Soon, the twentieth century will be put into a museum. Its curators will face many difficult tasks: how to arrange its galleries and exhibits, and where to put the horror of Nazism? In one scenario, the museum might be dominated by a long corridor, a spatial counterpart to a time line, with the central gallery culminating in a triumphant display of democratic political systems, market-oriented economies, and thoroughly global communications, a display whose artifacts might include the "Good War," the Internet, and the Kronos Quartet. Approaching these objects through the central gallery, one would pass a series of other corridors diverging to the left and the right, corridors housing shrill political manifestos, uniformed youth brigades, and pale-colored ration cards, all recalling the once confident enemies of liberalism: the communists, the fascists, the Nazis, and other political "utopians." The central gallery would serve as a reliable moral compass, celebrating the righteousness of the West (France, the United States, and Great Britain), drawing attention to the once wayward East (Germany and Russia). The defining event of the century would be World War II, one that put in proper place and perspective the entire century. National Socialism, in particular, would provide a frightening, anachronistic contrast to the political liberty and social emancipation that Europe has achieved in the last decades. Yet such a marvelous museum might well be too perfect. Outside, the furies of nationalism, the prospect of wholesale ecological degradation, and persistent economic fears would continue to assault the certainties on display inside.
Alternatively, to acknowledge the indeterminate aspects of our own fin de siècle, the gallery could be laid out less strictly, less confidently. Instead of a central gallery with diverging corridors to regulate the flow of impressions, the building would house a shifting conration of clusters and nodes, and exhibits from the same decade might be widely scattered and juxtaposed with apparently alien materials. The artifacts would be assembled not to reveal the twentieth century's progressive advance, but to trace and dramatize its curious collaborations, the collusions that made the century possible: the different histories that it drew upon, the glorious nostalgias that it fashioned, and the various futures that it imagined. Whereas the first museum would house the displays of liberal modernization, celebrating the enhanced ability of individuals to mobilize resources in the context of a highly differentiated capitalist economy and an open political democracy, the second would chart the genealogies of modernism, tracing the different ways that people and institutions have tinkered to make themselves secure in the dangerous zones of a constantly changing world. 1 Obviously, Nazism has a claim for inclusion in such a retrospective exhibition because it provided one, albeit extreme, answer to the economic and political crises of post-World War I Germany. Its claim is compelling not because National Socialism bears resemblance to the modern democracies of the period after World War II, or because it adopted and celebrated automobiles, airplanes, and other futuristic technology, but because it conceived of Germany as both the object of the social and economic forces of industrialization and, thanks to those same forces, as a potential subject that possessed the capacity to reorganize political life and prosper amid dangerous conditions. The Nazis were modernists because they made the acknowledgment of the radical instability of twentieth-century life the premise of relentless experimentation.
For most historians, Nazism has been regarded as the improbable outcome of disastrous political and economic conditions. Germany's precipitous military defeat in 1918, the near civil-war conditions that followed the revolution, the hyperinflation of 1922 and 1923, the long-winded recession in the mid-1920s, and finally the devastation of the Great Depression all added up to a worst-case scenario in which the rise of Hitler becomes comprehensible. Almost any textbook on the Weimar Republic will take readers through this house of horrors and lead them straight to the Nazi seizure of power in January 1933. (Indeed, Nazis and neo-Nazis are routinely regarded as the most reliable register of the troubles of both the first and the second German republics; Nazism, seen in this way, stands for system failures of one sort or another.) Once in power, the National Socialist regime gained the acquiescence of the majority of the German people, but never enjoyed outright support. Faced with the costs of developing an incipient consumer-oriented economy, it chose instead to engage in increasingly spectacular and dangerous foreign policies to distract the public. For most Germans, the Nazi leaders were experienced as bosses and pashas of varying degrees of corruption. While the regime's most important ideological goals--the elimination of the Jews from German life and the subjugation of eastern Europe--were pursued consistently, they were also pursued without popular consent. The combination of day-to-day venality and less discernable ideological scheming has encouraged historians to make distinctions between the "Nazis" and the "Germans," collective nouns whose overlap is never denied, but whose juxtaposition suggests mutual exclusion rather than degrees of equivalence. 2
Against the grain of conventional historiography, two kinds of arguments have been advanced that attempt to trace the traffic between National Socialism and modernity. Over thirty years ago, Ralf Dahrendorf and David Schoenbaum maintained that the Nazis must be seen as modernizers, who, willfully or not, made Germany significantly more modern in outlook and laid the foundations for the Federal Republic (Bundesrepublik) that would follow. 3 Yet this well-known argument, which continues to be elaborated (and furiously countered), unduly restricts the notion of the modern to terms derived from the consumer economies of the post-World War II period; it slights the specific character of the Nazi exchange with modernity and forces it into a mold that was made much later, a bundesrepublikanisch mold. A more sophisticated approach has been developed by Detlev Peukert and Zygmunt Bauman, but has received less attention from historians. It eschews the Federal Republic as a model for assessing Nazism and instead examines the degree to which Nazism was invested in the renovative or therapeutic traditions of western civilization. These arguments are not without their own problems, some of which I shall explain more fully below, but they offer grounds for further development. In the first set of arguments, Nazis are claimed to be simply modernizers; in the second, they are, even if only potentially, modernists.
Accounts that emphasize the modernizing nature of the Nazi regime entail that we reject the notion that Nazism was simply reactionary, merely defensive, or altogether unlikely, a spectacular creature unique to the tumultuous interwar years. At the same time, too much in the way of historical specificity is lost if we consider the Hitler regime as solely a developmental dictatorship, a mere stepping-stone to the more thoroughgoing modernization of the Federal Republic. Such a view places too much weight on the unintended consequences of Nazi politics and too much emphasis on the explicit contents of specific social policies. Furthermore, it can also lead, and in fact unfortunately has led, to a "mainstreaming" of the National Socialists, turning them into first-generation progressives and effectively consigning their racism more and more to the margins. Finally, the concept of modernization is too normative, encouraging observers to look at the past in terms of the present. The notion of modernism, in contrast, offers a more open-ended way of mapping the initiatives, blueprints, and experiments by which contemporaries tried to build lasting, possibly illiberal structures in the circumstances of radical instability. It requires that we focus less on unintended consequences, more on underemphasized premises, and that we view National Socialism as a distinctive, horrifying, but nonetheless plausible version of social renovation. That is not easy, for it makes the Nazis much more familiar, much more like us; it undermines cherished notions of how different "they" are from "us" or "we" are from "them," eroding the congenial assumption that modernizers leave racism behind as anachronistic. It suggests that we might have to consider the Nazis a genuinely popular political force, rather than merely a symptom of system failure. And if the Nazis are regarded as modernists and tinkerers who built a racial utopia in accordance with the scientific spirit, then the enlightenment tradition looks much more strange and ambiguous, a strangeness that insinuates itself into our own surroundings. Much, in fact, is at stake in this debate.
According to Ralf Dahrendorf and David Schoenbaum, the Nazis accelerated the transformation of Germany into a modern, highly differentiated industrial economy by mobilizing vast resources in pursuit of their political goals. Their aim was not the creation of a liberal republic; yet they fashioned its foundations by mobilizing citizens in an increasingly totalitarian manner, so destroying the basis of traditional authoritarian institutions such as the Prussian state, the military, and the aristocracy; eroding exclusive allegiances to political and cultural subgroups, such as socialists and Catholics; and weakening the hold of parochial structures, such as the family. In a precise turn of phrase, Axel Schildt summarizes Dahrendorf's argument: "Once there had been a ' Volksgenossen' [people's comrade] there could be no return of the 'Untertan' [traditional subject]." 4 In other words, national mobilization forever foreclosed the authoritarian subject. After twelve years of the Third Reich, including six difficult war years, Germans increasingly interacted as individuals rather than social types, and lived according to the standards of a mobile, achievement-oriented consumer society, rather than by the customs and habits of enclosed social milieus.
Even if, on David Schoenbaum's closer examination, the Nazis did not effectively break down social barriers and class divisions, as Dahrendorf had claimed, the regime profoundly reshaped the way people thought about themselves, and thus anticipated in the realm of attitude and expectation the more consequential transformations of the 1950s. For both Dahrendorf and Schoenbaum, however, modernization during the Third Reich was not a willful project, but an unintended consequence of the drastic mobilization in the name of antimodern, "blood and soil" dreams. The war, more than anything else, uprooted the "nation of provincials," laying the foundations for the much more homogeneous and mobile society of the postwar years. 5 This functional reading of twentieth-century change assigns to the Nazis leading roles as modernizers, even though the Nazis themselves, despite the continuities that span the year 1945, have long been seen as complete strangers to the consumer society of the Federal Republic. 6
The modernization that earlier scholars had regarded as unintentional, a younger generation of historians now insists was a central component of Nazi ideology. Rainer Zitelmann and Michael Prinz, in particular, have argued that Hitler and the Nazi elite actively sought to fashion a more modern Germany, one that effectively constitutes the prehistory to the Federal Republic by virtue of its social-welfare planning, economic rationalization, and technocratic leadership. Defining modernization in terms of the social mobility and technological capacity of post-1949 Germany, Zitelmann draws a picture of Hitler as a nationally minded reformer whose intentions were very nearly realized. Thanks to the energetic efforts of Robert Ley, who headed the German Labor Front, the vision of "an equal-opportunity, upwardly mobile society purged of the old class and caste differences and encased within the framework of an extensively developed welfare state" was in fact translated into Nazi versions of the Beveridge Report, which were kept under wraps only due to the exigencies of total war. 7 Ley's biographer, Ronald Smelser, has more sensibly noted that this "equal-opportunity" society was presupposed only in the name of German imperialism and only for racially acceptable Germans. While Zitelmann and Prinz do not ignore the racial context of these laws, they do treat Nazi social policy as wholly distinct from Nazi racial policy, and as a result their efforts to portray Hitler as a revolutionary modernizer leave out the most radical aspects of National Socialism, namely, racism and anti-Semitism. Moreover, their model of modernization excludes the political attributes--enhanced participation of freethinking individuals in the public sphere--with which it has always been associated. Indeed, Zitelmann deliberately severs social and economic progress from political liberalism. By rejecting normative approaches, he claims to encourage a more "value-free" discussion of modernization, a process he sees taking place in both totalitarian and liberal regimes. The tag of illiberalism, in other words, should not disqualify a candidate for the title of "modernizer." 8
The principal problem with Zitelmann's thesis is that it mistakes the means for the ends. Central to Hitler's worldview was the desirability of creating a racial state, and Nazi social policy was designed to advance this goal insofar as it created a healthier, more efficient, and more strictly gendered community of prospective soldiers, workers, and mothers. The wars against the Jews and the Slavs were not, as Zitelmann suggests, the Führer's sideshows to the main effort to make the German people more prosperous, nor were they, as Götz Aly and Susanna Heim argue, the result of postwar planning to modernize and rationalize German capitalism. They were meant to reorder the biological hierarchy of the nation and the continent. 9 Scholars have also criticized both Zitelmann and Prinz for taking too seriously the relentless initiatives of the German Labor Front and its wartime planning institute, the Arbeitswissenschaftliches Institut (the Ergonomics Institute), which, after all, owe as much to Ley's fantastic ambition as they do to an underlying ideological consensus among Nazi leaders. Yet the argument for intended modernization can be indulged because it rests mainly on intentions, not on results, the test by which Dahrendorf's and, to some extent, Schoenbaum's arguments have to be judged. To claim, therefore, that Nazi Germany remained divided by class or that social welfare provisions were inadequate, as critics do, does not invalidate Zitelmann's central point about the Nazi leadership's conceptualization of itself.
