返回主页
中国的国际行为及外交策略
目录
China’s International Behavior
Summary
Abbreviations
CHAPTER ONE Introduction
CHAPTER TWO China’s Foreign Policy Outlook
CHAPTER THREE Current Perceptions of the International Security Environment
CHAPTER FOUR China’s Foreign Policy Objectives
CHAPTER FIVE China’s Expanding Diplomatic Toolkit
CHAPTER Six China’s Foreign Policy Actions
Chapter SEVEN Challenges Facing Chinese Diplomacy
Chapter Eight Conclusions
China’s International Behavior
Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification
Evan S. Medeiros
Prepared for the United States Air Force
Copyright 2009 RAND Corporation
Preface
The expanding scope of China’s international activities is one of the
newest and most important trends in global affairs. China is increasingly
present and involved in many parts of the world, including in
regions once only marginal to Beijing’s interests. China’s global activism
has arisen so rapidly and has so many dimensions that it immediately
and naturally raises questions about China’s intentions and the
implications for U.S. security interests. U.S. policymakers and strategists
would like to understand more fully how China defines its international
objectives, how it is pursuing them, how effective it has been,
and whether it seeks to undermine U.S. power and influence.
To address these issues, this monograph analyzes the content,
character, and execution of China’s international behavior. It examines
how China views its security environment, how it defines its foreign
policy objectives, how it is pursuing these objectives, and the consequences
for U.S. economic and security interests. The breadth and the
rapidity of change in China’s international activities are daunting to
analyze, let alone to understand. This monograph aims to make such
assessments more accessible and meaningful.
This research is relevant for U.S. policymakers and strategists
who are focused on managing U.S.-China relations, on shaping Chinese
diplomacy, and on ensuring that China’s global activism does not
undercut U.S. foreign policy goals. This research also helps identify
opportunities for the United States and China to broaden and deepen
bilateral cooperation.
更多资讯，请访问： retter2012.com 。
This monograph is part of a substantial and growing body of
RAND Corporation research that examines the security implications
for the United States of China’s growing power and influence—both
as a military and as a diplomatic power. The research reported here was
conducted by the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project
AIR FORCE and was sponsored by the U.S. Air Force’s Director of
Operational Plans and Joint Matters (AF/A5X) and the Combatant
Commander of the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF/CC) for a study entitled
“The U.S.-China Security Relationship: Taiwan and Beyond.” It
builds on previous RAND Project AIR FORCE work, including the
following:
Evan S. Medeiros, Keith Crane, Eric Heginbotham, Norman D.
Levin, Julia F. Lowell, Angel Rabassa, and Somi Seong, Pacific
Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East
Asia to China’s Rise, MG-736-AF, 2008.
Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin
Pollpeter, Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Anti-Access Strategies
and Their Implications for the United States, MG-524-AF, 2007.
Roger Cliff and David A. Shlapak, U.S.-China Relations After
Resolution of Taiwan’s Status, MG-567-AF, 2007.
Evan S. Medeiros, Roger Cliff, Keith Crane, and James C.
Mulvenon, A New Direction for China’s Defense Industry,
MG-334-AF, 2005.
Keith Crane, Roger Cliff, Evan S. Medeiros, James C. Mulvenon,
and William H. Overholt, Modernizing China’s Military: Opportunities
and Constraints, MG-260-AF, 2005.
RAND Project AIR FORCE
RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corporation,
is the U.S. Air Force’s federally funded research and development
center for studies and analyses. PAF provides the Air Force
with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development,
employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future aerospace forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Force
Modernization and Employment; Manpower, Personnel, and Training;
Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine.
Additional information about PAF is available on our Web site:
http://www.rand.org/paf/
返回页首
Summary
China is now a global actor of significant and growing importance. It
is involved in regions and on issues that were once only peripheral to
its interests, and it is effectively using tools previously unavailable. It
is no longer necessary to emphasize integrating China into the existing
constellation of norms, rules, and institutions of the international
community; by and large, China is already there. It is influencing perceptions,
relationships, and organizations all over the world. China’s
international behavior is clearly altering the dynamics of the current
international system, but it is not transforming its structure.
China’s global activism is driven by an identifiable set of perceptions,
objectives, and policies—some are long-standing and others are
more current. Both China’s foreign policy objectives and its policies
have evolved in the last decade but with more change in the latter than
the former. In this sense, China has a distinct foreign policy strategy,
to the extent that any nation has one. China’s strategy is best understood
as comprising multiple layers, each adding to an understanding
of the totality of it. This monograph analyzes these layers, assesses the
challenges for China in implementing its strategy, and evaluates the
implications for U.S. interests and U.S. policy.
China’s Foreign Policy Outlook
China’s international behavior is influenced by at least three historically
determined lenses that color and shade its perceptions of its security
environment and its role in global affairs. First, China is in the process of reclaiming its status as a major regional power and, eventually,
as a great power—although the latter goal is not well defined
or articulated. Chinese policymakers and analysts refer to China’s rise
as a “revitalization” and a “rejuvenation.” Second, many Chinese view
their country as a victim of “100 years of shame and humiliation” at
the hands of Western and other foreign powers, especially Japan. This
victimization narrative has fostered an acute sensitivity to coercion by
foreign powers and especially infringements (real or perceived) on its
sovereignty. Third, China has a defensive security outlook that stems
from historically determined fears that foreign powers will try to constrain
and coerce it by exploiting its internal weaknesses.
China’s international behavior is also informed by the longstanding
diplomatic priorities of protecting its sovereignty and territorial
integrity, promoting economic development, and generating international
respect and status. These three priorities have been collectively
driving China’s foreign and security policy since the founding of the
People’s Republic of China in 1949. Yet, the policy manifestations of
these three strategic priorities and the leadership’s relative emphasis on
them have differed over the last 30 years. (See pp. 7–18.)
Chinese Perceptions of the International Security
Environment
China’s view of its security environment has two overarching dimensions.
The first is a widely held belief that China’s success is inextricably
linked to the international community, more so than ever before.
The second is the pervasive uncertainty about the range and severity of
threats to China’s economic and security interests. For some, China has
never been so secure and, for others, the numbers and types of security
threats are growing, motivating deep concerns about the future.
On balance, Chinese leaders have concluded that their external
security environment is favorable and that the next 15 to 20 years represent
a “strategic window of opportunity” for China to achieve its leading
objective of national revitalization through continued economic, to the extent possible, to extend this window of opportunity through
diplomacy.
更多资讯，请访问： retter2012.com 。
China’s view of its security environment includes six mainstream
perceptions:
No Major Power War: There is a low probability of large-scale
war among major powers, and thus the next 15 to 20 years is a
unique period for China to continue to develop and modernize.
Globalization: Globalization has redefined interstate economic
and political interactions, bolstering China’s global economic
importance and enhancing interdependence among states. Globalization
has imposed some constraints on China.
The Global Power Balance: Multipolarity is rapidly emerging;
although the United States remains a predominant power in the
world, it is declining gradually and in relative terms. The United
States is both a potential threat to China’s revitalization as a great
power and a central partner in China’s realization of this goal.
Nontraditional Security Challenges: China faces a variety of
such challenges, including terrorism, weapons proliferation, narcotics
and human trafficking, environmental degradation, the
spread of infectious diseases, and natural disasters. These are redefining
China’s relations with major powers in Asia and globally,
including by creating opportunities for tangible cooperation.
Energy Insecurity: China defines energy security in terms of
two issues: price volatility and security of delivery. China feels
vulnerable on both fronts. Such perceptions are increasingly driving
its efforts to gain access to crude oil and natural gas resources,
especially in the Middle East and Africa.
China’s Rise: Chinese policymakers see the “rise of China” as an
influential factor in global economic and security affairs. China
is increasingly confident in its diplomatic reach and influence and
feels it has succeeded in dampening fears of a “China threat,”
especially in Asia. (See pp. 19–44.)
China’s Foreign Policy Objectives
Chinese policymakers have crafted a foreign policy strategy that seeks
to accomplish five specific objectives: economic growth and development,
reassurance, countering constraints, resource diversification, and
reducing Taiwan’s international space. This list of diplomatic objectives
has expanded in the last decade as China became more integrated into
the international community.
First, China seeks to maintain a stable international environment
to facilitate continued reform and development at home—as Chinese
policymakers have reiterated for decades. This domestic focus has a
growing variety of external manifestations: China actively uses its
diplomacy to expand access to markets, investment, technology, and
natural resources. Second, China seeks to reassure Asian states and the
international community that its growing capabilities will not undermine
other countries’ economic and security interests. Third, Chinese
diplomacy, especially in Asia, seeks to reduce the ability or willingness
of other nations, singularly or collectively, to contain, constrain,
or otherwise hinder China’s revitalization. Fourth, China is building
political relationships to diversify its access to energy and other natural
resources, with a focus on Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.
Energy security encompasses diversifying both suppliers and supply
routes. Fifth, China seeks to reduce Taiwan’s international space and
limit other nations’ ability to confer legitimacy on Taiwan. (See pp.
45–60.)
China’s Foreign Policy Actions
China has developed and deployed a bevy of new and effective ways
to pursue its five foreign policy objectives. It has also been more confident,
flexible, creative, and assertive in using these new tools. China
has established “strategic partnerships” with developed and developing
countries alike and has initiated high-level “strategic dialogues” with
several major powers. China has embraced multilateral institutions, in
every region and on several functional issues. China’s expansion of its role in existing regional organizations and its formation of new ones
have become staples of its diplomacy. China’s use of economic diplomacy
is robust and multifaceted, including not only bilateral trade but
also outward direct investment, financial arrangements, development
aid, and free trade agreements to advance both economic and political
objectives. China’s military diplomacy now incorporates extensive participation
in United Nations peacekeeping activities, high-level defense
exchanges, joint exercises, and joint training and education; reassurance
is a major goal of these enhanced efforts. (See pp. 61–192.)
Challenges Facing Chinese Diplomacy
Beijing confronts several challenges that will constrain its ability to
meet its diplomatic objectives and perhaps also skew the ability to
understand China’s intentions. First, as China’s global presence and
influence grow, China’s neighbors and other states will expect more
of Beijing. It is unclear whether China is prepared to respond to these
demands, fearing an accumulation of too many burdens; this is already
raising questions about China’s predictability and its reliability. Second,
China’s approach to the Taiwan question, which can be inflexible and
aggressive at times, undermines its ability to appear moderate and
benign. Third, China’s myriad and acute governance challenges limit
the government’s ability to manage internal problems that could spill
over onto its neighbors. This governance deficit complicates Beijing’s
ability to comply fully with its commitments, making China appear as
an unreliable actor. A fourth challenge involves weaknesses in China’s
decisionmaking system. The problems of excessive secrecy and the lack
of coordination across the civilian, intelligence, and military bureaucracies
hinder China’s ability to respond rapidly and effectively to crises
with international dimensions. (See pp. 193–200.)
Key Findings about China’s International Behavior
China has been largely working within—indeed, deftly leveraging—
the current international system to accomplish its foreign policy objectives.
It sees more opportunities than constraints in using the current
system to advance its interests. China’s international behavior is not
ideologically driven, and China is not pursuing a revolutionary foreign
policy that seeks to acquire new territory, forge balancing coalitions, or
advance alternative models of economic development or global security.
China is not trying to tear down or radically revise the current
constellation of global rules, norms, and institutions. Rather, it has
been seeking to master them to advance its interests—an approach
that, to date, has proven quite productive for Beijing.
China is also dissatisfied with certain attributes of the current
status quo, such as the undetermined status of Taiwan and U.S. global
predominance in both security and economic affairs. Beijing’s response
has been to work within the system to address its concerns; this has
included attempts to reduce the relative power and influence of the
United States, especially U.S. actions directly affecting Chinese interests.
China does not currently seek to confront the United States to
erect a new international order. But China does challenge some U.S.
interests, particularly in Asia. On balance, China has been occasionally
assertive but seldom aggressive in pursuing this and other objectives.
China’s approach has been geared toward attracting and binding others,
rather than directly challenging their interests: It is more gravitational
than confrontational. It seeks to create an environment in Asia in which
states are drawn to, reliant on, and thereby deferential to Beijing, as a
way to minimize constraints and maximize its freedom of action.
