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The Army’s Role in Overcoming Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges
Summary
Abbreviations
Chapter One Background
Chapter Two The Range of Anti-Access/Area Denial Threats
Chapter Three Key Threat Capabilities
Chapter Four A Joint Approach to Countering Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges
Chapter Five Conclusions
Anti-Access Measures in Chinese Defense Strategy
The Army’s Role in Overcoming Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges
John Gordon IV, John Matsumura
Copyright 2013 RAND Corporation
Preface
This report presents findings from a research project conducted for the U.S. Army’s Office of
the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Plans, Training, Mobilization, and Security Directorate
(G-3), and the Army Capabilities Integration Center at Headquarters, U.S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command, Fort Eustis, Virginia. The project began in the fall of 2011 under the
dual sponsorship of these organizations.
The purpose of the study was to examine the evolving anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)
challenges that the U.S. military in general—and the Army in particular—would face in the
2012–2020 time frame.
The research effort involved developing a variety of plausible scenarios set in the 2020
time period in which joint and Army forces could be employed. Threats ranged from low- to
high-intensity situations that would present a variety of challenges to the Army and the other
services. These scenarios were used as the basis for Concept Options Group (COG) exercises
(essentially, tabletop war games). These exercises led to important insights regarding A2/AD
threats to U.S. forces, as well as how those threats might be countered.
In addition, supplementary research examined how threats are evolving and how the
United States might counter those growing threats.
This report will be followed by a restricted-distribution document that explains in detail
the scenarios and the specific issues that were identified by each of the COGs and the related
research. Meanwhile, this report serves to highlight the nature of the growing A2/AD threats
to U.S. forces and some possible counters to those threats.
This research was sponsored by the Army G-3 and the Army Capabilities Integration
Center and conducted within RAND Arroyo Center’s Force Development and Technology
Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded
research and development center sponsored by the United States Army.
The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document
is RAN126154.
For more information on RAND Arroyo Center, contact the Director of Operations
(telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>, extension 6419; fax<PHONE_NUMBER>; email Marcy_Agmon@rand.
org), or visit Arroyo’s web site at http://www.rand.org/ard.
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Summary
The U.S. military has become increasingly concerned about the challenges it could face in
gaining access to an operational area. Given their global responsibilities, the U.S. armed forces
must be prepared to deploy to a wide range of locations that include almost any type of terrain
and confront adversaries that span the threat spectrum from very poorly armed bands
to peer-level foes. Research indicates that, in most situations, anti-access challenges require a
joint solution, in which the capabilities of the different services can be brought to bear based
on the threat and the mission. This study examined the nature of those future challenges and
the Army’s role as part of a larger joint or combined force.
Anti-access (A2) challenges prevent or degrade the ability to enter an operational area.
These challenges can be geographic, military, or diplomatic. Area denial (AD) refers to threats
to forces within the operational area. As they relate to U.S. ground forces (the Army and
Marine Corps), AD threats are characterized by the opponent’s ability to obstruct the actions
of U.S. forces once they have deployed.
The Range of Anti-Access/Area Denial Threats
Irregular Adversaries
Irregular adversaries could be nonstate actors (such as a terrorist group or insurgents who have
limited support from a state sponsor) or the armed forces of a very weak nation. It is likely that
the A2 capability of such an opponent is limited.
Hybrid Adversaries
Hybrid adversaries have more and better weapons, operate with better command-and-control
systems, are better trained, and are capable of simultaneously engaging in irregular and conventional
combat. If a hybrid opponent is a nonstate actor, it is likely to have considerable
support from a friendly nation or nations. Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in 2006 is the
most notable recent example of this kind of opponent. For the purposes of this discussion, we
assume that this class of threat includes both nonstate opponents that are capable of fighting in
this manner and nation-states that elect to conduct operations in a hybrid mode.
State Adversaries
The U.S. military has historically planned for state adversaries, often assuming that lowerspectrum
threats were lesser-included cases. State adversaries are the armed forces of another
nation-state that normally operate in a conventional manner, wear uniforms, have formal military organizations, and employ the air, land, and naval weapon systems that are usually associated
with traditional military forces. Their level of capability can vary enormously; such
adversaries range from impoverished countries with obsolete military equipment to formidable
potential opponents with large numbers of state-of-the-art military systems. Very few state
opponents possess nuclear weapons, perhaps the ultimate A2 capability.
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Key Anti-Access/Area Denial Capabilities
The following capabilities are most likely to pose significant A2/AD challenges to joint operations
in future scenarios:
Long-range precision-strike systems. The development of Global Positioning System technology
has increased the accuracy of both cruise and ballistic missiles. This increase in
accuracy has profoundly changed the nature of the threat posed by long-range nonnuclear
missiles, particularly against fixed targets (such as ports and airfields).
Littoral anti-ship capabilities. These capabilities include high-quality non-nuclear submarines,
fast missile-armed surface craft, and smart coastal and shallow-water mines.
High-quality air defenses. During the famous Yom Kippur War of 1973, the state-of-theart
Soviet-made air defense system that challenged the Israeli Air Force was the SA-6
mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. The SA-6 had a maximum effective range
of roughly 25 km. Today, the state of the art in air defense is the Russian-built S-400
(SA-21) SAM. The S-400 has a maximum effective range against non-stealthy aircraft of
approximately 400 km. Additionally, the low-altitude threat has become more challenging
as improved anti-aircraft guns and shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons proliferate.
Long-range artillery and rocket systems. The proliferation of mobile rocket launchers with
ranges of more than 50 km can pose a major threat to Army or Marine Corps lodgment
areas, such as ports and airfields.
A Joint Approach to Countering Anti-Access/Area Denial Threats
A review of U.S. operations since World War II, combined with the development and examination
of possible future scenarios, indicated that—in most situations—the United States would
employ a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, or multinational approach to overcoming diplomatic,
geographic, and military A2/AD challenges. The capabilities of the different services
can be brought to bear in ways that are tailored for each specific operational environment.
There are important interdependencies and synergies between the services in terms of
their ability to overcome A2/AD challenges. For example, some threats to the Army’s ability to
deploy to an operational area must be addressed primarily by the other services (e.g., confronting
the threat of enemy submarines and sea mines is the responsibility of the Navy, though the
Army may be able to assist naval forces in mitigating those threats).
The Army has capabilities that can be of great value to the Air Force and Navy as they
develop joint solutions to overcoming evolving A2 challenges. Specifically, the Army could
provide considerable assistance to the Air Force and Navy in suppressing or destroying air
defenses that challenge joint air operations. It could also facilitate dispersed operations by the Air Force to assist the Navy in defeating littoral threats and establishing protected regional
enclaves for naval operations.
As the services work together to develop operational concepts and systems to mitigate A2/
AD challenges, the Army will play a significant role in this effort.
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Abbreviations
A2 anti-access
AD area denial
ASBM anti-ship ballistic missile
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System
C2 command and control
C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
CEP circular error probable
COG Concept Options Group
FCS Future Combat Systems
GPS Global Positioning System
IED improvised explosive device
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JPADS Joint Precision Air Drop System
MANPADS man-portable air defense system
MRL multiple-rocket launcher
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SAM surface-to-air missile
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
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Chapter One Background
The U.S. military has become increasingly concerned about the challenges it could face in
gaining access to an operational area. Given their global responsibilities, the U.S. armed forces
must be prepared to deploy to a wide range of locations that include almost any type of terrain
and that span the threat spectrum from very poorly armed opposition to peer-level foes.
Research indicates that, in most situations, anti-access challenges require a joint solution, in
which the capabilities of the different services can be brought to bear based on the threat and
the mission. This study examined the nature of those future challenges and the Army’s role as
part of a larger joint or combined force.
During the Cold War, much of the U.S. military—particularly the Army and Air
Force—could plan on operating in regions where considerable forces were already deployed.
For example, in 1988, as the Cold War was about to end, the U.S. Army had 207,000 personnel
organized into two corps and the equivalent of five divisions in West Germany. At the same
time, the Air Force had over 90,000 personnel and some 600 combat aircraft in Europe.1 The
anti-access challenge in that theater was characterized primarily by the enemy attempting to
interfere with the arrival of reinforcements for the considerable forces that were already in the
operational area prior to the start of hostilities.
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military has become smaller and increasingly
based inside the United States.2 Starting with the 1991 Gulf War, the military has had to project
power into regions where there has been little if any precrisis positioning of personnel and
equipment. Potential adversaries have noticed this change in operational mode, and some are
building capabilities to threaten the arrival and subsequent operations of U.S. forces as they
attempt to deploy and initiate operations.
It is appropriate to start with a framework to ensure common understanding of the challenges
that the Army, and the U.S. military in general, will likely face. It should be noted that
while some of the terms are new, the U.S. military has confronted significant anti-access and
area denial challenges in past operations.
Anti-access (A2) challenges prevent or degrade the ability to enter an operational area.
These challenges can be geographic, military, or diplomatic.3 For example, an operational
area could be very far inland, a great distance from ports and usable airfields. That would be
a geographic challenge. In other cases, diplomatic or political issues can pose an A2 challenge
when one or more nations in a region prohibit or limit the ability of the U.S. military to deploy
forces into their sovereign territory or to fly through their airspace.
Area denial (AD) refers to threats to forces within the operational area. As they relate to
U.S. ground forces (the Army and Marine Corps), AD threats are characterized by the opponent’s
ability to obstruct the actions of U.S. forces once they have deployed. Importantly, there
are far more potential opponents that could pose significant AD challenges than there are
opponents with major A2 capabilities. For example, when U.S. forces deployed to Afghanistan
in 2001–2002, there was not a significant military A2 threat, although there were initially
diplomatic challenges to overcome with regard to nearby countries, and the geography of the
region required a long-distance deployment far from the sea and existing U.S. bases. However,
once U.S. forces began operating in Afghanistan, they faced numerous and, at times, severe
AD threats, such as the increasingly common use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that
caused casualties and imposed constraints on the mobility of U.S. and coalition forces.
The types of A2/AD threats that the U.S. military could encounter in future operations
will vary considerably. At the low end of the conflict spectrum, there could be guerrilla-type
forces, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, with very limited A2 capabilities and a small number
of modern weapons. These forces could still pose a considerable AD challenge due to their ability
to operate among the local population and employ irregular tactics to strike U.S. forces at
times and places of their choosing.
