killed in the confusion that ensued on the entrance into the city, Kucha
fell. The triumph was, perhaps, not too dearly purchased. The Tungan
power had received a blow, which took the sting out of its menace, and
effectually protected Kashgar from any possible confederacy among the
Tungan cities. Yakoob Beg followed up the success of Kucha with all his
usual promptitude, but his power was not yet sufficiently matured to
justify him in carrying on extensive operations at such a distance from
the base of his resources. But another reason at this time combined to
recall his attention to another part of his dominions. The Russians were
advancing both in Khokand and in the district of Vernoe to the west of
Kuldja.

It was evident that prudence demanded a prompt return, and for the
present all further triumph must be abandoned. However, before Yakoob
Beg returned to regulate events in the western portion of his dominions,
he had the satisfaction of receiving the submission humbly tendered by
the ruling bodies of Karashar, Turfan, Hamil, and Urumtsi. After this
brilliant campaign, he slowly retraced his steps through Kucha to Aksu.
Then he turned into the mountains, and reduced Ush Turfan, which in his
onward march he had passed by; and, after this acquisition, the Tungani
of Ili expressed a desire to enter into terms of amity with one who had
brought his empire into direct contact with their state. All these
events occurred during the year 1867; and, although now and then
uncertain rumours reached England of these changes in Eastern
Turkestan, the world in general, even the Russian world, remained
indifferent to the progress of events of which it is now difficult to
trace the exact course. But, with the close of this first Tungan
campaign, and with the extension of the new state up to the walls of
Kucha, the Russian Government, as will be seen in a later chapter,
endeavoured to arrive at some clear view on the exact condition of the
newly formed confederacy to which they in their career of conquest were
approaching so rapidly.

This commencement of foreign interest in, nay, almost supervision of,
his actions in Eastern Turkestan, imposed some restriction on the
hitherto unrestrained caprice of Yakoob Beg, and the country beyond
Kucha up to Turfan was saved for a short time from the depredations from
which in 1871-73 it suffered so much. On his return to Kashgar after
this triumphant progress, and after having annexed the three important
cities, Aksu, Kucha, and Ush Turfan, the danger which had seemed to
threaten the state from Russia passed off, and Yakoob Beg proceeded to
consolidate his hold on what he had secured. Aksu and Kucha were
fortified, and various small forts were constructed in the passes
leading to Khokand and Kuldja. Every precaution was taken that he had it
in his power to observe, to ensure the safety of his little kingdom from
without, and for the moment all murmur within seemed to be hushed by the
loud acclamations at the victories of the Athalik Ghazi. He had, indeed,
accomplished no slight task, and could afford to regard his handiwork
with some complacency. To erect a powerful state on the ruins of the
Chinese power, and to unite in some sort of settled government turbulent
races and antagonistic sects, was no mean achievement; and to all the
credit due to such Yakoob Beg has indisputable claims. But for him,
confusion and disunion would have settled down over Eastern Turkestan,
until either the Russians or the Chinese had come to establish a
respectable government; but for him Kashgar would have lapsed into a
state of almost hopeless disorder, and Russian triumphs would have been
facilitated. But, when Yakoob Beg returned to find that he was not
seriously threatened in Kashgar, he experienced deep regret and
mortification that he had abstained from prosecuting his wars with the
Tungani with a greater vigour. He eagerly looked forward to an excuse
for resuming his discontinued operations against them. In the interval
that elapsed, he waged a small war in the mountainous region of his
territory extending into Badakshan and the Chitral. Sirikul had, ever
since the appearance of the Badakshi army in the service of Kashgar,
acknowledged a certain kind of obedience to Yakoob Beg; but in 1868, the
governor hitherto supported by the Athalik Ghazi broke out into revolt,
and committed several acts of depredation in the contiguous districts of
Sanju and Yarkand. Yakoob Beg without delay despatched a small force
against him, and, by the help of some mountain guns and the judicious
employment of a small but select body of cavalry, was successful in
overcoming all resistance with very slight loss. In February, 1869,
Yakoob Beg, having tried several milder alternatives, formally annexed
this district, and carried the inhabitants into Yarkand. He resettled
the territory with Kirghiz nomads and Yarkandis. Once more, he was able
to turn his attention to the east, and in 1869 commenced those final
campaigns against the Tungani which only ceased with the reappearance of
the Chinese. The great blot in the career of Yakoob Beg is the
resumption of hostilities against the Tungani. In 1867, when he first
engaged with any vigour the Tungani, some excuse may be found for that
unforeseeing action, in the fact that the Tungani were unbroken, and
might have proved formidable neighbours. But in 1869, they had been
hurled back on Korla, and, although it may be true that they were
inconvenient neighbours, robbing caravans and molesting travellers, it
is difficult to justify the later campaigns of Yakoob Beg against them,
especially as they were conducted by himself and his lieutenants with
exceptional ferocity. But, however weak may have been the impulse, and
however disastrous in the result may have been his crusade against the
Tungani, it was not difficult to discover a plausible excuse for
proceeding to extreme measures with his troublesome neighbours. In the
autumn of 1869, Korla fell before his triumphant arms, and it would
appear that he then turned north into the valleys of the Tekes and the
Yuldus, two rivers rising in the Tian Shan, and flowing through
Jungaria. This movement aroused the susceptibilities of the Russians,
and afforded a very simple excuse for the acquisition of Kuldja. In that
state, disturbances had arisen between the Tungani and the Tarantchis,
and it must have fallen an easy prey to the Athalik Ghazi had he been
permitted to advance. The Russians had, however, in 1871, entered
Kuldja, and explained their action by asserting that they had only done
so to restore order, and to prevent its falling into the hands of Yakoob
Beg. They merely held it in trust for the Chinese, so they said, and
would restore it to them, its rightful owners, so soon as they should be
able to keep permanent possession of it. While Yakoob Beg despatched a
large detachment into the country of the Tian Shan, his main body was
prosecuting with vigour the war against Karashar and Turfan. Yakoob Beg
did not always conduct the war in person, for his two sons, Kuli Beg and
Hacc Kuli Beg, were now growing up, and they, assisted by some of the
older lieutenants, triumphed in various actions over the Tungan rulers
of Turfan and Hamil, while even the princes of Urumtsi and Manas over
the Tian Shan were unable to oppose the valour and energy of their
adversary. The glory of these military achievements was tarnished by the
ruthless manner in which the district was laid waste, and the
inhabitants were massacred; and the senselessness of these proceedings
only required an hour of trial, such as the Chinese invasion, to prove
how fatal it would be to the enacters of these atrocities. Without any
great cessation, their operations were carried on down to the end of
1873, and it does not appear that Yakoob Beg derived any benefit
whatever from these costly and remote undertakings. Although the Tungan
chiefs of Urumtsi and Hamil were on several occasions defeated by the
armies of the Athalik Ghazi, their cities were never occupied, and they
consequently escaped that desolation which stretched from the walls of
Kucha to the regions north of Lake Lob. Chightam, a small town lying
half way between Turfan and Hamil, was the extreme point to which the
Kashgarian forces penetrated. The noble families of Urumtsi, Turfan, and
Hamil were almost totally destroyed in the fall of Turfan; and their
place in their own cities was seized by Tungan generals and adventurers,
who began to retreat westward from Kansuh, on the rumours of Chinese
preparations for invading Jungaria.

The wars against the Tungani certainly served one useful purpose in
enabling Yakoob Beg to collect a large and disciplined force round his
standard; but the attractions of service in his army lost much of their
value in the eyes of the hardier clans of Turkestan and the neighbouring
states, when it became known that the prospect of loot and prize money
in districts impoverished by several years of hostilities had
diminished. The rigour of the discipline maintained, too, was irksome to
nomads and irregulars accustomed to the easier service and freedom from
restraint of the other Asiatic princes; and during the later years of
his rule there were many desertions, and a difficulty was encountered in
inducing recruits to enter his army. The old practice, employed with
such success in the earlier years of his rule, of inducing the conquered
to combine with the conqueror, was no longer possible, for
extermination had become the order of the day. The Usbegs, Kirghiz, and
other tribes, could not supply in sufficient numbers the requirements of
the state, and the Tungani, who should have comprised the largest
portion of the subjects of the Athalik Ghazi, were coerced into
subjection with an undiscriminating severity. The result was really a
paralysis through sheer want of people, and it was not known until the
hour of trial came how weakened his forces had become. Every inducement
was held forth to Afghan, Badakshi, and, above all, to Indian soldiers
to join, but these, although they formed a nucleus of trustworthy and
efficient soldiers, were far too few to constitute a formidable army. We
are justified in assuming from the facts that these Tungan wars,
conducted in an unsparing manner, were the greatest mistake that marked
the career of Yakoob Beg. So far as his occupation of Kucha goes, he
could at least say that he had secured a valuable prize. He had acquired
every part of what could be considered Kashgar, and his kingdom was
effectually guarded, and his revenues prospectively increased, by the
possession of the great cities of Aksu and Kucha. He might exclaim with
justice that he had eclipsed all his predecessors in military prowess,
and if he had been wise he would then have turned his attention to the
well government of his state, and by so doing have demonstrated that he
was of a higher capacity for ruling a people, as well as for commanding
an army, than any Khoja prince of the past. Had he abstained from
prosecuting with such unflagging persistency his inveterate dislike of
the Tungani, he might easily have come to terms with his neighbours, and
the harm they could have done him would have been infinitesimally small.
But the chief advantage of that more prudent policy would have been
visible when the Chinese advanced to chastise the Tungani. Not only
would the Tungani have been more capable of resisting the Khitay, not
only would Manas and Urumtsi have been capable of offering a more
determined defence, but the Tungani could have retired on Turfan, and
held the country round that town, as well as Karashar and Korla, for a
protracted period against General Kin Shun. The Athalik Ghazi with
untouched resources could have awaited with just confidence the advance
of the Chinese upon his strong frontier city of Kucha, and, as the
Chinese accomplished the difficult task of crushing the Tungani, he
would have had the satisfaction of knowing that in all probability the
Chinese effort would have been spent before it reached his own borders.

It is impossible to judge men except by the results of their actions,
and the result of Yakoob Beg's incessant and unnecessary interference
with the Tungani was that the Chinese army was able in a few months to
dissipate the remaining Tungan communities, and to encounter in the full
flush of their triumph the numerically weaker forces of Yakoob Beg. It
is, therefore, impossible to exonerate the ruler from great blame in
hastily undertaking operations which a little consideration ought to
have shown to be unwise. Having traced Yakoob Beg's wars with the
Chinese Mahomedans, it is time to consider his rule of Kashgaria proper,
and the events that during these years were transpiring in other
quarters of the state.

CHAPTER IX.

YAKOOB BEG'S GOVERNMENT OF KASHGAR.

Yakoob Beg's chief claim to our consideration is that, for more than
twelve years, he gave a settled government to a large portion of Central
Asia, and that, however faulty his external policy may have been in
critical moments, his internal management was founded on a practical and
sufficiently just basis. As a warrior he had done much to justify
admiration, and had proved on many a well-fought field, and in many a
desperate encounter, his claims to be considered a fearless and resolute
soldier; but in this quality he was equalled, if not excelled, by his
own lieutenant, Abdulla Beg, the Murat of Kashgar, while some of the
deeds of his son, Beg Bacha, will rank in daring and surpass in ferocity
anything achieved by the Athalik Ghazi. But in capacity for
administration Yakoob Beg far surpassed his contemporaries, and the
merit of his success was enhanced, not so much by the originality of the
method adopted, as by the unique vigour and perseverance with which it
was put into force. The secret of his power can only be discovered by
constantly bearing in mind the fact that he had constituted himself the
champion of the Mahomedan religion in Central Asia. The Ameers of
Bokhara and Afghanistan might trifle with the seductive promises of the
Russians, and might consent to sacrifice the interests of their religion
for a transitory advancement of their worldly possessions; but to such
degradations the Athalik Ghazi--true "champion father" as he was--never
stooped. With whatever imaginary power the sympathy and good-will of
the Mahomedan peoples of Turkestan may have clothed this ruler, there is
no question that his attitude towards the Muscovite would have warranted
the assertion of greater power than was ever attributed to him; and the
secret of this delusion, an attitude of defiant strength without any
solid foundation for so bold a course, can only be unravelled by
remembering that the Athalik Ghazi strove to represent, not so much
Kashgaria, as the whole Mahomedan world of Central Asia. The necessities
of his own position, when, having conquered Kashgar, he found that he
had aroused the susceptibilities of the Russians, compelled him to seek
in every direction for aid, and to have recourse to every artifice for
increasing his strength, or its semblance, in order to avoid the
dissolution of his state and a subjection to the Czar. So well did he
succeed in his efforts, and so prompt were his movements and so fearless
his attitude, that the Russians were deluded into a belief--which was,
as we emphatically insist, unfounded--that Kashgar would prove a more
formidable antagonist than either Bokhara, or Khokand, or Khiva.

