sickness, and wine the Matter of vinegar in the way of privation and
of destruction contrary to nature (b. 34)? However, there is here
some difficulty: Since vinegar is generated out of wine, why is not
wine the Matter of vinegar, and potentially vinegar? Why is not the
living man potentially a corpse? Is it not rather the truth, however,
that these are accidental or contra-natural destructions ([Greek:
kata\ sumbebêko\s ai( phthorai/]--b. 36, _i.e._, not in the regular
appetency and aspirations, according to which the destruction of one
Form gives place to a better); and that through such destruction the
same Matter which belonged to the living man becomes afterwards the
Matter of the corpse; likewise the Matter of wine becomes, through
the like destruction, Matter of vinegar--by a generation like that of
night out of day? Changes of this sort must take place by complete
resolution into the original Materia Prima ([Greek: ei)s tê\n u(/lên
dei= e)panelthei=n]--a. 3); thus, if a living animal comes out of a
dead one, the latter is first resolved into its elements, and then
out of them comes the living animal. So vinegar is first resolved
into water, then out of the water comes wine (a. 5).

We shall now revert to the difficulty recently noticed, about
Definitions and Numbers. What is the cause that each number and each
definition is One? In all cases where there are several parts not put
together as a mere heap, but where there is a Whole besides the
parts, there must be some cause of this kind. With some bodies,
contact is such cause; with others, viscosity ([Greek:
glischro/tês]--p. 1045, a. 12), or some other affection. But the
definition is one complex phrase, not by conjunction like the Iliad,
but One by being the definition of one subject (a. 14). Now what is
it which makes the subject man, One? Why is he One and not Many, say
animal and a biped--more especially if there exist, as the Platonists
say, a Self-animal and a Self-biped? Why are not these two [Greek:
au)ta/] the man ([Greek: dia\ ti/ ga\r ou)k e)kei=na au)ta\ o(
a)/nthrôpo/s e)sti?]--a. 17), so that individuals are men by
participation not of one Self-man, but of the two--Self-animal,
Self-biped? On this theory altogether, it would seem that a man
cannot be One, but must be Many--animal and biped. It is plain that
in this way of investigation the problem is insoluble.

But if, as _we_ say (p. 1045, a. 23), there be on one side Matter, on
the other side Form--on one side that which is in Potency, on the
other side that which is in Act (a. 24)--the problem ceases to be
difficult. The difficulty is the same as it would be if the
definition of _himation_ were, round brass: the word _himation_ would
be the sign of that definition, and the problem would be, What is the
Cause why round and brass are One? But the difficulty vanishes, when
we reply that one is Matter, the other Form. And, in cases where
generation intervenes, what is the Cause why the potential Ens is
actual Ens, except the Efficient ([Greek: para\ to\ poiê=san]--a.
31)? There is no other Cause why the sphere in potency is a sphere in
actuality: such was the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of each ([Greek: tou=t' ê)=n
to\ t.ê.e. e(kate/rô|]--a. 33). Of Matter there are two varieties,
the Cogitable and the Perceivable; and, in the Definition, a part is
always Matter, a part is Form or Energy; as when we define the
circle--a plane figure. (Aristotle argues:--On the Platonic theory
that Ideas or Forms are Entia, separate from particulars,
self-existent, and independent of each other, no cause can be assigned
for the coalescence of any two or more of them into one; _e.g._ animal
and biped, into man. But upon my theory, Form and Matter, Power and
Act, are in their own nature relative to each other. It is their own
inherent nature to coalesce into one, or for Power to pass into Act.
This is the cause of their unity: no other cause can be found or is
necessary. See Alexander, p. 531.)

In those cases where there is no Matter, either cogitable or
perceivable, as in the Categories, Hoc Aliquid, Quale, Quantum, &c.,
each of them is, in itself and at once, both Ens and Unum (p. 1045,
b. 2). Hence neither Ens nor Unum is included in the Definitions, and
the [Greek: t.ê.e.] is, in itself and at once, both Ens and Unum. No
other cause can be assigned why each of these is Ens and Unum; each
of them is so, at once and immediately; yet not as if they were all
included in Ens or Unum as common genera; nor as if they were apart
and separable from particulars (b. 7).

Philosophers, who do not adopt this opinion, resort to various
phrases, all unsatisfactory, to explain the coalescence or unity of
the elements included in the Definition. Some call it [Greek:
me/thexis], but they give no cause of the [Greek: me/thexis]; others
[Greek: sunousi/a], or [Greek: su/ndesmos], or [Greek:
su/nthesis]--of soul with body, as definition of life. But we might
just as well use these phrases on other occasions, and say that to
be well was a synthesis of the soul with health; that the brazen
triangle was a [Greek: su/ndesmos] of brass with triangle; that
white was a synthesis of superficies with whiteness (p. 1045, b. 15).
These phrases carry no explanation; and these philosophers get into
the difficulty by taking a wrong point of departure. They first lay
down Power as different from Entelechy, and then look for an
explanation which makes them one ([Greek: ai)/tion d' o(/ti duna/meôs
kai\ e)ntelechei/as zêtou=si lo/gon e(nopoio\n kai\ diaphora/n]--p.
1045, b. 16, Schwegler observes that the two last words are loosely
put, and that the clear words to express what Aristotle means would
be: [Greek: zêtou=si lo/gon e(nopoio\n u(potithe/ntes
diaphora/n]--Comm. II. p. 154.). But the truth is that Power and
Entelechy are not essentially two, but only different aspects of one
and the same. The Last Matter and the Form are the same; but the
first is in potency, the second in perfect actuality ("Stoff und
Form, Potenzielles und Actuelles, sind eins und dasselbe auf
verschiedenen Entwicklungsstufen"--Schwegler II. p. 151). To enquire
in any particular case what is the cause of this One, is the same as
to enquire generally the cause of Unity. Each thing is a certain One;
the Potential and the Actual are One, in a certain way (b. 20). So
that no other Cause can be found except the Movent or Efficient--that
which moved the matter out of Potency into Actuality. As to those
things which have no Matter, each of them is One immediately and _per
se_ (b. 23).

. . . . . .

Book [Greek: Th].

In discriminating the meanings of Ens, we noticed one [Greek: kata\
du/namin kai\ e)ne/rgeian] (apart from Ens according to the
Categories). We shall now proceed to discuss these two terms [Greek:
du/namis] and [Greek: e(ntele/cheia = e)ne/rgeia] (p. 1045, b. 35).

It is elsewhere mentioned ([Greek: D]. p. 1019) that [Greek:
du/namis] has many senses, of which some (like the geometrical, &c.)
are equivocal or metaphorical, so that we shall pass them over here
(p. 1046, a. 6). But there is one first and proper sense of [Greek:
du/namis], from which many others diverge in different directions of
relationship or analogy (a. 10). That first and proper sense is--a
principle of change _in alio vel quatenus aliud_, or a principle of
change _ab alio vel quatenus aliud_ ([Greek: a)rchê\ metabolê=s e)n
a)/llô| ê)\ ê(=| a)/llo--a)rchê\ metabolê=s u(p' a)/llou ê)\ ê(=|
a)/llo]--a. 11, 14. The same definition is given in terms somewhat
different at p. 1048, a. 28: [Greek: tou=to le/gomen dunato\n o(\
pe/phuke kinei=n a)/llo ê)\ kinei=sthai u(p' a)/llou, ê)\ a(plô=s ê)\
tro/pon tina/.] This Aristotle calls [Greek: ê( kata\ ki/nêsin
du/namis]--expressed by Bonitz, Comm., p. 379: "agendi patiendive
nisum quendam."). The notion of [Greek: du/namis] however extends
more widely than this first sense of [Greek: du/namis kata\
ki/nêsin]. It includes other cases, as where we say that Hermes is
[Greek: duna/mei] in the wood, and that the half foot is [Greek:
duna/mei] in the whole foot (p. 1048, a. 33; Bonitz distinguishes
this last sense as Möglichkeit, from the first sense as Vermögen, p.
379).

We begin by speaking about the first and proper sense--[Greek:
du/namis ê( kata\ ki/nêsin]. One variety thereof is, when a thing has
power of being passively affected so and so--when there resides in
the thing a principle of passive change ([Greek: a)rchê\ metabolê=s
pathêtikê=s]--p. 1046, a. 13) by something else or by itself
_quatenus_ something else. (These last words are added because a sick
man has the [Greek: du/namis] of being cured either by a physician,
or by himself if he be a physician; but then in this last case he is
to be looked upon in two different characters, as physician and as
patient: he cures himself as physician, he is cured as patient.)
Another variety of [Greek: du/namis kata\ ki/nêsin] is, when a thing
has power of resisting change for the worse or destruction by any
exterior principle of change (a. 14); as hardness in iron. Sometimes
this [Greek: du/namis] is restricted to the cases in which a person
can do the thing in question well: no man is said to have the power
of speaking or singing unless he can perform these functions pretty
well (a. 18).

In all these varieties, the general notion of [Greek: du/namis kata\
ki/nêsin] is included (p. 1046, a. 16). The active and passive
[Greek: du/namis] are, in one sense, one and the same; in another
sense, distinct and different. For one of them resides in the
patient, the other in the agent (a. 27): sometimes the two come by
nature together in the same thing; yet the patient does not suffer
from itself as patient, but from itself as agent. Impotence ([Greek:
a)dunami/a]) is the privation contrary to this [Greek:
**du/namis]. Privation has many different meanings (a. 32).

Among these principles of change, some reside in the inanimate
substances, others in the animated; not only in the soul generally,
but also in the rational branch of the soul (p. 1046, a. 38).
Accordingly some [Greek: duna/meis] are Rational, others Irrational.
All arts and constructive sciences are [Greek: duna/meis] (or [Greek:
a)rchai\ metablêtikai\ e)n a)/llô| ê)\ ê(=| a)/llo]--b. 3). In the
rational capacities, the same capacity covers both contraries; in the
irrational, each bears upon one of the two contraries exclusively;
thus, fire will only heat but not chill, while the medical art will
produce either sickness or health. The reason is, that Science is
based upon rational explanations or definitions; and the same
rational explanation declares both the thing itself and the privation
thereof; though not indeed in the same manner: it declares, in a
certain way, both together, and, in a certain way, chiefly the
positive side (b. 10). Accordingly these sciences are sciences of
both the contraries at once: namely, _per se_, of one side of the
Antiphasis; not _per se_, of the other side; since the rational
explanation also declares, directly and _per se_, only one side,
while it declares the other side in a certain way indirectly,
mediately, _per accidens_--_i.e._, by negation and exclusion ([Greek:
a)popha/sei kai\ a)pophora=|].--b. 14). For the Contrary is the
highest grade of privation; and this is the exclusion of one side of
the alternative ([Greek: ê( ga\r ste/rêsis ê( prô/tê to\ e)nanti/on,
au(/tê d' a)pophora\ thate/rou]--p. 1046 b. 15; Bonitz says that
[Greek: to\ e)nanti/on] is the subject of this proposition, and
[Greek: ê( ste/rêsis] the predicate). Both of two contraries cannot
reside, indeed, in the same subject; but Science is a [Greek:
du/namis] through rational explanation or reason in the soul which
has within it a principle of motion; accordingly the soul can bring
to pass either of the two contraries, through reference to the same
rational notion or explanation which comprises both (b. 22).

The Megaric philosophers recognize no [Greek: du/namis] apart from
[Greek: e)ne/rgeia]; affirming that no one has any power, except at
the moment when he is actually exercising it. These philosophers are
wrong (for various reasons indicated: p. 1046, b. 30--p. 1047, a.
20). Power and Act are distinct. A particular event is possible to
happen, yet it does not happen; or possible not to happen, yet it
does happen (p, 1047, a. 22). That is possible, to which, if the act
supervene whereto such possibility relates, nothing impossible will
ensue (a. 25). The name [Greek: e)ne/rgeia], appended to that of
[Greek: e)ntele/cheia] ([Greek: ê( pro\s tê\n e)ntele/cheian
suntitheme/nê]--a. 30), has come to be applied to other things
chiefly from reference to motions; for motion is _par excellence_
[Greek: e)ne/rgeia]. Hence Non-Entia are never said to be moved,
though other predicates may be applied to them: we may call them
[Greek: dianoêta/] and [Greek: e)pithumêta/], but never [Greek:
kinou/mena]; for, if we did, we should be guilty of contradiction,
saying that things which are not [Greek: e)nergei/a|] are [Greek:
e)nergei/a|]. Among the Non-Entia there are some which are Entia
[Greek: duna/mei]: we call them Non-Entia, because they are not
[Greek: e)ntelechei/a|] (b. 2).

If the definition above given of [Greek: to\ dunato/n] be admitted,
we see plainly that no one can say truly: This is possible, yet it
will never happen (p. 1047, b. 3, seq.).

Among all the various [Greek: duna/meis], some are congenital, such
as the perceptive powers ([Greek: ai)sthê/seôn]--p. 1047, b. 31);
others are acquired by practice, such as playing the flute; others by
learning, like the arts: these two last varieties we cannot possess
without having previously exercised ourselves in them actively (b.
34), but the others, which are more of a passive character, we may
possess without such condition. This distinction coincides with that
which was drawn previously between the rational and the irrational
[Greek: duna/meis] or capacities: the rational capacities belonging
only to a soul, and to the rational branch thereof. Now every [Greek:
dunato/n] has its own specialities and conditions: it is itself a
given something, and it is surrounded with concomitants of special
time, place, neighbourhood, &c. (p. 1048, a. 1). The irrational
capacities must necessarily pass into reality, whenever the active
and the passive conditions come together, because there is but one
reality to arise; but the rational capacities not necessarily,
because they tend to either one of two contrary realities, both of
which cannot be produced. Which of the two contraries shall be
brought to reality, will depend upon another authority--the appetency
or deliberate resolution of the soul: to whichsoever of the two, each
possible, such sovereign appetency tends, that one will be brought to
pass, when agent and patient come together and both are in suitable
condition (a. 11); and under those circumstances, it will
_necessarily_ ([Greek: a)na/gkê]--a. 14) be brought to pass. We need
not formally enunciate the clause--"if nothing extrinsic occurs to
prevent it": for this is already implied in the definition of [Greek:
du/namis] which is never affirmed as absolute and unconditional, but
always under certain given conditions (a. 18: [Greek: e)/sti d' ou)
pa/ntôs, a)ll' e)cho/ntôn pô=s]). Accordingly the agent will not be
able to bring about both sides of the alternative at once, even
though appetite or deliberate resolution may prompt him to do it (a.
21).