In part by design and in part by default, China is diversifying its
sources of prosperity, security, and status—a trend that holds major
implications for China’s global influence and U.S.-China relations.
China is using its diplomacy to expand its access to markets, investment,
technology, and resources to fuel domestic development. It is
developing new diplomatic relationships and expanding existing ones
with numerous power centers including global and regional institu tions. It is also diversifying its sources of international status and legitimacy,
to broaden China’s appeal.
Chinese leaders continue to approach their foreign policy and foreign
relations through the prism of internal affairs, to use foreign policy
to assist the increasingly complex tasks of economic and social development
at home. This does not mean that China is an insular nation that
just wants to be left alone or that Chinese leaders view external affairs
as a secondary concern. The reality of China’s international behavior
could not be further from that.
For China, acting locally now requires that it think globally. The
links between domestic and international affairs for China have become
stronger and have assumed new dimensions in the last decade, but it is
this linkage that will continue to drive China’s international behavior.
China’s twin goals of maintaining economic growth and domestic stability
(and, thus, the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party)
remain the prevailing motivations for its external behavior.
As China’s global profile grows, China wants a “seat at the table”
to play a greater role in shaping global rules, norms, and institutions.
This is most evident in China’s multilateral diplomacy: China has created
new organizations and expanded its participation in existing ones.
China’s role as an agenda- and rule-setter will only become a more
prominent feature of its diplomacy in the coming years. However,
China’s actual record in such rule-making is quite limited. Although
China clearly wants to be part of such processes, it is unclear what new
rules or norms it seeks to advance, aside from a greater voice for itself.
To date, Beijing has promoted few genuinely new ideas and the institutions
it has created are not meant to compete with or replace existing
ones. Also, other Asian powers remain wary of China’s diplomatic
activism and have sought to limit China’s attempts to extend its influence
through participation in such organizations.
Furthermore, China’s international behavior is a deeply transitional
phenomenon. China’s perceptions, objectives and policies are fixed for
now but they are also evolving. Chinese policymakers clearly have objectives
in mind, but they are groping their way forward with newfound
power, influence, responsibilities, expectations, and constraints. China’s
international behavior is increasingly driven, as well as constrained, by both domestic imperatives and a dynamic global security environment.
Chinese foreign policy reflects a precarious balancing of competing
internal and external demands, which are growing in number and variety.
These demands, ultimately, will determine the content and character
of China’s future international behavior—contributing, at times, to
seemingly contradictory or inconsistent behaviors. (See pp. 201–207.)
Implications for U.S. Security Interests
China does not seek to displace the United States as the predominant
global power. Its elites do not currently want China to be a global
leader on par with the United States—a peer competitor. They view
their domestic challenges as too great to assume the risks and responsibilities
associated with such a role, and they recognize that they lack
the material resources to do so. They also fear that such a global role
would divert much needed resources from national development and
could foster regional backlashes against China. To be sure, Chinese
leaders welcome a more multipolar world, one in which multilateralism
reigns and U.S. power is constrained. Chinese leaders also want China
to be eventually recognized as a great power—although that aspiration
has very general attributes and is not well defined. Chinese leaders
aspire to such a status as external validation of China’s achievements,
but they are also wary of the burdens and costs associated with it.
Some of China’s foreign policy actions are directed at eroding relative
U.S. influence in certain regions and institutions. Russia has been
a useful Chinese partner in this effort. However, relations between the
two countries remain complex, and they do not currently constitute a
united front against the United States. The most competitive aspects
of China’s foreign policy are evident in the Asia-Pacific, which China
views as its strategic periphery. China is not now trying to push the
United States out of this region; Chinese leaders recognize the high
costs and likely failure of such an effort. Some Chinese policymakers
recognize the stability provided by U.S. security commitments. Rather,
China seeks to constrain the U.S. ability to constrain China; that is,
China seeks to maximize its freedom of action and leverage as a way to counter perceived U.S. efforts to limit Chinese choices. Thus, China
seeks to challenge U.S. influence when it directly touches Chinese
interests (especially core ones), but China does not seek to confront the
United States or expel it from the region.
Furthermore, China’s diversification strategy is altering the conduct
of U.S.-China relations. As the sources of China’s prosperity, security,
and status have broadened (and during a period in which China
perceives that the United States is in relative decline), Beijing is becoming
less willing to accommodate U.S. preferences and more able to resist
pressure from Washington, and even to generate countervailing forces.
The traditional U.S. approach of relying largely on bilateral diplomacy
to shape China’s international behavior faces new limitations.
China’s ascendance in the Asia-Pacific region is changing the
nature of U.S. relations with its allies and partners in the region. As
China becomes more relevant to their economic, financial, and military
affairs, the needs of U.S. allies and partners and their demands on
Washington will change. In some cases, this makes U.S. policy and
U.S. commitments more relevant, allowing Asian nations to engage
China with more confidence. At the same time, none of these nations
wants to choose between the United States and China; none wants the
United States to leave the region; none wants China to dominate the
region; and none wants to be drawn into an effort to contain China.
As China looms larger in their economic development and regional
security planning, this will complicate Washington’s ability to set
exclusively the terms of interaction and cooperation with allies, partners,
and others in the Asia-Pacific region and likely beyond. (See pp.
208–220.)
Acknowledgments
This monograph benefited enormously from the assistance of numerous
RAND colleagues who aided with its researching, editing, and
formatting. Jianglai Zhang and Matt Southerland provided invaluable
assistance gathering, processing, and analyzing large amounts of data
on numerous aspects of Chinese foreign policy. The breadth of this
monograph owes much to their diligence. Beth Hague provided valuable
inputs to various sections. RAND colleagues Eric Heginbotham,
David Shlapak, and Sarah Harting read several drafts and helped to
refine the argumentation and the clarity of the writing.
Numerous Chinese officials and scholars provided invaluable
insights into the peculiar art of interpreting “the real meaning” of official
slogans about foreign affairs and offered their analysis of the drivers
of China’s international behavior. I am grateful for the time and
insights of these Chinese interlocutors, but all discussions were conducted
on the basis of anonymity.
The initial draft of this monograph benefited greatly from formal
reviews by Michael Swaine and Norman Levin; Paul Heer provided
invaluable insights on the initial draft report as well. Megan Katt and
Jessica Hart helped to proofread, format, and finalize various versions
of this monograph. Patricia Bedrosian did yeoman’s service copy editing
the entire document, producing a much tighter read. All mistakes
are, of course, my own.
返回页首
Abbreviations
ACD Asian Cooperation Dialogue
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
b/d barrels per day
BFA Boao Forum for Asia
CACF China-Africa Cooperation Forum
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CD Conference on Disarmament
CEPA Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement [China-Taiwan]
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization
EAC East Asian Community
EAS East Asia Summit
EU European Union
FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FDI foreign direct investment
FTA free trade agreement
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP gross domestic product
GMS Greater Mekong Subregion
IADB Inter-American Development Bank
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
MES market-economy status
MINURSO Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPC National People’s Congress
NPT Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OAS Organization of American States
ODA official development assistance
ODI outward direct investment
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSC Open Source Center
PLA People’s Liberation Army [People’s Republic of China]
PRC People’s Republic of China
RMB renminbi [China]
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
UK United Kingdom
U.N. United Nations
UNAMIS U.N. Advance Mission in the Sudan
UNMIS U.N. Mission in the Sudan
UNPKO U.N. peacekeeping operations
UNSC U.N. Security Council
U.S. United States
WMD weapons of mass destruction
WTO World Trade Organization
返回页首
CHAPTER ONE Introduction
China’s economic and diplomatic interests now span the globe, having
gradually moved beyond the Asia-Pacific region in the last decade. China
is active on issues and in regions that were previously only peripheral to
Beijing’s calculations, notably, Latin America and the Middle East. Its
diplomacy is affecting the conduct of international relations at virtually
all levels of the global system, and its decisions are influencing international
perceptions, relationships, institutions, and processes. China has
become central to managing, if not resolving, many of the traditional
and nontraditional security issues facing the international community.1
Within Asia, China’s strategic periphery, it has become a preeminent
power, deeply involved in all aspects of economic and security affairs.
China has become a fulcrum of change in the regional order, further
ensuring that its pivotal role in Asia will deepen in the future.
These trends beg the following questions: What are China’s objectives
as a regional power and as a global actor? How is it pursuing them
and to what effect on the respective regions? Where is China’s international behavior headed? How might its external interests and foreign
policy change as its economic and military capabilities expand? And,
ultimately, are China’s foreign policy objectives consistent with U.S.
economic and security interests?
To some extent, China’s leaders have articulated answers to these
important queries. Chinese policymakers talk about “peace, development,
and cooperation” as the main features of China’s diplomacy,
and they argue that China’s foreign policy seeks “to foster a stable and
peaceful international environment that is conducive to building a well
off society in an all around way.” More recently, China’s leaders claim
to adhere to an international strategy of “peaceful development” in
building a “harmonious world.”2
These and other mantras are ubiquitous in the Chinese government’s
public discussions of its diplomacy. But such slogans and
policies are decidedly unsatisfying, prompting confusion and worry
among many external observers. It is not that such Chinese goals are
patently untrue or a clever prevarication about Beijing’s real intentions,
a common refrain in the United States; rather, they are insufficient to
explain the multiplicity of Chinese interests and actions. China’s official
characterizations of its foreign policy understate the various layers
of perceptions, motivations, and policies that collectively constitute
China’s international behavior. In doing so, they fail to capture the
dynamism of China’s foreign affairs, which, in turn, obscures external
understandings of Chinese behaviors. Therefore, to answer questions
about China’s current and future intentions, analysts must turn to the
analytical enterprise of weaving together Chinese statements, analyses,
and actions (and the motivations implied by all of these) to assess its
objectives as a regional power and as a global actor.
To this end, this monograph examines China’s current and future
“international behavior,” which is a collective term encompassing both
China’s foreign relations (bilateral and multilateral) and the foreign policies
it uses to pursue the former. How China conceives of its regional
and global interests and the strategies and policies it uses to pursue
such interests have direct implications for stability and security in Asia
and globally. Moreover, an understanding of the perceptions, strategies,
and tools underlying China’s diplomacy will illuminate the future
directions of China’s international behavior.
This monograph argues that China’s international behavior is
best understood as comprising multiple layers with each one adding
to the understanding of China’s current actions and future direction.
The layers are (1) the historically determined “lenses” through which
Chinese policymakers view the world and China’s role in it, (2) China’s
perceptions of its current international security environment, (3)
China’s foreign policy objectives, and (4) China’s specific foreign policy
actions in pursuit of its objectives (Figure 1.1). Given the breadth and
rapidity of change in China’s international behavior, this approach is
meant to provide an analytic framework, a model of sorts, for assessing
China’s current and future intentions and the implications for the
United States. It is not meant to be a comprehensive treatment of all
aspects of Chinese foreign and national security policy. For example,
this monograph does not address Chinese military modernization and
Chinese military operations in East Asia, as these topics are independent
research projects themselves and thus beyond the scope of the
present analysis.3
To research China’s international behavior, this monograph used
Chinese open-source writings extensively, as well as those of Western
analysts. These textual sources were complemented by a series of interviews
in China in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 with officials, analysts,
and scholars involved in research and policymaking on China’s foreign
and national security affairs.
Figure 1.1 Graphical Depiction of China’s International Behavior
This monograph is composed of an introduction, six substantive
sections, and a chapter containing conclusions. Following the introduction,
Chapter Two examines the various lenses through which Chinese
policymakers and analysts contemplate China’s role in global affairs.
These lenses, which are largely derived from Chinese history as well as its
long-standing national priorities, both reflect and inform Chinese biases
that pervade its foreign policymaking. These are presented as enduring
features of China’s international behavior. Chapter Three explores
China’s perceptions of its current international security environment
with a specific focus on the perceived challenges it confronts. Chapters
Four, Five, and Six then detail China’s current diplomatic objectives as
an international actor and the specific policies Beijing has adopted in
pursuit of them. The meaning and relevance of China’s international
actions are interpreted using the context of the previous chapters.