The interior management of a state, which, young in years, yet seemed to
tower among its fellows, might be supposed to be a very interesting
topic to dilate upon; but on this subject there is less direct evidence
than could be wished. Even Sir Douglas Forsyth, in his official report,
is not able to throw as much light as is desired on the inner working of
the administrative system of Yakoob Beg. Still, such as it is, with the
exception of the Russian writer, Gregorieff, he is the only authority on
the subject.

To commence with the court and the immediate surroundings of Yakoob Beg,
we are struck by two inconsistencies. In the first place, there were no
great nobles, or indeed adherents or his family; those chiefs who,
whether they were Khokandian nobles or Kirghiz or Afghan adventurers,
had proved their fidelity to his rule, and their capacity for service,
were actively employed as governors of districts, or as commandants of
fortresses in the wide-stretching dominions of their imperious master.
Periodically they came to pay their respects in the capital, and at
frequent intervals Yakoob Beg, in his journeys to the frontier, visited
them, and superintended their operations in person; but, in so active a
community where there was a dearth of mankind, the intellectually gifted
members of the society were too valuable to be permitted to devote their
energies and their attention to the object of becoming palace ornaments.
Yakoob Beg had forced himself on a people who regarded him with
indifference, and he had to maintain himself in his place by a never
relaxing vigour. To make this possible, he required a large staff of
efficient and trustworthy subordinates, who may be divided into three
classes of various capacities, viz., soldiers, administrators, and
tax-gatherers. Until the last few months of his reign there was no
symptom that his system was declining in vigour, or that his supply of
competent officials was limited and susceptible of being exhausted. Even
in his most prosperous years, however, there was always a difficulty in
obtaining a full supply; and in all inferior posts the disaffected
Khitay had to be employed. The Tungani of Kucha and Aksu were scarcely
more to be trusted in an emergency than their Buddhist kinsmen. Yet the
extensive civil service of the state, which undertook the education, the
religion, the civil order, the local administration of the people all
into its own hands, had to be kept in working order, whatever else might
happen. It can at once be perceived that, when a government which never
obtained any deep hold on the affections of the people had only a
limited population to draw upon, it was only a question of time to solve
the difficulty by an exhaustion of the supply of suitable brain
material, or by the uprising of an, at heart, dissatisfied people. No
one will ever understand the secret of Yakoob Beg's rule unless he
constantly bears in mind that his strict orthodoxy as a Mussulman, and
his still stricter enforcement of the laws of his religion within his
borders, were elements of strength only in his external relations; in
his internal affairs they placed him in the light of a tyrant, and
prevented his people ever experiencing any enthusiasm for his person and
rule. It is doubtful whether outside the priesthood and the more
fanatical Andijanis there was any great religious zeal at all, and it is
quite a delusion to speak of the Kashgari, as a whole, as being
fanatical Mahomedans, in the same degree that it is true to say so of
the Bokhariots or Afghans. In addition to there being no noble or
wealthy official class in the city of Kashgar, there was also the
strange inconsistency of an intensely strict etiquette being enforced
side by side with extreme plainness in costume and ceremonial. It is
rare indeed to hear any traveller to Kashgar speaking of the richness or
finery of court functionaries. Even Hadji Torah, or the Seyyid Yakoob
Khan, as he is now called, and Mahomed Yunus, the governor of Yarkand,
two of the most trusted and prominent followers of the Athalik Ghazi,
were not to be distinguished from a host of minor luminaries in the
court circle by any external insignia of their elevated position. Some
of the military, officers of the household troops, wore a device of a
dragon's head worked in silk over their plain uniform of leather; and
this seems to have been a custom surviving the disappearance of the
Chinese. Hadji Torah--who recently visited this country, and who had on
previous occasions travelled in Russia, Turkey, and India--however,
alone among Kashgarian notables, had introduced into his household some
of the comforts and luxuries of European life. His example was not
imitated by many others, and, after a brief period of fashion, the
improvements he had striven to make popular died out and were lost sight
of. The ordinary dress of a person above the rank of gentleman is a
large blanket-like cloak worn over a close-fitting tunic and breeches;
and the dress of the peasant is similar, only his cloak is usually a
sheepskin. The Ameer himself set the example of exceeding plainness in
his costume, and his followers were far too skilled courtiers to vary
their practice from that of their ruler. But what his court lacked in
pomp it gained in impressiveness by the perfect system of etiquette
enforced, and by the external show of reverence to the ruler and to his
religion, manifested in every petty detail of the palace ceremonial. The
Ameer received publicly in his audience-chamber every day, when all
petitions and stringent punishments were submitted to him. His
_shaghawals_, or foreign secretaries, made their report to him on
whatever business might be most pressing, whether it was concerning his
relations with India or Russia, with Afghanistan or the Tungani; and the
local governors, who might happen to have arrived at the capital, were
received in audience, either to present their personal respects to the
ruler, or their reports of the government of their provinces. But with
the exception of a few of his kinsmen, and more intimate associates,
such as Abdulla, none were permitted to be seated in his presence. Even
these could not sit within a certain distance of their sovereign. All
subjects who were allowed to approach his person had to do so in the
humblest manner, and with the deepest expressions of humility and
subjection. His son, Kuli Beg, was still more particular in his
intercourse with his subjects. Even his cousin, Hadji Torah, a man whose
experience and lineage entitled him to exceptional consideration, never
placed himself on an equality with this youthful despot, and always
clothed his words and thoughts when in conversation with him in an
outward show of humble respect and deferential obsequiousness. It will
be at once surmised, and, so far as our information warrants an opinion,
with correctness, that all this terrorism alienated any good feeling
from the ruling family that its prowess in the field and the cabinet
might have secured for it. In Kashgar we have a forcible proof of the
truth of Tennyson's line, that "he who only rules by terror doeth
grievous wrong;" and yet, founded as it was on a military system, and on
the deepest distrust of the subject races, it could not well have been
otherwise.

The most unmistakable proof of how Yakoob Beg's rule was founded, and
how it was maintained, is to be seen in the fact that his _orda_, or
palace, was one large barrack, the interior compartments of which were
devoted to the accommodation of the royal household. His out-houses were
filled with cannon of every description, from antiquated Chinese irjirs
to modern Krupps and Armstrongs, and his select corps of artillerymen,
clothed in a scarlet uniform, seldom left the chief cities, except for
serious operations against foreign enemies. At the Yangy-Shahr of
Kashgar, too, he kept his military stores, and it was said that in his
workshops there he was able to construct cannon and muskets in
considerable numbers in imitation of the most perfect weapons of
European science. But it must be noted that we have no record of any of
his home-made weapons being used in actual hostilities, while the supply
of arms received from Russia, or this country, is known to have been
made the most of. Besides the natural aptitude of his subjects of
Chinese descent for imitation, he had in his service, particularly in
his artillery, many sepoys who had deserted our service either at the
time of the mutiny or since. These soldiers, valuable either as
non-commissioned officers or in higher ranks still, combined with a
large number of good troops from Khokand and the mountain tribes of the
neighbourhood, gave a cohesion and vigour to the whole army that was
simply inestimable. That army, it may be here convenient to say, was
divided into two classes widely differing from each other, and called
upon, except in an emergency, when all the resources of the state were
summoned to take part in its defence, to perform duties as opposite as
their own composition. The army of the Ameer, founded on that confused
assemblage with which he conquered Kashgar, was divided into two bodies,
the _jigit_ or _djinghite_, the horse soldier, and the _sarbaz_, or foot
soldier. The former of these was the more formidable warrior, being
selected for personal strength or skill. The _jigits_ were trained to
fight on foot as well as on horse, and were armed with a long
single-barrelled gun and a sabre. Their uniform was a serviceable coat
of leathern armour mostly buff in colour, and to all intents and
purposes they correspond with our dragoons, or, perhaps, still more
closely with the proposed corps of mounted riflemen. The _sarbaz_, among
whom are included the artillerymen, presented greater varieties of
efficiency than his mounted comrade; still he had gone through some
regular drill and training, and resided in barracks. He was a regular
soldier, and might be trusted in defence of his country up to a certain
point. In numbers it is impossible to state accurately how many _jigits_
and _sarbazes_ there were in the service of the state; some months ago
they would have been placed as high as 50,000 or 60,000 strong, possibly
at a higher number still; now we are wiser on the subject, and we have
gone to the other end of the scale. It is probable, however, that Yakoob
Beg never had 20,000 perfectly trustworthy soldiers in his army, and
that after the conclusion of the Tungan wars, half that number would
more accurately represent his force of _jigits_ and _sarbazes_. But in
addition to the more or less effective main body, there was a
nondescript following of Khitay, Tungani, half-savage Kirghiz, and rude
degraded savages like the Dolans, that in numbers would have presented a
very formidable appearance. The Khitay must at once be struck out of the
estimate, for they were never permitted to go beyond the immediate
vicinity of Yarkand and Kashgar, where they kept themselves apart, and
were employed as military servants, as sentries, and as workmen in the
military shops and factories. The Tungani, who enrolled themselves at
various epochs in the service of Kashgar, were more than dubious in
their fidelity to the state; besides they were of such questionable
courage, that they were no allies of any importance. Even as compared
with one another, these were of varying kinds of efficiency; the Tungani
who joined Yakoob Beg in the earlier portion of his career seeming to be
the best of them. Those who joined after the fall of Aksu and Kucha,
less efficient and more ambiguous in their fidelity; and those who dwelt
in the country from Korla to Turfan and Manas, were totally inefficient,
and not to be trusted to any degree whatever. The Kirghiz and Kipchak
nomads were rather a source of danger to their friends than of dread to
their foes. Yakoob Beg had, therefore, at his orders but a very limited
force to maintain his own dynasty against the machinations of Khoja and
Tungan, and to defend a long and vulnerable frontier against many
powerful and ambitious neighbours. It was absurd for him to think of
venturing single-handed across the path of Russia, and to do him justice
he never deluded himself into the idea that he could. All he seems to
have aspired to was to resist to the uttermost any invasion of his
territory by them, and to die sooner than surrender. Limited in numbers
as his regular forces were, they seem to have had every claim to be
placed high in the rank of Asiatic soldiers. They were certainly not as
formidable a body as the Sikhs or Ghoorkas, probably not as the Afghans;
still they were infinitely superior, except in numbers, to any forces
the Ameer of Bokhara or the Khan of Khokand could place in the line of
battle. To Yakoob Beg alone belongs the credit of their organization.

Yakoob Beg's system of administration was simple in the extreme. A
_Dadkwah_, or governor, was appointed for each district, and in his
hands was vested the supreme control in all the affairs of his province.
Yet he was no irresponsible minister who could tyrannize as he pleased.
Tyrannize in small ways, undoubtedly, many of them did, but, as the life
of the subject could only be taken away by order of the ruler himself,
the most powerful weapon in the hands of an unscrupulous viceroy was
removed.