Having thus gone through the variety of [Greek: du/namis] called
[Greek: ê( kata\ ki/nêsin], we shall now give some explanations of
[Greek: e)ne/rgeia]; in the course of which we shall be able to
illustrate by contrast, the other variety of [Greek: du/namis], which
was indicated above (p. 1048, a. 30). [Greek: E)ne/rgeia] is used
when the thing exists, not [Greek: duna/mei]: meaning by [Greek:
duna/mei] such as Hermes in the wood or the half-yard in the whole
yard. We shall explain our meaning, by giving an induction of
particulars; for definition cannot be given of every thing. We must
group into one view the analogies following ([Greek: ou) dei= panto\s
o(/ron zêtei=n, a)lla\ kai\ to\ a)na/logon sunora=n]--a. 37): As the
person now actually building is to the professional builder not so
engaged; as the animal awake is to the animal asleep; as the animal
seeing is to the animal possessed of good eyes but having them
closed; as that which is severed from matter is to matter ([Greek:
to\ a)pokekrime/non]--b. 3); as the work completed is to the material
yet unworked;--so is [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] to [Greek: du/namis]. The
antithesis is not similar in all these pairs of instances, but there
is a relationship or analogy pervading all ([Greek: ô(s tou=to e)n
tou/tô| ê)\ pro\s tou=to, to/d' e)n tô=|de ê)\ pro\s to/de]--b. 8).
In some of the pairs, the antithesis is the same as that of [Greek:
ki/nêsis pro\s du/namin]; in others, it is the same as that of
[Greek: ou)si/a pro/s tina u(/lên] (b. 9). In one member of each
pair, we have [Greek: ê( e)ne/rgeia a)phôrisme/nê]; in the other
[Greek: to\ dunato/n] (b. 5--[Greek: e)ne/rgeia] here is _reality
severed and determinate_, as contrasted with [Greek: du/namis]
_potentiality huddled together and indeterminate_.--See Schwegler's
note: "Potenzialität und Aktualität sind reine
Verhältnissbegriffe"--p. 172, seq.). But in all the above-named
examples, that which is now [Greek: duna/mei] may come actually to
be [Greek: e)nergei/a|]: the person now sleeping may awake; the
person whose eyes are now closed may open them and see; the Hermes
now in the wood may be brought out of the wood and exist as a real
statue. It is otherwise with The Infinite, Vacuum, &c. These exist
[Greek: duna/mei] only, and can never come to exist [Greek:
e)nergei/a|], or independently. The Infinite can exist [Greek:
e)nergei/a|] only for our cognition. The fact that the bisection
thereof is never exhausted--that we may go on dividing as long as
we choose--gives to the potential Infinite a certain actuality,
though it cannot be truly separated (b. 16).

We must farther explain in what cases it is proper to say that a
thing is [Greek: duna/mei], and in what cases it is not proper. You
cannot properly say that earth is potentially a man: you may perhaps
say that the semen is potentially a man; yet even _this_ not
certainly, since other conditions besides semen are required (p.
1049, a. 2). The physician cannot cure every patient, yet neither is
the cure altogether a matter of chance ([Greek: a)po\ tu/chês]--a.
4): there is a certain measure of cure possible, and that is called
[Greek: to\ u(giai=non duna/mei]. The definition thereof, taken from
the side of the agent, would be--that which will come to pass if he
wills it, without any impediment from without; from the side of the
patient--when no impediment occurs from within him (a. 8). In like
manner, a house exists [Greek: duna/mei], when all the matter for it
is brought together, without need either of addition or subtraction
or change, and when there is no internal impediment; and so with
other products of art, where the principle of generation is extrinsic
to themselves. In natural products, where the principle of generation
is intrinsic, we treat them as potentially existing, when this
principle is in a condition to realize itself through itself,
assuming no external impediments to interfere. Thus we do not call
the semen potentially a man, because, before it becomes such, it must
undergo change in something else, and therefore stands in need of
some other principle; we call it so only when it is in such
conditions that its own principle suffices. Earth is not said to be a
statue [Greek: duna/mei], until it has first been changed into brass
(a. 17). We call the product not by the name of the Matter itself,
but by an adjective appellation derived from the next adjacent
Matter; thus we call a box, not wood, but wooden: wood is then a box
[Greek: duna/mei]. But we say this only of the proximate or immediate
Matter, not of the remote or primary Matter. We must go back through
successive stages to the first or most remote Matter; thus wood is
not earth, but earthy: earth therefore is potentially wood. The earth
may be aeriform; the air may be fiery; the fire has no analogous
adjective whereby it can be called, and is thus the first or last
Matter. But it is not said to be potentially any thing except the
[Greek: su/ntheton] combined with Form immediately above it. Matter
may be either proximate or remote: Potentiality is affirmed only of
the proximate Matter.

Since all the different meanings of Prius have been enumerated and
distinguished, it is plain that in all those meanings Actuality is
_prius_ as compared with Potentiality: whether the [Greek: du/namis]
be [Greek: a)rchê\ metablêtikê\ ( = kinêtikê\) e)n a)/llô| ê(=|
a)/llo], like Art; or [Greek: a)rchê\ kinêtikê\ ê)\ statikê\ e)n
au)tô=| ê(=| au)to/], like Nature (p. 1049, b. 5-10). Actuality is
_prius_ both [Greek: lo/gô|] and [Greek: ou)si/a|]: it is also
_prius_ [Greek: chro/nô|] in a certain sense, though not in a certain
other sense.

It is _prius_ [Greek: lo/gô|], because the Actual is included in the
definition of the Potential; that is, it must be presupposed and
foreknown, before you can understand what the Potential is (p. 1049,
b. 17). You explain [Greek: oi)kodomiko/s] or [Greek: o(ratiko/s] by
saying that he is [Greek: duna/menos oi)kodomei=n ê)\ o(ra=n]: you
explain [Greek: o(rato/n] by saying that it is [Greek: dunato\n
o(ra=sthai]: [Greek: to\ dunato/n], in its first and absolute
meaning, is [Greek: dunato/n] because it may come into Actuality (b.
13).

It is _prius_ [Greek: chronô=|] in the sense that the Potential
always presupposes an Actual identical _specie_, though not identical
_numero_, with that Actual to which the Potential tends. Take a man
now existing and now seeing, or corn now ripe in the field: these
doubtless, before they came into their present condition, must have
pre-existed in Potentiality; that is, there must have pre-existed a
certain matter--seed or a something capable of vision--which at one
time was not yet in a state of Actuality (p. 1049, b. 23). But prior
to this matter there must have existed other Actualities, by which
this matter was generated: the Actual is always generated out of its
Potential by a prior Actual, _e.g._, a man by a man, a musical man by
a musical man; there being always some prior movent, which must be
itself already in Actuality (b. 27). We have already declared that
every thing generated is something generated out of something, and by
something which is identical in species with the thing generated (b.
29). Hence it seems that there can be no builder who has built
nothing, no harper who has never harped; for the man who is learning
to harp learns by harping (b. 32); which gave occasion to the
sophistical puzzle--That one, who does not possess the knowledge,
will nevertheless do that to which the knowledge relates. The learner
does not possess the knowledge; yet still he must have possessed some
fragments of the knowledge: just as, in every thing which is in
course of generation, some fraction must have been already generated;
in every thing which is moved, some fraction has been already moved
(b. 36).

Lastly, Actuality is _prius_ as compared with Potentiality (not
merely [Greek: lo/gô|, kai\ chro/nô| e)/stin ô(/s], but also) [Greek:
ou)si/a|] (p. 1050, a. 4). In the first place, that which is latest
in generation is first in Form and in Essence; a man compared with a
child, man as compared with semen. Man already possesses the Form,
semen does not. Next, every thing generated marches or gradually
progresses towards its principle and towards its end. The principle
is the [Greek: ou(= e(/neka], and the generation is for the sake of
the end. Now the end or consummation is Actuality, and for the sake
of this the Potentiality is taken on ([Greek: lamba/netai]--a. 10).
Animals do not see in order that they may have sight; they have sight
in order that they may see: they do not theorize in order that they
may possess theoretical aptitude, but the converse; except indeed
those who are practising as learners. Moreover, Matter is said to
exist potentially, because it may come into Form; but, when it exists
actually, it is then in Form (a. 16). (Alexander says: [Greek: ô(/ste
ka)\n tou/tô| prote/ra (ê( e)ne/rgeia) ô(s _e)pheto\n_ kai\ ta/sson
kai\ ei)s ko/smon a)/gon duna/meôs]--p. 559, 10, Bon.) The case is
the same where the end is nothing beyond a particular mode of motion
(_e.g._, dancing): the dancing-master has attained his end when he
exhibits his pupil actually dancing. In natural productions this is
no less true than in artificial: Nature has attained her end, when
the product comes into [Greek: e)ne/rgeia]; that is, when it is
actually at work, from whence the name [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] is derived
([Greek: to\ ga\r e)/rgon te/los, ê( de\ e)ne/rgeia to\ e)/rgon--kai\
suntei/nei pro\s tê\n e)ntele/cheian]--a. 23).

In some cases (as we have often remarked) the ultimatum is use,
without any ulterior product distinct from the use, _e.g._, the act
of seeing is the ultimatum of the visual power (p. 1050, a. 24); in
other cases there is something ulterior and distinct as a house from
the building power. In the former of these cases, Actuality is the
end of [Greek: du/namis]; in the latter it is more the end than
[Greek: du/namis]. ([Greek: O(/môs ou)the\n ê(=tton e)/ntha me\n
te/los e)/ntha de\ ma=llon te/los tê=s duna/meô/s e)stin; ê( ga\r
oi)kodo/mêsis e)n tô=| oi)kodomoume/nô|, kai\ a(/ma gi/gnetai kai\
e)/sti tê=| oi)ki/a|]--a. 29. This passage is obscure: see the
comments of Alexander, with the notes of Schwegler and Bonitz, who
accuse Alexander of misunderstanding it; though it appears to me that
neither of them is quite clear. I understand Aristotle to reason as
follows:--[Greek: O(/rasis] is the [Greek: te/los], the [Greek:
e)ne/rgeia], the consummation of the visual power called [Greek:
o)/psis]; but [Greek: oi)kodo/mêsis], is not the [Greek: te/los], the
[Greek: e)ne/rgeia], the consummation of the building power called
[Greek: oi)kodomikê/]. This last has its [Greek: te/los], [Greek:
e)ne/rgeia], consummation, in the ulterior product [Greek: oi)ki/a].
Nevertheless [Greek: oi)kodo/mêsis], residing as it does [Greek: e)n
tô=| oi)kodomoume/nô|], and coming into existence simultaneously with
the house, is more the end, more akin to the end or consummation than
the building power called [Greek: oi)kodomikê/].)

In cases where there is an ulterior product beyond and apart from the
exercise of the power, the Actuality (consummation) resides in that
product (p. 1050, a. 31). In cases where is no such ulterior product,
the Actuality resides in the same subject wherein the power resides.
Thus sight resides in him who sees, and life in the soul. Hence also
happiness resides in the soul; for happiness is a certain kind of
life (b. 1).

It is thus plain that Actuality is the Essence and the Form, and that
it is _prius_ [Greek: tê=| ou)si/a|] compared with Potentiality. And,
as has been already remarked, one Actuality always precedes another,
in time, up to the eternal Prime Movent (p. 1050, b. 5). Moreover,
[Greek: e)ne/rgeia] is _prius_ to [Greek: du/namis] in respect to
speciality and dignity ([Greek: kuriôte/rôs]--b. 6). For eternal
things are _priora_ in essence to destructible things, and nothing is
eternal [Greek: duna/mei], as the reason of the case will show us (b.
8).

All Potentiality applies at once to both sides of the Antiphasis--to
the affirmative as well as to the negative. That which is not
possible, will never occur to any thing; but every thing which is
possible may never come to Actuality ([Greek: to\ dunato\n de\ pa=n
e)nde/chetai mê\ e)nergei=n]--p. 1050, b. 10). That which is possible
to be, is also possible not to be. Now that which is possible not to
be, may perhaps not be ([Greek: e)nde/chetai mê\ ei)=nai]--b. 13);
but that which may not be, is destructible, either absolutely (that
is, in respect to Essence), or in respect to such portions of its
nature as may not be, that is, in respect to locality or quantity or
quality. Accordingly, of those things which are absolutely, or in
respect to Essence, indestructible, nothing exists [Greek: duna/mei]
absolutely or in respect to Essence, though it may exist [Greek:
duna/mei] in certain respects, as in respect to quality or locality);
all of them exist [Greek: e)nergei/a|] (b. 18). Nor does any thing
exist [Greek: duna/mei], which exists by necessity; yet the things
which exist by necessity are first of all (_i.e._, _priora_ in regard
to every thing else); for, if they did not exist, nothing would have
existed. Moreover, if there be any Eternal Motion, or any Eternal
Motum, it cannot be Motum [Greek: duna/mei] except in respect to
whence and whither; in that special respect, it may have Matter or
Potentiality (b. 21).

Accordingly, the Sun, the Stars, and the whole Heaven, are always at
work, and there is no danger of their ever standing still, which some
physical philosophers fear ([Greek: a)ei\ e)nergei= o( ê(/lios]--p.
1050, b. 22); nor are they fatigued in doing this. Motion with them
is not a potentiality of both members of the Antiphasis, either to be
moved or not to be moved. If the fact were so--if their Essence were
Matter and Power, and not Act--the perpetual continuity of (one side
of the alternative) motion would be toilsome to them; but it is not
toilsome, since Actuality is their very Essence (b. 28). Likewise
mutable things (which are destructible), such as earth and fire,
imitate these indestructible entities, being ever at work; for these
elements possess motion by themselves and in themselves, each
changing into another (b. 30; compare De Gen. et Corr. p. 337, a. 2).
But the other [Greek: duna/meis] are all potentialities of both sides
of the Antiphasis, or of both alternatives. The rational [Greek:
duna/meis] can cause motion in such and such way, or not in such and
such way; the irrational [Greek: duna/meis] may be present or absent,
and thus embrace both sides of the alternative (b. 33).