Drawing on Chapters Two through Six, Chapter Seven highlights
the multiple challenges China faces in pursuit of both its longterm
goals and its current objectives. The study’s conclusions (Chapter
Eight) distill the monograph’s numerous arguments down to
several analytic judgments about the current and future content of
China’s international behavior. That chapter then assesses the consequences
of these claims for U.S.-China relations with a focus on the
degree of convergence and divergence in U.S. and Chinese global
interests.
返回页首
CHAPTER TWO China’s Foreign Policy Outlook
China’s international behavior is influenced by three historically determined
“lenses” of perception that color and shade how Chinese policymakers
view China’s external environment, think about China’s role
in international affairs, and implement policy actions. These lenses
reflect Chinese biases and prejudices about the international system
and China’s place in it. These lenses are all broad notions related to
China’s national-role concept and are not commonly articulated by
officials, nor do they appear in government documents. Rather, these
ideas pervade Chinese research, analysis, and policymaking about
Chinese foreign relations and foreign policy.1
The Three Lenses
National Revitalization
First, there is a pervasive belief in China that it is in the process of
reclaiming its lost status as a “great power” (da guo 大国). Chinese policymakers, analysts, and the media describe China’s current rise as
a “revitalization” (fuxing 复兴) or “rejuvenation” (zhenxing 振兴) of
China’s rightful place in the world as a great power. They commonly
refer to China’s substantial global influence during the Han, Tang, and
late Ming/early Qing dynasties—even though China had very limited
contact during these periods with ancient Greece, the Roman Empire,
Byzantium, or India.2 In the words of a Global Times commentary,
“China is in the midst of the historical process of ‘a major country
becoming stronger’ (da er qu qiang 大而趋强).”3 For many Chinese,
the current rise is actually the fourth such instance in Chinese history;
they point out that during past dynasties, China was a highly
advanced, culturally sophisticated, technologically developed society
that contributed significantly to the global economy and, by virtue of
this position, was internationally revered and respected.4
In referring to these earlier periods, Chinese policymakers and
analysts maintain that China was never a hegemonic ruler that relied
on force and coercion (a concept known as badao 霸道) but rather was
a benign and benevolent great power (a concept known as wangdao
王道) that attracted other countries by virtue of its moral goodness,
cultural richness, economic wealth, and technological sophistication.
For many Chinese, China is currently returning to this past role as
a benevolent great power, and in doing so it is correcting the historical aberration of China’s decline over the last 150 years since the Opium
War of the 1840s.5
Moreover, current Chinese conceptions of being a “great power”
are very general and not well defined by policymakers or scholars.
Chinese conceptions seem to coalesce around the notion of being
involved in (indeed, having Chinese views solicited on) any major international
decision affecting China’s interests (as China defines them).
Deference to China by other major powers is a consistent feature of
Chinese discussions of what it means to be a great power in the international
system. Chinese commentaries, to date, have discussed little
about what China would do with its position as a great power aside
from preventing coercion by other states and expanding its comprehensive
national power.
Chinese arguments about its country’s past behavior as a benign
hegemon are not solely nationalist rhetoric (although they are part of
that discourse) but rather are mainstream perceptions that pervade
Chinese attitudes about its global role and the rights entailed in such
a position. Common manifestations of this perception can be found
in Chinese arguments that China should currently be considered a
great power by virtue of its large population, its long history and rich
cultural traditions, its large and globally integrated economy, its position
as a permanent member on the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC), and its possession of nuclear weapons. Importantly, this
image of China’s past “greatness” contributes to a strong entitlement
mentality regarding China’s current ascension in international affairs and the expected treatment of China by other nations. In the words of
Qinghua University scholar Yan Xuetong,
The rise of China is granted by nature . . . [the Chinese] believe
that China’s decline is a historical mistake that should be
corrected . . . the Chinese regard their rise as regaining China’s
lost international status rather than obtaining something new . . .
the Chinese consider the rise of China a restoration of fairness
rather than gaining advantages over others.6
A Victim Mentality
A second and related view expressed in Chinese writings is that China
is a victim of “100 years of shame and humiliation” (bainian guochi
百年国耻) at the hands of Western and other foreign powers, especially
Japan. Beginning with the Opium War, China was invaded, divided,
and weakened by external powers until Mao Zedong unified China
and founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. This legacy
has left a deep impression on the perceptions and national identity of
many Chinese; the Communist party has fostered this narrative since
its inception, as part of its identity and as a means of fostering its legitimacy.
The CCP claims that it will protect China from both xihua and
fenhua—or being split and Westernized by external states.
This victimization narrative has created an acute Chinese sensitivity
to potential infringements on China’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity; it has also contributed to a strong Chinese emphasis in its
diplomacy on the principles of equality, mutual respect, and noninterference
in the internal affairs of states.7 These views reinforce the sense
of entitlement noted above. Indeed, China’s victim mentality and its
effort to reclaim lost status are two sides of the same coin that collectively shape China’s effort to regain its “rightful role” in modern international
relations.8
This victim mentality has been changing and evolving in recent
years. Chinese officials and scholars have discussed the adoption of
a “great power mentality” (daguo xintai 大国心态) that emphasizes
China’s substantial accomplishments in developing its economy and its
rising status in world affairs. Yet, the victimization theme persists and
is common in nationalist rhetoric on China’s foreign affairs; it is most
readily apparent as a force shaping public opinion and affecting government
policy during crises in U.S.-China and U.S.-Japan relations.9
Defensive Security Outlook
A defensive security outlook is a third notion that pervades China’s
thinking on its external affairs. This outlook stems from longstanding
and historically determined Chinese fears that foreign powers
are trying to constrain China (from rising), could coerce it (in a crisis),
or may otherwise exploit its internal weaknesses. These fears have their
origins in official CCP histories, which recount the invasion and Westernization
of China by foreign powers following the Opium War and,
during the Cold War, efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union
to frustrate such Chinese goals as developing nuclear weapons and unifying
with Taiwan. These historical accounts are used to bolster the
legitimacy of the Communist party as the savior of a weak and divided
China but also have the follow-on effect of fostering deep insecurities
about the intentions of external powers toward China.
These insecurities are reflected in many ways in official Chinese
policy and are important to understanding how Chinese leaders perceive
their own intentions. Chinese leaders publicly state that “China
will never seek hegemony and never go in for expansion” and that
China’s cultural tradition is one of “advocating peace” (chongshang
heping 崇尚和平), “emphasizing defense” (zhongshi fangyu 重视防
御), and “creating unity” (tuanjie tongyi 团结统一).10 Chinese leaders
argue that China does not inherently threaten other nations but rather
faces threats to its own security from both peripheral states and major
powers with regional interests, all of which have exploited China in the
past. The Chinese claim that they do not seek to seize, invade, or conquer
the territories of other countries. They often argue that past uses
of force and territorial disputes have been limited, punitive, and the
result of external provocations. These arguments are a common theme
in Communist party histories about past military interventions (e.g.,
Korea, India, and Vietnam) that claim that China conducted “defensive”
military operations provoked by aggressive foreign adversaries.
(Many of these accounts are disputed by Western historians.)
China’s defensive security outlook manifests in policies that place
a high priority on maximizing security around China’s periphery, especially
as it relates to border defense and territorial integrity. Chinese
leaders are especially fearful of the use of force and other coercive measures
(i.e., embargos or sanctions) by foreign powers to force China into
making unwanted decisions, especially during a military crisis. Chinese
writings about nuclear weapons doctrine, for example, are largely
focused on possessing a sufficient nuclear weapons capability to avoid
being blackmailed by a nuclear-armed adversary, as distinct from possessing
a large and diverse nuclear arsenal intended for discreet military
purposes, such as nuclear warfighting.11
An important evolution in Chinese thinking has been a growing
Chinese appreciation of the “security dilemma” in China’s foreign
affairs. Chinese officials and scholars, beginning in the mid-1990s,
started to appreciate that certain Chinese actions (taken to protect
China’s security interests) were perceived as threatening to countries
around China’s periphery; Chinese policymakers began to understand
that their “defensive” actions were motivating reactions from
other countries that augmented instability and security competition
in East Asia.12 This Chinese recognition prompted a greater emphasis
on reassurance as a feature of Chinese diplomacy, a theme that will be
addressed in greater detail below.
Long-Term Diplomatic Priorities
China’s three historical lenses are further reflected in three long-term
and enduring diplomatic priorities: sovereignty and territorial integrity,
economic development, and international respect and status. Whereas the
historical lenses are somewhat abstract, these priorities are more concrete
and have explicitly motivated China’s foreign and security policy
since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. They are
not just post-1978 phenomena. The policy manifestations of these three
priorities and the leadership’s relative emphasis on them have varied
over the last 25 years—and will continue to do so. Whereas Mao’s foreign
policy stressed sovereignty, territorial integrity, and status (among
other revolutionary ideas), in the reform era Chinese leaders have clearly and consistently placed the priority on national economic development
in China’s foreign relations.13
Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity
Protecting China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are core Chinese
national interests and are evident in foreign policies that seek to secure
China’s borders, promote reunification with Taiwan, limit foreign
threats to Chinese territory (including maritime territorial claims), and
minimize external interference in Chinese development and politics.14
China shares land borders with 14 countries and its coastline is about
14,500 kilometers long. China has had numerous territorial conflicts
with a majority of its neighboring nations over the past six decades,
regarding both border and maritime areas. Addressing these territorial
disputes and preventing foreign incursions into China has been a central
preoccupation of Chinese diplomacy. China’s successful efforts in
the 1980s to negotiate the return of Hong Kong and Macao are regularly
and frequently touted as major foreign policy successes of Deng’s
foreign policy approach. Of course, ensuring the mainland’s eventual
unification with Taiwan is a long-standing element of China’s effort to
protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
More recently, China perceives that it faces internal threats to its
territorial integrity from “separatist groups,” such as Muslim Uighurs
in Xinjiang Province, and the Dalai Lama. China’s recent emphasis on
counterterrorism in its foreign policy is a manifestation of this desire
to prevent such groups from linking up with al Qaeda or other highly
capable terrorists groups. There is little, if any, debate in China about the primacy of sovereignty and territorial integrity in Chinese foreign
policy.15
Economic Development
Economic development as a foreign policy priority is principally a
reform-era phenomenon. It refers to China’s 30-year-long effort to
ensure a stable external environment to improve the living standards
of Chinese people and to build up China’s “comprehensive national
power” to achieve China’s revival as a great power. Deng Xiaoping’s
1992 aphorism “only development has real meaning” (fazhan caishi
ying daoli 发展才是硬道理) remains a pervasive influence on China’s
foreign policies. In the words of China’s Premier Wen Jiabao, “Development
is the last word; it is not only the basis for resolving all internal
problems but is also the basis for boosting our diplomatic power. The
basis of competition between states lies in power.”16 Wang Yizhou, a
well known international relations scholar at the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences, detailed the logic of the development–foreign policy
linkage,
The main threat to China’s national security is not an invasion
or war conducted by external enemy forces, but the question of
whether China is able to maintain its own steady, orderly, and
healthy development. . . . Political development, civilization
development, social development, and value development are all
components of the concept of development. Under the precondition
of centering on economic development, China, through
the above-mentioned all-dimensional development, will be able
to greatly raise its international status and influence in the new
century, and will be able to carry out its diplomacy on the basis
of a more solid foundation of power. Therefore, going all-out to ensure China’s development is required by both domestic affairs
and foreign affairs.17
During the first two and a half decades of reform and development
(until about 2002), China’s policies were principally focused on
achieving wenbao (温饱), or the level of economic development at
which all Chinese people are fed and clothed. Jiang Zemin, during
the 16th Party Congress in November 2002, declared that China had
achieved that level; he then set a new developmental goal by calling
for China to “build a well-off society in an all around way” (quanmian
jianshe xiaokang shehui 全面建设小康社会) within the next two
decades. Although the precise meaning of Jiang’s phrase is debatable,
it generally means that China seeks to become a stable and prosperous
middle power with a sizable middle class by about 2020.