At stated periods, too, he had to proceed to Kashgar to give a report of
the chief occurrences in his province, and on such occasions petitions
containing charges against the Dadkwah were formally considered in his
presence. It may be said that this proceeding was a farce, and it is
probably true that a favoured viceroy could laugh at any ordinary
accusation against his character. But that would be an exceptional case.
Many Dadkwahs were reduced in official rank, for malpractices, and some,
such as Yakoob Beg's own half-brother, were removed for incompetence in
their charges. Side by side, too, with the Dadkwah, ruled the Kazi or
Judge, who, if of course not on a par in rank with the viceroy, was
still invested with complete authority in all legal decisions on crime.
This prominence given to the legal authorities had a good effect on the
public mind, for, although the Kazi, as a rule, might not dare to thwart
the wishes of the Dadkwah, the effect of the law being supreme was
scarcely detracted from. And what was that law? it may naturally be
asked. Precisely the same as the law of every other Mahomedan state,
with a few innovations traceable to the influence of the Chinese. The
Shariát, the holy code of the Prophet followed in all the Sunni states,
was enforced by Yakoob Beg, with particular severity; and in its working
no sense of mercy was permitted to temper the harshness of its
regulations. Crimes committed by women were punished with greater
inflictions than the same committed by men; and the ordinary
punishments, whipping, mutilation, and torture could be inflicted by
order of the Dadkwah. Only in capital cases had the decision to rest
with the sovereign. Thieves, beggars, and vagrants found wandering about
the streets at prohibited hours were immediately locked up, and brought
before the Kazi, who would either administer a caution, or a whipping,
if the accused had previously offended. Another check on the abuse of
power by the officials was to be found in the following regulation. A
charge to be visited with a severer punishment than twenty heavy strokes
from the _dira_--a leather strap, fixed in a wooden handle--had to be
investigated by a member of each official rank; so the Kazi passed a
culprit on, with his comments, to the Mufti, the Mufti to the Alim, and
the Alim to the Dadkwah. If any of these officials dissented from the
remarks of his subordinate, and the matter was found impossible to
arrange by mutual concessions, it was either referred to the sovereign
for solution, or was permitted to fall through. The Dadkwah had also to
be present at every punishment within his jurisdiction, and was directly
responsible to the Ameer for any miscarriage of justice. The Kazi Rais,
or head judge, had the right to decide all minor matters for
himself--for instance, in his patrols through the streets, if he met a
woman unveiled he could order her to be struck so many times with the
_dira_; or if he found a man selling adulterated food, or using light
weights, he could confiscate his goods, or in some other manner mulct
him in addition to administering a certain number of strokes. He and his
attendants were particularly energetic and zealous in compelling idlers
about the bazaars to repair to the mosques at prayer time, and in a very
paternal and authoritative manner did the Rais exercise his petty power
for the good of his people. Even on his despotism there was some check,
as he had no authority to inflict more than forty blows with the _dira_
for one offence. Intimately connected with the administration of justice
was the police system, which in its intricate ramifications permeated
all sections of society. Much as we may feel admiration for the judicial
code, which, up to a certain point admirably administered, ensured a
certain kind of rough justice throughout the Athalik Ghazi's dominions,
the police laws and discipline have greater claims to our favourable
opinion, as evidences of an astonishing capacity for government. In his
legal code, Yakoob Beg simply adopted the laws enforced on all true
believers by the Koran, and he had no claims to originality as a
lawgiver. But as a ruler adopting all those checks on sedition which lie
at the disposal of an unscrupulous sovereign, and which were brought to
such a pitch of perfection under Fouché and the Second Empire, Yakoob
Beg has reason to be placed in the very highest class of such
potentates. In this achievement, too, he was not a plagiarist, and, as
he must have been ignorant of similar regulations existing in Europe, he
must be allowed the credit of having originated a system of police in
which it is difficult to find a single flaw. In China, indeed, something
of the same kind has at all times existed, and at periods when the
Emperor grasped the sceptre firmly, and made his individuality felt in
the management of affairs, the police were one of the most active tools
of power. But even in that empire there is no record of their having
attained so complete a control over the actions and sentiments of the
people as in Kashgaria during the last decade. It appears, too, that in
superiority of system lay the sole pre-eminence of the latter; for the
Tungan, or policeman, of China was, individually man for man, a superior
class to the Kashgarian and other constables of Yakoob Beg. In short,
the whole credit of their existence belongs to that ruler.

Let us now give some account of this important body. It was divided into
two chief divisions quite distinct from and irrespective of each other,
secret and municipal. The _secret_ was not, like ours, a perceptible
class of detectives, acting in combination with the municipal, to which
was entrusted the discovery of crimes and conspiracies. It may loosely
be described as consisting of every member of the community, for all
desired to stand well with the powers that be, and the easiest way to
attain that object would be to place all confidential information at
their disposal. But it is evident that even in a state of irresponsible
power, like Kashgar, a clear encouragement, such as this, to invent
libels of one's neighbours, could only end in unprofitable litigation
and confusion. There was certainly a check on the too zealous
imaginations of the subjects, and, although there is not much evidence
on the subject, it appears to have been twofold. In the first place a
libeller incurred the risk of receiving very severe punishment,
particularly if the person libelled were of saintly lineage, or if he
filled any official post. This operated as a check on too hasty
accusations, especially when it became known that the reward for such
service was seldom speedily forthcoming, and scarcely ever answered the
expectations of the informer. But this check, which alone seems to have
been adopted in the earlier years of Yakoob Beg's authority, was found
to be insufficient as his power became consolidated. The secret police
then became organized to a certain degree; that is to say, they so far
formed a distinct corps that a member had to be approved of either by
the Dadkwah or the Rais. So well, however, was the secret of their
individuality maintained that few of them were generally known to the
people. Suspicion was wide-spread throughout all ranks of society, and
the governor in his _orda_, or the Rais in his hall of justice, or the
shopkeeper in his booth, or the artisan in his hut, never felt safe that
his neighbour, the man with whom he was holding the most friendly
converse, was not dissecting his expressions to discover whether they
contained anything treasonable. Members of this formidable body were
always attached to the suite of either foreign envoys or merchants; and
their presence in the rear of the _cortége_, always effectually closed
the mouths of the inhabitants, or only induced them to open them to give
false or contradictory replies.

There can be no doubt that this secret organization, brought to a high
pitch of perfection during the later years of his reign, gave a
consistency and strength to Yakoob Beg's tenure of power that was
wanting to all his predecessors. In leaving this part of the system, it
is as well to point out in conclusion that this detective force was
only useful in discovering what was about to occur in the state among
Andijani or Tungani, and that it was powerless to attempt the repression
by force of any outbreak of popular feeling. Its members were simply
spies, and as a body its value vanished when its members became
generally known. Constant changing, and the introduction of fresh
members, were the sole effectual means of preserving the _incognito_ of
a large body of men, and women even, who preserved official
communication only with the local governor or judge.

The municipal police were subdivided into urban and suburban, and they
present a complete contrast to the vague body we have just attempted to
describe. Their functions were known and recognizable. They were the
functionaries who put into practice the behests of the Kazi, and they
maintained order in the streets and bazaars, much as our own do. The
_Corbashi_ is the head of this body, and his subordinates are styled
_tarzagchi_. They wore a distinct uniform, and had drilling grounds
attached to barracks, in which, however, they were not all compelled to
reside. They were essentially military in their rules, and presented a
powerful first front to all evil-doers and would-be rebels. It was they
who accompanied the Kazi Rais in his daily circuit of the streets and
market-place, and it was from their weapon, the _dira_, that the
ordinary punishment was received. Their principal avocation seems to
have been to maintain order in the towns during the night-time, for in
the day we only hear of a few of them being detailed for personal
attendance on the Dadkwah and Kazi. With sunset their true importance is
more visible, for not only were they stationed in all main
thoroughfares, squares, and other open places of the city; but until
sunrise patrols at frequent intervals throughout the night visited all
the chief quarters of the town. The power vested in their hands during
these hours was very great, and it was dangerous for any stranger to
venture out after prohibited hours. All persons found in the streets
after sunset were arrested and incarcerated until the morning, when, if
they could give a satisfactory account of themselves, they were
released, with a caution not to keep such unseemly hours for the future.
If, however, they were unable to explain their business, a further term
of imprisonment was imposed; and it was a matter of some difficulty for
a stranger to obtain his complete liberty for some time afterwards. The
suburban police fulfilled much the same duties, and on all the country
roads patrols passed up and down during the night, while pickets were
stationed at the cross-roads. In the same manner as in the towns all
travellers, except those armed with a passport, were interned for a
minute investigation into their affairs in the morning. And "thieves,
beggars, and wanderers" were chastised at the discretion of the local
magistrate. The vagrant laws were as much enforced, too, as they were in
this country in the days of Queen Elizabeth, and in a general mode of
interference with the thoughts and actions of its subjects, the
Kashgarian government had attained a height of excellence that would
entitle it to rank with the Inquisition. Still there was order. No riots
occurred to distract the harmony of the public weal, and to an external
observer, especially to one belonging to a country where order is
considered the greatest _desideratum_, the government of the Athalik
Ghazi seemed to be the perfection of an Asiatic state, and that order a
reason for attributing all other virtues to its originator.

Travellers, however, who were provided with a passport, were accorded
privileges of transit, and were permitted, if they felt so disposed, to
continue their journeys during hours interdicted to less privileged
mortals. In each chief town there were offices for the issue of these
permits to travel. Not many obstacles were thrown in the path of those,
who left permanent guarantees in the shape of property behind them for
their return, in accomplishing their desire for travel; but rarely was
permission granted to any one, not blessed with these worldly
advantages, to proceed farther than the neighbouring district. Indeed in
all cases leave to visit foreign states, other than Khokand or Bokhara,
was a matter of difficulty to be obtained, and only in the most
exceptional cases was it granted. But it appears that there were some
evasions of this regulation by a simulation of religious zeal, for the
Sheikh-ul-Islam had it in his power to grant permits to leave the
country on pilgrimages to Bokhara the "holy," or to Mecca. In themselves
the passports were simple in phraseology. They merely stated the name
and address of the traveller, the nature of his business, and his
destination. Having obtained the consent of the Dadkwah, and the
authority of the Kazi, no difficulty was experienced in procuring the
necessary slip of paper. Infractions of this permission, by too long an
absence, or by proceeding in some forbidden direction, were visited on a
first offence with a fine. On a repetition of it, however, the
punishment became more severe. It would be interesting to know how these
protectors of the public peace were paid, and by what means. But on this
point there is little trustworthy information. We, however, know of one
tax which was devoted to the support of the urban police, but of the
funds from which the suburban were remunerated, we have no authority for
any assertion. A weekly tax was levied from all the shop and booth
owners, to go towards the payment of their protectors; but it is not
supposed that this amounted to a sufficient sum to maintain the large
force in the more important cities. The difference was probably paid out
of the state coffers under the head of justice. Judging from this we
cannot be far wrong in assuming that a similar tax was levied on the
farmers and country residents for the support of the suburban police;
and as the secret police required less outlay in the country than in the
cities, it is possible that that tax more nearly defrayed the total
cost, than it did in Yarkand or Kashgar. The police supervision and the
military terrorism, freely resorted to on all occasions offering an
excuse for such an extreme measure, have not been without their effect
in leaving traces of their existence and influence in the daily life of
the Kashgari, and on the countenances and sentiments of the subject
peoples. Where formerly lived a light-hearted and happy race there now
seemed as if a never-to-be-removed gloom had settled down on the face of
the land, and neither the assurance of security nor the irregular
encouragement of the ruler to commerce could remove the blight that had
fallen upon the energies and happiness of the people. As one of them
expressed it, in pathetic language, "During the Chinese rule there was
everything; there is nothing now." The speaker of that sentence was no
merchant, who might have been expected to be depressed by the
falling-off in trade, but a warrior and a chieftain's son and heir. If
to him the military system of Yakoob Beg seemed unsatisfactory and
irksome, what must it have appeared to those more peaceful subjects to
whom merchandise and barter were as the breath of their nostrils? All
the advantages of a perfect police system, heavily weighted by the
incumbrance of a costly addition of spies and tale-bearers, would seem
as nothing compared with the loss incurred by the fetters placed on
individual motion and enterprise. Considered by itself, the police
organization of Kashgar was, perhaps, the most perfect design achieved
by Yakoob Beg, and his community of spies will rank with anything in
effectiveness that has ever been accomplished by any potentate. But as a
permanent addition to his strength it is permissible to doubt whether he
really secured his rule by employing the latter, or obtained much more
by the formation of the former than the services of a trained body of
trustworthy, courageous men. The restrictions imposed on trade by the
severance of all communications with the East by the Tungan wars and by
the limited amount of liberty granted the native Kashgari, proved most
deterrent to all mercantile adventure, and placed in the hands of
Khokandians or Russians on the north, and of Cashmerians and Punjabis on
the south, most of the trade still carried on with Eastern Turkestan.

The trade carried on by the Athalik Ghazi's state, if we are to judge
solely by amount, with foreign countries, was greatest with Russia and
her dependencies; but if we investigate the matter more closely we find
that the result is a little more satisfactory to ourselves. The direct
trade that was carried on by way of Leh with Khoten and Sanju was
steadily increasing, while that of Russia by Khokand had for some time
remained stationary, if it had not even decreased. And then much of the
Russian trade has to be scored to this country, for in the marts of
Kashgar, underneath Russian exteriors, were very often to be found
English interiors, and the brand of well-known Manchester and Liverpool
makers was discovered beneath some gaudy and brilliant-looking cover
hailing from Moscow or Nishni Novgorod. Besides, recent investigations
have proved that some of the goods exported from Shikarpore, in Scinde,
through the Bholan Pass find their way through the mountainous districts
that intervene into the territory of his late Highness the Ameer of
Kashgar. Nor had Yakoob Beg totally neglected all means for inducing
merchants to enter his state; indeed, his chief objection seemed to have
been, not that they should have entered his state, but that they should
leave it. Serais were built in all the chief towns for the accommodation
of such merchants as might take up a temporary abode within his
territory, and the Andijani Serai, or hotel, specially constructed for
merchants from Khokand, was one of the largest and most striking
buildings in the city of Kashgar. Yakoob Beg had even detailed off to
take care of the serai and its occupants a large number of the old
Khitay, or Yangy Mussulmans, who were generally employed throughout the
city as domestic servants. When we come to the description of the
relations of Yakoob Beg with England and with Russia we will speak more
fully of the details of those treaties of commerce which were ratified
on several occasions, and whose ostensible object was the promotion of
trade and other friendly intercourse.

