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仆从国的态度和利益
目录
Chapter seven Host-Nation Support and U.S. Payments to Other Countries
Lessons from Historical Data
Japan’s Contributions to the United States
South Korea’s Contributions to the United States
Germany’s Contributions to the United States
NATO Security Investment Program Contributions
Chapter eight Relative Costs of Overseas Basing and Rotational Presence
Introduction to Cost Analysis
Chapter seven Host-Nation Support and U.S. Payments to Other Countries
This chapter responds to the NDAA requirement to determine both direct payments
and other contributions from host nations supporting U.S. military facilities overseas
and direct payments by the United States to host nations for use of facilities, ranges,
and lands. It puts these contributions and payments in the context of posture analysis
by reporting on the ways in which they can affect the relative costs of maintaining an
overseas presence and discussing how to factor them into analyses of alternative postures.
Flows can occur bilaterally, as in the case of host-nation support (HNS) and U.S.
payments to the governments of host nations, or multilaterally, as in the case of the
NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP).
To assess the magnitude and fiscal implications of HNS and U.S. payments to
other nations, we looked at 12 countries (Germany, South Korea, Japan, Italy, the
UK, Australia, Bahrain, Turkey, Spain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Djibouti) that could be
expected to provide the United States with HNS or, conversely, receive U.S. payments.
Together, the 12 countries account for a large majority of the United States’ overseas
military presence.
We found that the data are scant and scattered for many of those countries, but
sufficient to draw a few general conclusions relevant to posture decisions. For example,
a close examination of historical and contemporary records suggests that HNS—in
various forms—offsets a substantial share of U.S. overseas basing costs in a number of
venues, even if sizable amounts of U.S.-borne costs remain. In the case of Japan, the
country for which we have the most comprehensive data, we identified annual support
potentially within range of $6.5 billion or more, depending on the scope of the
definition of HNS and the forms of support—direct, indirect, cash, and in-kind—
under consideration.1 If we were to limit our discussion to “cost sharing,” as a subset
of all HNS, then that figure might be about $2.3 billion instead. South Korea and
Germany, two other countries for which we have some recent quantitative information,
also contribute noteworthy sums. It is also the case that some countries, such as Japan,
have been more inclined to contribute directly and others, such as Germany, have been more inclined to contribute indirectly, through forgone rent and lease payments and
waivers of taxes, fees, and damage claims. We have less evidence of U.S. payments to
other countries. The only concrete figure pertains to U.S. payments to Djibouti, which
amount to about $30 million each year.
From an analytical perspective, the relevance of HNS and U.S. payments differs
depending on the purpose of the analysis. For example, in comparing the costs of current
operations in foreign and U.S. locations, we would seek to assess the difference
between the bottom lines of operating in either location, i.e., the net cost of our presence
with any contributions and including payments. On that basis, only some HNS
and U.S. payments would affect our computations because much of the DoD accounting
data that we employed for our cost analyses are “net” from the outset (i.e., costs that
remain after taking these contributions and expenses into consideration). Care must
be taken, however, to treat both sides of the equation—U.S. and foreign—according
to the same accounting rules and to consider whether additional spending or investments
would be required to change venues. If contemplating a shift from one foreign
location to another, the data on HNS and U.S. payments could play a much larger
part in a comparative assessment. For example, if the U.S. posture were to shift to lessdeveloped
parts of the world, it seems likely that HNS would drop and U.S. payments
would increase.
We begin this chapter with a brief introduction to the terminology associated
with HNS and U.S. payments to host nations and follow with an overview of historical
and contemporary data sources. Next, we present the data on HNS and U.S. payments
and discuss the relevance of those data to the analysis of postures. In addition to bilateral
flows, i.e., HNS and U.S. payments, NATO allies—including the United States—
also undertake multilateral cost sharing, through common- and joint-funded budgets,
such as the NSIP. We consider the scope and relevance of NSIP funds separately. We
also discuss a recent congressional proposal to increase data collection.
Terminology and Data Sources
Because the choice of a particular definition can affect the calculation of the amounts
of support and U.S. payments, possibly by multiple orders of magnitude, we explain
our use of the terms in this report. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms provides a formal definition of the overarching concept of HNS,
per se, but it does not define “cost sharing,” “burden sharing,” or other terms that
infuse discussions about bilateral flows.
Definitions of Host-Nation Support, U.S. Payments, and Related Concepts
The DoD dictionary of military terminology defines HNS as “civil and/or military
assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peace time, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between
nations.”2 In common usage, HNS tends to be associated with a broad range of contributions,
most typically identified as either “cash” or “in-kind” support, on the one
hand, and either “direct” or “indirect” support, on the other hand, and designated for
the purposes of “cost sharing,” “burden sharing,” and/or “relocation.”
The distinctions among the different contributions merit clarification. Cost sharing
appears to be a subset of burden sharing, only some of which is HNS. USFK3
defines cost sharing as “allied cash assistance and in-kind contributions in support of
stationed U.S. forces” [italics added] that “can take the form of direct contributions such
as direct payment for facilities improvement or indirect forgone rents and waived tax
revenue.” It describes cost sharing as “one component of the larger entity referred to as
burden-sharing,” which it defines as “allied sharing of the full range of mutual security
responsibilities in the common defense. . . .” Working from that description, a host
nation’s cost-sharing contributions would almost certainly constitute HNS, whereas
some of its burden-sharing contributions, such as those for force provision in joint
operations, might not. Moreover, some HNS could fall outside the scope of cost sharing,
if, strictly speaking, cost sharing refers solely to “stationed forces” and does not
include contributions to support other forms of military presence.4
Although we could find no formal explanation of the position of relocation assistance
in relation to HNS, cost sharing, or burden sharing, one could argue that some
of those funds would constitute cost sharing; in practice, it tends to be cordoned off
and treated separately in some, but not all, administrative and legislative documents.5
Figure 7.1 summarizes our assessment of the relationships among types of contributions.
It represents relocation assistance with a dotted line, indicative of the ambiguity
of the placement of that assistance in relation to the other forms of contributions.
For purposes of this analysis, we focus our attention on cost sharing and, as much
as the data permit, identify contributions for relocation separately.
Figure 7.1 Relationships Among Contributions Consisting of Host-Nation Support, Cost Sharing, Burden Sharing, and Relocation Assistance
Title 10, U.S.C., sections 2350j, “Burden sharing contributions by designated
countries and regions,” and 2350k, “Relocation within host nation of elements of armed
forces overseas,” delineate the circumstance under which the Secretary of Defense may
accept cash payments from a host nation.6 Under §2350j, the Secretary may accept
cash contributions only for the payment of compensation for local national employees
of DoD, MILCON projects of DoD, and supplies and services of DoD. Section 2350k
authorizes the Secretary to accept cash contributions from foreign nations because of,
or in support of, relocation of elements of U.S. forces from or to any location within
that country, also for specific purposes described therein.
All other contributions, including but not limited to payments that foreign nations
make to individuals, contractors, or other entities for goods or services provided in support
of U.S. operations, thus constitute “in-kind” contributions.7
DoD reports8 define “direct” and “indirect” support from the perspective of the
host nation; that is, if the host nation bears the cost “on budget,” the support is direct,
and if the host nation bears the cost “off budget,” the support is indirect.9
In the context of cost sharing:
Direct cost sharing includes costs borne by host nations in support of U.S. forces for
rents on privately owned land and facilities, labor, utilities, and vicinity improvements.
Indirect cost sharing includes forgone rents and revenues, including rents
on government-owned land and facilities occupied or used by U.S. forces at no or
reduced cost to the United States, and tax concessions or customs duties waived
by the host nation.10
Table 7.1 provides a matrix that categorizes illustrative examples of contributions
(primarily cost sharing) on two dimensions: direct versus indirect support and cash
versus in-kind support.
Table 7.1 Forms of Support and Illustrative Examples of Contributions
We are not aware of any formal or commonly accepted definition of the term
“U.S. payments” and have developed our own definition. For purposes of this analysis,
we focus on direct payments to host-nation governments made explicitly for the purpose
of supporting the U.S. overseas posture in accordance with the NDAA’s stated
focus on direct payments for use of facilities, ranges, and lands. We do not consider
U.S. funding for security assistance (e.g., International Military Education and Training
and Foreign Military Financing), development assistance (e.g., Overseas Development
Assistance), or U.S. payments to other entities (e.g., employees and contractors)
for goods or services that might affect the host-nation economy but are not paid to the
host-nation government.
Sources of Data on Host-Nation Support and U.S. Payments
Up until 2004, DoD provided aggregate national-level information on direct and
indirect cost sharing and other forms of “contributions toward the common defense
and mutual security of the United States and its allies” in an annual report titled
Allied Contributions to the Common Defense. This report presented DoD’s assessment
of the absolute and relative contributions of the United States’ NATO allies, Pacific
allies (Australia, Japan, and South Korea), and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
nations. To gather data for the report, particularly the bilateral cost-sharing components,
DoD relied heavily on contract support11 and extensive inputs from U.S. embassies
and DoD components, including the military departments and commands.12,13
The annual reports were useful insomuch as they provided estimates of the dollar value
of direct and indirect cost sharing for most NATO, Pacific, and GCC allies, but they
provided little insight into the underlying composition of that support in each case and
with little documentation; hence, they are virtually impossible to validate or reproduce.