China’s continued economic development is also crucial to maintaining
the CCP’s grip on power. The party’s ability to continue to
raise the living standards of Chinese society serves as the fundamental
basis for the CCP’s continued legitimacy as the ruling party. As the
ideological basis of the party has eroded, it has been replaced with an
economic logic that demands that Chinese leaders provide greater economic
opportunities for the Chinese people to stay in power.
International Status
Chinese policymakers and scholars have long viewed China’s status as
a respected major power as a core element of their nation’s international
behavior. Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, CCP leaders have
traditionally linked China’s status to such attributes as its permanent
seat on the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council, its possession of
nuclear weapons, its large population and landmass, and its historic
legacy as a major power in Asia. China’s perception of its international
status changed after Mao and after the reform era began, especially
since the fall of the Soviet Union and the Tiananmen incident, but
Chinese leaders have always stuck to—indeed, clung to—these attributes as indicators that China is a major power.18 Although it is unclear
how Chinese leaders measured variation in their status over time, maximizing
status has consistently been a major objective in foreign policy
decisionmaking.19
Also, China’s emphasis on status is linked to its sensitivity to both
its image and reputation in international politics, which are distinct
concepts for China.20 China cares about its image because it wants
to be accepted as a member of the international community and does
not like being ostracized or otherwise isolated, especially in international
institutions. China pays attention to its reputation because of the
material benefits that it believes can stem from a positive one, in terms
of access to trade, aid, technology, and investment. China’s intensive
diplomacy after the Tiananmen incident in 1989 to rebuild its international
image and reputation is an example of the value China puts on
these factors in its foreign policy, for both symbolic and material reasons.
A more recent manifestation of this long-term priority has been a
government effort, beginning in the 1990s, to establish China’s status
as a “responsible major power” (fuzeren de daguo 负责任的大国).21
China’s emphasis on status—a nonmaterial attribute of states—is
curious given China’s traditional preoccupation with the relative position
of major powers in the international system and the jockeying for
power among them.22 This is so because many Chinese strategists see
status as critical to China’s position among the major power centers
and to ensuring Chinese accrual of both power and influence. Chinese
policymakers and scholars argue that efforts to improve China’s
international status are important because other nations are already
expressing concerns about China’s growing influence in global politics.
In other words, improving China’s image and reputation (and the policies
entailed therein) will help China to ameliorate external concerns
of “the China threat” and, thus, will help avoid obstacles to becoming
a strong, wealthy, and influential member of the international
community.23
China’s strivings for international respect and status manifest in
a variety of policies and actions intended to reflect China’s support for
international rules, norms, and institutions. Chinese policymakers and
scholars regularly talk about China playing a more active and constructive
role in international organizations—such as in the U.N. Security
Council, the World Trade Organization, and various regional security
organizations—to demonstrate that China is a force for stability
and economic development. Chinese analysts regularly appeal to the
goal of acting as a responsible major power to explain China’s activism
in multilateral institutions and on nontraditional security issues. Such
actions, according to Chinese Ambassador Wang Yi, boost China’s
international status and serve as a “touchstone for China’s effort to join
the ranks of the first-class powers in the world.”24
返回页首
CHAPTER THREE Current Perceptions of the International Security Environment
Chinese assessments of their external security environment are the
empirical basis on which China’s top policymakers determine China’s
foreign policy. These assessments play an integral role in debates about
which objectives and policies to pursue, and as these perceptions change
so can China’s behavior.1 Chinese policymakers and analysts highlight
several dimensions of their current security environment. Six predominant
perceptions are examined in this chapter.2
But, first, two overarching beliefs shade China’s view of its current
security environment. One is a widely held belief that China’s future
is inextricably (and increasingly) linked to the international community.
Chinese leaders understand that China’s current growth model
combined with the acceleration of globalization have deeply connected
China to the international community. China’s success in accomplishing
national revitalization depends on close and continuing interaction
with global and regional powers, markets, and institutions. In the
words of China’s 2008 national defense white paper, “the future and
destiny of China have been increasingly closely connected with the
international community. China cannot develop in isolation from the
rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability without
China.”3 Even in the wake of the global financial crisis in fall 2008
and the resulting rapid declines in Chinese growth, Hu Jintao affirmed
during the December 2008 Central Economic Work Conference that
the direction of global economic integration for China was correct and
should continue.4
The second belief relates to the pervasive uncertainty among Chinese
policymakers and scholars about the range and severity of threats
to China. For some, China is the most secure it has been in the last
200 years and its global influence and status are both growing. For
others, the security threats facing China are diverse and increasing,
challenging China’s ability to complete the task of national revival
as a great power. The tensions between these two views are reflected
in mainstream Chinese security assessments (such as the biennial
defense white papers). But these debates are only somewhat reflected in Chinese policies. The leadership’s emphasis on consensus decisionmaking
and promoting unified thinking within the CCP has mitigated the
effect of such debates on actual policymaking.5 Ultimately, the relative
balance between external threats and opportunities in Chinese assessments
(both public and internal ones) will serve as an important indicator
of future Chinese perceptions.
The Chinese government’s current position is that, on balance,
China faces a favorable external security environment for continued
growth and development. As addressed in detail below, Chinese leaders
believe that the current environment, for a variety of reasons, offers
a strategic window of opportunity that should last about 20 years and
should allow China to continue to grow its comprehensive national
power and to build a “moderately well-off society.” Chinese policymakers
seek to maximize this window and, if feasible, to extend it for as
long as possible.
Major Power Conflict
A primary and consistent feature of Chinese assessments of their external
environment is a belief in the low probability of war among major
powers, which would distract China from national development. As
the 2008 national defense white paper stated, “factors conducive to
maintaining peace and containing war are on the rise . . . thereby keeping
low the risk of worldwide, all-out and large-scale wars for a relatively
long period of time.”6 This does not mean that Chinese strategists
believe that conflict between China and the United States over Taiwan
is not possible (indeed, the Chinese military is intensely focused on
preparing for such a contingency); rather, it means that the broad contours
of major power relations have changed since the height of the Cold War, lessening the imminence of armed conflicts among major
powers.
This important conclusion, in its initial incarnation, was articulated
by Deng Xiaoping in the mid-1980s and was in direct opposition
to Mao’s assessment of the likelihood of “early war, major war and
nuclear war” (zao da, da da, he zhanzheng 早打, 大打, 核战争). Deng’s
conclusion, in overturning Mao’s pessimism, established the theoretical
foundation for his pursuit of a more internationalist foreign policy
and one that would assist economic development. Deng’s seminal conclusion
subsequently allowed the leadership’s articulation in 1985 of
the phrase “peace and development are the main trends of the times”
(heping yu fazhan shi dangjin shidai de zhuti 和平与发展是当今时代
的主体). This core conclusion and Deng’s repeated references to it in
the 1980s and 1990s set the foundation for China’s reform-era foreign
policy; and this phrase persists today in China’s foreign policy
discourse.7
Following a rapid and acute downturn in U.S.-China relations
in the late 1990s (sparked by the accidental bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade, among other events), there was a major and
important internal Chinese debate about the continued relevance of
“peace and development” as an accurate characterization of China’s
external security environment. After much internal discussion, Chinese
leaders concluded that this core assumption had not changed.8
As a result of this strategic conclusion, Jiang Zemin declared in 2002, during the CCP’s 16th Party Congress, that the next 20 years represented
a “period of strategic opportunity” (zhanlue jiyuqi 战略机遇期)
for China’s growth and development. Jiang’s characterization, that Hu
Jintao has since affirmed, remains a core theoretical conclusion that
justifies and validates the continuation of reform-era foreign policies
focused on promoting China’s stability, economic development, and,
in broadest terms, accumulation of comprehensive national power.9 In
the words of now retired Ambassador Shen Guofang in a June 2007
speech,
The first 20 years of the present century are a vital strategic
opportunity that China must firmly seize and put to good use.
These two decades have strategic significance for building a welloff
society in an all-round way. It is by revolving around this goal
that China plans its foreign policy, general strategy, and diplomatic
activities. The purpose of all diplomatic work is to accomplish
this goal.10
The low probability of war among major powers is balanced by
persistent Chinese concerns about multiple and growing threats to
Chinese, Asian, and global stability. The 2008 national defense white
paper provides a comprehensive Chinese assessment of such concerns:
World peace and development are faced with multiple difficulties
and challenges. Struggles for strategic resources, strategic
locations and strategic dominance have intensified. Meanwhile,
hegemonism and power politics still exist, regional turmoil keeps
spilling over, hot-spot issues are increasing, and local conflicts
and wars keep emerging. The impact of the financial crisis triggered by the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis is snowballing. In the
aspect of world economic development, issues such as energy and
food are becoming more serious, highlighting deep-seated contradictions.
Economic risks are manifesting a more interconnected,
systematic and global nature. Issues such as terrorism, environmental
disasters, climate change, serious epidemics, transnational
crime and pirates are becoming increasingly prominent.11
Chinese strategists, pointing to past tensions in U.S.–European Union
relations and U.S.-Russian relations throughout the 2000s, argue that
the conflicts and contradictions among major powers have been growing
and that these conflicts are a source of global instability. Many
Chinese analysts attribute this largely to U.S. “unilateralist” policies.
China’s defense white papers, including in the most recent 2008 version,
continue to refer to “hegemonism and power politics” as destabilizing
forces in international security affairs; this phrase is a common
Chinese reference to U.S. foreign policies and practices.12 Qian Qichen,
China’s former vice premier and long-time foreign policy doyen, succinctly
summarized—in a uniquely candid and revealing private
speech—elite Community party views on the current state of great
power relations:
The United States wants to engage in unilateralism but can
not dominate the world. . . . For a very long time to come in
the future, relations among the major powers will continue to
be marked by cooperation and competition, mutual exchanges
and mutual restraint, as well as competition and compromise. In
particular, the trend toward cooperation will be greater than the
trend toward conflict. The major powers will continue to maintain
a kind of stable mutual relationship.13
Another notable Chinese concern, highlighted in China’s last
three defense white papers, is the growing militarization of international
politics as a source of regional and global instability. The 2008
national defense white paper offered one of the starkest assessments
in the past several years: “The influence of military security factors
on international relations is mounting. Driven by competition in
overall national strength and the development of science and technology,
international military competition is becoming increasingly
intense. . . . All countries are attaching more importance to supporting
diplomatic struggles with military means. As a result, arms races in
some regions are heating up, posing grave challenges to the international
arms control and nonproliferation regime.”14
For China, these trends in major power relations are directly
affecting Chinese assessments about security and stability in Asia—the
region of highest strategic importance to China. Although “the Asia-
Pacific security situation is stable on the whole” as a result of growing
economic interdependence and the influence of multilateral organizations,
Chinese policymakers remain deeply concerned about the U.S.
role: “The U.S. has increased its strategic attention to and input in the
Asia-Pacific region, further consolidating its military alliances, adjusting
its military deployment and enhancing its military capabilities.”15 A
related Chinese concern is that limited, local conflicts are more likely to
emerge on China’s periphery as a result of the rise of religious, ethnic,
resource, and territorial disputes.
Globalization and Multipolarity
Chinese views on the effects of globalization and the development of
multipolarity on interstate relations are central to their perceptions of
their external security environment. Their conclusions about these two
trends serve as an important barometer of Chinese views on their economic
power, the degree of global interdependence, and the degree of
China’s strategic time and space for continued development.
Globalization
Chinese policymakers and scholars argue that globalization has redefined
interstate economic and political interactions since the end of
the Cold War, resulting in both opportunities for and constraints on
China. On balance, they see globalization as offering more opportunities
than challenges. Globalization has increased the importance of economic
power, enhanced interdependence among nations, and heightened
the opportunities for mutually beneficial economic cooperation.
Chinese policymakers talk about the value of economic diplomacy and
possessing “soft power” in a globalized world. They see all these trends
as redounding to China’s benefit by allowing it to expand its influence.
Ambassador Shen Guofang summarized Chinese views on the positive
implications of globalization.
Basically speaking, the great historical trend epitomized by globalization
and the resultant institutional change bodes well for
China’s peaceful development and has created for China even
more strategic space and maneuvering room.