We have now considered the army, the police, the administration of
justice, and the court of Yakoob Beg, and the only chief subject that
remains to be discussed are the principles of finance adopted by the
Ameer. To keep any state, even an Asiatic state, in a fit condition for
preserving its independence, a settled revenue is requisite, and Yakoob
Beg, whose atmosphere was one of almost continual warfare, was on
several occasions pressed for money in a manner difficult to be
conceived by us. His military operations languished for the want of the
sinews of war, and we are told on credible authority that many of his
soldiers received only payment out of the spoil taken at the sack of
Turfan and other places. So long as his ordinary expenditure was
increased by the addition of an extraordinary war outlay, so long was he
unable to make his receipts and expenditure balance. On the cessation of
hostilities against the Tungani, and the partial revival of trade in
consequence, his fiscal affairs assumed a brighter aspect, and it is
possible that during the last few years of his reign his revenue showed
a surplus. But to obtain that success, a most joyful one to every
embarrassed potentate, Yakoob Beg had to resort to many strange
expedients, and to manifest much patience and long-suffering; and in
overcoming petty obstacles and minor details, he proved himself to be a
man of more than average ability, no less than he had previously by the
skilful manipulation of armies and intriguers. Here again he erected a
structure distinct and separate from that handed down to him by the
Chinese. Comparatively speaking, the Chinese had been wealthy to the
Athalik Ghazi, and they received in moderate imposts on merchandise
alone almost a sufficient sum to defray the total cost of their
administration. Yakoob Beg had no such certain source of revenue; he had
to raise from an impoverished and only half-conquered state a sum almost
as large as that required by the Chinese. That he did it remains the
chief proof of his skill as a finance minister, and is another reason
for our regarding this extraordinary ruler with admiration. We may feel
sure that if we could follow closely the history of his fiscal efforts,
and the numberless plans that proved abortive, we should have revealed
one of the most instructive and interesting narratives of modern Asia.
There are no materials out of Kashgar, if there are such there, for such
an investigation however, and we can only follow as best we may be able,
the thread of events by the light of such authorities as are at our
disposal. In court and personal expenditure he set an example that might
with advantage be followed by other rulers in Asia even at the present
day, and in a strict economy and supervision of the petty sums that in
the aggregate make all the difference in any state between a surplus and
a deficit, were to be found the two guiding principles of his conduct.
Kashgaria might be in a very backward state of cultivation, and years of
commotion and warfare had undoubtedly thrown it back in the ranks of
prosperity and civilization, but the Athalik Ghazi was persuaded of the
truth of the Latin philosopher's saying, that "Parsimonia magna
vectigalia est." It must be remembered that Yakoob Beg set himself a
different task to accomplish than had the Chinese. Their idea was not so
much to extend their empire, although there has always been a tendency
with the Chinese to be aggressive against small neighbours, as to
acquire a territory that could be made a paying thing: much as the
pioneers of Anglo-Saxon conquest have made their impression in every
quarter of the globe in search of wealth and adventure, did the Chinese
by a seemingly irresistible impulse spread over the continent of Asia.
In doing so they were actuated as much by calculation of possible profit
as by any desire for military renown. The Emperor Keen-Lung himself was
flattered by the triumphs achieved beyond Gobi; but his lieutenants and
viceroys aimed at more mercenary objects, and but for the golden promise
held forth by a permanent conquest of Turkestan would have induced their
master to direct his efforts to some more profitable undertaking. The
Chinese, having acquired Kashgar, were far too sagacious to use up its
resources by an organized system of pillage, and they accordingly, let
it be granted chiefly with a view to their own personal aggrandizement,
devoted their attention to the development of its natural wealth by
means already detailed in a previous chapter. For three generations the
officials grew rich on the prosperity of their dependency, and for the
same period the people themselves were scarcely less flourishing. The
Chinese had accepted no slight responsibility in undertaking the
government of Kashgar on principles identical with those by which they
held authority in Tibet; but, owing to wonderful perseverance and good
management, they triumphed over every difficulty. The revenue raised for
state and local purposes was very great, and it sufficed to preserve
good order for many years, and to add permanent improvement to the state
in every direction. The task voluntarily undertaken by the Chinese was
far more onerous than that Yakoob Beg found he had to execute; but they
came to it with many advantages that he wanted. They had a large and
faithful army; he had only an uncertain gathering, which might flee or
desert on the first symptom of disaster: they had the resources of a
great and powerful empire at their back; he had nothing but his own
energy and determination: and above all, they had a reputation that
added to their strength and facilitated their undertakings, while he was
regarded as a mere military adventurer, receiving the contempt of Tungan
and Khoja alike. The very nature of things made the Chinese turn most of
their attention to commerce, while for years Yakoob Beg's sole thought
was to consolidate his military strength and form a large standing army.
For many years, then, Yakoob Beg only spent money on the drilling of
soldiers and the purchase of weapons. Now and then, when some danger
seemed to threaten him, either from Russia, Afghanistan, or the Tungani,
he would devote considerable sums to the construction of forts in the
line of the menaced position. But his chief expenditure was confined to
his army, and the maintenance of his dynasty by his police system. The
administration of justice required a certain sum of money, and the
Church for its support came in for a fair share of the good things that
were going. It is clear that his expenditure, if not very great in our
eyes, would severely tax a population of 1,000,000 people in no very
high state of prosperity. The chief source of wealth in the past had
always been the trade with China, and when that was broken off, the
slight increase in intercourse with Russia and India was not a
sufficient compensation. In fact, the country was very poor, without the
ingenuity and commercial instincts of the Khitay. During the days of the
war under Buzurg Khan, the only means of obtaining the necessary revenue
was by despoliation and enforced levies on the occupied portion of the
territory. When the western portion of Kashgaria was subdued, Yakoob Beg
found himself without any money in his exchequer, and no easy means of
filling it presented itself to him. In these straits he had recourse to
an expedient that, if not very novel, was at all events very effective.
He issued a proclamation to his faithful subjects to the effect that as
conqueror he was landowner of the whole state; but that he was
willing--eager would have been the more correct expression--to sell it
to them at a cheap rate. He, however, exempted from this the old
possessions of the Chinese Wangs and Ambans, and distributed their
extensive domains among the more prominent of his followers, who in
return acknowledged their liability to military service. The system was
an exact copy of the old feudal régime, and Yakoob Beg was vested with
all the rights and authority of the feudal lord of the Middle Ages. The
parallel is still further maintained by the large reward that the Church
received for its aid to the new ruler. The old revenues, devoted to the
support of the temples and religious seminaries in the past, and which
had miscarried during the troublous period of the war for the possession
of Turkestan, were restored, and fresh possessions were added thereto,
to demonstrate the generosity of the sovereign and his veneration for
the religion of Mahomed. His old friend the Sheikh-ul-Islam was still
more fortunate, and a large estate was set apart for his special
enjoyment. Nor does it appear that the Mussulman priests abused the
fresh power and advantages they thus secured; for among the toilers in
Kashgaria none were more energetic than they in educating the people,
and in extending their influence over their minds, both for the benefit
of their religion and for the security of the power of the Athalik
Ghazi. But in one respect, and it is impossible to exaggerate its
importance, Yakoob Beg's endeavours to found a strong military class,
bound to him by ties of past favours and others yet to come, were
abortive; for with rare exceptions his followers refused to fill their
new avocation of landed proprietors. Instead of devoting their attention
to the questions arising from agriculture and other rural pursuits, they
sub-let all their possessions to Andijani immigrants, and, residing in
their city _ordas_, gave themselves over either to lascivious pleasures
or to complete indolence. Even so distinguished a warrior as Abdulla
Beg, the slayer of more than 12,000 persons, as his panegyrists boasted,
suffered from the pervading effeminacy on the cessation of active
hostilities; and in the lower ranks of the service such deterioration in
energy was still more manifest. This change in the spirit of his earlier
supporters, among other things, obliged Yakoob Beg to depend the more on
the Andijani merchants and shopkeepers, and conduced to his adopting
more favourable views on foreign trade in the later years of his power.

The sum of money which he immediately received by the sale of lands
placed him in a condition to undertake those wars against the Tungani,
which added so much to the extent of his territory and to the
responsibilities of his position. Indeed, for several years after its
first enforcement it continued to bring in a certain amount to the
coffers of the State. But even this resource was transitory, and the sum
of money received by this means and in the shape of spoil, from Yarkand,
Kashgar, Khoten, and other places, was not sufficient to meet the
expenditure caused by the formation of a large army. Neither of these
practices could be regarded as a permanent means of obtaining a revenue,
for the former would scarcely admit of a repetition, and the latter soon
exhausted itself. So when his rule had become a little settled, and
these modes of raising money, in addition to the still more
reprehensible practice of robbing foreign merchants, had become out of
date to a certain degree, the Athalik Ghazi had to place his fiscal
arrangements on a more practical and honourable basis. While he laboured
under some disadvantages, already enumerated, as compared with the
Chinese, he had the great advantage over them that he strove for an
object more easily accomplished than the restoration of Kashgar to its
pristine welfare; and in his budget he had only steadily to keep in view
how much he required to maintain so many _jigits_, and so many police in
his pay, and to keep in his exchequer a small surplus for any untoward
emergency. He left the roads to take care of themselves; the irrigation
works, sadly wanted in various parts of the state, must be reserved for
his successors; and all proposals for the amelioration of the people
were shelved for a more opportune occasion. But so many thousand
_jigits_ must be in the ranks; so many fresh guns and cartridges must be
placed in the arsenals; and so many adventurers must be induced by good
pay to take service in the army as non-commissioned officers, in order
that the rank and file should be well drilled. The very necessities of
his position compelled Yakoob Beg to make all these military
preparations; but the cost was great, and the sacrifices thus imposed on
ruler and on people were a terrible strain. Recent events make us
inclined to believe that a less active military and foreign policy, and
a more peaceable and domestic one, would have tended to have added more
strength to the Athalik Ghazi's rule than the somewhat ostentatious
military parade to which he had recourse. Be that as it may, Yakoob Beg
instituted in 1867 two taxes, which may be supposed to represent the two
chief classes of receipts during his tenure of authority. The first of
these was a tithe on all the cereal produce of the country; this tax was
called the _Ushr_. The second, called the _Zakat_, was a customs due
levied on all merchandise entering Kashgar. The _Ushr_ was payable on
all land except that occupied by the Church, or by those who owed
military service to the crown instead of other payment; and even those
who rented land from the noble classes were obliged to surrender a tithe
to the ruler. It would appear, therefore, from this that it was not so
much the land as its legal possessor who was exempt from liability to
the usual obligations of citizenship. The danger contained in the
acquisition of all the crown lands by Andijani merchants, and the
gradual displacement of his more immediate followers through the energy
of these people, was not imperceptible to Yakoob Beg, and he accordingly
adopted measures for preventing his nobles selling their land without
his sanction. The receipts from this _Ushr_ were very considerable, and
it was the main source of his revenue for years. We have some idea of
the approximate value of land in Kashgar. The method of measuring land
for sale, and consequently also for taxation, is peculiar. It is not by
any given size that it is computed, or, indeed, strictly speaking by the
amount of crop it produces; but at a rate in accordance with the amount
of wheat with which it had been planted. The average rate was about a
pound for as much land as was sown with 20 lb. of wheat. The tenant, as
has been said, paid the government dues and handed over three-fourths of
the net produce to the landlord as rent, receiving for his portion only
the one-fourth remaining. Under this system it was only in very
prosperous years that any but very large tenants made sufficient to earn
a competent livelihood. In bad years it is possible that the landlord
had to satisfy himself with a smaller share, if he was not induced to
surrender his claim altogether for the disastrous period. But the
tax-farmers, entrusted with the collection of this rate, were eager to
become rich, no less than to earn a good name with the authorities for
bringing in a list with no defaulters. The unfortunate people were
completely at their mercy, and without any means of ascertaining the
accuracy of the claim, or of opposing extortionate demands on the part
of the tax-collectors. They paid without a murmur, perhaps without a
suspicion of the imposition that was being practised upon them, the sum
demanded of them, if they were able; and as their dues were payable
without delay and on demand before anything else was taken out of the
total sum of the produce, the Athalik Ghazi received his share with
regularity, and his tax-collector pocketed the excess sum for his own
satisfaction. In many cases it is known that the amount claimed by the
official exceeded by threefold the legal demand. Such a system was no
less hurtful to the ruler than it was ruinous to the people. That in one
tax alone a larger sum should be extracted from the people for the
benefit of the officials than was contributed for the necessities of the
state, exhibited a very loose system of supervision on the part of the
sovereign, and is a strong piece of evidence that in many ways Yakoob
Beg was a mixture of contradictions. We can scarcely persuade ourselves
that he was aware of these occurrences, and yet how could he be ignorant
of them?

