a few merchant convoys had been sacrificed, this was a loss Holland
could have better spared than that which she was actually compelled to
undergo.

While Blake was ruining the Dutch herring fishery for that year, Tromp
did not even succeed in destroying the squadron of Ayscue. Light and
baffling winds made it impossible for him to attack, and, after they
had paralysed him for a time, a change of weather occurred which was
still more to his disadvantage. He was blown off the coast by storms.
The stroke he had hoped to deliver in the Downs having missed of its
aim, Tromp sailed to the north, where Holland had also commercial
interests to protect. The Baltic trade was of immense interest to
her, and at that time some of her Indiamen were expected to be on
their way back by the northern route. The Dutch admiral did not meet
Blake, either on his way up or while in high latitudes. He collected
his convoys, and turned homewards. But his fortune was destined to
be bad throughout the campaign. He was overtaken in the North Sea by
violent storms, and his convoy was scattered. The Dutch reached home
in detachments, and several of their stragglers fell into the hands of
English cruisers. The outcry against Tromp was loud. Popular judgment
held him responsible for the loss of the herring fishery. The veteran
admiral can hardly have been thoroughly satisfied with himself, for,
though fortune had been against him, it cannot be denied that it had
been helped by his own management. He had sacrificed the greater to
the less, the more pressing to the more remote, and therefore ill-luck
had smitten him, and through him his country, with the full force of
its venom. He resigned his command as Lieutenant-Admiral of Holland,
and was succeeded by two seamen of less reputation. One of these was
Cornelius Witte de With, whom we, confounding his name with that of
the famous Grand Pensionary, commonly called De Witt. He was a rough,
stout-hearted, outspoken man, who, after bearing his part with honour
during this war, died in battle with the Swedes. The other was Michael
Adrianzoon de Ruyter (_i.e._ the trooper, a nickname taken as a name),
a small, blue-eyed, pious, and gentle man, who for the next twenty
years was to fight with increasing glory for the protection of Holland.

Immediately, or very shortly after, Tromp had sailed for the north,
Sir George Ayscue was despatched down Channel on a double mission.
He had in the first place to protect our own trade against the Dutch
attacks, and in the second to fall upon the convoys of the enemy. His
fleet was reinforced to forty vessels and upwards. While he was on
his way to the west, Michael de Ruyter had sailed from Holland on a
similar mission. He had with him a great convoy which was to be seen
safe beyond the Land's End. And then he was to wait for the home-coming
ships, and bring them back. As by that time the bulk of the English
force might be concentrated in the English Channel, he was probably
assured that reinforcements from the main fleet at home would be sent
to see him safely back. On the 16th of August a collision took place
off Plymouth between Ayscue and De Ruyter. The Dutch were seen out at
sea, and to windward. Ayscue stood out to the attack, and came into
action with De Ruyter in the afternoon. The Dutch admiral, who was
a man of good judgment, and therefore understood the advantages of
attacking, discharged the duties of the commander of a convoy admirably
well. Having the advantage of the wind, he bore down at once to attack
Ayscue, leaving his convoy to make its way onward unmolested. He may
have been the more readily induced to take the bold course by seeing
that Ayscue's ships were not well in hand. The English admiral had
only part of his vessels immediately with him, the others being some
distance astern nearer the shore. With the usual boldness of the
Commonwealth's admirals, and in reliance, as we may suppose, on the
greater average solidity of the English ships, Ayscue had no hesitation
in meeting attack halfway. The movements of the fight are vaguely
reported. It is, however, said that Ayscue broke through De Ruyter's
line and gained the weather-gage with part of his fleet. If this is
so, we may conclude that the two fleets met on opposite tacks, that
the Dutch weathered the head of the English line, that Ayscue himself
was leading, that he held his wind, and made, or found, an opening,
through which he passed to windward. When this was done, he was not
strong enough to push the battle with any prospect of advantage, as a
large part of his squadron was unable to work up to his support. If
this was the case, he was cut off, and in danger of being overpowered,
but the strength of the English ships again stood them in good stead,
and moreover the night came on. De Ruyter may not have thought it
wise to do more than was sufficient to cripple the English admiral,
so as to debar him from pursuing the convoy. If this was his purpose,
he succeeded. The vessels which had followed Ayscue in his spirited
movement were badly cut up in their rigging. When daylight came,
the Dutch admiral had regained the weather-gage. Ayscue remained in
expectation of another attack, but none was made. De Ruyter contented
himself with carrying off his convoy. The conduct of Ayscue had
not been on a level with his courage, and the Council of State was
apparently persuaded that he was unequal to the command of a great
fleet. They removed him shortly afterwards from active service, though
they softened the severity of this measure by a grant of handsome
pensions.

It was perhaps some suspicion of the insufficiency of their commanding
officer in the west which induced the Council of State first to call
upon Blake to reinforce him, and then to send their admiral and general
into the Channel himself. The most effectual method of reducing Holland
would have been to establish Blake on the Dutch coast with a force
capable of maintaining a blockade. But the Council of State either did
not understand this, or did not think their fleet powerful enough. They
preferred to collect a strong force in the Channel, for the purpose of
protecting their own commerce and strangling that of the Dutch. In the
middle of September Blake was in the Channel, making his way westward
with the main fleet. When his van, under the command of Vice-Admiral
Penn, was as far westward as Bolt Head, stormy weather from the west
and south-west made it seem advisable to Blake to bear up for Torbay
with the bulk of his fleet. Penn, however, remained out with a part
of the ships. On the afternoon of the 15th he caught sight of two
Dutch vessels to windward, which were seen to be making signals. The
look-out men at the topmasthead saw behind the two Dutchmen, visible
from the deck, a large fleet of ships still farther to windward. Penn,
on his own showing, was prepared to engage in spite of the enemy's
obvious superiority of numbers. He had the approval of Bourne, the
rear-admiral, who advised that all the captains within call should be
summoned to a council, in order that they might know that the enemy was
at hand. The code of signals was in its infancy, or else Penn could
have given his captains that information more rapidly than by the
clumsy device of a council in his flagship. Penn was unwilling to act
as Bourne wished, "lest any dirty mouth should say I called for counsel
whether I should fight or no." After a decent reluctance, the council
flag was hung out on the mizen shrouds, and the captains were duly
summoned to learn the vice-admiral's intention of giving battle. He had
in sight eighteen or twenty sail, with the merchantmen and fireships.
By two in the afternoon the captains had ended their council, and were
gone back, each man to his own ship. They lay to with their head to
the offing, waiting for the Dutchmen to come down, for they could not
work up to the enemy, and, if they had stood across the Channel for
the purpose of tacking in his direction, they might have seemed to be
opening a way for him to pass. The enemy was estimated at thirty-five
or forty ships, but he made no attack. He came down to within three
or four miles, and then hauled his wind and stood out across Channel.
Penn stood after him till he was detained by an accident to Bourne's
ship. In the meantime it had become stormy, with rain and mist, and
the wind at S.W. by S. Towards midnight it cleared up, a stiff gale
from the west blew off the mist, but it was dark and the moon did not
rise until after midnight. So Penn alternately lay to and stood off in
the darkness. About half an hour after midnight, the flash of gun-fire
was seen far off on the weather quarter. Penn immediately made signals
by firing guns and showing lights, summoning his squadron to follow
him in the direction of the fire. The fire ended within a quarter of
an hour, and all was again in silence and darkness to windward. Next
morning one of Penn's look-out frigates, the =Assurance=, Captain
Sanders, bore under his stern, and let him know what had happened. The
firing had been between Captain Sanders and a "lusty ship" which he saw
bearing eastward somewhat to the north of him. Sanders "fired two guns
to make her stay, but they would not; upon which Sanders hove out his
topsail, and presently came up with him; asked him whence his ship? he
answered, of Flushing. Sanders bid him amain (shorten sail) for the
Commonwealth of England, who answered very uncivilly; upon which they
began to fire on each other, and continued until Sanders had lost sight
of all our lights, being about an hour, so left the Fleming, who all
the time of the fight steered somewhat a southerly course; and about
the time Sanders left him he saw to the southward of them several
lights, and he was certain of one whereof had a light in his maintop;
all which he clearly perceived to steer away to the eastward, and was
confident it was the Hollands fleet, who made use of the darkness of
the first part of the night to pass by us." Penn thought this "low
and poor-spirited" in the bitterness of his disappointment. The truth
was, that the English had been completely out-manoeuvred. That light
in the maintop was De Ruyter's. While Penn was lying to, waiting to
be attacked, and Blake was at Torbay, he had taken a sweep out to the
southward and carried his convoy up Channel before the stiff westerly
gale.

Between the date when he returned to face Tromp and that on which
he sailed westward to replace Ayscue, Blake had been called upon to
dispose of a little war with France. The Commonwealth was not exactly
in a state of open hostility with the French king, but it had grounds
of complaint against his officers. They had helped Rupert, and, taking
advantage of the supposed weakness of the revolutionary Government
in England, they had plundered the ships of the Smyrna Company. On
the other hand, Spain had on the whole been friendly. As it happened
in the early days of September that the Spanish governor of the Low
Countries was endeavouring to regain possession of the towns of Dunkirk
and Mardyke, then held by French garrisons, and as a French naval
force, commanded by the Duc de Vendôme, was on its way to relieve the
French soldiers, the Commonwealth saw an opportunity of delivering a
blow at those who had attempted to harass England. Blake fell upon the
Duc de Vendôme, took seven of his vessels, and scattered the others.
The French Government complained, and the Council of State ordered an
inquiry. But it gave no satisfaction, and for the present the incident
passed over among the many other violent and irregular transactions of
the time. The besieged towns surrendered to the Spaniards, and remained
in their hands until, by a strange change of fortune, they passed into
those of the Protector Cromwell.

A day or two after he had been disappointed of an encounter with
De Ruyter, Vice-Admiral Penn rejoined Blake outside of Torbay. The
reunited English ships followed the Dutch up the Channel, but failed to
overtake them. De Ruyter effected his junction with Cornelius de With,
and together they saw the convoys safe back into port; then, having
provided for the trade, they returned to the coast of England to menace
the English fleet.

On the 27th of September, Blake, who was at anchor in the Downs, was
informed that the Dutch had made their appearance to the northward.
He at once put to sea. On the following day the English fleet was
very scattered. The van, under the command of Penn, and a part of the
centre, including Blake's flagship, were together, stretching across
the mouth of the estuary of the Thames. Part of the centre and the rear
had not yet succeeded in getting clear out of the Downs. The wind was
W. by N. While the English fleet was in this scattered condition, the
look-out ships of Penn's squadron found the Dutch to the eastward, and
leeward of the Kentish Knock, the farthest out of the shallows on the
coast of Essex and Suffolk. The English ships had worked to windward,
and had the weather-gage--that is to say, the power of bearing right
down on the enemy with the wind behind them. Penn, as ready, if we
are to believe his own report, to engage a superior enemy as he had
been a month before near Bolt Head, asked Blake's leave to attack. He
was told to wait until the rest of the fleet came up, and therefore
stretched ahead of his commander-in-chief, leaving a sufficient space
for his division to fall into line between him and Blake. In the course
of stretching out, he came too near the Kentish Knock, on which his own
flagship and two others touched. He found it necessary to tack, and as
he must have been standing to the N. before, this would bring him round
so that he headed south. In the meantime Blake had been joined by the
remaining ships of the centre and rear, and held on his course to the
north, passing well clear of the Knock to leeward. The Dutch had been
lying to in a line, stretched from N. to S. As Blake stood on to the
north, they filled, and passed on his lee side, heading to the south.
While the two lines were passing one another and cannonading as they
went past, the van, under the command of Penn, was heading more or less
in the same direction as the Dutch, but on the other side of Blake's
ships. Thus, when the Dutch cleared the centre and rear of the English
fleet, the van, which had been moving in the same direction, fell, in
Penn's words, "pat to receive them," and stayed by them till night.
We must suppose that the centre and rear of the English fleet either
tacked or wore together and fell into line behind Penn.

The action was far from decisive. On the English side the leaders
did nothing to lose the supposed advantage of the weather-gage, by
endeavouring to break through the Dutch line, and so put themselves
between the enemy and his refuge in Holland. They were content to
remain to windward, cannonading, and perhaps attempting to make use of
their fireships. On the other hand, the Dutch fighting was not worthy
of its reputation. Their fleet was, if anything, rather superior in
number to the English. But they were divided by violent party and
professional jealousies. The friends of Tromp were hostile to his
successors, Cornelius de With and Michael de Ruyter. It is said that
the crew of the _Brederode_ refused to allow De With to hoist his
flag in her. Some of the captains, who were probably merchant skippers
taken into the war fleet, according to the custom which prevailed also
among ourselves, showed downright cowardice, and Cornelius de With was
provoked into saying that some of them would find there was wood enough
in Holland to make a gallows. It is clear that only the late hour at
which the action began, and the approach of darkness, saved the Dutch
fleet from a serious disaster. If the English leaders had steered
through the Dutch line from windward to leeward, and had put themselves
on the enemy's line of retreat, a long list of prizes would have been
brought into English ports. But though our admirals in this war were
always ready to break the line from leeward to windward, they seem to
have avoided the other and much more effective movement. When night
fell, the Dutch were allowed to retreat with comparatively trifling
loss. We asserted, indeed, that several of them had been sunk, but no
reliance is to be placed on statements of that kind. Nothing is more
common than to find men asserting that they had sunk an enemy, when in
fact they had only lost sight of him in the smoke. Next morning the
Dutch were in sight to the eastward, and, the wind having shifted in
the night, they had now the weather-gage. Blake endeavoured to renew
the action, but Cornelius de With and De Ruyter, having no confidence
in their fleet, retreated to their own ports. The English followed till
they had sight of the Dutch coast, and then, finding that the enemy was
beyond their reach, returned to the Downs.

