probably Poland and Sweden, against Russia, Austria, and Spain, with
possibly Denmark. France had for a time been thought of as a fourth
member of the proposed alliance between Spain and the imperial courts,
but the disturbances in that country had, for the present, made her
almost a negligible quantity.

The conference at Reichenbach, which closed in August, affected
materially the state of Europe. The pacific efforts of England and the
Dutch Republic had already succeeded in curbing somewhat the warlike
passions of Prussia, and at this conference won a further triumph for
the peace principle by inducing Leopold of Austria to make peace with
Turkey. But Russia still persisted for a time in her war with the
Porte, and the English-Spanish dispute over Nootka Sound was almost as
far from settlement as ever.[349]

CHAPTER X.

AMERICA’S RELATIONS TO THE CONTROVERSY.

Attention was called above to the repeated conferences between Pitt
and the South American agitator, Miranda. The fact was pointed out
that these conferences occurred at the critical periods of the
English-Spanish negotiations.[350] To repeat briefly: The first was on
February 14, just after the receipt of the first Spanish communication
on the Nootka affair, and before the British Court had formulated
its reply. Miranda had previously proposed his “grand plan” for the
advantage of England united with South America. At this conference
the plan was admitted to be beneficial. It was decided that it should
be put into execution in case of a war with Spain. In consequence of
Pitt’s request, Miranda presented, some three weeks later, a written
statement of the commercial and military resources of South America.
Again, on May 6, when the war excitement in London was at its highest,
the great minister and the South American had a conference on the same
subject. Pitt was on his way to a cabinet council and was taking with
him for consideration at the council the papers which Miranda had
presented. Grenville was present at the interview. The conversation was
on the prospect of war with Spain, and on the disposition of the people
of South America toward joining England in order to gain independence.
Various interviews took place at Pitt’s house while the Spanish
negotiations were in progress.[351]

At some time during the year Miranda’s plan was presented in the form
of a draft of a constitution for the Spanish-American colonies after
they should have gained their independence. The proposed new empire
was to include all of South America, except Brazil and Guiana, and the
portion of North America west of the Mississippi River and south of the
forty-fifth parallel. Cuba was to be included as the key to the Gulf of
Mexico. The government was to be modeled in a general way on that of
Great Britain. The executive power was to be lodged in an inca, under
the title of “emperor,” with hereditary succession. The upper chamber
was to be composed of members nominated for life by the inca. Further
details of the government were worked out.[352] Miranda reminded Pitt
that the latter had seemed pleased with his ideas and had asked him to
leave the draft for further perusal. Plans for carrying on the war were
discussed, and the most favorable point for attack in South America was
considered. Means were devised for enlisting the interest of Jesuits
in Italy who were natives of South America and had been exiled by the
King of Spain. Accounts of recent insurrections in Spanish America were
given to show how ready the people were for emancipation. Later, a
detailed plan of attack was presented, with maps to illustrate it. At
Pitt’s request a plan of the defenses of Havana was left with him.

This shows what extended plans the British Cabinet was considering.
It was to be expected that England would persist in her demands, for
if Spain would not yield there was much to expect from a war. Secret
agents at various places in America were collecting information
looking toward military operations to carry out these schemes. Besides
the overtures to the United States through Canada, to be discussed
presently, there were secret emissaries at Charleston and New York, and
information was being collected concerning New Orleans, the Floridas,
and the Mississippi country. The feasibility of marching troops from
New Orleans to Mexico was considered, and reports were made by men
who were familiar with the country. Some of the secret employees were
enthusiastic over the possibility of making a great English colony
out of the Floridas and the Mississippi Valley. Agents of the Creek
and Cherokee Indians were negotiating for a friendly connection with
England. The plan, as far as it had taken shape, seems to have been for
England to seize the heart of North America for herself and erect the
remainder of Spanish America into a client state.[353]

As mentioned above, the British Cabinet sent instructions on May 6 to
Lord Dorchester, the governor of Canada.[354] He had intended to visit
England during the summer, but was requested to remain and prepare for
the impending struggle. Besides strengthening his own dominions he was
to make friendly overtures to the United States.[355] In consequence
of these orders Lord Dorchester gave instructions on June 27 to Major
Beckwith, whom he had selected as the medium through which these
overtures should be made. Beckwith was given double instructions. The
one set was to guide his conversations in discussing public questions
in a general way. The other was secret and for his private guidance.
In the first he was instructed to say that the appearance of war with
Spain rendered it improbable that Dorchester would obtain his expected
leave of absence that season. He was to return hearty thanks for the
friendly approbation of Dorchester’s proposed trip through the United
States on his way to England. He was to express the hope that the
appearance of a war with Spain, or even its actual occurrence, would
not alter the friendly disposition of the United States toward Great
Britain. He was to mention the pretensions of Spain to absolute control
over navigation, commerce, and fisheries in the Pacific Ocean, and
discuss the evil effect on the United States if such control should
be conceded. These things he might say freely and publicly. But his
secret instructions were to guide him in conversing with those whom he
might select as proper persons in whom to confide. From them he was to
learn the disposition of the Government and the people toward England
if the affair with Spain were not considered. Then he was to discover
what difference a war with that country might make. He was to ascertain
whether in case war should occur they would be likely to join Spain,
and also to find what might induce them to join Great Britain in such
an event. In discussing the Mississippi question he was to be cautious,
but might suggest that England would probably assist in obtaining its
navigation. Naval and military movements should be watched.[356]

Dorchester reported to the home office, on July 7, that Beckwith had
been hastily sent back to New York.[357] The latter did not have
to wait long to find the right man to converse with on the matter
contained in his secret instructions. On July 8, Hamilton, the
Secretary of the Treasury, made a memorandum giving the substance of a
communication from him. The major had spoken of the expected rupture
and had observed that all commercial nations must favor the views of
England.

    It was therefore presumed, should a war take place, that the United
    States would find it to their interest to take part with Great
    Britain rather than with Spain.[358]

It seems that Hamilton communicated the matter to the President at
once, for in a letter reporting a later conversation with Beckwith he
says:

    I have made the proper use of what you said to me at our last
    Interview [July 8].[359]

Under date of July 12, Jefferson, the Secretary of State, prepared a
paper entitled, “Heads of a consideration on the conduct we are to
observe in the war between Spain and Great Britain, and particularly
should the latter attempt the conquest of Louisiana and the Floridas.”
As one would expect, Jefferson inclined toward Spain rather than
England. He brought out the danger to the United States if England
should get control of New Orleans and the neighboring territory. He
suggested the idea of joining Spain in guaranteeing the independence
of these countries instead of allowing Great Britain to take them. The
paper seems to have been prepared to serve as a guide in an approaching
interview with the Canadian agent, for he says, “As to England, say
to Beckwith,” etc.,[360] then gives the substance of what Hamilton
reported as having been said to that gentleman in an interview of July
22, at which Jefferson was present.

In this interview the fact was brought to light that Beckwith was not
an authorized British agent, but that he had been sent by Dorchester
with the knowledge of the British Cabinet. Owing to his unofficial
character nothing of importance passed, but he was told that the United
States was ready to answer when it should be presented in an official
form. Hamilton had said that, at the time, he--

    would not mean either to raise or repress expectations. … Something
    was said respecting the probable course of military operations in
    case of a war between Britain and Spain, which Mr. Beckwith supposed
    would be directed toward South America, alleging, however, that this
    was mere conjecture on his part. I hinted cautiously our dislike of
    any attempt on New Orleans.

Hamilton added in a note:

    The views of the Government were to discard suspicion that any
    engagements with Spain or intentions hostile to Great Britain
    existed; to leave the ground in other respects vague and open, so as
    that in case of a rupture between Great Britain and Spain the United
    States ought to be in the best situation to turn it to account in
    reference to the disputes between them and Great Britain on the one
    hand and Spain on the other.[361]

Beckwith reported to Dorchester that Hamilton had said:

    We are perfectly unconnected with Spain, have even some points
    unadjusted with that Court, and are prepared to go into a
    consideration of the subject.[362]

Scott, a member of the House of Representatives from western
Pennsylvania, told Beckwith that the prospect for a rupture made
most forcible impressions on all classes in the States. There was a
deep interest, he said, in the prospect of England’s possessing New
Orleans. The possible dismemberment of South America and the opening of
commerce with that continent was of interest, as well as the question
of navigation, commerce, and fisheries in the Pacific. He thought that
the moment was very favorable for England; and he saw no reason why the
United States should not assist her.[363] After news of the declaration
and counter declaration, signed at Madrid July 24, reached America,
Beckwith reported general dissatisfaction in the United States at the
prospect of pacification. Agricultural interests had expected that
the war would bring them high prices, and the shipping interests were
expecting a share in the English carrying trade and hoped for free
commerce with the Spanish West Indies. Friends of England thought that
she ought to take the opportunity for ruining the Spanish marine, which
they imagined to be an easy matter. British possession of New Orleans
was expected and desired, except by the Government which hoped to gain
from a neutral position when the settlement should come. At the same
time he reported another conversation with Hamilton. The Secretary had
said:

    We consider ourselves at perfect liberty to act with respect to
    Spain in any way most conducive to our interests, even to the going
    to war with that power, if we shall think it advisable to join
    you.[364]

These reports were doubtless colored by the desire of the Canadian
agent to send as favorable news as possible; but after allowing for
the exaggerations and the distortion of facts that would naturally be
expected, enough remains to show that the prospect of war was common
talk and that it was not altogether undesired. They also point to the
well-known fact that England had many friends in the United States and
some even in the highest official circles.

While Beckwith was holding these unofficial conferences with American
statesmen President Washington and his advisers were considering
what measures the Government should take in the event of hostilities
breaking out. Between the time of Beckwith’s first interview with
Hamilton and that of the more formal conference a fortnight later in
Jefferson’s presence the latter had written to Monroe concerning the
matter. He said that a war between England and Spain was probable.
Symptoms indicated a general design on Louisiana and the Floridas.
He spoke of the unpleasant position of the United States if England
should obtain them. Both England and Spain, he said, ought to know that
this country was in a condition for war.[365] Late in August President
Washington wrote concerning the matter to his chief advisers. He
thought that if Great Britain and Spain should come to arms New Orleans
and the Spanish posts on the Mississippi would be the first objective
point of the former. He asked what the answer to Lord Dorchester
should be in case he should request permission to march troops from
Detroit across the territory of the United States against the Spanish
posts, or in case it should be attempted without leave, which was most
probable.[366]

On the day after that on which the President’s letter was written
Jefferson answered it. He thought that the United States should keep
out of the war as long as possible. If Lord Dorchester should make the
expected demand, it should either be silently ignored, or, if granted,
the same privilege ought to be offered to Spain. If the march should
be attempted without permission, the United States should allow it,
but protest against it, holding off from actual hostilities as long as
possible.[367]

On the same day Chief Justice Jay answered the President’s question.
He considered, first, what the United States had a right to do from
the standpoint of international law, and, secondly, what was expedient
under the circumstances. Under the first head he concluded that,
except in cases of absolute necessity, or those in which it could be
shown that passage would be entirely innocent, the right of dominion
involved the right of excluding foreigners. Under the second head
he said that the probability of their being restrained by a refusal
ought to be considered. If they would probably proceed anyway, it
would be most prudent, he concluded, to consent. However, he added,
these remarks retain little force when applied to leading troops from
posts in the actual possession of England through territory under
English jurisdiction, though both the posts and the territory, of
right, belong to the United States. He admitted that it would militate
against the interests of the United States to have England occupy the
Spanish territories in question. The extent to which the principles of
the balance of power were applicable to the case in hand would merit
serious inquiry, he remarked, if the United States had only to consider
what might be right and just. But since the condition of the country
strongly recommended peace, and since it would be more prudent to allow
Great Britain to conquer and hold the Floridas than to engage in war to
prevent it, such inquiries would be premature.[368]

On the second day after the President wrote, Vice-President Adams gave
his opinion. He said that the interests of the United States pointed to
neutrality as long as practicable. To preserve neutrality every wrong
must be avoided. Granting to England the privilege in question would
be an offense against Spain. Therefore, if asked, the answer should
be a refusal. If the measure should be undertaken without leave there
were two methods of procedure--the one was war; the other, negotiation.
Nations, he said, are not obliged to declare war for every injury
or even hostility; but tacit acquiescence would be misinterpreted.
Negotiation, then, was the only alternative. The fact that there had
been no exchange of ministers with England made this difficult. A
remonstrance might be made in either of two ways. It might be handed
by the American representative at Paris, Madrid, or The Hague to the
British ambassador at the same place, or a special messenger might be
sent to London to demand an audience, make remonstrance, and then take
his leave shortly if a minister were not sent to the United States.[369]