Hence we draw another argument for not admitting the Platonic
doctrine of Ideas, affirmed by the dialecticians ([Greek: oi( e)n
toi=s lo/gois]--p. 1050, b. 35). If there existed such Ideas, they
would be only [Greek: duna/neis**duna/meis] in respect to the [Greek:
e)ne/rgeia] existing in their particular embodiments. Thus an
individual cognizing man would be much more cognizant than [Greek:
au)toepistê/mê]; a particular substance in motion would be much more
in motion than [Greek: ki/nêsis] or [Greek: au)toki/nêsis] itself.
For [Greek: au)toepistê/mê] or [Greek: au)toki/nêsis] are only
[Greek: duna/meis] to the [Greek: e)pistê=mo/n ti] or the [Greek:
kinou/meno/n ti], which belong to [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] (b. 36). (We
may remark that in the Platonic Parmenides, p. 134, C., an argument
the very opposite to this is urged. It is there contended that
Cognitio _per se_ (the Idea) must be far more complete and accurate
than any cognition which _we_ possess.)

It is thus plain that [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] is _prius_ to [Greek:
du/namis], and to every principle of change (p. 1051, a. 2). It is
also better and more honourable than [Greek: du/namis] even in the
direction of good. We have already observed that [Greek: du/namis]
always includes both of two contraries, in the way of alternative:
one of these must be the good, the other the bad. Now the actuality
of good is better than the potentiality of good; the actuality of
health is better than the potentiality of health, which latter must
also include the potentiality of sickness, while the actuality of
health excludes the actuality of sickness. On the other hand, the
actuality of evil is worse than the potentiality of evil; for the
potentiality is neither of the two contraries or both of them at once
(a. 17). Hence we see that evil is nothing apart from particular
things; since it is posterior in its nature even to Potentiality:
there is therefore neither evil, nor error, nor destruction, in any
of the principia or eternal Essences (a. 19). (The note of Bonitz
here is just:--"Quem in hac argumentatione significavi
errorem--judicium morale de bono et malo immisceri falso iis rebus,
a quibus illud est alienum--ei non dissimilem Arist. in proximâ
argumentatione, si recte ejus sententiam intelligo, videtur
admisisse, quum quidem malum non esse [Greek: para\ ta\ pra/gmata],
seorsim ac per se existens, demonstrare conatur." Aristotle here as
elsewhere confounds the idea of Good, Perfection, Completeness, &c.,
with that of essential Priority. But what he says here--[Greek: ou)k
e)/sti to\ kako\n para\ ta\ pra/gmata]--can hardly be reconciled with
what he says in the Physica (pp. 189, 191, 192) about [Greek:
ste/rêsis], which he includes among the three [Greek: a)rchai/], and
which he declares to be [Greek: kakopoio/s]--p. 192, a. 15.)

Lastly, we discover geometrical truths by drawing visible diagrams,
and thus translating the Potentialities into Actuality. If these
diagrams were ready drawn for us by nature, there would be no
difficulty in seeing these truths; but, as the case stands, the
truths only inhere in the figures potentially (p. 1051, a. 23:
[Greek: ei) d' ê)=n diê|rêne/na, phanera\ a)\n ê)=n; nu=n d'
e)nupa/rchei duna/mei]). If the triangle had a line ready drawn
parallel to its side, we should have seen at once that its three
angles were equal to two right angles. Potential truths are thus
discovered by being translated into Actuality. The reason of this is,
that the Actuality is itself an act of cogitation, so that the
Potentiality springs from Actuality ([Greek: ai)/tion d' o(/ti
no/êsis ê( e)ne/rgeia; ô(/st' e)x e)nergei/as ê( du/namis]--a. 30. It
is not therefore true--what the Platonists say--that the mathematical
bodies and their properties are [Greek: ou)si/ai kai\ e)nergei=ai]:
they are only [Greek: duna/meis], and they are brought into being by
our cogitation or abstraction). It is true that each individual
diagram drawn is posterior to the power of drawing it (a. 32).

Having gone through the discussion of Ens according to the first of
the ten Categories, and of Ens Potential and Actual, we have now to
say something about Ens as True or False in the strictest sense of
the words ([Greek: to\ de\ kuriô/tata o)\n a)lêthe\s ê)\
pseu=dos]--p. 1051, b. 1). These words mean, in reference to things,
either that they are conjoined or that they are disjoined. To speak
truth is to affirm that things which are disjoined or conjoined in
fact, are disjoined or conjoined; to speak falsely, the reverse. The
appeal is to the fact: it is not because we truly call you white,
that you are white; it is because you really are white, that we who
call you white speak truth (b. 9). If there are some things which
are always conjoined, others always disjoined, others again
sometimes conjoined sometimes disjoined, propositions in reference
to the first two classes affirming conjunction or disjunction, will
be always true or always false, while in reference to the third
class propositions may be either true or false, according to the
case (b. 10).

But what shall we say in regard to things Uncompounded? In respect to
them, what is truth or falsehood--to be or not to be? ([Greek: ta\
a)su/ntheta]--p. 1051, b. 18). If we affirm white of the wood, or
incommensurability of the diagonal, such conjunction of predicate and
subject may be true or false; but how, if there be no predicate
distinct from the subject? Where there is no distinction between
predicate and subject, where the subject stands alone,--in these
cases, there is no truth or falsehood in the sense explained above:
no other truth except that the mind apprehends and names the subject,
or fails to do so. You either know the subject, or you do not know
it: there is no alternative but that of knowledge or ignorance; to be
deceived is impossible about the question _Quid est_ ([Greek: to\
me\n thigei=n kai\ pha/nai a)lêthe/s, ou) ga\r tau)to\ kata/phasis
kai\ pha/sis, to\ d' a)gnoei=n mê\ thigga/nein; a)patêthê=nai ga\r
peri\ to\ ti/ e)stin ou)k e)/stin a)ll' ê)\ kata\ sumbebêko/s]--b.
25. The last words are thus explained by Bonitz: "nisi forte per
abusum quendam vocabuli ipsam ignorantiam dixeris errorem"--p. 411.).
All these uncompounded subjects exist actually, not potentially: if
the latter had been true, they would have been generated and
destroyed; but Ens Ipsum ([Greek: to\ o)\n au)to/]--b. 29) is neither
generated nor destroyed; for, if it had been, it must have been
generated out of something. Respecting all those things which exist
in Essence and Actuality, you cannot be deceived: you may apprehend
them in cogitation, or fail to apprehend them. The essential question
respecting them is, whether they exist in such or such manner or not;
as it is respecting the One and the Uncompounded--whether, being an
existent, it exists thus and thus or not (b. 35). Truth consists in
apprehending or cogitating them (p. 1052, a. 1): the contrary thereof
is non-apprehension of them or ignorance ([Greek: a)/gnoia]), yet not
analogous to blindness; for that would be equivalent to having no
apprehensive intelligence ([Greek: ô(s a)\n ei) to\ noêtiko\n o(/lôs
mê\ e)/choi tis]--a. 3; one is not absolutely without [Greek:
noêtiko/n], but one's [Greek: no/êsis] does not suffice for
apprehending these particular objects).

Respecting objects immoveable and unchangeable, and apprehended as
such, it is plain that there can be no mistake as to the When
([Greek: kata\ to/ pote/]--p. 1052, a. 5; _i.e._, a proposition which
is true of them at one time cannot be false at another time). No man
will suppose a triangle to have its three angles equal to two right
angles at one time, but not at another. Even in these unchangeables,
indeed, a man may mistake as to the What: he may suppose that there
is no even number which is a prime number, or he may suppose that
there are some even numbers which are prime, others which are not so;
but, respecting any particular number, he will never suppose it to be
sometimes prime, sometimes not prime (a. 10).

(In respect to the meaning of [Greek: ta\ a)su/ntheta]--p. 1051, b.
17--Bonitz and Schwegler differ. Bonitz says, Comm. p. 409:
"Compositæ quas dicit non sunt intelligendæ eæ quæ ex pluribus
elementis coaluerunt, sed eæ potius, in quibus cum substantia
conjungitur accidens aliquod, veluti homo albus, homo sedens,
diagonalis irrationalis, et similia." Schwegler says, p. 187: "Unter
den [Greek: mê\ sunthetai\ ou)si/ai] versteht Arist. näher diejenigen
Substanzen, die nicht ein [Greek: su/ntheton] oder [Greek: su/nolon]
sondern [Greek: a)/neu u(/lês (ou) duna/mei)] und schlechthin [Greek:
e)nergei/a|], also reine Formen sind, und als solche kein Werden und
Vergehen haben." Of these two different explanations, I think that
the explanation given by Bonitz is the more correct, or at least the
more probable.)

. . . . . .

Book [Greek: L].

We have to speculate respecting Essence; for that which we are in
search of is the principles and causes of Essences (p. 1069, a. 18).
If we look upon the universe as one whole, Essence is the first part
thereof: if we look upon it as a series of distinct units ([Greek:
ei) tô=| e)phexê=s], a. 20), even in that view [Greek: ou)si/a]
stands first, [Greek: poio/n] next, [Greek: poso/n] third; indeed
these last are not Entia at all, strictly speaking (a. 21)--I mean,
for example, qualities and movements, and negative attributes such as
not-white and not-straight; though we do talk of these last too as
Entia, when we say _Est non-album_. Moreover Essence alone, and none
of the other Categories, is separable. The old philosophers ([Greek:
oi( a)rchai=oi]) are in the main concurrent with us on this point,
that Essence is _prius_ to all others; for they investigated the
principles, the elements, and the causes of Essence. The philosophers
of the present day (Plato, &c.) declare Universals, rather than
Particulars, to be Essences; for the genera are universal, which
these philosophers, from devoting themselves to dialectical
discussions, affirm to be more properly considered as Principles and
Essences (a. 28); but the old philosophers considered particular
things to be Essences, as fire and earth, for example, not the common
body or Body in general ([Greek: ou) to\ koino\n sô=ma]--a. 30).

Now there are three Essences. The Perceivable includes two varieties:
one, the Perishable, acknowledged by all, _e.g._, animals and plants;
the other Eternal, of which we must determine the elements, be they
many or one. There is also the Immoveable, which some consider to be
separable ([Greek: a)/llê de\ a)ki/nêtos kai\ tau/tên tine\s ei)=nai
phasi chôristê/n]--p. 1069, a. 33; [Greek: ou)si/a noêtê\ kai\
a)ki/nêtos]--Schwegler's note): either recognizing two varieties
thereof, distinct from each other--the Forms and Mathematical Entia;
or not recognizing Forms as separable Entia, but only the
Mathematical Entia (a. 36). Now the first, or Perceivable Essences,
belong to physical science, since they are moveable or endued with
motion; the Immoveable Essences, whether there be two varieties of
them or only one, belong to a science distinct from physical. The
Perceivable and the Immoveable Essences have no common principles
(b. 2).

The Perceivable Essence is subject to change ([Greek: metablêtê/]).
Since change takes place either out of Opposites or out of
Intermediates, and not out of every variety of Opposites, but only
out of Contraries ([Greek: e)k tê=s oi)kei/as a)popha/seôs, e)k tê=s
oi)kei/as sterê/seôs]--Alexander, pp. 644, 645, Bon.; the voice,
_e.g._, is not white, yet change does not take place from voice to
white, these being disparates, or of different genera: [Greek: ta\
ge/nei diaphe/ronta ou)k e)/chei o(do\n ei)s a)/llêla]--I. iv. p.
1055, a. 6), there must of necessity be a certain Substratum which
changes into the contrary condition; for contraries do not change
into each other. The substratum remains, but the contraries do not
remain: there is therefore a third something besides the contraries;
and that is Matter (p. 1069, b. 9). Since then the varieties of
change are four: (1) [Greek: ge/nesis] and [Greek: phthora/ (kata\
to\ ti/)], (2) [Greek: au)/xêsis kai\ phthi/sis (kata\ to\ poso/n)],
(3) [Greek: a)lloi/ôsis (kata\ to\ pa/thos] or [Greek: kata\ to\
poio/n]), (4) [Greek: phora/ (kata\ to/pon] or [Greek: kata\ to\
pou=]), each of these changes will take place into its respective
contrary: the Matter will necessarily change, having the potentiality
of both contraries (b. 14). Ens being two-fold, all change takes
place out of Ens Potentiâ into Ens Actu, _e.g._, out of potential
white into actual white; and the like holds for Increase and
Decrease. Thus not only may there be generation from Non-Ens
accidentally but all generation takes place also out of Ens; that is,
out of Ens Potentiâ, not Ens Actu (b. 20). This Ens Potentiâ is what
Anaxagoras really means by his Unum, which is a better phrase than
[Greek: o(mou= pa/nta]; what Empedokles and Anaxagoras mean by their
[Greek: mi=gma]; what Demokritus means when he says [Greek: o(mou=
pa/nta]. They mean that all things existed at once potentially,
though not actually; and we see that these philosophers got partial
hold of the idea of Matter ([Greek: ô(/ste tê=s u(/lês a)\n ei)=en
ê(mme/noi]--b. 24). All things subject to change possess Matter, but
each of them a different Matter; even the eternal things which are
not generated but moved in place, possess Matter--not generated, but
_from whence whither_ (_i.e._, the Matter of local movement pure and
simple--direction: [Greek: kai\ tô=n a)i+di/ôn o(/sa mê\ gennêta\
kinêta\ de\ phora=|, a)ll' ou) gennêtê/n (u(/lên), a)lla\ po/then
poi=]--b. 26).

Since there are three varieties of Non-Ens (p. 1069, b. 27; Alexander
and Bonitz explain this [Greek: trichô=s] differently), it may seem
difficult to determine, out of which among the three Generation takes
place. But the answer is, that the Potential Ens is not potential of
every thing alike and at haphazard, but potential in each case from
something towards something ([Greek: ei) dê\ ti/ e)sti duna/mei,
a)ll' o(/môs ou) tou= tucho/ntos, a)ll' e(/teron e)x e(te/rou]--b.
29). Nor is it enough to tell us that all things are huddled together
([Greek: o(mou= pa/nta chrê/mata]--b. 30); for they differ in respect
to Matter or Potentiality. If this were not so, how is it that they
are of infinite diversity, and not all One? The Noûs (_i.e._,
according to the theory of Anaxagoras) is One; so that, if the Matter
were One also, it would become in actuality that which it was at
first in potentiality, and the result would be all One and the Same
(b. 32).