Our easy victory proved somewhat misleading. Thinking that the enemy
was fairly beaten, the English Government relaxed its precautions.
A considerable part of the fleet was despatched, under the command
of Penn, to convoy the colliers who carried London's supply of fuel
from the northern ports. During the whole of October and the greater
part of November all seemed quiet, and Blake lay in the Downs with no
more than forty ships. But the Dutch were preparing for a vigorous
counter-stroke. Finding that Martin Tromp was the only man who could be
trusted to make their fleet do its duty, the States General decided
to restore him to the command. At the same time, great efforts were
made to collect a powerful force. There was, indeed, need for exertion.
The outward-bound convoys had to be seen clear of the Channel, and,
in order that this could be done, it was necessary to collect a force
capable of dealing with the main English fleet. As November drew to
its close, this had been achieved. On the 29th of the month, Tromp
made his appearance at "the back of the Goodwins," that is to say,
between the Sands and the coast of France, with eighty warships, and
behind him a convoy of merchant vessels. With a reduced force under
his orders, Blake was really incapable of preventing his enemy from
carrying his convoy through the Straits, but, with the high spirit
which the Commonwealth's commanders seldom failed to display, he made
a resolute effort to do the impossible. He weighed anchor and stood
out. The wind at first was at S.W., which gave the weather-gage to
Blake, while making it impossible for Tromp to take his great swarm of
men-of-war and merchant ships round the South Foreland. Then it chopped
suddenly and violently round to the N.W., and both fleets anchored
before night--Blake in Dover Roads, and Tromp some three leagues
farther out. Next morning the wind was less violent, though still from
the same point. Both fleets weighed anchor. Tromp steered to carry his
convoy into the Channel, keeping his warships carefully between the
merchant ships and the English. Blake followed, taking care not to
lose the weather-gage, and the two fleets swept on together until they
were in the neighbourhood of Dungeness. The odds against him were so
great that Blake would have been well justified in avoiding action.
But a council of war held in the flagship had decided that something
must be attempted. Our fleet had not yet been cured of the rashness
already shown by Sir George Ayscue in act, and by Penn in intention.
The lesson they were about to receive was very much needed, and it was
part of our fortune in this war that it did not prove more severe.
In the course of the afternoon of Tuesday the 30th of November, the
forty English ships under the command of Blake forced an action with
Tromp's eighty. As they held and kept the weather-gage, they escaped
complete destruction, but they were severely cut up, and two, the
=Garland= and the =Bonaventure=, fell into the possession of the enemy.
These two vessels, commanded by Captains Axon and Batten, had the
audacity to attach themselves to Tromp's flagship. They were promptly
surrounded and overpowered. The attempt which Blake made to rescue them
was unsuccessful, and as the English ships were unwilling to lose the
weather-gage, they could do little more than look on and cannonade from
a distance, while the two which had pushed into the midst of the enemy
suffered for their excess of daring. Night again put an end to the
battle. The English first anchored near Dover, and then returned to the
Downs. Tromp saw his convoy out of the Channel, and then cruised up and
down threatening our coast, and waiting for the home-coming merchant
ships.

Blake returned to the Downs chastened and even a little depressed by
the failure of his attempt to defeat Tromp with insufficient forces.
He offered to resign his command. The Council of State did not take
him at his word. On the contrary, they assured him of their continued
confidence, and left him entire discretion as to his movements, while
making every effort to strengthen his fleet. They began by taking
measures to enforce discipline and a proper martial spirit amongst
their captains. Blake had complained "that there was much baseness of
spirit, not among the merchantmen only, but many of the State's ships,"
and he had asked for a committee of inquiry. This request was instantly
complied with. Colonel Walton, Colonel Morley, and Mr. Chalmer were
sent down at once, not only to make a general inquiry into the action
and the condition of the fleet, but to order a trial of those captains
whose baseness of spirit had provoked the anger of the admiral. Several
of them were ordered for trial. Blake's own brother, Benjamin, was
removed from his command. As Benjamin Blake was afterwards employed,
and as the other three captains were only fined, it is to be presumed
that their conduct had not been very bad. The truth probably is, that
if all the captains had been as headlong as Axon and Batten, more of
them would have shared the same fate.

More effectual measures than the punishment of backward captains were
the recall of Penn from the north, and the commissioning of fresh
ships. It was not easy to find the men. Blake had complained in his
first despatch that the great number of "private men-of-war," that
is, privateers, allowed to cruise against Dutch commerce, served to
draw men off from the fleet. The sailors preferred the licence of
the privateer, and the opportunities for plunder it presented, to
the sterner discipline of the man-of-war. In the out-ports, too, it
was difficult to enforce the press. The magistrates were frequently
shipowners, who were unwilling to lose the crews of their own vessels,
and, when they were not, they had a fellow-sympathy with their
townsmen, which made them languid in the discharge of their duties. In
spite of the efforts made by the Commonwealth Government to tempt men
by promises of better pay and a larger share of prize-money, it was
compelled to make unsparing use of the old prerogatives of the Crown,
to force all subjects to take a share in defending the realm. Even this
did not suffice. Soldiers in large numbers had to be drafted into the
fleet to serve as marines, although that word was not in use. There
can be no doubt that these men were intended to make good the want of
sailors, for it was especially provided that they were to be called
upon to do the same work as far as possible.

Throughout the December of 1652 and January and February of 1653, Tromp
rode unmolested in the Channel. It was at this time that, according to
a legend for which there is not much foundation, he hoisted a broom
at his mainmast top as the outward and visible sign of his intention
to sweep the Channel. So little did the Council of State feel capable
of opposing him with a sufficient naval force during the earlier part
of these three months, that it sent off officers to the south coast
to remove the lights and buoys, in order to make it dangerous for the
Dutch to approach the shore. In fact, both the Government and its
admirals had learned that if the Dutch were to be fairly beaten off,
a competent force must be collected, and it must act together. To
strengthen the command, Deane was called back from Scotland, and Monk
was named to fill up the vacancy left by the death of Popham. These
two, with Blake, formed the Commission to discharge the office of Lord
High Admiral commanding at sea. Penn was continued in his place as
Vice-Admiral, but Bourne was removed from active service to direct the
dockyard at Harwich, and his place at sea was taken by John Lawson,
who had gained a high reputation for skill and courage as a captain.
These two may be said to have served as Nautical Assessors to the three
soldiers who were entrusted with the general military direction of the
fleet.

Towards the middle of February the whole of the naval forces on both
sides moved down Channel--Tromp to wait off the Land's End for the
Dutch convoys, and the English to wait for and fall upon him as he came
back to the eastward.

On the 18th of February the two fleets came in sight of one another
some fifteen miles off Portland. The wind was from the west, and was
light. Tromp had from eighty to ninety men-of-war with him, and behind
them a great flock of merchant ships. The English, numbering from
seventy to eighty ships, were to eastward and leeward, and were much
scattered. Only the smaller part of them were together, under the
immediate direction of the generals at sea--Blake and Deane. The major
part were at some distance to the eastward. Seeing the comparative
weakness and the isolation of the part of the English fleet nearest
him, Tromp took the energetic and intelligent decision to fall upon
them at once. Blake and Deane did not flinch, and a hot engagement,
in which the English were roughly handled, took place in the early
afternoon. Three of the English ships were taken by the Dutch, but
the enemy was not able to carry them off. While the ships immediately
exposed to attack were engaged, the rest of the fleet to leeward was
working up. About four o'clock it had gained a position which would
have enabled it to weather the Dutch line, and thus put Tromp between
two fires. To avoid this danger, the Dutch admiral tacked his fleet
together, and worked to windward--a sufficiently clear proof that
the fleets of the time did not fight in a disorderly swarm, but were
perfectly capable of manoeuvring together in obedience to signals.
The three ships which had fallen into the hands of the Dutch were
retaken, but a fourth vessel, the =Sampson=, was found to be so
severely shattered, and had lost so many men, including her captain,
that it was decided to withdraw the survivors and let her sink. During
the evening the English were busy taking men out of the smaller ships
to fill up the vacancies caused by death and wounds in the larger, and
refitting their damaged rigging. During the night both made their way
eastward, within sight of one another's lights, the English on the
north side of the Channel, then next them the Dutch men-of-war keeping
guard over the merchant ships, which sailed between them and the coast
of France.

On the morning of the 19th this great assemblage of ships, largely
exceeding in number and still more in tonnage the combined fleets
of Medina Sidonia and Lord Howard of Effingham, was off the Isle of
Wight. The wind was at W.N.W., which gave the weather-gage to the
English, but it was very gentle, and the day was advanced before the
English admirals could force an action. As his enemy had now his whole
force in hand, Tromp applied himself solely to the protection of his
convoy. He sent his merchant ships on ahead, and formed his men-of-war
in a half-moon, or rather obtuse angle, with his own flagship, the
_Brederode_, in the apex--that is to say, the other ships were formed
in two slanting lines branching out to right and left of Tromp himself.
Thus it was impossible for the English to attack the merchant ships,
either from N.W. or from S.E., without breaking through the Dutch
men-of-war. The action of this day began late, and led to no decisive
results, though the English claimed to have taken a few small ships. It
can easily be believed that they succeeded in disordering the formation
of the Dutch--a very difficult one to maintain; and the bad conduct of
several of the Dutch captains near the Kentish Knock makes it credible
that some of them were also guilty of misconduct on this occasion. The
States General had not shown sufficient firmness in using the trees of
Holland for the purpose indicated by Cornelius Witte de With.

The decisive day of the "Three days' battle" was the last. On the
morning of the 20th the wind had increased, and the English fleet,
not being hampered by heavily laden merchant ships, had no difficulty
in overtaking the enemy. A close action was forced as early as nine
o'clock in the morning. Both fleets were now approaching the entry to
the Straits of Dover. The English were to the north of their enemy, and
they steered so as, if possible, to head him before he reached Cape
Gris Nez and so cut his road home. The Dutch ships either did not, or
could not, serve as an effectual protection to the merchant vessels.
Tromp formed his line of battle, and did his own duty with the utmost
steadfastness and courage. But the English broke through. The credit of
the movement belongs to Penn, who as vice-admiral had been leading the
van. Between fifty and sixty merchant ships fell into our hands, and as
many more men-of-war as made up the total of our captures to seventeen.
Yet the English failed in their main purpose. They did not succeed in
heading the Dutch before they rounded Cape Gris Nez, and by dark Tromp
anchored his whole force, now in great confusion, in Calais Roads.
Under cover of night, and by taking skilful advantage of the ebb-tide,
which on that coast makes a north-easterly current, as also of the
thick and squally weather which came on after sundown, he carried off
all that remained of his convoy. In spite of our successes on the 20th,
this was still the great bulk of his merchant ships.

These three days of fighting had cost the English fleet very dear.
Both Blake and Deane were wounded, and the loss in captains and men
was heavy. The victory had by no means been so complete as had been
hoped, but it was not the less a subject of legitimate gratification
to England. The general superiority of the English fleet whenever it
was intelligently handled, and not hopelessly outnumbered, had been
proved, and the country had good grounds for believing that if the war
with Holland was pushed with energy, its enemies would be driven off
the sea. For the moment the fleet at the mouth of the Straits was in no
condition to pursue the Dutch. When day broke on the 21st, the enemy
had disappeared. The English fleet found itself alone, with some sixty
prizes. It had suffered much damage to its masts and spars. With the
wind at N.W. it was on a lee shore, and a gale, or even a very stiff
breeze, would have put it in a position of some danger. The decision
to make for an English port was both natural and proper. To put their
prizes in a place of safety was the natural instinct of the men who
looked to their prize-money for the larger part of their reward; and
as Tromp had had time enough to carry his convoy into the dangerous
shallows of the Dutch coast, there was nothing to be gained by pursuing
him. The generals therefore returned to St. Helen's and anchored on
the 23rd. Squadrons were sent out both to east and west of the Isle of
Wight, but there was no longer any enemy at sea.

