Syllabus
SELING, SUPERINTENDENT, SPECIAL COMMITMENT CENTER v.  Respondent Young is confined under the Act at the Special Commitment Center (Center), for which petitioner is the superintendent. Youngs challenges to his commitment in state court proved largely unsuccessful. Young then instituted a habeas action under 28 U. S. C. §2254, seeking release from confinement. The District Court initially granted the writ, concluding that the Act was unconstitutional. While the superintendents appeal was pending, this Court decided Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, holding that a similar commitment scheme, Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, on its face, met substantive due process requirements, was nonpunitive, and thus did not violate the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses. The Ninth Circuit remanded for reconsideration in light of Hendricks . The District Court then denied Youngs petition. In particular, the District Court determined that, because the Washington Act is civil, Youngs double jeopardy and ex post facto claims must fail. The Ninth Circuit reversed that ruling. The linchpin of Youngs claims, the court reasoned, was whether the Act was punitive as applied to Young. The court did not read Hendricks to preclude the possibility that the Act could be punitive as applied. Reasoning that actual confinement conditions could divest a facially valid statute of its civil label upon a showing by the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is punitive in effect, the court remanded the case for the District Court to determine whether the conditions at the Center rendered the Act punitive as applied to Young.
Held : An Act, found to be civil, cannot be deemed punitive as applied to a single individual in violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses and provide cause for release. Pp. 916.
(a) Respondent cannot obtain release through an as-applied challenge to the Act on double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds. The Act is strikingly similar to, and, in fact, was the pattern for, the Kansas Act upheld in Hendricks. Among other things, the Court there applied the principle that determining the civil or punitive nature of an Act must begin with reference to its text and legislative history. See 521 U. S., at 360369. Subsequently, the Court expressly disapproved of evaluating an Acts civil nature by reference to its effect on a single individual, holding, instead, that courts must focus on a variety of factors considered in relation to the statute on its face, and that the clearest proof is required to override legislative intent and conclude that an Act denominated civil is punitive in purpose or effect. Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93. With this in mind, the Ninth Circuits as-applied analysis for double jeopardy and ex post facto claims must be rejected as fundamentally flawed. This Court does not deny the seriousness of some of respondents allegations. Nor does the Court express any view as to how his allegations would bear on a court determining in the first instance whether Washingtons confinement scheme is civil. Here, however, the Court evaluates respondents allegations under the assumption that the Act is civil, as the Washington Supreme Court held and the Ninth Circuit acknowledged. The Court agrees with petitioner that an as-applied analysis would prove unworkable. Such an analysis would never conclusively resolve whether a particular scheme is punitive and would thereby prevent a final determination of the schemes validity under the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses. Confinement is not a fixed event, but extends over time under conditions that are subject to change. The particular features of confinement may affect how a confinement scheme is evaluated to determine whether it is civil or punitive, but it remains no less true that the query must be answered definitively. A confinement schemes civil nature cannot be altered based merely on vagaries in the authorizing statutes implementation. The Ninth Circuits as-applied analysis does not comport with precedents in which this Court evaluated the validity of confinement schemes. See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois , 478 U. S. 364. Such cases presented the question whether the Act at issue was punitive, whereas permitting respondents as-applied challenge would invite an end run around the Washington Supreme Courts decision that the Act is civil when that decision is not before this Court. Pp. 913.
(b) Todays decision does not mean that respondent and others committed as sexually violent predators have no remedy for the alleged conditions and treatment regime at the Center. The Act gives them the right to adequate care and individualized treatment. It is for the Washington courts to determine whether the Center is operating in accordance with state law and provide a remedy. Those courts also remain competent to adjudicate and remedy challenges to civil confinement schemes arising under the Federal Constitution. Because the Washington Supreme Court has held that the Act is civil in nature, designed to incapacitate and to treat, due process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under the Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed. E.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U. S. 71. Finally, the Court notes that an action under 42 U. S. C. §1983 is pending against the Center and that the Center operates under an injunction requiring it to take steps to improve confinement conditions. Pp. 1315.
(c) This case gives the Court no occasion to consider how a confinement schemes civil nature relates to other constitutional challenges, such as due process, or to consider the extent to which a court may look to actual conditions of confinement and implementation of the statute to determine in the first instance whether a confinement scheme is civil in nature. Whether such a scheme is punitive has been the threshold question for some constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Allen, supra. However, the Court has not squarely addressed the relevance of confinement conditions to a first instance determination, and that question need not be resolved here. Pp. 1516.
192 F. 3d 870, reversed and remanded.
OConnor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Souter, J., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Dissent
MARK SELING, SUPERINTENDENT, SPECIAL
COMMITMENT CENTER, PETITIONER
v.
ANDRE BRIGHAM YOUNG
Justice Stevens , dissenting.
A sexual predator may be imprisoned for violating the law, and, if he is mentally ill, he may be committed to an institution until he is cured. Whether a specific statute authorizing the detention of such a person is properly viewed as criminal or civil in the context of federal constitutional issues is often a question of considerable difficulty. See Kansas v. Hendricks , 521 U. S. 346 (1997) (reversing, by a 5 to 4 vote, a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court invalidating Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act); Allen v. Illinois , 478 U. S. 364 (1986) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act); In re Young , 122 Wash. 2d 1, 857 P. 2d 989 (1993) (en banc) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, the provisions of Washingtons Community Protection Act of 1990 dealing with sexually violent predators).
It is settled, however, that the question whether a state statute is civil or criminal in nature for purposes of complying with the demands of the Federal Constitution is a question of federal law. If a detainee comes forward with the clearest proof that the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the States] intention that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal. Allen, 478 U. S., at 369 (quoting United States v. Ward , 448 U. S. 242, 248249 (1980) ) (emphasis added). See also Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93, 100, 105 (1997) . Accordingly, we have consistently looked to the conditions of confinement as evidence of both the legislative purpose behind the statute and its actual effect. See Hendricks , 521 U. S., at 361, 367369; Schall v. Martin , 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen , 478 U. S., at 369, 373374. As we have acknowledged in those cases, the question whether a statute is in fact punitive cannot always be answered solely by reference to the text of the statute.
The majority in this case, however, incorrectly assumes that the Act at issue is necessarily civil. The issue the majority purports to resolve is whether an Act that is otherwise civil in nature can be deemed criminal in a specific instance based on evidence of its application to a particular prisoner. However, respondent Youngs petition did not present that issue. Rather, consistent with our case law, Young sought to introduce evidence of the conditions of confinement as evidence of the punitive purpose and effect of the Washington statute. See Amended Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus 6 and Supp. Brief on Remand 2, 6, 1011, in No. C94480C (WD Wash.), Record, Doc. Nos. 57, 155. As a result, Young in no way runs afoul of Hudson v. United States , 522 U. S. 93 (1997) . Properly read, Hudson acknowledges that resolving whether an Act is civil or criminal in nature can take into account whether the statutory scheme has a punitive effect. 1 Id., at 99. What Hudson rejects is an approach not taken by respondentone that bypasses this threshold question in favor of a dispositive focus on the sanction actually imposed on the specific individual. 2 Id., at 101102.
To be sure, the question whether an Act is civil or punitive in nature is initially one of statutory construction. Ante , at 9 (majority opinion). However, under the majoritys analysis, there is no inquiry beyond that of statutory construction. Ante , at 11. In essence, the majority argues that because the constitutional query must be answered definitively and because confinement is not a fixed event, conditions of confinement should not be considered at all, except in the first challenge to a statute, when, as a practical matter, the evidence of such conditions is most likely not to constitute the requisite clearest proof. This seems to me quite wrong. If conditions of confinement are such that a detainee has been punished twice in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is irrelevant that the scheme has been previously labeled as civil without full knowledge of the effects of the statute. 3
In this case, Young has made detailed allegations concerning both the absence of treatment for his alleged mental illness and the starkly punitive character of the conditions of his confinement. If proved, those allegations establish not just that those detained pursuant to the statute are treated like those imprisoned for violations of Washingtons criminal laws, but that, in many respects, they receive significantly worse treatment. 4 If those allegations are correct, the statute in question should be characterized as a criminal law for federal constitutional purposes. I therefore agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that respondent should be given the opportunity to come forward with the clearest proof that his allegations are true.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
1 In his concurrence, Justice Scalia concludes that, under the rule of Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93 (1997) , courts may never look to actual conditions of confinement and implementation of the statute to determine in the first instance whether a confinement scheme is civil in nature. See ante, at 1. Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, would take Hudson even further, precluding implementation-based challenges at any time. Ante, at 4. However, for the reasons set out above, I believe that both concurrences misread Hudson. I also note that Hudson did not involve confinement. In cases that do involve confinement, this Court has relied on the principle that a statutory scheme must be deemed criminal if it was sufficiently punitive either in purpose or effect. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, 361, 367369 (1997) ; Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen v. Illinois, 478 U. S. 364, 369, 373374 (1986) .
2 In response to my dissent, the Court has made it clear that it is simply holding that respondent may not prevail if he merely proves that the statute is punitive insofar as it has been applied to him. The question whether he may prevail if he can prove that the statute is punitive in its application to everyone confined under its provisions therefore remains open. In sum, the Court has rejected the narrow holding of the Ninth Circuit, but has not addressed the sufficiency of the broadest claim that petitioner has advanced.
3 In this case, those detained pursuant to Washingtons statute have sought an improvement in conditions for almost seven years. Their success in the courts, however, has had little practical impact.
