返回主页
结论：价值观和优先级
目录
Chapter eleven Conclusions
Minimum Essential Posture Needs
Regional Considerations (Europe)
Regional Considerations (The Pacific)
Regional Considerations (Middle East)
Value Perceptions and Priorities Are Critical to Posture Decisions
Chapter eleven Conclusions
This report responds to legislation that called for an independent assessment of the
overseas basing presence of U.S. forces. It specifically asked for an assessment of the
location and number of forces needed overseas to execute the national military strategy,
as well as an assessment of the advisability of changes to overseas basing in light of
potential fiscal constraints and the changing strategic environment. We conclude that
there are some enduring minimum overseas posture needs that are necessary to execute
the current national security strategy. The location and minimum number of forces
needed are generated by formal commitments, critical deterrence needs, and the basic
premise in U.S. national strategies and plans that the ability to sustain global power
projection is essential. We also conclude that it is advisable to maintain an overseas
posture that goes beyond these minimums, where the security value-added outweighs
the financial costs and risks. Both how much additional posture and the nature of that
posture that is advisable depend on several key questions that do not have definitive
answers and that require the application of decisionmaker judgment to weigh the benefits
and risks. We identify these questions and the implications of different answers
for the advisability of posture changes in this chapter. Advisability could also depend
on how decisionmakers prioritize the benefits of forward posture versus the value that
could be produced by using the same resources for other defense capabilities.
返回页首
Minimum Essential Posture Needs
There are several posture elements clearly needed to achieve U.S. strategic goals. The
ability to be globally responsive is at the core of the U.S. national security strategy.
This requires a global network of ports and air bases—infrastructure and access—and
the air and sea lift assets to move forces through that global network. Forward naval
forces also provide response flexibility, as well as playing a role in protecting freedom
of movement for commerce. In addition, there are other global enablers, such as communications
capabilities, that forward forces rely on and that link them to national
capabilities.
Where the United States has identified major threats, in-place forces are essential
for deterrence and to respond immediately to aggression to prevent defeat. This mandates
having presence in South Korea, across East Asia, and in the Middle East, with
the level and nature of advisable presence depending on answers to the key questions
we pose. Similarly, treaty commitments and other agreements to protect partners and
regions against missile and nuclear threats set forth minimum needs in Europe, in
addition to creating the need for greater presence in South Korea, East Asia, and the
Middle East. While these needs establish clear essential elements of overseas posture,
the best set of specific capabilities and locations required within these broad elements
depends on the judgment of policymakers; there may be equally effective substitute
sets. Beyond these foundations, U.S. strategy also seeks to pursue security cooperation
in all regions. Whether that is more cost-effective through permanent presence or
rotational presence—and how much of either might be needed—rests on judgments
regarding the level and nature of engagement necessary to achieve U.S. goals.
Table 11.1 summarizes the essential elements of posture. In the remainder of this
chapter, we discuss the judgments that should inform the specific choices within these
essential elements, particularly with respect to configuring posture to meet deterrence,
assurance, and security cooperation goals.
Table 11.1 Essential Elements of Overseas Posture
Changes Advisable to Consider Depending on Strategic Judgments
Barring a dramatic shift in the U.S. national security strategy, the current overseas
posture can continue to serve U.S. interests into the future. DoD has already made
significant reductions in its European posture. U.S. posture in Asia is shifting to
address the changing security environment in that region and new strategic priorities.
Enduring posture in the Middle East and Central Asia relies primarily on rotational
forces, base access, and prepositioned equipment and supplies. U.S. security goals in
Africa and Latin America are met through engagement, primarily by small, specialized
forces through deployments, rather than permanent presence. There are, however,
posture changes beyond those currently planned that could be reasonable to consider.
Table 11.2 summarizes existing posture elements that could merit more in-depth examination
for potential realignment depending on decisionmaker evaluations of the strategic
environment and judgments on priorities. Table 11.3 summarizes new elements
of posture that could merit pursuit depending on strategic evaluations and priorities.
If decisionmakers especially value deterrence and assurance, concentrating in
areas that position U.S. forces to respond to potential high-threat adversaries would be
most valuable, if these forces are not overly exposed and vulnerable to large and accurate
missile forces.
Table 11.2 Elements of Overseas Posture That Could Be Evaluated for Realignment/Closure
Table 11.3 New Elements of Posture That Could Be Considered
If decisionmakers especially value broad-based, intensive security cooperation,
then significant increases in rotations—force structure permitting—to Southeast Asia,
Eastern Europe, and Africa could be merited. Any significant reductions of permanent
forces and locations overseas would incur risk.
If reducing cost is the overriding priority, there are some options for realignment
for the United States to consider against forgone benefits: much of the remaining Army
presence in Europe; much of the Air Force presence in the UK and some of its forces
in Central Europe; the level of rotational presence in the Middle East; and Army, Air
Force, and, to a lesser degree, Marine Corps presence in Japan. These would entail significant
strategic trade-offs, particularly security cooperation in Europe and its periphery
and assurance in the Asia-Pacific region.
更多资讯，请访问： retter2012.com 。
The following section assesses the three main overseas regions of U.S. military
presence to highlight the key policy questions for overseas posture, based on enduring
and evolving national security concerns.
返回页首
Regional Considerations (Europe)
Europe
In Europe, forces and bases have been reduced substantially, with planned cuts taking
USAREUR forces 90 percent below their Cold War peak and USAFE forces more than
75 percent below their Cold War peak. The deterrence needs in Europe have largely
waned, with Europe projected to remain relatively stable. Forces in Europe, though,
help to maintain NATO cohesion and still likely provide some assurance to partners in
Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, given their apprehension about the long-term trajectory
of Russia. There is some deployment-responsiveness advantage to be gained from
stationing forces in Europe for operations outside of Europe, but it is limited. However,
mobility bases, key communications nodes, and regional medical capabilities all support
intertheater responsiveness and sustainment and, thus, are critical. Bases in Central
and Southern Europe can support air operations around the periphery of Europe,
providing immediate response value, as do naval forces in the Mediterranean. However,
the ground forces based in Europe do not provide a significant deployment benefit
to other theaters. For instance, deploying an ABCT from Germany to Kuwait takes
about 18 days, only about four days quicker than a comparable force coming from the
east coast of the United States—assuming no delay waiting for an LMSR in Europe—
and, if a situation is time-sensitive, lighter units can be airlifted from CONUS in a
time span comparable to those for European-based units. The exception would be
response times for special operations forces or other small units conducting missions
in which mere hours matter. BMD capabilities fulfill commitments and provide assurance
to regional partners. Beyond these capabilities, U.S. forces play a significant role
in enabling security cooperation, but the amount and nature of security cooperation in
Europe that is necessary or advisable, particularly given the need to consider competing
requirements and resource constraints, presents a policy choice.
In short, for forces in Europe, the central question is: How much does U.S. presence
assure allies, and how much is security cooperation valued? Each service member
based in Europe costs about an additional $15,000–40,000 per year, depending on the
service, with fixed costs of each European installation costing between $115 million
and $210 million per year, due to factors such as the high cost of living, accompanied
tours, and lower levels of HNS than key Asian allies. Can substantial cuts beyond current
plans be made in Europe to reduce costs while
maintaining sufficient alliance cohesion and interoperability with NATO partners?
adequately developing capabilities of new partners?
maintaining partner willingness to conduct operations outside of Europe when
the United States sees vital interests?
Three aspects of European-based posture contribute to security cooperation. The
first is advanced multinational training center capacity, exemplified by the JMTC in
Germany, which supports advanced military training with NATO partners and training
with emerging partners to improve their capabilities. For ground forces, training
facilities in Eastern Europe have also facilitated opportunities for the latter. For air
forces, there is the Warrior Preparation Center near Ramstein Air Force Base.
The second aspect is operational forces, both combat units and support or enabling
units. Fewer forces in Europe would lead to fewer security cooperation activities, as the marginal cost of such events is very low for forces stationed in Europe. Without continuous
presence, the opportunities for a broad range of security cooperation engagements
would decrease, with planning more difficult and greater lead times required. Additionally,
the direct expenses would be larger and more transparent, potentially depressing
the willingness to execute rotational deployments or small-scale security cooperation
activities. At the higher end, some of the unit-oriented tactical training could
be compensated for through rotational training, particularly if JMTC were retained.
But the ability to combine lower-level training events through the course of the year
would lessen. This second effect might be greater with enabling units that focus security
cooperation efforts on building specialized capabilities, such as logistics, medical,
air-ground operations, and intelligence units. The reduction would occur not only in
countries that host U.S. bases, but also in regions around Europe’s periphery, such as
Eastern Europe, Africa, and Central Asia.
The third aspect is forces that focus on the strategic and operational level of
engagement, such as headquarters units. A sizable reduction in forces would likely
lead to a downgrade of headquarters levels that would lessen senior leader engagement
activity. It would be possible to keep the command structure intact, though, to preserve
this capability, with forces being shifted to EUCOM and its components when
operational needs merit, much like CENTCOM.
We now turn to the spectrum of possibilities. The minimum permanent presence
in Europe must preserve bases to support air-based contingency response around the
periphery, mobility hubs, air and missile defense, communications capabilities, and
limited quick-response capability. As Figure 11.1 illustrates, to the extent that security
cooperation is less valued, further reductions could be made.
Figure 11.1 Posture Tradespace in Europe
The option that would go the furthest would restation most Army forces and
about half of the remaining Air Force units, while closing a number of bases—
including training facilities. The middle change option would reduce force structure
somewhat, removing an Army BCT and some enablers along with some Air Force consolidation.
A limited change option would consolidate a couple of Air Force bases. The
final option would be to make no changes beyond those already planned by the Army
and Air Force. In parallel with any of these, rotations could be increased or decreased
from those planned. High levels of rotations could make up for much of the forgone
unit-level tactical training, but with a significant reduction in the savings from reduced
permanent presence. It would also depend on keeping JMTC open or working out
agreements with allies to use their bases and training facilities.
The option shown in the bottom box of Figure 11.1 would greatly reduce security
cooperation activities and could affect assurance, but would reduce costs by about
$2 billion per year. Adding JMTC back in with increased Army and Air Force rotations
could mitigate the tactical-level reduction in interoperability and building new partner
capability effects, but would offset up to half of the savings. Savings for the second and third cases would be much smaller, ranging from $200 million to $500 million, with
fewer effects on security cooperation, especially if augmented with rotations.
At a higher level of strategic consideration, these forces have underpinned U.S.
relationships with partners in Europe. A posture that removed most forces would move
those relationships into uncharted waters, in which it would be difficult to predict
the consequences. This said, it should be noted that the United States has maintained
strong relationships elsewhere without strong presence, such as with Australia. Moreover,
force reductions could be partially (though not fully) mitigated with the provision
of more specialized capabilities such as cyber, missile defense, and special operations
forces.
In summary, if decisionmakers think only limited security cooperation with
European partners is needed to maintain interoperability and that strong relationships
can be maintained without a substantial permanent presence in Europe, then it could
be advisable to further reduce Army and Air Force presence in Europe, either to reduce
costs or to increase posture in other regions.
To support the national security strategy, a reduced permanent presence in Germany
would likely need to be accompanied by some level of increased rotations. This
direction would protect assets fundamental to formal European commitments, enable
increased rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific—if the resources were so redirected—
preserve the European links in the mobility infrastructure that enables global response,