We found no comparable source of information on past U.S. payments.
The data for recent years are less readily available. At present, there are no centralized
sources of information on contributions or U.S. payments, other than those pertaining
to cash support and multilateral cost sharing. To the extent that bilateral information
is available, it must be culled—oftentimes in broadly descriptive fragments—from
a variety of documents, websites, and individuals, including the following:
provisions of SOFAs that pertain to indirect support, e.g., those addressing tax
and other fee waivers14
special measures agreements (SMAs) that the United States has negotiated and
implemented with Japan and South Korea
acquisition and cross-servicing agreements that are negotiated between the United
States and its allies to allow U.S. forces to exchange most common types of support,
including food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment
various implementing agreements, technical arrangements, and diplomatic statements
annual, mandatory reports that DoD provides to Congress on cash payments
made from host nations to the United States under §2350j and §2350k, Title 10,
U.S.C., Subtitle A, part 4, Chapter 138, Subchapter II
official government websites of the host nations themselves
representatives of EUCOM, USFK, USFJ, and others with on-the-ground knowledge
of U.S. operations and related support.
Of these sources, only the annual reports on cash payments provide a comprehensive,
regularized accounting of the flow of funds. Those reports tally cash payments to
the United States from Japan, South Korea, and Kuwait.
Data on the NATO allies’ NSIP contributions are more readily available, e.g., in
NATO, U.S., and other budget documents, than those relating to bilateral support.
We discuss those data in a separate section on multilateral flows.
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Lessons from Historical Data
The final report in the Allied Contributions to the Common Defense series was released in
200415 and provides data on NATO, Pacific, and GCC allies’ bilateral direct and indirect
cost sharing for 2002. The data suggest that host-nation cost sharing is substantial
in absolute terms and for relative basing costs, but that the roles of direct and indirect
support differ by country and region. In 2002, cost sharing was reported to amount
to just over 50 percent of basing costs (see Table 7. 2), on average, among the NATO,
Pacific, and GCC allies; however, the bulk of all bilateral cost sharing among NATO
allies—including Germany—was indirect, and the bulk of all cost sharing among
Pacific allies—Japan especially—and GCC allies was direct.
As a general matter, we caution against drawing comparisons between the figures
for 2002 and those available for recent years. Our reasoning is two-fold: first, lacking
insight to the composition of the earlier figures—what they include and exclude in
each case—we cannot assume comparability across the years; second, the world—and the U.S. military’s role in it—has changed over the past decade. Nevertheless, in some
limited circumstances, subject to caveats, we make a small number of comparisons
below.
Table 7.2 U.S. Stationed Military Personnel and Bilateral Cost Sharing in 2002 (measured in nominal $ millions at 2002 exchange rates)
Over the eight-year period for which we have roughly comparable data,16 the
bottom line is consistent. The aggregate figure varied within a range of about $7 billion
to $8.5 billion (Figure 7.2). Notwithstanding the substantial contributions of U.S.
allies to the U.S. overseas presence, sizable amounts of U.S.-borne costs remain in
place. If U.S. allies were bearing about 50 percent of the cost burden in 2002, then the
United States would, by definition, have been bearing most, if not all, of the remaining
burden17; on that basis, the cost to the United States over that same period would have
also ranged from about $7 billion to $8.5 billion.
Figure 7.2 Aggregate Cost Sharing of All Allies (1995–2002)
Analysis of Contemporary Data on Host-Nation Support and U.S. Payments
Contemporary data on HNS and U.S. payments are scattered across a variety of
sources, including SOFAs, SMAs, and acquisition and cross-servicing agreements;
annual reports on cash payments; DoD budget documents; and the official government
websites of the host nations. Our review of those sources suggests that information
on HNS is more readily available than information on U.S. payments.
Host Nations’ Contributions to the United States
Tables 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5 collectively summarize our “state of knowledge” regarding the
contributions of the 12 countries we examined. Table 7.3 indicates, in the broadest
possible terms, the forms of support—cash, in-kind, direct, and indirect—that we can
associate definitively with each country. That we do not associate a country with a particular
form of support does not necessarily imply that the country does not, in fact,
provide such support, only that we could find no corroborating evidence.18 (Cash support
is an exception. Reporting under Title 10, U.S.C. is mandatory, thus, any country
that is not included in DoD’s annual report to Congress, by definition, does not make
cash contributions.) Table 7.4 distinguishes particular types of in-kind contributions,
and Table 7.5 describes Japan, South Korea, and Kuwait’s cash payments.
Table 7.3 Forms of Support Associated with Countries of Interest
Table 7.4 Types of In-Kind Contributions Associated with Countries of Interest
Table 7.5 Types of Cash Payments Associated with Countries of Interest (based on U.S. fiscal year estimates and measured in nominal $ millions
Much of our state of knowledge regarding bilateral contributions, especially indirect
support, is only qualitative and general; for example, we can say that a country,
such as Spain, adheres to the provisions of the NATO SOFA and therefore provides
the United States with income tax waivers or other personnel benefits, as shown above.
Only in the case of cash payments, which must be reported annually, can we confidently
track the flow of funds comprehensively (see Table 7.5).
Together, the cash payments of Japan, South Korea, and Kuwait amounted to
over $900 million annually from 2009 to 2011, of which about 94 percent pertained
to cost sharing and 6 percent pertained to relocation.
Below, we present estimates of bilateral support from Japan, South Korea, and
Germany. For those countries, we have enough information to tell cogent stories about
the nature of their support, but lacking any other public information on Kuwait’s contributions, we end our discussion of that country here. For readers with less interest in
this amount of detail, we suggest skimming the discussion of the three countries and
moving to the next section, on U.S. payments to host nations.
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Japan’s Contributions to the United States
Of the 12 countries under consideration, we have the most comprehensive data for
Japan, partly because Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA) post relatively detailed information about contributions on their respective websites,19 and partly because USFJ representatives provided us with information
on trends.20 We have additional information on the cost-sharing and training
relocation contributions that are covered under the U.S.-Japan SMA for the period
2011 to 2015 and on the subset of all contributions that are made in cash and thus
covered under Title 10, U.S.C., mandatory reporting requirements.21 The MOD and
MOFA data are not fully consistent, but are mostly reconcilable. We have adopted the
MOD estimates because they are available for four years, 2009–2012, whereas the
MOFA figures are available only for 2012. We address the difference between the two
agencies’ estimates in the notes and text that accompany the data.
Table 7.6 reports the estimates found in the budget documents on the MOD
website, using the terminology of those documents; Table 7.7 reports figures from the
MOFA website, some of which might already be built into the MOD budget estimates
and some of which are not because they either refer to other agencies or accrue “off
budget.” Because the U.S.-Japan SMA is specified in yen and the Japanese agencies
report contributions in yen, we provide two segments of Table 7.6: Segment “a” shows
the amounts in yen and segment “b” shows them in U.S. Dollars. Both versions provide
detailed breakouts for what the MOD describes as “cost-sharing for stationing
USFJ.”
Table 7.6 Japanese Funding for Cost Sharing and Other Purposes (based on Japanese fiscal year estimates)
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The amounts shown in Table 7.6, absent the addendum in Table 7.7, would all constitute
direct support because they are MOD budget figures and are, by definition, “on
budget.” However, the aggregate figure, about $6.5 billion, represents an upper bound
in that the amounts shown for base promotion include unspecified sums for purposes
unrelated to U.S. facilities, and at least some of the amounts shown for the Special
Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), realignment, and relocation might fall outside
the purview of HNS as we depict it in Figure 7.1. On the basis of our crosswalk of
the MOD and MOFA data and information provided in the underlying documents,
we do believe, however, that a significant fraction of the unspecified base-promotion
amounts could involve U.S. facilities. In the case of local community expenses, the
share pertaining to U.S. facilities could be almost 50 percent, and, in the case of facility
rentals, compensation expenses, etc., that share could be as much as 90 percent.
Applying those shares to each category, the revised aggregate figure would be about
$5.6 billion.
美国驻日本军事基地
珍珠链战略（String of pearls）
中日再战推演
Most of the identified support is in-kind. Japan uses cash to pay for all—or nearly
all—utility cost sharing and a substantial share of training relocation, but not the rest.
The cash payments for utilities reported in Table 7.5 map reasonably well to the dollar
values of those shown in Table 7.6, notwithstanding the differences in fiscal years (the
Japanese fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31). The mapping is less straightforward
for the training relocation contributions; the cash payments appear to cover all of
the training relocation contributions covered under the SMA and at least some of those
covered elsewhere. We know less about the amounts shown in the MOFA-derived
addendum (Table 7.7) except that some refer to ministries other than the MOD and
some, i.e., the estimated costs of government-owned land, constitute indirect support.
