the Treaty Powers were frankly informed of the objects of the mission.
Before he left, Count Inouye called upon Mr. Bingham, the American
Minister, who cordially sympathized with the Government’s intentions,
and borrowed Bayard Taylor’s abridged history of Commodore Perry’s
expedition. The Count said he feared that the Koreans might show signs
of obduracy, in which case it would become necessary for his colleague
and himself to have recourse to some of the measures which Commodore
Perry found so efficacious. Inouye wished to have the book so that he
could refresh his memory and be better perfected in the part if it became
necessary to play it.[15]

As before intimated, the Japanese Government was anxious that the Treaty
of 1876 should be followed by like Treaties between Korea and other
Powers. It cordially tendered its good offices when Commodore Shufeldt
visited Japan previous to the negotiation of the treaty concluded by
him, and on subsequent occasions did what was possible to facilitate the
conclusion of other treaties with Korea. Its policy in that regard was
illustrated in an interesting way by the statement of Count Inouye, then
Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Bingham in 1882, with reference
to the appointment of General Foote, the first American Minister to
Korea. He said to Mr. Bingham, as the latter reported to Secretary
Frelinghuysen, that the action of the American Government “in ratifying
so promptly its treaty with Korea and accrediting a minister to that
kingdom gave great satisfaction to His Imperial Japanese Majesty’s
Government, and was accepted as another evidence of the policy of justice
so often manifested by the United States toward the states of Asia.” He
also said that it was considered an act of friendship toward Japan as
well as Korea.

In considering all the subsequent relations of Japan and Korea two things
should be kept distinctly in view as determining questions of justice and
injustice, of wisdom or unwisdom, in the policy of both countries. In the
first place: In order to conclude “a treaty of commerce and amity which
recognized the independence of Korea,” Japan rather than engage in a
punitive war, had encountered in its own territory a rebellion which cost
the Government of the Restoration no less than 60,000 men and 416,000,000
_yen_. And second, in allowing this treaty to go through in the form
which it actually took, China had been convicted of the duplicity and
wholly untenable character of its claims to exercise the rights of
suzerainty over Korea. On the latter point Minister Rockhill[16] affirms
that the conclusion in 1876 of the treaty of Kang-wha between Japan and
Korea “marks the beginning of a new era in the history of the latter
country, its entry into the family of nations.” “Prior to the Kang-wha
treaty,” this authority goes on to say: “The nature of Korea’s relation
to China was a puzzle to Western nations. They were told, at one and the
same time, that Korea, though a vassal and tributary state of China, was
entirely independent so far as her government, religion, and intercourse
with foreign states were concerned—a condition of things hardly
compatible with our ideas of either absolute dependence or complete
independence.”

“In 1871 the Chinese Foreign Office wrote the United States Minister
in Peking, Mr. Frederick F. Low, who had informed it of his recent
appointment by his Government as special envoy to Korea, and was about
proceeding there, that: ‘Korea is regarded as a country subordinate
to China, yet is wholly independent in everything that relates to her
government, her religion, her prohibitions, and her laws; in none of
these things has China hitherto interfered.’”[17] But the first Article
of the treaty signed in 1876 with Japan reads as follows: “Chosen, being
an independent state, enjoys the same sovereign rights as does Japan”;
and in 1882 the King of Korea wrote to the President of the United
States, when the two countries were about to enter into treaty relations,
pledging his Government that the terms of the treaty should be “carried
into effect according to the laws of independent states.”

It was this not merely theoretical suzerainty, but a pernicious practice
of interference and dictation on the part of China over Korea, joined to
the utterly corrupt and weak government of the latter country, which led
inevitably to the war between the former and Japan. Similar claims of the
Government of Peking, under existing political and social conditions,
over the weaker states which were alleged to be dependencies of this
Government, the civilized nations of the world have repeatedly found
themselves compelled to disregard; and this, in the interests of the
dependent people themselves.

The mental attitude and practical treatment which the Korean Court and
Yang-ban class in general have accorded to the treaties with Japan and
other foreign nations have been essentially unchanged from the beginning.
All depends upon the apparent immediate effect of foreign intercourse
on their ancient rights and privileges of office-bearing and official
“squeezing.” The Mins, the family of the late Queen, have always been
notoriously corrupt; and, if the Queen herself was ever sincerely opposed
to the anti-foreign policy, it is likely that the opposition had its
source in the selfish interests of her own family and in her hatred of
the King’s father, the Tai Won Kun. The latter was always consistently
and energetically opposed to all foreign intercourse.

The condition of affairs in Korea preceding the troubles of 1882 and
1884 is graphically and truthfully described by the report of Ensign
George C. Foulk, of the United States Navy, in which he submitted to
his Government information relative to the revolutionary attempt of the
latter date. With regard to the Government of Korea, Ensign Foulk says
that “it has been for an indefinite period under the practical control
of the Min Family, of which the Queen of Korea is at present the highest
representative. The blood of this family is largely Chinese, and it has
been always, and remains, the desire and aim of this family to subject,
and retain in subjection, their country to the suzerainty of China.
Members of this family are accorded special privileges by China, and are,
to the exclusion of other Korean noble families, on comparatively social
terms with the Court of China, which they visit frequently. The family is
very large, and includes the highest number of great nobles, with the
greatest landed estates, of all the families of the nobility in Korea....
The great body of Korean people know little or nothing of the politics
of their Government, nor do they dare to use any information they may by
chance possess on Government affairs.”

Ensign Foulk then goes on to draw attention to the remarkable phenomenon
that, while the Chinese “are detested for their appearance, conduct and
customs,” nothing by way of cruelty and fraud that they may do awakens
practical resentment; but the Japanese, on the contrary, while “even
admired by Koreans of the present day for their appearance, customs,
and conduct,” are so hated that the “Koreans are always ready for the
license when they may vent this feeling in shedding Japanese blood.” With
regard to the real attitude of the Queen’s family, he further affirms:
“This energy of the Mins [namely, in conducting negotiations for a treaty
with the United States] has given them the mistaken reputation of being
members of the progressive party in Korea; in fact, they only acted in
obedience to their hereditary lord, China, without a thought patriotic to
Korea, beyond that they, in common with all Koreans at that time, felt
the danger of the seizure of a part of Korea by Russia.”

Now, however, the Tai Won Kun, the bitter enemy of the Queen, had his
turn at the wheel on which the fate of this unfortunate country was
revolving, first in one direction and then in the other. In July, 1882,
taking advantage of disaffection among the soldiers of the capital,
occasioned by short rations issued by the Mins (a “steal in army
contracts”), he directed their revolt against that family, and, having
disposed of its members, seized the Government for himself. Many Mins
were killed; Min Tai-ho (father of Min Yong-ik) was left, supposed to
be fatally wounded, in a ditch; poison was to be administered to the
Queen, but a maid, personating her in disguise, took the poison and died
while the Queen escaped. Min Yong-ik shaved his head, and, after hiding
in the mountains three days, walked to Fusan whence he escaped to Japan
in the guise of a Buddhist priest. For his disobedience to its command
and his attempt to annihilate its royal servants, the Mins, the Chinese
Government sent its troops to Korea and carried off into banishment the
Tai Won Kun; but the power of the Mins in China’s behalf having been
greatly cut down by the revolt, Chinese troops were placed in Seoul
to strengthen the remainder, and continued there after the revolt was
suppressed.

It was, then, in connection with the armed interference of China in a
domestic quarrel between the wife and the father of the Emperor,—China,
which had repeatedly disclaimed all responsibility for Korean internal
affairs and which had permitted Korea to make a foreign treaty on terms
of equality,—that the Korean Court offered again, in 1882, another
affront to Japan. This time, also, the insult was written in blood. For
through no fault or offence on their part, a number of Japanese were
killed in the course of a domestic riot, and the Japanese Minister was
obliged to flee from the capital and to put to sea in a fishing boat,
whence he was rescued by an English vessel. The provocation was greater
than that for which western nations have frequently exacted exemplary
vengeance, much greater than the offence given by the rebellious Daimyo
of Choshin, for which the Treaty Powers had held Japan herself so
strictly to account. Nevertheless, Japan made due allowance for the
irresponsibility and weakness of the Korean Government. An apology, an
indemnity of 550,000 _yen_ (50,000 being for private sufferers), and a
Convention of two articles defining treaty limits, etc. (signed August
30, 1882), were the sum of her demands. The payment of 400,000 _yen_ of
the indemnity was afterward remitted. The instructions of the Emperor of
Japan commanding this to be done contained the following declaration:

    We hereby remit four hundred thousand _yen_ of the indemnity
    of five hundred thousand _yen_ due from Korea, which sum we
    sincerely trust will be employed to supplement the funds
    already devoted to the introduction of civilization into the
    country.

It is a curious coincidence that the Minister who, on the 9th of
November, 1884, transmitted this message, was obliged only a few weeks
later to flee from Seoul like his predecessor, on account of the
perpetration of outrages against Japan, even greater than those for which
the indemnity had been exacted.

This renewal of the stipulated condition of commerce and amity between
Japan and Korea, with its renewed act of forgiveness on the part of the
former toward the latter, only prepared the way for the more serious
outrages of 1884. The Chinese force which was sent to support the
anti-foreign and unprogressive policy of the Min family, proceeded to
take up permanent quarters in extensive camps within the walls of Seoul.
They erected a fort close by the palace gates and two others outside of
the city, in a situation to defend the approaches from the river Han.
A little later they increased the number of Chinese troops in Seoul to
3,000 men. In the opinion of Ensign Foulk, the confession forced from
certain Korean officials revealed the truth that these foreign soldiers
were quartered in the capital city in order to enforce a secret agreement
between China and the Mins, representing Korea, which gave to the Peking
Government rights of suzerainty such as it had never even claimed before.

Then began an increasingly bitter strife between the reactionary party,
supported by Chinese soldiers, and the reform party, the leaders of
which had been abroad (chiefly in Japan) and had returned determined to
exert themselves to bring about reforms and to introduce the benefits
of Western civilization in their native land. Japan, however, had given
the frankest and most sincere assurances that such troops as it kept
in Korea were only for the defence of its own Legation, and that it
aimed to assist Korea in all its efforts at progress. “From Japan,”
says Ensign Foulk, “came a number of qualified Japanese, who were held
in readiness to begin teaching the use of machinery, the manufacture of
paper, pottery, etc. Steps were also taken towards securing a director of
agriculture, school teachers, and several other foreigners for service
under the Korean Government. In regard to these the initiatory steps were
taken in consultation with the progressive leaders, including the King,
in which I was warmly invited to have a voice.”[18] Gradually, however,
in part through fear, in part through jealousy, and perhaps also with
some degree, in certain cases, of more intelligent and honorable reasons,
certain leading members of the progressive party fell more and more under
Chinese influences.

How insolently the foreign soldiers from China during this period treated
the Koreans may be learned from the following incident. In August, 1884,
a Korean officer of high rank was openly seized by a party of Chinese
soldiers and beaten by them in the street so severely that his life was
despaired of; this was the outcome of a quarrel between the Chinese
Commissioner and the Korean officer about the right of passage through
a gateway of the Korean officer’s house, which was next to that of the
Chinese officer. “On the contrary,” says Ensign Foulk, “the attitude of
the Japanese in Seoul had always been such as to indicate an earnest
desire to aid the party of progress, and to be on peaceable, friendly
terms with the people. The conduct of Japanese citizens toward Koreans
was commendable. As indicating great consideration on the part of the
Japanese Government toward Korea, was the restraint placed upon Japanese
merchants establishing themselves in Seoul, by the Japanese Minister, who
evidently in doing so followed the spirit of the treaties, by which the
capital was not to be thrown open to trade if the Chinese left.”

[Illustration: The Tong-Kwan Tai-Kwol Palace.]

When their factional strifes had the customary expression in revolution,
arson, and bloodshed, the Koreans, aided by the Chinese soldiers, turned
upon the Japanese. The subsequent occurrences and the way that the
Japanese Government dealt with them are narrated in the words of one who
was an eye-witness of, and an actor in, them:[19]

    With subsequent occurrences I am personally familiar, having
    accompanied Count Inouye, Minister for Foreign Affairs, when he
    went as Special Ambassador to Korea to settle the difficulty.

    This was another occasion when public excitement ran very
    high in Japan. The nation was clamoring for war with China,
    and the feeling of keen indignation in Army and Navy circles
    was strongly marked. Following so closely upon the events of
    1882 this new outrage appeared to all classes to be the last
    straw. The Government, however, then under the premiership
    of Marquis Ito, was determined to have recourse to the last
    resort only after every means of honorable accommodation had
    been exhausted. As Marquis Ito’s mission to China subsequently
    showed, it was also determined to settle once and for all,
    so far as that could be done, the question of China’s right
    forcibly to interfere in Korean domestic brawls, which was
    really the gravest feature of the occurrence.

