Monthly Meeting News
|
May 15, 2010 Vice-President Andy Lloyd, ND0P, called the Pueblo West Amateur Radio Club meeting to order at 2 p.m. Saturday, May 15. Those in attendance were:
Andy, ND0P Instructors KB0JIT and NI5R reported the club's ham class currently has two hams studying for their General licenses. Two students, including a new student this week, are studying for their Technician licenses. Treasurer Dan Broadbooks, NG0T, reported the club has $385.60 in its treasury. Ways and Means Chairperson Jane Ewing, KA0USA, reminded the members of the upcoming bake sale at Walmart on Sunday, May 23, from 9 a.m.-1 p.m. NG0T delved into the question as to whether the club needs a Board of Directors. His interpretation of the rules is that the club does need at least one director. NI5R proposed that KB0JIT and ND0P become our club's Board of Directors, and KBJIT seconded the motion. A unanimous vote followed. However, this will entail more language be added to the club's Constitution. The change will be voted on at the next meeting, and if a quorum is not present, members will be polled by telephone or e-mail for their votes. WA0KAQ reported that he had contacted the ARRL Rocky Mountain Division Director about the status of club's ARRL Affiliation. N5ZGT reported he has signed the form and forwarded to the ARRL Executive Committee, of which he is also a member. The reported the Committee receives batches of applications for approval periodically throughout the year, since that is most efficient for staff and volunteers. Once received, final approval is made unless there are any issues. NG0T reported a problem has arisen about the club's incorporation and its tax status with the IRS. Dan explained, "When we filed for a Tax ID Number, we indicated that we expected to be what is called a 501(c)(6), which is a non-profit, but not a 501(c)(3). A 501(c)(3) is a type of organization that you can make a donation to and write it off on your taxes. What I have since learned is that the only way to become either one of these is to file a form asking the IRS to bless your status - to officially say, 'We've looked at your paperwork and we're ok with you being a 501(c)(6) or a 501(c)(3).' A 501(c)(3) requires more paperwork than the other. The bad news in all of this is that to get them to sign off on your status requires an application fee with the application, and either one of these is the same fee, and it is pretty hefty -- $400 - which would wipe out our treasury. The good news is once you've done that you can electronically file an annual report as long as you don't take in more than $25,000 in a year. The report consists of little more than saying, 'We didn't take in more than $25,000, we're still here, here's our address and our contact point.' "The problem we have right now is that our tax ID number is kind of in limbo. It's not officially associated with any kind of organization. I know that sounds odd, but what that means is that if I try to e-file something to that tax ID number that is non-profit, it will get kicked back. They are going to say, 'This isn't a non-profit of either type in our database' - even though we said when we filed for it 'This is what we expect we'll become.' So that's kind of the problem we face. "The immediate problem is that if we're non-profit we need to file some type of form by Monday, May 17, for last year, or an extension. We really can't file either one because we aren't officially a non-profit. So, the best 'out' here that I can see is to file as a "c" corporation, which is kind of the default of what we would be as a corporation if we're not officially a non-profit. I can accomplish that. Then we, as a club, need to decide whether or not we're willing to go ahead with the $400 hit to the treasury, and which of these two routes we wish to go - whether we want to go to the extra trouble of becoming a 501(c)(3) or whether we want to go with 501(c)(6), which is intended for social clubs, basically." Dan noted that with a 501(c)(6) corporation, we could take donations for anyone and they could take the donation off their taxes. If a business was donating, they couldn't take it off as a charitable donation, but they could take it off as a marketing or good will type expenditure. "The other problem in all of this," Dan continued, "is that if we were a non-profit right now and we failed to file by Monday, there is a $20 a day penalty that kicks in if we don't file in time. I apologize for that, because I didn't become aware of that until a few days ago when I was looking at some of this material. I had thought that we had the luxury of no real penalties as long as there was no underlying tax. In fact, that is not the case. "If we were to go in and file for either one of them now, and we came into existence officially on December 22, 2009, if they favorably said you're either one of these, then the problem is that you would have a late return that you are now filing where they could assert these penalties and you might have an uphill battle to get the penalty to go away. "A 'c' corporation, which is the default position, actually was supposed to have filed back on March 15. However, if we take the approach that most of the money we took in before December 22 is initial capital, not income, then we would initially have a small loss for the year. The initial dues would be counted as capital contributions, not as income. That would be magical, because filing late on a 'c' corp where there is no net income, there is no tax and no penalty. I can file a 'c' corp return if that is agreeable to the club, to get us to a position that we have filed something and the IRS shouldn't be bothering us for non-filing grounds. "I'm sure there are better things we could do with our limited resources than to pour it into that, although that would be a one-time-only expenditure. "By going in as a 'c' corporation, we would essentially have most of the rest of the year to decide what we wanted to do. Even if we filed another 'c' corp again next year, it would probably only be a nominal tax on our revenue over our expenses. We could get rid of any tax by making sure we spend our treasury down at the end of the year on something we wanted to spend it on anyway. "The question is whether everyone is agreeable to my filing the 'c' corp return so that we give IRS something and get them to not come asking why we haven't made so kind of a non-profit filing - which we effectively can't do until we get them to say we are some kind of non-profit." KB0RPD made a motion that the club let Dan proceed with the filing for a 'c' corporation and we will look at the filing of a 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(6) later in the year. All members voted in the affirmative. The secretary will poll members by telephone until the number of affirmative votes constituting a quorum is obtained or until it is not possible to get the necessary number of positive votes. The Pueblo West Metropolitan Association Board will issue a proclamation at its June meeting, proclaiming the last week of June to be Amateur Radio Week in Pueblo West. NE0DA will accept the proclamation. All members are welcome to attend. KB0RPD reported the National Weather Service has more batteries ready for the club, but they have not yet been delivered. A few more will be needed before Field Day. Following that event, batteries will begin to be distributed to club members. The batteries work well for back-up power for transceivers, handhelds, small inverters and converters for computers, 12-volt lighting (especially LEDs), small AM/FM radios, 12-volt fans, etc. KB0RPD requested the names and addresses of members who attended last month's meeting at which he presented the Weather Spotting program. Those who were in attendance are eligible to become Weather Spotters for the National Weather Service. WA0KAQ reported he participated in a 2-hour Webinar in April pertaining to Field Day. One of the topics discussed was how to introduce ham radio to youth. A study showed that what interested youth most about amateur radio were satellites, DX, Morse code and Fox Hunting. One club went as far as to challenge a school class to choose someone for a texting versus CW contest, as made popular some time back on the Jay Leno Show. The prize was free pizza for the class if the student won. A local pizza shop donated the pizza for the publicity it received from the promotion. The class received the pizza in spite of its loss, but the stunt put ham radio operators in the classroom and gave them a chance to tell about their hobby as well. NI5R and KB0RPD will work together to contact local schools to try to raise interest in our club working with the students. Perhaps something like the contest described could be done next fall. The club has no outside activities after Field Day. If there is an interest in doing more this summer and in the fall, more can be planned. Ideas are welcome. Here are a few things that were suggested, though none were scheduled.
1) Burger Burn - Covered dish picnic in the park with
family members invited. An HF station could be set up as well. The need for QSL cards was revisited. NI5R suggested using Colorado postcards. KB0JIT volunteered to work on making a card, too. There are 41 days left until Field Day, and by the time the next meeting rolls around, there will only be 7 days. WA0KAQ gave a progress report on what has been done.
1) Invitations have been extended to Fire Chief Brian
Caserta and crew of Pueblo West Fire Department; Captain Jeff
Teschner and representatives of the Pueblo County Sheriff's
Substation; the Salvation Army; the American Red Cross; and the
Pueblo West Metropolitan District Board and District Manager. 2) NI5R has finished the frame for the club's banner. 3) ND0P is working on the Field Day signs. 4) NI5R is exploring simple projects to be built on his project board for a Field Day educational activity. 5) A code oscilator and key will be available as an educational activity as well. KB0JIT will supply a code oscillator, and visitors will have the opportunity to learn to spell their names using Morse code. KB0RPD suggested setting up a laptop in conjunction with the project so visitors could see their Morse code words appear on the screen. WA0KAQ offered the solar power display he has built as an option to power that computer. 6) An ARRL Message Center will offer the opportunity for visitors and members to send ARRL Radiograms to friends throughout the country. Messages will be transferred to the Central Colorado Traffic Net on Saturday evening. 7) The band-pass filters for the competition radios have been completed by WA0KAQ and KB0JIT. 8) KA0USA has finished a tri-fold display poster to be used as a center piece on the Information Table. 9) Eight companies have sent catalogs and/or equipment information for distributing to visitors. Three additional companies have promised to send their newest catalogs the first part of June. It was decided not to set up a 2-meter station for the public to use. The original idea was to show how linked repeaters provide coverage throughout much of Colorado. Whether the club will be able to provide a porta-potty is still unknown. One company wanted more than $200 to provide one. ND0P will be checking another source. Three more Annex N forms (Field Day scheduling forms) were collected at the meeting. A schedule of operators, tour guides, set-up personnel, etc., will be put together before the next meeting. ND0P presented a program about how he uses the free Ham Radio Deluxe software to control his Yaesu FT-817 transceiver. Due to a lack of time, the scheduled videos were not shown. They will be rescheduled. With only a week left until Field Day when we have our June meeting, the meeting will feature a dry run of Field Day set-up and operations. Information will also be provided on using the N3FJP Field Day logging software and filling out ARRL Radiograms. The meeting adjourned at 4 p.m.
Submitted by William E. Ewing, WA0KAQ
|