Table 7.7 Addendum to Table 7.6 (in nominal billions of yen and millions of U.S. dollars, based on Japanese fiscal year estimates)
Given the scope of coverage of the MOD and MOFA estimates (see Table 7.8
also), it seems plausible that a tally of some combination of the amounts shown in
Tables 7.6 and 7.7 would capture all or nearly all of Japan’s direct support. The numbers
also make sense in terms of their order of magnitude relative to Japan’s reported
cost-sharing contributions in 2002. For 2012, the total upper bound amount shown
in Table 7.6, version “b,” is about $6.5 billion, of which about $2.3 billion constitutes
“cost sharing for stationing USFJ.” Adding the strictly additional direct component
(non-MOD contributions) from the addendum in Table 7.7 brings the total to about
$7.0 billion, and adding the indirect component (estimated cost of government-owned
land) brings the total for all purposes, including some potentially outside the scope of
our analysis, to about $9.1 billion. On the basis of the relative allocations of direct and
indirect support shown in Table 7.2, it is also plausible that the MOFA estimate for the
value of land provision accounts for most or all of Japan’s indirect support.22
The explicit cost-sharing component of the base promotion measures, shown in
Table 7.6, also includes most of the contributions covered under the U.S.-Japan SMA.
In our parlance, we might not adhere to the MOD’s delineation of cost sharing: We
might view some of the other elements of “promotion of base measures” as “cost sharing,”
such as those pertaining to facility rentals, but cannot readily parse them; at the
same time, we might also choose to subtract some of the amounts covering training
relocation costs. Another 5.1 billion yen of SMA funding—also designated for training
relocation needs—appears to fall under the SACO and realignment categories.
The text of the “Security Consultative Committee Document,” issued jointly by
the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and the Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs
and Defense in June 201123 (a “2+2” statement) defines HNS in terms of the funding
in Table 7.6 under the heading “cost sharing for stationing USFJ”:
The Ministers confirmed that the overall level of HNS is to be maintained at the
Japanese Fiscal Year (JFY) 2010 level (bearing in mind the budget of 188.1 billion
yen in the JFY 2010) over the five years of the SMA period [starting in JFY
2011].24 The Ministers affirmed that the two governments will implement a phased
reduction of labor and utilities costs that the Government of Japan funds, while
adding the amount of this reduction to the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP)
funding in the current SMA period (FIP funding over the current SMA period is
to be no less than 20.6 billion yen per year).
The texts of the U.S.-Japan SMA and the 2+2 statement and discussions of the
content of those documents found on the MOFA website and in government-togovernment
exchanges provide additional detail on the allocations of Japan’s contributions
to different forms of cost sharing.25 According to those sources, Japan committed
to covering the costs of a progressively smaller workforce (declining from 23,055 to
22,625 workers); a progressively smaller share of stationing related utility expenditures
(76 percent to 72 percent, capped at 24.9 billion yen); and a minimum level of FIP
(20.6 billion yen) that could be made higher by the amounts equal to any reductions in
expenditures for labor and utilities. The expenditures for labor and utility cost sharing
accrue under the SMA and those related to the FIP accrue outside the SMA.
Appendix H summarizes this information and provides yen and U.S. dollar estimates
for 2010 and the SMA period (2011–2015). In that appendix, we draw directly
from the figures in Table 7.6 for the 2011 and 2012 estimates and extrapolate from
those estimates, using data on wage growth, utility cost growth, and exchange rates, to make projections for 2013–2015. We include the estimates for 2010 because the
SMA and 2+2 statement treat it as a benchmark. Assuming that the 188.1 billion yen
commitment is not an upper limit,26 we conclude that labor cost sharing will increase
slightly, from about 114 billion yen in 2010 to about 115.8 billion yen in 2015; utility
cost sharing will remain at 24.9 billion yen, and the FIP will remain at 20.6 billion yen.
The total in U.S. dollars for all three types of contributions in 2015 would be about
$2 billion.
Given likely increases in the costs of labor and energy in Japan, we do not expect
to see any change in contributions to the FIP above or beyond the annual 20.6 billion
yen minimum. Recent increases in the cost of labor in Japan have been small, but
plausibly still large enough to offset the declining numbers of workers; recent increases
in the costs of energy in Japan have been substantially larger and almost certainly large
enough to offset the declining shares of utility expenditures.
USFJ provided us with data on trends in contributions over a 35-year
period, beginning in 1978 and ending in 2012.27 The data are denominated in
nominal (then-year) yen and consist of funding for cost sharing, as defined in
Table 7.6; that is, they include funding under the SMA (utilities, labor, and training
relocation), the FIP, and measures for base personnel. As provided, the yendenominated
data suggest a mostly steady decline in HNS from 2002 to the present
(Figure 7.3).28 The USFJ briefing that is the source of the data also predicts downward
pressure on HNS, especially utility cost sharing, in the future. However, when the
funding is converted to U.S. dollars, the trend reverses. Although Japan makes its contributions
in yen, this conversion is reasonable, as, absent support from the Japanese
government, the U.S. military would cover its costs from a U.S.-dollar–denominated
budget—subject to a floating exchange rate.
Table 7.8 summarizes our understanding of Japan’s contributions to the United
States in terms of the categories presented in Table 7.1.
Figure 7.3 Japanese Funding for Cost Sharing, 2002–2012 (based on Japanese fiscal year estimates in nominal currency values)
Table 7.8 Summary of Estimable Contributions of Japan to the United States
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South Korea’s Contributions to the United States
The second-most comprehensive set of data is available for South Korean contributions.
For this country, we have data on cost sharing under the U.S.-South Korea SMA and for cash payments under Title 10, U.S.C., but little else.29 The current and soon-toexpire
SMA spans the period 2009–2013 and addresses labor cost sharing, logistics
cost sharing, and South Korea–funded construction. The contribution of South Korea
for 2009 was 760 billion Korean won, amounting to almost $600 million in then-year
dollars; the contributions for 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 were to be determined by
increasing the contributions of the previous year by the rate of inflation two years prior,
not to exceed 4 percent (Table 7.9).
Table 7.9 South Korea’s Cost-Sharing and Relocation Contributions (measured in nominal currency)
Some but not all of South Korea’s cash payments correspond to commitments
under the U.S.-South Korea SMA. Cash payments cover the labor costs associated
with the SMA, amounting to no more than 71 percent of the labor costs for USFK’s
Korean workforce (not all of USFK’s Korean-national workers are compensated under
the SMA program); a declining fraction of the construction costs associated with the
SMA; and relocation costs that accrue outside the SMA.30 They do not cover any of
the logistics costs associated with the SMA; those contributions are solely “in-kind.”
Regarding construction, South Korea committed to a shift from cash to in-kind contributions
to be implemented fully by 2011, except for expenses associated with “design
and construction oversight of facilities”; in 2009, the cash component of South Korea–
funded construction was 70 percent, and by 2011 that share was expected to drop to
12 percent. Applying that trajectory, Appendix H provides estimates of South Koreafunded
construction, cash and in-kind, for 2009–2012.
Table 7.9 reports on “estimable” direct support—from South Korea to the United
States—but we cannot say whether it reports the totality of such support. A comparison
of the magnitude of recent and 2002 levels suggests that it might, but the scope of
coverage (see Table 7.10) looks narrow in comparison with Table 7.1.
美国驻日本军事基地
珍珠链战略（String of pearls）
中日再战推演
We have only qualitative information on South Korea’s indirect support—for
example Article IV of the SMA references tax exemptions—but the historical record
suggests that they are substantial. In 2002, for example, South Korea’s indirect support
amounted to more than 40 percent of the resources that it directed to cost sharing.
If one were to assume a roughly similar split between direct and indirect cost sharing
in the current era, admittedly a strong assumption, South Korea’s total cost-sharing
contribution could have amounted to about $1.27 to $1.33 billion in 2011, if Table 7.9
does, in fact, report the totality of all of South Korea’s direct support, and depending on the exclusion or inclusion of cash payments to cover relocation expenses. We offer
this estimate not as a valid, accurate, or even plausible estimate of the current level
of South Korea’s total contributions, but as indicative of the level of our uncertainty
around that total: It could be as little as $733 million, if considering only estimable
direct support, excluding relocation (Table 7.9); as much as $1.3 billion, if looking at
the extrapolated figure for direct and indirect support, including relocation (Table 7.9);
or perhaps some other number entirely.
Table 7.10 summarizes our understanding of South Korea’s contributions to the
United States in terms of the categories presented in Table 7.1.
Table 7.10 Summary of Estimable Contributions of South Korea to the United States
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Germany’s Contributions to the United States
For the Federal Republic of Germany, we have incomplete data on HNS for a single
year—2009—drawn largely from correspondence between U.S. and German government
officials. By inference and supported by discussions with EUCOM personnel,
we know that all of that HNS, be it direct or indirect, is “in-kind”—if Germany were
to provide the United States with any cash support, that support would be listed in
DoD’s annual report to Congress. A survey of documents related to the stationing of
U.S. forces in Germany, including the NATO SOFA, as well as the officials’ correspondence
provided by EUCOM and USAREUR, indicate that Germany’s indirect support
includes forgone customs duties, forgone income taxes, personnel benefits (such as
accepting U.S. Drivers Licenses without fees), and forgone rent on facilities provided
by Germany for use by the United States. Additionally, direct support takes the form
of land, infrastructure, construction, damage claim offsets, and compensation to local
communities.
In Appendix H, we present a compilation of the available quantitative data,
most if not all of which refers to direct support, with breakouts for each line item. In
Table 7.11, we present the compilation in three, aggregated categories.
