Opinion
INYO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA,
et al
., PETITIONERS
v.
PAIUTE-SHOSHONE INDIANS OF THE BISHOP
COMMUNITY OF THE BISHOP COLONY
et al
.
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case stems from a California countys investigation of Native American tribe members for alleged off-reservation crimes. Pursuing the investigation, county law-enforcement officers executed a state court warrant for casino employment records kept by the Tribe on its reservation. The Tribe sued the County, the District Attorney, and the Sheriff in federal court, asserting sovereign immunity from state court processes and seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.
The parties and, as amicus curiae , the United States agree that a Native American Tribe, like a State of the United States, is not a person subject to suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983. We hold that, in the situation here presented, the Tribe does not qualify as a person who may sue under §1983. Whether the Tribes suit qualifies for federal-court jurisdiction because it arises under some federal law other than §1983 is an issue the parties have not precisely addressed, and the trial and appellate courts have not clearly decided. We therefore remand the case for close consideration and specific resolution of that threshold question.
I
The Bishop Paiute Tribe is a federally recognized tribe located on the Bishop Paiute Reservation in California. The Bishop Paiute Gaming Corporation, chartered and wholly owned by the Tribe, operates and manages the Paiute Palace Casino, a tribal gaming operation run under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 102Stat. 2467, 25 U. S. C. §2701 et seq .
In March 1999, the Inyo County Department of Health and Human Services received information from the State Department of Social Services indicating that three Casino employees had failed to report Casino earnings on their applications for state welfare benefits. Brief for Petitioners 45. According to the County, the employees failed to respond when the Department requested that they reconcile the apparent discrepancies between their Casino earnings and their welfare application forms. Id ., at 5. The Department then forwarded the matter to the Inyo County District Attorneys Office, which, in turn, asked the employees to reconcile the apparent discrepancies. Id ., at 6. That request, the County asserts, was also ignored. Ibid .
In February 2000, the District Attorneys Office asked the Casino for the three employees employment records, explaining that it was investigating alleged welfare fraud. 291 F. 3d 549, 554 (CA9 2002). The Tribe responded that its privacy policy precluded release of the records without the employees consent.
The District Attorney then sought and, on showing probable cause, obtained a search warrant from the Inyo County Superior Court. The warrant authorized a search of the Casino for payroll records of the three employees. On March 23, 2000, the Inyo County Sheriff and the District Attorney executed the warrant. They did so over the objection of tribal officials. Those officials urged that the state court lacked jurisdiction to authorize a search of premises and seizure of records belonging to a sovereign tribe. 1 The Sheriff and the District Attorney, lacking cooperation from the Tribe, cut the locks off the storage facility containing the Casinos personnel records. The county officials seized timecard entries, payroll registers, and payroll check registers relating to the three employees; the seizure also garnered information contained in quarterly wage and withholding reports the Corporation had submitted to the State. Each item seized contained at least one reference to an employee under investigation.
In July 2000, the District Attorneys Office asked the Tribe for the personnel records of six other Casino employees. The Tribe reiterated its privacy policy, but offered to accept as evidence of consent a redacted copy of the last page of each employees signed welfare application. That page contained a statement that employment records of individuals applying for public assistance were subject to review by county officials. The District Attorney refused the offer. 2
To ward off any additional searches, the Tribe and the Corporation filed suit in Federal District Court naming as defendants the District Attorney and the Sheriff in their individual and official capacities, and the County. Asserting federal question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §§1331(i)(3)(4), and the federal common law of Indian affairs, the Tribe sought injunctive and declaratory relief to vindicate its status as a sovereign immune from state processes under federal law, and to establish that state law was preempted to the extent that it purported to authorize seizure of tribal records. App. 97, ¶1, 105114, ¶¶2653. The Tribes complaint also sought relief under 42 U. S. C. §1983, including compensatory damages. In this regard, the Tribe alleged that by act- ing beyond the scope of their jurisdiction and without authorization of law in executing the warrant, 3 the defendants violated the Tribes and Corporations Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments rights, and the Tribes right to self-government. App. 109, ¶38; see id ., at 108110, ¶¶3339.
On November 22, 2000, the District Court, on defendants motion, dismissed the Tribes complaint. Tribal sovereign immunity, the court held, did not categorically preclude the search and seizure of the Casinos personnel records. Taking into account the competing interests of the State and the Tribe, the court concluded that, [i]n the interest of a fair and uniform application of Californias criminal law, state officials should be able to execute search warrant[s] against the tribe and tribal property. App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a. The court also held that the District Attorney and the Sheriff had qualified immunity from suit in their individual capacities. Id ., at 57a58a.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Courts judgment dismissing the action. [E]xecution of a search warrant against the Tribe, the Court of Appeals said, interferes with the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. 291 F. 3d, at 558 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959) ). In the appellate courts view, the District Court should not have balanced the interests at stake to determine whether the warrant was enforceable. 291 F. 3d, at 559. This Courts precedent, the Ninth Circuit said, advanced a more categorical approach denying state jurisdiction … over a tribe absent a waiver by the tribe or a clear grant of authority by Congress. Ibid . (citing Oklahoma Tax Commn v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U. S. 450, 458 (1995) ).
[E]ven if a balancing test is the appropriate legal framework, the Court of Appeals added, the balance of interests favors a ruling for the Tribe. 291 F. 3d, at 559. The Tribes privacy policies regarding employee records promote tribal [self-government] interests, the Ninth Circuit reasoned; notably, those policies fostered a trusting relationship with tribal members, and affect[ed] the Casino, the Tribes predominant source of economic development revenue. Ibid . The appeals court recognized the States countervailing interest in investigating potential welfare fraud, but thought it incumbent upon the State to further that interest through far less intrusive means. Ibid .
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the District Attorney and the Sheriff were not shielded by qualified immunity. [A] reasonable county officer, it held, would have known … that seizing tribal property held on tribal land violated the Fourth Amendment because the property and land were outside the officers jurisdiction. Id ., at 568. The appeals court acknowledged prior Ninth Circuit precedent holding that the right to tribal self-government is not protected by §1983. Id ., at 568, n. 7 (citing Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins , 881 F. 2d 657 (1989)); see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29, n. 15. But in this case, the Court of Appeals concluded, a §1983 claim could be maintained because the Tribe sought protection from an unlawful search and seizure, a right secured by the Fourth Amendment and therefore within §1983s compass. 291 F. 3d, at 568, and n. 7. On December 2, 2002, we granted certiorari. 537 U. S. 1043 (2002) .
II
Central to our review is the question whether the Tribes complaint is actionable under §1983. That provision permits citizen[s] and other person[s] within the jurisdiction of the United States to seek legal and equitable relief from person[s] who, under color of state law, deprive them of federally protected rights. 4 In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58 (1989) , this Court held that a State is not a person amenable to suit under §1983. [I]n enacting §1983, the Court said, Congress did not intend to override well-established immunities or defenses under the common law, including [t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id ., at 67. Although this case does not squarely present the question, the parties agree, and we will assume for purposes of this opinion, that Native American tribes, like States of the Union, are not subject to suit under §1983. See Brief for Petitioners 3538; Tr. of Oral Arg. 49; Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U. S. 751, 754 (1998) (an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity).
The issue pivotal here is whether a tribe qualifies as a claimant a person within the jurisdiction of the United Statesunder §1983. 5 The United States maintains it does not, invoking the Courts longstanding interpretive presumption that person does not include the sovereign, a presumption that may be disregarded only upon some affirmative showing of statutory intent to the contrary. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 78 (quoting Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 780781 (2000) ); see Will , 491 U. S., at 64. Nothing in the text, purpose, or history of §1983, the Government contends, overcomes the interpretive presumption that person does not include the sovereign. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 78 (some internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the Government urges, given the Courts decision that person excludes sovereigns as defendants under §1983, it would be anomalous for the Court to give the same word a different meaning when it appears later in the same sentence. Id ., at 8; see Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994) (the presumption that a given term is used to mean the same thing throughout a statute is surely at its most vigorous when a term is repeated within a given sentence); cf. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 (1978) (because municipalities are persons entitled to sue under the antitrust laws, they are also, in principle, persons capable of being sued under those laws).
The Tribe responds that Congress intended §1983 to provide a powerful civil remedy against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights. Brief for Respondents 45 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 700701 (1978) ). To achieve that remedial purpose, the Tribe maintains, §1983 should be broadly construed. Brief for Respondents 45 (citing Monell , 436 U. S., at 684685) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indian tribes, the Tribe here asserts, have been especially vulnerable to infringement of their federally protected rights by states. Brief for Respondents 42 (citing, inter alia , The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737 (1867) (state taxation of tribal lands); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U. S. 172 (1999) (state infringement on tribal rights to hunt, fish, and gather on ceded lands); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U. S. 30 (1989) (tribal jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U. S. 202 (1987) (state attempt to regulate gambling on tribal land)). To guard against such infringements, the Tribe contends, the Court should read §1983 to encompass suits brought by Indian tribes.