The "Three days' battle" was the turning-point of the war. Hitherto
the Dutch had fairly divided the honours with ourselves, but from this
time forward the upper hand passed decisively to the English fleet. The
ships were stronger, and the crews in the main fought better. War is in
the last result decided in favour of one combatant or other by power to
win at the actual moment of contact. This power was with the English
and not with the Dutch, and therefore all the skill and patriotism of
Martin Tromp and his lieutenants, Witte de With and Michael de Ruyter,
could do no more than postpone the final disaster, and provide that
if the flag of Holland were to go down, it should at least sink with
honour.

Before the final decisive struggle was fought out, there was an
interval, during which active operations languished. Both fleets stood
in need of repairs; for if the Dutch had lost severely, not a few of
our own vessels had been compelled to drag themselves into Portsmouth
so severely crippled that they were in need of a thorough refit. The
work of getting the English fleet ready for sea once more was not
discharged without difficulties and delay. The Navy Committee had many
obstacles to overcome before its squadrons could be put in order to
continue the war. There was a great want of men. The sailors no longer
volunteered in any large numbers, and the press was ill enforced.
Colonel Overton, the governor of Hull, found the local magistrates
so lax in their discharge of their duty that he was provoked into
threatening to send them to sea in default of sailors. The unpopularity
of the navy was due to causes of long standing. One of these, at least,
endured throughout the whole course of our wars. It was discovered
under the rule of the Commonwealth that the seamen had not lost that
preference of the privateer to the man-of-war they had shown during
the reign of Elizabeth. Blake had complained of the competition of
these partisan fighters of the sea at the very beginning of the war.
Government was constrained to put a severe check upon them, partly by
limiting the issue of letters of marque to vessels of a certain size,
and partly by giving men-of-war captains the right to press sailors
from the privateers. There were also very genuine causes of discontent
to deter men from volunteering into the service of the State. Under
the pressure due to the immense demands made upon its treasury, the
Commonwealth had become a bad paymaster. Not only were the salaries
of officers and men in arrear, but the contractors were slowly paid,
and, taking advantage of the power given them by the position of
creditor to the State, they supplied their goods late, and of inferior
quality. In the summer of 1653 one Captain John Taylor reported to the
Admiralty that the men belonging to the ships at Chatham had refused
to do anything towards taking the ballast in or getting it out, or, in
fact, to put their hand to the work of fitting the ships for sea. Their
excuse was the defective state of the victuals and beer. Captain Taylor
had to confess that "they have brought me beer, bread, and butter,
worse than I ever saw in the dearest times." The beer was particularly
vile, and the brewer protested that he could not make it any better,
because he was only paid three shillings and sixpence a barrel. The men
found it so bad that they actually preferred to drink water. The crews
imputed their sickness to the state of the victuals, and there is every
probability that they were right.

That the condition of the sick and wounded was deplorable is proved
by the testimony of many witnesses. Thus Dr. Daniel Whistler, who was
sent down to Portsmouth in March to attend on General Blake, gives a
terrible picture of the state of those who, after being wounded in
the "Three days' battle," were landed at Portsmouth. There was no
hospital. The wounded men were left for hours in the streets before
the Navy Commissioners could find lodgings for them in private houses.
When they were lodged, the surgeons very often did not know where to
find them, there was a want of linen and medicines, of wholesome food
and good nursing. The houses were overcrowded, and nothing was done
to protect men against the temptation to drink ardent spirits, which
was especially strong at Portsmouth, where the water was brackish.
Four months later, Monk himself drew a hardly less dismal picture of
the condition of the wounded at Ipswich, Aldeborough, Southwold, and
Dunwich. The payments due for their support were irregularly made, and
the inhabitants, we are told, were weary of them. Monk was compelled to
stand security at his own personal risk in order to raise money for the
purpose of helping his unfortunate sailors, lying sick and wounded in
the houses of people who in some cases were as poor as themselves, and
in others were mere harpies.

These evils were no doubt primarily due to want of money, but they can
also be accounted for by the utter want of any organisation capable
of dealing with the demands of war on an unprecedented scale. The
Council of State fought hard to meet the necessities of the times, and
when it had been swept out of the way by Cromwell's expulsion of the
Long Parliament on the 19th of April, the Council of the Protector
continued these efforts. Thus, in December 1652, a number of proposals
for the encouragement of seamen had been made and accepted. They
were divided into three sections. The first dealt with the sick and
wounded men. They were promised that their pay should be continued
until their health was restored, and it was decided that a general
hospital should be erected at Deal. Some hospitals in London were to
be given up wholly to sick and wounded seamen, and so were half the
other hospitals in other parts of England. It was at this date that
the wages of able seamen "fit for the helm and lead, top and yard,"
were raised from 19s. to 24s. a month, with a deduction of 1s. for the
chaplain and surgeon, according to the ancient custom. This substantial
benefit was accompanied by profuse promises of fairer treatment in
future. Another section of the propositions was devoted to the shares
in prizes. A bonus of a month's salary was offered to every man who,
having served six months, or upwards, since the beginning of the war,
would volunteer for the coming year. In order to remove "the many and
great disappointments caused by the present way of sharing prizes,"
it was provided that in future 10s. per ton should be paid for every
vessel taken, and £6, 13s. 4d. for every piece of ordnance, "this to
be shared amongst them proportionately, according to their respective
offices in the ship, and the custom of the sea." What was probably not
less agreeable to the sailors was an order that they should have the
pillage, that is to say, the right to appropriate at once, as booty,
whatever was found on or above the gun-deck of a prize, while a reward
of £10 per gun was to be paid for every vessel destroyed. If they could
have been fairly carried out, these conditions would have done much to
reconcile men to the navy, but, as has been already said, the chronic
want of money both of the Council of State and, in later times, of
the Protector, drove them to fail in their promises of payment, and
to lay hands upon the money in the possession of the Commissioners of
Prizes. Yet these Governments strove hard to make both ends meet, and
did resolutely endeavour to stop pilfering in the administration of
the navy. By expedients and hard work they contrived to keep powerful
fleets at sea in an efficient condition.

CHAPTER VIII

THE LATTER HALF OF THE WAR

 The only satisfactory account I have met of the sea fights of 1653 and
 the transactions at Leghorn are given by the letters printed at length
 in the Calendar of State Papers of the Interregnum for this year. It
 is on them that this chapter is based, in addition to authorities
 named above.

During the pause in hostilities between the end of February and the
end of May, the scene of operations of the two fleets was shifted from
the Channel to the North Sea. It was well understood on the English
side that the most effectual way of breaking the power of the Dutch
was to attack them on their own coast. Our headquarters were fixed
for the brief remains of the war at Yarmouth and Harwich. The violent
measure by which Cromwell ended for the time the existence of the Long
Parliament made no change in the conduct of the naval war. It was on
the 19th of April that he suddenly burst in on the eloquence of Sir
Henry Vane by declaring that there had been too much of this, put his
hat on, and ordered Colonel Harrison's regiment of musketeers to turn
the honourable members into the street. His action was accepted, and
had no doubt been foreseen, by the officers commanding the fleet, and
the men followed the lead of their superiors. At a meeting of naval
officers held on board the =Resolution= at Spithead on the 22nd of
April 1653, a general declaration of adhesion to Cromwell was drawn
up. It leaves no doubt that the fleet was at least prepared to accept
Cromwell as the effectual ruler of England. It was addressed to the
Council of Officers, and is as follows:--

 "Gentlemen,--There being certain intelligence come to our hands of
 the great changes within our nation, viz. the dissolution of this
 parliament; we, the general, commanders, and officers here present
 with this part of the fleet, have had a very serious consideration
 thereof, as also what was our duty, and incumbent upon us in such
 a juncture of time; and find it set upon our spirits, that we are
 called and intrusted by this nation for the defence of the same
 against the enemies thereof at sea, whether the people of the United
 Provinces, or others. And we are resolved, in the strength of God,
 unanimously to prosecute the same, according to the trust reposed in
 us; and have thought good to signify the same unto you, desiring you
 will take the effectualest course you can for the strengthening and
 encouraging one another in this work; and doubt not but the Lord, who
 hath done great and wonderful things for His people that have trusted
 in Him, will also be found among us, His poor unworthy servants, if we
 continue firm and constant in our duties, walking before Him in faith,
 humility, and dependence; not seeking ourselves, but His glory; which
 that we may all do, is the desire and prayer of your affectionate
 friends and brethren."

This resolution was forwarded by Cromwell to the ships on other
stations, and was everywhere accepted. Blake, indeed, did not sign it,
for he was still confined on shore by his wound, but he continued to
serve as admiral and general at sea.

Towards the end of May active operations were resumed. In spite of the
losses suffered in February, the Dutch took the offensive. Their fleet,
estimated at over a hundred ships, appeared in the Downs, and attacked
the forts at Dover. On the day when the Dutch were insulting our coast
for the last time in this war, Monk and Deane were at Yarmouth with the
bulk of the English fleet. Eleven ships, very ill manned, were fitting
out in the Thames under the command of Blake, who had returned to
service, though still not cured of his wounds. It was known that Tromp
was at sea, but great doubt prevailed as to his movements. Transports
engaged in bringing stores from the Humber were warned to be on the
outlook lest they should meet the Lieutenant-Admiral of Holland in
the northern part of the German Ocean. Nimble vessels were despatched
in search of him in every direction. On the 28th of May, on the day
in which Tromp left the Downs for the north, the generals at sea were
informed of his attack on Dover. They at once weighed, and fell down
the coast to Southwold Bay. On the 31st of May they were at anchor off
Dunwich, where a few fragments of brickwork and a disused church now
mark the site of what was once one of the busiest trading towns on
the east coast of England. Here they were informed that Tromp's fleet
had been seen at the head of the Long Sand. The Long Sand is, with
the exception of the Kentish Knock, the farthest out of the belt of
shallows stretching from the mouth of the Thames to Orford Ness. Monk
and Deane immediately sailed in pursuit. On the 2nd of June they caught
sight of Tromp to leeward. During the 1st they had waited for Blake
to join them from the river with his eleven ships. This reinforcement
would have raised their fleet to a total strength of 126. But Blake
was not yet ready, and the weather was thick and hazy. On the 2nd it
cleared up, and the Dutch were seen to leeward. The English had the
wind, and immediately sailed for the purpose of attacking.

Tromp, conscious that he was outmatched in strength of ships and weight
of broadsides, adopted a plan of action which became habitual to the
French admirals of the next century. He accepted battle to leeward,
and retreated in a slanting direction, or, according to the sea phrase
of the seventeenth century, "lasking." As the English line came down
from windward, its van would naturally come into action before the
centre, or rear, were within striking distance of the enemy. This
would expose the leading ships of the attacking line to the fire of
a superior number of enemies, and there would be considerable danger
that they might suffer crippling damage. It was at this that the French
admirals habitually aimed, and the Dutch adopted this more timid
method of accepting battle when, as on the present occasion, they felt
overmatched. Its advantage lay in this, that, if several of the van
ships of the fleet acting on the offensive were severely damaged, the
total injury done might be sufficient to deter the admiral in command
from pressing his attack home. In later times, when English admirals
had become pedantically devoted to the maintenance of an orderly and
precise line, this conduct of the battle by the enemy to leeward did
avail, never indeed to win a victory, but frequently to avert a defeat.
As against the fiercer leadership of the seventeenth century it was not
equally successful.

On the 2nd of June the advancing English fleet forced the action
early in the afternoon. The Blue Division, under the command of John
Lawson, was in the van, and appears to have struck upon the enemy's
line in his van, under the command of Michael de Ruyter. The Dutch,
pursuing the evasive manner of fighting they had adopted from a sense
of weakness, flinched from the attack, and filed away to leeward,
firing high, to do the utmost possible amount of damage to the masts
and spars of the English. Tromp, indeed, bore up to support De Ruyter,
that is to say, lay close to the wind, so as to bring himself near the
English fleets, and within the range of effective fire. While the Blue
Division and a part only of the remainder of our fleet were engaged,
a shift of the wind altered the relative positions of the two fleets.
It turned to the east, and therefore gave the weather-gage to the
Dutch. The more distant centre and rear of the English fleet were thus
thrown to leeward of the Blue Squadron, now closely engaged with the
enemy. Tromp, as ready to attack where he had a reasonable prospect
of success, as he was skilful to retreat before a superior enemy,
immediately assumed the offensive, and endeavoured to throw the whole
weight of his fleet on the Blue Division. Lawson met the attack firmly,
while the Red and White Divisions worked to windward to his support.
Then the wind changed again, giving the weather-gage once more to the
English. The fleets were now so close together that the Dutch could
not, even if they wished to do so, avoid a general action. They resumed
their movement of retreat towards the coast of Flanders, but they bore
away almost yardarm to yardarm with the English. The battle did not
cease until nine at night, when the long daylight of early June came
to an end. If the claim made by the English officers was well founded,
their enemy suffered the loss of several vessels burnt or sunk. On our
side the loss of life was comparatively slight, but it included the
general-at-sea, Richard Deane, who sailed in the =Resolution= with
his colleague Monk. Deane fell cut in two by a cannon shot in the
first broadside fired by the Dutch at the =Resolution=. His blood was
splashed all over Monk, who saw the fall of his friend and colleague
with his usual imperturbable serenity. Fearing that the sight of
Deane's body, mangled almost beyond recognition, might dishearten the
men, and perhaps moved by a sense of decency, Monk took off his long
cloak and threw it over the corpse.

