Opinion
ERICK CORNELL CLAY, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
A motion by a federal prisoner for postconviction relief under 28 U. S. C. §2255 is subject to a one-year time limitation that generally runs from the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final. §2255, ¶6(1). This case concerns the starting date for the one-year limitation. It presents a narrow but recurring question on which courts of appeals have divided: When a defendant in a federal prosecution takes an unsuccessful direct appeal from a judgment of conviction, but does not next petition for a writ of certiorari from this Court, does the judgment become final for postconviction relief purposes (1) when the appellate court issues its mandate affirming the conviction, or, instead, (2) on the date, ordinarily 69 days later, when the time for filing a petition for certiorari expires?
In accord with this Courts consistent understanding of finality in the context of collateral review, and the weight of lower court authority, we reject the issuance of the appellate court mandate as the triggering date. For the purpose of starting the clock on §2255s one-year limitation period, we hold, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate courts affirmation of the conviction.
I
In 1997, petitioner Erick Cornell Clay was convicted of arson and distribution of cocaine base in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. On November 23, 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions. That courts mandate issued on December 15, 1998. See Fed. Rules App. Proc. 40(a)(1) and 41(b) (when no petition for rehearing is filed, a court of appeals mandate issues 21 days after entry of judgment). Clay did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari. The time in which he could have petitioned for certiorari expired on February 22, 1999, 90 days after entry of the Court of Appeals judgment, see this Courts Rule 13(1), and 69 days after the issuance of the appellate courts mandate.
On February 22, 2000one year and 69 days after the Court of Appeals issued its mandate and exactly one year after the time for seeking certiorari expiredClay filed a motion in the District Court, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2255, to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. Congress has prescribed [a] 1-year period of limitation for such motions run[ning] from the latest of four specified dates. §2255, ¶6. Of the four dates, the only one relevant in this case, as in the generality of cases, is the first: the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final. §2255, ¶6(1).
Relying on Gendron v. United States , 154 F. 3d 672, 674 (CA7 1998) (per curiam) , the District Court stated that when a federal prisoner in this circuit does not seek certiorari … , the conviction becomes final on the date the appellate court issues the mandate in the direct appeal. App. to Pet. for Cert. 8a. Because Clay filed his §2255 motion more than one year after that date, the court denied the motion as time barred.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. That court declined Clays invitation to reconsider our holding in Gendron , although it acknowledged that Gendron s construction of section 2255 represents the minority view. 30 Fed. Appx. 607, 609 (2002). Bowing to stare decisis , the court expressed reluctan[ce] to overrule [its own] recently-reaffirmed precedent without guidance from the Supreme Court. Ibid.
The Fourth Circuit has agreed with Gendron s interpretation of §2255. See United States v. Torres , 211 F. 3d 836, 838842 (2000) (when a federal prisoner does not file a petition for certiorari, his judgment of conviction becomes final for §2255 purposes upon issuance of the court of appeals mandate). Six Courts of Appeals have parted ways with the Seventh and Fourth Circuits. These courts hold that, for federal prisoners like Clay who do not file petitions for certiorari following affirmance of their convictions, §2255s one-year limitation period begins to run when the defendants time for seeking review by this Court expires. 1 To secure uniformity in the application of §2255s time constraint, we granted certiorari, 536 U. S. 957 (2002) , and now reverse the Seventh Circuits judgment. 2
II
Finality is variously defined; like many legal terms, its precise meaning depends on context. Typically, a federal judgment becomes final for appellate review and claim preclusion purposes when the district court disassociates itself from the case, leaving nothing to be done at the court of first instance save execution of the judgment. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U. S. 706, 712 (1996) ; Restatement (Second) of Judgments §13, Comment b (1980). For other purposes, finality attaches at a different stage. For example, for certain determinations under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. §3161 et seq. , and under a now-repealed version of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, several lower courts have held that finality attends issuance of the appellate courts mandate. See Brief for Amicus Curiae by Invitation of the Court 2228 (hereinafter DeBruin Brief) (citing cases). For the purpose of seeking review by this Court, in contrast, [t]he time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari runs from the date of entry of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed, and not from the issuance date of the mandate (or its equivalent under local practice). This Courts Rule 13(3).
Here, the relevant context is postconviction relief, a context in which finality has a long-recognized, clear meaning: Finality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires. See, e.g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U. S. 383, 390 (1994) ; Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 321, n. 6 (1987) ; Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 887 (1983) ; United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S. 537, 542, n. 8 (1982) ; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 622, n. 5 (1965) . Because we presume that Congress expects its statutes to be read in conformity with this Courts precedents, United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 495 (1997) , our unvarying understanding of finality for collateral review purposes would ordinarily determine the meaning of becomes final in §2255.
Amicus urges a different determinant, relying on verbal differences between §2255 and a parallel statutory provision, 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(1), which governs petitions for federal habeas corpus by state prisoners. See DeBruin Brief 820. Sections 2255 and 2244(d)(1), as now formulated, were reshaped by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. See §§101, 105, 110Stat. 1217, 1220. Prior to that Act, no statute of limitations governed requests for federal habeas corpus or §2255 habeas-like relief. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265 (1986) ; United States v. Nahodil , 36 F. 3d 323, 328 (CA3 1994). Like §2255, §2244(d)(1) establishes a one-year limitation period, running from the latest of four specified dates. Three of the four time triggers under §2244(d)(1) closely track corresponding portions of §2255. Compare §§2244(d)(1)(B)(D), with §2255, ¶¶6(2)(4). But where §2255, ¶6(1), refers simply to the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final, §2244(d)(1)(A) speaks of the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 3
When Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, we have recognized, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo , 472 F. 2d 720, 722 (CA5 1972)). Invoking the maxim recited in Russello , amicus asserts that becomes final in §2255, ¶6(1), cannot mean the same thing as became final in §2244(d)(1)(A); reading the two as synonymous, amicus maintains, would render superfluous the words by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such reviewwords found only in the latter provision. DeBruin Brief 820. We can give effect to the discrete wording of the two prescriptions, amicus urges, if we adopt the following rule: When a convicted defendant does not seek certiorari on direct review, §2255s limitation period starts to run on the date the court of appeals issues its mandate. Id., at 36. 4
Amicus would have a stronger argument if §2255, ¶6(1), explicitly incorporated the first of §2244(d)(1)(A)s finality formulations but not the second, so that the §2255 text read becomes final by the conclusion of direct review . Had §2255 explicitly provided for the first of the two finality triggers set forth in §2244(d)(1)(A), one might indeed question the soundness of interpreting §2255 implicitly to incorporate §2244(d)(1)(A)s second trigger as well. As written, however, §2255 does not qualify becomes final at all. Using neither of the disjunctive phrases that follow the words became final in §2244(d)(1)(A), §2255 simply leaves becomes final undefined.
Russello , we think it plain, hardly warrants the decision amicus urges, one that would hold the §2255 petitioner to a tighter time constraint than the petitioner governed by §2244(d)(1)(A). Russello concerned the meaning of a provision in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. §1961 et seq. , that directed forfeiture to the United States of any interest [a convicted defendant] has acquired … in violation of [the Act]. §1963(a)(1). The petitioner in Russello urged a narrow construction of the unqualified words any interest … acquired. Rejecting that argument, we observed that a succeeding subsection, §1963(a)(2), reached any interest in … any enterprise the defendant conducted in violation of RICOs proscriptions. At that point, we referred to the maxim invoked by amicus . See supra , at 6. The qualifying words in … any enterprise narrowed §1963(a)(2), but in no way affected §1963(a)(1). The comparison of the two subsections, we said, fortified the broad construction we approved for the unmodified words any interest … acquired. Russello , 464 U. S., at 2223 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. , at 23 (Had Congress intended to restrict §1963(a)(1) to an interest in an enterprise, it presumably would have done so expressly as it did in the immediately following subsection (a)(2).).
Far from supporting the Seventh Circuits constricted reading of §2255, ¶6(1), Russello s reasoning tends in Clays favor. An unqualified termhere becomes final Russello indicates, calls for a reading surely no less broad than a pinpointed onehere, §2244(d)(1)(A)s specification became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.
Moreover, as Clay and the Government urge, see Brief for Petitioner 22; Reply Brief for United States 78, one can readily comprehend why Congress might have found it appropriate to spell out the meaning of final in §2244(d)(1)(A) but not in §2255. Section 2244(d)(1) governs petitions by state prisoners. In that context, a bare reference to became final might have suggested that finality assessments should be made by reference to state law rules that may differ from the general federal rule and vary from State to State. Cf. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4, 8 (2000) (an application for state postconviction relief is properly filed for purposes of 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2) when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable [state] laws and rules governing filings). The words by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review make it clear that finality for the purpose of §2244(d)(1)(A) is to be determined by reference to a uniform federal rule. Section 2255, however, governs only petitions by federal prisoners; within the federal system there is no comparable risk of varying rules to guard against.
Amicus also submits that 28 U. S. C. §2263 reinforces the Seventh Circuits understanding of §2255. DeBruin Brief 20; accord, Torres , 211 F. 3d, at 840. Chapter 154 of Title 28 governs certain habeas petitions filed by death-sentenced state prisoners. Section 2263(a) prescribes a 180-day limitation period for such petitions running from final State court affirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. That period is tolled, however, from the date that a petition for certiorari is filed in the Supreme Court until the date of final disposition of the petition if a State prisoner files the petition to secure review by the Supreme Court of the affirmance of a capital sentence on direct review by the court of last resort of the State or other final State court decision on direct review. §2263(b)(1).