and reflect calls in strategic guidance for a greater reliance on rotations and evolving
the European-based posture. The challenge would be ensuring that rotations and other
senior leader engagements remain sufficient to maintain interoperability and promote
the development of partners. Additionally, operational plans would have to be carefully
analyzed to determine whether any specific forces would need to be retained in Europe
and to otherwise incorporate greater use of U.S.-based forces.
返回页首
Regional Considerations (The Pacific)
The Pacific
The Pacific has grown substantially in its economic importance to the United States
in recent decades, and the United States seeks to continue to contribute to stability
in the region by engaging with partners and exploring ways to work bilaterally and
multilaterally to address security problems. The United States deters aggression from
North Korea, as it has for over 60 years, and pursues a number of security interests in
Southeast Asia, such as helping the Philippines to address insurgent threats and helping
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to maintain security in the Strait of Malacca.
China’s unsettled border disputes have flared up in recent years, and the United States
seeks to play a constructive role in preventing those disputes from spinning out of
control.
A major challenge to meeting deterrence and assurance goals with the current
basing structure is the emerging threat from long-range precision-guided weapons.
The majority of U.S. facilities in the region are in South Korea and Japan. All of these
facilities sit in the heaviest threat zones and face long-range threats from either North
Korea or China, or both. These weapons threaten air bases in particular, but can also
include variants designed to target surface ships and concentrated ground forces. The
geography of the Pacific narrows the options that can be considered because there are
so few suitable alternative operating locations in Northeast Asia.
更多资讯，请访问： retter2012.com 。
The central questions for this region are as follows:
Will increased presence in the Pacific strengthen deterrence, and how should posture
address the missile threat?
What level and types of presence are most valuable?
Should bases near China be dispersed, hardened, or reduced in response to the
missile threat?
How much is security cooperation and assurance in the Asia-Pacific region valued?
In Japan, the U.S. homeports one aircraft carrier and numerous surface ships
at Yokosuka, with another major naval base at Sasebo, where an ARG resides. F-18
fighter aircraft are stationed at Atsuki and Iwakuni, with F-16s and P-3s at Misawa in
northern Japan. Finally, an airlift wing operates from Yokota airbase in Tokyo. In Okinawa,
Kadena Air Base is home to a composite wing that includes F-15 fighter aircraft
and a second air base used by the USMC, Futenma. Key elements of the 31st MEU
reside in Okinawa, with rotational units filling it out. Okinawa is also home to the
III MEF HQ Group, most of the First Marine Air Wing, the Third Marine Logistics
Group, and elements of the Third Marine Division, with additional infantry and aviation
detachment rotations from the United States.
For those who believe it necessary to maintain a forward presence at these locations
to deter and assure, despite threats from precision-guided weapons, there are
a few broad options. These facilities could be hardened and protected with missile
defenses or the number and mix of aircraft and ships could be reduced—either aiming
to restation them elsewhere in the Pacific or back to the United States, striking a balance
between assurance and operational resilience.1 Such measures would make these
bases less vulnerable—though certainly not invulnerable—to attack. Furthermore, in
the context of efforts to add capabilities to the Pacific region, it may not make sense
to add them to facilities in the highest threat zones. While clearly the intent of keeping
forces in a potentially vulnerable location is to bolster assurance and deterrence, if
doing so leaves U.S. forces open to a crippling attack, it might have the opposite effect.
Alternatively, the number and kinds of aircraft and ships that are based at these facilities
could be changed, again so as not to present such a lucrative target while yet retaining
military utility. For fighter aircraft, this problem could become more acute when
Joint Strike Fighters begin to enter the inventory, because the number of fighters in the
entire U.S. inventory will decline, potentially reducing the tolerance for accepting risks
to aircraft. Ships that homeport in high-threat zones are vulnerable in port, but with
sufficient attack warning can head to sea and reduce this vulnerability. So for ships,
assumptions about attack warnings are important in choosing among options. A final
option, dispersal to many bases, may be challenging given limited options for gaining
access to enough facilities to effectively dilute the inventory of attacking missiles.
Moreover, fighters require special facilities to handle weapons, which would need to be
provided at dispersed locations. There are more dispersal options with regard to large
support aircraft, which can operate from dual-use civilian airfields—often without any
special modifications to existing infrastructure. If such a strategy is pursued, it may
have implications for costs and U.S. requests for host-nation burden sharing, because it would involve a shift of resources to a larger number of facilities possibly located away
from close allies who have provided substantial HNS.2
For those who believe that the implications for deterrence and assurance would
be limited were there to be major changes to forces in Japan, the U.S. footprint could
be reduced. The United States has already developed plans and begun to shift forces to
Guam and other locations in the Pacific through restationing and the shifting of rotational
deployment locations. While some of these locations are still potentially under
some threat from Chinese missiles, the threat is qualitatively different from the threat
faced by forces in Japan or South Korea.
更多资讯，请访问： retter2012.com 。
The Navy has moved some of its submarine force forward to Guam to increase
undersea presence in the Pacific. Similar moves may be warranted for the surface fleet,
particularly the carrier fleet, but also amphibious vessels and cruisers/destroyers. Forward
stationing of vessels is only one essential element to increase naval forward presence;
additional homeporting in the Pacific would also have to be tied to changes in
personnel and maintenance policies and schedules to achieve the maximum presence
benefit of overseas homeporting. So while forward stationing of assets can improve
availability to an extent, naval presence is more influenced by the size of the fleet
than the level of overseas basing. Were one to consider substantially increasing FDNF,
the benefits of increased naval presence and responsiveness would need to be weighed
against the financial costs and feasibility of aligning personnel, training, and maintenance
policies. So in the near term, increasing presence in the Pacific is likely to
demand reducing presence elsewhere.
Currently, the USMC posture in the Pacific is in transition. As agreed to with
Japan and Australia, the Marine Corps plans to reduce some forces in Okinawa, maintain
a rotational presence in northern Australia, establish a substantial presence in
Guam, and increase forces in Hawaii. DoD has set a policy goal of having 22,000
Marines based west of Hawaii.
For humanitarian response and security cooperation, the dedicated MEU/ARG
in the Pacific provides unique capabilities. Beyond the value of keeping the 31st MEU
in the Pacific, there seem to be several open questions regarding the USMC posture in
the Pacific. In addition to the 2,200-strong 31st MEU, over half of which is constituted
through rotations, there are substantial numbers of other ground, logistics, and MEF
headquarters group marines stationed or rotationally deployed to Okinawa, comprising
a substantial number of the 13,000 permanently stationed and 5,600 rotationally
deployed (when the UDPs are fully reinstituted) marines in Okinawa. However, the
absence of dedicated lift for the other ground and logistics forces makes their forward
position less of an advantage. If the forces are to fly to a contingency location to marry
up with equipment, their presence in Okinawa or elsewhere in the Western Pacific saves limited travel time. If they require maritime lift, that will have to come from
the United States, erasing the responsiveness advantage of forward presence, or from
the addition of dedicated, collocated maritime lift. In contrast, fixed-wing strike aircraft
in Japan can operate from home bases in the event of contingencies in the region
(although they could also deploy rapidly to expansible bases from the United States),
and rotary-wing aircraft can self-deploy from Okinawa within the region, but they
could not from CONUS. However, the Marine Corps may not want to station aircraft
units apart from ground forces.
The Marine Corps pays more to have forces forward stationed on Pacific islands
than in CONUS. The annual costs of keeping marines in Hawaii are a little higher
than in Japan, and costs in Guam are likely to be higher as well. In addition, construction
costs in Guam are the highest, although Japan has agreed to make a substantial
contribution to construction there. We estimate that restationing all but the MEU elements
and aviation units to CONUS (instead of potentially elsewhere in the Pacific)
and not reinstituting two of three UDP rotations (leaving just the one for the battalion
landing team and aviation detachment for the MEU) would save roughly $200 million
per year. In addition, construction costs are likely to be similar or lower in CONUS,
even considering the substantial contribution to construction in Guam for marines
that Japan has agreed to make.3
更多资讯，请访问： retter2012.com 。
Thus, depending on how decisionmakers assess the benefit that additional Marine
Corps forces beyond the 31st MEU play in Okinawa or elsewhere in the Pacific, with
respect to assurance, security cooperation, and responsiveness, keeping them there
merits weighing against the somewhat higher costs, the lack of dedicated lift beyond
the one ARG, the potential threats to Okinawa from China, the opposition in some
quarters in Okinawa to a continued U.S. presence there, and the training limitations
for marines stationed there. Among these considerations, the biggest is likely to be how
it would affect Japanese and other regional nations’ perceptions of U.S. commitments
to the region. One possibility to ameliorate this risk would be to retain the III MEF
Command Element in the region to preserve frequent high-level engagement activities.
The broader decision to keep these forces in the Pacific also merits linkage to the Navy’s
force-structure considerations, particularly if the intention is to increase the presence of
MEU/ARGs or otherwise mobile MEU-sized MAGTFs in the Pacific, which might be
one, but not the only, objective. If so, the Navy might have to shift some of its amphibious
fleet to the Pacific. For training purposes, ideally USMC and USN forces preparing
to embark on a MEU/ARG would be located close enough to train together, but as
of the writing of this report, there are no plans to locate more amphibious ships near
Marine Corps forces in the western Pacific.
To guide these decisions, it may be helpful to consider what factors are being used
to guide and judge the Marine Corps posture in the Pacific. Currently, one guideline is the number of marines based west of the International Date Line. A more operational
metric might be considered to identify the operational capabilities and response times
desired, while still providing assurance.4 The expeditionary orientation of the Marine
Corps might make meeting presence, or at least responsiveness, goals through other
means than forward basing possible. For example, it may be that if greater Marine
Corps presence in the Pacific is desired, alternative deployment concepts, such as flying
marines from the United States for rotations on which they employ prepositioned
equipment stored in Southeast Asia, could meet policy intentions. Similarly, engagement
goals may be met by using units much smaller than MEU-sized MAGTFs, with
less-frequent large exercises with partners handled through deployments from the
United States. For example, if a country in Southeast Asia were to agree to allow joint
high-speed vessels port access, these might be used to transport smaller numbers of
marines within the region, who could fly from their home station to conduct regional
engagement rotations aboard these vessels.
In the Pacific, the United States is trying to improve responsiveness in Southeast
Asia with rotational forces in Singapore, the Philippines, and Australia. In addition,
this increases the number and frequency of security cooperation activities with Southeast
Asian partners. Whether policymakers view this as sufficient could have implications
for the overseas posture. If greater responsiveness or security cooperation is
desired, the Navy or Marine Corps presence in the region could be increased. If host
nations were willing, the USAF rotational presence in the region could be increased.
Such a rotational presence could help to increase the response capabilities of U.S. forces,
improve training benefits to regional partners, and help to better align security interests
in the region, but will come with increased costs. Finally, in South Korea, the U.S.
and South Korean governments are in the process of implanting a bilateral agreement
to consolidate U.S. forces. This consolidation will increase efficiency and reduce costs.
In the future, this consolidation could lead to vulnerability if North Korea invests substantially
in an accurate missile force, but to date it has not done so. The United States
has managed to continue to assure South Korea of its commitment to its security while
drawing down the number of forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula.
The U.S. has far-reaching goals in Asia, but its forces are concentrated in Northeast
Asia, where they are now within range of large numbers of precision-guided weapons.
In Northeast Asia, the question is how the United States can continue to both
deter potential foes and assure allies while making adjustments to reduce the chances
of catastrophic failure from attacks by precision-guided weapons. The problem is complex
enough that no one solution is likely to meet all the competing needs and fit within resource constraints. Therefore, if the United States still wants to maintain
forces in Northeast Asia, some combination of hardening, active defenses, dispersal,
and changes to the mix of forces that are exposed to the highest threats will likely be