    The choice of an official of Count Inouye’s high rank showed
    the importance which the government attached to the mission.
    The designation of Admiral Kabayama and General Takashima,
    typical representatives of the prevailing feeling in Army and
    Navy circles, to accompany him, was most sagacious. It was
    proof to the Army and Navy, as well as to the people at large,
    that nothing would be done in the dark, and that no arrangement
    would be concluded in anywise damaging to Japan’s honor or
    prestige.

    It must be confessed that there was good ground for indignation
    in Japan. A domestic revolution had taken place in Seoul,
    attended by many of the incidents common where government
    is “despotism tempered by assassination.” But neither Japan
    nor her agents were responsible for that. Mr. Takezoye, the
    Japanese Minister, had gone to the Palace with his bodyguard,
    at the King’s request, to guard the royal person. It was a
    technical mistake, no doubt on the Minister’s part, for he
    should not have interfered in the matter, or, at the most,
    should have asked the King to come to the Legation. But there
    can be no doubt that he acted in good faith. He was an amiable
    scholar rather than a diplomat and had always maintained the
    most cordial personal relations with the King. The latter
    was never in any sense a prisoner in his hands, as was shown
    conclusively by the visit of the foreign representatives.
    The populace of Seoul, egged on by the conservatives, took a
    different view, however, as did also the large force of Chinese
    troops gathered at the Chinese Legation. The former slaughtered
    all the Japanese they could reach, and the latter, some 3,000
    in number, in company with several hundred Korean soldiers,
    attacked the Japanese soldiers. The little Japanese force (143
    in number, not 400 as Hulbert states) beat them off with heavy
    loss, without themselves suffering any serious casualties. By
    that time, however, the conservatives had gained the upper hand
    in the palace. The King informed Mr. Takezoye that he did not
    require further assistance from him, preferring to be guarded
    by his own soldiers; whereupon the Minister, as in duty bound,
    returned to the Legation. He found his position untenable,
    however, and resolved to go to Chemulpo. There were about 200
    non-combatants at the Legation to be cared for, among them
    many women and children. Guarding these as best they could
    the little band of soldiers started for the city gate through
    streets filled with a hostile mob. It was a dangerous march; a
    march which foreigners who were in Seoul at the time described
    to me with admiration. Numbers of armed Koreans were gathered
    to oppose it, not the least formidable being those who threw
    stones and other missiles from the house tops. At one point
    some Korean soldiers brought out Gatling guns, but these were
    charged and disabled before any use could be made of them. The
    Japanese forced their way, finally, through the West Gate, and
    thence on to Chemulpo, with casualties of one killed and a
    number wounded. The Legation was looted and set on fire several
    hours after it was deserted, and was completely destroyed.

    Mr. Takezoye was at Chemulpo when Count Inouye arrived on
    the 31st of December. The Count was also met by Mr. von
    Mollendorff, a high official of the Chinese Customs, detailed
    for duty in Korea, who likewise acted in a diplomatic capacity.
    Count Inouye informed him that he intended to go to Seoul at
    once and to demand an audience at the earliest practicable
    moment. Mr. von Mollendorff had various reasons to urge for
    delay, but Count Inouye swept them aside, and the Embassy
    proceeded to Seoul the next day; it was accompanied by about
    400 soldiers, a smaller force having been left at Chemulpo.
    In Seoul, where they arrived that night, the Ambassador and
    suite were lodged in the yamen of the Governor of the City,
    just outside the West Gate. The same night the Ambassador
    presented his formal request for an immediate audience. It met
    with the customary Oriental reception: His Majesty was not in
    robust health; the Ambassador himself must be tired and in need
    of rest after his long journey; the attention of His Majesty
    was occupied with preparations for a fitting reception of His
    Excellency, and so on. Mr. von Mollendorff was kept very busy
    running back and forth, but finally it was made clear to the
    minds of the King’s advisers that Count Inouye meant exactly
    what he said, and that disagreeable things might happen if he
    did not have his way.

    The audience was finally appointed for January 3d. On the
    morning of that day the cavalcade set forth, a military band
    trained by a foreign band-master in the van; then a mounted
    guard of honor; then the Ambassador, accompanied by Admiral
    Kabayama and General Takashima and followed by his secretaries,
    and bringing up the rear a company of infantry. As the
    procession passed through the Gate and emerged into the wide
    street leading to the East Gate, a curious and inspiriting
    spectacle presented itself. The morning was fresh and clear;
    the air crisp and invigorating, and the broad, sunny street
    as far as the eye could see was one mass of gaily clad
    humanity, men dressed in coats of every color, white, as is
    usual, predominating. The crowds parted before the head of the
    procession like waves beneath the prow of a ship; the Korean
    police ran alongside plying their many-thonged whips with
    indiscriminate zeal; and then, as if to add the last queer
    touch to the whole proceeding, the band struck up “Dixie.”

    Nor did odd happenings end here. When the procession arrived
    at the triple gates of the Palace, the centre gate was closed.
    Count Inouye halted the line immediately and demanded the
    reason. It was explained by Mr. Mollendorff that the centre
    gate was reserved for the King, and that the side gates
    were used by the highest dignitaries. Count Inouye replied
    that he was an Ambassador, the personal representative of
    his sovereign, and that as such he could not pass through
    an inferior entrance. Back went the messenger behind the
    barred gate, and in a few minutes appeared again breathlessly
    explaining that to their great chagrin and regret, royal
    etiquette, binding upon His Majesty as upon his lowest subject,
    could not be disregarded. Upon that Count Inouye blandly
    retorted that he also was bound by etiquette, immutable and
    unchangeable; and that if the gate was not opened within three
    minutes, much to his regret he would be obliged to retrace his
    steps and to report to his Imperial Master this new slight to
    Japan. The gate was opened without further delay.

    After that the audience passed off smoothly. Count Inouye was
    careful to impress upon the King’s mind, as upon the minds of
    his advisers, that while his mission was one of peace, much
    depended upon the sincerity and promptitude with which Korea
    met Japan’s just demands for redress and upon the guarantees
    she gave against the recurrence of like causes of complaint.
    The negotiations throughout were conducted in that spirit.
    The Ambassador was kindly and considerate, but would tolerate
    no paltering or double-dealing. He couched his demands in
    firm but friendly language, made every allowance for the
    embarrassing position in which the King found himself, placed
    the responsibility for what had happened where it belonged,
    but made it very clear all the while that neither he nor
    his government would be trifled with. This was shown in a
    sensational way at the first formal meeting of the Ambassador
    with the Korean plenipotentiaries. The meeting had hardly
    convened when suddenly a bustle was heard in the courtyard,
    and, without further notice, the Chinese Consul-General
    entered, suavely bowing to those present. Paying no attention
    to him, Count Inouye sprang to his feet and demanded of
    the Chief Korean Plenipotentiary what the intrusion meant,
    and whether the Chinese official had ventured upon this
    extraordinary step with his knowledge and consent. If that
    were the case, he would regard it as his duty to break off the
    negotiations at once, for the Japanese Government would not
    tolerate for a moment any interference of that kind, and would
    warmly resent Korea’s connivance with it. There was a hasty
    disavowal on the Korean side, the Consul-General lamely adding
    that as China and Japan and Korea were friends, and as the
    matter under discussion was of interest to all three, he had
    come of his own accord to participate in a friendly way in the
    proceedings. He thereupon withdrew somewhat less blithely than
    he had entered. Count Inouye then repeated what he had said and
    gave the Korean plenipotentiaries clearly to understand that
    he would not tolerate the repetition of such childish antics,
    but would regard them, if again attempted, as reason for the
    gravest offence. This warning had its effect; the negotiations
    thereafter proceeded expeditiously and the Convention was
    signed on the 9th of January. It stipulated an apology; the
    payment of an indemnity of 110,000 _yen_ to the relatives of
    the murdered and the merchants who had been plundered; the
    punishment of the murderers of Captain Isobayashi, military
    _attaché_; the furnishing of sites for legation and consulate,
    materials for building the same, and 20,000 _yen_ to pay the
    cost of construction; the building of barracks for Japanese
    troops adjacent to the Legation; and further that the murderers
    of Captain Isobayashi should be punished within twenty days
    after the convention was signed.

The events of 1882 and 1884 had emphasized what the entire history of
the relations of Japan and Korea had made manifest—namely, that some
distinct understanding with China must be reached if the two neighboring
countries were ever to live together in peace. The task of establishing
such an understanding was assigned to Marquis Ito, and in the spring
of 1885 he proceeded to China as Japan’s special Ambassador. Li Hung
Chang, who was then Viceroy of Chi-li, was the Ambassador appointed by
the Peking Government. The latter appointment was the more significant
because Li was supposed to entertain a profound distrust and dislike of
the Japanese; moreover, Yuan Shi Kai, whose subsequent career has been so
important in the politics of the Far East, and who had been in command of
the Chinese soldiers at the time of their slaughter of the Japanese in
1884, was a _protégé_ of Li’s. In spite of the inherent difficulties, the
broad statesmanship and frankness of the Marquis overcame them; and the
intercourse of these two men, whose personality and policy afterward had
so much to do with the history of their respective countries, resulted
in their becoming friends. The Chinese statesman expressed regret that
he had not met Ito before, since he had now for the first time gained
a correct conception of Japan’s policy; he even went so far as to ask
the Marquis to mention the need of governmental reforms to the Dowager
Empress of China, who became angry at him, her own Viceroy, when he
ventured to refer to the matter before her.

On the 18th of April, 1885, a Convention was signed which was intended
to prevent in the future all recurrence of events similar to those of
the previous December. The important point of this Convention is that
both sides pledged themselves against armed interference in Korea except
in pressing emergencies and after mutual consultation. This agreement,
while it saved the “face” of China—a matter so imperatively important
from the Chinese point of view—was a virtual abandonment of her claim
of suzerainty; for it gave to Japan, which made no such claim, equal
interest in the internal affairs of Korea and equal right to send troops
into its territory, in case the judgment of both countries recognized
such a need. The agreement also promised good for Korea herself, since
it made the use of Chinese or Japanese soldiers in control of Korean
affairs more unlikely for trifling reasons; and, on the other hand, it
safeguarded her against other foreign armed intervention as the result of
her domestic intrigues.

The story of what followed and led up to the war with Japan is, briefly,
as follows: The stipulations of this Convention were observed by Japan
both in letter and in spirit, and by China, upon the surface at least.
For a few years neither Power sent troops to Korea; and China ceased
to flaunt the claim to suzerainty before her neighbor’s face. But she
still cherished the fiction and sought to maintain by indirection, and
by means peculiarly Chinese, what she had failed to uphold in the open.
Thus, in 1887, as stated in Moore’s _Digest of International Law_: “The
Chinese Government sought to prevent the departure of a Korean envoy
to the United States on the ground of the dependent relation of Korea
toward China. The American Minister at Peking was instructed to express
surprise and regret at this action on the part of the Chinese Government.
The envoy finally set out on his journey, but when he arrived in the
United States the Chinese Minister at Washington wrote the Department of
State to the effect that the Korean envoy would, on his arrival there,
report to the Chinese Legation, and would be presented through it to the
Department of State; after which he might apply for an opportunity to
present his credentials to the President.

“The Korean envoy, on the day after his arrival in Washington, addressed
a note to Mr. Bayard, as Secretary of State, asking for an interview to
arrange for the presentation of his credentials to the President. Such
an arrangement was duly made, and the envoy was presented without the
intervention of the Chinese Minister. ‘As the United States,’ said Mr.
Bayard, ‘have no privity with the interrelations of China and Korea, we
shall treat both as separate governments customarily represented here by
their respective and independent agents.’”

So unmistakable a declaration as this from a friendly, impartial Power
would, it might reasonably be thought, have caused China to abandon her
shadowy pretensions. It did not have that effect, however. Her agents in
Korea committed no overt act which was likely to provoke remonstrance
from the Treaty Powers; but they lost no opportunity of preserving in
the Korean mind at least the fiction of dependency upon China. Yuan
Shi Kai, for example, “Claimed, and to a large extent obtained, the
position of Chinese Resident at Seoul. His official title was ‘Director
General Resident in Korea of Diplomatic and Consular Relations,’ and his
substantive rank in his own country was that of Intendant of Circuit, a
rank corresponding, according to the Anglo-Chinese Treaty, to that of a
Consul.... Resident Yuan was permitted to proceed to the Audience Hall in
his chair and to be seated in the presence of the King, privileges not
accorded to the representatives of the other Powers.” (Wilkinson’s _The
Government of Korea_.) The privileges thus claimed by this representative
of China were obtained in the course of several years after the
conclusion of the Convention of 1885. They were largely ceremonial in
character and none of the representatives of the Treaty Powers ever
recognized the right of the so-called Resident to interfere in any manner
in their business with the Korean Government. Whatever there was peculiar
in his relations to that Government was a question of an understanding,
practically secret, and never formally enunciated or recognized, between
the Korean Court and himself. The conditions then prevailing in Korea
were highly conducive to the existence of such anomalies. An amiable but
weak King; a corrupt Court and Government, with two powerful factions
struggling for supremacy and stopping at nothing to gain it—these were
ideal conditions for the exercise of Chinese diplomacy. It accomplished
nothing in the end, however, even in the hands of such an astute and able
man as Yuan Shi Kai. Japan, of course, never recognized his pretensions,
but, biding her time and always dealing with Korea as an independent
state, devoted herself to the promotion of the rapidly growing commercial
and industrial interests of her people in the peninsula.

