PerCuriam
JAMEY L. WILKINS v. OFFICER GADDY
Per Curiam .
In Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U. S. 1, 4 (1992) , this Court held that the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment [even] when the inmate does not suffer serious injury. In this case, the District Court dismissed a prisoners excessive force claim based entirely on its determination that his injuries were de minimis . Because the District Courts approach, affirmed on appeal, is at odds with Hudson s direction to decide excessive force claims based on the nature of the force rather than the extent of the injury, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment is reversed.
I
In March 2008, petitioner Jamey Wilkins, a North Carolina state prisoner, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina pursuant to 42 U. S. C. §1983. Wilkins pro se complaint alleged that, on June 13, 2007, he was maliciously and sadistically assaulted [w]ithout any provocation by a corrections officer, respondent Gaddy. 1 App. to Pet. for Cert. C4. According to the complaint, Gaddy, apparently angered by Wilkins request for a grievance form, snatched [Wilkins] off the ground and slammed him onto the concrete floor. Ibid . Gaddy then proceeded to punch, kick, knee and choke [Wilkins] until another officer had to physically remove him from [Wilkins]. Ibid . Wilkins further alleged that, [a]s a result of the excessive force used by [Gaddy], [he] sustained multiple physical injuries including a bruised heel, lower back pain, increased blood pressure, as well as migraine headaches and dizziness and psychological trauma and mental anguish including depression, panic attacks and nightmares of the assault. Ibid .
The District Court, on its own motion and without a response from Gaddy, dismissed Wilkins complaint for failure to state a claim. Citing Circuit precedent, the court stated that, [i]n order to state an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish that he received more than a de minimus [sic] injury. No. 3:08cv00138 (WD NC, Apr. 16, 2008), pp. 1, 2 (citing Taylor v. McDuffie , 155 F. 3d 479, 483 (CA4 1998); Riley v. Dorton , 115 F. 3d 1159, 1166 (CA4 1997) (en banc); footnote omitted). According to the court, Wilkins alleged injuries were no more severe than those deemed de minimis in the Circuits Taylor and Riley decisions. Indeed, the court noted, Wilkins nowhere asserted that his injuries had required medical attention.
In a motion for reconsideration, Wilkins stated that he was unaware that the failure to allege medical treatment might prejudice his claim. He asserted that he had been prescribed, and continued to take, medication for his headaches and back pain, as well as for depression. And he attached medical records purporting to corroborate his injuries and course of treatment.
Describing reconsideration as an extraordinary remedy, the court declined to revisit its previous ruling. No. 3:08cv00138 (WD NC, Aug. 25, 2008), p. 1. The medical records, the court observed, indicated that some of Wilkins alleged injuries were pre-existing conditions. Id ., at 3. Wilkins had sought treatment for high blood pressure and mental health issues even before the assault. The court acknowledged that Wilkins received an X ray after the incident to examine his bruised heel, but it note[d] that bruising is generally considered a de minimus [sic] injury. Id. , at 4. The court similarly characterized as de minimis Wilkins complaints of back pain and headaches. The court denied Wilkins leave to amend his complaint. In a summary disposition, the Court of Appeals affirmed for the reasons stated by the district court. No. 087881 (CA4, Jan. 23, 2009).
II
In requiring what amounts to a showing of significant injury in order to state an excessive force claim, the Fourth Circuit has strayed from the clear holding of this Court in Hudson . Like Wilkins, the prisoner in Hudson filed suit under §1983 alleging that corrections officers had used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Evidence indicated that the officers had punched Hudson in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach without justification, resulting in minor bruises and swelling of his face, mouth, and lip as well as loosened teeth and a cracked partial dental plate. 503 U. S., at 4. A Magistrate Judge entered judgment in Hudsons favor, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that an inmate must prove a significant injury in order to state an excessive force claim. Hudson v. McMillian , 929 F. 2d 1014, 1015 (1990) (per curiam) . According to the Court of Appeals, Hudsons injuries, which had not required medical attention, were too minor to warrant relief. Ibid .
Reversing the Court of Appeals, this Court rejected the notion that significant injury is a threshold requirement for stating an excessive force claim. The core judicial inquiry, we held, was not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. 503 U. S., at 7; see also Whitley v. Albers , 475 U. S. 312, 319321 (1986) . When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, the Court recognized, contemporary standards of decency always are violated … whether or not significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury. Hudson , 503 U. S., at 9; see also id ., at 1314 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (The Court today appropriately puts to rest a seriously misguided view that pain inflicted by an excessive use of force is actionable under the Eighth Amendment only when coupled with significant injury, e.g. , injury that requires medical attention or leaves permanent marks).
This is not to say that the absence of serious injury is irrelevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry. Id ., at 7. [T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation. Ibid. (quoting Whitley , 475 U. S., at 321). The extent of injury may also provide some indication of the amount of force applied. As we stated in Hudson , not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. 503 U. S., at 9. The Eighth Amendments prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Ibid. (some internal quotation marks omitted). An inmate who complains of a push or shove that causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim. Ibid. (quoting Johnson v. Glick , 481 F. 2d 1028, 1033 (CA2 1973)).
Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts. An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury. Accordingly, the Court concluded in Hudson that the supposedly minor nature of the injuries provide[d] no basis for dismissal of [Hudsons] §1983 claim because the blows directed at Hudson, which caused bruises, swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate, are not de minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes. 503 U. S., at 10.
The allegations made by Wilkins in this case are quite similar to the facts in Hudson , and the District Courts analysis closely resembles the approach Hudson disavowed. Wilkins alleged that he was punched, kicked, kneed, choked, and body slammed maliciously and sadistically and [w]ithout any provocation. Dismissing Wilkins action sua sponte , the District Court did not hold that this purported assault, which allegedly left Wilkins with a bruised heel, back pain, and other injuries requiring medical treatment, involved de minimis force. Instead, the court concluded that Wilkins had failed to state a claim because he simply has not alleged that he suffered anything more than de minimus [sic] injury. No. 3:08cv00138 (WD NC, Apr. 16, 2008), at 2.
In giving decisive weight to the purportedly de minimis nature of Wilkins injuries, the District Court relied on two Fourth Circuit cases. See Riley , 115 F. 3d, at 11661168; Taylor , 155 F. 3d, at 483485. Those cases, in turn, were based upon the Fourth Circuits earlier decision in Norman v. Taylor , 25 F. 3d 1259 (1994) (en banc), which approved the practice of using injury as a proxy for force. According to the Fourth Circuit, Hudson does not foreclose and indeed is consistent with [the] view … that, absent the most extraordinary circumstances, a plaintiff cannot prevail on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim if his injuries are de minimis . 25 F. 3d, at 1263.
The Fourth Circuits strained reading of Hudson is not defensible. This Courts decision did not, as the Fourth Circuit would have it, merely serve to lower the injury threshold for excessive force claims from significant to non- de minimis whatever those ill-defined terms might mean. Instead, the Court aimed to shift the core judicial inquiry from the extent of the injury to the nature of the forcespecifically, whether it was nontrivial and was applied … maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. 503 U. S., at 7. To conclude, as the District Court did here, that the absence of some arbitrary quantity of injury requires automatic dismissal of an excessive force claim improperly bypasses this core inquiry. Id ., at 9. 2
In holding that the District Court erred in dismissing Wilkins complaint based on the supposedly de minimis nature of his injuries, we express no view on the underlying merits of his excessive force claim. In order to prevail, Wilkins will ultimately have to prove not only that the assault actually occurred but also that it was carried out maliciously and sadistically rather than as part of a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. Ibid . Moreover, even if Wilkins succeeds, the relatively modest nature of his alleged injuries will no doubt limit the damages he may recover.
***
The petition for certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
1 The materials in the record do not disclose Gaddys full name.
2 Most Circuits to consider the issue have rejected the Fourth Circuits de minimis injury requirement. See, e.g., Wright v. Goord, 554 F. 3d 255, 269270 (CA2 2009) ([O]ur Court has reversed summary dismissals of Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force even where the plaintiffs evidence of injury was slight … . [T]he absence of any significant injury to [the plaintiff] does not end the Eighth Amendment inquiry, for our standards of decency are violated even in the absence of such injury if the defendants use of force was malicious or sadistic); Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F. 3d 641, 648649 (CA3 2002) ([T]he Eighth Amendment analysis must be driven by the extent of the force and the circumstances in which it is applied; not by the resulting injuries. … [D]e minimis injuries do not necessarily establish de minimis force); Oliver v. Keller, 289 F. 3d 623, 628 (CA9 2002) (rejecting the view that to support an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim a prisoner must have suffered from the excessive force a more than de minimis physical injury (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. LaVallee, 439 F. 3d 670, 687 (CA10 2006) (same). The Fifth Circuit has sometimes used language indicating agreement with the Fourth Circuits approach. See, e.g., Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F. 3d 921, 924 (1999) ([T]o support an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim a prisoner must have suffered from the excessive force a more than de minimis injury). But see Brown v. Lippard, 472 F. 3d 384, 386 (2006) (This Court has never directly held that injuries must reach beyond some arbitrary threshold to satisfy an excessive force claim). Even in the Fifth Circuit, however, Wilkins likely would have survived dismissal for failure to state a claim because that courts precedents have classified the sort of injuries alleged here as non-de minimis. See, e.g., ibid. (permitting a prisoners Eighth Amendment excessive force claim to proceed to trial where evidence indicated that the prisoner suffered one-centimeter abrasions on both his left knee and left shoulder, pain in his right knee, and tenderness around his left thumb, as well as back problems); Gomez, 163 F. 3d, at 922 (refusing to grant summary judgment on de minimis injury grounds where the prisoner alleged physical pain [and] bodily injuries in the form of cuts, scrapes, [and] contusions to the face, head, and body).