in order. These adjustments would likely require substantial investments in infrastructure.
At the same time, the United States wants to strengthen the security partnerships
it maintains in South and Southeast Asia, but for now that will have to be accomplished
through rotational presence. Rotational presence can be more cost-effective
than permanent presence if rotations provide partial-year presence or are of long duration
(assuming sufficient force structure to support such presence), but can be more
expensive under some conditions. At present in this area, only rotational presence is
viable in the near term; so in this case, there is no cost trade-off to consider. If greater
security cooperation is desired, some permanent presence in Southeast Asia in the long
term may be the most cost-effective means to meet that need, but that would depend
on finding a willing host nation, which the United States could pursue through relationship-
building steps. Alternatively, more arrangements like the recent agreements
with Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines, which allow regular access but not permanent
presence, may meet security cooperation goals for the region.
Overall, modest reductions in the Asia-Pacific Region could produce some savings
while preserving in-place forces in South Korea and some additional capabilities
in Japan for broader regional security. These reductions would include some of the
Marine Corps forces and an Air Force base and wing, contributing roughly equal
amounts of up to roughly $450 million per year. However, the nature and size of these
reductions would depend on how decisionmakers judge the likely impact of modest
force reductions in Asia on regional perceptions of the U.S. commitment to the region,
how critical they believe large in-place forces are to deterrence, and the degree to which
forces should be kept in higher-threat zones. But these modest reductions would reflect
the call for pursuing new approaches to defense in the face of resource constraints. Any
of these steps, though, might appear incompatible with the U.S. government’s stated
intention to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region, even if alternative approaches
could provide similar capabilities. Concerted efforts to explain to allies how security
could still be provided would have to be made, with some risk of not fully assuring key
U.S. allies in the region.
更多资讯，请访问： retter2012.com 。
Alternatively, emphasizing different aspects of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance
could lead to increased presence in Asia and the Pacific. If increased security
cooperation in South and Southeast Asia is highly valued and increases in rotational
presence are pursued, costs would increase. If done, however, in combination with
modest reductions in Northeast Asia, costs in the greater region might be held relatively
steady. If such rotations were added while maintaining or even increasing presence
oriented toward meeting perceived needs to increase assurance and deterrence,
then annual recurring costs in the region would increase, potentially substantially. Any
costs for hardening of facilities would be in addition to the cost estimates in the report.
The region presents a complex set of judgments and trade-offs regarding assurance,
deterrence, security cooperation, and risks, with a range of options corresponding to
different judgments on how different posture choices are likely to affect these factors.
返回页首
Regional Considerations (Middle East)
As noted in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, U.S. defense efforts in the Middle
East will be aimed at countering violent extremists, upholding commitments to allies
and partner states, and addressing the enduring concerns of the proliferation of ballistic
missiles and nuclear weapons. In supporting these objectives “the United States
will continue to place a premium on U.S. and allied military presence in—and support
of—partner nations in and around this region.”5 The United States has a diverse
network of air bases that provide a range of capabilities in the Persian Gulf region
and are complemented by maritime capabilities that also provide enduring regional
presence. In the Persian Gulf, the United States has an interest in preventing Iran
from disrupting commerce in the region, seeking to politically pressure or destabilize
neighboring states, or (in the future) threatening regional states with nuclear coercion.
U.S. facilities in the Persian Gulf region tend to be located in wealthy states that have
overlapping interests with the United States, particularly regarding the free flow of
natural resources. In other areas, U.S. interests and policies do not overlap with those
of the host nation, particularly regarding U.S. relations with Israel, and potentially over
human rights and political representation. There is public information that several host
nations in the region provide burden sharing; as shown in Chapter Seven, Kuwait and
Qatar have a history of helping to offset basing costs.
Basing in the region traditionally has involved trade-offs between the need to
deter adversaries and reassure partners while also weighing political sensitivities to the
U.S. military presence in host nations. While the wind-down of the conflicts in Iraq
and Afghanistan have reduced the need for major combat and support assets in the
region, enduring concerns over Iran continue to heavily motivate U.S. force presence.
The Arab Spring has added another element of uncertainty to the internal political
dynamics in many states, which could create a perceived need for presence to respond
to new crises, but could lead to difficulties in maintaining U.S. presence. So in many
respects the United States continues to face the balance between adequate force presence
to secure national objectives and political risk to sustain those forces.
Overall, the central question for this region is how responsiveness and deterrence
needs in the Persian Gulf should be weighed against the potential for political tensions
and risks.
More specifically, the posture in the region, particularly in the Persian Gulf,
involves judgments on some key aspects of that presence, representing the tradespace
for consideration. The United States currently maintains substantial forces on a rotational basis in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. The presence in Kuwait of 13,500
military personnel (mostly Army),6 serves several functions, including providing staging
hubs and logistical support for contingencies, storage for prepositioned equipment
for contingency response, assurance to the Kuwaitis and others of a U.S. commitment
to defend the region, and capabilities for security cooperation and training among
GCC partners. In the Kingdom of Bahrain, the U.S. Fifth Fleet HQ at Manama has
plans to expand U.S. naval facilities, including plans to station up to eight LCSs. Qatar
hosts the U.S. air base at Al Udeid. The UAE provides a number of facilities for U.S.
forces operating in the region, and both the USAF and the USN benefit from access
to UAE territory. The airbase at Al Dhafra, along with the Air Warfare Center there,
provides extensive opportunities for training and security cooperation with Gulf air
forces. The UAE also hosts the Integrated Air Missile Defense Center, again providing
training for various GCC members.
These roles need to be weighed against the political risks of maintaining this level
of presence and the deterrent and response benefits, as well as the costs. To the extent
that the presence provides deterrence and assurance, enables capabilities for possible
contingencies, involves minimal political risk, and includes substantial burden sharing
by Gulf states, it will be an important contribution to stability. One of the key questions
involves the political risks associated with the presence in these countries, some
of which, like Bahrain, are dealing with their own internal challenges. Future changes
in the threat environment or in the political risks from the presence could alter this calculation
and represent an area for possible future adjustments. Any reduction in force
presence could be mitigated by retaining or adding prepositioned material. This would
provide considerable responsiveness to a range of contingencies. This approach could
also possibly reduce local political sensitivities associated with the troop presence.
Traditionally, the United States has maintained a limited-visibility military presence
in the Middle East that consisted almost entirely of prepositioned equipment and
contingency access to partner military facilities. It appears as if the exigencies of deterring
Iran and assuring U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf is pushing the United States away
from this strategy in favor of a more force-intensive—although largely rotational—
presence. However, given the ability of the United States to maintain a maritime presence
in and deploy forces relatively quickly to the region, it is not clear whether the
United States needs to maintain substantial force levels in the Persian Gulf to meet
these objectives. For example, while not a perfect analogy, forces have been drawn
down in South Korea while still assuring an ally and without prompting aggression,
suggesting that revisiting force needs could merit consideration.
Finally, a foreign military presence has always been a sensitive political issue for
many Middle Eastern countries. If a host-nation government faces the prospect of significant internal unrest, decisionmakers may want to carefully weigh whether they
continue to make investments to military facilities and base forces in that nation. Political
instability could well result in diminished or lost American access.
Figure 11.2 provides a spectrum of possible options for U.S. presence in the Persian
Gulf region, taking various factors into account. As noted on the left side of the
figure, one factor to consider in determining the level and type of presence is perceptions
about the threats that need to be countered and the associated forces critical to
both deter and provide rapid response to those threats. However, increasing force could
also be in tension with political considerations in the region. The top tier reflects a
robust presence for deterring and countering major regional contingencies. It consists
both of substantial prepositioning and a heavy rotational presence involving air and
missile defense assets, Army units, MEFs, AEWs, and an enduring USN presence. This
top-tier presence would perform well in terms of responsiveness and deterrence, but
comes with increased financial costs to the United States. For example, annual ABCT
rotations to the region are estimated to cost about $200 million per year, maintaining
continuous presence of a composite 90-aircraft AEW costs about $300 million
per year, and quarterly fighter-squadron rotations would be $50–100 million per year,
depending on the aircraft types and how the rotations are executed (and not including
the costs of any needed increases in force structure to provide a sufficient rotation base).
Harder to gauge are the potential political risks, the willingness of regional leaders to
accept this presence, and the problems that such a significant sustained presence could
pose to partner states. This could come from domestic sources, where such presence
could spur opposition to the regimes in the host nations, from other states, or from nonstate actors in the region. This is likely to be a function of many factors, including
the degree to which partners and the United States share common concerns over the
threats to be countered.
Figure 11.2 Posture Tradespace in the Persian Gulf
The middle tier represents a reduction in presence and cost relative to the top-tier
option. Army rotations to Kuwait would be reduced or eliminated, with continued
or increased emphasis on prepositioning. The planned Navy expansion in Bahrain
would be deferred. Under this option, responsiveness and forward deterrence would be
reduced, although this would be a function of the threats to be countered. If major contingencies,
including Iran, were no longer viewed as primary concerns, then a reduced
presence as illustrated in this mid-tier option would not necessarily erode responsiveness
and deterrence. It could also serve to reduce sources of political opposition in host
states to a sizable U.S. military presence in the region.
The third tier would further reduce the routine presence in the Persian Gulf region
and instead focus on maintaining access to host-nation facilities as needed. This would
result in additional cost savings and possible political benefits from further reducing
routine U.S. presence. Again, these potential benefits would have to be weighed against
the threats and the corresponding impact on deterrence and assurance. A reduced
presence of this scale could risk both increasing the chances of adversary aggression
and undermining the confidence of regional partners in the U.S. commitment to their
security. To the extent that latent state threats become acute on short notice, the United
States would be less well positioned to respond quickly.
All of the tiered options involve trade-offs and are highly contingent on regional
developments and dynamics. The degree of risk assumed in each is likewise contingent.
Depending on how decisionmakers assess deterrence needs in the region and the role of
forward posture in meeting them versus how they assess the risks of creating political
tensions or a backlash in the region would lead to choices on different points along the
spectrum. Depending on the weight given to the two competing sets of factors, decisionmakers
could elect to selectively reduce rotations in the region, maintain the status
quo, or seek to increase rotations to the region across the services.
返回页首
Value Perceptions and Priorities Are Critical to Posture Decisions
There are some clear limits to how far consolidation in the U.S. overseas posture could
be pursued, beyond which achieving national security goals and executing the 2012
Defense Strategic Guidance would become untenable. There is a minimum threshold
of foreign posture that the United States must retain. Beyond that, there is additional
posture that is almost certainly advisable to retain or even add. As described in this
chapter, there are a number of choices specific to each region, where different judgments
could lead to differing calculations of the advisability of reductions, additions,
or changes in the nature of posture. Again, the three illustrative postures presented in this report represent policy options, not right or wrong choices, because only the
cost side of the equation can be determined with precision. Decisions will reflect judgments
based on the perceived values of the competing goals—how they should be
prioritized—and the degree to which overseas posture is perceived to advance those
goals.
返回页首
返回主页
version:2.1<EMAIL_ADDRESS>© retter2012.com