Naturally neither the Government nor the people of Japan could view
without resentment the attempts on China’s part to maintain rights she
had already practically surrendered. But this feeling did not assume a
definite form until the assassination of Kim Ok Kiun at Shanghai, in
March, 1894, and the arrest of a confederate of the murderer in Japan,
who confessed that he was officially commissioned to murder another
one of the Korean political refugees. These events aroused a storm
of indignation in Japan. What followed added fuel to the flames. The
murderer and the body of his victim were conveyed on board a Chinese
man-of-war to Korea. The murderer was rewarded and the severed parts of
Kim’s body were publicly exhibited in different parts of Seoul. Rightly
or wrongly this barbarous act, against which the foreign representatives
at the instance of the Japanese Minister unofficially protested, was
attributed to the Queen’s party. The excitement it caused had not
subsided when, in May, came the “Tong Hak” rebellion. The Tong Haks were
religious fanatics, the chief article of whose creed was said to be the
massacre of all foreigners. Seoul was rife with rumors, and the utmost
alarm and confusion prevailed. According to the report of the American
Minister, the rebellion was practically suppressed on the 3d of June by
Korean troops; and on the 8th of June the Government officially announced
that it was at an end. In the meantime, however, the Chinese Government,
without previous notice to Japan or mutual consultation, as stipulated
in the Convention of 1885, sent a force of 2,000 troops to Korea, which
on June 10th landed at A-San, about forty miles south of Chemulpo,
ostensibly to suppress the rebellion. The American Minister, Mr. Sill,
in his report on the subject to the Department of State, says that
“this was done at Korean request, dictated and insisted on by Yuan, the
Chinese Resident.” Learning of the purpose to send troops, the Japanese
Government promptly remonstrated with the Government at Peking, and in
reply was informed (after the act) that the troops had been sent because
urgently needed to suppress disorders in “the vassal state.” There was
no explanation and no apology beyond this palpable and contemptuous
violation of the terms of the Convention of 1885. There was but one
possible response. On the same day that the Chinese troops landed, a
force of Japanese marines was sent to the capital, to be replaced a few
days later by a larger body of soldiers. The scene of the struggle was
then transferred to Seoul. The Korean Government, having brought the
trouble on its own head, showed its usual impotence. It begged both Japan
and China to leave, and sought aid from the foreign representatives in
the effort to persuade them to do so. China was quite willing to accede
to these appeals. Possibly her agent on the spot, it may even be the
Government at Peking, was startled by the promptitude with which Japan
had accepted the challenge. In any event, China had nothing to lose and
much to gain by doing as Korea asked. She could leave the scene with
flying banners, having shown that Korea was in fact her vassal; that the
Convention was waste paper and that Japan could be flouted with impunity.
Naturally this programme did not commend itself to Japan. According
to her view of the situation there were certain vital questions to be
settled before the troops were withdrawn. Foremost among these was the
decision of Korea’s actual status; then, subsidiary to this, but none the
less important, the adoption of certain reforms which, while improving
the public administration and promoting the common weal, would prevent
the recurrence of disturbances which were a constant menace to the
welfare of Korea and her neighbors. Accordingly, the Japanese Minister
presented a memorial on the proposed reforms and demanded a categorical
statement as to whether Korea was a vassal of China or not.

Regarding the latter demand the American Minister reports that “This
caused great consternation,” since if they (the Korean Government)
answered in the negative they would offend China, while an affirmative
answer would bring down the wrath of Japan. After many consultations
and several reminders to be prompt from the Japanese, an answer was
given in this sense: “Korea, being an independent state, enjoys the same
sovereign rights as does Japan (see Treaty of Kang-wha, 1876), and that
‘in both internal administration and foreign intercourse Korea enjoys
complete independence’ (see letter of the King to the President of the
United States). They supposed that by thus quoting the treaties which
China allowed them to make she cannot take offence, while Japan should be
content with such an answer.”

The breaking out of hostilities between China and Japan was, of course,
the occasion of renewal in acute form of internal strife between the
conservative and the progressive forces in Korea. But for the time being
the progressive forces, backed by the dominance of the Japanese, were
the stronger. On the 5th of August, 1894, the Korean treaty with China
was denounced; on the 15th of the same month it was formally abrogated
by the Korean Government; and on the 19th notice of an entirely new plan
of Government was officially issued. On September 3d Marquis Saionji,
special Ambassador from the Emperor of Japan, had an audience with the
King and presented him with gifts, in honor of his accession to the
position of an independent sovereign. Numerous reforms[20] which had been
discussed in the Korean Council on July 31st of this same year and agreed
upon as laws to be submitted to His Majesty for his approval, instead of
being sincerely, wisely, and perseveringly enacted and enforced, became
the causes of increased defection, intrigue, and internal dissensions.

The rebellion (referred to above as the “Tong Hak” rebellion), which had
been reported as suppressed the previous June, broke out in a still more
dreadful form on the first of October (1894). The Korean rebels became a
“disorganized pillaging mob.” Taxes were no longer paid; Korean officials
were robbed and mutilated or murdered; small parties of the Japanese
were attacked and tortured to death after the traditional manner of the
nation. Meantime the Japanese forces were quite uniformly victorious
both by land and by sea; and on October 9th the last of the Chinese
forces were driven across the Yalu River. A solemn “oath, sworn at the
royal temple by His Majesty the King of Korea, while he worshipped, on
the 12th day of the twelfth moon of the five hundred and third year of
the foundation of Ta Chosen” (January 7, 1895), bound him to “give up
all idea of subjection to China and to labor firmly to establish the
independence of Korea”; “to decide all political affairs in council with
his Cabinet”; “to prevent Her Majesty the Queen, his concubines, and all
the royal relations from interfering in affairs of state,” thus securing
a separation between their affairs and those of the royal household; and
to introduce and foster other reforms of a political and educational
character. How poorly His Majesty kept his solemn oath, the subsequent
history of his throne and of his nation abundantly shows.

By the Chino-Japan war the dominating and baleful influence of China
was for all time removed, and to Korea was secured the opportunity for
an independent and progressive national development under the guidance,
and by the assistance, of Japan. That the Government of Japan honestly
wished for this good to come to Korea, there is no reasonable ground of
doubt. That the good did not follow is, however, due to the fault of both
nations. As regards the character and conduct of the average political
reformer there is a marked similarity between the Japanese and the
Koreans. Such a one is apt to be over-confident, and even self-conceited;
to have only a scanty acquaintance with the fundamental principles of
politics and of statesmanship; to be lacking in a judicial estimate of
the difficulties to be overcome; to make use (often with an apparent
preference for them) of offensive rather than conciliatory means; and to
have no adequate apprehension of the value of time, and of the necessity
of securing time, in order to effect important changes in national
affairs. Neither has he learned the art of compromise in consistency
with the maintenance of important moral principles. That Japan has not
hitherto failed in reforming herself as conspicuously as Korea is chiefly
due, after making proper allowances for the different environments of the
two nations, to the great difference in the character of the two Emperors
who have been upon their thrones during the period of trial; to the fact
that Japan has had a body of most conspicuously wise leaders—something
Korea has completely lacked; and to the difference as respects the
essential spirit of loyalty among the people which the feudal system
developed in Japan, but which has never been to any extent developed in
Korea.

The complete inability of the Korean official to comprehend, or
to sympathize with, the motives which led the representatives of
Japan—first, Mr. Otori and then Count Inouye—to urge the adoption of
administrative reforms may be judged by the fact that the King’s father,
the Tai Won Kun, handed to Inouye on his arrival as Minister at Seoul a
list of sixty persons whom he wished to have forthwith executed in order
to secure himself in control of affairs. Squabbles for power between the
party of the Queen and the party of the Tai Won Kun therefore continued
and even became increasingly acute. The Korean hot-head progressives were
pushing reforms without sufficient regard to the existing conditions.
But for a time the presence of a real statesman as the representative of
Japan in Korea kept the evil forces in check.

Count Inouye’s appointment to the post of Minister was an eloquent proof
of the profound interest which the Japanese Government took in Korea,
and of its earnest desire to aid her in the promotion of domestic reform
and progress. On the Count’s part, personally, the acceptance of such
a task, difficult and in many ways distasteful, was an exhibition of
self-sacrificing patriotism, to which the present action of his bosom
friend and associate, Marquis Ito, affords a striking parallel. While
striving to reconcile the warring Korean factions, he devoted himself
to the improvement of administrative conditions and to the promotion of
the public welfare. He attained a measure of success in some directions,
and would undoubtedly have achieved more lasting success had it been
possible for him to remain longer in Korea. His singleness of purpose was
recognized by many Koreans, and the sincerity of his endeavors to benefit
Korea was acknowledged by foreign observers. But the task was too heavy
for the time he could devote to it.

Finally, other more imperative duties called Count Inouye home, and
he was succeeded by Viscount Miura, a man of a different stamp. Then
followed the murder of the Queen, with all its unhappy train of
consequences. Although the crime was undoubtedly concocted by the Queen’s
implacable enemy, the Tai Won Kun, the Japanese Government never sought
to evade the share of responsibility imposed upon it. The tragedy was
a far severer blow to Japanese interests than to those of Korea, for
the Queen alive, and even still bitterly hostile to Japan, could never
have worked the harm that the manner of her taking-off had caused. And,
indeed, while apology for this murder from the moral point of view cannot
be justified, in spite of the cruel character of the victim and of the
fact that there was then visited upon her only the same treatment which
she had herself given to scores and hundreds of others, when considered
from the diplomatic point of view the act was even more foolish and
reprehensible.

The following account from Hershey[21] gives in brief, but with
sufficient detail for our purposes, the events of this period:—

    The impolitic attempts at hasty and radical reform in Korea,
    which followed the outbreak of the Chino-Japanese war, were
    resisted by the Court party at Seoul, headed by the Queen and
    the Min family to which she belonged. Early in October, 1895,
    the Queen planned a _coup d’état_ with a view to disbanding
    the soldiers who had been trained by Japanese officers, and of
    replacing the pro-Japanese partisans of reform in the Korean
    Cabinet by her friends. The result was a counter-plot (in which
    the King’s father, the veteran conspirator Tai Won Kun, was
    a prime mover) to seize the King and Queen with the aim of
    obtaining complete control of the Korean Government in interest
    of the pro-Japanese and reform party. In carrying out this
    plot (in which the Japanese Minister Miura seems to have been
    an accomplice) the Queen was murdered by Japanese and Korean
    ruffians.

“This disgusting crime,” Hershey goes on to say, “although it assured
the power of the reform Cabinet for the time being, reacted upon its
perpetrators, and was followed, four months later, by another equally
revolting, by means of which Russia gained control of the Government of
Korea. In January, 1896, there took place a slight uprising in Northern
Korea, at the instigation, it was said, of pro-Russian leaders. When the
major portion of the army had been sent out of the capital to suppress
the rebellion, 127 Russian marines with a cannon suddenly landed at
Chemulpo on February 10, and immediately entered Seoul. The next day the
King, accompanied by the Crown Prince and some court ladies, fled in
disguise to the Russian Legation, where he remained until February 20,
1897.”

Following this escapade the Prime Minister, Kim Hong Chip, a man widely
respected and in no way connected with the murder of the Queen, and Chung
Pyang Ha, equally innocent of the same crime, were deliberately thrust
forth from the palace gates into the hands of the waiting mob, which,
in true Korean fashion, tore them limb from limb. Another Minister was
killed a few days later in the country. Thus ended Japan’s attempt to
enter into friendly relations with Korea while the latter nation was
in the anomalous condition of an independent dependency of China. Two
valuable results, however, had been reached: Korea had been definitively
and finally delivered from Chinese control and dominating influence; and
her own inability to stand alone and to inaugurate the needed reforms
had been, it would seem, quite sufficiently demonstrated. Japan, on the
other hand, had not as yet shown her ability wisely to inaugurate and
effectively to secure these reforms; and by the injudicious action of
her representative in Korea she had thrown the temporary control of the
Korean Court into the selfish and intriguing hands of other foreigners.
The events of the next decade, therefore, led logically and irresistibly
forward to a yet more desperate struggle, at a yet more frightful cost,
to solve the Korean problem.