PerCuriam
JAMEY L. WILKINS v. OFFICER GADDY
Per Curiam .
In Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U. S. 1, 4 (1992) , this Court held that the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment [even] when the inmate does not suffer serious injury. In this case, the District Court dismissed a prisoners excessive force claim based entirely on its determination that his injuries were de minimis . Because the District Courts approach, affirmed on appeal, is at odds with Hudson s direction to decide excessive force claims based on the nature of the force rather than the extent of the injury, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment is reversed.
I
In March 2008, petitioner Jamey Wilkins, a North Carolina state prisoner, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina pursuant to 42 U. S. C. §1983. Wilkins pro se complaint alleged that, on June 13, 2007, he was maliciously and sadistically assaulted [w]ithout any provocation by a corrections officer, respondent Gaddy. 1 App. to Pet. for Cert. C4. According to the complaint, Gaddy, apparently angered by Wilkins request for a grievance form, snatched [Wilkins] off the ground and slammed him onto the concrete floor. Ibid . Gaddy then proceeded to punch, kick, knee and choke [Wilkins] until another officer had to physically remove him from [Wilkins]. Ibid . Wilkins further alleged that, [a]s a result of the excessive force used by [Gaddy], [he] sustained multiple physical injuries including a bruised heel, lower back pain, increased blood pressure, as well as migraine headaches and dizziness and psychological trauma and mental anguish including depression, panic attacks and nightmares of the assault. Ibid .
The District Court, on its own motion and without a response from Gaddy, dismissed Wilkins complaint for failure to state a claim. Citing Circuit precedent, the court stated that, [i]n order to state an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish that he received more than a de minimus [sic] injury. No. 3:08cv00138 (WD NC, Apr. 16, 2008), pp. 1, 2 (citing Taylor v. McDuffie , 155 F. 3d 479, 483 (CA4 1998); Riley v. Dorton , 115 F. 3d 1159, 1166 (CA4 1997) (en banc); footnote omitted). According to the court, Wilkins alleged injuries were no more severe than those deemed de minimis in the Circuits Taylor and Riley decisions. Indeed, the court noted, Wilkins nowhere asserted that his injuries had required medical attention.
In a motion for reconsideration, Wilkins stated that he was unaware that the failure to allege medical treatment might prejudice his claim. He asserted that he had been prescribed, and continued to take, medication for his headaches and back pain, as well as for depression. And he attached medical records purporting to corroborate his injuries and course of treatment.
Describing reconsideration as an extraordinary remedy, the court declined to revisit its previous ruling. No. 3:08cv00138 (WD NC, Aug. 25, 2008), p. 1. The medical records, the court observed, indicated that some of Wilkins alleged injuries were pre-existing conditions. Id ., at 3. Wilkins had sought treatment for high blood pressure and mental health issues even before the assault. The court acknowledged that Wilkins received an X ray after the incident to examine his bruised heel, but it note[d] that bruising is generally considered a de minimus [sic] injury. Id. , at 4. The court similarly characterized as de minimis Wilkins complaints of back pain and headaches. The court denied Wilkins leave to amend his complaint. In a summary disposition, the Court of Appeals affirmed for the reasons stated by the district court. No. 087881 (CA4, Jan. 23, 2009).
II
In requiring what amounts to a showing of significant injury in order to state an excessive force claim, the Fourth Circuit has strayed from the clear holding of this Court in Hudson . Like Wilkins, the prisoner in Hudson filed suit under §1983 alleging that corrections officers had used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Evidence indicated that the officers had punched Hudson in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach without justification, resulting in minor bruises and swelling of his face, mouth, and lip as well as loosened teeth and a cracked partial dental plate. 503 U. S., at 4. A Magistrate Judge entered judgment in Hudsons favor, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that an inmate must prove a significant injury in order to state an excessive force claim. Hudson v. McMillian , 929 F. 2d 1014, 1015 (1990) (per curiam) . According to the Court of Appeals, Hudsons injuries, which had not required medical attention, were too minor to warrant relief. Ibid .
Reversing the Court of Appeals, this Court rejected the notion that significant injury is a threshold requirement for stating an excessive force claim. The core judicial inquiry, we held, was not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. 503 U. S., at 7; see also Whitley v. Albers , 475 U. S. 312, 319321 (1986) . When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, the Court recognized, contemporary standards of decency always are violated … whether or not significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury. Hudson , 503 U. S., at 9; see also id ., at 1314 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (The Court today appropriately puts to rest a seriously misguided view that pain inflicted by an excessive use of force is actionable under the Eighth Amendment only when coupled with significant injury, e.g. , injury that requires medical attention or leaves permanent marks).
This is not to say that the absence of serious injury is irrelevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry. Id ., at 7. [T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation. Ibid. (quoting Whitley , 475 U. S., at 321). The extent of injury may also provide some indication of the amount of force applied. As we stated in Hudson , not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. 503 U. S., at 9. The Eighth Amendments prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Ibid. (some internal quotation marks omitted). An inmate who complains of a push or shove that causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim. Ibid. (quoting Johnson v. Glick , 481 F. 2d 1028, 1033 (CA2 1973)).
Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts. An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury. Accordingly, the Court concluded in Hudson that the supposedly minor nature of the injuries provide[d] no basis for dismissal of [Hudsons] §1983 claim because the blows directed at Hudson, which caused bruises, swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate, are not de minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes. 503 U. S., at 10.
The allegations made by Wilkins in this case are quite similar to the facts in Hudson , and the District Courts analysis closely resembles the approach Hudson disavowed. Wilkins alleged that he was punched, kicked, kneed, choked, and body slammed maliciously and sadistically and [w]ithout any provocation. Dismissing Wilkins action sua sponte , the District Court did not hold that this purported assault, which allegedly left Wilkins with a bruised heel, back pain, and other injuries requiring medical treatment, involved de minimis force. Instead, the court concluded that Wilkins had failed to state a claim because he simply has not alleged that he suffered anything more than de minimus [sic] injury. No. 3:08cv00138 (WD NC, Apr. 16, 2008), at 2.
In giving decisive weight to the purportedly de minimis nature of Wilkins injuries, the District Court relied on two Fourth Circuit cases. See Riley , 115 F. 3d, at 11661168; Taylor , 155 F. 3d, at 483485. Those cases, in turn, were based upon the Fourth Circuits earlier decision in Norman v. Taylor , 25 F. 3d 1259 (1994) (en banc), which approved the practice of using injury as a proxy for force. According to the Fourth Circuit, Hudson does not foreclose and indeed is consistent with [the] view … that, absent the most extraordinary circumstances, a plaintiff cannot prevail on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim if his injuries are de minimis . 25 F. 3d, at 1263.
The Fourth Circuits strained reading of Hudson is not defensible. This Courts decision did not, as the Fourth Circuit would have it, merely serve to lower the injury threshold for excessive force claims from significant to non- de minimis whatever those ill-defined terms might mean. Instead, the Court aimed to shift the core judicial inquiry from the extent of the injury to the nature of the forcespecifically, whether it was nontrivial and was applied … maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. 503 U. S., at 7. To conclude, as the District Court did here, that the absence of some arbitrary quantity of injury requires automatic dismissal of an excessive force claim improperly bypasses this core inquiry. Id ., at 9. 2
In holding that the District Court erred in dismissing Wilkins complaint based on the supposedly de minimis nature of his injuries, we express no view on the underlying merits of his excessive force claim. In order to prevail, Wilkins will ultimately have to prove not only that the assault actually occurred but also that it was carried out maliciously and sadistically rather than as part of a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. Ibid . Moreover, even if Wilkins succeeds, the relatively modest nature of his alleged injuries will no doubt limit the damages he may recover.
***
The petition for certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
1 The materials in the record do not disclose Gaddys full name.
2 Most Circuits to consider the issue have rejected the Fourth Circuits de minimis injury requirement. See, e.g., Wright v. Goord, 554 F. 3d 255, 269270 (CA2 2009) ([O]ur Court has reversed summary dismissals of Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force even where the plaintiffs evidence of injury was slight … . [T]he absence of any significant injury to [the plaintiff] does not end the Eighth Amendment inquiry, for our standards of decency are violated even in the absence of such injury if the defendants use of force was malicious or sadistic); Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F. 3d 641, 648649 (CA3 2002) ([T]he Eighth Amendment analysis must be driven by the extent of the force and the circumstances in which it is applied; not by the resulting injuries. … [D]e minimis injuries do not necessarily establish de minimis force); Oliver v. Keller, 289 F. 3d 623, 628 (CA9 2002) (rejecting the view that to support an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim a prisoner must have suffered from the excessive force a more than de minimis physical injury (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. LaVallee, 439 F. 3d 670, 687 (CA10 2006) (same). The Fifth Circuit has sometimes used language indicating agreement with the Fourth Circuits approach. See, e.g., Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F. 3d 921, 924 (1999) ([T]o support an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim a prisoner must have suffered from the excessive force a more than de minimis injury). But see Brown v. Lippard, 472 F. 3d 384, 386 (2006) (This Court has never directly held that injuries must reach beyond some arbitrary threshold to satisfy an excessive force claim). Even in the Fifth Circuit, however, Wilkins likely would have survived dismissal for failure to state a claim because that courts precedents have classified the sort of injuries alleged here as non-de minimis. See, e.g., ibid. (permitting a prisoners Eighth Amendment excessive force claim to proceed to trial where evidence indicated that the prisoner suffered one-centimeter abrasions on both his left knee and left shoulder, pain in his right knee, and tenderness around his left thumb, as well as back problems); Gomez, 163 F. 3d, at 922 (refusing to grant summary judgment on de minimis injury grounds where the prisoner alleged physical pain [and] bodily injuries in the form of cuts, scrapes, [and] contusions to the face, head, and body).