As we have recognized in other contexts, qualification of a sovereign as a person who may maintain a particular claim for relief depends not upon a bare analysis of the word person, Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 317 (1978) , but on the legislative environment in which the word appears, Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, 161 (1942) . Thus, in Georgia , the Court held that a State, as purchaser of asphalt shipped in interstate commerce, qualified as a person entitled to seek redress under the Sherman Act for restraint of trade. Id ., at 160 163. Similarly, in Pfizer , the Court held that a foreign nation, as purchaser of antibiotics, ranked as a person qualified to sue pharmaceuticals manufacturers under our antitrust laws. Pfizer , 434 U. S., at 309320; cf. Stevens, 529 U. S., at 787, and n. 18 (deciding States are not person[s] subject to qui tam liability under the False Claims Act, but leaving open the question whether they can be persons for purposes of commencing an FCA qui tam action (emphasis deleted)); United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U. S. 200, 213 (2001) (Although we generally presume that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning, the presumption is not rigid, and the meaning of the same words well may vary to meet the purposes of the law. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted)).
There is in this case no allegation that the County lacked probable cause or that the warrant was otherwise defective. It is only by virtue of the Tribes asserted sovereign status that it claims immunity from the Countys processes. See App. 97105, ¶¶125, 108110, ¶¶3339; 291 F. 3d, at 554 (Court of Appeals find[s] that the County and its agents violated the Tribes sovereign immunity when they obtained and executed a search warrant against the Tribe and tribal property. (emphasis added)). Section 1983 was designed to secure private rights against government encroachment, see Will , 491 U. S., at 66, not to advance a sovereigns prerogative to withhold evidence relevant to a criminal investigation. For example, as the County acknowledges, a tribal member complaining of a Fourth Amendment violation would be a person qualified to sue under §1983. See Brief for Petitioners 20, n. 7. But, like other private persons, that member would have no right to immunity from an appropriately executed search warrant based on probable cause. Accordingly, we hold that the Tribe may not sue under §1983 to vindicate the sovereign right it here claims. 6
III
In addition to §1983, the Tribe asserted as law under which its claims arise the federal common law of Indian affairs. Supra , at 4 (quoting App. 97, ¶1). But the Tribe has not explained, and neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals appears to have carefully considered, what prescription of federal common law enables a tribe to maintain an action for declaratory and injunctive relief establishing its sovereign right to be free from state criminal processes. In short, absent §1983 as a foundation for the Tribes action, it is unclear what federal law, if any, the Tribes case aris[es] under. 28 U. S. C. §1331. We therefore remand for focused consideration and resolution of that jurisdictional question.
* * *
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
1 The United States maintains, and the County does not dispute, that the Corporation is an arm of the Tribe for sovereign immunity purposes. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 1114.
2 At oral argument, the County defended this refusal by asserting that federal law prohibited it from releasing the relevant pages of the employees welfare applications. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 45. But the United States assured the Court that [t]here is no Federal regulation or other Federal requirement that would have prevented the County from sharing the relevant information with the Tribe. Id., at 21. This entire controversy, it thus appears, might have been avoided had the county officials understood that federal law allowed the accommodation sought by the Tribe.
3 The Tribe did not dispute the States authority over the crimes under investigation. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29.
4 The relevant portion of 42 U. S. C. §1983 reads: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
5 Courts of Appeals have expressed divergent views on this question. See Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v. Alaska, 155 F. 3d 1150, 1152, n. 1 (CA9 1998) (concluding that Tribes are persons entitled to sue under §1983); American Vantage Co. v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 292 F. 3d 1091, 1097, n. 4 (CA9 2002) ([I]t is doubtful whether [a] Tribe qua sovereign would qualify as a citizen of the United States or other person eligible to bring an action under §1983. (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams, 810 F. 2d 844, 865, n. 16 (CA9 1987) (Fletcher, J., dissenting))); cf. Illinois v. Chicago, 137 F. 3d 474, 477 (CA7 1998) (stating in dictum that a state is not a person under [§1983]); Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F. 2d 306, 314318 (CA3 1981) (en banc) (holding that a State may bring a §1983 action in a parens patriae capacity).
6 It hardly demean[s] . . . Native American Tribes, see post, at 1 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), in our view, to bracket them with States of the Union in this regard.
Opinion
INYO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA,
et al
., PETITIONERS
v.
PAIUTE-SHOSHONE INDIANS OF THE BISHOP
COMMUNITY OF THE BISHOP COLONY
et al
.
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case stems from a California countys investigation of Native American tribe members for alleged off-reservation crimes. Pursuing the investigation, county law-enforcement officers executed a state court warrant for casino employment records kept by the Tribe on its reservation. The Tribe sued the County, the District Attorney, and the Sheriff in federal court, asserting sovereign immunity from state court processes and seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.
The parties and, as amicus curiae , the United States agree that a Native American Tribe, like a State of the United States, is not a person subject to suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983. We hold that, in the situation here presented, the Tribe does not qualify as a person who may sue under §1983. Whether the Tribes suit qualifies for federal-court jurisdiction because it arises under some federal law other than §1983 is an issue the parties have not precisely addressed, and the trial and appellate courts have not clearly decided. We therefore remand the case for close consideration and specific resolution of that threshold question.
I
The Bishop Paiute Tribe is a federally recognized tribe located on the Bishop Paiute Reservation in California. The Bishop Paiute Gaming Corporation, chartered and wholly owned by the Tribe, operates and manages the Paiute Palace Casino, a tribal gaming operation run under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 102Stat. 2467, 25 U. S. C. §2701 et seq .
In March 1999, the Inyo County Department of Health and Human Services received information from the State Department of Social Services indicating that three Casino employees had failed to report Casino earnings on their applications for state welfare benefits. Brief for Petitioners 45. According to the County, the employees failed to respond when the Department requested that they reconcile the apparent discrepancies between their Casino earnings and their welfare application forms. Id ., at 5. The Department then forwarded the matter to the Inyo County District Attorneys Office, which, in turn, asked the employees to reconcile the apparent discrepancies. Id ., at 6. That request, the County asserts, was also ignored. Ibid .
In February 2000, the District Attorneys Office asked the Casino for the three employees employment records, explaining that it was investigating alleged welfare fraud. 291 F. 3d 549, 554 (CA9 2002). The Tribe responded that its privacy policy precluded release of the records without the employees consent.
The District Attorney then sought and, on showing probable cause, obtained a search warrant from the Inyo County Superior Court. The warrant authorized a search of the Casino for payroll records of the three employees. On March 23, 2000, the Inyo County Sheriff and the District Attorney executed the warrant. They did so over the objection of tribal officials. Those officials urged that the state court lacked jurisdiction to authorize a search of premises and seizure of records belonging to a sovereign tribe. 1 The Sheriff and the District Attorney, lacking cooperation from the Tribe, cut the locks off the storage facility containing the Casinos personnel records. The county officials seized timecard entries, payroll registers, and payroll check registers relating to the three employees; the seizure also garnered information contained in quarterly wage and withholding reports the Corporation had submitted to the State. Each item seized contained at least one reference to an employee under investigation.
In July 2000, the District Attorneys Office asked the Tribe for the personnel records of six other Casino employees. The Tribe reiterated its privacy policy, but offered to accept as evidence of consent a redacted copy of the last page of each employees signed welfare application. That page contained a statement that employment records of individuals applying for public assistance were subject to review by county officials. The District Attorney refused the offer. 2
To ward off any additional searches, the Tribe and the Corporation filed suit in Federal District Court naming as defendants the District Attorney and the Sheriff in their individual and official capacities, and the County. Asserting federal question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §§1331(i)(3)(4), and the federal common law of Indian affairs, the Tribe sought injunctive and declaratory relief to vindicate its status as a sovereign immune from state processes under federal law, and to establish that state law was preempted to the extent that it purported to authorize seizure of tribal records. App. 97, ¶1, 105114, ¶¶2653. The Tribes complaint also sought relief under 42 U. S. C. §1983, including compensatory damages. In this regard, the Tribe alleged that by act- ing beyond the scope of their jurisdiction and without authorization of law in executing the warrant, 3 the defendants violated the Tribes and Corporations Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments rights, and the Tribes right to self-government. App. 109, ¶38; see id ., at 108110, ¶¶3339.