@( enable_user_search_form:Boolean,enable_package_search_form:Boolean,enable_transaction_search_form:Boolean ) @draw_user_search_form() = {


CommerceGate.
Where the merchants
meet buyers
CommerceGate offers a complete set of services for you to accept credit card payments from your customers quickly and safely.
CommerceGate.
Where the merchants
meet buyers
CommerceGate offers a complete set of services for you to accept credit card payments from your customers quickly and safely.
CommerceGate.
Where the merchants
meet buyers
CommerceGate offers a complete set of services for you to accept credit card payments from your customers quickly and safely.
CommerceGate.
Where the merchants
meet buyers
CommerceGate offers a complete set of services for you to accept credit card payments from your customers quickly and safely.


--- layout: default title: CCA'17 - PayPal Payment Successful meta: Payment Successful! keyword: cloud services, iaas, paas, saas, cloud infrastructures, cloud computing, storage, data architectures, distributed networking, computing, cloud management, cloud operations, security and privary, performance, scalability, reliability, virtualization, cloud data analytics, big data management, big data analysis, cloud software, hardware, cloud applications, social clouds systems, mobile clouds systems, cloud economics ---
Your payment has been successful!
We thank you very much for registering for CCA'17. An email has been sent to you confirming your payment to CCA'17. Please keep this email for your reference.
Please make sure you fill out and submit the registration form. Failing to fill out this form will result in the elimination of your registration.
You may find the registration form by following the link below:
Should you have any concerns, questions or comments, please do not hesitate to contact us at:
We are looking forward to seeing you at CCA'17!


Stand Alone Replacment Menu
An alternative for the bootstrap dropdown javascript control using knockout and jquery.


"x" "1" "SANGAIAH,R, GOLD,A, NEWCOMB,KO AND BALL,LM,SYNTHESIS AND BIOLOGICALACTIVITY OF BAY-REGION METABOLITES OF A CYCLOPENTA-FUSED POLYCYCLIC AROMATICHYDROCARBON: BENZ[J]ACEANTHRYLENE, J. MED. CHEM. 34(2):54 __ 6-549, 1991"


DailyCode 35
Made some improvements today. I like the direction I'm going regarding my headers. I just keep eliminating the superfluous and unecessary. Designing for mobile is a real pleasure. There's isn't enough room for the unnessary and that's my way naturally. Eliminating the superfluous is derived from a user/conent/component-centric focus. What service am I providing to my users? Why? Assuming that I am providing information, what is the nature of this info? It's function, form and behavior? How can I present this information to my users in the most appropriate fashion (given the project requirements and my own principles as an engineer)? How do I structure this information as a performant component? This line of reasoning may just be my creative process and if it is I have surely evolved as a maker of things.


"Oi Jordan, derekdaquel.com is available, we should totally buy it"
Owner of derekdaquel.com
"Hey Remy, imagine if we bought Derek's domain name, how funny would that be!?"
"Dang, I wish I bought this domain when Remy and Jordan told me to buy it."
CEO - forgettingToBuyDomains.com


Menu
JESSICALLISON
About
Experience
Portfolio
Contact
Connect
Menu
JESSICALLISON
Portfolio
All
Computer Graphics
Graphic Design
Visual Art
Beluga Tissue Modeling System in Maya
(more)
Coral Reef Scene in Processing
(more)
Video Game Design in Unity3D
(more)
Georgia Tech T-Book
(more)
Roadsign Design Study
(more)
Shop With Friends App
(more)
Digital Still Life
STEAM Infographic
(more)
GT Homecoming Promotion
Personal Professional Branding
T-Night Promotion
3D Box Design
(more)
T-Night Promotion
Competition Logo Design
Event Invitation
Menu Redesign
Packaging Redesign
Digital Still Life
Digital Still Life
Beluga Tissue Modeling System in Maya
(more)
Coral Reef Scene in Processing
(more)
Video Game Design in Unity3D
(more)
Shop With Friends App
(more)
Georgia Tech T-Book
(more)
STEAM Infographic
(more)
GT Homecoming Promotion
Personal Professional Branding
T-Night Promotion
T-Night Promotion
Competition Logo Design
Event Invitation
Menu Redesign
Packaging Redesign
Roadsign Design Study
(more)
Digital Still Life
3D Box Design
(more)
Digital Still Life
Digital Still Life


He'll drag you down to his level and beat you with experience."


vuex-counter
Project setup
npm install
Compiles and hot-reloads for development
npm run serve
Compiles and minifies for production
npm run build
Run your tests
npm run test
Lints and fixes files
npm run lint
Customize configuration
See Configuration Reference.


Scenario: Watch out! Robogator can be like a demon! If robogator is on-guard and
senses something less than 2 feet away, it will move towards it. If it senses it less than 1 foot away it will stop, and start snapping
its jaws.
Motors: Both leg motors and the jaw motor
Sensors: Ultrasonic
How We Do It: When on-guard, we read the ultrasonic sensor, which gives distance to an object (in cm).
If the distance is more than 62cm, we turn off all the motors.
If the distance is between 31cm and 62cm, we set the leg motors to move forward and the jaw motor off.
If the distance is less than 31cm, we set the leg motors off and the jaw motors to toggle between a slower opening
and faster closing rate to give a real gator jaw snap feel. We keep rechecking the distance and repeating.


GRACIFIED WEB DESIGN
Home
About
Services
Affordable
&
CLASSIC
Professional
Web Design
we offer you the best webpages ever,which will help in the adverts of your business, patronise our workshop for easy business growth and development,a dvanced
promos and discounts
are available in our workshop
SUBSCRIBE TO OUR NEWSLETTER
Submit


The house across from Anna's house
You go to the house across from Anna's house. All the lights are on. This has to be {redacted}'s house. You can almost taste some good home cooking. You can just smell that sweet, sweet fragrance of Xbox victory. It kind of smells like Mountain Dew.
- Go time!