Table 7.11 Summary Compilation of Data on Germany’s Contributions to the United States in 2009
The data compilation provides evidence of contributions amounting to about 600
million euros or $830 million in 2009. The total is subject to at least two noteworthy
caveats. First, much if not all of Germany’s indirect support, such as the value of for-gone sales tax associated with commissaries located on U.S. bases, is not captured in
the table because we lack the data to do so. Thus, we can add the numbers to yield a
total for 2009, but it is not the actual total. Looking back to the historical data presented
in Table 7.2, the vast majority of Germany’s contributions a decade ago were
indirect, suggesting that today’s actual total could be much higher. In addition, the
officials’ correspondence makes reference to an estimated value of the land provided by
the Federal Republic of Germany to U.S. forces of about 5 billion euros. However, the
correspondence goes on to indicate that these lands “have special value for the military
user” and no market value calculations have been made for the areas.31 Because we
have no information about the method used to calculate the 5 billion euro estimate, we
cannot offer a firm interpretation and do not include the figure in Table 7.11. Second,
87 percent of the total—some 520 million euros or $722 million—relates to construction,
an activity that is inherently “lumpy” as one-time charges, such as for consolidation
and relocations, heavily impact this category. For that reason, we cannot say what
the numbers might look like in another year.
Remaining Countries’ Contributions to the United States
For the remaining countries, we have little or no quantitative information, and in only
the rarest of circumstances do we have much qualitative information. In the case of
Italy, for example, we have an overview of HNS provided by a EUCOM expert and
some detail—albeit almost entirely qualitative—on contributions associated with a
specific facility, i.e., Sigonella, that are spelled out in a technical arrangement.
Our information about Italy’s contributions—also entirely “in-kind”—derives
from a survey of documents (e.g., the NATO SOFA, the memoranda of understanding
concerning the use of installations and infrastructure by U.S. forces in Italy, and
the technical arrangement regarding installations and infrastructure in use by the U.S.
forces in Sigonella) and from an issue paper prepared by a EUCOM subject-matter
expert on “Italian Contributions to Forward Deployed U.S. Forces.”32 According to
the documents, Italy provides a variety of indirect support (forgone customs duties,
forgone income tax receipts, and other minor benefits to U.S. personnel) and direct
support (facility administration, repairs and maintenance, and security personnel).
In addition, the EUCOM issue paper indicates that the government of Italy forgoes
rent on facilities and provides utility infrastructure, transportation infrastructure, payments
of a portion of damage claims, and compensation to local communities to help
offset U.S. forces–related costs. We have little information about the magnitude of
Italy’s contributions, but we have enough to affirm that the aggregate figure would
be non-negligible. For example, among its non-recurring contributions, the EUCOM
issue paper33 indicates that the government of Italy has spent over 200 million euros to
bolster the roads around Aviano Air Base and 10 million euros planning road upgrades
around facilities in the Dal Molin and Vicenza areas, and that another 200 million
euros will be needed to complete the upgrades.
Another example of the fragmentary nature of the information on HNS can be
found in a USAFE-provided issue paper.34 In that paper, USAFE indicates that they
benefit from force protection savings that are attributable to co-location at host-nation
facilities. We can infer that such benefits might accrue, for example, in Spain and the
UK, where U.S. forces co-locate at facilities, such as Rota, RAF Mildenhall, and RAF
Lakenheath, but we have no estimates of the dollar value of that co-location. Developing
a dollar-value estimate for force protection, for example, would require specific
information about the service requirement for each location, the share of that requirement
attributable to the U.S. presence, and the costs of provision.
U.S. Payments to Other Countries
The data on U.S. payments to other countries are even scarcer than those on HNS.
They might be scarcer because such payments are less common than HNS or because they are more scattered and sensitive and, therefore, more difficult to obtain.35 Two
types of data sources provide a small amount of insight. The first consists of the body
of agreements that the United States maintains with countries in which it has security
interests; the second consists of EUCOM, USFJ, USFK, and other representatives with
on-the-ground knowledge of operations and financial practices.
Drawing on those sources, we find that the United States
makes payments of about $30 million annually to Djibouti36
makes no payments to any NATO allies
likely makes few or no payments to any European non-NATO allies
may or may not make any payments to any other host nations.37
The $30 million payment to Djibouti is made in consideration for the access to
and use of the areas and facilities described in the Arrangement in Implementation of the
‘Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the Republic of Djibouti on Access to and Use of Facilities in the Republic of Djibouti’
of February 19, 2003, Concerning the Use of Camp Lemonier and Other Facilities and
Areas in the Republic of Djibouti and its annexes. Under the terms of that implementing
arrangement, any payments made by the United States to Djibouti, consistent with the
land lease of 2003, would be credited against the $30 million. By comparison, a recent
press report notes that Djibouti, which hosts France’s largest military base in Africa,
receives another $36.75 million per year in rent payments from that country.38
Treatment of Bilateral Flows in Posture Analysis
In this section, we discuss the interpretation of the data on host-nation contributions
and U.S. payments. We find that the role of the various bilateral flows in analysis
depends on the context; for example, whether the purpose of the analysis is to
estimate host nation costs
evaluate U.S. fiscal exposure
compare costs of alternative basing locations.
Differences among analytical contexts necessitate case-by-case consideration. To
that end, we offer a simple framework for assessing the relevance of different forms of
support to particular analytical efforts. The framework decomposes costs by bearer.
The total cost of maintaining U.S. forces in a particular location can be described in
terms of costs borne by the United States and costs borne by others, specifically the
host nation:39
Total cost = U.S.-borne costs + U.S. payments + HNS.
“U.S.-borne costs” consist of all direct expenses of maintaining the U.S. presence,
except those reflected in “U.S. payments”; “U.S. payments” consist of payments
made by the United States to the host nation for use of facilities, ranges, and lands; and
“HNS” consists of direct (cash and in-kind) support and indirect (in-kind) support.
Estimating Host-Nation Costs
The cost to the host nation is the resource value of the HNS that it contributes, less
some fraction of the amount of U.S. payments that it receives. Regardless of the value
that the United States places on a particular good or service, the provision of that
good or service, as embodied in HNS, represents a real cost to the host nation if the
host nation could have put the underlying resources to use elsewhere and if the value
attributed to HNS reflects the value of those resources in the alternative uses, i.e., the
market value or opportunity cost associated with the resources.40 Similarly, the value
of underlying resources comes into play in assessing the relationship between U.S. payments
and host-nation costs. If the amount of U.S. payments exceeds the market value
or opportunity cost of the facilities, ranges, or land under consideration, then that
additional amount would offset the host nation’s cost.
The host nation’s cost could be taken as an indicator of that country’s commitment
to the presence of U.S. forces; however, a country lacking financial ability may
have a high level of commitment to the U.S. presence, even if it cannot formalize
that commitment through HNS. Indeed, that country might require remuneration to
counter the strain that hosting would otherwise place on its limited resources. Recognizing
the role of financial ability in establishing the terms of support and payments,
we caution against over-interpreting either a lack of support or, conversely, a request
for payments.
Evaluating Fiscal Exposure
Fiscal exposure, as we use the term, refers to the amount that the United States could
be called upon to pay, were HNS to decline in a particular venue. If a host nation were
to determine that it would or could not continue to provide support at the current
level, e.g., for lack of budgetary and other resources, the United States could find itself
“on the hook” for the amount of the shortfall, if it were to remain in that country.
Alternatively, the United States might choose to shed some activities, hence costs, but
if all the activities are necessary to maintain the U.S. presence, it could lack the flexibility
to do so. Thus, HNS, or some fraction of HNS, can represent a financial risk.
Comparing Costs of Illustrative Postures
To compare the costs of illustrative postures—as in Chapter Ten, based on the models
developed in Chapter Eight—we would look at the bottom lines for U.S. costs associated
with maintaining a U.S. presence at each location under each configuration of
U.S. forces. This bottom line can be represented as either the total cost, less HNS, or
the sum of U.S.-borne costs and U.S. payments; however, whether we would need to
factor any HNS and U.S. payments into our calculations depends on the composition
of the data that we start with, the methods that we use to make our calculations, and
how we define “maintaining a U.S. presence.”
Because we work mostly with DoD cost data—which are primarily but not
entirely accounting data—we are especially interested in the ways in which host-nation
contributions and U.S. payments filter through the DoD cost accounts. In many or
most instances, the DoD cost data are already net of HNS. Netting occurs automatically
when the host nation’s contribution is in-kind and takes the form of a good or
service, so that the contribution is not recorded directly in the DoD cost accounts, or
when the host nation reimburses U.S. expenditures.41,42 In short, DoD cost data and the cost modeling in Chapter Eight largely reflect net DoD spending, with accounting
for HNS “built in” either through the absence of DoD spending for a service or
good or host-nation reimbursement for the same. Albeit less often, the data might also
include elements of U.S. payments that flow through ordinary program accounts.
In those instances in which the data are already net of host-nation contributions
or include U.S. payments, we do not need to draw the bilateral flows into our calculations;
if we did, we would be double-counting them. For example, were we to subtract
Japan’s $2.3 billion cost-sharing contributions from a data-derived estimate of the costs
of U.S. operations in Japan, our “bottom line” could be as much as $2.3 billion too low
because much if not all of that $2.3 billion flows directly from the government of Japan
to goods and services providers, as is the case of in-kind support for labor cost sharing
and facility improvements, or reimburses a U.S. expenditure, as occurs in the context
of utility cost sharing. Similarly, if some fraction of the U.S. payment to Djibouti were
to enter into the DoD cost accounts as an ordinary expense, e.g., an amount used to
cover a lease, we would not want to count it twice.