CHAPTER X

THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL (_CONTINUED_)

The conclusion of the centuries of intricate and unsatisfactory relations
between these two countries was, to quote the words of another, that
“Japan saw herself deposed from the position in Korea to which her
victories entitled her, by a nation which appeared to be both an upstart
and a usurper on the Sea of Japan.”[22] For three and a quarter centuries
Russia had been advancing through Asia at the average rate of 20,000
square miles annually; and now, in the endeavor, in itself laudable, to
secure an outlet on the Pacific for her Asiatic possessions, she began
extending her customary policy over Manchuria and the Peninsula. It is
doubtful whether the Korean King, when he took refuge in the Russian
Legation at Seoul, was really alarmed for his personal safety; it is
certain that he hated intensely the reform measures which had been forced
upon him, and the men among his own subjects who were committed to
those measures. His life was, however, never in any real danger at this
period. His presence and his position at the Russian Legation, during his
entire stay there, was lacking in all semblance of royal dignity. He was
himself in the virtual custody of a foreign power. The different Cabinet
Ministers had their places assigned in the dining-room of the Legation,
behind screens;—“all except one lucky individual who secured quarters
for his exclusive use in an abandoned out-house where wood and coal were
usually stored.”

There began now a game of manœuvring and intrigue in which, for some
years to come, the Japanese were to be at a large disadvantage. The
King, who has always shown himself irrevocably committed to the peculiar
methods of Korean politics, within two weeks of the day on which he had
taken refuge in the Russian Legation, began secretly communicating with
the Japanese Minister. The Russian Minister at that time, who has been
pronounced “probably the most adroit representative of her interests whom
Russia ever had in Korea,” proclaimed himself an unwilling victim of the
King’s fear, which he regarded as hysterical, but could not, in common
decency, fail to respect. The Japanese were in no position to resent the
insult or to foreguard against the menace which all this involved.

Not unnaturally, the Russian representative undertook promptly to avail
his country of the especially favorable opportunity for promoting its
interests in the Far East which was offered by the intimate relations
of protection established over the Korean Government. For it should
never be lost out of mind that until years after these events, whoever
had dominating influence with the Korean monarch controlled, in largest
measure, the Korean Government. M. Waeber, among other material benefits,
secured valuable mining and timber concessions for his countrymen; it
was also, probably, due to his influence that the Korean troops which
had been trained by the Japanese, were disbanded. There then followed a
radical change in the policy of Japan, which is described as follows by
Hershey:[23]

    In the summer of 1896 Japan formally departed from her
    policy of the past two decades of upholding the independence
    and integrity of Korea by her own efforts, and sought the
    co-operation of Russia toward the same end. On May 14th, the
    Russian and Japanese Ministers at Seoul concluded a memorandum
    which fixed the number and disposition of Japanese troops in
    Korea. On June 9, 1896, the Yamagata-Lobanoff protocol was
    signed at St. Petersburg. It was thereby agreed:

        (1) That the Japanese and Russian governments
        should unite in advising the Korean Government to
        suppress all unnecessary expenses and to establish
        an equilibrium between expenditure and revenue. If,
        as a result of reforms which should be considered
        indispensable, it should become necessary to have
        recourse to foreign debts, the two governments should
        of a common accord render their support to Korea.
        (2) The Japanese and Russian governments should try
        to abandon to Korea, in so far as the financial and
        economic situation of that country should permit,
        the creation and maintenance of an armed force
        and of a police organized of native subjects, in
        proportion sufficient to maintain internal order,
        without foreign aid. (3) Russia was to be permitted
        to establish a telegraph line from Seoul to her
        frontier; the Japanese Government being allowed to
        administer those lines already in its possession.
        (4) In case the principles above expounded require a
        more precise and more detailed definition, or if in
        the future other points should arise about which it
        should be necessary to consult, the representatives
        of the two governments should be instructed to
        discuss them amicably.

The Protocol of June, 1896, was no sooner signed than Russia proceeded
to violate its terms. In the same month she tried to gain control of the
Korean army by placing it under Russian instruction and discipline; in
the same year, she urged the request that the disposal of all the Korean
taxes and customs be placed in the hands of M. Kir Alexeieff. This plan
was partly carried through the following year, and Mr. J. McLeavy Brown
was dismissed from the position of Financial Adviser and General Director
of Customs for Korea, although he was soon after formally restored to
the latter office, the control of which he had never been, in fact,
induced to surrender. In August of 1897, M. de Speyer succeeded M.
Waeber as the Representative of Russia (_Conseiller d’Etat_) in Korea;
his conduct of Russian affairs, which seems to have been quite devoid of
the conciliatory policy of his predecessor, lost for his country many of
the advantages which had already been secured. Besides the inducement
from this fact, the recent acquisition of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan
seemed to make it desirable for Russia, for the time being at least, to
conciliate Japan. And Japan, on her part, definitively committed herself
to the effort to conciliate Russia, while at the same time safeguarding
her own important, and indeed essentially vital, interests in the
Peninsula. Accordingly there was concluded between the two nations the
Nishi-Rosen Protocol of August 25, 1898.

That instrument was as follows:

    ARTICLE I.—The Imperial governments of Japan and Russia
    definitely recognize the sovereignty and entire independence
    of Korea, and mutually engage to abstain from all direct
    interference in the affairs of that country.

    ARTICLE II.—Desiring to remove every possible cause of
    misunderstanding in the future, the Imperial governments of
    Japan and Russia mutually engage not to take any measure
    regarding the nomination of military instructors and financial
    advisers without having previously arrived at a mutual accord
    on the subject.

    ARTICLE III.—In view of the great development of the commercial
    and industrial enterprise of Japan in Korea, as also the
    considerable number of Japanese subjects residing in that
    country, the Russian Imperial Government shall not impede the
    development of commercial and industrial relations between
    Japan and Korea.

Five days later—namely, on August 30th—Marquis Ito, who was visiting in
Korea, and had been cordially received by the Emperor and invited to
dine with him, publicly reaffirmed the policy for which His Imperial
Majesty of Japan and he himself, as His Majesty’s subject, wished to be
responsible, in a speech delivered at a dinner given at the Foreign
Office. On that occasion the Marquis spoke as follows:

    YOUR EXCELLENCIES AND GENTLEMEN:

    I thank you sincerely for the kind words in which the Acting
    Minister of Foreign Affairs has just addressed me on your
    behalf, but at the same time I am constrained to say that I
    do not deserve the high compliments which he chose to confer
    upon me. Allow me to avail myself of the present opportunity to
    say a few words concerning the attitude of Japan toward this
    country. You doubtless know that in 1873 a group of Japanese
    statesmen advocated the despatch of a punitive expedition to
    Korea, a proposal to which I was uncompromisingly opposed from
    the outset, because I deemed such a war not only uncalled for,
    but contrary to the principles of humanity. You may imagine the
    magnitude of the excitement occasioned by this question, when
    I tell you that the split which it caused in the ranks of the
    Japanese statesmen led to a tremendous civil war a few years
    afterward. The point to which I wish to direct your attention
    is that His Imperial Japanese Majesty’s Government did not
    hesitate to reject what it considered to be an unjust proposal
    even at such gigantic risk.

    Japan’s policy toward Korea has since been unchanged; in other
    words, her object has always been to assist and befriend this
    country. It is true that at times incidents of an unpleasant
    nature unfortunately interfered with the maintenance of
    unsuspecting cordiality between the two nations. But I may
    conscientiously assure you that the real object of the Japanese
    Government has always been to render assistance to Korea in her
    noble endeavors to be a civilized and independent state.

    I am sincerely gratified to see that to-day Korea is
    independent and sovereign. Henceforth it will be Japan’s
    wish to see Korea’s independence further strengthened and
    consolidated; no other motive shall influence Japan’s conduct
    toward this country. On this point you need not entertain the
    slightest doubt.

    Japan’s good wishes for Korean independence are all the
    more sincere and reliable because her vital interests are
    bound up with those of your country. A danger to Korean
    independence will be a danger to Japan’s safety. So you will
    easily recognize that the strongest of human motives, namely
    self-interest, combines with neighborly feelings to make Japan
    a sincere well-wisher and friend of Korean independence.

    Let me repeat once more that Korea may rest assured of the
    absence of all sinister motives on Japan’s part. Friendship
    between two countries in the circumstances of Japan and Korea
    ought to be free from any trace of suspicion and doubt as to
    each other’s motives and intentions. In conclusion, allow me to
    express my heartful hope that you may long remain in office and
    assiduously exert yourselves for the good of your sovereign and
    country.

With the coming of M. Pavloff to Korea as its Representative, in
December, 1898, the diplomacy of Russia in this part of the Orient
abandoned the traditional method of patient, persistent effort at
advance, together with more or less perfect assimilation of the new
tribes and peoples brought under its control, and adopted the more
brilliant but dangerous policy of a swift promotion of obviously
selfish schemes by a mixture of threats and cajolery. It is not even
now certain how far this policy was supported by, or even known to, the
home government of Russia. The war with Japan, to which these acts led
steadily and irresistibly forward, seemed, only in its actual results, to
reveal at all fully to this Government what its representatives had been
doing in the Far East.

Among the various attempts of M. Pavloff and his coadjutors to obtain
concessions for themselves and for their country, those which looked
toward the establishment of a Russian naval base in certain localities of
the Korean coast were threatening to Japan. “But Russia’s conduct on the
Northern frontier of Korea along the Tumen and Yalu rivers was”—to quote
again from Hershey—“the greatest source of anxiety to Japan.”

    In 1896 Russia had obtained valuable mining concessions in
    two districts near the port of Kiong-hung at the mouth of
    the Tumen River, and later sought to extend her influence in
    that region. More important and dangerous, however, to the
    interests of Japan were the attempts of Russia to obtain an
    actual foothold on Korean territory at Yong-am-po on the Korean
    side of the Yalu River. As far back as 1896, when the King
    was a guest of the Russian Legation, a Russian merchant had
    obtained timber concessions on the Uining Island in the Sea of
    Japan and on the Tumen and Yalu rivers. The concession along
    the Yalu was to be forfeited unless work was begun within five
    years in the other two regions. This condition does not appear
    to have been complied with when the Korean Government was
    suddenly notified on April 13, 1903, that the Russian timber
    syndicate would at once begin the work of cutting timber on the
    Yalu. Early in May sixty Russian soldiers in civilian dress,
    later increased by several hundred more, were reported to have
    occupied Yong-am-po, a point rather remote from the place where
    actual cutting was in progress. At the same time there was
    taking place a mysterious mobilization of troops from Liaoyang
    and Port Arthur toward Feng-hwang-cheng and Antung on the other
    side of the Yalu. Early in June four Russian warships paid a
    week’s visit to Chemulpo. In August M. Pavloff appears to have
    been on the point of obtaining an extension of the Yong-am-po
    lease, but this was prevented by the receipt of an ultimatum
    from the Japanese Minister. Mr. Hayashi threatened that if the
    Korean Government were to sign such a lease, Japan would regard
    diplomatic relations between the two countries as suspended,
    and would regard herself as free to act in her own interests.

In this connection it should be said, that while the Korean Government
did not formally renew the lease, the Emperor did secretly enter into an
arrangement with M. Pavloff concerning Yong-am-po, practically conceding
all that was asked on Russia’s behalf. This document was discovered after
the war began and hastily cancelled by the Emperor, of his own accord,
upon the recommendation of the Korean Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Meantime another conflict of interests between Russia and Japan was
developing and contributing to the same result—namely, the Russo-Japanese
war. This was the so-called “Manchurian Question.” It is not necessary
for the purposes of our narrative to trace with any detail the origin
and different stages of that succession of successful intrigues and
encroachments upon foreign territory which had been for some time carried
on with the Chinese by methods similar to those now being employed in
Korea. Some of the more salient points in the history of the preceding
period of nearly a half-century need, however, to be called to mind.
In 1860, when the allied forces occupied Peking, the Russian Minister,
General Ignatieff, by a brilliant stroke of diplomacy, secured for his
country the cession of the maritime province of Manchuria, with 600 miles
of coast, and the harbor of Vladivostok, down to the mouth of the Tumen.
For this he gave nothing in return beyond the pretence that it was in his
power to bring pressure upon the allies and thus secure their more speedy
evacuation of the Chinese capital.