Chinese policymakers also remain wary of getting drawn into
regional politics, especially the Israel-Palestine issue. China has sought
and achieved a greater voice, but it will aver deep involvement, even
when pulled by regional actors. This is emerging as a new tension in its
effort to expand its presence and influence in the Middle East.
China’s growing engagement with the Middle East is starting
from a low baseline. China seldom devoted major political or diplomatic
resources to Middle Eastern affairs before the 2000s. It lacked
extensive expertise in the region, having nowhere near the levels of
expertise it has on the United States or East Asia. China’s strong rhetorical
support (largely under Mao) for Palestinian and Arab causes
changed as China toned down the ideological elements of its foreign
policy in the 1980s and, more practically, as it sought to build better
relations with Israel to gain access to conventional weapons and related
technology imports. (Since the 1980s, Israel has become one of the top
external arms suppliers to the Chinese military.)124
Moreover, the Middle East was never a region of high strategic
value to China and certainly had nowhere near the levels of importance
as East and South Asia. Instability in the Middle East seldom prompted
concern among Chinese leaders, as indicated in part by their proclivity
to introduce destabilizing weapon systems into regional conflicts.
In the 1980s and 1990s, a main feature of China’s Middle East diplomacy
was arms sales to the region, aside from rhetorically touting Arab
causes. This was largely for profit, except in the case of Iran, in which
China also used such transfers to maintain some regional influence and
generate leverage in dealings with the United States.125 Examples of major Chinese arms exports include sales of conventional weapons and
cruise missiles to both Iraq and Iran during their conflict in the 1980s;
sales of medium-range missiles to Saudi Arabia (1987–1988); civilian
nuclear cooperation with Iran, which reportedly ended in 1997; and
long-standing and extensive assistance to Iran’s ballistic missile and
cruise missile programs.126
Since the 1980s, China’s relations with Iran have been the most
high-profile and controversial aspect of its Middle East policy—to the
extent that Beijing had a clear and coherent “policy” toward this region.
Sino-Iranian relations have always loomed large for Beijing because of
the complications they created for China’s relations with the United
States; in other words, China-Iran interactions were (and are) strongly
influenced, in China’s eyes, by the implications for U.S.-China ties. The
stark differences in Chinese and U.S. views about Iran’s intentions as a
regional actor and as an aspiring proliferator fueled recurring tensions
in U.S.-China relations. Whereas U.S. policymakers viewed Iran as a
prime source of regional instability (because of its funding of terrorism
and pursuit of WMD), China sought stable and amicable relations
with Iran on the basis of their mutually beneficial arms trade relationship,
their common views about both nations being great civilizations,
their joint efforts to foster a more multipolar international system, and
their mutual suspicion of the United States.127 Beijing also frequently
used its ties with Iran to generate leverage in U.S.-China relations, in
particular to register opposition to such U.S. policies as arms sales to
Taiwan. Some of these dynamics persist today.128
In contrast to its past approach to the Middle East, China has
increased its multilateral and bilateral interaction with regional nations,
and Beijing is a far less passive actor than before. China forged “strategic
partnerships” with two key countries—Saudi Arabia (1999) and
Iran (2000), and it has frequent and expanding diplomatic exchanges
with both. China’s dedicated effort to grow its ties with the Saudis
is a prime example of its goal to diversify its political and economic
influence in the region. China established the Sino-Arab Cooperation
Forum in 2004 to encourage cooperation on regional politics, trade,
science, education, culture, and health care between China and Arab
countries. Beijing maintains a dialogue with the Arab Gulf Cooperation
Council; Hu Jintao met with the GCC’s leadership in April 2006.
In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, China
appointed a special envoy to the Middle East who has sought to “promote
reconciliation and facilitate dialogue” on the Middle East peace
process, although China has avoided substantive involvement in that
process.129 In October 2006, following the Israel-Lebanon conflict earlier
that summer, China pledged to expand to 1,000 the number of
Chinese engineering troops that were supporting the U.N.’s Interim
Force in Lebanon peacekeeping operation; China’s commitment notably
came as the U.N. faced problems finding contributors (even among
the UNSC permanent member states) to the expanded peacekeeping
activity in southern Lebanon.130
To increase its general political influence and economic leverage
(i.e., its ability to win contract bids), China has provided development
aid and infrastructure support to numerous Middle Eastern nations,
most notably the Palestinian Authority and Iran. China has engaged
actively in multilateral discussions about Iraq’s future. It contributed to
Iraq’s reconstruction by agreeing, in June 2007, to forgive billions in Iraqi debt and offering millions in humanitarian aid.131 In mid-2008,
a Chinese national oil company was given the Iraqi government’s first
foreign contract to develop an Iraqi oil field. This pattern of using
development aid to facilitate market access is similar to that used in
Africa, as noted above.132
What has driven these policy shifts? China’s Middle East diplomacy
is increasingly, but not exclusively, influenced by its need for
oil and natural gas. In 2008, about 50 percent of China’s crude oil
imports came from the Middle East, which makes it the region on
which China relies most for imported oil. That figure has remained
static for years, whereas China’s imports from other regions, notably
Russia and Africa, have grown substantially.133 China’s oil demand is
rising and will likely be met by increased imports, including from this
region. The International Energy Agency projects that China’s dependence
on imported oil will increase from 46 percent of total demand in
2004 to 63 percent in 2015 and 77 percent in 2030.134 More than half
of these imports are likely to continue coming from the Middle East,
although estimates vary.135 Already, China runs a trade deficit with
major oil-producing countries in the Middle East, especially Saudi
Arabia, Iran, and Oman.136 Together, these three countries supplied
China with 37 percent of its crude oil imports in 2007.137 Not surprisingly,
oil, and not exports of Chinese goods, dominates China’s trade
relationships with many Middle Eastern nations. Israel, the Levant, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates are exceptions to this trend. The
United Arab Emirates for many years has been the biggest importer of
Chinese goods in the region.138 The Middle East may become a more
lucrative export market for China as countries import Chinese technology,
which is already the case in Egypt.139
The relative importance of energy is reflected in China’s regional
diplomacy. China continues to work assiduously to secure oil and natural
gas trade and investment deals with Iran and Saudi Arabia as a
way to secure long-term access.140 A Chinese state-owned oil company,
Sinopec, in December 2007, signed a $70 billion to $100 billion deal to
develop the giant Yadavaran oil field in Iran (in exchange for pledges to
purchase natural gas from Iran), although this agreement has yet to be
finalized.141 In December 2006, another Chinese state-owned company,
China National Offshore Oil Corporation, signed a memorandum of
understanding with Iran to invest $16 billion in the development of the
North Pars gas field and the construction of gas liquefaction facilities.
In Saudi Arabia, Sinopec, in January 2004, also secured a natural gas
exploration block in Rub al-Khali in an auction that failed to attract
the interest of most major international companies. In March 2006,
Sinopec, Saudi Aramco, Exxon Mobil, and the Fujian provincial government
finalized joint venture agreements to expand the capacity of
the Fujian refinery, which will primarily process Saudi crude oil.
China’s desire for greater access to Middle Eastern energy supplies
should not be overstated as a driver of its regional diplomacy.
Although China’s reliance on oil imports is growing and it imports
much crude oil from the Middle East, it has also initiated a national
energy diversification strategy that eventually could moderate the
growth in imports. Also, China is diversifying its sources of energy
imports, especially from such politically volatile and diplomatically
complex regions as the Middle East. China is concerned about its reliance
on energy shipments through vulnerable sea lanes, through which
much Middle Eastern oil travels. China is looking for both alternative
suppliers and alternative routes for transporting energy resources to
China. Its crude oil imports from Russia are large (9 percent in 2007)
and rising rapidly (a 25 percent increase in 2007). China is investing
in numerous projects within Central Asia (notably in Kazakhstan) that
would facilitate land transport of oil and natural gas resources.142 This
effort is already reflected to some extent in Chinese crude imports: The
growth in China’s imports from the Middle East slowed to 9 percent
in 2006, and the growth in imports from Africa and Eurasia were 19
percent and 30 percent, respectively.
Beyond energy security, Beijing is concerned about the rise of
Islamic extremism in the Middle East, fearing that it could embolden
and materially assist Muslim Uighur separatists in Xinjiang Province.
Such concerns about extremism and transnational terrorist networks
are one reason that Chinese policymakers, more frequently than in
past years, express concerns about regionwide instability. These concerns
motivate China’s efforts to foster stability through more aid and
diplomatic involvement. China created a special envoy to the region
and has even participated in peace process negotiations, such as the
2007–2008 Annapolis Process. At the same time, a distinct objective
for Chinese policymakers is to avoid getting drawn deeply into Middle
East politics, which they view as too complex to resolve and as sapping
China’s diplomatic resources. Last, China’s Middle East policymaking
is part and parcel of Beijing’s broader effort to promote its view of building a more multipolar international system in which Beijing can
forge coalitions among developing countries to advance China’s positions
in major multilateral organizations such as the U.N.143
China’s approach to the Middle East continues to be shaped by
its relations with the United States and Chinese perceptions of U.S.
objectives in the region. Chinese leaders recognize that U.S. presence
in the Middle East is considered by Washington as a strategic interest,
that U.S. diplomatic and military presence will persist for decades,
and that U.S. policy is critical to regional stability—as well as being
a source of much instability. Chinese policymakers harbor deep suspicions
that the long-term U.S. intention is to dominate the region, and
Chinese leaders often disagree with the specific policies that the United
States has used to pursue perceived American objectives (notably the
2003 intervention in Iraq). Chinese strategists also recognize that the
U.S. involvement in Iraq has so heavily preoccupied U.S. leaders (and
so drawn on U.S. diplomatic and military resources) that it has created
welcome breathing space in U.S.-China relations and diverted U.S.
attention away from East Asia.144
Chinese views about the U.S. regional role manifest in a balancing
act in China’s Middle East diplomacy—one that is becoming more
complex for Beijing as its interests expand. China seeks to maintain
positive relations with both Sunni and Shia Arab states, on the one
hand, and with Israel and Arab states, on the other hand. China also
seeks to avoid actions that will place it in direct confrontation with the
United States, such as large and high-profile arms sales or a close association
with Iran. At the same time, Beijing wants to build and maintain political relationships that will ensure access to resources and markets,
even when this involves preserving ties with controversial nations
such as Iran. Beijing is also pursuing policies that would prevent the
United States from restricting China’s ability to exercise political and
economic influence; this manifests in China’s regional aid, expanding
diplomatic relationships, and continued pursuit of energy deals
and weapons technology exports to Iran despite U.S. protests. China’s
“middle-man” approach to UNSC deliberations on Iran’s nuclear
weapons program similarly further reflects China’s effort to balance
these multiple regional objectives, specifically its interests in nonproliferation
and regional stability, on the one hand, and access to energy
supplies and stable relations with Iran, on the other.
Overall, China’s evolving policymaking toward the Middle East
is focused on diversifying its political and economic relationships to
protect its equities in the region. China’s desire for access to energy
supplies plays a leading role, but not an exclusive one, in Beijing’s calculations.
As these material interests expand, China’s stake in fostering
regional stability will likely increase as well; indeed there is already
evidence of this. This development, in turn, may precipitate heretofore
avoidable tradeoffs in China’s Middle East diplomacy that lead
Beijing to contribute to regional or international processes to moderate
state behaviors (such as Iran’s support for terrorism and weapons
proliferation).145 These trends aside, the broader context of Chinese
Middle East diplomacy should not be lost: Chinese foreign policy
will continue to give priority to China’s Asian neighbors and its relations
with major powers. Even among China’s ties with developing
nations, the Middle East does not appear to garner as much of China’s
political and economic resources as do China’s ties with Africa,
even though Beijing’s attention to and activities in the Middle East are
expanding.
Multilateral Diplomacy
Since the mid-1990s, Chinese views on the value of multilateral organizations
evolved from passivity and skepticism to active embrace of
them. Chinese policymakers now see multilateral organizations as central
to the Chinese goals of advancing “multipolarization,” fostering the
emergence of a “just and rational international order,” and “building
a harmonious world.” The importance of multilateralism has grown.