We do not find in §2263 cause to alter our reading of §2255. First, amicus reliance on §2263 encounters essentially the same problem as does his reliance on §2244(d)(1)(A): Section 2255, ¶6(1), refers to neither of the two events that §2263(a) identifies as possible starting points for the limitation periodaffirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct review and the expiration of the time for seeking such review. Thus, reasoning by negative implication from §2263 does not justify the conclusion that §2255, ¶6(1)s limitation period begins to run at one of those times rather than the other. Cf. supra , at 68. Second, §2263(a) ties the applicable limitation period to affirmance of the conviction and sentence, while §2255, ¶6(1), ties the limitation period to the date when the judgment of conviction becomes final. See Torres , 211 F. 3d, at 845 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). The Russello presumptionthat the presence of a phrase in one provision and its absence in another reveals Congress designgrows weaker with each difference in the formulation of the provisions under inspection. Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U. S. 424, 435436 (2002) .
* * *
We hold that, for federal criminal defendants who do not file a petition for certiorari with this Court on direct review, §2255s one-year limitation period starts to run when the time for seeking such review expires. Under this rule, Clays §2255 petition was timely filed. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
1 See Derman v. United States, 298 F. 3d 34, 3942 (CA1 2002); Kapral v. United States, 166 F. 3d 565, 567577 (CA3 1999); United States v. Gamble, 208 F. 3d 536, 537 (CA5 2000) (per curiam); United States v. Garcia, 210 F. 3d 1058, 10591061 (CA9 2000); United States v. Burch, 202 F. 3d 1274, 12751279 (CA10 2000); Kaufmann v. United States, 282 F. 3d 1336, 13371339 (CA11 2002).
2 Agreeing with the position advanced by the majority of the courts of appeals that have ruled on the question, the United States joins petitioner Clay in urging that Clays §2255 motion was timely filed. We therefore invited David W. DeBruin to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the Seventh Circuits judgment. Mr. DeBruins able advocacy permits us to decide the case satisfied that the relevant issues have been fully aired.
3 The Courts of Appeals have uniformly interpreted direct review in §2244(d)(1)(A) to encompass review of a state conviction by this Court. See Derman v. United States, 298 F. 3d, at 4041; Williams v. Artuz, 237 F. 3d 147, 151 (CA2 2001); Kapral v. United States, 166 F. 3d, at 575; Hill v. Braxton, 277 F. 3d 701, 704 (CA4 2002); Ott v. Johnson, 192 F. 3d 510, 513 (CA5 1999); Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F. 3d 280, 283 (CA6 2000); Anderson v. Litscher, 281 F. 3d 672, 674675 (CA7 2002); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F. 3d 345, 347348 (CA8 1998); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F. 3d 1157, 1159 (CA9 1999); Locke v. Saffle, 237 F. 3d 1269, 1273 (CA10 2001); Bond v. Moore, 309 F. 3d 770, 774 (CA11 2002).
4 Although recognizing that the question is not presented in this case, Tr. of Oral Arg. 27, amicus suggests that §2255s limitation period starts to run upon issuance of the court of appeals mandate even in cases in which the defendant does petition for certiorari. Id., at 2728, 3638, 4142. As amicus also recognizes, however, id., at 41, courts of appeals have uniformly concluded that, if a prisoner petitions for certiorari, the contested conviction becomes final when the Supreme Court either denies the writ or issues a decision on the merits, United States v. Hicks, 283 F. 3d 380, 387 (CADC 2002).
Opinion
ERICK CORNELL CLAY, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
A motion by a federal prisoner for postconviction relief under 28 U. S. C. §2255 is subject to a one-year time limitation that generally runs from the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final. §2255, ¶6(1). This case concerns the starting date for the one-year limitation. It presents a narrow but recurring question on which courts of appeals have divided: When a defendant in a federal prosecution takes an unsuccessful direct appeal from a judgment of conviction, but does not next petition for a writ of certiorari from this Court, does the judgment become final for postconviction relief purposes (1) when the appellate court issues its mandate affirming the conviction, or, instead, (2) on the date, ordinarily 69 days later, when the time for filing a petition for certiorari expires?
In accord with this Courts consistent understanding of finality in the context of collateral review, and the weight of lower court authority, we reject the issuance of the appellate court mandate as the triggering date. For the purpose of starting the clock on §2255s one-year limitation period, we hold, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate courts affirmation of the conviction.
I
In 1997, petitioner Erick Cornell Clay was convicted of arson and distribution of cocaine base in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. On November 23, 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions. That courts mandate issued on December 15, 1998. See Fed. Rules App. Proc. 40(a)(1) and 41(b) (when no petition for rehearing is filed, a court of appeals mandate issues 21 days after entry of judgment). Clay did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari. The time in which he could have petitioned for certiorari expired on February 22, 1999, 90 days after entry of the Court of Appeals judgment, see this Courts Rule 13(1), and 69 days after the issuance of the appellate courts mandate.
On February 22, 2000one year and 69 days after the Court of Appeals issued its mandate and exactly one year after the time for seeking certiorari expiredClay filed a motion in the District Court, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2255, to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. Congress has prescribed [a] 1-year period of limitation for such motions run[ning] from the latest of four specified dates. §2255, ¶6. Of the four dates, the only one relevant in this case, as in the generality of cases, is the first: the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final. §2255, ¶6(1).
Relying on Gendron v. United States , 154 F. 3d 672, 674 (CA7 1998) (per curiam) , the District Court stated that when a federal prisoner in this circuit does not seek certiorari … , the conviction becomes final on the date the appellate court issues the mandate in the direct appeal. App. to Pet. for Cert. 8a. Because Clay filed his §2255 motion more than one year after that date, the court denied the motion as time barred.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. That court declined Clays invitation to reconsider our holding in Gendron , although it acknowledged that Gendron s construction of section 2255 represents the minority view. 30 Fed. Appx. 607, 609 (2002). Bowing to stare decisis , the court expressed reluctan[ce] to overrule [its own] recently-reaffirmed precedent without guidance from the Supreme Court. Ibid.
The Fourth Circuit has agreed with Gendron s interpretation of §2255. See United States v. Torres , 211 F. 3d 836, 838842 (2000) (when a federal prisoner does not file a petition for certiorari, his judgment of conviction becomes final for §2255 purposes upon issuance of the court of appeals mandate). Six Courts of Appeals have parted ways with the Seventh and Fourth Circuits. These courts hold that, for federal prisoners like Clay who do not file petitions for certiorari following affirmance of their convictions, §2255s one-year limitation period begins to run when the defendants time for seeking review by this Court expires. 1 To secure uniformity in the application of §2255s time constraint, we granted certiorari, 536 U. S. 957 (2002) , and now reverse the Seventh Circuits judgment. 2
II
Finality is variously defined; like many legal terms, its precise meaning depends on context. Typically, a federal judgment becomes final for appellate review and claim preclusion purposes when the district court disassociates itself from the case, leaving nothing to be done at the court of first instance save execution of the judgment. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U. S. 706, 712 (1996) ; Restatement (Second) of Judgments §13, Comment b (1980). For other purposes, finality attaches at a different stage. For example, for certain determinations under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. §3161 et seq. , and under a now-repealed version of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, several lower courts have held that finality attends issuance of the appellate courts mandate. See Brief for Amicus Curiae by Invitation of the Court 2228 (hereinafter DeBruin Brief) (citing cases). For the purpose of seeking review by this Court, in contrast, [t]he time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari runs from the date of entry of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed, and not from the issuance date of the mandate (or its equivalent under local practice). This Courts Rule 13(3).
Here, the relevant context is postconviction relief, a context in which finality has a long-recognized, clear meaning: Finality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires. See, e.g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U. S. 383, 390 (1994) ; Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 321, n. 6 (1987) ; Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 887 (1983) ; United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S. 537, 542, n. 8 (1982) ; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 622, n. 5 (1965) . Because we presume that Congress expects its statutes to be read in conformity with this Courts precedents, United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 495 (1997) , our unvarying understanding of finality for collateral review purposes would ordinarily determine the meaning of becomes final in §2255.
Amicus urges a different determinant, relying on verbal differences between §2255 and a parallel statutory provision, 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(1), which governs petitions for federal habeas corpus by state prisoners. See DeBruin Brief 820. Sections 2255 and 2244(d)(1), as now formulated, were reshaped by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. See §§101, 105, 110Stat. 1217, 1220. Prior to that Act, no statute of limitations governed requests for federal habeas corpus or §2255 habeas-like relief. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265 (1986) ; United States v. Nahodil , 36 F. 3d 323, 328 (CA3 1994). Like §2255, §2244(d)(1) establishes a one-year limitation period, running from the latest of four specified dates. Three of the four time triggers under §2244(d)(1) closely track corresponding portions of §2255. Compare §§2244(d)(1)(B)(D), with §2255, ¶¶6(2)(4). But where §2255, ¶6(1), refers simply to the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final, §2244(d)(1)(A) speaks of the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 3
When Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, we have recognized, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo , 472 F. 2d 720, 722 (CA5 1972)). Invoking the maxim recited in Russello , amicus asserts that becomes final in §2255, ¶6(1), cannot mean the same thing as became final in §2244(d)(1)(A); reading the two as synonymous, amicus maintains, would render superfluous the words by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such reviewwords found only in the latter provision. DeBruin Brief 820. We can give effect to the discrete wording of the two prescriptions, amicus urges, if we adopt the following rule: When a convicted defendant does not seek certiorari on direct review, §2255s limitation period starts to run on the date the court of appeals issues its mandate. Id., at 36. 4
Amicus would have a stronger argument if §2255, ¶6(1), explicitly incorporated the first of §2244(d)(1)(A)s finality formulations but not the second, so that the §2255 text read becomes final by the conclusion of direct review . Had §2255 explicitly provided for the first of the two finality triggers set forth in §2244(d)(1)(A), one might indeed question the soundness of interpreting §2255 implicitly to incorporate §2244(d)(1)(A)s second trigger as well. As written, however, §2255 does not qualify becomes final at all. Using neither of the disjunctive phrases that follow the words became final in §2244(d)(1)(A), §2255 simply leaves becomes final undefined.