It is also possible that some host-nation contributions serve a purpose that is
outside the scope of our analysis; that is, they do not line up with our definition of
“maintaining a U.S. presence.” The contributions might, for example, serve to expand
capacity, enhance capabilities, or enable a change of mission. Some of the Japan’s contributions
toward facility improvements or South Korea’s contributions toward construction
might do more than restore, modernize, or recapitalize existing facilities;
some relocation contributions might also fall outside the bounds of an estimate of the
ongoing costs of sustaining overseas posture.
By and large, we conclude that a tally of the DoD cost data can come close to
approximating the sum of U.S.-borne costs and U.S. payments in many environments,
absent any further adjustments. Nevertheless, it is still possible that some of the data
are not fully net of HNS, as should be typical, or inclusive of U.S. payments, thus
necessitating adjustments in our calculations. In such cases, we would need to subtract
the un-netted HNS from the cost tally to credit the contribution and add the excluded
U.S. payments to recognize them.43
If comparing the costs of maintaining a presence in two different foreign locations,
one might need to look more closely at the types and amounts of HNS offered— or expected to be offered—and U.S. payments made—or expected to be made—at
the two locations. Just because one nation offers certain types of support or requires
particular payments does not necessitate that another will follow suit. (The indirect
benefits associated with many SOFAs might present an exception.) When the United
States already maintains a presence in one of those locations, we might have the benefit
of tapping into existing data to calculate a bottom line; if the United States is considering
a new location, we would need to construct a bottom line, using our best estimates
of U.S.-borne costs, U.S. payments, and HNS. Should we observe lower-than-expected
costs in some foreign locations, the provision of HNS (cost sharing in particular) might
then explain the gaps, but it would not negate them.
Moreover, the bottom lines that we calculate for each location, whether foreign
or U.S., must address not just the costs of ongoing operations, but those of additional
spending or investments that might be required in the course of a change of posture. If
a move would require investments in new capacity, e.g., for training or other purposes,
then those costs—and the feasibility of building out that capacity—must be factored
into the analysis.44
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NATO Security Investment Program Contributions
The NSIP is financed by the ministries of defense of each NATO member country,
according to a cost-sharing formula that is based on relative income and other factors,45
and is supervised by the NATO Investment Committee.
NATO describes the NSIP as follows:46
This programme covers major construction and command and control system
investments, which are beyond the national defence requirements of individual
member countries. It supports the roles of the NATO strategic commands by providing
installations and facilities such as air defence communication and information
systems, military headquarters for the integrated structure and for deployed
operations, and critical airfield, fuel systems and harbour facilities needed in support
of deployed forces.
Whereas the data on bilateral contributions and U.S. payments are highly fragmented,
we are able to derive rough estimates of the NATO allies’ contributions to the NSIP—stated as “requirements”—from a combination of U.S. and NATO budget
documents and congressional reports (see Table 7.12).
Table 7.12 U.S. and Other Nations’ Contributions to the NATO Security Infrastructure Program (Measured in nominal $US millions unless stated otherwise)
Under the current cost-sharing formula, the United States covers just over 22 percent
of the total NSIP requirement. The U.S. gross requirement averaged $257 million
annually from 2008 to 2012, with outlays averaging $219 million; other NATO allies’
NSIP requirements averaged about $895 million in aggregate.
Because of the NSIP, the United States bears a smaller share of the infrastructural
costs associated with facilities in which it has a substantial interest than it might otherwise
bear. The DoD budget justification47 for FY 2013 cites three specific examples:
At Aviano Air Base, Italy, NATO funded over $465 million for the beddown of
two fighter squadrons. The projects include both operational and community
support facilities.
At Ramstein Air Base, Germany, NATO has invested over $210 million to provide
strategic air transport infrastructure to include parking aprons, freight and
passenger terminal facilities, and a C-5–capable hangar.
At Naval Station Rota, Spain, NATO has invested $151 million in port infrastructure
upgrades to provide logistics support and resupply facilities for NATO
maritime forces. Additional NSIP investment at Rota will manifest itself through
the approved NATO capability package for strategic air transport. This NATO
capability package includes nearly $83 million for infrastructure upgrades and
recoupment eligibility to support NATO’s Southern European Strategic Air
Transport requirements.
Applying the U.S. share of the overall NSIP requirement, approximately 22 percent,
to the NSIP activities in each location, the U.S. share of the NSIP funds in
Aviano, Ramstein, and Rota would have amounted to about $102 million, $46 million,
and $33 million, respectively.
The implications of the NSIP funding for our posture cost analysis are not clearcut.
Depending on the specific nature of the NSIP program activity, the effects of
NSIP funding on the bottom lines at facilities that benefit from NSIP could differ
markedly.48 A key issue is whether the NSIP project activity constitutes recapitalization
or something more. If recapitalization, we would need to make downward adjustments
in our recapitalization estimates in Chapter Eight, amounting to 78 percent of
the NSIP funding amount; if capacity expansion or capability enhancement, we would
not need to make such adjustments. In the latter case, we would treat the funding as
outside the scope of our cost analysis. On the basis of NATO’s and DoD’s characterizations
of the program, it is plausible that the program activity could constitute either,
but that expansions and enhancements might dominate. Thus, even though NSIP cost
sharing represents a cost savings for the United States—assuming that the United
States would have carried either the full burden or a larger share of the burden of the
NSIP-funded infrastructure cost in the absence of NSIP—the flows of funds through
the program might not be analytically “relevant” for estimating the costs of maintaining
the U.S. overseas posture.
Host-Nation Support Data Collection in the Future
At present, the task of reporting comprehensively on either HNS or U.S. payments is
nearly impossible, owing to the scarcity and fragmentation of the data. By analogy, the
task resembles that of an archeologist attempting to reassemble a shattered vase: We
have unearthed a few pieces that are large enough to tell us that we do, indeed, have a
vase, but not enough to know its true dimensions or contours.
In looking to the future, we might first look to the past for insight. The historical
record, specifically DoD’s Allied Contributions to the Common Defense annual reports,
provides insight in terms of both the value it adds and the value it does not add. On the
one hand, the figures contained in those reports suggest the potential importance of
HNS in funding U.S. requirements overseas. By all appearances, U.S. allies have contributed
substantially over the years, both directly and indirectly. On the other hand,
the difficulty of interpreting and replicating those figures speaks to the importance of
thorough documentation. With hindsight, it is apparent that those reports have less
value than they could have had because of the lack of documentation of methods and
sources.
The historical record also provides insight insomuch as it speaks to the possible
costs of any new effort to collect and compile data in the future. As noted previously,
the resources required to generate the annual reports on allied contributions
were non-negligible.
The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 calls for a return to annual reporting on host
nations’ contributions from 2013 through 2015. Specifically, language in that legislation
requires “the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, [to]
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the direct, indirect,
and burden sharing contributions49 made by host nations to support overseas United
States military installations and United States Armed Forces deployed in country.” The
report should include “at least” a description of all costs associated with stationing U.S.
Armed Forces in the host nation, a description of the host nation’s contributions,50 and
the methodology and accounting procedures used to measure and track host-nation
contributions.
In requiring DoD to document thoroughly its methodology and accounting
procedures, the legislation stands to increase the value of the end product; however,
that product—and its documentation—will come at a cost. Whether the value of the
endeavor outweighs that cost will depend partly on the reasons for collecting the data.
The data could contribute positively to an evaluation of the costs borne by host nations
or of the fiscal exposure associated with the U.S. military’s overseas presence, but might
not contribute as positively to a comparative assessment of the costs of operating at different
locations. For a comparative analysis of the costs to the United States of basing
in foreign and U.S. locations, the estimates that emerge from our and other analyses
employing DoD cost data may be sufficient, in that they provide reasonable approximations
of the bottom lines of operating at the different locations. The additional data
could play a more important part in a comparison of the costs of basing in different
foreign locations, particularly if those locations differ in either their willingness or ability
to provide support. If the U.S. overseas posture shifts toward less-developed parts
of the world where resources are scarcer, it seems likely that HNS will decline and U.S.
payments will increase. Regardless of the intention, it will be worth gauging the necessary
degree of granularity in the data collection and the merits of further refinements.
Implications of Findings on Host-Nation Support and U.S. Payments
for Postures
This chapter responded to the legislative requirement to determine both direct payments
and other contributions from host nations supporting U.S. military facilities
overseas and direct payments by the United States to host nations for use of facilities,
ranges, and lands. It put these contributions and payments in the context of posture
analysis by reporting on the ways in which they can affect the relative costs of maintaining
an overseas presence and discussing how to factor them into analyses of illustrative
postures. Looking at 12 countries that together account for a large majority
of the United States’ overseas military presence, we found that the data are scant and
scattered, but still sufficient to draw a few general conclusions of relevance to posture
decisions.