The debate over whether modernization (intended or not) did take place is likely to continue for some time. For the moment, it has reached a stalemate. On the one hand, some clarity has been provided by the careful macrosociological soundings of Jens Alber, who indicates that the Third Reich did not accelerate the long-term trends consistent with modernization (urbanization, expansion of the service sector, percentage of women working) and in some cases counteracted them (working-class access to higher education, professionalization in the civil service, religiously mixed marriages). Alber's argument has been underscored by historians who emphasize the absence of any meaningful social mobility, the prevalence of low wages among blue-collar workers, the largely illusory world of consumption, the deleterious effects of social-Darwinist polycracy, and the regime's hostile and self-destructive attitude toward scientific research. In the end, Alber draws a picture of German society in which the erosion of social life and the tentative nature of national consensus weakened the ability of the regime to mobilize citizens. 10 On the other hand, local studies continue to lend plausibility to the argument in favor of modernization. Rüdiger Hachtmann, for example, maintains that shop-floor rationalization, improved working conditions, and service in the war combined to "deproletarianize" industrial workers. Numerous scholars also take seriously Nazi claims to honor workers, and argue that efforts to integrate them in the national community were not without effect. The German Labor Front, once again, has been credited with improving the status of workers, while analyses of the Hitler Youth or the social-service activities of middle-class women suggest that the regime's social policies enjoyed substantial support. The National Socialists were surprisingly popular insofar as they were identified with a new national mood that emphasized national integration, social reform, and economic prosperity. 11
Schoenbaum's distinction between social reality and interpreted social reality is perhaps the best way to make sense of the contradictory evidence. In the years 1933-45, Germans lived in two worlds. Amidst a familiar universe of stable links to family, region, and social milieu, the Nazis constructed a "second world" out of "a network of organizations" in which "the traditional criteria of social worth and social placement had no validity." 12 Schoenbaum, Hans Mommsen, and others dismiss this fascist public sphere as merely "happy illusion" (schöner Schein) but it is worth considering just how consequential was the impact of Nazi policies on social identity. To what extent did Germans regard themselves as Volksgenossen, as people's comrades? The degree of self-mobilization into the Nazi sphere is impressive: in each of the last years before the war, over one million volunteers participated in the annual Winterhilfe (winter help) charity drive; several million more young people were happily recruited into the Hitler Youth; more than two million workers enrolled in German Labor Front apprenticeship programs; as many as eight million Germans joined local civil-defense leagues; and an astonishing fifty-four million had, by 1938, participated in some sort of Kraft durch Freude (Strength through Joy) activity. 13 Wartime service only strengthened the role of National Socialist institutions and the validity of its pitiless worldview in daily life. 14 Germans, without relinquishing established ties to family, workmates, and neighbors, apparently moved relatively easily from one world to the other, adopting as they did the vocabulary of national integration, the messianism of the Führer cult, the terms of constant struggle, and eventually the identities of Aryan overlords vis-à-vis conquered civilians and foreign workers. 15
That the National Socialist world crumbled so quickly in 1945, to the point that the 1949 elections appeared to revive the electoral parochialisms of the Weimar era, surely revealed the limits of the fascist dream world. 16 But given the few years in which the Nazis had to mobilize--Ley's German Labor Front, for example, did not begin its vast reëducation effort until the end of 1934--and the half-life that the collective experiences of National Socialism continued to lead in the 1950s and 1960s, it would be a mistake to assume that this world was superficial because incomplete. In this context, the well-known postwar surveys, in which even lower-income groups readily admitted that Nazism had positive aspects, are worth remembering. 17
If the Nazis were modernizers, it was less on account of their efficacy in destroying traditional social milieus, as Dahrendorf claims, than of their capacity to manufacture an alternative public sphere in which Germans identified themselves increasingly as Volksgenossen. At least at certain times and places, they accepted Nazi premises about the equality of opportunity, responded to appeals in the name of the nation, and internalized many of the regime's hideous racial distinctions. There is considerable evidence that this fascist arena "deproletarianized" workers and validated individual achievement and thereby anticipated the consumer society of the 1950s. To confine the discussion of modernization to these terms, however, and so to regard National Socialism as a foundation for the Federal Republic, is to miss completely the first principle of Nazi politics, which was the construction of a racial "utopia" in Europe, not the establishment of a modern welfare state in Germany. Racial and social policy cannot be separated, as if the regime's efforts to eradicate whole peoples were tangential to otherwise beneficial policies on behalf of individuals. Even so, Zitelmann and Prinz have identified a crucial aspect of National Socialism that the historiographical emphasis on Nazi propaganda, Nazi terror, and Nazi genocide has missed: the degree to which the Nazis were committed to renovating German society. Although the Hitler regime cannot be adequately described as merely a German version of Beveridge's England or Roosevelt's America, the Nazis operated in the subjunctive tense, experimenting, reordering, reconstructing, and it is this spirit of renovation that qualifies National Socialism as modern.
The Nazi project was unabashedly racist. When Hitler's National Socialists came to power in January of 1933, they believed they stood at the very edge of history, poised to redirect the nation to fit the grooves of an envisioned Aryan future. The whole previous itinerary of Germany, in which a liberal sphere had been elaborated, in which public claims had been put forward by political parties and interest groups, and in which various ethnic groups, provincial identities, and religious communities had survived and commingled, was to come to an abrupt halt. From the perspective of the Nazis, the year 1933 marked a sharp break. In place of the quarrels of party, the contests of interest, and the divisions of class that had so heavily compromised the ability of the nation to act, the Nazis proposed to build a unified racial community.
On the one hand, the National Socialists sought to nurture the biological inheritance of Germans by putting in place an elaborate pronatalist social-welfare edifice and refurbishing the work place in a more rational manner. All the busy activity to promote family health, to reward parents with tax allowances, to extend young people technical training, and to provide workers with vacations and other diversions, may at first glance resemble an attractive "New Deal," but in fact was put in place to prepare Germans to assume roles as productive members of the national Volksgemeinschaft (people's community). The emphasis of social policy was always on the enforcement of discipline in the name of the community, not the provision of opportunity for the individual. On the other hand, this constructive program of national health was accompanied by a stern eugenics administration that sought progressively to weed out alleged biological dangers to the German Volk. From the very beginning, the regime applied measures to identify, segregate, and eradicate debilitating or supposedly foreign matter. Mental or physical disabilities, homosexuality, alcoholism, and even promiscuous or "asocial" behavior marked millions of Germans as candidates for surveillance and sterilization. Local health boards eventually cleared the way for the sterilization of at least half a million men and women. At the same time, so-called artfremd (alien) groups, particularly Jews but also Gypsies, were progressively banished from German public life. By 1938, the Third Reich was committed to completely eliminating Jews from Germany, a policy that shifted in the war years to the elimination of all Jews in Europe. The ultimate result of racial nurturing and racial weeding was to be a well-regulated völkisch society, strong and homogeneous enough to prosper in the dangerous era of world wars. The long-term well-being of the German Volk would be ensured by a vast empire in eastern Europe, one that would provide Germans with the space, raw materials, and slave labor necessary to survive the coming planetary struggles. With the massive deportation of Polish villagers from designated German core areas, the arrival of thousands of German colonists to reclaim "ancestral" lands, the conscription of local labor in those efforts, and the concentration, ghettoization, and finally outright murder of Polish Jews, occupied Poland after 1939 was the site where the Nazi utopia was realized to a large degree. 18
The broad outlines of this racial order have never been in doubt. For the most part, however, the "Final Solution" has been studied in isolation. As a result, the obsessive anti-Semitism of leading Nazis has emerged as a central motif in the explanation of Germany's twentieth-century barbarism. The racial utopia of the Third Reich appears as a flight from modern history, contemporary but atavistic. Yet when social welfare, genocide, and foreign conquest are regarded as parts of a whole, Nazi racism appears less anachronistically demonic and more connected to contemporary social practices. To see only the provisions the Nazis made to ensure national health and national efficiency or only the terroristic administration of the sterilization, deportation, and mass killing is to miss the central role that the Volkskörper, or the "body" of the nation, played in National Socialism. The Nazis were neither mere social-welfare innovators nor simply obsessed racial fanatics; rather, they were committed to an ambitious program of racial reclamation in which they drew liberally on the premises of modern social planning. 19
The notion of the Volkskörper stands at the intersection where the confidence of experts in the ability of science and technology to solve social problems confronted the growing acknowledgment of the limits to such engineering. By the end of the nineteenth century, advances in epidemiology, in particular, had established a new paradigm of biomedical therapy in which the illnesses of industrial civilization could be identified and cured. As the number of social-welfare and medical professionals grew and the scope of social services expanded, the population became increasingly regulated by distinctions based on value and worth. The establishment of psychiatry, the professionalization of youth and social services, the administration of public health and public hygiene, the rationalization of the workplace, the emphasis on the rehabilitation of criminals, and the propositions of eugenics all suggested ways in which the biological quality of the nation could be improved by techniques of nurturing, selection, and eradication. Seen in this light, the advances of modern science realized the most cherished assumption of the enlightenment, namely that this worldly existence could be perfected by human design. Indeed, Zygmunt Bauman characterizes modern existence as the articulation of an activist or, as he puts it, the gardener's approach to life. To one degree or another, he argues, the reproduction of social life involves "separating and setting apart useful elements destined to live and thrive, from harmful and morbid ones, which ought to be exterminated." For Bauman, the garden does not stand for paradise. It is a place where the ideals of self-perfection encompass the techniques of extermination, where classical proportion has been exploded by the frenzy of wild flowers and fiendish experiments. 20 Bauman regards modernity not as "a civilizing process (Elias), or as a process of the progressive rationalization of all spheres of social life (Weber)," but as a startlingly value-free culmination of routines of cultivation. 21
Detlev Peukert and the historians who have been influenced by him have advanced arguments similar to Bauman's around the Foucauldian theme of a therapeutic state that invests more and more resources to intervene and ostensibly reform social life. However, Peukert points out that the normative standards by which the interventions of social policy are formulated and justified are not, by themselves, sufficient to account for the murderous regime of National Socialism. Even considering the mounting frustrations of twentieth-century social planners as they bumped up against limits to reform, the persistence of illness and old age, or the intractability of juvenile delinquency, it took the harsh fiscal realities of the Great Depression to disassemble the grand optimism of universal health into various techniques of triage. "In times of crisis," Peukert writes, the Volkskörper was defined in increasingly "negative, restrictive terms. The central concern now becomes that of identifying, segregating, and disposing of those individuals who are abnormal or sick" ("GFS," 241). 22 For Peukert a lethal combination of racism, abstract criteria of "value" and "nonvalue" in therapeutic practices, and high-technology solutions based on Depression-era cost-benefit analyses indicate that the "Final Solution" was "one among other possible outcomes of the crisis of modern civilization" ("GFS," 236).