In the middle of the spectrum are so-called “hybrid” opponents, which can employ irregular
or guerrilla-type tactics but are reasonably well armed with modern weapons. Hybrid
opponents can therefore simultaneously fight in a conventional manner. Examples include the
irregular Viet Cong and regular North Vietnamese forces during the Vietnam War and, more
recently, the Hezbollah forces that Israel fought in southern Lebanon in 2006.4
At the high end of the threat spectrum are the armed forces of nation-states that tend to
employ conventional tactics and weapons. Even at this end of the spectrum, the level of A2/
AD capability can vary considerably. As with the hybrid threat, this challenge is not new to
the U.S. military. In the case of World War II, Nazi Germany had a potent, long-range A2
capability in its submarine force (the U-boats) that threatened Allied shipping routes that carried
troops and supplies across the Atlantic. Similarly, during the Cold War, a major mission of
the Soviet Navy’s submarines was to prepare to interdict the movement of U.S. reinforcements
to Europe.
In many cases, the U.S. military will have to employ a system of joint capabilities to
overcome A2/AD challenges. This observation is based on both the insights gained in the
scenarios that were examined as part of this research and an examination of how operations
were actually conducted in the post–World War II era in which a range of air, land, and naval
capabilities were required to gain and maintain access. In some situations, U.S. air and
naval power will be the primary capabilities required (at least in the initial phases of an operation)
to overcome significant A2 threats. In other situations, the role of ground forces will
dominate or could come to do so as an operation progresses.
Chapter Two of this report examines the range of A2/AD military threats that U.S.
forces could confront today or in the foreseeable future, including the relationship of air, land,
and naval forces in overcoming those threats. Chapter Three explores a selection of key threat capabilities in greater detail, with an emphasis on the joint implications of A2 challenges.
Chapter Four profiles a joint approach to countering A2/AD challenges, focusing specifically
on the A2 challenges faced by the Air Force, the Navy, and the Army and options to reduce
these threats. Chapter Five offers conclusions and highlights the primary findings presented
in the report.
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Chapter Two The Range of Anti-Access/Area Denial Threats
In this chapter, we review the general types of A2/AD threats that U.S. forces face today and
will likely confront in the future. Some of the A2 threats presented here are of particular concern
and are discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.
Irregular Adversaries
Irregular adversaries could be nonstate actors (such as a terrorist group or insurgents who have
limited support from a state sponsor) or the armed forces of a very weak nation. It is likely that
the A2 capability of such an opponent is limited.1
Anti-Access Threats
A2 threats that U.S. forces could encounter include the following:
small, high-speed boats used to attack shipping vessels in coastal regions, either with
onboard weapons or via suicide ramming2
mortars capable of shelling airfields or ports from ranges of up to roughly 10 km
artillery rockets, launched either singly or in small numbers, capable of striking targets
up to roughly 20 km away.3
Area Denial Threats
AD threats could include the following:
sniper attacks, which may be effective in slowing the flow of aircraft into and out of airports,
or more-coordinated attacks involving automatic weapons, such as heavy machine
guns capable of threatening low-altitude aircraft as they land or take off from airports
IEDs and conventional land mines of various types, which have been very effective, lowtech,
and low-cost insurgent weapons in Iraq and Afghanistan and have compelled the
United States to take major steps to reduce the threat
individuals or small units operating with light infantry weapons, such as small arms
or machine guns, likely in organized groups no larger than a company (roughly 100–
200 personnel)
individuals or units with man-portable anti-armor weapons, such as rocket-propelled grenades4
manned or light vehicle-portable mortars, probably without guided projectiles
simple electronic warfare attacks, such as low-tech jamming of Global Positioning System
(GPS) signals.5
Hybrid Adversaries
Compared with irregular forces, hybrid adversaries have more and better weapons, operate
with better command-and-control (C2) systems, are better trained, and are capable of simultaneously
engaging in irregular and conventional combat.6 If a hybrid opponent is a nonstate
actor, it is likely to have considerable support from a friendly nation or nations. Hezbollah
in southern Lebanon in 2006 is the most notable recent example of this kind of opponent.
In Hezbollah’s case, there was considerable support from both Iran and Syria, including the
provision of long-range rockets and anti-ship cruise missiles. There are historical examples of
nations fighting in this manner as well. During World War II, German forces in the Soviet
Union were simultaneously confronted with a sizable state-controlled guerrilla threat in their
rear area (the “Partisans”) and engaged in a massive conventional battle against a peer-level
opponent in the form of the Soviet Army and Air Force. The mix of irregular and conventional
tactics employed by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese regular military is another
example of a nation-state operating in this manner.
Another important distinction of this class of threat is that the opponent is able to operate
in larger formations and control terrain, at least temporarily.7 For the purposes of this discussion,
we assume that this class of threat includes both nonstate opponents that are capable of
fighting in this manner and nation-states that elect to conduct operations in a hybrid mode. In
the latter case, U.S. forces could simultaneously be confronted by a hybrid threat and strictly
conventional capabilities, discussed in the section “State Adversaries,” later in this chapter.
Although the exact nature of the military A2 threat would vary depending on the opponent,
examples of the opponent’s capabilities could include the threats listed in the case of
irregular adversaries, plus the following:
C2 capabilities to plan and conduct operations with up to roughly a battalion-size force
short-range anti-ship weapons, such as guns and missiles, that can be used within lineof-
sight distances
small numbers of shallow-water sea mines
cannons, mortars, and rocket launchers capable of operating in battery- or battalion-size
fi ring elements at ranges up to 100 km with precision warheads, thus presenting a signifi -
cant threat to airfi elds and ports (see Figure 2.1)8
Figure 2.1 Hezbollah’s Rocket and Missile Threat to Israel, 2006
limited numbers of unmanned aerial systems for both surveillance and attack, adapted
commercially available systems.
In this case, AD threats could include those listed in the irregular adversary case, plus
the following:
man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) able to threaten aircraft that lack appropriate
countermeasures while fl ying at low altitude
37- to 57-mm anti-aircraft guns capable of threatening aircraft fl ying at up to 10,000 ft
short-range precision weapons, such as anti-tank guided missiles equipped with modern
warheads that can attack at ranges of 2–5 km
small numbers of older, armored vehicles
limited cyber attack capabilities intended to disrupt and degrade U.S. and coalition command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(C4ISR) systems
chemical or biological weapons.9
State Adversaries
To a large extent, the U.S. military has historically planned for state adversaries, often assuming
that lower-spectrum threats were lesser-included cases.10 This tendency was perhaps most
prevalent in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Interestingly, during the past decade’s operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army and Marine Corps had to reorient toward irregular
and hybrid-type opponents to a considerable extent. During that period, the Air Force and
Navy, generally in a supporting role to the Army and Marine Corps, remained more focused
on state-to-state conflict. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan waned, the Air Force and Navy
started to highlight the A2 (and, to a lesser extent, AD) potential of possible future opponents.
State adversaries are the armed forces of another nation-state that normally operate in a
conventional manner, wear uniforms, have formal military organizations, and employ the air,
land, and naval weapon systems that are usually associated with traditional military forces.
Their levels of military capability can vary enormously; such adversaries can range from impoverished
countries with obsolete military equipment to formidable potential opponents with
large numbers of state-of-the-art military systems. We address nuclear weapons as a unique
military capability later in this report.
The following are some of the more significant military A2 capabilities that better-armed
nations possess or could obtain that would be particularly threatening to U.S. forces:
naval forces, including both surface ships and attack submarines, able to attack U.S. warships
and commercial shipping vessels up to thousands of miles offshore
long-range anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) and cruise missiles11
naval mines, including sophisticated bottom mines that can sit quietly on the seabed,
waiting for the most valuable ship target to be detected by their onboard sensors
long-range precision, conventionally armed cruise and ballistic missiles for strikes against
ports and airfields; long-range strike aircraft capable of attacking ships, ports, air bases,
C2 facilities, and deployed forces ashore; and weapons aboard the aircraft, which could
include a mix of gravity weapons (guided or unguided) and long-range precision stand-off
munitions, such as air-launched cruise missiles
unmanned aerial systems for strike, surveillance, and reconnaissance, the ranges and payloads
of these which are steadily increasing12
long-range surface-to-surface rockets with ranges of more than 50 km. Warheads include
unitary and submunitions, and can be precision-guided
long-range air defenses capable of engaging non-stealthy aircraft at ranges of more than
100 km, often resistant to many electronic counter-measures13
advanced low-to-medium altitude air defense systems (including advanced MANPADS
and radar/infrared anti-aircraft guns)
electronic and cyber warfare techniques and technologies targeting communication networks,
GPS, and air- and space-based reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities.
The types of AD threats that this class of opponent could field include the following:
armored fighting vehicles, perhaps in large numbers
attack helicopters and fixed-wing strike aircraft, possibly armed with precision munitions
large numbers of cannons, heavy mortars, and rocket launchers, including precision
munitions
long-range, precision anti-armor systems, including both anti-tank guided missiles and
indirect-fire and artillery-delivered weapons
possibly significant chemical or biological weapon stocks.14
Chapter Three explores the more significant threats that U.S. forces might encounter in
future operations.
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Chapter Three Key Threat Capabilities
Chapter Two provided an overview of the types of military A2/AD threats that the U.S. military
currently faces and is likely to confront in future operations. As noted in that chapter, the
severity of threats varies considerably, depending on the capability of the opponent. In some
cases, a nonstate opponent, such as Hezbollah, might be better armed than the military forces
of a weak nation-state.
This chapter examines some particularly challenging threats in greater detail. Many of
the threats examined in this chapter have major implications for the Air Force and Navy. This
matters to the Army, because if enemy A2 threats force the Navy and Air Force to change their
mode of operations, that could have a significant effect on how the Army employs its forces.
Keeping with that theme, this chapter focuses primarily on new or emerging military A2 challenges.
We conclude with a brief discussion of a particularly serious A2 challenge: nucleararmed
opponents.