A close examination of the available data suggests that HNS offsets a meaningful
share of U.S. overseas basing costs in a number of venues, but that sizable amounts of
U.S.-borne costs remain and that contributions and, to a lesser extent, payments, vary
markedly across locations. The data also suggest that Japan, South Korea, and Germany
are among the biggest contributors of HNS to the United States, but the limitations
of the data, including the lack of availability for other countries, make it difficult
to draw cross-country comparisons. We note that some countries, such as Japan, have
been more inclined to make direct contributions and others, such as Germany, have
been more inclined to make indirect contributions. While direct contributions can
be difficult to quantify and value, it can be even more difficult to quantify and value
indirect contributions, which include forgone rent and lease payments and waivers of
taxes, fees, and damage claims.
In contemplating a move from an existing foreign facility to a U.S. location, the
data that we use to develop our cost estimates in Chapters Eight and Ten should yield
reasonable approximations of the bottom lines of operating at either location, with
little need for adjustment. The DoD spending data that we employ in our analyses are
by definition net of most if not all host-nation contributions. In most instances, the
data are either inherently net (i.e., the host nation pays for the good or service directly)
or already netted for us. Nevertheless, we might still need to factor in some U.S. payments,
as would be the case were we to develop a cost estimate for Djibouti.
For a posited move from one foreign location to another foreign location, or from
the United States to a new foreign location, key considerations would include the willingness
and ability of alternative hosts to provide HNS and their need for payments.
Countries experiencing greater fiscal hardship might be less willing or able to provide
support and might be more needful of payments, resulting in higher costs to the
United States, assuming all else to be equal. Although not a focus of this chapter, the
last point merits comment. In reality, all else may not be equal. The calculation of the
bottom line for the United States—that is, the sum of U.S.-borne costs and U.S. payments—
will depend not just on the amount of HNS and U.S. payments that prevail
in a particular location, but also on the costs of obtaining goods and services in that
location. If a country is relatively expensive to operate in because labor, energy, and
other inputs are especially costly, the bottom line for the United States could still be
relatively high, even with substantial HNS and no U.S. payments.
Thus, for the purposes of examining the cost effects of posture changes with
respect to those locations in which we currently operate, the existing cost data can be
used to effectively support the analyses. In contrast, where posture options would contemplate
facilities in nations in which the United States does not have existing facilities,
cost estimating would be more uncertain and have to rely on either analogous situations
or discussions with the prospective host nation. Moreover, it would be important
to consider whether additional spending or investments would be required to change
venues, either from a foreign to U.S. location or one foreign to another foreign location.
If one location presents a full complement of facilities in good condition and another
requires ground-up construction or major R&M or recapitalization, the costs of shifting
from one location to another could be greater than an analysis of current operating
costs might suggest.
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Chapter eight Relative Costs of Overseas Basing and Rotational Presence
This chapter lays out the analyses we conducted to determine the incremental costs
of maintaining the broad range of U.S. installations and forces overseas—by region
and type—versus in the United States, and it explains how we embedded the results
of these analyses in models that provide a policy-relevant way of comparing how total
DoD costs are likely to change as the result of posited posture changes. In doing so,
this chapter describes three cost-assessment methodologies and the derived cost models
developed to comprehensively estimate the cost effects of changes in posture. The first
methodology determines the relative recurring costs of stationing forces and operating
military facilities and training ranges overseas compared with the United States,
accounting for any costs that would simply transfer from one installation or region to
another versus those that would actually change from a DoD standpoint.1 The second
assesses the recurring costs of rotational presence, a possible alternative to permanent
presence, for different types of operational units to different regions. The third methodology
determines one-time investment costs to transition from one posture to another.
Together, the three resulting models enable estimates of how changes to posture would
affect total DoD costs. The models and their parameters are also informative by themselves
for understanding how overseas posture, and changes to it, affects costs.
To conduct the analyses and develop the models, we collected data from each
service across all relevant budget accounts—not just those directly associated with
maintaining installations, such as operations and maintenance funding for installation
support—and from relevant DoD agencies to get a comprehensive picture that is
broader than that typically generated when examining the costs of maintaining facilities
and forces overseas. Additionally, we developed the cost models to get insights into
the incremental costs of overseas presence, as opposed to only determining the actual
costs in given locations. This was necessary to estimate the cost effects of different
posture policy options from a total DoD standpoint. It is only through these models
that we could separate out the costs that would likely change with a modification to
posture versus those costs that would shift to another location, which necessitated the
decomposition of several costs components into fixed and variable cost elements, as
described in the chapter. Budget data do not neatly categorize into these two categories,
which is why could not just use raw budget data to assess the costs associated with
overseas presence. And the data in some budget accounts that are affected by location
and assignment policies, such as allowances in the military personnel accounts, are not
binned and aggregated by location, further necessitating analysis of budget data and
model development.
In this chapter’s introduction, we first define several terms, summarize our analytic
approach, discuss the limitations of our approach, and preview the findings. We
then spend the bulk of the chapter describing our three methodologies and the associated
cost models. Finally, we end the chapter with a discussion of the implications
of this cost analysis for the U.S. military posture. Note that all costs discussed in this
chapter are net of host-nation support.
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Introduction to Cost Analysis
Definitions of Terms
The following key terms are used throughout the report to characterize costs.
Incremental cost, or incremental cost difference, refers to the relative difference
in recurring costs (for similar units, populations, or installations) between the
United States and an overseas region or between two different overseas regions.
Investment cost, or one-time investment cost, refers to the monies needed to shift the
U.S. posture by relocating forces or closing (or vacating) installations.
Recurring costs refers to the annual costs of operating and sustaining forces and
installations, whether in the United States or overseas. For recurring costs, we
draw a further distinction between fixed and variable recurring costs:
–– Fixed costs refers to the recurring costs that are not sensitive to base population
and is basically invariant to the number of people assigned to the base.
–– Variable costs refers to those costs that vary with base population.2
To further explain fixed and variable recurring costs, if forces shift from overseas
to the United States, the variable costs at the “sending” base decrease, and those at the
“receiving” base increase, by the respective variable costs per person for the associated
base types and regions. The fixed costs, because they are insensitive to population,
change (i.e., are eliminated or newly added) only if a base is closed or opened.
Approach to Overall Cost Analysis: Constructing Cost Models
This cost analysis is designed to provide: (1) cost assessments of the illustrative posture
options developed in this report, (2) insights about the key drivers of the costs of overseas
posture to facilitate decisionmaking, and (3) a toolkit—or at least a methodology—
that could potentially be used by DoD to make a rough estimate the cost effects of
other change options. To achieve these goals, we had to develop cost models. There are
three reasons why we take this approach and develop cost models.
First, we needed to evaluate a range of posture options that modify the numbers
and locations of overseas forces and bases in different ways to assess the cost impacts.
To do so, our approach had to be flexible enough to estimate the effects of a range of
changes to posture for which not all of the proposed base locations and their hosted
forces would precisely match the attributes of existing bases and the forces assigned
to them—and thus would be expected to have the same costs as one of them. It also
had to be able to produce results for different posture options quickly as we explored
a range of options. This led us to produce generalized models that we could employ to
estimate the likely cost effects of changing base populations, opening or closing bases,
and adding or eliminating rotations—the three inputs to our models—in ways that
do not match existing cases. In essence, we had to be able to “extrapolate” from existing
cases. In creating a general model, we lose some of the fidelity possible from more
granular analysis specific to each unit and location. But in exchange for some loss of
fidelity, we gain flexibility and explanatory power, while preserving sufficient accuracy
to compare the relative costs of different options to determine whether they offer sufficient
merit from a cost-benefit standpoint to analyze in further depth. In short, the
cost models are designed to provide a decision-support tool for the first phase of a posture
options analysis—what options to develop in more depth with sufficient detail to
more precisely determine cost and operational impacts—not to provide the final specific
costs to inform a specific decision or develop budget estimates for posture change
implementation plans.
Second, we sought to provide decisionmakers with tools to quickly develop and
assess a range of options. To readily develop a range of possibilities, it is valuable for
decisionmakers to understand the major factors that drive costs. By understanding
the relative impact of different factors on cost, decisionmakers can better determine
what options are likely to reduce costs, if that is an aim in the development of posture
options, and what options are likely to increase costs the most if they are seeking to
develop posture options to improve or add new capabilities in a region. To do this, our
cost models must parse the important features of overseas posture, but still allow rapid
computations and be easily understood.
Third, we developed cost models to serve analytical purposes. We believe our
approach accurately enables assessment of the relative cost differences for DoD between
various posture options based on how total costs actually change, which cannot be
done simply using raw budget data for bases or forces. The simplest case of reducing
overseas posture is removing the forces from a given base and closing the base altogether.
In that case, one would not actually save the full scope of annual operating
costs at the base. A portion of the costs are fixed costs and would be saved, but another
portion includes variable costs that would still accrue somewhere in DoD but possibly
at a different level. Whether DoD’s annual recurring variable costs associated with the
personnel at the closing base would change depends on whether there is a difference
between the variable costs at the closing base and those at the base(s) receiving the
forces. Thus, one must also understand the cost structure of the receiving base and how
the fixed and variable costs at a base are split. In short, how the costs in a region change
when a base is closed is not what is of interest. Rather, what is of interest is how total
DoD costs change, involving additions and subtractions for every move. Currently, the
DoD data do not readily decompose into these fixed versus variable costs; thus a modeling
approach to distinguish the two is crucial.