Knox, the Secretary of War, sent his advice on the same day as the
Vice-President. He mentioned the danger to the United States if England
should get the Mississippi Valley. The true interests of the country
dictated neutrality. Spain, he said, would not enter the war unless
supported by France, and such support was not unexpected. If it should
be given, France would attempt to associate the United States with her
in the war. One of the parties might offer sufficient inducement to the
United States to enter the war, or they might be obliged to enter the
war on their own account to avert a greater evil.[370]

More than two weeks later Hamilton sent a long discussion of the
question from the standpoint of national right and from the standpoint
of expediency. He concluded that if Great Britain should ask the
privilege, it would be best for the United States to agree to it and
then explain the matter to Spain. If troops should be marched across
without consent having been asked, it would be a cause of war and would
have to be resented or a great national humiliation borne. Hostilities,
he thought, should be delayed as long as possible.[371]

While these precautionary measures were being considered by the
Government at New York, instructions were being sent to the American
diplomatic agents in Europe to guide them in case of a breach between
England and Spain. On August 11 Jefferson wrote instructions for Col.
David Humphreys, whom he was sending to Europe as a secret agent of
the United States. Humphreys was to go first to London, where he
should deliver instructions to Morris, the American informal agent at
that place. After delivering these he was to proceed by way of Lisbon
to Madrid, where he should deliver instructions to Carmichael, the
American chargé at the Spanish Court.[372]

Morris had been watching the progress of the dispute between England
and Spain and had been in close touch and sympathy with French
representatives.[373] The letter which Humphreys carried instructed
Morris to intimate to the British Court in case of war that the United
States could not be indifferent to the prospect of England’s acquiring
territory in the adjoining Spanish possessions. The American Government
would contemplate a change of neighbors with extreme uneasiness. Due
balance on their borders was not less desirable to Americans than the
balance of power in Europe was to Englishmen. Jefferson wrote: “We wish
to be neutral, and we will be so if they will execute the treaty fairly
and attempt no conquests adjoining us.” Other dominions of Spain, he
declared, left them room for conquests. “If war takes place, we would
really wish to be quieted on these two points, offering in return an
honorable neutrality. More than this they are not to expect.”

This was to be communicated only in the event of war having actually
taken place.[374] Without waiting for America to broach the subject,
the Duke of Leeds had sounded Morris on the American attitude toward
the extravagant claims of Spain. The latter answered carelessly without
giving any real information. He said that Spain was apprehensive of the
Americans and would sacrifice for their friendship. He intimated that
the navigation of the Mississippi might be offered.[375] A report was
current in London that Spain had actually made this concession to the
United States.[376]

Jefferson was planning to use French mediation to secure from Spain the
opening of the Mississippi. He instructed Short, the American chargé at
Paris, to make advances for this purpose through Lafayette if war had
begun or whenever it should begin. France, he said, would be drawn into
the war only as an ally, hence she might reasonably insist that Spain
should do all in her power to keep the United States from the ranks of
the enemy.[377]

In his instructions to Carmichael Jefferson suggested that, in case
of war, the people of Louisiana and Florida would favor England. He
also suggested that it would be best for both countries if Spain
would cede the Floridas and New Orleans to the United States in
return for a guaranty of the Spanish possessions on the west bank of
the Mississippi. These matters were being pressed warmly and firmly,
the Secretary said, under the idea that the war between Spain and
Great Britain would be begun before Carmichael could receive these
instructions, and such an opportunity must not be lost.[378] As stated
in the previous chapter, Fitzherbert believed that Spain had made
friendly overtures to the United States, but thought also that they
would not be cordially received. The Spanish representative at New York
presented a letter to President Washington on August 3 which doubtless
contained the overtures to which Fitzherbert referred.[379] Very late
in the negotiations Short thought that the Spanish ambassador at Paris
was about to offer through him a concession of territory to the United
States, but the conversation was interrupted before it reached the
vital point.[380]

Humphreys delivered Jefferson’s instructions to Carmichael late in the
year. Carmichael thought that America might have obtained all of her
wishes if the Secretary’s letters had arrived early in the summer. At
that time--

    The critical state of affairs induced the Comte de Floridablanca
    to throw out those general assertions that we should have no
    reason to complain of the conduct of this Court with respect to
    the Mississippi, which gave rise to the report its navigation
    was opened. That minister had intimations from del Campo of the
    conferences between Mr. Morris and the Duke of Leeds, which
    occasioned him to say with warmth to Mr. Carmichael, “Now is the
    time to make a treaty with England.” Fitzherbert availed himself of
    these conferences to create apprehensions that the Americans would
    aid his nation in case of war.[381]

The circumstances studied in this chapter show that plans were being
formed which, if they had been carried out, would have profoundly
altered the subsequent development of the United States. They show
also that the attitude of the United States was looked upon as of
considerable importance, and influenced to a certain extent the
counsels of both of the contending parties. Incidentally it is seen
that the controversy afforded an opportunity for expressions of the
attitude of the American Government toward encroachment of European
nations on American soil. In the above quotations from Jefferson’s
letters may be found a very good statement of the principles that later
became known as The Monroe Doctrine.

CHAPTER XI.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE FAMILY COMPACT--EFFECT ON THE NEGOTIATION.

The decree of the National Assembly, in May, ordering the armament of
14 vessels of the line has been studied in a former chapter. Attention
was there called to the fact that this step was taken before Spain had
made a formal demand for assistance under the family compact. It was
also noted that the formal demand was made in the middle of June, but
that the King, fearing the consequences, had delayed laying the matter
before the Assembly.[382] On August 2, more than six weeks later, a
letter from Montmorin informed the Assembly that Spain had demanded
in the most positive manner the execution of treaties in case the
negotiation with England did not turn out as desired. The King, hoping,
for a speedy settlement, had thought it wise to defer provoking a
discussion of the matter in the National Assembly; but in view of the
continued preparations of England he could delay no longer. Therefore
he had charged the writer to warn the Assembly and thought that it
would be prudent to increase the French armament. He laid before the
Assembly the letter of the Spanish ambassador of June 16, with copies
of the letters and documents accompanying it, recounting the history
of the dispute and the negotiations to the time when it was written.
The minister asked the Assembly to deliberate on the demand of the
Court of Madrid. All of the documents were referred to the diplomatic
committee.[383]

On the next day, August 3, another letter from Montmorin notified the
Assembly that a courier from Madrid had brought news of the signature
of a declaration and counter declaration that gave hope of an amicable
settlement. Great applause greeted the announcement. The letter and
declarations were referred to the diplomatic committee. Dupont de
Nemours then announced that he had some observations to present on
the treaty with Spain known as the “family compact;” but to save the
valuable time of the Assembly he would bring them to the attention of
the Deputies by having them printed. Another Deputy announced that
he also would present some remarks on the Spanish demand in the same
manner.

Dupont, in his observations on the treaty, first announced the
principles on which he proposed to examine it. It had been made, he
said, thirty years before, when political philosophy had made scarcely
any progress. It was antiquated and inconsistent in some respects, but
these defects did not prevent its being just and salutary in principle.
Some, he said, wished to break the treaty and abandon our allies, but
reason, common sense, and honor point to the contrary--that we should
confirm it. He declared that defensive and commercial arrangements
ought to be kept, but anything involving offensive warfare ought
to be struck out. He thought that it ought to be so modified that
instead of a family it would be a national compact. Wherever the word
“crown” occurred he would substitute the word “nation,” and instead of
“the Kings agree,” etc., he would have it read “the nations (through
their Kings).” He examined the treaty article by article and measured
each by these standards. Most of the stipulations he would preserve,
with slight modifications; a few he would strike out entirely. The
stipulation which provided that the mere requisition should be
sufficient to establish the obligation of the nation called upon to
furnish the aid was wholly untenable, he declared. The need should be
first established, and the nation called upon should have the right of
judging. Instead of limiting the alliance to the House of Bourbon, he
thought that all nations having similar sentiments ought to be admitted.

The other Deputy, who presented the observations on the Spanish demand,
declared that Spain had been a faithful ally. She had taken up a
failing cause in 1761 and shared in the unhappy sacrifices of two years
later. She had aided in the American Revolution and had prepared to
assist in the trouble with the Netherlands in 1787. Gratitude would
command France to reciprocate; but he wished to appeal to reason and
not to sentiment. Spain and France were natural allies because of
common interests. The treaty of 1761, no longer a family but a national
compact, offered many advantages. Spain was still the most important
outlet for French commerce. France had profited more from the alliance
than Spain, hence was indebted to her. The financial embarrassment at
the time was serious, and a war would be dangerous, but even this ought
not to cause France to sacrifice honor. He thought that the armaments
ought to be continued and all the forces of France ought to be offered
to Spain. If this should be done, England would probably give way. The
war, if it should come, ought to have the support of all France and be
waged on new and noble principles.[384]

It was more than three weeks before the diplomatic committee was ready
to report. The principal member of the committee was Mirabeau. He was
spokesman when the report was presented to the Assembly on August 25.
He began by saying that the peace was not likely to be disturbed;
that the territory in dispute between Spain and England belonged to
neither, but to the natives; that it was not worth the loss of blood
and treasure; that France, because of internal conditions, ought to
avoid war; and that there would soon be universal peace and no need of
allies. After giving these pacific assurances, he admitted that France
ought to change her political principles, but declared that this ought
not to be done suddenly. She could not remain isolated from the world.
The suspension of treaties would be perilous. All treaties made by
the King ought to be observed by the nation until they were annulled
or changed. He recited the history of Spain’s faithful observance of
the family compact; then asked whether it would be right for France
to annul such a solemn engagement at a time when Spain was threatened
by the same danger that she had three times warded off from France.
In view of the great English armament, self-interest obliged France
to strengthen her alliance with Spain. That would require a faithful
observance of the treaty. If England did not really desire war, but was
arming simply to conduct the negotiation more favorably, increasing
the French armament would doubtless delay the result. But if the
abandonment of French engagements should force Spain to make peace with
England more promptly, a great wrong would be done to French credit and
French commerce. If England desired war, then France ought to support
Spain with all her resources. For if England should force Spain to
succumb, France would be the next object of her ambition and vengeance.
It was not proposed, he said, to ratify the compact as a whole, but
only the defensive and commercial stipulations. He proposed to notify
the King of Spain that the alliance would be preserved, and at the same
time to refer the treaty to a committee for revision, after which it
should be renewed.