What is frustrating about the pathbreaking analyses of both Peukert and Bauman is their insufficient appreciation of the fantastic vision of the National Socialists. The drive to renovate Europe along racial lines cannot be summed up either in the strict, delimiting terms of cost-benefit calculations or simply as one (horrible) version of the western ideal of self-cultivation. On the one hand, Peukert's emphasis on the Great Depression seems to me to be too narrow and, on the other, Bauman's generic vocabulary of improvement too broad a description of the Nazi racial project.
A useful way of thinking about the links between the administration of modern reform and the extraordinary measures of National Socialism is to consider modernism in aesthetic terms. In literary criticism and art history, modernism encompasses new ways of looking that emerged at the turn of the century. The turbulence of metropolitan life pushed individuals onto uncertain pathways, undermined the ability of coherent story lines to narrate the topsy-turvy fullness of sensations and impressions, and put into doubt the practices of mimetic representation. It is this determination of impermanence that has characterized the idea of modernism. Not only was the present increasingly experienced as brand-new, completely different from the confines of even the recent past, but it was itself doomed to be merely transitory. Fashions, fads, and all ideas of the moment were thus typically modern creatures, bursting onto the scene with great energy before falling into disuse, persisting for a while as ruins, then disappearing again. It followed that any attempt to capture the essence of the age had to focus on these occasional features that Baudelaire described as "le transitoire, le fugitif, le contingent." 23 To track the merely transitory was to represent the enduring nature of the age.
The epistemological and aesthetic dimensions of modernism signal the discontinuous nature of social experience in the last centuries. Rather than a progressive articulation of power and possibility, civilization records the merely tentative security achieved in the face of inherent dangers. The rise of capitalism, the introduction of industrial technology, the establishment of central state administration, and the proliferation of military power that Anthony Giddens, for one, associates with the "created environment" of modernity, did not automatically advance the security of Europe. 24 The threshold of risk advanced as well. Moreover, an increasingly well-regulated society generated new phobias as the definition and scope of social responsibility expanded. As a result, the practices of discipline that Peukert, Foucault, and many others see coalescing around the regulation of "the social" at the end of the nineteenth century were accompanied by revived premonitions of disaster. The experiments and initiatives that were so confidently proposed were themselves only temporary measures, sure to give way to the fluctuations of time and to more novel and even more strenuous efforts at renovation. In light of the contingency of reform, modern social practices have often been scaled back, but the punctuation of catastrophe has also armed the imagination and emboldened experimentation. Over the last two hundred years, the identification of social debilities has led repeatedly to the creation of new therapeutic regimes. The National Socialists emerge as modernists because they made the acknowledgment of the discontinuity of history the premise of their fantastic political and racial designs. In what follows I want to explore more fully crisis and renovation as characteristics of the modern and of the Nazi modern.
The mastery over nature, which is the central tenet of modernization, increased the ability of men and women to manipulate the environment, but it also cast the natural world in ever more inimical and dangerous terms. In the seventeenth century, Francis Bacon and the master builders who followed him rewrote the nature they tried to rework, describing floods and storms and, later, emotions in increasingly chaotic and terrifying terms. 25 Steadily subduing but also suddenly exposing so many previously unrecognized dangers, the enlightenment appeared self-subverting and suspect from the outset. This ambivalence grew more serious over time because the potential of the industrial revolution revealed both the malleability and the fragility of the world. If nineteenth-century Europeans served the general cause of improvement, surveying wilderness, clearing forests, draining swamps, and digging mines, they also worried about the imminence of revolution, the fragility of the social order, the disease and poverty of the new industrial cities, and the biological degeneration of the modern individual. The insight of the engineer, the recognition of the sheer plasticity of the material world, always carried with it the acknowledgment of the impermanence of all thing--material edifices, market relations, social orders, moral persuasions. Especially after 1848, as the failures of liberal reform became clearer, corrosion came to be regarded as characteristic of industrialism as manufacture. "Social evolution," Ferdinand Tönnies wrote toward the end of the nineteenth century, "takes the form of continual disintegration." 26
The desperate dynamism of capitalism and industrialism furnished observers such as Tönnies with multiple visions of chaos and dissolution. However, the fugitive formations he identified did not preclude efforts at stabilization. On the contrary, the recognition of crisis gave nineteenth-century projects of reform their urgency. In the face of cholera epidemics, working-class revolution, and urban poverty, the modern experience added up to a relentless struggle to regulate and renovate civil society. Late nineteenth-century notions of national solidarity dramatized the importance of renovating the social body. Forward-looking statesmen envisioned the nation as a factory in which all hands worked together for the common good. They accordingly propounded ambitious programs of national efficiency, trade protectionism, political enfranchisement, social hygiene, and overseas expansion. Not to take the road to reform was to renounce economic prosperity and risk social disintegration and national decline. Social pathology and social experimentation thus went hand-in-hand. Emile Durkheim, perhaps the most famous diagnostician of the social ills of modern civilization as a result of his work on suicide, compared the statesman to a physician: "He prevents the outbreak of illness by good hygiene, and he seeks to cure them when they have appeared." 27
To come to terms with what Peukert has portrayed as the Janus face of modernity--the techniques of amelioration and the circumstances of degeneration--was to admit both the necessity and the provisional nature of reform. 28 For the civil servant or the public health official, as much as for the artist, the enduring aspect of the modern age was instability. Modernism, which has usually been conceived in literary or artistic terms, has remarkable social and political implications. It is the apprehension of the malleable: the dark acknowledgment of the fragility and impermanence of the material world allied with the conviction that relentless reform could steady collapsing structures. In this perspective, modernism breaks with the past, manufactures its own historical traditions, and imagines alternative futures. Indeed, by being reflexive and making instability the explicit premise for its practice, modernism is hospitable not only to anarchic individualism but also to authoritarian designs. 29 In my view, it is the premises rather than the attributes of modern projects that need to be examined more closely. What makes the twentieth century so promiscuous is not the content of the identities people have fashioned or the designs they have erected, but the presumption that contingency abounds and has to be managed, that chaos is about to take over and has to be negotiated. Again and again, modernists staged history as a boundary situation. The most spectacular displays of modernism are not to be found in a museum of expressionist art or a collection of prose poetry, but in the avant-garde political collaborations that sought to come to terms with a brand-new world regarded as unstable and dangerous. With every step, the political adventurer as much as the modernist poet or painter revealed ground that was tremulous, breaking apart, unclear. Liberal certainties that proposed to reveal the coherence of the world appeared completely inadequate. But whereas the latter made manifest the disenchantment that had been revealed, the former proposed more fearsome designs to overcome it. 30
The social experimentation of the nineteenth century was only a preamble to the hyperimaginative technologies of the twentieth. World War I, in particular, strengthened immeasurably the links between jeopardy and renovation. Leaving behind a landscape of ruins, it prepared the future as a vast site for experimentation. Although World War I is generally described in terms of immobility--four long years of irresolution, the war of attrition in the trenches, the scarcities on the home front--it cannot be fully understood without taking account of its astonishing mobility: not simply the battles beneath the ocean and above the ground, not just the dramatic movements on the eastern front in 1917 and 1918, but the extraordinary mobilization of industry, the dramatic rearrangements of the domestic balance of power, the carefully choreographed production of civilian morale, and, mostly, the disruption of millions of private lives. Again and again, witnesses recounted how the war and its rebellious aftermath were experienced in terms of extreme discontinuity. Literary accounts of the war, argues Samuel Hynes, were overwhelmingly "descriptive rather than narrative: like the war itself they do not move in any direction." 31
If any single event overturned accepted assumptions about the steady, accumulating course of history it was the Russian Revolution in 1917. In the two years that followed, revolutions broke out in Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest, and militant strikes pulled the shadow of revolution across the rest of Europe. At the same time, the influenza epidemic killed off more people than the ten million the war had and invited comparisons to the Plague. War, revolution, and plague all raised apocalyptic expectations about the end of time. So startling were the rapid-fire events of the years 1914-19 that the remembered past had little to offer in the way of guidance. History had truly become a delinquent. Derailed by war and revolution, it no longer seemed to run along the straight and predictable railway tracks of the nineteenth century. One historian took stock of the postwar years when he prefaced his 1934 History of Europe: "Men wiser and more learned than I have discerned in history a plot, a rhythm, a predetermined pattern. These harmonies are concealed from me. I can see only one emergency following upon another as wave follows upon wave." 32 Military defeat, the end of the monarchy, and the unsteady political and economic fortunes of the Weimar Republic gave this general sense of disorientation a particularly sharp edge in Germany.
However, the German experience of the present as catastrophic and of even the recent past as irretrievable was not simply the premise for nostalgia. In the years after the war, the aesthetic categories of modernism--shock, disruption, discontinuity, and transience--profoundly shaped the way intellectuals, artists, scientists, and politicians regarded time and approached the future. A remarkable consensus characterized Weimar culture: the twentieth century had invalidated the governing lines of development that had held until 1914; World War I, in particular, marked a major break, but did so not simply by destroying a familiar world, but by undermining conditions of stability altogether. Harsh economics, nearly continuous ideological warfare, and a pervasive culture of cynicism contributed to a postwar state of emergency that not only exerted a powerful aesthetic appeal by generating image after image of extreme "boundary" situations, but provided the necessary qualifications for unprecedented experimentation in postliberal design. Catastrophic thinking appeared to reopen the possibilities of history that the "routinized, bourgeois conduct of political life" had previously foreclosed. 33 The rough politics of the post-1918 years--the technocratic impulses of organized capitalism, the rise of fascism, the insurgency of communism, and the killing ground of Auschwitz--rested on the dizzying assumption that history was malleable and could be reworked and reshaped in hitherto unimagined ways. Again and again, German thinkers on the Left and the Right linked emergency with renewal, tradition and convention with decadence.