The Causes are thus three and the Principles are three: the pair of
Contraries, one of them Form ([Greek: lo/gos kai\ ei)=dos]), the
other Privation, and the third Matter (p. 1069, b. 35). But we must
keep in mind that neither Materia Prima nor Forma Prima is generated.
For in all Change, there is something (the Matter) which undergoes
change; something by which the change is effected (the Prime Movent,
[Greek: u(ph' ou(= me/n, tou= prô/tou kinou=ntos]--p. 1070, a. 1);
and something into which the change takes place (the Form). The brass
becomes round; but, if both the brass becomes and the round becomes,
you will be condemned to an infinite regression: you must stop
somewhere ([Greek: a)na/gkê dê\ stê=nai]--a. 4). Moreover, every
Essentia is generated out of another Essentia of the same name and
form ([Greek: e)k sunônu/mou]--a. 5). All generated things proceed
either from Nature, Art, Fortune, or Spontaneity. It is Nature, where
the principle or beginning is in the subject itself; it is Art, where
the principle or beginning is in something apart from the subject;
Fortune is the privation of Art; Spontaneity is the privation of
Nature ([Greek: ai( de\ loipai\ ai)/tiai sterê/seis tou/tôn]--a. 9).
Essentiæ are threefold: (1) Matter, which appears to be Hoc Aliquid
but is not so, for detached members or fragments, simply touching
each other without coalescing, are matter and substratum (_i.e._,
prepared for something ulterior); (2) Nature, which is really Hoc
Aliquid--a certain definite condition, into which generation takes
place ([Greek: ê( de\ phu/sis kai\ to/de ti, ei)s ê(/n, kai\ e(/xis
tis]--a. 12); (3) The Concrete of the two preceding--the individual
object called Sokrates or Kallias. In some cases there is no Hoc
Aliquid except in this Concrete or Compound; thus in artificial
objects or productions, such as a house or health, there is no Form
except the Art itself: the ideal house, pre-existing in the mind of
the builder, is generated and destroyed in a different sense from the
real house. It is in the case of natural objects, if in any case,
that there exists a Hoc Aliquid independent of the concrete
individual (a. 17).

Hence Plato was not wrong in saying that Forms were coextensive with
natural objects ([Greek: o(po/sa phu/sei]--p. 1070, a. 18), if there
are Forms distinct from these objects: such as fire, flesh, head,
which are all properly Matter. The Last Matter (or that which has
come most under the influence of Form) belongs to that which is in
the fullest sense Essentia (or the individual concrete named Sokrates
or Kallias--a. 20). The Moving Causes pre-exist, as real individual
beings or objects: the Formal Causes come into existence
simultaneously with the individual real compound. When the patient
becomes well, then health comes at the same time into existence: when
the brazen sphere comes, the sphericity of it comes at the same time
(a. 24). Whether any thing of the Form continues after the
dissolution of the individual compound, is a problem to be
investigated (a. 25). In some cases nothing hinders but what it may
continue; for example, the soul may be of such a nature: I do not
mean every soul--for every soul perhaps cannot continue--but the
[Greek: Nou=s] or rational soul (a. 27). Still it is plain that this
affords no support to the theory of self-existent separate Ideas; for
every individual man is begotten by another individual man. In like
manner also with respect to the arts; for the medical art affords the
Form or rational explanation of health (a. 30; _i.e._, health is
generated, not by the Idea of Health, but by the medical art, or by
the artist in whom that art is embodied).

Causes and principles, in one point of view, are different: different
subjects; but in another point of view, they are the same for all;
that is, if we speak generally and according to analogy (if we
confine ourselves to the most general terms, Form, Privation, Matter,
&c.). In respect to Essentia, Relatio, and the remainder of the
Categories, a difficulty arises to say whether the causes, elements,
and principles of all the Categories are the same. It would be
strange if they were all the same; because then Essentiæ, as well as
Relata, would proceed out of the same causes and elements. For, what
can these latter be? They cannot be extra-categorical; since there
exists no general class apart from or besides Essentia and the other
Categories (p. 1070, b. 1). Nor can any one Category be the element
of the others: for the element is _prius_ to that of which it is the
element. Nor again can Essentia be the element of Relata; nor is any
one of the nine Categories the element of Essentia. Again, how is it
possible that the elements of all the Categories can be the same? No
element can be the same as that compound of which it is an element:
neither B nor A can be the same as B A. If, therefore, there were
such elements, they must be extra-categorical; which is impossible.
Nor can the element in question (the supposed one and the same) be
any cogitable, such as Ens or Unum; for every individual Concrete is
both Ens and Unum and the element cannot be identical with the
compound put together out of it. Neither Essentia nor Relatio could
be said to exist, if Ens were the element out of which they are
composed; but these Categories exist necessarily: therefore there is
no one and the same element common to all the Categories (b. 9).

Yet we ought perhaps rather to repeat, what was observed before, that
in one sense, the elements of all are the same; in another sense,
different. Take for example the perceivable bodies. We find here hot
as the Form, cold as the Privation; as Matter, there is that which
is, primarily and _per se_, both hot and cold potentially: the hot
and the cold are both Essentiæ; likewise other things of which these
are the principles, _e.g._, flesh and bone, which of necessity are
different from the principles out of which they proceed (b. 15).
Flesh and bone have these elements and principles; other things have
other elements and principles. The same specific principles cannot be
assigned to all, but only principles analogous to these in each case,
as saying, in general terms, that there are three principles--Form,
Privation, Matter. Each of these is different in every different
genus; thus in colour, the principles are white, black, surface,
light, darkness, air, and out of these are generated day and night
(b. 21).

The three preceding causes are all intrinsic or immanent ([Greek:
e)nupa/rchonta]). But there are other causes also extrinsic, such as
the Movent. So that Principle and Element are not exactly identical;
for Principle as well as Cause includes all the four: [Greek: to\
kinou=n ê)\ i(sta/n] is a Principle, and is itself an Essentia (p.
1070, b. 25). Thus the analogous Elements are three, while the
Principles or Causes are four; but the four are specifically
different in each different case. Thus, health is Form; sickness is
Privation; body is Matter; the medical art is Movent. House is Form;
disorder of a certain sort is Privation; bricks are Matter; the
building art is Movent. We thus make out four Causes; yet, in a
certain sense, there will be only three (b. 32). For, in natural
products, a man is the Movent Cause of a man; in artificial products
([Greek: e)n toi=s a)po\ dianoi/as]) the Movent is Form or Privation.
In a certain sense, the medical art is health, and the building art
is the Form of a house, and a man begets a man. And farther, over and
above these special movent causes, there is the Primum Movens of all
(b. 35).

We distinguish what is separable from what is not separable. Now
Essentiæ, and they only, are separable; accordingly they are the
causes of every thing else, since without Essentiæ there cannot be
either affections or movements (p. 1071, a. 2). Such causes would be
soul and body, or reason, appetite, and body. Again, in another
sense, the principles of all things are generically the same, though
specifically different; such are Potentia and Actus. In some cases,
the same thing exists now potentially, at another time actually; thus
wine, though actually wine, is potentially vinegar; flesh is actually
flesh, potentially a man, Potentia and Actus will merge in the
above-mentioned causes--Form, Privation, Matter, Movent (a. 7). For
the Form (if it be separable), the Concrete (of Form and Matter), and
Privation (like darkness or sickness)--all these exist actually;
while Matter exists potentially, capable either of Form or Privation.
Things differ potentially and actually sometimes through difference
in the Matter, sometime through difference in the Form. Thus, the
cause of a man is, in the way of Matter, the elements fire and earth;
in the way of Form his own Form, and the same Form in another
individual--his father and besides these, the Sun with its oblique
motion; which last neither Matter, nor Form, nor Privation, nor the
like Form in another individual, but a Movent Cause ([Greek: a)lla\
kinou=nta]--a. 17).

We must remember, besides, that some things may be described in
general terms, others cannot be so described. The first principles of
all things are, speaking in general terms, Hoc Primum Actu and Aliud
Primum Potentiâ. These universals do not really exist (p. 1071, a.
19), for the principium of all individuals is some other individual.
Man indeed is the principium of the Universal Man but no Universal
Man exists (a. 21). Peleus is the principium of Achilles; your
father, of you; this B, of that B A; B, the universal, of B A the
universal. Next (after the Movent) come the Forms of Essences; but
the different genera thereof (as has been already stated), colours,
sounds, essences, quantities, &c., have different causes and
elements, though the same when described in general terms and by
analogy; also different individuals in the same species have
different causes and elements, not indeed different in species, but
different individually; that is, your Matter, your Movent, your Form,
are different from mine, though in general terms and definition they
are the same ([Greek: tô=| katho/lou de\ lo/gô| tau)ta/]--a. 29).

When therefore, we enquire, What are the principles or elements of
Essences, of Relata, of Qualities &c., and whether they are the same
or different? it is plain that, generically speaking (allowing for
difference of meaning--[Greek: pollachô=s], p. 1071, a. 31), they are
the same in each; but, speaking distributively and with reference to
particulars, they are different, and not the same. In the following
sense ([Greek: ô(di/]--a. 34), they are the same, namely, in the way
of Analogy ([Greek: tô=| a)na/logon]). They are always Matter, Form,
Privation, the Movent; hence the causes of Essences are causes of all
other things, since, when Essences disappear, all the rest disappears
along with them: besides all these, there is the Primum Movens
Actuale, common to all ([Greek: e)/ti to\ prô=ton e)ntelechei/a|]--a.
36). In the following sense, again, they are different--when we cease
to speak of genera, and pass from equivocal terms to particulars:
wherever there are different opposites (as white and black, health
and sickness) and wherever there are different Matters ([Greek: kai\
e)/ti ai( u(=lai]--p. 1071, b. 1; [Greek: u(=lai] in the plural,
rare).

We have thus declared, respecting the principles of Perceivable
Essences, what and how many they are; in what respect the same, and
in what respect they are different. Essences are threefold; two
Physical and one Immoveable. We shall proceed to speak of this last.
There exists, of necessity, some Eternal, Immoveable Essence. For
Essences are the first of all existent things; and, if they all be
perishable, every thing is perishable. But it is impossible that
Motion can ever have been generated or can ever be destroyed; for it
always existed: it is eternal. There is the like impossibility about
Time: for, if Time did not exist, there could be nothing _prius_ and
nothing _posterius_ (p. 1071, b. 8). Both Motion and Time are thus
eternal; both are also continuous; for either the two are identical,
or Time is an affection ([Greek: pa/thos]) of Motion. Now no mode of
Motion is continuous except local motion; and that in a circle (for
rectilinear motion cannot be continuous and eternal). There must be a
Movent or Producent Principle ([Greek: kinêtiko\n ê)\ poiêtiko/n]--b.
12); but, if the Movent existed potentially and not actually, there
could not be motion continuous and eternal; for that which has mere
power may never come into act. There will be no use therefore in such
eternal Essences as Plato assumes in his Ideas, unless there be along
with them some principle of potential change ([Greek: ei) mê/ tis
duname/nê e)ne/stai a)rchê\ metaba/llein]--b. 15). Nor indeed will
even that be sufficient (_i.e._, any principle of _merely potential_
change), nor any other Essence (such as Numbers--Schwegler) besides
or along with the Platonic Ideas; for, if this _principium_ shall not
come into Actuality ([Greek: ei) mê\ e)nergê/sei]--b. 17), the motion
which we postulate, continuous and eternal, will not result from it.
Nor will it even be sufficient that the Movent Principle should be
supposed to be in actuality or operation ([Greek: ou)d' ei)
e)nergê/sei], p. 1071, b. 18), if its Essence be Potentiality: the
motion resulting therefrom cannot be eternal; for that which exists
potentially may perhaps not exist at all. The Movent Principles
therefore must be something of which the Essence is Actuality (b.
19), and which shall be without Matter, for they must be eternal,
otherwise nothing else can be eternal. They must therefore be
essential Actualities (b. 22).

Here however, a difficulty suggests itself. It seems that every thing
which is in actuality must also be in potentiality, but that every
thing which is in potentiality does not in every case come into
actuality: so that Potentiality seems the _prius_ of the two ([Greek:
dokei= ga\r to\ me\n e)nergou=n pa=n du/nasthai, to\ de\ duna/menon
ou) pa=n e)nergei=n]--p. 1071, b. 24; Bonitz compares p. 1060, a. 1:
[Greek: a)rchê\ ga\r to\ sunanairou=n]). But, if this were true, no
Entia could exist; for it may be that they exist potentially, but not
yet exist actually (b. 26). There is the like impossibility, if we
adopt the theory of those theologians (Orpheus, Hesiod, &c.) who take
their departure from Night, or of those physical philosophers who
begin with a chaotic huddle of all things. In both cases such
original condition is one of mere potentiality; and how can it ever
be put in motion, if there is to be no cause in actuality ([Greek:
ei) mêthe\n e)/stai e)nergei/a| ai)/tion]--b. 29)? Matter will never
cause motion in itself, but must wait for the carpenter's art; nor
will the earth, but must wait for seed.

It is for this reason that some philosophers, like Plato and
Leukippus, represent Actuality as eternal; for they say that motion
has always existed. But they do not say what variety of motion, nor
why that variety, to the exclusion of others. For nothing is moved at
haphazard; there must always be some reason why it is moved in one
way rather than another: for example, by nature in one way; by other
causes, such as violence or Noûs, in some other way (p. 1071, b. 36).
But it is not competent to Plato to assume what he sometimes does
assume as principium (p. 1072, a. 2--allusion to Plato Phædrus 245,
E), viz., a Self-Movent; for Plato affirms (in Timæus 34, B) that the
soul is _posterius_, and coæval with the Kosmos. The doctrine just
mentioned--That the Potential is prior to the Actual--is true in one
sense, but not true in another; we have already explained _how_
([Greek: ei)/rêtai de\ pô=s]--a. 4. Schwegler thinks, note p. 254,
that this [Greek: ei)/rêtai] refers to what has been said in Book
[Greek: Th], p. 1049, b. 3, seq.; and this seems probable, though
Bonitz in his note contests it, and refers to his own theory, set
forth in his Prooemium pp. 24, 25, that Book [Greek: L] is a separate
treatise of Aristotle, completely distinct from all the rest of the
Metaphysica. This theory of Bonitz may be in the main true; but it is
still possible that Book [Greek: Th] may have been written
previously, and that Aristotle may here refer to it, as Schwegler
suppose**.).