Beginning around 2002, Chinese leaders, policymakers, and state
media started reducing their classic calls for greater “multipolarity” and
less “hegemony and power politics”; instead, they began emphasizing
the role of multilateral organizations in addressing global economic
and security challenges.146
This change in rhetoric was more than just symbolism. In 2004,
China’s top leaders elevated explicitly the concept of “cooperation,”
along with the core ideas of “peace and development,” as three defining
principles in China’s diplomacy.147 The addition of this third term
underscored China’s commitment to multilateralism as a mechanism of
reassurance and also as an indication of China’s growing comfort with
and use of such institutions. Thus, there is a firm policy basis for this
priority in China’s official diplomacy—one that is sanctioned at the
highest levels of the CCP. Most notably, multilateralism has become a
pillar of Hu Jintao’s foreign policy and a way for his administration to
distinguish (albeit modestly) its diplomatic approach from that of Hu’s
predecessors.148
China in the U.N.
China’s behavior in the United Nations is a leading indicator of its
affinity for using multilateral organizations to advance its objectives.
China has been more involved and assertive in its U.N. activities,
including in the UNSC and U.N. affiliate organizations, such as the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Conference on
Disarmament (CD). For Beijing, the U.N. is the center of its support
for multilateralism and building a multipolar international system. As
Chinese President Hu Jintao stated during a speech at the U.N.’s 60th
anniversary in 2005, “[We should] uphold multilateralism to realize
common security. . . . The United Nations, as the core of the collective
security mechanism, plays an irreplaceable role in international cooperation
to ensure global security. Such a role can only be strengthened
and must not in any way be weakened.”149
China pursues several goals in its U.N. activities.150 First, it seeks
to bolster the U.N.’s standing as the premier multilateral organization
that can promote China’s vision of “democracy in international affairs”
and building a “just and fair international order.”151 With China being a
veto-wielding, permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, such
goals are not communitarian altruism but directly advance China’s foreign
policy objectives. In practical terms, what that means is that China
uses its position to change U.N. actions it opposes and to advance the
ones it supports. China, for example, hails the U.N. as a citadel of multilateral cooperation but, for all practical purposes, it opposes the
expansion of the permanent membership of the U.N. Security Council
to include Japan, India, or Brazil. China’s use of the U.N. to promote
its worldview is increasingly reflected in Chinese efforts to constrain or
alter U.S. positions in the U.N. Security Council on such controversial
security issues as North Korea, Iran, Sudan, and Burma.
Second, China has historically seen the U.N. as a prime venue in
which to reduce international support for Taiwan and to prod nations
to transfer their formal diplomatic relations to Beijing. Of China’s six
UNSC vetoes to date, two have been related to denying U.N. peacekeeping
support to nations that recognized Taiwan. China has become
more subtle in its Taiwan-related U.N. diplomacy, but this motive is
still prominent.
Third, China uses the U.N. to validate and bolster its image as
a major power worthy of respect and deference; in recent years, it has
used its UNSC actions to demonstrate that it is a “responsible major
developing nation” that seeks to address such common, global security
challenges as WMD proliferation and terrorism.152 This Chinese goal
has meant that the quality of its participation in U.N. activities has
improved, and it has become slightly more transparent as a government.
This motivation is most strongly reflected in China’s substantial
contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations; it has contributed
more than any other permanent member of the Security Council. Also,
China has begun to participate in U.N.-led processes to improve transparency
on defense issues. This requires that it report its annual defense
expenditures to the U.N., and in 2008 it restarted its annual reporting
to the U.N. Register on Conventional Arms Exports, which was suspended
in 1997 over a dispute about how to classify U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan.
Last, a central, but more subtle, driver of China’s U.N. diplomacy
is to constrain the U.S. assertion of its power and minimize U.S. ability
to impose its solutions on international problems. Many Chinese
analysts see the U.N. as a mechanism to moderate U.S. “unilateralism” by bolstering the organization’s ability to constrain the prerogatives of
the United States and its allies.153 This is most evident in topics related
to human rights, humanitarian questions, and imposition of penalties
and sanctions. Seldom mentioned in Chinese public statements,
this objective is evident in numerous Chinese actions at the UNSC
(detailed below) and is a reflection of contrasting U.S. and Chinese
visions of state sovereignty and involvement in other states’ internal
affairs.
In this decade, China has been more openly resistant to U.S. policies
that directly affect China’s economic and security interests, such as
U.S. efforts to impose economic sanctions on Sudan, or the U.S. push
for nonproliferation-related sanctions against North Korea or Iran.
Chinese cooperation with Russia in shaping U.N. debates, especially
opposing U.S. positions, on these issues has grown substantially in the
latter half of this decade.
This is a complex and shifting objective for Beijing, largely because
of the competing foreign policy objective of not confronting or openly
antagonizing Washington. This latter dynamic was evident in China’s
low-key but “principled opposition” to U.S. efforts to seek U.N. authorization
for the 2003 military intervention in Iraq; Beijing let Moscow
and Paris lead the charge in opposing U.S. actions. Since then, China’s
tolerance for disagreeing with the United States at the U.N. seems to
have grown. Beijing has shown increased willingness to assert itself in
high-profile UNSC debates and to openly contradict Washington. This
is largely a function of several factors: China’s growing confidence in its
own capabilities; its willingness to tolerate negative U.S. reactions and
a related view that the United States needs China more than before;
Beijing’s perception that the U.S. image and influence were in decline
during the Bush administration; its expanding global economic interests;
and China’s ability to work with other nations, such as Russia, to
avoid isolation in its disagreements with the United States.
U.N. Security Council Activities
China’s involvement, activism, and assertiveness in the U.N. are evident
in its UNSC-related activities. Several examples are provided
below: U.N. peacekeeping operations, Somalia, Sudan, Taiwan, and
other UNSC debates.
Peacekeeping Operations. China has quantitatively and qualitatively
expanded its participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations
(UNPKOs) in the last five years. As of 2008, China is the largest
contributor to UNPKOs among the five permanent members of the
U.N. Security Council and almost the largest contributor among other
NATO member states. In 2008, China was the 12th largest contributor
to U.N. peacekeeping operations among all U.N. members. China
currently deploys 1,861 troops, 88 military observers, and 208 police
to 12 U.N. peacekeeping operations worldwide (Table 6.2).154
Table 6.2 Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping Operations
China first began participating in UNPKOs in 1990 but,
throughout that decade, its contributions were limited to providing a
few military observers and civilian police to some U.N. operations. In
the 2000s, China dramatically expanded its contributions, which have
increased 20 times since 2000 (whereas those of the United States,
Russia, and the UK have declined or not grown). About 75 percent of
China’s contributions are to UNPKOs in Africa, and this number is
set to increase as China augments its deployments to UNPKOs in the
Darfur region of Sudan, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. China’s contributions are commonly in the functional areas
of engineering, medical services, and transportation. China is also
the second-largest contributor of civilian police (from the Ministry of
Public Security) to UNPKOs.
The quality of China’s involvements in UNPKOs has improved
as well. In September 2007, the U.N. for the first time appointed a
Chinese General, Zhao Jingmin, as the primary commander for the
U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). According to Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang, “There are now at least
three Chinese nationals serving in the Force Generation Unit, Military
Planning Service Office and the Operations Office for the Asia and
Middle East Division at U.N. headquarters.”155
In addition, China has become more politically flexible in the
operations it supports. In 2004, it initially contributed 130 police officers
to the UNPKO in Haiti, even though Haiti recognizes Taiwan,
and then expanded the contribution to 143 by early 2009.156 This was
the first time that China has taken such a step; in the late 1990s, it
vetoed UNSC resolutions authorizing such peacekeeping operations
in nations that recognize Taiwan (Guatemala in 1997 and Macedonia
in 1999).157 Gill and Chin-hao Huang argue that even on a
highly sensitive issue that directly affects China’s international image,
such as the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, “Beijing has adopted a
more active approach, supporting the need for political reconciliation
and a hybrid African Union/United Nations peacekeeping force
to address the humanitarian crisis. In early 2008, China dispatched
some 140 engineering troops to Darfur to help prepare the way for
the larger U.N. force envisioned by the international community.”158
Somalia. In 2003 and 2004, China led the charge in UNSC deliberations
on the Somalia peace process. In 2003, it took the unusual
step of chairing a resolution on the peace process in which it was
designated as the lead and thus “held the pen” on drafting relevant
statements and resolutions. In 2004, China prodded the UNSC to frequently
issue UNSC presidential statements on Somalia—nearly doubling
the number from previous years. China also insisted—during an
unusual UNSC meeting held in Nairobi, Kenya (convened to address
the Darfur crisis in Sudan)—that the council members address the
Somalia issue first. China successfully pushed for Somali leaders to speak to the UNSC meeting in Nairobi before it discussed the Sudan
issue. As a result of China’s efforts, the UNSC issued five presidential
statements on Somalia and an equivalent number of UNSC resolutions.
Chinese motivations for assuming such an active role are not clear, as
China has no major economic or diplomatic stakes in Somalia. A possible
explanation is that Beijing sought to improve China’s standing with
East African nations, an area in which Taiwan has some diplomatic
relations and the United States has traditionally been isolated.159
Sudan. China’s diplomatic activism in the UNSC has been most
prominent and public in deliberations about Sudan’s Darfur crisis.
China consistently used its position on the UNSC to shield the Sudanese
government from sanctions and other international opprobrium
(Table 6.3).
Beginning in early 2004, China initially sought to keep the
Darfur issue off the UNSC agenda, even as Kofi Annan and other
senior U.N. officials were raising public awareness of the emerging
humanitarian crisis there.160 Once the Darfur issue was put onto the
UNSC agenda, China opposed several draft resolutions that would
impose economic penalties on the government in Khartoum for its support
of Janjaweed militia activities in Darfur. In UNSC deliberations,
Beijing threatened to veto several such resolutions, even after Washington
declared Khartoum’s activities to constitute “genocide.” China
actively argued against resolutions that placed sanctions on Sudan’s
petroleum sector (e.g., UNSC 1564), imposed an arms embargo on
Sudan (e.g., UNSC 1556), expanded the scope of the arms embargo
to all parties operating in Darfur and imposed additional measures
including a travel ban and an assets freeze on individuals designated
by the UNSC Sudan Sanctions Committee (e.g., UNSC 1591), and
referred the Sudan issue to the International Criminal Court (e.g.,
UNSC 1593). Also, China (working often through Pakistan and Syria,
perhaps to deflect criticism from itself) sought to lessen the scope of these sanctions. China eventually abstained on all four of these UNSC
sanction resolutions, after moderating the language of many of them,
including eliminating references to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
Beijing reluctantly agreed to UNSC Resolution 1590, which called
for creation of a U.N. Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) and deployment
of 10,000 military personnel. In August 2006, Beijing abstained
on another key UNSC vote on resolution 1706, which expanded the
size of the original UNMIS force and called for its deployment to
Darfur. Khartoum opposed 1706 as well. Beijing’s position was that Khartoum’s consent is required to deploy the U.N. forces to Darfur—
consent that was not forthcoming until mid-2007.161
Beginning in late 2006, China began to play a more active role
in resolving the Darfur situation, including putting pressure on the
Sudanese government. According to the joint congressional testimony
of two deputy assistant secretaries of state, Thomas Christensen and
James Swan,
Since late 2006 China has shown an increased willingness to engage
with the international community on Darfur, and has applied
diplomatic pressure on the Government of Sudan to change its
behavior, as well as to engage in a political process for a peaceful
negotiation to the Darfur conflict. China voted for UNSC Resolution
1769 that created the hybrid United Nations African Mission
in Darfur, but has at times acquiesced in the Government of
Sudan’s opposition to its full implementation. China has pledged
up to 300 military engineers, of whom 140 have been dispatched,
making China the first non-African Troop Contributing Country
to deploy in Darfur. China has also become more involved
in responding to the humanitarian crisis, providing some direct
assistance and donating $1.8 million U.S. dollars to the Darfur
region and the African Union Special Mission.162
Chinese diplomats and analysts have been relatively clear, in both
public and private, about the symbolic and material motivations for