In addition to the _Ushr_ there was another tax on home produce, viz.,
the _Tanabi_, or tax on land devoted to the production of vegetables or
fruit. The Tanab is, by the way, a lineal measure of forty-seven yards,
and a Tanabi is a piece of land forty-seven yards square. On this extent
of land cultivated for vegetables, or fruit, a small tax was raised.
More than any other tax did this vary according to the character of the
district, and to the quality of the year's crop. It was seldom less than
a shilling a Tanabi, even in the least renowned district, whereas in
some parts, in good years, it was five shillings, or even more. Here
again, however, the middleman interfered, and exacted as much as he saw
there was any possibility of his obtaining. This tax undoubtedly ought
to have produced a large sum, as a larger portion of the soil is laid
out as fruit and vegetable gardens than for crops; but whether it was
more difficult to raise, or there was more peculation _in transitu_ from
the tax-payer to the imperial exchequer, it is certain that we hear much
less of this tax than we should be disposed to imagine. The two great
taxes on home productions were therefore a corn due and a fruit due. The
rate was not in itself excessive, and could be paid by any community
without embarrassment. It is uncertain to what extent the avarice of the
officials had made the conditions of these two taxes more onerous,
although, on the most favourable supposition, the citizen was mulcted in
no inconsiderable sum. A more serious question for the ruler was, how
did it affect his own position with regard to his subjects? Did Yakoob
Beg appear in the eyes of the Kashgari as an exacting and oppressive
tyrant on account of these heavy impositions?

It is impossible to speak on this point with any degree of certainty,
but it is only natural to expect that such was the case. No tiller of
the ground can feel grateful to a sovereign who required him to hand
over almost one-third of his receipts before he made use of one penny of
them, even for the payment of his rent. It is scarcely probable that
Yakoob Beg approved of such enormous profits going to his officials;
but, that having tolerated petty exactions in his earlier days, he found
himself unable to attempt the task of coping with the evil when it had
assumed such alarming proportions. It is impossible to believe that he
remained in ignorance of what was occurring under his very eyes, and
there is some evident foundation for the accusation that he participated
in the division of the profits of his tax-gatherers. We should be loth
to admit the accuracy of such a charge, and yet the arguments in its
favour are too plausible to admit of a very confident contradiction. It
would not speak well for the efficiency of his secret police if he had
remained in ignorance of a fact which was losing him the sympathy of his
subjects.

The gold mines at Khoten were worked after the fall of that city in
1868, and continued productive down to the present time. There is no
information on the quantities of the precious metal that are there
turned out in the year, but it is probable that they are not very great.
The coal mines near Aksu and Kucha are no longer made use of, except by
a few individuals, and the copper mines in that district have, since the
departure of the Chinese, only been very partially explored. The jade
that used to come in great quantities from Aksu and Khoten, is still to
be found throughout Kashgar; but although it is probable that it still
nearly all comes from those cities, the Kashgari themselves tell a
hesitating tale as to its place of production. A visitor to Kashgar, on
going the round of the bazaars, soon found that the people's tongues
were tied by the presence, in his train, of a number of the secret
police, who had been specially told off to prevent the Feringhee
obtaining any troublesome information on the state of the people, or the
resources of the state. A striking instance was given him of the close
attention paid by these guardians of order to the veriest trifles. The
traveller inquired in one stall where the jade, which was the chief
commodity of the merchant in question, came from, and received the
reply, Aksu. Proceeding to another shop in the street, he repeated the
question, when he was informed that it was imported from Khokand. But
the traveller said, your neighbour told me it came from Aksu. The
shopkeeper, taken aback by this abrupt remark, became confused, and
admitted that it came from Aksu. Warned by a look from the official, he
then repeated his original assertion that it came from Khokand. The use
of all this absurd shuffling, and attempt to throw dust in strangers'
eyes, is impossible to discover; for it was a matter of little moment
whether jade came from Aksu, or Khokand, so long as we knew that it
formed an important commodity, both in the rough and in the chiselled
state, in the cities of Kashgaria.

The customs tax, or _Zakat_, is sanctioned by the Shariát, and was
levied at all the border posts on the various roads leading into the
state. Up to the ratification of the treaties with Great Britain and
Russia, its regulations were vague and elastic in the extreme. In fact,
any merchant who might have been so foolhardy as to venture into Kashgar
would have had reason, before these events, to think himself fortunate
if he escaped the penalty of his rashness; for assuredly his luggage
would not, but would have been confiscated for the special benefit of
his Highness the Ameer. So late as 1869, Russian merchants were robbed
of their baggage, and personally ill-treated, and only after long years
of negotiation did the Russian Government obtain any satisfaction for
the injuries and loss inflicted on one of their subjects. And then how
did the Athalik Ghazi send the sum of money he agreed to pay for the
loss the merchant had incurred?--why in a depreciated Chinese currency,
part of a large number of coins that he had found in a disused temple in
Kashgar! Before this, all the external trade had been carried on with
Khokand and Bokhara, Afghanistan and Badakshan, and the receipts from
_Zakat_ were quite insignificant, barring such treasure trove as the
spoliation of a merchant from Tashkent, or from Leh. But with the
persistent efforts on the part of the Russians on the north, and of the
English native merchants on the south, to pierce the gloom hiding the
country of Eastern Turkestan, it became impossible for Yakoob Beg to
maintain much longer the incognito he was so jealous in maintaining.
Perhaps also the prospect of deriving an income from _Zakat_, that
should smooth down many of his difficulties, was not without some
influence on his mind when he came into direct contact with civilized
empires. His expectations were far too sanguine, and he seems to have
once more, during the last twelve months of his life, become indifferent
to the advantages or disadvantages of trade with his neighbours. In
fact, when he placed his customs on a fair footing, he found that it
would require many years to recoup him for the excessive exactions he
surrendered. The merchants who first attempted to commence intercourse
with Kashgar became speedily discouraged by the dangers of the route,
and the small opening for a large remunerative trade in a country whose
wealth and population had been magnified tenfold. In a country where the
richest merchant in the chief town possessed only a capital of £8,000,
not much could be expected in the way of fortune; and although the legal
dues on all merchandise were fixed at an _ad valorem_ rate of 2-1/2 per
cent., it was soon discovered that if the ruler happened to be in want
of cash he would not scruple to take what he could from the stranger.
Both to the ruler, and to the foreign merchant, the new arrangement
contained distasteful matter. The former perceived that he had
surrendered some of his imperial rights, and that he was not to be
recompensed by his receiving more money, and the latter knew that the
treaty stipulation would not save him from having to pay excess fees.

The _Zakat_, far from showing the expected disposition to increase,
seemed rather inclined to remain stationary, if not to decrease; and
the foreign merchant had obtained some promise on the part of the ruler
of personal protection, and of assistance in the disposal of his wares.
His discontent at the stagnation in the customs soon showed itself by
his exacting excess dues, sometimes on British, sometimes on Russian,
but more often on Khokandian and Afghan merchants. Instead of increasing
his receipts, these strong measures only threw them back, and left him
in a worse plight than he was in before. He had not the patience
necessary to enable him to wait with confidence the fuller development
of trade, nor had he the perseverance or tact to place fresh inducements
in the path of merchants to renew their intercourse with him and his
state. Many visited Kashgar with merchandise a first time; but few,
indeed, repeated the visit. The ruler was off-handed in his reception of
them. They were scarcely accorded any liberty in their movements, and
the profit of their journey was greatly reduced by the payment of a due
of 5 per cent. instead of the stipulated condition of 2-1/2 per cent. It
is a pure fiction, therefore, to say that trade with Kashgar had
increased during the rule of the Athalik Ghazi through his friendly
inclination. If the amount of merchandise imported into his state had
increased, it was owing only to the necessities of its inhabitants, and
was a fact that must have taken place either by intercourse direct, or
through native states, with the two great providers of Central Asia. The
exaggerated enthusiasm that it was endeavoured to raise up in this
country about this same mythical ruler of Yarkand never spread far, and
there was always some scepticism, if there could be no disproof, of the
reports of the formidableness of this new kingdom. Looking calmly at the
real state of Yakoob Beg's position, even at the height of his power, we
find him to have always been a pecuniarily embarrassed ruler, glad of
the smallest windfall in the shape of the spoil of a single merchant.
The _Zakat_, his advisers pointed out to him, might be made a most
productive source of revenue, if foreign merchants could be induced to
bring their wares into the country. The loss the people had felt in the
departure of the Chinese might be amply repaired by the appearance of
Russian and English merchants to supply the same place that they filled.
If his aspirations were disappointed, and the _Zakat_ did not show any
signs of possessing that elasticity which had been predicted, it is
probable that in his impatience, heightened by the perception that
foreign trade might lead to foreign complications, he did not give the
scheme a sufficient time for a fair trial. His other sources of revenue,
_Ushr_ and _Tanabi_, and the gold mines of Khoten, brought in a sum
enough to meet the current expenses of the government and to maintain in
his service as many soldiers as his recruiting officers were able to
secure. But there was little if any surplus; and local improvements, and
all outlay that might have been reproductive and for the benefit of the
people, were strictly forbidden. The only works we can find constructed
by him, with a view to the advancement of the interests of his subjects,
were the merchants' _serais_, built in each city, and these were
self-supporting. Yakoob Beg has no claim to being considered as a
beneficent ruler. He was a military dictator, who had shown a rare power
for inaugurating a rough system of government, and whose campaigns had
always been singularly successful. As a ruler, showing a full
appreciation of the wants of his people, and adopting the best possible
measures to obtain them, he had no claims to consideration. Indeed, he
could not be compared with the Chinese, who, however personal may have
been their motives, certainly raised the state to a high pitch of
material prosperity, and left many enduring marks of their past
occupation. These two dominations, foisted on the Kashgari by the strong
arm, while each immeasurably superior to the Khoja claimants,
represented two distinct modes of governing a subject race. The Chinese
endeavoured to conciliate, and to make the necessity for their presence
felt by the people; the Athalik Ghazi was supremely indifferent to the
prosperity of his subjects, so long as they were willing to pay him the
tribute money, and to serve in his army. An exactly opposite result
might have been expected, for there was far more kinship between the
Khokandian adventurer and the Kashgari, than there was between the
Khitay and the Andijani. Admirers of Yakoob Beg may, of course, plead
that his rule had not acquired sufficient consistency to justify him in
tasking his strength by great undertakings, such as the construction of
roads and canals. In one respect he had not the labour at his disposal,
and he was, consequently, hampered by a difficulty that the Chinese were
free from. Still when we remember that all these works ought to have
been remunerative, and to have strengthened Yakoob Beg's individual
power, instead of taxing his resources, the excuse cannot be admitted as
entitled to our consideration. Yakoob Beg has claims only to be admired
for having given us something better than a repetition of the depravity
of the Khoja rulers, and of course among his coevals he is entitled to
far the highest place. If it is only asked for him that he should be
placed above them, no one can raise the slightest objection to it; for
beyond the shadow of a doubt, he was the most energetic and talented
ruler that had appeared among the Khanates for several centuries. But it
would be affectation to deny that a higher place than this has been
claimed for him; and before according his right to occupy it, the
evidence on which his claim rests must be sifted with the greatest care.
Even now I do not say that his claims are unproven; but that it is open
to doubt whether his work has not been exaggerated, I think must be
admitted by every one who has studied the course of his life in Kashgar.
It is absurd to talk of Yakoob Beg having been an equal of Genghis Khan
or of Timour, in any other way than that of showing that his personal
abilities were of a transcendent order. As a legislator and public
benefactor, it is fair to compare him with the Chinese, who possessed
some advantages over him, but who laboured under some disadvantages in
religion, and other conditions, as compared with him. And when we do
this, after impartial consideration we find that the balance is greatly
in favour of the Chinese. What can we judge from this, but that the rule
of Yakoob Beg, while presenting some striking features, was inferior in
degree to that of the Chinese? It is only fair to remember that the
difficulties in his path were great, and that he overcame many of them.
Before closing this chapter some description of the chief men who
assisted him to conquer the country, and then to govern it, may be not
without interest to the reader.

First among these, by right of his position as well as by his high
abilities, comes the Seyyid Yakoob Khan, or Hadji Torah, as he has more
conveniently been called, the prince who has recently visited several of
the principal courts of Europe. He is a near relative of the Athalik
Ghazi, although, strange to say, there is no consanguinity between them.
He is a son of Nar Mahomed Khan, the governor of Tashkent, who married
as his second wife Yakoob Beg's sister, and who was instrumental in
advancing the interests of Yakoob Beg during the earlier days of his
career in Khokand. The Seyyid was almost as old as his uncle, the Ameer
of Kashgar, having been born in Tashkent in 1823; but despite this near
connection Hadji Torah played no part in the conquest of Kashgar. Until
Yakoob Beg achieved complete success in his enterprise in Eastern
Turkestan he was considered by Khokandians of high rank a simple
adventurer. The Seyyid Yakoob Khan was of the best lineage in Turkestan,
and it is very possible that until the year 1867 he regarded his uncle
with a considerable amount of indifference. Certain it is that Hadji
Torah was far otherwise employed than in assisting his relative when
the latter was engaged in some of the desperate encounters of his not
uneventful career. In the civil administration of Khokand he filled,
under Alim Kuli, high posts, such as Principal of the Madrassa of
Tashkent, and then he was appointed Kazi, or Judge. It was after the
fall of Ak Musjid that he commenced that career of activity as a
traveller and a negotiator which brought him to the shores of the
Bosphorus and to the banks of the Neva and the Thames. That was in the
year 1854, and he was appointed as a sort of secretary to the embassy of
Mirza Jan Effendi, the ambassador sent by Mollah Khan to Constantinople
for aid. On a subsequent occasion he again visited Constantinople in a
similar capacity, after the death of Mollah Khan, and during the brief
tenure of power by his successor, Mahomed Khan, the nominee of Alim
Kuli. This was in 1865, and during the troubles that ensued in Khokand
and the final success of Khudayar Khan, the legal ruler of Khokand and
antagonist of Alim Kuli, Hadji Torah resided quietly at Constantinople,
where Abdul Aziz entertained him with sumptuous hospitality. It would
appear that he obtained some kind of reputation among the numerous
visitors from either Turkestan who came to Turkey, and apart from his
sacrosanct character few could fail to be impressed favourably by his
cheerful yet dignified manner. His uncle in 1870 had indeed overcome all
opposition to his rule, and it might at a first glance appear strange
why he should desire to secure the services of a man of whom he could
have seen or known little for many years. But Hadji Torah possessed
abilities and experience rare among the inhabitants of Central Asia, and
to Yakoob Beg the very talents his nephew possessed were those he was
most in need of.