PerCuriam
JAMEY L. WILKINS v. OFFICER GADDY
Per Curiam .
In Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U. S. 1, 4 (1992) , this Court held that the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment [even] when the inmate does not suffer serious injury. In this case, the District Court dismissed a prisoners excessive force claim based entirely on its determination that his injuries were de minimis . Because the District Courts approach, affirmed on appeal, is at odds with Hudson s direction to decide excessive force claims based on the nature of the force rather than the extent of the injury, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment is reversed.
I
In March 2008, petitioner Jamey Wilkins, a North Carolina state prisoner, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina pursuant to 42 U. S. C. §1983. Wilkins pro se complaint alleged that, on June 13, 2007, he was maliciously and sadistically assaulted [w]ithout any provocation by a corrections officer, respondent Gaddy. 1 App. to Pet. for Cert. C4. According to the complaint, Gaddy, apparently angered by Wilkins request for a grievance form, snatched [Wilkins] off the ground and slammed him onto the concrete floor. Ibid . Gaddy then proceeded to punch, kick, knee and choke [Wilkins] until another officer had to physically remove him from [Wilkins]. Ibid . Wilkins further alleged that, [a]s a result of the excessive force used by [Gaddy], [he] sustained multiple physical injuries including a bruised heel, lower back pain, increased blood pressure, as well as migraine headaches and dizziness and psychological trauma and mental anguish including depression, panic attacks and nightmares of the assault. Ibid .
The District Court, on its own motion and without a response from Gaddy, dismissed Wilkins complaint for failure to state a claim. Citing Circuit precedent, the court stated that, [i]n order to state an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish that he received more than a de minimus [sic] injury. No. 3:08cv00138 (WD NC, Apr. 16, 2008), pp. 1, 2 (citing Taylor v. McDuffie , 155 F. 3d 479, 483 (CA4 1998); Riley v. Dorton , 115 F. 3d 1159, 1166 (CA4 1997) (en banc); footnote omitted). According to the court, Wilkins alleged injuries were no more severe than those deemed de minimis in the Circuits Taylor and Riley decisions. Indeed, the court noted, Wilkins nowhere asserted that his injuries had required medical attention.
In a motion for reconsideration, Wilkins stated that he was unaware that the failure to allege medical treatment might prejudice his claim. He asserted that he had been prescribed, and continued to take, medication for his headaches and back pain, as well as for depression. And he attached medical records purporting to corroborate his injuries and course of treatment.
Describing reconsideration as an extraordinary remedy, the court declined to revisit its previous ruling. No. 3:08cv00138 (WD NC, Aug. 25, 2008), p. 1. The medical records, the court observed, indicated that some of Wilkins alleged injuries were pre-existing conditions. Id ., at 3. Wilkins had sought treatment for high blood pressure and mental health issues even before the assault. The court acknowledged that Wilkins received an X ray after the incident to examine his bruised heel, but it note[d] that bruising is generally considered a de minimus [sic] injury. Id. , at 4. The court similarly characterized as de minimis Wilkins complaints of back pain and headaches. The court denied Wilkins leave to amend his complaint. In a summary disposition, the Court of Appeals affirmed for the reasons stated by the district court. No. 087881 (CA4, Jan. 23, 2009).
II
In requiring what amounts to a showing of significant injury in order to state an excessive force claim, the Fourth Circuit has strayed from the clear holding of this Court in Hudson . Like Wilkins, the prisoner in Hudson filed suit under §1983 alleging that corrections officers had used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Evidence indicated that the officers had punched Hudson in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach without justification, resulting in minor bruises and swelling of his face, mouth, and lip as well as loosened teeth and a cracked partial dental plate. 503 U. S., at 4. A Magistrate Judge entered judgment in Hudsons favor, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that an inmate must prove a significant injury in order to state an excessive force claim. Hudson v. McMillian , 929 F. 2d 1014, 1015 (1990) (per curiam) . According to the Court of Appeals, Hudsons injuries, which had not required medical attention, were too minor to warrant relief. Ibid .
Reversing the Court of Appeals, this Court rejected the notion that significant injury is a threshold requirement for stating an excessive force claim. The core judicial inquiry, we held, was not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. 503 U. S., at 7; see also Whitley v. Albers , 475 U. S. 312, 319321 (1986) . When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, the Court recognized, contemporary standards of decency always are violated … whether or not significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury. Hudson , 503 U. S., at 9; see also id ., at 1314 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (The Court today appropriately puts to rest a seriously misguided view that pain inflicted by an excessive use of force is actionable under the Eighth Amendment only when coupled with significant injury, e.g. , injury that requires medical attention or leaves permanent marks).
This is not to say that the absence of serious injury is irrelevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry. Id ., at 7. [T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation. Ibid. (quoting Whitley , 475 U. S., at 321). The extent of injury may also provide some indication of the amount of force applied. As we stated in Hudson , not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. 503 U. S., at 9. The Eighth Amendments prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Ibid. (some internal quotation marks omitted). An inmate who complains of a push or shove that causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim. Ibid. (quoting Johnson v. Glick , 481 F. 2d 1028, 1033 (CA2 1973)).
Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts. An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury. Accordingly, the Court concluded in Hudson that the supposedly minor nature of the injuries provide[d] no basis for dismissal of [Hudsons] §1983 claim because the blows directed at Hudson, which caused bruises, swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate, are not de minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes. 503 U. S., at 10.
The allegations made by Wilkins in this case are quite similar to the facts in Hudson , and the District Courts analysis closely resembles the approach Hudson disavowed. Wilkins alleged that he was punched, kicked, kneed, choked, and body slammed maliciously and sadistically and [w]ithout any provocation. Dismissing Wilkins action sua sponte , the District Court did not hold that this purported assault, which allegedly left Wilkins with a bruised heel, back pain, and other injuries requiring medical treatment, involved de minimis force. Instead, the court concluded that Wilkins had failed to state a claim because he simply has not alleged that he suffered anything more than de minimus [sic] injury. No. 3:08cv00138 (WD NC, Apr. 16, 2008), at 2.
In giving decisive weight to the purportedly de minimis nature of Wilkins injuries, the District Court relied on two Fourth Circuit cases. See Riley , 115 F. 3d, at 11661168; Taylor , 155 F. 3d, at 483485. Those cases, in turn, were based upon the Fourth Circuits earlier decision in Norman v. Taylor , 25 F. 3d 1259 (1994) (en banc), which approved the practice of using injury as a proxy for force. According to the Fourth Circuit, Hudson does not foreclose and indeed is consistent with [the] view … that, absent the most extraordinary circumstances, a plaintiff cannot prevail on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim if his injuries are de minimis . 25 F. 3d, at 1263.
The Fourth Circuits strained reading of Hudson is not defensible. This Courts decision did not, as the Fourth Circuit would have it, merely serve to lower the injury threshold for excessive force claims from significant to non- de minimis whatever those ill-defined terms might mean. Instead, the Court aimed to shift the core judicial inquiry from the extent of the injury to the nature of the forcespecifically, whether it was nontrivial and was applied … maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. 503 U. S., at 7. To conclude, as the District Court did here, that the absence of some arbitrary quantity of injury requires automatic dismissal of an excessive force claim improperly bypasses this core inquiry. Id ., at 9. 2
In holding that the District Court erred in dismissing Wilkins complaint based on the supposedly de minimis nature of his injuries, we express no view on the underlying merits of his excessive force claim. In order to prevail, Wilkins will ultimately have to prove not only that the assault actually occurred but also that it was carried out maliciously and sadistically rather than as part of a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. Ibid . Moreover, even if Wilkins succeeds, the relatively modest nature of his alleged injuries will no doubt limit the damages he may recover.
***
The petition for certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
1 The materials in the record do not disclose Gaddys full name.
2 Most Circuits to consider the issue have rejected the Fourth Circuits de minimis injury requirement. See, e.g., Wright v. Goord, 554 F. 3d 255, 269270 (CA2 2009) ([O]ur Court has reversed summary dismissals of Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force even where the plaintiffs evidence of injury was slight … . [T]he absence of any significant injury to [the plaintiff] does not end the Eighth Amendment inquiry, for our standards of decency are violated even in the absence of such injury if the defendants use of force was malicious or sadistic); Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F. 3d 641, 648649 (CA3 2002) ([T]he Eighth Amendment analysis must be driven by the extent of the force and the circumstances in which it is applied; not by the resulting injuries. … [D]e minimis injuries do not necessarily establish de minimis force); Oliver v. Keller, 289 F. 3d 623, 628 (CA9 2002) (rejecting the view that to support an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim a prisoner must have suffered from the excessive force a more than de minimis physical injury (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. LaVallee, 439 F. 3d 670, 687 (CA10 2006) (same). The Fifth Circuit has sometimes used language indicating agreement with the Fourth Circuits approach. See, e.g., Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F. 3d 921, 924 (1999) ([T]o support an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim a prisoner must have suffered from the excessive force a more than de minimis injury). But see Brown v. Lippard, 472 F. 3d 384, 386 (2006) (This Court has never directly held that injuries must reach beyond some arbitrary threshold to satisfy an excessive force claim). Even in the Fifth Circuit, however, Wilkins likely would have survived dismissal for failure to state a claim because that courts precedents have classified the sort of injuries alleged here as non-de minimis. See, e.g., ibid. (permitting a prisoners Eighth Amendment excessive force claim to proceed to trial where evidence indicated that the prisoner suffered one-centimeter abrasions on both his left knee and left shoulder, pain in his right knee, and tenderness around his left thumb, as well as back problems); Gomez, 163 F. 3d, at 922 (refusing to grant summary judgment on de minimis injury grounds where the prisoner alleged physical pain [and] bodily injuries in the form of cuts, scrapes, [and] contusions to the face, head, and body).