4 Under such conditions, Young has now served longer in prison following the completion of his sentence than he did on the sentence itself.
Dissent
MARK SELING, SUPERINTENDENT, SPECIAL
COMMITMENT CENTER, PETITIONER
v.
ANDRE BRIGHAM YOUNG
Justice Stevens , dissenting.
A sexual predator may be imprisoned for violating the law, and, if he is mentally ill, he may be committed to an institution until he is cured. Whether a specific statute authorizing the detention of such a person is properly viewed as criminal or civil in the context of federal constitutional issues is often a question of considerable difficulty. See Kansas v. Hendricks , 521 U. S. 346 (1997) (reversing, by a 5 to 4 vote, a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court invalidating Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act); Allen v. Illinois , 478 U. S. 364 (1986) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act); In re Young , 122 Wash. 2d 1, 857 P. 2d 989 (1993) (en banc) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, the provisions of Washingtons Community Protection Act of 1990 dealing with sexually violent predators).
It is settled, however, that the question whether a state statute is civil or criminal in nature for purposes of complying with the demands of the Federal Constitution is a question of federal law. If a detainee comes forward with the clearest proof that the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the States] intention that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal. Allen, 478 U. S., at 369 (quoting United States v. Ward , 448 U. S. 242, 248249 (1980) ) (emphasis added). See also Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93, 100, 105 (1997) . Accordingly, we have consistently looked to the conditions of confinement as evidence of both the legislative purpose behind the statute and its actual effect. See Hendricks , 521 U. S., at 361, 367369; Schall v. Martin , 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen , 478 U. S., at 369, 373374. As we have acknowledged in those cases, the question whether a statute is in fact punitive cannot always be answered solely by reference to the text of the statute.
The majority in this case, however, incorrectly assumes that the Act at issue is necessarily civil. The issue the majority purports to resolve is whether an Act that is otherwise civil in nature can be deemed criminal in a specific instance based on evidence of its application to a particular prisoner. However, respondent Youngs petition did not present that issue. Rather, consistent with our case law, Young sought to introduce evidence of the conditions of confinement as evidence of the punitive purpose and effect of the Washington statute. See Amended Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus 6 and Supp. Brief on Remand 2, 6, 1011, in No. C94480C (WD Wash.), Record, Doc. Nos. 57, 155. As a result, Young in no way runs afoul of Hudson v. United States , 522 U. S. 93 (1997) . Properly read, Hudson acknowledges that resolving whether an Act is civil or criminal in nature can take into account whether the statutory scheme has a punitive effect. 1 Id., at 99. What Hudson rejects is an approach not taken by respondentone that bypasses this threshold question in favor of a dispositive focus on the sanction actually imposed on the specific individual. 2 Id., at 101102.
To be sure, the question whether an Act is civil or punitive in nature is initially one of statutory construction. Ante , at 9 (majority opinion). However, under the majoritys analysis, there is no inquiry beyond that of statutory construction. Ante , at 11. In essence, the majority argues that because the constitutional query must be answered definitively and because confinement is not a fixed event, conditions of confinement should not be considered at all, except in the first challenge to a statute, when, as a practical matter, the evidence of such conditions is most likely not to constitute the requisite clearest proof. This seems to me quite wrong. If conditions of confinement are such that a detainee has been punished twice in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is irrelevant that the scheme has been previously labeled as civil without full knowledge of the effects of the statute. 3
In this case, Young has made detailed allegations concerning both the absence of treatment for his alleged mental illness and the starkly punitive character of the conditions of his confinement. If proved, those allegations establish not just that those detained pursuant to the statute are treated like those imprisoned for violations of Washingtons criminal laws, but that, in many respects, they receive significantly worse treatment. 4 If those allegations are correct, the statute in question should be characterized as a criminal law for federal constitutional purposes. I therefore agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that respondent should be given the opportunity to come forward with the clearest proof that his allegations are true.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
1 In his concurrence, Justice Scalia concludes that, under the rule of Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93 (1997) , courts may never look to actual conditions of confinement and implementation of the statute to determine in the first instance whether a confinement scheme is civil in nature. See ante, at 1. Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, would take Hudson even further, precluding implementation-based challenges at any time. Ante, at 4. However, for the reasons set out above, I believe that both concurrences misread Hudson. I also note that Hudson did not involve confinement. In cases that do involve confinement, this Court has relied on the principle that a statutory scheme must be deemed criminal if it was sufficiently punitive either in purpose or effect. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, 361, 367369 (1997) ; Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen v. Illinois, 478 U. S. 364, 369, 373374 (1986) .
2 In response to my dissent, the Court has made it clear that it is simply holding that respondent may not prevail if he merely proves that the statute is punitive insofar as it has been applied to him. The question whether he may prevail if he can prove that the statute is punitive in its application to everyone confined under its provisions therefore remains open. In sum, the Court has rejected the narrow holding of the Ninth Circuit, but has not addressed the sufficiency of the broadest claim that petitioner has advanced.
3 In this case, those detained pursuant to Washingtons statute have sought an improvement in conditions for almost seven years. Their success in the courts, however, has had little practical impact.
4 Under such conditions, Young has now served longer in prison following the completion of his sentence than he did on the sentence itself.
Dissent
MARK SELING, SUPERINTENDENT, SPECIAL
COMMITMENT CENTER, PETITIONER
v.
ANDRE BRIGHAM YOUNG
Justice Stevens , dissenting.
A sexual predator may be imprisoned for violating the law, and, if he is mentally ill, he may be committed to an institution until he is cured. Whether a specific statute authorizing the detention of such a person is properly viewed as criminal or civil in the context of federal constitutional issues is often a question of considerable difficulty. See Kansas v. Hendricks , 521 U. S. 346 (1997) (reversing, by a 5 to 4 vote, a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court invalidating Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act); Allen v. Illinois , 478 U. S. 364 (1986) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act); In re Young , 122 Wash. 2d 1, 857 P. 2d 989 (1993) (en banc) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, the provisions of Washingtons Community Protection Act of 1990 dealing with sexually violent predators).
It is settled, however, that the question whether a state statute is civil or criminal in nature for purposes of complying with the demands of the Federal Constitution is a question of federal law. If a detainee comes forward with the clearest proof that the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the States] intention that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal. Allen, 478 U. S., at 369 (quoting United States v. Ward , 448 U. S. 242, 248249 (1980) ) (emphasis added). See also Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93, 100, 105 (1997) . Accordingly, we have consistently looked to the conditions of confinement as evidence of both the legislative purpose behind the statute and its actual effect. See Hendricks , 521 U. S., at 361, 367369; Schall v. Martin , 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen , 478 U. S., at 369, 373374. As we have acknowledged in those cases, the question whether a statute is in fact punitive cannot always be answered solely by reference to the text of the statute.
The majority in this case, however, incorrectly assumes that the Act at issue is necessarily civil. The issue the majority purports to resolve is whether an Act that is otherwise civil in nature can be deemed criminal in a specific instance based on evidence of its application to a particular prisoner. However, respondent Youngs petition did not present that issue. Rather, consistent with our case law, Young sought to introduce evidence of the conditions of confinement as evidence of the punitive purpose and effect of the Washington statute. See Amended Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus 6 and Supp. Brief on Remand 2, 6, 1011, in No. C94480C (WD Wash.), Record, Doc. Nos. 57, 155. As a result, Young in no way runs afoul of Hudson v. United States , 522 U. S. 93 (1997) . Properly read, Hudson acknowledges that resolving whether an Act is civil or criminal in nature can take into account whether the statutory scheme has a punitive effect. 1 Id., at 99. What Hudson rejects is an approach not taken by respondentone that bypasses this threshold question in favor of a dispositive focus on the sanction actually imposed on the specific individual. 2 Id., at 101102.
To be sure, the question whether an Act is civil or punitive in nature is initially one of statutory construction. Ante , at 9 (majority opinion). However, under the majoritys analysis, there is no inquiry beyond that of statutory construction. Ante , at 11. In essence, the majority argues that because the constitutional query must be answered definitively and because confinement is not a fixed event, conditions of confinement should not be considered at all, except in the first challenge to a statute, when, as a practical matter, the evidence of such conditions is most likely not to constitute the requisite clearest proof. This seems to me quite wrong. If conditions of confinement are such that a detainee has been punished twice in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is irrelevant that the scheme has been previously labeled as civil without full knowledge of the effects of the statute. 3
In this case, Young has made detailed allegations concerning both the absence of treatment for his alleged mental illness and the starkly punitive character of the conditions of his confinement. If proved, those allegations establish not just that those detained pursuant to the statute are treated like those imprisoned for violations of Washingtons criminal laws, but that, in many respects, they receive significantly worse treatment. 4 If those allegations are correct, the statute in question should be characterized as a criminal law for federal constitutional purposes. I therefore agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that respondent should be given the opportunity to come forward with the clearest proof that his allegations are true.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
1 In his concurrence, Justice Scalia concludes that, under the rule of Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93 (1997) , courts may never look to actual conditions of confinement and implementation of the statute to determine in the first instance whether a confinement scheme is civil in nature. See ante, at 1. Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, would take Hudson even further, precluding implementation-based challenges at any time. Ante, at 4. However, for the reasons set out above, I believe that both concurrences misread Hudson. I also note that Hudson did not involve confinement. In cases that do involve confinement, this Court has relied on the principle that a statutory scheme must be deemed criminal if it was sufficiently punitive either in purpose or effect. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, 361, 367369 (1997) ; Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen v. Illinois, 478 U. S. 364, 369, 373374 (1986) .