On the one hand, against the backdrop of globalization, interdependency
among the various economic entities has deepened
without interruption. All countries now attach more importance
to the strengthening of economic diplomacy. The trends toward
the diversification of interests among the various nations and peoples,
toward the emergence of multiple political poles, and toward
cultural pluralism are gaining strength all the time.
On the other hand, the repercussions of globalization have been
reshaping world politics and regional politics and fashioning new national behavior. They also have challenged all nations in the
world to build a harmonious world. Institutionalizing new diplomatic
thinking in the age of globalization has become a new issue
closely watched by every nation.16
At the same time, Chinese analysts note the costs and dangers of
globalization: Globalization has exacerbated economic and social inequities
that have disproportionately benefited developed countries at the
expense of developing nations, including China. This has contributed
to growing “North-South” tensions and the emergence of “economic
neo-colonialism” in which developing nations are subordinated to and
dependent on Western economic and technological superiority. For
China, these trends are not a net negative development. The inequalities
and North-South tensions create space for China to play a bridging
role between those benefiting most from globalization and those being
disadvantaged because China can speak with and for both collection
of states. For many Chinese, this role provides China with the credibility
to expand its political and economic influence in the developing
world.17
Multipolarity
Following the end of the Cold War, most Chinese analysts predicted
a quick evolution from a bipolar system to one initially dominated by
U.S. power and, eventually, to the emergence of a multipolar system.
In the 1990s, such a multipolar configuration among major powers
evolved far slower than China expected and much to its dismay. Chinese
policymakers were surprised and concerned about the U.S. ability
to maintain its position of unipolar dominance. Many Chinese
analysts initially described the post–Cold War “international pattern”
(guoji geju 国际格局) of the early 1990s as “one superpower and many
powers” (yi chao duo qiang 一超多强) but with a strong trend toward
eventual multipolarity. Yet, by the late 1990s, given the continued and unexpected predominance of U.S. economic and military power, a
common Chinese modification of the latter characterization was, “the
superpower is more powerful while many powers are less so” (yi chao
geng chao duo qiang bu qiang 一超更超,多强不强).18 The slow development
of multipolarity—and specifically the U.S. ability to maintain
its position of global predominance and its perceived preference for
unilateral use of military force to advance its interests—has been a
long-standing source of concern for many Chinese policymakers and
strategists.
This perception is now changing and rapidly so. In the last five
years, many Chinese assessments claim that the pendulum of global
order has decidedly swung back in favor of multipolarity. This is now
an official CCP determination, a significant development relevant to
China’s policy formulation and execution. Hu Jintao’s October 2007
report to the 17th Party Congress was the most optimistic assessment
to date; it stated “the progress toward a multipolar world is irreversible”
(emphasis added). This was a much more definite view than Jiang
Zemin’s 2002 report to the 16th Party Congress, which characterized
“the trend” toward multipolarity as “developing amid twists and
turns” (emphasis added).19 (Jiang’s report to the 15th Party Congress
in 1997 modestly claimed, “The world structure is moving towards
multipolarization.”)20
Chinese policymakers and scholars now commonly argue that
multipolarity is accelerating as U.S. influence is diminishing in relative
terms. Chinese assessments about multipolarity point to the global financial crisis and the relative decline of the U.S. economy, on the one
hand, and international resentment and alienation fostered by the U.S.
intervention in Iraq and the U.S. conduct of the global war on terrorism,
on the other. Chinese policymakers and analysts argue that the
latter activities undermined U.S. economic power, military strength,
and international legitimacy. A senior Chinese diplomat stated, “The
uni-polar hegemonistic strategy of the United States has met setback
after setback and its foreign strategy has pulled back.”21 Many Chinese
analysts and scholars now estimate that a truly multipolar system may
emerge in the next 20 to 30 years.
Another aspect of Chinese thinking about the acceleration of
multipolarity is the strength of emerging powers, such as India, Brazil,
Mexico, and China, and related organizations such as the G-20. “The
rise of newly emerging powers has accelerated as has the rise of new
regional organizations. Their voice on the international stage has grown
stronger.”22 Although Chinese strategists realize that the emergence
of a multipolar system remains a medium-term proposition, they see
emerging powers and related organizations as accelerating this trend.
China’s 2008 national defense white paper affirmed this view:
Economic globalization and world multi-polarization are gaining
momentum. The progress toward industrialization and informationization
throughout the globe is accelerating and economic
cooperation is in full swing, leading to increasing economic interdependence,
inter-connectivity and interactivity among countries.
The rise and decline of international strategic forces is quickening,
major powers are stepping up their efforts to cooperate with
each other and draw on each other’s strengths. They continue to
compete with and hold each other in check, and groups of new
emerging developing powers are arising. Therefore, a profound
readjustment is brewing in the international system.23
U.S. Power and Great Power Relations
A third, defining Chinese perception relates to the distribution of power
among major powers in the current international system. For a nation
like China, which is known for its historic disposition toward Realpolitik
thinking, this calculation has a profound effect on its decisionmakers.
Chinese analysts commonly discuss such assessments in terms
of the degree of unipolarity versus multipolarity in the international
system. As noted above, despite past frustration, Chinese policymakers
see current trends as distinctly favoring the emergence of a more multipolar
system as new powers rise and the U.S. faces relative and gradual
decline. Chinese analyses of great power relations heavily focus on U.S.
power, the U.S. role in global politics, and U.S.-China relations.
The current U.S. position of relative predominance in international
affairs, which the Chinese refer to as “hegemony,” is a source of substantial
concern and enduring dissatisfaction for Chinese policymakers.
The U.S. position raises a number of concerns of varying degrees
for Chinese policymakers.24 Most generally, many Chinese fear that the
United States seeks to constrain China’s development of its economic,
diplomatic, and military capabilities, particularly as it affects China’s
position in East Asia. This is a pervasive belief among policymakers,
scholars, military officers, and the general public. The 2008 national
defense white paper stated, “At the same time, the U.S. has increased its
strategic attention to and input in the Asia-Pacific region, further consolidating
its military alliances, adjusting its military deployment and
enhancing its military capabilities. . . .” and that China faces “strategic
maneuvers and containment from the outside.”25
These general Chinese concerns about U.S. strategic intentions
are particularly acute because of the Taiwan question. U.S. and Chinese
sharp differences over Taiwan’s status are China’s most intense
concern because it is a core national interest and the one most likely to
precipitate armed conflict. Militaries in the United States and China
are preparing for such a conflict, which accentuates the extent to which
each side views the other as a potential adversary. Most Chinese see
U.S. policy on Taiwan, in particular U.S. arms sales to the island, as
seeking to prevent reunification and, thus, as part of a broader U.S.
effort to prevent China’s rise for fear that China will eventually eclipse
the United States. Thus, Chinese opposition to U.S. policymaking on
the Taiwan question is an important, but not singular, driver of the
Chinese view that a mainstream U.S. strategic goal is to hinder and
constrain China’s rise.
Looking beyond the Taiwan issue, many Chinese believe that
Washington sees itself as morally superior to Beijing, does not accept
the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, and thus seeks to
bring about China’s democratization. Many Chinese believe that the
United States, because of an American sense of exceptionalism and
superiority, seeks to ensure its long-term dominance in international
affairs, as reflected in a perceived preference for unilateral actions and
coercive diplomacy.
China’s most acute concerns about U.S. intentions are seldom
directly articulated in official statements, but these themes persist in
the writings of scholars and analysts—and across a broad range of
issues beyond military ones.26 Many Chinese interpret U.S. policies
and public debates about China—such as regarding the revaluation of
the renminbi, reform of the Chinese economy, the bilateral trade deficit,
China’s role in East Asia, or modernization of the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA)—as indicative of U.S. efforts to weaken China and
undermine its rise. Even a mainstream and centrist Chinese international relations scholar, Huang Renwei, characterized U.S. policy this
way:
The United States has been trying to “regulate” and confine China’s
international behavior with the international rules and regulations
that have been set under its dominance, with a view to
slowing down China’s development as well as to guarding against
and doing away with the latent threat of China’s challenge to US
hegemony. . . .
The United States has been attempting to raise the “democracy
criteria” that bar China from access to the international system,
and to infiltrate China with Western values, with a view to transforming
China from a country of “different nature and different
category” into one of the “same nature and same category.” At the
same time, by encroaching upon national sovereignty through the
international system, the US and Western force is exerting greater
and greater influence on China’s internal evolution process.27
As a result, many Chinese strategists characterize U.S. policy as both
engagement and containment (with the relative priority on each shifting
over time) and as viewing China as both an enemy and a friend.
This has become a mainstream conclusion among policymakers and
scholars in China.28
Despite these concerns, Chinese policymakers and foreign policy
analysts also now emphasize Washington’s growing reliance on Beijing
to manage global economic and security challenges. This perception,
which began in the early part of this decade, has become even more
pronounced following the global financial crisis, the damage to the
U.S. economy, and the formation of the G-20 mechanism in which
China sees itself as playing a leading role. Huang Renwei nicely summarized
this Chinese view:
On the one hand, the United States is trying by every means
available to use the West-dominated international system to control
the “alien” socialist China, confine China’s international
maneuvering room while incorporating China into this system,
and prevent the rapidly rising China from challenging US hegemony.
There are long-term and fundamental strategic differences
between China and the United States on the development
direction of transformation of the international system and their
respective position in the force structure.
On the other hand, China is playing an increasingly important,
constructive role in safeguarding the stability of the international
system, which has made the United States realize that China is
not like the Soviet Union in the Cold War, nor is it a destructive
force confronting the existing international system. Given the
increasingly high price for maintaining its hegemony, the United
States cannot but consider cooperating with China so that China
can share the cost for preserving the international system.29
Chinese concerns about U.S. predominance and possible containment
strategies are matched by the recognition that the United States
remains central to China’s ultimate goal of national revitalization.
Many in China realize, reluctantly so given the perception of relative
U.S. decline, that China’s developmental goals cannot be successful
without stable relations with the United States; at a minimum, many in
China see that adversarial relations with the United States could derail
China’s current trajectory. The complexity of Chinese perceptions of
the United States and U.S.-China relations was articulated by Chinese
scholar Wang Jisi:
In recent years, the U.S. image in China has become increasingly
diffuse. Several images of the United States now coexist in China:
a paper tiger that was defeated by China and is weakening itself
through hubris and over-extension; the only hegemonic power
that threatens world peace and stability; an opponent that violates
China’s territorial integrity and denies it national reunification; an economic engine that drives the world economy and, to
an increasing extent, the Chinese economy; an admirable society
boasting the world’s most advanced scientific, technological and
educational institutions; a model of modernization from which
China can learn; and an ideologically driven power that wants to
shape China’s political destiny.30
Despite these somewhat contradictory views of the United States,
many in China continue to refer to the U.S.-China relationship as the
“key of the keys” (zhong zhong zhi zhong 重中之中), an internal CCP
formulation adopted in the 1990s under Jiang Zemin to underscore
U.S. centrality to Chinese foreign policy.31 Under Hu Jintao, the degree
to which this policy line remains prominent is unclear. Since 2002, Hu
Jintao has executed subtle shifts in U.S.-China relations and Chinese
foreign policy. Hu has paid as much, if not more, attention to China’s
relations with its Asian neighbors. He has injected a more practical and
less emotional tone to China’s relations with the United States in which
China seems more willing to tolerate bilateral tensions and withstand
U.S. demands but equally willing to expand substantive cooperation in
existing and new areas of mutual interest.
Mainstream Chinese strategists argue that, on balance, China’s
most important bilateral relationship remains with the United States
but in a world characterized by more diffuse types of power and a
greater number of important relationships, including with states, groups
of states, and institutions. This calculation about U.S.-China relations
stems from three views.32 First, the United States is still a key source of
trade, investment, and technology for China’s economic development.
The United States remains China’s largest trading partner, for example,
and China is the largest holder of U.S. government debt and is also
the fastest growing export market for the United States. The degree of China’s interdependence with the U.S. economy is high and not likely
to change significantly in the next two decades.