To scale total costs to personnel, one must develop some kind of per-person or
per-unit costs to apply to the force types relocating to the United States. Simply dividing
the total support costs at an installation by the total personnel without taking into
account the fixed and variable cost dynamic would overestimate per-person variable
costs and understate fixed costs dramatically. Just assessing the gross costs of maintaining
the current U.S. overseas posture base by base would have been insufficient,
because this would not enable the evaluation of changes at a base except for full closure
and would not enable evaluation of changes to net DoD costs instead of changes at a
regional or base level. This necessitated the development of generalized cost models.
Approach to Individual Cost Models
Recurring Costs of Permanent Posture
To conduct this analysis, we analyzed the costs incurred by forces and installations to
produce cost models based on the ways those activities actually incur costs. To do so,
we grouped costs into four categories: training, personnel-related, installation-related,
and regional logistics:
Training activity costs are simply the operations and sustainment costs that enable
operational units’ day-to-day operations, excluding the military pay for unit personnel;
they vary in our modeling based on where units are and by unit type.
Personnel-related costs are allowances and permanent-change-of-station (PCS)
moving costs incurred by DoD.3 In our modeling, we estimate how these costs
vary based on location and service.
Installation-related costs include facility operations, maintenance, R&M; family
services; morale, welfare, and recreation; medical services; and dependents’ education.
We also include the construction costs to periodically recapitalize infrastructure,
but, because of the cost dynamics, we take a slightly different approach
than for other installation-related costs. In our modeling, installation-related
costs vary based on whether installations open or close and how many people are
at an installation.
Regional logistics costs are additional logistics costs borne by DoD to support
permanent overseas forces and bases. These costs include additional transportation
costs for overseas delivery of supplies and overseas regional distribution centers,
which form an additional layer of logistics. In our modeling, these costs vary
with the number of people in a region.
Training costs are driven by and assignable to operational units (e.g., a fighter
wing or an infantry brigade) themselves. Data provided by the services indicate that
training costs sometimes vary for like units located in different regions. Some differences
may have to do with differences in the types and frequencies of activities they
conduct (such as partner-nation exercises and training), restrictions on those activities,
or actual cost differentials for the same activities. The annual training cost difference
between the United States and region r for a single unit type j can be expressed as
cjr – cjUS, where cjr is the annual training cost in region r for unit type j, and r = {Pacific,
Europe}. We derive these different costs from service data and models. We apply the
difference in the annual per-unit cost to each instance of a unit relocating from an
overseas region to the United States in our cost estimates for the illustrative postures.
Personnel-related costs are specific to each person based on where they are located,
assignment characteristics, and family status. Allowances are monies provided for specific
needs adjusted for costs specific to a location and the servicemember’s situation
(i.e., living in barracks, on-base housing, or off-base housing, as well as whether accompanied
by dependents) and include housing, the overall cost of living, and compensation
for living apart from their families.4 Additional PCS costs for stationing service
members overseas are incurred because it is more expensive to transport people and
their household goods to and from overseas locations than within the United States.
The rate of PCS moves per person per year may also be higher overseas, depending on
assignment policies. The cost impact from shifting personnel to or from the United
States is Σ(cjr – cjUS)xjr, where cjr – cjUS is the differential cost arising from the difference
between overseas and U.S. cost per person for a person in service j in region r, and xjr
is the number of personnel of service j shifted from or to region r.
For installation-related annual recurring costs, there are fixed-cost components
and variable-cost components. Within installation-related costs, we include installation
support, construction to recapitalize existing infrastructure, and DoD Education
Agency (DODEA) support. For each of these categories of cost in a given region,
the basic model for cost is estimated using a regression model and has the form
cisr = asr + bsr pisr. Here, cisr is the total installation-support cost of installation i of service
s in region r, asr is the fixed-cost component of an installation of service s in region r,
and bsr pisr is the product of the variable cost per person for service s in region r and the
number of personnel at installation i of service s in region r. The personnel we include
as an independent variable (pisr ) are “cost drivers” (the people on an installation who,
by virtue of being assigned there, create demand for installation support), and the personnel
we exclude are part of the installation-support cost dependent variable, cisr. In
applying this model, we explored different variants that employ additional independent
variables. For instance, in the category of installation-support cost, we find that the
fixed cost at an installation sometimes depends on whether operational forces are present
at the installation.
Using this approach for installation-related costs, the annual cost savings (if any)
from relocating forces to the United States depends on whether the sending installation
remains open or closes and whether there is reason to believe the annual fixed
cost at the receiving installation remains the same. In the most common case in our
analysis, the sending installation closes and the fixed cost at the receiving installation is
estimated to not change. In this case, the annual fixed cost at the sending installation
would be saved by DoD. In addition, there might be a savings or increase in variable
cost. However, for installation-support costs, we often find little or no statistically significant
difference between overseas and U.S. estimates of the variable-cost coefficient,
bsr, so the potential savings in the installation-support portion of installation-related
variable costs, (bsr – bUS)pisr, is often zero or relatively low. In other possible cases, the
sending installation remains open and its fixed costs continue to be incurred—hence
no savings in fixed cost.
Finally, regional logistics costs are those borne by DoD to support permanent
overseas forces and bases within a specific region. These costs include the higher cost of
transportation for the delivery of supplies overseas relative to within the United States
and regional distribution centers. Most supplies are brought into the DoD supply
system through U.S. distribution centers or delivered directly from U.S. suppliers. It
simply costs more to ship items overseas than around the United States, and sometimes
it is necessary or costs less to stock them overseas, necessitating regional distribution centers.5 We determine the incremental logistics costs for the delivery of supplies overseas
on a regional basis and then convert this to cost per person.
We aggregate these various cost assessments into a single, recurring-cost model
that estimates the cost impacts of changes in postures. When personnel are relocated
from overseas to the United States as the result of a unit restationing, we apply the
relative training cost differences, if any, for their unit type. We also apply the perperson
costs aggregated from personnel-related costs, the variable-cost component of
installation-related costs support, and per-person regional logistics costs. When a base
is closed, we also apply the fixed-cost component of the installation-support cost to
determine the change in costs.
Before we step into the details of our recurring cost analysis, we briefly discuss
some of the statistical concepts relevant to our analysis. First, sample size was often a
constraining factor for the portions of our analysis where we used regression analysis,
thereby limiting the ability to assess too many different factors and in some cases limiting
the ability to produce significant modeling results. Generally, the sample sizes
for U.S. bases (several dozen data points for each service) were adequate to develop
parameter estimates with reasonable standard errors for statistical significance and that
fit the data well to provide strong explanatory power. The case was rarely the same
for overseas bases. For each service, there were usually 5–10 data points per region, or
even fewer—too few from which to perform separate regression analyses, and usually
too few from which to derive consistent (and reasonable) parameter estimates for each
region separately. Sometimes we overcame this by combining regions to develop an
aggregate overseas estimate, sometimes we excluded one or more outliers in a set typically
associated with unique installation characteristics, and sometimes the data points
were simply too few, and we sought to estimate costs for individual data points (i.e.,
bases) instead of using generalized modeling results.
Finally, we used a linear specification for the relationship of personnel to support
costs, rather than an alternative, such as logarithmic or quadratic. There were several
reasons for this. The primary reason is that military planning factors for personnel and
facility planning explicitly include linear formulations for requirements determination.
Personnel planning factors that define the number of personnel authorized for given
activities, such as food service, medical support, and facility maintenance, often use
linear relationships. These are formulated in the same way as the regression equation
we discussed above: cisr = asr + bsr pisr, where the fixed component, asr, is the management overhead element, and the variable component is driven by the base population.6 Likewise,
DoD facilities planning factors include linear requirements, such as an amount
of space (e.g., square feet) required per person. Second, we found that most data plots
suggest linear relationships. These data plots can be seen in Appendix A. Finally, we
tested alternative specifications for several cases. In cases where the plots did not appear
as convincingly to be linear, we tested alternative specifications. We found these alternatives
to provide no better, and in almost all cases worse, fit to the data and to produce
counterintuitive (and in some cases absurd) cost equations.
Costs of Rotational Presence
To develop a cost model for estimating the costs of rotational presence, we examined
the costs associated with the deployment of personnel and equipment, prepositioning
equipment, supporting personnel, and special compensation for deployment. We built
the model to estimate how changes in presence levels and policy options would affect
costs. Presence level is a function of rotation frequency and length, which both affect
costs in the model. Policy options include whether or not equipment is prepositioned,
and, if not, whether airlift or sealift is used to transport unit equipment. The final
cost factor is whether or not the United States has or maintains a base in the region to
which the units rotate, whether the host nation provides base support in other cases,
and whether base operating support would have to be established and provided for the
rotating unit.
Investment Costs for Restationing Forces
To determine one-time investment costs for moving forces to a new location or closing
bases, we developed an investment cost model incorporating personnel-related movement
and separation; base-related closure costs, including support contract termination,
mothball/shutdown, severance to foreign civilians, labor contract settlement costs,
and a range of one-time unique costs; and construction of new facilities to host the
units. Because of the uncertainties inherent in potential environmental cleanup costs
and in the potential gains from the residual value of facilities returned to host nations,
we excluded these costs from our assessment of investment costs. We used standard
DoD rates for the personnel-related costs, and we mined past reports to develop estimates
of base closure costs. We used regression modeling similar to that used for the
recurring-cost analysis to determine new facility requirements. In this modeling, we
determined relationships between the number of people at a base and the value of the
facilities there, again decomposing the facility value into fixed and variable costs, with
fixed costs, for example, representing facilities for which only one on a base might be
needed (e.g., commissary).