Russello , we think it plain, hardly warrants the decision amicus urges, one that would hold the §2255 petitioner to a tighter time constraint than the petitioner governed by §2244(d)(1)(A). Russello concerned the meaning of a provision in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. §1961 et seq. , that directed forfeiture to the United States of any interest [a convicted defendant] has acquired … in violation of [the Act]. §1963(a)(1). The petitioner in Russello urged a narrow construction of the unqualified words any interest … acquired. Rejecting that argument, we observed that a succeeding subsection, §1963(a)(2), reached any interest in … any enterprise the defendant conducted in violation of RICOs proscriptions. At that point, we referred to the maxim invoked by amicus . See supra , at 6. The qualifying words in … any enterprise narrowed §1963(a)(2), but in no way affected §1963(a)(1). The comparison of the two subsections, we said, fortified the broad construction we approved for the unmodified words any interest … acquired. Russello , 464 U. S., at 2223 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. , at 23 (Had Congress intended to restrict §1963(a)(1) to an interest in an enterprise, it presumably would have done so expressly as it did in the immediately following subsection (a)(2).).
Far from supporting the Seventh Circuits constricted reading of §2255, ¶6(1), Russello s reasoning tends in Clays favor. An unqualified termhere becomes final Russello indicates, calls for a reading surely no less broad than a pinpointed onehere, §2244(d)(1)(A)s specification became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.
Moreover, as Clay and the Government urge, see Brief for Petitioner 22; Reply Brief for United States 78, one can readily comprehend why Congress might have found it appropriate to spell out the meaning of final in §2244(d)(1)(A) but not in §2255. Section 2244(d)(1) governs petitions by state prisoners. In that context, a bare reference to became final might have suggested that finality assessments should be made by reference to state law rules that may differ from the general federal rule and vary from State to State. Cf. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4, 8 (2000) (an application for state postconviction relief is properly filed for purposes of 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2) when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable [state] laws and rules governing filings). The words by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review make it clear that finality for the purpose of §2244(d)(1)(A) is to be determined by reference to a uniform federal rule. Section 2255, however, governs only petitions by federal prisoners; within the federal system there is no comparable risk of varying rules to guard against.
Amicus also submits that 28 U. S. C. §2263 reinforces the Seventh Circuits understanding of §2255. DeBruin Brief 20; accord, Torres , 211 F. 3d, at 840. Chapter 154 of Title 28 governs certain habeas petitions filed by death-sentenced state prisoners. Section 2263(a) prescribes a 180-day limitation period for such petitions running from final State court affirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. That period is tolled, however, from the date that a petition for certiorari is filed in the Supreme Court until the date of final disposition of the petition if a State prisoner files the petition to secure review by the Supreme Court of the affirmance of a capital sentence on direct review by the court of last resort of the State or other final State court decision on direct review. §2263(b)(1).
We do not find in §2263 cause to alter our reading of §2255. First, amicus reliance on §2263 encounters essentially the same problem as does his reliance on §2244(d)(1)(A): Section 2255, ¶6(1), refers to neither of the two events that §2263(a) identifies as possible starting points for the limitation periodaffirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct review and the expiration of the time for seeking such review. Thus, reasoning by negative implication from §2263 does not justify the conclusion that §2255, ¶6(1)s limitation period begins to run at one of those times rather than the other. Cf. supra , at 68. Second, §2263(a) ties the applicable limitation period to affirmance of the conviction and sentence, while §2255, ¶6(1), ties the limitation period to the date when the judgment of conviction becomes final. See Torres , 211 F. 3d, at 845 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). The Russello presumptionthat the presence of a phrase in one provision and its absence in another reveals Congress designgrows weaker with each difference in the formulation of the provisions under inspection. Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U. S. 424, 435436 (2002) .
* * *
We hold that, for federal criminal defendants who do not file a petition for certiorari with this Court on direct review, §2255s one-year limitation period starts to run when the time for seeking such review expires. Under this rule, Clays §2255 petition was timely filed. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
1 See Derman v. United States, 298 F. 3d 34, 3942 (CA1 2002); Kapral v. United States, 166 F. 3d 565, 567577 (CA3 1999); United States v. Gamble, 208 F. 3d 536, 537 (CA5 2000) (per curiam); United States v. Garcia, 210 F. 3d 1058, 10591061 (CA9 2000); United States v. Burch, 202 F. 3d 1274, 12751279 (CA10 2000); Kaufmann v. United States, 282 F. 3d 1336, 13371339 (CA11 2002).
2 Agreeing with the position advanced by the majority of the courts of appeals that have ruled on the question, the United States joins petitioner Clay in urging that Clays §2255 motion was timely filed. We therefore invited David W. DeBruin to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the Seventh Circuits judgment. Mr. DeBruins able advocacy permits us to decide the case satisfied that the relevant issues have been fully aired.
3 The Courts of Appeals have uniformly interpreted direct review in §2244(d)(1)(A) to encompass review of a state conviction by this Court. See Derman v. United States, 298 F. 3d, at 4041; Williams v. Artuz, 237 F. 3d 147, 151 (CA2 2001); Kapral v. United States, 166 F. 3d, at 575; Hill v. Braxton, 277 F. 3d 701, 704 (CA4 2002); Ott v. Johnson, 192 F. 3d 510, 513 (CA5 1999); Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F. 3d 280, 283 (CA6 2000); Anderson v. Litscher, 281 F. 3d 672, 674675 (CA7 2002); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F. 3d 345, 347348 (CA8 1998); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F. 3d 1157, 1159 (CA9 1999); Locke v. Saffle, 237 F. 3d 1269, 1273 (CA10 2001); Bond v. Moore, 309 F. 3d 770, 774 (CA11 2002).
4 Although recognizing that the question is not presented in this case, Tr. of Oral Arg. 27, amicus suggests that §2255s limitation period starts to run upon issuance of the court of appeals mandate even in cases in which the defendant does petition for certiorari. Id., at 2728, 3638, 4142. As amicus also recognizes, however, id., at 41, courts of appeals have uniformly concluded that, if a prisoner petitions for certiorari, the contested conviction becomes final when the Supreme Court either denies the writ or issues a decision on the merits, United States v. Hicks, 283 F. 3d 380, 387 (CADC 2002).
Opinion
ERICK CORNELL CLAY, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
A motion by a federal prisoner for postconviction relief under 28 U. S. C. §2255 is subject to a one-year time limitation that generally runs from the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final. §2255, ¶6(1). This case concerns the starting date for the one-year limitation. It presents a narrow but recurring question on which courts of appeals have divided: When a defendant in a federal prosecution takes an unsuccessful direct appeal from a judgment of conviction, but does not next petition for a writ of certiorari from this Court, does the judgment become final for postconviction relief purposes (1) when the appellate court issues its mandate affirming the conviction, or, instead, (2) on the date, ordinarily 69 days later, when the time for filing a petition for certiorari expires?
In accord with this Courts consistent understanding of finality in the context of collateral review, and the weight of lower court authority, we reject the issuance of the appellate court mandate as the triggering date. For the purpose of starting the clock on §2255s one-year limitation period, we hold, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate courts affirmation of the conviction.
I
In 1997, petitioner Erick Cornell Clay was convicted of arson and distribution of cocaine base in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. On November 23, 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions. That courts mandate issued on December 15, 1998. See Fed. Rules App. Proc. 40(a)(1) and 41(b) (when no petition for rehearing is filed, a court of appeals mandate issues 21 days after entry of judgment). Clay did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari. The time in which he could have petitioned for certiorari expired on February 22, 1999, 90 days after entry of the Court of Appeals judgment, see this Courts Rule 13(1), and 69 days after the issuance of the appellate courts mandate.
On February 22, 2000one year and 69 days after the Court of Appeals issued its mandate and exactly one year after the time for seeking certiorari expiredClay filed a motion in the District Court, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2255, to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. Congress has prescribed [a] 1-year period of limitation for such motions run[ning] from the latest of four specified dates. §2255, ¶6. Of the four dates, the only one relevant in this case, as in the generality of cases, is the first: the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final. §2255, ¶6(1).
Relying on Gendron v. United States , 154 F. 3d 672, 674 (CA7 1998) (per curiam) , the District Court stated that when a federal prisoner in this circuit does not seek certiorari … , the conviction becomes final on the date the appellate court issues the mandate in the direct appeal. App. to Pet. for Cert. 8a. Because Clay filed his §2255 motion more than one year after that date, the court denied the motion as time barred.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. That court declined Clays invitation to reconsider our holding in Gendron , although it acknowledged that Gendron s construction of section 2255 represents the minority view. 30 Fed. Appx. 607, 609 (2002). Bowing to stare decisis , the court expressed reluctan[ce] to overrule [its own] recently-reaffirmed precedent without guidance from the Supreme Court. Ibid.
