysander by Agesilaus in 396 B.C. The mission of
  Lysander to the despot Dionysius at Syracuse (Plutarch, Lysand.
  c. 2) must also have taken place prior to the death of Agis in
  399 B.C.; whether before or after the failure of the stratagem at
  Delphi, is uncertain; perhaps after it.

It was apparently about a year after the campaigns in Elis, that
king Agis, now an old man, was taken ill at Heræa in Arcadia, and
carried back to Sparta, where he shortly afterwards expired. His
wife Mimæa had given birth to a son named Leotychides, now a youth
about fifteen years of age.[428] But the legitimacy of this youth
had always been suspected by Agis, who had pronounced, when the
birth of the child was first made known to him, that it could not be
his. He had been frightened out of his wife’s bed by the shock of an
earthquake, which was construed as a warning from Poseidon, and was
held to be a prohibition of intercourse for a certain time; during
which interval Leotychides was born. This was one story; another was,
that the young prince was the son of Alkibiades, born during the
absence of Agis in his command at Dekeleia. On the other hand, it
was alleged that Agis, though originally doubtful of the legitimacy
of Leotychides, had afterwards retracted his suspicions, and fully
recognized him; especially, and with peculiar solemnity, during
his last illness.[429] As in the case of Demaratus about a century
earlier,[430]—advantage was taken of these doubts by Agesilaus, the
younger brother of Agis, powerfully seconded by Lysander, to exclude
Leotychides, and occupy the throne himself.

  [428] The age of Leotychides is approximately marked by the
  date of the presence of Alkibiades at Sparta 414-413 B.C. The
  mere rumor, true or false, that this young man was the son of
  Alkibiades, may be held sufficient as chronological evidence to
  certify his age.

  [429] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2; Pausanias, iii, 8, 4; Plutarch,
  Agesilaus, c. 3.

  [430] Herodot. v, 66.

Agesilaus was the son of king Archidamus, not by Lampito the mother
of Agis, but by a second wife named Eupolia. He was now at the
mature age of forty,[431] and having been brought up without any
prospect of becoming king,—at least until very recent times,—had
passed through the unmitigated rigor of Spartan drill and training.
He was distinguished for all Spartan virtues; exemplary obedience
to authority, in the performance of his trying exercises, military
as well as civil,—intense emulation, in trying to surpass every
competitor,—extraordinary courage, unremitting energy, as well as
facility in enduring hardship,—perfect simplicity and frugality
in all his personal habits,—extreme sensibility to the opinion of
his fellow-citizens. Towards his personal friends or adherents,
he was remarkable for fervor of attachment, even for unscrupulous
partisanship, with a readiness to use all his influence in screening
their injustices or short-comings; while he was comparatively
placable and generous in dealing with rivals at home, notwithstanding
his eagerness to be first in every sort of competition.[432] His
manners were cheerful and popular, and his physiognomy pleasing;
though in stature he was not only small but mean, and though he
labored under the additional defect of lameness on one leg,[433]
which accounts for his constant refusal to suffer his statue to be
taken.[434] He was indifferent to money, and exempt from excess of
selfish feeling, except in his passion for superiority and power.

  [431] I confess I do not understand how Xenophon can say, in
  his Agesilaus, i, 6, Ἀγησίλαος τοίνυν ἔτι μὲν νέος ὢν ἔτυχε
  τῆς βασιλείας. For he himself says (ii, 28), and it seems
  well established, that Agesilaus died at the age of above 80
  (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 40); and his death must have been about 360
  B.C.

  [432] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 2-5; Xenoph. Agesil. vii, 3;
  Plutarch, Apophth. Laconic. p. 212 D.

  [433] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2; Xenoph. Agesil. viii, 1.

  It appears that the mother of Agesilaus was a very small woman,
  and that Archidamus had incurred the censure of the ephors, on
  that especial ground, for marrying her.

  [434] Xenoph. Agesil. xi, 7; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2.

In spite of his rank as brother of Agis, Agesilaus had never yet
been tried in any military command, though he had probably served
in the army either at Dekeleia or in Asia. Much of his character,
therefore, lay as yet undisclosed. And his popularity may perhaps
have been the greater at the moment when the throne became vacant,
inasmuch as, having never been put in a position to excite jealousy,
he stood distinguished only for accomplishments, efforts, endurances,
and punctual obedience, wherein even the poorest citizens were his
competitors on equal terms. Nay, so complete was the self-constraint,
and the habit of smothering emotions, generated by a Spartan
training, that even the cunning Lysander himself did not at this time
know him. He and Agesilaus had been early and intimate friends,[435]
both having been placed as boys in the same herd or troop for the
purposes of discipline; a strong illustration of the equalizing
character of this discipline, since we know that Lysander was of
poor parents and condition.[436] He made the mistake of supposing
Agesilaus to be of a disposition particularly gentle and manageable;
and this was his main inducement for espousing the pretensions of the
latter to the throne, after the decease of Agis. Lysander reckoned,
if by his means Agesilaus became king, on a great increase of his own
influence, and especially on a renewed mission to Asia, if not as
ostensible general, at least as real chief under the tutelar headship
of the new king.

  [435] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2.

  [436] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 2.

Accordingly, when the imposing solemnities which always marked the
funeral of a king of Sparta were terminated,[437] and the day arrived
for installation of a new king, Agesilaus, under the promptings of
Lysander, stood forward to contest the legitimacy and the title of
Leotychides, and to claim the sceptre for himself,—a true Herakleid,
brother of the late king Agis. In the debate, which probably took
place not merely before the ephors and the senate but before the
assembled citizens besides, Lysander warmly seconded his pretensions.
Of this debate unfortunately we are not permitted to know much.
We cannot doubt that the mature age and excellent reputation of
Agesilaus would count as a great recommendation, when set against
an untried youth; and this was probably the real point (since the
relationship of both was so near) upon which decision turned;[438]
for the legitimacy of Leotychides was positively asseverated by his
mother Timæa,[439] and we do not find that the question of paternity
was referred to the Delphian oracle, as in the case of Demaratus.

  [437] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 1.

  [438] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3;
  Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2; Xen. Agesil. 1, 5—κρίνασα ἡ πόλις
  ἀνεπικλητότερον εἶναι Ἀγησίλαον καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ, etc.

  [439] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2. This statement contradicts the talk
  imputed to Timæa by Duris (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Plutarch,
  Alkibiad. c. 23).

There was, however, one circumstance which stood much in the way
of Agesilaus,—his personal deformity. A lame king of Sparta had
never yet been known. And if we turn back more than a century
to the occurrence of a similar deformity in one of the Battiad
princes at Kyrênê,[440] we see the Kyrenians taking it so deeply to
heart, that they sent to ask advice from Delphi, and invited over
the Mantineian reformer Demônax. Over and above this sentiment of
repugnance, too, the gods had specially forewarned Sparta to beware
of “a lame reign.” Deiopeithes, a prophet and religious adviser of
high reputation, advocated the cause of Leotychides. He produced an
ancient oracle, telling Sparta, that “with all her pride she must
not suffer a lame reign to impair her stable footing;[441] for if
she did so, unexampled suffering and ruinous wars would long beset
her.” This prophecy had already been once invoked, about eighty years
earlier,[442] but with a very different interpretation. To Grecian
leaders, like Themistokles or Lysander, it was an accomplishment of
no small value to be able to elude inconvenient texts or intractable
religious feelings, by expository ingenuity. And Lysander here raised
his voice (as Themistokles had done on the momentous occasion before
the battle of Salamis),[443] to combat the professional expositors;
contending that by “a lame reign,” the god meant, not a bodily defect
in the king,—which might not even be congenital, but might arise
from some positive hurt,[444]—but the reign of any king who was not
a genuine descendant of Hêraklês.

  [440] Herodot. iv, 161. Διεδέξατο δὲ τὴν βασιληΐην τοῦ
  Ἀρκεσίλεω ὁ παῖς Βάττος, χωλός τε ἐὼν καὶ οὐκ ἀρτίπους. Οἱ δὲ
  Κυρηναῖοι ~πρὸς τὴν καταλαβοῦσαν συμφορὴν~ ἔπεμπον ἐς Δελφοὺς,
  ἐπειρησομένους ὅντινα τρόπον καταστησάμενοι κάλλιστα ἂν οἰκέοιεν.

  [441] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Pausanias,
  iii, 8, 5.

  [442] Diodor. xi, 50.

  [443] Herodot. vii, 143.

  [444] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 3. ὡς οὐκ οἴοιτο τὸν θεὸν τοῦτο
  κελεύειν φυλάξασθαι, ~μὴ προσπταίσας τις χωλεύσῃ~, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον,
  μὴ οὐκ ὢν τοῦ γένους βασιλεύσῃ.

  Congenital lameness would be regarded as a mark of divine
  displeasure, and therefore a disqualification from the throne,
  as in the case of Battus of Kyrênê above noticed. But the
  words χωλὴ βασίλεια were general enough to cover both the
  cases,—superinduced as well as congenital lameness. It is upon
  this that Lysander founds his inference—that the god did not
  mean to allude to bodily lameness at all.

The influence of Lysander,[445] combined doubtless with a
preponderance of sentiment already tending towards Agesilaus, caused
this effort of interpretative subtlety to be welcomed as convincing,
and led to the nomination of the lame candidate as king. There was,
however, a considerable minority, to whom this decision appeared a
sin against the gods and a mockery of the oracle. And though the
murmurs of such dissentients were kept down by the ability and
success of Agesilaus during the first years of his reign; yet when,
in his ten last years, calamity and humiliation were poured thickly
upon this proud city, the public sentiment came decidedly round to
their view. Many a pious Spartan then exclaimed, with feelings of
bitter repentance, that the divine word never failed to come true at
last,[446] and that Sparta was justly punished for having wilfully
shut her eyes to the distinct and merciful warning vouchsafed to her,
about the mischiefs of a “lame reign.”[447]

  [445] Pausanias, iii, 8, 5; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Plutarch,
  Lysand. c. 22; Justin, vi, 2.

  [446]

    Ἴδ᾽ οἷον, ὦ παῖδες, προσέμιξεν ἄφαρ
    Τοὔπος τὸ θεοπρόπον ἡμῖν
    Τῆς παλαιφάτου προνοίας,
    Ὅ τ᾽ ἔλακεν, etc.

  This is a splendid chorus of the Trachiniæ of Sophokles (822)
  proclaiming their sentiments on the awful death of Hêraklês, in
  the tunic of Nessus, which has just been announced as about to
  happen.

  [447] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30; Plutarch, Compar. Agesil. and
  Pomp. c. 1. Ἀγησίλαος δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν ἔδοξε λαβεῖν, οὔτε τὰ
  πρὸς θεοὺς ἄμεμπτος, οὔτε τὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, κρίνας νοθείας
  Λεωτυχίδην, ὃν υἱὸν αὑτοῦ ἀπέδειξεν ὁ ἀδελφὸς γνήσιον, τὸν δὲ
  χρησμὸν κατειρωνευσάμενος τὸν περὶ τῆς χωλότητος. Again, ib. c.
  2. δι᾽ Ἀγησίλαον ἐπεσκότησε τῷ χρησμῷ Λύσανδρος.

Besides the crown, Agesilaus at the same time acquired the large
property left by the late king Agis; an acquisition which enabled
him to display his generosity by transferring half of it at once
to his maternal relatives,—for the most part poor persons.[448]
The popularity acquired by this step was still farther increased
by his manner of conducting himself towards the ephors and senate.
Between these magistrates and the kings, there was generally a bad
understanding. The kings, not having lost the tradition of the
plenary power once enjoyed by their ancestors, displayed as much
haughty reserve as they dared, towards an authority now become
essentially superior to their own. But Agesilaus,—not less from
his own preëstablished habits, than from anxiety to make up for the
defects of his title,—adopted a line of conduct studiously opposite.
He not only took pains to avoid collision with the ephors, but showed
marked deference both to their orders and to their persons. He rose
from his seat whenever they appeared; he conciliated both ephors and
senators by timely presents.[449] By such judicious proceeding, as
well as by his exact observance of the laws and customs,[450] he was
himself the greatest gainer. Combined with that ability and energy
in which he was never deficient, it ensured to him more real power
than had ever fallen to the lot of any king of Sparta; power not
merely over the military operations abroad which usually fell to
the kings,—but also over the policy of the state at home. On the
increase and maintenance of that real power, his chief thoughts were
concentrated; new dispositions generated by kingship, which had never
shown themselves in him before. Despising, like Lysander, both money,
luxury, and all the outward show of power,—he exhibited, as a king,
an ultra-Spartan simplicity, carried almost to affectation, in diet,
clothing, and general habits. But like Lysander also, he delighted
in the exercise of dominion through the medium of knots or factions
of devoted partisans, whom he rarely scrupled to uphold in all their
career of injustice and oppression. Though an amiable man, with
no disposition to tyranny, and still less to plunder, for his own
benefit,—Agesilaus thus made himself the willing instrument of both,
for the benefit of his various coadjutors and friends, whose power
and consequence he identified with his own.[451]

  [448] Xen. Agesil. iv, 5; Plutarch, Ages. c. 4.

  [449] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 4.

  [450] Xen. Agesil. vii, 2.

  [451] Isokrates, Orat. v, (Philipp.) s. 100; Plutarch, Agesilaus,
  c. 3, 13-23; Plutarch, Apophthegm. Laconica, p. 209 F—212 D.

  See the incident alluded to by Theopompus ap. Athenæum, xiii, p.
  609.

At the moment when Agesilaus became king, Sparta was at the maximum
of her power, holding nearly all the Grecian towns as subject allies,
with or without tribute. She was engaged in the task (as has already
been mentioned) of protecting the Asiatic Greeks against the Persian
satraps in their neighborhood. And the most interesting portion
of the life of Agesilaus consists in the earnestness with which
he espoused, and the vigor and ability with which he conducted,
this great Pan-hellenic duty. It will be seen that success in his
very promising career was intercepted[452] by his bad, factious
subservience to partisans, at home and abroad,—by his unmeasured
thirst for Spartan omnipotence,—and his indifference or aversion
to any generous scheme of combination with the cities dependent on
Sparta.

  [452] Isokrates (Orat. v, _ut sup._) makes a remark in substance
  the same.