When night fell, both fleets were in sight of Dunkirk. The Dutch,
taking advantage of the shallow draught of their ships, ran close in
shore, where the deeper-keeled English vessels could not follow them.
The sound of the cannon had been heard by the ships under Blake's
immediate command in the estuary of the Thames. He was still ill, and
found himself growing daily worse, but he made an effort to aid his
brother generals-at-sea. On the morning of the 3rd he was clear of
the Thames, but the wind was very light, and the day was far advanced
before he could reach the scene of battle. The want of wind had in
the meantime suspended the action between the two fleets. It was not
until the afternoon that Monk, now in sole command, was again able to
bring the Dutch to battle. The second day's fight was less fiercely
contested than the first. The Dutch, convinced of their inferiority,
fought in retreat along the coast of Flanders, keeping as much as they
could in the shallow water, and heading for the protection of their own
harbours. Blake came up in time to take part in the end of the battle,
but he and Monk were unable to prevent Tromp from taking refuge in the
Weilings, the name we gave to the land-locked waters between the island
of Walcheren and the mainland.

The actual loss of the Dutch fleet was undoubtedly exaggerated in the
English reports, but, although we over-estimated the number of vessels
destroyed, there can be no doubt that the defeat of the Dutch had been
complete, and was of a kind to depress them greatly. It could not be
accounted for by accident or mere mismanagement, but was manifestly
due to the inferior quality of the fleet. This was fully recognised by
the brave and able men in command of the Dutch Navy. Tromp told the
States General that they must build better ships if they hoped to fight
the English successfully; while Cornelius de With, always an outspoken
man, declared that the English were masters of "us and of the sea."
The approaching ruin of their commerce and fisheries broke the spirit
of the United Provinces. The loss already suffered had been enormous.
Thousands of merchants were bankrupt. The fisheries were annihilated,
and the Zuyder Zee was crowded with merchant vessels unable to proceed
on their voyage from fear of the English fleets. In the meantime the
partisans of the House of Orange were stirring. The oligarchical
Government established after the death of William II. was threatened
by a most dangerous rebellion. Under pressure from abroad and at home,
it appealed for peace. The Protector insisted upon the full demands
that had been made by the Council of State. Much as the Dutch had
suffered, they were not prepared to submit so fully as this, and the
harsh insistence of England provoked a revival of national pride.
Declaring that it was better to die sword in hand than to submit to
the outrageous demands made upon them, the States General resolved to
attempt one last determined effort to regain the free use of the sea.
Every nerve was strained to equip a great fleet, and for the time all
commerce was suspended, in order the better to fit out a fighting force.

The English were no less resolute to maintain and, if possible, improve
their advantages. The fleet was not brought back from the coast of
Holland, but remained for the purpose of blockading the Dutch in their
own ports. Food and munitions of war were sent out from England to
Monk, who was again left in sole command by the illness of Blake, whose
strength broke down completely under the strain of active service. With
Penn as his second in command, and Lawson as his third, Monk was equal
to his duties. He may not have been a seaman, though by this time he
had been much at sea, but he was in the highest sense of the word a
general, a fighter, who did his work thoroughly, used the force of his
command to the utmost of its strength, and understood how to strike,
with a great compact mass, at the heart of his enemy. Towards the end
of July he stood across the North Sea for stores, and then returned at
once to his cruising-ground off the Texel, the island which prolongs
the State of North Holland, and between which and the mainland runs the
chief passage to the Zuyder Zee. Some thirty Dutch warships belonging
to the squadron of Amsterdam were at anchor behind the protection of
the land. Tromp, with eighty sail, was at Flushing, between Walcheren
and the mainland. The object of the Dutch admiral was to unite these
two divisions, and thereby raise his force to a slight superiority
over the English. Monk's aim was naturally to prevent the junction of
the enemy, and, if possible, to crush his divisions in detail while
they were endeavouring to unite. Thus the last battle of the war was
preceded by skilful manoeuvring. In the earlier movements success
was fairly won for his flag by the nerve and skill of Tromp. On the
26th of July some of his ships appeared to the south of the English
fleet, then riding outside the Texel. Monk started in pursuit on the
28th, and soon sighted the enemy. The wind was at W., and it was too
late for any extensive movement. On the 29th the Dutch were still in
sight to the south. As the English approached, they fell back. Monk
pressed on, with his lighter and better sailing ships in advance. These
vessels, the frigates of his fleet, directed their attack on the rear
of the Dutch line. Their better sailing powers enabled them to force
on an engagement, and so compelled Tromp to turn to the support of
the vessels attacked. But it was too late on the 29th for a decisive
engagement. At night both fleets anchored near Camperdown. The English,
who had in all probability aimed at getting the weather-gage, had
apparently stood farther out than Tromp, whose vessels were in any
case better able to approach the shore. Thus, when the fleets came to
an anchor, the Dutch were nearer in, and it would also seem that the
English had somewhat overshot the enemy, for they anchored a little
farther to the south. All through the night and the following day it
blew a gale with heavy squalls from the W.N.W. The wind was so high
that ships under way could scarcely bear their topsails, and, as they
were on a lee shore, the fleets had enough to do to keep off it,
without attacking one another. During the afternoon of the 30th the
Amsterdam squadron joined Tromp, raising his force to something over a
hundred and twenty vessels. So far he had effected his purpose, and had
shown himself worthy of his great reputation as a skilful captain. On
the morning of the 31st both fleets stood off the shore. The wind was
still at W.N.W., and Tromp had the weather-gage. The battle began very
early in the morning, and surpassed any of the previous engagements of
the war both in the fury of the contest and the decisive character of
the results. Monk was determined to bring the matter to an issue, and
he did not wait for Tromp to bear down upon him, but tacked upon his
enemy, and broke through the Dutch line from leeward.

It was six o'clock in the morning when the battle began. Both fleets
were heading to the W.S.W., the English somewhat ahead, the Dutch to
the northward and windward. By tacking, Monk altered the relative
positions of the fleets from parallel to intersecting lines. The bulk
of the Dutch weathered the head of the English line, but their rear
ships were cut off. We "went through their whole fleet," said Captain
Cubitt, "leaving part on one side, and part on the other of us." Tromp
was resolved not to lose the weather-gage, and he also tacked when he
saw Monk's movement. So did Monk when he had passed through the Dutch
line, and the manoeuvre was repeated three times by each. On the
second tack, all the Dutch appear to have weathered the English line.
The two fleets passed very close, engaging with the utmost fury. From
the heavy loss suffered in our ships, it may be concluded that in
this battle the Dutch fired less to dismast than to kill. Six English
captains were slain, one was mortally wounded, and the loss in the
lower ranks must have been in proportion. It was counted one of the
advantages of the windward position that it facilitated the despatch of
fireships against the enemy to leeward. The Dutch did not fail to use
a weapon, so terrible in theory, and so dreadfully destructive when it
took effect. Experience, however, proved that as against well-handled
ships under way, and under control of steady officers, it could rarely
be employed successfully. The fireship could generally be avoided
by moving vessels, and when that was difficult, or inconvenient to
do, then it was taken in charge by the boats which the warship towed
astern, and dragged away to leeward, where it burned out harmlessly. On
this occasion little hurt was done by the "branders."

We cannot suppose that the movement of tacking in succession was
performed by two fleets, each of over a hundred sail, with absolute
uniformity. On this occasion, as in the great battle of the 12th of
April 1783, when Rodney pierced the French from leeward, the main line
may have broken into smaller ones. But the general course of the battle
was in three great zig-zags, ranging along the coast of Holland, from
near Egmont towards the mouth of the Maas, which are at a distance of
about forty miles from one another. There was no shrinking on the part
of the Dutch, and no failure of effort on the part of the English to
push the attack home. In many points of the line ships were locked
together in desperate attempts to board, or repel boarders. By three in
the afternoon victory belonged to the English. A large proportion of
the Dutch had been cut off from Tromp, and had fallen to leeward. Most
of them were probably too damaged to be in case to do more than put
before the wind, and escape as best they could. They fled into Goree
and the Maas. The bulk of their fleet was debarred from that refuge
by the English, who were still to leeward, and therefore on the line
of retreat. It could only head northward and eastward to the Texel.
Thither in the afternoon it fled, leaving behind miles of sea covered
with the wreckage of the battle, and bearing with it the corpse of its
great admiral, who fell by the death he had come to long for--shot
mercifully dead by a musket bullet through the heart. He at least had
nothing to reproach himself with. All that valour and skill could do to
save Holland, he did. If he failed, it was because the mistaken policy
of the soldier princes of the House of Nassau, and the unwisdom of the
merchant oligarchy, had in false economy supplied him with inferior
ships. An Englishman does not undervalue the heroes of his own race,
when he acknowledges that not only their valour but skill enabled them
to overcome the most famous of the Dutch seamen.

We had no prizes, for we burned or sank the ships taken, and our own
damage in the battle had not been small, but the victory was decisive.
Holland again sued for peace; and as Cromwell had come to recognise
that he must not insist on too much, it was finally signed some months
later.

While the main tide of war had been ebbing and flowing through the
North Sea and the Channel, there had been minor conflicts at the entry
to the Baltic and the Mediterranean. The first is of comparatively
little importance in naval history, and is indeed hardly worth
mentioning, except on the ground that it illustrates a chronic
difficulty of the English Government in all naval wars. We drew a
great part of our stores from the Baltic. Pitch and tar, hemp for
cordage, and pine wood for spars and planking, as well as part of the
oak used in our ships, were supplied by Scandinavia and Russia. At a
later period the American plantations entered into competition with
the Baltic trade, but in the middle of the seventeenth century these
indispensable articles were obtained only in the North of Europe. If
they were cut off by the hostility of the Northern Powers, the task
of fitting a fleet for sea was rendered almost impossible. The sense
that they had it in their power to inflict so heavy a blow upon us,
rendered the kingdoms of the North occasionally somewhat exacting. In
the first Dutch war, the King of Denmark acted with open hostility to
the Commonwealth. He had strong political motives for remaining on
good terms with the United Provinces, and it is very possible that he
shared the common incredulity of Europe as to our power to overcome the
first naval power in the world. If the Dutch proved victorious, they
would certainly be obliged to him for any harm he might have done us.
Acting under the influence of a desire to please the Dutch, the King
of Denmark availed himself of a pretext to arrest an English convoy
at Elsinore in the autumn of 1652. A squadron of eighteen ships was
despatched under the command of Captain Ball to enforce their release.
Ball's force was scattered by a gale, and he was compelled to return
without the convoy. A long and angry negotiation followed between the
Governments, but the Danish king learned that it was more dangerous to
offend England than Holland, before we were compelled to teach him the
lesson directly.