Second, the United States provides key international “public
goods” to Asia in the form of regional security and stability and freedom
of navigation from which China benefits. There is a tacit recognition
in China that U.S. alliances, security commitments, and forward
deployments have significantly contributed to the regional stability in
Asia that facilitated Chinese economic reform and development over
the past 30 years.33 This view has lessened in recent years as China has
become more concerned about U.S. efforts to expand its alliance with
Japan and its security cooperation with India.34
Third, avoiding conflict and overt geopolitical competition with
the United States is critical to China’s effort to ensure a stable and
peaceful security environment; major strategic competition or outright
military conflict with the United States—more than with any other
nation—would significantly disrupt China’s security environment.
Under severe conditions, it could lead China to shift national resources
from economic development to military modernization—an outcome
not desired by China’s leaders. Chinese scholars write about the need
for “space” and “time” for China’s rise, and stable relations with the
United States is critical to both. To be sure, Chinese analysts also recognize
that although a stable, if not amicable, relationship with the
United States is a necessary condition for its rise, it is by no means a
sufficient one.35
As an indication that China seeks to balance its myriad interests
in relations with the United States, some Chinese strategists have
argued that China can accept a hegemonic power while opposing its
hegemonic behavior. In other words, China can live in a world with a
unipolar power as long as doing so does not directly undermine Chinese interests. This distinction may allow Chinese policymakers and
analysts to balance the need for stable U.S.-China relations against
their concerns about U.S. predominance and Washington’s “unilateral”
use of its power. Whether such a formulation is widely accepted
among China’s top leaders remains unclear.36
Beginning in the 2004–2005 time frame, China’s most acute
concerns about U.S. power and the implications for China have lessened
because Chinese analysts believe that U.S. policies have alienated
many states, undermined U.S. influence, and accelerated its relative
decline. Mainstream Chinese analyses about the U.S. global position
are replete with references to being tied down in the Middle East, for
example. Huang Renwei put it this way:
So, the United States is trapped in a vicious cycle when it challenges
the international system. The strategic assets that it is
trying to promote in the existing international system are offsetting
the strategic liabilities that it is bearing. This will undermine
the system, with the liabilities more and more quickly exceeding
the assets, which will shake the foundation of the hegemonic
position of the empire. This is a very peculiar and important phenomenon
in the contemporary international system, and it offers
China an important strategic opportunity to join and merge into
the international system.37
Nontraditional Security Challenges
Within the last five years and especially after the terrorist attacks of September
11, Chinese officials and analysts have begun to highlight the
threats to China’s interests posed by nontraditional security challenges,
including terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), narcotics and human trafficking, environmental degradation, the spread of infectious diseases, and natural disasters. Chinese
leaders, policymakers, and analysts view these emerging threats as ones
that can, and have, directly and acutely affected China’s external security
environment. Ambassador Shen Guofang argued,
Non-traditional security threats have become more striking. A
variety of new issues, global and transnational, have developed
continuously. We cannot be optimistic about the international
security situation, what with the surge in energy prices, global
warming, the ecological crisis, the gap between the rich and
the poor, cross-national crime, and frequent outbreaks of major
epidemics.38
A decade ago, few Chinese leaders would have shared such concerns,
and today they are universally accepted. This shift is largely
a function of China’s own experiences in managing its responses to
such crises as 9/11, the SARS outbreak in 2003, continuing problems
with Avian influenza, the accelerating HIV/AIDS crisis in China, and
regional nuclear proliferation. The Chinese foreign ministry now refers
to nontraditional security issues as having “unprecedented complexity
and destruction and . . . [posing] a direct threat to world peace and
security.”39 Hu Jintao’s speech at the July 2006 G-8 meeting in Russia
was devoted to these themes, indicating their priority in national policy,
and he outlined numerous proposals to address such challenges. This
was the first time that China’s top leader had addressed nontraditional
challenges in such detail.40
There is also an instrumental logic to China’s sudden focus, early
this decade, on nontraditional security challenges. On one level, following
9/11, Beijing’s new emphasis on counterterrorism and counterproliferation served as a basis for stabilizing and broadening U.S.-China
relations. Chinese policymakers viewed 9/11 and the resulting shift
in U.S. national security priorities as a unique opportunity to put the
bilateral relationship on more stable and long-term footing. Chinese
leaders believed that this shift in U.S. priorities after 9/11 took China
out of the crosshairs of U.S. national security planning. Indeed, Chinese
policymakers and analysts now regularly highlight U.S. “reliance”
on Chinese cooperation to address common, nontraditional security
challenges.41
On a second level, China has focused heavily on nontraditional
security challenges in its interactions with its East Asian neighbors,
especially in regional forums, to expand China’s influence. China
has used bilateral and multilateral discussions of nontraditional security
challenges as a basis for broadening the scope of its political and
military engagement with Asian countries; Beijing has also expanded
diplomatic and material cooperation in managing responses to such
problems as the outbreaks of infectious diseases. In addition, China’s
bilateral and multilateral dialogues on nontraditional challenges are
central to its effort to appear benign and cooperative to countries on
its periphery. Such discussions also draw an implicit contrast with U.S.
regional security dialogues and operational cooperation with Southeast
Asian nations, which in recent years have focused heavily on counterterrorism
cooperation and joint military operations. In focusing on
nontraditional challenges, China seeks to reinforce shared “Asian” conceptions
of national security in which the latter concept is not just military
security but encompasses attention to Southeast Asian nations’
priority on domestic stability, economic development, and consensusbased
solutions to bilateral disagreements.
Energy Insecurity42
China’s acute concern about energy supplies is a relatively new but
important factor shaping its international behavior, especially its relationships
with key supplier countries in Central Asia, the Middle East,
and Africa. China’s need for imported oil and gas became a pressing
issue in the early part of this decade when China’s economic growth
and energy demand growth “re-coupled,” unlike during the 1980 to
2000 period when China’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew much
faster than its energy needs. In 2001, China’s economy began to grow
faster than projected and the energy intensity of economic activity
grew faster than the GDP. This recoupling led to a surge in energy
demand, for both industrial activity as well as transportation. Even
though China had become a net importer of oil in 1993, it was not
well prepared for the nation’s accelerating growth and growing energy
intensity. This situation resulted in shortages in oil, coal, and electricity
and prolonged power shortages in many provinces. This demand
surge and the corresponding shortages thrust energy security onto China’s
foreign policy agenda, as Chinese companies made a mad dash to
secure access to energy supplies.43
In China, energy security is defined in terms of two issues: price
volatility and security of delivery. China feels vulnerable on both fronts,
and such perceptions are shaping its diplomacy. China’s intense policy
focus on energy security (which initially had a frenzied quality to it)
stems most specifically from its rapidly growing demand for crude oil
and a corresponding increase in its reliance on imported crude oil; the
latter grew from 1.6 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2001 to 4.1 million
b/d in 2007. These increases reached consumption levels that some
Chinese had projected for their country in 2020. China became the world’s second-largest consumer of oil (after the United States) in 2003
and the world’s third-largest importer of oil (after the United States
and Japan) in 2004.44 In 2008, China imported about 45 percent of its
total national oil demand, with 76 percent of China’s crude oil imports
coming from the Middle East and Africa (with about 45 percent from
the Middle East alone).45 These numbers need to be kept in context:
crude oil imports provide for about 10 percent of China’s total energy
needs.
At least three geopolitical considerations drive Chinese concerns
about security of delivery.46 First, the Middle East (the region of China’s
greatest dependence on crude oil imports) is perceived as unstable,
where the risks of supply disruptions are high. (Africa is not seen as
being as volatile.) Chinese analysts became especially concerned about
reliance on Middle East oil after the U.S. war in Iraq in 2003, which
some in China viewed as heavily motivated by U.S. desires to control
Iraq’s oil assets and thus to increase U.S. leverage over global oil markets.
One prominent Chinese analysis concluded, “There is no doubt
that U.S. control over the world’s oil resource was significantly strengthened
in the wake of the success of [the] Iraq War.”47 Along these lines, Chinese analysts assess that the extensive U.S. military presence in the
Middle East accentuates China’s vulnerability to future supply cutoffs
enforced by the United States. Second, importing oil from the Middle
East and other regions requires long-distance ocean transportation for
which China can provide little independent protection. The Strait of
Malacca, in particular, is one critical access point for most of China’s
seaborne oil imports and an access point that the Chinese navy is
not capable of policing. Some Chinese policymakers have reportedly
termed this vulnerability China’s “Malacca Dilemma,” although the
origin and veracity of this particular phrase remains unclear.48 A third
perceived Chinese vulnerability is that it relies on overseas tanker companies
to ship about 90 percent of its oil imports. These three concerns
are motivating China’s efforts, via diplomacy, to gain access to energy
resources that are closer to China, available for pipeline or ground
transport, and thus not as subject to possible disruption.
China’s Rise in International Affairs49
A new and pervasive element of China’s perception of its current security
environment is the “rise of China” in global affairs. This idea is
becoming more than just a perception shaping policymaking; it is also
an overarching theme and focus of China’s global diplomacy. China’s
confidence in its accomplishments and its global influence is palpable
in the comments of policymakers and analysts. Many Chinese argue
that as the world becomes more multipolar and U.S. power declines
in relative terms, China is becoming a more influential international
actor. In the words of former Vice Premier Qian Qichen in an internal
speech:
It can be said that the 21st century cannot be the “American century.”
It is not that the Americans do not want it but that it is not possible. This has been proven by the Iraq issue. The United
States wants to engage in unilateralism but it cannot dominate
the world. . . . Speaking about international relations in the new
century, one has to talk about China. China is the most vibrant
force in the world today. The rapid growth of our country has led
to widespread attention in the international community.50
China’s confidence is based, in part, on a recognition of the growing
reliance by many of China’s neighbors on trade and investment
with it. Chinese analysts talk about China as a “large world market,”
a “huge commercial ship,” or a “giant businessman” that plays a central
role in the world economy. And by dint of its large and globalized
economy, the Chinese believe they are generating extensive political
influence in Asia and beyond. China’s 2008 national defense white
paper put it this way: “The achievements made in China’s modernization
drive have drawn worldwide attention.”51 A foreign ministry
assessment concluded: “China has been able to release its huge economic
potential against the backdrop of economic globalization and
the change in the international system.”52
Beyond its perceived economic power, Chinese policymakers and
analysts also highlight China’s activism in multilateral organizations
and its role in managing regional security problems, such as the North
Korean nuclear crisis, as a further indication of China’s accumulating
geopolitical influence. This very assessment was starkly stated, for the
first time, in the 2008 national defense white paper: “China is playing
an active and constructive role in multilateral affairs, thus notably elevating
its international position and influence.” A prominent Chinese
analysis cited China’s regional activism as contributing to “the coming
of a new kind of geopolitics in Asia.”53 Chinese scholar Huang Renwei
put it in even broader terms: “As a major driver of the current transformation
of the international system, China is playing an increasingly important and influential role. In fact, China has become a main participant
in and builder of the international system in transformation.”54
Building on these successes, Chinese analysts and policymakers
now regularly discuss using China’s new global position to shape the
rules and norms of major international organizations in ways consistent
with Chinese interests.55 Ambassador Shen Guofang summarized
many of these arguments in a June 2007 speech:
China’s rapidly growing economy, its gradually increasing political
and diplomatic influence, and the striking rise in its international
status are all influencing the international structure in
far-reaching ways. . . . China’s own unique strengths and influence
demand that it play an important role in international
affairs. . . .
China should enhance its ability to determine the agenda and its
ability to make use of the rules by playing a substantive role in all
kinds of consultations and the writing of international rules. It
should show even more initiative in participating in international
affairs and in building the multilateral system.56
Chinese analysts argue that China’s effort to “rise” while not provoking
global resentment is working: China has effectively reduced
Asian fears of China’s rising economic and military power. Chinese
analyses highlight the appeal of China’s cooperative approach to foreign
affairs based on the strategy of integrating into the current system
as opposed to trying to overthrow it. Such analyses also regularly highlight
the appeal of Chinese concepts such as “common interest” and
the “new security concept,” which stress China’s focus on economic
interdependence, regional integration, and multilateral security cooperation.