His attention, however, was first called to a dangerous internal
conspiracy with which Sparta was threatened. The “lame reign” was
as yet less than twelve months old, when Agesilaus, being engaged
in sacrificing at one of the established state solemnities, was
apprised by the officiating prophet, that the victims exhibited
menacing symptoms, portending a conspiracy of the most formidable
character. A second sacrifice gave yet worse promise; and on the
third, the terrified prophet exclaimed, “Agesilaus, the revelation
before us imports that we are actually in the midst of our enemies.”
They still continued to sacrifice, but victims were now offered to
the averting and preserving gods, with prayers that these latter,
by tutelary interposition, would keep off the impending peril. At
length, after much repetition, and great difficulty, favorable
victims were obtained; the meaning of which was soon made clear. Five
days afterwards, an informer came before the ephors, communicating
the secret, that a dangerous conspiracy was preparing, organized by a
citizen named Kinadon.[453]

  [453] Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 4.

The conspirator thus named was a Spartan citizen, but not one of
that select number called The Equals or The Peers. It has already
been mentioned that inequalities had been gradually growing up
among qualified citizens of Sparta, tending tacitly to set apart
a certain number of them under the name of The Peers, and all the
rest under the correlative name of The Inferiors. Besides this,
since the qualification of every family lasted only so long as the
citizen could furnish a given contribution for himself and his sons
to the public mess-table, and since industry of every kind was
inconsistent with the rigid personal drilling imposed upon all of
them,—the natural consequence was, that in each generation a certain
number of citizens became disfranchised and dropped off. But these
disfranchised men did not become Periœki or Helots. They were still
citizens, whose qualification, though in abeyance, might be at any
time renewed by the munificence of a rich man;[454] so that they too,
along with the lesser citizens, were known under the denomination of
The Inferiors. It was to this class that Kinadon belonged. He was
a young man of remarkable strength and courage, who had discharged
with honor his duties in the Lykurgean discipline,[455] and had
imbibed from it that sense of personal equality, and that contempt
of privilege, which its theory as well as its practice suggested.
Notwithstanding all exactness of duty performed, he found that the
constitution, as practically worked, excluded him from the honors and
distinctions of the state; reserving them for the select citizens
known under the name of Peers. And this exclusion had become more
marked and galling since the formation of the Spartan empire after
the victory of Ægospotami; whereby the number of lucrative posts
(harmosties and others) all monopolized by the Peers, had been so
much multiplied. Debarred from the great political prizes, Kinadon
was still employed by the ephors, in consequence of his high spirit
and military sufficiency, in that standing force which they kept
for maintaining order at home.[456] He had been the agent ordered
on several of those arbitrary seizures which they never scrupled to
employ towards persons whom they regarded as dangerous. But this
was no satisfaction to his mind; nay, probably, by bringing him
into close contact with the men in authority, it contributed to
lessen his respect for them. He desired “to be inferior to no man
in Sparta,”[457] and his conspiracy was undertaken to realize this
object by breaking up the constitution.

  [454] See Vol. II, Ch. vi, p. 359 of this History.

  [455] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 5. Οὗτος (Kinadon) δ᾽ ἦν νεανίσκος καὶ
  τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εὔρωστος, οὐ μέντοι τῶν ὁμοίων.

  The meaning of the term Οἱ ὅμοιοι fluctuates in Xenophon;
  it sometimes, as here, is used to signify the privileged
  Peers—again De Repub. Laced. xiii, 1; and Anab. iv, 6, 14.
  Sometimes again it is used agreeably to the Lykurgean theory;
  whereby every citizen, who rigorously discharged his duty in the
  public drill, belonged to the number (De Rep. Lac. x, 7).

  There was a variance between the theory and the practice.

  [456] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9. Ὑπηρετήκει δὲ καὶ ἄλλ᾽ ἤδη ὁ
  Κινάδων τοῖς Ἐφόροις τοιαῦτα. iii, 3, 7. Οἱ συντεταγμένοι ἡμῶν
  (Kinadon says) αὐτοὶ ὅπλα κεκτήμεθα.

  [457] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 11. μηδενὸς ἥττων εἶναι τῶν ἐν
  Λακεδαίμονι—was the declaration of Kinadon when seized and
  questioned by the ephors concerning his purposes. Substantially
  it coincides with Aristotle (Polit. v, 6, 2)—ἢ ὅταν ἀνδρώδης τις
  ὢν μὴ μετέχῃ τῶν τιμῶν, οἷον Κινάδων ὁ τὴν ἐπ᾽ Ἀγησιλάου συστήσας
  ἐπίθεσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας.

It has already been mentioned that amidst the general insecurity
which pervaded the political society of Laconia, the ephors
maintained a secret police and system of espionage which reached its
height of unscrupulous efficiency under the title of the Krypteia.
Such precautions were now more than ever requisite; for the changes
in the practical working of Spartan politics tended to multiply the
number of malcontents, and to throw the Inferiors as well as the
Periœki and the Neodamodes (manumitted Helots), into one common
antipathy with the Helots, against the exclusive partnership of the
Peers. Informers were thus sure of encouragement and reward, and the
man who now came to the ephors either was really an intimate friend
of Kinadon, or had professed himself such in order to elicit the
secret. “Kinadon (said he to the ephors) brought me to the extremity
of the market-place, and bade me count how many Spartans there were
therein. I reckoned up about forty, besides the king, the ephors and
the senators. Upon my asking him why he desired me to count them,
he replied,—Because these are the men, and the only men, whom you
have to look upon as enemies;[458] all others in the market-place,
more than four thousand in number, are friends and comrades. Kinadon
also pointed out to me the one or two Spartans whom we met in the
roads, or who were lords in the country districts, as our only
enemies; every one else around them being friendly to our purpose.”
“How many did he tell you were the accomplices actually privy to
the scheme?”—asked the ephors. “Only a few (was the reply); but
those thoroughly trustworthy; these confidants themselves, however,
said that all around them were accomplices,—Inferiors, Periœki,
Neodamodes, and Helots, all alike; for whenever any one among the
classes talked about a Spartan, he could not disguise his intense
antipathy,—he talked as if he could eat the Spartans raw.”[459]

  [458] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 5.

  [459] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 6. Αὐτοὶ μέντοι πᾶσιν ἔφασαν
  συνειδέναι καὶ εἵλωσι καὶ νεοδαμώδεσι, καὶ τοῖς ὑπομείοσι καὶ
  τοῖς περιοίκοις· ὅπου γὰρ ἐν τούτοις τις λόγος γένοιτο περὶ
  Σπαρτιατῶν, οὐδένα δύνασθαι κρύπτειν τὸ μὴ οὐχ ἡδέως ἂν ~καὶ ὠμῶν
  ἐσθίειν αὐτῶν~.

  The expression is Homeric—ὠμὸν βεβρώθοις Πρίαμον, etc. (Iliad.
  iv, 35). The Greeks did not think themselves obliged to restrain
  the full expression of vindictive feeling. The poet Theognis
  wishes, “that he may one day come to drink the blood of those who
  had ill-used him” (v. 349 Gaisf.).

“But how (continued the ephors) did Kinadon reckon upon getting
arms?” “His language was (replied the witness)—We of the standing
force have our own arms all ready; and here are plenty of knives,
swords, spits, hatchets, axes and scythes—on sale in this
market-place, to suit an insurgent multitude; besides, every man
who tills the earth, or cuts wood and stone, has tools by him which
will serve as weapons in case of need; especially in a struggle with
enemies themselves unarmed.” On being asked what was the moment fixed
for execution, the witness could not tell; he had been instructed
only to remain on the spot, and be ready.[460]

  [460] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 7. ὅτι ἐπιδημεῖν οἱ παρηγγελμένον εἴη.

It does not appear that this man knew the name of any person
concerned, except Kinadon himself. So deeply were the ephors alarmed,
that they refrained from any formal convocation even of what was
called the Lesser Assembly,—including the senate, of which the
kings were members _ex officio_, and, perhaps, a few other principal
persons besides. But the members of this assembly were privately
brought together to deliberate on the emergency; Agesilaus, probably,
among them. To arrest Kinadon at once in Sparta appeared imprudent;
since his accomplices, of number as yet unknown, would be thus
admonished either to break out in insurrection, or at least to make
their escape. But an elaborate stratagem was laid for arresting him
out of Sparta, without the knowledge of his accomplices. The ephors,
calling him before them, professed to confide to him (as they had
done occasionally before) a mission to go to Aulon (a Laconian town
on the frontier towards Arcadia and Triphylia) and there to seize
some parties designated by name in a formal skytalê or warrant;
including some of the Aulonite Periœki,—some Helots,—and one
other person by name, a woman of peculiar beauty, resident at the
place, whose influence was understood to spread disaffection among
all the Lacedæmonians who came thither, old as well as young.[461]
When Kinadon inquired what force he was to take with him on the
mission, the ephors, to obviate all suspicion that they were picking
out companions with views hostile to him, desired him to go to the
Hippagretês (or commander of the three hundred youthful guards called
horsemen, though they were not really mounted) and ask for the first
six or seven men of the guard[462] who might happen to be in the way.
But they (the ephors) had already held secret communication with the
Hippagretês, and had informed him both whom they wished to be sent,
and what the persons sent were to do. They then despatched Kinadon
on his pretended mission telling him that they should place at his
disposal three carts, in order that he might more easily bring home
the prisoners.

  [461] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 8. Ἀγαγεῖν δὲ ἐκέλευον καὶ τὴν
  γυναῖκα, ἣ καλλίστη μὲν ἐλέγετο αὐτόθι εἶναι, λυμαίνεσθαι
  δ᾽ ἐῴκει τοὺς ἀφικνουμένους Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ
  νεωτέρους.

  [462] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9, 10.

  The persons called Hippeis at Sparta, were not mounted; they were
  a select body of three hundred youthful citizens, employed either
  on home police or on foreign service.

  See Herodot. viii, 124; Strabo, x, p. 481; K. O. Müller, History
  of the Dorians, B. iii, ch. 12, s. 5, 6.

Kinadon began his journey to Aulon, without the smallest suspicion
of the plot laid for him by the ephors; who, to make their purpose
sure, sent an additional body of the guards after him, to quell any
resistance which might possibly arise. But their stratagem succeeded
as completely as they could desire. He was seized on the road, by
those who accompanied him ostensibly for his pretended mission.
These men interrogated him, put him to the torture,[463] and heard
from his lips the names of his accomplices; the list of whom they
wrote down, and forwarded by one of the guards to Sparta. The ephors,
on receiving it, immediately arrested the parties principally
concerned, especially the prophet Tisamenus; and examined them along
with Kinadon, as soon as he was brought prisoner. They asked the
latter, among other questions, what was his purpose in setting on
foot the conspiracy; to which he replied,—“I wanted to be inferior
to no man at Sparta.” His punishment was not long deferred. Having
been manacled with a clog round his neck to which his hands were
made fast,—he was in this condition conducted round the city, with
men scourging and pricking him during the progress. His accomplices
were treated in like manner, and at length all of them were put to
death.[464]

  [463] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9.

  Ἔμελλον δὲ οἱ συλλαβόντες αὐτὸν μὲν κατέχειν, τοὺς δὲ ξυνειδότας
  ~πυθόμενοι αὐτοῦ γράψαντες ἀποπέμπειν~ τὴν ταχίστην τοῖς ἐφόροις.
  Οὕτω δ᾽ εἶχον οἱ ἔφοροι πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥστε καὶ μορὰν ἱππέων
  ἔπεμψαν τοῖς ἐπ᾽ Αὐλῶνος. Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ εἰλημμένου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἧκεν
  ἱππεὺς, ~φέρων τὰ ὀνόματα ὧν Κινάδων ἀπέγραψε~, παραχρῆμα τόν τε
  μάντιν Τισάμενον καὶ τοὺς ἐπικαιριωτάτους ξυνελάμβανον. Ὡς δ᾽
  ἀνήχθη ὁ Κινάδων, καὶ ἠλέγχετο, καὶ ὡμολόγει πάντα, καὶ ~τοὺς
  ξυνειδότας ἔλεγε~, τέλος αὐτὸν ἤροντο, τί καὶ βουλόμενος ταῦτα
  πράττοι;

  Polyænus (ii, 14, 1) in his account of this transaction,
  expressly mentions that the Hippeis or guards who accompanied
  Kinadon, put him to the torture (στρεβλώσαντες) when they seized
  him, in order to extort the names of his accomplices. Even
  without express testimony, we might pretty confidently have
  assumed this. From a man of spirit like Kinadon, they were not
  likely to obtain such betrayal without torture.

  I had affirmed that in the description of this transaction given
  by Xenophon, it did not appear whether Kinadon was able to write
  or not. My assertion was controverted by Colonel Mure (in his
  Reply to my Appendix), who cited the words φέρων τὰ ὀνόματα ὧν
  Κινάδων ~ἀπέγραψε~, as containing an affirmation from Xenophon
  that Kinadon could write.

  In my judgment, these words, taken in conjunction with what
  precedes, and with the probabilities of the fact described, do
  not contain such an affirmation.

  The guards were instructed to seize Kinadon, and after _having
  heard from Kinadon who his accomplices were, to write the names
  down and send them to the ephors_. It is to be presumed that they
  executed these instructions as given; the more so, as what they
  were commanded to do, was at once the safest and the most natural
  proceeding. For Kinadon was a man distinguished for personal
  _stature and courage_ (τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εὔρωστος, iii, 3,
  5) so that those who seized him would find it an indispensable
  precaution to pinion his arms. Assuming even that Kinadon could
  write,—yet, if he were to write, he must have his right arm
  free. And why should the guards take this risk, when all which
  the ephors required was, that Kinadon should _pronounce_ the
  names, to be written down by others? With a man of the qualities
  of Kinadon, it probably required the most intense pressure to
  force him to betray his comrades, even by word of mouth; it would
  probably be more difficult still, to force him to betray them by
  the more deliberate act of writing.

  I conceive that ἧκεν ἱππεὺς, φέρων τὰ ὀνόματα ὧν ὁ Κινάδων
  ἀπέγραψε is to be construed with reference to the preceding
  sentence, and announces the carrying into effect of the
  instructions then reported as given by the ephors. “A guard came,
  bearing the names of those whom Kinadon had given in.” It is not
  necessary to suppose that Kinadon had written down these names
  with his own hand.

  In the beginning of the Oration of Andokides (De Mysteriis),
  Pythonikus gives information of a mock celebration of the
  mysteries, committed by Alkibiades and others; citing as his
  witness the slave Andromachus; who is accordingly produced, and
  states to the assembly _vivâ voce_ what he had seen and who
  were the persons present—Πρῶτος μὲν οὗτος (Andromachus) ταῦτα
  εμήνυσε, καὶ ~ἀπέγραψε τούτους~ (s. 13). It is not here meant to
  affirm that the slave Andromachus wrote down the names of these
  persons, which he had the moment before publicly announced to the
  assembly. It is by the words ἀπέγραψε τούτους that the orator
  describes the public oral announcement made by Andromachus, which
  was formally taken note of by a secretary, and which led to legal
  consequences against the persons whose names were given in.