Travelog is an application where users can record their travels, adventures, and vacations and share them with the whole world or explore adventures people have taken.
Travelog is an interactive and social application that implements features that allows users to share content, interact with other users, and provide a subscription service for users. A custom notification system was built and designed using Jquery, Ruby, Javascript, and AJAX. This ensured a proper way of creating and sending notifications consistently. A subscription service was implemented with the use of Stripe. The Stripe platform's architecture and code allowed the secure handling of user payment and routing of money.


{{ content }}
{%- include head.html -%}
{%- include views/header.html -%} {%- include views/banner.html -%} {%- include extensions/hashlocate.html -%} {%- include extensions/theme-toggle.html -%} {%- include extensions/click-to-top.html -%}


States are used to specify that invocations can occur only during some state that is initiated and/or terminated by other expected invocations. A test can define multiple state machines and an invocation can be constrained to occur during a state of one more more state machines.
To define a new state machine:
final States state-machine-name = context.states("state-machine-name").startsAs("initial-state");
final States state-machine-name = states("state-machine-name").startsAs("initial-state");
final States state-machine-name = context.states("state-machine-name").startsAs("initial-state");
The intial state is optional. If not specified, the state machine starts in an unnamed initial state.
JMock can auto-instantiate States to reduce boilerplate code.
The following clauses constrain invocations to occur within specific states and define how an invocation will change the current state of a state machine.
| when(state-machine.is("state-name")); | Constrains the last expectation to occur only when the state machine is in the named state. |
| when(state-machine.isNot("state-name")); | Constrains the last expectation to occur only when the state machine is not in the named state. |
| then(state-machine.is("state-name")); | Changes the state of state-machine to the named state when the invocation occurs. |
For example:
final States pen = context.states("pen").startsAs("up"); oneOf (turtle).penDown(); then(pen.is("down")); oneOf (turtle).forward(10); when(pen.is("down")); oneOf (turtle).turn(90); when(pen.is("down")); oneOf (turtle).forward(10); when(pen.is("down")); oneOf (turtle).penUp(); then(pen.is("up"));


cute.
>> puts "this is red".red >> puts "this is red with a blue background (read: ugly)".red_on_blue >> puts "this is red with an underline".red.underline >> puts "this is really bold and really blue".bold.blue >> logger.debug "hey this is broken!".red_on_yellow # in rails >> puts Color.red "This is red" # but this part is mostly untested
Windows users:
You will need the Win32 Console Ansi gem. Get it: $ sudo gem install win32console-1.0.0 --source require.errtheblog.com (We're trying to make it official. Hang in there.)
>> chris[at]ozmm[dot]org


Frequently Asked Questions
This guide assumes you're over 16 and exclusively a UK citizen. Changing your name gets complicated if you have dual-citizenship.
Do I need a lawyer to change my name?
Nope. To change your name, you just need to a sign a document saying you've renounced your old name, in the presence of two non-family witnesses. This is called an unenrolled deed poll which 99% of organisations will accept.
Once you've printed and signed your deed poll you can can start contacting organisations to get your records updated. Ideally, you should start with your passport and driver's licence, as these will give you photo ID in your new name. Be sure to update your name with your bank and any creditors, to avoid being accused of fraud.
Are there restrictions on the name I can choose?
Technically the only restriction is that you can't change your name for fraudulent purposes. In practical terms further restrictions apply, as the UK Home Office won't issue a passport if your name contains:
- Numbers or symbols
- Punctuation marks other than hyphens or apostrophes
- Too many characters in forenames/surname to fit onto the face of the passport
- Language which may cause outrage or offence or are deliberately or inadvertently likely to offend sectors of the community
- Wording that promotes criminal activities
- A trademarked name, or is subject to copyright, except where the applicant produces written permission from the owner
While many businesses expect you to have both a first and last name, you can get a passport consisting of a single name (a mononym).
You don't need to use the same name day-to-day as on official forms.
How do I decide on a name?
Try lots of different names and build a shortlist of your favourites. You can ask friends, partners and family for suggestions, though the final decision is always yours. Experiment with a new name for a week or two and see you feel.
Behind the Name is useful for understanding the history and meaning of a name.
An organisation won't change my name, what do?
Many organisations don't understand their obligations under GDPR's Right to Rectification. Companies can ask for photo ID in your new name, but if they start asking for unreasonable documents or an enrolled deed poll then cite GDPR's Right to Rectification and send them the linked ICO guidance. If necessary, ask to speak to their Data Protection Officer. Even if the organisation is not based in the UK they still need to comply with GDPR when handling your data.
How do I change my title?
You don't need a deed poll to change your title and can start using a new one whenever you want.
If you want to emphasise a gender change you could include your title in the Old Name and New Name fields e.g. Mr Martin Copperfields -> Miss Martha Copperfields
Do I need to buy special document paper?
Nope. Your deed poll is valid on any paper. However, if you want to make your deed poll look fancy, try parchment or vellum paper with a thickness of around 100gsm.
Why did you make another deed poll website?
When I changed my name I used the fantastic freedeedpoll.org.uk. While it's a great website, it uses a server to generate the PDF, meaning your personal details get unnecessarily sent off your computer. The website's creator has been working on an alternative that doesn't do this, but it wasn't finished when I last checked. Some of my partners wanted to change their names, so I built this website instead.
What is this website's privacy policy?
This website doesn't store or transmit any information about you. The deed poll is created locally, in your browser.
This website doesn't use cookies, analytics or tracking pixels.
Can I suggest improvements or raise issues with this website?
Please do. This website is open source and contributions are always welcome.
If you don't have or want a GitHub account you could drop me a line via Twitter (@kittsville) or email (kittsville@gmail.com).


These are the masayume image workflows.
Links:
Directories:
/home/masayume/Downloads/masayumeP/4PIXATOOL/src-GENERATORS/ /home/masayume/Downloads/masayumeP/4PIXATOOL/src-GENERATORS/src-DIF-stablediffusion/ /home/masayume/Downloads/masayumeP/4PIXATOOL/src-GENERATORS/src-DIF-WAIFU/
Sources:
Follow this sequence:
- 0: Prepare the image: resize, optimize contrast and saturation, evaluate posterization/color reduction.
- 1: Import the image
- 2: Left Sidebar Palette -> Clear
- 3: Palette -> New
- 4: click color position and use Pick on all the main colors
- 5: Palette -> Set to convert the colors
- 6: Iterate eventually back to step 4 to add more hues
- 7: Proceed with General for pixelate H/W, Contrast, Basic Blur etc.
Image sources:
- openprocessing: generativeart
- openprocessing: shaders
- openprocessing: 3D
- hashtags: #genuary , #genuary2023 , #p5js , #generativeart
Follow this sequence:
- 0: Prepare the image: resize, optimize contrast and saturation, evaluate posterization/color reduction.
- 1: Import the image
- 2: Left Sidebar Palette -> Clear
- 3: Palette -> New
- 4: click color position and use Pick on all the main colors
- 5: Palette -> Set to convert the colors
- 6: Iterate eventually back to step 4 to add more hues
- 7: Proceed with General for pixelate H/W, Contrast, Basic Blur etc.
Cards:
Filters:
Pose sources:
- Digitalgarden: 2d resources
- local directory:
/DATA/E/INSPIRE/@REF-poses/
- holden: REF-poses
- holden: ALT_poses
To get started with writing JavaScript, open the Scratchpad and write your first "Hello world" JavaScript code:
function greetMe(yourName) { alert("Hello " + yourName);
Select the code in the pad and hit Ctrl+R to watch it unfold in your browser!
I am an IT pro, blogger, game developer and pixel artist. I am also intersted in Web Developing.
If you want to see my works, Visit the below links:
- twitter.com/masayumeP
- github.com/masayume
- www.masayume.it
- pinterest.co.uk/masayume
page designed by Umar Farooq.