The Mediterranean was the scene of a very much more lively and varied
fragment of the great war. It has been said above that when Penn left
the Mediterranean at the beginning of 1652 he was replaced by Captain
Richard Badiley, who was despatched into those seas with a squadron
appointed to protect the merchant ships against an attack by Prince
Rupert and the French. The main centres of English trade in the
Mediterranean were the Levant,--where the Turkey Company had factories
at Smyrna and Scanderoon (Alexandretta),--Venice, and Leghorn. When
the Dutch war broke out, there were six English warships in the
Mediterranean, stretching widely over it for the purpose of collecting
merchant ships at their different ports of departure, and bringing
them together into one convoy before passing the Straits on the way
home. Badiley himself was at Scanderoon with three ships. Captain Henry
Appleton was at Leghorn with two. The sixth, the =Constant Warwick=,
was at Genoa, where she had been sent to careen, because she was very
foul and eaten by worms. Appleton had several English ships with him,
and he would in the ordinary course of the service wait until he was
joined by Badiley before sailing for England. The outbreak of the war
with Holland entirely broke up the usual arrangement. The Dutch were
represented in the Mediterranean by a force numerically stronger than
ours, though the individual ships were smaller than our largest. This
advantage they were certain to use for the destruction of our trade.
The war began in June, and, as news travelled slowly then, was not
known, even in Italy, till the end of that month or the beginning of
the next. The Dutch ships in the western half of the Mediterranean
were collected in the neighbourhood of Appleton, at Leghorn. They were
fourteen in number, and were under the command of an officer named
Catz. With such a disproportion of force against him, the English
officer had no resource but to seek the protection of a neutral port.
Leghorn belonged to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and to him Appleton
appealed for protection. The Grand Duke was not very favourably
inclined towards the English officer, who had cost him considerable
annoyance by capturing a French vessel just outside his port and
bringing her in as a prize. The position of a neutral in a great naval
war is always more or less disagreeable. The combatants are generally
either anxious to make use of its harbours as a refuge, or eager to
follow up an enemy in its waters. The ingenuity of international
lawyers has invented many pretty and plausible regulations for the
guidance of all persons in such a case. But it is the misfortune of
international law that nobody is bound to enforce its decrees unless he
feels himself injured by the breach of them, while the party who really
is injured, and therefore quotes them on his own behalf, is frequently
the weaker, and so is unable to supply that sanction which is necessary
for the validity of any law. Between the stronger who wishes to crush
the weaker, and the weaker who does not wish to be crushed, the neutral
is often in a dilemma of great delicacy, since the weaker is often
quite strong enough to be able to punish him for inability to enforce
respect for his own neutrality. Besides, it is particularly hard to
judge from the local strength of belligerents which of them is likely
to prove the more powerful on the whole. When, then, Captain Appleton
brought the French prize into Leghorn, he caused the Grand Duke very
intelligible annoyance. The English might have the upper hand at sea,
and yet the French might be quite powerful enough by land to pay
themselves for what England had taken on the water, by pillaging the
Grand Duchy of Tuscany. A not dissimilar dilemma presented itself
when Appleton appealed to the protection of the port against the
fourteen ships of Catz. The Grand Duke could hardly tell which of the
two was the most dangerous to offend. In spite of the offence given
him by Appleton, he endeavoured to hold the balance even between the
quarrelsome sea powers. He promised the English that he would not allow
the Dutchmen to attack them if they came within the Mole of Leghorn.
In regard to the waters beyond he could give no guarantee, since he had
no naval force. To make assurance doubly sure, he allowed the English
merchant ships to land their cargoes, and put them for safety in the
Lazaretto or Quarantine House of Leghorn. Appleton might possibly have
increased his force to a point which would have made it comparatively
safe for him to give battle to the Dutch, if the merchant ships in the
harbour had been willing to help him. They all carried guns, and the
crews of that time were comparatively large. The merchant captains
displayed the cowardice of the mere trader. They refused to give
Appleton any help, alleging as their excuse that they had no orders
from home to recognise his authority, and no security that they would
be paid for any damage their vessels might suffer in action with the
Dutch. During all the summer and autumn of 1652, Appleton and Charles
Longland, the agent of the Commonwealth in Florence, were engaged in
fruitless efforts to recruit the strength of the squadron from the
merchant ships at Leghorn and Venice.

Since there was no hope from this source, nothing remained but to wait
for the arrival of Badiley, in the hope that when all the six English
warships were together, they might prove more capable of dealing with
the enemy. It was a desperate chance, since all the probabilities
were that Badiley would sail into the middle of the Dutch blockading
ships. In order to reduce this danger as far as possible, Appleton
despatched Captain Owen Cox with the =Constant Warwick= to meet the
ships coming from the Levant, and warn them of the danger. The usual
course for an officer bringing a convoy from the Levant would be to
touch at Zante, picking up other merchant ships, then to go on to
Messina and Naples for the same purpose, to range the coast of Italy as
high as Leghorn, and then sail for the Straits, where he would pick up
the Spanish trade. The =Constant Warwick= found Badiley at Zante, the
most southerly of the Ionian Islands, where he was waiting for ships
still on their way from Smyrna and Cyprus. On receipt of the news of
war and the danger of Appleton, he came straight on, without making
the usual stoppages at Messina and Naples. His energy did not avert
disaster. The Dutch blockading squadron had in the meantime passed
from the command of Catz to that of Jan Van Galen, who came overland
to supersede his predecessor. Galen was sufficiently alert to make
himself aware of the approach of Badiley while the English ships were
between the islands of Elba and Corsica. His own squadron had been so
far reinforced that he was able to leave six ships to keep a watch on
Appleton, while he sailed with eleven for the purpose of attacking
Badiley. On the afternoon of the 27th of August, Galen attacked the
English convoy. It consisted of eight vessels in all, but of these only
three were warships; the other five were merchant vessels, sufficiently
well armed to be able to beat off a small privateer or Algerine pirate,
but hardly able to encounter a man-of-war of any size. Yet the Dutch
were generally small; and as Badiley's own ship, the =Paragon=, was
heavier than any of them, it may well be that if the Turkey Company's
ships had shown a manlier spirit, they might have given a fairly good
account of the enemy. As a matter of fact, not only the traders, but
the two warships with Badiley supported him either not at all, or very
little. The encounter on the afternoon of the 27th was confined to
distant cannonading, but next morning the Dutch attacked with energy,
and the =Paragon= had to make a desperate fight for the protection
of her convoy. The whole weight of the action fell upon her. She was
greatly shattered in her rigging, and the loss in killed and wounded
amounted to no less than eighty-one, a very large proportion of a
crew of about three hundred men. In the meantime the merchant ships
did very little, and the =Paragon's= two consorts not very much. One
of them did worse, for she fell into the hands of the enemy. This was
the =Phenix=, which was destined to be the cause of some exciting
events further on. If Captain Badiley told the truth, she was lost by
blundering management and the misconduct of her men. Thirty of the crew
got into the long-boat towing astern, and fled to the =Paragon=, where
they spread so violent a panic that Captain Badiley considered his own
ship in danger of being lost. Fortunately for him, it fell a dead calm,
and when the wind rose he was able to carry the =Paragon=, her one
remaining consort, and the five merchant vessels into Porto Longone, at
the south-east end of the island of Elba.

Here the governor offered him protection, and even remained loyal
to his promises, although offered a heavy bribe by the Dutch if he
would allow them to plunder the English vessels. But though Badiley
escaped destruction, both English squadrons were now blockaded. Jan
Van Galen was further reinforced, and was able to watch both Appleton
at Leghorn and Badiley at Porto Longone. The second of these officers
had been appointed to the general command. In co-operation with
Charles Longland, he kept making strenuous efforts, throughout the
last months of this year and the early months of the next, to raise
his own force so far that he could attack the Dutch with some hope of
success, or at least reunite the two squadrons. He failed to do either
one or the other. He and Longland were in want of money, the merchant
captains were in want of courage, and the vigilance of the Dutch kept
the English apart and impotent. The watch on Porto Longone was not so
close but that Badiley was able to go to and fro between that port
and Leghorn. The =Constant Warwick=, too, re-entered Leghorn, but no
general movement was possible. So the year wore away. It was noted
that when the news of Blake's defeat off Dungeness reached Italy, the
Grand Duke showed himself even less friendly than before. There were
many Royalist exiles at his court who spared no effort to injure the
Parliament's officers. Dutch diplomacy was active, and an envoy from
"the person called Charles II.," as Captain Badiley described his king,
appeared in time to support their representations.

In the meantime the English at Leghorn were subject to a perpetual
blistering irritation. The Dutch brought the =Phenix= into the
roadstead, and began ostentatiously to fit her as a man-of-war. When
she was ready, the command was given to Cornelius van Tromp, the son
of the famous admiral. The sight of this vessel was an eyesore to
the English, and in particular to Captain Owen Cox, who had been
transferred to the command of the =Bonaventure= on the death of her
captain, Witheridge. Cox began to plot schemes for retaking the
=Phenix=. Appleton, who was afraid of offending the Grand Duke, was
very angry with his subordinate's excess of zeal, and even went so far
as to put him under arrest, but Badiley restored him to his command.
At the same time, he certainly gave his approval to schemes for
retaking the prize. He justified this strong measure in the immediate
neighbourhood of the Grand Duke's harbour by arguments which no doubt
appeared convincing to himself, but are mainly remarkable for a rather
childlike simplicity. "If two people," said Captain Badiley, "who
are at enmity with one another, go into the house of a third on the
promise that they will not make a disturbance, of course they ought
to keep quiet, but if one of them filches the sword of the other, the
gentleman robbed has surely a right to recover his stolen property.
Now the Dutch have filched our ship the =Phenix=, and so the Grand
Duke cannot reasonably object if we take her back again." The English
captains were not so convinced of the unanswerable character of their
interpretation of international law as to present it for the Grand
Duke's consideration before they took the =Phenix=. The argument was
pretty, but it was better to expound the law after the =Phenix= had
changed hands. They also decided that the more quietly the thing was
done the better. According to their exposition of the practice of
nations, it was quite legitimate to take an enemy in neutral waters,
provided that the ship were taken in the small hours, and that no
pistols were fired to disturb the slumbers of the citizens.

The capture was effected in this way, but not until Cornelius van Tromp
had given the English further intolerable provocation. About the middle
of November he put to sea on a cruise, and returned a few days later
with his prize. By way of insult and glorification over his enemy,
Cornelius van Tromp had entered the roadstead trailing the English
flag in the water under his stern. On the night of the 20th November
he was punished for this piece of unmannerly brag. A cutting-out
party was prepared in Appleton's flagship, the =Leopard=. It consisted
of three boats. Captain Cox, who was very properly entrusted with
the execution of his favourite enterprise, took the first, with
fourteen men, Lieutenant Young of the =Leopard= had the second, with
thirty-three, and Lieutenant Lynn of the =Bonaventure= the third, with
the same number of men. The opportunity had been well chosen. It was
St. Andrew's Eve, and the Dutch were carousing. Captain Badiley was
informed that in order to ingratiate themselves with the Italians the
Dutch captains heard a sermon from a friar before dinner. He preached
upon the text, "Follow Me, and I will make you fishers of men"; for
which sin "nearly a hundred of their men were fished from them that
night in the =Phenix=." The boats lost one another in the dark after
leaving the =Leopard=, and it was not until "the appearing of the
morning stars" that they were all alongside the prize. The capture was
easily effected, for a large part of the Dutch crew was drinking on
shore, and the other was more or less drunk on the ship. Young Tromp
was finishing a carouse in the cabin when the English broke in. He
escaped capture by diving from the stern-port and swimming to another
Dutch ship, but, although he was very quick, he did not get off till
one of the English sailors had given him a wipe with a cutlass, telling
him that that was for trailing the English flag under his stern. From
the moment he was in possession of the deck, Captain Cox cut cable
and set sail. There was a good deal of scuffling and fighting between
decks, in which Lieutenant Young was killed, but the English finally
drove the Dutch into the hold, and would have quelled the resistance
much sooner if they had not fulfilled their obligations to the Grand
Duke by rigidly abstaining from the use of firearms. Several of the
Dutch ships pursued, but they might as well have spared themselves
the trouble. The =Phenix= easily out sailed them all, and Captain Cox
carried her to Naples.

This incident filled the English both at Leghorn and Porto Longone
with high gratification, but it was the beginning of new sorrows. The
Grand Duke at first laughed at the trick, but the outcries of the
Dutch forced him to take a more serious view of the outrage. An act of
hasty ill-temper on the part of Captain Appleton gave him an excuse
for putting the English captain into prison at Pisa. Later on, he
handed him over to Badiley at Porto Longone. The English endeavoured
to propitiate the Italian prince by the sentence of a court-martial
which removed Appleton from his command. His offence had been that
he took a runaway prisoner out of the hands of the duke's sentry on
the Mole. But although the Grand Duke professed himself satisfied,
and even asked that Appleton might be restored to his command, he
was plainly annoyed with the English, and probably very tired of the
trouble they were causing him. The urgent appeals of Longland and
Badiley for reinforcements from England could not be answered at the
very height of the great war. The Grand Duke may perhaps have thought
that it was better to make friends of the Dutch. He began to press
either for the surrender of the =Phenix= by the English, or for their
departure from his port. At last, in March 1653, Badiley decided to
wait no longer. Indeed the Grand Duke was showing a temper which made
decisive action necessary. Badiley therefore sent orders to Appleton
to get ready the two men-of-war, and the four merchant ships, lying
within the Mole, to meet him. The Dutch had raised the blockade of
Porto Longone, and were concentrated outside Leghorn. The plan of the
English commander was that he should appear off the port, and that so
soon as he was known to be in the neighbourhood, Captain Appleton was
to take the opportunity to slip out by night. Badiley, in the course of
a controversy which arose between the two, asserted that he gave strict
orders to the effect that the ships within the Mole were not to come
out by day unless they saw him engaged with the Dutch. He complained
that the sloth of Appleton and his captains spoiled this plan. They
did not make the necessary exertions to come out of cover by night.
Then their rashness completed what their idleness had begun. They came
out in broad daylight, when it was impossible to slip past the Dutch
unseen. These two errors were, according to Badiley, the cause of the
disaster which ensued. As the English ships came out with a leading
wind, they had the Dutch between them and the English ships which had
come over from Porto Longone. It was the manifest interest of the enemy
to attack the English in detail. Badiley being at the greater distance
and to leeward, they naturally attacked Appleton. If they had followed
the reverse course, they would have presented the English with an
opportunity of concentrating upon them, since Appleton would have had
nothing to do but to run down from windward to the assistance of his
colleague. The two men-of-war and four armed merchant ships which had
come out from Leghorn were easily overpowered by the Dutch. Badiley
says he was unable to render Appleton any effectual assistance, and the
Council of State seems to have thought that he was telling the truth.
The =Leopard= made a stout fight, but the other ships did not offer a
prolonged resistance.