2 In response to my dissent, the Court has made it clear that it is simply holding that respondent may not prevail if he merely proves that the statute is punitive insofar as it has been applied to him. The question whether he may prevail if he can prove that the statute is punitive in its application to everyone confined under its provisions therefore remains open. In sum, the Court has rejected the narrow holding of the Ninth Circuit, but has not addressed the sufficiency of the broadest claim that petitioner has advanced.
3 In this case, those detained pursuant to Washingtons statute have sought an improvement in conditions for almost seven years. Their success in the courts, however, has had little practical impact.
4 Under such conditions, Young has now served longer in prison following the completion of his sentence than he did on the sentence itself.
Dissent
MARK SELING, SUPERINTENDENT, SPECIAL
COMMITMENT CENTER, PETITIONER
v.
ANDRE BRIGHAM YOUNG
Justice Stevens , dissenting.
A sexual predator may be imprisoned for violating the law, and, if he is mentally ill, he may be committed to an institution until he is cured. Whether a specific statute authorizing the detention of such a person is properly viewed as criminal or civil in the context of federal constitutional issues is often a question of considerable difficulty. See Kansas v. Hendricks , 521 U. S. 346 (1997) (reversing, by a 5 to 4 vote, a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court invalidating Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act); Allen v. Illinois , 478 U. S. 364 (1986) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act); In re Young , 122 Wash. 2d 1, 857 P. 2d 989 (1993) (en banc) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, the provisions of Washingtons Community Protection Act of 1990 dealing with sexually violent predators).
It is settled, however, that the question whether a state statute is civil or criminal in nature for purposes of complying with the demands of the Federal Constitution is a question of federal law. If a detainee comes forward with the clearest proof that the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the States] intention that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal. Allen, 478 U. S., at 369 (quoting United States v. Ward , 448 U. S. 242, 248249 (1980) ) (emphasis added). See also Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93, 100, 105 (1997) . Accordingly, we have consistently looked to the conditions of confinement as evidence of both the legislative purpose behind the statute and its actual effect. See Hendricks , 521 U. S., at 361, 367369; Schall v. Martin , 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen , 478 U. S., at 369, 373374. As we have acknowledged in those cases, the question whether a statute is in fact punitive cannot always be answered solely by reference to the text of the statute.
The majority in this case, however, incorrectly assumes that the Act at issue is necessarily civil. The issue the majority purports to resolve is whether an Act that is otherwise civil in nature can be deemed criminal in a specific instance based on evidence of its application to a particular prisoner. However, respondent Youngs petition did not present that issue. Rather, consistent with our case law, Young sought to introduce evidence of the conditions of confinement as evidence of the punitive purpose and effect of the Washington statute. See Amended Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus 6 and Supp. Brief on Remand 2, 6, 1011, in No. C94480C (WD Wash.), Record, Doc. Nos. 57, 155. As a result, Young in no way runs afoul of Hudson v. United States , 522 U. S. 93 (1997) . Properly read, Hudson acknowledges that resolving whether an Act is civil or criminal in nature can take into account whether the statutory scheme has a punitive effect. 1 Id., at 99. What Hudson rejects is an approach not taken by respondentone that bypasses this threshold question in favor of a dispositive focus on the sanction actually imposed on the specific individual. 2 Id., at 101102.
To be sure, the question whether an Act is civil or punitive in nature is initially one of statutory construction. Ante , at 9 (majority opinion). However, under the majoritys analysis, there is no inquiry beyond that of statutory construction. Ante , at 11. In essence, the majority argues that because the constitutional query must be answered definitively and because confinement is not a fixed event, conditions of confinement should not be considered at all, except in the first challenge to a statute, when, as a practical matter, the evidence of such conditions is most likely not to constitute the requisite clearest proof. This seems to me quite wrong. If conditions of confinement are such that a detainee has been punished twice in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is irrelevant that the scheme has been previously labeled as civil without full knowledge of the effects of the statute. 3
In this case, Young has made detailed allegations concerning both the absence of treatment for his alleged mental illness and the starkly punitive character of the conditions of his confinement. If proved, those allegations establish not just that those detained pursuant to the statute are treated like those imprisoned for violations of Washingtons criminal laws, but that, in many respects, they receive significantly worse treatment. 4 If those allegations are correct, the statute in question should be characterized as a criminal law for federal constitutional purposes. I therefore agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that respondent should be given the opportunity to come forward with the clearest proof that his allegations are true.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
1 In his concurrence, Justice Scalia concludes that, under the rule of Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93 (1997) , courts may never look to actual conditions of confinement and implementation of the statute to determine in the first instance whether a confinement scheme is civil in nature. See ante, at 1. Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, would take Hudson even further, precluding implementation-based challenges at any time. Ante, at 4. However, for the reasons set out above, I believe that both concurrences misread Hudson. I also note that Hudson did not involve confinement. In cases that do involve confinement, this Court has relied on the principle that a statutory scheme must be deemed criminal if it was sufficiently punitive either in purpose or effect. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, 361, 367369 (1997) ; Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen v. Illinois, 478 U. S. 364, 369, 373374 (1986) .
2 In response to my dissent, the Court has made it clear that it is simply holding that respondent may not prevail if he merely proves that the statute is punitive insofar as it has been applied to him. The question whether he may prevail if he can prove that the statute is punitive in its application to everyone confined under its provisions therefore remains open. In sum, the Court has rejected the narrow holding of the Ninth Circuit, but has not addressed the sufficiency of the broadest claim that petitioner has advanced.
3 In this case, those detained pursuant to Washingtons statute have sought an improvement in conditions for almost seven years. Their success in the courts, however, has had little practical impact.
4 Under such conditions, Young has now served longer in prison following the completion of his sentence than he did on the sentence itself.
Dissent
MARK SELING, SUPERINTENDENT, SPECIAL
COMMITMENT CENTER, PETITIONER
v.
ANDRE BRIGHAM YOUNG
Justice Stevens , dissenting.
A sexual predator may be imprisoned for violating the law, and, if he is mentally ill, he may be committed to an institution until he is cured. Whether a specific statute authorizing the detention of such a person is properly viewed as criminal or civil in the context of federal constitutional issues is often a question of considerable difficulty. See Kansas v. Hendricks , 521 U. S. 346 (1997) (reversing, by a 5 to 4 vote, a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court invalidating Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act); Allen v. Illinois , 478 U. S. 364 (1986) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act); In re Young , 122 Wash. 2d 1, 857 P. 2d 989 (1993) (en banc) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, the provisions of Washingtons Community Protection Act of 1990 dealing with sexually violent predators).
It is settled, however, that the question whether a state statute is civil or criminal in nature for purposes of complying with the demands of the Federal Constitution is a question of federal law. If a detainee comes forward with the clearest proof that the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the States] intention that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal. Allen, 478 U. S., at 369 (quoting United States v. Ward , 448 U. S. 242, 248249 (1980) ) (emphasis added). See also Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93, 100, 105 (1997) . Accordingly, we have consistently looked to the conditions of confinement as evidence of both the legislative purpose behind the statute and its actual effect. See Hendricks , 521 U. S., at 361, 367369; Schall v. Martin , 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen , 478 U. S., at 369, 373374. As we have acknowledged in those cases, the question whether a statute is in fact punitive cannot always be answered solely by reference to the text of the statute.
The majority in this case, however, incorrectly assumes that the Act at issue is necessarily civil. The issue the majority purports to resolve is whether an Act that is otherwise civil in nature can be deemed criminal in a specific instance based on evidence of its application to a particular prisoner. However, respondent Youngs petition did not present that issue. Rather, consistent with our case law, Young sought to introduce evidence of the conditions of confinement as evidence of the punitive purpose and effect of the Washington statute. See Amended Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus 6 and Supp. Brief on Remand 2, 6, 1011, in No. C94480C (WD Wash.), Record, Doc. Nos. 57, 155. As a result, Young in no way runs afoul of Hudson v. United States , 522 U. S. 93 (1997) . Properly read, Hudson acknowledges that resolving whether an Act is civil or criminal in nature can take into account whether the statutory scheme has a punitive effect. 1 Id., at 99. What Hudson rejects is an approach not taken by respondentone that bypasses this threshold question in favor of a dispositive focus on the sanction actually imposed on the specific individual. 2 Id., at 101102.
To be sure, the question whether an Act is civil or punitive in nature is initially one of statutory construction. Ante , at 9 (majority opinion). However, under the majoritys analysis, there is no inquiry beyond that of statutory construction. Ante , at 11. In essence, the majority argues that because the constitutional query must be answered definitively and because confinement is not a fixed event, conditions of confinement should not be considered at all, except in the first challenge to a statute, when, as a practical matter, the evidence of such conditions is most likely not to constitute the requisite clearest proof. This seems to me quite wrong. If conditions of confinement are such that a detainee has been punished twice in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is irrelevant that the scheme has been previously labeled as civil without full knowledge of the effects of the statute. 3
In this case, Young has made detailed allegations concerning both the absence of treatment for his alleged mental illness and the starkly punitive character of the conditions of his confinement. If proved, those allegations establish not just that those detained pursuant to the statute are treated like those imprisoned for violations of Washingtons criminal laws, but that, in many respects, they receive significantly worse treatment. 4 If those allegations are correct, the statute in question should be characterized as a criminal law for federal constitutional purposes. I therefore agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that respondent should be given the opportunity to come forward with the clearest proof that his allegations are true.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
1 In his concurrence, Justice Scalia concludes that, under the rule of Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93 (1997) , courts may never look to actual conditions of confinement and implementation of the statute to determine in the first instance whether a confinement scheme is civil in nature. See ante, at 1. Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, would take Hudson even further, precluding implementation-based challenges at any time. Ante, at 4. However, for the reasons set out above, I believe that both concurrences misread Hudson. I also note that Hudson did not involve confinement. In cases that do involve confinement, this Court has relied on the principle that a statutory scheme must be deemed criminal if it was sufficiently punitive either in purpose or effect. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, 361, 367369 (1997) ; Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen v. Illinois, 478 U. S. 364, 369, 373374 (1986) .