Connecting to UKIDSSDR8PLUS database
QUERY STARTED: Thu Aug 01 06:45:48 BST 2013 [1 active, 25405 total]
Please keep this browser window open and wait for your results or further information to appear below...
Connected to database• OK
SQL Error: The SELECT permission was denied on the object 'gpsSource', database 'UKIDSSDR8PLUS', schema 'dbo'.
QUERY FINISHED: Thu Aug 01 06:45:49 BST 2013
Click your browsers 'BACK' button to try another query...


THE CONTENDER A film review by Steve Rhodes Copyright 2000 Steve Rhodes RATING (0 TO ****): ****
In Washington, duplicity runs deep. But, in THE CONTENDER, the extremely impressive second feature film by writer and director Rod Lurie (DETERRENCE), there is at least one politician for whom principles are more important than politics, even if her integrity costs her the honor of being the nation's first female vice president. Speaking of honors, expect to see this political thriller and morality tale garner many well deserved Oscar nominations including, but not limited to, Best Actress (Joan Allen) and Best Supporting Actor (Gary Oldman).
Ohio Senator Laine Hanson (Joan Allen) is a Republican turned Democrat and an avowed atheist. She may not believe in God, but she certainly has an unfailing commitment to her principles. "Principles only mean something if you stick to them when it's inconvenient," she explains with utter sincerity. She may or may not be the next vice president, and it is her adherence to her principles that seems likely to come between her and the job she so desires. Allen, in a consistently strong performance, never lets Senator Hanson dissolve into self-righteousness. She gives a sympathetic performance that doesn't require sympathy to admire.
The elected vice president died six weeks ago, so President Jackson Evans (Jeff Bridges) has to choose a successor. Knowing that 300 FBI agents investigated Nelson Rockefeller, the only other vice presidential replacement, President Evans wants to make his choice carefully. But it's more than that. Six years into office, the president views the choice as his "swan song."
The sharply written script mixes heavy drama with sweet comedy. The president, for example, not having to run again, is kicking back and really enjoying the trappings of his office. He brags that he can order absolutely anything he wants 24 hours a day, and he can never stump his chef. He even has a bowling ball with the presidential seal engraved on it, which he uses in his own private bowling alley. It's a great life, and he's making the most of it. Bridges's charismatic performance is full of nuances and subtlety that leaves us never quite sure of his motivations.
As the story opens, popular Senator Jack Hathaway (William L. Petersen) seems to be the likely nominee, especially after his daring attempted rescue of a girl whose car goes into the lake near where he is fishing. Surprisingly, the President brushes his candidacy aside, claiming that someone might decide that his heroism was actually another Chappaquidick episode.
The president's long-time nemesis, Congressman Shelly Runyon (Gary Oldman), ends up chairing the nomination hearings. Looking like a nerdish version of Roberto Benigni (LIFE IS BEAUTIFUL), Runyon's body shakes nervously and his upper lip perspires profusely when he presides over his committee. The congressman is at once utterly polite and completely devious. When he uncovers a college sex scandal involving Senator Hanson, he salivates at the possibilities and doesn't shy away. He and his fellow conspirators brag to themselves that they are going "to obliterate a life." Runyon's wife worries, with good reason, that "he will go down as a second-rate Joe McCarthy." No matter how unlikable Runyon becomes, Oldman never lets him dissolve into caricature.
In a great, one-dimensional part, Sam Elliott plays Kermit Newman, the president's hard-nosed Chief of Staff. When the scandal breaks, Newman screams his demands. He wants dirt on Runyon, immediately: "Little boys, midgets, cows," whatever they can find. His approach, however, isn't the one that Senator Hanson feels comfortable with. She wants to talk nothing but policy at her hearings -- the usual liberal litany of ban all handguns, abolish the death penalty and guarantee a woman's right to choose. She specifically refuses to dignify with any response the accusation that she "put on a sex show" in college. After all, she reasons, if she were a man, no one would care about how many women she had slept with in college.
All of the casting in this ensemble effort is terrific. Christian Slater is good as a naive and ambitious young congressman who, in a career enhancing attempt, negotiates his way onto the nominating committee. Like a minnow swimming with sharks, he seems in constant danger.
Lurie's staging is masterful, even if sometimes a bit over the top. As Congressman Runyon denounces Senator Hanson to the world -- "Laine Hanson is a cancer!" -- we watch her jog through a military cemetery and pass the Iwo Jima monument to the brave boys who fought for our freedom.
The beauty of the story is that we keep waiting for more shoes to drop. Some of them do, but others we expect to, don't. And still others drop, but turn out not to be what we expect. My only complaint is that one key twist is needlessly telegraphed.
"You are an enigma...," the president says to Hanson, his would-be vice president, late in the story. Interrupting him, she completes the famous quote, "wrapped in a riddle." The movie itself is no enigma. Its principles are crystal clear and dramatically demonstrated. THE CONTENDER is ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN for our time.
THE CONTENDER runs 2:05. It is rated R for strong sexual content and language and would be fine for most teenagers.
Email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Web: http://www.InternetReviews.com
The review above was posted to the
rec.arts.movies.reviews newsgroup (de.rec.film.kritiken for German reviews).
The Internet Movie Database accepts no responsibility for the contents of the
review and has no editorial control. Unless stated otherwise, the copyright
belongs to the author.
Please direct comments/criticisms of the review to relevant newsgroups.
Broken URLs inthe reviews are the responsibility of the author.
The formatting of the review is likely to differ from the original due
to ASCII to HTML conversion.
Related links: index of all rec.arts.movies.reviews reviews


6:00-9:00 PM
7:00-10:00 PM
We are sponsored by FiveTen, Adidas Outdoor, and Prana. Our members get awesome discounts from these vendors.
Members on the team have access to a discounted membership from Mesa Rim, which is where we hold our practices.
The team also gets exclusive access to Mesa Rim's Training Facility once a week for Wednesday practices.


Testing Ooyala insertion
Ooyala
Another section
This section should appear next to the video, not before it.


|
Loads the source operand into the machine status word, bits 0 through 15 of register CR0. The source operand can be a 16-bit general-purpose register or a memory location. Only the loworder 4 bits of the source operand (which contains the PE, MP, EM, and TS flags) are loaded into CR0. The PG, CD, NW, AM, WP, NE, and ET flags of CR0 are not affected. The operandsize attribute has no effect on this instruction.
If the PE flag of the source operand (bit 0) is set to 1, the instruction causes the processor to switch to protected mode. While in protected mode, the LMSW instruction cannot be used to clear the PE flag and force a switch back to real-address mode.
The LMSW instruction is provided for use in operating-system software; it should not be used in application programs. In protected or virtual-8086 mode, it can only be executed at CPL 0.
This instruction is provided for compatibility with the Intel 286Ã�Â¢Ã¢â�¬Å¾Ã�Â¢ processor; programs and procedures intended to run on the Pentium 4, Intel Xeon, P6 family, Pentium, Intel486, and Intel386 processors should use the MOV (control registers) instruction to load the whole CR0 register. The MOV CR0 instruction can be used to set and clear the PE flag in CR0, allowing a procedure or program to switch between protected and real-address modes.
This instruction is a serializing instruction.
|


# coding: utf-8
# Copyright (c) Pymatgen Development Team.
# Distributed under the terms of the MIT License.
from __future__ import division, print_function, unicode_literals, absolute_import
"""
This module defines classes that set the molecular topology i.e atoms, bonds,
angles and dihedrals
"""
import itertools
from monty.json import MSONable
from pymatgen.core.bonds import CovalentBond
__author__ = 'Kiran Mathew'
__email__ =<EMAIL_ADDRESS>__credits__ = 'Brandon Wood'
[docs]class Topology(MSONable):
"""
Args:
atoms (list): map atom names to force field(ff) atom name,
[['c', 'c1'],...]
bonds (list): List of bonds,
[[i,j, bond_type], ... ] where i, j are integer(starts from 1)
atom ids in the molecules and bond_type = (ff atomname_i, ff atomname_j)
angles (list): List of angles,
[[i,j,k, angle_type], ... ],
angle_type = (ff atomname_i, ff atomname_j, ff atomname_k)
charges (list): List of charges, [0.4, 0.7, ... ]
dihedrals (list): List of dihedrals,
[[i,j,k,l, dihedral_type], ... ]
dihedral_type = (ff atomname_i, ff atomname_j, ff atomname_k, ff atomname_l)
imdihedrals (list): List of improper dihedrals,
[['i,j,k,l, dihedral_type], ... ]
"""
def __init__(self, atoms, bonds, angles, charges=None, dihedrals=None,
imdihedrals=None):
self.atoms = atoms
self.bonds = bonds
self.angles = angles
self.charges = [] if charges is None else charges
self.dihedrals = dihedrals
self.imdihedrals = imdihedrals
[docs] @staticmethod
def from_molecule(molecule, tol=0.1, ff_map="ff_map"):
"""
Return Topology object from molecule. Charges are also set if the
molecule has 'charge' site property.
Args:
molecule (Molecule)
tol (float): Relative tolerance to test in determining the bonds
in the molecule. Basically, the code checks if the distance
between the sites is less than (1 + tol) * typical bond
distances. Defaults to 0.1, i.e., 10% longer.
ff_map (string): Ensure this site property is set for each site if
atoms need to be mapped to its forcefield name.
eg: Carbon atom, 'C', on different sites can be mapped to
either 'Ce' or 'Cm' depending on how the forcefield parameters
are set.
Returns:
Topology object
"""
type_attrib = ff_map if hasattr(molecule[0], ff_map) else "specie"
bonds = molecule.get_covalent_bonds(tol=tol)
angles = []
dihedrals = []
for bond1, bond2 in itertools.combinations(bonds, 2):
bond1_sites = [bond1.site1, bond1.site2]
bond2_sites = [bond2.site1, bond2.site2]
s_bond1 = set(bond1_sites)
s_bond2 = set(bond2_sites)
common_site = s_bond1.intersection(s_bond2)
if common_site:
site1 = (s_bond1 - s_bond2).pop()
site2 = common_site.pop()
site3 = (s_bond2 - s_bond1).pop()
angle = [molecule.index(site1), molecule.index(site2),
molecule.index(site3),
(str(getattr(site1, type_attrib)),
str(getattr(site2, type_attrib)),
str(getattr(site3, type_attrib)))]
angles.append(angle)
else:
for site1, site2 in itertools.product(bond1_sites,
bond2_sites):
if CovalentBond.is_bonded(site1, site2, tol=tol):
bond1_sites.remove(site1)
bond2_sites.remove(site2)
dihedral = bond1_sites + [site1,
site2] + bond2_sites
dihedral = [molecule.index(dihedral[0]),
molecule.index(dihedral[1]),
molecule.index(dihedral[2]),
molecule.index(dihedral[3]),
(str(getattr(dihedral[0], type_attrib)),
str(getattr(dihedral[1], type_attrib)),
str(getattr(dihedral[2], type_attrib)),
str(getattr(dihedral[3], type_attrib)))]
dihedrals.append(dihedral)
break
atoms = [[str(site.specie), str(getattr(site, type_attrib))]
for site in molecule]
bonds = [[molecule.index(b.site1), molecule.index(b.site2),
(str(getattr(b.site1, type_attrib)),
str(getattr(b.site2, type_attrib)))] for b in bonds]
charges = None
if hasattr(molecule[0], "charge"):
charges = [site.charge for site in molecule]
return Topology(atoms, bonds, angles,
charges=charges, dihedrals=dihedrals)