  So again, in the old law quoted by Demosthenes (adv. Makast. p.
  1068), Ἀπογραφέτω δὲ τὸν μὴ ποιοῦντα ταῦτα ὁ βουλόμενος πρὸς τὸν
  ἄρχοντα; and in Demosthenes adv. Nikostrat. p. 1247. Ἃ ἐκ τῶν
  νόμων τῷ ἰδιώτῃ τῷ ἀπογράφαντι γίγνεται, τῇ πόλει ἀφίημι: compare
  also Lysias, De Bonis Aristophanis, Or. xix, s. 53; it is not
  meant to affirm that ὁ ἀπογράφων was required to perform his
  process in writing, or was necessarily able to write. A citizen
  who could not write might do this, as well as one who could. He
  _informed against_ a certain person as delinquent; he _informed
  of_ certain articles of property, as belonging to the estate
  of one whose property had been confiscated to the city. The
  information, as well as the name of the informer, was taken down
  by the official person,—whether the informer could himself write
  or not.

  It appears to me that Kinadon, having been interrogated,
  _told_ to the guards who first seized him, the names of his
  accomplices,—just as he _told_ these names afterwards to the
  ephors (καὶ τοῦς ξυνειδότας ~ἔλεγε~); and this, whether he was,
  or was not, able to write; a point, which the passage of Xenophon
  noway determines.

  [464] Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 11.

Such is the curious narrative, given by Xenophon, of this
unsuccessful conspiracy. He probably derived his information from
Agesilaus himself; since we cannot easily explain how he could have
otherwise learnt so much about the most secret manœuvres of the
ephors, in a government proverbial for constant secrecy, like that of
Sparta. The narrative opens to us a glimpse, though sadly transient
and imperfect, of the internal dangers of the Spartan government. We
were aware, from earlier evidences, of great discontent prevailing
among the Helots, and to a certain extent among the Periœki. But
the incident here described presents to us the first manifestation
of a body of malcontents among the Spartans themselves; malcontents
formidable both from energy and position, like Kinadon and the
prophet Tisamenus. Of the state of disaffected feeling in the
provincial townships of Laconia, an impressive proof is afforded by
the case of that beautiful woman who was alleged to be so active
in political proselytism at Aulon; not less than by the passionate
expressions of hatred revealed in the deposition of the informer
himself. Though little is known about the details, yet it seems that
the tendency of affairs at Sparta was to concentrate both power
and property in the hands of an oligarchy ever narrowing among the
citizens; thus aggravating the dangers at home, even at the time when
the power of the state was greatest abroad, and preparing the way for
that irreparable humiliation which began with the defeat of Leuktra.

It can hardly be doubted that much more wide-spread discontent came
to the knowledge of the ephors than that which is specially indicated
in Xenophon. And such discovery may probably have been one of the
motives (as had happened in 424 B.C. on occasion of the expedition
of Brasidas into Thrace) which helped to bring about the Asiatic
expedition of Agesilaus, as an outlet for brave malcontents on
distant and lucrative military service.

Derkyllidas had now been carrying on war in Asia Minor for near three
years, against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, with so much efficiency
and success, as both to protect the Asiatic Greeks on the coast, and
to intercept all the revenues which those satraps either transmitted
to court or enjoyed themselves. Pharnabazus had already gone up to
Susa (during his truce with Derkyllidas in 397 B.C.), and besides
obtaining a reinforcement which acted under himself and Tissaphernes
in 396 B.C. against Derkyllidas in Lydia, had laid schemes for
renewing the maritime war against Sparta.[465]

  [465] Diodor. xiv, 39; Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 13.

It is now that we hear again mentioned the name of Konon, who, having
saved himself with nine triremes from the defeat of Ægospotami,
had remained for the last seven years under the protection of
Evagoras, prince of Salamis, in Cyprus. Konon, having married at
Salamis, and having a son[466] born to him there, indulged but faint
hopes of ever returning to his native city, when, fortunately for
him as well as for Athens, the Persians again became eager for an
efficient admiral and fleet on the coast of Asia Minor. Through
representations from Pharnabazus, as well as from Evagoras in
Cyprus,—and through correspondence of the latter with the Greek
physician Ktesias, who wished to become personally employed in the
negotiation, and who seems to have had considerable influence with
queen Parysatis,[467]—orders were obtained, and funds provided, to
equip in Phœnicia and Kilikia a numerous fleet, under the command of
Konon. While that officer began to show himself, and to act with such
triremes as he found in readiness (about forty in number) along the
southern coast of Asia Minor from Kilikia to Kaunus,[468]—further
preparations were vigorously prosecuted in the Phœnician ports, in
order to make up the fleet to three hundred sail.[469]

  [466] Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristophanis) s. 38.

  [467] See Ktesias, Fragmenta, Persica, c. 63, ed. Bähr; Plutarch,
  Artax. c. 21.

  We cannot make out these circumstances with any distinctness;
  but the general fact is plainly testified, and is besides very
  probable. Another Grecian surgeon (besides Ktesias) is mentioned
  as concerned,—Polykritus of Mendê; and a Kretan dancer named
  Zeno,—both established at the Persian court.

  There is no part of the narrative of Ktesias, the loss of which
  is so much to be regretted as this; relating transactions, in
  which he was himself concerned, and seemingly giving original
  letters.

  [468] Diodor. xiv, 39-79.

  [469] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 1.

It was by a sort of accident that news of such equipment reached
Sparta,—in an age of the world when diplomatic residents were as
yet unknown. A Syracusan merchant named Herodas, having visited
the Phœnician ports for trading purposes, brought back to Sparta
intelligence of the preparations which he had seen, sufficient to
excite much uneasiness. The Spartans were taking counsel among
themselves, and communicating with their neighboring allies, when
Agesilaus, at the instance of Lysander, stood forward as a volunteer
to solicit the command of a land-force for the purpose of attacking
the Persians in Asia. He proposed to take with him only thirty
full Spartan citizens or peers, as a sort of Board or Council of
Officers; two thousand Neodamodes or enfranchised Helots, whom the
ephors were probably glad to send away, and who would be selected
from the bravest and most formidable; and six thousand hoplites from
the land-allies, to whom the prospect of a rich service against
Asiatic enemies would be tempting. Of these thirty Spartans, Lysander
intended to be the leader; and thus, reckoning on his preëstablished
influence over Agesilaus, to exercise the real command himself,
without the name. He had no serious fear of the Persian arms, either
by land or sea. He looked upon the announcement of the Phœnician
fleet to be an empty threat, as it had so often proved in the mouth
of Tissaphernes during the late war; while the Cyreian expedition
had inspired him further with ardent hopes of another successful
Anabasis, or conquering invasion of Persia from the sea-coast
inwards. But he had still more at heart to employ his newly-acquired
ascendency in reëstablishing everywhere the dekarchies, which had
excited such intolerable hatred and exercised so much oppression,
that even the ephors had refused to lend positive aid in upholding
them, so that they had been in several places broken up or
modified.[470] If the ambition of Agesilaus was comparatively less
stained by personal and factious antipathies, and more Pan-hellenic
in its aim, than that of Lysander,—it was at the same time yet more
unmeasured in respect to victory over the Great King, whom he dreamed
of dethroning, or at least of expelling from Asia Minor and the
coast.[471] So powerful was the influence exercised by the Cyreian
expedition over the schemes and imagination of energetic Greeks: so
sudden was the outburst of ambition in the mind of Agesilaus, for
which no one before had given him credit.

  [470] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 2.

  [471] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 1. ἐλπίδας ἔχοντα μεγάλας αἱρήσειν
  βασιλέα, etc. Compare iv, 2, 3.

  Xen. Agesilaus, i, 36. ἐπινοῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων καταλύσειν τὴν ἐπὶ τὴν
  Ἑλλάδα στρατεύσασαν πρότερον ἀρχήν, etc.

Though this plan was laid by two of the ablest men in Greece, it
turned out to be rash and improvident, so far as the stability of the
Lacedæmonian empire was concerned. That empire ought to have been
made sure by sea, where its real danger lay, before attempts were
made to extend it by new inland acquisitions. And except for purposes
of conquest, there was no need of farther reinforcements in Asia
Minor; since Derkyllidas was already there with a force competent
to make head against the satraps. Nevertheless, the Lacedæmonians
embraced the plan eagerly; the more so, as envoys were sent from many
of the subject cities, by the partisans of Lysander and in concert
with him, to entreat that Agesilaus might be placed at the head of
the expedition, with as large a force as he required.[472]

  [472] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 5.

No difficulty probably was found in levying the proposed number
of men from the allies, since there was great promise of plunder
for the soldiers in Asia. But the altered position of Sparta with
respect to her most powerful allies was betrayed by the refusal of
Thebes, Corinth, and Athens to take any part in the expedition. The
refusal of Corinth, indeed, was excused professedly on the ground
of a recent inauspicious conflagration of one of the temples in the
city; and that of Athens, on the plea of weakness and exhaustion not
yet repaired. But the latter, at least, had already begun to conceive
some hope from the projects of Konon.[473]

  [473] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 5; Pausan. iii, 9, 1.

The mere fact that a king of Sparta was about to take the command
and pass into Asia, lent peculiar importance to the enterprise. The
Spartan kings, in their function of leaders of Greece, conceived
themselves to have inherited the sceptre of Agamemnon and
Orestes;[474] and Agesilaus, especially, assimilated his expedition
to a new Trojan war,—an effort of united Greece, for the purpose of
taking vengeance on the common Asiatic enemy of the Hellenic name.
The sacrifices having been found favorable, Agesilaus took measures
for the transit of the troops from various ports to Ephesus. But
he himself, with one division, touched in his way at Geræstus, the
southern point of Eubœa; wishing to cross from thence and sacrifice
at Aulis, (the port of Bœotia nearly opposite to Geræstus on the
other side of the strait) where Agamemnon had offered his memorable
sacrifice immediately previous to departure for Troy. It appears
that he both went to the spot, and began the sacrifice, without
asking permission from the Thebans; moreover, he was accompanied
by his own prophet, who conducted the solemnities in a manner not
consistent with the habitual practice of the temple or chapel of
Artemis at Aulis. On both these grounds, the Thebans, resenting the
proceeding as an insult, sent a body of armed men, and compelled
him to desist from the sacrifice.[475] Not taking part themselves
in the expedition, they probably considered that the Spartan king
was presumptuous in assuming to himself the Pan-hellenic character
of a second Agamemnon; and they thus inflicted a humiliation which
Agesilaus never forgave.

  [474] Herodot. i, 68; vii, 159; Pausan. iii, 16, 6.

  [475] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 3, 4; iii, 5, 5; Plutarch, Agesilaus,
  c. 6; Pausan. iii, 9, 2.

Agesilaus seems to have reached Asia about the time when Derkyllidas
had recently concluded his last armistice with Tissaphernes and
Pharnabazus; an armistice, intended to allow time for mutual
communication both with Sparta and the Persian court. On being asked
by the satrap what was his purpose in coming, Agesilaus merely
renewed the demand which had before been made by Derkyllidas—of
autonomy for the Asiatic Greeks. Tissaphernes replied by proposing a
continuation of the same armistice, until he could communicate with
the Persian court,—adding that he hoped to be empowered to grant the
demand. A fresh armistice was accordingly sworn to on both sides,
for three months; Derkyllidas (who with his army came now under the
command of Agesilaus) and Herippidas being sent to the satrap to
receive his oath, and take oaths to him in return.[476]

  [476] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 5, 6; Xen. Agesilaus, i, 10.

  The term of three months is specified only in the latter passage.
  The former armistice of Derkyllidas had probably not expired when
  Agesilaus first arrived.

While the army was thus condemned to temporary inaction at Ephesus,
the conduct and position of Lysander began to excite intolerable
jealousy in the superior officers; and most of all Agesilaus. So
great and established was the reputation of Lysander,—whose statue
had been erected at Ephesus itself in the temple of Artemis,[477] as
well as in many other cities,—that all the Asiatic Greeks looked
upon him as the real chief of the expedition. That he should be
real chief, under the nominal command of another, was nothing more
than what had happened before, in the year wherein he gained the
great victory of Ægospotami,—the Lacedæmonians having then also
sent him out in the ostensible capacity of secretary to the admiral
Arakus, in order to save the inviolability of their own rule, that
the same man should not serve twice as admiral.[478] It was through
the instigation of Lysander, and with a view to his presence,
that the decemvirs and other partisans in the subject cities had
sent to Sparta to petition for Agesilaus; a prince as yet untried
and unknown. So that Lysander,—taking credit, with truth, for
having ensured to Agesilaus first the crown, next this important
appointment,—intended for himself, and was expected by others, to
exercise a fresh turn of command, and to renovate in every town
the discomfited or enfeebled dekarchies. Numbers of his partisans
came to Ephesus to greet his arrival, and a crowd of petitioners
were seen following his steps everywhere; while Agesilaus himself
appeared comparatively neglected. Moreover, Lysander resumed all
that insolence of manner which he had contracted during his former
commands, and which on this occasion gave the greater offence, since
the manner of Agesilaus was both courteous and simple in a peculiar
degree.[479]

  [477] Pausan. vi, 3, 6.

  [478] Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 7. This rule does not seem to have been
  adhered to afterwards. Lysander was sent out again as commander
  in 403 B.C. It is possible, indeed, that he may have been again
  sent out as nominal secretary to some other person named as
  commander.

  [479] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7.

The thirty Spartan counsellors, over whom Lysander had been named
to preside, finding themselves neither consulted by him, nor
solicited by others, were deeply dissatisfied. Their complaints
helped to encourage Agesilaus, who was still more keenly wounded
in his own personal dignity, to put forth a resolute and imperious
strength of will, such as he had not before been known to possess.
He successively rejected every petition preferred to him by or
through Lysander; a systematic purpose which, though never formally
announced,[480] was presently discerned by the petitioners, by the
Thirty, and by Lysander himself. The latter thus found himself not
merely disappointed in all his calculations, but humiliated to
excess, though without any tangible ground of complaint. He was
forced to warn his partisans, that his intervention was an injury
and not a benefit to them; that they must desist from obsequious
attentions to him, and must address themselves directly to Agesilaus.
With that prince he also remonstrated on his own account,—“Truly,
Agesilaus, you know how to degrade your friends.”—“Ay, to be sure
(was the reply), those among them who want to appear greater than I
am; but such as seek to uphold me, I should be ashamed if I did not
know how to repay with due honor.”—Lysander was constrained to admit
the force of this reply, and to request, as the only means of escape
from present and palpable humiliation, that he might be sent on some
mission apart; engaging to serve faithfully in whatever duty he might
be employed.[481]

  [480] The sarcastic remarks which Plutarch ascribes to Agesilaus,
  calling Lysander “my meat-distributor” (κρεοδαίτην), are not
  warranted by Xenophon, and seem not to be probable under the
  circumstances (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 23; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 8).