That Actuality is prior to Potentiality, is conformable to the
doctrine of Anaxagoras, Noûs in his doctrine existing in Actuality;
also to that of Empedokles, who introduces Friendship and Enmity; and
again, to that of Leukippus, who affirms Motion to be eternal. So
that Chaos or Night (_i.e._, mere Potentiality) did not prevail for
an infinite anterior time, but the same things came round in
perpetual vicissitude or rotation; which consists with the doctrine
that Actuality is prior to Potentiality. If the same condition comes
round periodically, we must necessarily assume something Actual,
which perpetually actualizes in the same manner ([Greek: dei= ti
a)ei\ me/nein ô(sau/tôs e)nergou=n]--p. 1072, a. 10). Again, if
generation and destruction are to take place, we must assume
something else Actual, which actualizes in a manner perpetually
changing ([Greek: a)/llo dei= ei)=nai a)ei\ e)nergou=n a)/llôs kai\
a)/llôs]--a. 12). This last must actualize sometimes _per se_,
sometimes in a different way; that is, according to some other
influence, or according to the First (or Uniform) Actual. But it will
necessarily actualize according to the First Actual; which will thus
be a cause both to itself, and to the variable Actual. Now the First
Actual is the best; for it is the cause of perpetual sameness, while
the other is cause of variety; both together are the cause of
unceasing variety. But this is how the motions really stand. Why
then, should we look out for other principles (a. 18)?

Now, since the preceding views are consistent with the facts and may
be true ([Greek: e)pei\ d' ou(/tô t' e)nde/chetai]--p. 1072, a.
18)--and, if they be not true, we shall be compelled to admit that
every thing proceeds either from Night, or from confused Chaos or
Non-Ens--we may consider the problem as solved. There exists something
always in unceasing circular motion: this is evident not merely from
reason, but from fact. The First Heaven (Aplanês or Fixed Star sphere)
will therefore be eternal. There must therefore exist something which
causes this unceasing motion, or some Prime Movent. But, since Movens
Immobile, Movens Motum, Motum non Movens, form a series of three
terms, and since the two last of these certainly exist, we may infer
that the first exists also; and that the Prime Movent, which causes
the motion of the Aplanês, is immoveable (a. **20-25.--This
passage perplexes all the commentators--Schwegler, Bonitz, Alexander,
&c. It can hardly be construed without more or less change of the
text. I do not see to what real things Aristotle can allude under the
description of Mota which are not Moventia. There is much to be said
for Pierron and Zévort's translation, p. 220: "Comme il n'y a que
trois sortes d'êtres--ce qui est mu, ce qui meut, et le moyen terme
entre ce qui est mu et ce qui meut: c'est un être (_i.e._, this
middle term is an être) qui meut sans être mu."--Bonitz disapproves
this interpretation of the word [Greek: me/son], and it is certainly
singular to say that between _Movens_ and _Motum_, the term _Movens
sed non Motum_ forms a medium: _Motum sed non Movens_ would form just
as good a medium**.). This Prime Movent, which causes motion
without being itself moved, must be eternal, must be Essentia, and
must be an Actuality.

Now both the Appetibile ([Greek: to\ o)rekto/n]) and the Cogitabile
([Greek: to\ noêto/n]) cause motion in this way, _i.e._, without
being moved themselves; moreover the Primum Appetibile and the Primum
Cogitabile are coincident or identical (p. 1072, a. 27). For that
which appears beautiful, is the object of desire; but that which is
beautiful, is the first object of will (a. 28). Cogitation is the
principium of the two (the primary fact or fundamental element): we
will so and so, because we think it good; it is not true that we
think it good because we will it ([Greek: o)rego/metha de\ dio/ti
dokei=, ma=llon ê)\ dokei= dio/ti o)rego/metha]--a. 29). Now the
Cogitant Mind ([Greek: nou=s]) is moved by the Cogitabile, and, in
the series of fundamental Contraries, the members of one side of the
series are Cogitabilia _per se_ (while those of the other side are
only Cogitabilia _per aliud_--[Greek: noêtê\ d' ê( e(te/ra
sustoichi/a kath' au(tê/n]--a. 31; see Alex., p. 668, 16, Bon.).
These Cogitabilia _per se_ are first as to Essentia (_i.e._, compared
with the Cogitabilia _per aliud_, they are logically _priora_): and
again, among Essentiæ, that variety which is simple and actual comes
first (_i.e._, it is logically _prius_, as compared with the compound
and the potential). Now Unum is not identical with Simplex: Unum
signifies that which is a measure of something else, while Simplex
denotes a peculiar attribute of the subject in itself (a. 34). But
the Pulchrum and the Eligibile _per se_ belongs to the same side of
the series of Contraries, as the Cogitabilia _per se_: and the Primum
Pulchrum or Eligibile is the Best or akin thereunto, in its own
particular ascending scale (b. 1).

That [Greek: to\ ou(= e(/neka] is among the Immoveables, may be seen
by our Treatise De Bono, where we give a string of generic and
specific distributions ([Greek: ê( diai/resis dêloi=]--p. 1072, b. 2;
see the interpretation of Alexander, adopted both by Schwegler and by
Bonitz). For [Greek: to\ ou(= e(/neka] is used in a double sense: in
one of the two senses it ranks among the Immoveables: in another it
does not ([Greek: e)/sti ga\r ditto\n to\ ou(= e(/neka], b.
3--[Greek: ditto/n] is Schwegler's correction, adopted by Bonitz). It
causes motion, in the manner of a beloved object; and that which it
causes to move, causes motion in the other things ([Greek: kinei= de\
ô(s e)rô/menon; to\ de\ kinou/menon ta)/lla kinei=]--b. 3; [Greek:
to\ de\ kinou/menon] is the conjecture of Schwegler and Bonitz).

Now, if any thing be moved, there is a possibility that it may be in
a condition different from that in which it actually is. If the first
actuality of the Moveable be translation or motion in space, there is
a possibility that it may be otherwise than it is as to place, even
though it cannot be otherwise than it is as to Essentia (p. 1072, b.
7).

But, as to the Prime Movent, which is itself immoveable, and which
exists in actuality, it is impossible that _that_ can be other than
what it is, in any respect whatever (p. 1072, b. 8). For the first of
all changes is local motion, or rotation in a circle, and this is
exactly what the Prime Movent imparts (but does not itself possess).
It exists by necessity, and by that species of necessity which
implies the perfect and beautiful: and in this character it is the
originating principle. For there are three varieties of necessity:
(1) That of violence, in contradiction to the natural impulse;
(2) That without which good or perfection cannot be had; (3) That
which is what it is absolutely, without possibility of being otherwise.
From a principle of this nature (_i.e._, necessary in the two last
senses) depend the Heaven and all Nature (b. 14).

The mode of existence ([Greek: diagôgê/]) of this Prime Movent is for
ever that which _we_ enjoy in our best moments, but which we cannot
obtain permanently; for its actuality itself is also pleasure (p.
1072, b. 16). As actuality is pleasure, so the various actualities of
waking, perceiving, cogitating, are to us the pleasantest part of our
life; while hopes and remembrances are pleasing by derivation from
them (but these states we men cannot enjoy permanently and without
intermittence). Cogitation _per se_ (_i.e._, cogitation in its most
perfect condition) embraces that which is best _per se_; and most of
all when it is most perfect. The Noûs thus cogitates itself through
participation of the Cogitabile: for it becomes itself cogitable by
touching the Cogitabile and cogitating: so that Cogitans and
Cogitabile become identical. For Noûs in general (the human Noûs
also) is in potentiality the recipient of the Cogitabile, and of
Essentia or Forms; and it comes into actuality by possessing these
Forms. So that what the Prime Movent possesses is more divine than
the divine element which Noûs in general involves; and the actuality
of theorizing is the pleasantest and best of all conditions ([Greek:
noêto\s ga\r gi/gnetai thigga/nôn kai\ noô=n, ô(/ste tau)to\n nou=s
kai\ noêto/n. to\ ga\r dektiko\n tou= noêtou= kai\ tê=s ou)si/as
nou=s. e)nergei= de\ e)/chôn; ô(/st' e)kei=no ma=llon tou/tou o(\
dokei= o( nou=s thei=on e)/chein, kai\ ê( theôri/a to\ ê(/diston kai\
a)/riston]--b. 24. This is a very difficult passage, in which one
cannot be sure of interpreting rightly. None of the commentators are
perfectly satisfactory. The pronoun [Greek: e)kei=no] seems to refer
to [Greek: ê( no/êsis ê( kath' au(tê/n]--three lines back. The
contrast seems to be between the Prime Movent, and Noûs in general,
including the human Noûs. [Greek: To\ dektiko/n] cannot refer to the
Prime Movent, which has no potentiality, but must refer to the human
Noûs, which is not at first, nor always, in a state of actuality.
[Greek: Ma=llon] seems equivalent to [Greek: theio/teron]. The human
Noûs has [Greek: thei=o/n ti], by reason of its potentiality to
theorize.).

Thus it is wonderful, if God has perpetually an existence like that
of our best moments; and still more wonderful, if he has a better.
Yet such is the fact. Life belongs to him: for the actuality of Noûs
is life, and God is actuality. His life, eternal and best, is
actuality _per se_ (or _par excellence_). We declare God to be an
Animal Optimum Æternum, so that duration eternal and continuous
([Greek: ai)ô\n sunechê/s]) belongs to him: for _that_ is God
([Greek: tou=to ga\r o( theo/s]--p. 1072, b. 30).

The Pythagoreans and Speusippus are mistaken in affirming that
Optimum and Pulcherrimum is not to be found in the originating
principle ([Greek: e)n a)rchê=|]); on the ground that the principles
of plants and animals are indeed causes, but that the beautiful and
perfect appears first in the results of those principles. For the
seed first proceeds out of antecedent perfect animals: the first is
not seed, but the perfect animal. Thus we must say that the man is
prior to the seed: I do not mean the man who sprang from the seed,
but the other man from whom the seed proceeded (p. 1073, a. 2).

From the preceding reasonings, it is evident that there exists an
Essence eternal, immoveable, and separated from all the perceivable
Essences. We have shown (in Physica; see Schwegler's note) that this
Essence can have no magnitude; that it is without parts and
indivisible (p, 1073, a. 6). For it causes in other subjects motion
for an infinite time; and nothing finite can have infinite power. For
this reason the Prime Movent cannot have finite magnitude; but every
magnitude is either finite or infinite, and there is no such thing as
infinite magnitude; therefore the Prime Movent can have no magnitude
at all. We have also shown that it is unchangeable in quality, and
without any affections ([Greek: a)pathe\s kai\ a)nalloi/ôton]). For
all other varieties of change are posterior as compared with
locomotive change or motion in space, which is the first of all. As
the Prime Movent is exempt from this first, much more is it exempt
from the others (a. 13).

We must now consider whether we ought to recognize one such Movent or
Essence only, or several of the same Essences? and, if several, how
many? Respecting the number thereof we must remember that our
predecessors have laid down no clear or decisive doctrines ([Greek:
a)popha/seis], p. 1073, a. 16). The Platonic theory of Ideas includes
no peculiar research on this subject (a. 18). The Platonists call
these Ideas Numbers: about which they talk sometimes as if there were
an infinite multitude of them, sometimes as if they were fixed as
reaching to the dekad and not higher--but they furnish no
demonstrative reason why they should stop at the dekad. We shall
proceed to discuss the point consistently with our preceding
definitions and with the nature of the subjects (a. 23). The
Principium, the First of all Entia, is immoveable both _per se_ and
_per accidens_: it causes motion in another subject, to which it
imparts the first or locomotive change, one and eternal (a. 25). The
Motum must necessarily be moved by something; the Prime Movent must
be immoveable _per se_; eternal motion must be caused by an eternal
Movent; and one motion by one Movent (a. 30). But we see that, over
and above the simple rotation of the All (or First Heaven), which
rotation we affirm to be caused by the Primum Movens Immobile, there
are also other eternal rotations of the Planets; for the circular
Celestial Body, as we have shown in the Physica, is eternal and never
at rest (a. 32). We must therefore necessarily assume that each of
these rotations of the Planets is caused by a Movent Immoveable _per
se_--by an eternal Essence (a. 35). For the Stars and Planets are in
their nature eternal Essences: that which moves them must be itself
eternal, and prior to that which it causes to be moved; likewise that
which, is prior to Essence must itself be Essence, and cannot be any
thing else (a. 37). It is plain, therefore, that there must
necessarily exist a number of Essences, each eternal by nature,
immoveable _per se_, and without magnitude, as Movents to the
Heavenly Bodies and equal in number thereto (a. 38). These Essences
are arranged in an order of first, second, &c., corresponding to the
order of the planetary rotations (b. 2), But what the number of these
rotations is, we must learn from Astronomy--that one among the
mathematical sciences which is most akin ([Greek: oi)keiota/tês]) to
the First Philosophy; for Astronomy theorizes about Essence
perceivable but eternal, while Arithmetic and Geometry do not treat
of any Essence at all ([Greek: peri\ ou)demia=s ou)si/as]--b. 7).
That the rotations are more in number than the rotating bodies, is
known to all who have any tincture of Astronomy; for each of the
Planets is carried round in more than one rotation (b. 10). But what
the exact number of these rotations is, we shall proceed to state
upon the authority of some mathematicians, for the sake of
instruction, that the reader may have some definite number present to
his mind: for the rest, he must both investigate for himself and put
questions to other investigators; and, if he learns from the
scientific men any thing dissenting from what we here lay down, he
must love both dissentients but follow that one who reasons most
accurately ([Greek: philei=n me\n a)mphote/rous, pei/thesthai de\
toi=s a)kribeste/rois]--b. 16).

Aristotle then proceeds to unfold the number and arrangement of the
planetary spheres and the corrective or counter-rolling ([Greek:
a)nelittou/sas]) spheres implicated with them (p. 1073, b. 17--p.
1074, a. 14). He afterwards proceeds: Let the number of spheres thus
be forty-seven; so that it will be reasonable to assume the
Immoveable Movent Essences and Principles to be forty-seven also, as
well as the perceivable spheres ([Greek: ai)sthêta/s]--p. 1074, a.
16): we say _reasonable_ ([Greek: eu)/logon]), for we shall leave to
stronger heads to declare it necessary. But, since there cannot be
any rotation except such as contributes to the rotation of one of the
Planets, and since we must assume that each Nature and each Essence
is exempt from extraneous affection and possessed _per se_ of the
Best as an end, so there will be no other Nature besides the
forty-seven above enumerated, and this number will be the _necessary_
total of the Essences (a. 21). For, if there were any others, they
would cause motion by serving as an end for some rotation to aspire
to ([Greek: kinoi=en a)\n ô(s te/los ou)=sai phora=s]--a. 23); but it
is impossible that there can be any other rotation besides those that
have been enumerated.