The Fourth Circuit has agreed with Gendron s interpretation of §2255. See United States v. Torres , 211 F. 3d 836, 838842 (2000) (when a federal prisoner does not file a petition for certiorari, his judgment of conviction becomes final for §2255 purposes upon issuance of the court of appeals mandate). Six Courts of Appeals have parted ways with the Seventh and Fourth Circuits. These courts hold that, for federal prisoners like Clay who do not file petitions for certiorari following affirmance of their convictions, §2255s one-year limitation period begins to run when the defendants time for seeking review by this Court expires. 1 To secure uniformity in the application of §2255s time constraint, we granted certiorari, 536 U. S. 957 (2002) , and now reverse the Seventh Circuits judgment. 2
II
Finality is variously defined; like many legal terms, its precise meaning depends on context. Typically, a federal judgment becomes final for appellate review and claim preclusion purposes when the district court disassociates itself from the case, leaving nothing to be done at the court of first instance save execution of the judgment. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U. S. 706, 712 (1996) ; Restatement (Second) of Judgments §13, Comment b (1980). For other purposes, finality attaches at a different stage. For example, for certain determinations under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. §3161 et seq. , and under a now-repealed version of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, several lower courts have held that finality attends issuance of the appellate courts mandate. See Brief for Amicus Curiae by Invitation of the Court 2228 (hereinafter DeBruin Brief) (citing cases). For the purpose of seeking review by this Court, in contrast, [t]he time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari runs from the date of entry of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed, and not from the issuance date of the mandate (or its equivalent under local practice). This Courts Rule 13(3).
Here, the relevant context is postconviction relief, a context in which finality has a long-recognized, clear meaning: Finality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires. See, e.g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U. S. 383, 390 (1994) ; Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 321, n. 6 (1987) ; Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 887 (1983) ; United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S. 537, 542, n. 8 (1982) ; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 622, n. 5 (1965) . Because we presume that Congress expects its statutes to be read in conformity with this Courts precedents, United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 495 (1997) , our unvarying understanding of finality for collateral review purposes would ordinarily determine the meaning of becomes final in §2255.
Amicus urges a different determinant, relying on verbal differences between §2255 and a parallel statutory provision, 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(1), which governs petitions for federal habeas corpus by state prisoners. See DeBruin Brief 820. Sections 2255 and 2244(d)(1), as now formulated, were reshaped by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. See §§101, 105, 110Stat. 1217, 1220. Prior to that Act, no statute of limitations governed requests for federal habeas corpus or §2255 habeas-like relief. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265 (1986) ; United States v. Nahodil , 36 F. 3d 323, 328 (CA3 1994). Like §2255, §2244(d)(1) establishes a one-year limitation period, running from the latest of four specified dates. Three of the four time triggers under §2244(d)(1) closely track corresponding portions of §2255. Compare §§2244(d)(1)(B)(D), with §2255, ¶¶6(2)(4). But where §2255, ¶6(1), refers simply to the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final, §2244(d)(1)(A) speaks of the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 3
When Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, we have recognized, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo , 472 F. 2d 720, 722 (CA5 1972)). Invoking the maxim recited in Russello , amicus asserts that becomes final in §2255, ¶6(1), cannot mean the same thing as became final in §2244(d)(1)(A); reading the two as synonymous, amicus maintains, would render superfluous the words by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such reviewwords found only in the latter provision. DeBruin Brief 820. We can give effect to the discrete wording of the two prescriptions, amicus urges, if we adopt the following rule: When a convicted defendant does not seek certiorari on direct review, §2255s limitation period starts to run on the date the court of appeals issues its mandate. Id., at 36. 4
Amicus would have a stronger argument if §2255, ¶6(1), explicitly incorporated the first of §2244(d)(1)(A)s finality formulations but not the second, so that the §2255 text read becomes final by the conclusion of direct review . Had §2255 explicitly provided for the first of the two finality triggers set forth in §2244(d)(1)(A), one might indeed question the soundness of interpreting §2255 implicitly to incorporate §2244(d)(1)(A)s second trigger as well. As written, however, §2255 does not qualify becomes final at all. Using neither of the disjunctive phrases that follow the words became final in §2244(d)(1)(A), §2255 simply leaves becomes final undefined.
Russello , we think it plain, hardly warrants the decision amicus urges, one that would hold the §2255 petitioner to a tighter time constraint than the petitioner governed by §2244(d)(1)(A). Russello concerned the meaning of a provision in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. §1961 et seq. , that directed forfeiture to the United States of any interest [a convicted defendant] has acquired … in violation of [the Act]. §1963(a)(1). The petitioner in Russello urged a narrow construction of the unqualified words any interest … acquired. Rejecting that argument, we observed that a succeeding subsection, §1963(a)(2), reached any interest in … any enterprise the defendant conducted in violation of RICOs proscriptions. At that point, we referred to the maxim invoked by amicus . See supra , at 6. The qualifying words in … any enterprise narrowed §1963(a)(2), but in no way affected §1963(a)(1). The comparison of the two subsections, we said, fortified the broad construction we approved for the unmodified words any interest … acquired. Russello , 464 U. S., at 2223 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. , at 23 (Had Congress intended to restrict §1963(a)(1) to an interest in an enterprise, it presumably would have done so expressly as it did in the immediately following subsection (a)(2).).
Far from supporting the Seventh Circuits constricted reading of §2255, ¶6(1), Russello s reasoning tends in Clays favor. An unqualified termhere becomes final Russello indicates, calls for a reading surely no less broad than a pinpointed onehere, §2244(d)(1)(A)s specification became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.
Moreover, as Clay and the Government urge, see Brief for Petitioner 22; Reply Brief for United States 78, one can readily comprehend why Congress might have found it appropriate to spell out the meaning of final in §2244(d)(1)(A) but not in §2255. Section 2244(d)(1) governs petitions by state prisoners. In that context, a bare reference to became final might have suggested that finality assessments should be made by reference to state law rules that may differ from the general federal rule and vary from State to State. Cf. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4, 8 (2000) (an application for state postconviction relief is properly filed for purposes of 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2) when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable [state] laws and rules governing filings). The words by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review make it clear that finality for the purpose of §2244(d)(1)(A) is to be determined by reference to a uniform federal rule. Section 2255, however, governs only petitions by federal prisoners; within the federal system there is no comparable risk of varying rules to guard against.
Amicus also submits that 28 U. S. C. §2263 reinforces the Seventh Circuits understanding of §2255. DeBruin Brief 20; accord, Torres , 211 F. 3d, at 840. Chapter 154 of Title 28 governs certain habeas petitions filed by death-sentenced state prisoners. Section 2263(a) prescribes a 180-day limitation period for such petitions running from final State court affirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. That period is tolled, however, from the date that a petition for certiorari is filed in the Supreme Court until the date of final disposition of the petition if a State prisoner files the petition to secure review by the Supreme Court of the affirmance of a capital sentence on direct review by the court of last resort of the State or other final State court decision on direct review. §2263(b)(1).
We do not find in §2263 cause to alter our reading of §2255. First, amicus reliance on §2263 encounters essentially the same problem as does his reliance on §2244(d)(1)(A): Section 2255, ¶6(1), refers to neither of the two events that §2263(a) identifies as possible starting points for the limitation periodaffirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct review and the expiration of the time for seeking such review. Thus, reasoning by negative implication from §2263 does not justify the conclusion that §2255, ¶6(1)s limitation period begins to run at one of those times rather than the other. Cf. supra , at 68. Second, §2263(a) ties the applicable limitation period to affirmance of the conviction and sentence, while §2255, ¶6(1), ties the limitation period to the date when the judgment of conviction becomes final. See Torres , 211 F. 3d, at 845 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). The Russello presumptionthat the presence of a phrase in one provision and its absence in another reveals Congress designgrows weaker with each difference in the formulation of the provisions under inspection. Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U. S. 424, 435436 (2002) .
* * *
We hold that, for federal criminal defendants who do not file a petition for certiorari with this Court on direct review, §2255s one-year limitation period starts to run when the time for seeking such review expires. Under this rule, Clays §2255 petition was timely filed. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
1 See Derman v. United States, 298 F. 3d 34, 3942 (CA1 2002); Kapral v. United States, 166 F. 3d 565, 567577 (CA3 1999); United States v. Gamble, 208 F. 3d 536, 537 (CA5 2000) (per curiam); United States v. Garcia, 210 F. 3d 1058, 10591061 (CA9 2000); United States v. Burch, 202 F. 3d 1274, 12751279 (CA10 2000); Kaufmann v. United States, 282 F. 3d 1336, 13371339 (CA11 2002).
2 Agreeing with the position advanced by the majority of the courts of appeals that have ruled on the question, the United States joins petitioner Clay in urging that Clays §2255 motion was timely filed. We therefore invited David W. DeBruin to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the Seventh Circuits judgment. Mr. DeBruins able advocacy permits us to decide the case satisfied that the relevant issues have been fully aired.
3 The Courts of Appeals have uniformly interpreted direct review in §2244(d)(1)(A) to encompass review of a state conviction by this Court. See Derman v. United States, 298 F. 3d, at 4041; Williams v. Artuz, 237 F. 3d 147, 151 (CA2 2001); Kapral v. United States, 166 F. 3d, at 575; Hill v. Braxton, 277 F. 3d 701, 704 (CA4 2002); Ott v. Johnson, 192 F. 3d 510, 513 (CA5 1999); Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F. 3d 280, 283 (CA6 2000); Anderson v. Litscher, 281 F. 3d 672, 674675 (CA7 2002); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F. 3d 345, 347348 (CA8 1998); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F. 3d 1157, 1159 (CA9 1999); Locke v. Saffle, 237 F. 3d 1269, 1273 (CA10 2001); Bond v. Moore, 309 F. 3d 770, 774 (CA11 2002).