2 In response to my dissent, the Court has made it clear that it is simply holding that respondent may not prevail if he merely proves that the statute is punitive insofar as it has been applied to him. The question whether he may prevail if he can prove that the statute is punitive in its application to everyone confined under its provisions therefore remains open. In sum, the Court has rejected the narrow holding of the Ninth Circuit, but has not addressed the sufficiency of the broadest claim that petitioner has advanced.
3 In this case, those detained pursuant to Washingtons statute have sought an improvement in conditions for almost seven years. Their success in the courts, however, has had little practical impact.
4 Under such conditions, Young has now served longer in prison following the completion of his sentence than he did on the sentence itself.
Dissent
MARK SELING, SUPERINTENDENT, SPECIAL
COMMITMENT CENTER, PETITIONER
v.
ANDRE BRIGHAM YOUNG
Justice Stevens , dissenting.
A sexual predator may be imprisoned for violating the law, and, if he is mentally ill, he may be committed to an institution until he is cured. Whether a specific statute authorizing the detention of such a person is properly viewed as criminal or civil in the context of federal constitutional issues is often a question of considerable difficulty. See Kansas v. Hendricks , 521 U. S. 346 (1997) (reversing, by a 5 to 4 vote, a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court invalidating Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act); Allen v. Illinois , 478 U. S. 364 (1986) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act); In re Young , 122 Wash. 2d 1, 857 P. 2d 989 (1993) (en banc) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, the provisions of Washingtons Community Protection Act of 1990 dealing with sexually violent predators).
It is settled, however, that the question whether a state statute is civil or criminal in nature for purposes of complying with the demands of the Federal Constitution is a question of federal law. If a detainee comes forward with the clearest proof that the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the States] intention that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal. Allen, 478 U. S., at 369 (quoting United States v. Ward , 448 U. S. 242, 248249 (1980) ) (emphasis added). See also Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93, 100, 105 (1997) . Accordingly, we have consistently looked to the conditions of confinement as evidence of both the legislative purpose behind the statute and its actual effect. See Hendricks , 521 U. S., at 361, 367369; Schall v. Martin , 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen , 478 U. S., at 369, 373374. As we have acknowledged in those cases, the question whether a statute is in fact punitive cannot always be answered solely by reference to the text of the statute.
The majority in this case, however, incorrectly assumes that the Act at issue is necessarily civil. The issue the majority purports to resolve is whether an Act that is otherwise civil in nature can be deemed criminal in a specific instance based on evidence of its application to a particular prisoner. However, respondent Youngs petition did not present that issue. Rather, consistent with our case law, Young sought to introduce evidence of the conditions of confinement as evidence of the punitive purpose and effect of the Washington statute. See Amended Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus 6 and Supp. Brief on Remand 2, 6, 1011, in No. C94480C (WD Wash.), Record, Doc. Nos. 57, 155. As a result, Young in no way runs afoul of Hudson v. United States , 522 U. S. 93 (1997) . Properly read, Hudson acknowledges that resolving whether an Act is civil or criminal in nature can take into account whether the statutory scheme has a punitive effect. 1 Id., at 99. What Hudson rejects is an approach not taken by respondentone that bypasses this threshold question in favor of a dispositive focus on the sanction actually imposed on the specific individual. 2 Id., at 101102.
To be sure, the question whether an Act is civil or punitive in nature is initially one of statutory construction. Ante , at 9 (majority opinion). However, under the majoritys analysis, there is no inquiry beyond that of statutory construction. Ante , at 11. In essence, the majority argues that because the constitutional query must be answered definitively and because confinement is not a fixed event, conditions of confinement should not be considered at all, except in the first challenge to a statute, when, as a practical matter, the evidence of such conditions is most likely not to constitute the requisite clearest proof. This seems to me quite wrong. If conditions of confinement are such that a detainee has been punished twice in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is irrelevant that the scheme has been previously labeled as civil without full knowledge of the effects of the statute. 3
In this case, Young has made detailed allegations concerning both the absence of treatment for his alleged mental illness and the starkly punitive character of the conditions of his confinement. If proved, those allegations establish not just that those detained pursuant to the statute are treated like those imprisoned for violations of Washingtons criminal laws, but that, in many respects, they receive significantly worse treatment. 4 If those allegations are correct, the statute in question should be characterized as a criminal law for federal constitutional purposes. I therefore agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that respondent should be given the opportunity to come forward with the clearest proof that his allegations are true.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
1 In his concurrence, Justice Scalia concludes that, under the rule of Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93 (1997) , courts may never look to actual conditions of confinement and implementation of the statute to determine in the first instance whether a confinement scheme is civil in nature. See ante, at 1. Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, would take Hudson even further, precluding implementation-based challenges at any time. Ante, at 4. However, for the reasons set out above, I believe that both concurrences misread Hudson. I also note that Hudson did not involve confinement. In cases that do involve confinement, this Court has relied on the principle that a statutory scheme must be deemed criminal if it was sufficiently punitive either in purpose or effect. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, 361, 367369 (1997) ; Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen v. Illinois, 478 U. S. 364, 369, 373374 (1986) .
2 In response to my dissent, the Court has made it clear that it is simply holding that respondent may not prevail if he merely proves that the statute is punitive insofar as it has been applied to him. The question whether he may prevail if he can prove that the statute is punitive in its application to everyone confined under its provisions therefore remains open. In sum, the Court has rejected the narrow holding of the Ninth Circuit, but has not addressed the sufficiency of the broadest claim that petitioner has advanced.
3 In this case, those detained pursuant to Washingtons statute have sought an improvement in conditions for almost seven years. Their success in the courts, however, has had little practical impact.
4 Under such conditions, Young has now served longer in prison following the completion of his sentence than he did on the sentence itself.
Dissent
MARK SELING, SUPERINTENDENT, SPECIAL
COMMITMENT CENTER, PETITIONER
v.
ANDRE BRIGHAM YOUNG
Justice Stevens , dissenting.
A sexual predator may be imprisoned for violating the law, and, if he is mentally ill, he may be committed to an institution until he is cured. Whether a specific statute authorizing the detention of such a person is properly viewed as criminal or civil in the context of federal constitutional issues is often a question of considerable difficulty. See Kansas v. Hendricks , 521 U. S. 346 (1997) (reversing, by a 5 to 4 vote, a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court invalidating Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act); Allen v. Illinois , 478 U. S. 364 (1986) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act); In re Young , 122 Wash. 2d 1, 857 P. 2d 989 (1993) (en banc) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, the provisions of Washingtons Community Protection Act of 1990 dealing with sexually violent predators).
It is settled, however, that the question whether a state statute is civil or criminal in nature for purposes of complying with the demands of the Federal Constitution is a question of federal law. If a detainee comes forward with the clearest proof that the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the States] intention that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal. Allen, 478 U. S., at 369 (quoting United States v. Ward , 448 U. S. 242, 248249 (1980) ) (emphasis added). See also Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93, 100, 105 (1997) . Accordingly, we have consistently looked to the conditions of confinement as evidence of both the legislative purpose behind the statute and its actual effect. See Hendricks , 521 U. S., at 361, 367369; Schall v. Martin , 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen , 478 U. S., at 369, 373374. As we have acknowledged in those cases, the question whether a statute is in fact punitive cannot always be answered solely by reference to the text of the statute.
The majority in this case, however, incorrectly assumes that the Act at issue is necessarily civil. The issue the majority purports to resolve is whether an Act that is otherwise civil in nature can be deemed criminal in a specific instance based on evidence of its application to a particular prisoner. However, respondent Youngs petition did not present that issue. Rather, consistent with our case law, Young sought to introduce evidence of the conditions of confinement as evidence of the punitive purpose and effect of the Washington statute. See Amended Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus 6 and Supp. Brief on Remand 2, 6, 1011, in No. C94480C (WD Wash.), Record, Doc. Nos. 57, 155. As a result, Young in no way runs afoul of Hudson v. United States , 522 U. S. 93 (1997) . Properly read, Hudson acknowledges that resolving whether an Act is civil or criminal in nature can take into account whether the statutory scheme has a punitive effect. 1 Id., at 99. What Hudson rejects is an approach not taken by respondentone that bypasses this threshold question in favor of a dispositive focus on the sanction actually imposed on the specific individual. 2 Id., at 101102.