We may fairly infer this from the bodies which are carried in
rotation ([Greek: e)k tô=n pherome/nôn]--p. 1074, a. 24). For, if
every carrier exists naturally for the sake of the thing carried, and
if every current or rotation is a current of something carried, there
can exist no current either for the sake of itself or for the sake of
some other current. Every current must exist for the sake of the
Planets, and with a view to their rotation. For, if one current
existed for the sake of another, this last must exist for the sake of
a third, and so on; but you cannot go on in this way _ad infinitum_;
and therefore the end of every current must be, one or other of the
Divine Bodies which are carried round in the heavens (a. 31).

That there is only one Heaven, we may plainly see. For, if there were
many heavens, as there are many men, the principium of each would be
one _in specie_, though the principia would be many _in numero_ (p.
1074, a. 33). But all things that are many in number, have Matter,
and are many, by reason of their Matter; for to all these many, there
is one and the same Form ([Greek: lo/gos])--definition or rational
explanation: _e.g._, one for all men, among whom Sokrates is one (a.
35). But the First Essence has no Matter; for it is an Actual
([Greek: to\ de\ ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai ou)k e)/chei u(/lên to\ prô=ton;
e)ntele/cheia **ga/r]--a. 36). The Primum Movens Immobile is
therefore One, both in definition and in number; accordingly, the
Motum--that which is moved both eternally and continuously--is One
also. There exists therefore only one Heaven (p. 1074, a. 38).

Now it has been handed down in a mythical way, from the old and most
ancient teachers (p. 1074, b. 1) to their successors, that these
(Eternal Essences) are gods, and that the divine element comprehends
all nature ([Greek: o(/ti theoi/ te/ ei)sin ou(=toi kai\ perie/chei
to\ thei=on tê\n o(/lên phu/sin]--b. 3). The other accompaniments of
the received creed have been superadded with a view to persuading the
multitude and to useful purposes for the laws and the common interest
(b. 4); wherefore the gods have been depicted as like to men and to
some other animals, combined with other similar accompaniments. If a
man, abstracting from these stories, accepts only the first and
fundamental truth--That they conceived the First Essences as gods, he
will consider it as a divine doctrine ([Greek: thei/ôs a)\n
ei)rê=sthai nomi/seien]--b. 9), preserved and handed down as
fragments of truth from the most ancient times. For probably all art
and philosophy and truth have been many times discovered, lost, and
rediscovered. To this point alone, and thus far, the opinion of our
fathers and of the first men is evident to us (b. 14).

There are however various difficulties connected with the Noûs; for
it would seem to be more divine than the visible celestial objects,
and yet we do not understand what its condition can be to be such (p.
1074, b. 17). For, if it cogitates nothing but is in the condition of
slumber and inaction, what ground can there be for respecting it
([Greek: ti/ a)\n ei)/ê to\ semno/n]--b. 18)? And, if it cogitates
something actually, yet if this process depends upon something
foreign and independent (_i.e._, upon the Cogitatum), the Noûs cannot
be the best Essence; since it is then essentially not Cogitation in
act, but only the potentiality of Cogitation; while its title to
respect arises from actual Cogitation. Again, whether we assume its
Essence to be Cogitation actual or Cogitation potential, _what_ does
it cogitate? It must cogitate either itself, or something different
from itself; and, if the latter, either always the same Cogitatum, or
sometimes one, sometimes another. But is there no difference whether
its Cogitatum is honourable or vulgar? Are there not some things
which it is absurd to cogitate? Evidently the Noûs must cogitate what
is most divine and most honourable, without any change; for, if it
did change, it must change for the worse, and that very change would
at once ([Greek: ê)/dê]) be a certain motion; whereas the Noûs is
essentially immoveable (b. 27). First of all, if the Essence of the
Noûs be, not Cogitation actual but Cogitation potential, we may
reasonably conceive that the perpetuity of Cogitation would be
fatiguing to it (b. 29); next, we see plainly that there must exist
something else more honourable than the Noûs; namely, the Cogitatum;
for to cogitate, and the act of cogitation, will belong even to one
who cogitates the vilest object. If cogitation of vile objects be
detestable ([Greek: pheukto/n], b. 32)--for not to see some things is
better than to see them--Cogitation cannot be the best of all things
(_i.e._, Cogitation absolutely, whatever be the Cogitatum).

Since the Noûs is itself the best of all things, it must employ its
cogitation upon itself and nothing else. Its cogitation will thus be
Cogitation of Cogitation ([Greek: au(to\n a)/ra noei=, ei)/per e)sti\
to\ kra/tiston, kai\ e)/stin ê( no/êsis noê/seôs no/êsis]--p. 1074,
b. 35). Yet, if we look to the human mind, Cognition, Perception,
Opinion, Mental Discourse, &c., appear always as having direct
reference to something else, and as referring each to itself only in
an indirect and secondary way ([Greek: a)ei\ a)/llou--au(tê=s d' e)n
pare/rgô|]--b. 36); and farther, if to cogitate is one thing and to
be cogitated another thing, in which of the two points of view will
the _bene_ of the Noûs consist? To be Cogitation, and to be a
Cogitatum, are not logically the same ([Greek: ou)de\ ga\r tau)to\
to\ ei)=nai noê/sei kai\ nooume/nô|]--b. 38).

But may we not meet these difficulties by replying that there are
some things in which Cognition is identical with the Cognitum? that
is, in those Cognita which are altogether exempt from Matter? In
Constructive cognitions without Matter, the Form and the [Greek:
t.ê.e.] is both Cognitum and Cognitio; in Theoretical cognitions
without Matter, the Notion and the Cogitation is itself the Cognitum
([Greek: o( lo/gos to\ pra=gma kai\ ê( no/êsis]). Since it appears,
therefore, that, wherever there is no Matter, Cogitatum and Noûs are
not different, the same will be true of the divine Noûs: its
Cogitatio and its Cogitatum will be identical (p. 1075, a. 5).

One farther difficulty remains, if we suppose the Cogitatum to be a
Compound ([Greek: su/ntheton]); for, on that supposition, the
Cogitans would change in running through the different parts of the
whole. But the reply seems to be, that every thing which has not
Matter is indivisible and not compound (p. 1075, a. 7). As the human
Noûs, being that which deals with compounds, comports itself for a
certain time--for it does not attain its _bene_ in cogitating this or
that part of the compound, but in apprehending a certain total or
completion which is something different from any of the parts--so
does the divine Noûs, engaged in cogitation of itself, comport itself
in perpetuity (a. 10).

Another point to be considered is--in what manner the nature of the
Universe ([Greek: ê( tou= o(/lou phu/sis]--p. 1075, a. 11) includes
Bonum and Optimum. Is Bonum included as something separate and as an
adjunct by itself transcendent? Or is it immanent, pervading the
whole arrangement of the constituent parts? Or does it exist in both
ways at once, as in the case of a disciplined army; for, in this
latter, Bonum belongs both to the array and to the general, and
indeed more to the latter, since the array is directed by the
general, not the general by the array. All things in the universe are
marshalled in a certain orderly way--the aquatic creatures, the
aërial, and the plants; but all things are not marshalled alike. The
universe is not such that there is no relation between one thing and
another: there is such a relation; for every thing is marshalled with
a view to one end, though in different degrees. As, in a family, the
freemen have least discretion left to them to act at haphazard, but
all or most of their proceedings are regulated, while slaves and oxen
are not required to do much towards the common good, but are left for
the most part to act at hazard,--in this way the principium of each
is arranged by nature (a. 23). For example, every thing must
necessarily come to the termination of one individual existence to
make room for another: there are also some other facts and conditions
common to all things in the universe ([Greek: le/gô d' oi(=on ei)/s
ge to\ diakrithê=nai a)na/gkê a(pa=sin e)lthei=n]--a. 23; see the
explanation of [Greek: diakrithê=nai], given by Bonitz, Comm. p.
519--not very certain).

In concluding this exposition, we must not lose sight of the
absurdities and impossibilities which attach to all other, nor what
is advanced by the most ingenious philosophers before us, nor which
of their theories carries with it the fewest difficulties (p. 1075,
a. 27).

That all things proceed from Contraries, all these philosophers agree
in affirming. But it is not true that all things are generated, nor
that they are generated from contraries; for the celestial substance
is not generated at all, nor has it any contrary. Moreover, in those
cases where there really are contraries, these philosophers do not
teach us how generation can take place out of them; for contraries
themselves have no effect upon each other. Now our doctrine solves
this difficulty reasonably, by introducing a _tertium quid_ (p. 1075,
a. 31)--Matter. Some of these philosophers erroneously consider
Matter to be itself one of the contraries: they consider the Unequal
as matter or substratum to the Equal; or the Many as matter or
substratum to the One; (Evil, as opposed to Good). We resolve this in
the same way: our Matter is one, is contrary itself to nothing, but
may be potentially either of two contraries. Farthermore, if we admit
the doctrine that Evil itself is Matter or one of the elements, the
inference will follow that every thing whatever, except the Unum
itself, partakes of Evil (a. 6).

Some philosophers do not admit either Good or Evil to be principles
at all; but they are manifestly wrong; for in all things Good is most
of all the principle (p. 1075, a. 37). Others again are so far right
that they recognize Good as a principle: but they do not tell us
_how_ it is a principle--whether as End, or as Movent, or as Form.

Empedokles lays down a strange doctrine: he makes Friendship to be
the Good (p. 1075, b. 2). But, in his theory, Friendship is principle
partly as Movent, for its function is to bring together ([Greek:
suna/gei ga\r]--b. 3); partly as Matter, for it is itself a portion
of the mixture ([Greek: mo/rion tou= mi/gmatos]--b. 4). Now, even
granting the possibility that the same thing may be _per accidens_
([Greek: kata\ sumbebêko/s]--b. 5, _i.e._, by special coincidence in
any one particular case) principle as Movent, and also principle as
Matter, nevertheless the two are not the same logically and by
definition. Under which of the two, therefore, are we to reckon
Friendship? It is moreover another strange feature in the theory of
Empedokles, that he makes Enmity to be indestructible; for this very
Enmity is with him the nature and principle of Evil (b. 8).

Anaxagoras declares Good to be the principle as Movent; for, in his
theory, Noûs causes motion; but it causes motion with a view to some
end, which is of course different from itself; so that the real
principle is different from Noûs: unless indeed he adopted one of our
tenets; for we too say that, in a certain sense, the medical art is
health (p. 1075, b. 10; Z. vii. p. 1032, b. 10). It is moreover
absurd, that Anaxagoras does not recognize any contrary to Good and
to the Noûs (b. 11). (Bonitz remarks, Comm. p. 522:--Aristotle means
that Anaxagoras was wrong, because he failed "ad eam devenire
rationem, ut intellectum sui ipsius intelligentiam ideoque sui ipsius
[Greek: te/los] esse statueret"; farther, he remarks, on the line b.
10--[Greek: a)/topon de\ kai\ to\ e)nanti/on mê\ poiê=sai tô=|
a)gathô=| kai\ tô=| nô=|]: "Quid enim? nonne pariter et eodem jure
[Greek: nou=s a)migê/s], quem posuit Anaxagoras, ab omni
contrarietate et oppositione immunis sit, ac primus motor apud
Aristotelem?"--Aristotle would have replied to this: "I recognize
principles of Evil under the names of [Greek: u(/lê] and [Greek:
ste/rêsis]; the last of the two being directly opposed to Form
(Regularity or Good), the first of the two being indifferent and
equally ready as a recipient both for evil and for good. My Prime
Movent acts like an [Greek: e)rô/menon] in causing motion in the
Celestial Substance: the motion of this last is pure Good, without
any mixture of Evil. But, when this motion is transmitted to the
sublunary elements, it becomes corrupted by [Greek: u(/lê] and
[Greek: ste/rêsis], so that Evil becomes mingled with the Good.
Anaxagoras recognizes no counteracting principles, analogous to
[Greek: u(/lê] and [Greek: ste/rêsis], so that Evil, on his theory,
remains unexplained.")

Those philosophers who lay down Contraries as their principles, do
not make proper use of these Contraries, unless their language be
improved or modified (p. 1075, b. 12). Nor do they tell us why some
things are destructible, other things indestructible; for they trace
all things to the same principles. Some make all things to proceed
from Non-Ens; others, to escape that necessity, make all things One
(and thus recognize no real change or generation at all--the Eleates,
b. 16). Again, not one of them tells us why generation must always
be, or what is the cause of generation. Once more, those who
recognize two contrary principles must necessarily recognize a third
superior to both (b. 18); and the Platonists with their Ideas are
under the like necessity. For they must assign some reason why
particular things partake of these Ideas.

Other philosophers, moreover, must consistently with their theories
recognize something contrary to Wisdom and to the most venerable
Cognition. But we are under no such necessity; for there is nothing
contrary to the First ([Greek: tô=| prô/tô|]). All contraries involve
Matter, and are in potentiality the same: one of the two contraries
is ignorance in regard to the other; but the First has no contrary
(p. 1075, b. 24).

Again, if there be no Entia beyond the Perceptibilia, there can be no
beginning, no arrangement in order, no generation, no celestial
bodies or proceedings (_i.e._, all these will remain unexplained).
There will always be a beginning behind the beginning, _ad
infinitum_; as there is in the theories of all the theologians and
physical philosophers (p. 1075, b. 27). And, even if we recognize,
beyond the Perceptibilia, Ideas or Numbers, these are causes of
nothing; or, if causes of any thing, they are certainly not causes of
motion. How, moreover, can Magnitude, and a Continuum arise out of
that which has no Magnitude? Number cannot, either as Movent or as
Form, produce a Continuum (b. 30).

Again, (Contraries cannot be principles, because) no Contrary can be
essentially Constructive and essentially Movent (p. 1075, b. 31); for
Contraries involve Matter and Potentiality, and may possibly,
therefore, not exist. And, if there be Potentiality, it will come
prior to Actuality: upon that supposition therefore (_i.e._, of
Contraries as the fundamental principles) Entia could not be eternal.
But Entia are eternal; therefore these theories must be in part
amended: we have shown how (b. 34).