4 Although recognizing that the question is not presented in this case, Tr. of Oral Arg. 27, amicus suggests that §2255s limitation period starts to run upon issuance of the court of appeals mandate even in cases in which the defendant does petition for certiorari. Id., at 2728, 3638, 4142. As amicus also recognizes, however, id., at 41, courts of appeals have uniformly concluded that, if a prisoner petitions for certiorari, the contested conviction becomes final when the Supreme Court either denies the writ or issues a decision on the merits, United States v. Hicks, 283 F. 3d 380, 387 (CADC 2002).
Opinion
ERICK CORNELL CLAY, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
A motion by a federal prisoner for postconviction relief under 28 U. S. C. §2255 is subject to a one-year time limitation that generally runs from the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final. §2255, ¶6(1). This case concerns the starting date for the one-year limitation. It presents a narrow but recurring question on which courts of appeals have divided: When a defendant in a federal prosecution takes an unsuccessful direct appeal from a judgment of conviction, but does not next petition for a writ of certiorari from this Court, does the judgment become final for postconviction relief purposes (1) when the appellate court issues its mandate affirming the conviction, or, instead, (2) on the date, ordinarily 69 days later, when the time for filing a petition for certiorari expires?
In accord with this Courts consistent understanding of finality in the context of collateral review, and the weight of lower court authority, we reject the issuance of the appellate court mandate as the triggering date. For the purpose of starting the clock on §2255s one-year limitation period, we hold, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate courts affirmation of the conviction.
I
In 1997, petitioner Erick Cornell Clay was convicted of arson and distribution of cocaine base in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. On November 23, 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions. That courts mandate issued on December 15, 1998. See Fed. Rules App. Proc. 40(a)(1) and 41(b) (when no petition for rehearing is filed, a court of appeals mandate issues 21 days after entry of judgment). Clay did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari. The time in which he could have petitioned for certiorari expired on February 22, 1999, 90 days after entry of the Court of Appeals judgment, see this Courts Rule 13(1), and 69 days after the issuance of the appellate courts mandate.
On February 22, 2000one year and 69 days after the Court of Appeals issued its mandate and exactly one year after the time for seeking certiorari expiredClay filed a motion in the District Court, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2255, to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. Congress has prescribed [a] 1-year period of limitation for such motions run[ning] from the latest of four specified dates. §2255, ¶6. Of the four dates, the only one relevant in this case, as in the generality of cases, is the first: the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final. §2255, ¶6(1).
Relying on Gendron v. United States , 154 F. 3d 672, 674 (CA7 1998) (per curiam) , the District Court stated that when a federal prisoner in this circuit does not seek certiorari … , the conviction becomes final on the date the appellate court issues the mandate in the direct appeal. App. to Pet. for Cert. 8a. Because Clay filed his §2255 motion more than one year after that date, the court denied the motion as time barred.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. That court declined Clays invitation to reconsider our holding in Gendron , although it acknowledged that Gendron s construction of section 2255 represents the minority view. 30 Fed. Appx. 607, 609 (2002). Bowing to stare decisis , the court expressed reluctan[ce] to overrule [its own] recently-reaffirmed precedent without guidance from the Supreme Court. Ibid.
The Fourth Circuit has agreed with Gendron s interpretation of §2255. See United States v. Torres , 211 F. 3d 836, 838842 (2000) (when a federal prisoner does not file a petition for certiorari, his judgment of conviction becomes final for §2255 purposes upon issuance of the court of appeals mandate). Six Courts of Appeals have parted ways with the Seventh and Fourth Circuits. These courts hold that, for federal prisoners like Clay who do not file petitions for certiorari following affirmance of their convictions, §2255s one-year limitation period begins to run when the defendants time for seeking review by this Court expires. 1 To secure uniformity in the application of §2255s time constraint, we granted certiorari, 536 U. S. 957 (2002) , and now reverse the Seventh Circuits judgment. 2
II
Finality is variously defined; like many legal terms, its precise meaning depends on context. Typically, a federal judgment becomes final for appellate review and claim preclusion purposes when the district court disassociates itself from the case, leaving nothing to be done at the court of first instance save execution of the judgment. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U. S. 706, 712 (1996) ; Restatement (Second) of Judgments §13, Comment b (1980). For other purposes, finality attaches at a different stage. For example, for certain determinations under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. §3161 et seq. , and under a now-repealed version of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, several lower courts have held that finality attends issuance of the appellate courts mandate. See Brief for Amicus Curiae by Invitation of the Court 2228 (hereinafter DeBruin Brief) (citing cases). For the purpose of seeking review by this Court, in contrast, [t]he time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari runs from the date of entry of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed, and not from the issuance date of the mandate (or its equivalent under local practice). This Courts Rule 13(3).
Here, the relevant context is postconviction relief, a context in which finality has a long-recognized, clear meaning: Finality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires. See, e.g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U. S. 383, 390 (1994) ; Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 321, n. 6 (1987) ; Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 887 (1983) ; United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S. 537, 542, n. 8 (1982) ; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 622, n. 5 (1965) . Because we presume that Congress expects its statutes to be read in conformity with this Courts precedents, United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 495 (1997) , our unvarying understanding of finality for collateral review purposes would ordinarily determine the meaning of becomes final in §2255.
Amicus urges a different determinant, relying on verbal differences between §2255 and a parallel statutory provision, 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(1), which governs petitions for federal habeas corpus by state prisoners. See DeBruin Brief 820. Sections 2255 and 2244(d)(1), as now formulated, were reshaped by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. See §§101, 105, 110Stat. 1217, 1220. Prior to that Act, no statute of limitations governed requests for federal habeas corpus or §2255 habeas-like relief. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265 (1986) ; United States v. Nahodil , 36 F. 3d 323, 328 (CA3 1994). Like §2255, §2244(d)(1) establishes a one-year limitation period, running from the latest of four specified dates. Three of the four time triggers under §2244(d)(1) closely track corresponding portions of §2255. Compare §§2244(d)(1)(B)(D), with §2255, ¶¶6(2)(4). But where §2255, ¶6(1), refers simply to the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final, §2244(d)(1)(A) speaks of the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 3
When Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, we have recognized, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo , 472 F. 2d 720, 722 (CA5 1972)). Invoking the maxim recited in Russello , amicus asserts that becomes final in §2255, ¶6(1), cannot mean the same thing as became final in §2244(d)(1)(A); reading the two as synonymous, amicus maintains, would render superfluous the words by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such reviewwords found only in the latter provision. DeBruin Brief 820. We can give effect to the discrete wording of the two prescriptions, amicus urges, if we adopt the following rule: When a convicted defendant does not seek certiorari on direct review, §2255s limitation period starts to run on the date the court of appeals issues its mandate. Id., at 36. 4
Amicus would have a stronger argument if §2255, ¶6(1), explicitly incorporated the first of §2244(d)(1)(A)s finality formulations but not the second, so that the §2255 text read becomes final by the conclusion of direct review . Had §2255 explicitly provided for the first of the two finality triggers set forth in §2244(d)(1)(A), one might indeed question the soundness of interpreting §2255 implicitly to incorporate §2244(d)(1)(A)s second trigger as well. As written, however, §2255 does not qualify becomes final at all. Using neither of the disjunctive phrases that follow the words became final in §2244(d)(1)(A), §2255 simply leaves becomes final undefined.
Russello , we think it plain, hardly warrants the decision amicus urges, one that would hold the §2255 petitioner to a tighter time constraint than the petitioner governed by §2244(d)(1)(A). Russello concerned the meaning of a provision in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. §1961 et seq. , that directed forfeiture to the United States of any interest [a convicted defendant] has acquired … in violation of [the Act]. §1963(a)(1). The petitioner in Russello urged a narrow construction of the unqualified words any interest … acquired. Rejecting that argument, we observed that a succeeding subsection, §1963(a)(2), reached any interest in … any enterprise the defendant conducted in violation of RICOs proscriptions. At that point, we referred to the maxim invoked by amicus . See supra , at 6. The qualifying words in … any enterprise narrowed §1963(a)(2), but in no way affected §1963(a)(1). The comparison of the two subsections, we said, fortified the broad construction we approved for the unmodified words any interest … acquired. Russello , 464 U. S., at 2223 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. , at 23 (Had Congress intended to restrict §1963(a)(1) to an interest in an enterprise, it presumably would have done so expressly as it did in the immediately following subsection (a)(2).).
Far from supporting the Seventh Circuits constricted reading of §2255, ¶6(1), Russello s reasoning tends in Clays favor. An unqualified termhere becomes final Russello indicates, calls for a reading surely no less broad than a pinpointed onehere, §2244(d)(1)(A)s specification became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.
Moreover, as Clay and the Government urge, see Brief for Petitioner 22; Reply Brief for United States 78, one can readily comprehend why Congress might have found it appropriate to spell out the meaning of final in §2244(d)(1)(A) but not in §2255. Section 2244(d)(1) governs petitions by state prisoners. In that context, a bare reference to became final might have suggested that finality assessments should be made by reference to state law rules that may differ from the general federal rule and vary from State to State. Cf. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4, 8 (2000) (an application for state postconviction relief is properly filed for purposes of 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2) when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable [state] laws and rules governing filings). The words by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review make it clear that finality for the purpose of §2244(d)(1)(A) is to be determined by reference to a uniform federal rule. Section 2255, however, governs only petitions by federal prisoners; within the federal system there is no comparable risk of varying rules to guard against.
Amicus also submits that 28 U. S. C. §2263 reinforces the Seventh Circuits understanding of §2255. DeBruin Brief 20; accord, Torres , 211 F. 3d, at 840. Chapter 154 of Title 28 governs certain habeas petitions filed by death-sentenced state prisoners. Section 2263(a) prescribes a 180-day limitation period for such petitions running from final State court affirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. That period is tolled, however, from the date that a petition for certiorari is filed in the Supreme Court until the date of final disposition of the petition if a State prisoner files the petition to secure review by the Supreme Court of the affirmance of a capital sentence on direct review by the court of last resort of the State or other final State court decision on direct review. §2263(b)(1).