To be sure, the question whether an Act is civil or punitive in nature is initially one of statutory construction. Ante , at 9 (majority opinion). However, under the majoritys analysis, there is no inquiry beyond that of statutory construction. Ante , at 11. In essence, the majority argues that because the constitutional query must be answered definitively and because confinement is not a fixed event, conditions of confinement should not be considered at all, except in the first challenge to a statute, when, as a practical matter, the evidence of such conditions is most likely not to constitute the requisite clearest proof. This seems to me quite wrong. If conditions of confinement are such that a detainee has been punished twice in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is irrelevant that the scheme has been previously labeled as civil without full knowledge of the effects of the statute. 3
In this case, Young has made detailed allegations concerning both the absence of treatment for his alleged mental illness and the starkly punitive character of the conditions of his confinement. If proved, those allegations establish not just that those detained pursuant to the statute are treated like those imprisoned for violations of Washingtons criminal laws, but that, in many respects, they receive significantly worse treatment. 4 If those allegations are correct, the statute in question should be characterized as a criminal law for federal constitutional purposes. I therefore agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that respondent should be given the opportunity to come forward with the clearest proof that his allegations are true.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
1 In his concurrence, Justice Scalia concludes that, under the rule of Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93 (1997) , courts may never look to actual conditions of confinement and implementation of the statute to determine in the first instance whether a confinement scheme is civil in nature. See ante, at 1. Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, would take Hudson even further, precluding implementation-based challenges at any time. Ante, at 4. However, for the reasons set out above, I believe that both concurrences misread Hudson. I also note that Hudson did not involve confinement. In cases that do involve confinement, this Court has relied on the principle that a statutory scheme must be deemed criminal if it was sufficiently punitive either in purpose or effect. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, 361, 367369 (1997) ; Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen v. Illinois, 478 U. S. 364, 369, 373374 (1986) .
2 In response to my dissent, the Court has made it clear that it is simply holding that respondent may not prevail if he merely proves that the statute is punitive insofar as it has been applied to him. The question whether he may prevail if he can prove that the statute is punitive in its application to everyone confined under its provisions therefore remains open. In sum, the Court has rejected the narrow holding of the Ninth Circuit, but has not addressed the sufficiency of the broadest claim that petitioner has advanced.
3 In this case, those detained pursuant to Washingtons statute have sought an improvement in conditions for almost seven years. Their success in the courts, however, has had little practical impact.
4 Under such conditions, Young has now served longer in prison following the completion of his sentence than he did on the sentence itself.
Dissent
MARK SELING, SUPERINTENDENT, SPECIAL
COMMITMENT CENTER, PETITIONER
v.
ANDRE BRIGHAM YOUNG
Justice Stevens , dissenting.
A sexual predator may be imprisoned for violating the law, and, if he is mentally ill, he may be committed to an institution until he is cured. Whether a specific statute authorizing the detention of such a person is properly viewed as criminal or civil in the context of federal constitutional issues is often a question of considerable difficulty. See Kansas v. Hendricks , 521 U. S. 346 (1997) (reversing, by a 5 to 4 vote, a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court invalidating Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act); Allen v. Illinois , 478 U. S. 364 (1986) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act); In re Young , 122 Wash. 2d 1, 857 P. 2d 989 (1993) (en banc) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, the provisions of Washingtons Community Protection Act of 1990 dealing with sexually violent predators).
It is settled, however, that the question whether a state statute is civil or criminal in nature for purposes of complying with the demands of the Federal Constitution is a question of federal law. If a detainee comes forward with the clearest proof that the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the States] intention that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal. Allen, 478 U. S., at 369 (quoting United States v. Ward , 448 U. S. 242, 248249 (1980) ) (emphasis added). See also Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93, 100, 105 (1997) . Accordingly, we have consistently looked to the conditions of confinement as evidence of both the legislative purpose behind the statute and its actual effect. See Hendricks , 521 U. S., at 361, 367369; Schall v. Martin , 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen , 478 U. S., at 369, 373374. As we have acknowledged in those cases, the question whether a statute is in fact punitive cannot always be answered solely by reference to the text of the statute.
The majority in this case, however, incorrectly assumes that the Act at issue is necessarily civil. The issue the majority purports to resolve is whether an Act that is otherwise civil in nature can be deemed criminal in a specific instance based on evidence of its application to a particular prisoner. However, respondent Youngs petition did not present that issue. Rather, consistent with our case law, Young sought to introduce evidence of the conditions of confinement as evidence of the punitive purpose and effect of the Washington statute. See Amended Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus 6 and Supp. Brief on Remand 2, 6, 1011, in No. C94480C (WD Wash.), Record, Doc. Nos. 57, 155. As a result, Young in no way runs afoul of Hudson v. United States , 522 U. S. 93 (1997) . Properly read, Hudson acknowledges that resolving whether an Act is civil or criminal in nature can take into account whether the statutory scheme has a punitive effect. 1 Id., at 99. What Hudson rejects is an approach not taken by respondentone that bypasses this threshold question in favor of a dispositive focus on the sanction actually imposed on the specific individual. 2 Id., at 101102.
To be sure, the question whether an Act is civil or punitive in nature is initially one of statutory construction. Ante , at 9 (majority opinion). However, under the majoritys analysis, there is no inquiry beyond that of statutory construction. Ante , at 11. In essence, the majority argues that because the constitutional query must be answered definitively and because confinement is not a fixed event, conditions of confinement should not be considered at all, except in the first challenge to a statute, when, as a practical matter, the evidence of such conditions is most likely not to constitute the requisite clearest proof. This seems to me quite wrong. If conditions of confinement are such that a detainee has been punished twice in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is irrelevant that the scheme has been previously labeled as civil without full knowledge of the effects of the statute. 3
In this case, Young has made detailed allegations concerning both the absence of treatment for his alleged mental illness and the starkly punitive character of the conditions of his confinement. If proved, those allegations establish not just that those detained pursuant to the statute are treated like those imprisoned for violations of Washingtons criminal laws, but that, in many respects, they receive significantly worse treatment. 4 If those allegations are correct, the statute in question should be characterized as a criminal law for federal constitutional purposes. I therefore agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that respondent should be given the opportunity to come forward with the clearest proof that his allegations are true.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
1 In his concurrence, Justice Scalia concludes that, under the rule of Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93 (1997) , courts may never look to actual conditions of confinement and implementation of the statute to determine in the first instance whether a confinement scheme is civil in nature. See ante, at 1. Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, would take Hudson even further, precluding implementation-based challenges at any time. Ante, at 4. However, for the reasons set out above, I believe that both concurrences misread Hudson. I also note that Hudson did not involve confinement. In cases that do involve confinement, this Court has relied on the principle that a statutory scheme must be deemed criminal if it was sufficiently punitive either in purpose or effect. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, 361, 367369 (1997) ; Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen v. Illinois, 478 U. S. 364, 369, 373374 (1986) .
2 In response to my dissent, the Court has made it clear that it is simply holding that respondent may not prevail if he merely proves that the statute is punitive insofar as it has been applied to him. The question whether he may prevail if he can prove that the statute is punitive in its application to everyone confined under its provisions therefore remains open. In sum, the Court has rejected the narrow holding of the Ninth Circuit, but has not addressed the sufficiency of the broadest claim that petitioner has advanced.
3 In this case, those detained pursuant to Washingtons statute have sought an improvement in conditions for almost seven years. Their success in the courts, however, has had little practical impact.
4 Under such conditions, Young has now served longer in prison following the completion of his sentence than he did on the sentence itself.
Dissent
MARK SELING, SUPERINTENDENT, SPECIAL
COMMITMENT CENTER, PETITIONER
v.
ANDRE BRIGHAM YOUNG
Justice Stevens , dissenting.
A sexual predator may be imprisoned for violating the law, and, if he is mentally ill, he may be committed to an institution until he is cured. Whether a specific statute authorizing the detention of such a person is properly viewed as criminal or civil in the context of federal constitutional issues is often a question of considerable difficulty. See Kansas v. Hendricks , 521 U. S. 346 (1997) (reversing, by a 5 to 4 vote, a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court invalidating Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act); Allen v. Illinois , 478 U. S. 364 (1986) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act); In re Young , 122 Wash. 2d 1, 857 P. 2d 989 (1993) (en banc) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, the provisions of Washingtons Community Protection Act of 1990 dealing with sexually violent predators).
It is settled, however, that the question whether a state statute is civil or criminal in nature for purposes of complying with the demands of the Federal Constitution is a question of federal law. If a detainee comes forward with the clearest proof that the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the States] intention that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal. Allen, 478 U. S., at 369 (quoting United States v. Ward , 448 U. S. 242, 248249 (1980) ) (emphasis added). See also Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93, 100, 105 (1997) . Accordingly, we have consistently looked to the conditions of confinement as evidence of both the legislative purpose behind the statute and its actual effect. See Hendricks , 521 U. S., at 361, 367369; Schall v. Martin , 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen , 478 U. S., at 369, 373374. As we have acknowledged in those cases, the question whether a statute is in fact punitive cannot always be answered solely by reference to the text of the statute.
The majority in this case, however, incorrectly assumes that the Act at issue is necessarily civil. The issue the majority purports to resolve is whether an Act that is otherwise civil in nature can be deemed criminal in a specific instance based on evidence of its application to a particular prisoner. However, respondent Youngs petition did not present that issue. Rather, consistent with our case law, Young sought to introduce evidence of the conditions of confinement as evidence of the punitive purpose and effect of the Washington statute. See Amended Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus 6 and Supp. Brief on Remand 2, 6, 1011, in No. C94480C (WD Wash.), Record, Doc. Nos. 57, 155. As a result, Young in no way runs afoul of Hudson v. United States , 522 U. S. 93 (1997) . Properly read, Hudson acknowledges that resolving whether an Act is civil or criminal in nature can take into account whether the statutory scheme has a punitive effect. 1 Id., at 99. What Hudson rejects is an approach not taken by respondentone that bypasses this threshold question in favor of a dispositive focus on the sanction actually imposed on the specific individual. 2 Id., at 101102.