The Rise of Long-Range Precision Strike Systems
The development of GPS technology has enabled a great increase in the accuracy of both
cruise and ballistic missiles. This increase in accuracy has profoundly changed the nature of
the threat posed by long-range non-nuclear missiles, particularly against fixed targets, such as
ports and airfields.
Ballistic Missiles
The increase in the number and variety of precision ballistic missiles is a particularly troubling
threat—and one that is very different from the inaccurate Scud-class weapons that made sensational,
but militarily ineffective, attacks on U.S. and coalition military forces and civilian
targets during the 1991 Gulf War. Whereas the 1960s-era Scud-B had a circular error probable
(CEP, within which 50 percent of missiles will land) of some 900 m when fired at a target
300 km distant,1 the modern Chinese DF-15A missile has a CEP of 30–45 m, and the DF-15B
has a CEP of 5–10 m, at a maximum range of 600 km (see Figure 3.1).2 This type of missile
capability presents a significant threat to ports and, especially, airfields. Warheads can be either
unitary (with a single high-explosive charge) or scatterable submunitions.
It is important to note that while the number of nations with missile arsenals is growing,
the quality and number of these weapons varies considerably. China and Russia, for example,
are very well equipped, with a large number of long-range precision weapons. Iran and North
Korea also have hundreds of missiles, but their arsenals are composed primarily of older weapons
with poor accuracy. Figure 3.2 shows the difference in the number of Chinese and Iranian
theater ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles.
In addition to the considerable difference in the number of missiles, the level of threat
posed depends to a great degree on the accuracy of these weapons. For example, if an opponent
were attempting to shut down an air base with missile strikes, the number of weapons
that it would have to fire would be highly dependent on the missiles’ accuracy. When comparing
China and Iran, not only is the Chinese missile arsenal considerably larger, as shown in
Figure 3.2, but its weapons are also much more accurate. Figure 3.3 shows the number of missiles
that Iran would have to fire to have a high probability of hitting a target 100 m in diameter,
such as an aircraft hangar or a group of large fuel tanks on an air base.
Guided cruise and ballistic missiles tend to be fairly expensive and, thus, may be available
in only limited numbers. Additionally, for nations that possess these kinds of advanced capabilities,
the norm is for the larger portion of the missile inventory to consist of shorter-range
weapons (which are cheaper and can be produced in greater numbers), with fewer of the more
expensive, longer-range systems. Unfortunately, these kinds of capabilities are proliferating
at a relatively high rate. Part of the reason for this is the reduction in the cost of the underlying
technology. Another reason is the cost-effectiveness of this solution relative to others (e.g.,
developing and maintaining a large, modern air force).
Figure 3.2 Chinese and Iranian Ballistic and Cruise Missile Inventories, by Range
Figure 3.3 Number of Chinese and Iranian Missiles Required Against Point Targets
Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Ballistic missiles have the advantage of great range and speed of flight. They are expensive systems,
however. Cruise missiles and unmanned aerial systems (which can be armed or unarmed
and are also used for reconnaissance and surveillance) are much cheaper and do not require as
advanced a technical base as do ballistic missiles. The proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), in particular, has been significant over the past decade. Hostile reconnaissance UAVs
can monitor and report on the activities of U.S. Army forces in an operational area and provide accurate targeting data. Cruise missiles and armed unmanned aerial systems represent a growing
threat to both fixed facilities and, increasingly, forces operating in the field.
This threat applies all of the services, particularly the Air Force, which operates far from
fixed bases. For the cost of one ballistic missile, an opponent could purchase several long-range
cruise missiles. The trade-off would be a greater number of less-survivable strike weapons.
Because most cruise missiles are subsonic and fly at relatively low altitude, they are more vulnerable
to defenses than are ballistic missiles. The same trade-off applies to UAVs in relation to
ballistic missiles.
Maritime Anti-Access Capabilities
An important subset of long-range precision ballistic missiles is the new Chinese-developed
ASBM. The emergence in the past few years of this new, potentially game-changing capability
is a major concern to the U.S. Navy. The anti-ship cruise missile threat has been around for
many years and is well understood by the Navy. Cruise missiles are normally subsonic, and
most have ranges of less than 200 nautical miles, whether launched by aircraft, surface ship,
submarine, or a shore-based coastal defense unit.
ASBMs have a much longer range than most anti-ship cruise missiles—perhaps over
2,000 km. They could be launched from mobile platforms toward an area where U.S. warships
are operating and would probably use onboard sensors for the “end-game” attack on a warship.
3 China is currently working on this capability, with the centerpiece being the DF-21D
missile. Should the entire system work as planned, it could force the U.S. Navy’s surface elements
to operate much farther from the Chinese coast than previous naval concepts of operation
would have envisioned, or it could force the Navy to operate as currently planned but at
much greater risk. Although ASBM technology is being pioneered by the Chinese military, it
is possible that other nations could develop a similar capability in the future.
The ASBM system is vulnerable to complexities of the “kill chain,” however. Unlike
fixed land bases, such as airfields, ships move. Therefore, the Chinese would have to be able to
(1) acquire the target ship, (2) identify it as a desirable target as opposed to a merchant ship
or a decoy, (3) get the launch commands to a firing unit in a timely manner, (4) possibly provide
in-flight target updates to the missile while it is en route, and (5) manage the end-game
flight toward the target. For this process to succeed, the Chinese would have to overcome any
active and passive defenses directed against the entire kill chain. Nevertheless, until and unless
the Navy develops sufficient countermeasures to address this new threat, it could be forced to
modify its concepts of operation in significant ways.
In littoral areas within a few hundred miles of a coast, there are a number of important
A2 capabilities that an opponent could possess. These include high-quality non-nuclear
submarines, fast missile-armed surface craft, and smart coastal and shallow-water mines.
A number of nations have acquired modern diesel-electric or air-independent propulsion
submarines. These very quiet designs can be armed with advanced torpedoes, mines, or
submarine-launched cruise missiles. The quiet nature of their propulsion plants, coupled with
sonar-absorbing or -reflecting hull coatings, makes these boats very difficult to detect. Despite the decades of effort devoted to anti-submarine warfare, the U.S. Navy could face a considerable
A2 threat from this class of submarine.
Today’s naval mines are far more sophisticated than the moored mines of World Wars
I and II. Sea mines today can be deposited on the ocean floor with onboard sensors that can
identify the most lucrative targets. Some mines will explode when triggered by their sensors, but
others fire weapons, such as torpedoes. Because these systems are normally passive, detecting
them before they fire can be a significant challenge for the Navy. It should be noted that some
submarines are capable of laying mines in coastal waters. A related naval threat is unmanned
undersea vehicles that can be used for reconnaissance and surveillance or to carry weapons.
A specialized form of naval mine are shallow-water weapons intended to threaten coastal
traffic and vehicles or landing craft approaching a beach. Like other forms of naval mines,
these weapons can be located and cleared, but this can be a very time-consuming process
requiring days or even weeks. While it is unlikely that most opponents will be able to mine
more than a fraction of their coastal areas, the mere presence of these threats can impose caution
on naval operations, including the movement of ships being used to transport equipment
and supplies for the Army.
The Proliferation of High-Quality Air Defenses
The air defense A2/AD challenge can generally be broken into two types of threats. First, there
is the medium-high-altitude threat that applies to aircraft operating above roughly 15,000 ft.
In most cases, fairly large missiles are required to engage aircraft at those altitudes. The
second type of air defense threat is low-altitude weapons—primarily shoulder-fired missiles
(MANPADS) and anti-aircraft artillery. We address each threat type in turn.
Medium-High-Altitude Defenses
During the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the state-of-the-art Soviet-made air defense system that
challenged the Israeli Air Force was the SA-6 mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM). The SA-6
had a maximum effective range of roughly 25 km. In the Gulf War in 1991, U.S. forces faced
these and other longer-range but much older air defense systems. Today, the state of the art
in air defense is the Russian-built S-400 (SA-21) SAM, which has already been sold to other
countries. The S-400 has a maximum effective range against non-stealthy aircraft of approximately
400 km.4 The S-400 is also highly resistant to electronic countermeasures, and, unlike
the earlier SA-6, it can track and engage multiple targets. Importantly, today’s modern SAMs
(such as the S-400) are also very mobile. A well-trained SAM battery crew can disassemble the
system and be ready to move within ten minutes. Coupled with a clever battle management
system that manages radar emissions and integrated long-range S-300 (SA-20) and -400-type
SAMs with short-range systems, these are formidable A2 capabilities. (Figure 3.4 shows a
Russian-built S-300 system.)
The S-400 and similar systems are currently very expensive and require extensive training
to implement successfully. This tends to limit the number of scenarios and the degree to which
these systems will be confronted. That said, looking toward the future, these systems could
represent an asymmetric approach, and one with significantly lower costs than developing and fielding an air force that is comparable to that of the United States. The U.S. Air Force and the
U.S. Navy have yet to engage an opponent with this class of modern SAM. Until and unless
the joint force can suppress this threat, U.S. air operations will be subject to major constraints.
Low-Altitude Air Defenses
As with long-range air defenses, such as the S-300/400, there has also been an increase in
both the number and quality of lower-altitude air defense capabilities. Examples include
MANPADS and larger, vehicle-mounted systems. Not every opponent can afford the latest
generation of air defenses, but the cost of low-altitude defensive equipment is considerably
lower than that of the larger S-300/400 or PATRIOT systems.
Today’s modern air defenses are generally equipped with multiple types of sensors and
fire-control systems, such as radar, electro-optical, and infrared capabilities, providing several
options by which to acquire targets and engage hostile aircraft. If the target is a low-altitude
aircraft, such as a transport plane loaded with paratroopers or a helicopter that is part of an
air assault operation, these shorter-range air defenses can normally remain passive with their
radars turned off until they are about to engage their targets. Therefore, while of a different
nature than the S-300/400 threat, these weapons could also force airborne and air assault
operations to be conducted at much greater distances from the objective area than has been
the norm in the past.
The cumulative effect of an opponent’s air defenses is, at a minimum, to impose caution
on air operations. In the case of the low-altitude threat (MANPADS and anti-aircraft artillery),
the ease with which these systems can be concealed means that they can suddenly show
up in the rear area, such as at a key airfield, where they could pose an unexpected A2 challenge.