  [481] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 7-10; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7-8;
  Plutarch, Lysand. c. 23.

  It is remarkable that in the Opusculum of Xenophon, a special
  Panegyric called _Agesilaus_, not a word is said about this
  highly characteristic proceeding between Agesilaus and Lysander
  at Ephesus; nor indeed is the name of Lysander once mentioned.

This proposition, doubtless even more agreeable to Agesilaus than to
himself, being readily assented to, he was despatched on a mission
to the Hellespont. Faithful to his engagement of forgetting past
offences and serving with zeal, he found means to gain over a Persian
grandee named Spithridates, who had received some offence from
Pharnabazus. Spithridates revolted openly, carrying a regiment of
two hundred horse to join Agesilaus; who was thus enabled to inform
himself fully about the satrapy of Pharnabazus, comprising the
territory called Phrygia, in the neighborhood of the Propontis and
the Hellespont.[482]

  [482] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 10.

The army under Tissaphernes had been already powerful at the moment
when his timidity induced him to conclude the first armistice with
Derkyllidas. But additional reinforcements, received since the
conclusion of the second and more recent armistice, had raised him
to such an excess of confidence, that even before the stipulated
three months had expired, he sent to insist on the immediate
departure of Agesilaus from Asia, and to proclaim war forthwith,
if such departure were delayed. While this message, accompanied by
formidable reports of the satrap’s force, filled the army at Ephesus
with mingled alarm and indignation, Agesilaus accepted the challenge
with cheerful readiness; sending word back that he thanked the satrap
for perjuring himself in so flagrant a manner, as to set the gods
against him and ensure their favor to the Greek side.[483] Orders
were forthwith given, and contingents summoned from the Asiatic
Greeks, for a forward movement southward, to cross the Mæander, and
attack Tissaphernes in Karia, where he usually resided. The cities on
the route were required to provide magazines, so that Tissaphernes,
fully anticipating attack in this direction, caused his infantry to
cross into Karia, for the purpose of acting on the defensive; while
he kept his numerous cavalry in the plain of the Mæander, with a
view to overwhelm Agesilaus, who had no cavalry, in his march over
that level territory towards the Karian hills and rugged ground. But
the Lacedæmonian king, having put the enemy on this false scent,
suddenly turned his march northward towards Phrygia and the satrapy
of Pharnabazus. Tissaphernes took no pains to aid his brother satrap,
who on his side had made few preparations for defence. Accordingly
Agesilaus, finding little or no resistance, took many towns and
villages, and collected abundance of provisions, plunder, and slaves.
Profiting by the guidance of the revolted Spithridates, and marching
as little as possible over the plains, he carried on lucrative
and unopposed incursions as far as the neighborhood of Daskylium,
the residence of the satrap himself, near the Propontis. Near the
satrapic residence, however, his small body of cavalry, ascending an
eminence, came suddenly upon an equal detachment of Persian cavalry,
under Rhathines and Bagæus; who attacked them vigorously, and drove
them back with some loss, until they were protected by Agesilaus
himself coming up with the hoplites. The effect of such a check (and
there were probably others of the same kind, though Xenophon does
not specify them) on the spirits of the army was discouraging. On
the next morning, the sacrifices being found unfavorable for farther
advance, Agesilaus gave orders for retreating towards the sea. He
reached Ephesus about the close of autumn; resolved to employ the
winter in organizing a more powerful cavalry, which experience proved
to be indispensable.[484]

  [483] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 11, 12; Xen. Agesil. i, 12-14;
  Plutarch, Agesil. c. 9.

  [484] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 13-15; Xen. Agesil. i, 23. Ἐπεὶ μέντοι
  οὐδὲ ἐν τῇ Φρυγίᾳ ἀνὰ τὰ πεδία ἐδύνατο στρατεύεσθαι, διὰ τὴν
  Φαρναβάζου ἱππείαν, etc.

  Plutarch, Agesil. c. 9.

  These military operations of Agesilaus are loosely adverted to in
  the early part of c. 79 of the fourteenth Book of Diodorus.

This autumnal march through Phrygia was more lucrative than glorious.
Yet it enables Xenophon to bring to view different merits of his
hero Agesilaus; in doing which he exhibits to us ancient warfare
and Asiatic habits on a very painful side. In common both with
Kallikratidas and Lysander, though not with the ordinary Spartan
commanders, Agesilaus was indifferent to the acquisition of money for
himself. But he was not the less anxious to enrich his friends, and
would sometimes connive at unwarrantable modes of acquisition for
their benefit. Deserters often came in to give information of rich
prizes or valuable prisoners; which advantages, if he had chosen,
he might have appropriated to himself. But he made it a practice
to throw both the booty and the honor in the way of some favorite
officer; just as we have seen (in a former chapter) that Xenophon
himself was allowed by the army to capture Asidates and enjoy a large
portion of his ransom.[485] Again, when the army in the course of
its march was at a considerable distance from the sea, and appeared
to be advancing farther inland, the authorized auctioneers, whose
province it was to sell the booty, found the buyers extremely slack.
It was difficult to keep or carry what was bought, and opportunity
for resale did not seem at hand. Agesilaus, while he instructed
the auctioneers to sell upon credit, without insisting on ready
money,—at the same time gave private hints to a few friends that he
was very shortly about to return to the sea. The friends thus warned,
bidding for the plunder on credit and purchasing at low prices, were
speedily enabled to dispose of it again at a seaport, with large
profits.[486]

  [485] Xen. Agesil. i, 19; Xen. Anabas. vii, 8, 20-23; Plutarch,
  Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p 809, B. See above, Chapter lxxii, of
  this History.

  [486] Xen. Agesil. i, 18. πάντες παμπλήθη χρήματα ἔλαβον.

We are not surprised to hear that such lucrative graces procured for
Agesilaus many warm admirers; though the eulogies of Xenophon ought
to have been confined to another point in his conduct, now to be
mentioned. Agesilaus, while securing for his army the plunder of the
country over which he carried his victorious arms, took great pains
to prevent both cruelty and destruction of property. When any town
surrendered to him on terms, his exactions were neither ruinous nor
grossly humiliating.[487] Amidst all the plunder realized, too, the
most valuable portion was the adult natives of both sexes, hunted
down and brought in by the predatory light troops of the army, to
be sold as slaves. Agesilaus was vigilant in protecting these poor
victims from ill-usage; inculcating upon his soldiers the duty, “not
of punishing them like wrong-doers, but simply of keeping them under
guard as men.[488]” It was the practice of the poorer part of the
native population often to sell their little children for exportation
to travelling slave-merchants, from inability to maintain them. The
children thus purchased, if they promised to be handsome, were often
mutilated, and fetched large prices as eunuchs, to supply the large
demand for the harems and religious worship of many Asiatic towns.
But in their haste to get out of the way of a plundering army, these
slave-merchants were forced often to leave by the way-side the little
children whom they had purchased, exposed to the wolves, the dogs, or
starvation. In this wretched condition, they were found by Agesilaus
on his march. His humane disposition prompted him to see them carried
to a place of safety, where he gave them in charge of those old
natives whom age and feebleness had caused to be left behind as
not worth carrying off. By such active kindness, rare, indeed, in a
Grecian general, towards the conquered, he earned the gratitude of
the captives, and the sympathies of every one around.[489]

  [487] Xen. Agesil. i, 20-22.

  [488] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 19; Xen. Agesil. i, 28. τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν
  λῃστῶν ἁλισκομένους βαρβάρους.

  So the word λῃστὴς, used in reference to the fleet, means the
  commander of a predatory vessel or privateer (Xen. Hellen. ii, 1,
  30).

  [489] Xen. Agesil. i, 21. Καὶ πολλάκις μὲν προηγόρευε τοῖς
  στρατιώταις ~τοὺς ἁλισκομένους μὴ ὡς ἀδίκους τιμωρεῖσθαι,
  ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀνθρώπους ὄντας φυλάσσειν~. Πολλάκις δὲ, ὅποτε
  μεταστρατοπεδεύοιτο, ~εἰ αἴσθοιτο καταλελειμμένα παιδάρια μικρὰ
  ἐμπόρων, (ἃ πολλοὶ ἐπώλουν, διὰ τὸ νομίζειν μὴ δύνασθαι ἂν φέρειν
  αὐτὰ καὶ τρέφειν)~ ἐπεμέλετο καὶ τούτων, ὅπως συγκομίζοιτό ποι·
  τοῖς δ᾽ αὖ διὰ γῆρας καταλελειμμένοις αἰχμαλώτοις προσέταττεν
  ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτῶν, ὡς μήτε ὑπὸ κυνῶν, μήθ᾽ ὑπὸ λύκων,
  διαφθείροιντο. Ὥστε οὐ μόνον οἱ πυνθανόμενοι ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ
  αὐτοὶ οἱ ἁλισκόμενοι εὐμενεῖς αὐτῷ ἐγίγνοντο.

  Herodotus affirms that the Thracians also sold their children for
  exportation,—πωλεῦσι τὰ τέχνα ἐπ᾽ ἐξαγωγῇ (Herod. v, 6): compare
  Philostratus, Vit. Apollon. viii, 7-12, p. 346; and Ch. xvi, Vol.
  III, p. 216 of this History.

  Herodotus mentions the Chian merchant Panionius (like the
  “_Mitylenæus mango_” in Martial,—“Sed Mitylenæi roseus mangonis
  ephebus” Martial, vii, 79)—as having conducted on a large scale
  the trade of purchasing boys, looking out for such as were
  handsome, to supply the great demand in the East for eunuchs,
  who were supposed to make better and more attached servants.
  Herodot. viii, 105. ὅκως γὰρ κτήσαιτο (Panionius) παῖδας εἴδεος
  ἐπαμμένους, ἐκτάμνων ἀγινέων ἐπώλεε ἐς Σάρδις τε καὶ Ἔφεσον
  χρημάτων μεγάλων· παρὰ γὰρ τοῖσι βαρβάροισι τιμιώτεροί εἰσι οἱ
  εὐνοῦχοι, πίστιος εἵνεκα τῆς πάσης, τῶν ἐνορχίων. Boys were
  necessary, as the operation was performed in childhood or
  youth,—παῖδες ἐκτομίαι (Herodot. vi, 6-32: compare iii, 48).
  The Babylonians, in addition to their large pecuniary tribute,
  had to furnish to the Persian court annually five hundred παῖδας
  ἐκτομίας (Herodot. iii, 92). For some farther remarks on the
  preference of the Persians both for the persons and the services
  of εὐνοῦχοι, see Dio Chrysostom, Orat. xxi, p. 270; Xenoph.
  Cyropæd. vii, 5, 61-65. Hellanikus (Fr. 169, ed. Didot) affirmed
  that the Persians had derived both the persons so employed, and
  the habit of employing them, from the Babylonians.

  When Mr. Hanway was travelling near the Caspian, among the
  Kalmucks, little children of two or three vears of age, were
  often tendered to him for sale, at two rubles per head (Hanway’s
  Travels, ch. xvi, pp. 65, 66).

This interesting anecdote, imparting a glimpse of the ancient world
in reference to details which Grecian historians rarely condescend
to unveil, demonstrates the compassionate disposition of Agesilaus.
We find in conjunction with it another anecdote, illustrating the
Spartan side of his character. The prisoners who had been captured
during the expedition were brought to Ephesus, and sold during
the winter as slaves for the profit of the army. Agesilaus,—being
then busily employed in training his troops to military
efficiency, especially for the cavalry service during the ensuing
campaign,—thought it advisable to impress them with contempt for the
bodily capacity and prowess of the natives. He therefore directed the
heralds who conducted the auction, to put the prisoners up to sale
in a state of perfect nudity. To have the body thus exposed, was a
thing never done, and even held disgraceful by the native Asiatics;
while among the Greeks the practice was universal for purposes of
exercise,—or at least, had become universal during the last two or
three centuries,—for we are told that originally the Asiatic feeling
on this point had prevailed throughout Greece. It was one of the
obvious differences between Grecian and Asiatic customs,[490]—that
in the former, both the exercises of the palæstra, as well as the
matches in the solemn games, required competitors of every rank
to contend naked. Agesilaus himself stripped thus habitually;
Alexander, prince of Macedon, had done so, when he ran at the Olympic
stadium,[491]—also the combatants out of the great family of the
Diagorids of Rhodes, when they gained their victories in the Olympic
pankratium,—and all those other noble pugilists, wrestlers, and
runners, descended from gods and heroes, upon whom Pindar pours forth
his complimentary odes.

  [490] Herodot. i, 10. παρὰ γὰρ τοῖσι Λυδοῖσι, σχεδὸν δὲ παρὰ
  τοῖσι ἄλλοισι βαρβάροισι, καὶ ἄνδρα ὀφθῆναι γυμνόν, ἐς αἰσχύνην
  μεγάλην φέρει. Compare Thucyd. i, 6; Plato, Republic, v, 3, p.
  452, D.

  [491] Herodot. v, 22.

On this occasion at Ephesus, Agesilaus gave special orders to put up
the Asiatic prisoners to auction naked; not at all by way of insult,
but in order to exhibit to the eye of the Greek soldier, as he
contemplated them, how much he gained by his own bodily training and
frequent exposure, and how inferior was the condition of men whose
bodies never felt the sun or wind. They displayed a white skin, plump
and soft limbs, weak and undeveloped muscles, like men accustomed to
be borne in carriages instead of walking or running; from whence we
indirectly learn that many of them were men in wealthy circumstances.
And the purpose of Agesilaus was completely answered; since his
soldiers, when they witnessed such evidences of bodily incompetence,
thought that “the enemies against whom they had to contend were not
more formidable than women.”[492] Such a method of illustrating the
difference between good and bad physical training, would hardly have
occurred to any one except a Spartan, brought up under the Lykurgean
rules.

  [492] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 19. Ἡγούμενος δὲ, καὶ τὸ καταφρονεῖν
  τῶν πολεμίων ῥώμην τινὰ ἐμβάλλειν πρὸς τὸ μάχεσθαι, προεῖπε
  τοῖς κήρυξι, τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν λῃστῶν ἁλισκομένους βαρβάρους γυμνοὺς
  πωλεῖν. Ὁρῶντες οὖν οἱ στρατιῶται λευκοὺς μὲν, ~διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε
  ἐκδύεσθαι~, μαλακοὺς δὲ καὶ ἀπόνους, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ἐπ᾽ ὀχημάτων
  εἶναι, ἐνόμισαν, οὐδὲν διοίσειν τὸν πόλεμον ἢ εἰ γυναιξὶ δέοι
  μάχεσθαι.