We do not find in §2263 cause to alter our reading of §2255. First, amicus reliance on §2263 encounters essentially the same problem as does his reliance on §2244(d)(1)(A): Section 2255, ¶6(1), refers to neither of the two events that §2263(a) identifies as possible starting points for the limitation periodaffirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct review and the expiration of the time for seeking such review. Thus, reasoning by negative implication from §2263 does not justify the conclusion that §2255, ¶6(1)s limitation period begins to run at one of those times rather than the other. Cf. supra , at 68. Second, §2263(a) ties the applicable limitation period to affirmance of the conviction and sentence, while §2255, ¶6(1), ties the limitation period to the date when the judgment of conviction becomes final. See Torres , 211 F. 3d, at 845 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). The Russello presumptionthat the presence of a phrase in one provision and its absence in another reveals Congress designgrows weaker with each difference in the formulation of the provisions under inspection. Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U. S. 424, 435436 (2002) .
* * *
We hold that, for federal criminal defendants who do not file a petition for certiorari with this Court on direct review, §2255s one-year limitation period starts to run when the time for seeking such review expires. Under this rule, Clays §2255 petition was timely filed. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
1 See Derman v. United States, 298 F. 3d 34, 3942 (CA1 2002); Kapral v. United States, 166 F. 3d 565, 567577 (CA3 1999); United States v. Gamble, 208 F. 3d 536, 537 (CA5 2000) (per curiam); United States v. Garcia, 210 F. 3d 1058, 10591061 (CA9 2000); United States v. Burch, 202 F. 3d 1274, 12751279 (CA10 2000); Kaufmann v. United States, 282 F. 3d 1336, 13371339 (CA11 2002).
2 Agreeing with the position advanced by the majority of the courts of appeals that have ruled on the question, the United States joins petitioner Clay in urging that Clays §2255 motion was timely filed. We therefore invited David W. DeBruin to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the Seventh Circuits judgment. Mr. DeBruins able advocacy permits us to decide the case satisfied that the relevant issues have been fully aired.
3 The Courts of Appeals have uniformly interpreted direct review in §2244(d)(1)(A) to encompass review of a state conviction by this Court. See Derman v. United States, 298 F. 3d, at 4041; Williams v. Artuz, 237 F. 3d 147, 151 (CA2 2001); Kapral v. United States, 166 F. 3d, at 575; Hill v. Braxton, 277 F. 3d 701, 704 (CA4 2002); Ott v. Johnson, 192 F. 3d 510, 513 (CA5 1999); Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F. 3d 280, 283 (CA6 2000); Anderson v. Litscher, 281 F. 3d 672, 674675 (CA7 2002); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F. 3d 345, 347348 (CA8 1998); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F. 3d 1157, 1159 (CA9 1999); Locke v. Saffle, 237 F. 3d 1269, 1273 (CA10 2001); Bond v. Moore, 309 F. 3d 770, 774 (CA11 2002).
4 Although recognizing that the question is not presented in this case, Tr. of Oral Arg. 27, amicus suggests that §2255s limitation period starts to run upon issuance of the court of appeals mandate even in cases in which the defendant does petition for certiorari. Id., at 2728, 3638, 4142. As amicus also recognizes, however, id., at 41, courts of appeals have uniformly concluded that, if a prisoner petitions for certiorari, the contested conviction becomes final when the Supreme Court either denies the writ or issues a decision on the merits, United States v. Hicks, 283 F. 3d 380, 387 (CADC 2002).
Opinion
ERICK CORNELL CLAY, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
A motion by a federal prisoner for postconviction relief under 28 U. S. C. §2255 is subject to a one-year time limitation that generally runs from the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final. §2255, ¶6(1). This case concerns the starting date for the one-year limitation. It presents a narrow but recurring question on which courts of appeals have divided: When a defendant in a federal prosecution takes an unsuccessful direct appeal from a judgment of conviction, but does not next petition for a writ of certiorari from this Court, does the judgment become final for postconviction relief purposes (1) when the appellate court issues its mandate affirming the conviction, or, instead, (2) on the date, ordinarily 69 days later, when the time for filing a petition for certiorari expires?
In accord with this Courts consistent understanding of finality in the context of collateral review, and the weight of lower court authority, we reject the issuance of the appellate court mandate as the triggering date. For the purpose of starting the clock on §2255s one-year limitation period, we hold, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate courts affirmation of the conviction.
I
In 1997, petitioner Erick Cornell Clay was convicted of arson and distribution of cocaine base in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. On November 23, 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions. That courts mandate issued on December 15, 1998. See Fed. Rules App. Proc. 40(a)(1) and 41(b) (when no petition for rehearing is filed, a court of appeals mandate issues 21 days after entry of judgment). Clay did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari. The time in which he could have petitioned for certiorari expired on February 22, 1999, 90 days after entry of the Court of Appeals judgment, see this Courts Rule 13(1), and 69 days after the issuance of the appellate courts mandate.
On February 22, 2000one year and 69 days after the Court of Appeals issued its mandate and exactly one year after the time for seeking certiorari expiredClay filed a motion in the District Court, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2255, to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. Congress has prescribed [a] 1-year period of limitation for such motions run[ning] from the latest of four specified dates. §2255, ¶6. Of the four dates, the only one relevant in this case, as in the generality of cases, is the first: the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final. §2255, ¶6(1).
Relying on Gendron v. United States , 154 F. 3d 672, 674 (CA7 1998) (per curiam) , the District Court stated that when a federal prisoner in this circuit does not seek certiorari … , the conviction becomes final on the date the appellate court issues the mandate in the direct appeal. App. to Pet. for Cert. 8a. Because Clay filed his §2255 motion more than one year after that date, the court denied the motion as time barred.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. That court declined Clays invitation to reconsider our holding in Gendron , although it acknowledged that Gendron s construction of section 2255 represents the minority view. 30 Fed. Appx. 607, 609 (2002). Bowing to stare decisis , the court expressed reluctan[ce] to overrule [its own] recently-reaffirmed precedent without guidance from the Supreme Court. Ibid.
The Fourth Circuit has agreed with Gendron s interpretation of §2255. See United States v. Torres , 211 F. 3d 836, 838842 (2000) (when a federal prisoner does not file a petition for certiorari, his judgment of conviction becomes final for §2255 purposes upon issuance of the court of appeals mandate). Six Courts of Appeals have parted ways with the Seventh and Fourth Circuits. These courts hold that, for federal prisoners like Clay who do not file petitions for certiorari following affirmance of their convictions, §2255s one-year limitation period begins to run when the defendants time for seeking review by this Court expires. 1 To secure uniformity in the application of §2255s time constraint, we granted certiorari, 536 U. S. 957 (2002) , and now reverse the Seventh Circuits judgment. 2
II
Finality is variously defined; like many legal terms, its precise meaning depends on context. Typically, a federal judgment becomes final for appellate review and claim preclusion purposes when the district court disassociates itself from the case, leaving nothing to be done at the court of first instance save execution of the judgment. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U. S. 706, 712 (1996) ; Restatement (Second) of Judgments §13, Comment b (1980). For other purposes, finality attaches at a different stage. For example, for certain determinations under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. §3161 et seq. , and under a now-repealed version of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, several lower courts have held that finality attends issuance of the appellate courts mandate. See Brief for Amicus Curiae by Invitation of the Court 2228 (hereinafter DeBruin Brief) (citing cases). For the purpose of seeking review by this Court, in contrast, [t]he time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari runs from the date of entry of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed, and not from the issuance date of the mandate (or its equivalent under local practice). This Courts Rule 13(3).
Here, the relevant context is postconviction relief, a context in which finality has a long-recognized, clear meaning: Finality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires. See, e.g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U. S. 383, 390 (1994) ; Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 321, n. 6 (1987) ; Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 887 (1983) ; United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S. 537, 542, n. 8 (1982) ; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 622, n. 5 (1965) . Because we presume that Congress expects its statutes to be read in conformity with this Courts precedents, United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 495 (1997) , our unvarying understanding of finality for collateral review purposes would ordinarily determine the meaning of becomes final in §2255.
Amicus urges a different determinant, relying on verbal differences between §2255 and a parallel statutory provision, 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(1), which governs petitions for federal habeas corpus by state prisoners. See DeBruin Brief 820. Sections 2255 and 2244(d)(1), as now formulated, were reshaped by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. See §§101, 105, 110Stat. 1217, 1220. Prior to that Act, no statute of limitations governed requests for federal habeas corpus or §2255 habeas-like relief. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265 (1986) ; United States v. Nahodil , 36 F. 3d 323, 328 (CA3 1994). Like §2255, §2244(d)(1) establishes a one-year limitation period, running from the latest of four specified dates. Three of the four time triggers under §2244(d)(1) closely track corresponding portions of §2255. Compare §§2244(d)(1)(B)(D), with §2255, ¶¶6(2)(4). But where §2255, ¶6(1), refers simply to the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final, §2244(d)(1)(A) speaks of the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 3
When Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, we have recognized, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo , 472 F. 2d 720, 722 (CA5 1972)). Invoking the maxim recited in Russello , amicus asserts that becomes final in §2255, ¶6(1), cannot mean the same thing as became final in §2244(d)(1)(A); reading the two as synonymous, amicus maintains, would render superfluous the words by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such reviewwords found only in the latter provision. DeBruin Brief 820. We can give effect to the discrete wording of the two prescriptions, amicus urges, if we adopt the following rule: When a convicted defendant does not seek certiorari on direct review, §2255s limitation period starts to run on the date the court of appeals issues its mandate. Id., at 36. 4
Amicus would have a stronger argument if §2255, ¶6(1), explicitly incorporated the first of §2244(d)(1)(A)s finality formulations but not the second, so that the §2255 text read becomes final by the conclusion of direct review . Had §2255 explicitly provided for the first of the two finality triggers set forth in §2244(d)(1)(A), one might indeed question the soundness of interpreting §2255 implicitly to incorporate §2244(d)(1)(A)s second trigger as well. As written, however, §2255 does not qualify becomes final at all. Using neither of the disjunctive phrases that follow the words became final in §2244(d)(1)(A), §2255 simply leaves becomes final undefined.