Low-altitude air defenses can also represent a significant AD threat to aircraft flying within
the operational area. The Russian-made SA-15 (also known as the GK330 Tor; see Figure 3.5)
represents this class of A2/AD threat.
Long-Range Multiple-Rocket Launchers and Tactical Missiles
The post–World War II trend in artillery systems has been a pursuit of greater and greater
range. In the 1970s, the main Soviet MRL was the truck-mounted 122-mm BM-21. That
system had a maximum range of 20 km. Today, the norm in mobile multiple-rocket systems
is a range of 80 km or more. For example, the Iranian 333-mm Fajr-5 has a range of roughly
75 km and has multiple warhead options, including the ability to carry high-explosive submunitions
(see Figure 3.6).
This class poses a significant A2 challenge to Army forces. For example, today’s airborne
operations usually require the rapid seizure of a usable airfield where air-landed (as opposed to
parachuted) follow-on forces and supplies can arrive to supplement the initial parachute units.
However, if the airfield is within range of this class of enemy weapon, all operations there
could be shut down. It should be noted that a number of long-range MRLs available today
have much longer ranges than the Fajr-5. For example, the Chinese WS-2 heavy MRL has a
projected range of 300–350 km and the ability to fire multiple warhead types, including submunitions.
This long range provides the weapon with an operational-level reach.5
Cyber Threats
In addition to traditional kinetic weapon threats, an opponent could pose a significant challenge
to U.S. forces via cyber attacks. In the past two or three decades, the U.S. military has
become very dependent on C4ISR systems, regardless whether it is engaging a state or nonstate
opponent. The ability to acquire massive amounts of information, process it, and quickly disseminate
it to large numbers of users over long distances is now a fundamental aspect of U.S.
military operations.
Of the three types of opponents discussed in this report (irregular, hybrid, and state), the
irregular opponent may have some degree of cyber capability, but it will probably be limited to
occasional attempts to disrupt some U.S. operations. Some hybrid opponents may also be able
to seriously disrupt the U.S. C4ISR system. Similarly, the ability of state opponents to degrade
or disrupt the U.S. system will vary.
The important point is that, today and in the future, the U.S. military will be exposed to
cyber threats that could be severe. It should be assumed that cyber attacks will be part of an
opponent’s A2/AD operational approach.
Chemical and Biological Weapons
A potentially significant A2/AD challenge is the threat of chemical and biological weapon use.
Chemical weapons were used extensively in World War I and occasionally since then, including
during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War. Biological weapons were stockpiled by some nations during
the Cold War, but little if any use was made of them. While chemical and biological weapons
do not have the instant, spectacular, and physically devastating effects of nuclear weapons, the
threat or actual use of this class of weapon could serve to raise the stakes in a conflict and pose
both A2 and AD challenges.
Another important characteristic of these weapons is that they are much easier to produce
than nuclear weapons. Indeed, nonstate opponents (irregular or hybrid) could easily acquire or
produce chemical or biological weapons. Delivery systems could include either conventional weapons (e.g., MRLs) or stealthy, clandestine means, such as packing them into commercial
shipping containers, oil drums, or other cargo.
Nuclear Weapons: A Very Special Case
The most spectacular and potentially devastating military A2 capability that an opponent
could possess is nuclear weapons. Fortunately, the number of countries with a nuclear arsenal is
very small, and fewer still are potential opponents of the United States. That said, if the United
States is on the verge of a crisis with a nuclear-armed state, the strategic and operational A2
threat might simply be perceived as too risky by senior U.S. decisionmakers.
There are several possible targeting strategies that a regional nuclear-armed state could
consider. These “target sets” include the following:
1. Warships at sea. In some sense, this is the least risky strategy for a nuclear-armed regional
power. A nuclear strike on ships at sea could be described as an attack on a purely military
target, and there would be little if any collateral damage involving civilians or civilian
infrastructure. However, for some regional nuclear powers, locating and targeting
moving ships at sea might be too difficult. Much would depend on how long it would
take to acquire the target, process that information and vet it with decisionmakers
capable of authorizing a nuclear strike, send the necessary information to nuclear strike
units (e.g., a nuclear-armed missile unit), and launch the attack. Ships move, and if this
process requires hours, the target could be literally hundreds of miles from the location
where it was detected.6
2. Fixed military facilities ashore. The best example is a military airfield, which has the
advantage of being a non-moving target, unlike a warship. For some regional nuclear
powers with a limited ability to conduct attacks against moving warships within an
acceptable time frame, a fixed military facility could be a much more easily achievable
target. However, a nuclear strike on an air base would, by definition, be on some
nation’s sovereign territory. Additionally, depending on whether there was a civilian
community nearby, there could be massive amounts of collateral damage. As in the
warship case, the justification would be that this was still a military target.
3. Civilian infrastructure. Examples include ports, oil refineries, or other civilian targets
of value or, potentially, a direct strike on a population center. In the case of a port, an
attack could have an immediate military effect as well, slowing or preventing the arrival
of opposing military forces at that location. Such a move would almost certainly cause
massive damage and possibly a huge number of civilian casualties. The threat of such
a devastating strike might also cause a nation that is friendly to the United States to
deny access by U.S. forces, particularly if the would-be host nation was convinced that
the United States or other members of a coalition would be unable to protect it from
such a strike. U.S. assurances of nuclear retaliation against a would-be perpetrator of the nuclear attack might not be good enough for the threatened nation, given the risks
involved.
4. U.S. military forces operating inside the adversary country. In this case, the nuclear-armed
nation waits for U.S. or other coalition forces to enter its territory and then conducts
a nuclear strike against them. Public justification for such a move would probably be
framed as “self-defense” against an invader. The threatened nation that makes such a
strike on its own territory might be willing to accept a degree of collateral damage to
inflict massive casualties on the invading forces. It is possible that a nuclear first use
under these conditions would be accompanied by a threat of further nuclear use (as in
the third case discussed) should the United States retaliate with nuclear weapons.
5. A high-altitude nuclear burst to disrupt U.S. C4ISR systems. A nuclear burst several hundred
kilometers above the earth could severely disrupt or permanently disable many
electronic systems in a region. This action could be taken without inflicting any direct
casualties and with little or no damage to physical infrastructure. In that sense, this
might be the most appealing option to an opponent. Additionally, an initial highaltitude
burst could serve as a stern warning that further nuclear use might follow, as in
the third and fourth cases.
These five illustrative situations do not include all the possible targeting strategies of a
nuclear-armed opponent. Nuclear weapons represent the high end of military A2 capability
that will require the United States to operate differently if these systems are in the hands of an
adversary.7
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Chapter Four A Joint Approach to Countering Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges
As discussed earlier in this report, U.S. forces could face a wide range of A2/AD threats. A
review of U.S. operations conducted since World War II, combined with the development and
examination of possible future scenarios, indicated that, in most situations, the United States
would employ a joint approach to overcoming diplomatic, geographic, and military A2/AD
challenges. The capabilities of the different services can be brought to bear in ways that are
tailored for each specific operational environment.
In the area of diplomatic challenges, actions taken by the U.S. military can offer considerable
assistance. During periods of peace, when there is normal engagement (often referred
to as “Phase 0” activities), U.S. military activities can improve the likelihood of access in the
event of a crisis. Indeed, the peacetime presence of the U.S. military might, in itself, negate or
dramatically reduce the possibility of a military crisis in a particular region. Indeed, pre-crisis
activities and the presence of the U.S. military can be beneficial in overcoming A2 challenges,
particularly in the diplomatic realm:
The presence of U.S. military forces demonstrates American interest and intent to
protect friends and allies.
There is an opportunity to train and exercise with the armed forces of friends and allies in
a region to learn one another’s procedures. Such engagement will help minimize coalition
operational challenges and maximize interoperability should a crisis occur.
Key pieces of equipment, such as munitions and unit supplies, can be prepositioned
ashore or afloat, thus reducing the amount of tonnage that has to be deployed in the
event of a crisis.
Senior U.S. military personnel and planners can become familiar with regional issues,
such as which infrastructure is available to facilitate the arrival of U.S. and coalition
forces in the event of a crisis.
The size and role of U.S. forces in a particular country or region will vary, often as a result
of domestic political concerns in individual nations. Those realities can also influence which
service is best suited for peacetime, or Phase 0, engagement activities. Some countries will allow
the United States to station an appropriately sized military force inside their borders during
peacetime. In some cases, this could include sizable U.S. ground forces, as in the Republic of
Korea; in others, it may be air and naval forces, as in Japan. In many host countries, internal
politics will allow only periodic exercises with U.S. forces. The Cobra Gold exercises with the armed forces of Thailand are a good example.1 There is no U.S. military force permanently
stationed in West Africa, but the U.S. Navy sends ships for months at a time to the Africa
Partnership Station to train police and military forces from various West African nations and
to improve interoperability. These ships can operate offshore or anchor at regional ports.
The U.S. Army provides special value in several respects during Phase 0 efforts to improve
access for U.S. forces in a country or region. In most countries, the army dominates the military
force. There are a number of reasons for this, not the least of which is that air forces and
navies represent large capital investments that many nations cannot afford. Unfortunately,
some countries that are friendly to the United States are confronted with internal security
problems, including insurgencies. In those cases, the countries’ armies (and police forces) tend
to be the most important security contingent.
For these reasons, the U.S. Army can be particularly useful in engaging the armydominated
militaries of many nations. As mentioned earlier, there are many situations in
which the permanent assignment of U.S. Army forces inside a country during peacetime is
not possible, usually due to political concerns in the United States or the host nation. In those
situations, small training teams periodically deployed to the host country, allowing key leaders
from the host-nation military to attend U.S. Army schools, and periodic combined exercises
with that country’s army can be of mutual benefit—and will contribute to gaining access in
the event of a major crisis.
In terms of overcoming geographic access challenges, the Army is, to a large extent, dependent
on the capabilities of the Air Force and Navy—including the future modernization plans
of those services. Unless a deployment can be accomplished with leased commercial assets,
the Army generally requires Air Force and Navy capabilities. The Army has organic aircraft
(mostly helicopters) and some coastal shipping assets, but they are limited in both capacity and
range. Thus, the Army is heavily reliant on the Navy and Air Force, which have the majority of
the capability required to move the Army. As the Army examines ways of reducing the effect
of geographic challenges to access, the continued prepositioning of Army unit equipment sets
and supplies, both ashore and afloat, should be examined. During the Cold War, this was a
very useful technique to expedite the Army’s deployability. Additionally, it may be possible
to improve access to commercial air- and sealift to help deploy the Army, a move that would
relieve some of the burden on Air Force and Navy aircraft and ships.