Farther, none of these theories explains how it is that numbers
coalesce into One; or soul and body into One; or Form and Matter into
one Concrete. Nor can they explain this, unless they adopt our
doctrine, that the Movent brings about this coalition (p. 1075, b.
37).

Those philosophers (like Speusippus) who recognize many different
grades and species of Entia (first the Mathematical Number, &c.),
with separate principles for each, make the Essence of the Universe
to be incoherent ([Greek: e)peisodiô/dê]--p. 1076, a. 1) and set up
many distinct principles; for none of these Essences contributes to
or bears upon the remainder, whether it exists or does not exist. Now
Entia are not willing to be badly governed ([Greek: ta\ de\ o)/nta
ou) bou/letai politeu/esthai kakô=s. "ou)k a)gatho\n polukoirani/ê;
ei(=s koi/ranos."]--p. 1076, a. 4).

IV.

DE COELO.

Book I.

CH. 1.--The science of Nature has for its principal object--Bodies,
Magnitudes, and the various affections and movements of Bodies and
Magnitudes; also the beginnings or principles of this sort of
Essence. The Continuous is that which is divisible into parts
perpetually divisible: and Body is that which is divisible in every
direction. Of magnitudes, some (lines) are divisible only in one
direction; others (planes) only in two directions; others again
(bodies) in three directions. This is the maximum: there is no other
magnitude beyond; for three are all, and to say "in three directions"
is the same as to say "in all directions." As the Pythagoreans say,
The Universe and All Things are determined by Three: in End, Middle,
and Beginning, lies the number of the Universe, or the Triad. We have
received these as laws from nature, and we accordingly employ this
number (Three) for solemnities in honour of the Gods. Moreover, we
apply our predicates on the same principle; for we call Two, and The
Two--Both, but we do not call them all. Three is the first number to
which we apply the predicate All. Herein (as was observed before) we
follow the lead of Nature herself. Since therefore these three
phrases--All Things, The Universe, The Perfect or Complete--do not
specifically differ from each other, but are distinguished only in
respect of the matter or occasions on which they are applied. Body is
the only kind of magnitude which can be declared Perfect or Complete,
that is, All; for it is the only magnitude determined or defined by
the Three. Being divisible in three directions, it is divisible every
way; other magnitudes are divisible either only in one way or only in
two. Magnitudes are both divisible and continuous according to the
number by which they are designated--continuous in one direction, in
two, in three, or all. All divisible magnitudes are also continuous:
whether all continuous magnitudes are divisible, is not yet clear.
But what _is_ clear is--that there is no upward transition to a
higher genus beyond Body, as there is from line to surface, and from
surface to Body. If there were, Body would not be perfect or complete
as a magnitude; for the transition would be made at the point of
deficiency; but the perfect or complete can have no deficiency: it
stretches every way. Such is each body included as a part in the
universe: it has dimensions in every direction. Yet each is
distinguished from its neighbour by contact, and each therefore in a
certain sense is many. But the Universe ([Greek: to\ pa=n]) including
all these parts is of necessity perfect and complete; extending not
merely in one way, and in another way not, but [Greek: pa/ntê|], as
the word literally means (ss. 1-4).

CH. 2.--Respecting the nature of the Universe, we shall enquire
presently whether in the aggregate it be infinite or of finite
magnitude. But first let us speak about its different constituent
species, proceeding on the following basis. I affirm that all natural
bodies and magnitudes are _per se_ locally moveable; and that Nature
is to them a beginning or principle of motion. Now all Local Motion
(known by the name of [Greek: phora/]) is either Rectilinear or
Circular, or compounded of the two; for these two are the only simple
motions, by reason that the only two simple magnitudes are the
rectilinear and the circular. The circular is motion round the
Centre; the rectilinear is motion either downwards towards the centre
or upwards from the centre. These three are the only simple modes of
motion or currents: as I said in the last chapter that body was made
complete in the number three, so also the motion of body is made
complete in the number three. Now, as there are some bodies (such as
fire, earth, and their cognates) which are simple (_i.e._ which have
in themselves a natural beginning or principle of motion), and others
which are compounds of these, so also there must be simple motions
belonging to the former and compound motions belonging to the latter;
such compound motions being determined by the preponderant element
therein. Since, therefore, circular motion is a simple mode of
motion, and since simple modes of motion belong only to simple
bodies, there must of necessity be a particular variety of simple
body, whose especial nature it is to be carried round in circular
motion. By violence, indeed, one body might be moved in a mode
belonging to another; but not by nature. Moreover, since motion
against nature is opposite to motion conformable to nature, and since
each mode has one single opposite, simple circular motion, if it be
not conformable to the nature of this body, must be against its
nature. If then the body rotating in a circle be fire or any of the
other elements, its natural mode of motion must be opposite to
circular motion. But each thing has only one opposite; and up and
down are each other's opposites. If then the body which rotates in a
circle rotates thus against nature, it must have some other mode of
motion conformable to nature. But this is impossible: for, if the
motion conformable to its nature be motion upwards, the body must be
fire or air; if motion downwards, the body must be earth or water
(and there is no other simple mode of motion that it can have).
Moreover, its rotatory motion must be a first motion; for the perfect
is prior in nature to the imperfect. Now the circle is perfect; but
no straight line is perfect: neither an infinite straight line, for
in order to be perfect, it must have an end and a boundary; nor any
finite straight line, for each has something without it and may be
prolonged at pleasure. So that, if motion first by nature belong to a
body first by nature, if circular motion (as being perfect) be prior
to rectilinear motion, and if rectilinear motion belong to a first or
a simple body, as we see both in fire and in earth,--we may be sure
_à fortiori_ that circular motion belongs to a simple body, and that
there is, besides the four elements here, prior to them and more
divine than them, a different body cf special nature and essence.
Indeed, since circular motion is against the nature of these four
elements, there must be some other different body to whose nature it
is conformable. There must thus be some simple and primary body,
whose nature it is to be carried round in a circle, as earth is
carried downwards and fire upwards. On the assumption that the
revolving bodies revolved against their own nature, it would be
wonderful and even unreasonable that this one single mode of motion,
being thus contrary to nature, should be continuous and eternal; for
in all other things we see that what is contrary to nature dies away
most speedily. Now, if the revolving body were fire, as some affirm,
the revolving motion would be just as much contrary to its nature as
motion downwards; for the natural motion of fire is upwards or away
from the centre. Reasoning from all these premisses, we may safely
conclude that, distinct from all these bodies which are here around
us, there exists a body whose nature is more honourable in proportion
to its greater distance from us here (ss. 1-13).

CH. 3.--We plainly cannot affirm that every body is either heavy or
light: meaning by heavy, that which is carried by its nature
downwards or towards the centre; by light, that which is carried by
its nature upwards or away from the centre. Heaviest (or earth) is
that which underlies all other downward moving bodies, lightest
(fire) is that which floats above all upward moving bodies. Air and
water are both light and heavy, relatively, but relatively to
different terms of comparison; thus, water is heavy as compared to
air and fire, light as compared to earth. But that body whose nature
it is to revolve in a circle, cannot possibly have either heaviness
or levity; for it cannot move in a right line, either upwards or
downwards, nor either by nature or against nature. Not by nature,
for, in that case, it must be identical with some one of the four
elements; not against nature, because, if it moved upwards against
nature, this would prove that motion downwards was conformable to its
nature, and it would thus be identical with earth: we have already
seen that, if a body moves upwards against nature, it must move
downwards according to nature, and _vice versâ_. Now the same natural
motion which belongs to any body as a whole, belongs also to its
minute fragments (to the whole earth and to any of its constituent
clods). Accordingly the revolving body in its local movement of
revolution cannot possibly be dragged in any other direction, either
upward or downward,--neither the whole nor any portion thereof. It is
alike reasonable to conceive it as ungenerable, indestructible,
incapable both of increase and of qualitative change ([Greek:
a)nauxe\s kai\ a)nalloi/ôton]). It cannot be generated, because
every thing generated comes out of a substratum and an opposite, into
which it relapses on being destroyed. Now the revolving body has no
opposite; for we have already seen that opposite bodies have their
currents of motion opposite, and there is no current of motion
opposite to that of circular rotation. Nature has rightly excepted
this ungenerable and indestructible substance from the action of
contraries, in which generation and destruction occur. It is also
incapable of increase or diminution, because these processes take
place through the accession of new cognate materials; and in this
case there are none such. It is farther incapable of qualitative
change, because this always implies the being affected favourably or
unfavourably ([Greek: pa/thos]); and this last never takes place, in
plants or in animals, without some increase or diminution in quantity
(ss. 1-5).

This Celestial Substance is thus eternal, ungenerable,
indestructible, noway increased nor diminished, neither growing old
nor capable of disturbing affections nor changeable in quality.
Herein the evidence of reason and that of phenomena concur. For all
men, Hellenes and Barbarians, have some belief respecting the Gods,
and all who believe Gods to exist assign to the divine nature the
uppermost place in the Kosmos; an immortal place going naturally
along with immortal persons. Our perceptions confirm this
sufficiently, at least when we speak with reference to human belief.
For not the smallest change has ever been observed in the celestial
substance, throughout all past time. Under these impressions, the
ancients gave to it the name which it now bears; for the same
opinions suggest themselves to us not once, nor twice, but an
infinite number of times**. Hence the ancients, regarding the First
Body as something distinct from Fire, Earth, Air, or Water, called
the uppermost place Æther, from its being always running ([Greek:
a)po\ tou= thei=n a)ei/]), the adverbial designation being derived
from eternal duration. Anaxagoras employs this name improperly: he
calls Fire by the name of Æther (s. 6).

It is plain, from all we have said, that the simple bodies cannot be
more in number than those just indicated; for a simple body must of
necessity have a simple mode of motion, and there are only three
simple modes of motion--one circular and two rectilinear, one of
these being from the centre, the other towards the centre (s. 7).

CH. 4.--That Circular Rotation has no motion opposed to it, may be
shown by several different arguments. If there were any, it would
certainly be rectilinear motion; for convex and concave, though each
respectively opposed to the other, are, when both put together,
opposed as a couple to rectilinear motion. But each variety of
rectilinear motion has another variety of rectilinear motion opposed
to it; and each thing has but one opposite. Moreover the oppositions
between one motion (or one current--[Greek: phora/]) and another are
founded upon oppositions of place, which are three in number: (1)
Above and Below; (2) Before and Behind; (3) Right and Left. Now the
motion in circular rotation **from A to B is not opposite to that
from B to A: the opposition of motion is along the straight line
which joins the two; for an infinite number of different circles may
be drawn, not interfering with each other but all passing through the
same two points A and B. In the same circle, the opposition between
the current from A to B and that from B to A, is along the line of
diameter--not along the line of circumference. If one circular
current were really opposed to any other circular current, one or
other of the two would have existed to no purpose; for both have the
same object. That is to say: what is carried round in a circle, let
it begin from any point whatever, must necessarily come round equally
to all the opposite places, above, below, before, behind, right,
left. If the two (presumed) opposite circular currents were equal,
they would neutralize each other, and there would be no motion at all
of either of them. If one of the two were the more powerful, it would
extinguish the other; so that to suppose the existence of both is to
suppose that one or both exists in vain (_i.e._, can never be
realized). We say that a sandal exists in vain ([Greek: ma/tên]),
when it cannot be fastened on. But God and nature do nothing in vain
(ss. 1-8).

CH. 5.--Most of the ancient philosophers admitted an infinite body;
but this may be shown to be impossible. The question is very
important; for the consequences which follow from admitting the
Infinite as principium, affect our speculations concerning the whole
of Nature (s. 1).

Every body is of necessity either simple or compound. The infinite
body therefore, if it exists, must of necessity be either one or the
other. But there can be no infinite compound composed of simple
bodies finite in magnitude and in number: so that, if an infinite
body exist, it must be simple. We shall first enquire whether the
First Body, whose nature it is to move in a circle, can be infinite
in magnitude. Now, if it were infinite, the radii thrown out from the
centre would be infinite, and the distance between them would also be
infinite; that is, no finite peripheral line can be found touching
all the extremities of the radii without: if any such line be
assumed, you may always assume a greater. We call Number infinite,
because the greatest number cannot be given; and the like may be said
about this distance. Now, as an infinite distance cannot be passed
over, no circular motion passing over it is possible, so as to come
round to the point of departure. But we see plainly that the First
Body or the Heaven does come round in a circle; and it has been shown
by reasoning _à priori_ that there _is_ a variety of body whose
nature it is to move in a circle. Such a body therefore as the First
(revolving) Body cannot be infinite (ss. 2, 3).

Four other arguments are added, proving the same conclusion (s. 4,
seq.). One of them is: That an infinite square, circle, or sphere, is
an impossibility; each of these figures being defined or determined.
As there can be no infinite circle, so neither can an infinite body
be moved round in a circle (s. 7).

CH. 6.--As the First Body cannot be infinite, so neither can those
bodies be infinite whose nature it is to move to the centre and from
the centre--neither the centripetal nor the centrifugal body. For
these two currents are opposite in nature; opposite currents being
characterized by the opposite places to which they tend. But of two
opposites, if the one be fixed and determinate, the other must be
fixed and determinate also. Now the centre is determined; for the
centripetal body, let it fall from what height it will, can never
fall lower than the centre; and, since the centre is determined, the
upper region or extremity must also be determined. The places at each
extreme being thus determined, the intermediate space must be
determined also; otherwise there would exist motion undetermined or
infinite, which has been shown in a former treatise to be impossible
(Physica, VIII. viii.); and therefore that body which either is
therein, or may possibly be therein, must be determined. But it is a
fact that the centripetal body and the centrifugal body can be
therein; for centripetality and centrifugality are of the nature of
each respectively (ss. 1, 2).

Hence we see that there can be no infinite body. There are other
reasons also. As the centripetal body is heavy, if it be infinite,
its gravity must also be infinite; and, if gravity cannot be
infinite, neither can any heavy body be infinite. The like about any
light body, such as the centrifugal (s. 3).

He then shows (by a long process of reasoning, not easy to follow)
first, that there cannot be an infinite body with finite gravity;
next, that there can be no infinite gravity. Accordingly there can be
no infinite body at all, having gravity. At the end, he considers
that this is established, (1) by the partial arguments ([Greek: dia\
tô=n kata\ me/ros]) immediately preceding; (2) by the general
reasonings in his other treatises respecting first principles, in
which he explained the Infinite--in what sense it existed and did not
exist; (3) by an argument about the Infinite, upon which he touches
in the next chapter (ss. 4-13).