Russello , we think it plain, hardly warrants the decision amicus urges, one that would hold the §2255 petitioner to a tighter time constraint than the petitioner governed by §2244(d)(1)(A). Russello concerned the meaning of a provision in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. §1961 et seq. , that directed forfeiture to the United States of any interest [a convicted defendant] has acquired … in violation of [the Act]. §1963(a)(1). The petitioner in Russello urged a narrow construction of the unqualified words any interest … acquired. Rejecting that argument, we observed that a succeeding subsection, §1963(a)(2), reached any interest in … any enterprise the defendant conducted in violation of RICOs proscriptions. At that point, we referred to the maxim invoked by amicus . See supra , at 6. The qualifying words in … any enterprise narrowed §1963(a)(2), but in no way affected §1963(a)(1). The comparison of the two subsections, we said, fortified the broad construction we approved for the unmodified words any interest … acquired. Russello , 464 U. S., at 2223 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. , at 23 (Had Congress intended to restrict §1963(a)(1) to an interest in an enterprise, it presumably would have done so expressly as it did in the immediately following subsection (a)(2).).
Far from supporting the Seventh Circuits constricted reading of §2255, ¶6(1), Russello s reasoning tends in Clays favor. An unqualified termhere becomes final Russello indicates, calls for a reading surely no less broad than a pinpointed onehere, §2244(d)(1)(A)s specification became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.
Moreover, as Clay and the Government urge, see Brief for Petitioner 22; Reply Brief for United States 78, one can readily comprehend why Congress might have found it appropriate to spell out the meaning of final in §2244(d)(1)(A) but not in §2255. Section 2244(d)(1) governs petitions by state prisoners. In that context, a bare reference to became final might have suggested that finality assessments should be made by reference to state law rules that may differ from the general federal rule and vary from State to State. Cf. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4, 8 (2000) (an application for state postconviction relief is properly filed for purposes of 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2) when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable [state] laws and rules governing filings). The words by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review make it clear that finality for the purpose of §2244(d)(1)(A) is to be determined by reference to a uniform federal rule. Section 2255, however, governs only petitions by federal prisoners; within the federal system there is no comparable risk of varying rules to guard against.
Amicus also submits that 28 U. S. C. §2263 reinforces the Seventh Circuits understanding of §2255. DeBruin Brief 20; accord, Torres , 211 F. 3d, at 840. Chapter 154 of Title 28 governs certain habeas petitions filed by death-sentenced state prisoners. Section 2263(a) prescribes a 180-day limitation period for such petitions running from final State court affirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. That period is tolled, however, from the date that a petition for certiorari is filed in the Supreme Court until the date of final disposition of the petition if a State prisoner files the petition to secure review by the Supreme Court of the affirmance of a capital sentence on direct review by the court of last resort of the State or other final State court decision on direct review. §2263(b)(1).
We do not find in §2263 cause to alter our reading of §2255. First, amicus reliance on §2263 encounters essentially the same problem as does his reliance on §2244(d)(1)(A): Section 2255, ¶6(1), refers to neither of the two events that §2263(a) identifies as possible starting points for the limitation periodaffirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct review and the expiration of the time for seeking such review. Thus, reasoning by negative implication from §2263 does not justify the conclusion that §2255, ¶6(1)s limitation period begins to run at one of those times rather than the other. Cf. supra , at 68. Second, §2263(a) ties the applicable limitation period to affirmance of the conviction and sentence, while §2255, ¶6(1), ties the limitation period to the date when the judgment of conviction becomes final. See Torres , 211 F. 3d, at 845 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). The Russello presumptionthat the presence of a phrase in one provision and its absence in another reveals Congress designgrows weaker with each difference in the formulation of the provisions under inspection. Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U. S. 424, 435436 (2002) .
* * *
We hold that, for federal criminal defendants who do not file a petition for certiorari with this Court on direct review, §2255s one-year limitation period starts to run when the time for seeking such review expires. Under this rule, Clays §2255 petition was timely filed. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
1 See Derman v. United States, 298 F. 3d 34, 3942 (CA1 2002); Kapral v. United States, 166 F. 3d 565, 567577 (CA3 1999); United States v. Gamble, 208 F. 3d 536, 537 (CA5 2000) (per curiam); United States v. Garcia, 210 F. 3d 1058, 10591061 (CA9 2000); United States v. Burch, 202 F. 3d 1274, 12751279 (CA10 2000); Kaufmann v. United States, 282 F. 3d 1336, 13371339 (CA11 2002).
2 Agreeing with the position advanced by the majority of the courts of appeals that have ruled on the question, the United States joins petitioner Clay in urging that Clays §2255 motion was timely filed. We therefore invited David W. DeBruin to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the Seventh Circuits judgment. Mr. DeBruins able advocacy permits us to decide the case satisfied that the relevant issues have been fully aired.
3 The Courts of Appeals have uniformly interpreted direct review in §2244(d)(1)(A) to encompass review of a state conviction by this Court. See Derman v. United States, 298 F. 3d, at 4041; Williams v. Artuz, 237 F. 3d 147, 151 (CA2 2001); Kapral v. United States, 166 F. 3d, at 575; Hill v. Braxton, 277 F. 3d 701, 704 (CA4 2002); Ott v. Johnson, 192 F. 3d 510, 513 (CA5 1999); Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F. 3d 280, 283 (CA6 2000); Anderson v. Litscher, 281 F. 3d 672, 674675 (CA7 2002); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F. 3d 345, 347348 (CA8 1998); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F. 3d 1157, 1159 (CA9 1999); Locke v. Saffle, 237 F. 3d 1269, 1273 (CA10 2001); Bond v. Moore, 309 F. 3d 770, 774 (CA11 2002).
4 Although recognizing that the question is not presented in this case, Tr. of Oral Arg. 27, amicus suggests that §2255s limitation period starts to run upon issuance of the court of appeals mandate even in cases in which the defendant does petition for certiorari. Id., at 2728, 3638, 4142. As amicus also recognizes, however, id., at 41, courts of appeals have uniformly concluded that, if a prisoner petitions for certiorari, the contested conviction becomes final when the Supreme Court either denies the writ or issues a decision on the merits, United States v. Hicks, 283 F. 3d 380, 387 (CADC 2002).


Nope, in Oslo =/
Nope, in Oslo =/
I repeat Sturgeon’s Revelation, which was wrung out of me after twenty years of wearying defense of science fiction against attacks of people who used the worst examples of the field for ammunition, and whose conclusion was that ninety percent of SF is crud.  In other words, the claim (or fact) that 90% of science fiction is crap is ultimately uninformative, because science fiction conforms to the same trends of quality as all other artforms.


| Book of Mormon |
Annotations |
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Chapter 58
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1 And behold, now it came to pass that our next object was
to obtain the city of Manti; but behold, there was no way that we could lead
them out of the city by our small bands. For behold, they remembered that
which we had hitherto done; therefore we could not decoy them away from their
strongholds.
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2 And they were so much more numerous than was our army
that we durst not go forth and attack them in their strongholds.
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3 Yea, and it became expedient that we should employ our
men to the maintaining those parts of the land which we had regained of our
possessions; therefore it became expedient that we should wait, that we might
receive more strength from the land of Zarahemla and also a new supply of
provisions.
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4 And it came to pass that I thus did send an embassy to
the governor of our land, to acquaint him concerning the affairs of our
people. And it came to pass that we did wait to receive provisions and
strength from the land of Zarahemla.
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5 But behold, this did profit us but little; for the
Lamanites were also receiving great strength from day to day, and also many
provisions; and thus were our circumstances at this period of time.
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6 And the Lamanites were sallying forth against us from
time to time, resolving by stratagem to destroy us; nevertheless we could not
come to battle with them, because of their retreats and their strongholds.
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7 And it came to pass that we did wait in these difficult
circumstances for the space of many months, even until we were about to
perish for the want of food.
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8 But it came to pass that we did receive food, which was
guarded to us by an army of two thousand men to our assistance; and this is
all the assistance which we did receive, to defend ourselves and our country
from falling into the hands of our enemies, yea, to contend with an enemy
which was innumerable.
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9 And now the cause of these our embarrassments, or the
cause why they did not send more strength unto us, we knew not; therefore we
were grieved and also filled with fear, lest by any means the judgments of
God should come upon our land, to our overthrow and utter destruction.
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10 Therefore we did pour out our souls in prayer to God,
that he would strengthen us and deliver us out of the hands of our enemies,
yea, and also give us strength that we might retain our cities, and our
lands, and our possessions, for the support of our people.
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11 Yea, and it came to pass that the Lord our God did
visit us with assurances that he would deliver us; yea, insomuch that he did
speak peace to our souls, and did grant unto us great faith, and did cause us
that we should hope for our deliverance in him.