  Xen. Agesil. i, 28—where he has it—πίονας δὲ καὶ ἀπόνους, διὰ
  τὸ ἀεὶ ἐπ᾽ ὀχημάτων εἶναι (Polyænus, ii, 1, 5; Plutarch, Agesil.
  c. 9).

  Frontinus (i, 18) recounts a proceeding somewhat similar on the
  part of Gelon, after his great victory over the Carthaginians
  at Himera in Sicily:—“Gelo Syracusarum tyrannus, bello adversus
  Pœnos suscepto, cum multos cepisset, infirmissimum quemque
  præcipue ex auxiliaribus, qui nigerrimi erant, nudatum in
  conspectu suorum produxit, ut persuaderet contemnendos.”

While Agesilaus thus brought home to the vision of his soldiers the
inefficiency of untrained bodies, he kept them throughout the winter
under hard work and drill, as well in the palæstra as in arms. A
force of cavalry was still wanting. To procure it, he enrolled all
the richest Greeks in the various Asiatic towns, as conscripts to
serve on horseback; giving each of them leave to exempt himself,
however, by providing a competent substitute and equipment,—man,
horse, and arms.[493] Before the commencement of spring, an adequate
force of cavalry was thus assembled at Ephesus, and put into
tolerable exercise. Throughout the whole winter, that city became a
place of arms, consecrated to drilling and gymnastic exercises. On
parade as well as in the palæstra, Agesilaus himself was foremost in
setting the example of obedience and hard work. Prizes were given
to the diligent and improving among hoplites, horsemen, and light
troops; while the armorers, braziers, leather-cutters, etc.,—all
the various artisans, whose trade lay in muniments of war, were in
the fullest employment. “It was a sight full of encouragement (says
Xenophon, who was doubtless present and took part in it), to see
Agesilaus and the soldiers leaving the gymnasium, all with wreaths on
their heads, and marching to the temple of Artemis to dedicate their
wreaths to the goddess.”[494]

  [493] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 15; Xen. Agesil. i, 23. Compare what
  is related about Scipio Africanus—Livy, xxix, 1.

  [494] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 17, 18; Xen. Agesil. i, 26, 27.

Before Agesilaus was in condition to begin his military operations
for the spring, the first year of his command had passed over.
Thirty fresh counsellors reached Ephesus from Sparta, superseding
the first thirty under Lysander, who forthwith returned home. The
army was now not only more numerous, but better trained, and more
systematically arranged than in the preceding campaign. Agesilaus
distributed the various divisions under the command of different
members of the new Thirty; the cavalry being assigned to Xenoklês,
the Neodamode hoplites to Skythês, the Cyreians to Herippidas, the
Asiatic contingents to Migdon. He then gave out that he should march
straight against Sardis. Nevertheless, Tissaphernes, who was in
that place, construing this proclamation as a feint, and believing
that the real march would be directed against Karia, disposed his
cavalry in the plain of the Mæander as he had done in the preceding
campaign; while his infantry were sent still farther southward within
the Karian frontier. On this occasion, however, Agesilaus marched
as he had announced, in the direction of Sardis. For three days he
plundered the country without seeing an enemy; nor was it until the
fourth day that the cavalry of Tissaphernes could be summoned back to
oppose him; the infantry being even yet at a distance. On reaching
the banks of the river Paktôlus, this Persian cavalry found the Greek
light troops dispersed for the purpose of plunder, attacked them
by surprise, and drove them in with considerable loss. Presently,
however, Agesilaus came up, and ordered his cavalry to charge,
anxious to bring on a battle before the Persian infantry could arrive
in the field. In efficiency, it appears, the Persian cavalry was a
full match for his cavalry, and in number apparently superior. But
when he brought up his infantry, and caused his peltasts and younger
hoplites to join the cavalry in a vigorous attack,—victory soon
declared on his side. The Persians were put to flight and many of
them drowned in the Paktôlus. Their camp, too, was taken, with a
valuable booty; including several camels, which Agesilaus afterwards
took with him into Greece. This success ensured to him the unopposed
mastery of all the territory around Sardis. He carried his ravages
to the very gates of that city, plundering the gardens and ornamented
ground, proclaiming liberty to those within, and defying Tissaphernes
to come out and fight.[495]

  [495] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 21-24; Xen. Agesil. i, 32, 33;
  Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10.

  Diodorus (xiv, 80) professes to describe this battle; but his
  description is hardly to be reconciled with that of Xenophon,
  which is better authority. Among other points of difference,
  Diodorus affirms that the Persians had fifty thousand infantry;
  and Pausanias also states (iii, 9, 3) that the number of Persian
  infantry in this battle was greater than had ever been got
  together since the times of Darius and Xerxes Whereas, Xenophon
  expressly states that the Persian infantry had not come up, and
  took no part in the battle.

The career of that timid and treacherous satrap now approached its
close. The Persians in or near Sardis loudly complained of him as
leaving them undefended, from cowardice and anxiety for his own
residence in Karia; while the court of Susa was now aware that
the powerful reinforcement which had been sent to him last year,
intended to drive Agesilaus out of Asia, had been made to achieve
absolutely nothing. To these grounds of just dissatisfaction was
added a court intrigue; to which, and to the agency of a person yet
more worthless and cruel than himself, Tissaphernes fell a victim.
The queen mother, Parysatis, had never forgiven him for having been
one of the principal agents in the defeat and death of her son Cyrus.
Her influence being now reëstablished over the mind of Artaxerxes,
she took advantage of the existing discredit of the satrap to get an
order sent down for his deposition and death. Tithraustes, the bearer
of this order, seized him by stratagem at Kolossæ in Phrygia, while
he was in the bath, and caused him to be beheaded.[496]

  [496] Plutarch. Artaxerx. c. 23; Diodor. xiv, 80; Xen. Hellen.
  iii, 4, 25.

The mission of Tithraustes to Asia Minor was accompanied by increased
efforts on the part of Persia for prosecuting the war against Sparta
with vigor, by sea as well as by land; and also for fomenting
the anti-Spartan movement which burst out into hostilities this
year in Greece. At first, however, immediately after the death of
Tissaphernes, Tithraustes endeavored to open negotiations with
Agesilaus, who was in military possession of the country around
Sardis, while that city itself appears to have been occupied by
Ariæus, probably the same Persian who had formerly been general
under Cyrus, and who had now again revolted from Artaxerxes.[497]
Tithraustes took credit to the justice of the king for having
punished the late satrap; out of whose perfidy (he affirmed) the
war had arisen. He then summoned Agesilaus, in the king’s name, to
evacuate Asia, leaving the Asiatic Greeks to pay their original
tribute to Persia, but to enjoy complete autonomy, subject to that
one condition. Had this proposition been accepted and executed,
it would have secured these Greeks against Persian occupation or
governors; a much milder fate for them than that to which the
Lacedæmonians had consented in their conventions with Tissaphernes
sixteen years before,[498] and analogous to the position in which
the Chalkidians of Thrace had been placed with regard to Athens,
under the peace of Nikias;[499] subject to a fixed tribute, yet
autonomous,—with no other obligation or interference. Agesilaus
replied that he had no power to entertain such a proposition without
the authorities at home, whom he accordingly sent to consult. But
in the interim he was prevailed upon by Tithraustes to conclude an
armistice for six months, and to move out of his satrapy into that
of Pharnabazus; receiving a contribution of thirty talents towards
the temporary maintenance of the army.[500] These satraps generally
acted more like independent or even hostile princes, than coöperating
colleagues; one of the many causes of the weakness of the Persian
empire.

  [497] Xen. Hellen. iii, 14, 25; iv, 1, 27.

  [498] Thucyd. viii, 18, 37, 58.

  [499] Thucyd. v, 18, 5.

  [500] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 26; Diodor. xiv, 80. ἑξαμηνιαίους
  ἀνοχάς.

When Agesilaus had reached the neighborhood of Kymê, on his march
northward to the Hellespontine Phrygia, he received a despatch from
home, placing the Spartan naval force in the Asiatic seas under
his command, as well as the land-force, and empowering him to name
whomsoever he chose as acting admiral.[501] For the first time
since the battle of Ægospotami, the maritime empire of Sparta was
beginning to be threatened, and increased efforts on her part were
becoming requisite. Pharnabazus, going up in person to the court
of Artaxerxes, had by pressing representations obtained a large
subsidy for fitting out a fleet in Cyprus and Phœnicia, to act under
the Athenian admiral Konon against the Lacedæmonians.[502] That
officer,—with a fleet of forty triremes, before the equipment of
the remainder was yet complete,—had advanced along the southern
coast of Asia Minor to Kaunus, at the south-western corner of the
peninsula, on the frontier of Karia and Lykia. In this port he was
besieged by the Lacedæmonian fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes
under Pharax. But a Persian reinforcement strengthened the fleet
of Konon to eighty sail, and put the place out of danger; so that
Pharax, desisting from the siege, retired to Rhodes.

  [501] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 27.

  [502] Diodor. xiv, 39, Justin, vi, 1.

The neighborhood of Konon, however, who was now with his fleet of
eighty sail near the Chersonesus of Knidus, emboldened the Rhodians
to revolt from Sparta. It was at Rhodes that the general detestation
of the Lacedæmonian empire, disgraced in so many different cities by
the local dekarchies and by the Spartan harmosts, first manifested
itself. And such was the ardor of the Rhodian population, that their
revolt took place while the fleet of Pharax was (in part at least)
actually in the harbor, and they drove him out of it.[503] Konon,
whose secret encouragements had helped to excite this insurrection,
presently sailed to Rhodes with his fleet, and made the island his
main station. It threw into his hands an unexpected advantage;
for a numerous fleet of vessels arrived there shortly afterwards,
sent by Nephareus, the native king of Egypt (which was in revolt
against the Persians), with marine stores and grain to the aid of
the Lacedæmonians. Not having been apprized of the recent revolt,
these vessels entered the harbor of Rhodes as if it were still a
Lacedæmonian island; and their cargoes were thus appropriated by
Konon and the Rhodians.[504]

  [503] Diodor. xiv, 79. Ῥόδιοι δὲ ἐκβαλόντες τὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων
  στόλον, ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ τὸν Κόνωνα προσεδέξαντο
  μετὰ τοῦ στόλου παντὸς εἰς τὴν πόλιν.

  Compare Androtion apud Pausaniam, vi, 7, 2.

  [504] Diodor. xiv, 79; Justin (vi, 2) calls this native Egyptian
  king _Hercynion_.

  It seems to have been the uniform practice, for the corn-ships
  coming from Egypt to Greece to halt at Rhodes (Demosthen. cont.
  Dionysodor p. 1285: compare Herodot. ii, 182).

In recounting the various revolts of the dependencies of Athens
which took place during the Peloponnesian war, I had occasion to
point out more than once that all of them took place not merely in
the absence of any Athenian force, but even at the instigation (in
most cases) of a present hostile force,—by the contrivance of a
local party,—and without privity or previous consent of the bulk
of the citizens. The present revolt of Rhodes, forming a remarkable
contrast on all these points, occasioned the utmost surprise and
indignation among the Lacedæmonians. They saw themselves about to
enter upon a renewed maritime war, without that aid which they had
reckoned on receiving from Egypt, and with aggravated uncertainty
in respect to their dependencies and tribute. It was under this
prospective anxiety that they took the step of nominating Agesilaus
to the command of the fleet as well as of the army, in order to
ensure unity of operations;[505] though a distinction of functions,
which they had hitherto set great value upon maintaining, was thus
broken down,—and, though the two commands had never been united in
any king before Agesilaus.[506] Pharax, the previous admiral, was
recalled.[507]

  [505] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 27.

  [506] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10; Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 22.

  [507] The Lacedæmonian named Pharax, mentioned by Theopompus
  (Fragm. 218, ed. Didot: compare Athenæus, xii, p. 536) as a
  profligate and extravagant person, is more probably an officer
  who served under Dionysius in Sicily and Italy, about forty years
  after the revolt of Rhodes. The difference of time appears so
  great, that we must probably suppose two different men bearing
  the same name.

But the violent displeasure of the Lacedæmonians against the revolted
Rhodians was still better attested by another proceeding. Among
all the great families at Rhodes, none were more distinguished
than the Diagoridæ. Its members were not only generals and high
political functionaries in their native island, but had attained
even Pan-hellenic celebrity by an unparalleled series of victories
at the Olympic and other great solemnities. Dorieus, a member of
this family, had gained the victory in the pankration at Olympia
on three successive solemnities. He had obtained seven prizes in
the Nemean, and eight in the Isthmian games. He had carried off the
prize at one Pythian solemnity without a contest,—no one daring
to stand up against him in the fearful struggle of the pankration.
As a Rhodian, while Rhodes was a subject ally of Athens during the
Peloponnesian war, he had been so pronounced in his attachment to
Sparta as to draw on himself a sentence of banishment; upon which he
had retired to Thurii, and had been active in hostility to Athens
after the Syracusan catastrophe. Serving against her in ships
fitted out at his own cost, he had been captured in 407 B.C. by the
Athenians, and brought in as prisoner to Athens. By the received
practice of war in that day, his life was forfeited; and over and
above such practice, the name of Dorieus was peculiarly odious to the
Athenians. But when they saw before the public assembly a captive
enemy, of heroic lineage, as well as of unrivalled athletic majesty
and renown, their previous hatred was so overpowered by sympathy and
admiration, that they liberated him by public vote, and dismissed him
unconditionally.[508]

  [508] Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 19.

  Compare a similar instance of merciful dealing, on the part
  of the Syracusan assembly, towards the Sikel prince Duketius
  (Diodor. xi, 92).

This interesting anecdote, which has already been related in
my eighth volume,[509] is here again noticed as a contrast to
the treatment which the same Dorieus now underwent from the
Lacedæmonians. What he had been doing since, we do not know; but
at the time when Rhodes now revolted from Sparta, he was not only
absent from the island, but actually in or near Peloponnesus.
Such, however, was the wrath of the Lacedæmonians against Rhodians
generally, that Dorieus was seized by their order, brought to Sparta,
and there condemned and executed.[510] It seems hardly possible that
he can have had any personal concern in the revolt. Had such been
the fact, he would have been in the island,—or would at least have
taken care not to be within the reach of the Lacedæmonians when the
revolt happened. Perhaps, however, other members of the Diagoridæ,
his family, once so much attached to Sparta, may have taken part in
it; for we know, by the example of the Thirty at Athens, that the
Lysandrian dekarchies and Spartan harmosts made themselves quite
as formidable to oligarchical as to democratical politicians, and
it is very conceivable that the Diagoridæ may have become less
philo-Laconian in their politics.