To be sure, the question whether an Act is civil or punitive in nature is initially one of statutory construction. Ante , at 9 (majority opinion). However, under the majoritys analysis, there is no inquiry beyond that of statutory construction. Ante , at 11. In essence, the majority argues that because the constitutional query must be answered definitively and because confinement is not a fixed event, conditions of confinement should not be considered at all, except in the first challenge to a statute, when, as a practical matter, the evidence of such conditions is most likely not to constitute the requisite clearest proof. This seems to me quite wrong. If conditions of confinement are such that a detainee has been punished twice in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is irrelevant that the scheme has been previously labeled as civil without full knowledge of the effects of the statute. 3
In this case, Young has made detailed allegations concerning both the absence of treatment for his alleged mental illness and the starkly punitive character of the conditions of his confinement. If proved, those allegations establish not just that those detained pursuant to the statute are treated like those imprisoned for violations of Washingtons criminal laws, but that, in many respects, they receive significantly worse treatment. 4 If those allegations are correct, the statute in question should be characterized as a criminal law for federal constitutional purposes. I therefore agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that respondent should be given the opportunity to come forward with the clearest proof that his allegations are true.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
1 In his concurrence, Justice Scalia concludes that, under the rule of Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93 (1997) , courts may never look to actual conditions of confinement and implementation of the statute to determine in the first instance whether a confinement scheme is civil in nature. See ante, at 1. Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, would take Hudson even further, precluding implementation-based challenges at any time. Ante, at 4. However, for the reasons set out above, I believe that both concurrences misread Hudson. I also note that Hudson did not involve confinement. In cases that do involve confinement, this Court has relied on the principle that a statutory scheme must be deemed criminal if it was sufficiently punitive either in purpose or effect. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, 361, 367369 (1997) ; Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen v. Illinois, 478 U. S. 364, 369, 373374 (1986) .
2 In response to my dissent, the Court has made it clear that it is simply holding that respondent may not prevail if he merely proves that the statute is punitive insofar as it has been applied to him. The question whether he may prevail if he can prove that the statute is punitive in its application to everyone confined under its provisions therefore remains open. In sum, the Court has rejected the narrow holding of the Ninth Circuit, but has not addressed the sufficiency of the broadest claim that petitioner has advanced.
3 In this case, those detained pursuant to Washingtons statute have sought an improvement in conditions for almost seven years. Their success in the courts, however, has had little practical impact.
4 Under such conditions, Young has now served longer in prison following the completion of his sentence than he did on the sentence itself.
Dissent
MARK SELING, SUPERINTENDENT, SPECIAL
COMMITMENT CENTER, PETITIONER
v.
ANDRE BRIGHAM YOUNG
Justice Stevens , dissenting.
A sexual predator may be imprisoned for violating the law, and, if he is mentally ill, he may be committed to an institution until he is cured. Whether a specific statute authorizing the detention of such a person is properly viewed as criminal or civil in the context of federal constitutional issues is often a question of considerable difficulty. See Kansas v. Hendricks , 521 U. S. 346 (1997) (reversing, by a 5 to 4 vote, a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court invalidating Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act); Allen v. Illinois , 478 U. S. 364 (1986) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act); In re Young , 122 Wash. 2d 1, 857 P. 2d 989 (1993) (en banc) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, the provisions of Washingtons Community Protection Act of 1990 dealing with sexually violent predators).
It is settled, however, that the question whether a state statute is civil or criminal in nature for purposes of complying with the demands of the Federal Constitution is a question of federal law. If a detainee comes forward with the clearest proof that the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the States] intention that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal. Allen, 478 U. S., at 369 (quoting United States v. Ward , 448 U. S. 242, 248249 (1980) ) (emphasis added). See also Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93, 100, 105 (1997) . Accordingly, we have consistently looked to the conditions of confinement as evidence of both the legislative purpose behind the statute and its actual effect. See Hendricks , 521 U. S., at 361, 367369; Schall v. Martin , 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen , 478 U. S., at 369, 373374. As we have acknowledged in those cases, the question whether a statute is in fact punitive cannot always be answered solely by reference to the text of the statute.
The majority in this case, however, incorrectly assumes that the Act at issue is necessarily civil. The issue the majority purports to resolve is whether an Act that is otherwise civil in nature can be deemed criminal in a specific instance based on evidence of its application to a particular prisoner. However, respondent Youngs petition did not present that issue. Rather, consistent with our case law, Young sought to introduce evidence of the conditions of confinement as evidence of the punitive purpose and effect of the Washington statute. See Amended Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus 6 and Supp. Brief on Remand 2, 6, 1011, in No. C94480C (WD Wash.), Record, Doc. Nos. 57, 155. As a result, Young in no way runs afoul of Hudson v. United States , 522 U. S. 93 (1997) . Properly read, Hudson acknowledges that resolving whether an Act is civil or criminal in nature can take into account whether the statutory scheme has a punitive effect. 1 Id., at 99. What Hudson rejects is an approach not taken by respondentone that bypasses this threshold question in favor of a dispositive focus on the sanction actually imposed on the specific individual. 2 Id., at 101102.
To be sure, the question whether an Act is civil or punitive in nature is initially one of statutory construction. Ante , at 9 (majority opinion). However, under the majoritys analysis, there is no inquiry beyond that of statutory construction. Ante , at 11. In essence, the majority argues that because the constitutional query must be answered definitively and because confinement is not a fixed event, conditions of confinement should not be considered at all, except in the first challenge to a statute, when, as a practical matter, the evidence of such conditions is most likely not to constitute the requisite clearest proof. This seems to me quite wrong. If conditions of confinement are such that a detainee has been punished twice in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is irrelevant that the scheme has been previously labeled as civil without full knowledge of the effects of the statute. 3
In this case, Young has made detailed allegations concerning both the absence of treatment for his alleged mental illness and the starkly punitive character of the conditions of his confinement. If proved, those allegations establish not just that those detained pursuant to the statute are treated like those imprisoned for violations of Washingtons criminal laws, but that, in many respects, they receive significantly worse treatment. 4 If those allegations are correct, the statute in question should be characterized as a criminal law for federal constitutional purposes. I therefore agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that respondent should be given the opportunity to come forward with the clearest proof that his allegations are true.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
1 In his concurrence, Justice Scalia concludes that, under the rule of Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93 (1997) , courts may never look to actual conditions of confinement and implementation of the statute to determine in the first instance whether a confinement scheme is civil in nature. See ante, at 1. Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, would take Hudson even further, precluding implementation-based challenges at any time. Ante, at 4. However, for the reasons set out above, I believe that both concurrences misread Hudson. I also note that Hudson did not involve confinement. In cases that do involve confinement, this Court has relied on the principle that a statutory scheme must be deemed criminal if it was sufficiently punitive either in purpose or effect. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, 361, 367369 (1997) ; Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen v. Illinois, 478 U. S. 364, 369, 373374 (1986) .
2 In response to my dissent, the Court has made it clear that it is simply holding that respondent may not prevail if he merely proves that the statute is punitive insofar as it has been applied to him. The question whether he may prevail if he can prove that the statute is punitive in its application to everyone confined under its provisions therefore remains open. In sum, the Court has rejected the narrow holding of the Ninth Circuit, but has not addressed the sufficiency of the broadest claim that petitioner has advanced.
3 In this case, those detained pursuant to Washingtons statute have sought an improvement in conditions for almost seven years. Their success in the courts, however, has had little practical impact.
4 Under such conditions, Young has now served longer in prison following the completion of his sentence than he did on the sentence itself.
Dissent
MARK SELING, SUPERINTENDENT, SPECIAL
COMMITMENT CENTER, PETITIONER
v.
ANDRE BRIGHAM YOUNG
Justice Stevens , dissenting.
A sexual predator may be imprisoned for violating the law, and, if he is mentally ill, he may be committed to an institution until he is cured. Whether a specific statute authorizing the detention of such a person is properly viewed as criminal or civil in the context of federal constitutional issues is often a question of considerable difficulty. See Kansas v. Hendricks , 521 U. S. 346 (1997) (reversing, by a 5 to 4 vote, a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court invalidating Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act); Allen v. Illinois , 478 U. S. 364 (1986) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act); In re Young , 122 Wash. 2d 1, 857 P. 2d 989 (1993) (en banc) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, the provisions of Washingtons Community Protection Act of 1990 dealing with sexually violent predators).
It is settled, however, that the question whether a state statute is civil or criminal in nature for purposes of complying with the demands of the Federal Constitution is a question of federal law. If a detainee comes forward with the clearest proof that the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the States] intention that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal. Allen, 478 U. S., at 369 (quoting United States v. Ward , 448 U. S. 242, 248249 (1980) ) (emphasis added). See also Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93, 100, 105 (1997) . Accordingly, we have consistently looked to the conditions of confinement as evidence of both the legislative purpose behind the statute and its actual effect. See Hendricks , 521 U. S., at 361, 367369; Schall v. Martin , 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen , 478 U. S., at 369, 373374. As we have acknowledged in those cases, the question whether a statute is in fact punitive cannot always be answered solely by reference to the text of the statute.