The King of France was to open negotiations with the King of Spain at
once for this purpose. He also proposed that the fleet be raised to
30 ships of the line, with a proportionate number of smaller vessels.
After a few short favorable addresses on the report the discussion was
postponed to the next day.[385]

When the discussion was resumed on August 26 the report met with very
little opposition. There was a futile attempt, led by Pétion, to
postpone the decision until further information might be obtained.
L’Abbé Maury favored confirming the treaty as it stood, declaring,
rightly as events proved, that it would give England a great advantage
to leave the alliance so indefinite. Ricard considered 30 vessels too
small an armament and proposed increasing it to 45. Others favored his
idea and Mirabeau embodied it in his report. With this modification,
the decrees proposed were unanimously adopted by the Assembly. The
essential points were: First, defensive and commercial arrangements
with Spain were to be observed; secondly, negotiations were to be
opened with Spain for the purpose of renewing and perpetuating the
alliance; thirdly, the armament should be raised to 45 ships of the
line, with a proportionate number of smaller vessels.[386]

On August 30 Montmorin informed the Assembly that the King had
sanctioned the decrees and would proceed at once to carry them out.
The minister for marine, he said, had already received orders for the
armament. Only 16 vessels would be fitted out at once, which, added
to the 14 already armed, would make 30. Preparations would be made to
complete the armament to 45 if that should become necessary.[387] On
September 1 Montmorin replied to Fernan Nuñez’s letter of June 16. He
told of the action of the Assembly and inclosed a copy of the decrees.
The King, he said, was taking steps to carry them out. The reason that
only 30 ships instead of 45 would be armed immediately was to avoid
the appearance of hostility to England. The French King hoped for a
peaceful settlement and reciprocal disarmament.[388]

To one who did not scrutinize the decrees closely the action of the
Assembly seemed to be all that Spain could desire. If the support had
been tardy, yet it was enthusiastic. It seems that at heart most of the
Assembly really desired to support Spain and thought that they were
doing all that could be expected; but their irrepressible tendency to
theorize blinded them to the practical. Apparently they did not realize
that their proposal to modify the treaty at such a critical time
nullified it as far as any immediate assistance under it was concerned.
It seems possible that if Mirabeau had stood firmly for ratifying
the treaty as it was he might still have carried the Assembly with
him.[389]

The French Government was anxious regarding the effect that the action
of the Assembly might have on England. The French view of England’s
conduct was well expressed in a letter from Montmorin to Luzerne, the
ambassador from France to the English Court. After remarking that
the British Court would probably be astonished at the decrees, he
explained that the step was necessary to sustain the honor of France.
It had not been taken precipitately, he said, but had been delayed
as long as possible, even provoking complaints from Spain. When it
was learned that Spain had given satisfaction to England, and still
the latter refused to disarm, the French Government was compelled to
suppose that the British Cabinet had some ulterior purpose and was not
certain that it did not concern France. Either England did not wish to
terminate the Nootka affair justly or she had other objects, for which
this was to furnish a stepping-stone. If it was a question of Spain,
France was interested in saving her ally; if the French themselves were
concerned, argument was unnecessary. Luzerne was to use these arguments
with Leeds and Pitt. He was also to use confidentially the fact that
the Assembly had decreed a larger armament than the Government had
asked. This, Montmorin remarked, ought to make an impression. Luzerne
might again suggest French intervention, but with much circumspection,
since it had been refused before.[390] On the day after writing the
above private instructions for the ambassador, Montmorin asked him to
assure the English King that the armaments were purely precautionary
and had no object except those designated by the Assembly. The French
King hoped for a peaceable settlement. He had been pleased with the
declaration and counter-declaration, but would have been more pleased
if a proportionate disarmament had followed, or at least an agreement
not to increase the armaments.[391]

Gower, the British ambassador at Paris, had promptly expressed to
Montmorin his surprise at the action of the Assembly. He reported on
August 27 to his Government that Montmorin was surprised also, and had
told him that orders would be given to commission more ships, “but
that it would be done (this he said in the utmost confidence) avec
le plus grande lenteur.”[392] A dispatch of the next day hinted that
Spanish money might have influenced the Assembly.[393] On September 1
instructions were sent from London telling Gower to renew the English
assurances of friendliness for France, but to observe that it would be
impossible for the harmony to continue if France should support Spain.
He was to represent that any aid or encouragement to Spain would be a
cause of umbrage to England, since it would make a just settlement more
difficult.[394] On September 4 Gower presented a memorial demanding
an explanation of the armament.[395] Montmorin’s letter to Luzerne of
August 28, referred to above, was presented to the English Court on
September 7.[396] On September 10, in reply to Gower’s of the 4th,
Montmorin referred the English Court to a letter written September 9
to Luzerne, which the latter would present. For some reason Luzerne
delayed handing this to the British Court, and on September 21 Gower
was instructed to demand a formal reply to his memorial. When this
demand reached Paris, Montmorin was out of the city. Having returned,
he answered, October 4, that he did not understand Luzerne’s delay. He
declared that France had no wish to influence the negotiations, but in
case the matter could not be amicably settled she might be compelled
to support Spain. Before this reached London Gower had been instructed
to demand that the French fleet make no move to join the Spanish. On
October 14 Montmorin agreed that no movement should be made until
England should have received a reply from Spain to the ultimatum which
the British Court had sent a few days before.[397] Hugh Elliot was sent
secretly as a special English agent to argue with the French Court
against supporting Spain. He met members of the diplomatic committee
and thought, at least, that he had converted them to the English view.
W. A. Miles coöperated with Elliot in this undertaking. Only obscure
and mysterious references to their mission are extant, and many
curious speculations have been made concerning it.[398]

Before news reached Madrid of the action of the National Assembly
negotiations had begun for a final settlement of the Nootka question.

The declaration and counter declaration signed late in July had been
accepted by England as affording the satisfaction demanded. This had
opened the way for a pacific discussion of the respective rights to
Nootka and the neighboring coast.[399] On September 8 Fitzherbert
presented to Floridablanca the first projet of a treaty. It had been
formulated in London three weeks earlier and had been sent with
instructions to the British ambassador. These instructions declared
it to be the purpose of the British Government to avoid requiring
Spain to make any mortifying renunciation of rights, but at the same
time the stipulations were to be so worded that they would not imply
an admission of the Spanish claims by the British Government. It was
impossible for His Majesty to recognize them, either directly or
indirectly. They were merely a matter of pride with Spain, it was said,
and were really a source of weakness rather than of strength.[400]

When Fitzherbert submitted the projet he inclosed with it extended
observations on each article. The preamble, as it had been worded by
the British ambassador, declared a desire to form a convention which
would settle the present differences and avoid such disputes for the
future. On this he observed that the Court of London thought that would
be the best means of settlement which, without formally pronouncing on
the opposing pretensions, should regulate the respective positions of
the two Crowns for the future. If British subjects could be assured
of the free exercise of their rights in the Pacific, the English King
would not be reluctant to establish all possible rules to prevent
illicit commerce with Spanish possessions. The Court of London was
persuaded that a Cabinet so wise as that of Spain could not seriously
have advanced such vast pretensions.

The first article declared that British subjects should be replaced in
possession of the ships and lands of which they had been deprived at
Nootka by a Spanish officer toward the month of April, 1789.[401] The
observations on this gave the English arguments against the claim of
Spain to exclusive dominion over the coasts in question. The English
Court could not admit the justice of an exclusive sovereignty over
so vast a coast, which since its discovery had without interruption
been frequented by British subjects and by those of other nations as
well. Spain claimed only as far as the sixty-first degree, conceding
to Russia the portion beyond. Fitzherbert insisted, with a good deal
of sagacity, that the very principle of this division demonstrated
the inadmissibility of the Spanish pretension. If Russia had acquired
rights to the coast beyond the sixty-first degree in virtue of the
establishments which her subjects had formed there, how, he asked,
could other nations be denied the opportunity of making establishments
in like manner on the parts of the coast situated below this degree and
not already occupied? As to the Spanish claim to priority of discovery,
he implied that it could be disproved, though he did not disprove it.
However, he insisted that discovery alone, without being followed up
by actual occupation, could not be admitted as furnishing a right to
possession which could operate to the exclusion of other nations.
England did not claim exclusive jurisdiction, he said. What she wished
was a reciprocal assurance of free access for both nations to the new
establishments formed or to be formed by the one or the other.

The second article, in keeping with the statement just made, declared
that between certain limits, to be named later, the subjects of
both Crowns should exercise their commerce without hindrance in the
establishments of either.

The third article declared that England would employ efficient means
to prevent such access being made a pretext for illicit commerce with
Spanish colonies. With this in view it was stipulated that between
certain limits, to be named later, British subjects should make no
establishments, and that they should not approach within a certain
distance of the coast between these limits. Fitzherbert observed
that the purpose of this was to assure to Spain the rights of domain
over all places in actual possession of her subjects. It was desired
to make this as favorable to the Spanish pretensions as possible.
He proposed as the northern limit of Spanish exclusive dominion the
thirty-first degree. This would have left to Spain not quite all of
Lower California. He suggested that the boundary should run east on
this degree to the Colorado River, follow that river to its source, and
then run northeast to the nearest point on the Missouri. Spain should
have exclusive dominion of the coast from the above-mentioned parallel
southward to within about 10° of Cape Horn. In his private instructions
Fitzherbert was authorized to yield a little if necessary. He might
accept as the northern limit the fortieth parallel from the Pacific to
the Missouri. He thought that the distance within which British ships
should not approach ought to be 5 leagues. On this point his private
instructions allowed him to yield to 8 or even 10 leagues.

The fourth article provided that everywhere else in the Pacific the
subjects of both Crowns should enjoy freedom of navigation and fishery,
with the privilege of landing on the coasts to trade with the natives
or form establishments in unoccupied places. It was thought, he said,
that this would be the best way to prevent injurious competition in
making settlements. This principle was to be applied to the Nootka
settlement also, when that should have been returned to Great Britain.
On this, he said, no further observations were necessary. It was a
natural consequence of the foregoing stipulations. This would have
meant, had it been conceded, that England and Spain would have had
equal rights to all of the coast north of Lower California. The fifth
article referred to making establishments in South America, and was not
considered essential by the British Cabinet. The sixth referred to the
exchange of ratifications.[402]

Soon after the presentation of this projet the action of the French
Assembly became known at Madrid, and its influence must next be
considered.

A letter from Madrid of September 10 to the “Gazette de Leide” told
that a courier had just arrived from Paris with the news that a
decree had been rendered by the National Assembly for a provisional
maintenance of the family compact and for increasing the armament.
This had greatly decreased the inquietude over the English demands.
A rumor had arisen that these demands would overthrow many of the
long-established principles of Spain, for they were based on English
pretensions to a right of free navigation and commerce in the South Sea
and on the western coast of America. The expectation of such powerful
aid had produced an agreeable sensation.[403] This was the effect on
the popular mind.

Its influence on Floridablanca was very different. In submitting to a
council of the principal ministers of state the English projet of a
treaty studied above, he said that it was advisable to consider first
the relations of Spain with the principal courts of Europe. He began
with France. In referring to the portion of the decree that limited the
treaty to “defensive and commercial arrangements,” he remarked that
this expression was capable of many interpretations and equivocations.
He noticed further that even the declaration for this partial
maintenance of the treaty was made subordinate to the expression
“taking all proper precautions to preserve the peace.” If, he declared,
the deciding on what were proper precautions be left to the Assembly,
composed of so many members and with such extraordinary ideas, there
was no hope that their decision would accord with Spain’s ideas of
preserving the peace. That body might not consider the Nootka dispute
a casus foederis. It might decide that Spain was to blame, or that she
had motives of aggression, or that she had not admitted all of the
means of conciliation proposed by England. The desire of the Assembly
to negotiate a new treaty on national lines was ominous, he said.
They, of course, wished to modify or explain the old. This new system
of the sovereignty of the nation might present difficulties. The body
asserting it, the National Assembly, was itself a usurper. Referring
to the provision for arming 45 ships of the line, he called attention
to the fact that the reason assigned was not that of supporting Spain.
The decree declared that the armament was in consideration of the
armaments of various nations of Europe, and was for the security of
French commerce and French colonial possessions. Finally, he declared,
even if the Assembly really wished to aid Spain it was doubtful whether
it could do so, on account of the lack of funds and on account of the
disorders of the country. If aid should be sent, the insubordination
of the French sailors would be in danger of contaminating the Spanish
and would impede their own usefulness. He concluded that there was very
little hope of aid. Only in case that England attacked France would
there be any reasonable hope of assistance.

After discussing the unhappy relations with France, the minister took
up each of the other nations in turn. Prussia and the Netherlands
were allies of England, so must be counted as enemies. Of the small
States, the Courts of Lisbon, Naples, and Turin could be counted on as
friendly neutrals. All that could be hoped for from Turkey, Tripoli,
and Algiers was that they would not injure Spain; but not so with
Tunis and Morocco, which were actually threatening and were probably
being reckoned on by England. The Court of Vienna was not open to new
enterprises of war or new alliances. Sweden would not be a safe ally,
and besides would demand a subsidy. Denmark also would have to be
subsidized, and then would join only in case that Russia entered also.
The latter was already engaged in war with Sweden[404] and Turkey, and
was being menaced by England and Prussia. In the absence of money and
support she would have to yield. If Spain had a full treasury to open
to Russia and would enter a war against England, engaging her Baltic
fleet, there was no doubt that Catherine II would form an alliance. But
Spain had not the treasury and was not in a position to undertake a
war for the benefit of Russia. If, however, Spain could not honorably
avoid war and should be attacked, some arrangement with Russia for
reciprocal aid would be useful. Steps had been taken with that in view,
but nothing definite had been done. The United States would be useful
allies, since they could harass English commerce and threaten Canada.
They had been sounded and seemed not unfavorable. But they would desire
the navigation of the Mississippi, which would open to them a door for
contraband trade with Mexico. And besides this they might in the end be
enabled to insist on the boundary of Florida which they had unjustly
arranged with England, usurping a large part from Spain.