In 1870 the Athalik Ghazi was anxious to draw close the bonds of
alliance with the Porte; who could assist him better than the man who
had resided in Constantinople for several years, and who had formed a
friendly intimacy with the Sultan? In 1871 Yakoob Beg first recognized
the imminence of danger to his state from Russia, then put in possession
of Kuldja; who could instruct him in the most effectual way of warding
off that danger, either by an alliance with England or by propitiating
the Russians, than the travelled Hadji Torah? The very qualities that
the Seyyid Yakoob Khan possessed were those the Ameer Yakoob Beg stood
most in need of. He might search among all his followers, those who had
shared every vicissitude of his strange fortunes, and he could not find
one other with an identical capacity. The overtures to his nephew are
thus easily intelligible, and the nephew himself gladly greeted his
entry into a wider career than was that of an honoured guest on the
hospitality of the Porte. His subsequent embassies in the service of
Kashgar to St. Petersburg, Calcutta, Constantinople, and London are too
recent and too well known to require mention here. When he settled in
Kashgar he married a daughter of Mahomed Khoja, the Sheikh-ul-Islam of
Kashgaria. His weight with the people was consequently very great, and
his judgment was greatly valued by the Ameer. Even over Beg Bacha, the
turbulent and ferocious heir-apparent, Hadji Torah had acquired some
influence by his ready tact and _bonhomie_.

Of the two chief personages, Mahomed Khoja and Abdulla Pansad, the
priest and the soldier, who assisted Yakoob Beg, it is unfortunately
impossible to discover much, and that little has already been stated in
the preceding pages. There can be no doubt, however, that they were the
principal instruments in promoting the aggrandizement of Yakoob Beg, and
the two who enjoyed more than any other the confidence and friendship of
the man they had supported so faithfully. But of another well-tried
follower we know more, chiefly through the pages of Dr. Bellew. Mahomed
Yunus seems to have been the most educated and well informed among the
governors of Yakoob Beg. He had the reputation of being quite the
best-informed man in Kashgar, but as the _curriculum_ of instruction did
not include modern languages, it is difficult to guage the exact degree
of that reputation. He was an old and trusted follower of the Athalik
Ghazi, for when he was in the service of Khokand Mahomed Yunus
officiated as his scribe. He, however, as a civilian, took no part in
the expedition of Buzurg Khan, and it was not until after the death of
Alim Kuli and the success of Khudayar Khan that he joined his firm
friend and master in Kashgar. So high an opinion had Yakoob Beg of his
talents, and so pressed was he for skilled rulers, that Mahomed Yunus
was at once appointed Dadkwah of the recently conquered district of
Yarkand, the richest, the most populous, and the most turbulent of all
the governorships in Kashgaria. The skill with which he brought the
troublesome Yarkandis into complete submission to the new ruler, and the
rare ability he manifested in his administration of his province down
almost to the present time, justify the selection of his whilome comrade
in Khokand. At first it seems that the governor ruled with a high hand,
and that the slightest symptom of insubordination was checked by an
immediate arrest and a not long-delayed execution. During the last seven
years, however, his government had become milder, chiefly because all
evil-doers had been got rid of. Among some of the minor followers may be
mentioned Alish Beg, Dadkwah of Kashgar; Ihrar Khan Torah, the first
envoy despatched from Kashgar to India; and Mahomed Beg of Artosh: but
we have no sufficient information of them to give an account of them
that would be interesting to the general reader.

CHAPTER X.

YAKOOB BEG'S POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA.

Yakoob Beg had in the earlier days of his career come into contact with
the Russians, and although, in the long interval between the fall of Ak
Musjid and his departure from Khokand, the Russians, chiefly owing to
the prostration resulting from the Crimean War, did not press on with
the energy that their first advance on the Syr Darya seemed to promise,
there is no doubt that the possibility of its occurrence was the
foremost thought in the minds of Yakoob Beg and his contemporaries. In
1865, when the Russians threatened and eventually occupied Tashkent, and
brought their frontier halfway on its journey to the Oxus, Yakoob Beg
was far too much occupied with his own affairs in Kashgar to attempt any
interference in Khokand. With, however, the dismemberment of Khokand and
the rout of the Bokhariot army in the spring of 1866, his attention was
forcibly claimed by a fact that seemed in the future to involve him as
the next victim of Russian aggrandizement. In that year, too, he had not
only overcome all resistance in the more important districts of
Kashgaria, but he had to a greater extent than before, become
responsible for the political actions of the people of this state
through the deposition of Buzurg Khan. As early as 1866, it may be
assumed that the new ruler of Kashgar had his attention directed to the
movements of his old antagonist, by their successes against the
Khokandians and Bokhariots; but it is clear that the Russians were not
equally interested in his doings at this period. With the occupation of
the northern portion of Khokand, the rule of Russia was brought into
nearer proximity with that of the new power of Kashgar, and it became
only a question of time whether the two governments were to attain a
harmonious agreement, or whether a series of petty disputes was to
result in a further extension of the Russian Empire, towards both India
and China. The independent portion of the Khanate of Khokand still
intervened, and the difficult country of the Kizil Yart mountains served
the useful purpose of giving the Athalik Ghazi breathing time, ere he
should arrive at a decision about his future relations with Russia.
Indeed, up to this point the interest of Russia in the affairs of
Kashgar had been very slight, for it does not appear that much, if any,
intercourse had been carried on between the two territories in the past.
Far otherwise was it in Ili, where the Russians had for many years been
located as merchants or as consuls. Their station at Almatie or Vernoe,
an important town and fort situated about 50 miles north of Issik Kul
and 250 west of Ili itself, had in a few years become a large and
flourishing city, instead of preserving its original character of a
small mountain fort. Russian merchants carried on a very extensive trade
by this road with Ili, Urumtsi, Hamil, and Pekin, and their relations
with the Chinese merchants had attained a very satisfactory basis. It
was, therefore, with no friendly feeling, that the Tungan rising in Ili
was regarded by a very large section of the Russians in the
neighbourhood. The disturbances that thereupon broke out, effectually
put a stop to all trade in this quarter for some time, and the old
traffic, or such of it as continued, with China had to be conducted
along the less direct route through Siberia. For six years, the Russians
tolerated the uncertain state of affairs in Ili, where the Tungani and
the Tarantchis disputed between themselves as to which should be the
ruling party; but their dissatisfaction was scarcely concealed at the
substitution of a native government for that of China. When, therefore,
Yakoob Beg, having conquered the country south of the Tian Shan, seemed
to threaten the provinces north of that barrier, it is not surprising
that the Russians availed themselves of excuses for forestalling him,
and for placing their commercial relations on an equally good footing as
they had been in the past with the inhabitants of Ili, by a forced
occupation of that territory. But the Russians were resolved to give as
little umbrage as possible to the Chinese. Ili was formally acknowledged
to be Chinese territory, and the Czar voluntarily promised, through his
representative at Pekin, to restore it as soon as the Emperor of China
was able to despatch a sufficient force to preserve order therein. This
tact secured the permanent goodwill of the Chinese, and Russia obtained,
in several important trade concessions, a very gratifying reward for her
skilful diplomacy. Her friendly action to the Celestials was also
heightened in its effect by a piece of unfortunate policy on our part.
The Panthays had erected in Yunnan a Mahomedan power, which seemed to
have broken off completely from Pekin, and report brought such tales to
our frontier of the power and goodwill of the Sultan of the Panthays
ruling in Ta-li-foo, that in an ill-advised moment we entered into
negotiations with this potentate. The Chinese authorities very naturally
took umbrage at this tacit support of a rebellious vassal, and all our
subsequent efforts have been unable to remove the suspicions produced by
our vacillating attitude on that occasion. The Russians still further
preserved the appearance of friendship for China by their refusal,
maintained during several years, to acknowledge the government set up in
Kashgar by Buzurg Khan and Yakoob Beg. This action was however the less
worthy of approval, because at that period the Russians had no immediate
concern in Kashgaria. Their sole interest lay in the course of events in
Jungaria, with which they were intimately connected by trade and
political associations, stretching back for almost a century.
Undoubtedly Jungaria was much affected by commotions in Kashgaria, and
we accordingly see, when the march of events in the latter province
assumed an aspect menacing to the future independence of Jungaria, the
Russians taking prompt measures to secure the possession of that
province for themselves. When Ili passed into the hands of Russia, the
old trade revived along this route to a certain degree, and some
intercourse ensued with the Tungani of Urumtsi, Manas and Hamil.
Measures seem to have been taken to impress on the rulers of those
cities the prudence of not interfering with merchants or travellers, and
matters became to a certain degree satisfactory for Russian
tranquillity. The city of Ili never, however, recovered its former
prosperity, for Vernoe still remains the most important town in this
region. Originally a fort constructed in 1854, as a small mountain post,
to defend the road from the marauding Kirghiz, it has increased from its
insignificant origin into a large settlement of Cossacks and Calmucks,
and is now a very thriving community. It was, therefore, it must be
remembered, primarily with Jungaria that Russia was interested. So far
as the internal affairs of Kashgar were concerned, she could have
disregarded the dispute between the rivals, Yakoob Beg and the Chinese;
it was only when a powerful Mahomedan state was erected in Eastern
Turkestan, and threatened both the independence of Ili, and also to
raise up disunion in Khokand, that Russia was compelled to consider what
policy it would be wise to adopt towards the recently proclaimed Athalik
Ghazi. Whether it was absolutely necessary or even prudent to annex Ili,
may be doubted with some reason, but it is impossible to find fault with
the Russians for that step. Probably it was the most excusable of all
their conquests, none the less may the decision have been founded on a
misapprehension of circumstances, or it may have been premature to shut
Yakoob Beg out from advancing into a region where he would have been at
the complete mercy of the Russians. Nor is it clear even that Yakoob Beg
had the intention, so generously attributed to him, of committing what
would certainly have resulted in political extinction, viz., an advance
to the northern side of the Tian Shan. The reader will, we hope,
perceive that as little interest was felt by the Russians in the events
transpiring in Kashgar as there was in India, and this indifference
continued down at all events to the end of 1866. At that date Yakoob
Beg's enterprise had been crowned with complete success and the Russian
Government, far more promptly and accurately apprised of the course of
events than our Government in India, was obliged to devote some
attention to this new power, whose appearance was already beginning to
raise a ferment in the Mahomedan states lying to the west of Kashgar.