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12 And we did take courage with our small force which we
had received, and were fixed with a determination to conquer our enemies, and
to maintain our lands, and our possessions, and our wives, and our children,
and the cause of our liberty.
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13 And thus we did go forth with all our might against the
Lamanites, who were in the city of Manti; and we did pitch our tents by the
wilderness side, which was near to the city.
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14 And it came to pass that on the morrow, that when the
Lamanites saw that we were in the borders by the wilderness which was near
the city, that they sent out their spies round about us that they might
discover the number and the strength of our army.
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15 And it came to pass that when they saw that we were not
strong, according to our numbers, and fearing that we should cut them off
from their support except they should come out to battle against us and kill
us, and also supposing that they could easily destroy us with their numerous
hosts, therefore they began to make preparations to come out against us to
battle.
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16 And when we saw that they were making preparations to
come out against us, behold, I caused that Gid, with a small number of men,
should secrete himself in the wilderness, and also that Teomner and a small
number of men should secrete themselves also in the wilderness.
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17 Now Gid and his men were on the right and the others on
the left; and when they had thus secreted themselves, behold, I remained,
with the remainder of my army, in that same place where we had first pitched
our tents against the time that the Lamanites should come out to battle.
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18 And it came to pass that the Lamanites did come out
with their numerous army against us. And when they had come and were about to
fall upon us with the sword, I caused that my men, those who were with
me, should retreat into the wilderness.
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The only pre-Columbian weapon I can find that was similar
to a sword was the macuahuitl which was made with a plank of wood similar in
shape to a cricket bat with obsidian blades mounted on the edges. It is
similar enough to a sword that it is often referred to as the Aztec sword.
However, the macuahuitl does not seem to fit the Book of
Mormon time frame. “Some groups of Central Mexico, principally in the
transition between the Early and the Late Post-Classic, probably
developed this weapon” (emphasis added, Dr. Marco Antonio Cervera Obregón, “The
macuahuitl: an innovative weapon of the Late Post-Classic in Mesoamerica”,
Arms & Armour, Vol.3, Nov. 2, 2006, p. 146, article from a research journal).
The Post-Classic period is between 900 CE and the Spanish conquest.
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19 And it came to pass that the Lamanites did follow after
us with great speed, for they were exceedingly desirous to overtake us that
they might slay us; therefore they did follow us into the wilderness; and we
did pass by in the midst of Gid and Teomner, insomuch that they were not
discovered by the Lamanites.
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20 And it came to pass that when the Lamanites had passed
by, or when the army had passed by, Gid and Teomner did rise up from their
secret places, and did cut off the spies of the Lamanites that they should
not return to the city.
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21 And it came to pass that when they had cut them off,
they ran to the city and fell upon the guards who were left to guard the
city, insomuch that they did destroy them and did take possession of the
city.
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22 Now this was done because the Lamanites did suffer
their whole army, save a few guards only, to be led away into the wilderness.
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23 And it came to pass that Gid and Teomner by this means
had obtained possession of their strongholds. And it came to pass that we
took our course, after having traveled much in the wilderness towards the
land of Zarahemla.
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24 And when the Lamanites saw that they were marching
towards the land of Zarahemla, they were exceedingly afraid, lest there was a
plan laid to lead them on to destruction; therefore they began to retreat
into the wilderness again, yea, even back by the same way which they had
come.
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25 And behold, it was night and they did pitch their
tents, for the chief captains of the Lamanites had supposed that the Nephites
were weary because of their march; and supposing that they had driven their
whole army therefore they took no thought concerning the city of Manti.
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26 Now it came to pass that when it was night, I caused
that my men should not sleep, but that they should march forward by another
way towards the land of Manti.
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27 And because of this our march in the night-time,
behold, on the morrow we were beyond the Lamanites, insomuch that we did
arrive before them at the city of Manti.
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28 And thus it came to pass, that by this stratagem we did
take possession of the city of Manti without the shedding of blood.
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29 And it came to pass that when the armies of the
Lamanites did arrive near the city, and saw that we were prepared to meet
them, they were astonished exceedingly and struck with great fear, insomuch
that they did flee into the wilderness.
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30 Yea, and it came to pass that the armies of the
Lamanites did flee out of all this quarter of the land. But behold, they have
carried with them many women and children out of the land.
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31 And those cities which had been taken by the Lamanites,
all of them are at this period of time in our possession; and our fathers and
our women and our children are returning to their homes, all save it be those
who have been taken prisoners and carried off by the Lamanites.
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32 But behold, our armies are small to maintain so great a
number of cities and so great possessions.
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33 But behold, we trust in our God who has given us
victory over those lands, insomuch that we have obtained those cities and
those lands, which were our own.
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34 Now we do not know the cause that the government does
not grant us more strength; neither do those men who came up unto us know why
we have not received greater strength.
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35 Behold, we do not know but what ye are unsuccessful,
and ye have drawn away the forces into that quarter of the land; if so, we do
not desire to murmur.
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36 And if it is not so, behold, we fear that there is some
faction in the government, that they do not send more men to our assistance;
for we know that they are more numerous than that which they have sent.
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37 But, behold, it mattereth not—we trust God will deliver
us, notwithstanding the weakness of our armies, yea, and deliver us out of
the hands of our enemies.
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38 Behold, this is the twenty and ninth year, in the
latter end, and we are in the possession of our lands; and the Lamanites have
fled to the land of Nephi.
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39 And those sons of the people of Ammon, of whom I
have so highly spoken, are with me in the city of Manti; and the Lord has
supported them, yea, and kept them from falling by the sword, insomuch that
even one soul has not been slain.
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The only pre-Columbian weapon I can find that was similar
to a sword was the macuahuitl which was made with a plank of wood similar in
shape to a cricket bat with obsidian blades mounted on the edges. It is
similar enough to a sword that it is often referred to as the Aztec sword.
However, the macuahuitl does not seem to fit the Book of
Mormon time frame. “Some groups of Central Mexico, principally in the
transition between the Early and the Late Post-Classic, probably
developed this weapon” (emphasis added, Dr. Marco Antonio Cervera Obregón, “The
macuahuitl: an innovative weapon of the Late Post-Classic in Mesoamerica”,
Arms & Armour, Vol.3, Nov. 2, 2006, p. 146, article from a research journal).
The Post-Classic period is between 900 CE and the Spanish conquest.
In addition, notice the author indicates God’s intervention on behalf of the
stripling warriors.
Sometimes when the problem of evil is expressed, apologists will argue that
God allows evil to be perpetrated because he values moral agency so much that
he will not intercede on behalf of the victim out of respect for the agency
of the perpetrator.
Hopefully most will find this idea of unwillingness to intercede repugnant
without further explanation. However, for those needing more explanation,
notice that this verse actually affirms that God will intercede to prevent
wickedness.
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40 But behold, they have received many wounds;
nevertheless they stand fast in that liberty wherewith God has made them
free; and they are strict to remember the Lord their God from day to day;
yea, they do observe to keep his statutes, and his judgments, and his
commandments continually; and their faith is strong in the prophecies
concerning that which is to come.
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41 And now, my beloved brother, Moroni, may the Lord our
God, who has redeemed us and made us free, keep you continually in his
presence; yea, and may he favor this people, even that ye may have success in
obtaining the possession of all that which the Lamanites have taken from us,
which was for our support. And now, behold, I close mine epistle. I am
Helaman, the son of Alma.
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Chinese Gov’t Reaffirms ‘Blockchain Not Crypto’ Stance
by Christine VasilevaChina’s CCTV1, a state-backed social media, ran another story on crypto assets, featuring a 60-minutes exposition with President Xi. But this time, the message was not as enthusiastic as in the past.
China’s Effect on BTC Still Chaotic
China’s stance on Bitcoin (BTC) and crypto, in general, sparked a rally in prices, as well as igniting a mini-altcoin season. Previous comments on the country warming up to crypto lifted BTC as much as 42% to above $10,000 a couple of weeks ago.
Now, the new feature is more critical of digital assets, calling them scams, or unregistered securities. Dovey Wan, co-founder of Primitive Crypto, commented on the recent critical stance of Chinese authorities during the high-profile TV programing.
The chief message once again circled around “blockchain, not Bitcoin”, but did not go as far as to call BTC a scam coin. Chinese traders still have access to some of the most active exchanges worldwide, and mining is as strong as ever.
However, the government has shown a consistent stance on smaller projects, including domestic ICOs. China was also the arena for the Plus Token scheme, which took investments from locals and went on to liquidate them through the Huobi exchange.
Wan recently commented that Chinese investors did not see BTC as a store of value similar to gold, but were eager to speculate for higher returns.
Personal Repercussions Feared for Crypto Leaders
But the biggest fear of the government’s stance is not on banning firms and activities. There have been talks of direct personal repercussions for crypto-related personas. Because of the vast and active Chinese social media community, some of the leaders, influencers, and developers, could be personally targeted, warned Wan.
Even the promotion of DAI stablecoin usage may be seen as a potential risk. At this point, it is uncertain what the Chinese government would have in mind when persecuting lesser coins and projects.
Wan believes China has the power and the potential intention to nationalize crypto assets, including ASIC and other infrastructure. China’s president, Xi Jinping, also stated that the currently vibrant sector may soon be considered criminal activity. Still, China’s government for now excludes crypto mining from the list of illegal activities, and the Bitcoin network is still highly dependent on pools with Chinese-based operations.
The recent critical stance coincided with stagnant BTC prices, at around $8,535.15, down from today’s move above $8,630.
What do you think about China’s stance on crypto coins and blockchain? Share your thoughts in the comments section below!
The Rundown


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