Thirty years later, after the new province had been developed and
the harbor of Vladivostok converted into a powerful fortress, Russia
determined upon building an all-rail route across Siberia, and
immediately began to press for other concessions in Chinese territory
that in 1897 resulted in the association which constructed what is now
known as the Manchurian Railway. This enterprise was ostensibly a joint
affair of the two countries; but it has been fitly described as “only
a convenient bonnet” for an essentially Russian undertaking. Russian
engineers now came in large numbers to Manchuria; Russian Cossacks
accompanied them for purposes of their protection. Later in the same
year the seizure by Germany of Kiao-chau, in satisfaction for outrages
committed upon German missionaries, was followed by Russia’s request
to the Chinese Government for permission to winter her fleet at Port
Arthur. In March of the next year Japan had the added mortification,
bitterness, and cause for alarm, of seeing Russia demand and obtain from
China a formal lease of the same commercial and strategic points of
the peninsula of Liao-tung of which Russia, by combining with Germany
and France, had deprived Japan when she had won them by conquest in
war. These enterprises in Manchuria were financed by the Russo-Chinese
Bank, an institution which had recently been founded in the Far East
as a branch of the Russian Ministry of Finance. So important is this
last-mentioned fact that one writer places upon M. Pokotiloff, Chief of
the Russo-Chinese Bank in Berlin, the responsibility for the whole Port
Arthur episode, and declares it was he who dictated the policy of Russia
in Manchuria after the Boxer uprising.[24]

The occupation of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan (renamed Dalny) was
accompanied by assurances from the Russian Government—chiefly designed
to quiet Great Britain and Japan—that it had “no intention of infringing
the rights and privileges guaranteed by existing treaties between China
and foreign countries;” and that no interference with Chinese sovereignty
was contemplated. To the objections raised when it proceeded to fortify
Port Arthur, the reply was made that Russia “must have a safe harbor for
her fleet, which could not be at the mercy of the elements at Vladivostok
or dependent upon the good-will of Japan.” Under this plea she refused
to change the status of Port Arthur as a closed and principally military
port. The effect of all this upon the attitude of public feeling in Japan
toward Russia can easily be imagined. Even when, in August, 1899, the
port of Dalny was declared “open” by an Imperial ukase, regulations with
respect to passports and claims to a monopoly of mining rights continued
to lessen the confidence of other nations in Russia’s good faith with
respect to the occupation of Manchuria. It is now sufficiently well
established that during this period secret agreements between Li Hung
Chang and the Russian Government were made which enlarged the special
privileges of Russia in Manchuria. Meantime, also, her military hold was
being strengthened; so that by December, 1898, she had 20,000 men at her
two ports, while Cossack guards—“the pennons on their lances showing a
combination of the Russian colors and the Chinese dragon”—were patrolling
the railway line and protecting the work of fortification at Port Arthur.

During these years the Japanese Government was watching with quiet but
painful solicitude the movements going forward in China. When Marquis
Ito visited Peking and the Yangtse provinces in the summer of 1898,
he was received with marked attention, especially by the reform party
among the leading Chinese officials; but the baleful influence of the
Dowager-Empress, and of the party opposed to everything likely to
curtail their power, arrested the attempts at _rapprochement_ between
China and Japan. It was the so-called “Boxer Movement,” however, which
gave to Russia a new claim of right to interfere in Chinese affairs and
to establish more firmly than ever before her special privileges in
Manchuria. The history of this movement—of the way in which Russia dealt
with its extension into Manchuria, of the siege of Peking and the doings
of the allied forces, and of the subsequent behavior of the Russians
with regard to the evacuation of Manchuria—is now well known, or easily
accessible, by all students of the period.

In spite of repeated promises to evacuate the points seized and held by
Russian forces when, after the relief of the Legations, these forces
were withdrawn from Peking and Chi-li to be concentrated in Manchuria,
and in disregard of the interests of the other allies, the policy of
keeping all that she had gained, and of gaining more as far as possible,
was steadily pursued by Russia. On November 11, 1900, an agreement was
made between the Representative of Admiral Alexeieff and the Tartar
General at Mukden, the most significant point of which was the promise
of the Chinese official to provide the Russian troops with lodging and
provisions, to disarm and disband all Chinese soldiers and hand over
all arms and ammunition to the Russians, and to dismantle all forts and
defences not occupied by the Russians.

It was the probable effect of a continued occupation of Manchuria by
Russia upon their business interests which led Great Britain and America
to wish that the repeated Russian assurances of good faith toward China
and toward all foreign nations should manifest themselves in works. The
case could not be wholly the same with Japan. Her interests of trade
were, indeed, if not at the time so large, more close and vital than
those of any other nation outside of China. But her other interests were
incomparable. So that when Russia failed to carry out her engagements,
even under a convention which was so much in her favor, there was a
revival of suspicion and apprehension on the part of the Japanese
Government and the Japanese people. Manchuria and Korea both pointed an
index finger of warning directed toward Russia.

It was to further a peaceful adjustment of all the disturbed condition
of the interests of Russia and Japan in the Far East that Marquis Ito
went, on his way home from his visit to the United States, at the end
of 1901, on an unofficial mission to St. Petersburg. The failure of
the overtures which he bore discouraged those of the leading Japanese
statesmen who were hoping for some reconciliation which might take the
shape of allowing Russian ascendency in Manchuria and Japanese ascendency
in Korea. It also strengthened the conviction which prevailed among
the younger statesmen that the St. Petersburg Government regarded
Manchuria as not only its fortress in the Far East, but also as its path
to the peninsula lying within sight of Japan’s shores. “The Japanese
Government,” says Mr. D. W. Stevens, “at last felt that the vital
interests of Japan might be irrevocably jeopardized in Korea as well
as in Manchuria, if it continued to remain a mere passive spectator
of Russian encroachments; and in August, 1903, it resolved to take
a decisive step. In the most courteous form and through the usual
diplomatic channels Japan intimated at St. Petersburg that her voice
must be heard, and listened to, in connection with Far Eastern questions
in which her interests were vitally concerned.” The answer of Russia
was the appointment of Admiral Alexeieff as Viceroy over the Czar’s
possessions in the Far East, with executive and administrative powers of
a semi-autocratic character.

But let us return to Korea and inquire: What was the policy with which
its Emperor and his Court met the exceedingly critical situation into
which the country was being forced by the conflict going on between
Russia and Japan both within, and just outside of, its borders? The
answer is not dubious. It was the policy, in yet more aggravated form,
of folly, weakness, intrigue, and corruption, both in the administration
of internal affairs and also in the management of the now very delicate
foreign relations. The Emperor was—to use the descriptive phrase of
another—enjoying “an orgy of independence.” The former restraints
which had been imposed upon him by Chinese domination, by the personal
influence of the Tai Won Kun, or of the Queen, by his fears of the
reformers, and even by any passive emotional impulses of his own, leading
to reformation, were now all removed. While he was a “guest” at the
Russian Legation there was certainly no direct influence exerted by his
hosts, to assist, advise, or guide him into better ways. It was not the
policy of Russia to effect—at least for the present or immediately
prospective occasion—any moral betterment of the administration of
Korean home and foreign affairs. Under the regency of his father, the
Government had been cruel, despotic, and murderous toward both native
and foreign Christians. But the Tai Won Kun had some regard for ancient
common laws and usages. Under him the people were reasonably sure of such
rights, protection, and privileges of public domain, as their ancestors
had enjoyed. The public granaries were kept full against the time of
famine. The timber and fire-wood on the hills was not given over to
any one who could bribe or cajole the corrupt officials; and the line
of demarcation between royal and popular rights was more clearly drawn
and better understood. But now all this was changed for the worse. The
King declared himself the sole and private owner—to dispose of as he
saw fit—of all the properties which had formerly been considered as
belonging to the state. Low-born favorites appropriated or laid waste
the public domain. The country’s resources were wasted; the people were
subjected to new and irregular exactions, levied by irregular people for
illegal purposes. A succession of the most consummate rascals which ever
afflicted any country came into virtual control. They were endowed with
offices purchased or extorted from the head ruler. Eunuchs were sent out
from the palace on “still hunts,” so to speak, to discover any kind of
property which, by any pretext whatever, could be claimed; and to seize
such property in the name of His Majesty, or of the King’s concubine,
Lady Om, or of some one of the Imperial Princes. Laws which were intended
to promote the ends of justice were twisted from their purpose and made
to serve the ends of plunder. Such privileges as that of coining and
counterfeiting the currency were sold to private persons.

Then began also that squandering of the nation’s most valuable resources
which, under the name of “concessions” to foreigners who generally allied
themselves for this end with corrupt Korean officials, has continued down
to the present time; and the adjustment of which is still giving the
Resident-General and his judicial advisers some of their most serious
problems. To quote the description of this period by a distinguished
foreigner, long in the Korean service: “Nothing in this country is
safe from the horde which surrounds His Majesty and seemingly has his
confidence. Public office is bought and sold without even the pretence
of concealment. Officials share with the palace the plunder which they
extort from the people. So and So (naming a prominent Korean Official)
is said to owe his influence there largely to the fact that out of every
ten thousand _yen_ which he collects he surrenders seven thousand to
the Emperor, retaining only three for himself. With his colleagues it
is usually the other way, about.” According to the same authority, many
kinds of property which were formerly regarded as belonging to the state
were now being appropriated to the Emperor’s use, or to that of his
favorites, without any pretext, under the rule that “might makes right.”
Torturing, strangling, and decapitation, were no infrequent methods of
accomplishing the imperial will; though it should be said that these
favors were somewhat impartially distributed. Sometimes it was the secret
strangling in prison of such patriots as An Kyun-su and Kwan Yung-chin,
on the night of May 27, 1900—than which, it has truly been said, “no more
dastardly crime ever stained the annals of this or any other government”:
sometimes it was the torturing and execution of such unspeakable rascals
as the ex-court-favorites, Kim Yung-chun (1901), Yi Yong-ik, and Yi
Keun-tak (1902). In a word, _the period of “independence,” to which the
Emperor has been lately imploring his own subjects and the civilized
world to restore him, was the period in which he took what, and gave
away what, and did what he chose, under the basest influences; for the
most worthless or mischievous ends, without law or pretence of justice
or goodness of heart, to the lasting disgrace and essential ruin of the
nation_.

Such is a summary of the doings during the years preceding the
Russo-Japanese war, on the part of the Korean Emperor and his Court.
“Through all this period,” says Mr. Hulbert,[25] “Russian influence was
quietly at work securing its hold upon the Korean Court and upon such
members of the government as it could win over. The general populace
was always suspicious of her, however, and always preferred the rougher
hand of Japan to the soft but heavy hand of Russia.” The threatening
nature of the situation created by these Russian encroachments was as
well understood at Washington and London as at Tokyo. It was intimately
connected with the Manchurian question to the untangling of which Mr. Hay
had devoted so much thought.

But Russia’s action in Manchuria, threatening as it was to the interests,
not alone of Japan but also of other foreign powers, did not call upon
the Japanese Government for armed interference.[26] As the behavior of
Japan showed during the Boxer troubles in China, she had learned caution
with respect to fighting the battles of civilized Europe and America, at
her own expense and without show of gratitude from others.

As we have already seen, the most threatening feature of the situation
for Japan was Russia’s activity upon the Yalu, especially at Yong-am-po.
In the interests of peace Mr. Hay supplemented his efforts to maintain
the principle of the open door and equal opportunity in Manchuria, by
an earnest endeavor (which had Lord Lansdowne’s cordial support) to
fend off the impending quarrel between Japan and Russia. Since all the
Treaty Powers were interested in the matter of treaty ports in Korea,
the method that most readily suggested itself was the opening of Wiju
and Yong-am-po, which would remove any question of the latter place
being used as a military or naval base. The request was reasonable from
every point of view, since Wiju, as the market town, and Yong-am-po,
as the port, were naturally the complement, on the Korean side of the
Yalu, of Antung then recently declared an open port on the Manchurian.
Indeed, other considerations apart, some such action was imperatively
necessary from the Korean standpoint, inasmuch as an open port in Chinese
territory, without a corresponding port of entry in neighboring Korean
territory, could not fail to be prejudicial to the interests of Korea.
Accordingly the American and British representatives at Seoul were
instructed to urge upon the Korean Government the necessity of opening
these ports.

This was done, but the attempt to persuade the Emperor met with strenuous
opposition on M. Pavloff’s part, and finally failed, apparently because
of the incapacity of His Majesty’s nearest advisers to grasp the real
significance of the crisis and the momentous effect which the decision
must have upon Korea’s fortunes. The struggle was a fierce one while it
lasted and, among other minor results, led to the resignation of the
Minister for Foreign Affairs. The gentleman who succeeded him, as Acting
Minister, was disposed to favor the opening of the ports, in spite of the
strong opposition of the palace coterie. He went so far as to prepare
letters to the foreign representatives declaring the ports open, and was
actually about sending them out, on his own responsibility, when he was
stopped, partly by a peremptory order from the palace, and partly by
the persuasion of his friends who represented to him the great personal
danger he would incur by such a step.