On November 22, 2000, the District Court, on defendants motion, dismissed the Tribes complaint. Tribal sovereign immunity, the court held, did not categorically preclude the search and seizure of the Casinos personnel records. Taking into account the competing interests of the State and the Tribe, the court concluded that, [i]n the interest of a fair and uniform application of Californias criminal law, state officials should be able to execute search warrant[s] against the tribe and tribal property. App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a. The court also held that the District Attorney and the Sheriff had qualified immunity from suit in their individual capacities. Id ., at 57a58a.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Courts judgment dismissing the action. [E]xecution of a search warrant against the Tribe, the Court of Appeals said, interferes with the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. 291 F. 3d, at 558 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959) ). In the appellate courts view, the District Court should not have balanced the interests at stake to determine whether the warrant was enforceable. 291 F. 3d, at 559. This Courts precedent, the Ninth Circuit said, advanced a more categorical approach denying state jurisdiction … over a tribe absent a waiver by the tribe or a clear grant of authority by Congress. Ibid . (citing Oklahoma Tax Commn v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U. S. 450, 458 (1995) ).
[E]ven if a balancing test is the appropriate legal framework, the Court of Appeals added, the balance of interests favors a ruling for the Tribe. 291 F. 3d, at 559. The Tribes privacy policies regarding employee records promote tribal [self-government] interests, the Ninth Circuit reasoned; notably, those policies fostered a trusting relationship with tribal members, and affect[ed] the Casino, the Tribes predominant source of economic development revenue. Ibid . The appeals court recognized the States countervailing interest in investigating potential welfare fraud, but thought it incumbent upon the State to further that interest through far less intrusive means. Ibid .
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the District Attorney and the Sheriff were not shielded by qualified immunity. [A] reasonable county officer, it held, would have known … that seizing tribal property held on tribal land violated the Fourth Amendment because the property and land were outside the officers jurisdiction. Id ., at 568. The appeals court acknowledged prior Ninth Circuit precedent holding that the right to tribal self-government is not protected by §1983. Id ., at 568, n. 7 (citing Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins , 881 F. 2d 657 (1989)); see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29, n. 15. But in this case, the Court of Appeals concluded, a §1983 claim could be maintained because the Tribe sought protection from an unlawful search and seizure, a right secured by the Fourth Amendment and therefore within §1983s compass. 291 F. 3d, at 568, and n. 7. On December 2, 2002, we granted certiorari. 537 U. S. 1043 (2002) .
II
Central to our review is the question whether the Tribes complaint is actionable under §1983. That provision permits citizen[s] and other person[s] within the jurisdiction of the United States to seek legal and equitable relief from person[s] who, under color of state law, deprive them of federally protected rights. 4 In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58 (1989) , this Court held that a State is not a person amenable to suit under §1983. [I]n enacting §1983, the Court said, Congress did not intend to override well-established immunities or defenses under the common law, including [t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id ., at 67. Although this case does not squarely present the question, the parties agree, and we will assume for purposes of this opinion, that Native American tribes, like States of the Union, are not subject to suit under §1983. See Brief for Petitioners 3538; Tr. of Oral Arg. 49; Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U. S. 751, 754 (1998) (an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity).
The issue pivotal here is whether a tribe qualifies as a claimant a person within the jurisdiction of the United Statesunder §1983. 5 The United States maintains it does not, invoking the Courts longstanding interpretive presumption that person does not include the sovereign, a presumption that may be disregarded only upon some affirmative showing of statutory intent to the contrary. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 78 (quoting Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 780781 (2000) ); see Will , 491 U. S., at 64. Nothing in the text, purpose, or history of §1983, the Government contends, overcomes the interpretive presumption that person does not include the sovereign. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 78 (some internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the Government urges, given the Courts decision that person excludes sovereigns as defendants under §1983, it would be anomalous for the Court to give the same word a different meaning when it appears later in the same sentence. Id ., at 8; see Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994) (the presumption that a given term is used to mean the same thing throughout a statute is surely at its most vigorous when a term is repeated within a given sentence); cf. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 (1978) (because municipalities are persons entitled to sue under the antitrust laws, they are also, in principle, persons capable of being sued under those laws).
The Tribe responds that Congress intended §1983 to provide a powerful civil remedy against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights. Brief for Respondents 45 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 700701 (1978) ). To achieve that remedial purpose, the Tribe maintains, §1983 should be broadly construed. Brief for Respondents 45 (citing Monell , 436 U. S., at 684685) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indian tribes, the Tribe here asserts, have been especially vulnerable to infringement of their federally protected rights by states. Brief for Respondents 42 (citing, inter alia , The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737 (1867) (state taxation of tribal lands); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U. S. 172 (1999) (state infringement on tribal rights to hunt, fish, and gather on ceded lands); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U. S. 30 (1989) (tribal jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U. S. 202 (1987) (state attempt to regulate gambling on tribal land)). To guard against such infringements, the Tribe contends, the Court should read §1983 to encompass suits brought by Indian tribes.
As we have recognized in other contexts, qualification of a sovereign as a person who may maintain a particular claim for relief depends not upon a bare analysis of the word person, Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 317 (1978) , but on the legislative environment in which the word appears, Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, 161 (1942) . Thus, in Georgia , the Court held that a State, as purchaser of asphalt shipped in interstate commerce, qualified as a person entitled to seek redress under the Sherman Act for restraint of trade. Id ., at 160 163. Similarly, in Pfizer , the Court held that a foreign nation, as purchaser of antibiotics, ranked as a person qualified to sue pharmaceuticals manufacturers under our antitrust laws. Pfizer , 434 U. S., at 309320; cf. Stevens, 529 U. S., at 787, and n. 18 (deciding States are not person[s] subject to qui tam liability under the False Claims Act, but leaving open the question whether they can be persons for purposes of commencing an FCA qui tam action (emphasis deleted)); United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U. S. 200, 213 (2001) (Although we generally presume that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning, the presumption is not rigid, and the meaning of the same words well may vary to meet the purposes of the law. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted)).
There is in this case no allegation that the County lacked probable cause or that the warrant was otherwise defective. It is only by virtue of the Tribes asserted sovereign status that it claims immunity from the Countys processes. See App. 97105, ¶¶125, 108110, ¶¶3339; 291 F. 3d, at 554 (Court of Appeals find[s] that the County and its agents violated the Tribes sovereign immunity when they obtained and executed a search warrant against the Tribe and tribal property. (emphasis added)). Section 1983 was designed to secure private rights against government encroachment, see Will , 491 U. S., at 66, not to advance a sovereigns prerogative to withhold evidence relevant to a criminal investigation. For example, as the County acknowledges, a tribal member complaining of a Fourth Amendment violation would be a person qualified to sue under §1983. See Brief for Petitioners 20, n. 7. But, like other private persons, that member would have no right to immunity from an appropriately executed search warrant based on probable cause. Accordingly, we hold that the Tribe may not sue under §1983 to vindicate the sovereign right it here claims. 6
III
In addition to §1983, the Tribe asserted as law under which its claims arise the federal common law of Indian affairs. Supra , at 4 (quoting App. 97, ¶1). But the Tribe has not explained, and neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals appears to have carefully considered, what prescription of federal common law enables a tribe to maintain an action for declaratory and injunctive relief establishing its sovereign right to be free from state criminal processes. In short, absent §1983 as a foundation for the Tribes action, it is unclear what federal law, if any, the Tribes case aris[es] under. 28 U. S. C. §1331. We therefore remand for focused consideration and resolution of that jurisdictional question.
* * *
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
1 The United States maintains, and the County does not dispute, that the Corporation is an arm of the Tribe for sovereign immunity purposes. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 1114.
2 At oral argument, the County defended this refusal by asserting that federal law prohibited it from releasing the relevant pages of the employees welfare applications. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 45. But the United States assured the Court that [t]here is no Federal regulation or other Federal requirement that would have prevented the County from sharing the relevant information with the Tribe. Id., at 21. This entire controversy, it thus appears, might have been avoided had the county officials understood that federal law allowed the accommodation sought by the Tribe.
3 The Tribe did not dispute the States authority over the crimes under investigation. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29.
4 The relevant portion of 42 U. S. C. §1983 reads: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
5 Courts of Appeals have expressed divergent views on this question. See Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v. Alaska, 155 F. 3d 1150, 1152, n. 1 (CA9 1998) (concluding that Tribes are persons entitled to sue under §1983); American Vantage Co. v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 292 F. 3d 1091, 1097, n. 4 (CA9 2002) ([I]t is doubtful whether [a] Tribe qua sovereign would qualify as a citizen of the United States or other person eligible to bring an action under §1983. (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams, 810 F. 2d 844, 865, n. 16 (CA9 1987) (Fletcher, J., dissenting))); cf. Illinois v. Chicago, 137 F. 3d 474, 477 (CA7 1998) (stating in dictum that a state is not a person under [§1983]); Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F. 2d 306, 314318 (CA3 1981) (en banc) (holding that a State may bring a §1983 action in a parens patriae capacity).