CH. 7.--Every body is of necessity either infinite or finite. If
infinite, it is as a whole either of like constituents or of unlike.
If the latter, either of a finite number of species, or of an
infinite number. The last is impossible, if our fundamental
assumptions are allowed to stand. For since the simple modes of
motion are limited in number, the simple bodies must be alike
limited; each simple mode of notion belonging to its own special
simple body, and each natural body having always its own natural
motion. But, if the Infinite be composed of a finite number of
species, each of these constituent parts must be infinite; that is,
water and fire must be infinite. Yet this too, is impossible; for we
have seen that there cannot be either infinite levity or infinite
gravity (the attributes of fire and water). Moreover, if these bodies
be infinite, the places which they occupy, and the motions which they
make, must also be infinite; but this also we have shown to be
inadmissible, if our fundamental assumptions are admitted. The
centripetal body cannot be carried to an infinite distance downward,
nor the centrifugal body to an infinite distance upward. That which
cannot come to pass, cannot be in course of coming to pass; thus, if
a thing cannot come to be white, or a cubit long, or domiciled in
Egypt, it cannot be in course of becoming white, or a cubit long, &c.
It cannot be in course of being carried to a terminus which cannot be
reached. It might be argued that fire, though discontinuous and
dispersed, might still be infinite, in the sum total of its different
masses. But body is that which is extended in every direction: how
can there be many bodies unlike to each other, yet each of them
infinite? Each of them, if infinite at all, ought to be infinite in
every direction (ss. 1-5).

We thus see that the Infinite cannot consist of unlike constituents.
But neither can it consist of constituents all similar. For, first,
there are only three simple motions, and one of the three it must
have; but we have shown that it cannot have either centripetal or
centrifugal motion (_i.e._, that it cannot have either infinite
gravity or infinite levity); nor can it again have circular motion,
for the Infinite cannot be carried in a circle: this would amount to
saying that the Heaven is infinite, which we have shown to be
impossible. The Infinite indeed cannot be moved in any way at all;
for, if moved, it must be moved either according to nature, or
contrary to nature (violently), and, if its present motion be
violent, it must have some other mode of motion which is natural to
it. But, if it have any such, this assumes that there exists some
other place belonging to it, into which it may be conveyed--an
obvious impossibility (ss. 6, 7).

Farthermore, the Infinite cannot act in any way upon the Finite, nor
be acted upon thereby (ss. 8-10). Nor can the Infinite be acted upon
in any way by the Infinite (ss. 11-12).

If then every perceptible body possesses powers, as agent or patient
or both, there can be no perceptible body which is infinite. But all
bodies which are in any place are perceptible; therefore no body
which is in any place can be infinite. There is no infinite body,
indeed there can be no body at all, outside of the Heaven; for that
which is outside of the Heaven is in a place. Even if perceivable
only up to a certain point ([Greek: me/chri tino/s]), even if merely
intelligible, it would still be in a place, and would therefore come
under the foregoing argument--that there is no body outside of the
Heaven (ss. 13, 14).

The foregoing reasoning may be summed up, in more general language
([Greek: logikô/teron]), as follows:--The Infinite assumed as
homogeneous cannot be moved in a circle, since the Infinite has no
centre; nor in a straight line, since this would imply a second
infinite place into which it must be moved according to nature, and a
third infinite place into which it must be moved against nature, and
since in either case the force which causes it to be moved must be
infinite. But we have already argued, in treating of Motion (Phys.
VIII. x.) that nothing finite can have infinite power, nothing
infinite can have finite power; and, if that which is moved according
to nature can also be moved contrary to nature, there must of
necessity be two Infinites--Movens and Motum. Yet what can that be
which causes the Infinite to move? If it cause itself to move, it
must be animated ([Greek: e)/mpsuchon]): but how can an infinite
animated being ([Greek: zô=|on]) exist? And, if there be anything
else which causes it to move, there must exist two Infinites, each
distinguished from the other in form and power (ss. 15-17).

Again, even if we admit the doctrine of Leukippus and
Demokritus--That the whole is not continuous, but discontinuous,
atoms divided by intervening spaces--still the Infinite is
inadmissible. For the nature and essence of these atoms is all the
same, though they are different from each other in figure and
arrangement; accordingly the motion of all must be the same: if one
is heavy or centripetal, all must be so alike; if one is light or
centrifugal, all must be so alike. But either of these motions would
imply the existence of centre and periphery; which does not consist
with an infinite whole. In the Infinite, there is neither centre nor
periphery; no terminus prefixed either for upward or downward motion;
no _own place_ either for centripetal or centrifugal matter.
Therefore in an infinite universe, there can be no motion at all
(ss. 18, 19).

CH. 8.--There cannot be more than one Kosmos. All things both rest
and are moved, either by violence, or according to nature. In that
place to which it is carried by nature, it also rests by nature: in
that place to which it is carried by violence, it rests by violence.
If the current which we see towards the centre is by violence, the
opposite current must be natural; if earth is carried by violence
from thence hitherward, its natural current must be from hence
thitherward; and, if being here it rests without violence, its
current towards here must be a natural one. For there is one only
which is natural. Now, if there be many Kosmi, they must be alike in
their nature, and must be composed of the same bodies, having the
same nature and powers--fire, earth, and the two intermediate
elements: for, if the bodies here are not the same as those in other
Kosmi--if the same names are given in an equivocal sense and do not
connote the same specific attributes--the name Kosmos must be
equivocal also, and there cannot be many true or real Kosmi, in the
same sense. To the parts or elements of each Kosmos, therefore, the
centripetal and **centrifugal currents are natural; for the simple
currents are limited in number, and each element is so named as
to connote one of them specially; and, if the currents are
the same, the elements must also be the same everywhere. If there
were another Kosmos, the earth in that would tend towards the centre
of our Kosmos, and the fire in that would tend towards the periphery
of our Kosmos. But this is impossible; since in that case the earth
in that Kosmos would run away from the centre of its own Kosmos, and
the fire therein would run away from its own periphery. Either we
must not admit the same nature in the simple elements of the numerous
Kosmi; or, if we do admit it, we must recognize only one centre and
one periphery. This difficulty prevents our recognizing more than one
Kosmos (ss. 1-6).

It is unphilosophical to affirm that the nature of these simple
elements becomes changed according as they are more or less distant
from their own places. The difference is at best one of degree, not
one of kind. That they _are_ moved, we see plainly; there must
therefore be some one current of motion natural to them. Accordingly
every portion of the same element (or of elements the same in kind)
must tend towards the same numerical place--towards this actual
centre ([Greek: pro\s to/de ti me/son]), or that actual periphery;
and, if the tendency be towards one centre _specie_, but towards many
centres _numero_, because particulars differ _numero_ alone, and not
_specie_, still the attribute will be alike in all, and will not be
present in some portions, absent in others: I mean that, if the
portions of this Kosmos are relative to each other, those in another
Kosmos are in the like condition, and what is taken from this Kosmos
will not be different from what is taken from the corresponding
elements of any other Kosmos. Unless these assumptions can be
overthrown, it is indisputably certain that there can be only one
centre and one periphery; by consequence therefore, only one Kosmos
and not more (ss. 7-10).

There are other reasons to show that there is a given terminus for
the natural current both of fire and of earth. A thing moved,
speaking generally, changes from something definite into something
else definite; but there are different species of such change: the
change called getting-well is from sickness to health; that called
growth is from the little to great; that called local movement is
from a terminus to another terminus, and local movements are
specifically different from each other, according as the terminus _a
quo_ and the terminus _ad quem_ is defined in each. The terminus is
always a known and definite point: it is not accidental, nor
dependent upon the arbitrium of the mover. Fire and earth therefore
do not move on to infinity, but to definite points in opposite
directions; and the local antithesis is between above and below:
these are the two termini of the respective currents. Earth is
carried with greater velocity, the nearer it approaches to the
centre; fire is carried with greater velocity, the nearer it
approaches to the periphery. This shows that its current does not
stretch to infinity; for its velocity would then increase infinitely.
Earth is not carried downward by the force of any thing else, nor
fire upwards: not by any violence, nor by squeezing out ([Greek:
e)kthli/psei]), as some say. If this were so, a larger quantity of
earth would move downward, and a larger quantity of fire upward, more
slowly than a smaller. But the reverse is what occurs: the larger
quantity of earth moves downward more rapidly than the smaller; if
its motion had been caused by violence or by squeezing out, such
motion would have slackened as it became more widely distant from the
moving force (ss. 11-14).

We may deduce the same conclusion from the reasonings of the First
Philosophy, also from the fact of circular motion which of necessity
is constant both here and everywhere. Further, it is clear that there
can be only one Kosmos; for, as there are three bodily elements, so
there are three special places of such elements: one the undermost,
at the centre; another the uppermost, at the periphery, revolving in
a circular orbit; the third, in the intermediate place between the
two, being the light or floating element ([Greek: to\ e)pipo/lazon]);
for, if not there, it must be outside of the Kosmos, which is
impossible (ss. 15, 16).

CH. 9.--We must however now examine some reasons, which have been
alleged to prove the contrary; and which seem to show, not only that
there are many Kosmi, but even that there _must_ be many, and that
the hypothesis of one single Kosmos is inadmissible. It is urged that
in all aggregates, natural as well as artificial, the Form by itself
is one thing, and the Form implicated with Matter is another. When we
declare the definition of a sphere or a circle, we do not include
therein gold or brass, for this makes no part of the essence: if we
mention these metals, it is when we cannot conceive or grasp anything
beyond the particular case; for example, if we have one particular
circle before us. Nevertheless, even here the circle in the abstract
is one thing, and this particular circle is another: the first is the
Form by itself, the last is the Form along with Matter, one among
particular objects. Now, since the Heaven is perceivable by sense, it
must be one among particular objects; for every thing perceivable is
implicated with Matter. As such, it is _this_ Heaven: to be _this_
Heaven (Form along with Matter) is one thing; to be the Heaven simply
and absolutely (Form without Matter) is another. Now, wherever there
is Form, there either are or may be many distinct particulars;
whether we admit (with Plato) that the Forms exist separately, or
not. In all things where the Essence is implicated with Matter, we
see that the particular manifestations are many and of indefinite
number. Upon this reasoning therefore, there are or at least may be
many Heavens: the supposition that there can be no more than one, is
inadmissible (ss. 1-2).

But we must see how far this reasoning will hold. That the Form
without Matter differs from the Form with Matter, is perfectly true.
But this does not show that there must be many Kosmi; nor can there
be many, if this one Kosmos exhausts all the matter that exists. If
the matter of man were flesh and bone, and if a single man were
formed, including all flesh and all bone indissolubly united; there
could not possibly exist any other man; and the like is true about
other objects; for, where the essence is implicated with an
underlying matter, no object can come into existence unless some
matter be furnished. The Kosmos, or Heaven, is a particular object,
composed partly out of appropriate matter: but if it absorbs all the
appropriate matter, no second Kosmos can come to pass. We shall now
show that it does include all the appropriate matter (ss. 3-5).

The word Heaven has three different senses. 1. It means the essence
of the extreme periphery of the universe, or the natural body which
is there situated: we call this highest and farthest place Heaven,
where we suppose all the divine agency to be situated ([Greek: e)n
ô(=| to\ thei=on pa=n i(dru=sthai/ phamen]). 2. It means the body
continuous ([Greek: to\ suneche\s sô=ma]) with the extreme periphery
of the universe, wherein are contained Sun, Moon, and some of the
Stars (Planets); for these we affirm to be in the Heaven. 3. In a
third sense, it means the body circumscribed ([Greek:
periecho/menon]) by this extreme periphery: for we usually call the
Whole and the Universe, Heaven.--These being the three senses of
Heaven, the Whole circumscribed by the extreme periphery must by
necessity consist of all the natural and perceivable body existing,
since there neither is nor can be any such outside of the Heaven.
For, if there were any such outside of the Heaven, it must be either
one of the elements or a compound thereof--either by nature or
contrary to nature. For we have shown that each of the three
elements--the circular, the centrifugal, and the centripetal--has its
own special place by nature; and that, even if the place in which it
now is were not its natural place, that place would be the natural
place of another one among the three; for, if a place be contrary to
nature in reference to one, it must be conformable to nature in
reference to another. Neither of these three elements therefore can
be outside of the Heaven, nor, of course, any of their compounds. And
there exists no other body besides these; nor can **there exist
any other (ss. 6, 7).

We see therefore plainly that there neither is nor can be any mass of
body ([Greek: sô=matos o)/gkon]) outside of the Heaven; and that the
Heaven comprehends all matter--all body natural and perceptible. So
that there neither are, nor ever have been, nor ever can be, many
Heavens: this one is unique as well as perfect. Nor is there either
place, or vacuum, or time, outside of the Heaven. There is no place
or vacuum; because, if there were, body might be placed therein;
which we have shown to be impossible. There is no time; because time
is the number of motion, and there can be no motion without some
natural body; but there cannot exist any extra-celestial body.
Neither, therefore, are the things outside of the Heaven in place,
nor is there time to affect them with old age, nor do they undergo
change of any kind. They are without any change of quality and
without susceptibility of suffering; they remain, throughout the
entire Æon, in possession of the best and most self-sufficing life.
The word Æon is a divine expression proposed ([Greek: thei/ôs
e)/phthegktai]) by the ancient philosophers: they call the Æon of
each creature that end which circumscribes the natural duration of
the creature's life. Pursuant to this same explanation, the end of
the whole Heaven--the end comprising all time and the infinity of all
things--is Æon, so denominated [Greek: a)po\ tou= **a)ei\
ei)=nai], immortal and divine. From this is suspended existence and
life for all other things; for some closely and strictly, for others
faintly and feebly. For it is a doctrine often repeated to us in
ordinary philosophical discourse ([Greek: e)n toi=s e)gkukli/ois
philosophê/masi]) respecting divine matters--that the Divine, every
thing primary and supreme, is by necessity unchangeable; and this
confirms what has been just affirmed. For there exists nothing more
powerful than itself which can cause it to be moved (if there were,
_that_ would be more divine); nor has it any mean attribute; nor is
it deficient in any of the perfections belonging to its nature. Its