The narrative of this official throws a curious side-light upon M.
Pavloff’s methods and shows in an interesting way his persistence, even
at a time when the correspondence between Russia and Japan preceding the
war had reached a critical stage, in endeavoring by every means at his
command to carry through the very intrigue which formed the _gravamen_
of Japan’s strongest reason for complaining. It is easy, in the light
of what has happened, to condemn this action; but even at the time it
must have seemed to impartial observers more like the infatuation of a
desperate gambler than the well-considered moves of a shrewd diplomatist.
It was all done, too, in support of a transparent subterfuge, namely:
that Russia had no arrangement with Korea which gave to the proposed
use of Yong-am-po any other character than that of an entirely peaceful
occupation for legitimate commercial purposes; and that her agents had
done absolutely nothing in the way of preparing the place for military
occupation. When he was urging upon the Acting Minister for Foreign
Affairs reasons for not opening Yong-am-po, the latter enquired: “Why
have you staked off such a large extent of territory, and why are you
building a fort?” M. Pavloff instantly denied in emphatic terms that
anything of the kind had been done. “For the past ten days,” quietly
replied the Korean official, “I have had two men whom I trust thoroughly
on the spot, and my question is the result of telegraphic reports I
have received from them.” The interview did not continue, but within
forty-eight hours his scouts reported to the Acting Minister that all the
stakes had been removed. There had not been time, they said, thoroughly
to remove all traces of works upon the fortifications, but that as much
of the works as possible had been levelled and the whole covered up with
loose earth, tree-trunks and branches. Such effrontery seems incredible;
but these are facts, and others like them equally typical of M. Pavloff’s
methods could be recited. It is doubtful whether even his own government
knew all the circumstances, or was fully aware, until it was too late,
what he had done and was continuing to do to arouse Japanese suspicion
and resentment.

The negotiations having in view the peaceful adjustment of the
conflicting interests of Russia and Japan in the Far East, which
were begun by the latter country in the summer of 1903, were further
continued. Mr. Kurino, the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, was
informed by Baron Komura, who was then Japanese Minister of Foreign
Affairs, that the recent conduct of Russia at Peking, in Manchuria, and
in Korea, was the cause of grave concern to the Government at Tokyo.
“The unconditional and permanent occupation of Manchuria by Russia
would,” said Baron Komura, “create a state of things prejudicial to the
security and interests of Japan. The principle of equal opportunity would
thereby be annulled, and the territorial integrity of China be impaired.
There is, however, a still more serious consideration for the Japanese
Government; that is to say, if Russia was established on the flank of
Korea it would be a constant menace to the separate existence of that
empire, or at least would make Russia the dominant power in Korea. But
Korea is an important outpost in Japan’s line of defence, and Japan
consequently considers its independence absolutely essential to her own
repose and safety. Moreover, the political as well as the commercial and
industrial interests and influence which Japan possesses in Korea are
paramount over those of other Powers. These interests and this influence
Japan, having regard to her own security, cannot consent to surrender to,
or share with, another Power.”

In view of these reasons, Mr. Kurino was instructed to present the
following note to Count Lamsdorff, the Russian Minister of Foreign
Affairs: “The Japanese Government desires to remove from the relations
of the two empires every cause of future misunderstanding, and believes
that the Russian Government shares the same desire. The Japanese
Government would therefore be glad to enter with the Russian Imperial
Government upon an examination of the condition of affairs in the regions
of the extreme East, where their interests meet, with a view of defining
their respective special interests in those regions. If this suggestion
fortunately meets with the approval, in principle, of the Russian
Government, the Japanese Government will be prepared to present to the
Russian Government their views as to the nature and scope of the proposed
understanding.”

The consent of Count Lamsdorff and the Czar having been obtained,
on August 12th articles were prepared and submitted by the Japanese
Government which it wished to have serve as a basis of understanding
between the two countries. The essential agreements to be secured by
these articles were: (1) A mutual engagement to respect the independence
and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires, and to
maintain the “open door” in these countries; and (2) a reciprocal
recognition of Japan’s preponderating interests in Korea and of Russia’s
special interests in Manchuria. These demands were not altered in any
very important way by Japan during all the subsequent negotiations. It
was their persistent rejection by Russia, together with her long delays
in replying while she was meantime making obvious preparations of a
war-like character, which precipitated the tremendous conflict that
followed some months later. In her first reply with counter proposals
which was made nearly eight weeks later through Baron Rosen, the Russian
Minister at Tokyo, Russia not only reduced Japan’s demands regarding
Korea, but even proposed new restrictions upon her in that country. But
what was equally significant, the counter-proposals took no account
of the demand for an agreement as to the independence and territorial
integrity of the Chinese empire, or as to the policy of the “open door”
in Manchuria and Korea. On the contrary, they required Japan expressly
to recognize Manchuria as “in all respects outside her sphere of
interest.” Meantime Russia was increasing her commercial and military
activity in both the territorial spheres where the question of interests
and rights was under dispute.

In the second overture of October 30th, several important concessions
were made by Japan, to which on December 11th Russia replied with
a repetition of the former counter-proposal—omitting, however, the
offensive clause regarding Manchuria and inserting the Japanese proposal
relating to the connection of the Korean and the Chinese-Eastern
railways. Ten days later the Japanese Government presented a third
overture in which Baron Komura tried to make it clear to the Russian
Government that Japan desired “to bring within the purview of the
proposed arrangement all those regions in the Far East where the
interests of the two empires meet.” But when the reply of Russia was
received in Tokyo on January 6, 1904, it was found that not only was
there no mention made of the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria,
but that Russia again insisted upon Japan’s regarding the “Manchurian
Question” and the littoral of Manchuria as quite outside her sphere
of interest. Russia, indeed, agreed “not to impede Japan or the other
Powers in the enjoyment of the rights and privileges acquired by them
under existing treaties with China, exclusive of the establishment of
settlements”; but only on condition that Japan would agree not to use
any part of the territory of Korea for strategical purposes, and also to
the establishment of a neutral zone in Northern Korea. In spite of the
fact that the two governments were still as far apart as at the beginning
in regard to the most vital points of interest, Japan made another and
fourth attempt. This overture was presented to Count Lamsdorff on January
13th and, in spite of the urgent request for an early reply, this did
not come until February 7, the day following the severing of diplomatic
relations between the two countries. Negotiations were then ended; appeal
was now made to the “arbitrament of war,” so-called.

It is not our purpose to discuss in detail the question of rights, as
involved in these negotiations, whether from the political or the moral
point of view, or to consider whether Japan’s method of initiating
hostilities was in accordance with law, or with precedent as established,
if such it can be said to be, by the usage of civilized nations. In both
regards we believe, however, that the claims of Japan to have the right
upon her side are in all important particulars defensible. But having
begun the war with Russia it can be seen that to secure free passage for
her troops through Korea, and to secure Korea in the rear of her troops
as they passed to the front, were necessities imposed upon Japan in a
yet more absolute and indisputable fashion than was the undertaking of
the war itself. If it was necessary in order to maintain the integrity
and free, peaceful development of Japan that, all other means having
failed, she should resort to arms in the effort to check the dangerous
encroachments of Russia in Manchuria and Korea, it was immediately and
essentially necessary for any measure of success in this last resort,
that she should gain and hold control over the conduct of the Korean
Court and the Korean populace during the war. What were the nature and
the habitual modes of behavior of both Court and people has already
been made clear; more information on these subjects will be afforded in
subsequent chapters. As to danger of treachery we may note in passing
that, while friendship was being protested to the face of the Japanese in
Korea, a boat was picked up in the Yellow Sea, late in January, 1904—that
is, a few days before the outbreak of the war—which bore a Korean
messenger with a letter to Port Arthur asking for Russian troops to be
sent to Korea. The resort to valuable concessions as a bribe for foreign
influence became at once, on the beginning of hostilities, more active
even than before. On this latter point we quote the words of Mr. D. W.
Stevens:

    The outbreak of the war created a veritable storm of terror
    in the ranks of Korean officialdom. Many of its members who
    were known as Russian sympathizers fled to the country; a few
    took refuge in the houses of foreign friends. Palace circles
    were in particular profoundly agitated. There was a curious
    manifestation of the trend of the Korean official mind toward
    the belief that political support can be bought. Those were
    golden days for the foreigner who, willing to trade upon
    Korean ignorance and credulity, cared to let it be understood,
    either openly or tacitly, that his government would appreciate
    favors shown to himself. One foreign minister was surprised
    by the offer of a mining concession which before that he had
    unsuccessfully tried to obtain. Having due regard for his own
    and his country’s reputation he naturally declined. Others,
    private individuals, were not so scrupulous; and there are
    to-day extant exceptionally favorable public grants, both
    claimed and actually enjoyed, which were thus, as it has been
    put, “obtained in the shadow of the war.”

At this time the Emperor was dominated by the influence of a courtier
named Yi Yong-ik, whose foreign affiliations were wholly Russian. The
Palace coterie, even including this man’s bitter political enemies, was
almost entirely pro-Russian. But the Emperor was also, of course, much
afraid of the Japanese, who were now near at hand, whereas the Russians
and their Korean coadjutors had either fled the country or gone into
retirement. For the time being, therefore, Japan had control of the
Imperial environment. Meantime, one of two courses only seemed open
to the Japanese themselves: they could either set aside the Emperor
and his untrustworthy officials, and assume complete control of Korean
affairs; or they could make some sort of arrangement which would secure
an alliance with Korea. If faithful to this alliance, the Emperor would
be assured of his personal safety and of his throne; and the country
would be placed definitively under Japanese protection. The leaders in
Japan knew perfectly well that His Korean Majesty was anti-Japanese and
characteristically false and treacherous; but they hoped by moderation
to win him over to at least a partial and temporary fulfilment of the
obligations under which he would be placed by the adoption of the more
friendly course.

There were also military reasons why a sort of protectorate and alliance
seemed necessary; and if possible in a way to avoid the troubles of a
forcible annexation. For, very special and momently imminent dangers
threatened the construction and use of the railway by which the Japanese
were transporting their troops and supplies through Korea to the seat of
the war. In several instances armed attacks were made upon the workmen
and the track was torn up. In another connection it will be shown that
the charge of extreme cruelty and wholesale slaughter made by Mr.
Hulbert[27] (and illustrated by a picture designed to excite pathos),
because the Japanese military authorities executed some of the leaders
of these dangerous riots, is quite unwarranted by the facts. The same
thing may be said of the charge that the _Po-an_, or “Society for the
Promotion of Peace and Safety,” was illegally and wantonly suppressed
by the Japanese in July of 1904. The simple truth is that this society
bore about the same relation to the cause of “peace and safety” which
has been borne during the past two years by the several associations for
intrigue and murder which have masqueraded under titles suggestive of the
most noble schemes for promoting the interests of patriotism, education,
morals and religion. It must be either a dull or a prejudiced mind,
indeed, that can take in the atmosphere of Korean politics for even a
few months—not to say, years—of residence in the land, and not understand
the threatening significance of these _associations_. On the other hand,
the question of propriety in dealing summarily with those who persist in
tearing up the tracks of a military road in time of war may confidently
be left to those who are experienced in such matters.

Indeed, with regard to the entire conduct of affairs by the Japanese
during this period, we may ask the question, and give the answer, of Mr.
Whigham:[28] “What, then, is Japan to do? Is she to sit down and watch
the Russian flood descending on her fields without attempting to set up a
barrier? The answer is very simple. Japan must take Korea and do it very
quickly, too.”

It was such a situation of extreme peril and emergency which compelled
the Japanese Government to secure formal recognition in an agreement
with the Korean Government—so far as such a thing as government then
existed in Korea—that should admit of no misunderstanding. This necessity
gave rise to the Conventions of February 23, 1904, and of August 22 of
the same year. The latter of these conventions was the logical sequence
and supplement of the former. By the first of the Protocols[29] it
was designed to secure necessary reforms in the administration of
Korea and, besides, such an alliance between the two governments that
Japan should guard the Korean Emperor and his people against foreign
aggressions in the future and secure for herself the furtherance of
her military operations against Russia. Of more permanent importance
still was the prevention in the future of all such experiences as she
had passed through in 1894-1895, and was passing through at the present
time. The Convention of February, however, was no sooner concluded than
His Majesty began plotting to prevent its going into effect. With the
conduct of military matters he was indeed powerless to interfere; but
every attempt at reform met with either his passive resistance or open
opposition. This attitude of his made necessary the additional provisions
stipulated in the supplementary Protocol of August 22, 1904.[30] In this,
provision was made for the appointment by the Korean Government of a
Japanese recommended by the Japanese Government as “Financial Adviser,”
and of some foreigner, also to be recommended by the Japanese Government,
as “Adviser to the Department of Foreign Affairs.” The appointees to
these positions were Mr. Megata and Mr. D. W. Stevens.