6 It hardly demean[s] . . . Native American Tribes, see post, at 1 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), in our view, to bracket them with States of the Union in this regard.
Opinion
INYO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA,
et al
., PETITIONERS
v.
PAIUTE-SHOSHONE INDIANS OF THE BISHOP
COMMUNITY OF THE BISHOP COLONY
et al
.
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case stems from a California countys investigation of Native American tribe members for alleged off-reservation crimes. Pursuing the investigation, county law-enforcement officers executed a state court warrant for casino employment records kept by the Tribe on its reservation. The Tribe sued the County, the District Attorney, and the Sheriff in federal court, asserting sovereign immunity from state court processes and seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.
The parties and, as amicus curiae , the United States agree that a Native American Tribe, like a State of the United States, is not a person subject to suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983. We hold that, in the situation here presented, the Tribe does not qualify as a person who may sue under §1983. Whether the Tribes suit qualifies for federal-court jurisdiction because it arises under some federal law other than §1983 is an issue the parties have not precisely addressed, and the trial and appellate courts have not clearly decided. We therefore remand the case for close consideration and specific resolution of that threshold question.
I
The Bishop Paiute Tribe is a federally recognized tribe located on the Bishop Paiute Reservation in California. The Bishop Paiute Gaming Corporation, chartered and wholly owned by the Tribe, operates and manages the Paiute Palace Casino, a tribal gaming operation run under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 102Stat. 2467, 25 U. S. C. §2701 et seq .
In March 1999, the Inyo County Department of Health and Human Services received information from the State Department of Social Services indicating that three Casino employees had failed to report Casino earnings on their applications for state welfare benefits. Brief for Petitioners 45. According to the County, the employees failed to respond when the Department requested that they reconcile the apparent discrepancies between their Casino earnings and their welfare application forms. Id ., at 5. The Department then forwarded the matter to the Inyo County District Attorneys Office, which, in turn, asked the employees to reconcile the apparent discrepancies. Id ., at 6. That request, the County asserts, was also ignored. Ibid .
In February 2000, the District Attorneys Office asked the Casino for the three employees employment records, explaining that it was investigating alleged welfare fraud. 291 F. 3d 549, 554 (CA9 2002). The Tribe responded that its privacy policy precluded release of the records without the employees consent.
The District Attorney then sought and, on showing probable cause, obtained a search warrant from the Inyo County Superior Court. The warrant authorized a search of the Casino for payroll records of the three employees. On March 23, 2000, the Inyo County Sheriff and the District Attorney executed the warrant. They did so over the objection of tribal officials. Those officials urged that the state court lacked jurisdiction to authorize a search of premises and seizure of records belonging to a sovereign tribe. 1 The Sheriff and the District Attorney, lacking cooperation from the Tribe, cut the locks off the storage facility containing the Casinos personnel records. The county officials seized timecard entries, payroll registers, and payroll check registers relating to the three employees; the seizure also garnered information contained in quarterly wage and withholding reports the Corporation had submitted to the State. Each item seized contained at least one reference to an employee under investigation.
In July 2000, the District Attorneys Office asked the Tribe for the personnel records of six other Casino employees. The Tribe reiterated its privacy policy, but offered to accept as evidence of consent a redacted copy of the last page of each employees signed welfare application. That page contained a statement that employment records of individuals applying for public assistance were subject to review by county officials. The District Attorney refused the offer. 2
To ward off any additional searches, the Tribe and the Corporation filed suit in Federal District Court naming as defendants the District Attorney and the Sheriff in their individual and official capacities, and the County. Asserting federal question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §§1331(i)(3)(4), and the federal common law of Indian affairs, the Tribe sought injunctive and declaratory relief to vindicate its status as a sovereign immune from state processes under federal law, and to establish that state law was preempted to the extent that it purported to authorize seizure of tribal records. App. 97, ¶1, 105114, ¶¶2653. The Tribes complaint also sought relief under 42 U. S. C. §1983, including compensatory damages. In this regard, the Tribe alleged that by act- ing beyond the scope of their jurisdiction and without authorization of law in executing the warrant, 3 the defendants violated the Tribes and Corporations Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments rights, and the Tribes right to self-government. App. 109, ¶38; see id ., at 108110, ¶¶3339.
On November 22, 2000, the District Court, on defendants motion, dismissed the Tribes complaint. Tribal sovereign immunity, the court held, did not categorically preclude the search and seizure of the Casinos personnel records. Taking into account the competing interests of the State and the Tribe, the court concluded that, [i]n the interest of a fair and uniform application of Californias criminal law, state officials should be able to execute search warrant[s] against the tribe and tribal property. App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a. The court also held that the District Attorney and the Sheriff had qualified immunity from suit in their individual capacities. Id ., at 57a58a.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Courts judgment dismissing the action. [E]xecution of a search warrant against the Tribe, the Court of Appeals said, interferes with the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. 291 F. 3d, at 558 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959) ). In the appellate courts view, the District Court should not have balanced the interests at stake to determine whether the warrant was enforceable. 291 F. 3d, at 559. This Courts precedent, the Ninth Circuit said, advanced a more categorical approach denying state jurisdiction … over a tribe absent a waiver by the tribe or a clear grant of authority by Congress. Ibid . (citing Oklahoma Tax Commn v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U. S. 450, 458 (1995) ).
[E]ven if a balancing test is the appropriate legal framework, the Court of Appeals added, the balance of interests favors a ruling for the Tribe. 291 F. 3d, at 559. The Tribes privacy policies regarding employee records promote tribal [self-government] interests, the Ninth Circuit reasoned; notably, those policies fostered a trusting relationship with tribal members, and affect[ed] the Casino, the Tribes predominant source of economic development revenue. Ibid . The appeals court recognized the States countervailing interest in investigating potential welfare fraud, but thought it incumbent upon the State to further that interest through far less intrusive means. Ibid .
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the District Attorney and the Sheriff were not shielded by qualified immunity. [A] reasonable county officer, it held, would have known … that seizing tribal property held on tribal land violated the Fourth Amendment because the property and land were outside the officers jurisdiction. Id ., at 568. The appeals court acknowledged prior Ninth Circuit precedent holding that the right to tribal self-government is not protected by §1983. Id ., at 568, n. 7 (citing Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins , 881 F. 2d 657 (1989)); see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29, n. 15. But in this case, the Court of Appeals concluded, a §1983 claim could be maintained because the Tribe sought protection from an unlawful search and seizure, a right secured by the Fourth Amendment and therefore within §1983s compass. 291 F. 3d, at 568, and n. 7. On December 2, 2002, we granted certiorari. 537 U. S. 1043 (2002) .
II
Central to our review is the question whether the Tribes complaint is actionable under §1983. That provision permits citizen[s] and other person[s] within the jurisdiction of the United States to seek legal and equitable relief from person[s] who, under color of state law, deprive them of federally protected rights. 4 In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58 (1989) , this Court held that a State is not a person amenable to suit under §1983. [I]n enacting §1983, the Court said, Congress did not intend to override well-established immunities or defenses under the common law, including [t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id ., at 67. Although this case does not squarely present the question, the parties agree, and we will assume for purposes of this opinion, that Native American tribes, like States of the Union, are not subject to suit under §1983. See Brief for Petitioners 3538; Tr. of Oral Arg. 49; Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U. S. 751, 754 (1998) (an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity).
The issue pivotal here is whether a tribe qualifies as a claimant a person within the jurisdiction of the United Statesunder §1983. 5 The United States maintains it does not, invoking the Courts longstanding interpretive presumption that person does not include the sovereign, a presumption that may be disregarded only upon some affirmative showing of statutory intent to the contrary. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 78 (quoting Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 780781 (2000) ); see Will , 491 U. S., at 64. Nothing in the text, purpose, or history of §1983, the Government contends, overcomes the interpretive presumption that person does not include the sovereign. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 78 (some internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the Government urges, given the Courts decision that person excludes sovereigns as defendants under §1983, it would be anomalous for the Court to give the same word a different meaning when it appears later in the same sentence. Id ., at 8; see Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994) (the presumption that a given term is used to mean the same thing throughout a statute is surely at its most vigorous when a term is repeated within a given sentence); cf. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 (1978) (because municipalities are persons entitled to sue under the antitrust laws, they are also, in principle, persons capable of being sued under those laws).
The Tribe responds that Congress intended §1983 to provide a powerful civil remedy against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights. Brief for Respondents 45 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 700701 (1978) ). To achieve that remedial purpose, the Tribe maintains, §1983 should be broadly construed. Brief for Respondents 45 (citing Monell , 436 U. S., at 684685) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indian tribes, the Tribe here asserts, have been especially vulnerable to infringement of their federally protected rights by states. Brief for Respondents 42 (citing, inter alia , The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737 (1867) (state taxation of tribal lands); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U. S. 172 (1999) (state infringement on tribal rights to hunt, fish, and gather on ceded lands); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U. S. 30 (1989) (tribal jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U. S. 202 (1987) (state attempt to regulate gambling on tribal land)). To guard against such infringements, the Tribe contends, the Court should read §1983 to encompass suits brought by Indian tribes.