Beijing’s actions on the Darfur crisis. Publicly, Chinese diplomats raise
the banner of China’s long-standing opposition to external interference
in the internal affairs of other countries, especially on the basis of
human rights violations or a humanitarian crisis. Many Chinese fear that such justifications for imposing sanctions or the use of force could
be directed at China in the future. At a more basic level, senior Chinese
scholars argue that Chinese leaders are simply agnostic about the
domestic political activities of China’s international partners; for them,
there is no universal value system that should be applied by the U.N.
or bilaterally. The prevailing value for Chinese leaders is fostering economic
growth and development; issues of regime legitimacy and governance
practices are not a priority for China in its bilateral relations.163
Such issues become relevant to Chinese leaders and diplomats
only when China’s agnostic approach toward humanitarian issues
affects its international image and its ability to foster long-term bilateral
economic relations. There are many indications that China’s position
on the Darfur crisis began to change because of such calculations.
There is a rough correlation between China’s willingness, in late 2006,
to put pressure on the Sudanese government to allow peacekeepers into
Darfur and the escalation in the campaign led by nongovernmental
organizations to criticize China for its support of Khartoum, such as by
labeling the 2008 Beijing Olympics the “Genocide Olympics.” Another
likely influence on China’s change in approach to the Darfur issue
was the concerns about Darfur expressed by numerous African leaders
during the November 2006 China-Africa summit in Beijing.164
Moreover, Chinese diplomats note privately that China has had
a substantial economic stake in relations with Sudan, given its deep
involvement in Sudan’s petroleum sector. In 2004 and 2005, the years
of the critical U.N. debates on Darfur, Sudan was one of China’s top
ten suppliers of crude oil imports (about 5 percent). Sudan was also
China’s largest source of foreign oil production (followed by Kazakhstan)
as a function of the large equity investment of two large national
oil companies, Sinopec and the China National Petroleum Corporation.
As a result, Chinese policymakers were reluctant to alienate a key supplier of energy resources at the very time they felt in desperate need
to increase access to imported oil.165
Taiwan. China’s effort to isolate Taiwan and to reduce its international
space has historically been a consistent driver of its activities at
the U.N. Since 1971, three of China’s six UNSC vetoes have been to
block U.N. assistance to states with formal ties to Taiwan.166 China’s
recent anti-Taiwan diplomacy in the U.N. reflects a greater sophistication
and less-confrontational approach. Without using the veto option
(or even threatening to veto), China has creatively calibrated its support
for U.N. peacekeeping operations to reduce Taiwan’s international
space—and thus the number of countries that recognize Taiwan.
China is no longer vetoing such operations (which otherwise usually
garner unanimous UNSC support), but rather China is taking a
more low-profile (and seemingly effective) approach. In 2003, China
complicated the U.N.’s ability to deploy a peacekeeping stabilization
force to Liberia until Beijing was assured that the new host government
would shift recognition to China. (The old government, run by Charles
Taylor, had diplomatic relations with Taiwan since 1997.) When the
UNSC initially agreed to establish a mission and send a stabilization
force to Liberia after the fall of Charles Taylor’s regime, China supported
only a three-month mandate for the operation even though at
least six months were necessary for the initial mobilization and deployment
of the peacekeeping force. China then persuaded the U.N. to
intervene to ensure that the post-Taylor government would recognize
China. A month after the September 2003 UNSC resolution (1509)
authorizing for 12 months the stabilization force in Liberia, China and
Liberia reestablished diplomatic relations (on October 11, 2003).167
In contrast to this episode, China has also been willing to support
and send troops to U.N. peacekeeping operations in Haiti, even
though the government there has formal diplomatic relations with
Taiwan. This arrangement has not been trouble-free for Beijing, given some statements by Haitian officials that Beijing deemed provocative,
but China’s support has continued.
UNSC Expansion. In early 2005, China’s UNSC activism and
influence were readily apparent in its response to a proposal to expand
Security Council membership. Although China has been fairly passive
in past U.N. discussions about such reform (by endorsing most of the
Group 77’s suggestions), China staunchly opposed the formal April
2005 proposal to expand the Security Council to include Germany,
India, Brazil, and Japan. It was Japan’s inclusion that most motivated
Beijing’s opposition, with China arguing that Japan’s perceived unwillingness
to face up to and properly atone for the brutality of its occupation
of China and other Asian nations in World War II invalidated
Tokyo for such a position on the Security Council. Supporters of Japan
argued that Japan’s U.N. contributions justify its membership: Japan
pays 19 percent of the U.N.’s budget and the United States pays about
21 percent. China contributes 2 percent.
China used a variety of creative diplomatic approaches to block
this proposal. Chinese diplomats lobbied their U.N. counterparts to
initially not sponsor the resolution and then to reject it. China leveraged
its growing political relations with African nations to successfully
kill the proposal. China encouraged African diplomats to insist that at
least two African nations join the original proposal for UNSC membership
and be given veto power. The latter requirement guaranteed the
death of the expansion proposal, which occurred in August 2005.168
For China, there was a domestic component to its opposition as
well. Japan’s bid for council membership prompted a massive Internetbased
petition opposing Japanese membership; these events, among
others, incited a series of anti-Japan riots in Beijing and Shanghai
in spring 2005 that caused millions of dollars in destruction—
including to Chinese businesses. It is unclear whether the Chinese government
initiated such public activities, facilitated them once started,
or simply did not strongly oppose them. Government authorities eventually
intervened to halt the Shanghai riots after a few days, indicating
that, although the government may have found these riots useful, it ultimately worried that they could spin out of control and change to
antigovernment protests.
China’s UNSC Assertiveness. In addition to the specific Chinese
behaviors described above, a more general trend is apparent in China’s
UNSC behavior—a growing assertiveness and a related policy
coordination with Russia. Since 2007, China has vetoed two UNSC
resolutions, which is unique behavior given that, beforehand, Beijing
had issued only four vetoes in about 30 years, dating back to when it
joined the U.N. in 1971 (Table 6.4). Both vetoes, one related to Burma
(2007) and the other to Zimbabwe (2008), were in response to UNSC
resolutions censuring these two countries for their human rights practices
and calling for political change. In both cases, China argued that
the human rights issues are not the purview of the Security Council
because they do not pose a “threat to international peace and security,”
referring to the language in the U.N. Charter. In both cases, Russia
and China issued joint vetoes, a first for them since the early 1970s.
To be sure, Bush administration officials pushed these resolutions even
though they knew that they were highly controversial, and Chinese
diplomats had signaled that they would be opposed by China, Russia,
and other nations.169
Table 6.4 China’s U.N. Security Council Vetoes
Chinese and Russian coordination on other Security Council
issues has increased as well. In 2006 and 2007, a high correlation is
evident in Chinese and Russian votes on many UNSC resolutions. On
Sudan, Russia joined China in abstaining on almost every resolution
involving imposition of sanctions, even after China successfully lessened
the penalties (e.g., UNSC 1564, 1591, and 1672). In particular, a
rough division of labor appears to have developed on the North Korea
and Iran nuclear issues: On Iran, Russia takes the lead and China follows;
on North Korea, China takes the lead and Russia follows. This cooperation has most often been used to alter or modify U.S.- and
UK-led efforts in the Security Council to impose sanctions on or otherwise
penalize Iran and North Korea for their continued development
of nuclear weapons.170 A clear motivation of Sino-Russian coordination
is to constrain U.S. efforts to advance punitive solutions to the Iran and
North Korea issues.
China’s assertiveness in the UNSC has also manifested in a greater
willingness to confront other nations and, in this sense, its actions have
been more in line with U.S. policy goals. Since 2006, China has supported
limited sanctions on both North Korea and Iran for their continued
nuclear weapons development: UNSC 1695 and 1718 in the case
of North Korea and UNSC 1737, 1747, and 1803 in the case of Iran. In
some cases, these resolutions even included sanctions referencing Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter. In April 2009, following a North Korean
rocket launch, China notably supported a tough-minded UNSC presidential
statement against Pyongyang’s actions even though it opposed a
binding UNSC resolution. The statement was robust and sent a strong
signal; however, it “condemned” North Korea’s rocket launch, called it
a violation of 1718 (closing a loophole for satellite launches), called for
no more launches, and tightened sanctions on Pyongyang. All of these
actions represent stark breaks from past Chinese approaches to UNSC
deliberations on nonproliferation.171
U.N.-Related Nonproliferation Affairs. China has become heavily
involved in U.N.-related forums on arms control and nonproliferation
affairs, such as the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and
International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. China has used such
forums to register its opposition to U.S. security policies (such as U.S.
missile defense programs), to limit U.S. influence on key issues and to
promote the Chinese position on nonproliferation and arms control.
In the late 1990s and early in the 2000s, China used the CD as its
main venue in which to oppose U.S. missile defense plans. China essentially froze the activities of the CD until the United States agreed to a
“mandate” to begin negotiations on a treaty banning the weaponization
of space; the United States had long opposed this step, favoring informal
“talks” instead. China sought to use its position in the CD to generate
international opposition to U.S. missile defense plans and to push the
United States to agree to limits on its development of missile defense capabilities.
China finally dropped this stance in 2003 when it realized that it
had been ineffective and that China had stalled CD activities for years.172
China’s actions within the IAEA have had an increasingly cooperative
flavor and been more in line with U.S. nonproliferation goals.
China has sought to moderate other members (often the United States)
who pushed the IAEA for both stronger safeguards and greater attention
to noncompliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) and IAEA safeguard agreements. For example, China for years
opposed the IAEA Board of Governors’ “reporting” of cases of noncompliance
to the UNSC, arguing that such issues should be handled
within the IAEA. China feared that once such cases reached the
UNSC, certain nations, such as North Korea and Iran, would be the
subject of possible sanctions and penalties. China believed that sanctions
would be counterproductive to a negotiated solution—a longheld
Chinese view of sanctions.
China’s approach began to change around 2003, however. In
February 2003 and March 2004, as the North Korea situation escalated,
China supported a consensus resolution of the IAEA Board of
Governors on reporting North Korean noncompliance to the UNSC.
Beijing had been reluctant to take such a position against Pyongyang
throughout the 1990s. In September 2005 and February 2006, respectively,
China abstained and then voted “yes” in roll call votes on two
resolutions that reported Iranian noncompliance to the UNSC. These
changes in China’s behavior are a result of growing concerns about
North Korean and Iranian intransigence, greater attention to the effect
of nuclear proliferation on stability in Northeast Asia and the Middle
East, and, perhaps, a recognition that international concerns about nuclear proliferation were growing more acute and that China was
increasingly out of line with mainstream international assessments.173
Another example of changing Chinese nonproliferation activities
in U.N. bodies was its support for UNSC resolution 1540 on combating
WMD proliferation. During the drafting of 1540, the Chinese strongly
supported calling WMD proliferation “a threat to international peace
and security,” which refers to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Yet, it
was reluctant to let the resolution include any language that would provide
a legal basis for proliferation-related interdiction activities, which
the Chinese government felt would violate international law. With the
input of China and other countries, UNSC 1540 evolved from essentially
a counterproliferation initiative (that did not ban interdiction)
to one that created binding legal obligations on member states to prevent
proliferation, a reporting requirement for member states on their
domestic nonproliferation controls, and a mechanism for multilateral
nonproliferation cooperation.174
In sum, China is getting better at maneuvering within the U.N.
and using U.N. processes to pursue its increasingly global foreign policy
interests, even when they conflict with the United States and other
major powers. Beijing’s willingness to take the lead on issues appears to
be growing as well. Beijing’s cooperation with Moscow has afforded it
added room to pursue its foreign policy objectives without appearing
to be isolated or out of step with international public opinion. China
has opposed U.S. initiatives and has sought to moderate U.N. actions
that directly impinge on China’s material interests, such as in the cases
of Sudan and Iran. China will continue to take steps to promote its
own view of global order and, when possible, to constrain U.S. exercise
of its diplomatic and military power in the future—especially when it
undercuts Chinese interests.
返回页首
返回主页
version:1.0<EMAIL_ADDRESS>© retter2012.com