The majority in this case, however, incorrectly assumes that the Act at issue is necessarily civil. The issue the majority purports to resolve is whether an Act that is otherwise civil in nature can be deemed criminal in a specific instance based on evidence of its application to a particular prisoner. However, respondent Youngs petition did not present that issue. Rather, consistent with our case law, Young sought to introduce evidence of the conditions of confinement as evidence of the punitive purpose and effect of the Washington statute. See Amended Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus 6 and Supp. Brief on Remand 2, 6, 1011, in No. C94480C (WD Wash.), Record, Doc. Nos. 57, 155. As a result, Young in no way runs afoul of Hudson v. United States , 522 U. S. 93 (1997) . Properly read, Hudson acknowledges that resolving whether an Act is civil or criminal in nature can take into account whether the statutory scheme has a punitive effect. 1 Id., at 99. What Hudson rejects is an approach not taken by respondentone that bypasses this threshold question in favor of a dispositive focus on the sanction actually imposed on the specific individual. 2 Id., at 101102.
To be sure, the question whether an Act is civil or punitive in nature is initially one of statutory construction. Ante , at 9 (majority opinion). However, under the majoritys analysis, there is no inquiry beyond that of statutory construction. Ante , at 11. In essence, the majority argues that because the constitutional query must be answered definitively and because confinement is not a fixed event, conditions of confinement should not be considered at all, except in the first challenge to a statute, when, as a practical matter, the evidence of such conditions is most likely not to constitute the requisite clearest proof. This seems to me quite wrong. If conditions of confinement are such that a detainee has been punished twice in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is irrelevant that the scheme has been previously labeled as civil without full knowledge of the effects of the statute. 3
In this case, Young has made detailed allegations concerning both the absence of treatment for his alleged mental illness and the starkly punitive character of the conditions of his confinement. If proved, those allegations establish not just that those detained pursuant to the statute are treated like those imprisoned for violations of Washingtons criminal laws, but that, in many respects, they receive significantly worse treatment. 4 If those allegations are correct, the statute in question should be characterized as a criminal law for federal constitutional purposes. I therefore agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that respondent should be given the opportunity to come forward with the clearest proof that his allegations are true.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
1 In his concurrence, Justice Scalia concludes that, under the rule of Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93 (1997) , courts may never look to actual conditions of confinement and implementation of the statute to determine in the first instance whether a confinement scheme is civil in nature. See ante, at 1. Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, would take Hudson even further, precluding implementation-based challenges at any time. Ante, at 4. However, for the reasons set out above, I believe that both concurrences misread Hudson. I also note that Hudson did not involve confinement. In cases that do involve confinement, this Court has relied on the principle that a statutory scheme must be deemed criminal if it was sufficiently punitive either in purpose or effect. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, 361, 367369 (1997) ; Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen v. Illinois, 478 U. S. 364, 369, 373374 (1986) .
2 In response to my dissent, the Court has made it clear that it is simply holding that respondent may not prevail if he merely proves that the statute is punitive insofar as it has been applied to him. The question whether he may prevail if he can prove that the statute is punitive in its application to everyone confined under its provisions therefore remains open. In sum, the Court has rejected the narrow holding of the Ninth Circuit, but has not addressed the sufficiency of the broadest claim that petitioner has advanced.
3 In this case, those detained pursuant to Washingtons statute have sought an improvement in conditions for almost seven years. Their success in the courts, however, has had little practical impact.
4 Under such conditions, Young has now served longer in prison following the completion of his sentence than he did on the sentence itself.
Dissent
MARK SELING, SUPERINTENDENT, SPECIAL
COMMITMENT CENTER, PETITIONER
v.
ANDRE BRIGHAM YOUNG
Justice Stevens , dissenting.
A sexual predator may be imprisoned for violating the law, and, if he is mentally ill, he may be committed to an institution until he is cured. Whether a specific statute authorizing the detention of such a person is properly viewed as criminal or civil in the context of federal constitutional issues is often a question of considerable difficulty. See Kansas v. Hendricks , 521 U. S. 346 (1997) (reversing, by a 5 to 4 vote, a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court invalidating Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act); Allen v. Illinois , 478 U. S. 364 (1986) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act); In re Young , 122 Wash. 2d 1, 857 P. 2d 989 (1993) (en banc) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote, the provisions of Washingtons Community Protection Act of 1990 dealing with sexually violent predators).
It is settled, however, that the question whether a state statute is civil or criminal in nature for purposes of complying with the demands of the Federal Constitution is a question of federal law. If a detainee comes forward with the clearest proof that the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the States] intention that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal. Allen, 478 U. S., at 369 (quoting United States v. Ward , 448 U. S. 242, 248249 (1980) ) (emphasis added). See also Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93, 100, 105 (1997) . Accordingly, we have consistently looked to the conditions of confinement as evidence of both the legislative purpose behind the statute and its actual effect. See Hendricks , 521 U. S., at 361, 367369; Schall v. Martin , 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen , 478 U. S., at 369, 373374. As we have acknowledged in those cases, the question whether a statute is in fact punitive cannot always be answered solely by reference to the text of the statute.
The majority in this case, however, incorrectly assumes that the Act at issue is necessarily civil. The issue the majority purports to resolve is whether an Act that is otherwise civil in nature can be deemed criminal in a specific instance based on evidence of its application to a particular prisoner. However, respondent Youngs petition did not present that issue. Rather, consistent with our case law, Young sought to introduce evidence of the conditions of confinement as evidence of the punitive purpose and effect of the Washington statute. See Amended Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus 6 and Supp. Brief on Remand 2, 6, 1011, in No. C94480C (WD Wash.), Record, Doc. Nos. 57, 155. As a result, Young in no way runs afoul of Hudson v. United States , 522 U. S. 93 (1997) . Properly read, Hudson acknowledges that resolving whether an Act is civil or criminal in nature can take into account whether the statutory scheme has a punitive effect. 1 Id., at 99. What Hudson rejects is an approach not taken by respondentone that bypasses this threshold question in favor of a dispositive focus on the sanction actually imposed on the specific individual. 2 Id., at 101102.
To be sure, the question whether an Act is civil or punitive in nature is initially one of statutory construction. Ante , at 9 (majority opinion). However, under the majoritys analysis, there is no inquiry beyond that of statutory construction. Ante , at 11. In essence, the majority argues that because the constitutional query must be answered definitively and because confinement is not a fixed event, conditions of confinement should not be considered at all, except in the first challenge to a statute, when, as a practical matter, the evidence of such conditions is most likely not to constitute the requisite clearest proof. This seems to me quite wrong. If conditions of confinement are such that a detainee has been punished twice in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is irrelevant that the scheme has been previously labeled as civil without full knowledge of the effects of the statute. 3
In this case, Young has made detailed allegations concerning both the absence of treatment for his alleged mental illness and the starkly punitive character of the conditions of his confinement. If proved, those allegations establish not just that those detained pursuant to the statute are treated like those imprisoned for violations of Washingtons criminal laws, but that, in many respects, they receive significantly worse treatment. 4 If those allegations are correct, the statute in question should be characterized as a criminal law for federal constitutional purposes. I therefore agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that respondent should be given the opportunity to come forward with the clearest proof that his allegations are true.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
1 In his concurrence, Justice Scalia concludes that, under the rule of Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93 (1997) , courts may never look to actual conditions of confinement and implementation of the statute to determine in the first instance whether a confinement scheme is civil in nature. See ante, at 1. Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, would take Hudson even further, precluding implementation-based challenges at any time. Ante, at 4. However, for the reasons set out above, I believe that both concurrences misread Hudson. I also note that Hudson did not involve confinement. In cases that do involve confinement, this Court has relied on the principle that a statutory scheme must be deemed criminal if it was sufficiently punitive either in purpose or effect. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, 361, 367369 (1997) ; Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 269271 (1984) ; Allen v. Illinois, 478 U. S. 364, 369, 373374 (1986) .
2 In response to my dissent, the Court has made it clear that it is simply holding that respondent may not prevail if he merely proves that the statute is punitive insofar as it has been applied to him. The question whether he may prevail if he can prove that the statute is punitive in its application to everyone confined under its provisions therefore remains open. In sum, the Court has rejected the narrow holding of the Ninth Circuit, but has not addressed the sufficiency of the broadest claim that petitioner has advanced.
3 In this case, those detained pursuant to Washingtons statute have sought an improvement in conditions for almost seven years. Their success in the courts, however, has had little practical impact.
4 Under such conditions, Young has now served longer in prison following the completion of his sentence than he did on the sentence itself.


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Notebooks
Story: [Making a living through cleverness]
[Making a living through cleverness]
Title
[Making a living through cleverness]
Collection
Summary
A story mostly translated by Louis Maingard about cleverness and the use of it to make a living.
Comments
1) Most of the translation on these pages is by Louis Maingard, 2) This story is found in Kora Book I-3
Keywords
Kora (story about cleverness) , Kora (translated by Maingard) , cleverness (to make a living) , Maingard (translations in Kora notebooks)
Story Pages
126-131


IDL source Global index
enum CapeFlowsheetType { PROCESS_GRAPH, PARTITION_GRAPH, OPEN_PARTITION_GRAPH };
The different types of flowsheet.
PROCESS_GRAPH for any flowsheet,
PARTITION_GRAPH for flowsheet with one partition,
OPEN_PARTITION_GRAPH for flowsheet with no cycles.