But still the intrigue and treachery of His Majesty went on. In spite of
the excellent service of Mr. Megata in straightening out the confusion
of the Korean finances, and in utter disregard of Mr. Stevens’ advices
and endeavors to make the new Protocols both appear, and actually to
be, greatly to the advantage of the Emperor and of his country, the
imperial ways remained unchanged. His own Foreign Ministers were either
disregarded or made tools of intrigue. Even after the Treaty of November,
1905, His Majesty sent secret telegrams from the Palace ordering the
Foreign Ministers of other Governments to pay no attention to the
directions of his own Minister of Foreign Affairs, while the latter was
arranging for the closing of the Legations according to the terms of
the Treaty. During the entire war he was in secret communication with
Japan’s enemies, while claiming Japan’s protection under the Protocols of
February and August, 1904. This treacherous correspondence was carried
on through emissaries at Shanghai; and large sums of money, which the
Japanese Financial Adviser had somehow to provide, were wasted upon
these futile efforts to change the course of events. Indeed, in this
correspondence and in the distribution of this money, it is probable
that the chief agent in Shanghai was the same person as the chief agent
of Russia herself.

The subsequent history of the relations of Japan and Korea, as these
relations resulted through the events of July, 1907, in establishing a
protectorate which placed all important Korean affairs, both internal and
foreign, under the control of the Japanese Resident-General, cannot be
understood or judged without keeping the necessity and the significance
of these Protocols steadily in mind. Of the Convention of February, 1904,
Lawrence significantly says:[31]

    Japan took the earliest opportunity of regularizing her
    position by a Protocol negotiated with the native Government,
    and communicated with Tokyo to her Legations abroad on February
    27th. In this, the last of the long series of diplomatic
    agreements relating to the subject, the fiction of Korean
    independence is still kept up, while the fact of Japanese
    control is further accentuated. By the third Article Japan
    “guarantees the independence and territorial integrity of the
    Korean Empire”; and by the second she covenants to ensure “the
    safety and repose of the Imperial Household of Korea.” The
    Korean Government, on its part, covenants to adopt the advice
    of Japan in regard to improvements in administration, and to
    give full facilities for the promotion of any measures the
    Japanese Government may undertake to protect Korea against
    foreign aggressions or internal disturbances. It also agrees
    that for the promotion of these objects Japan may occupy
    strategic points in Korean territory.

    The effect of this agreement has been to place the resources
    of Korea at the disposal of Japan in the present war. The
    victorious army which forced the passage of the Yalu so
    brilliantly on May 1st was landed at Korean ports, concentrated
    on Korean soil, and supplied from Korean harbors. In the
    political sphere Korea has denounced, as having been made
    under compulsion, all her treaties with Russia and all
    concessions granted to Russian subjects. On the other hand,
    Russia has declared that she will regard as null and void
    all the acts of the Korean Government while under Japanese
    tutelage, and her newspapers loudly proclaim that, if our
    (English) neutrality were genuine, we should raise objections
    against the Protocol, as being inconsistent with the Treaty
    of 1902, whereby we, in conjunction with Japan, mutually
    recognize the independence of Korea. In reality there is no
    inconsistency, because, as we have just seen, it is clear
    from the first Article of the Treaty that the independence is
    not an ordinary independence, but a diplomatic variety which
    was perfectly consistent with recurring interventions to ward
    off foreign aggression and put down domestic revolt. In other
    words, it was a dependent independence, or no independence
    at all, and such it remains under the agreement of February,
    1904. That instrument undoubtedly establishes a Japanese
    Protectorate over Korea, and the beauty of Protectorates is
    their indefiniteness. As Professor Nye, the great Belgian
    jurist, says in his recently published work on _Le Droit
    International_: “Le terme ‘protectorat,’ désigne la situation
    créée par le traité de protection.... Le protectorat a plus ou
    moins de développement; rien n’est fixé dans la théorie; il est
    cependant un trait caracteristique commun aux Etats protégés
    c’est qu’ils ne sont pas entièrement indépendants dans leurs
    relations avec les autres Etats.” These words exactly fit the
    condition of Korea under its recent agreement with Japan.
    Indeed, the description might be extended to its internal
    affairs also. Susceptibilities are soothed, and possibly
    diplomatic difficulties are turned, by calling it independent;
    but in reality it is as much under Japanese protection as Egypt
    is under ours; all state-paper description to the contrary
    notwithstanding.

The new Treaty of August 22, 1904, shows that this is fully understood at
Tokyo. A financial adviser and a diplomatic adviser are to be appointed
by the Korean Government on the recommendation of Japan, and nothing
important is to be done in their departments without their advice. No
treaties with Foreign Powers are to be concluded, and no concessions
to foreigners granted, without previous consultation with the Japanese
Government.

That the view of this authority as to the significance of the Conventions
of 1904 is not the view of any individual alone has been clearly
demonstrated by the acceptance of its conclusions, in a practical way,
though the official action of foreign governments since the date of the
conventions themselves.

In particular it is to be noted that the Government of the United States
has expressed an opinion touching the effect in international law upon
the status of Korea of the February and August Protocols which is
substantially identical with that of Professor Lawrence. Before there was
any occasion for a formal expression of opinion a significant indication
of the views of the Department of State upon the subject could be found
in the Foreign Relations for 1904. Over the Protocols as published
therein may be found the caption “Protectorate by Japan over Korea.”
(437 _f._) Later on, Secretary Root had occasion expressly to state this
opinion. This was when, in December, 1905, Mr. Min Yung-chan, whilom
Korean Minister to France, came to the United States for the purpose
of protesting against recognition by the United States of the Treaty
of November 17th of the same year. In a letter to Mr. Min, explaining
the reasons which made it impossible for the American Government not to
recognize the binding force of that instrument, the Secretary added that
there was another and a conclusive reason against interference in the
matter. This reason, he said, was to be found in the circumstance that
Korea had _previously_ concluded with Japan two agreements which, in
principle and in practice, established a Japanese Protectorate in Korea,
and to the force of which in that particular the Treaty of November 17
added nothing.

To this view of the virtual significance of these earlier Protocols
there is only to be opposed the demonstrably false assertions of the
now ex-Emperor and the opinions and affirmations—quite unwarranted as
the next chapter will show—of writers like Mr. Hulbert, Mr. Story, and
other so-called “foreign friends” of His Majesty. These assertions and
opinions are certainly not made any more credible by the willingness of
their authors to denounce the President and Acting Foreign Minister of
the United States in Korea, and, by implication, all the other heads of
foreign governments who neither share their opinion, nor approve of their
conduct in support of the opinion![32]

By the Treaty of Portsmouth the Russian Government not only definitely
relinquished all the political interests she had previously claimed to
possess in Korea, but also recognized in all important particulars the
rights acquired in the same country by Japan through the Conventions of
February and August, 1904. Article Second of the Treaty stipulates: “The
Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan possesses in Korea
paramount political, military and economical interests, engages neither
to obstruct nor interfere with the measures of guidance, protection and
control which the Imperial Government of Japan may find it necessary to
take in Korea.”

Thus did the war with Russia, which was fought over the relations
between Japan and Korea as an issue of supreme importance, terminate the
second main period in the history of these relations. The Chino-Japan
war removed forever that foreign influence which had continued through
centuries, not only to prevent the immediate realization of a true
national independence on the part of Korea, but also to unfit the Korean
Government to maintain such independence when conferred upon it as the
gift of another nation. The Russo-Japanese war terminated the attempt of
a more powerful foreign nation to supersede the controlling influence
of Japan in Korea. At the same time it gave a convincing further
demonstration of Korea’s inherent and hopeless inability to control
herself, under any existing conditions of her government or of her system
of civilization. Thus the provisions for a Japanese Protectorate, which
shall secure for both nations the largest possible measure of good,
offered to the Marquis Ito his difficult problem as Imperial Commissioner
to Korea in November, 1905.

CHAPTER XI

THE COMPACT

It will need no argument for those familiar with the habitual ways of
the Korean Government in dealing with foreign affairs to establish
the necessity that Japan should make more definite, explicit, and
comprehensive, the Protocols of February 23 and August 22, 1904.
Foreign affairs have always been with the Emperor and Court of Korea
a particularly favorable but mischievous sphere for intrigue and
intermeddling. The Foreign Office has never had any real control over
the agents of the government, who have been the tools of the Emperor in
their dealings with foreign Legations. The Korean Foreign Minister in
1905 was not an efficient and responsible representative of either the
intentions or the transactions of his own government; instructions were
frequently sent direct from the Palace to Ministers in other countries;
foreign Legations had, each one, a separate cipher to be used for
such communications; and there were several instances of clandestine
communication with agents abroad, even during the Russo-Japanese war.
To guard, therefore, against the repetition of occurrences similar to
those which had already cost her so dearly, Japan’s interests demanded
that her control over the management of Korea’s foreign affairs should be
undivided and unquestioned.

It was not, however, in the interests of Japan alone that the management
of Korea’s foreign affairs was to pass out of her own hands. It was
distinctly, as events are fast proving beyond a reasonable doubt, for
the advantage of Korea herself. In any valid meaning of the word, Korea
had never been “independent” of foreign influences, dominating over
her and corrupting the officials within her own borders. For centuries
these influences came chiefly from China; for a decade, chiefly from
Russia and other Western nations. The Treaty of 1905 was also, just as
distinctly—so, we believe, the events will ultimately prove—for the
advantage of these Western nations, and of the entire Far East.

It is, therefore, highly desirable, not only as vindicating the honor
of Marquis Ito and of the Japanese Government, but also as establishing
the Protectorate of Japan over Korea upon foundations of veracity and
justice, that the exact and full truth should be known and placed
on record before the world, concerning the Convention of November,
1905. This is the more desirable because of the gross and persistent
misrepresentations of the facts which have been repeated over and over
again—chiefly by the same persons—down to the time of the appearance of
the so-called Korean Commission at The Hague Conference of 1907.[33]
His Majesty the Emperor (now ex-Emperor) of Korea has, indeed, publicly
proclaimed his intention not to keep a treaty “made under duress” and
through fears of “personal violence”; he has also made it appear that
the signatures and the Imperial seal upon the document were fraudulently
obtained. Meantime, he has sedulously (and, we believe, with such
sincerity as his nature admits) cultivated and cherished the friendship
of the Japanese Resident-General who negotiated, and who has administered
affairs under, the Treaty. How he lost his crown, at the hands of his own
Ministry, for his last violation of the most solemn provisions of the
same treaty, is now a matter of universal history.

Marquis Ito arrived at Seoul, as the Representative of the Japanese
Government, to conclude a new Convention with Korea, during the first
week of November, 1905. He was the bearer of a letter from his own
Emperor to the Emperor of Korea, which frankly explained the object of
his mission. What follows is the substance of His Japanese Majesty’s
letter.

“Japan, in self-defence and for the preservation of the peace and
security of the Far East, had been forced to go to war with Russia;
but now, after a struggle of twenty months, hostilities were ended.
During their continuance the Emperor of Korea and his people, no doubt,
shared the anxiety felt by the Emperor and people of Japan. In the mind
of His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, the most absorbing thought and
purpose now was to safeguard the future peace and security of the two
Empires, and to augment and strengthen the friendly relations existing
between them. Unfortunately, however, Korea was not yet in a state of
good defence, nor was the basis for a system of effective self-defence
yet created. Her weakness in these regards was in itself a menace to
the peace of the Far East as well as to her own security. That this
was unhappily the case was a matter of as much regret to His Majesty
as it could be to the Emperor of Korea; and for this reason the safety
of Korea was as much a matter of anxiety to him as was that of his own
country. His Majesty had already commanded his Government to conclude the
Protocols of February and August, 1904, for the defence of Korea. Now, in
order to preserve the peace which had been secured, and to guard against
future dangers arising from the defenceless condition of Korea, it was
necessary that the bonds which united the two countries should be closer
and stronger than ever before. Having this end in view, His Majesty had
commanded His Government to study the question and to devise means of
attaining this desirable result. The preservation and protection of the
dignity, privileges, and tranquillity of the Imperial House of Korea
would, as a matter of course, be one of the first considerations kept in
view.

“His Majesty felt sure that if the Emperor of Korea would carefully
consider the general situation and its bearing upon the interests and
welfare of his country and people, he would decide to take the advice now
earnestly tendered to him.”

It should be noticed that this address from His Imperial Majesty of Japan
to the Korean Emperor—the sincerity of which cannot be questioned—is
pervaded with the same spirit as that which has characterized the
administration, hitherto, of the Japanese Residency-General.

Marquis Ito informed the Korean Emperor that he would ask for another
audience in a few days. His Majesty consented, adding that in the
meantime he desired carefully to study the letter from the Emperor of
Japan.[34]

On the 15th of November, Marquis Ito had a private audience which lasted
about four hours, and in which he frankly explained the object of his
mission.... The Emperor began the interview by complaining of certain
injuries done by the Japanese civil and military authorities during the
war. He dwelt at length upon past events, saying, among other things,
that he had not wished to go to the Russian Legation in 1895, but had
been over-persuaded by those about his person.