In 1866, however, some indefinite agreement was arrived at by the
commanders of forces along the Naryn borders, to abstain from
interfering with each other's actions. The Russian forces were permitted
to follow refugees from Khokand and predatory Kirghiz within the nominal
frontier of Kashgar, and when occasion arose a similar right was
accorded to the Kashgarian officials. By some good fortune, perhaps
caused by a feeling of mutual respect, no collisions of any consequence
occurred between the representatives of the two powers during these
early and vague negotiations. Although the Russian governors of Siberia
and Turkestan refused to acknowledge either Buzurg Khan or Yakoob Beg,
they seem to have done their best to make use of these conciliatory
measures along the northern frontier as a lever for inducing Yakoob Beg
to make overtures to them for their support. If such was their intention
the firmness of Yakoob Beg thwarted all their designs, as will be seen
in the sequel. To obtain, however, some advantage out of the apparent
apprehension of the Kashgarian ruler for Russian power was absolutely
necessary, if only to demonstrate the perfection to which Muscovite
diplomacy had attained. So, while refusing to acknowledge the new state
in Eastern Turkestan and deeply deploring the departure of the Chinese,
orders were given to the frontier officers to obtain the sanction of the
Kashgarian officials in the neighbourhood to the construction of a
bridge across the Naryn and of a military road over the Tian Shan into
Kashgar. This was in 1867, and it is not to be wondered at that the
Kashgarian authorities replied with a categorical refusal. To have
acquiesced in this demand would have been to have placed the city of
Kashgar at the complete mercy of the Russians. The position of that city
is most disadvantageous in a military point of view, and the only
obstacle an army advancing from Issik Kul has to encounter is the
difficulty of the road from the Naryn torrent, and the general
impracticability of the passes through this portion of the Tian Shan
range. The Russian government was much disappointed at this rebuff
experienced at the hands of a native ruler, and accordingly in great
haste it was resolved that a fort should be constructed on the Naryn
just within their frontier. In 1868 this fort was completed, but by that
time a fresh change had taken place in the state of affairs, and hopes
were entertained that an agreement might yet be arranged by peaceful
means with Kashgar. During these two years there had been continual
disturbances and fighting in Western Turkestan. Bokhara, instigated,
according to Russian assertions, by Yakoob Beg, had joined with Khokand
and Khiva in a combined uprising against Russia; but in so far as that
uprising was combined it never occurred, for both Bokhara and Khokand
fell an easy prey in detail to the armies of the Czar. The punishment of
Khiva was reserved for a future occasion, and indeed of all the
confederates Khiva was the only one which obtained any successes in the
field. The most palpable result of that campaign was the acquisition of
Samarcand by Russia, and for a time all opposition seemed to be stamped
out. No sooner, however, had the main Russian army returned to Tashkent
than a large force invested the small garrison left in Samarcand, and
the whole country rose in arms again. The Russian garrison held tightly
on to its post, and, although in comparison to its strength its loss was
most severe, the town was preserved until the arrival of General
Kaufmann with reinforcements. Bokhara then sued for peace, which, after
some delay, was concluded with the unfortunate Ameer Mozaffur Eddin. By
that treaty the Russians obtained the right to place military
cantonments at Kermina, Charjui, and Karshi. Kermina is situated about
fifty miles east of the town of Bokhara, on the road from Katti Kurgan
and Samarcand; Karshi about sixty miles south of Katti Kurgan, and half
way to the Oxus; while Charjui is on the Oxus and some eighty miles west
of Bokhara. Of all these the last is the most important, for thence a
direct caravan route leads to Merv and Meshed. Once more, in 1870-71,
Bokhara entered the field, but the enterprise collapsed through the
unconcerted measures of the allies and the weakness of Khokand. During
these five eventful years of rebellion amongst the races of Western
Turkestan, Yakoob Beg preserved his neutrality. If the assertion is
correct that he had played an underhand part in the formation of the
league against Russia, assuredly he endeavoured to make his actions
contradict his diplomacy. Not a Kashgarian soldier participated in the
efforts made so repeatedly by Bokhara and Khokand to shake off the bonds
of Russian vassalage. Like Shere Ali of Cabul, he devoted his attention
exclusively to the affairs of his immediate province, and wars in the
extreme east of his dominions against co-religionists were a preferable
alternative to the risks attending a _jehad_ against the most formidable
enemy of Islam! Russia had indeed little to complain of in Yakoob Beg's
interference in their possessions. His instigation of premature
rebellions, or, if he did not instigate them, the approval extended to
them by some of his chief ministers, was the very kindest act he could
have conferred on the ruling power of Turkestan, for Russia never has
had anything to fear from any isolated risings among the people of this
part of Central Asia. Nothing less than an unanimous and concerted
rising in Western Turkestan, aided with a nucleus of regular troops and
officers, such as, to go no farther, either Afghanistan can supply, or
Kashgar could at one time have supplied--nothing less than this will
ever produce a complete catastrophe to the Russian arms, and in a short
campaign of a few months send the Russian legions back to their old
quarters of thirteen years ago. Whether Yakoob Beg ever was strong
enough to risk the independence of his state on so important an
enterprise may fairly be doubted, and he showed a commendable prudence
in abstaining from hostilities when he had sufficient matters to occupy
all his attention, and to task all his resources within his own borders;
but assuming such to have been the case, his indifference to the
suffering thereby inflicted on the Khokandians must remain a blot on his
fair fame. If the part he played in these earlier plots was scarcely
honourable, how much less so was his action in the last rebellion of
1875. But it may be as well to postpone considering that event until
later on in this chapter. Yakoob Beg most probably took a very selfish
view of the state of affairs. His own extremely uncertain tenure of
power made him anxious lest any storm from beyond his frontier should
wreck the frail bark in which he had asserted his claim to independence,
and the whole object of his policy was simply to divert attention from
himself to other quarters. The Russians above all must have their work
cut out for them in repression of continual sedition in their
possessions; while each day of respite witnessed Yakoob Beg in a better
position for making a strenuous resistance when the time should come,
according to Russian ideas, for an attempt to be made to crush his
power. Viewed from this standpoint, the conduct of Yakoob Beg towards
his fellow-countrymen appears in a slightly more favourable aspect,
although his policy of expediency has little in it to command
admiration. Yet the result answered his expectations. In 1868 the
construction of Fort Naryn was the avowed preliminary measure to an
occupation of Kashgar; from that danger this policy of compromise saved
him. Again, in 1870, was he pronounced an incorrigible enemy of the
Czar, and an expedition was prepared which was to bring him to his
senses; once more a revolt in Khokand intervened to distract Russian
attention and Russian arms from the Naryn to Ferghana. The expedition
against Khiva in 1873 also served the purpose of diverting to another
quarter the blow which should, according to many, have descended on the
offending head of the Athalik Ghazi; and lastly, in 1875 the
insurrection in Khokand, the most serious and the most nearly successful
of all the native wars against Russia, saved him from an invasion for
which every preparation had been made.

To return to the year 1868, when the Russian government had constructed
the fort on the Naryn, and had openly proclaimed its intention of
punishing the slight put upon it by Yakoob Beg's refusal to permit the
construction of a road over the mountains to Artosh. Up to that year the
intercourse had been of a semiofficial character between the officers on
either side of the frontier. We have now come to a phase of the question
of a slightly different import. The Russian officials endeavoured to
obtain from Yakoob Beg concessions that would be advantageous to their
country, at the same time that they categorically declined to recognize
his official _status_ as an independent prince. Their antagonist was far
too astute to permit himself to be out-manoeuvred by so simple a
device, and his officials were quite unauthorized to enter into any
arrangement without its being brought before their master in the manner
consistent with his dignity. We have seen that the Russians, failing in
their diplomatic chicane, had recourse to threats, although the irony of
fate prevented those threats ever being put into execution. But
concurrently with these efforts on the part of the Russian government,
others of a different kind were being made by individuals. The Russian
merchants of Kuldja contained in their ranks several men whose
enterprise and courage had been remarkable in the manipulation of trade
with the Chinese and the Tungani. They were not easily deterred from any
undertaking which promised them brilliant remuneration, even though the
risk and uncertainty might be great. The pioneers of commerce were free
from the fetters that hampered official movements. It was of little
moment to them who ruled in Kashgaria so long as he extended his
protection to their goods and their persons whilst they were within his
territory. The Russian government viewed with favour the efforts that
were made to cross the Tian Shan, for on the individual fell the
greatest portion of the risk, while the government profited much by the
fruits of his experience. The Russian merchants were, therefore, not
discouraged by their authorities when they laid their proposals before
General Kolpakovsky, as English merchants would have been under similar
circumstances by the authorities at Calcutta--nay, it is tolerably
certain that they received many inducements to persist in their
intention; both their patriotism and desire for advancing their own
worldly concerns were appealed to, to urge them to attempt to obtain
admission into Kashgar. When, therefore, it became evident in 1868 that
nothing was to be obtained from Yakoob Beg by indirect means, and when
it was also decided that a military remedy would not be convenient, the
field was fairly cleared for another kind of performers to begin
operations.

Early in the year 1868 a Russian merchant, named Kludof, collected at
Vernoe a small caravan. His chief commodities consisted of those
gewgaws, which, prepared in Moscow, have been found, according to
Russian experience, the most marketable articles in Western Turkestan;
but, in addition to these trumpery packages, more useful necessaries,
such as cotton goods and cutlery, were taken as specimens of some of the
real advantages that would come in the wake of Russian trade. Kludof set
out with the intention of crossing the Tian Shan by the Naryn, and
making for the border town of Ush Turfan, whence Kashgar is easily
reached by the high road. But he had not proceeded far beyond Fort
Naryn, then in course of construction, when he was attacked by a band of
marauders. With the loss of all his possessions he must still be
considered fortunate in having escaped without any serious personal
injury. Perhaps the robbers were inspired with some respect for the
person of a Russian subject, or, as the indictment against Yakoob Beg
affirms, by the express orders of that ruler, who wished to deter,
without causing any serious complication with the government, Russian
subjects of any kind whatever from entering his kingdom. As it happened,
however, Kludof was a very determined fellow, one not easily balked when
he had set his mind on accomplishing anything. The government viewed his
case with commiseration, and he was assisted in collecting together
another caravan of larger proportions than its predecessor. But before
setting out on the same road he determined to make an effort to reach
the ear of Yakoob Beg himself, and by a singular piece of good fortune
he was able to do so through a Kashgarian subject residing in Kuldja.
The presents, judiciously selected, with which he accompanied his letter
complaining of the injury he had received at the hands of Kirghiz
subjects of the ruler of Kashgar, yet only demanding as a reparation
permission to come into that state as a peaceful subject of the Czar,
fully propitiated Yakoob Beg, who sent a safe conduct to Vernoe for
Kludof and his caravan. This merchant made a most favourable impression
on the ruler of Kashgar, and it seemed at one moment as if he would
achieve what all the diplomacy of the two previous years had failed in
accomplishing. Even Yakoob Beg was induced to take a slight step towards
a better agreement with his neighbour, for in the summer of 1868, he
sent Shadi Mirza, one of his nephews, to Vernoe, requesting that he
might be permitted to go on to Tashkent, to place before the governor of
Turkestan certain proposals from his master for a complete understanding
with Russia. Simultaneously with the despatch of Shadi Mirza by Yakoob
Beg, a Russian officer, Captain Reinthal, was commissioned by General
Kolpakovsky, the governor of Kuldja, to proceed to Kashgar and demand
the surrender of some Kirghiz robbers, who, from within Yakoob Beg's
dominion, had sallied forth to pillage Russian merchants. They had also
seized several inhabitants of Khokand and the Naryn district; and the
Russian government demanded the unconditional surrender of these
individuals as her subjects. Captain Reinthal was instructed to make
these two demands in a peremptory way, and to convince the new
government that Russia would not permit any infraction of the spirit of
the treaties concluded with the old government under the Chinese.
Captain Reinthal was received in a sufficiently hospitable manner, but
his movements were scrupulously restricted to the city. He did not, on
this occasion, learn much of importance about the country, but he was
impressed favourably by the appearance of such of the army as he saw.
The Kirghiz robbers were captured by the order of Yakoob Beg, but he
stoutly refused to surrender them. The Russian prisoners were also kept
in honourable confinement as a guarantee for the safe return of Shadi
Mirza. They were, however, permitted to return to Russian territory when
it became known that Shadi Mirza was progressing favourably with his
mission to Tashkent. Captain Reinthal accomplished little or nothing on
this embassade, and had to report, on his return to his superior, the
strange tidings that the new power was resolved to play an independent
part in Asia, and to answer defiance with defiance, and threat with
threat. This report must have seemed scarcely credible, but there is no
doubt that Captain Reinthal advised, as the result of his experience,
the adoption of a lenient and friendly policy towards the new-comer.
This concession to a Central Asian despot was not agreeable at
head-quarters, and the question was shelved for the time. Shadi Mirza,
who had been detained at Vernoe, was at last permitted to continue his
journey to Tashkent, where he found General Kaufmann absent in Europe.
Instructions were then issued to send him on to St. Petersburg, where he
arrived in the last days of 1868. He had several informal interviews
with the governor of Turkestan, but he was not received by the Czar or
any of the higher officials. In fact, he was only treated as an ordinary
traveller, and not as the representative of a neighbouring state.
Nothing up to this had been done by the Russian government, showing that
they recognized Yakoob Beg as ruler of Kashgaria. The Chinese were
still, in their eyes, the _de jure_ owners of that province, whoever
might be the temporary owners _de facto_. On the return of Shadi Mirza
to Kashgar, in January, 1869, the relations between Russia and Yakoob
Beg may be said to have returned to the exact _status quo ante_. All the
Russian demands for trade had been unsuccessful, and, except the
brilliant journey of Mr. Kludof, no one had broken through the mystic
charm that shut out the Garden of Asia from all foreign spectators.
Their envoy, Captain Reinthal, had been treated in a precisely similar
manner to that in which Shadi Mirza had been received at Vernoe and St.
Petersburg; and a firm and dignified attitude had effectually checked
the Russian officer when he attempted to express those threats which
formed the principal part of his instructions. There was something
imposing in the quiet way in which Yakoob Beg asserted his equality in
rank with the Czar of All the Russias. His invariable reply, when the
great power of Russia was made use of as an argument to overcome his
refusal to accede to the trade concessions demanded, was, "My brother,
the White Czar, is a most powerful monarch, and rules over the greater
portion of the earth, and I am only an insignificant prince in
comparison to him. But none the less can I encounter the danger like a
true man, and esteem it a happiness to die in defence of my country and
my faith." To so courageous and so honourable a reply what rejoinder
could be made by the abashed officers? It is impossible to refuse Yakoob
Beg the highest admiration for his stanchness in his opposition to
Russia. If for his own narrow interests it may have been imprudent to
throw down the gage of battle so freely, all the more does that attitude
claim respect when we see him trampling on purely selfish motives, and
asserting his claim to leadership in that wider question of Asiatic
against Muscovite, of Mahomedan against Greek. Had he only been
consistent throughout his career, had he only been as firm in his
convictions and as prompt in carrying them into practice as he generally
was, when the occasion came for a great effort against Russia, how
different might have been his own fate and the present aspect of affairs
in Central Asia!