"ZERED "=Zared, luxuriance; willow bush, a brook or valley communicating with the Dead Sea near its southern extremity (Numbers 21:12; Deuteronomy 2:14). It is called the “brook of the willows” (Isaiah 15:7) and the “river of the wilderness” (Amos 6:14). It has been identified with the Wady el-Aksy.
"ZERED "=Zared, luxuriance; willow bush, a brook or valley communicating with the Dead Sea near its southern extremity (Numbers 21:12; Deuteronomy 2:14). It is called the “brook of the willows” (Isaiah 15:7) and the “river of the wilderness” (Amos 6:14). It has been identified with the Wady el-Aksy.


Abstract database result class
Every driver result class must extend this class in order to be loadable and to comply with the database access layer interface.
Every driver result class must extend this class in order to be loadable and to comply with the database access layer interface.


Contribute¶
Extending Python for android native support¶
So, you want to get into python-for-android and extend what’s available to Python on Android ?
Turns out it’s not very complicated, here is a little introduction on how to go about it. Without Pyjnius, the schema to access the Java API from Cython is:
[1] Cython -> [2] C JNI -> [3] Java
Think about acceleration sensors: you want to get the acceleration values in Python, but nothing is available natively. Lukcily you have a Java API for that : the Google API is available here http://developer.android.com/reference/android/hardware/Sensor.html
You can’t use it directly, you need to do your own API to use it in python, this is done in 3 steps
Step 1: write the java code to create very simple functions to use¶
like : accelerometer Enable/Reading In our project, this is done in the Hardware.java: https://github.com/kivy/python-for-android/blob/master/src/src/org/renpy/android/Hardware.java you can see how it’s implemented
Step 2 : write a jni wrapper¶
This is a C file to be able to invoke/call Java functions from C, in our case, step 2 (and 3) are done in the android python module. The JNI part is done in the android_jni.c: https://github.com/kivy/python-for-android/blob/master/recipes/android/src/android_jni.c
Step 3 : you have the java part, that you can call from the C¶
You can now do the Python extension around it, all the android python part is done in https://github.com/kivy/python-for-android/blob/master/recipes/android/src/android.pyx
→ [python] android.accelerometer_reading ⇒ [C] android_accelerometer_reading ⇒ [Java] Hardware.accelerometer_reading()
The jni part is really a C api to call java methods. a little bit hard to get it with the syntax, but working with current example should be ok
Example with bluetooth¶
Start directly from a fork of https://github.com/kivy/python-for-android
The first step is to identify where and how they are doing it in sl4a, it’s really easy, because everything is already done as a client/server client/consumer approach, for bluetooth, they have a “Bluetooth facade” in java.
You can learn from it, and see how is it’s can be used as is, or if you can simplify / remove stuff you don’t want.
From this point, create a bluetooth file in python-for-android/tree/master/src/src/org/renpy/android in Java.
Do a good API (enough simple to be able to write the jni in a very easy manner, like, don’t pass any custom java object in argument).
Then write the JNI, and then the python part.
3 steps, once you get it, the real difficult part is to write the java part :)
Jni gottchas¶
- package must be org.renpy.android, don’t change it.
Create your own recipes¶
A recipe is a script that contains the “definition” of a module to compile. The directory layout of a recipe for a <modulename> is something like:
python-for-android/recipes/<modulename>/recipe.sh
python-for-android/recipes/<modulename>/patches/
python-for-android/recipes/<modulename>/patches/fix-path.patch
When building, all the recipe builds must go to:
python-for-android/build/<modulename>/<archiveroot>
For example, if you want to create a recipe for sdl, do:
cd python-for-android/recipes
mkdir sdl
cp recipe.sh.tmpl sdl/recipe.sh
sed -i 's#XXX#sdl#' sdl/recipe.sh
Then, edit the sdl/recipe.sh to adjust other information (version, url) and complete the build function.


--- layout: plainarticle permalink: '/homecoming/' title: Homecoming ---
Every year in fall Jacobs alumni from all over the world reunite at their alma mater. For the classes that celebrate their 5th or 10th anniversary, this is a very special weekend of the year. While there are many highlights such as the Gala Dinner or the Theme Party, simply getting together and seeing old faces as well as connecting with new alumni, is what makes this event so memorable every year.
The event is organized by the Class Representatives of the anniversary classes in collaboration with the Assessor for Event Management of the Alumni Association and the Alumni Office of the university.


{% extends "basic/base.html" %} {% load template_extras %} {% block header %} {% endblock %} {% block content %}
The following conditions are required before you may access this:
| Completed | Condition | Hyperlink | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| {{condition.description}} | {{condition.entry_point.LTI_title}} (you completed this {{ condition.when|date:"d M Y, H:i"}}) | {%else%}{{condition.description}} | {{condition.entry_point.LTI_title}} | {%endif%}


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java.lang.Object org.apache.xml.serializer.ElemDesc
public final class ElemDesc
This class has a series of flags (bit values) that describe an HTML element
This class is not a public API. It is public because it is used outside of this package.
| Field Summary | |
|---|---|
(package private) static int |
ASPECIAL
Bit position if this element type is ???. |
static int |
ATTREMPTY
Bit position if this attribute type is an empty type. |
static int |
ATTRURL
Bit position if this attribute type is a URL. |
(package private) static int |
BLOCK
Bit position if this element type is a block. |
(package private) static int |
BLOCKFORM
Bit position if this element type is a block form. |
(package private) static int |
BLOCKFORMFIELDSET
Bit position if this element type is a block form field set. |
private static int |
CDATA
Bit position if this element type is CDATA. |
(package private) static int |
EMPTY
Bit position if this element type is empty. |
private static int |
FLOW
Bit position if this element type is a flow. |
(package private) static int |
FONTSTYLE
Bit position if this element type is a font style. |
(package private) static int |
FORMCTRL
Bit position if this element type is a form control. |
(package private) static int |
HEAD
Bit position if this element type is a head element (i.e. |
(package private) static int |
HEADELEM
Bit position if this element type is a header element (i.e. |
(package private) static int |
HEADMISC
Bit position if this element type is an odd header element. |
(package private) static int |
HTMLELEM
Bit position if this element is the "HTML" element |
private static int |
INLINE
Bit position if this element type should be inlined. |
private static int |
INLINEA
Bit position if this element type is INLINEA. |
(package private) static int |
INLINELABEL
Bit position if this element type is an inline label. |
(package private) static int |
LIST
Bit position if this element type is a list. |
private StringToIntTable |
m_attrs
Table of attribute names to integers, which contain bit flags telling about the attributes. |
private int |
m_flags
Bit flags to tell about this element type. |
private static int |
PCDATA
Bit position if this element type is PCDATA. |
(package private) static int |
PHRASE
Bit position if this element type is a phrase. |
(package private) static int |
PREFORMATTED
Bit position if this element type is a preformatted type. |
(package private) static int |
RAW
Bit position if this element type is should be raw characters. |
(package private) static int |
SPECIAL
Bit position if this element type is ???. |
(package private) static int |
WHITESPACESENSITIVE
Bit position if this element type is whitespace sensitive. |
| Constructor Summary | |
|---|---|
ElemDesc(int flags)
Construct an ElemDesc from a set of bit flags. |
| Method Summary | |
|---|---|
(package private) int |
getFlags()
|
private boolean |
is(int flags)
Tell if this element type has the basic bit properties that are passed as an argument. |
boolean |
isAttrFlagSet(java.lang.String name,
int flags)
Tell if any of the bits of interest are set for a named attribute type. |
(package private) void |
setAttr(java.lang.String name,
int flags)
Set an attribute name and it's bit properties. |
| Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object |
|---|
clone, equals, finalize, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, toString, wait, wait, wait |
| Field Detail |
|---|
private int m_flags
private StringToIntTable m_attrs
static final int EMPTY
private static final int FLOW
static final int BLOCK
static final int BLOCKFORM
static final int BLOCKFORMFIELDSET
private static final int CDATA
private static final int PCDATA
static final int RAW
private static final int INLINE
private static final int INLINEA
static final int INLINELABEL
static final int FONTSTYLE
static final int PHRASE
static final int FORMCTRL
static final int SPECIAL
static final int ASPECIAL
static final int HEADMISC
static final int HEAD
static final int LIST
static final int PREFORMATTED
static final int WHITESPACESENSITIVE
static final int HEADELEM
static final int HTMLELEM
public static final int ATTRURL
public static final int ATTREMPTY
| Constructor Detail |
|---|
ElemDesc(int flags)
flags
- Bit flags that describe the basic properties of this element type.| Method Detail |
|---|
private boolean is(int flags)
flags
- Bit flags that describe the basic properties of interest.
int getFlags()
void setAttr(java.lang.String name, int flags)
name
- non-null name of attribute, in upper case.flags
- flag bits.public boolean isAttrFlagSet(java.lang.String name, int flags)
name
- non-null reference to attribute name, in any case.flags
- flag mask.
|
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Stanford Performing Arts
Autumn 2012
Edition
Bing Concert Hall
The Bing Concert Hall at Stanford will play a vital role on campus and in the local community. The hall's exceptional acoustics and state-of-the-art technical capabilities will showcase the world's finest performers.
The hall is scheduled to open early in 2013. The concert hall will have 844 seats in an intimate vineyard-style configuration, with terraced sections wrapping all the way around the stage.
Calendar
Harmony for Humanity: Daniel Pearl World Music Concert
Sundays with the St. Lawrence String Quartet
Merce Cunningham Dance Company
Juilliard String Quartet