As we have recognized in other contexts, qualification of a sovereign as a person who may maintain a particular claim for relief depends not upon a bare analysis of the word person, Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 317 (1978) , but on the legislative environment in which the word appears, Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, 161 (1942) . Thus, in Georgia , the Court held that a State, as purchaser of asphalt shipped in interstate commerce, qualified as a person entitled to seek redress under the Sherman Act for restraint of trade. Id ., at 160 163. Similarly, in Pfizer , the Court held that a foreign nation, as purchaser of antibiotics, ranked as a person qualified to sue pharmaceuticals manufacturers under our antitrust laws. Pfizer , 434 U. S., at 309320; cf. Stevens, 529 U. S., at 787, and n. 18 (deciding States are not person[s] subject to qui tam liability under the False Claims Act, but leaving open the question whether they can be persons for purposes of commencing an FCA qui tam action (emphasis deleted)); United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U. S. 200, 213 (2001) (Although we generally presume that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning, the presumption is not rigid, and the meaning of the same words well may vary to meet the purposes of the law. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted)).
There is in this case no allegation that the County lacked probable cause or that the warrant was otherwise defective. It is only by virtue of the Tribes asserted sovereign status that it claims immunity from the Countys processes. See App. 97105, ¶¶125, 108110, ¶¶3339; 291 F. 3d, at 554 (Court of Appeals find[s] that the County and its agents violated the Tribes sovereign immunity when they obtained and executed a search warrant against the Tribe and tribal property. (emphasis added)). Section 1983 was designed to secure private rights against government encroachment, see Will , 491 U. S., at 66, not to advance a sovereigns prerogative to withhold evidence relevant to a criminal investigation. For example, as the County acknowledges, a tribal member complaining of a Fourth Amendment violation would be a person qualified to sue under §1983. See Brief for Petitioners 20, n. 7. But, like other private persons, that member would have no right to immunity from an appropriately executed search warrant based on probable cause. Accordingly, we hold that the Tribe may not sue under §1983 to vindicate the sovereign right it here claims. 6
III
In addition to §1983, the Tribe asserted as law under which its claims arise the federal common law of Indian affairs. Supra , at 4 (quoting App. 97, ¶1). But the Tribe has not explained, and neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals appears to have carefully considered, what prescription of federal common law enables a tribe to maintain an action for declaratory and injunctive relief establishing its sovereign right to be free from state criminal processes. In short, absent §1983 as a foundation for the Tribes action, it is unclear what federal law, if any, the Tribes case aris[es] under. 28 U. S. C. §1331. We therefore remand for focused consideration and resolution of that jurisdictional question.
* * *
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
1 The United States maintains, and the County does not dispute, that the Corporation is an arm of the Tribe for sovereign immunity purposes. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 1114.
2 At oral argument, the County defended this refusal by asserting that federal law prohibited it from releasing the relevant pages of the employees welfare applications. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 45. But the United States assured the Court that [t]here is no Federal regulation or other Federal requirement that would have prevented the County from sharing the relevant information with the Tribe. Id., at 21. This entire controversy, it thus appears, might have been avoided had the county officials understood that federal law allowed the accommodation sought by the Tribe.
3 The Tribe did not dispute the States authority over the crimes under investigation. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29.
4 The relevant portion of 42 U. S. C. §1983 reads: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
5 Courts of Appeals have expressed divergent views on this question. See Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v. Alaska, 155 F. 3d 1150, 1152, n. 1 (CA9 1998) (concluding that Tribes are persons entitled to sue under §1983); American Vantage Co. v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 292 F. 3d 1091, 1097, n. 4 (CA9 2002) ([I]t is doubtful whether [a] Tribe qua sovereign would qualify as a citizen of the United States or other person eligible to bring an action under §1983. (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams, 810 F. 2d 844, 865, n. 16 (CA9 1987) (Fletcher, J., dissenting))); cf. Illinois v. Chicago, 137 F. 3d 474, 477 (CA7 1998) (stating in dictum that a state is not a person under [§1983]); Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F. 2d 306, 314318 (CA3 1981) (en banc) (holding that a State may bring a §1983 action in a parens patriae capacity).
6 It hardly demean[s] . . . Native American Tribes, see post, at 1 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), in our view, to bracket them with States of the Union in this regard.
Opinion
INYO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA,
et al
., PETITIONERS
v.
PAIUTE-SHOSHONE INDIANS OF THE BISHOP
COMMUNITY OF THE BISHOP COLONY
et al
.
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case stems from a California countys investigation of Native American tribe members for alleged off-reservation crimes. Pursuing the investigation, county law-enforcement officers executed a state court warrant for casino employment records kept by the Tribe on its reservation. The Tribe sued the County, the District Attorney, and the Sheriff in federal court, asserting sovereign immunity from state court processes and seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.
The parties and, as amicus curiae , the United States agree that a Native American Tribe, like a State of the United States, is not a person subject to suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983. We hold that, in the situation here presented, the Tribe does not qualify as a person who may sue under §1983. Whether the Tribes suit qualifies for federal-court jurisdiction because it arises under some federal law other than §1983 is an issue the parties have not precisely addressed, and the trial and appellate courts have not clearly decided. We therefore remand the case for close consideration and specific resolution of that threshold question.
I
The Bishop Paiute Tribe is a federally recognized tribe located on the Bishop Paiute Reservation in California. The Bishop Paiute Gaming Corporation, chartered and wholly owned by the Tribe, operates and manages the Paiute Palace Casino, a tribal gaming operation run under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 102Stat. 2467, 25 U. S. C. §2701 et seq .
In March 1999, the Inyo County Department of Health and Human Services received information from the State Department of Social Services indicating that three Casino employees had failed to report Casino earnings on their applications for state welfare benefits. Brief for Petitioners 45. According to the County, the employees failed to respond when the Department requested that they reconcile the apparent discrepancies between their Casino earnings and their welfare application forms. Id ., at 5. The Department then forwarded the matter to the Inyo County District Attorneys Office, which, in turn, asked the employees to reconcile the apparent discrepancies. Id ., at 6. That request, the County asserts, was also ignored. Ibid .
In February 2000, the District Attorneys Office asked the Casino for the three employees employment records, explaining that it was investigating alleged welfare fraud. 291 F. 3d 549, 554 (CA9 2002). The Tribe responded that its privacy policy precluded release of the records without the employees consent.
The District Attorney then sought and, on showing probable cause, obtained a search warrant from the Inyo County Superior Court. The warrant authorized a search of the Casino for payroll records of the three employees. On March 23, 2000, the Inyo County Sheriff and the District Attorney executed the warrant. They did so over the objection of tribal officials. Those officials urged that the state court lacked jurisdiction to authorize a search of premises and seizure of records belonging to a sovereign tribe. 1 The Sheriff and the District Attorney, lacking cooperation from the Tribe, cut the locks off the storage facility containing the Casinos personnel records. The county officials seized timecard entries, payroll registers, and payroll check registers relating to the three employees; the seizure also garnered information contained in quarterly wage and withholding reports the Corporation had submitted to the State. Each item seized contained at least one reference to an employee under investigation.
In July 2000, the District Attorneys Office asked the Tribe for the personnel records of six other Casino employees. The Tribe reiterated its privacy policy, but offered to accept as evidence of consent a redacted copy of the last page of each employees signed welfare application. That page contained a statement that employment records of individuals applying for public assistance were subject to review by county officials. The District Attorney refused the offer. 2
To ward off any additional searches, the Tribe and the Corporation filed suit in Federal District Court naming as defendants the District Attorney and the Sheriff in their individual and official capacities, and the County. Asserting federal question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §§1331(i)(3)(4), and the federal common law of Indian affairs, the Tribe sought injunctive and declaratory relief to vindicate its status as a sovereign immune from state processes under federal law, and to establish that state law was preempted to the extent that it purported to authorize seizure of tribal records. App. 97, ¶1, 105114, ¶¶2653. The Tribes complaint also sought relief under 42 U. S. C. §1983, including compensatory damages. In this regard, the Tribe alleged that by act- ing beyond the scope of their jurisdiction and without authorization of law in executing the warrant, 3 the defendants violated the Tribes and Corporations Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments rights, and the Tribes right to self-government. App. 109, ¶38; see id ., at 108110, ¶¶3339.