Read more on: Cost Analysis
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The following list shows all technologies that I have used in my daily work for a long time and gained a deep understanding of them by learning about their inner workings or technical backgrounds.
The following list shows some technologies that I made myself more familiar with out of personal interest. Thus, I have more than just a basic level of understanding about them, but no expert level experience. I am currently digging into the language Q# as well as the basics of quantum computing in general.


| Class | Description |
|---|---|
| AbstractAntJavaBasedPlay2Mojo |
Base class for Ant Java task using mojos.
|
| AbstractAntJavaBasedPlay2Mojo.JavaRunnable |
Internal runnable wrapper for Ant Java task.
|
| AbstractArchivingMojo |
Base class for Play! packaging mojos.
|
| AbstractPlay2AssetsCompileMojo | |
| AbstractPlay2DistMojo |
Base class for Play! distribution packaging mojos.
|
| AbstractPlay2EnhanceMojo | |
| AbstractPlay2Mojo |
Abstract base class for Play! Mojos.
|
| AbstractPlay2ServerMojo |
Base class for Play! server mojos.
|
| AbstractPlay2SourceGeneratorMojo |
Source generator base class for Play!
|
| AbstractPlay2StartServerMojo |
Base class for Play! server asynchronously starting ("start" and "start-server") mojos.
|
| AbstractPlay2StopServerMojo |
Base class for Play! server stopping ("stop" and "stop-server") mojos.
|
| LessDependencyCache | |
| MavenFileWatchLogger |
Maven
Log wrapper implementing FileWatchLogger interface. |
| MavenPlay2Builder | |
| PidFileDeleter |
Shutdown hook responsible for deleting "server.pid" file.
|
| Play2ClosureCompileMojo |
Compile JavaScript assets
|
| Play2CoffeeCompileMojo |
Compile Coffee Script assets
|
| Play2DistExplodedMojo |
Create exploded Play! framework and Play! application (standalone distribution).
|
| Play2DistMojo |
Package Play! framework and Play! application as one zip achive (standalone distribution).
|
| Play2EbeanEnhanceMojo |
Enhence Ebean entity classes
|
| Play2EnhanceClassesMojo |
Enhance Java classes
|
| Play2LessCompileMojo |
Compile Less assets
|
| Play2RoutesCompileMojo |
Compile routes
|
| Play2RunMojo |
Run Play! server in development mode (
sbt run equivalent). |
| Play2StartMojo |
Start Play! server in production mode (
sbt start equivalent). |
| Play2StopMojo |
Stop Play! server started in production mode (
sbt stop equivalent). |
| Play2TemplateCompileMojo |
Compile Scala templates
|
Copyright © 2013–2018. All rights reserved.


Numbers 7:54
On the eighth day offered Gamaliel the son of Pedahzur, prince of the children of Manasseh:


Orm
Orm is short for Object
Relational Mapper which does 2 things: it maps your database table rows to objects and it allows you
to establish relations between those objects.
It follows the
Active Record Pattern closely, but was also influenced by other systems.
Introduction
Unlike many other ActiveRecord implementations, ours is small, fast and dead simple to use. It attempts to make creating, updating and deleting items from your database as easy as possible. It does this by doing all the hard work for you.
Installation
The Orm package is included in the Fuel download. All you need to do is enable it in your config.
'always_load' => array(
'packages' => array(
'orm',
),
),
Object Caching
By default, the ORM implements object caching, to ensure data consistency. Consider the following example:
// fetch a customer record from the client table by its id key
$customer = Model_Clients::find($id);
// give the user a minumum discount of 10%
if ($customer->discount < 10)
{
$customer->discount = 10;
}
// fetch the same customer record
$client = Model_Client($id);
// print the clients discount
echo $client->discount;
If you would have used standard database queries, you would expect the printout to show the value of "discount" as it is stored in the table record for this customer. With the ORM, thanks to object caching, this is not the case. Both queries return the same object (by reference), so the change to $customer will be reflected in $client. If you would var_dump() both variables, you will see that they are identical, with the same object #id.
You can disable the retrieval from cache for a subsequent query using:
// fetch a customer record from the client table by its id key
$customer = Model_Clients::find($id);
// fetch as a new object using array notation
$client1 = Model_Client($id, array('from_cache' => false));
// fetch as a new object using chaining
$client2 = Model_Client::query()->from_cache(false)->where('id', '=', $id)->get_one();
If you would dump these three variables, you will see that the objects will have unique #id's, and modifying one will not change the other. You can also enable this behaviour globally, so ORM results will never be cached. You need this for example in tasks, for batch operations. You wouldn't want to store thousands of objects in memory!
// globally disable the ORM object cache
\Orm\Query::caching(false);
If you have disabled the caching globally, you can enable it on a per-query basis:
// fetch a customer record from the client table by its id key
$customer = Model_Clients::find($id);
// fetch as a new object using array notation
$client1 = Model_Client($id, array('from_cache' => true));
// fetch as a new object using chaining
$client2 = Model_Client::query()->from_cache(true)->where('id', '=', $id)->get_one();
And finally, if you really know you are not going to need or use ORM object caching, you can also create an orm.php configuration file in your application config directory, and add:
<?php
return array(
// global query settings
'caching' => true,
);
Under specific circumstances, you may need to flush the complete ORM cache, or part of it. For example it you run a batch processor or queue worker, to run background tasks. Since it always runs, it will always re-use it's cache, which can lead to cached values being reused while the database has been altered in the meantime. To flush, use:
// flush the complete ORM cache
\Orm\Model::flush_cache(null);
// flush the cache for a specific model
\Some\Model\Name::flush::cache();
// or by class name
\Orm\Model::flush_cache('Some\Model\Name');
Troubleshooting
Some common problems and frequent questions.
My relations/foreign keys aren't being saved (1)
This happens most often when you're using the wrong type of relationship. Especially Has-one and Belongs-to tend to get mixed up. Reread the examples in the docs to make sure you're using the correct relation types and check if everything is configured correctly.
I can't relate objects (2)
Make sure your model is extending Orm\Model
and not Model_Crud
.
I get an exception that my related model in a package/module can't be found
Make sure the package or module is loaded by Fuel, otherwise the Autoloader won't be able to find
the class.
And when configuring the related model "model_to"
make sure you configure the full
classname, this includes the namespace even if you're in that namespace. Classnames in
strings are always taken from global context, no matter the current namespace context.
I get an Orm\FrozenObject exception
Objects can't be edited while being saved to the database, that prevents circular saving and resaving
already saved objects. This shouldn't happen during normal usage and is most often caused by faulty
configuration of relations.
Sometimes this can be caused by a bug, especially when you're not using a stable release.
I have defined a limit and offset, but the results are not correct
The ORM always makes sure that query results are consistent. If you run a query that contains related models, a subquery will be generated to make sure the entire related resultset is fetched. Even if this means more records then the limit you have set will be fetched. This is because once you start manipulating incomplete resultsets, very bad things might happen to your related models.
If you are absolutely sure you are not going to manipulate the results, for example because you need them for pagination only, you can use rows_limit() and rows_offset() instead, which will force them on the entire query.
My query result doesn't reflect the record values in the database
Familiarize yourself with ORM object caching, see the explanation given above.


Inspired Meals Prep Search
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Google guidelines to make beautiful products
Front-end toolkit with a responsive grid system and prebuilt components
JavaScript library which makes front-end development easier
Huge collection of icons for web development
Module bundler which packs and optimizes all static files
CSS preprocessor which makes CSS writing easier


Nos of Users :
Nos of Reports Received :
Nos of Police Station :
Enter 10 Digit Registered Phone Number :
Search
List of Police Station
Emergency Incoming Help Details
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Let the wheel decide your stomach
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App created by Jerry Huang and Steven Zhu
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1 Samuel 14:48
And he gathered an host, and smote the Amalekites, and delivered Israel out of the hands of them that spoiled them.


In QuantConnect, the self.Debug()
method is the equivalent of the log.info()
function in Quantopian.
Debug output is viewable via the QuantConnect Terminal Console.
Output to the console via self.Debug()
is rate-limited.
If you need long-term storage of your logs and don't want to overflow the console,
consider using self.Log()
instead.
An example comparing logging between Quantopian and QuantConnect is shown below.
Quantopian
def initialize(context): log.info("Hello, console!")
QuantConnect
class MyLoggingAlgorithm(QCAlgorithm): def Initialize(self) -> None: self.Debug("Hello, console!") self.Log("Hello, backtesting logs!")
Logging via self.Log()
has daily limits in QuantConnect.
On the free tier, users are limited to 10KB of logs per day for your account/organization.
To increase this limit, you can upgrade your account to a different tier. Calls to self.Debug()
will also count towards the 10KB log limit, but are always outputted to the Terminal Console regardless of
your daily log limit.
To view pricing and upgrade your account, visit the Organization Pricing page.
You can view the logs generated via self.Log()
for a backtest
by first accessing a backtest, and clicking the "Logs" tab near the bottom of the page.
To download the logs, you can click the "Download Logs" link to download a text file containing
your backtest's logs.