After the capture of the ships at Leghorn, there was nothing to detain
Badiley on the coast of Northern Italy, and he therefore betook himself
first to Naples, and then to the Straits. He would, if he had had
his own choice, have remained abroad to cruise, but his men were by
this time sick of the service, and were clamouring to return home.
He appears to have been afflicted by some very disorderly fellows in
his ships' companies. It was in vain that Captain Badiley appealed to
their patriotism, and threatened them with the terrors of No. 11 in the
Parliament's recently issued Articles of War. They answered persuasions
and threats alike with cries of "Home, home!" At last he sailed, and
reached England unopposed. The riotous character of his men was not
improved by the time they returned to Chatham. Their violence made the
duty of paying them off very irksome to Mr. Commissioner Pett, but he
had his revenge; for no sooner were they paid off on their return from
the Straits than they were pressed again, and sent off to serve their
country in the great decisive battles of the war in June and July.

Diplomatic difficulties arose between the Government of England
and the Grand Duke of Tuscany in consequence of this episode of the
war, but before this there had been a violent pamphlet controversy
between the parties concerned. It was one of the earliest, though not
the first, of the series of naval quarrels. Appleton, considering he
had been left in the lurch by Badiley, openly accused his commander
of treachery and cowardice, in a pamphlet dedicated to Cromwell and
supported by the testimony of his captains. Badiley replied by a
counter-pamphlet, retorting the charges of treachery and cowardice on
Appleton, and adorning his defence of himself by charges of incapacity,
impiety, and immorality against his critics. Both parties were very
angry, very hot, and very abusive. They present the reader with the
spectacle of heated seafaring men wrangling in an abusive manner, with
much clumsy irony. On the whole, it does appear that if Appleton had
been more alert and intelligent, he might have given more effectual
help to Badiley. So Cromwell apparently thought, for Appleton was not
employed again. Yet both were so furious, loud-mouthed, and brutal,
that it is impossible to accept either as a wholly trustworthy witness.

CHAPTER IX

THE PROTECTORATE

 AUTHORITIES.--Carlyle's _Letters and Speeches of Cromwell_ will
 of course be consulted for this period. Clarendon's intellectual
 greatness and his insight enable him to interpret the spirit of
 events even when he is wrong in his facts. Cromwell's instructions
 to Penn and Venables, the letters of all the officers concerned, and
 the journals of the proceedings in San Domingo, have been collected
 in the second volume of the Life of Penn. Blake's operations in the
 Mediterranean and the ocean are to be made out from the papers in
 Thurloe, his own letters, and the narratives of the capture of the
 Plate Ships and the battle at Santa Cruz, published by order of
 Cromwell's Parliament.

The Government of Oliver Cromwell was that of a usurper and, in the
strict sense of the word, a tyrant. He did not indeed use his power
with wilful cruelty, but by the very nature of the case he ruled by the
sword, and not by law. Still, usurper and tyrant as he was, his aim was
not the indulgence of any mere passion of his own. He was not only the
greatest man of his time, and one of the greatest of all time, but he
was thoroughly English in his wishes, his aims, and even prejudices.
The desire to give the nation, in return for the subversion of its
regular Government, a compensation which would take the form of an
extension of its national grandeur and the promotion of its interests,
had possibly something to do in framing his foreign policy. Yet there
was a wide difference between the course he followed and that which
commended itself, first to the Jacobins, and then to Napoleon. He did
not plunge England into a succession of wars in pursuit of glory and an
unattainable universal dominion, in order to divert it from discontent
with his own rule. He aimed at the things which the great majority of
Englishmen, whether Royalist or Puritan, knew to be consistent with the
true interests of England, and could approve. These were three. In the
first place, he undertook to teach foreign nations once more that they
must respect England--a lesson they had too much forgotten during the
weak rule of the Stuarts and the confusion of the Civil War. The old
rhyme has it, that

    "Though his government did a tyrant's resemble,
    He made England great and her enemies tremble."

In so far, he was doing what every Royalist would have wished to see
the king do. Then Oliver was resolved to obtain security for English
commerce on the sea, and on that point there were no differences of
opinion in the nation. Finally, he designed to obtain for England
that extension of her trade and that expansion of her colonial empire
after which the ambition of the nation was already straining. The
criticism that his schemes were too great for his resources is perhaps
well founded. Yet, had he lived to establish his Government firmly,
it is probable that he would not have asked the nation for more than
it could easily give. The sums spent by his Government on maritime
expeditions were not greater than those pilfered and wasted during the
reign of Charles II. But, however that may be, the fact remains that
Oliver first pointed out to England the course she was to follow in the
eighteenth century; and if he was wrong in practice, it was because the
principles of his foreign policy were in advance of their time.

There were two ways by which the Protector could carry out his
policy--by alliance with Spain or by alliance with France. The long war
between these two nations was still in progress--with growing success
and resources on the side of France, and daily increasing weakness on
the side of Spain. There were reasons which might seem to make it the
Protector's interest to ally himself with Spain. The growing strength
of France at her very doors was a menace to England. The weakness of
Spain would render her a dependent ally--that is to say, it would have
that effect if Spain were capable of being influenced by ordinary
considerations of policy. Then the close relationship between the
families of Stuart and Bourbon must always give the French monarchy a
leaning to the side of the opponents of the Protector's Government.
But Spain was not to be influenced in the way desired by England.
Before Cromwell could undertake to help the Spaniards against the
French, there were two concessions he was bound to demand from them.
The first was the exemption of Englishmen from the jurisdiction of
the Inquisition. The second was the admission of English trade to the
Spanish possessions in the New World. Pride and the blind obstinacy
with which the Spaniards, to their ruin, have always clung to their
most extreme pretensions, made it impossible for the King and Council
of Castile to yield what Oliver demanded. It is a well-known story that
when the Protector made these two concessions the price of his alliance
against France, the Spanish ambassador, Don Alonso de Cárdenas,
answered, "My master has but two eyes, and you ask him for both of
them." Spain, in fact, would rather fight on in hopeless, contumacious
obstinacy than yield up her right to protect the purity of her faith
and her pretension to retain the monopoly of the New World. Since,
then, Cromwell could not obtain his ends by treaty, he prepared to
extort them from Spain by force. He turned to the French alliance, and
made ready for war.

The attack on Spain was to be conducted on three lines. One does not
concern us, except in so far as it is necessary to remember that unless
England had possessed a superiority of strength at sea, she could
not have followed it. At a later period English troops were sent to
co-operate in the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands. But before this,
Spain had been attacked on the sea. Two expeditions were fitted out in
England. The first, under the command of Robert Blake, was to sail for
the Mediterranean, and, after disposing of certain preliminary duties,
was to attack Spain at home. The second, under the combined commands of
William Penn as general-at-sea, and of Robert Venables as general of
the land forces, was to fall upon the Spaniards in the New World. This
second expedition marks a notable epoch in our colonial history, and,
at the cost of somewhat forestalling the order of time, may be told as
an episode by itself.

According to all modern notions, the policy of Cromwell in fitting out
this expedition was eminently immoral. A great fleet carrying a force
of soldiers was sent out with orders to attack the Spaniards before a
declaration of war. But in the middle of the seventeenth century, and
in the circumstances, there was nothing even irregular in what the
Protector did. It is necessary to understand in their main lines the
relations of European States to Spain in the New World, and to do that
we must look back for a moment. At the close of the fifteenth century,
the almost simultaneous voyages of Columbus across the Atlantic and
of Vasco da Gama round the Cape of Good Hope had appeared to give the
Crowns of Spain and Portugal the rights of previous discovery over the
trade routes to the East. It must not be forgotten that Columbus was
believed to have reached the eastern extremity of Asia. He himself
died in the belief that this was what he had done. It was not until
Vasco Nuñez de Balboa had crossed the Isthmus of Darien, and Magellan
had sailed through the straits named after him, and had found a vast
expanse of ocean between him and Asia, that it came to be understood
that there was a continent of America. In 1494 it was thought that
Asia had been reached, and it appeared not improbable that Spain and
Portugal would come to blows over the limits of what we should now
call their respective spheres of influence. The two States appealed
to the Pope, Alexander VI., and he drew a line between them running
from pole to pole 100 miles to the west of the Cape de Verd Islands.
The decision of the arbitrator did not appear satisfactory to the
Portuguese, who would have been confined too closely to the coast
of Africa. They protested, and their protest was listened to by the
Catholic sovereigns, Isabel of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon. In
the year after the Pope had given his decision, a conference was held
at the town of Tordesillas, and it was then settled that the line of
demarcation should run 300 leagues to the west of the Azores and in
the corresponding meridian on the other side of the globe. In the
course of time, it was found that this decision had thrown by very
much the greater part of the two American continents into the share of
Spain. Other nations refused, indeed, to allow that the bull "Inter
cætera" gave Spain any exclusive rights. But the Spanish Government
was of another opinion. It abstained, indeed, from interfering with
the English settlements in New England and the French in Canada, which
were poor and distant. Its own weakness forced it so far to acquiesce
in what it could not prevent, but it never recognised the legitimacy of
foreign settlements; and whenever any of them approached those regions
where the Spanish rule was strong, they were liable to attack, even
when peace prevailed in Europe. The Spaniards, in fact, recognised no
peace beyond the line--that is to say, the line of demarcation from
north to south, and not, as is sometimes supposed, the equator.

Hence there arose a permanent condition of lawless violence in the
West Indies. By far the greater part of the islands, composing the
Greater and the Lesser Antilles, were not occupied by the Spaniards
at all. European adventurers were not to be debarred from settling in
unoccupied lands, by a mere decision of the Pope which they did not
recognise as valid. During the first half of the seventeenth century,
English, French, and Dutch had swarmed in to dispute these islands with
the Spaniard. The weakness of Spain made it impossible for her to keep
them out altogether. The early history of these settlements is obscure.
One very curious colony, founded by a Puritan company, of which Pym
was one of the directors, in the island of Old Providence on the coast
of Honduras, has left no trace except a few letter-books. Barbadoes
was peacefully occupied by Englishmen, and became rapidly prosperous.
Other English adventurers, some of them holding patents from the
king and others without, had settled in Antigua, Montserrat, Nevis,
and part of St. Kitts. The other part of St. Kitts was held by the
French. The Dutch also were in the West Indies, less as settlers than
as traders with the French and English. Yet, though these settlements
had increased and prospered, they were never quite safe from Spanish
attack. One great Spanish armament, under Don Fadrique de Toledo, had
swept the West Indies in 1629; other and minor attacks had been common.
The settlement in Old Providence, after many alarms and adventures, had
been finally exterminated at some time in the earlier stages of our
Civil War. It will be seen, then, that if the Spaniards were assailed
by Cromwell without formal declaration of hostilities in the New World,
the act was abundantly justified by Spanish precedents.

In 1654 the newly established Government was being urgently pressed
to send out just such an armament as was finally despatched. An
Englishman, of the name of Thomas Gage, the son of a family of English
Roman Catholics and strong Royalists, had published an exhortation
to his countrymen to fall upon Spanish America, and had revealed the
real weakness of the land in a book called the _New Survey of the
West Indies_, published in 1648, and very popular in the seventeenth
century. Gage, who had been a priest, and who then became converted,
and preached as a Puritan divine in England, was one of the very
few Englishmen for whom it had been possible to visit the Spanish
possessions. At the same time, some at least among the planters of
Barbadoes were urging the English Government to adopt an aggressive
policy, and were promising effectual support.

Under the stimulus of all these motives, the Protector's Government
organised this expedition in the summer and autumn of 1654. It was to
consist of 38 warships, carrying 1134 guns and 4380 seamen. A land
force of 3000 soldiers, divided into five regiments of 600 each, was
to be raised. The whole, when ready, was to sail for the West Indies,
and to begin hostilities with the Spaniards from the day it crossed
the tropic of Cancer. The orders given to the expedition, as was
commonly the case with the Council of State and Cromwell, were perfect
examples of what such things should be--at once absolutely precise
in prescribing the aim, and wisely large in defining the means to be
adopted. "We shall not," said the Protector, "tie you up to a method
by any particular instructions." The generals, in fact, were deprived
of every excuse for failure by being left free to choose the fittest
means. As for the object of the cruise, on that point there was no
doubt. They were to go over to the West Indies, firstly, to chastise
the French, who had been guilty of excesses against English trade;
secondly, to enforce the Navigation Laws against the Dutch, who had
been carrying on an interloping commerce with the English islands;
thirdly, and this was the main purpose of the armament, they were to
effect a settlement among the Spanish possessions. Where it was to
be made, they were themselves to judge on the spot, and according to
circumstances. They might land on the islands, taking Hispaniola by
preference, or, failing that, St. John, that is, San Juan de Puerto
Rico. Or, again, they might pass the islands and fall upon the mainland
somewhere between the mouth of the Orinoco and Porto Bello, that part
of South America commonly called the Spanish Main. A third course was
to attack both the islands and the mainland, but it was made abundantly
clear that the hands of those who were to be responsible for doing the
work were not to be tied by too precise instructions.