After considering the foreign relations of Spain, Floridablanca
reminded the ministers that they ought also to reflect on internal
affairs--the army, the navy, the treasury, and economic conditions. The
army was weak, he said, but could soon be increased as much as would be
necessary in a maritime war. The navy was well equipped at the time,
but provision would have to be made for reënforcements and supplies.
All of this would occasion much expense, and the treasury was scarcely
sufficient for peace. It would be necessary to have recourse to credit.
Bad harvests and weak administration of justice, he said, had increased
the cost of provisions. New taxes could not be imposed without causing
resistance, especially in view of the evil example of France.

These reflections on the conditions of Spain at home and abroad, the
Count said, would have to be kept in mind in considering the plan for
a convention which England had proposed. On the other hand, they must
not lose sight of the loss that would be caused to the rights of Spain
in the two Americas. They must remember the danger to Spanish commerce
and navigation and to the quietude of the colonial establishments.
They must also consider the evil example that would be given to other
nations by a concession to Great Britain, as well as “the incentive
to England to increase her pretensions and exact other condescensions
if we enter easily into the first.”[405] From these reflections it is
evident that Floridablanca had decided to yield to England, but with at
least a show of resistance.

Such a communication from the prime minister to the Council of
State would lead one to infer that the Spanish Court was about to
desert the French alliance, and was willing to sacrifice something
for the friendship of England. But if this is only an inference the
communications with the English ambassador at about the same time leave
no doubt of the fact. At a conference on September 13 Floridablanca
declared to Fitzherbert that His Catholic Majesty regarded the National
Assembly with the utmost horror. He was extremely averse to adopting
the kind of treaty proposed by that body. He feared for the influence
on his own authority that a recognition of the French Assembly would
have. If, however, England should press too hardly in the present
conjuncture, the Count declared, Spain would be compelled to accept the
alliance of France on any condition. But if an accommodation could be
speedily arranged, His Catholic Majesty intended to reject the treaty
proposed by the French Assembly and to establish an intimate concert
and union with England. The Count informed the British ambassador that
he had submitted the latter’s projet and observations to the Council
of State. That body had decided that it would be necessary to send to
America in order to locate definitely the northern and southern limits
of the Spanish settlements as proposed. Since this would delay the
settlement of the Nootka affair, he suggested the immediate conclusion of
a preliminary agreement, which would secure to Great Britain by general,
but sufficient, stipulations, the objects that she had in view. This
would put a stop to the armaments, give time to arrange a system of union
between Spain and England, and allow His Catholic Majesty to disengage
himself entirely from France.[406]

At this conference, on September 13, Floridablanca had said that
he would present a plan for the temporary settlement which he had
suggested. Fitzherbert had found it best in his dealings with the
Spanish Court to be first on the ground. Consequently on the following
day he sent to the Count a projet for the proposed temporary agreement.
On the same evening Floridablanca presented his plan in the form
of a counter-projet. The next day, September 15, they held another
conference to consider the plans. The English ambassador labored in
vain to induce the Spanish minister to admit some alterations in the
latter’s plan, so that it would be acceptable to the British Court.
The Count insisted that he had conceded all that his colleagues and
the King would allow him to grant. He earnestly requested Fitzherbert
to transmit it to the Duke of Leeds in its existing form. He felt
confident that the terms would be accepted by the Court of London. As
a means of shortening by some weeks the continuance of the present
expensive armaments, he would send instructions authorizing Campo, the
Spanish ambassador at London, to sign it in case His Britannic Majesty
should approve it.[407] Since neither of these plans was accepted, it
is not necessary to study their terms in detail.

This shows the influence that the action of the French Assembly had on
the relations of the three countries. In view of it, Spain despaired
of getting any assistance from France, and, further, it promised to
be the occasion for a rearrangement of alliances, Spain breaking the
traditional union with France and arranging an intimate alliance with
England.[408]

CHAPTER XII.

ENGLISH ULTIMATUM--SPANISH DEFIANCE.

In the middle of October the “Gazette de Leide” printed a letter from
Madrid, dated September 24, saying:

    We are assured that the negotiation with England is in a good way
    and is about to terminate in a friendly manner.[409]

This was written a few days after the Spanish Court had decided to
abandon the family compact and form an intimate alliance with England
as studied in the last chapter. The next issue of the same paper
printed a letter from London, dated October 12, which had a very
different tone:

    The warlike appearances have greatly increased in the last eight
    days. The next dispatches from Fitzherbert, replying to the last
    English demand, will probably decide for peace or war. On our side
    all preparations for a rupture have already been made.[410]

This was written a fortnight after news had reached London of
Spain’s proposed change. Instead of receiving the friendly advances
of the Spanish Court in the spirit in which Floridablanca hoped,
and apparently expected, the Court of St. James accepted them as an
announcement that the French alliance had failed, and an acknowledgment
that Spain was at the mercy of England. This is really what they
meant. Instead of following Spain’s example and giving up some of
her pretensions, England took advantage of Spanish helplessness and
gave Spain ten days to decide whether she would accept war in the
face of almost insurmountable difficulties, or peace with humiliating
concessions. Much discontent had arisen in England at the length
to which the negotiation was being drawn out. It was considered
inconsistent with the decisive tone at the beginning. The object to
be gained was thought to be hardly worth such an expensive armament
continued for so many months. The ministry was being severely
criticised, and felt the necessity of forcing a decision.[411]

Although feeling keenly the criticism of the armament, yet the
Government was unwilling to disarm until Spain should have yielded.
On September 10, in consequence of the repeated requests from Spain
for a mutual disarmament, Leeds directed Fitzherbert to represent to
Floridablanca that, with every wish for an amicable adjustment, it did
not appear to the British Government expedient to disarm until such
adjustment should be secured.[412] For the same reason the ministry was
unwilling to accept any temporary arrangement, such as Floridablanca
had suggested, which would postpone the final settlement to a later
date. Consequently, on October 2 two drafts of a treaty were sent to
Fitzherbert. They contained substantially the same terms except that
one provided for the definite demarkation of the limits of Spanish
exclusive sovereignty, and the other did not. These embodied Great
Britain’s ultimatum. Fitzherbert was to give the Spanish Court ten days
in which to decide on an answer. If at the end of that time an answer
had not been received the ambassador was to quit Madrid.

After sending the ultimatum the British Court redoubled its energies
in preparing for war. One is almost led to believe, from the vigor
displayed, that war was desired and that the ultimatum was prepared
with the deliberate intention of forcing a breach. In a letter of
October 22 Leeds asked Auckland, the British ambassador at The Hague,
to communicate to the Government of the Republic the probability
of a rupture. He expected in a few days to send copies of all the
correspondence relating to the discussion that Auckland might lay
them before the Dutch Government. Although it might happen, he said,
that England would be obliged to commence the hostilities, yet he had
no doubt that every circumstance would convince mankind that “Great
Britain was not the aggressor in the war which may, in a few days,
disturb the general tranquillity.” After speaking of the cordiality of
the Dutch Government, he continued:

    It will also, I trust, be understood in Holland how material it
    is to enable us to act with vigor in the outset. I therefore hope
    that there will be no difficulty in furnishing some naval succors
    before the expiration of the two months stipulated. It would be to
    be wished, if possible, that a detachment be sent immediately on the
    news of hostilities, and that it should amount to 8 ships of the
    line and 8 frigates. If, however, so much can not be obtained, even
    a less number will be a material object.[413]

A notion of the popular view of the impending war may be gleaned from a
letter written by Storer to Auckland on the same day that the secretary
for foreign affairs wrote the one just studied. Storer said that all
of the officers were in high spirits at the prospect of a voyage to
Mexico. He thought that the Nootka affair was merely a pretext for a
war that had been previously determined upon. He said:

    Pitt is tired of peace. He bullied France so effectually three years
    ago[414] that he is determined to try the same thing with Spain.

He thought that the negotiators themselves did not know what would
happen.[415] If the British ministers were not actually trying to force
a war, it is, at least, evident that they were willing to accept it
should it come; and that they were not willing to make any considerable
concessions to preserve peace.

The ultimatum, with instructions for his private guidance, reached
Fitzherbert October 12. He was told that Floridablanca’s proposal for a
temporary agreement was not admissible since it would leave the matter
open to a subsequent discussion. It was important that it should be
settled at once. If Floridablanca’s proposal had not been accompanied
by assurances that indicated a sincere desire for accommodation with
England, it would have been doubtful, he was told, whether anything
could have been hoped from a further continuance of the negotiation.
The prospect for a speedy settlement and the chance for dissolving
the family compact compensated largely for the inconvenience of
further delay, but that delay could be only for a few days. The
Count’s committing himself on points of so much delicacy indicated
that the Spanish Court had determined to go a considerable length.
His language respecting France was consistent with his character.
The temporary arrangement proposed by him admitted the British claims
in general terms, but the indefiniteness of its terms would leave
ground for disputes. Fitzherbert was to remind the Count that he
had, in principle, admitted the justice of the British claims. The
present articles, he was told, did no more than to secure definitely
those rights. Their rejection would be considered as a proof either
that Spain was not sincerely desirous of an accommodation or that
she was unwilling to grant distinctly the security which the Spanish
minister had argued to be in fact contained in the articles which he
had suggested. The question as to security of navigation, commerce,
and fisheries in that part of the world depended on whether Spain
did or did not insist on her exclusive claim to the continent in
question and the seas adjacent. This could be decided as well at one
time as another. The question of restitution should depend on whether
Spain rested her case on her pretended exclusive sovereignty or prior
discovery, or whether she could prove that she had actual occupation
of Nootka prior to the time when lands were purchased and buildings
erected there by British subjects.[416] The only matter that could
afford an excuse for delay was the determination of limits. Such an
article would seem to be desirable to both sides, but His Britannic
Majesty would not object seriously to the omission of such demarkation.
The great expense of maintaining the armament ready for service and the
just expectations of the public could not admit of further delay in
coming to a decision on the question of peace or war. Fitzherbert was
to communicate this fact to Floridablanca in the least offensive but
the most explicit manner possible. Ten days was considered a sufficient
time for the Spanish answer.

On the question of disarming in the event of an amicable settlement,
Leeds suggested that mutual confidence would be a stronger security
than any formal stipulations. England did not wish to reduce to a
peace establishment at once, on account of the French armament and
because of the fact that Russia seemed unwilling to adopt a moderate
policy toward Turkey. It was incumbent on the allies to prevent the
dismemberment of Turkey.[417]

On October 13, the next day after receiving the above instructions
and the projets of a convention accompanying them, Fitzherbert had a
conference with the Spanish minister, at which the latter’s language
led the former to doubt the possibility of an amicable settlement. At
an interview on the following day the British minister presented parts
of the drafts of the ultimatum. The Count’s reception of these was so
unfavorable that Fitzherbert thought best to warn all of the British
consuls in Spain of the prospect of an immediate rupture. He wrote to
his home Government that it seemed impossible to obtain a convention
with a demarcation of limits. That no means of effecting a pacification
might be left untried, Fitzherbert delivered to Floridablanca on
October 15 a translation of the entire projet without the demarcation
of limits. The Count’s reply of the next day was still in terms
extremely wide of the English proposals, but it revived Fitzherbert’s
hopes of engaging the Spanish minister by degrees to accede to His
Britannic Majesty’s demands.[418]

In this reply of October 16 Floridablanca said that there were
considerable difficulties in the way of agreeing to the English projet.
He submitted some observations justifying some small but substantial
changes which he had suggested. He remarked that the British projet,
in demanding that the buildings and lands should be restored to the
British subjects, assumed that they had once possessed them. He
declared that this assumption was untrue; that the British subjects
had only been attempting to make an establishment, from which the
Spanish commander had prevented them. If they had ever bought land, as
pretended, they had failed to take possession of it.

Before examining Floridablanca’s observations further it may be well
to remark that this was the point of fact on which it was impossible
for the two Courts to agree. Each relied on the statements made by its
own subjects and these statements were conflicting. Meares told of his
purchase of land and his erection of a building thereon in 1788 in such
a manner as to lead the British Cabinet to believe that he had formed
a substantial English settlement, and that the establishment was still
there in the spring of 1789 when Martinez arrived. On the other hand,
Martinez’s account showed that when he arrived at Nootka there were no
evidences of any British establishment, but that the expedition under
Colnett, which arrived two months later, came to form an establishment.
Neither was wholly right nor wholly wrong.[419]

Floridablanca said that it was very difficult and almost impossible for
Spain to consent that British subjects should land in unoccupied places
to trade with the natives and form establishments. Places without a
substantial Spanish occupation, he said, might be found almost anywhere
along the coast of America. This clause, he said, ought to be omitted
from the projet. Fitzherbert had proposed that British vessels should
not approach within 10 leagues of places occupied by Spain. The Count
insisted that the distance was too short. Instead of the expression,
“occupied by Spain,” he would substitute the expression, “belonging to
Spain.” With his observations the Spanish minister submitted a counter
projet which embodied them. In his letter accompanying these documents,
Floridablanca said that he had proposed a special junta to consider
the English propositions. However, if Fitzherbert would agree to the
Spanish counter projet, he would venture to propose it to the King
and see if the matter could not be settled before the meeting of the
junta.[420]

The Spanish minister had decided that Spain would have to yield to
the English demands. He was directing his efforts toward an attempt
to induce the British ambassador to modify those demands so that they
would give as little offense as possible to Spanish pride. But other
Spanish officials were not so ready to yield as the prime minister was.