In the case of the Air Force, the service’s buy of intercontinental-range transport aircraft
is just about finished. There are a total of 213 C-17 and 79 C-5 transport aircraft in the airlift
fleet.2 The Air Force provides the capability to rapidly transport small Army formations
(roughly one brigade at a time). Importantly, the Air Force can deliver and sustain Army elements
far inland, a great distance from ports. For intratheater air mobility, the Air Force’s
C-130 force is of considerable help to the Army, although it should be noted that the C-130
is not considered a long-range intertheater transport aircraft. As of this writing, there were
428 C-130s of various models in the Air Force.3
The Navy (including the option to lease commercial shipping assets) has the capability
to transport a huge quantity of tonnage. Since the Vietnam War, the norm has been for Army
personnel to fly to an operational area in Air Force transport aircraft or commercial airliners,
but the vast majority of the Army’s equipment and supplies travels by sea. During the Gulf
War, more than 95 percent of all tonnage deployed to the theater went by ship. A single large
medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ship (LMSR) can carry roughly the same amount of tonnage
as all the C-17s and C-5s in the Air Force inventory.4 What the Navy and leased commercial
ships need is usable and protected ports. Some modern ships are so deep that they can use only
a limited number of ports. In other cases, the facilities at ports are so poor that the offloading
of cargo can be significantly delayed.
Overcoming Military Anti-Access Challenges
Military A2 challenges are an area of particular interest to the U.S. armed forces. In that
regard, there are important relationships and interdependencies among the services. These
interdependencies highlight how A2 threats to one service can affect the others. In this section,
we discuss how an evolving military A2 threat might affect each service’s future operations,
with emphasis on threats posed by better-armed opponents and characteristic of the hybrid and
state adversaries—the types of capabilities that were highlighted in Chapter Three.
Since the Goldwater-Nichols legislation of the 1980s, the U.S. military has taken an
increasingly joint approach to operations.5 A joint approach is particularly important to overcoming
A2/AD threats. The following sections describe some of the relationships between the
Army and the other services in terms of managing or eliminating A2/AD challenges.
Anti-Access Challenges to the Air Force
The development of precision ballistic and cruise missiles represents a major threat to U.S. Air
Force operations. With the introduction of ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of well over
1,000 miles and CEPs measured in tens of meters, the nature of the threat to land-based air
operations has changed profoundly. This class of weapon has a high probability of damaging
runways or destroying aircraft on the ground unless the air base is well defended, such as with
hardened aircraft shelters and runway repair equipment.
Against a country like China, which has a large and growing inventory of precision ballistic
and cruise missiles, the Air Force will be forced to (1) operate from greater distances, knowing
that most opponents will have fewer very long-range missiles; (2) disperse its operations to a
larger number of bases, forcing an opponent to expend its missile arsenal against more targets,
each with fewer aircraft than a large base; or (3) to the extent possible, increase the defenses
of each of its bases. In that regard, the defenses against cruise missiles are very different from
those needed to counter the ballistic missile threat. The former is a much easier technical challenge,
and defense strategies tend to be far cheaper than those for ballistic missile threats.
If the Air Force is compelled to operate farther away to minimize the missile threat to its
bases, the arrival location of Army personnel and units will also be farther from the immediate area of operations. This could complicate and slow the initiation of important Army capabilities
in the region. Additionally, the farther away from the operational area that the Air Force
must operate, the lower the sortie rate of its aircraft. For Army forces engaged in a theater, the
amount and timeliness of Air Force support could be adversely affected by the need to base
outside the range of all or most enemy missiles.
How the Army Can Help Enable Air Force Operations
Given the A2/AD threat to Air Force bases, the Army could also have a role in providing protection.
This could come in three forms. First, there could be a need for active missile defenses
at Air Force bases, particularly if those bases are located inland, where the Navy would not be
able to provide protection with its Aegis-armed cruisers and destroyers. Active defense is less of
a challenge against cruise missiles than against ballistic missiles. It is possible to defend against
cruise missiles with an appropriate mix of early warning/surveillance radars, such as Sentinel,
and defensive missiles, point-defense guns, and, perhaps, speed-of-light weapons, such as lasers
or directed-energy systems. We address the Army’s possible role in greater detail later in this
chapter.
Second, if there is a ground threat to forward Air Force bases in the operational area, the
Army might have to provide ground maneuver units in defensive roles, particularly if the host
nation is unable to provide adequate protection. Such threats could consist of commando-type
units or conventional units, such as air assault or airborne forces. The threat could include indirect
fire from artillery or rockets.6
Third, the Army could provide engineering and logistics support. If the Air Force is
forced to operate from dispersed locations, it might need the Army’s assistance to bring fuel,
munitions, and other supplies to those bases, especially if air bases are located inland, away
from ports. The Air Force’s possible dependence on the Army for logistics assistance would be
particularly strong if it were operating from bases where few or no supplies and munitions were
already positioned. Army engineering support could be needed if bases required improvements
or repair due to enemy missile bombardment, especially given the time constraints (and cycle
times for regeneration) that would likely be involved.
The Army’s Role in Suppressing Air Defenses
The proliferation of high-quality air defenses is another significant A2/AD challenge for the
Air Force (and naval aviation). Chapter Three discussed the types of systems that pose a major
challenge to air operations. The long-range systems of the S-300/400 type will inspire caution
on the part of commanders charged with decisionmaking for all types of aircraft; this threat
could force large subsonic, non-stealthy cargo and surveillance platforms to operate far from
the threat or require a major change in tactics (e.g., non-stealthy transport planes would have
to conduct more very-low-altitude operations to avoid radar detection).
The Army can provide capabilities to destroy or suppress enemy air defenses in support of
Air Force and Navy aviation. There is historical precedent for this kind of ground force support
to air forces. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, once Israeli ground forces reached the west
bank of the Suez Canal, they quickly deployed long-range 175-mm self-propelled guns against
their bridgehead. Those guns were used to engage Egyptian SAM batteries, thus reducing the overall air defense threat to Israeli aircraft. Once Israeli ground forces began to rapidly expand
their bridgehead, they overran numerous fixed Egyptian SAM sites and forced mobile SAM
units to flee, lest they also be overrun by Israeli armored units. In the 1991 Gulf War, the Army
Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), equipped with anti-personnel, anti-materiel bomblets,
was used to attack and suppress enemy air defense sites.
Depending on the specifics of a future crisis, the Air Force and Navy could benefit from
such Army capabilities as long-range (up to roughly 300 km) ATACMS Block II artillery fires
(see Figure 4.1) to engage enemy air defenses, as well as the ability of Army ground forces to
overrun or drive off hostile SAMs.7 Army unmanned aerial systems might be useful for target
location and surveillance of hostile air defense systems to alert and guide deep-strike Army or
joint systems toward the target. In light of the longer-range threat systems that are proliferating,
the Army may need even longer-range deep-strike systems. Regardless, these are examples
of the joint interdependencies that could come into play when confronting enemy A2 threats.
Anti-Access Challenges to U.S. Naval Forces
As mentioned in Chapter Three, ASBMs and cruise missiles represent a major threat to U.S.
naval operations. The ASBM threat, in particular, is different from the decades-old anti-ship
cruise missile threat that the Navy has faced since the 1960s. The much longer range of the
ASBM challenge could require U.S. naval forces to operate much farther from an enemy coast
than in the past. In littoral areas, mines, fast-attack craft, and fast suicide craft employing
swarming tactics, along with submarine threats, are all major concerns to U.S. naval forces.
Amphibious operations by the Marine Corps could be seriously affected by these threats. If the Navy cannot develop adequate countermeasures to various littoral threats, its ability to operate
ships close to the coast could be seriously compromised.8
From the Army’s perspective, these A2 capabilities that threaten naval operations could
have several effects. First, should a combination of hostile submarines, ASBMs and long-range
anti-ship cruise missiles, and enemy aircraft force the U.S. Navy to operate farther from the
objective area, by definition, it will be more difficult (if not impossible) to deploy Army forces
by sea. Related to the first concern, even if Army forces can be deployed into the operational
area, perhaps in relatively small numbers, the Navy might not be able to remain sufficiently
close to the Army’s operational area to provide timely and effective fire and air support or to
meet the Army’s logistical needs.
The littoral threats could constrain the arrival of Army (and Marine Corps) forces in the
operational area, whether through sea-based forced entry or an administrative move ashore
from shipping. Shallow-water mines could impose significant threats to Marine Corps amphibious
operations. Even after a forced entry operation has theoretically cleared a portion of enemy
coastline, it is conceivable that the area offshore could be “reseeded” with high-tech naval
mines delivered by enemy submarines or unmanned undersea vehicles. High-speed missilearmed
vessels that can hide in cluttered terrain along a coast or mingle with civilian shipping
can also pose a serious threat to U.S. ships operating in littoral regions.
Army Support to Naval Forces
As was the case with the Air Force, there are situations in which the Navy could benefit from
the Army to overcome or reduce enemy A2 capabilities. When fighting a major opponent that
has a significant offensive missile capability, it is likely that the Navy’s Aegis-armed cruisers
and destroyers will be in high demand to protect the fleet, help shield the other services’ elements
operating in the littoral region, and help defend cities and other economic assets of U.S.
allies in a region.
Today’s Arleigh Burke–class destroyers are armed with 90 vertical-launch system tubes.
Some of those tubes are devoted to offensive strike weapons, such as the Tomahawk Land
Attack Missile, while others are set aside for defensive missiles, such as the Standard Missile 2,
3, and 6. When a destroyer (or Aegis cruiser) needs to reload its missiles, it must retire to a port
and spend a day or more with access to cranes to lift new missiles into the launch tubes; reloading
cannot be done at sea. Because the ship is stationary for the entire reloading cycle, it is
potentially vulnerable. That could cause the Navy to establish rearm locations well outside the
range of enemy missiles. While such a move would help ensure the safety of the ship during
the vulnerable reloading period, it also means that the ship might have to steam many hundreds
of miles outside the operational area to find a safe reloading site. If, on the other hand,
the Army could deploy missile defenses to a closer location—perhaps not completely beyond
the entire enemy missile “threat ring” but outside the range of the most threatening missiles—
the total time that the ship would be unavailable for action could be cut by several days.