The log view allows you to view the application log.
Message types
There are three major types of messages in the log view:
- [INFO] - These are informational messages.
- [WARN] - These are warnings that something may not be operating as expected.
- [ERROR] - These are error messages, informing you when something went wrong.


Pre-Order Grace Potter's Holidays Rule 2 Album
An article about the album, its release date and song names. Maybe some statistics about one or two that have already been released
An article about the album, its release date and song names. Maybe some statistics about one or two that have already been released
there will be a small blurb or summary of the article here
there will be a small blurb or summary of the article here
there will be a small blurb or summary of the article here
there will be a small blurb or summary of the article here
there will be a small blurb or summary of the article here
there will be a small blurb or summary of the article here


{% load static %}{% load staticfiles %}
The work under this website is licenced under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International License CC BY-SA


{% extends "base.html" %}
{% load query_params %}
{% load taxonomy %}
{% block content %}
{% if selected_viral_fragment %}
{% endif %}
Select a viral sequence in the table to view its parent contig Viral regionViral contig viewer
No contig selected
Documents written by HoloFood partners and collaborators relevant to the {{ catalogue.title }} Viral Catalogue


motor system
Contents
7.7. motor system#
notes from Neuroscience, 5th edition + Intro to neurobiology course at UVA
7.7.1. 16 lower#
sensory in dorsal spinal cord, motor in ventral
farther out neurons control farther out body parts (medial=trunk, lateral=arms,legs)
one motor neuron (MN) innervates multiple fibers
the more fibers/neuron, the less precise
MN pool - group of MNs=motor units
muscle tone = all your muscles are a little on, kind of like turning on the car engine and when you want to, you can move forward
more firing = more contraction
MN types
fast fatiguable - white muscle
fast fatigue-resistant
slow - red muscles, make atp
muscles are innervated by a proportion of these MNs
reflex
whenever you get positive signal on one side, also get negative on other
flexor - curl in (bicep)
extensor - extend (tricep)
proprioceptors (+) - measure length - more you stretch, more firing of alpha MN to contract
intrafusal muscle=spindle - stretches the proprioceptor so that it can measure even when muscle is already stretched
\(\gamma\) motor neuron - adjusts intrafusal muscles until they are just right
keeps muscles tight so you know how much muscle is streteched
if alpha fires a lot, gamma will increase as well
high gamma allows for fast responsiveness - brainstem modulators (serotonin) also do this
opposes muscle stretch to keep it fixed
spindle -> activates muscles -> contracts -> turns off
sensory neurons / gamma MNs innervate muscle spindle
homonymous MNs go into same muscle, antagonistic muscle pushes other way
golgi tendon (-) measures pressure not stretch
safety switch
inhibits homonymous neuron so you don’t rip muscle off
ALS = Lou Gehrig’s disease
MNs are degenerating - reflexes don’t work
progressive loss of \(\alpha\) MNs
last neuron to go is superior rectus muscle -> people use eyes to talk with tracker
CPG = central pattern generator
ex. step on pin, lift up leg
walking works even if you cut cat’s spinal cord
collection of interneurons
7.7.2. 17 upper#
cAMP is used by GPCR
lift and hold circuit
ctx->lateral white matter->lateral ventral horn->limb muscles
lateral white matter - most sensitive to injury
brainstem->medial white matter->medial horn->trunk
medial white matter -> goes into trunk
bulbarspinal tracts
lateral and medial vestibulospinal tracts - feedback
automated system - not much thinking
posture - reflex
too slow for learning surfing
reticular - feedforward = anticipate things before they happen
command / control system for trunk muscles (posture)
feedforward - not a reflex, lean back before opening drawer
caudal pontine - feeds into spinal cord
colliculospinal tract
has superior colliculus - eye muscles, neck-looking
see ch. 20 - reflex
corticular bulbar tract (premotor->primary motor->brainstem)
motor cortexes - this info is descending
can override reticular reflexes in reticular formation
premotor cortex (P2) - contains all actions you can do
has mirror neurons that fire ahead of primary neurons
fire if you think about it or if you do it
primary motor cortex (P1)
layer 1 ascending
layer 4 input
layer 5 - Betz cells - behave like 6 (output)
layer 6 - descending output
has map like S1 does
Jacksonian march get seizure that goes from feet to face (usually one side)
epileptic seizure - neurons fire too much and fire neurons near them
insular - flashes of moods
pyriform - flashes of smells
Betz cells - if they fire, you will do something
dictate a goal, not single neuron to fire
axons to ventral horn of spinal cord
lesions
upper
spasticity - unorganized leg motions
increased tone - tight muscles
hyperactive deep reflexes
ex. babinski’s sign
curl foot down a lot because you don’t know how much to curl
curling foot down = normal plantar
more serotonin can cause this
lower
hypoactive deep reflexes
decreased tone
severe muscle atrophy
pathways
Betz cell
90% cross midline in brainstem - control limbs
10% don’t cross - trunk muscles
7.7.3. 18 basal ganglia (choose what you want to do)#
“who you are”
outputs
brainstem
motor cortex
4 loops (last 2 aren’t really covered)
motor loops
body movement loop
SnC -> S (CP) -> (-) Gp -> (-) VA/VL -> motor cortex
oculomotor loop
cortex -> caudate -> substantia nigra pars reticulata -> superior colliculus
non-motor loops 3. prefrontal loop - daydreaming (higher-order function)
spiny neurons corresponding to a silly idea (alien coming after you) filtered out because not fired enough
schizophrenia - can’t filter that out
limbic loop - mood
has nucleus accumbens
can make mood better with dopamine
substantia nigra
pars compacta - dopaminergic neurons (input to striatum)
more dopamine = more strength between cortical pyramidal neurons and spiny neurons (turns up the gain)
dopamine helps activate a spiny neuron
may be the ones that learn (positive outcome is saved, will result in more dopamine later)
Parkinson’s - specific loss of dopaminergic neurons
dopaminergic neurons form melanin = dark color
when you get down to 20% what you were born with
know what they need to do - don’t have enough dopamine to act
treat with L Dopa -> something like dopamine -> take out globus pallidus
cocaine, amphetamine - too much dopamine
Huntington’s - death of specific class of spiny neurons
have uncontrolled actions
Tourette’s - too much dopamine
also alcohol
MPPP (synthetic heroin)
MPTP looks like dopamine but turns into MPP and kills dopaminergic neurons
treated with L Dopa to reactivate spiny neurons
pars reticulata
doesn’t have dopamine (output from striatum)
striatum contains spiny neurons
caudate (for vision) - output to globus pallidus and substantia nigra (pars reticulata)
putamen - output only to globus pallidus
each spiny neuron gets input from ~1000 cortical pyramidal cells
globus pallidus
each spiny neuron connects to one globus pallidus neuron
deja vu - spiny neuron you haven’t fired in a while
VA/VL (thalamus)
all motor actions must go through here before cortex
has series of commands of all actions you can do
has parallel set of betz cells that will illicit those actions
VA/VL is always firing, globus pallidus inhibits it (tonic connection)
7.7.4. 19 cerebellum (fine tuning all your motion)#
redundant system - cortex could do all of this, but would be slow
repeated circuit - interesting for neuroscientists
all info comes in, gets processed and goes back out
cerebellum gets motor efferant copy
all structures on your brain that do processing send out efferent
cerebellum sends efferant copy back to itself with time delay (through inferior olive)
cerebrocerebellum
deals with premotor cortex (mostly motor cortex)
spinocerebellum = clarke’s nucleus, knows stretch of every muscle, many proprioceptors go straight into here
motor cortex
has a map of muscles
vestibular cerebellum - vestibular->cerebellum->vestibular
vestibular system leans you back but if wind blows, have to adjust to that
input
pontine nuclei (from cortex)
vestibular nuclei (balance)
cuneate nucleus (somatosensory from spinal upper body)
clarke (proprio from spinal lower body)
processing
cerebellar deep nuclei
output
deep cerebellar nuclei
go to superior colliculus, reticular formation
VA/VL (thalamus) - back to cortex
red nucleus
circuit 1 - fine-tuning
circuit 2 - detects differences, adjusts
cerebellum -> red nucleus (is an efferant copy) -> inferior olive -> cerebellum
compare new copy to old copy
cells
purkinje cells - huge number of dendrite branches - dead planar allows good imaging
GABAergic
(input) mossy fibers -(+)> granule cells (send parallel fibers) -(+)> purkinje cell -(-)> deep cerebellar nuclei (output)
mossy->granule->parallel fibers connect to ~100,000 parallel fibers
climbing fiber - comes from inferior olive and goes back to purkinje cell (this is the efferent copy) = training signal
loops
deep excitatory loop (climbing/mossy) -(+)-> deep cerebellar nuclei
cortical inhibitory loop (climbing/granule) -(+)-> purkinje
the negative is from purkinje to deep cerebellar nuclei
alcohol
can create gaps = folia
long-term use causes degeneration = ataxia (lack of coordination)
7.7.5. 20 eye movements/integration#
Broca’s view - look at people with problems
Ramon y Cajal - look at circuits
5 kinds of eye movements
saccades
use cortex, superior colliculus (visual info -> LGN -> cortex, 10% goes to brainstem)
constantly moving eyes around (fovea)
~scan at 30 Hz
5 Hz=200 ms for cortex to process so pause eyes (get 5-6 images)
there is a little bit of drift
can’t control this
humans are better than other animals at seeing things that aren’t moving
VOR - vestibular ocular reflex - keeps eyes still
use vestibular system, occurs in comatose
fast
works better if you move your head fast
optokinetic system - tracks with eyes
ex. stick head out window of car and track objects as they go by
slower than VOR (takes 200 ms)
works better if slower
reflex
in cortex (textbooks) but probs brainstem (new)
smooth pursuit - can track things moving very fast
suppress saccades and track smoothly
only in higher apes
area MT is highest area of motion coding and goes up and comes down multiple ways
high speed processing isn’t understood
could be retina processing
vergence - crossing your eyes
suppresses conjugate eye movements
we can control this
only humans - bring objects up very close
reading uses this
eye muscles
rectus
vertical
superior
inferior
use complicated vertical gaze center
last to degenerate in ALS
locked-in syndrome - can only move eyes vertically
controls oculomotor nucleus
lateral
medial
lateral (controlled by abducens)
use horizontal gaze center=PPRF which talk to abducens -MLF connects abducents to opposite medial lateral rectus muscle
oblique - more circular motions
superior (controlled by trochlear nucleus)
inferior
everything else controlled by oculomotor nucleus
superior colliculus has visual map
controls saccades, connects to gaze centers
takes input from basal ganglia (oculomotor loop)
also gets audio input from inferior colliculus (hear someone behind you and turn)
gets strokes
redundant with frontal eye field in secondary motor cortex
connects to superior colliculus, gaze center, and comes back
if you lose one of these, the other will replace it
if you lose both, can’t saccade to that side
7.7.6. 21 visceral (how you control organs, stress levels, etc.)#
parasympathetic works against sympathetic
divisions
sympathetic - fight-or-flight (adrenaline)
functions
neurons to smooth muscle
pupils dilate
increases heart rate
turn off digestive system
2 things with no parasympathetic counterpart
increase BP
sweat glands
location
neurons in spinal cord lateral horn
send out neurons to sympathetic trunk (along the spinal cord)
all outgoing connections are adrenergic
beta-adrenergic drugs block adrenaline
beta agonist - activates adrenaline receptors (do this before EKG)
parasympathetic - relaxing (ACh)
location
brainstem
edinger westphal nucleus - pupil-constriction
salivatory nucleus
vagus nucleus - digestive system, sexual function
nucleus ambiguous - heart
nucleus of the solitary tract - all input/output goes through this 1. rostral part (front) - taste neurons 2. caudal part (back) contains all sensory information of viscera (ex. BP, heart rate, sexual
sacral spinal cord (bottom) - gut/bladder/genitals
not parallel to sympathetic – poor design - may cause stress-associated diseases
hard to make drugs with ACh
enteric nervous system - in your gut
takes input through vagus nerve from vagus nucleus
also has sensory neurons and sends afferents back to brainstem
pathway
insular cortex - what you care about
amygdala - contains emotional memories
hypothalamus - controls a lot
mostly peptinergin neurons
aging, digestion, mood, straight to bloodstream & CNS
releases hormones
ex. leptin - stops you eating when you eat calories
reticular formation - feedforward, prepares digestion before we eat
three examples
heart rate
starts at nucleus ambiguous
also takes input from chemoreceptors (ex. pH)
SA node at heart generates heartbeat - balances Ach and adrenaline
sympathetic sends info from thoracic spinal cord
heart sends back baroreceptor afferents
bladder function
parasympathetic in sacral lateral horn make you pee (contracts bladder)
turn off sympathetic NS
open sphincter muscle (voluntary)
can also control this via skeletal nervous system
circuit
amygdala (can’t pee when nervous)
pontine micturation center -> parasympathetic preganglionic neurons -> parasympathetic ganglionic neurons
inhibitory local circuit neurons -> somatic MNs
sexual function
Viagra turns on parasympathetic NS
also gives temporal color blindness
sympathetic involved in ejaculation
temporal correlation (“Point and Shoot”)