What made post-1918 Germany so classically modern was the central role that catastrophe played in its cultural apprehensions and political perspectives. Germany was the "modernist nation par excellence of our century," writes Modris Eksteins in his important book, The Rites of Spring, because it was "starkly future-oriented." A flight forward would resolve the anxieties of the present. Even the war was fought to change rather than preserve the world. 34 Three aspects of this apocalyptic vision stand out: the conviction that the grand narrative of "History" as it had developed over the course of the nineteenth century had been invalidated; the belief that these circumstances had been clarified by the extreme instability of private autobiographies and public institutions, particularly in the war; and the notion that this development and its recognition now permitted the wholesale renovation of the body of the nation. Characteristic postwar images of crippled veterans, unemployment lines, tumbledown metropolitan facades, and marauding armies all testified to the impermanence of the material world, but also to the tractability of its reconstruction. In other words, Germany stood outside "History," exposed to the anarchy of national and international politics, but also poised to reinvent itself. The future had never appeared so dangerous or so open-ended as when viewed from among the ruins of the postwar years.
The prevalent feeling of discontinuity sustained a reckless politics manufactured to meet the challenges and opportunities that crisis seemed to imply. The formulation of Moeller van den Bruck, a conservative critic who was posthumously adopted by the Nazis, is apt. He repeatedly referred to the "Revolutionsgewinn," the revolutionary yield, of the year 1918. 35 Catastrophe had given the Germans the latitude to gamble. After their capitulation on the western front and their humiliation at Versailles, the Germans had become a "Gefahrvolk," a people of danger, better able to prosper in conditions of extreme danger than a "tired, matured" France or England, nations whose opportunities and revolutions had long since passed. 36 Here was the modernist subject par excellence.
Much of the political and cultural thought of the postwar years revolved around tooling techniques of mobility by which Germany could reinvent history. The long-range bombers, high-powered lasers, and other military technologies that patriotic pulp-fiction writers invented to revise the Versailles settlement were only the most fantastic features of the wholly "altered world" (veränderte Welt) that Ernst Jünger and others claimed modern-day technology had in fact fashioned. Technology introduced new levels of danger, wrecking the once unassailable certainties of the bourgeois epoch, but also equipping a new generation of uniformed and disciplined machine-men with unrivalled power. Danger and energy were the two sides of the twentieth-century manufacturing process that had literally stamped the planet with an unmistakable geometry. 37 It is no surprise that America, as the most technologically marvelous nation, fascinated Weimar Germany, not only because it offered such an authoritative version of the created environment, but because its exuberant liberation from tradition corresponded most closely to Germany's calamities in the 1920s. 38 In much the same spirit, Neue Sachlichkeit (New Objectivity) architects and Bauhaus designers envisioned thoroughly functionalized spaces in place of the "chaos" of the marketplace and big cities. The alternative to revolution, as the influential Le Corbusier put it, was architecture, the "regulating line" of the plan. 39 In other fields of study, geographers and geopoliticians redrew a "heroic earth" in which previously unrecognized features promised Germany dynamic political opportunities. 40 For their part, biomedical professionals continued to operate with broad Lamarckian assumptions, drawing attention to the deleterious consequences of mismanaged reproduction but, at the same time, looking forward to the possibilities of cultivating a superior Volkskörper. 41 Weimar culture added up to an industrious invention of the future.
The stress in all these visions was on the authoritative management of contingency: architecture promised a regulative geometry, geopolitics essential capacities, and biology genetic destiny. On the Left and on the Right, thinkers such as Ernst Bloch and Carl Schmitt groped for a new totality. 42 Nonetheless, the very premise on which these new social compacts were built introduced new dangers. The very delinquency of history had authorized the redemptive utopias of the machine-builders, architects, and eugenicists, but eventually it also withheld the crucial element of stability each sought. On the imaginary horizon, new technologies emerged to imperil the social order, emboldened enemies continued to mobilize along Germany's borders, the Volk remained vulnerable to inherited pathologies. In this state of permanent emergency, renovation was a state of mind, a process rather than a destination.
Renovation was the hallmark of National Socialism as well. The Nazis approached the twentieth century as a dangerous, unstable terrain that required relentless mobilization but also offered the Germans prospects for grandeur. This approach was obviously self-serving since the Third Reich used one emergency after the other to consolidate power. The extraordinary exertions it demanded, especially during the war, released the enormous social energy fueling the regime. To forego mobilization was to risk reviving the divisive quarrels of civil society and thus eroding the Führer's legitimacy. But the catastrophe of global war and the apocalyptic struggle the Nazis waged against Jews and other racial "enemies" were much more than ruses. Central to the Nazi worldview was the conviction that Germany was extremely vulnerable to biological deterioration. "He who leaves the plants in a garden to themselves," warned Walther Darré, the future Nazi Minister of Agriculture, "will soon find to his surprise that the garden is overgrown by weeds." As a result, "questions of breeding" and social modeling in general had to be "at the center of all considerations." 43 Unless the national destiny was forcefully managed, the parasitical influence of Jews and the disintegrative effects of democracy would proliferate.
These emergency conditions of jeopardy created the conditions for renovation, however. If Germany embarked on far-reaching racial mobilization, it would be in a position to dominate the European continent. History was no guide, since the leaders of both Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany had failed to fashion an embracing Volksgemeinschaft or introduce necessary social and hygienic reforms. Again and again, the insinuation of the extraordinary dangers of the present, the fabulous prospects for the future, and the ceaseless necessity for struggle developed a basically nonlinear view of history. What scholars have long recognized as apocalyptic features in the National Socialist worldview, which invalidated the predictable "story line" of historical development since 1789 and postulated the commencement of "new time," rested on a thoroughly modernist sensitivity to the discontinuous punctuation of crisis and opportunity. 44 Although the Nazis referred frequently to eternal laws of history, they did so mainly to undermine the historical legitimacy of the Weimar Republic. It is highly significant that once in power the Nazis did not attempt to restore or preserve an authentic Germany. Instead, they sought to recast the nation in the newly fashioned mold of a high-performance racial society that encouraged social mobility in the name of national discipline.
Not only the "blood and soil" vision of the Third Reich but also the anti-intellectual premises of the regime have been overstated. In the sciences, for example, technocratic impulses came to prevail. The so-called Aryan sciences were pushed to the margins as engineers, architects, and scientists mobilized to take advantage of the Nazis' "aggressive cult of feasibility." University research institutes, corporate laboratories, and military planners collaborated to fashion quite achievable "big science" projects. The unmistakable victory of the technocrats in the late 1930s underscored the spirit of renovation that prized improvisation, application, and practicality in difficult situations. Technocratic ideas thrived in this twilight zone of danger and possibility, the effects of which were only heightened by the conscripted labor, barbed wire, and utmost secrecy at sites like the Peenemünde missile complex. 45 The struggle to renovate and arm the national Volkskörper was in no way incompatible with the spirit of modernism or the technocratic practice of scientists. Michael Burleigh's and Wolfgang Wippermann's insistence that modernism cannot possibly be racist is entirely unconvincing. 46
To be sure, there was a long völkisch pedigree to Nazi racism. The rise of biological anti-Semitism at the end of the nineteenth century, the eugenic utopias of Alfred Ploetz, Willibald Hentschel, and Walther Darré, and Germany's long-standing imperial ambitions in eastern Europe indicate that the Nazis were not original thinkers. Nonetheless, the project of racial construction they pursued had few precedents. In the name of racial hygiene, the Third Reich segregated Germans into categories based on "worth" and "value," embarked on far-reaching eugenics programs to "weed out" undesirables, and made provisions for a social-welfare administration to nurture and improve the health of the majority. Moreover, the Nazis mobilized in the name of a distant "Thousand-Year Reich," the foundations for which required relentless reform. In their view, struggle did not eliminate, but only contained the marauding movements of history, so that Germans had to prepare vigilantly for war as much as they had to cultivate their genes. At every step, successful conquest provided the precondition for further mobilization. In the Generalplan Ost (the General Plan for the East), for example, occupied Poland and parts of the Soviet Union became the vast site of an envisaged Neureich, a modern empire planned according to exact demographic, economic, and urban requirements in order to renovate the Altreich, pre-1938 Germany. 47 The destruction of one half of European Jewry is stark testimony to the degree to which visions of a Germanic Neureich were implemented.
The Nazis saw the world as a totally mobilized, pitiless landscape. The catastrophes of recent history had wrecked the edifices of the liberal age and exposed Germany to the predations of the Allies, the insurgency of the Bolsheviks, and, most dangerous of all, the prospect of biological deterioration.  Grand imperial designs and well-ordered racial hierarchies would lay the foundations for previously unimagined German prosperity. The surprising contingencies of history had conred both the unpredictable terrain of danger and the very tractable zone of design. The features of modernism described both places. Defining itself in the machine-age terms of crisis and renovation, National Socialism constructed a totalitarian version of the modern. The Third Reich is, as Zygmunt Bauman concluded of the Holocaust, "a rare, yet significant and reliable, test of the hidden possibilities of modern society." 48 There is perhaps no artifact of the "Nazi Modern" better suited for inclusion in the museum of the twentieth century than the gas mask, a tool that acknowledges the extreme jeopardy of the moment, but holds out the possibility of survival as long as the wearer enrolls in a stern regimen of uniformity and discipline, ready for relentless onslaughts and murderous counterattacks. 49 In the end, as we know, the regime self-destructed. The total mobilization Nazism envisaged is no longer a credible response to the perils and possibilities of the twentieth century. Hopefully, we live more easily with indeterminacy and understand more clearly the costs of managing contingency. Nonetheless, the complicity of Nazism in the premises of modernism is haunting.
Peter Fritzsche is Professor of History at the University of Illinois. His most recent book is Reading Berlin 1900 and he is currently at work on a history of
nostalgia.
All translations into English, unless otherwise indicated, are my own.
1. This is drawn from Marshall Berman, who defines "modernism as any attempt by modern men and women to become subjects as well as objects of modernization, to get a grip on the modern world and make themselves at home in it" (Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982], 5). But, in my view, the circumstances of danger and the possibly illiberal outcomes of these efforts are not sufficiently emphasized by Berman. For a better sense of the range of modernisms, see Russell Berman, The Rise of the Modern German Novel: Crisis and Charisma (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Carl E. Schorske, Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture (New York: Knopf, 1980); Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989); and Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989). The different ways the past can be reassembled is the subject of Raphael Samuel, Theatres of Memory (London: Verso, 1994).
2. See my argument in "Where Did All the Nazis Go? Reflections on Collaboration and Resistance," Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte 23 : 191-214. The best surveys of public opinion in the Third Reich are Detlev Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition and Racism in Everyday Life, trans. Richard Deveson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); and Ian Kershaw, The "Hitler Myth." Image and Reality in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
3. See Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (New York: Doubleday, 1967); and David Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 (New York: Doubleday, 1966).
4. The original reads: "Die Rückkehr des 'Untertans' war nicht mehr möglich, nachdem es einen 'Volksgenossen' gegeben hatte" (Axel Schildt, "NS-Regime, Modernisierung und Moderne. Anmerkungen zur Hochkonjunktur einer andauernden Diskussion," Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte 23 [1994]: 6).
5. See Celia Applegate, A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
6. See Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany; and Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution.
7. Ronald Smelser, Robert Ley: Hitler's Labor Front Leader (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 305. See also Rainer Zitelmann, Hitler: Selbstverständnis eines Revolutionärs (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986); and Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung, ed. Rainer Zitelmann and Michael Prinz (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1991).