  [509] Hist. of Greece, Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 159.

  [510] Pausanias, vi, 7, 2.

This extreme difference in the treatment of the same man by Athens
and by Sparta raises instructive reflections. It exhibits the
difference both between Athenian and Spartan sentiment, and between
the sentiment of a multitude and that of a few. The grand and
sacred personality of the Hieronike Dorieus, when exhibited to
the senses of the Athenian multitude,—the spectacle of a man in
chains before them, who had been proclaimed victor and crowned on
so many solemn occasions before the largest assemblages of Greeks
ever brought together,—produced an overwhelming effect upon their
emotions; sufficient not only to efface a strong preëstablished
antipathy founded on active past hostility, but to countervail
a just cause of revenge, speaking in the language of that day.
But the same appearance produced no effect at all on the Spartan
ephors and senate; not sufficient even to hinder them from putting
Dorieus to death, though he had given them no cause for antipathy
or revenge, simply as a sort of retribution for the revolt of the
island. Now this difference depended partly upon the difference
between the sentiment of Athenians and Spartans, but partly also
upon the difference between the sentiment of a multitude and that of
a few. Had Dorieus been brought before a select judicial tribunal
at Athens, instead of before the Athenian public assembly,—or, had
the case been discussed before the assembly in his absence,—he
would have been probably condemned, conformably to usage, under the
circumstances; but the vehement emotion worked by his presence upon
the multitudinous spectators of the assembly, rendered such a course
intolerable to them. It has been common with historians of Athens
to dwell upon the passions of the public assembly as if it were
susceptible of excitement only in an angry or vindictive direction;
whereas, the truth is, and the example before us illustrates, that
they were open-minded in one direction as well as in another,
and that the present emotion, whatever it might be, merciful or
sympathetic as well as resentful, was intensified by the mere fact of
multitude. And thus, where the established rule of procedure happened
to be cruel, there was some chance of moving an Athenian assembly to
mitigate it in a particular case, though the Spartan ephors or senate
would be inexorable in carrying it out,—if, indeed, they did not, as
seems probable in the case of Dorieus, actually go beyond it in rigor.

While Konon and the Rhodians were thus raising hostilities against
Sparta by sea, Agesilaus, on receiving at Kymê the news of his
nomination to the double command, immediately despatched orders
to the dependent maritime cities and islands, requiring the
construction and equipment of new triremes. Such was the influence
of Sparta, and so much did the local governments rest upon its
continuance, that these requisitions were zealously obeyed. Many
leading men incurred considerable expense, from desire to acquire
his favor; so that a fleet of one hundred and twenty new triremes
was ready by the ensuing year. Agesilaus, naming his brother-in-law,
Peisander, to act as admiral, sent him to superintend the
preparations; a brave young man, but destitute both of skill and
experience.[511]

  [511] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 28, 29; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10.

Meanwhile, he himself pursued his march (about the beginning of
autumn) towards the satrapy of Pharnabazus,—Phrygia south and
south-east of the Propontis. Under the active guidance of his new
auxiliary, Spithridates, he plundered the country, capturing some
towns, and reducing others to capitulate; with considerable advantage
to his soldiers. Pharnabazus, having no sufficient army to hazard a
battle in defence of his satrapy, concentrated all his force near
his own residence at Daskylium, offering no opposition to the march
of Agesilaus; who was induced by Spithridates to traverse Phrygia
and enter Paphlagonia, in hopes of concluding an alliance with the
Paphlagonian prince Otys. That prince, in nominal dependence on
Persia, could muster the best cavalry in the Persian empire. But
he had recently refused to obey an invitation from the court at
Susa, and he now not only welcomed the appearance of Agesilaus, but
concluded an alliance with him, strengthening him with an auxiliary
body of cavalry and peltasts. Anxious to requite Spithridates for
his services, and vehemently attached to his son, the beautiful
youth Megabates,—Agesilaus persuaded Otys to marry the daughter
of Spithridates. He even caused her to be conveyed by sea in a
Lacedæmonian trireme,—probably from Abydos to Sinôpê.[512]

  [512] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 1-15.

  The negotiation of this marriage by Agesilaus is detailed in a
  curious and interesting manner by Xenophon. His conversation
  with Otys took place in the presence of the thirty Spartan
  counsellors, and probably in the presence of Xenophon himself.

  The attachment of Agesilaus to the youth Megabazus or Megabates,
  is marked in the Hellenica (iv, 1, 6-28)—but is more strongly
  brought out in the Agesilaus of Xenophon (v, 6), and in Plutarch,
  Agesil. c. 11.

  In the retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks (five years before)
  along the southern coast of the Euxine, a Paphlagonian prince
  named Korylas is mentioned (Xen. Anab. v, 5, 22; v, 6, 8).
  Whether there was more than one Paphlagonian prince—or whether
  Otys was successor of Korylas—we cannot tell.

Reinforced by the Paphlagonian auxiliaries, Agesilaus prosecuted
the war with augmented vigor against the satrapy of Pharnabazus. He
now approached the neighborhood of Daskylium, the residence of the
satrap himself, inherited from his father Pharnakês, who had been
satrap before him. This was a well-supplied country, full of rich
villages, embellished with parks and gardens for the satrap’s hunting
and gratification: the sporting tastes of Xenophon lead him also to
remark that there were plenty of birds for the fowler, with rivers
full of fish.[513] In this agreeable region Agesilaus passed the
winter. His soldiers, abundantly supplied with provisions, became so
careless, and straggled with so much contempt of their enemy, that
Pharnabazus, with a body of four hundred cavalry and two scythed
chariots, found an opportunity of attacking seven hundred of them by
surprise; driving them back with considerable loss, until Agesilaus
came up to protect them with the hoplites.

  [513] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 16-33.

This partial misfortune, however, was speedily avenged. Fearful of
being surrounded and captured, Pharnabazus refrained from occupying
any fixed position. He hovered about the country, carrying his
valuable property along with him, and keeping his place of encampment
as secret as he could. The watchful Spithridates, nevertheless,
having obtained information that he was encamped for the night in
the village of Kanê, about eighteen miles distant, Herippidas (one
of the thirty Spartans) undertook a night-march with a detachment
to surprise him. Two thousand Grecian hoplites, the like number of
light-armed peltasts, and Spithridates with the Paphlagonian horse,
were appointed to accompany him. Though many of these soldiers
took advantage of the darkness to evade attendance, the enterprise
proved completely successful. The camp of Pharnabazus was surprised
at break of day; his Mysian advanced guards were put to the sword,
and he himself, with all his troops, was compelled to take flight
with scarcely any resistance. All his stores, plate, and personal
furniture, together with a large baggage-train and abundance of
prisoners, fell into the hands of the victors. As the Paphlagonians
under Spithridates formed the cavalry of the victorious detachment,
they naturally took more spoil and more prisoners than the infantry.
They were proceeding to carry off their acquisitions, when Herippidas
interfered and took everything away from them; placing the entire
spoil of every description, under the charge of Grecian officers, to
be sold by formal auction in a Grecian city; after which the proceeds
were to be distributed or applied by public authority. The orders of
Herippidas were conformable to the regular and systematic proceeding
of Grecian officers; but Spithridates and the Paphlagonians were
probably justified by Asiatic practice in appropriating that which
they had themselves captured. Moreover, the order, disagreeable
in itself, was enforced against them with Lacedæmonian harshness
of manner,[514] unaccompanied by any guarantee that they would be
allowed, even at last, a fair share of the proceeds. Resenting the
conduct of Herippidas as combining injury with insult, they deserted
in the night and fled to Sardis, where the Persian Ariæus was in
actual revolt against the court of Susa. This was a serious loss, and
still more serious chagrin, to Agesilaus. He was not only deprived of
valuable auxiliary cavalry, and of an enterprizing Asiatic informant;
but the report would be spread that he defrauded his Asiatic allies
of their legitimate plunder, and others would thus be deterred from
joining him. His personal sorrow too was aggravated by the departure
of the youth Megabazus, who accompanied his father Spithridates to
Sardis.[515]

  [514] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 11. πικρὸς ὢν ἐξεταστὴς τῶν κλαπέντων,
  etc.

  [515] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 27; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 11.

  Since the flight of Spithridates took place secretly by night,
  the scene which Plutarch asserts to have taken place between
  Agesilaus and Megabazus cannot have occurred on the departure of
  the latter, but must belong to some other occasion; as, indeed,
  it seems to be represented by Xenophon (Agesil. v, 4).

It was towards the close of this winter that a personal conference
took place between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus, managed by the
intervention of a Greek of Kyzikus named Apollophanês; who was
connected by ties of hospitality with both, and served to each as
guarantee for the good faith of the other. We have from Xenophon,
himself probably present, an interesting detail of this interview.
Agesilaus, accompanied by his thirty Spartan counsellors, being the
first to arrive at the place of appointment, all of them sat down
upon the grass to wait. Presently came Pharnabazus, with splendid
clothing and retinue. His attendants were beginning to spread fine
carpets for him, when the satrap, observing how the Spartans were
seated, felt ashamed of such a luxury for himself, and sat down
on the grass by the side of Agesilaus. Having exchanged salutes,
they next shook hands; after which Pharnabazus, who as the older
of the two had been the first to tender his right hand, was also
the first to open the conversation. Whether he spoke Greek well
enough to dispense with the necessity of an interpreter, we are not
informed. “Agesilaus (said he), I was the friend and ally of you
Lacedæmonians while you were at war with Athens; I furnished you with
money to strengthen your fleet, and fought with you myself ashore on
horseback, chasing your enemies into the sea. You cannot charge me
with having ever played you false, like Tissaphernes, either by word
or deed. Yet, after this behavior, I am now reduced by you to such a
condition, that I have not a dinner in my own territory, except by
picking up your leavings, like the beasts of the field. I see the
fine residences, parks, and hunting-grounds, bequeathed to me by my
father, which formed the charm of my life, cut up or burnt down by
you. Is this the conduct of men mindful of favors received, and eager
to requite them? Pray answer me this question; for, perhaps, I have
yet to learn what is holy and just.”

The thirty Spartan counsellors were covered with shame by this
emphatic appeal. They all held their peace; while Agesilaus, after
a long pause, at length replied,—“You are aware, Pharnabazus, that
in Grecian cities, individuals become private friends and guests of
each other. Such guests, if the cities to which they belong go to
war, fight with each other, and sometimes by accident even kill each
other, each in behalf of his respective city. So then it is that we,
being at war with your king, are compelled to hold all his dominions
as enemy’s land. But in regard to you, we would pay any price to
become your friends. I do not invite you to accept us as masters,
in place of your present master; I ask you to become our ally, and
to enjoy your own property as a freeman—bowing before no man and
acknowledging no master. Now freedom is in itself a possession of the
highest value. But this is not all. We do not call upon you to be a
freeman, and yet poor. We offer you our alliance, to acquire fresh
territory, not for the king, but for yourself; by reducing those who
are now your fellow-slaves to become your subjects. Now tell me,—if
you thus continue a freeman and become rich, what can you want
farther to make you a thoroughly prosperous man?”

“I will speak frankly to you in reply (said Pharnabazus). If the king
shall send any other general, and put me under him, I shall willingly
become your friend and ally. But if he imposes the duty of command on
me, so strong is the point of honor, that I shall continue to make
war upon you to the best of my power. Expect nothing else.”[516]

  [516] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 38. Ἐὰν μέντοι μοι τὴν ἀρχὴν προστάττῃ,
  τοιοῦτόν τι, ὡς ἔοικε, φιλοτιμία ἐστὶ, εὖ χρὴ εἰδέναι, ὅτι
  πολεμήσω ὑμῖν ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι ἄριστα.

  Compare about φιλοτιμία, Herodot. iii, 53.

Agesilaus, struck with this answer, took his hand and said,—“Would
that with such high-minded sentiments you _could_ become our friend!
At any rate, let me assure you of this,—that I will immediately quit
your territory; and for the future, even should the war continue, I
will respect both you and all your property, as long as I can turn my
arms against any other Persians.”

Here the conversation closed; Pharnabazus mounted his horse, and
rode away. His son by Parapita, however,—at that time still
a handsome youth,—lingered behind, ran up to Agesilaus, and
exclaimed,—“Agesilaus, I make you my guest.”—“I accept it with all
my heart,”—was the answer. “Remember me by this,”—rejoined the
young Persian,—putting into the hands of Agesilaus the fine javelin
which he carried. The latter immediately took off the ornamental
trappings from the horse of his secretary Idæus, and gave them as a
return present; upon which the young man rode away with them, and
rejoined his father.[517]

  [517] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 29-41; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 13, 14;
  Xen. Agesil. iii, 5.

There is a touching interest and emphasis in this interview as
described by Xenophon, who here breathes into his tame Hellenic
chronicle something of the romantic spirit of the Cyropædia. The
pledges exchanged between Agesilaus and the son of Pharnabazus
were not forgotten by either. The latter,—being in after days
impoverished and driven into exile by his brother, during the
absence of Pharnabazus in Egypt,—was compelled to take refuge in
Greece; where Agesilaus provided him with protection and a home,
and even went so far as to employ influence in favor of an Athenian
youth, to whom the son of Pharnabazus was attached. This Athenian
youth had outgrown the age and size of the boy-runners in the Olympic
stadium; nevertheless Agesilaus, by strenuous personal interference,
overruled the reluctance of the Eleian judges, and prevailed upon
them to admit him as a competitor with the other boys.[518] The
stress laid by Xenophon upon this favor illustrates the tone of
Grecian sentiment, and shows us the variety of objects which personal
ascendency was used to compass. Disinterested in regard to himself,
Agesilaus was unscrupulous both in promoting the encroachments, and
screening the injustices, of his friends.[519] The unfair privilege
which he procured for this youth, though a small thing in itself,
could hardly fail to offend a crowd of spectators familiar with the
established conditions of the stadium, and to expose the judges to
severe censure.

  [518] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 40. πάντ᾽ ἐποίησεν, ὅπως ἂν δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον
  ἐγκριθείη εἰς τὸ στάδιον ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ, μέγιστος ὢν παίδων.

  [519] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 5-13.

Quitting the satrapy of Pharnabazus,—which was now pretty well
exhausted, while the armistice concluded with Tithraustes must have
expired,—Agesilaus took up his camp near the temple of Artemis, at
Astyra in the plain of Thêbê (in the region commonly known as Æolis),
near the Gulf of Elæus. He here employed himself in bringing together
an increased number of troops, with a view to penetrate farther
into the interior of Asia Minor during the summer. Recent events
had greatly increased the belief entertained by the Asiatics in his
superior strength; so that he received propositions from various
districts in the interior, inviting his presence, and expressing
anxiety to throw off the Persian yoke. He sought also to compose
the dissensions and misrule which had arisen out of the Lysandrian
dekarchies in the Greco-Asiatic cities, avoiding as much as possible
sharp inflictions of death or exile. How much he achieved in this
direction, we cannot tell,[520] nor can it have been possible,
indeed, to achieve much, without dismissing the Spartan harmosts and
lessening the political power of his own partisans; neither of which
he did.