PerCuriam
JAMEY L. WILKINS v. OFFICER GADDY
Per Curiam .
In Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U. S. 1, 4 (1992) , this Court held that the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment [even] when the inmate does not suffer serious injury. In this case, the District Court dismissed a prisoners excessive force claim based entirely on its determination that his injuries were de minimis . Because the District Courts approach, affirmed on appeal, is at odds with Hudson s direction to decide excessive force claims based on the nature of the force rather than the extent of the injury, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment is reversed.
I
In March 2008, petitioner Jamey Wilkins, a North Carolina state prisoner, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina pursuant to 42 U. S. C. §1983. Wilkins pro se complaint alleged that, on June 13, 2007, he was maliciously and sadistically assaulted [w]ithout any provocation by a corrections officer, respondent Gaddy. 1 App. to Pet. for Cert. C4. According to the complaint, Gaddy, apparently angered by Wilkins request for a grievance form, snatched [Wilkins] off the ground and slammed him onto the concrete floor. Ibid . Gaddy then proceeded to punch, kick, knee and choke [Wilkins] until another officer had to physically remove him from [Wilkins]. Ibid . Wilkins further alleged that, [a]s a result of the excessive force used by [Gaddy], [he] sustained multiple physical injuries including a bruised heel, lower back pain, increased blood pressure, as well as migraine headaches and dizziness and psychological trauma and mental anguish including depression, panic attacks and nightmares of the assault. Ibid .
The District Court, on its own motion and without a response from Gaddy, dismissed Wilkins complaint for failure to state a claim. Citing Circuit precedent, the court stated that, [i]n order to state an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish that he received more than a de minimus [sic] injury. No. 3:08cv00138 (WD NC, Apr. 16, 2008), pp. 1, 2 (citing Taylor v. McDuffie , 155 F. 3d 479, 483 (CA4 1998); Riley v. Dorton , 115 F. 3d 1159, 1166 (CA4 1997) (en banc); footnote omitted). According to the court, Wilkins alleged injuries were no more severe than those deemed de minimis in the Circuits Taylor and Riley decisions. Indeed, the court noted, Wilkins nowhere asserted that his injuries had required medical attention.
In a motion for reconsideration, Wilkins stated that he was unaware that the failure to allege medical treatment might prejudice his claim. He asserted that he had been prescribed, and continued to take, medication for his headaches and back pain, as well as for depression. And he attached medical records purporting to corroborate his injuries and course of treatment.
Describing reconsideration as an extraordinary remedy, the court declined to revisit its previous ruling. No. 3:08cv00138 (WD NC, Aug. 25, 2008), p. 1. The medical records, the court observed, indicated that some of Wilkins alleged injuries were pre-existing conditions. Id ., at 3. Wilkins had sought treatment for high blood pressure and mental health issues even before the assault. The court acknowledged that Wilkins received an X ray after the incident to examine his bruised heel, but it note[d] that bruising is generally considered a de minimus [sic] injury. Id. , at 4. The court similarly characterized as de minimis Wilkins complaints of back pain and headaches. The court denied Wilkins leave to amend his complaint. In a summary disposition, the Court of Appeals affirmed for the reasons stated by the district court. No. 087881 (CA4, Jan. 23, 2009).
II
In requiring what amounts to a showing of significant injury in order to state an excessive force claim, the Fourth Circuit has strayed from the clear holding of this Court in Hudson . Like Wilkins, the prisoner in Hudson filed suit under §1983 alleging that corrections officers had used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Evidence indicated that the officers had punched Hudson in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach without justification, resulting in minor bruises and swelling of his face, mouth, and lip as well as loosened teeth and a cracked partial dental plate. 503 U. S., at 4. A Magistrate Judge entered judgment in Hudsons favor, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that an inmate must prove a significant injury in order to state an excessive force claim. Hudson v. McMillian , 929 F. 2d 1014, 1015 (1990) (per curiam) . According to the Court of Appeals, Hudsons injuries, which had not required medical attention, were too minor to warrant relief. Ibid .
Reversing the Court of Appeals, this Court rejected the notion that significant injury is a threshold requirement for stating an excessive force claim. The core judicial inquiry, we held, was not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. 503 U. S., at 7; see also Whitley v. Albers , 475 U. S. 312, 319321 (1986) . When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, the Court recognized, contemporary standards of decency always are violated … whether or not significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury. Hudson , 503 U. S., at 9; see also id ., at 1314 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (The Court today appropriately puts to rest a seriously misguided view that pain inflicted by an excessive use of force is actionable under the Eighth Amendment only when coupled with significant injury, e.g. , injury that requires medical attention or leaves permanent marks).
This is not to say that the absence of serious injury is irrelevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry. Id ., at 7. [T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation. Ibid. (quoting Whitley , 475 U. S., at 321). The extent of injury may also provide some indication of the amount of force applied. As we stated in Hudson , not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. 503 U. S., at 9. The Eighth Amendments prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Ibid. (some internal quotation marks omitted). An inmate who complains of a push or shove that causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim. Ibid. (quoting Johnson v. Glick , 481 F. 2d 1028, 1033 (CA2 1973)).
Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts. An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury. Accordingly, the Court concluded in Hudson that the supposedly minor nature of the injuries provide[d] no basis for dismissal of [Hudsons] §1983 claim because the blows directed at Hudson, which caused bruises, swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate, are not de minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes. 503 U. S., at 10.
The allegations made by Wilkins in this case are quite similar to the facts in Hudson , and the District Courts analysis closely resembles the approach Hudson disavowed. Wilkins alleged that he was punched, kicked, kneed, choked, and body slammed maliciously and sadistically and [w]ithout any provocation. Dismissing Wilkins action sua sponte , the District Court did not hold that this purported assault, which allegedly left Wilkins with a bruised heel, back pain, and other injuries requiring medical treatment, involved de minimis force. Instead, the court concluded that Wilkins had failed to state a claim because he simply has not alleged that he suffered anything more than de minimus [sic] injury. No. 3:08cv00138 (WD NC, Apr. 16, 2008), at 2.
In giving decisive weight to the purportedly de minimis nature of Wilkins injuries, the District Court relied on two Fourth Circuit cases. See Riley , 115 F. 3d, at 11661168; Taylor , 155 F. 3d, at 483485. Those cases, in turn, were based upon the Fourth Circuits earlier decision in Norman v. Taylor , 25 F. 3d 1259 (1994) (en banc), which approved the practice of using injury as a proxy for force. According to the Fourth Circuit, Hudson does not foreclose and indeed is consistent with [the] view … that, absent the most extraordinary circumstances, a plaintiff cannot prevail on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim if his injuries are de minimis . 25 F. 3d, at 1263.
The Fourth Circuits strained reading of Hudson is not defensible. This Courts decision did not, as the Fourth Circuit would have it, merely serve to lower the injury threshold for excessive force claims from significant to non- de minimis whatever those ill-defined terms might mean. Instead, the Court aimed to shift the core judicial inquiry from the extent of the injury to the nature of the forcespecifically, whether it was nontrivial and was applied … maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. 503 U. S., at 7. To conclude, as the District Court did here, that the absence of some arbitrary quantity of injury requires automatic dismissal of an excessive force claim improperly bypasses this core inquiry. Id ., at 9. 2
In holding that the District Court erred in dismissing Wilkins complaint based on the supposedly de minimis nature of his injuries, we express no view on the underlying merits of his excessive force claim. In order to prevail, Wilkins will ultimately have to prove not only that the assault actually occurred but also that it was carried out maliciously and sadistically rather than as part of a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. Ibid . Moreover, even if Wilkins succeeds, the relatively modest nature of his alleged injuries will no doubt limit the damages he may recover.
***
The petition for certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
1 The materials in the record do not disclose Gaddys full name.
2 Most Circuits to consider the issue have rejected the Fourth Circuits de minimis injury requirement. See, e.g., Wright v. Goord, 554 F. 3d 255, 269270 (CA2 2009) ([O]ur Court has reversed summary dismissals of Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force even where the plaintiffs evidence of injury was slight … . [T]he absence of any significant injury to [the plaintiff] does not end the Eighth Amendment inquiry, for our standards of decency are violated even in the absence of such injury if the defendants use of force was malicious or sadistic); Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F. 3d 641, 648649 (CA3 2002) ([T]he Eighth Amendment analysis must be driven by the extent of the force and the circumstances in which it is applied; not by the resulting injuries. … [D]e minimis injuries do not necessarily establish de minimis force); Oliver v. Keller, 289 F. 3d 623, 628 (CA9 2002) (rejecting the view that to support an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim a prisoner must have suffered from the excessive force a more than de minimis physical injury (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. LaVallee, 439 F. 3d 670, 687 (CA10 2006) (same). The Fifth Circuit has sometimes used language indicating agreement with the Fourth Circuits approach. See, e.g., Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F. 3d 921, 924 (1999) ([T]o support an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim a prisoner must have suffered from the excessive force a more than de minimis injury). But see Brown v. Lippard, 472 F. 3d 384, 386 (2006) (This Court has never directly held that injuries must reach beyond some arbitrary threshold to satisfy an excessive force claim). Even in the Fifth Circuit, however, Wilkins likely would have survived dismissal for failure to state a claim because that courts precedents have classified the sort of injuries alleged here as non-de minimis. See, e.g., ibid. (permitting a prisoners Eighth Amendment excessive force claim to proceed to trial where evidence indicated that the prisoner suffered one-centimeter abrasions on both his left knee and left shoulder, pain in his right knee, and tenderness around his left thumb, as well as back problems); Gomez, 163 F. 3d, at 922 (refusing to grant summary judgment on de minimis injury grounds where the prisoner alleged physical pain [and] bodily injuries in the form of cuts, scrapes, [and] contusions to the face, head, and body).