For some time after these abortive proceedings the Russians abstained
from any direct interference in Kashgar, but the conferring of the title
of Athalik Ghazi, or Commander of the Faithful, on Yakoob Beg by the
Ameer of Bokhara had roused the susceptibilities of Russia too much to
be allayed. It seemed, indeed, as if this acknowledgment of the
orthodoxy of Yakoob Beg by the Head of Islam in Central Asia heralded
forth some understanding between the two states, and that a menace was
directed against the Russian government. Whether there was any agreement
between Mozaffur Eddin and Yakoob Beg it is not possible at present to
say, but that such should have been brought about by their mutual
antipathy to Russia would not have been very wonderful. However, in the
disturbances of 1870 Yakoob Beg took no active part. While the Russian
arms were triumphing over every opponent in their newly acquired
province of Ferghana and its vicinity, Yakoob Beg was busily engaged
with the Tungani, who at that time were causing trouble to him along his
far eastern frontier. The revolt collapsed in Khokand, and Yakoob Beg,
apparently unconcerned with the events transpiring in the West, was
carrying his victorious arms to new conquests in the East. During the
year 1870, when murmurs of the approaching storm were becoming audible,
the Russian government endeavoured to obtain the alliance of Khudayar
Khan, of Khokand, for the purpose of bringing Yakoob Beg within their
influence. This Khan had, as has been already mentioned, been betrayed
by Yakoob Beg, who had followed the example of the ambitious Vizier Alim
Kuli, and was now mainly dependent on the Russians for support against
his rebellious subjects. He could not be considered in any way,
therefore, as likely to be favourably disposed towards his neighbour of
Kashgar, or as lukewarm in the cause of his protectors and benefactors.
The Russians felt assured of his hearty support in advocating their
plan, which was as follows. From time immemorial, as has been seen in
the sketch of the history of Kashgar, there have been two rival elements
in Kashgaria--the Chinese and the Khokandian. The Chinese was triumphant
in modern times for a little more than a century, while the Khokandian
has, more or less, at all other times been paramount. But whenever a
native dynasty had attained a certain degree of security therein, it was
always threatened by the ambitious designs of the Khan of Khokand, who
had generally contributed most towards its successful establishment. The
Russian government resolved to avail themselves of this historical fact
to pour into the ear of Khudayar Khan insidious counsels as to his
claims as feudal lord over Eastern Turkestan. There once more, so they
argued, had a Khokandian subject formed an independent and rival
administration, and all his victories had been won by Khokandian
sympathies, and by the good right arms of Khokandian subjects. And how
had this soldier of fortune acted towards his own country when he had
received everything from her that he needed? By offering an asylum to
all those who had participated in the plots against Khudayar Khan
himself, by encouraging sedition in the state itself against the
Russians and their nominee, Khudayar, the legal ruler of the state. As
if these crimes were not sufficiently serious, he had added thereto the
insult of having refused to recognize in Khudayar his liege lord; and
Khudayar's own personal fears were worked upon to yield that
acquiescence to the Russian proposal that was necessary to secure its
success. It was pointed out to him that a strong military power in
Kashgar might give an impetus to the plots then fermenting in the active
brain of Aftobatcha, the ambitious son of Mussulman Kuli, the prime
minister and vizier of thirty years ago. The arguments were specious,
and it cannot be doubted that they made some impression on Khudayar
Khan. This much-to-be-pitied ruler, forced by the necessities of his
position to humour his Russian advisers, still had the courage to refuse
to assert his claims as lord over Kashgar. With a gentle irony he
pointed to the map, and showed how Khokand's frontier should extend
farther to the west than it did, and that a conquest over the barren
regions of the Kizil Yart would be but a sorry equivalent for the loss
of Tashkent and Hodjent. He, however, promised to make use of his best
means for inducing Yakoob Beg to make overtures to the Russian
government for the ratification of a treaty of commerce. So Khudayar
Khan indited a letter to Yakoob Beg, at the dictation of his Russian
friends, to this effect; but he silvered the pill by a private message
giving information of the Russian intentions in the future. The tenor of
that communication was that the Russians were less eager than might
have been supposed to bring matters to a final crisis with Yakoob Beg,
and that they were most desirous of settling the question without any
flagrant loss of dignity by being the first to recommence negotiations.
Both publicly and privately Khudayar Khan advised that the Athalik Ghazi
should make some concessions in form to the Russian government. The
Russians themselves, having failed to induce Khudayar Khan to put
pressure on Yakoob Beg, appear to have arrived at the same conclusion as
that set out in the letters of Khudayar. Yakoob Beg must make the sign,
and they would meet him half way in his desire to share in the great
benefits accruing from a Muscovite alliance. The authorities at Tashkent
went so far as to flatter themselves that they had attained a solution
of one of their chief annoyances. They had, by making use of the
mediation of Khudayar, gone so far as to open the door for Yakoob Beg to
abase himself. Such condescension was unheard of, and no doubt was
entertained but that this proud Mahomedan ruler would gladly hasten to
avail himself of the last chance accorded him by the clemency of the
Czar.

But they were reckoning without their host. Yakoob Beg quickly perceived
that the bold exterior of the Russian demands concealed a vacillating
purpose, and that a power which would go out of its way so far to bring
about an arrangement, would yield much more when the discussion became
directly carried on. He had evidently impressed the few Russians who had
visited him with a belief in his strength, and rumour had magnified his
resources, and converted his small and heterogeneous following into a
regular and trained army. He was not the man to destroy, when the game
was almost in his hands too, all the favourable impressions, that stood
him in such good stead during his career, which his policy for four
years had succeeded in creating about his personality. After a suitable
delay his formal reply to the official letter of Khudayar arrived, and
its contents must have been eminently displeasing to the Russians. In
general terms he refused to enter into negotiations with the Russians,
because they had refused to acknowledge his own government, and had ever
supported the cause of his enemies the Chinese. But, not content with
this blunt refusal to the offer made from Tashkent, he went on to minor
matters and dealt with the question of Russian policy in specific
language. The common enemy of him and all his co-religionists was not
worthy of any consideration from him or his allies, the rulers of
Khokand and Bokhara. "The Russians that have come here, into my state of
Kashgar, look at these localities and become acquainted with the state
of the country, and therefore it is better to forbid their coming, for
they are a treacherous and crooked-minded people." In such plain terms
did Yakoob Beg speak of a power which could without any serious risk
have crushed him at any moment. Yet in one sense his boldness was the
height of prudence, and succeeded when perhaps a less decided attitude
would have completely failed. The Russians were fairly deluded in their
estimate of their new antagonist, and all means having been exhausted
for inducing Yakoob Beg to abandon his indifferent attitude towards
themselves, it began to be seriously discussed at Tashkent whether, if
simply for the purpose of obtaining accurate information of his country,
it would not be prudent to acknowledge the existence of a ruler who had
for nearly six years been established as responsible sovereign of a very
large portion of Asia. The path was smoothed, too, for the Russian
diplomatists by Yakoob Beg sending a letter to the governor of
Turkestan, stating that it was useless for the Czar to attempt the
establishment of diplomatic relations through the good offices of
Khudayar Khan; but that if the Russians really desired to enter into
alliance with him they could send an embassy to him, when formal steps
could be commenced for securing the trade and other agreements that were
desirable. The letter was a very dignified piece of writing, such as
one European sovereign would have sent to another in the Middle Ages.
"He did not deny," he said, "either the power or the resources of
Russia, but as a brave man he placed his trust in God, and he would
never shirk the contest, because all he aspired to was to die for his
faith." This letter produced a great impression at Tashkent, and it was
resolved to send an ambassador to Kashgar.

Before pursuing the narrative, it may be as well to sum up what had
passed between Russia and Kashgar up to this period, for henceforth
these two states were to stand in a completely different relationship
towards each other. The Russians strove to induce Yakoob Beg to make the
most favourable commercial and political concessions to them, while they
refused to grant him any equivalent, except the dubious one, "advantage
from the produce of Russian manufactures." They even added insult to
injury by openly proclaiming that they only recognized the Chinese as
the rulers of Kashgar, and refused to discuss the arguments advanced by
Shadi Mirza in favour of his uncle's claim to be considered _de facto_
sovereign. They adopted an attitude of bullying towards this Asiatic
prince, and loudly proclaimed in their practice the truth of the
aphorism, that might is right. They backed up their verbal threats on
several occasions by a show of military preparations, but not once did
they put those threats into execution. On the other hand, Yakoob Beg's
policy was consistent throughout and dignified. While studiously
avoiding any aggressive measures, even under the excuse of defensive
precautions, he was always firm in his refusal to recognize any of the
semi-official overtures that were repeatedly made to induce him to show
his hand. Instead of appearing in the light of a suppliant, as according
to all precedent he should, he assumed the position of a dictator.
"Acknowledge me as legally constituted ruler of Kashgaria, or else there
is an end to all negotiation. Send a properly accredited ambassador to
me, and he shall be honourably received. A representative of recognized
rank shall then convey my token of friendship to your master. Refuse to
grant me these just considerations, and my kingdom is closed to your
merchants and officials without exception. Admission shall only be
obtained over my own body and that of my devoted army." For the first
time in the annals of Russian history an Asiatic ruler had tired out the
finessing and intrigue that had become customary with that empire as the
means for infinite conquest. Yakoob Beg was the only sovereign who
refused to be subservient to the Czar, and eventually achieved a
diplomatic triumph over his representatives. In the spring of 1872,
Yakoob Beg was at the very acme of his prosperity. Not yet had he
commenced those later campaigns against the Tungani, which more than
anything else tended to weaken his power and to raise discontent against
his administration; and, fresh from his diplomatic success over the
Russians, he appeared in the eyes of many Asiatics as a fit champion to
redeem their fortunes in a conflict with Russia. Excusable as their
enthusiasm undoubtedly was, it is tolerably certain that the power of
Yakoob Beg was exaggerated both by the adulation of his friends and by
the nervous susceptibilities of the Russians. It is noteworthy that
Russia proved herself on one occasion to be quite as liable to this
latter disease as England is assumed to be.

To Baron Kaulbars, the explorer of the sources of the Syr Darya, was
entrusted the delicate mission of representing the Russian government
for the first time at the court of the Athalik Ghazi, and to no better
diplomatist could it have been consigned. He set out from Kuldja early
in May, 1872, carrying with him a large collection of presents for the
ruler and his chief advisers, and arrived in Kashgar without any mishap
in June of the same year. Here he was received in the most cordial
manner, and the consideration and hospitality exhibited towards him by
the ruler were beyond all expectation. In the picturesque phraseology
of the East, the Athalik Ghazi, at his first audience with Baron
Kaulbars, said, "Sit upon my knees, on my bosom, or where ye like; for
ye are guests sent me from heaven." The most complete freedom of action
was accorded, for the first time, to all the members of the embassy, and
two merchants who had accompanied it for the purpose of exploring the
country received a safe-conduct to go on to Yarkand and Khoten. Yakoob
Beg scarcely attempted to conceal his gratification at the presence of
the Russians; possibly his pleasure chiefly arose from such an
unmistakable admission of his skill as a diplomatist. But in every way
facilities were afforded his visitors for seeing all objects of interest
round Kashgar. Reviews were held in honour of the occasion, and as there
happened to be a considerable number of troops in the vicinity, passing
through to operate against the Tungani beyond Kucha, the show was
imposing enough. The Russians were favourably impressed by what they
saw, and Baron Kaulbars expressed himself surprised at the military
exactitude with which the manoeuvres were carried out. Yakoob Beg,
always open to flattery, exclaimed in an enthusiastic moment, "I look
upon the Russians as my dearest friends; if I had not, should I have
shown you my military power? Assuredly it is not usual even with you to
make known one's actual condition to an enemy." Matters were now in a
fair way to a pleasant solution. Baron Kaulbars and Yakoob Beg were
mutually delighted; but, after the time for pleasant talk had expired,
it was necessary that some definite arrangements should be drawn up for
the political and commercial relations of the two countries in the
future.

The chief objects the Russians had in view when they sent Baron Kaulbars
to Kashgar were three. In the first place they wanted to acquire general
information about that state, and to discover whether Yakoob Beg was as
powerful as report had asserted. In the second, they wished to put their