Created by Tom Wright
Communicate your work to other people.
“Many scientific papers fail to usefully communicate research work to their audience. They focus on the authors instead of on the readers by failing to clarify the motivation for the work or by including unnecessary details. Or they try to impress the readers rather than inform them. As a result, they are interesting to or understandable by only a small set of highly specialized readers. Effective scientific papers, in contrast, are interesting and useful to many readers, including newcomers to the field.”
“Collaborators let down their guards. Successful collaborators still carry a taser.”
Ryan Lilly
Each author should participate sufficiently to take responsibility for the content.
Authorshop credit should be based only on substantial contributions to:
Activities that do not qualify for authorship include:
These may be acknowledged "Clinical Investigators" or "Participating Investigators"
Contributions should be specified.
The principal author sends a memo to all potential authors:
Are you able to take responsibility for the content of this paper?
For at least a specific section did you have input to:
- conception and design, or analysis and interpretation of data
and- were you involved in drafting the article / section of the article or revising it critically for important intellectual content
and- were you involved in the final revision of the version to be published.
Is the paper:
Open-access (OA) literature is digital, online, free of charge, and free of most copyright and licensing restrictions.
Required for research funded by:CIHR, NSERC, NIH.
| OA Repositories | OA Journals |
Don't perform peer review May contain unrefereed preprints, refereed postprints, or both. |
Perform peer review Have expenses: peer review, manuscript preparation, server space Many business models: |
|---|
ROARMAP - Database of OA repositories
SHERPA/RoMEO - Database of authors rights by journal
Review the article guidelines:
Writing is an iterative process.
| Section | Content |
|---|---|
| Abstract | Summary of the paper. |
| Introduction | What is the problem? |
| Materials and Methods | How did I solve the problem? |
| Results | What did I find out? |
| Discussion | What does it mean? |
| Acknowledgements | Who helped me out? |
| Literature Cited | Whose work did I refer to? |
| Appendices (optional) | Extra information |
Clarifies the motivation and prepares readers for the structure of the paper.
The first paragraph is essential. Catch the attention of the audience and convey the importance of the work.
The first sentance should be snappy and profound.
Succincly describe what was done.
If you used standard procedures reference them, explain any deviations.
Justify the statistical methods used.
Explain why you use these methods.
Consider using flow charts, tables etc.
Don't make the reader work through in chronological order. State the important findings first, then use the rest of the paragraph to justify them.
The word significant can only be used when a statistical test was performed.
Do not restate the results, interpret your findings at a higher level of abstraction.
How did your results compare with expected results?
Discuss any weaknesses, explain why it is not practical to address them.
Show what your findings mean in the broader context, what further predictions can be made?
Present information in a format that is easily evaluated by the reader.
Pay attention to axis labels, units etc.
It should be possible to understand a table or figure without referring to the text.
If possible show raw data as well as a summary, e.g. datapoints on a boxplot.
Show error bars (and describe them in the figure legend.
Minimize jargon and acronyms.
Be concise, avoid extra words.
| Phrase | Replace |
|---|---|
| In order to... | To |
| The fact that... | delete |
| It is clear that... | Clearly |
| It is evident that... | Evidently |
Use past tense for results described in the paper.
Use present tense for results from published papers.
Use future tense only for experiments that are planned for the future.
Use first person sparingly, reserve it's use for special emphasis of things "you" uniquely did.
Passive verbs: is, was, has, have, had are boring.
Take care with pronouns it or they to refer to a previous sentence. If in doubt repeat the target in subsequent sentences.
Check the journal style guide.
Use standard abbreviations, (hr, min, sec, mm, l etc.)
Define abbreviations first time they are used. If a paragraph is too heavy with abbreviations consider rewriting.
Don't use abbreviations for terms mentioned less than 3 times.
Paraphrasing other's words too closely may be considered plagiarism.
Self-plagiarism applies to your previous work.
Can be avoided by referencing all information used from other sources.
Must be registered.
ClinicalTrials.gov“Reproducibility, rigour, transparency and independent verification are cornerstones of the scientific method”
“Journals should recommend deposition of data in public repositories, where available, and link data bidirectionally when the paper is published.”