Fitzherbert did not accept the count’s terms. He insisted on the
British projet as it stood. The special junta was summoned. It
was composed of eight of the principal ministers, not including
Floridablanca. The order naming the members was dated October 19.
The next day a note requested them to hasten, for the ambassador was
very urgent. Sessions were held on the 21st, 22d, 24th, and 25th. The
English projet was examined article by article.

The findings of the junta furnish an excellent notion of the feeling
of Spaniards respecting the dispute. It was declared that Martinez’s
conduct at Nootka had not been contrary to international law nor an
insult to the English flag. What he had done was to prevent the forming
of an establishment in a place belonging to the Spanish dominions, in
which, by virtue of treaties made before all Europe and guaranteed
by England herself, no foreign disembarkation was permitted without
a just motive, and much less the forming of military or commercial
establishments. Even granting that the proceedings of Martinez had
been culpable, and, by a distortion of ideas, that the resistance to
a usurpation could be considered an insult, Spain had already given
England such satisfaction as was compatible with her dignity. The
increasing of the British pretensions while the Spanish were being
moderated showed that the Nootka affair was only a mask to cover
England’s hostile designs of taking advantage of the revolution in
France to attack the divided House of Bourbon.

Referring to a clause in the British projet providing for the return
of any vessels that might have been seized since April, 1789, the
conclusions of the junta declared that this showed England’s design of
sending new expeditions. They would not limit themselves to fisheries
nor to trading with the natives. They intended to form fortified
establishments and construct vessels there to carry on trade with
all of New Spain. Their first aggressions would lead to others. The
weak and extended Spanish dominions afforded opportunities for their
activity. There were many places that Spain had not been able and
probably never would be able to people. The English pretension was
the more irritating since it extended also to all the coasts of South
America. If Spain should grant their demands she might expect in the
end to surrender to them all of the commerce of Peru and New Spain.

The English offer of not allowing their subjects to approach within 10
leagues of any place occupied by Spain was useless, the junta declared,
since they demanded the privilege of disembarking in all unoccupied
places. By this means they could approach insensibly to those that were
occupied. If the Spanish governors should attempt to prevent them, it
would lead to disputes and to new negotiations which would afford new
opportunities for aggressions. They would finally take all of these
countries from Spain.

The English assumption of rights in South America was branded as an
infamous artifice. Although Spain had for three centuries been in
exclusive and peaceful possession of all South America, the English
were now pretending that they had equal rights to unoccupied places.
Appealing directly to the King, they said:

    Strange, astonishing, unheard-of it is, Señor, that England should
    dare to pretend that Your Majesty should authorize and adopt a
    stipulation which prohibits mutually the forming of establishments
    there as long as the subjects of other powers shall not attempt to
    do so; adding that the respective subjects shall have the right of
    disembarking in those places and building huts and other temporary
    structures for objects connected with their fisheries. … The English
    pretend that all South America is open to all nations, and that its
    territories shall belong to the first that desires to occupy them.

England, they declared, was now exacting more than she had dared to
ask in 1763, when she had so great an advantage. She had forgotten
her guaranty in the treaty of Utrecht that Spain’s American dominions
should be restored as they had been in the reign of King Charles II,
and should remain in that condition. If Spain should grant these
privileges to England, other nations would claim them under the
“most-favored-nation clause” of the same treaty.

The King was asked to consider how his father had resisted England when
there was much less at stake and when the Spanish army and navy were
in no better condition. In case of war England’s attention, they said,
would be directed not against the Peninsula, but against the colonies.
Havana Vera Cruz, Cartagena, Porto Rico, Santo Domingo, Trinidad,
Caracas, Montevideo, and Buenos Ayres were considered likely points of
attack. All of these were declared ready to defend themselves because
of their superior garrisons and of climatic and strategic advantages.

Floridablanca had inclosed with other papers for the junta a copy of
the observations on Spain’s relations to other powers, which he had
prepared early in September on receipt of the news of the decree of
the National Assembly.[421] Because of the frankness shown in other
matters the junta said that they were encouraged to volunteer their own
observations on this. Speaking of Prussia as England’s most powerful
ally, they said that her King was not in a position to dictate terms
to all of the northern powers, consequently he would have to consider
his own defense. In view of this and of the existing state of Turkish
affairs they concluded that England’s position was not an especially
strong one. As to possible support for Spain, they said that France
could not be blind to her interests and to her obligations under the
family compact. To avoid the evil effects on the Spanish fleet of
insubordination in the French navy the two could operate separately.
Spain could probably not get any aid from the United States. Neither
were they likely to join England. Portugal could not aid except by
remaining neutral. There was nothing to ask or expect from Sardinia,
Naples, Venice, or Turkey, and the African states ought to give little
concern. As to Russia they were more hopeful. They suggested that it
would not be impossible for Spain, by offering commercial advantages,
to enter an alliance with Russia, Sweden, and Denmark and secure their
help against England. They respectfully submitted to the King and his
prime minister the idea of a treaty with Russia defining territorial
limits on the western coast of America and guaranteeing each other
against English aggressions on that coast.

The junta then offered several observations on the harshness of the
English demands. England was offering nothing, they said, in return
for the sacrifices demanded of Spain. She had turned a deaf ear to
Spain’s repeated requests for a reciprocal disarmament, hence there
was good reason to fear that she was trying to force a breach. It was
plain that she intended to form new establishments in the Spanish
dominions. She proposed to deprive Spain of the power of repelling the
intrusions which she meditated by allowing no recourse except a report
of the matter to the home governments and a new convention in each
case. This would mean subjection and a continual state of war. She was
inviting other nations to help her despoil Spain. She was insisting
on the establishment of a principle which would allow usurpations in
every uninhabited place. The whole Spanish dominions would shortly be
destroyed. Her demands were as injurious as could be made after the
most disgraceful war. If this cession should be made through fear in
a time of profound peace, it would encourage still greater claims.
Authorized by such a document other nations would form common cause,
and the vast continent of the Indies would be exposed to a general
occupation. Even in an unfortunate war Spain would only have to come
to an understanding with her enemies, and there would be hope for
favorable alliances and better terms with less sacrifices.

Finally the junta gave their conclusions as to the answer that should
be made to England’s ultimatum. The concessions now demanded, they
said, would inevitably lead Spain into a war. She would then suffer
all that the King now wished to avoid, and England would certainly
accept no less afterwards. In case that this projet should be rejected
and war should ensue, what treaty, it was asked, could be concluded
more absolutely ruinous, even in the remote chance of complete
prostration, than the convention which was now proposed? Therefore the
junta could not in any manner accept the unjust terms contained in
the English ultimatum. They recognized that this would mean war. They
advised preparation at once to repel hostile attacks and an immediate
search for allies even before giving a final answer to the English
ambassador.[422]

On October 25, the day of the last session of the junta, its
conclusions were hurried off to Floridablanca to be laid before the
King. Their reception and influence on the negotiation will be studied
in the next chapter.[423]

CHAPTER XIII.

THE NOOTKA SOUND CONVENTION--ITS RECEPTION AND RESULTS.

After submitting the English ultimatum to the extraordinary junta, as
studied in the last chapter, Floridablanca continued his conferences
with Fitzherbert. He made strenuous efforts to induce the British
ambassador to modify the English demands. In the first article, which
declared that the buildings and lands on the Northwest Coast should
be restored to the British subjects, the Count pressed earnestly for
the insertion of the clause, “notwithstanding the exclusive rights
which Spain has claimed.” This would have been almost tantamount to
a recognition of the Spanish claim. Fitzherbert would not consent to
it. But since the declarations of July had expressly reserved the
discussion of those rights, and since the Spanish minister would not be
content without some reference to them in the convention, the British
ambassador consented to mention them in the preamble. Consequently, he
proposed the insertion of the clause, “laying aside all retrospective
discussion of the rights and claims of the two parties.” He was very
careful to word it so that there would not be in it any admission of
the justice of the Spanish claim. After some hesitation the Count
accepted it.

In the second article Fitzherbert consented to the omission of one
word. The projet had provided that “for all other acts of violence or
hostility,” etc., reparation should be made. The Count objected to the
word “other” as an unnecessary and invidious reference to the action
of Martinez at Nootka in 1789, in view of the fact that satisfactory
reparation for it had already been made. The British ambassador
consented to omit “other.” The Spanish minister attempted to limit this
reparation to offenses committed “on the said continent and the islands
adjacent.” Fitzherbert would not agree. This would not have included
the violence recently done to Captain Macdonald in the West Indies,
mentioned in the last chapter. England apprehended other similar
seizures, and such would not have been unnatural under the strained
relations existing between the two countries for so many months.

The last clause of the third article, making the privilege of landing
anywhere on the coast subject to the restrictions contained in the
following articles, was not in the draft _without_ a demarkation of
limits which was made the basis of the treaty, but it was in the
draft _with_ a demarkation of limits. Fitzherbert compromised on this
point and combined the two drafts. He admitted a limitation of the
privilege without obtaining a definite demarkation of the boundaries of
Spanish exclusive sovereignty. If Floridablanca had not secured this
concession, it would have meant that the English could have landed and
established colonies in any unoccupied spot on the coast of California,
Mexico, Central or South America. This concession was not included
in the draft which was examined by the special junta. It was on this
point that they so violently opposed conceding the English demands and
advised war at all hazards instead.

In the fourth article, regarding the limit of 10 leagues within
which English vessels should not approach Spanish establishments,
Floridablanca pressed very earnestly for extending the distance to
15 leagues. As a precedent for his contention, he cited the treaty
of 1763 between England and France, which fixed 15 leagues as the
distance within which French fishermen might not approach the coasts
of Cape Breton. He suggested the insertion of the words “in the said
seas,” which would confine this restriction to the Pacific. Fitzherbert
embodied the last mentioned suggestion, since he conceived that it
might be of advantage to the English fisheries on the Atlantic coasts
of Spanish America, but he would not admit the extension to 15 leagues.
His private instructions, as mentioned in the last chapter, had named
5 leagues as the distance to be first proposed, but had allowed him to
concede 8 or even 10.

The fifth and sixth articles contained the stipulations upon which
there was the most difficulty in agreeing. In the course of their
discussion the negotiation was frequently on the point of being broken
off. Floridablanca would not consent to a convention that failed to
secure to Spain her exclusive intercourse with her establishments.
Neither would he consent to fix any precise line as the boundary of
the Spanish possessions, either on the north or the south. He pleaded
insufficient information. Fitzherbert wrote to the British Cabinet
that the language of the Spanish minister on both of these points was
so firm and decisive as to make it evident beyond a doubt that the
alternative of peace or war rested on finding or not finding a solution
of these difficulties. Neither of the two drafts of the English
ultimatum afforded a solution. The one provided that the subjects of
the two Crowns should have free access to all unoccupied places and
to all establishments formed since April, 1789, or to be formed north
of a fixed line on the Northwest Coast and south of a fixed line on
the South American coast. The other, omitting any reference to fixed
limits, provided that this privilege should extend to the whole Pacific
coast of North and South America.