8. See Zitelmann, "Die totalitäre Seite der Moderne," in Zitelmann and Prinz, Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung, 2-4. The normative approach is acknowledged and defended in Horst Matzerath and Heinrich Volkmann, "Modernisierungstheorie und Nationalsozialismus," in Theorien in der Praxis des Historikers. Forschungsbeispiele und ihre Diskussion, ed. Jürgen Kocka (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1977), 86-106.
9. See Götz Aly and Susanna Heim, Vordenker der Vernichtung. Auschwitz und die deutschen Pläne für eine neue europäische Ordnung (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1991); Dan Diner, "Rationalisierung und Methode. Zu einem neuen Erklärungsveruch der 'Endlösung,'" Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 40 (July 1992): 359-82; and Vernichtungspolitik: Eine Debatte über den Zusammenhang von Sozialpolitik und Genozid im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland, ed. Wolfgang Schneider (Berlin: Junius, 1991).
10. See Jens Alber, "Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung," Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 41 (June 1989): 346-65. See also Günter Könke, "'Modernisierungschub' oder relative Stagnation? Einige Anmerkungen zum Verhältnis von Nationalsozialismus und Moderne," Geschichte und Gesellschaft 20 (October-December 1994): 584-608; Schildt, "NS-Regime, Modernisierung und Moderne"; and Hans Mommsen, "Nationalsozialismus als vorgetäuschte Modernisierung," in Der historische Ort des Nationalsozialismus, ed. Walter H. Pehle (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1990), 31-46.
11. See Rüdiger Hachtmann, "Thesen zur 'Modernisierung' der Industriearbeit in Deutschland 1924 bis 1944," in Norddeutschland im Nationalsozialismus, ed. Frank Bajohr (Hamburg: Ergebnisse Verlag, 1993), 414-51; and John Gillingham, "The 'Deproletarianization' of German Society: Vocational Training in the Third Reich," Journal of Social History 19 (spring 1986): 423-32. The popularity of the regime among workers is discussed in Gunther Mai, "Arbeiterschaft zwischen Sozialismus, Nationalismus und Nationalsozialismus," in Die Schatten der Vergangenheit: Impulse zur Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus, ed. Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse, and Rainer Zitelmann (Frankfurt: Propyläen, 1990), 195-217; Ulrich Herbert, "Arbeiterschaft im 'Dritten Reich.' Zwischenbilanz und offene Fragen," Geschichte und Gesellschaft 15 (July-September 1989): 320-60; and Alf Lüdtke, "'Ehre der Arbeit': Industriearbeiter und Macht der Symbole. Zur Reichweite symbolischer Orientierungen im Nationalsozialismus," in Arbeiter im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Klaus Tenfelde (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1991), 343-92. See also Arno Klönne, Jugend im Dritten Reich (Düsseldorf: Diedrichs, 1982); Herwart Vorländer, Die NSV: Darstellung und Dokumentation einer nationalsozialistischen Organisation (Boppard: Boldt, 1988); Claudia Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family, and Nazi Politics (New York: St. Martin's, 1987); and my "Where Did All the Nazis Go?"
12. The original reads: "Den Nationalsozialisten gelang es, neben der weitgehend stabil gebliebenen überkommenen Sozialordnung eine 'zweite Welt' mit einem Netzwerk von Organisationen zu errichten, in der die traditionellen Kriterien sozialer Geltung und Plazierung keine Gültigkeit hatten" (Alber, "Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung," 348). Alber develops this point, which remains undeveloped in Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution, 283-88.
13. See Smelser, Robert Ley, 191-216; and Vorländer, Die NSV.
14. See Omer Bartov, Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
15. See Smelser, Robert Ley, 302-303; Kershaw, The "Hitler Myth"; Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany, 125-55; and Bartov, Hitler's Army, esp. 144-78.
16. See Jürgen Falter, "Kontinuität und Neubeginn. Die Bundestagswahl 1949 zwischen Weimar und Bonn," Politische Vierteljahresschrift 22 (September 1981): 236-63.
17. See Saul Friedländer, Reflections on Nazism: An Essay on Kitsch and Death, trans. Thomas Weyr (New York: Harper and Row, 1984); Mai, "Arbeiterschaft zwischen Sozialimus, Nationalismus und Nationalsozialismus," 209, 212; and Bartov, Hitler's Army, 7-8, 112-13.
18. See Gisela Bock, Zwangssterilisation im Nationalsozialismus: Studien zur Rassenpolitik und Frauenpolitik (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1986); Hans Mommsen, "The Realization of the Unthinkable: The 'Final Solution of the Jewish Question' in the Third Reich," in The Policies of Genocide, ed. Gerhard Hirschfeld (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986); and the recent overview by Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, The Racial State: Germany, 1933-1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
19. See Detlev J. K. Peukert, "The Genesis of the 'Final Solution' from the Spirit of Science," in Reevaluating the Third Reich, ed. Thomas Childers and Jane Caplan (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1993), 234-52; hereafter abbreviated "GFS."
20. See Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 70.
21. See Moishe Postone, review of Modernity and the Holocaust, by Zygmunt Bauman, American Journal of Sociology 97 (March 1992): 1521-23.
22. See also Elizabeth Harvey, Youth and The Welfare State in Weimar Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Cornelie Usborne, The Politics of the Body in Weimar Germany: Women's Reproductive Rights and Duties (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992); and Paul Weindling, Health, Race and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism, 1870-1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
23. Charles Baudelaire, "The Painter of Modern Life," in his The Painter of Modern Life and Other Essays, ed. J. Mayne (London: Phaidon, 1964), 13. See also Michael W. Jennings, Dialectical Images: Walter Benjamin's Theory of Literary Criticism (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), 18.
24. See Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 55-60.
25. See Carol Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1980); and Rolf Peter Sieferle, Die Krise der menschlichen Natur: Zur Geschichte eines Konzepts (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989), 14-34.
26. The original reads: "l'évolution sociale prend la forme d'une désagrégation spontanée" (quoted in David Frisby, Fragments of Modernity: Theories of Modernity in the Work of Simmel, Kracauer and Benjamin [Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985], 46).
27. Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method ; quoted in Robert A. Nye, Crime, Madness, and Politics in Modern France: The Medical Concept of National Decline (Princeton. N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 169.
28. See Detlev J. K. Peukert, "Das Janusgesicht der Moderne," in his Max Webers Diagnose der Moderne (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1989), 55-69.
29. On the reflexivity of modernism, see Giddens, Consequences of Modernity, 38-45.
30. The importance of ambivalence and ambiguity has been stressed by Zygmunt Bauman, although he sees the elimination of ambivalence rather than its acknowledgment as typically modern (see Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence [Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991]). Several excellent cultural histories explore the ways in which modernists question the epistemological status of vision, demystify "common sense," and seek to problematize perception, but hardly appreciate how this postliberal survey might rearm the political imagination. See, for example, Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); Andreas Huyssen, After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1986); and Andreas Huyssen, "Fortifying the Heart--Totally: Ernst Jünger's Armored Texts," New German Critique 59 (spring-summer 1993): 3-23.
31. Samuel Hynes, A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture (New York: Atheneum, 1991), 115-16. See also Kriegserlebnis: Der Erste Weltkrieg in der literarischen Gestaltung und symbolischen Deutung der Nationen, ed. Klaus Vondung (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1980); and Eric J. Leed, No Man's Land: Combat and Identity in World War I (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 1-72.
32. H. A. L. Fisher, quoted in Modris Eksteins, "History and Degeneration: Of Birds and Cages," in Degeneration: The Dark Side of Progress, ed. J. Edward Chamberlin and Sander L. Gilman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 21.
33. From Richard Wolin, "Carl Schmitt, the Conservative Revolutionary: Habitus and the Aesthetics of Horror," Political Theory 20 (August 1992): 432. See also Karl-Heinz Bohrer, Die Ästhetik des Schreckens. Die pessimistische Romantik und Ernst Jüngers Frühwerk (Munich: Beck, 1978); Andrew Hewitt, Fascist Modernism: Aesthetics, Politics, and the Avant-Garde (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Peter Sloterdijk, The Critique of Cynical Reason, trans. Michael Eldred (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987); and my "Landscape of Danger, Landscape of Design: Crisis and Modernism in Weimar Germany," in Dancing on the Volcano: Essays on the Culture of the Weimar Republic, ed. Thomas W. Kniesche and Stephen Brochmann (Columbia, S. C.: Camden House, 1994), 29-46.
34. See Eksteins, Rites of Spring, xvi, 73, 119.
35. Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, "Wir wollen die Revolution gewinnen," Gewissen, 31 March 1920, 1.
36. See Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Germany's Third Empire, trans. E. O. Lorimer (1922; London: Allen and Unwin, 1934), 17; and Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, "Die Ideen der Jungen in der Politik," Der Tag, 26 July 1919, 1.
37. See Peter S. Fisher, Fantasy and Politics: Visions of the Future in the Weimar Republic (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991). Ernst Jünger's key text is Der Arbeiter (Hamburg: Hanseatischen Verlags-Anstalt, 1932), but also see the scrapbooks that document Jünger's conception of the "second nature" of the twentieth century in Der gefährliche Augenblick: Eine Sammlung von Bildern und Berichten, ed. Ferdinand Bucholtz (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1931); and Die veränderte Welt: Eine Bilderfibel unserer Zeit, ed. Edmund Schultz and Ernst Jünger (Breslau: Korn, 1933). The discussions by Matthew Biro, "The New Man as Cyborg: res of Technology in Weimar Visual Culture," New German Critique 62 (spring-summer 1994); and Walter H. Sokel, "The 'Postmodernism' of Ernst Jünger in his Proto-Fascist Stage," New German Critique 59 (spring-summer 1993): 33-40, are also valuable. New German Critique 59 (spring-summer 1993) is entirely devoted to Jünger.
38. See Mary Nolan, Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
39. See Adelheid von Saldern, "'Statt Kathedralen die Wohnmaschine.' Paradoxien der Rationalisierung im Kontext der Moderne," in Zivilisation und Barbarei: Die widersprüchlichen Potentiale der Moderne, ed. Frank Bajohr et al. (Hamburg: Christians, 1991), 168-92; Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture, trans. Frederick Etchels (London: Rodker, 1931); and Robert Fishman, Urban Utopias in the Twentieth Century: Ebeneser Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright, and Le Corbusier (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977), 163-263.
40. See David Murphy, "The Heroic Earth: The Flowering of Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany," (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 1992); and Ewald Banse, Expressionismus und Geographie (Braunschweig, 1920).
41. See Weindling, Health, Race, and German Politics; and Usborne, Politics of the Body.
42. See Wolfgang Essbach, "Radikalismus und Modernität bei Jünger und Bloch, Lukács und Schmitt," and Michael Makropoulos, "Haltlose Souveränität. Benjamin, Schmitt und die klassische Moderne in Deutschland," in Intellektuellendiskurse in der Weimarer Republik: Zur politischen Kultur einer Gemengelage, ed. Manfred Gangl and Gerard Raulet (Frankfurt: Campus, 1994), 145-59, 197-211. See also Norbert Bolz, Auszug aus der entzauberten Welt: Philosophischer Extremismus zwischen den Weltkriegen (Munich: Fink, 1989); and Norbert Bolz, "Charisma und Souveränität," in Der Fürst dieser Welt.
43. Walther Darré, "Marriage Laws and the Principles of Breeding," in Nazi Ideology before 1933, ed. Barbara Miller Lane and Leila J. Rupp (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1978), 115; cited in Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence, 27.
44. See, for example, James M. Rhodes, The Hitler Movement: A Modern Millenarian Revolution (Stanford: Hoover Press, 1980).
45. See, for example, Science, Technology and National Socialism, ed. Monika Renneberg and Mark Walker (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), esp. Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, "'Keinerlei Untergang': German Armaments Engineers during the Second World War and in the Service of the Victorious Powers," 30-50, and Michael J. Neufeld, "The Guided Missile and the Third Reich: Peenemünde and the Forging of a Technological Revolution," 51-71.
46. See the prefatory remarks to Burleigh and Wippermann, The Racial State.
47. See "Der Generalplan Ost," Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 6 (July 1958): 281-325; Czeslaw Madajczyk, Die Okkupationspolitik Nazideutschlands in Polen, 1939-1945 (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1988); Aly and Heim, Vordenker der Vernichtung; and Der "Generalplan Ost": Hauptlinien der nationalsozialistischen Planungs- und Vernichtungspolitik, ed. Mechtild Rössler and Sabine Schleiermacher (Berlin: Akademie, 1993).
48. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 12.
49. See my "Machine Dreams: Airmindedness and the Reinvention of Germany," The American Historical Review 98 (June 1993): 685-709.