| Terms | Description | Executor | Initiator | Status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| hot | Print new documents | Joshua Lindberg | Bartholomeo Diaz | scheduled | Edit Delete |
| free | Review an article | Karl Marx | Bartholomeo Diaz | in progress | Edit Delete |
| ordinal | Collect fresh news | Freddy Mercury | Bartholomeo Diaz | completed | Edit Delete |
| soft | Organize a meeting | Vasco da Gama | Bartholomeo Diaz | in progress | Edit Delete |
| hot | Sign today's documents | James Milner | Bartholomeo Diaz | completed | Edit Delete |
| soft | Verify dubious data | Kevin Spacey | Bartholomeo Diaz | rejected | Edit Delete |
| soft | Answer emails | Ragnar Lothbrok | Bartholomeo Diaz | completed | Edit Delete |
| free | Meet key customer | Sarah Tancredi | Bartholomeo Diaz | cancelled | Edit Delete |
| ordinal | Make daily reports | Peter Jackson | Bartholomeo Diaz | in progress | Edit Delete |
| ordinal | Take an interview | Salvador Dali | Bartholomeo Diaz | scheduled | Edit Delete |


This application generates a random password based on criteria user provides
Start
Please select options for generating password
Should contain lowercase letters
Should contain uppercase letters
Should contain numbers
Should contain special characters
Generate password