As a result, many Chinese analyses argue that China’s “hard
power” and “soft power” in international relations are growing, and its
nascent “soft power” stands in stark contrast to international resentment toward the United States stemming from U.S. policies on Iraq
and counterterrorism.57
Chinese analyses continue to point out that the process of rising
through domestic economic development and global integration is not
without its costs and risks. Chinese policymakers are well aware of the
problems experienced by past rising powers, and they specifically seek
to avoid the conflict-provoking approaches of Imperial Japan, Germany
in the 1930s, and the Soviet Union in the 20th century. These concerns
are reflected in the leadership’s ultimate choice of its diplomatic slogan
of “peaceful development” over its predecessor “peaceful rise”; the latter
formulation could be interpreted as presumptuous to some and confrontational
to others.58
Last, Chinese analysts are aware that China’s pursuit of domestic
development through international trade and foreign investment has
fostered vulnerability to maritime threats because of the heavy concentration
of China’s economic assets along its eastern and southern coastlines.
Additional vulnerabilities stem from China’s reliance on external
demand (from the United States and the European Union) for growth,
its reliance on access to global sea lanes for trade, and its growing need
for unfettered access to investment, technology, and natural resources
from foreign sources to modernize its economy. Thus, although Chinese
analysts are aware of the benefits associated with China’s growing
international status and global economic integration, they also recognize
the inherent risks and vulnerabilities of their position.
返回页首
CHAPTER FOUR China’s Foreign Policy Objectives
The lenses through which China looks at the world, its long-term
diplomatic priorities, and its perceptions of its current security environment
collectively manifest themselves in five foreign policy objectives.
They are fostering economic development, reassurance, countering
constraints, diversifying access to natural resources, and reducing
Taiwan’s international space. These five differ from China’s long-term
diplomatic priorities because they are more specific and reflect current
perceptions; thus, they could more easily change in response to internal
or external stimuli.
These objectives constitute the core of China’s current international
behavior. In most cases, they reflect China’s responses to its security
environment and its effort to shape that environment in a way
that fosters China’s development, sovereignty, and international status.
The government has articulated some, but not all, of the objectives in
its speeches and publications; others are analytical extrapolations from
Chinese writings and government actions. Importantly, the degree
to which China emphasizes any one of these objectives in its foreign
policy differs, depending on the nation and region and over time; these
variations will be addressed in the analysis of China’s foreign policy
actions in Chapters Five and Six.
Understanding Official Policy
An analysis of China’s current objectives begins with an understanding
of the formal, government-articulated strategic guidelines, or tifa (提法), that guide Chinese foreign policy. These phrases constitute
the conceptual edifice of the CCP’s diplomacy. It is important
to understand these concepts because they reveal how China’s leaders
define and articulate their goals and how they communicate with one
another.
When assessing the meaning and value of such party guidelines
for “foreign affairs work” (waijiao gongzuo 外交工作), two caveats are
in order. First, the meanings of these phrases change over time as the
guidelines themselves become conceptually developed and distinct
from previous tifa. Within the CCP, such guidelines are often initially
articulated without much meaning (and often do not appear very distinct
from previous ones articulated by past party leaders); they become
developed over time based on actual practice and circumstance.
Second, the application of such guidelines is subject to a classic
party dictum of “adhering to principles while being flexible,” which
in practice seems to give Chinese policymakers the political license to
occasionally take actions contrary to these guidelines, while claiming
fidelity to the party’s dictates. These practices are common in Leninist
political systems. Despite such flexibility in interpretation, these guidelines
have had and continue to have a real effect on foreign policy, as
both a constraint and an enabler.
At least three concepts constitute the foundation of the CCP’s
current foreign policy.
All-Around Diplomacy
Chinese policymakers describe their increasingly active and robust
diplomacy using the expression “all-around diplomacy” (quanfangwei
waijiao 全方位外交). On face value, this principle sounds rather
broad and explains little, but in a Chinese context, it possesses specific
and new (or newly emphasized) dimensions of statecraft. All-around
diplomacy is meant to contrast China’s current approach with past
CCP guiding principles—such as “leaning to one side”—which had a more ideological nature.1 This phrase reinforces (to foreign as well as
Chinese audiences) the notion that Chinese foreign policy will continue
to focus on protecting China’s national interests (i.e., sovereignty,
development, and respect) and not on ideological goals, as was often
the case in past years. All-around diplomacy is also meant to emphasize
the comprehensive nature of Chinese foreign policy: It will include all
nations, developed and developing, and will include multiple regions,
such as Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Europe as well as
Asia. Chinese foreign policy will embrace all modes of international
interactions (bilateral, multilateral, and regional), and such interactions
will encompass economics, politics, military, science and technology,
culture, education, and tourism. In the words of reports from the highlevel
2006 Central Conference on Foreign Affairs Work, “China has
created a pattern of opening to the outside world in all directions, at
all levels, and in broad areas. . . . [emphasis added]”2 Thus, all-around
diplomacy is meant to signal the degree to which the Chinese leaders
support a highly internationalist and nonideological foreign policy.
Peace and Development
As noted in Chapter Three, since the mid-1980s Chinese leaders have
affirmed the relevance of “peace and development as the main trend of
the times” as the basis for China’s reform-era foreign policy. In recent
years, this seminal phrase has assumed two new forms. Chinese leaders
now talk about the trinity of “peace, development, and cooperation” as
the “basic principles” (jiben yuanze 基本原则) of China’s diplomacy.
The addition of “cooperation” is a Hu Jintao innovation, which is
meant to underscore China’s commitment to multilateral organizations.
Chinese leaders have also placed a growing emphasis on the theme of
“economic development” in China’s multilateral and bilateral diplomacy.
The importance of “development” as a guiding principle is evident
in China’s foreign economic relations, its changing foreign aid
practices, its proliferating bilateral economic and financial dialogues,
and its contributions to U.N. activities. In addition, in 2004, the concept
of “peaceful development” became a prominent member of China’s
foreign policy orthodoxy. This phrase is meant to reflect China’s
effort to avoid the mistakes of past rising powers by reassuring other
states about the means and direction of China’s activism in international
politics. With this idea, China is conveying that it will be mindful
of other nations’ interests as it ascends in the international system,
and it will not use military competition as a means to realize national
revitalization.3
Harmonious World
In 2005, Hu Jintao began calling for the building of “a harmonious
world” (hexie shijie 和谐世界) in international affairs. This principle is
an external manifestation of his domestic policy of building a “harmonious
society” (hexie shehui 和谐社会). The meaning of “harmonious
world,” as with “harmonious society,” is still taking shape and gaining
clarity. Because it is a distinctly Hu Jintao idea, it may become the key
principle in China’s diplomacy until China’s fifth generation of leaders
ascends to power in 2012. Although initially articulated earlier, Hu’s vision for a harmonious world was further developed at a key Central
Foreign Affairs Work Conference in August 2006.4 For Hu, a harmonious
world is one in which states act in ways that respect each other’s
national sovereignty, tolerate diversity (in national political systems and
values), and promote national development by equitably spreading economic
benefits. Although these ideas are all long-standing principles in
Chinese diplomacy, they reflect Hu Jintao’s effort to define a distinctive
approach to foreign policy.5
Hu’s conception of a harmonious world has two dimensions, and
time will tell whether or how they manifest in actual policy. First, a
harmonious worldview suggests that China’s leaders are moving away
from their traditionally reactive and combative view of foreign affairs
as a “struggle” (douzheng 斗争) against any number of external forces
(e.g., hegemony and power politics). This shift was a specific theme
of the 2006 Foreign Affairs Work Conference. There are a growing
number of indications that this shift is taking effect, at least in official
rhetoric. Hu Jintao’s work report to the 17th Party Congress, for the
first time, did not call for establishing a “new international political and
economic order,” a phrase that Deng started using in these reports as
far back as 1988, and it had achieved near-canonical status in China’s
foreign affairs lexicon. Instead Hu’s 2007 report used a phrase that was
less evocative of a challenge to the current international system: China
will “work to make the international order fairer and more equitable.”6
In addition, Chinese media reports now seldom use the phrase “opposing
hegemonism and maintaining world peace” as a “task” (renwu 任
务) in foreign affairs work; rather, the new formulation is “maintaining
world peace and advancing common development.”7 Chinese officials have also been downplaying their advocacy of “multipolarity,” because
some Chinese realize it is viewed as an implicit effort to constrain and
balance U.S. power. In its place, Chinese government statements now
more commonly call for greater “multilateralism” in interstate relations,
which, as noted above, is a key theme in Hu Jintao’s diplomacy.8
A second dimension of Hu’s harmonious world concept is the
emphasis on how intimately tied China has become with the international
community. Hu seeks to foster greater awareness throughout
the Chinese system about using the intense linkages between domestic
and international affairs as a way to promote better policy coordination
across the Chinese bureaucracy. Hu reportedly attributes many of
the problems plaguing China’s diplomacy to the lack of such coordination.
According to media reports about the 2006 Central Foreign
Affairs Work Conference, a key phrase in the conference’s final report
was “internal, external, two great situations” (guonei guowai, liangge
daju 国内国外，两个大局).9 In other words, China can promote a
harmonious world only if domestic actors in China (e.g., corporations
with overseas activities) are aware of China’s foreign policy equities and
if, conversely, China’s foreign policy directly and substantially assists
domestic economic development.
Core Diplomatic Objectives
Economic Development
A persistent and consistent economic logic drives China’s foreign policy
and foreign relations. This logic has two dimensions, one traditional
and the other more recent. First, as Chinese leaders have often stated
over the past 30 years, China seeks to maintain a favorable international
environment conducive to continued domestic reform, development, and modernization. This goal was set out by Deng and has
been the core foreign policy objective during the entire reform era.10
This slogan is not merely propaganda; it has real meaning behind it.
Chinese diplomacy seeks to minimize threats on its peripheries (e.g.,
Russia, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia) that would cause
China to divert national resources away from economic reform and the
leadership’s management of China’s developmental challenges. Insofar
as maintaining robust growth and balanced development are central
to the CCP’s continued legitimacy, Chinese foreign policies seek to
stabilize China’s regional security environment and address emerging
threats (e.g., territorial disputes and transnational challenges) to ensure
that the leadership can continue to focus on economic development
and growing China’s comprehensive national power.
China’s interpretation of this overarching goal has changed over
time, as China’s perceptions of its security environment and its conception
of its national interest have evolved. China’s pursuit of economic
development now requires it to pay attention to transnational issues,
such as environmental and health crises, which have complicated China’s
relations with its neighbors. Most concretely, counterterrorism
has a strong domestic component because of Chinese concerns about
Muslim separatists in Xinjiang and Central Asia.
A second and increasingly salient manifestation of the domestic
economic logic to China’s diplomacy is its use of foreign policy
to expand access to trade, aid, investment, resources, and technology
and, specifically, to forge and maintain bilateral political relationships
that will ensure continued access to these critical inputs to economic
growth. There are several new external manifestations of China’s longstanding
priority on domestic growth and development. In short,
acting locally for China now requires that it think globally. In this
regard, Chinese leaders have newly designated “economic diplomacy”
as a high priority for Chinese foreign policy. As China’s economy grows
and globalization accelerates, diplomacy is no longer exclusively about
protecting Chinese sovereignty, regional security, and international
status but features a greater emphasis on the specific contributions of China’s diplomacy to domestic development. In the words of Ambassador
Wu Jianmin, “Fifty years ago, an ambassador would be laughed
at if he talked about economics. Fifty years later, if an ambassador does
not know about economics, he will become a laughing stock.”11
Reassurance
In the mid-1990s, Chinese leaders and analysts began to recognize
that specific Chinese policies, such as pursuit of its disupted territorial
claims in the South China Sea and missile tests around Taiwan in
1995–1996, had prompted concerns among its Asian neighbors about
Beijing’s intentions, which appeared to many as potentially aggressive
and threatening. Chinese policymakers again noticed in the early
2000s that China’s rapidly growing economy and expanding military
capabilities were prompting varying degrees of concern from other
Asian powers and the broader international community. This gradual
recognition led to the adoption of a regional strategy that sought to
reassure Asian states that China would not only not undermine their
economic or security interests but would contribute to them. In short,
China wanted to represent an opportunity, not a threat.12
China subsequently implemented several specific policies to
address these diverse anxieties. It has sought to foster an image as a
benign regional actor and as a “responsible major power” by demonstrating
the economic and cultural benefits of engagement with China.