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- Do not put "00" before "91", use a '+' sign instead!
- Break your number as xxx-xxx-xxxx, instead of one long string


The Ruby core-library includes classes like String, Array, Numerics (Floats, Integers), Range, Regexp and modules/mixins so that you can create your own enumerable and number classes. In total there are about 300 methods at your disposal.
RubyJS is a full port of these classes, implemented on top of the JavaScript core library. The library is 100% JavaScript and runs in all browsers, no compilers or interpeters are involved. All classes stay in the RubyJS
or R
namespace and do not extend any of the built-in JavaScript objects.


Explore building permit data from the city of Nashville! Maybe you're interested in demolition permits. Or residents of Antioch who are building an addition to their home.


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PETHTOOL
Section: [FIXME: manual] (8)Updated: 07/19/2011
Index Return to Main Contents
NAME
pethtool - Display or change ethernet card settingsSYNOPSIS
pethtool [OPTIONS] [<INTERFACE>]
DESCRIPTION
This script mimic ethtool behavior, but is written purely in python and python module ethtool.

Time: 05:34:28 GMT, December 24, 2015


Evaluate form | Build a prompt on a div | Close all prompts | Back to index
This demonstration shows extended features around checkboxes


Weather Station
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Passing Arguments in Shell Script
May 2, 2016
TL;DR Just skip to the good part
Basic Arguments
The other day I started making this shell script program spotify-now, which gets information on the current Spotify song using the dbus message from the media player. When writing this script I wanted to be able to pass in parameters to the script from the command line using arguments.
This is easy as all you have do is use the ${n}
variable to get the parameter (n being the position of the argument). With my script it looked something like this:
#!/bin/bash
# spotify-now
getTitle () {
...
}
echo "$(getTitle ${1})"
$ ./spotify-now title
How Much A Dollar Cost
Although this solution is quick and easy, it’s also very limiting in the parameters you can pass and made for some messy terminal commands.
Using Strings in Arguments
When brainstorming for a better way to pass command line arguments I came across the date
command. This unix program prints out the system’s time and date information. What intrigued me about this command is how it took in a date string containing keywords such as the name of the month or what hour it was.
$ date '+Date: %b %d'
Date: May 02
I decided to find a way to implement this into my script. Usually, something like this would be done with a language such as C or Python but I was determined to stay with a simple shell script seeing as though it was a small program and I didn’t want to over complicate things.
To do this sort of thing in shell script all you have to do is replace the keywords in the string argument with the data you want. You have to do this for each keyword and error checking can be tedious but really not much worse than doing in any other language.
#!/bin/bash
# spotify-now
getArtist () {
...
}
getTitle () {
...
}
INFO="${1}"
INFO="${INFO//"%artist"/$(getArtist)}"
INFO="${INFO//"%title"/$(getTitle)}"
echo "$INFO"
$ ./spotify-now "%artist - %title"
Kendrick Lamar - To Pimp A Butterfly
Of course all this code is on my Github and please do fork it and make pull requests regarding any issues or improvements you may have with my code.


A Site for Sore Eyes
February 26, 2016
I have been coding for: 9 weeks
My website is, for now, complete! Designing my own site allowed me to revive an artistic/creative side that hasn't been utilized in a long time. Through tinkering around with CSS properties to make everything perfect, I realized this type of coding really fits within my detail-oriented nature. It allowed me to get super precise using selectors to affect behavior of highly specific HTML elements on my pages. Before I realized it, hours went by as I tried to perfect one tiny aspect of my site. Out of all of the challenges in Phase 0, working on my website led me down the most (and most time consuming) rabbit holes - but I didn't mind! When I showed off my site to friends and family, I had to explain to them how DIFFICULT it is to actually do all of this from scratch. "Nobody does this anymore!", "People cheat and use templates or online tools!"" I'm not sure if they actually got it...but I'm still proud I've actually built something.
I had so much fun doing this and truly got excited when I implemented a new feature within the design and saw it play out on the page. Every time I look at someone else's website, or other websites I admire, I get new ideas and become eager to implement the, myself. I had to keep in mind, however, that my preferences weren't the only ones that mattered. Putting my site out to my cohort-mates helped me learn what was more appealing universally. I received feedback that some of my color choices or animations were too subtle, so I quickly made some tweaks. It's awesome to me that website design is so dynamic and fluid. This means that I can implement changes, update, and refresh it at any point! There will never be a static, finished product.
In thinking about the rise of CSS template sites like Bootstrap and Jekyll, I wonder how many developers are hired for CSS and HTML skills alone these days. Because so many people can create websites on their own using a variety of tools, I imagine you'd have to be a pretty incredible designer to design websites using vanilla CSS. Still, this challenge opened my eyes to the possibility of doing front-end, user-facing work. Now, I just have to make sure I don't completely neglect my site throughout Phases 1, 2, and 3!