In order to solve this difficulty the English ambassador admitted the
restriction at the end of the third article, mentioned above. For the
same purpose he consented to insert in the fifth article the clause,
“situated to the north of the parts of the said coast already occupied
by Spain.” This preserved the Spanish exclusive dominion as far
northward as her most northern establishment. The provision in article
6 was materially changed. The draft of the ultimatum had provided that
the subjects of neither nation should make any establishment south
of a definite line to be fixed so long as no settlement should be
formed thereon by the subjects of any other power. Instead of fixing
a definite line the negotiators agreed to insert the clause, “in such
part of those coasts as are situated to the south of those parts of the
same coasts and of the islands adjacent already occupied by Spain.”
They added the provision that in such places the respective subjects
should have the right of landing and constructing temporary buildings
for purposes connected with their fisheries. The clause, “so long as
no establishments shall be formed thereon by the subjects of any other
power,” was omitted from the article. This had been objected to on the
ground that it would be virtually a public invitation to all nations
to make settlements there and so join England in despoiling Spain of
her dominions. In order to remove the Spanish objection to publicity
and still assure England that she would not be compelled to keep her
hands off while other nations should do the thing that she had bound
herself not to do, the stipulation was embodied in a secret article.
This secret clause provided that the stipulation in the sixth article
forbidding the subjects of Spain and England to make establishments
in such places should remain in force only so long as no settlements
should be formed there by the subjects of any other power.[424]

These changes having been agreed to, Fitzherbert presented to
Floridablanca on October 23 a new projet embodying them. He said
that he had conformed to the ideas of Floridablanca as far as his
instructions would permit. In order to discuss the new draft before it
should be laid before the King, the British ambassador proposed to call
on the Count in the evening of the same day.[425] When their conference
closed, the Spanish minister said that he was still in doubt whether
the reply which he should give the next morning would be for peace or
war.[426] On the morning of October 24 Floridablanca said that the King
had agreed to Fitzherbert’s terms and had promised that the convention
should be signed with the usual formalities three or four days
later.[427] The British ambassador pressed for an immediate signature,
but the minister said that he could not consent to it. The Count was at
the time with the King at San Ildefonso, whither His Majesty had gone
on a hunting trip. Fitzherbert had gone to the same place to continue
his conferences with the Count. The latter said that if the convention
should be signed while there his enemies would charge him with having
taken advantage of the fact that he was almost alone with the King to
induce His Majesty to agree to a measure contrary to the interests
of his Crown. He said also that he wished, before signing, to send a
memorial to the junta to justify himself for signing the convention
contrary to their opinion. He pledged His Catholic Majesty’s word
that the convention should be signed “verbatim et literatim.”[428] The
exchange of full powers took place on October 26, and the wording of
the titles of the two negotiators to be inserted in the preamble was
arranged on October 27.[429] According to the agreement made four days
earlier, the following convention was signed on October 28:

                    _The Nootka Sound convention._

    Their Britannic and Catholic Majesties being desirous of
    terminating, by a speedy and solid agreement, the differences
    which have lately arisen between the two Crowns, have considered
    that the best way of attaining this salutary object would be that
    of an amicable arrangement which, setting aside all retrospective
    discussions of the rights and pretensions of the two parties,
    should regulate their respective positions for the future on bases
    which would be conformable to their true interests as well as to
    the mutual desires with which Their said Majesties are animated,
    of establishing with each other, in everything and in all places,
    the most perfect friendship, harmony, and good correspondence.
    With this in view they have named and constituted for their
    plenipotentiaries, to wit, on the part of His Britannic Majesty,
    Alleyne Fitzherbert, of the privy council of His said Majesty in
    Great Britain and Ireland, and his ambassador extraordinary and
    minister plenipotentiary to His Catholic Majesty; and on the part
    of His Catholic Majesty, Don Joseph Moñino, Count of Floridablanca,
    Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Spanish Order of Charles III,
    counselor of state to His said Majesty, and his principal secretary
    of state and of the cabinet, who, after having communicated to each
    other their full powers, have agreed on the following articles:

                              ARTICLE I.

    It is agreed that the buildings and tracts of land situated on the
    Northwest Coast of the continent of North America, or on islands
    adjacent to that continent, of which the subjects of His Britannic
    Majesty were dispossessed about the month of April, 1789, by a
    Spanish officer, shall be restored to the said British subjects.

                              ARTICLE II.

    Further, a just reparation shall be made, according to the nature of
    the case, for every act of violence or hostility which may have been
    committed since the said month of April, 1789, by the subjects of
    either of the contending parties against the subjects of the other;
    and in case any of the respective subjects shall, since the same
    period, have been forcibly dispossessed of their lands, buildings,
    vessels, merchandise, or any other objects of property on the said
    continent or on the seas or islands adjacent, they shall be replaced
    in possession of them or a just compensation shall be made to them
    for the losses which they have sustained.

                             ARTICLE III.

    And in order to strengthen the bonds of friendship and to preserve
    in the future a perfect harmony and good understanding between the
    two contracting parties, it is agreed that their respective subjects
    shall not be disturbed or molested either in navigating or carrying
    on their fisheries in the Pacific Ocean or in the South Seas, or in
    landing on the coasts of those seas in places not already occupied,
    for the purpose of carrying on their commerce with the natives of
    the country or of making establishments there; the whole subject,
    nevertheless, to the restrictions and provisions which shall be
    specified in the three following articles.

                              ARTICLE IV.

    His Britannic Majesty engages to employ the most effective measures
    to prevent the navigation and fishery of his subjects in the Pacific
    Ocean or in the South Seas from being made a pretext for illicit
    trade with the Spanish settlements; and with this in view it is
    moreover expressly stipulated that British subjects shall not
    navigate nor carry on their fishery in the said seas within the
    distance of 10 maritime leagues from any part of the coast already
    occupied by Spain.

                              ARTICLE V.

    It is agreed that as well in the places which are to be restored
    to British subjects by virtue of the first article as in all other
    parts of the Northwest Coast of North America or of the islands
    adjacent, situated to the north of the parts of the said coast
    already occupied by Spain, wherever the subjects of either of the
    two powers shall have made settlements since the month of April,
    1789, or shall hereafter make any, the subjects of the other
    shall have free access and shall carry on their commerce without
    disturbance or molestation.

                              ARTICLE VI.

    It is further agreed with respect to the eastern and western coasts
    of South America and the islands adjacent, that the respective
    subjects shall not form in the future any establishment on the
    parts of the coast situated to the south of the parts of the same
    coast and of the islands adjacent already occupied by Spain; it
    being understood that the said respective subjects shall retain the
    liberty of landing on the coasts and island so situated for objects
    connected with their fishery and of erecting thereon huts and other
    temporary structures serving only those objects.

                             ARTICLE VII.

    In all cases of complaint or infraction of the articles of the
    present convention the officers of either party without previously
    permitting themselves to commit any act of violence or assault
    shall be bound to make an exact report of the affair and of its
    circumstances to their respective Courts, who will terminate the
    differences in an amicable manner.

                             ARTICLE VIII.

    The present convention shall be ratified and confirmed within the
    space of six weeks, to be counted from the day of its signature, or
    sooner if possible.

    In witness whereof we, the undersigned plenipotentiaries of their
    Britannic and Catholic Majesties, have, in their names and by virtue
    of our full powers, signed the present convention, and have affixed
    thereto the seals of our arms.

    Done at the palace of San Lorenzo the 28th of October, 1790.[430]

                                            ALLEYNE FITZHERBERT.
                                            THE COUNT OF FLORIDABLANCA.

                            SECRET ARTICLE.

    Since by article 6 of the present convention it has been stipulated,
    respecting the eastern and western coasts of South America, that the
    respective subjects shall not in the future form any establishment
    on the parts of these coasts situated to the south of the parts
    of the said coasts actually occupied by Spain, it is agreed and
    declared by the present article that this stipulation shall remain
    in force only so long as no establishment shall have been formed
    by the subjects of any other power on the coasts in question. This
    secret article shall have the same force as if it were inserted in
    the convention.

    In witness whereof, etc.[431]

Ratifications were exchanged by Floridablanca and Fitzherbert on
November 22.

The fact that the convention was signed in opposition to the advice
of the special junta occasioned lively comment for several weeks in
Spanish official circles. It will be recalled from the last chapter
that the sittings of the junta were on October 21, 22, 24, and 25,
and that on the last date the junta hurried its conclusions off to
Floridablanca, advising war rather than compliance with the English
demands. From a statement in an earlier part of the present chapter,
it will be remembered that the convention was virtually concluded
between Floridablanca and Fitzherbert at their interview of October
23; and that on the next day the King pledged his word to sign the
convention as it then was.

On October 27 a letter from Floridablanca informed Iriarte, the
secretary of the junta, that the conclusions of the junta had been
received on the 25th, had been laid before the King on the 26th,
and were being considered by the Council of State. He cautioned the
members of the junta to keep the proceedings of that body absolutely
secret.[432] The Count evidently hoped to keep concealed the fact that
the convention had already been agreed upon. He did not succeed long in
doing this. On October 28 Iriarte replied to the Count’s letter of the
day before, discussing at length the latter’s injunction to secrecy.
Notes in Iriarte’s hand on slips of paper inserted later in these two
letters show that he had learned of the fact of the convention’s having
been agreed upon before the conclusions of the junta had been received,
though it had not been signed until afterwards. In proof of the fact he
referred to a circular letter which the British ambassador had written
on October 26, telling all of the English consuls in Spain that the
dispute had been settled and that the convention would be formally
signed in a few days. Another brief note similarly inserted censured
the administration very severely for accepting the English terms. It
said:

    This convention of October 28, 1790, is the first treaty that
    has been made during the reign of Charles IV, and in it has been
    conceded to England what has always been resisted and refused to all
    powers since the discovery of the Indies; and the concession means
    much to us.[433]

On November 21 Floridablanca expressed the King’s thanks to all of the
ministers that took part in the junta for their promptness and zeal.
His Majesty assured them that he would not have hesitated a moment to
carry out their recommendations if motives absolutely secret to himself
had not compelled him to order the convention signed. The Count
inclosed some reflections on the convention which His Majesty offered
in addition to the secret motives.[434]

These reflections declared that the purpose of the Convention was to
avoid a war in the present unhappy circumstances, reserving it for a
more favorable time, if it should become necessary. It did not involve
an absolute renunciation in case Spain chose not to observe it. It
was shown that by a strict interpretation of some of its terms the
Convention could be made of little value to England and little loss to
Spain. In the stipulations that granted to English subjects privileges
of commerce and settlement north or south of places already occupied,
attention was called to the expression “already occupied.” The word
“occupied” did not mean nearly so much as “inhabited” or “peopled”
would have meant, and “already” did not mean “actually” or “now.” If
a place had been once occupied and then abandoned this expression
could be made to apply to it. The implication was that formal acts
of taking possession where there had been no thought of making an
actual settlement could be made to come under this head. Such acts had
been performed practically all along the coast. Such a construction
would have almost nullified the privileges granted to England. The
reflections said further that the English were not allowed to approach
Spanish settlements and Spain had equal rights with England anywhere on
the coast. It was thought that Russia’s fear of English encroachments
would be a safeguard against England. English trade and settlements
were limited to the part of the coast north of Nootka. It was insisted
that the treaty simply recognized existing conditions; that it conceded
nothing except what had been allowed, and on the other hand obtained
concessions by limiting the privileges. It was proposed to observe the
Convention only so long as it should be to the advantage of Spain to do
so. Whenever she felt strong enough to assert her ancient rights she
could still do it.[435] The purpose of these arguments was doubtless to
quiet adverse criticism of the Convention. It was partially successful
at the time. A few days later, after the letter of Floridablanca
and the reflections had been considered, all of the ministers of the
junta sent to the King their thanks for his confidence.[436] But this
success did not last long. Criticism of the Convention continued and
finally led to the overthrow of Floridablanca. In May, 1791, the
British ambassador wrote that the Spanish prime minister was very
anxious to have England take effectual measures for preventing British
vessels from touching at Spanish ports, that his enemies might not
find new reasons for attacking him.[437] Finally, in the latter part
of February, 1792, Floridablanca was dismissed from office. The Nootka
business was said to have been the principal cause of his fall.[438]

News of the agreement to sign the convention reached London November
4. On that day Leeds wrote to Auckland that a messenger had just
arrived with a dispatch from Fitzherbert, dated October 24, saying
that the convention had been agreed upon and would be signed four days
later. A copy inclosed with this letter exactly corresponds to the
convention as signed.[439] An unofficial letter, written on the same
day by a clerk in the foreign office and accompanying this official
note, declared that the convention would speak for itself; that it
contained everything that England had demanded. The writer said that
the Spanish ministry had been decidedly for war rather than make the
sacrifice, but that Floridablanca had obtained the King’s consent while
on a hunting trip, and pledged his master’s word that the convention
would be signed on their return, that it might have the sanction of
his colleagues “pro forma.”[440] The signed convention reached London
five days later. Leeds immediately sent a copy of it to Auckland,
that the latter might lay it before the Dutch Government. The Duke
congratulated the ambassador on the happy termination of such a very
important negotiation.[441] On the day of its arrival, November 9, the
British Court ratified the convention, and hurried a messenger off to
Fitzherbert.[442] As stated above, the ratifications were exchanged at
Madrid on November 22.