This was as it should have been, but all was not equally well with
the expedition. The leaders selected by Cromwell did not do honour
to his choice. Venables, the commander of the troops, must have done
something to make the Protector think him fit for the place, but on
this expedition he showed himself a feeble, pottering, uxorious man.
He took his wife with him, and appears to have been miserable when
separated from her company. Penn was undoubtedly a brave and skilful
seaman, but he wanted the intellectual resources and strength of
character required to make good the deficiencies of his colleague. The
weakness of the usurping Government is revealed by the action which
these two men, seemingly without any agreement with one another, took
during the summer. They both wrote to the exiled king, offering him
their services. At such a time, men who have not honour enough to
stand aside from a usurping Government, and who cannot serve it with
enthusiasm, are very likely to be found looking over their shoulders
for a safe retreat, and making friends with the enemy of the Government
of to-day, who may possibly be the ruler of to-morrow. Penn and
Venables offered to bring the whole armament over to King Charles if he
could find a port for them abroad. The king, who was totally unable to
comply with the condition, declined the offer. It throws an unpleasant
light on the character of Penn, that, immediately after he had been
making this offer to betray the master who trusted in him, he was found
appealing to the Protector for a grant of land in Ireland, which land,
as a matter of fact, was the confiscated property of the supporters
of the king. He and Venables did not work harmoniously together. They
had a squabble in England before they sailed, which was made up by the
exertions of friends, but probably left them on not very confidential
terms with one another. It was not only the inferiority of, and want of
harmony between, the leaders which was likely to militate against the
efficiency of the expedition. The victualling was ill done, probably
because of the poverty of the Government. A good part of the stores was
not ready in time, and had to be sent on later. A large portion of the
soldiers raised were of an inferior quality. Cromwell could not spare
the choice troops who were the support of his rule. The five regiments
were specially raised for the service, and they consisted mainly of
discharged soldiers of the king as well as of the Parliament. These
men had lost, or in many cases had never possessed, a true military
character. The number of 3000 provided for by the scheme was never
attained. The expedition did not carry more than 2500 men, of whom
perhaps half were more likely to be a hindrance than a help where
discipline was required.

On the 20th of December 1654 Rear-Admiral Dakins was sent on with
fourteen ships in advance. The bulk of the expedition sailed on
Christmas Day, which was probably chosen at least partly from a Puritan
desire to show disrespect for the feast. In mid-ocean the heavier
ships, which hampered the speed of the fleet, were left behind. Penn
and Venables pressed on with the better sailers. By the 29th January
1655 the whole armament was assembled in Carlisle Bay in Barbadoes.

The disappointments of the expedition began at once. It was found that
those planters who had been urging the Government to send a force into
the West Indies, and had promised effectual help, had spoken without
authority. The planters of Barbadoes were by no means generally pleased
at the appearance of an expedition from England. The generals were
authorised to raise a regiment in the island, and the planters were
afraid that if the freemen enlisted in large numbers, their "servants"
would revolt so soon as the armed force was gone. By servants must be
understood both the black slaves and those white men, criminals and
prisoners of war, who were bound to a term of service. Much pressure
had to be exercised before this opposition was overcome. It was at
last surmounted, and the regiment was raised. In the meantime the news
spread through the English islands. The swarm of loose adventurers
who filled them, the runaway "servants," sailors who had deserted
from their ships,--all the raw material, in fact, out of which the
formidable buccaneering body called the "Brethren of the Coast" was
afterwards formed,--began to collect in regiments, and were burning
to take part in the service, which seemed to promise plunder. Such
men as these, the floating population of the frontier, valiant in
pothouses, but feeble in battle, were of no real value for military
purposes. Yet they were accepted to the number of several thousands.
The expedition had unfortunately been put under the command of a
committee. In this Cromwell followed the practice of the Parliament,
and was perhaps influenced by the fear of putting too much power into
the hands of a single man. Not only Penn and Venables, but Goodson
the vice-admiral, Dakins the rear-admiral, two special Commissioners,
Winslow and Gregory Butler, together with some others, were joined in
the general command, and nothing was to be done without the consent
of three of them. The opinion of the wiser few, who would willingly
have dispensed with the riff-raff of the islands, was overborne, and
the expedition was hampered by an ill-armed, worse-disciplined, and
thoroughly untrustworthy mob. It is to be noted also that this distant
and unhealthy service in the West Indies was not popular with the
sailors. While at Carlisle Bay, the sea officers came in a body to Penn
and represented to him their hope that the hardships of their service
would be allowed for in their pay and prize-money. One good measure
that had been decided upon in England was here perfected. A regiment of
sailors was formed. It was put under the command of Admiral Goodson as
colonel, with naval officers to lead the companies.

Two months were spent at Barbadoes, which might have incomparably
better been employed in assailing the Spaniards before they were
ready. At last, on the 31st of March, the expedition got under way.
It proceeded by Antigua, Montserrat, Nevis, and St. Kitts to the
south-eastern end of Hispaniola, and appeared before the town of San
Domingo on the 13th of April. San Domingo stands on the western side
of a little river called the Ozama. It is in the middle of a large
bay, some twenty-eight miles broad and some ten miles deep. The coast
is low, rocky, and beaten by a formidable surf. Looked at from the
sea, the spray thrown up from the waves was like the smoke of cannon
fringing the beach. Close to the town on the west side was a fort. To
the west of the fort, and at a distance of some five miles from the
town, another river, called by the Spaniards Jaina, and by us Hina,
falls into the sea. When there is a dead calm, or a land breeze from
the north, it is possible to land here, but at other times the surf
is too dangerous for boats. These conditions made it necessary to
disembark the soldiers to westward and leeward of the town at some
distance. In the West Indies the trade wind, or true breeze, always
blows from the east. Beyond Cape Nisao, the western extremity of San
Domingo Bay, there are a few landing-places in the surf-beaten coast.
At one of these, perhaps Catalina Bay, Venables disembarked with the
bulk of the expedition on the 14th of April. In the meantime Penn
remained, with the greater part of the fleet and two regiments of
soldiers, in front of San Domingo. The object of retaining these two
corps was to land them at the mouth of the Jaina, to co-operate with
Venables when he had got so far. They had with them stores and scaling
ladders for the purpose of attacking the town.

The story of what came of these imposing preparations is happily all
but unparalleled in English history. Venables began his march on the
day after landing, in circumstances of the most lamentable kind, if he
is to be believed.

 "Our men, the last fortnight at sea, had bad bread, and little of it
 or other victuals, notwithstanding General Penn's order, so that they
 were very weak at landing; and some, instead of three days' provision
 at landing, had but one, with which they marched five days, and
 therefore fell to eat limes, oranges, lemons, &c., which put them into
 fluxes and fevers. Of the former, I had my share for near a fortnight,
 with cruel gripings that I could scarce stand."

In this dismal condition they struggled through the narrow paths which
traversed the dense tropical forest, without meeting more than a very
trifling resistance from the Spaniards. By the 16th they had reached
the Jaina. Here they remained until the 24th, engaged in what can
only be called pottering. General Venables came back to the flagship,
partly for the purpose of taking "a vomit," and partly in search of
his wife, who went with him when he returned to his post. Every kind
of difficulty as to provisions, scaling ladders, and powder united to
hamper the attack on the Spaniards. It does not appear that the men
were absolutely destitute of courage. On the 18th a portion of them
were roughly handled in an ambush, but they rallied well, and beat the
enemy back. The hardships of the service, of which the most intolerable
was thirst, did something to depress their spirits, but what worked
upon them most was unquestionably the discovery that they were being
led without energy or intelligence. First, the army advanced from the
Jaina to Fort Jerónimo. A vaunting attack, made without sufficient
means, was followed by a retreat to the former position. When at last,
on the 24th, the real attack was to be delivered, the troops, badly
armed, badly disciplined, and mostly of bad quality to start with, were
thoroughly ready for a panic.

On Wednesday the 25th the final attack on the Fort Jerónimo was to
be made. The troops advanced and met at first with no opposition.
They established themselves on the eastern side of the fort, where
no guns were mounted. An advance guard, called in the language of
the time a "Forlorn," was to open the attack, supported by a party
of "Reformadoes"--that is to say, officers belonging to corps which
had been suppressed or broken up and incorporated with others. Behind
them were the other regiments of the expedition. When the Forlorn was
close on the fort, and the attack just about to begin, a small body of
Spanish lancers, put by all the witnesses at some forty or fifty men,
fell suddenly upon the English. Their charge was directed against the
Forlorn, which fell suddenly and shamefully into disorder, and fled
headlong back on the Reformadoes. The Reformadoes, whose part it was
to have set an example to the army, were seized with a no less ignoble
spasm of terror. The Forlorn and the Reformadoes, mingled in confusion,
retreated upon the supporting regiments, which they infected with their
own cowardice. The whole mass gave way in flight, and retreated in all
the hubbub of an utter rout. Some of the officers did indeed behave
with the gallantry to be expected of English gentlemen. Haynes, the
major-general, the same officer who had co-operated with Blake in the
taking of the Channel Islands for the Parliament, broke out of the
mob of runaways, and, armed only with a small walking-sword, threw
himself in the path of a handful of Spanish lancers who were pressing
the pursuit. He was accompanied by an ensign named Blagg, who showed
the colours in the vain hope of rallying some support. But the example
of these brave men was lost on the terror-stricken rabble. Haynes
was borne to the ground and slain; Blagg tore his colours from the
staff, and, wrapping them round his body, fell down, and there died,
pierced with many wounds. The completeness of their success appears
to have taken the Spaniards entirely by surprise. They were a mere
handful, and, although they are said to have killed between three and
four hundred, they were not supported, and were easily repulsed when
some of the English were induced to make a stand. The corps to which
belongs the honour of saving the expedition from extermination was the
sailors' regiment commanded by Admiral Goodson. These men were no
doubt veterans of the Dutch war, who were hardened to perils. They let
the cowards pass, and then closed up to cover their retreat. So soon as
they were resolutely faced, the forty or fifty Spanish lancers, who had
hitherto "had the execution" of some thousands of Englishmen, fell back.

There were those among the English who believed that all was not
lost, and that a second attempt might be made with a fair prospect
of success. But the bulk of officers and men were completely cowed.
They could think of nothing except of hurrying back with the utmost
possible speed to the landing-place, and taking refuge in the ships.
The officers would not trust themselves with such men, and indeed the
spirit of the whole force was completely broken. While retreating
during the night, they were terrified at the noise made by the
land-crabs in the bush, and opened a wild fire right and left.

While the army was making this deplorable exhibition of itself, the
ships were parading to and fro in front of San Domingo, engaging at
odd moments in a languid artillery fire with the forts. Penn declared
that he could have easily destroyed Fort Jerónimo, and have swept the
sea-wall of the town. He excused his failure to act, by saying that his
colleagues would not agree. Venables, in particular, was opposed to the
destruction of Jerónimo, on the ground that it would be useful as a
hospital. It is not obvious, however, that Penn need have been deterred
by this from attacking the town. His conduct was certainly wanting in
enterprise, and the difference between him and his colleague seems to
be this, that whereas Venables did wrong, Penn did too little.

Having lost hundreds of men by the sword, and a still larger number by
the tropical diseases which were now raging, the unlucky expedition
cast about for some means of escaping the reproach of utter failure.
Some of the more poor-spirited among them were ready to return to
Barbadoes, and from thence to England. The majority, either because
they possessed more courage, or because, however much they feared
the enemy and the climate, they dreaded Oliver Cromwell still more,
were resolved to make a last effort before returning empty-handed. A
compensation which was easily to be secured lay ready to their hands.
The island of Jamaica is almost due west of the west end of the island
of San Domingo, at a distance of about a hundred miles. Gage, the
author of the _Survey of the West Indies_, was with Venables, and he,
with the English planters from Barbadoes and St. Kitts, could easily
inform the generals that the island was almost uninhabited, and would
be an easy prize. On the 4th of May, Penn and Venables left the bay of
San Domingo, and on the 10th appeared before the Spanish town on the
south side of Jamaica. Here, fortunately for them, perhaps, there was
no opposition. The population, in fact, was very small, hardly able to
beat off a considerable raid of pirates. The town was occupied after a
mere show of resistance on the 9th, 10th, and 12th of May. The Spanish
governor made his submission at once. His countrymen, with greater
spirit, deserted the town and took refuge in the hills.