My name is Lauren!
Find Out More About MeI am currently a student at the University of Michigan's School of Information
Python, XML, SQL
Processing, Cataloging, and Digitizing
MARC, EAD, DC, MODS, METS, PREMIS, RDF
Online and in the archives
something
more something
I would love to discuss my past experiences and future opportunities to collaborate
734-664-9617


Bulid A Bot
Bulid A Bot +3
Personal +1
Marketing
Travel
Social & Fun
Social & Fun +1
Analytics +2
Productivity +1


Version 1.2 Changelog (29-Sept-2012)
Responsive design i.e. the content automatically fits the viewer's screen.
11 Bootstrap web themes included which can be updated through admin options.
Facebook connect integrated i.e. you can allow facebook users to log-in/register to your site easily.
Add/Edit/Delete custom pages with rich text editor. Those pages will be shown automatically in the top menu.
Registration protected by captcha.
Option to notify admin when a new listing is posted or existing one has been edited.
Show/Hide the sidebar in map view.
Bigger info windows when clicked on a map marker.
Link to favorite listings
Unique marker for featured listings on map.
Different markers for different real estate property types
HTML5
Security fixes:
XSS & CSRF Security patch
Created with the Personal Edition of HelpNDoc: Free HTML Help documentation generator


Open this page in two browsers and see how easy Sails.js makes realtime applications!
Sorting: {{tableParams.sorting()|json}}


nips nips2001 nips2001-35 nips2001-35-reference knowledge-graph by maker-knowledge-mining
Source: pdf
Author: Anita C. Faul, Michael E. Tipping
Abstract: The recent introduction of the 'relevance vector machine' has effectively demonstrated how sparsity may be obtained in generalised linear models within a Bayesian framework. Using a particular form of Gaussian parameter prior, 'learning' is the maximisation, with respect to hyperparameters, of the marginal likelihood of the data. This paper studies the properties of that objective function, and demonstrates that conditioned on an individual hyperparameter, the marginal likelihood has a unique maximum which is computable in closed form. It is further shown that if a derived 'sparsity criterion' is satisfied, this maximum is exactly equivalent to 'pruning' the corresponding parameter from the model. 1
[1] C. M. Bishop and M. E . Tipping. Variational relevance vector machines. In C. Boutilier and M. Goldszmidt , editors, Proceedings of th e 16th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, pages 46- 53. Morgan Kaufmann , 2000.
[2] S. Chen, D. L. Donoho, and M. A. Saunders. Atomic decomposition by basis pursuit. Technical Report 479, Department of Statistics, Stanford University, 1995.
[3] Y. Grandvalet. Least absolute shrinkage is equivalent to quadratic penalisation. In L. Niklasson, M. Boden, and T. Ziemske, editors, Proceedings of th e Eighth International Conference on Artificial N eural Networks (ICANN98) , pages 201- 206. Springer, 1998.
[4] D. J. C. MacKay. Bayesian interpolation. Neural Computation, 4(3):415- 447, 1992.
[5] A. J. Smola, B. Scholkopf, and G. Ratsch . Linear programs for automatic accuracy control in regression. In Proceedings of th e Ninth Int ernational Conference on Artificial N eural N etworks, pages 575- 580, 1999.
[6] M. E. Tipping. The Relevance Vector Machine. In S. A. Solla, T . K. Leen , and K.-R. Muller, editors, Advances in N eural Information Processing Systems 12, pages 652- 658. MIT Press, 2000.
[7] M. E. Tipping. Sparse kernel principal component analysis. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 13. MIT Press, 200l.
[8] M. E . Tipping and A. C. Faul. Bayesian pursuit. Submitted to NIPS*Ol.
[9] V. N. Vapnik. Statistical Learning Theory. Wiley, 1998.


respiratory air asthma pollution health diseases effects pollen climate Health {border-style chronic Respir px;} #ffffff;} lung Climate change changes pollutants Med D’Amato European Respiratory heat important increase increased patients Eur associated global indoor related Annesi-Maesano allergic mortality risk Environ Europe allergy deaths particles particulate Italian Viegi evidence exposure factors frequency function impact ozone pulmonary px; {font-family ./. Air Global World concentrations disease font-size morbidity people pollution, prevalence prevention quality severe ./.. Allergy GARD Ministry Rev Simoni acute adverse affect airway allergens double; emissions environmental epidemics events high human increasing major smoke studies waves Alliance Baldacci Care Cecchi Change Diseases Heat airborne border-color border-width cardiovascular countries diseases, economic environment impacts international levels observed population production rhinitis rise risks solid; study subjects symptoms thunderstorm urban {font-style {font-weight ./j.-...x Chronic Effect Increase Indoor Maio Multidiscip Norback Organization Outdoor Panel Sci allergenic areas bold cause century conditions cost courier; developing development effect em; especially exacerbations exhaust expected factors, following future gas greenhouse ground growth health: higher hospital include like matter national obstructive plant pollens problem pt;} statement stress temperature thunderstorm, tobacco vehicle


Server and Client side library for performing MPC in JavaScript. Server handles relaying shares between parties. Clients and Servers can both participate in the computation and provide input data.
Requirements
Server:
Node and npm
Client:
Make sure to use the sockets.io.js script file that matches exactly the version used in the server.
If the client code is to be served by the server, use:
<script src="/socket.io/socket.io.js"></script>
If the client code is served independently, fetch the matching socket.io.js from the CDN, or use the file from<server_dir>/node_modules/socket.io-client/dist
Installation
Server:
run npm from inside the project directory to install dependencies listed in package.json automatically:
$ npm install
Client:
Make sure to include jiff.js after socket.io
<script src="/lib/jiff-client.js"></script>
Then inside a script tag (and after the page loads), initialize a jiff object and setup a computation:
var instance = jiff.make_jiff("http://localhost:3000", "<computation_id>", parties)
instance will provide methods for sharing, opening, and performing operations on shares.
Documentation
The documentation can be generated using JSDoc; you will find these docs in docs/jsdocs/
:
./node_modules/.bin/jsdoc -c docs/jsdoc.conf.json
npm run-script gen-docs # shortcut
The latest documentation can be viewed at on the project page.
Running the application
To run a sample server:
$ node index.js
Then open localhost:3000/apps/sum.html
(or any other file under apps/
) in a browser, for every party open the page in a new tab/window.
Running the test cases
To run the test cases:
$ npm test
Information and Collaborators
More information about this project, including collaborators and publications, can be found at multiparty.org.
License
MIT


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§664-32 Jurisdiction. The circuit courts shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine, without the intervention of a jury, all controversies respecting rights of private way and water rights, as in this part provided. [L 1886, c 69, §2; am L 1888, c 26, §2; am L 1907, c 56, §2; RL 1925, §2937; RL 1935, §3678; RL 1945, §10219; RL 1955, §234-31; HRS §664-32; am L 1972, c 90, §6(m)]
Case Notes
Jurisdiction not exclusive as to water rights. 10 H. 476 (1896); 19 H. 106 (1908); 32 H. 404 (1932), aff'd 52 F.2d 356 (1931).
Cited: 19 H. 106, 117 (1908).


You lie down in the clearing. It is pitch dark now, and the stars are shining above you.
After this series of tests, your mind is exhausted but still alert. Without difficulty, you recognize the constellation of the centaur.
That's it! A centaur! He steals the memories of travelers who enter the forest, and only gives it back to those who find his constellation.
You made it. Now you can perfectly remember your way out of the forest.


dsalkjlksajlk
With 43,945 sandwich shops in 110 countries, Subway has become the world’s most ubiquitous restaurant chain, posting armies of “sandwich artists” in more American outposts than McDonald’s and Starbucks combined.
Yet at the dawn of its 50th birthday, all is not well in the land of Jared and jingles about $5 footlongs. Subway’s U.S. sales last year declined 3 percent, or $400 million, falling faster than any other of America’s top 25 food chains. The mega-deli was also knocked back to America’s third best-selling food chain for the first time in seven years.
Subway ascended over the last several decades on the back of broad American tastes, offering a healthy alternative for eaters leery of fast food, and at prices that made it unstoppable during the Great Recession. Even First Lady Michelle Obama praised Subway during a visit last year for “working to get kids excited about eating their vegetables.”


|
BlockSnake
|
#include <Fruit.hpp>
Public Member Functions | |
| Fruit (AssetManager *assetManager, Vector3f position) | |
| Public Member Functions inherited from GameObject | |
| Vector3f | getPosition () const |
| bool | canCollide () const |
| virtual | ~GameObject () |
Protected Member Functions | |
| virtual void | update (float tpf) override |
| virtual void | onDestroy () override |
| virtual void | draw (float aspect) override |
| virtual void | onCollision (GameObject *col) override |
| virtual void | findRandomPlace () |
| Protected Member Functions inherited from GameObject | |
| Matrix4x4< float > | getCurrentMat (float aspect) |
| virtual void | onKeyDown (unsigned short keycode) |
Private Attributes | |
| AssetManager * | assetManager |
| int | fruitProgram |
| int | texture |
| int | primitive |
| GLint | mv_location |
Additional Inherited Members | |
| Protected Attributes inherited from GameObject | |
| Vector3f | position |
| bool | doesCollide |
| Vector3f | scale |
| Vector3f | rotation |
| Fruit::Fruit | ( | AssetManager * | assetManager, |
| Vector3f | position | ||
| ) |
Creates an fruit.
| assetManager | The assetManager where the resources are handled. |
| position | The starting position |
|
overrideprotectedvirtual |
Implements GameObject.
|
protectedvirtual |
finds a new place in the field when it's hit
|
overrideprotectedvirtual |
Reimplemented from GameObject.
|
overrideprotectedvirtual |
Reimplemented from GameObject.
|
overrideprotectedvirtual |
Implements GameObject.
|
private |
|
private |
The opengl program
|
private |
|
private |
The mesh
|
private |
Reference to the texture


Wood note the special terrible edition
File
Format
Help
Save
New
Copy Conntents to clipboard
Clear
Bullet
About This
Help Center/Documentation
Hello World!