404 File Not Found
The page you were looking for doesn't exist.
You may have mistyped the address or the page may have moved.


Class GoalMap
Implementation of a goal map system, also known as Dijkstra maps ( http://www.roguebasin.com/index.php?title=The_Incredible_Power_of_Dijkstra_Maps )
Inheritance
Implements
Inherited Members
Namespace: GoRogue.Pathing
Assembly: GoRogue.dll
Syntax
public class GoalMap : IMapView<double? >
Remarks
This class encapsulates the work of building a goal map from your map level. You provide the constructor with a map level exposed as GoalStates (obstacle, a goal, or an open space), and GoalMap will compute the goal map for the level. /// When the underlying circumstances of the level change, the GoalMap instance will need to be updated. Call Update() if obstacles have changed, such as digging through walls or opening or closing a door, or UpdatePathsOnly() if the goals have changed but not the obstacles. /// Each cell is a Nullable<double>, where a null is an obstacle, and a value indicates a distance from a goal, with 0 being a goal tile.
Constructors
| Improve this Doc View SourceGoalMap(IMapView<GoalState>, Distance)
Constructor. Takes a base map and a distance measurement to use for calculation.
Declaration
public GoalMap(IMapView<GoalState> baseMap, Distance distanceMeasurement)
Parameters
| Type | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| IMapView<GoalState> | baseMap | The underlying map as GoalStates. |
| Distance | distanceMeasurement | The distance measurement (and implicitly the AdjacencyRule) to use for calculation. |
Properties
| Improve this Doc View SourceBaseMap
The underlying map.
Declaration
public IMapView<GoalState> BaseMap { get; }
Property Value
| Type | Description |
|---|---|
| IMapView<GoalState> |
DistanceMeasurement
The distance measurement the GoalMap is using to calculate distance.
Declaration
public Distance DistanceMeasurement { get; }
Property Value
| Type | Description |
|---|---|
| Distance |
Height
Height of the goal map.
Declaration
public int Height { get; }
Property Value
| Type | Description |
|---|---|
| System.Int32 |
Item[Coord]
Returns the goal-map value for the given position.
Declaration
public double? this[Coord pos] { get; }
Parameters
| Type | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Coord | pos | The position to return the goal-map value for. |
Property Value
| Type | Description |
|---|---|
| System.Nullable<System.Double> | The goal-map value for the given position. |
Item[Int32]
Declaration
public double? this[int index1D] { get; }
Parameters
| Type | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| System.Int32 | index1D |
Property Value
| Type | Description |
|---|---|
| System.Nullable<System.Double> |
Item[Int32, Int32]
Returns the goal-map value for the given position.
Declaration
public double? this[int x, int y] { get; }
Parameters
| Type | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| System.Int32 | x | X-coordinate of the position to return the goal-map value for. |
| System.Int32 | y | Y-coordinate of the position to return the goal-map value for. |
Property Value
| Type | Description |
|---|---|
| System.Nullable<System.Double> | The goal-map value for the given position. |
Width
Width of the goal map.
Declaration
public int Width { get; }
Property Value
| Type | Description |
|---|---|
| System.Int32 |
Methods
| Improve this Doc View SourceGetDirectionOfMinValue(Coord)
Gets the direction of the neighbor with the minimum goal-map value from the given position.
Declaration
public Direction GetDirectionOfMinValue(Coord position)
Parameters
| Type | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Coord | position | The position to get the minimum value for. |
Returns
| Type | Description |
|---|---|
| Direction | The direction that has the minimum value in the goal-map, or Direction.NONE if the neighbors are all obstacles. |
ToString()
Returns the goal-map values represented as a 2D grid-style string.
Declaration
public override string ToString()
Returns
| Type | Description |
|---|---|
| System.String | A string representing the goal map values. |
Overrides
ToString(Int32)
Returns the goal-map values represented as a 2D-grid-style string, with the given field size.
Declaration
public string ToString(int fieldSize)
Parameters
| Type | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| System.Int32 | fieldSize | Number of characters allocated to each value in the string. |
Returns
| Type | Description |
|---|---|
| System.String | A string representing the goal-map values. |
ToString(Int32, String)
Returns the goal-map values represented as a 2D-grid-style string, with the given field size, and any non-null values formatted using the given format string.
Declaration
public string ToString(int fieldSize, string formatString)
Parameters
| Type | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| System.Int32 | fieldSize | Number of characters allocated to each value in the string. |
| System.String | formatString | Format string to use for non-null values. |
Returns
| Type | Description |
|---|---|
| System.String | A string representing the goal-map values. |
ToString(String)
Returns the goal-map values represented as a 2D-grid-style string, where any value that isn't null is formatted as per the specified format string.
Declaration
public string ToString(string formatString)
Parameters
| Type | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| System.String | formatString | Format string to use for non-null values. |
Returns
| Type | Description |
|---|---|
| System.String | A string representing the goal-map values. |
Update()
Re-evaluates the entire goal map. Should be called when obstacles change. If the obstacles have not changed but the goals have, call UpdatePathsOnly() for better efficiency.
Declaration
public bool Update()
Returns
| Type | Description |
|---|---|
| System.Boolean | False if no goals were produced by the evaluator, true otherwise |
UpdatePathsOnly()
Re-evaluates the walkable portion of the goal map. Should be called anytime the goals change.
Declaration
public bool UpdatePathsOnly()
Returns
| Type | Description |
|---|---|
| System.Boolean | False if no goals were produced by the evaluator, true otherwise |
Events
| Improve this Doc View SourceUpdated
Triggers when the GoalMap is updated.
Declaration
public event Action Updated
Event Type
| Type | Description |
|---|---|
| System.Action |


It's not often we iterate over the Muppets twice, but in this case it seems prudent to try from 'extras.ejs':


| Total net profit | -1.23 | Gross profit | 2.69 | Gross loss | -3.92 |
| Profit factor | 0.69 | Expected payoff | -0.1 | ||
| Absolute drawdown | -1.23 | Maximal drawdown (%) | 3.92 (145.72%) | ||
| Total trades | 12 | Profit trades (% of total) | 9 (75.0%) | Loss trades (% of total) | 3 (25.0%) |
| Long positions (won %) | 3 (100.0%) | Short positions (won %) | 9 (66.67%) | ||
| Largest | profit trade | 0.59 | loss trade | -1.41 | |
| Average | profit trade | 0.3 | loss trade | -1.31 | |
| Minimum | profit trade | 0.01 | loss trade | -1.1 | |
| Maximum | take profit in pips | 105.8 | stop loss in pips | -38.9 | |
| Average | take profit in pips | 20.2 | stop loss in pips | -27.9 | |
| Minimum | take profit in pips | 0.1 | stop loss in pips | -15.7 | |
| Maximum | Reward-Risk | 3.0 | Duration in minutes | 6789 | |
| Average | Reward-Risk | 0.7 | Duration in minutes | 826.5 | |
| Minimum | Reward-Risk | 0.0 | Duration in minutes | 1 | |
| Maximum | consecutive wins (profit in money) | 9.0 (2.69) | consecutive losses (loss in money) | 3.0 (-3.92) | |
| Average | consecutive wins | 9.0 | consecutive losses | 3.0 |
| Total net profit | 1.09 | Gross profit | 1.09 | Gross loss | 0.0 |
| Profit factor | 0.0 | Expected payoff | 0.36 | ||
| Absolute drawdown | 0.0 | Maximal drawdown (%) | 0.0 (0.0%) | ||
| Total trades | 3 | Profit trades (% of total) | 3 (100.0%) | Loss trades (% of total) | 0 (0.0%) |
| Largest | profit trade | 0.59 | loss trade | 0.0 | |
| Average | profit trade | 0.36 | loss trade | 0.0 | |
| Minimum | profit trade | 0.23 | loss trade | 0.0 | |
| Maximum | take profit in pips | 14.7 | stop loss in pips | -30.9 | |
| Average | take profit in pips | 8.8 | stop loss in pips | -28.7 | |
| Minimum | take profit in pips | 5.8 | stop loss in pips | -26.1 | |
| Maximum | Reward-Risk | 0.5 | Duration in minutes | 449.0 | |
| Average | Reward-Risk | 0.3 | Duration in minutes | 162.3 | |
| Minimum | Reward-Risk | 0.2 | Duration in minutes | 1.0 | |
| Maximum | consecutive wins (profit in money) | 3.0 (1.09) | consecutive losses (loss in money) | 0.0 (0.0) | |
| Average | consecutive wins | 3.0 | consecutive losses | 0.0 |
| Total net profit | -2.32 | Gross profit | 1.6 | Gross loss | -3.92 |
| Profit factor | 0.41 | Expected payoff | -0.26 | ||
| Absolute drawdown | -2.32 | Maximal drawdown (%) | 3.92 (245.0%) | ||
| Total trades | 9 | Profit trades (% of total) | 6 (66.67%) | Loss trades (% of total) | 3 (33.33%) |
| Largest | profit trade | 0.5 | loss trade | -1.41 | |
| Average | profit trade | 0.27 | loss trade | -1.31 | |
| Minimum | profit trade | 0.01 | loss trade | -1.1 | |
| Maximum | take profit in pips | 105.8 | stop loss in pips | -38.9 | |
| Average | take profit in pips | 24.0 | stop loss in pips | -27.7 | |
| Minimum | take profit in pips | 0.1 | stop loss in pips | -15.7 | |
| Maximum | Reward-Risk | 3.0 | Duration in minutes | 6789.0 | |
| Average | Reward-Risk | 0.8 | Duration in minutes | 1047.9 | |
| Minimum | Reward-Risk | Duration in minutes | 4.0 | ||
| Maximum | consecutive wins (profit in money) | 6.0 (1.6) | consecutive losses (loss in money) | 3.0 (-3.92) | |
| Average | consecutive wins | 6.0 | consecutive losses | 3.0 |