Marquis Ito replied that as he would remain in Korea for some time, there
would be ample opportunity for a full exchange of views regarding the
matters to which His Majesty referred. At the present moment he felt it
to be his imperative duty to beg His Majesty to hear the particulars
of the mission with which he had been charged by his Imperial Master.
From 1885 onward, he went on to say, Japan had earnestly endeavored to
maintain the independence of Korea. Unfortunately, Korea herself had
rendered but little aid in the struggle which Japan had maintained in her
behalf. Nevertheless, these efforts had preserved His Majesty’s Empire,
and, although there might have been causes of complaint, such as those to
which His Majesty had just referred, in justice to Japan it should not be
forgotten that in the midst of the great struggle in which she had been
engaged, it was unhappily not possible wholly to avoid such occurrences.
If His Majesty would consider all the circumstances, he would undoubtedly
realize that in the midst of the absorbing anxiety of that momentous
contest and of the heavy burdens it imposed upon Japan, whatever fault
might attach to her as regarded the matters of which His Majesty had
spoken was at least excusable. Korea, on the other hand, had borne but
a small portion of the burden created by the necessity of defending
and maintaining a principle in which she was as deeply interested as
Japan—namely, the peace and security of the Far East. Turning to the
future, however, it could be clearly perceived that in order effectively
to ensure the future peace and security of the Far East, it was
imperatively necessary that the bonds uniting the two countries should
be drawn closer. For that purpose, and with that object in view, His
Majesty the Emperor of Japan had graciously entrusted him with the task
of explaining the means which, after mature and careful deliberation, it
had been concluded should be adopted.

The substance of the plan which had been thus formulated might be summed
up as follows: ... The Japanese Government, with the consent of the
Government of Korea, to have the right to control and direct the foreign
affairs of Korea, while the internal autonomy of the Empire would be
maintained; and, of course, His Majesty’s Government, under His Majesty’s
direction, would continue as at the present time.

Explaining the objects of the Agreement thus outlined, the Marquis
pointed out that it would effectively safeguard the security and prestige
of the Imperial House of Korea, while affording the surest means of
augmenting the happiness and prosperity of the people. For the reasons
stated, and for these alone, the Marquis went on to say, he strongly
advised the Emperor to accept this plan; and, taking into account
the general situation, and the condition of Korea in particular, he
earnestly hoped that His Majesty would consent. The Japanese Minister was
authorized to discuss the details with His Majesty’s Ministers.

The Emperor in reply expressed his appreciation of the manifestation of
sincere good-will on the part of the Emperor of Japan, and his thanks.
Although he would not absolutely reject the proposal, it was his earnest
desire to retain some outward form of control over the external affairs
of Korea. As to the actual exercise of such control by Japan, and in what
manner it should be exercised, he had no objections to urge.

Marquis Ito enquired what was meant by “outward form.”

The Emperor replied, “the right to maintain Legations abroad.”

The Marquis then stated that, in accordance with diplomatic rules and
usage, there was in that case no difference between the form and the
substance of control. Therefore he could not accept the suggestion.
If Korea were to continue to have Legations abroad, she would in fact
retain control of the external relations of the Empire. The _status quo_
would be perpetuated; there would be constant danger of the renewal of
past difficulties; and again the peace of the East would be threatened.
It was absolutely necessary that Japan should control and direct the
external relations of Korea. This decision was the result of most careful
investigations and deliberations; it could not be changed. Marquis Ito
further stated that he had brought a memorandum of the agreement which it
was desired to conclude; and this he then handed to the Emperor.

The Emperor, having read it, expressed his implicit trust in Marquis
Ito, saying that he placed more reliance upon what he said than upon
the representations of his own subjects. [It may seem a strange comment
upon the working of His Majesty’s mind, but all my observations and
experiences, while in Korea, lead me to believe in the veracity of this
declaration. To the last, the Emperor trusted the word of the Marquis
Ito.]... If, however, he accepted the agreement and retained no outward
form of control over Korean foreign affairs, the relations of Japan and
Korea would be like those of Austria and Hungary; or Korea’s condition
would be like that of one of the African tribes.

Marquis Ito begged leave to dissent. Austria and Hungary were ruled by
one monarch; whereas in this case His Majesty would still be Emperor
of Korea, and would continue as before to exercise his Imperial
prerogatives. As for the presumed resemblance to an African tribe,
that could hardly be considered in point; since Korea had a Government
established for centuries and therefore a national organization and forms
of administration such as no savage tribe possessed.

The Emperor expressed appreciation of what the Marquis said, but repeated
that he did not care for the substance, and only wished to retain some
external form of control over Korea’s foreign affairs. He therefore hoped
that the Marquis would inform his Emperor and the Japanese Government of
this wish and would induce them to change the plan proposed; this wish
he reiterated a number of times. [There were undoubtedly two reasons,
entirely valid from his point of view, for the endeavor to secure this
change. The first was the very natural desire to “save his face”; and the
second was the—with him—scarcely less natural desire to leave room for
intrigue to contest the scope of the terms agreed upon while claiming to
be faithful to their substance.]

The Marquis stated that he could not comply with the request of His
Majesty. The draft was the definitive expression of the views of the
Japanese Government after most careful consideration, and could not
be changed as His Majesty desired. He then quoted the Article in the
Portsmouth Treaty wherein Russia recognizes the paramount political,
commercial, and economic interests of Japan in Korea. There was only
one alternative, he added: either to accept or to refuse. He could not
predict what the result would be if His Majesty refused, but he feared
that it might be less acceptable than what he now proposed. If His
Majesty refused, he must clearly understand this.

The Emperor replied that he did not hesitate because he was ignorant
of this fact, but because he could not himself decide at that moment.
He must consult his Ministers and ascertain also “the intention of the
people at large.”

The Marquis replied that His Majesty was, of course, quite right in
desiring to consult his Ministers, but he could not understand what was
meant by consulting “the intention of the people.” Inasmuch as Korea did
not have a constitutional form of government, and consequently no Diet,
it seemed rather a strange proceeding to consult “the intention of the
people.” If such action should lead to popular ferment and excitement and
possibly public disturbances, he must respectfully point out that the
responsibility would rest with His Majesty.

Finally, after some further discussion, the Emperor requested Marquis Ito
to have Minister Hayashi (who held the power to negotiate the proposed
agreement) consult with his own Minister for Foreign Affairs. The result
could be submitted to the Cabinet; and when that body had reached a
decision His Majesty’s approval could be asked.

Marquis Ito said that prompt action was necessary, and requested His
Majesty to summon the Minister for Foreign Affairs at once, and to
instruct him to negotiate and sign the agreement. The Emperor replied
that he would give instructions to the Minister for Foreign Affairs
to that effect. Marquis Ito stated that he would remain awaiting the
conclusion of that agreement, and would again request His Majesty to
grant him an audience.

Before this first audience ended the Emperor again asked Marquis Ito to
persuade His Majesty of Japan to consent that Korea should retain some
outward form of control over her foreign affairs; but again Marquis Ito
refused. This repeated refusal of Japan’s Representative to concede
anything whatever as an abatement of his country’s control in the future
over Korea’s relations to foreign countries distinctly reveals the nature
of the only treaty that could then possibly have been concluded between
the two Powers. On the following day, the 16th of November, Marquis Ito
had a conference with all of the Cabinet Ministers, except the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, who on the same day began negotiations with Minister
Hayashi. Marquis Ito explained fully to the Korean Ministers the object
of his mission and the views of his Government.

On the 17th of November, at 11 A. M., all of the Korean Ministers went
to the Japanese Legation, lunched there, and conferred with Mr. Hayashi
until 3 o’clock, when they adjourned to the Palace and held a meeting
in the Emperor’s presence. Their decision was, finally, to refuse to
agree to the Treaty in the form in which it had been proposed. Marquis
Ito was taking dinner with General Hasegawa, when, at 7.30, he received
a message from Mr. Hayashi conveying this intelligence and a request to
come to the Palace.[35] Accordingly, at 8 o’clock, he went to the Palace
in company with General Hasegawa, the latter’s aide, and the three or
four mounted gendarmes, who accompanied Marquis Ito wherever he went.
_There were no other Japanese guards or soldiers in attendance, and none
in the immediate vicinity of the Palace. The gendarmes who accompanied
the Marquis did not enter the Palace precincts, and all the gates and
entrances were guarded as usual by Korean soldiers, Korean gendarmes and
Korean policemen._ Precautions had indeed been taken to preserve order in
the city, as some outburst of mob violence was possible. The necessity
of this precaution was shown later in the night when an attempt was made
to set fire to the house of Mr. Yi Wan-yong, Minister of Education (now
Prime Minister). It was only when the conference was ended that, at the
express request of the Korean Ministers, a small number of gendarmes was
summoned to accompany them to their homes. [This precaution will not seem
excessive, or threatening of violence to others, in the eyes of one who,
like myself, has spent a period of two months in Korea, characterized by
repeated attempts to assassinate the Ministers, who always went guarded
by Korean and Japanese gendarmes. See pp. 66 _ff._]

Upon arriving at the Palace, Marquis Ito was informed by Mr. Hayashi
that, although His Majesty had ordered the Cabinet to come to an
agreement which would establish a cordial _entente_ with Japan, and
although the majority of the Cabinet Ministers were ready to obey His
Majesty’s commands, Mr. Han, the Prime Minister, persistently refused
to obey. Marquis Ito thereupon, through the Minister of the Household,
requested a private audience with His Majesty.

It should be explained here that during all of the proceedings, which
took place in the rooms on the lower floor of the “Library,” the Emperor
was in his rooms in the upper story, and was never personally approached
by any one except, as hereafter stated, by his own Ministers. It may also
be added, in explanation of the time of the conference, that it had been
His Majesty’s invariable practice for years to transact important public
business at night. He turned night into day in that regard and the
Cabinet Ministers had customarily been obliged to attend in turn at the
Palace and remain there all night long.

To the request for a private audience the Emperor replied that although
he would be pleased to grant an audience at once, he was very tired and
was suffering from sore throat—the plea of indisposition being one to
which he is accustomed to resort for avoiding audiences. Therefore he
preferred that Marquis Ito should consult with his Ministers whom he
would instruct to negotiate and conclude an agreement establishing a
cordial _entente_ between Korea and Japan. At the same time that the
Emperor requested the Marquis to consult with the Cabinet for that
purpose, the Minister of the Household informed the Cabinet Ministers
that His Majesty commanded them to negotiate with Marquis Ito.

Marquis Ito then turned to the Prime Minister, and, repeating what
Mr. Hayashi had told him, enquired whether the statement correctly
represented his attitude. The Prime Minister replied that it was correct.
His Majesty had often commanded him to come to an understanding with
the Japanese Minister, but he had refused. Then the other Ministers
had accused him of disloyalty in disobeying His Majesty’s commands. He
himself could not but feel that the accusation was well founded and, on
that account, he wished immediately to resign his office and to await the
Imperial punishment for his disobedience. As he had informed Marquis Ito
the day before, although he was perfectly well aware that Korea could not
maintain her independence by her own unaided efforts, he still wished
to retain the outward semblance of control over the Nation’s foreign
relations.

Thereupon Marquis Ito said that the last thought in his mind would be
to try to force the Prime Minister to do any thing which would destroy
his country. The Minister had said, however, that he wished to resign
because he had been disloyal in disobeying the Emperor’s commands. It
did not seem to him, the Marquis, that this was either a dignified, or
a sensible course for a Minister of State to adopt. The management of
public affairs required decision. If the Prime Minister could not come
to some understanding with Japan’s representatives, as his own Majesty
the Emperor had commanded him to do, he was seriously jeopardizing his
country’s interests. The Marquis could not believe that this was genuine
loyalty. There was only one alternative before the Prime Minister, either
to obey the Imperial order, or, carefully considering the gravity of the
situation, to do what he could to change the Imperial opinion. He then
asked the Prime Minister to request the other Ministers, in accordance
with the Emperor’s command, conveyed through the Minister of the
Household, to give their views regarding the proposed agreement. This the
Prime Minister proceeded to do.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Pak Chi-sun (afterwards Acting
Prime Minister) stated that, as he had informed the Japanese Minister,
he was opposed to the treaty and did not wish to negotiate it; but if he
was ordered to do so, he would comply. The Marquis asked what he meant by
“ordered”; did he mean an Imperial order? Mr. Pak assented.

The Minister of Finance, Mr. Min Yong-ki, said that he was opposed to the
treaty. (He remained in office for a year and a half after the conclusion
of the treaty, considering, no doubt, that the Imperial command absolved
him from responsibility.)

The Minister of Education, Mr. Yi Wan-yong (now Prime Minister), replied
that he had already expressed his opinion fully in His Majesty’s
presence. The request of Japan was the logical result of existing