On November 22, 2000, the District Court, on defendants motion, dismissed the Tribes complaint. Tribal sovereign immunity, the court held, did not categorically preclude the search and seizure of the Casinos personnel records. Taking into account the competing interests of the State and the Tribe, the court concluded that, [i]n the interest of a fair and uniform application of Californias criminal law, state officials should be able to execute search warrant[s] against the tribe and tribal property. App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a. The court also held that the District Attorney and the Sheriff had qualified immunity from suit in their individual capacities. Id ., at 57a58a.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Courts judgment dismissing the action. [E]xecution of a search warrant against the Tribe, the Court of Appeals said, interferes with the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. 291 F. 3d, at 558 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959) ). In the appellate courts view, the District Court should not have balanced the interests at stake to determine whether the warrant was enforceable. 291 F. 3d, at 559. This Courts precedent, the Ninth Circuit said, advanced a more categorical approach denying state jurisdiction … over a tribe absent a waiver by the tribe or a clear grant of authority by Congress. Ibid . (citing Oklahoma Tax Commn v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U. S. 450, 458 (1995) ).
[E]ven if a balancing test is the appropriate legal framework, the Court of Appeals added, the balance of interests favors a ruling for the Tribe. 291 F. 3d, at 559. The Tribes privacy policies regarding employee records promote tribal [self-government] interests, the Ninth Circuit reasoned; notably, those policies fostered a trusting relationship with tribal members, and affect[ed] the Casino, the Tribes predominant source of economic development revenue. Ibid . The appeals court recognized the States countervailing interest in investigating potential welfare fraud, but thought it incumbent upon the State to further that interest through far less intrusive means. Ibid .
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the District Attorney and the Sheriff were not shielded by qualified immunity. [A] reasonable county officer, it held, would have known … that seizing tribal property held on tribal land violated the Fourth Amendment because the property and land were outside the officers jurisdiction. Id ., at 568. The appeals court acknowledged prior Ninth Circuit precedent holding that the right to tribal self-government is not protected by §1983. Id ., at 568, n. 7 (citing Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins , 881 F. 2d 657 (1989)); see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29, n. 15. But in this case, the Court of Appeals concluded, a §1983 claim could be maintained because the Tribe sought protection from an unlawful search and seizure, a right secured by the Fourth Amendment and therefore within §1983s compass. 291 F. 3d, at 568, and n. 7. On December 2, 2002, we granted certiorari. 537 U. S. 1043 (2002) .
II
Central to our review is the question whether the Tribes complaint is actionable under §1983. That provision permits citizen[s] and other person[s] within the jurisdiction of the United States to seek legal and equitable relief from person[s] who, under color of state law, deprive them of federally protected rights. 4 In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58 (1989) , this Court held that a State is not a person amenable to suit under §1983. [I]n enacting §1983, the Court said, Congress did not intend to override well-established immunities or defenses under the common law, including [t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id ., at 67. Although this case does not squarely present the question, the parties agree, and we will assume for purposes of this opinion, that Native American tribes, like States of the Union, are not subject to suit under §1983. See Brief for Petitioners 3538; Tr. of Oral Arg. 49; Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U. S. 751, 754 (1998) (an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity).
The issue pivotal here is whether a tribe qualifies as a claimant a person within the jurisdiction of the United Statesunder §1983. 5 The United States maintains it does not, invoking the Courts longstanding interpretive presumption that person does not include the sovereign, a presumption that may be disregarded only upon some affirmative showing of statutory intent to the contrary. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 78 (quoting Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 780781 (2000) ); see Will , 491 U. S., at 64. Nothing in the text, purpose, or history of §1983, the Government contends, overcomes the interpretive presumption that person does not include the sovereign. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 78 (some internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the Government urges, given the Courts decision that person excludes sovereigns as defendants under §1983, it would be anomalous for the Court to give the same word a different meaning when it appears later in the same sentence. Id ., at 8; see Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994) (the presumption that a given term is used to mean the same thing throughout a statute is surely at its most vigorous when a term is repeated within a given sentence); cf. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 (1978) (because municipalities are persons entitled to sue under the antitrust laws, they are also, in principle, persons capable of being sued under those laws).
The Tribe responds that Congress intended §1983 to provide a powerful civil remedy against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights. Brief for Respondents 45 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 700701 (1978) ). To achieve that remedial purpose, the Tribe maintains, §1983 should be broadly construed. Brief for Respondents 45 (citing Monell , 436 U. S., at 684685) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indian tribes, the Tribe here asserts, have been especially vulnerable to infringement of their federally protected rights by states. Brief for Respondents 42 (citing, inter alia , The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737 (1867) (state taxation of tribal lands); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U. S. 172 (1999) (state infringement on tribal rights to hunt, fish, and gather on ceded lands); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U. S. 30 (1989) (tribal jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U. S. 202 (1987) (state attempt to regulate gambling on tribal land)). To guard against such infringements, the Tribe contends, the Court should read §1983 to encompass suits brought by Indian tribes.
As we have recognized in other contexts, qualification of a sovereign as a person who may maintain a particular claim for relief depends not upon a bare analysis of the word person, Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 317 (1978) , but on the legislative environment in which the word appears, Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, 161 (1942) . Thus, in Georgia , the Court held that a State, as purchaser of asphalt shipped in interstate commerce, qualified as a person entitled to seek redress under the Sherman Act for restraint of trade. Id ., at 160 163. Similarly, in Pfizer , the Court held that a foreign nation, as purchaser of antibiotics, ranked as a person qualified to sue pharmaceuticals manufacturers under our antitrust laws. Pfizer , 434 U. S., at 309320; cf. Stevens, 529 U. S., at 787, and n. 18 (deciding States are not person[s] subject to qui tam liability under the False Claims Act, but leaving open the question whether they can be persons for purposes of commencing an FCA qui tam action (emphasis deleted)); United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U. S. 200, 213 (2001) (Although we generally presume that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning, the presumption is not rigid, and the meaning of the same words well may vary to meet the purposes of the law. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted)).
There is in this case no allegation that the County lacked probable cause or that the warrant was otherwise defective. It is only by virtue of the Tribes asserted sovereign status that it claims immunity from the Countys processes. See App. 97105, ¶¶125, 108110, ¶¶3339; 291 F. 3d, at 554 (Court of Appeals find[s] that the County and its agents violated the Tribes sovereign immunity when they obtained and executed a search warrant against the Tribe and tribal property. (emphasis added)). Section 1983 was designed to secure private rights against government encroachment, see Will , 491 U. S., at 66, not to advance a sovereigns prerogative to withhold evidence relevant to a criminal investigation. For example, as the County acknowledges, a tribal member complaining of a Fourth Amendment violation would be a person qualified to sue under §1983. See Brief for Petitioners 20, n. 7. But, like other private persons, that member would have no right to immunity from an appropriately executed search warrant based on probable cause. Accordingly, we hold that the Tribe may not sue under §1983 to vindicate the sovereign right it here claims. 6
III
In addition to §1983, the Tribe asserted as law under which its claims arise the federal common law of Indian affairs. Supra , at 4 (quoting App. 97, ¶1). But the Tribe has not explained, and neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals appears to have carefully considered, what prescription of federal common law enables a tribe to maintain an action for declaratory and injunctive relief establishing its sovereign right to be free from state criminal processes. In short, absent §1983 as a foundation for the Tribes action, it is unclear what federal law, if any, the Tribes case aris[es] under. 28 U. S. C. §1331. We therefore remand for focused consideration and resolution of that jurisdictional question.
* * *
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
1 The United States maintains, and the County does not dispute, that the Corporation is an arm of the Tribe for sovereign immunity purposes. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 1114.
2 At oral argument, the County defended this refusal by asserting that federal law prohibited it from releasing the relevant pages of the employees welfare applications. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 45. But the United States assured the Court that [t]here is no Federal regulation or other Federal requirement that would have prevented the County from sharing the relevant information with the Tribe. Id., at 21. This entire controversy, it thus appears, might have been avoided had the county officials understood that federal law allowed the accommodation sought by the Tribe.
3 The Tribe did not dispute the States authority over the crimes under investigation. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29.
4 The relevant portion of 42 U. S. C. §1983 reads: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
5 Courts of Appeals have expressed divergent views on this question. See Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v. Alaska, 155 F. 3d 1150, 1152, n. 1 (CA9 1998) (concluding that Tribes are persons entitled to sue under §1983); American Vantage Co. v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 292 F. 3d 1091, 1097, n. 4 (CA9 2002) ([I]t is doubtful whether [a] Tribe qua sovereign would qualify as a citizen of the United States or other person eligible to bring an action under §1983. (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams, 810 F. 2d 844, 865, n. 16 (CA9 1987) (Fletcher, J., dissenting))); cf. Illinois v. Chicago, 137 F. 3d 474, 477 (CA7 1998) (stating in dictum that a state is not a person under [§1983]); Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F. 2d 306, 314318 (CA3 1981) (en banc) (holding that a State may bring a §1983 action in a parens patriae capacity).