PerCuriam
JAMEY L. WILKINS v. OFFICER GADDY
Per Curiam .
In Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U. S. 1, 4 (1992) , this Court held that the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment [even] when the inmate does not suffer serious injury. In this case, the District Court dismissed a prisoners excessive force claim based entirely on its determination that his injuries were de minimis . Because the District Courts approach, affirmed on appeal, is at odds with Hudson s direction to decide excessive force claims based on the nature of the force rather than the extent of the injury, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment is reversed.
I
In March 2008, petitioner Jamey Wilkins, a North Carolina state prisoner, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina pursuant to 42 U. S. C. §1983. Wilkins pro se complaint alleged that, on June 13, 2007, he was maliciously and sadistically assaulted [w]ithout any provocation by a corrections officer, respondent Gaddy. 1 App. to Pet. for Cert. C4. According to the complaint, Gaddy, apparently angered by Wilkins request for a grievance form, snatched [Wilkins] off the ground and slammed him onto the concrete floor. Ibid . Gaddy then proceeded to punch, kick, knee and choke [Wilkins] until another officer had to physically remove him from [Wilkins]. Ibid . Wilkins further alleged that, [a]s a result of the excessive force used by [Gaddy], [he] sustained multiple physical injuries including a bruised heel, lower back pain, increased blood pressure, as well as migraine headaches and dizziness and psychological trauma and mental anguish including depression, panic attacks and nightmares of the assault. Ibid .
The District Court, on its own motion and without a response from Gaddy, dismissed Wilkins complaint for failure to state a claim. Citing Circuit precedent, the court stated that, [i]n order to state an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish that he received more than a de minimus [sic] injury. No. 3:08cv00138 (WD NC, Apr. 16, 2008), pp. 1, 2 (citing Taylor v. McDuffie , 155 F. 3d 479, 483 (CA4 1998); Riley v. Dorton , 115 F. 3d 1159, 1166 (CA4 1997) (en banc); footnote omitted). According to the court, Wilkins alleged injuries were no more severe than those deemed de minimis in the Circuits Taylor and Riley decisions. Indeed, the court noted, Wilkins nowhere asserted that his injuries had required medical attention.
In a motion for reconsideration, Wilkins stated that he was unaware that the failure to allege medical treatment might prejudice his claim. He asserted that he had been prescribed, and continued to take, medication for his headaches and back pain, as well as for depression. And he attached medical records purporting to corroborate his injuries and course of treatment.
Describing reconsideration as an extraordinary remedy, the court declined to revisit its previous ruling. No. 3:08cv00138 (WD NC, Aug. 25, 2008), p. 1. The medical records, the court observed, indicated that some of Wilkins alleged injuries were pre-existing conditions. Id ., at 3. Wilkins had sought treatment for high blood pressure and mental health issues even before the assault. The court acknowledged that Wilkins received an X ray after the incident to examine his bruised heel, but it note[d] that bruising is generally considered a de minimus [sic] injury. Id. , at 4. The court similarly characterized as de minimis Wilkins complaints of back pain and headaches. The court denied Wilkins leave to amend his complaint. In a summary disposition, the Court of Appeals affirmed for the reasons stated by the district court. No. 087881 (CA4, Jan. 23, 2009).
II
In requiring what amounts to a showing of significant injury in order to state an excessive force claim, the Fourth Circuit has strayed from the clear holding of this Court in Hudson . Like Wilkins, the prisoner in Hudson filed suit under §1983 alleging that corrections officers had used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Evidence indicated that the officers had punched Hudson in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach without justification, resulting in minor bruises and swelling of his face, mouth, and lip as well as loosened teeth and a cracked partial dental plate. 503 U. S., at 4. A Magistrate Judge entered judgment in Hudsons favor, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that an inmate must prove a significant injury in order to state an excessive force claim. Hudson v. McMillian , 929 F. 2d 1014, 1015 (1990) (per curiam) . According to the Court of Appeals, Hudsons injuries, which had not required medical attention, were too minor to warrant relief. Ibid .
Reversing the Court of Appeals, this Court rejected the notion that significant injury is a threshold requirement for stating an excessive force claim. The core judicial inquiry, we held, was not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. 503 U. S., at 7; see also Whitley v. Albers , 475 U. S. 312, 319321 (1986) . When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, the Court recognized, contemporary standards of decency always are violated … whether or not significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury. Hudson , 503 U. S., at 9; see also id ., at 1314 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (The Court today appropriately puts to rest a seriously misguided view that pain inflicted by an excessive use of force is actionable under the Eighth Amendment only when coupled with significant injury, e.g. , injury that requires medical attention or leaves permanent marks).
This is not to say that the absence of serious injury is irrelevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry. Id ., at 7. [T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation. Ibid. (quoting Whitley , 475 U. S., at 321). The extent of injury may also provide some indication of the amount of force applied. As we stated in Hudson , not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. 503 U. S., at 9. The Eighth Amendments prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Ibid. (some internal quotation marks omitted). An inmate who complains of a push or shove that causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim. Ibid. (quoting Johnson v. Glick , 481 F. 2d 1028, 1033 (CA2 1973)).
Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts. An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury. Accordingly, the Court concluded in Hudson that the supposedly minor nature of the injuries provide[d] no basis for dismissal of [Hudsons] §1983 claim because the blows directed at Hudson, which caused bruises, swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate, are not de minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes. 503 U. S., at 10.
The allegations made by Wilkins in this case are quite similar to the facts in Hudson , and the District Courts analysis closely resembles the approach Hudson disavowed. Wilkins alleged that he was punched, kicked, kneed, choked, and body slammed maliciously and sadistically and [w]ithout any provocation. Dismissing Wilkins action sua sponte , the District Court did not hold that this purported assault, which allegedly left Wilkins with a bruised heel, back pain, and other injuries requiring medical treatment, involved de minimis force. Instead, the court concluded that Wilkins had failed to state a claim because he simply has not alleged that he suffered anything more than de minimus [sic] injury. No. 3:08cv00138 (WD NC, Apr. 16, 2008), at 2.
In giving decisive weight to the purportedly de minimis nature of Wilkins injuries, the District Court relied on two Fourth Circuit cases. See Riley , 115 F. 3d, at 11661168; Taylor , 155 F. 3d, at 483485. Those cases, in turn, were based upon the Fourth Circuits earlier decision in Norman v. Taylor , 25 F. 3d 1259 (1994) (en banc), which approved the practice of using injury as a proxy for force. According to the Fourth Circuit, Hudson does not foreclose and indeed is consistent with [the] view … that, absent the most extraordinary circumstances, a plaintiff cannot prevail on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim if his injuries are de minimis . 25 F. 3d, at 1263.
The Fourth Circuits strained reading of Hudson is not defensible. This Courts decision did not, as the Fourth Circuit would have it, merely serve to lower the injury threshold for excessive force claims from significant to non- de minimis whatever those ill-defined terms might mean. Instead, the Court aimed to shift the core judicial inquiry from the extent of the injury to the nature of the forcespecifically, whether it was nontrivial and was applied … maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. 503 U. S., at 7. To conclude, as the District Court did here, that the absence of some arbitrary quantity of injury requires automatic dismissal of an excessive force claim improperly bypasses this core inquiry. Id ., at 9. 2
In holding that the District Court erred in dismissing Wilkins complaint based on the supposedly de minimis nature of his injuries, we express no view on the underlying merits of his excessive force claim. In order to prevail, Wilkins will ultimately have to prove not only that the assault actually occurred but also that it was carried out maliciously and sadistically rather than as part of a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. Ibid . Moreover, even if Wilkins succeeds, the relatively modest nature of his alleged injuries will no doubt limit the damages he may recover.