In terms of the threat posed by enemy missile-armed littoral surface craft and small fastattack
suicide boats, the Army may be able to assist the Navy by providing unmanned aerial
systems or attack helicopters to help locate and eliminate enemy craft operating in the coastal regions. Depending on how large an area must be patrolled, and the amount of clutter in a
particular coastal region, a considerable number of aerial patrol assets could be required. There
is precedent for the use of Army attack helicopters in such a role. U.S. Army Apaches have
been used to patrol waters of the Arabian Gulf, and as recently as 2011, British Army Apaches
destroyed Libyan coastal patrol boats using Hellfire missiles.9
Finally, there could be situations in which Army watercraft could be a useful supplement
to Navy and Marine Corps shallow-water vessels. For example, if the main ports in a region are
unusable, the ability to use minor ports or over-the-shore logistics could be critical.
Options to Reduce Anti-Access Threats to the Army
There are a variety of A2 threats that could be especially problematic for the Army. Some of
them, such as the development of increasingly long-range air defenses, are also a challenge for
the Air Force and Navy. Others are more specific to the Army. In this section, we provide an
overview some of the most serious threats against which the Army will have to develop counters,
either on its own or in concert with the other services.
Mitigating the Air Defense Threat
Chapter Three highlighted two major classes of air defense threats: medium-high-altitude and
low-altitude. In general terms, the Air Force and naval aviation pay more attention to eliminating
or suppressing the former. The development of modern air-delivered precision munitions
and high-quality intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems have greatly
reduced the need for Air Force and Navy strike aircraft to operate at low altitude; today, they
can achieve great accuracy from above 15,000 ft. Therefore, the Air Force and Navy tend to
focus on the medium-high-altitude threats.
From the Army’s perspective, both classes of air defenses have important implications.
Unless eliminated or suppressed, air defense may render the Army’s premier forcible-entry
capabilities—airborne forces, such as the 82nd Airborne Division—unable to exercise their
core mission. It might be too risky for fighters to operate within the range of these AD assets,
let alone the slower, non-stealthy transport planes (e.g., C-17 or C-130) that are required by
Army airborne forces.
If an opponent has long-range SAMs, such as the S-300/400, the Army will probably
have to conduct airborne operations at much greater distances from the objective than in the
past. While the Air Force and Navy can be expected to devote considerable effort to locating
and suppressing these weapons, there could be a residual threat of a few enemy batteries hiding
with their radars turned off until an appropriate target—such as a large transport aircraft—
appears. If there is even suspicion that such a threat still exists, air planners will probably insist
that the drop zones for Army airborne forces be located as far from the threat as possible. This
was the situation in Kosovo in 1999 during Operation Allied Force, when NATO air commanders
were never sure whether the SA-6s operating inside Kosovo had been eliminated
because of the Serbs’ efforts to hide their air defense assets.10 Given the long range (well over 100 km) of these air defense systems, this could impose significant operational limitations on
Army airborne operations, particularly because today’s airborne infantry units are generally
foot-mobile, as they were in World War II.
What can the Army do to reduce the severity of these threats? In most cases, the actual
suppression of enemy air defenses will likely be the responsibility of either the Air Force
or naval aviation. As mentioned earlier, in some scenarios, the Army can contribute to the
suppression effort with its systems, such as the long-range ATACMS. Additionally, it could
modernize some or all of its airborne units to give them an air-droppable light mechanized/
motorized capability. This would allow some airborne units to drop in much farther from the
worst of the enemy’s air defenses and then move toward objective areas with motorized or light
mechanized units. Of course, increasing the number of vehicles in an airborne unit will require
that more transport aircraft be devoted to the operation. Figure 4.2 shows the Marine Corps’
LAV-25 light armored vehicle, a good example of the type of air-droppable system that could
be useful to Army airborne units.
It is useful to point out that an air-droppable light-armor concept bears some resemblance
to the “air mechanization” and “mounted vertical maneuver” concepts that were closely associated
with the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) program, which was canceled in 2009.
Conceptually, there is some similarity in the sense that early-deploying light armor arriving
by air was a key feature of FCS. In this case, we envision that the kind of enhancement mentioned
here would be implemented in only some of the Army’s airborne units—perhaps only a
single brigade. (There were six airborne infantry brigades as of as of this writing.) In contrast,
the FCS program had much more ambitious goals, targeting as much as one-third of the active
Army.
The key features of this proposed enhancement to today’s airborne forces would be as
follows: (1) it would provide a degree of mounted combat capability to airborne units, allowing
them to land farther from their objectives than today’s generally foot-mobile airborne
units, thus avoid some of the most severe A2 threats; (2) it would utilize the current U.S. Air
Force transport aircraft fleet (in contrast, FCS envisioned acquiring large numbers of verticaltakeoff-
and-landing aircraft for the Army); and (3) it would involve equipping only a portion
of the airborne force with this capability because of the limited number of available Air Force
transport planes.
Another technique the Army could use to help reduce the effect of improved enemy air
defenses is to make greater use of the Joint Precision Air Drop System (JPADS; see Figure 4.3).
JPADS would allow Air Force cargo aircraft to remain well above low-altitude air defenses,
such as anti-aircraft guns and MANPADS, and still deliver equipment and supplies (though
not personnel) from high altitude with great accuracy. JPADS is a GPS-based system that can
deliver loads of up to five tons to within 30–50 m of the designated landing point. (The followon
JPADS-M system will be able to deliver 15–30 tons.) Coupled with the use of light armored
vehicles in some airborne units, JPADS could resupply those units once they start advancing
toward their objectives, as it did in Afghanistan.
The Long-Range Artillery Threat
Today, the Army is limited in its ability to respond to the long-range artillery threat. Its own
Multiple Launch Rocket System and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System are limited to a
range of 84 km. While the ATACMS has a much greater range, quickly transporting a significant
number of these bulky, heavy missiles to a just-seized airfield could be difficult. The 155-mm howitzers organic to airborne units are limited to roughly 30-km range. This apparent
capability gap is an area that the Army should address, both internally and in concert with
the other services.
Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
The A2 threat posed by cruise missiles and UAVs is an area in which technology could serve the
Army well. There are a number of options that the Army could consider to increase its defenses
against this type of threat. In general terms, weapons are either air defense guns and missiles
or directed-energy weapons, such as lasers. During the past decade’s operations in Iraq, a version
of the U.S. Navy’s Close-In Weapons System (see Figure 4.4), a 20-mm rapid-fire gun,
was used to defend bases from rocket attacks. That interim solution represents the kind of gun
system that the Army could further develop. Another, longer-term option would be truck- or
trailer-mounted mobile laser or directed-energy systems that could engage cruise missiles or
UAVs. With all of these defenses, streamlined C2 systems are needed to quickly pass intelligence
to units that are at risk, perform combat identification, assign sensors and weapons,
manage the airspace, and establish rules of engagement. New C2 architectures, such as the
Joint Air-Ground Integration Cell, should shift more of these functions to the ground sectors.
Not only could this capability be valuable to protect Army forces, but it could also be very
useful for the defense of joint assets, such U.S. Air Force bases and the important economic
infrastructure of U.S. allies in a region. As in the example of threats to the airfields that are
seized as part of an airborne operation, if these systems were sufficiently mobile, they could be
quickly deployed to provide defense against rocket or UAV attacks.
Combining Ground Maneuver with Other Joint Capabilities
Many of the A2 threats discussed here have the effect of inhibiting the introduction of ground
forces into an operational area. Threats to Air Force aircraft and Navy ships can delay or prevent
the arrival of Army and Marine Corps ground forces. Threats to air bases can degrade the
amount and timeliness of air support to ground forces. That said, in some scenarios, the introduction
of ground forces could actually help overcome the A2 threat to joint forces.
An example is the case of Iran attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz with a combination
of mines, coastal defense missiles and guns, high-speed attack boats, and aircraft.
Should the Iranians actually try to do this, it is likely that the United States and its allies
would attempt to eliminate those threats with precision-strike munitions, delivered primarily
by aircraft. Should the use of fires alone be insufficient to eliminate the threat to shipping vessels
passing through the strait, introducing an appropriately sized ground force could force the
Iranians to move, and therefore expose, their anti-ship missile launchers and air defense units
operating in the vicinity. The fact that their units would be moving to avoid being destroyed
by ground forces would make them more easily detectable by other elements of the joint force,
and probably much easier to target and destroy. Additionally, the presence of U.S. ground
forces in the area would minimize the likelihood that Iranian forces could deploy replacement
units to reestablish a threat to shipping.
Increased Use of Unmanned Systems
The Army has already made a major commitment in the area of unmanned air and ground
systems. In the past decade, the needs of troops in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan have accelerated
the move toward the increased use of these systems.
Unmanned systems could benefit the Army and the other services as they confront many
of the A2/AD threats discussed in this report. For example, armed unmanned aerial systems
might be of considerable value against both medium-high- and low-altitude enemy air defenses.
The maritime surveillance mission, in which considerable littoral areas require constant surveillance,
could be an ideal mission for long-endurance unmanned systems. Unmanned ground
systems for both ISR and attack could be particularly useful in high-threat areas. Unmanned
ground systems would also have the advantage of providing persistent coverage of an area, perhaps
for days or even weeks.
As the Army considers possible solutions to address the evolving A2/AD threat, greater
use of unmanned systems could be one of the most promising areas for technology solutions.
Just as the Army can be of assistance to the Air Force and Navy in overcoming A2 threats
to their operations, the other services can assist the Army (and Marine Corps) in eliminating
or reducing the severity of AD threats to ground force operations.
In many operations, a large proportion—or even a majority—of airborne ISR systems
will belong to the Air Force and Navy, particularly long-range, high-altitude platforms. As
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated, these long-endurance unmanned systems
can greatly increase the situational awareness of U.S. ground forces. In future operations,
this will probably still be the case, although the degree of the air defense threat will have
important effects on U.S. airborne ISR systems.