6 It hardly demean[s] . . . Native American Tribes, see post, at 1 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), in our view, to bracket them with States of the Union in this regard.
Opinion
INYO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA,
et al
., PETITIONERS
v.
PAIUTE-SHOSHONE INDIANS OF THE BISHOP
COMMUNITY OF THE BISHOP COLONY
et al
.
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case stems from a California countys investigation of Native American tribe members for alleged off-reservation crimes. Pursuing the investigation, county law-enforcement officers executed a state court warrant for casino employment records kept by the Tribe on its reservation. The Tribe sued the County, the District Attorney, and the Sheriff in federal court, asserting sovereign immunity from state court processes and seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.
The parties and, as amicus curiae , the United States agree that a Native American Tribe, like a State of the United States, is not a person subject to suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983. We hold that, in the situation here presented, the Tribe does not qualify as a person who may sue under §1983. Whether the Tribes suit qualifies for federal-court jurisdiction because it arises under some federal law other than §1983 is an issue the parties have not precisely addressed, and the trial and appellate courts have not clearly decided. We therefore remand the case for close consideration and specific resolution of that threshold question.
I
The Bishop Paiute Tribe is a federally recognized tribe located on the Bishop Paiute Reservation in California. The Bishop Paiute Gaming Corporation, chartered and wholly owned by the Tribe, operates and manages the Paiute Palace Casino, a tribal gaming operation run under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 102Stat. 2467, 25 U. S. C. §2701 et seq .
In March 1999, the Inyo County Department of Health and Human Services received information from the State Department of Social Services indicating that three Casino employees had failed to report Casino earnings on their applications for state welfare benefits. Brief for Petitioners 45. According to the County, the employees failed to respond when the Department requested that they reconcile the apparent discrepancies between their Casino earnings and their welfare application forms. Id ., at 5. The Department then forwarded the matter to the Inyo County District Attorneys Office, which, in turn, asked the employees to reconcile the apparent discrepancies. Id ., at 6. That request, the County asserts, was also ignored. Ibid .
In February 2000, the District Attorneys Office asked the Casino for the three employees employment records, explaining that it was investigating alleged welfare fraud. 291 F. 3d 549, 554 (CA9 2002). The Tribe responded that its privacy policy precluded release of the records without the employees consent.
The District Attorney then sought and, on showing probable cause, obtained a search warrant from the Inyo County Superior Court. The warrant authorized a search of the Casino for payroll records of the three employees. On March 23, 2000, the Inyo County Sheriff and the District Attorney executed the warrant. They did so over the objection of tribal officials. Those officials urged that the state court lacked jurisdiction to authorize a search of premises and seizure of records belonging to a sovereign tribe. 1 The Sheriff and the District Attorney, lacking cooperation from the Tribe, cut the locks off the storage facility containing the Casinos personnel records. The county officials seized timecard entries, payroll registers, and payroll check registers relating to the three employees; the seizure also garnered information contained in quarterly wage and withholding reports the Corporation had submitted to the State. Each item seized contained at least one reference to an employee under investigation.
In July 2000, the District Attorneys Office asked the Tribe for the personnel records of six other Casino employees. The Tribe reiterated its privacy policy, but offered to accept as evidence of consent a redacted copy of the last page of each employees signed welfare application. That page contained a statement that employment records of individuals applying for public assistance were subject to review by county officials. The District Attorney refused the offer. 2
To ward off any additional searches, the Tribe and the Corporation filed suit in Federal District Court naming as defendants the District Attorney and the Sheriff in their individual and official capacities, and the County. Asserting federal question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §§1331(i)(3)(4), and the federal common law of Indian affairs, the Tribe sought injunctive and declaratory relief to vindicate its status as a sovereign immune from state processes under federal law, and to establish that state law was preempted to the extent that it purported to authorize seizure of tribal records. App. 97, ¶1, 105114, ¶¶2653. The Tribes complaint also sought relief under 42 U. S. C. §1983, including compensatory damages. In this regard, the Tribe alleged that by act- ing beyond the scope of their jurisdiction and without authorization of law in executing the warrant, 3 the defendants violated the Tribes and Corporations Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments rights, and the Tribes right to self-government. App. 109, ¶38; see id ., at 108110, ¶¶3339.
On November 22, 2000, the District Court, on defendants motion, dismissed the Tribes complaint. Tribal sovereign immunity, the court held, did not categorically preclude the search and seizure of the Casinos personnel records. Taking into account the competing interests of the State and the Tribe, the court concluded that, [i]n the interest of a fair and uniform application of Californias criminal law, state officials should be able to execute search warrant[s] against the tribe and tribal property. App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a. The court also held that the District Attorney and the Sheriff had qualified immunity from suit in their individual capacities. Id ., at 57a58a.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Courts judgment dismissing the action. [E]xecution of a search warrant against the Tribe, the Court of Appeals said, interferes with the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. 291 F. 3d, at 558 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959) ). In the appellate courts view, the District Court should not have balanced the interests at stake to determine whether the warrant was enforceable. 291 F. 3d, at 559. This Courts precedent, the Ninth Circuit said, advanced a more categorical approach denying state jurisdiction … over a tribe absent a waiver by the tribe or a clear grant of authority by Congress. Ibid . (citing Oklahoma Tax Commn v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U. S. 450, 458 (1995) ).
[E]ven if a balancing test is the appropriate legal framework, the Court of Appeals added, the balance of interests favors a ruling for the Tribe. 291 F. 3d, at 559. The Tribes privacy policies regarding employee records promote tribal [self-government] interests, the Ninth Circuit reasoned; notably, those policies fostered a trusting relationship with tribal members, and affect[ed] the Casino, the Tribes predominant source of economic development revenue. Ibid . The appeals court recognized the States countervailing interest in investigating potential welfare fraud, but thought it incumbent upon the State to further that interest through far less intrusive means. Ibid .
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the District Attorney and the Sheriff were not shielded by qualified immunity. [A] reasonable county officer, it held, would have known … that seizing tribal property held on tribal land violated the Fourth Amendment because the property and land were outside the officers jurisdiction. Id ., at 568. The appeals court acknowledged prior Ninth Circuit precedent holding that the right to tribal self-government is not protected by §1983. Id ., at 568, n. 7 (citing Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins , 881 F. 2d 657 (1989)); see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29, n. 15. But in this case, the Court of Appeals concluded, a §1983 claim could be maintained because the Tribe sought protection from an unlawful search and seizure, a right secured by the Fourth Amendment and therefore within §1983s compass. 291 F. 3d, at 568, and n. 7. On December 2, 2002, we granted certiorari. 537 U. S. 1043 (2002) .
II
Central to our review is the question whether the Tribes complaint is actionable under §1983. That provision permits citizen[s] and other person[s] within the jurisdiction of the United States to seek legal and equitable relief from person[s] who, under color of state law, deprive them of federally protected rights. 4 In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58 (1989) , this Court held that a State is not a person amenable to suit under §1983. [I]n enacting §1983, the Court said, Congress did not intend to override well-established immunities or defenses under the common law, including [t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id ., at 67. Although this case does not squarely present the question, the parties agree, and we will assume for purposes of this opinion, that Native American tribes, like States of the Union, are not subject to suit under §1983. See Brief for Petitioners 3538; Tr. of Oral Arg. 49; Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U. S. 751, 754 (1998) (an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity).
The issue pivotal here is whether a tribe qualifies as a claimant a person within the jurisdiction of the United Statesunder §1983. 5 The United States maintains it does not, invoking the Courts longstanding interpretive presumption that person does not include the sovereign, a presumption that may be disregarded only upon some affirmative showing of statutory intent to the contrary. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 78 (quoting Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 780781 (2000) ); see Will , 491 U. S., at 64. Nothing in the text, purpose, or history of §1983, the Government contends, overcomes the interpretive presumption that person does not include the sovereign. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 78 (some internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the Government urges, given the Courts decision that person excludes sovereigns as defendants under §1983, it would be anomalous for the Court to give the same word a different meaning when it appears later in the same sentence. Id ., at 8; see Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994) (the presumption that a given term is used to mean the same thing throughout a statute is surely at its most vigorous when a term is repeated within a given sentence); cf. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 (1978) (because municipalities are persons entitled to sue under the antitrust laws, they are also, in principle, persons capable of being sued under those laws).