***
The petition for certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
1 The materials in the record do not disclose Gaddys full name.
2 Most Circuits to consider the issue have rejected the Fourth Circuits de minimis injury requirement. See, e.g., Wright v. Goord, 554 F. 3d 255, 269270 (CA2 2009) ([O]ur Court has reversed summary dismissals of Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force even where the plaintiffs evidence of injury was slight … . [T]he absence of any significant injury to [the plaintiff] does not end the Eighth Amendment inquiry, for our standards of decency are violated even in the absence of such injury if the defendants use of force was malicious or sadistic); Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F. 3d 641, 648649 (CA3 2002) ([T]he Eighth Amendment analysis must be driven by the extent of the force and the circumstances in which it is applied; not by the resulting injuries. … [D]e minimis injuries do not necessarily establish de minimis force); Oliver v. Keller, 289 F. 3d 623, 628 (CA9 2002) (rejecting the view that to support an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim a prisoner must have suffered from the excessive force a more than de minimis physical injury (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. LaVallee, 439 F. 3d 670, 687 (CA10 2006) (same). The Fifth Circuit has sometimes used language indicating agreement with the Fourth Circuits approach. See, e.g., Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F. 3d 921, 924 (1999) ([T]o support an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim a prisoner must have suffered from the excessive force a more than de minimis injury). But see Brown v. Lippard, 472 F. 3d 384, 386 (2006) (This Court has never directly held that injuries must reach beyond some arbitrary threshold to satisfy an excessive force claim). Even in the Fifth Circuit, however, Wilkins likely would have survived dismissal for failure to state a claim because that courts precedents have classified the sort of injuries alleged here as non-de minimis. See, e.g., ibid. (permitting a prisoners Eighth Amendment excessive force claim to proceed to trial where evidence indicated that the prisoner suffered one-centimeter abrasions on both his left knee and left shoulder, pain in his right knee, and tenderness around his left thumb, as well as back problems); Gomez, 163 F. 3d, at 922 (refusing to grant summary judgment on de minimis injury grounds where the prisoner alleged physical pain [and] bodily injuries in the form of cuts, scrapes, [and] contusions to the face, head, and body).
Concurrence
JAMEY L. WILKINS v. OFFICER GADDY
Justice Thomas , with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the Fourth Circuits Eighth Amendment analysis is inconsistent with Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U. S. 1 (1992) . But I continue to believe that Hudson was wrongly decided. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U. S. 89, 95 (2007) (dissenting opinion); Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U. S. 825, 858 (1994) (opinion concurring in judgment); Helling v. McKinney , 509 U. S. 25, 37 (1993) (dissenting opinion); Hudson , supra , at 17 (dissenting opinion).
At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the word punishment referred to the penalty imposed for the commission of a crime. Helling , supra , at 38 ( Thomas , J., dissenting) . The Court adhered to this understanding until 1976, when it declared in Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U. S. 97, that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause also extends to prison conditions not imposed as part of a criminal sentence. See generally Hudson , supra , at 1820 ( Thomas , J., dissenting); Farmer , supra , at 861 ( Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). To limit this abrupt expansion of the Clause, the Court specified that its new interpretation of the Eighth Amendment should not extend to every deprivation a prisoner suffers, but instead should apply only [to] that narrow class of deprivations involving serious injury inflicted by prison officials acting with a culpable state of mind. Hudson , supra , at 20 (T homas , J., dissenting) (citing Estelle , supra , at 106); see generally Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U. S. 294, 298 (1991) .
Hudson , however, discarded the requirement of serious injury. Building upon Estelle s mislaid foundation, the Court concluded that force, rather than injury, is the relevant inquiry, and that a prisoner who alleges excessive force at the hands of prison officials and suffers nothing more than de minimis injury can state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Hudson thus turned the Eighth Amendment into a National Code of Prison Regulation, 503 U. S., at 28 (T homas , J., dissenting); Farmer , 511 U. S., at 859 (T homas , J., concurring in judgment), with federal judges [acting as] superintendents of prison conditions nationwide, id. , at 860. Although neither the Constitution nor our precedents require this result, no party to this case asks us to overrule Hudson . Accordingly, I concur in the Courts judgment.
Concurrence
JAMEY L. WILKINS v. OFFICER GADDY
Justice Thomas , with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the Fourth Circuits Eighth Amendment analysis is inconsistent with Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U. S. 1 (1992) . But I continue to believe that Hudson was wrongly decided. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U. S. 89, 95 (2007) (dissenting opinion); Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U. S. 825, 858 (1994) (opinion concurring in judgment); Helling v. McKinney , 509 U. S. 25, 37 (1993) (dissenting opinion); Hudson , supra , at 17 (dissenting opinion).
At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the word punishment referred to the penalty imposed for the commission of a crime. Helling , supra , at 38 ( Thomas , J., dissenting) . The Court adhered to this understanding until 1976, when it declared in Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U. S. 97, that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause also extends to prison conditions not imposed as part of a criminal sentence. See generally Hudson , supra , at 1820 ( Thomas , J., dissenting); Farmer , supra , at 861 ( Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). To limit this abrupt expansion of the Clause, the Court specified that its new interpretation of the Eighth Amendment should not extend to every deprivation a prisoner suffers, but instead should apply only [to] that narrow class of deprivations involving serious injury inflicted by prison officials acting with a culpable state of mind. Hudson , supra , at 20 (T homas , J., dissenting) (citing Estelle , supra , at 106); see generally Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U. S. 294, 298 (1991) .
Hudson , however, discarded the requirement of serious injury. Building upon Estelle s mislaid foundation, the Court concluded that force, rather than injury, is the relevant inquiry, and that a prisoner who alleges excessive force at the hands of prison officials and suffers nothing more than de minimis injury can state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Hudson thus turned the Eighth Amendment into a National Code of Prison Regulation, 503 U. S., at 28 (T homas , J., dissenting); Farmer , 511 U. S., at 859 (T homas , J., concurring in judgment), with federal judges [acting as] superintendents of prison conditions nationwide, id. , at 860. Although neither the Constitution nor our precedents require this result, no party to this case asks us to overrule Hudson . Accordingly, I concur in the Courts judgment.
Concurrence
JAMEY L. WILKINS v. OFFICER GADDY
Justice Thomas , with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the Fourth Circuits Eighth Amendment analysis is inconsistent with Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U. S. 1 (1992) . But I continue to believe that Hudson was wrongly decided. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U. S. 89, 95 (2007) (dissenting opinion); Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U. S. 825, 858 (1994) (opinion concurring in judgment); Helling v. McKinney , 509 U. S. 25, 37 (1993) (dissenting opinion); Hudson , supra , at 17 (dissenting opinion).
At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the word punishment referred to the penalty imposed for the commission of a crime. Helling , supra , at 38 ( Thomas , J., dissenting) . The Court adhered to this understanding until 1976, when it declared in Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U. S. 97, that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause also extends to prison conditions not imposed as part of a criminal sentence. See generally Hudson , supra , at 1820 ( Thomas , J., dissenting); Farmer , supra , at 861 ( Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). To limit this abrupt expansion of the Clause, the Court specified that its new interpretation of the Eighth Amendment should not extend to every deprivation a prisoner suffers, but instead should apply only [to] that narrow class of deprivations involving serious injury inflicted by prison officials acting with a culpable state of mind. Hudson , supra , at 20 (T homas , J., dissenting) (citing Estelle , supra , at 106); see generally Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U. S. 294, 298 (1991) .
Hudson , however, discarded the requirement of serious injury. Building upon Estelle s mislaid foundation, the Court concluded that force, rather than injury, is the relevant inquiry, and that a prisoner who alleges excessive force at the hands of prison officials and suffers nothing more than de minimis injury can state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Hudson thus turned the Eighth Amendment into a National Code of Prison Regulation, 503 U. S., at 28 (T homas , J., dissenting); Farmer , 511 U. S., at 859 (T homas , J., concurring in judgment), with federal judges [acting as] superintendents of prison conditions nationwide, id. , at 860. Although neither the Constitution nor our precedents require this result, no party to this case asks us to overrule Hudson . Accordingly, I concur in the Courts judgment.
Concurrence
JAMEY L. WILKINS v. OFFICER GADDY
Justice Thomas , with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the Fourth Circuits Eighth Amendment analysis is inconsistent with Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U. S. 1 (1992) . But I continue to believe that Hudson was wrongly decided. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U. S. 89, 95 (2007) (dissenting opinion); Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U. S. 825, 858 (1994) (opinion concurring in judgment); Helling v. McKinney , 509 U. S. 25, 37 (1993) (dissenting opinion); Hudson , supra , at 17 (dissenting opinion).
At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the word punishment referred to the penalty imposed for the commission of a crime. Helling , supra , at 38 ( Thomas , J., dissenting) . The Court adhered to this understanding until 1976, when it declared in Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U. S. 97, that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause also extends to prison conditions not imposed as part of a criminal sentence. See generally Hudson , supra , at 1820 ( Thomas , J., dissenting); Farmer , supra , at 861 ( Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). To limit this abrupt expansion of the Clause, the Court specified that its new interpretation of the Eighth Amendment should not extend to every deprivation a prisoner suffers, but instead should apply only [to] that narrow class of deprivations involving serious injury inflicted by prison officials acting with a culpable state of mind. Hudson , supra , at 20 (T homas , J., dissenting) (citing Estelle , supra , at 106); see generally Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U. S. 294, 298 (1991) .
Hudson , however, discarded the requirement of serious injury. Building upon Estelle s mislaid foundation, the Court concluded that force, rather than injury, is the relevant inquiry, and that a prisoner who alleges excessive force at the hands of prison officials and suffers nothing more than de minimis injury can state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Hudson thus turned the Eighth Amendment into a National Code of Prison Regulation, 503 U. S., at 28 (T homas , J., dissenting); Farmer , 511 U. S., at 859 (T homas , J., concurring in judgment), with federal judges [acting as] superintendents of prison conditions nationwide, id. , at 860. Although neither the Constitution nor our precedents require this result, no party to this case asks us to overrule Hudson . Accordingly, I concur in the Courts judgment.
Concurrence
JAMEY L. WILKINS v. OFFICER GADDY
Justice Thomas , with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the Fourth Circuits Eighth Amendment analysis is inconsistent with Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U. S. 1 (1992) . But I continue to believe that Hudson was wrongly decided. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U. S. 89, 95 (2007) (dissenting opinion); Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U. S. 825, 858 (1994) (opinion concurring in judgment); Helling v. McKinney , 509 U. S. 25, 37 (1993) (dissenting opinion); Hudson , supra , at 17 (dissenting opinion).