On November 12 Burges, under secretary for the foreign office, wrote to
Auckland:

    That you and our Dutch friends are satisfied with the conclusion of
    the Spanish business, I am not surprised. Even the opposition here,
    always ready enough to pick holes, as you know, whenever they can,
    seem to be dumfounded, and to have nothing to say against us except
    that we have asked and carried so much that it is impossible such a
    peace can last long.

Speaking of the credit given to Fitzherbert for his success in the
negotiation and of the honor conferred upon him by his being raised to
the peerage, the same letter continued:

    Fitzherbert of course gains much glory, as all good ministers should
    who follow up their instructions, and I understand that he is
    forthwith to receive the high reward of an Irish peerage.[443]

These references are sufficient to show that the English ministry
was highly pleased with the success of the negotiation. On November
24 the mayor, the aldermen, and the commons of the city of London,
in common council assembled, assured the King of their gratitude for
the continuance of peace with Spain, and congratulated him on the
reconciliation.[444] On November 26 Parliament assembled. The King’s
speech mentioned the successful termination of the negotiation and laid
before the Houses copies of the declaration and counter declaration
and the convention.[445] On the same day the House of Lords accorded
enthusiastic thanks and congratulations.[446] Four days later the
Commons, after an extended debate and some criticisms from the
opposition, approved the address, and assured the King that provision
would be made for the expenses of the armament.[447] A general
discussion of the merits of the convention was made the order of the
day for December 13 in the House of Lords. The debate was extended, and
the criticism of the ministry by the opposition was very severe. The
friends of the Government seemed confident of the results and did not
exert themselves greatly to refute the arguments. The convention was
approved.[448] On the same day the Commons debated a motion calling for
all of the correspondence on the dispute. There were the same violent
attacks by the opposition and the same apparent indifference on the
part of the friends of the administration. The motion was defeated by
an overwhelming majority. On the next day, December 14, the merits of
the convention were discussed. The opposing sides manifested much the
same spirit, and in the end the convention was approved by a large
majority.[449]

The logical results of the convention were interfered with by England’s
taking part in the war against France within a little more than
two years after its signature. This absorbed her attention almost
continuously for twenty-two years and prevented her, to a great extent,
from taking advantage of the concessions gained. Before the end of
that period the United States had entered the contest for controlling
the Northwest Coast, and in a few years more purchased the Spanish
claim. Thereby the whole matter was merged in the Oregon controversy.
The immediate result for England was that she obtained free access to
an extended coast, of which she has since come into full possession.
For Spain, it was the first external evidence of the weakness of the
reign of Charles IV, and was the beginning of the series of disasters
which Spain successively suffered under that incompetent Monarch and
his corrupt advisers. It was the first express renunciation of Spain’s
ancient claim to exclusive sovereignty over the American shores of
the Pacific Ocean and the South Seas. It marks the beginning of the
collapse of the Spanish colonial system.[450]

CHAPTER XIV.

SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS AND FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE NOOTKA SOUND
DISPUTE.

Although the convention was concluded in 1790, yet the Nootka Sound
affair was still far from settled. The first article of the convention,
agreeing to restore to British subjects the buildings and lands
which had been taken from them at Nootka, had to be carried out. The
agreement of the Spanish declaration of July 24 to indemnify the
parties concerned in the ships captured at Nootka was also still to
be fulfilled. It required a long arbitration and two new conventions
to accomplish these results, and in the meantime an intimate treaty
of alliance had been entered into for mutual protection against the
excesses of the French Revolution. It was more than four years before
these matters were finally adjusted. The present chapter will review
them briefly.

The English and Spanish Governments each appointed a commissioner to
go to Nootka and carry out the agreement of the first article of the
convention of October 28, 1790. The commissioners did not meet until
the summer of 1792. A brief statement should be made concerning the
establishment at Nootka between the events of 1789 and the meeting of
the commissioners three years later. Martinez’s abandonment of Nootka
in the fall of 1789 and his return to Mexico was discussed in a former
chapter. The plans of the Viceroy for sending a new expedition under
Eliza to reoccupy the post in the spring of 1790 were studied in the
same chapter.[451] The Viceroy feared that Nootka would be seized by
the English before his expedition could reach the place, or that an
English expedition might later attempt to wrest the post from the
Spanish.[452] His fears were not realized. The port was reoccupied
and held without opposition. During the three following seasons a
substantial Spanish settlement was formed, and, using this as a center,
exploring expeditions examined the neighboring coast.[453]

The British commissioner for carrying out the convention was Captain
Vancouver. He left England in 1791 and was to reach the Northwest
Coast in the spring of the following year. His principal business
was to explore that coast. Additional instructions concerning the
transfer of Nootka were to be sent to him later.[454] These reached
him during the summer of 1792 while he was engaged in exploring the
coast in the neighborhood of the island that later received his name.
He arrived at Nootka late in August. He found there Bodega y Quadra,
the Spanish commissioner. It would be of little value to follow in
detail the negotiations between them, since their mission accomplished
nothing. They could not agree, although, personally, a very strong
friendship sprang up between them. Vancouver expected that the entire
establishment would be transferred to England. Quadra, after careful
investigation, became convinced that the English had never purchased
nor taken possession of any land except the small plat of ground on
which Meares’s temporary house had stood in 1788. Consequently he
offered to transfer this, but no more. Vancouver refused to accept so
little and the whole matter was referred back to the Governments at
London and Madrid.[455] Having continued his survey of the coast for
two years longer, Vancouver returned to Nootka in the summer of 1794
expecting that new instructions would be awaiting him regarding the
transfer. He was disappointed. He waited two months at Nootka for them,
then went to Monterey, where he waited nearly two months more. The
English instructions still did not come, but the Spanish commissioner
had received his orders, and Vancouver was informed that a special
British commissioner had been sent for the purpose. On December 1 he
sailed for England.[456]

While the arrangements were being made to send the above commissioners
to Nootka to carry out the stipulations in the first article of the
convention, steps were also being taken to fulfill the agreement in the
declarations of July 24. The two Governments appointed commissioners
to decide on the amount of the indemnity which Spain should pay to
those interested in the ships captured at Nootka. Their negotiation
was conducted at London. The Spanish agent, Manuel de Las Heras, was
sent in May, 1791. Baron St. Helens [Fitzherbert] wrote on May 29
introducing him to Lord Grenville, who had succeeded the Duke of Leeds
in the foreign office. Heras was also consul-general to England. St.
Helens said:

    He appears to me to be very sensible, well informed, and right
    headed; so that I am persuaded that he will do his best in order to
    execute the commission with which he is charged to the satisfaction
    of both Courts.[457]

When the Spanish commissioner reached London he either misunderstood
his instructions or was intentionally very reserved regarding them. On
August 26 Grenville wrote to St. Helens:

    The sending of M. Las Heras at last without any instructions is
    really abominable, and would be reason enough, if we were so
    disposed, to refuse to hear of alliance or anything else.

He appealed to St. Helens to “make those slow Spaniards send
instructions and powers, and, above all, liberty to refer the matter
to arbitration, by which the ministers of both Courts will get it off
their hands.”[458] On receipt of this letter the British ambassador
called the attention of Floridablanca to the commissioner’s delay
in negotiating. The Spanish minister thought that the instructions
to Heras were clear and explicit; nevertheless, he sent additional
instructions on September 8 authorizing the commissioner to settle
and liquidate the damages, with the concurrence of Campo, the Spanish
ambassador. He was to give the British Court to understand that in
case of difference the Spanish King was willing to submit the matter
to arbitration. The Count had given St. Helens a copy of these
instructions and the latter sent them to Grenville, saying that they
seemed satisfactory except that the commissioner did not have authority
to settle finally without submitting the matter to the Spanish King. He
remarked that such would have been an unprecedented power and said that
His Catholic Majesty had promised to act on it immediately.[459]

It seems that the commissioners failed to agree and that the matter
was referred to a court of arbitration, which sat at or near Madrid
in the early part of the next year. On May 14, 1792, St. Helens wrote
from Aranjuez that the Nootka arbitration business was “en bon train,”
and though it was going more slowly than expected he hoped to send
dispatches concerning it in a very few days.[460] A fortnight later the
business had taken a new turn. The British ambassador wrote:

    I can not but hope that the proposal which goes by this messenger
    for settling what the Count of Aranda[461] calls the fastidious
    business of the Nootka claims by the payment of a round sum of money
    as a discharge in full will strike your fancy as much as it does his
    and mine.

The writer added that if the offer should be thought too small he was
confident that Spain would increase it ten, fifteen, or even twenty
thousand Spanish dollars. If Grenville should reject the offer and
wish the matter to revert to arbitration he said that Aranda would
facilitate it.[462] The amount offered was 200,000 Spanish dollars.
About two months later the Nootka claimants were called upon to decide
whether they wished to accept the offer or to have the matter referred
back to Madrid in hope of having the sum increased.[463] The claimants
apparently did not accept the offer. A month afterwards Dundas, the
home secretary, wrote:

    The Nootka business, I take it for granted, will get on, but it
    hangs rather unaccountably. I suspect that both sides are in some
    degree to blame.[464]

After a delay of several months more, the Spanish Court increased the
offer by $10,000. On February 12, 1793, the following convention was
signed:

                      _Nootka claims convention._

    In virtue of the declarations exchanged at Madrid on the 24th of
    July, 1790, and of the convention signed at the Escorial on the
    18th [28th] of the following October, Their Catholic and Britannic
    Majesties, desiring to regulate and determine definitely everything
    regarding the restitution of the British ships seized at Nootka, as
    well as the indemnification of the parties interested in the ships,
    have named for this purpose and constituted as their commissioners
    and plenipotentiaries, to wit, on the part of His Catholic Majesty,
    Don Manuel de Las Heras, commissary in His said Majesty’s armies,
    and his agent and consul-general in the Kingdoms of Great Britain
    and Ireland; and on the part of His Britannic Majesty, Mr. Ralph
    Woodford, Knight Baronet of Great Britain; who, after having
    communicated their full powers, have agreed upon the following
    articles:

                              ARTICLE I.

    His Catholic Majesty, besides having restored the ship _Argonaut_,
    the restoration of which took place in the port of San Blas in
    the year 1791 [1790], agrees to pay as indemnity to the parties
    interested in it the amount of two hundred and ten thousand hard
    dollars in specie, it being understood that this sum is to serve
    as compensation and complete indemnification for all their losses,
    whatever they may be, without any exception, and without leaving the
    possibility of a future remonstrance on any pretext or motive.

                              ARTICLE II.

    Said payment shall be made on the day on which the present
    convention shall be signed by the commissioner of His Catholic
    Majesty in the presence of the commissioner of His Britannic
    Majesty, which latter shall give at the same time an acknowledgment
    of payment consistent with the terms enunciated in the former
    article and signed by the said commissioner for himself and in the
    name and by the order of His Britannic Majesty and of the said
    interested parties. And there shall be attached to the present
    convention a copy of the said acknowledgment of payment, executed in
    the proper form, and likewise of the respective full powers and of
    the authorizations of the said interested parties.

                             ARTICLE III.

    The ratifications of the present convention shall be exchanged in
    this city of London within a period of six weeks from the date of
    its signature, or before if possible.

    In witness whereof we, the undersigned commissioners and
    plenipotentiaries of Their Catholic and Britannic Majesties, have
    signed the present convention in their names and in virtue of our
    respective full powers, affixing to it the seals of our arms.

    Done at Whitehall, February 12, 1793.[465]

                                                   MANUEL DE LAS HERAS.
                                                   R. WOODFORD.