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Chapter Five Conclusions
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the global war on terrorism took the services
and their weapon modernization initiatives in a new direction. From 2002 to 2012, the Army
shifted much of its portfolio of capabilities to better address the lower end of the threat spectrum.
Meanwhile, global threats have continued to evolve. As the U.S. military looks toward
the future, it must address the A2/AD challenges that it currently faces and those that are likely
to arise in the coming years. Importantly, the military writ large, and the Army in particular,
will have to cope with a wide range of A2/AD challenges, from low- to high-end capabilities.
The Army’s experience over the past decade should leave it relatively well prepared to
address certain potential A2/AD threats, particularly those that involve insurgency-like operations
and tactics. For example, the Army now has considerable experience with the IED
threat that will probably be a common AD technique used by future opponents. However, the
advancement of threat capabilities at the middle and higher end of the threat spectrum means
that many potential adversaries are a much greater challenge now than they were a decade ago,
particularly in terms of denying U.S. forces access to an operational area. For example, ASBMs
were not recognized as a threat when the U.S. military first became heavily engaged in counterterrorism
and counterinsurgency operations early in the last decade.
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Ironically, the A2 challenge now appears to be exacerbated by the cancellation or postponement
of key capabilities that the Army was in the process of developing as the Cold War
ended. Many of these advanced weapon and modernization programs, designed to defeat a
much larger Soviet Union over the northern plains of Germany, were considered obsolete. And
while the massive adversary force no longer exists, many of its key capabilities have proliferated,
either in exact form or in copy. Examples include high-end, high-altitude air defenses;
MANPADS; high-volume, long-range artillery; advanced tactical weapons (e.g., shaped
charges, explosively formed projectiles); and nuclear weapons. As technology makes its mark,
guidance for missiles (both ballistic and cruise), along with variety of unmanned systems and
other advancements, can be added to the mix.
In the A2/AD environment, perhaps the total force size matters less than force capability,
at least initially. Unlike the Cold War era, in which large numbers of forces were already
prepositioned in theater, in the modern A2/AD scenario, U.S. forces may be outnumbered by a
much greater margin as they attempt to gain and maintain access. When force ratio and capability
disparity are combined with current and continued threat advancement, the challenge
to the joint forces can be substantial. In the scenarios we examined for this study, there was a
high premium on advanced force protection capabilities, particularly for protecting U.S. forces
from an opponent’s A2 capabilities. These capabilities include both defensive systems, such
as the C-RAM (counter–rocket, artillery, and mortar) system, and offensive options, such as long-range fires. Regardless of the means of entry into a theater, force protection is an essential
U.S. capability and will serve as an enabler for force buildup. Thus, establishing a sufficiently
high force ratio and rate of inflow early on—and providing a means to protect that force—can
facilitate access to a theater and help ensure that the area of operations is a location of U.S.
combatant commanders’ choosing.
There are important interdependencies and synergies between the services in terms of
their ability to overcome A2/AD challenges. For example, some threats to the Army’s ability to
deploy to an operational area are addressed primarily by the other services. In most cases, A2/
AD threats require joint solutions.
The Army has capabilities that can be of great value to the Air Force and Navy as they
develop joint solutions to overcoming evolving A2 challenges. Specifically, the Army could provide
considerable assistance to the Air Force and Navy in suppressing or destroying air defenses
that challenge joint air operations. It could also facilitate dispersed operations by the Air Force
to assist the Navy in defeating littoral threats and establishing protected regional enclaves for
naval operations. Army ground-based air defense systems (including today’s PATRIOT and
next-generation systems to protect against UAVs, cruise missiles, and other threats) could be
critically important for the protection of critical joint assets, such as ports and airfields.
As the services work together to develop operational concepts and systems to mitigate A2/
AD challenges, the Army will play a significant role in this effort.
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Anti-Access Measures in Chinese Defense Strategy
ROGER CLIFF
CT-354
Testimony presented before the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission on January 27, 2011
Chairwoman Bartholomew, Chairman Wortzel, Commissioners. Thank you for the opportunity to
testify before the Commission on this topic.
As I have testified before this Commission in the past, China’s military is modernizing rapidly, but
still has a long ways to go before it reaches the level of the U.S. military. According to its 2006
defense white paper, the Chinese military’s goal is to have made “major progress” in its
modernization by 2020 and be capable of winning a high-technology conflict by the middle of the
century.3 They are probably being modest about the rapidity with which they hope to catch up to
the United States, but nonetheless they probably do not expect to be our equals any time before
2020. The challenge for them, therefore, is how to prevail in a conflict with the United States if
one were to occur before then.
The problem of defeating a better-equipped adversary, however, is one that the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) has faced since its establishment in 1927. Chinese military strategists,
therefore, have a long tradition of developing strategies and tactics for defeating a superior
military. What has changed is the type of conflict they expect to be involved in. During the 1920,
1930s, and 1940s, they were fighting wars of survival against the armies of the Kuomintang
government and Japan. During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, they were concerned about a largescale
invasion of China, first from the United States and later from the Soviet Union. By the 1980s
they were no longer concerned about a large-scale invasion, but began writing about the possibility of “local wars under modern conditions” (and indeed fought a limited war with Vietnam
in 1979). After 1991’s Operation Desert Storm they began referring to “local wars under hightechnology
conditions” and, since 2004, have described the type of conflict they are preparing for
as“informationized local wars.”
The term that the Chinese military uses to describe its overall defense strategy is “Active
Defense.” Active Defense is said to feature “defensive operations, self-defense and striking and
getting the better of the enemy only after the enemy has started an attack.”4Active Defense is not
a new term; the Chinese military has described its defense strategy as Active Defense since
1960s. Just as the type of conflict the PLA has prepared for has evolved over time, however, the
specific content of Active Defense has also changed. In 1993 a new set of military-strategic
guidelines(军事战略方针) called “Active Defense for the New Period,” and in 1999 the Chinese
military issued a new set of doctrinal regulations (战役纲要 and 战斗条令) that describe the
Chinese military’s assessment of how its military forces should be employed in the early 21st
century. These doctrinal regulations are classified, so I have not seen them. However, we who
study the PLA are able to acquire official textbooks and reference books that we believe are
based on these regulations and from these textbooks and reference books infer the PLA’s
principles for conducting military operations.
I should note that, while we in the United States frequently refer to China as having an antiaccess
strategy, the Chinese military does not think in those terms. Several of my RAND
colleagues and I did a study of Chinese anti-access measures that was published in 2007 and, at
the time we did the study, we could find no instances of the use of a term equivalent to “ antiaccess”
in Chinese military publications, and the only use I have seen since then has been
references to our book.5 Instead, as suggested above, the focus of Chinese thinking about
military operations has been on the broader problem of how to defeat a militarily superior
adversary. The Chinese term for their approach to this broader challenge is “using inferiority to
defeat superiority” (以劣胜优). Chinese doctrinal writings describe a wide range of actions and
tactics consistent with how a militarily inferior country might defeat a militarily superior country,
however, and many of these are things that we in the United States would regard as anti-access
tactics. Thus, although China cannot be said to have an explicit anti-access strategy, their likely strategy for defeating the United States in the event of a conflict contains virtually all of the
elements of what we would consider to be an anti-access strategy (plus other things as well).
Chinese Strategic Principles with Access Denial Implications
Several strategic principles with implications for why and how China might try to deny a militarily
superior adversary access to the western Pacific can be found in publications of the Chinese
military on strategy and operations.6 The first of these is the importance of avoiding a direct
confrontation with the forces of such an adversary. Direct confrontation with a superior adversary
almost guarantees defeat for the inferior force. Chinese military publications, therefore,
emphasize avoiding direct confrontation with the adversary’s forces and instead seeking points of
weakness and vulnerability. Denying an adversary access to the region is consistent with this
principle as it implies attacking the adversary’s transportation, bases, and other facilities and
systems besides its main combat forces, and preventing the adversary from deploying its combat
forces into the region will in turn enable China to avoid a direct confrontation with the adversary’s
forces.
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The second strategic principle is seizing the initiative early. This contrasts with the protracted war
concept envisioned in the 1960s and 1970s, whereby Chinese military planners intended to allow
the adversary to hold the initiative early and only after the adversary had overextended itself and
worn itself out would the PLA take the initiative from it. The Chinese conception of informationized
local wars, however, is one of rapid-paced, short-duration conflicts. Under such circumstances,
seizing the initiative early on will be critical to the conflict ending on terms favorable to China.
Denying or slowing an adversary’s access to the theater of conflict is consistent with seizing the
initiative early as limiting the amount of forces the adversary has in the theater during the initial
stages of conflict will provide the PLA with a local force ratio that contributes to its ability to seize
and hold the initiative. Seizing the initiative early, moreover, will enable the PLA to conduct the
type of operations needed to limit an adversary’s ability to deploy into the theater.
A third relevant strategic principle, which is closely related to the second, is the value of achieving
military surprise. Surprise is seen as potentially necessary to seizing the initiative from a superior
adversary and as best achieved early on in a conflict, before the adversary has had a chance to
build up its strength. Denying or slowing an adversary’s access to the theater of conflict is thus
consistent with achieving surprise, as doing so will lengthen the period of time before the adversary’s forces in theater have been built up. As will be discussed later, moreover, surprise
can greatly increase the effectiveness of many anti-access actions.
A fourth strategic principle relates closely to the principles of seizing the initiative early and the
value of achieving surprise. This is the principle of preemption, of attacking an adversary while
that adversary is still in the midst of preparing to launch offensive operations against China.
Preemption is seen as an excellent way of seizing the initiative as well as of achieving surprise.
Preemption also strongly supports the concept of employing access-denial measures as, if an
adversary is allowed time to fully build its forces up in theater, the effectiveness of access-denial
measures will be greatly reduced. If, on the other hand, a preemptive attack is launched well
before the adversary is fully prepared for conflict, then anti-access measures can lengthen the
amount of time that the local military advantage preemption provides will last.