This effort motivated, in part, China’s activism within multilateral economic
and security organizations in Asia—ones from which it had long
been aloof. Specific aspects of this new reassurance strategy are detailed
in Chapter Six of this monograph; many of China’s regional reassurance efforts are reflected in its regional policy line known as “great
peripheral diplomacy” (da zhoubian waijiao 大周边外交).13 China’s
articulation of the “peaceful rise”/“peaceful development” strategy in
2003–2004 is the most public manifestation of China’s awareness of
security dilemma dynamics and the need to address regional anxieties
through reassurance.14
Chinese policymakers did this because they feared that such concerns
would motivate China’s Asian neighbors to constrain China in the
region or, collectively, to balance Chinese power. China’s recognition
of its role in such security dilemma dynamics in Asia and the degree
to which Chinese actions affect others’ perceptions was an important
step in the evolution of Chinese strategists’ thinking. This realization
stands in contrast to years of simplistically rejecting the security concerns
of China’s neighbors by reciting mantras about China being “a
peace-loving nation” that pursued equality, mutual benefit, and winwin
cooperation.15
Countering Constraints
A third Chinese objective can be characterized as countercontainment
or counterconstrainment.16 It involves Chinese strategies and policies
that seek to reduce other nations’ ability or willingness to constrain China’s influence and freedom of action in global affairs. As argued in
Chapter Three, Chinese policymakers, analysts, and the general public
perceive many U.S. policies as designed to hinder or prevent China’s
emergence as a great power. The most intense concerns about U.S. containment
efforts stem from perceptions of U.S. foreign and defense
policies (though these concerns also extend to U.S. economic policies
as well). Many Chinese argue that the United States is using its alliances
in Asia and its regional military deployments to contain Chinese
power. These deep concerns are most evident in Chinese commentaries
about changes to the U.S.-Japan alliance, U.S. military interactions
with Taiwan, the emerging U.S.-India strategic relationship, U.S.
military deployments in Central Asia, and the U.S. military’s force
enhancements in the Western Pacific.
In the words of a mainstream Chinese assessment, “The United
States has never given up its efforts to establish a ‘small-sized NATO’
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] [in Asia] and has been trying its
best to build a strategic balance of power in Asia using Japan and other
regional powers to pin down and to use against China. At the same
time, the United States has asked China to enhance military transparency
so that it can see a clearer picture of China’s strategic intention
and capability.”17 Chinese policymakers and analysts have expressed
similar concerns during U.S.-China negotiations over trade and financial
issues, in which some Chinese see high-profile U.S. policies, such
as pushing for appreciation of the renminbi and liberalization of its
financial sector, as trying to limit China’s growth.18
Few Chinese policymakers publicly articulate such worries about
U.S. intentions as official policy because that would be seen as confronting
the United States. Rather, these Chinese concerns are reflected in statements calling for more “multipolarity,” building “democracy in
international relations,” and the construction of a “harmonious world.”
China’s advocacy of these phrases constitutes their implicit opposition
to the U.S. unipolar position and U.S. unilateral policies, which many
Chinese see as focused on regime change and coercive actions not sanctioned
by international law or international institutions.19
China’s responses to these concerns are readily apparent in its
international behavior. Its diplomacy worldwide—but especially in
Asia—seeks to forge political relationships that collectively create an
environment in which the United States cannot use its diplomacy or
military cooperation to constrain China’s freedom of action and especially
cannot work with other Asian states to balance or otherwise
constrain China. Most specifically, Chinese foreign policy seeks to
build bilateral diplomatic relationships in which regional policymakers
are sensitive to China’s views on key regional and global problems, specifically
including the Taiwan issue. Huang Renwei described it this
way:
Entering the international system and participating in its transformation,
China will be able to greatly broaden its effective strategic
room of maneuver in terms of time and space. Hence, the
hegemon will not be able to implement its strategy of containing
China. Economic diplomacy and multilateral diplomacy will
become the breakthrough and the supporting points for China’s
foreign policy, [and] Asian regional cooperation mechanisms
offer China an important arena for practice in innovating international
order. . . .
Considering the relationship between China and the international
system, we can reach a basic view: promoting common interests
with other late-coming big powers is not only a requirement to
be fulfilled in order to prevent the United States from roping in other big powers and establishing a strategic alliance containing
China, but also a requirement to be fulfilled in order to ensure
stable transformation of the international system.20
To be sure, countercontainment is not the primary objective in
Chinese global diplomacy or in Asia. If it were, Chinese diplomacy
would likely be far more confrontational with the United States and
its regional allies; for example, China would actively try to pull and
prod U.S. allies away from the United States by proffering China as
an alternative security partner. Rather, Chinese diplomacy has focused
on economic opportunism and expanding its multilateral cooperation.
In particular, it has been seeking to create new and expand existing
multilateral organizations in which the United States has a limited role
but also as a way to develop a regional order in East Asia in which U.S.
influence is diluted. And China seeks to do this gradually so as not to
appear to directly oppose the United States or its allies. Thus, countercontainment
is a distinct Chinese objective, but it does not manifest
itself in a confrontational set of policies that emphasize defense cooperation
and zero-sum interactions. This objective may receive greater
expression in the future if U.S.-China relations become more competitive,
if China’s regional influence grows, and if Beijing sees itself as less
dependent on stable relations with Washington.
A critical dimension of China’s strategy of countercontainment/
counterconstrainment is avoiding confrontation with the United States,
as that would ultimately defeat the purpose of the effort. China does not
want to appear as if it actively seeks to undermine U.S. power and influence
in Asia or to eventually push the United States from the region.
Such steps could precipitate outright rivalry with the United States
and some of its allies, potentially derailing China’s effort to maintain a
stable periphery. In fact, many Chinese strategists openly acknowledge
now that U.S. military presence and security commitments in Asia
contribute to regional stability, and China (and the region) could suffer if such arrangements dissolved.21 Yet, Chinese policymakers and analysts
have long-standing concerns about the U.S. military posture in
Asia, and these concerns have become more acute of late because of the
expanding scope of U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Australia alliances, trilateral
coordination among the three allies, and growing U.S. security cooperation
with India and Singapore.
Therefore, Chinese foreign policy on this question faces a major
dilemma. On the one hand, China seeks the time and space for its
national rejuvenation; to do so, it believes that it needs to negate other
nations’ abilities to constrain its foreign policy pursuits and related economic
objectives. On the other hand, Beijing needs to execute such a
counterconstrainment policy in a way that avoids generating the very
antagonism that could most directly derail its objectives. This is a delicate
balancing act and a central challenge for Chinese foreign policy
in the region and in its relations with the United States. Several factors
may determine how China manages this balancing act: the relative
stability of U.S.-China relations, Chinese perceptions of U.S. goals in
Asia, U.S. perceptions of China’s regional diplomacy, and the extent of
regional accommodation or alienation to China.
Expanding and Diversifying Access to Natural Resources
A relatively new objective for Chinese foreign policy is expanding and
diversifying access to natural resources, especially hydrocarbon energy
resources.22 Beginning early in this decade, not only did China’s GDP
growth accelerate (from 8 percent in 2002 to 12 percent in 2007)
but the resource intensity of GDP growth increased as well (measured
in terms of the amount of resource inputs used for each dollar
of GDP output). This trend required that China go abroad in search
of resources to fuel continued growth, and not just oil and natural gas.
China substantially increased its imports of iron ore, crude oil, natural gas, copper, wood, cement, soy, and manganese. The degree of resource
intensity involved in Chinese growth may decline somewhat because
of a pending slowdown in GDP growth (perhaps down to 6–8 percent
in 2009), efficiency gains, and shifts in China’s growth model. But
these changes will be gradual and will be most focused on demand for
hydrocarbon resources and heavily polluting industries, such as steel
and cement production. According to projections by Deutsche Bank,
China’s demand for most of these resources is expected to grow significantly
in the next 15 years. Between 2006 and 2020, China’s import
demand for iron ore is projected to increase by 380 percent, soy by
80 percent, coal by 7,400 percent, copper by 600 percent, manganese
by 30 percent, and wood by 330 percent.23 As a result, the desire to
expand access to these strategic resources now drives much of China’s
diplomacy in such resource-rich regions as Africa, the Middle East,
and Latin America.
Resource security, for China, encompasses diversifying both suppliers
as well as supply routes. As noted in the previous chapter, there is
both a demand and supply logic behind this objective. On the demand
side, China’s need for secure and consistent access to imported resources
is expanding, even during this period of relative global slowdown. On
the supply side, Chinese policymakers have deep concerns about China’s
regional dependencies, especially its reliance on the Middle East
for about 45 percent of its crude oil imports.24
China’s acute anxieties are manifesting in diplomacy, at all levels
and using multiple tools, which seeks to build new and to expand existing
political relationships to ensure consistent access to energy supplies
and natural resources. China’s rapid expansion of relations with Saudi
Arabia and other Gulf states (e.g., Oman and the United Arab Emirates)
in the last five years is one such example. China also protects key bilateral relationships to ensure continued access to resources on preferential
terms. These goals are reflected in China’s effort to upgrade relations
with sub-Saharan African nations and includes shielding important
suppliers from international pressure on human rights questions,
notably Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Uzbekistan. China has also sought
to improve bilateral relations with nations along key ocean and land
supply routes, such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia (along the
Straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda) and Kazakhstan in Central
Asia. It seeks to minimize the possibility of disruption, including foreign
interdiction.25
Reducing Taiwan’s International Space
A final, but by no means insignificant or new, foreign policy objective
for China is reducing Taiwan’s international space and limiting other
nations’ ability to confer status or legitimacy on Taiwan. This strategy
is a long-standing one for China and is part and parcel of its incessant
effort to prevent Taiwan’s independence and, ultimately, to bring about
reunification. China’s desire to eliminate Taiwan’s international space
is evident in both its multilateral and bilateral diplomacy; this has been
the case for decades. This strategy motivates some of China’s interactions
in major multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations
and the World Health Organization, to deny Taiwan a level of participation
that could carry with it the hint of legitimacy.
Bilaterally, China takes steps to prod nations away from recognizing
Taiwan and toward Beijing. Taiwan currently has diplomatic
relations with 23 nations, spread out among Latin America (12), Africa
(4), the South Pacific/Oceania (6), and the Vatican.26 China’s efforts have resulted in a competition, often referred to as “dollar diplomacy,”
in which China uses large aid packages and other financial incentives
(such as construction of a sport stadium in the Dominican Republic)
to persuade nations to switch their diplomatic recognition from Taipei
to Beijing, and vice versa. This effort has accelerated in this decade, as
China’s financial resources have expanded and Beijing’s concerns about
Taiwan’s international activities have grown. Press reports in 2008
revealed that Costa Rica agreed to switch its recognition to China in
June 2007 after Beijing pledged, in a secret deal, to provide $130 million
in aid and agreed to buy $300 million in Costa Rican government
bonds, drawing on its sizable foreign exchange reserves.27 China
has targeted several other Latin American and African nations to prod
them to change their diplomatic ties, and successes on this score are
accumulating. Since 2003, Costa Rica, Chad, Grenada, Malawi, Liberia,
the Dominican Republic, and Senegal have all switched to diplomatic
recognition of China. A few countries in Latin America, such as
Paraguay and Panama, are thought to have seriously considered such
a shift. But China and Taiwan agreed in the second half of 2008 to
freeze this diplomatic competition to create an environment favorable
to cross-Strait confidence-building following the March 2008 election
of Ma Ying-jeou as president of Taiwan.
返回页首
CHAPTER FIVE China’s Expanding Diplomatic Toolkit
CHAPTER FIVE China’s Expanding Diplomatic Toolkit
返回页首
CHAPTER Six China’s Foreign Policy Actions
CHAPTER Six China’s Foreign Policy Actions
返回页首
Chapter SEVEN Challenges Facing Chinese Diplomacy
Chapter SEVEN Challenges Facing Chinese Diplomacy
返回页首
Chapter Eight Conclusions
Chapter Eight Conclusions
返回页首
返回主页
version:2.1<EMAIL_ADDRESS>© retter2012.com