class Constraints
onConstraint: (node, args, result, operation, continuation, scope) ->
Convert expressions into cassowary objects require ‘cassowary’
class Constraints
onConstraint: (node, args, result, operation, continuation, scope) ->
variable[paths] -> constrain[paths]
if result instanceof c.Constraint || result instanceof c.Expression
result = [result]
for arg in args
if arg instanceof c.Variable
result.push(arg)
if arg.paths
result.push.apply(result, arg.paths)
arg.paths = undefined
[variable, path] -> variable[paths]
if result.length > 0
if result.length > 1
result[0].paths = result.splice(1)
return result[0]
return result
get: (scope, property, path) ->
if typeof @properties[property] == 'function' && scope
return @properties[property].call(@, scope, path)
else
variable = @var(@getPath(scope, property))
return [variable, path || (property && scope) || '']
remove: () ->
for path in arguments
if constraints = @solutions.variables[path]
for constrain in constraints by -1
@solutions.remove(constrain, path)
return @
var: (name) ->
return @solutions.variables[name] ||= new c.Variable name: name
strength: (strength, deflt = 'medium') ->
return strength && c.Strength[strength] || c.Strength[deflt]
weight: (weight) ->
return weight
varexp: (name) ->
return new c.Expression name: name
'==': (left, right, strength, weight) ->
return new c.Equation(left, right, @strength(strength), @weight(weight))
'<=': (left, right, strength, weight) ->
return new c.Inequality(left, c.LEQ, right, @strength(strength), @weight(weight))
'>=': (left, right, strength, weight) ->
return new c.Inequality(left, c.GEQ, right, @strength(strength), @weight(weight))
'<': (left, right, strength, weight) ->
return new c.Inequality(left, c.LEQ, right, @strength(strength), @weight(weight))
'>': (left, right, strength, weight) ->
return new c.Inequality(left, c.GEQ, right, @strength(strength), @weight(weight))
'+': (left, right, strength, weight) ->
return c.plus(left, right)
'-': (left, right, strength, weight) ->
return c.minus(left, right)
'*': (left, right, strength, weight) ->
return c.times(left, right)
'/': (left, right, strength, weight) ->
return c.divide(left, right)
for property, method of Constraints::
Overload cassowary helpers so they can use [variable, path] pairs in place of simple variables
if method.length > 3 && property != 'onConstraint'
do (property, method) ->
Constraints::[property] = (left, right, strength, weight) ->
if left.push
overloaded = left = @onConstraint(null, null, left)
if right.push
overloaded = right = @onConstraint(null, null, right)
value = method.call(@, left, right, strength, weight)
if overloaded
return @onConstraint(null, [left, right], value)
return value
Constraints::[property].after = 'onConstraint'
module.exports = Constraints


14 September 2020 / PROGRAMMING
Let us consider a simple piece of code which is running on two threads.
boolean flag = true
//Thread 1
flag = flase
//Thread 2
while(flag){
//Operations
}
Now we change the value of flag to false from true from thread 1 and say our expectation is that the execution of while loop in thread 2 to stop because of this change. But according to Java specifications this code will not work, because of "Visibility Problem".
To understand this let us first understand the CPU caching structure:
| Thread 1 | Thread 2 |
|---|---|
| #core# | #core# |
| local-cache | local-cache |
| Shared | Cache |
Consider a CPU with 2 cores where 2 threads are running and both of them have seperate local cache where seperate copy flag variable is stored,so even when the flag is changed true to false in thread 1, the change is not reflected in thread 2 hence our code fails. Hence the change is not visible in thread 2
Solution:
volatile int value = 1
So how does this work?
Upon adding volatile keyword to the flag variable, whenever we are updating its value the data is flushed through the local cache of thread 1 to the shared cache and refreshed back to thread 2. Hence this time the code runs, as thread 2 has now updated value of flag.
Now let us consider a very simple piece of code
volatile int value = 1
| Thread 1 | Thread 2 |
|---|---|
| value++ | value++ |
In this piece of code we are expecting that the value will be 1 at thread1 and 2 in thread2, but to our dismay this will not work even when we are using volatile.
Let us check the execution:
The operation:value++ --> Correponds to 2 steps #readValue(=1) and #addAndWrite(=2)
| Steps | Thread 1 | Thread 2 |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | #readValue(=1) | - |
| 2 | - | #readValue(=1) |
| 3 | #addAndWrite(=2) | - |
| 4 | - | #addAndWrite(=2) |
In both the thread initially the values will read as 1 because none of the 2 threads has updated the value yet. At step 3 lets say thread1 updates the value from 1->2. Now after this step any thread reading the value will get 2. Unfortunately thread2 has already read the value and the next possible operation done by thread2 is adding 1.
This happens because we have compound operations, not atomic operations. Read then Write. Since our CPU has multiple cores or we can never be sure of JVM scheduling of threads it is possible that the operations of these two threads are interlined.
So this problem is a "Synchronization Problem"
Solution:
| Thread 1 | Thread 2 (active) |
|---|---|
| synchronized(obj){value++} | synchronized(obj){value++} |
We can use synchronized block which will allow only one thread to be active and execute the code
Solution #2:
AtomicInteger value = new AtomicInteger(1)
| Thread 1 | Thread 2 |
|---|---|
| value.increment() = 2 | - |
| - | value.increment() = 3 |
Using AtomicInteger allows us to do the compound operation as single atomic operation, and hence making our operation thread-safe.
More Reference : Oracle Docs
Utsab Chowdhury
Read more posts by this author.


{% extends 'base.html' %} {% block content %}
Something went wrong and it is our fault. We are very sorry! Please try again a little bit later.


Power level needed:
Current Power Level:
Sozin's Comet has passed through the night sky, greatly enhancing the strength of the Fire Nation. Aang must master the "Avatar State" to defeat Fire Lord Ozai and bring peace to the world. Help him by combining the powers of the four elements. Be warned, however, if the strength of the elements surpasses the limits in which Aang can handle, he will perish and the world will fall into chaos. Good Luck!


Commissions
$if(query): $for i in query:${i['title']}
Posted on ${DATE(i['unixtime'])} at ${TIME(i['unixtime'])}
$if(i['max_amount']):Price Range: From ${SYMBOL(i['settings'])}${PRICE(i['min_amount'])} to ${SYMBOL(i['settings'])}${PRICE(i['max_amount'])}
$else:Price Range: Around ${SYMBOL(i['settings'])}${PRICE(i['min_amount'])}
Available Slots: ${i['available']}
$:{MARKDOWN(i['content'])}
There are no available commissions to display.


Log in here
If you are not signed up, logging in will automatically sign you up
Username
Email
Log in
© Copyright 2020 DBtify - All Rights Reserved