At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the word punishment referred to the penalty imposed for the commission of a crime. Helling , supra , at 38 ( Thomas , J., dissenting) . The Court adhered to this understanding until 1976, when it declared in Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U. S. 97, that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause also extends to prison conditions not imposed as part of a criminal sentence. See generally Hudson , supra , at 1820 ( Thomas , J., dissenting); Farmer , supra , at 861 ( Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). To limit this abrupt expansion of the Clause, the Court specified that its new interpretation of the Eighth Amendment should not extend to every deprivation a prisoner suffers, but instead should apply only [to] that narrow class of deprivations involving serious injury inflicted by prison officials acting with a culpable state of mind. Hudson , supra , at 20 (T homas , J., dissenting) (citing Estelle , supra , at 106); see generally Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U. S. 294, 298 (1991) .
Hudson , however, discarded the requirement of serious injury. Building upon Estelle s mislaid foundation, the Court concluded that force, rather than injury, is the relevant inquiry, and that a prisoner who alleges excessive force at the hands of prison officials and suffers nothing more than de minimis injury can state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Hudson thus turned the Eighth Amendment into a National Code of Prison Regulation, 503 U. S., at 28 (T homas , J., dissenting); Farmer , 511 U. S., at 859 (T homas , J., concurring in judgment), with federal judges [acting as] superintendents of prison conditions nationwide, id. , at 860. Although neither the Constitution nor our precedents require this result, no party to this case asks us to overrule Hudson . Accordingly, I concur in the Courts judgment.
Concurrence
JAMEY L. WILKINS v. OFFICER GADDY
Justice Thomas , with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the Fourth Circuits Eighth Amendment analysis is inconsistent with Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U. S. 1 (1992) . But I continue to believe that Hudson was wrongly decided. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U. S. 89, 95 (2007) (dissenting opinion); Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U. S. 825, 858 (1994) (opinion concurring in judgment); Helling v. McKinney , 509 U. S. 25, 37 (1993) (dissenting opinion); Hudson , supra , at 17 (dissenting opinion).
At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the word punishment referred to the penalty imposed for the commission of a crime. Helling , supra , at 38 ( Thomas , J., dissenting) . The Court adhered to this understanding until 1976, when it declared in Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U. S. 97, that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause also extends to prison conditions not imposed as part of a criminal sentence. See generally Hudson , supra , at 1820 ( Thomas , J., dissenting); Farmer , supra , at 861 ( Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). To limit this abrupt expansion of the Clause, the Court specified that its new interpretation of the Eighth Amendment should not extend to every deprivation a prisoner suffers, but instead should apply only [to] that narrow class of deprivations involving serious injury inflicted by prison officials acting with a culpable state of mind. Hudson , supra , at 20 (T homas , J., dissenting) (citing Estelle , supra , at 106); see generally Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U. S. 294, 298 (1991) .
Hudson , however, discarded the requirement of serious injury. Building upon Estelle s mislaid foundation, the Court concluded that force, rather than injury, is the relevant inquiry, and that a prisoner who alleges excessive force at the hands of prison officials and suffers nothing more than de minimis injury can state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Hudson thus turned the Eighth Amendment into a National Code of Prison Regulation, 503 U. S., at 28 (T homas , J., dissenting); Farmer , 511 U. S., at 859 (T homas , J., concurring in judgment), with federal judges [acting as] superintendents of prison conditions nationwide, id. , at 860. Although neither the Constitution nor our precedents require this result, no party to this case asks us to overrule Hudson . Accordingly, I concur in the Courts judgment.
Concurrence
JAMEY L. WILKINS v. OFFICER GADDY
Justice Thomas , with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the Fourth Circuits Eighth Amendment analysis is inconsistent with Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U. S. 1 (1992) . But I continue to believe that Hudson was wrongly decided. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U. S. 89, 95 (2007) (dissenting opinion); Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U. S. 825, 858 (1994) (opinion concurring in judgment); Helling v. McKinney , 509 U. S. 25, 37 (1993) (dissenting opinion); Hudson , supra , at 17 (dissenting opinion).
At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the word punishment referred to the penalty imposed for the commission of a crime. Helling , supra , at 38 ( Thomas , J., dissenting) . The Court adhered to this understanding until 1976, when it declared in Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U. S. 97, that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause also extends to prison conditions not imposed as part of a criminal sentence. See generally Hudson , supra , at 1820 ( Thomas , J., dissenting); Farmer , supra , at 861 ( Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). To limit this abrupt expansion of the Clause, the Court specified that its new interpretation of the Eighth Amendment should not extend to every deprivation a prisoner suffers, but instead should apply only [to] that narrow class of deprivations involving serious injury inflicted by prison officials acting with a culpable state of mind. Hudson , supra , at 20 (T homas , J., dissenting) (citing Estelle , supra , at 106); see generally Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U. S. 294, 298 (1991) .
Hudson , however, discarded the requirement of serious injury. Building upon Estelle s mislaid foundation, the Court concluded that force, rather than injury, is the relevant inquiry, and that a prisoner who alleges excessive force at the hands of prison officials and suffers nothing more than de minimis injury can state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Hudson thus turned the Eighth Amendment into a National Code of Prison Regulation, 503 U. S., at 28 (T homas , J., dissenting); Farmer , 511 U. S., at 859 (T homas , J., concurring in judgment), with federal judges [acting as] superintendents of prison conditions nationwide, id. , at 860. Although neither the Constitution nor our precedents require this result, no party to this case asks us to overrule Hudson . Accordingly, I concur in the Courts judgment.
Concurrence
JAMEY L. WILKINS v. OFFICER GADDY
Justice Thomas , with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the Fourth Circuits Eighth Amendment analysis is inconsistent with Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U. S. 1 (1992) . But I continue to believe that Hudson was wrongly decided. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U. S. 89, 95 (2007) (dissenting opinion); Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U. S. 825, 858 (1994) (opinion concurring in judgment); Helling v. McKinney , 509 U. S. 25, 37 (1993) (dissenting opinion); Hudson , supra , at 17 (dissenting opinion).
At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the word punishment referred to the penalty imposed for the commission of a crime. Helling , supra , at 38 ( Thomas , J., dissenting) . The Court adhered to this understanding until 1976, when it declared in Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U. S. 97, that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause also extends to prison conditions not imposed as part of a criminal sentence. See generally Hudson , supra , at 1820 ( Thomas , J., dissenting); Farmer , supra , at 861 ( Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). To limit this abrupt expansion of the Clause, the Court specified that its new interpretation of the Eighth Amendment should not extend to every deprivation a prisoner suffers, but instead should apply only [to] that narrow class of deprivations involving serious injury inflicted by prison officials acting with a culpable state of mind. Hudson , supra , at 20 (T homas , J., dissenting) (citing Estelle , supra , at 106); see generally Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U. S. 294, 298 (1991) .
Hudson , however, discarded the requirement of serious injury. Building upon Estelle s mislaid foundation, the Court concluded that force, rather than injury, is the relevant inquiry, and that a prisoner who alleges excessive force at the hands of prison officials and suffers nothing more than de minimis injury can state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Hudson thus turned the Eighth Amendment into a National Code of Prison Regulation, 503 U. S., at 28 (T homas , J., dissenting); Farmer , 511 U. S., at 859 (T homas , J., concurring in judgment), with federal judges [acting as] superintendents of prison conditions nationwide, id. , at 860. Although neither the Constitution nor our precedents require this result, no party to this case asks us to overrule Hudson . Accordingly, I concur in the Courts judgment.
Concurrence
JAMEY L. WILKINS v. OFFICER GADDY
Justice Thomas , with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the Fourth Circuits Eighth Amendment analysis is inconsistent with Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U. S. 1 (1992) . But I continue to believe that Hudson was wrongly decided. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U. S. 89, 95 (2007) (dissenting opinion); Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U. S. 825, 858 (1994) (opinion concurring in judgment); Helling v. McKinney , 509 U. S. 25, 37 (1993) (dissenting opinion); Hudson , supra , at 17 (dissenting opinion).
At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the word punishment referred to the penalty imposed for the commission of a crime. Helling , supra , at 38 ( Thomas , J., dissenting) . The Court adhered to this understanding until 1976, when it declared in Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U. S. 97, that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause also extends to prison conditions not imposed as part of a criminal sentence. See generally Hudson , supra , at 1820 ( Thomas , J., dissenting); Farmer , supra , at 861 ( Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). To limit this abrupt expansion of the Clause, the Court specified that its new interpretation of the Eighth Amendment should not extend to every deprivation a prisoner suffers, but instead should apply only [to] that narrow class of deprivations involving serious injury inflicted by prison officials acting with a culpable state of mind. Hudson , supra , at 20 (T homas , J., dissenting) (citing Estelle , supra , at 106); see generally Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U. S. 294, 298 (1991) .
Hudson , however, discarded the requirement of serious injury. Building upon Estelle s mislaid foundation, the Court concluded that force, rather than injury, is the relevant inquiry, and that a prisoner who alleges excessive force at the hands of prison officials and suffers nothing more than de minimis injury can state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Hudson thus turned the Eighth Amendment into a National Code of Prison Regulation, 503 U. S., at 28 (T homas , J., dissenting); Farmer , 511 U. S., at 859 (T homas , J., concurring in judgment), with federal judges [acting as] superintendents of prison conditions nationwide, id. , at 860. Although neither the Constitution nor our precedents require this result, no party to this case asks us to overrule Hudson . Accordingly, I concur in the Courts judgment.