The Tribe responds that Congress intended §1983 to provide a powerful civil remedy against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights. Brief for Respondents 45 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 700701 (1978) ). To achieve that remedial purpose, the Tribe maintains, §1983 should be broadly construed. Brief for Respondents 45 (citing Monell , 436 U. S., at 684685) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indian tribes, the Tribe here asserts, have been especially vulnerable to infringement of their federally protected rights by states. Brief for Respondents 42 (citing, inter alia , The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737 (1867) (state taxation of tribal lands); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U. S. 172 (1999) (state infringement on tribal rights to hunt, fish, and gather on ceded lands); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U. S. 30 (1989) (tribal jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U. S. 202 (1987) (state attempt to regulate gambling on tribal land)). To guard against such infringements, the Tribe contends, the Court should read §1983 to encompass suits brought by Indian tribes.
As we have recognized in other contexts, qualification of a sovereign as a person who may maintain a particular claim for relief depends not upon a bare analysis of the word person, Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 317 (1978) , but on the legislative environment in which the word appears, Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, 161 (1942) . Thus, in Georgia , the Court held that a State, as purchaser of asphalt shipped in interstate commerce, qualified as a person entitled to seek redress under the Sherman Act for restraint of trade. Id ., at 160 163. Similarly, in Pfizer , the Court held that a foreign nation, as purchaser of antibiotics, ranked as a person qualified to sue pharmaceuticals manufacturers under our antitrust laws. Pfizer , 434 U. S., at 309320; cf. Stevens, 529 U. S., at 787, and n. 18 (deciding States are not person[s] subject to qui tam liability under the False Claims Act, but leaving open the question whether they can be persons for purposes of commencing an FCA qui tam action (emphasis deleted)); United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U. S. 200, 213 (2001) (Although we generally presume that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning, the presumption is not rigid, and the meaning of the same words well may vary to meet the purposes of the law. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted)).
There is in this case no allegation that the County lacked probable cause or that the warrant was otherwise defective. It is only by virtue of the Tribes asserted sovereign status that it claims immunity from the Countys processes. See App. 97105, ¶¶125, 108110, ¶¶3339; 291 F. 3d, at 554 (Court of Appeals find[s] that the County and its agents violated the Tribes sovereign immunity when they obtained and executed a search warrant against the Tribe and tribal property. (emphasis added)). Section 1983 was designed to secure private rights against government encroachment, see Will , 491 U. S., at 66, not to advance a sovereigns prerogative to withhold evidence relevant to a criminal investigation. For example, as the County acknowledges, a tribal member complaining of a Fourth Amendment violation would be a person qualified to sue under §1983. See Brief for Petitioners 20, n. 7. But, like other private persons, that member would have no right to immunity from an appropriately executed search warrant based on probable cause. Accordingly, we hold that the Tribe may not sue under §1983 to vindicate the sovereign right it here claims. 6
III
In addition to §1983, the Tribe asserted as law under which its claims arise the federal common law of Indian affairs. Supra , at 4 (quoting App. 97, ¶1). But the Tribe has not explained, and neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals appears to have carefully considered, what prescription of federal common law enables a tribe to maintain an action for declaratory and injunctive relief establishing its sovereign right to be free from state criminal processes. In short, absent §1983 as a foundation for the Tribes action, it is unclear what federal law, if any, the Tribes case aris[es] under. 28 U. S. C. §1331. We therefore remand for focused consideration and resolution of that jurisdictional question.
* * *
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
1 The United States maintains, and the County does not dispute, that the Corporation is an arm of the Tribe for sovereign immunity purposes. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 1114.
2 At oral argument, the County defended this refusal by asserting that federal law prohibited it from releasing the relevant pages of the employees welfare applications. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 45. But the United States assured the Court that [t]here is no Federal regulation or other Federal requirement that would have prevented the County from sharing the relevant information with the Tribe. Id., at 21. This entire controversy, it thus appears, might have been avoided had the county officials understood that federal law allowed the accommodation sought by the Tribe.
3 The Tribe did not dispute the States authority over the crimes under investigation. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29.
4 The relevant portion of 42 U. S. C. §1983 reads: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
5 Courts of Appeals have expressed divergent views on this question. See Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v. Alaska, 155 F. 3d 1150, 1152, n. 1 (CA9 1998) (concluding that Tribes are persons entitled to sue under §1983); American Vantage Co. v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 292 F. 3d 1091, 1097, n. 4 (CA9 2002) ([I]t is doubtful whether [a] Tribe qua sovereign would qualify as a citizen of the United States or other person eligible to bring an action under §1983. (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams, 810 F. 2d 844, 865, n. 16 (CA9 1987) (Fletcher, J., dissenting))); cf. Illinois v. Chicago, 137 F. 3d 474, 477 (CA7 1998) (stating in dictum that a state is not a person under [§1983]); Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F. 2d 306, 314318 (CA3 1981) (en banc) (holding that a State may bring a §1983 action in a parens patriae capacity).
6 It hardly demean[s] . . . Native American Tribes, see post, at 1 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), in our view, to bracket them with States of the Union in this regard.


§532-14 Disposition by State. If the intestate leaves no kindred, the intestate's estate shall be disposed of as provided in chapter 523A. [CC 1859, §1451; RL 1925, §3315; RL 1935, §4823; RL 1945, §12083; RL 1955, §318-14; HRS §532-14; am L 1974, c 75, §6; am L 1985, c 68, §25]
Case Notes
"Kindred", meaning of. 4 H. 221, 225.
Cited: 3 H. 262, 268; 20 H. 114, 116.


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§660-17 Return to be prompt. Any person to whom a writ of habeas corpus is directed, upon payment or tender of reasonable charges or expenses for its execution if ordered by the court, and any person to whom an order to show cause is directed, shall make return thereto with as much promptness as the nature of the case will permit. [L 1870, c 32, §12; RL 1925, §2740; RL 1935, §4325; RL 1945, §10366; am L 1953, c 101, §10; RL 1955, §239-17; HRS §660-17; am L 1972, c 90, §5(k)]
Case Notes
Amendment of return. 15 H. 276 (1903).


Restructuring JSON Data Sample
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MicroProfile Rest Client
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Song [id=56780987, lastScheduledShortDates=May 30, 2021, author=Jonas Myrin and Matt Redman, title=10,000 Reasons (Bless The Lord)]


Lili Bourgeois Portfolio
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Lili Bourgeois
1500 Rhode Island Ave N., Golden Valley, MN 55427
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Email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Education
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Master's in Education (M.Ed.) | Degree Date: May 2016
Secondary Science Teacher Education Program
Year long, immersion, urban teacher preparation program in which candidates receive a Master's degree and initial Massachusetts teacher licensure
Bachelor of Science | Degree Date: May 2013
Major: Psychology | Minor: Anthropology, Biology
GPA: 3.7 | Cum Laude
Teaching Assistant for Introductory to Psychology Course
Research Assistant for Growth in Early Marriage Laboratory
Certification and Licensure
Massachusetts Initial Teacher Licensure in Biology, 5-8 and 8-12
Minnesota Standard Teaching Licensure in Life Science, 9-12
Sheltered English Immersion Endorsement
Professional Experience
Biology Teacher | High School of Science and Technology | Springfield, MA | Aug 2016-2018
Utilized state framework and Next Generation Science Standards based curriculum to design and plan units of study
Modified and varied instructional practices based on Individual Education Plans and English Language Learners
Developed assessments with focus on differentiated learning and maintained record of grades
Established a safe, collaborative and student-centered learning environment to maintain classroom management
Clinical Teacher | Springfield Central High School | Springfield, MA | Sept. 2015- June 2016-2018
Full responsibility of two tenth grade biology classes (one inclusion class) in a Science, Technology, Engineering, Arts, Advanced Study and Mathematics Magnet School
Co-taught an upperclassmen psychology elective
Additional Activities Related to Professional Experience
Developed and implemented biology curriculum for in-school credit recovery program
Appointed grade-level team leader- provided instructional, technological and classroom management support
Trained in Student Teacher Assistance Team protocol to address social, emotional and behavioral interventions
Completed an academic year-long 3D Printing 4 Learning- Community of Practice Workshop
Related Experience
Special Education Paraprofessional | Amherst-Pelham Regional Middle School | Amherst, MA | Jan. 2015- June 2015
Provided social cognitive, emotional, behavioral and academic support to students diagnosed on the autism spectrum or with similar neurological profiles
Implemented positive behavioral interventional programs as well as de-escalation strategies
Child Development Intern | The May Institute | West Springfield, MA | Dec. 2012- May 2013
Introduced to Applied Behavior Analysis—implemented basic discrete trials and responsible for data entry
Educated students in life skills and participated in daily activities with students
Research Assistant- Department of Psychology | University of Massachusetts | Amherst, MA | Jan. 2012- May 2013
Assisted with all aspects of the research, including data collection, entry, coding, basic data analysis
Responsible to run individual sessions with participants on a flexible schedule throughout academic year