Having now at last done something, the English leaders hastened to
deprive themselves personally of all credit by deserting their command
and running back to England. The early history of Jamaica is a very
painful one, and need not be told here. Perhaps the moral of it all
is best given by a witness who wrote after the Restoration of Charles
II. He reported that when the Spaniards saw how fast the English died,
they were surprised, but that, when they learned how much they drank,
they were surprised that any of them lived. The military and naval
leaders squabbled, and the soldiers and sailors fought. At last it
was decided that Penn should return to England with the bulk of the
fleet, leaving Goodson with twelve of the lighter vessels. He sailed
on the 25th of June, returning home by the western end of Cuba and the
Florida Channel. One English vessel, the =Discovery=, had been blown
up by accident at Jamaica. On the way another disaster occurred. The
=Paragon=, which had been Badiley's ship in the Mediterranean, caught
fire and blew up, with the loss of a hundred lives. Penn returned to
England in a very intelligibly dismal state of mind. He was inclined
to see the hand of the Lord visiting the sins of the expedition, and
something he referred to mysteriously as the "sin in England," on the
men of little faith about him. He was also visibly nervous as to the
reception it was likely he would meet with from the Protector, and
began garrulously excusing himself before he reached home. It was not
without cause that he, and possibly his colleague Venables, of whom we
have less evidence, looked forward to facing Oliver Cromwell. The old
explanation of the Protector's anger, that he punished the generals for
taking Jamaica when they were ordered to take San Domingo, was given in
ignorance of their instructions; but he had good cause to be angry with
them, both for the incapacity displayed at San Domingo, and for their
hasty desertion of their conquest of Jamaica. As his spy service was
both watchful and efficient, it is at least possible that Cromwell had
warning of their letters to the king. They reached England on the 31st
August, anchoring at Spithead. Within a fortnight they were both in the
Tower, on the recommendation of the Protector's Council. They did not
escape from this till they had made abject submission. Penn retired
to the estate which he had begged for himself out of the confiscated
property of the king's friends in Ireland, and was no more employed
during Oliver Cromwell's life.

Goodson remained at Jamaica for nearly two years, prosecuting the war
with Spain. The smallness of the force left under his command made
it impossible for him to undertake operations on a great scale. In
truth, what he did bore a very close resemblance to the piratical
warfare afterwards carried on by the buccaneers. He sailed twice to
the Spanish Main, burning and plundering small towns, taking water
and provisions at unfortified places, but attempting nothing against
the great port of Carthagena. To some among the English officers at
Jamaica this method of conducting hostilities was not acceptable. They
thought it piratical, and unworthy of a great State; but it was all
Goodson could do, and it served a useful purpose. The first two years
of our establishment in Jamaica were times of miserable weakness and
suffering. The governors died one after the other, and the ranks of
their followers were terribly thinned by fever. If during this interval
a vigorous attack had been made by the Spaniards, who were acclimatised
and expert in bush fighting, it is not impossible that we should have
lost the island. The presence of Goodson's ships and his activity
warded off this danger, and it is partly to him, therefore, that we
must attribute the merit of retaining this colonial possession.

Before the fleet under Penn left to undergo its varied fortunes in
the West Indies, another naval armament had sailed from England under
the command of Robert Blake. It started somewhat earlier than the
expedition directed against the West Indies--on the 29th September.
Blake's orders were ultimately to attack the Spaniards, but the
time for hostilities against them in Europe had not yet come. In
the interval there was plenty for an English admiral to do in the
Mediterranean. In the first place, he had, in the modern phrase,
"to show the flag"--that is to say, to let foreign nations see that
England was mistress of a naval force capable of extorting respect.
Then the Protector had inherited from the Council of State a number
of diplomatic disputes with the Italian princes. The presence of a
powerful English fleet in the Mediterranean was likely to add material
weight to the expostulations of his diplomatists. Blake worked his
way slowly along the Spanish and Italian coasts of the Mediterranean,
and was everywhere treated with deference. There is a story that at
Malaga he gave the Spaniards a proof that the ruler of England did not
bear the sword in vain for the defence of his subjects. It is said
that an English sailor who was on shore on leave displayed his Puritan
sentiments by insulting the host. For this he was maltreated by the
mob, on the instigation of a friar. Blake, so the story goes, insisted
on the punishment of the ecclesiastic, and was told by the governor
that he had no power to punish churchmen, which, if it was ever
said, was untrue. Upon this, the English admiral threatened to open
fire unless the friar was given up to him. His threat and the ocular
demonstration they had of his strength brought the Spanish authorities
to reason. The friar was sent on board, presumably expecting and,
if he was a fanatic, hoping for martyrdom. Blake, however, confined
himself to rebuking the over-zealous friar, and declaring that he would
make the English name as much respected as ever was that of a Roman
citizen. There is nothing improbable in the story, which, however,
rests solely on the authority of Bishop Burnet. Whatever may be the
accuracy of this anecdote, it is beyond question that Blake's mission
was to make the name of Englishmen respected in the Mediterranean,
and that it was fulfilled. The Italian princes found that delay would
no longer be tolerated. Their disputes with the English Government
were wound up. A naval power is not limited in its influence, as the
strongest of merely military powers must needs be. The States around
the Mediterranean might have despised the menace of the New Model Army,
which was no doubt capable of marching all through Italy, if only it
could have got so far; but a fleet can make the power of the State felt
wherever ships can go. Cromwell's menaces were formidable to the very
extremities of the Mediterranean.

In that sea there was one duty to be discharged which the English Navy
had been forced to neglect for too long. The pirates of the Barbary
States had long been a pest and a menace to the commerce of Europe, and
even to the coasts of Christian States. Within the Mediterranean nobody
had yet seriously undertaken to break their power. It is true that
they no longer operated in great fleets, as they had done in the days
of Barbarossa. The age of the pirate admirals had been succeeded by
that of the Raises, or pirate captains, but they were still formidable
to commerce, if they attempted no longer to capture towns and conquer
territory. The growing English trade in the Mediterranean suffered
from them severely. When the Church of England included a prayer for
prisoners and captives in her Litany, the words had a significance
they no longer bear. In 1620 the ridiculously feeble effort already
recorded, to check this disgraceful infliction, had been made with no
better result than to convince these Mohammedan sea rovers that England
was not formidable. It was necessary to bring them to a sounder view
of the facts, and this was one part of the task entrusted to Blake.

After passing along the coasts of Spain and Italy, Blake went on to
discharge this part of his duties. He first sailed over to Algiers
in March and opened negotiations. It was his purpose to secure his
object--the release of English captives and some security for the
exemption of English ships from capture in future--without fighting, if
possible. The Barbary States were still nominally part of the dominions
of the Sultan, and there was always a chance that severe measures taken
at their expense might provoke retaliation on the servants and property
of the Levant Company at Smyrna and Scanderoon. At Algiers, then, Blake
attempted peaceful negotiations with the Dey, and even exerted himself
on his behalf with the Grand Master of the Knights of St. John. The Dey
was obstinate, or, as he habitually lived in terror of the piratical
portion of his subjects, it would perhaps be more accurate to say that
he did not dare to make such an arrangement as Blake demanded. Still
the English admiral held his hand. Before taking hostile measures at
Algiers, he decided to pay a visit to the less formidable piratical
town of Tunis. The Dey of this other town of plunderers was not less
unreasonable, and by this time Blake's patience was exhausted. After
returning for a few days to Trapani in Sicily, he came back and fell
upon the pirate ships. Tunis was strong, and the Dey believed it to
be unattackable. It lies at the very bottom of the deep gulf between
Cape Farina and Cape Bon. The approach was protected by the forts of
Farina and Goletta, famous in the wars of Charles V. and Philip II. The
pirate galleys had been hauled under the guns of these fortifications,
and their owners might with some show of reason believe them safe,
but they had never yet been attacked in the style adopted by Blake.
On the 4th of April 1655 (just one month, be it noted for purposes
of comparison, before Penn and Venables sailed away from San Domingo
shamefully beaten) the English admiral stood in and opened fire on the
Tunisian ships. The forts proved very ineffectual, and the fire of the
vessels was soon silenced. Then the English took to their boats and
boarded. They were quickly masters of the prizes, and lost no time in
burning them. From Tunis Blake went first to Tripoli, and then came
back to Algiers. In these places satisfactory arrangements were at last
made. The Orientals had, in fact, discovered that the moderation of the
English admiral was not due to fear or weakness, and they at once bowed
to force. Blake's conduct was approved by Cromwell, and he was now free
to proceed to the execution of the last part of his duty.

The alliance with France was in the meantime maturing. There was no
longer any reason for delaying an open declaration of hostilities
against Spain. On the contrary, as Penn and Venables had had time to
develop their attack on the West Indies, it was very desirable that
the Spaniards should be prevented from sending reinforcements, and
this could be most effectually done by compelling them to stand on
guard at home. Blake was therefore ordered to cruise off Cadiz, for the
double purpose of intercepting the treasure-ships on their way back
from America and of preventing the despatch of a Spanish squadron to
the West Indies. The blockade was so far successful that the Spaniards
were paralysed, but no prizes were taken, and by the approach of autumn
the English ships were severely strained. In October Blake returned to
England. The war with Spain had not as yet been prosecuted with very
triumphant success. The failure at San Domingo was a huge disgrace,
hardly balanced in the opinion of the world by the capture of Jamaica.
The successful blockade of Cadiz, though it must have caused great loss
to the enemy, had not produced those visible results in the way of
prizes and bullion which the nation could understand. But Cromwell was
resolved to persevere.

In 1656 Blake returned to the coast of Spain. On this cruise he was
accompanied by Edward Montagu, afterwards the first Earl of Sandwich,
and their object was again to capture the much-desired Plate Fleet.
This year they had a better chance of success. In 1655 the Spanish
Government had stopped the vessels, but it was now in such dire need
of money that it was compelled to run the risk of bringing them home.
In summer a first detachment reached the neighbourhood of Cadiz, only
to fall into the hands of the English blockading fleet. Blake and
Montagu were not present at the capture, for they had retired to the
friendly ports of Portugal to refit, but a squadron had been left to
watch the port, under the command of Richard Stayner. It proved amply
sufficient for the work to be done. The Spanish treasure-ships, though
of great bulk for the time, were intrinsically very feeble, and their
decks were hampered by merchandise. Stayner burned or captured nearly
the whole, with a very trifling loss to himself. The bullion and goods
taken amounted in value to nearly the revenue of England for a year--to
over two millions sterling. Montagu returned to England with the booty,
taking Stayner with him. Although the great sugar-loaves of silver
were pillaged by the sailors, there was enough left to load thirty
waggons, which were driven through London to the Tower, to the general
gratification of the Protector's subjects.

Blake in the meanwhile remained outside of Cadiz during the autumn
and winter, till the spring of 1657, waiting for the next instalment
of the Plate Fleet. It was an unheard-of thing at that time to keep a
fleet out for the winter. Even now the heavier vessels had been sent
home with Montagu and Stayner, but the persistence of the others in
remaining abroad shows that our navy was increasing in seaworthiness
and hardihood. In the April of 1657 Blake was rewarded for his
perseverance by learning that a large Spanish squadron carrying
treasure had taken refuge at Santa Cruz de Tenerife.

To attack them in this port was in the general opinion an enterprise
of the utmost hazard. The bay of Santa Cruz is deep and the island
hilly, therefore the harbour is perpetually liable either to be in a
dead calm, or to be swept by the violent gusts of wind off the land.
These natural obstacles made entrance difficult for a fleet. And Santa
Cruz was in addition very powerfully fortified. So strong, in fact,
had art and nature made the harbour, that the Spaniards considered
a successful attack impossible, and Blake's contemporaries looked
upon his triumph as an unheard-of achievement of daring. Yet the
Commonwealth admiral, like so many other men of strong mind, showed
his strength by despising the vain appearance of force. He estimated
the inefficiency of the Spaniards at its true value. Moreover, he saw
that the forts, if attacked closely, would probably fail to stop the
entry of a fleet running before a good breeze and borne on a rising
tide. Once in the harbour, and in the midst of the Spanish vessels, he
would be comparatively safe, since they would mask the fire of the guns
on shore. With the turn of the tide, aided, as it was very likely to
be, by one of the common winds off the land, he would be able to secure
his retreat. No doubt there was an appreciable risk, as there always
must be in the serious operations of war. But it was one a bold man
commanding an effective fighting force could run without temerity.

The attack was made on the 20th of April, in the early hours of the
morning. The fleet had sighted the harbour by daybreak, and the
look-out frigates had reported that the Spanish ships were still in the
bay. The decision to attack was taken at once, and the English fleet
stood in. The result fully justified the calculations we may suppose
Blake to have made. The English ships ran past the forts with little
or no damage. They were in the midst of the Spanish ships and in hot
action by eight o'clock. The Spanish galleons were as ill fitted for
war as the vessels taken outside of Cadiz. Though the English remained
in the bay while daylight lasted, they lost only 50 killed and 120
wounded, while none of the ships received more damage than could be
made good at sea in a few days' work. The fate of the Spaniards was
very different. By seven in the evening they were all sunk, driven on
shore, or set on fire. When the work was thoroughly done, the English
prepared to drift out on the ebb-tide. By this time daylight must have
been over, and in the dusk and following darkness they would probably
in any case have passed the forts with very little injury. But by one