During all of the time that the negotiations were in progress over
the liquidation of the Nootka claims, a treaty of alliance and
commerce between England and Spain was being discussed. The British
Court attempted to induce the Spanish Government to accept duties on
English manufactures, “instead,” as Grenville said, “of paying an
army not to prevent their being smuggled.” In the same connection he
remarked, “but that, I fear, is a trait of wisdom far beyond their
comprehension.”[466] The negotiation dragged through 1791 and 1792 and
into 1793. In the meantime Spain had twice changed prime ministers. On
the fall of Floridablanca, Aranda had succeeded him. After holding the
position for about a year Aranda was succeeded by the Duke of Alcudia,
the famous Godoy, known as the Prince of Peace, the paramour of the
corrupt Queen. The impulse that finally brought the negotiations to a
crisis was the murder of the French King by order of the Convention.
A shudder of horror passed over Europe. Four days after the death
of Louis XVI the British Cabinet decided to authorize St. Helens to
discuss a permanent alliance with the Court of Spain against the
excesses of the French Revolution. The alliance was to be commercial,
offensive, and defensive.[467] Such an alliance was concluded May
25, 1793, and ratified by the British Court on June 21 following.
Ratifications were exchanged July 5.[468]

This alliance facilitated the settlement of the Nootka business. After
the failure of Vancouver and Quadra to agree in 1792 as to what should
be surrendered at Nootka, the Governments took up the matter again.
While the negotiations for this purpose were in progress a long letter
from Revilla-Gigedo, the Viceroy of Mexico, reached Madrid. This was
the informe of April 12, 1793, to which reference has frequently been
made. Godoy, the Spanish prime minister, wrote to the Viceroy that in
view of this and other letters from the same source he had concluded a
convention with St. Helens.[469] In this long letter the Viceroy, after
having given a brief history of the Spanish operations on the Northwest
Coast, and especially the Nootka expeditions, gave an extended
discussion, the purpose of which was to show that Nootka was not worth
retaining. He dwelt on the millions that had been spent during the
past twenty-five years in erecting and sustaining new establishments
in Upper California, and discouraged attempts to occupy more distant
places. He indorsed the idea of settling the Straits of Juan de Fuca
and southward, but he thought that settlements farther north would be
a cause of anxiety and fruitless expense and would afford occasions
for quarrels and misunderstandings with England. If England wished to
maintain possession of Nootka as a point of honor, he declared that
Spain ought to yield to her. He proposed a generous surrender of the
post to the English.[470]

The convention to which Godoy referred as having been concluded by
himself with the British ambassador was signed at Madrid on January 11,
1794, and was as follows:

          _Convention for the mutual abandonment of Nootka._

    Their Catholic and Britannic Majesties desiring to remove and
    obviate all doubt and difficulty relative to the execution of
    article 1 of the convention concluded between Their said Majesties
    on the 28th of October, 1790, have resolved and agreed to order that
    new instructions be sent to the officials who have been respectively
    commissioned to carry out the said article, the tenor of which
    instructions shall be as follows:

    That within the shortest time that may be possible after the arrival
    of the said officials at Nootka they shall meet in the place, or
    near, where the buildings stood which were formerly occupied by the
    subjects of His Britannic Majesty, at which time and in which place
    they shall exchange mutually the following declaration and counter
    declaration:

                             DECLARATION.

        “I, N---- N----, in the name and by the order of His
        Catholic Majesty, by means of these presents restore to
        N---- N---- the buildings and districts of land situated
        on the Northwest Coast of the continent of North America,
        or the islands adjacent to that continent, of which the
        subjects of His Britannic Majesty were dispossessed by a
        Spanish officer toward the month of April, 1789. In witness
        whereof I have signed the present declaration, sealing it
        with the seal of my arms. Done at Nootka on the ---- day of
        ----, 179--.”

                         COUNTER DECLARATION.

        “I, N---- N----, in the name and by the order of His
        Britannic Majesty, by means of these presents declare
        that the buildings and tracts of land on the Northwest
        Coast of the continent of North America, or on the islands
        adjacent to that continent, of which the subjects of His
        Britannic Majesty were dispossessed by a Spanish officer
        toward the month of April, 1789, have been restored to me
        by N---- N----, which restoration I declare to be full and
        satisfactory. In witness whereof I have signed the present
        counter declaration, sealing it with the seal of my arms.
        Done at Nootka on the ---- day of ----, 179--.”

    That then the British official shall unfurl the British flag
    over the land so restored in sign of possession. And that after
    these formalities the officials of the two Crowns shall withdraw,
    respectively, their people from the said port of Nootka.

    Further, Their said Majesties have agreed that the subjects of
    both nations shall have the liberty of frequenting the said port
    whenever they wish and of constructing there temporary buildings
    to accommodate them during their residence on such occasions. But
    neither of the said parties shall form any permanent establishment
    in the said port or claim any right of sovereignty or territorial
    dominion there to the exclusion of the other. And Their said
    Majesties will mutually aid each other to maintain for their
    subjects free access to the port of Nootka against any other nation
    which may attempt to establish there any sovereignty or dominion.

    In witness whereof we, the undersigned first secretary of state
    and of the Cabinet of His Catholic Majesty, and the ambassador and
    plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty, in the name and by the
    express order of our respective sovereigns, have signed the present
    agreement, sealing it with the seals of our arms.

    Done at Madrid, January 11, 1794.[471]

                                                   THE DUKE OF ALCUDIA.
                                                   ST. HELENS.

The two Courts proceeded to carry out this agreement. Godoy instructed
the Viceroy of Mexico to appoint some one as the commissioner for
Spain.[472] The British commissioner was appointed later, and sent
by way of Spain, Havana, Vera Cruz, and Mexico.[473] He arrived at
La Coruna about the middle of August, 1794.[474] On November 20 he
landed at Vera Cruz, and went by way of Mexico to San Blas.[475] From
this port both commissioners sailed for Nootka. The Englishman was Sir
Thomas Pierce; the Spaniard, Manuel de Alava. They met at Nootka and
on the appointed day, March 23, 1795, carried out the above agreement.
Alava had previously destroyed the buildings of the Spanish settlement.
After the prescribed ceremonies had been performed, both the Spanish
and the English deserted the place.[476] Neither nation ever reoccupied
it. Nootka is still inhabited by Indians.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Schoell, Histoire des Traités de Paix, IV, 112.

[2] See Humboldt, Alex. von, Essai Politique, II, 460.

[3] Oscar Browning, the writer of Chapter X, in Volume VIII, of the
Cambridge Modern History, recently published, gives the least prejudiced
and most accurate account. However, it is very brief. He introduces the
Incident as an important episode in the foreign policy of Pitt. He says:
“An event occurred on the other side of the world which nearly brought
about a European conflagration.” In preparing his brief discussion he
consulted the documents in the public record office.

[4] See Duro, Armada Española, VIII, 8-16.

[5] See Hassall, The French People, 341.

[6] Richard Cadman Etches to Captain Portlock, London, September 3,
1785. (Meares, An Answer to Mr. Dixon, 10.) The instructions were not
carried out by this commander, but the same company was interested in the
expedition which reached Nootka for that purpose in 1789. Nootka Sound was
for a time called King Georges Sound by the English and San Lorenzo by the
Spanish.

[7] Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 172.

[8] Sometimes written “Mears.”

[9] Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages.

[10] This condition and the terms on which relief was offered him by
Portlock and Dixon, who reached the place in the spring, led to a bitter
personal quarrel between Meares and Dixon, which produced several mutually
recriminating pamphlets.

[11] Meares, Voyages. Introductory voyage, i-xl. In this Meares quotes the
letters which passed between him and Portlock in May, 1787, which gave
rise to the quarrel.

[12] Id. 2.

[13] The Merchant Proprietors to John Meares, esq., Commanding the
_Felice_ and _Iphigenia_, China, December 24, 1787. (Id., Appendix I.)

[14] Id.

[15] See Chapter IV below.

[16] Meares, Memorial, Appendix to Voyages. He explains that this ruse
was at first successful, but was later discovered through the financial
failure of the Portuguese merchant who had allowed his name to be thus
used.

[17] Dixon, Further Remarks on Meares’s Voyages, 55. His hostility to
Meares prejudices any statement made by him. See above, p. 287, note b
[10].

[18] Bancroft, Northwest Coast, 1, 193. This author devotes some 10 pages
to a discussion of this expedition.

Greenhow, Oregon and California, 172-178, attempts to prove that the
expedition was purely Portuguese. His account is too prejudiced to be of
much value. The chief purpose of his book was to prove that America had a
better claim to the Oregon country than England. If this expedition had
been purely Portuguese, England could have acquired no possible claim
through it.

[19] Meares. Voyages, 2, 3.

[20] Id., 88.

[21] Id., 104. This date should probably be changed to May 12. When the
English and Spanish not at Nootka in 1789 their calendars were one day
apart. (See below, p. 312, note a [82].) Since there are no conflicting
dates given for the events at Nootka in 1788, those found in the journals
of the English commanders are followed.

[22] Id., 114.

[23] The purchase is confirmed in the information of William Graham,
London, May 5, 1790 (inclosure No. VI, with Meares’s Memorial, appendix
to Voyages). It was also confirmed by Duffin in conversation with
Vancouver in 1792. (Vancouver, Voyages, II, 370-372). Both of these have
strong English prejudices. The purchase is denied by Gray and Ingraham.
(Greenhow, Oregon and California, 414.) They strongly favored the Spanish.
They say that the Indians denied having sold land to the English. That
there was a purchase was practically conceded, however, even by the
Spaniards, since Quadra offered to Vancouver in 1792 the land on which
Meares’s house had stood in 1788. (See Vancouver, Voyages, II, 335 ff.)

[24] Id., 115-116.

[25] Id., 130.

[26] Greenhow, Oregon and California, 175.

[27] Meares, Voyages. 131.

[28] Id., 146, and Memorial in appendix.

[29] Id., 95.

[30] Id., 204.

[31] Meares, Voyages, 173, and Memorial in appendix.

[32] Id., 173-179.

[33] Id., 220.

[34] Greenhow, Oregon and California, 172; and Bancroft, Northwest Coast,
I, 194.

[35] Dixon, Further Remarks on Meares’s Voyages, 24. This writer, in his
controversial pamphlet, quotes from a letter of Captain Duncan, who had
met Meares near the entrance to Nootka Sound in 1788. This letter makes
the statement that Meares had “at that time a small vessel on the stocks
at Nootka, where, he told me, he had a fort, guns mounted, and Portuguese
colors flying.” It was written January 17, 1791, and can hardly be given
absolute credence, since Dixon was so prejudiced against Meares. Greenhow
is too partisan to be fair, and the Americans, Gray and Ingraham, and
Haswell, whom Bancroft quotes on the point, were very pro-Spanish. On the
other hand, Meares’s statements can not be taken for truth unless it is
very plain that there is no reason for his telling anything else.

[36] Meares, Voyages, 220. It is doubtful whether this testimony can be
considered of any value. As to the truthfulness of the picture, it is
interesting to notice the Indian village in the background. He had said
that before this the entire village had been moved some 30 miles up the
sound for the winter.

[37] Meares, Voyages, appendix, Memorial, VI.

[38] Meares to Douglas, _Felice_, Friendly Cove, in King Georges Sound,
September 20, 1788. (Meares, Voyages, Appendix V.)

[39] Id., 334.

[40] Meares to Douglas, _Felice_, Friendly Cove, in King Georges Sound,
September 20, 1788. (Meares, Voyages, Appendix V, p. 217.)

[41] Note his reference to the killing of Callicum by the Spaniards in
1789. (Meares, Voyages, 118; also see 217, 218, referring to Colnett’s
expedition of 1789.) His preface would lead one to think that the writing
of his narrative was entirely an afterthought. He mentions as his motives
the wishes of friends, the political circumstances of the moment [the
diplomatic controversy with Spain], and public expectation. He says: “I
little thought it would be my future lot to give this part of my maritime
life to the world. If I had looked forward to the possibility of such
an event I should have enlarged my observations and been more minutely
attentive,” etc. But the fact that in his list of subscribers he gives
the names of a number of men living in China shows that before leaving
there, at least, he expected to publish his narrative. All of this tends
to depreciate the value of his statements where his interests are at stake.

[42] Gray and Ingraham to Quadra, Nootka Sound, August 3, 1792. (Greenhow,
Oregon and California, 414.) (Prejudiced.)

[43] Colnett, Voyage, vii.

[44] Spanish translation of an extract from the “License from the governor
and company of merchants of Great Britain for trading in the South Sea
and other parts of America, to Richard Cadman Etches and Company to trade
in the places where the South Sea Company has the privilege by an act of
Parliament.” (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) It was signed
by the secretary of the company and dated August 4, 1785. They were
forbidden to trade south of 45° on the northwest coast. (See Colnett to
the Viceroy, October 1, 1789; Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.)

[45] Spanish translation of Colnett to the Viceroy, October 1, 1789. (Id.)

[46] Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages. Also Colnett to the Viceroy,