  [520] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 41; Xen. Agesil. i, 35-38; Plutarch,
  Agesil. c. 14, 15; Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 100.

His plans were now all laid for penetrating farther than ever into
the interior, and for permanent conquest, if possible, of the western
portion of Persian Asia. What he would have permanently accomplished
towards this scheme, cannot be determined; for his aggressive march
was suspended by a summons home, the reason of which will appear in
the next chapter.

Meanwhile, Pharnabazus had been called from his satrapy to go and
take the command of the Persian fleet in Kilikia and the south of
Asia Minor, in conjunction with Konon. Since the revolt of Rhodes
from the Lacedæmonians, (in the summer of the preceding year,
395 B.C.) that active Athenian had achieved nothing. The burst
of activity, produced by the first visit of Pharnabazus at the
Persian court, had been paralyzed by the jealousies of the Persian
commanders, reluctant to serve under a Greek,—by peculation of
officers who embezzled the pay destined for the troops,—by mutiny
in the fleet from absence of pay,—and by the many delays arising
while the satraps, unwilling to spend their own revenues in the war,
waited for orders and remittances from court.[521] Hence Konon had
been unable to make any efficient use of his fleet, during those
months when the Lacedæmonian fleet was increased to nearly double its
former number. At length he resolved,—seemingly at the instigation
of his countrymen at home[522] as well as of Euagoras prince of
Salamis in Cyprus, and through the encouragement of Ktesias, one
of the Grecian physicians resident at the Persian court,—on going
himself into the interior to communicate personally with Artaxerxes.
Landing on the Kilikian coast, he crossed by land to Thapsakus on
the Euphrates (as the Cyreian army had marched), from whence he
sailed down the river in a boat to Babylon. It appears that he did
not see Artaxerxes, from repugnance to that ceremony of prostration
which was required from all who approached the royal person. But his
messages, transmitted through Ktesias and others,—with his confident
engagement to put down the maritime empire of Sparta and counteract
the projects of Agesilaus, if the Persian forces and money were put
into efficient action,—produced a powerful effect on the mind of
the monarch; who doubtless was not merely alarmed at the formidable
position of Agesilaus in Asia Minor, but also hated the Lacedæmonians
as main agents in the aggressive enterprise of Cyrus. Artaxerxes not
only approved his views, but made to him a large grant of money, and
transmitted peremptory orders to the coast that his officers should
be active in prosecuting the maritime war.

  [521] Compare Diodor. xv, 41 _ad fin._; and Thucyd. viii, 45.

  [522] Isokrates (Or. viii, De Pace, s. 82) alludes to “many
  embassies” as having been sent by Athens to the king of Persia,
  to protest against the Lacedæmonian dominion. But this mission of
  Konon is the only one which we can verify, prior to the battle of
  Knidus.

  Probably Dennis, the son of Pyrilampês, an eminent citizen and
  trierarch of Athens, must have been one of the companions of
  Konon in this mission. He is mentioned in an oration of Lysias
  as having received from the Great King a present of a golden
  drinking-bowl or φιάλη; and I do not know on what other occasion
  he can have received it, except in this embassy (Lysias, Or. xix,
  De Bonis Aristoph. s. 27).

What was of still greater moment, Konon was permitted to name any
person whom he chose, as admiral jointly with himself. It was by his
choice that Pharnabazus was called from his satrapy, and ordered to
act jointly as commander of the fleet. This satrap, the bravest and
most straightforward among all the Persian grandees, and just now
smarting with resentment at the devastation of his satrapy[523] by
Agesilaus, coöperated heartily with Konon. A powerful fleet, partly
Phœnician, partly Athenian or Grecian, was soon equipped, superior
in number even to the newly-organized Lacedæmonian fleet under
Peisander.[524] Euagoras, prince of Salamis in Cyprus,[525] not only
provided many triremes, but served himself, personally, on board.

  [523] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 6.

  [524] The measures of Konon and the transactions preceding the
  battle of Knidus, are very imperfectly known to us; but we may
  gather them generally from Diodorus, xiv, 81; Justin, vi, 3, 4;
  Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Conon. c. 2, 3; Ktesiæ Fragment, c. 62, 63,
  ed. Bähr.

  Isokrates (Orat. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 165; compare Orat. ix,
  (Euagor.) s. 77) speaks loosely as to the duration of time that
  the Persian fleet remained blocked up by the Lacedæmonians before
  Konon obtained his final and vigorous orders from Artaxerxes,
  unless we are to understand his _three years_ as referring to
  the first news of outfit of ships of war in Phœnicia, brought to
  Sparta by Herodas, as Schneider understands them; and even then
  the statement that the Persian fleet remained πολιορκούμενον
  for all this time, would be much exaggerated. Allowing for
  exaggeration, however, Isokrates coincides generally with the
  authorities above noticed.

  It would appear that Ktesias the physician obtained about this
  time permission to quit the court of Persia and come back to
  Greece. Perhaps he may have been induced (like Demokêdes of
  Kroton, one hundred and twenty years before) to promote the views
  of Konon in order to get for himself this permission.

  In the meagre abstract of Ktesias given by Photius (c. 63)
  mention is made of some Lacedæmonian envoys who were now going up
  to the Persian court, and were watched or detained on the way.
  This mission can hardly have taken place before the battle of
  Knidus; for then Agesilaus was in the full tide of success, and
  contemplating the largest plans of aggression against Persia. It
  must have taken place, I presume, after the battle.

  [525] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Euagoras) s. 67. Εὐαγόρου δὲ ~αὑτόν
  τε παρασχόντος~, καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως τὴν πλείστην παρασκευάσαντος.
  Compare s. 83 of the same oration. Compare Pausanias, i, 3, 1.

It was about the month of July, 394 B.C., that Pharnabazus and
Konon brought their united fleet to the south-western corner of Asia
Minor; first, probably, to the friendly island of Rhodes, next,
off Loryma[526] and the mountain called Dorion on the peninsula of
Knidus.[527] Peisander, with the fleet of Sparta and her allies,
sailed out from Knidus to meet them, and both parties prepared for
a battle. The numbers of the Lacedæmonians are reported by Diodorus
at eighty-five triremes; those of Konon and Pharnabazus at above
ninety. But Xenophon, without particularizing the number on either
side, seems to intimate the disparity as far greater; stating that
the entire fleet of Peisander was considerably inferior even to the
Grecian division under Konon, without reckoning the Phœnician ships
under Pharnabazus.[528] In spite of such inferiority, Peisander did
not shrink from the encounter. Though a young man without military
skill, he possessed a full measure of Spartan courage and pride;
moreover,—since the Spartan maritime empire was only maintained by
the assumed superiority of his fleet,—had he confessed himself
too weak to fight, his enemies would have gone unopposed around
the islands to excite revolt. Accordingly, he sailed forth from
the harbor of Knidus. But when the two fleets were ranged opposite
to each other, and the battle was about to commence,—so manifest
and alarming was the superiority of the Athenians and Persians,
that his Asiatic allies on the left division, noway hearty in the
cause, fled almost without striking a blow. Under such discouraging
circumstances, he nevertheless led his fleet into action with the
greatest valor. But his trireme was overwhelmed by numbers, broken
in various places by the beaks of the enemy’s ships, and forced back
upon the land, together with a large portion of his fleet. Many of
the crews jumped out and got to land, abandoning their triremes to
the conquerors. Peisander, too, might have escaped in the same way;
but disdaining either to survive his defeat or to quit his ship, fell
gallantly fighting aboard. The victory of Konon and Pharnabazus was
complete. More than half of the Spartan ships were either captured
or destroyed, though the neighborhood of the land enabled a large
proportion of the crews to escape to Knidus, so that no great number
of prisoners were taken.[529] Among the allies of Sparta, the chief
loss of course fell upon those who were most attached to her cause;
the disaffected or lukewarm were those who escaped by flight at the
beginning.

  [526] Diodor. xiv, 83. διέτριβον περὶ Λώρυμα τῆς Χερσονήσου.

  It is hardly necessary to remark, that the word _Chersonesus_
  here (and in xiv, 89) does not mean the peninsula of Thrace
  commonly known by that name, forming the European side of the
  Hellespont,—but the peninsula on which Knidus is situated.

  [527] Pausan. vi, 3, 6. περὶ Κνίδον καὶ ὄρος τὸ Δώριον
  ὀνομαζόμενον.

  [528] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 12. Φαρνάβαζον, ναύαρχον ὄντα, ξὺν
  ταῖς Φοινίσσαις εἶναι. Κόνωνα δὲ, τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἔχοντα, τετάχθαι
  ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ. Ἀντιπαραταξαμένου δὲ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου, καὶ ~πολὺ
  ἐλαττόνων αὐτῷ τῶν νεῶν φανεισῶν τῶν αὑτοῦ τοῦ μετὰ Κόνωνος
  Ἑλληνικοῦ~, etc.

  [529] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 10-14; Diodor. xiv, 83; Cornelius
  Nepos, Conon, c. 4; Justin, vi, 3.

Such was the memorable triumph of Konon at Knidus; the reversal of
that of Lysander at Ægospotami eleven years before. Its important
effects will be recounted in the coming chapter.

CHAPTER LXXIV.

FROM THE BATTLE OF KNIDUS TO THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF
ATHENS.

Having in my last chapter carried the series of Asiatic events down
to the battle of Knidus, in the beginning of August, B.C. 394, at
which period war was already raging on the other side of the Ægean,
in Greece Proper,—I now take up the thread of events from a period
somewhat earlier, to show how this last-mentioned war, commonly
called the Corinthian war, began.

At the accession of Agesilaus to the throne, in 398 B.C., the power
of Sparta throughout all Greece from Laconia to Thessaly, was greater
than it had ever been, and greater than any Grecian state had ever
enjoyed before. The burden of the long war against Athens she had
borne in far less proportion than her allies; its fruits she had
reaped exclusively for herself. There prevailed consequently among
her allies a general discontent, which Thebes as well as Corinth
manifested by refusing to take part in the recent expeditions;
either of Pausanias against Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in
Peiræus,—or of Agis against the Eleians,—or of Agesilaus against
the Persians in Asia Minor. The Eleians were completely humbled
by the invasions of Agis; all the other cities in Peloponnesus,
from apprehension, from ancient habit, and from being governed by
oligarchies who leaned on Sparta for support, were obedient to her
authority,—with the single exception of Argos, which remained, as
before, neutral and quiet, though in sentiment unfriendly. Athens
was a simple unit in the catalogue of Spartan allies, furnishing
her contingent, like the rest, to be commanded by the xenâgus,—or
officer sent from Sparta for the special purpose of commanding such
foreign contingents.

In the northern regions of Greece, the advance of Spartan power
is yet more remarkable. Looking back to the year 419 B.C. (about
two years after the peace of Nikias), Sparta had been so unable to
protect her colony of Herakleia, in Trachis on the Maliac Gulf,
near the strait of Thermopylæ, that the Bœotians were obliged
to send a garrison thither, in order to prevent it from falling
into the hands of Athens. They even went so far as to dismiss the
Lacedæmonian harmost.[530] In the winter of 409-408 B.C., another
disaster had happened at Herakleia, in which the Lacedæmonian harmost
was slain.[531] But about 399 B.C., we find Sparta exercising an
energetic ascendency at Herakleia, and even making that place a
central post for keeping down the people in the neighborhood of Mount
Œta and a portion of Thessaly. Herippidas, the Lacedæmonian, was sent
thither to repress some factious movements, with a force sufficient
to enable him to overawe the public assembly, to seize the obnoxious
party in the place, and to put them to death, five hundred in number,
outside of the gates.[532] Carrying his arms farther against the
Œtæans and Trachinians in the neighborhood, who had been long at
variance with the Laconian colonists at Herakleia, he expelled them
from their abodes, and forced them to migrate with their wives and
children into Thessaly.[533] Hence, the Lacedæmonians were enabled
to extend their influence into parts of Thessaly, and to place a
harmost with a garrison in Pharsalus, resting upon Herakleia as a
basis,—which thus became a position of extraordinary importance for
their dominion over the northern regions.

  [530] Thucyd. v, 52.

  [531] Xen. Hellen. i, 2, 18.

  [532] Diodor. xiv, 38; Polyæn. ii, 21.

  [533] Diodorus, _ut sup._; compare xiv, 81. τοὺς Τραχινίους
  φεύγοντας ἐκ τῶν πατρίδων ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, etc.

With the real power of Sparta thus greatly augmented on land, in
addition to her vast empire at sea, bringing its ample influx of
tribute,—and among cities who had not merely long recognized her
as leader, but had never recognized any one else,—it required an
unusual stimulus to raise any formidable hostile combination against
her, notwithstanding a large spread of disaffection and antipathy.
The stimulus came from Persia, from whose treasures the means had
been before furnished to Sparta herself for subduing Athens. The
news that a formidable navy was fitting out in Phœnicia, which had
prompted the expedition of Agesilaus in the spring of 396 B.C., was
doubtless circulated and heard with satisfaction among the Grecian
cities unfriendly to Sparta; and the refusal of Thebes, Corinth, and
Athens, to take service under that prince,—aggravated in the case
of the Thebans by a positive offence given to him on the occasion of
his sacrifice at Aulis,—was enough to warn Sparta of the dangerous
sentiments and tendencies by which she was surrounded near home.