A fifth strategic principle with implications for access denial is the principle of conducting “keypoint
strikes” (重点打击). This concept is based on the idea that, rather than attempting to destroy
an adversary’s entire military force, the PLA should try to paralyze the adversary by attacking
critical nodes in its system of systems (a concept that will be quite familiar to Gen Deptula, who
will be testifying later today). These critical nodes include the adversary’s command systems,
information systems, logistic systems, and the linkages between the adversary’s systems.
Attacking an adversary’s logistic systems can obviously affect the adversary’s ability to deploy
into the theater of conflict but, as I will discuss later, attacks on command systems, information
systems, and the linkages between systems can also potentially have the effect of denying an
adversary access to the region.
A sixth strategic principle, which supports many of the other principles described above, is the
principle of “concentrated attack.” This principle states that, rather than husbanding forces for a
protracted conflict and distributing the best capabilities throughout the force, the best capabilities
should be collected together and used for high-intensity attacks on vital targets early on in the
conflict. This principle obviously complements the principle of key-point strikes, but also supports
the ideas of surprise, preemption, and seizing the initiative early. Surprise and preemption will be
most effective if the best forces are used on a large-scale, and the more effective surprise and
preemptive attacks are, the easier it will be to seize the initiative.
A final strategic principle with implications for access denial is the importance of achieving
information superiority. Information superiority is seen as critical to prevailing in a conflict and
preemption and surprise are seen as important to achieving information superiority. And, as I will discuss later, achieving information superiority within the theater of conflict is in turn a key
element of a successful anti-access campaign.
Anti-Access Measures in Chinese Military Doctrine
Beyond the broad strategic principles described above, authoritative Chinese military publications
advocate a variety of specific military operations with potential effects.7 These can be grouped
into attacks on the bases and platforms from which adversary combat aircraft would operate;
attacks on adversary systems and facilities used to transport, supply, and repair and maintain
forces in the theater; and attacks on adversary systems used to collect, process, and disseminate
information for forces in the theater.
“Attacks on the bases and platforms from which adversary combat aircraft would operate” refers
to attacks on enemy air bases and aircraft carriers. Damaging or destroying an enemy’s air bases
and aircraft carriers would prevent the enemy’s combat aircraft from contributing to combat
operations within the theater and thus would be equivalent to denying the aircraft access to the
combat theater, even if aircraft were in the theater on the ground. Successful attacks on air
bases and aircraft carriers, or even the threat of successful attacks, moreover, would likely have
the effect of deterring the deployment of additional aircraft into the theater.
Chinese military publications emphasize the value of attacking enemy air bases, with specific
targets at those air bases including the runways, aircraft parked in the open, command-andcontrol
systems, fuel and ammunition supplies, air crews, and support facilities and personnel.
Successful attacks on most of these targets would render the air base unusable for combat
operations. If only the aircraft were destroyed or the air crews killed then in theory the base would
still be usable if additional aircraft or air crews were flown in, but the success of such attacks
might deter further combat operations from being attempted from the base in question. Means
identified for attacking these targets include ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft armed with
precision-guided munitions, and special operations forces or covert operatives.
Chinese military publications also emphasize the importance of neutralizing enemy aircraft
carriers. Aircraft carriers are seen as powerful offensive weapons but also as having potential
vulnerabilities. They are seen as particularly vulnerable while redeploying, transiting narrow
waterways, when undergoing resupply, and when the weather is bad. Chinese military
publications indicate that considerable effort would be devoted to detecting and tracking enemy aircraft carriers and, when an opportunity arose, the PLA would attempt to overwhelm the
carrier’s defenses with a large-scale attack. Potential means of attack identified include anti-ship
cruise missiles (launched by aircraft, surface ships, or submarines), torpedoes (launched by
submarine), sea mines, and ballistic missiles. Note that such attacks would not need to sink the
aircraft carrier to be effective. Since an aircraft carrier’s purpose is to act as a base for combat
aircraft, it would be sufficient for China’s purposes to just damage the flight deck or otherwise
render the carrier unable to conduct flight operations. Particularly if the conflict is of short duration,
the war could be over before repairs sufficient to return the carrier to combat operations were
complete.
An alternative approach to neutralizing a carrier would be to prevent it from receiving additional
supplies at sea. According to Chinese military publications, an aircraft carrier consumes an
immense amount of supplies. If supply ships were prevented from reaching the aircraft carrier, it
would soon exhaust its stores of aviation fuel and munitions and no longer be able to conduct
combat operations.
A second category of military operations with potential anti-access effects is attacks on
adversary systems and facilities used to transport, supply, and repair and maintain forces in the
theater. Some of these systems and facilities will, of course, be located on air bases, attacks on
which have already been mentioned. These include runways, which are used by transport and
aerial refueling aircraft, not just combat aircraft, fuel and ammunition supplies, and support
facilities and personnel. Other systems and facilities used to transport, supply, and repair and
maintain forces in the theater that are identified in Chinese military publications include the
transport and aerial refueling aircraft themselves; naval troop transports, cargo ships, tankers,
and underway replenishment ships; naval ports and associated facilities; facilities for the storage
and distribution of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies other than those on air bases (which have
already been mentioned); and ground transportation infrastructure and systems including roads,
railways, bridges, ground transport vehicles such as trucks and trains, and fuel pipelines.
Effective attacks on these targets could either prevent an adversary’s forces from deploying into
the theater of conflict, or render them unable to conduct combat operations (e.g., due to a lack of
fuel, ammunition, or spare parts) while in the theater.
Means identified for attacking systems and facilities used to transport, supply, and repair and
maintain forces in the theater include ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft armed with
precision-guided munitions, and special operations forces or covert operatives for fixed facilities,
aircraft on the ground, or ships in port; long-range surface-to-air missiles and aircraft armed with
long-range air-to-air missiles for transport and aerial refueling aircraft while in the air; and anti ship-cruise missiles (launched by aircraft, surface ships, or submarines), torpedoes (launched by
submarine), and sea mines for ships at sea.
A third category of operations with potential anti-access effects advocated by Chinese military
publications is attacks on adversary systems used to collect, process, and disseminate
information for forces in the theater (usually referred to as “command, control, communications,
computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance” or “C4ISR” systems). Although attacks
on such systems would not necessarily prevent forces from deploying into or operating in the
theater of conflict, such attacks could nonetheless have an anti-access effect by interfering with
command, control, and communication or surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities within the
theater to the extent that the adversary commander would prefer to operate his or her forces from
bases farther from the locus of conflict.
Specific targets of this type identified in Chinese military publications include satellites, landbased
and airborne early warning radars, communications infrastructure, command posts, and
computer networks. Means of attack mentioned include jamming, anti-satellite weapons, ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft with long-range air-to-air missiles, stealth aircraft, computer
network operations, and electromagnetic pulse weapons.
Conclusion
As noted at the beginning of my testimony, China does not have an explicit anti-access strategy.
Rather, the strategic principles and force employment concepts that the PLA has developed as
the current embodiment of its “Active Defense” strategy would be better described by U.S. military
analysts as an “asymmetric strategy.” That is, they are ways in which a country with lessadvanced
military capabilities might seek to diminish the advantage enjoyed by a country with
greater military capabilities. These strategic principles and force employment concepts, however,
imply a variety of military actions that have potential anti-access effects.
It is clear, moreover, that these concepts are not just academic musings disconnected from actual
planning and force development in the PLA. Over the past decade and a half the PLA has
systematically acquired many of the capabilities needed to implement these anti-access
concepts. These capabilities include ballistic missiles capable of accurately striking fixed targets
as well as ships at sea, land-attack cruise missiles, long-range strike aircraft, long-range surfaceto-
air missiles, quiet submarines, supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, and, as recently revealed,
stealth aircraft.
Interestingly, many of these systems are capable of attacking targets at approximately similar
ranges from Chinese territory – roughly 1,500 kilometers (about 900 miles) or so. The
conventional land-attack and anti-ship versions of the DF-21 ballistic missile apparently have this
range as does the CJ-10 (formerly known as DH-10) ground-launched cruise missile, and this is
also the reported combat radius of the H-6 and JH-7 naval strike aircraft and Su-27/Su-30/J-11
fighter.8 I would not be surprised if China’s newly revealed stealth fighter, which appears to be a
relatively large aircraft, turns out to have a similar combat radius.
Chinese strategic writings refer to the “first island chain” and “second island chain.” The first
island chain extends from the Kurile Islands, through the main islands of Japan, the Ryukus, the
Philippines, and Borneo. The second island chain extends through the Marianas and Micronesia.
See Figure 1.
As can be seen in Figure 2, the majority of U.S. air and naval bases in the western Pacific region,
as well as the areas in which U.S. carrier strike groups would likely operate in the event of a
conflict with China, fall on or within the first island China and are within 1,500 km of Chinese
territory, meaning that they are potentially subject to attack by Chinese ballistic missiles, cruise
missiles, and strike aircraft. The one exception to this – so far – is the air and naval facilities on
the island of Guam, which falls on the second island chain. Thus, it appears that Chinese
planning force development for the past decade or so has been focused on acquiring capabilities
to prevent U.S. forces from operating from on or within the first island chain. The successful
achievement of that objective would have a major impact on U.S. operations in the western
Pacific because, as can be seen, there is only one location in the western Pacific – Guam –
where there are U.S. air and naval bases outside of the first island chain. Once China has
acquired the capability to deny U.S. forces access to the first island chain moreover, Chinese
military planners will likely shift their focus of attention to the second island chain.
Comparing the military capabilities China has acquired over the past decade or so with the force
employment concepts found in Chinese writings and the locations of U.S. air and naval bases
and operating areas in the western Pacific, one cannot but be impressed by the systematic and
methodical way in which the PLA has gone about acquiring the capabilities needed to
successfully implement those concepts. It is clear that we are dealing with a military that is
focused and serious about finding ways in which to defeat us should a conflict occur. Although
the ongoing conflicts in Southwest Asia will rightly remain the emphasis of U.S. military resources
and planning for the time being, we also need to engage in an effort to acquire the capabilities to counter those that China is acquiring that are at least as focused and systematic as those which
China is engaged in.
Figure 1: First and Second Island Chains
Figure 2: Areas of the Western Pacific Most Vulnerable to Chinese Anti-Access Measures
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