{% load static %} {{block.super}} {{form.media}}
"A good site, I have learnt alot from it"
"Simply amazing!!"
"A good site for developers, both experienced and upcoming"
Awards allows developers to submit their work for viewing and view other developers' work.
FOLLOW US:
Copyright © All Rights Reserved.AWARDS


{% extends "base.html" %} {% load account %} {% block title %} Password reset | {{ block.super }} {% endblock %} {% block content %}
Your password has been reset. You can now login


--- layout: post status: publish published: true title: 'Stepping into yesteryear: home video of a 1930s Cubs game' author: display_name: Marcus Gilmer login: Marcus Gilmer email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>url: '' author_login: Marcus Gilmer author_email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>wordpress_id: 10911 wordpress_url: http://ivyenvy.com/?p=10911 date: '2015-02-04 11:21:27 +0000' date_gmt: '2015-02-04 17:21:27 +0000' categories: - Wrigley Field tags: - Wrigley Field - St. Louis Cardinals - '1938' comments: - id: 16888 author: Justan Neels author_email: '' author_url: '' date: '2015-02-04 11:41:13 +0000' date_gmt: '2015-02-04 17:41:13 +0000' content: Did you see the "Ricketts" sign out in left? - id: 16889 author: Nicholas J Tucker author_email: '' author_url: '' date: '2015-02-04 16:22:04 +0000' date_gmt: '2015-02-04 22:22:04 +0000' content: Great video. Strange that the building over the left field wall has Ricketts on the roof. Coincidence or what? - id: 16900 author: Andy author_email: '' author_url: http://ivyenvy.com/ date: '2015-02-07 10:22:23 +0000' date_gmt: '2015-02-07 16:22:23 +0000' content: So much cigar smoke...I want to go back! ---
Here's a fun one that's been making the rounds: home video from some attendees to a Cubs game in the 1930s. It's fantastic footage, a glimpse into a time when men attended the games in full suits and smoked cigars in the stands. DNAInfo Chicago ran the footage yesterday, noting that it came from a slew of film donated by one family to the Chicago Film Archive. There's so much to love about the video: a cleaner Waveland Ave skyline, the old scoreboard in all its glory, and the way Wrigley looks like it really hasn't changed all that much in the almost 80 years since this game was filmed (though the trees lining the scoreboard and upper center field bleachers would be fun to have back).
As for when the game that's filmed took place, there's no certainty, but there are some guesses. From the DNAInfo story:
One commenter suggests the footage comes from the home opener against the Cardinals on April 22, 1938.
The bleachers were built in 1937, 23 years after Wrigley Field was erected at 1060 W. Addison St. in 1914. Bill Veeck planted the ivy in September of 1937.
Though originally marked as from 1937, the 1938 date could be correct, according to the Chicago Film Archives, as the film date comes from the stock code, and may not be when the reel was actually used.
As for the Ricketts sign? No relation to the current owners: it was the name of a local chain of restaurants in the city at the time. It's also nice to know that, judging by the overcoats, April day games were freezing back in the 1930s, too, climate change be damned.
You can check out the whole catalog of the family's film here, which includes more footage at Wrigley and even a winter sports event at Soldier Field before it was made to look like a spaceship (worth it just for the old car driving through A WALL OF FLAMES at the 1:10 mark).


TIC
TAC
TOE
Press to Start
Please add the two players
First Player's Name:
Second Player's Name:
Add Players
Confirm Change
WINNER!!
PLAYER 1
X
WINS
0
GAME TIED
=
WINNER!!
PLAYER 2
O
WINS
0
Stop Game
Change Players


CIVET: Workspace Management
Current workspace: {{workspace}}
Select a task from the options below:
Export data in tab-delimited format
Use save-variable list in the template
Select the variables to export
Edit text meta-data
Add comments to workspace
Return to home page


If you are pressed for time, please just read the following bullet points. It summarizes what I will be covering in this
short article about planning ahead.
Understand what people need
Increase data gathering on crop health
Connect with organizations to distribute surplus crops
It is important to understand the people who are getting your produce. Since they will be the ones buying your products,
it’s also necessary to understand their likes and dislikes in food whether it be quality or representation.
According to Roni Neff, director of the food system environmental sustainability and public health program at John Hopkins
University, she claims that a lot of food waste happens due to perception from customers. This means that consumers
are looking for “perfect looking” food. They see that ugly looking produce may have some defects and are not
suitable for consumption despite the fact that they completely are. In order to combat this, it is important
to simply find ways to reduce the production of such looking crops. Even if such produce are made, there are
ways to still reduce the food loss on the farm due to bad looks before shipping to markets. One important way
is to connect with local organizations who specialize in redistributing food to those who want them. Farmers
will not need to worry about the amount of food loss they are impacted by as it will help them reduce the wastage
on the farm. Furthermore, another possible solution is for farmers to focus on gathering crop health data.
According to Beausanga, a PhD student researching food waste, she states how farmers associate food waste with weather and
pests more because they’re the root of the problem. Yield and profit is more of a concern for farmers as it correlates
with the farm’s produce. She notes that while redistribution of surplus crops is in place, better data gathering
to target crop utilization is a good place to start. This means that by reducing the number of crops lost to
uncontrollable effects such as pests and weather, it will turn more yield to the farmer. To accomplish such a
task will allow the scientific community to explore better methods and routes for better crop yield and less
loss.


Join Gilt in Supporting Net Neutrality on September 10
Would you enjoy using the Internet more if it were slower? Of course not! But a slower Internet could become the reality for many of us, under rule changes proposed by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission.
The FCC’s proposed guidelines would effectively divide the Internet into a “fast lane” for companies that can afford to pay for better connectivity, and a “slow lane” for everyone else. “Net Neutrality”–the idea that Internet service providers (ISPs) should treat all users the same–be they small businesses run by a single founder, or global corporations with tens of thousands of employees–would be no more.
On Wednesday, September 10, 2014, Gilt will join other companies and citizens in asking U.S. lawmakers to defend Net Neutrality and protect the Internet–and we need YOU to join us! On Sept. 10, we’ll provide some tools to help you to contact the White House and the FCC to let them know that you support an equal, open Internet. Meantime, spread your support via social media, using the hashtag #NetNeutrality.
Why Gilt Cares About Net Neutrality
Gilt has been able to grow from a five-person team into a company with more than 1000 employees working in cities around the world–from New York to Dublin to Tokyo to Louisville, Kentucky. We owe much of our success to an open, equal Internet. If we’d been restricted to a “slow lane” when we started out in 2007, getting Gilt up and running would have been much more difficult–if not impossible. We want other entrepreneurs to have their fair shot at starting new companies that will create jobs, introduce new technologies and business models, and make the world a better–and more interesting–place.
Why September 10 Is an Important Date
A groundswell of support on September 10 will suggest to our lawmakers that they should treat Net Neutrality an election issue. The FCC’s public comment period on Net Neutrality ends on September 15. According to NBC News, so far the FCC has received more than 1.1 million comments on this issue–99 percent in favor of preserving Net Neutrality. “300,000 comments were original compositions,” NBC says–a ratio far higher than what most issues generate.
Keep the Internet Equal
Imagine a world where tech start-ups, fashion designers, crafters, and other small businesses never launch–all because they can’t pay the fees necessary to drive in “the Internet fast lane.” The prospects of this happening should worry anyone who believes in innovation, creativity and the American dream.
Millions of Americans–including President Barack Obama, CEOs, nonprofits, religious groups, even celebrities–oppose a two-lane Internet. They’ve expressed their support of Net Neutrality in public statements, comments to the FCC and Congress, and past awareness campaigns. But the fight isn’t over: We need the FCC to establish a strong, clear rule that protects Net Neutrality once and for all, so this issue doesn’t come up again.
Please join us on September 10 in telling our lawmakers to protect the Internet!


Allow clients to launch from thousands of pre-packaged applications with scaling, monitoring, and management tools.
 Auto failover & self-healing technology, easily add new infrastructure.
Offer cloud solutions with Infrastructure, Platform and Storage services supported. Offer competitive cloud solutions.
Allow clients to launch from thousands of pre-packaged applications with scaling, monitoring, and management tools.
 Auto failover & self-healing technology, easily add new infrastructure.
Offer cloud solutions with Infrastructure, Platform and Storage services supported. Offer competitive cloud solutions.
An enterprise cloud platform that delivers.


Steam server notice
Humble Monthly Timer
Infinite scroll
Filter
Article blacklist
Member blacklist
Wishbook
Scrapbook
Enhanced game tag box
Convert profile image to circle
Hide badge of rank
Groups by date
Shortly vote
Design changes for wish check


THE NO HUNGER WEBSITE
the motive line
Fill the form to get register your NGO.You can help us to achieve our goals.
Donation
Food
Money
Registration
Volunteer
NGO
Hotel
Provide Info
NGO'S REGISTRATION
NGO Name
User Name
Email
Contact Number
Password
Confirm password
1 / 3
NGO's are a big part of our team
2 / 3
You can help us by providing charity
3 / 3
You can also provide us volunteer,s that are willing to work with us
Number of NGO's working with us
5000+ NGO's currently working with us
Food donated till now
3000 packets
Estimated Consumers remaining
3000 people
Volunteers on work
3000 volunteers
More Info


JSW Infrastructure commissions new iron ore terminal at Paradip Port
The higher load rate may help reduce the pre-berthing delays at the port.
by Moneycontrol NewsJSW Infrastructure, a private port company of the $14 billion JSW Group, has commissioned its new iron ore terminal at Paradip Port.
The 370-metre long terminal with a capacity of 18 million tons per annum, is built to handle capesize vessels for iron ore and pellet exports and can load at a rate of 100,000 metric tonnes per day.
The higher load rate may help reduce the pre-berthing delays at the port.
JSW Infrastructure has invested Rs 750 crore in the new terminal at Paradip.
Paradip Port Trust had awarded JSW Infrastructure the right to develop a fully mechanised iron ore export terminal on Build, Operate & Transfer basis for 30 years.
"With the commissioning of this terminal, India can now offer cape size shipments. The capacities are far better than not only any other Indian port but also many ports Internationally. This will help boost competitiveness of customers as well as Paradip Port," said Arun Maheshwari, Joint MD & CEO of JSW Infrastructure.
Following the commissioning of this new terminal, JSW Infrastructure's current cargo capacity has crossed the 100 million tonnes per annum mark. The company plans to achieve a capacity of 200 million tonnes a year in the next three years.
"We will achieve our capacity target through a mix of greenfield and brownfield expansions," added Maheshwari.


10 points in 851.45 Seconds
15 points in 120.56 Seconds
OR
Use arrow keys to rotate (←) left or (→) right.


--- layout: post title: "IIT Madras' Secret Society creates AR-powered contactless solution for marketing" subtitle: "They bagged the top spot in the finale for presenting a customer-centric, innovative solution to reach out to potential consumers in a contact-less way in the new normal after the COVID-19 pandemic" date: 2020-12-01 15:30:13 +0530 background: '/img/posts/06.jpg' published: true categories: [ Technology ] tags: [ technology, iit, ar, contactless, marketing, samsung ] ---
A team of students from the Mechanical Engineering Department of the Indian Institute of Technology Madras (IITM) emerged winners at Samsung's fifth edition of its pan-India campus programme called Samsung EDGE after competing with 20 other top institutes across India with over 5200 students participating.
This year, all rounds in the two-month-long programme were conducted virtually to ensure the safety of students and all Samsung employees. The competition, spread over three months, invited participation of students from diverse domains such as BTech, Masters of Business Administration and Masters of Design.
The Secret Society came up with Augmented Reality solutions such as an AR store where you can place things in your house virtually and see how it looks.
One other solution they came up with included asking your phone to help you do something, like pointing it at your washing machine and it will tell you which buttons to press and provide more information.