{{#if under_five }}
All {{#if location_types }}{{{ location_types }}} {{/if}}locations near you{{#if age}} for a {{ age }} year old child{{/if}}{{#if filter_string }} that {{{ filter_string }}}{{/if}}:
{{/if}} {{#if over_five }}For information about programs for your {{ age }} year old child, visit CPS.edu.
All {{#if location_types }}{{{ location_types }}} {{/if}}locations near you{{#if filter_string }} that {{{ filter_string }}}{{/if}}:
{{/if}}


France says troops kill a leading jihadist in the Sahel
PARIS (Reuters) - French troops killed one of the Sahel region’s leading jihadists on Oct. 9, France’s defense minister said on Tuesday.
Ali Maychou was the No. 2 in command of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an umbrella group for al Qaeda-linked insurgents in West Africa’s Sahara.
Violence by Islamist militants has proliferated in the sparsely-populated Sahel in recent years, with links to al Qaeda and Islamic State using central and Northern Mali as a launch pad for attacks across the largely desert region.


| Package | Description |
|---|---|
| com.hazelcast.client |
Contains classes/interfaces related to Client
|
| com.hazelcast.client.impl |
Contains most of the client side HazelcastInstance implementation functionality.
|
| com.hazelcast.cluster.impl |
This package contains the implementation of the cluster functionality.
|
| com.hazelcast.config |
Provides classes for configuring HazelcastInstance.
|
| com.hazelcast.core |
Provides core API interfaces/classes.
|
| com.hazelcast.instance |
This package contains Hazelcast Instance functionality.
|
| com.hazelcast.jca |
This package contains jca functionality
|
| com.hazelcast.spi |
Provides interfaces/classes for Hazelcast SPI.
|
| com.hazelcast.spi.impl |
Contains implementations for Hazelcast SPI.
|
| Modifier and Type | Method and Description |
|---|---|
Config |
ClientEngine.getConfig() |
| Modifier and Type | Method and Description |
|---|---|
Config |
HazelcastClientInstanceImpl.getConfig() |
Config |
HazelcastClientProxy.getConfig() |
Config |
ClientEngineImpl.getConfig() |
| Modifier and Type | Field and Description |
|---|---|
protected Config |
AbstractJoiner.config |
| Modifier and Type | Method and Description |
|---|---|
static Collection<String> |
TcpIpJoiner.getConfigurationMembers(Config config) |
| Constructor and Description |
|---|
ConfigCheck(Config config,
String joinerType) |
| Modifier and Type | Class and Description |
|---|---|
class |
ClasspathXmlConfig
A
Config which is initialized by loading an XML configuration file from the classpath. |
class |
FileSystemXmlConfig
A
Config which is which includes functionality for loading itself from a
XML configuration file. |
class |
InMemoryXmlConfig
Creates a
Config loaded from an in memory Hazelcast XML String. |
class |
UrlXmlConfig
A
Config which is loaded using some url pointing to a Hazelcast XML file. |
| Modifier and Type | Method and Description |
|---|---|
String |
ConfigXmlGenerator.generate(Config config)
Generates the XML string based on some Config.
|
boolean |
Config.isCompatible(Config config) |
| Modifier and Type | Method and Description |
|---|---|
Config |
HazelcastInstance.getConfig()
Returns the configuration of this Hazelcast instance.
|
| Modifier and Type | Method and Description |
|---|---|
static HazelcastInstance |
Hazelcast.getOrCreateHazelcastInstance(Config config)
Gets or creates the HazelcastInstance with a certain name.
|
static HazelcastInstance |
Hazelcast.newHazelcastInstance(Config config)
Creates a new HazelcastInstance (a new node in a cluster).
|
| Modifier and Type | Field and Description |
|---|---|
Config |
Node.config |
| Modifier and Type | Method and Description |
|---|---|
Config |
HazelcastInstanceImpl.getConfig() |
Config |
HazelcastInstanceProxy.getConfig() |
Config |
Node.getConfig() |
| Modifier and Type | Method and Description |
|---|---|
static HazelcastInstance |
HazelcastInstanceFactory.getOrCreateHazelcastInstance(Config config) |
static HazelcastInstance |
HazelcastInstanceFactory.newHazelcastInstance(Config config) |
static HazelcastInstance |
HazelcastInstanceFactory.newHazelcastInstance(Config config,
String instanceName,
NodeContext nodeContext) |
| Constructor and Description |
|---|
GroupProperties(Config config) |
Node(HazelcastInstanceImpl hazelcastInstance,
Config config,
NodeContext nodeContext) |
| Modifier and Type | Method and Description |
|---|---|
Config |
HazelcastConnectionImpl.getConfig() |
| Modifier and Type | Method and Description |
|---|---|
Config |
NodeEngine.getConfig() |
| Modifier and Type | Method and Description |
|---|---|
Config |
NodeEngineImpl.getConfig() |
Copyright © 2016 Hazelcast, Inc.. All Rights Reserved.


Accessible likert scale
Fieldset/legend pattern
Notes
| Browser | Read as |
|---|---|
| VoiceOver (OS X 10.9.5) | |
| Firefox (36.0.1) | label, legend, legend, "radio button" |
| Chrome (41.0.2272.101) | label, legend, "radio button" |
| Safari (7.1.4 [95<IP_ADDRESS>]) | label, "radio button, x of n" |
aria-describedby pattern
Notes
| Browser | Read as |
|---|---|
| VoiceOver (OS X 10.9.5) | |
| Firefox (36.0.1) | aria-describedby, "radio button" |
| Chrome (41.0.2272.101) | label, "radio button" |
| Safari (7.1.4 [95<IP_ADDRESS>]) | label, "radio button, x of n" |
table pattern
Notes
| Browser | Read as |
|---|---|
| VoiceOver (OS X 10.9.5) | |
| Firefox (36.0.1) | "radio button" |
| Chrome (41.0.2272.101) | "radio button" |
| Safari (7.1.4 [95<IP_ADDRESS>]) | "radio button, x of n" |


15.4. About the ExercisesWe haven't looked yet at the details of the various templates and classes in the header <regex>, so it's difficult to write code that uses them. Instead, for these exercises, use the header "rgxutil.h", which provides simple functions for checking regular expression syntax and for regular expression matching. The function match_ECMA uses the ECMAScript grammar; the function match_grep uses the grep grammar; and the function match_ere uses the ERE grammar. The header is available on my Web site in the archive that contains the examples. In addition, its contents are listed in Appendix B.3. To check the syntax of a regular expression, write the regular expression as a C-style string, and pass it to one of the functions match_ECMA, match_grep, or match_ere. Example 15.1. Checking Syntax (regexgram/check.cpp)
To check whether a regular expression matches some target text, write both the regular expression and the target text as C-style strings, and pass them to one of the functions match_ECMA, match_bre, or match_ere. Example 15.2. Matching (regexgram/match.cpp)
|


Overview
Create a new OutboundEmail configuration to use to send emails over SMTP.
Summary
Each configuration that is created is validated first by attempting to connect to the server.
Request Arguments
| Name |
Type |
Description |
Required |
|
name
|
String
|
The display name of the configuration.
|
True
|
|
mail_sendtype
|
String
|
Only SMTP is supported. This field is defaulted to smtp.
|
False
|
|
mail_smtptype
|
String
|
The email provider through which emails are sent. This is merely a convenience which allows for
prepopulating data in the UI. Possible values are: google, exchange, outlook, other. other is the
default.
|
False
|
|
mail_smtpserver
|
String
|
The address of the SMTP server.
|
True
|
|
mail_smtpport
|
Integer
|
The port on which to connect to the SMTP server. The default is 465, which assumes you are using
SSL.
|
False
|
|
mail_smtpuser
|
String
|
The username for authenticating with the SMTP server. It is only required if mail_smtpauth_req is
true.
|
False
|
|
mail_smtppass
|
String
|
The password for authenticating with the SMTP server. It is only required if mail_smtpauth_req is
true.
|
False
|
|
mail_smtpauth_req
|
Boolean
|
Indicates whether or not the SMTP server requires authentication. The default is false.
|
False
|
|
mail_smtpssl
|
String
|
The encryption protocol used for connecting to the SMTP server. "0" represents no encryption.
"1" represents SSL. "2" represents TLS. The default is SSL.
|
False
|
Request
{
"name": "My Exchange Account",
"mail_smtptype": "exchange",
"mail_smtpserver": "smtp.example.com",
"mail_smtpport": 465,
"mail_smtpuser"<EMAIL_ADDRESS>"mail_smtppass": "P@55w0rd",
"mail_smtpauth_req": true,
"mail_smtpssl": "1"
}
Response Arguments
| Name |
Type |
Description |
|
name
|
String
|
The display name of the configuration.
|
|
type
|
String
|
Only user configuration may be created using this endpoint, so user will always be
returned. system and system-override configurations are always created by the application.
|
|
user_id
|
String
|
The current user's ID. The current user may only create configurations for himself or herself.
|
|
mail_sendtype
|
String
|
Only SMTP is supported, so smtp will always be returned.
|
|
mail_smtptype
|
String
|
The email provider through which emails are sent. Possible values are: google, exchange, outlook, other.
|
|
mail_smtpserver
|
String
|
The address of the SMTP server.
|
|
mail_smtpport
|
Integer
|
The port on which to connect to the SMTP server.
|
|
mail_smtpuser
|
String
|
The username for authenticating with the SMTP server.
|
|
mail_smtppass
|
Boolean
|
Indicates whether or not a password exists. true is returned for this field when a password does
exist. This field is not included in the response when a password does not exist.
|
|
mail_smtpauth_req
|
Boolean
|
Indicates whether or not the SMTP server requires authentication.
|
|
mail_smtpssl
|
String
|
The encryption protocol used for connecting to the SMTP server.
|
Response
{
"id": "e04ce998-960e-11e6-8628-3c15c2d582c6",
"name": "My Exchange Account",
"type": "user",
"user_id": "e91b1fa7-1bd8-3c71-be96-512e643f9ca4",
"mail_sendtype": "smtp",
"mail_smtptype": "exchange",
"mail_smtpserver": "smtp.example.com",
"mail_smtpport": 465,
"mail_smtpuser"<EMAIL_ADDRESS>"mail_smtppass": true,
"mail_smtpauth_req": true,
"mail_smtpssl": "1",
"deleted": false,
"my_favorite": false,
"_acl": {
"fields": {}
},
"_module": "OutboundEmail"
}
Change Log
| Version |
Change |
|
v10
|
Added /OutboundEmail POST endpoint.
|


--- date: 2010-03-05T00:00:00Z published: true title: 6 Critical WordPress Plugins You Should Have Installed url: /2010/03/05/6-critical-wordpress-plugins-you-should-have-installed/ ---
Design Instruct and Six Revisions only uses six WordPress plugins. We’ve kept our plugins to the bare essentials—any other features we add to our WordPress installation, we develop ourselves specifically for our sites.