It was upon these tendencies that the positive instigation and
promises of Persia were brought to bear, in the course of the
following year; and not merely promises, but pecuniary supplies,
with news of revived naval warfare threatening the insular dominion
of Sparta. Tithraustes, the new satrap, who had put to death and
succeeded Tissaphernes, had no sooner concluded the armistice
mentioned above, and prevailed upon Agesilaus to remove his army
into the satrapy of Pharnabazus, than he employed active measures
for kindling war against Sparta in Greece, in order to create a
necessity for the recall of Agesilaus out of Asia. He sent a Rhodian
named Timokrates into Greece, as envoy to the cities most unfriendly
to the Lacedæmonians, with a sum of fifty talents;[534] directing
him to employ this money in gaining over the leading men in these
cities, and to exchange solemn oaths of alliance and aid with
Persia, for common hostility against Sparta. The island of Rhodes
having just revolted from the Spartan dominion, had admitted Konon
with the Persian fleet (as I have mentioned in the last chapter),
so that probably the Rhodian envoy was on a mission to Tithraustes
on behalf of his countrymen. He was an appropriate envoy on this
occasion, as having an animated interest in raising up new enemies
to Sparta, and as being hearty in stirring up among the Thebans and
Corinthians the same spirit which had led to the revolt of Rhodes.
The effect which that revolt produced in alarming and exasperating
the Spartans, has been already noticed; and we may fairly presume
that its effect on the other side, in encouraging their Grecian
enemies, was considerable. Timokrates visited Thebes, Corinth, and
Argos, distributing his funds. He concluded engagements on behalf
of the satrap, with various leading men in each, putting them into
communication with each other; Ismenias, Androkleidas, and others in
Thebes,—Timolaus and Polyanthes at Corinth,—Kylon and others at
Argos. It appears that he did not visit Athens; at least, Xenophon
expressly says that none of his money went there. The working of this
mission,—coupled, we must recollect, with the renewed naval warfare
on the coast of Asia, and the promise of a Persian fleet against
that of Sparta,—was soon felt in the more pronounced manifestation
of anti-Laconian sentiments in these various cities, and in the
commencement of attempts to establish alliance between them.[535]

  [534] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 1. Πέμπει Τιμοκράτην Ῥόδιον εἰς τὴν
  Ἑλλάδα, δοὺς χρυσίον ἐς πεντήκοντα τάλαντα ἀργυρίου, καὶ κελεύει
  πειρᾶσθαι, πιστὰ τὰ μέγιστα λαμβάνοντα, διδόναι τοῖς προεστηκόσιν
  ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τε πόλεμον ἐξοίσειν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους.

  Timokrates is ordered to give the money; yet not absolutely, but
  only on a certain condition, in case he should find that such
  condition could be realized; that is, if by giving it he could
  procure from various leading Greeks sufficient assurances and
  guarantees that they would raise war against Sparta. As this was
  a matter more or less doubtful, Timokrates is ordered to _try
  to give the money for this purpose_. Though the construction of
  πειρᾶσθαι couples it with διδόναι, the sense of the word more
  properly belongs to ἐξοίσειν—which designates the purpose to be
  accomplished.

  [535] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 2; Pausan. iii, 9, 4; Plutarch,
  Artaxerxes, c. 20.

With that Laconian bias which pervades his Hellenica, Xenophon
represents the coming war against Sparta, as if it had been brought
about mainly by these bribes from Persia to the leading men in
these various cities. I have stated on more than one occasion, that
the average public morality of Grecian individual politicians in
Sparta, Athens, and other cities, was not such as to exclude personal
corruption; that it required a morality higher than the average, when
such temptation was resisted,—and a morality considerably higher
than the average, if it were systematically resisted, and for a long
life, as by Perikles and Nikias. There would be nothing therefore
surprising, if Ismenias and the rest had received bribes under the
circumstances here mentioned. But it appears highly improbable that
the money given by Timokrates could have been a bribe; that is,
given privately, and for the separate use of these leaders. It was
furnished for the promotion of a certain public object, which could
not be accomplished without heavy disbursements; it was analogous
to that sum of thirty talents which (as Xenophon himself tells us)
Tithraustes had just given to Agesilaus, as an inducement to carry
away his army into the satrapy of Pharnabazus (not as a present for
the private purse of the Spartan king, but as a contribution to
the wants of the army),[536] or to that which the satrap Tiribazus
gave to Antalkidas afterwards,[537] also for public objects.
Xenophon affirms, that Ismenias and the rest, having received these
presents from Timokrates, accused the Lacedæmonians and rendered
them odious,—each in his respective city.[538] But it is certain,
from his own showing, that the hatred towards them existed in these
cities, before the arrival of Timokrates. In Argos, such hatred was
of old standing; in Corinth and Thebes, though kindled only since the
close of the war, it was not the less pronounced. Moreover, Xenophon
himself informs us, that the Athenians, though they received none of
the money,[539] were quite as ready for war as the other cities. If
we therefore admit his statement as a matter of fact, that Timokrates
gave private presents to various leading politicians, which is by no
means improbable,—we must dissent from the explanatory use which he
makes of this fact by setting it out prominently as the cause of the
war. What these leading men would find it difficult to raise was,
not hatred to Sparta, but confidence and courage to brave the power
of Sparta. And for this purpose the mission of Timokrates would be
a valuable aid, by conveying assurances of Persian coöperation and
support against Sparta. He must have been produced publicly either
before the people, the senate, or at least the great body of the
anti-Laconian party in each city. And the money which he brought with
him, though a portion of it may have gone in private presents, would
serve to this party as the best warrant for the sincerity of the
satrap.

  [536] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 26.

  [537] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 16.

  [538] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 2. Οἱ μὲν δὴ δεξάμενοι τὰ χρήματα ἐς
  τὰς οἰκείας πόλεις διέβαλλον τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους· ἐπεὶ δὲ ταύτας
  ἐς μῖσος αὐτῶν προήγαγον, συνίστασαν καὶ τὰς μεγίστας πόλεις πρὸς
  ἀλλήλας.

  [539] Xenophon, _ut sup._

  Pausanias (iii, 9, 4) names some Athenians as having received
  part of the money. So Plutarch also, in general terms (Agesil. c.
  15).

  Diodorus mentions nothing respecting either the mission or the
  presents of Timokrates.

Whatever negotiations may have been in progress between the cities
visited by Timokrates, no union had been brought about between them
when the war, kindled by an accident, broke out as a “Bœotian
war,”[540] between Thebes and Sparta separately. Between the Opuntian
Lokrians and the Phokians, north of Bœotia, there was a strip of
disputed border land; respecting which the Phokians, imputing
wrongful encroachment to the Lokrians, invaded their territory. The
Lokrians, allied with Thebes, entreated her protection; upon which
a body of Bœotians invaded Phokis; while the Phokians on their
side threw themselves upon Lacedæmon, invoking her aid against
Thebes.[541] “The Lacedæmonians (says Xenophon) were delighted to
get a pretence for making war against the Thebans,—having been long
angry with them on several different grounds. They thought that the
present was an excellent time for marching against them, and putting
down their insolence; since Agesilaus was in full success in Asia,
and there was no other war to embarrass them in Greece.”[542] The
various grounds on which the Lacedæmonians rested their displeasure
against Thebes, begin from a time immediately succeeding the close of
the war against Athens, and the sentiment was now both established
and vehement. It was they who now began the Bœotian war; not the
Thebans, nor the bribes brought by Timokrates.

  [540] Πόλεμος Βοιωτικός (Diodor. xiv, 81).

  [541] Xenophon (Hellen. iii, 5, 3) says,—and Pausanias (iii, 9,
  4) follows him,—That the Theban leaders, wishing to bring about
  a war with Sparta, and knowing that Sparta would not begin it,
  purposely incited the Lokrians to encroach upon this disputed
  border, in order that the Phokians might resent it, and that thus
  a war might be lighted up. I have little hesitation in rejecting
  this version, which I conceive to have arisen from Xenophon’s
  philo-Laconian and miso-Theban tendency, and in believing that
  the fight between the Lokrians and Phokians, as well as that
  between the Phokians and Thebans, arose without any design on the
  part of the latter to provoke Sparta. So Diodorus recounts it, in
  reference to the war between the Phokians and the Thebans; for
  about the Lokrians he says nothing (xiv, 81).

  The subsequent events, as recounted by Xenophon himself, show
  that the Spartans were not only ready in point of force, but
  eager in regard to will, to go to war with the Thebans; while the
  latter were not at all ready to go to war with Sparta. They had
  not a single ally; for their application to Athens, in itself
  doubtful, was not made until after Sparta had declared war
  against them.

  [542] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 5. Οἱ μέντοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι ~ἄσμενοι
  ἔλαβον πρόφασιν στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τοὺς Θηβαίους, πάλαι ὀργιζόμενοι~
  αὐτοῖς, τῆς τε ἀντιλήψεως τῆς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος δεκάτης ἐν Δεκελείᾳ,
  καὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ μὴ ἐθελῆσαι ἀκολουθῆσαι· ᾐτιῶντο δ᾽
  αὐτοὺς, καὶ Κορινθίους πεῖσαι μὴ συστρατεύειν. Ἀνεμιμνήσκοντο δὲ
  καὶ, ὡς θύοντ᾽ ἐν Αὐλίδι τὸν Ἀγησίλαον οὐκ εἴων, καὶ τὰ τεθυμένα
  ἱερὰ ὡς ἔῤῥιψαν ἀπὸ τοῦ βωμοῦ· καὶ ὅτι οὐδ᾽ εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν
  συνεστράτευον Ἀγησιλάῳ. Ἐλογίζοντο δὲ καὶ καλὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἐξάγειν
  στρατιὰν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς, καὶ παῦσαι τῆς ἐς αὐτοὺς ὕβρεως· τά τε γὰρ
  ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ καλῶς σφίσιν ἔχειν, κρατοῦντος Ἀγησιλάου, καὶ ἐν τῇ
  Ἑλλάδι οὐδένα ἄλλον πόλεμον ἐμποδὼν σφίσιν εἶναι. Compare vii, 1,
  34.

  The description here given by Xenophon himself,—of the
  past dealing and established sentiment between Sparta and
  Thebes,—refutes his allegation, that it was the bribes brought
  by Timokrates to the leading Thebans which first blew up the
  hatred against Sparta; and shows farther, that Sparta did not
  need any circuitous manœuvres of the Thebans, to furnish her with
  a pretext for going to war.

The energetic and ambitious Lysander, who had before instigated the
expedition of Agesilaus across the Ægean, and who had long hated
the Thebans,—was among the foremost advisers of the expedition now
decreed by the ephors against Thebes,[543] as well as the chief
commander appointed to carry it into execution. He was despatched
with a small force to act on the north of Bœotia. He was directed
to start from Herakleia, the centre of Lacedæmonian influence in
those regions,—to muster the Herakleots, together with the various
dependent populations in the neighborhood of Œta, Œtæans, Malians,
Ænianes, etc.—to march towards Bœotia, taking up the Phokians
in his way,—and to attack Haliartus. Under the walls of this
town king Pausanias engaged to meet him on a given day, with the
native Lacedæmonian force and the Peloponnesian allies. For this
purpose, having obtained favorable border sacrifices, he marched
forth to Tegea, and there employed himself in collecting the allied
contingents from Peloponnesus.[544] But the allies generally were
tardy and reluctant in the cause; while the Corinthians withheld
all concurrence and support,[545]—though neither did they make any
manifestation in favor of Thebes.

  [543] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28.

  [544] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 6, 7.

  [545] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 23.

  The conduct of the Corinthians here contributes again to refute
  the assertion of Xenophon about the effect of the bribes of
  Timokrates.

Finding themselves thus exposed to a formidable attack on two sides,
from Sparta at the height of her power, and from a Spartan officer
of known ability,—being, moreover, at the same time without a
single ally,—the Thebans resolved to entreat succor from Athens. A
Theban embassy to Athens for any purpose, and especially for this
purpose, was itself among the strongest marks of the revolution which
had taken place in Grecian politics. The antipathy between the
two cities had been so long and virulent, that the Thebans, at the
close of the war, had endeavored to induce Sparta to root out the
Athenian population. Their conduct subsequently had been favorable
and sympathizing towards Thrasybulus in his struggle against the
Thirty, and that leader had testified his gratitude by dedicating
statues in the Theban Herakleion.[546] But it was by no means clear
that Athens would feel herself called upon, either by policy or by
sentiment, to assist them in the present emergency; at a moment when
she had no Long Walls, no fortifications at Peiræus, no ships, nor
any protection against the Spartan maritime power.

  [546] Pausanias, ix, 11, 4.

It was not until Pausanias and Lysander were both actually engaged in
mustering their forces, that the Thebans sent to address the Athenian
assembly. The speech of the Theban envoy sets forth strikingly the
case against Sparta as it then stood. Disclaiming all concurrence
with that former Theban deputy, who, without any instructions, had
taken on himself to propose, in the Spartan assembly of allies,
extreme severity towards the conquered Athenians,—he reminded the
Athenians that Thebes had by unanimous voice declined obeying the
summons of the Spartans, to aid in the march against Thrasybulus
and the Peiræus; and that this was the first cause of the anger
of the Spartans against her. On that ground, then, he appealed to
the gratitude of democratical Athens against the Lacedæmonians.
But he likewise invoked against them, with yet greater confidence,
the aid of oligarchical Athens,—or of those who at that time had
stood opposed to Thrasybulus and the Peiræus; for it was Sparta who,
having first set up the oligarchy at Athens, had afterwards refused
to sustain it, and left its partisans to the generosity of their
democratical opponents, by whom alone they were saved harmless.[547]
Of course Athens was eager, if possible (so he presumed), to regain
her lost empire; and in this enterprise he tendered the cordial
aid of Thebes as an ally. He pointed out that it was by no means
an impracticable enterprise; looking to the universal hatred which
Sparta had now drawn upon herself, not less on the part of ancient
allies than of prior enemies. The Athenians knew by experience that
Thebes could be formidable as a foe; she would now show that she
could be yet more effective as a friend, if the Athenians would
interfere to rescue her. Moreover, she was now about to fight, not
for Syracusans or Asiatics, but for her own preservation and dignity.
“We hesitate not to affirm, men of Athens (concluded the Theban
speaker), that what we are now invoking at your hands is a greater
benefit to you than it is to ourselves.”[548]

  [547] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 9.

  Πολὺ δ᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦμεν, ὅσοι τῶν ἐν ἄστει ἐγένεσθε, προθύμως
  ἐπὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἰέναι. Ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ, καταστήσαντες ὑμᾶς ἐς
  ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ ἐς ἔχθραν τῷ δήμῳ, ἀφικόμενοι πολλῇ δυνάμει, ὡς
  ὑμῖν σύμμαχοι, παρέδοσαν ὑμᾶς τῷ πλήθει· ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις
  εἶναι, ἀπολώλατε, ὁ δὲ δῆμος οὑτοσὶ ὑμᾶς ἔσωσε.

  [548] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 9, 16.

Eight years had now elapsed since the archonship of Eukleides and
the renovation of the democracy after the crushing visitation of
the Thirty. Yet we may see, from the important and well-turned
allusion of the Theban speaker to the oligarchical portion of the
assembly, that the two parties still stood in a certain measure
distinguished. Enfeebled as Athens had been left by the war, she
had never since been called upon to take any decisive and emphatic
vote on a question of foreign policy; and much now turned upon the
temper of the oligarchical minority, which might well be conceived
likely to play a party game and speculate upon Spartan countenance.
But the comprehensive amnesty decreed on the reëstablishment of the
democratical constitution,—and the wise and generous forbearance
with which it had been carried out, in spite of the most torturing