Concurrence
JAMEY L. WILKINS v. OFFICER GADDY
Justice Thomas , with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the Fourth Circuits Eighth Amendment analysis is inconsistent with Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U. S. 1 (1992) . But I continue to believe that Hudson was wrongly decided. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U. S. 89, 95 (2007) (dissenting opinion); Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U. S. 825, 858 (1994) (opinion concurring in judgment); Helling v. McKinney , 509 U. S. 25, 37 (1993) (dissenting opinion); Hudson , supra , at 17 (dissenting opinion).
At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the word punishment referred to the penalty imposed for the commission of a crime. Helling , supra , at 38 ( Thomas , J., dissenting) . The Court adhered to this understanding until 1976, when it declared in Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U. S. 97, that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause also extends to prison conditions not imposed as part of a criminal sentence. See generally Hudson , supra , at 1820 ( Thomas , J., dissenting); Farmer , supra , at 861 ( Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). To limit this abrupt expansion of the Clause, the Court specified that its new interpretation of the Eighth Amendment should not extend to every deprivation a prisoner suffers, but instead should apply only [to] that narrow class of deprivations involving serious injury inflicted by prison officials acting with a culpable state of mind. Hudson , supra , at 20 (T homas , J., dissenting) (citing Estelle , supra , at 106); see generally Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U. S. 294, 298 (1991) .
Hudson , however, discarded the requirement of serious injury. Building upon Estelle s mislaid foundation, the Court concluded that force, rather than injury, is the relevant inquiry, and that a prisoner who alleges excessive force at the hands of prison officials and suffers nothing more than de minimis injury can state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Hudson thus turned the Eighth Amendment into a National Code of Prison Regulation, 503 U. S., at 28 (T homas , J., dissenting); Farmer , 511 U. S., at 859 (T homas , J., concurring in judgment), with federal judges [acting as] superintendents of prison conditions nationwide, id. , at 860. Although neither the Constitution nor our precedents require this result, no party to this case asks us to overrule Hudson . Accordingly, I concur in the Courts judgment.
Concurrence
JAMEY L. WILKINS v. OFFICER GADDY
Justice Thomas , with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the Fourth Circuits Eighth Amendment analysis is inconsistent with Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U. S. 1 (1992) . But I continue to believe that Hudson was wrongly decided. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U. S. 89, 95 (2007) (dissenting opinion); Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U. S. 825, 858 (1994) (opinion concurring in judgment); Helling v. McKinney , 509 U. S. 25, 37 (1993) (dissenting opinion); Hudson , supra , at 17 (dissenting opinion).
At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the word punishment referred to the penalty imposed for the commission of a crime. Helling , supra , at 38 ( Thomas , J., dissenting) . The Court adhered to this understanding until 1976, when it declared in Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U. S. 97, that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause also extends to prison conditions not imposed as part of a criminal sentence. See generally Hudson , supra , at 1820 ( Thomas , J., dissenting); Farmer , supra , at 861 ( Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). To limit this abrupt expansion of the Clause, the Court specified that its new interpretation of the Eighth Amendment should not extend to every deprivation a prisoner suffers, but instead should apply only [to] that narrow class of deprivations involving serious injury inflicted by prison officials acting with a culpable state of mind. Hudson , supra , at 20 (T homas , J., dissenting) (citing Estelle , supra , at 106); see generally Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U. S. 294, 298 (1991) .
Hudson , however, discarded the requirement of serious injury. Building upon Estelle s mislaid foundation, the Court concluded that force, rather than injury, is the relevant inquiry, and that a prisoner who alleges excessive force at the hands of prison officials and suffers nothing more than de minimis injury can state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Hudson thus turned the Eighth Amendment into a National Code of Prison Regulation, 503 U. S., at 28 (T homas , J., dissenting); Farmer , 511 U. S., at 859 (T homas , J., concurring in judgment), with federal judges [acting as] superintendents of prison conditions nationwide, id. , at 860. Although neither the Constitution nor our precedents require this result, no party to this case asks us to overrule Hudson . Accordingly, I concur in the Courts judgment.
Concurrence
JAMEY L. WILKINS v. OFFICER GADDY
Justice Thomas , with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the Fourth Circuits Eighth Amendment analysis is inconsistent with Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U. S. 1 (1992) . But I continue to believe that Hudson was wrongly decided. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U. S. 89, 95 (2007) (dissenting opinion); Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U. S. 825, 858 (1994) (opinion concurring in judgment); Helling v. McKinney , 509 U. S. 25, 37 (1993) (dissenting opinion); Hudson , supra , at 17 (dissenting opinion).
At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the word punishment referred to the penalty imposed for the commission of a crime. Helling , supra , at 38 ( Thomas , J., dissenting) . The Court adhered to this understanding until 1976, when it declared in Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U. S. 97, that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause also extends to prison conditions not imposed as part of a criminal sentence. See generally Hudson , supra , at 1820 ( Thomas , J., dissenting); Farmer , supra , at 861 ( Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). To limit this abrupt expansion of the Clause, the Court specified that its new interpretation of the Eighth Amendment should not extend to every deprivation a prisoner suffers, but instead should apply only [to] that narrow class of deprivations involving serious injury inflicted by prison officials acting with a culpable state of mind. Hudson , supra , at 20 (T homas , J., dissenting) (citing Estelle , supra , at 106); see generally Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U. S. 294, 298 (1991) .
Hudson , however, discarded the requirement of serious injury. Building upon Estelle s mislaid foundation, the Court concluded that force, rather than injury, is the relevant inquiry, and that a prisoner who alleges excessive force at the hands of prison officials and suffers nothing more than de minimis injury can state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Hudson thus turned the Eighth Amendment into a National Code of Prison Regulation, 503 U. S., at 28 (T homas , J., dissenting); Farmer , 511 U. S., at 859 (T homas , J., concurring in judgment), with federal judges [acting as] superintendents of prison conditions nationwide, id. , at 860. Although neither the Constitution nor our precedents require this result, no party to this case asks us to overrule Hudson . Accordingly, I concur in the Courts judgment.


Restore Dialog¶
The Restore dialog provides an easy way to use a Custom, tar, or Directory format backup taken with the pgAdmin Backup dialog to recreate a database or database object. The Backup dialog invokes options of the pg_dump client utility; the Restore dialog invokes options of the pg_restore client utility.
You can use the Query Tool to play back the script created during a plain-text backup made with the Backup dialog. For more information about backing up or restoring, please refer to the documentation for pg_dump or pg_restore.
Use the fields on the General tab to specify general information about the restore process:
Use the drop-down listbox in the Format field to select the format of your backup file.
Select Custom or tar to restore from a custom archive file to create a copy of the backed-up object.
Select Directory to restore from a compressed directory-format archive.
Enter the complete path to the backup file in the Filename field. Optionally, select the Browser icon (ellipsis) to the right to navigate into a directory and select the file that contains the archive.
Use the Number of Jobs field to specify if pg_restore should use multiple (concurrent) jobs to process the restore. Each job uses a separate connection to the server.
Use the drop-down listbox next to Rolename to specify the role that will be used to authenticate with the server during the restore process.
Click the Restore options tab to continue. Use the fields on the Restore options tab to specify options that correspond to pg_restore options.
Use the switches in the Sections box to specify the content that will be restored:
Move the switch next to Pre-data to the Yes position to restore all data definition items not included in the data or post-data item lists.
Move the switch next to Data to the Yes position to restore actual table data, large-object contents, and sequence values.
Move the switch next to Post-data to the Yes position to restore definitions of indexes, triggers, rules, and constraints (other than validated check constraints).
Use the switches in the Type of objects box to specify the objects that will be restored:
Move the switch next to Only data to the Yes position to limit the restoration to data.
Move the switch next to Only schema to limit the restoration to schema-level database objects.
Use the switches in the Do not save box to specify which objects will not be restored:
Move the switch next to Owner to the Yes position to exclude commands that set object ownership.
Move the switch next to Privilege to the Yes position to exclude commands that create access privileges.
Move the switch next to Tablespace to the Yes position to exclude tablespaces.
Move the switch next to Comments to the Yes position to exclude commands that set the comments. Note: This option is visible only for database server greater than or equal to 11.
Use the switches in the Queries box to specify the type of statements that should be included in the restore:
Move the switch next to Include CREATE DATABASE statement to the Yes position to include a command that creates a new database before performing the restore.
Move the switch next to Clean before restore to the Yes position to drop each existing database object (and data) before restoring.
Move the switch next to Single transaction to the Yes position to execute the restore as a single transaction (that is, wrap the emitted complete successfully, or no changes are applied. This option implies –exit-on-error.
Use the switches in the Disable box to specify the type of statements that should be excluded from the restore:
Move the switch next to Trigger (active when creating a data-only restore) to the Yes position to include commands that will disable triggers on the target table while the data is being loaded.
Move the switch next to No data for Failed Tables to the Yes position to ignore data that fails a trigger.
Use the switches in the Miscellaneous/Behavior box to specify miscellaneous restore options:
Move the switch next to Verbose messages to the No position to instruct pg_restore to exclude verbose messages.
Move the switch next to Use SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION to the Yes position to include a statement that will use a SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION command to determine object ownership (instead of an ALTER OWNER command).
Move the switch next to Exit on error to the Yes position to instruct pg_restore to exit restore if there is an error in sending SQL commands. The default is to continue and to display a count of errors at the end of the restore.
When you’ve specified the details that will be incorporated into the pg_restore command, click the Restore button to start the process, or click the Cancel button to exit without saving your work. A popup will confirm if the restore is successful.
Use the Stop Process button to stop the Restore process.
Click Click here for details on the popup to launch the Process Watcher. The Process Watcher logs all the activity associated with the restore, and provides additional information for troubleshooting should the restore command encounter problems.