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美国的全球战略
目录
Chapter Two Strategic Considerations: Benefits of Overseas Posture to Contingency Response
Force Types and Implications for Deployment and Presence
En Route Infrastructure and Capabilities
Deployment by Air and Sea
Small-Scale Contingency Deployment Analysis
Direct Operational Support
Chapter Three Strategic Considerations: Benefits of Overseas Posture for Deterrence and Assurance
The Adversary Gets a Vote
Assuring Allies
Implications for Posture
Chapter Two Strategic Considerations: Benefits of Overseas Posture to Contingency Response
An important strategic benefit often attributed to forward military presence is its contribution
to contingency response by enabling military forces to respond quickly to
a wide range of situations and geographic regions. Indeed, U.S. overseas posture has
its roots in contingency responsiveness, particularly where there have been threats of
major wars by strong adversaries, epitomized by positioning large forces in Europe and
Northeast Asia, and this is where attention often first turns when posture changes are
considered. While this role still remains, the nature of threats has evolved considerably,
U.S. combined arms response capabilities have changed dramatically, and partner
capabilities have improved significantly. As a result of these changes, assumptions
about how forward posture should be configured to contribute to responsiveness may
need to evolve.
In warfighting campaigns that involve a large U.S. deployment, the vast majority
of the forces will come from the United States, with joint capabilities and limited
ground forces preventing defeat in the face of any larger attacks. Those forces deploy
to contingencies using a sophisticated network of air and sea bases and fleets of transport
aircraft and ships. These fleets and en route infrastructure, along with at-sea presence,
also enable flexibility to respond rapidly across much of the globe to a broad
range of unpredictable events. Additionally, geographically distributed forward bases
and airfield access buttress response capabilities by enabling air assets to quickly support
widely ranging operations. Forward presence, then, is backed by the full military
capacity of the nation, which largely resides in the United States.
Thus, for contingency responsiveness posture plays several roles, providing:
1. in-place forces enabling response to high-consequence, low-probability major
events, in conjunction with longer reach assets
2. global infrastructure to enable high-volume force flows for major wars and rapid
response to smaller contingencies in unpredictable locations
3. seaborne forces to also respond quickly to globally dispersed, unpredictable,
small-scale contingencies and major events
4. basing access to enable air; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR);
and logistics support from nearby safe havens.
For major threats from highly capable adversaries, forward posture underpins
the ability to prevent initial setbacks or defeat until sufficient reinforcements arrive to
achieve U.S. goals. Large force deployments require large numbers of ships, with delivery
potentially constrained by reception port capacity. If a large force is needed quickly,
it must be in place, as the U.S. stationed large ground forces backed up by high levels of
prepositioned equipment in Germany in the face of the perceived Soviet threat during
the Cold War. But this type of situation no longer dominates overseas presence considerations.
With the changes in threats and U.S. weapon capabilities, the needed posture
capabilities for initial major contingency response has changed. Forward and longrange
offensive strike capabilities from air and maritime forces, air and missile defense
assets, and limited initial ground forces can respond in a few days or even hours to a
contingency. This force can be reinforced by a buildup of ground and more significant
air forces as needed for the situation and mission.
The implication for U.S. posture is that heavy forces needed early in an operation
must either be in place or their heavy equipment must be prepositioned in place
or at sea in the region. Air assets can deploy rapidly as long as there are bases available
with enabling assets ready to receive and support them. Rapid reinforcement by limited
numbers of light ground forces by air and by sea, in the case of deployed marines,
and by maritime forces in the area is also feasible. Large-scale reinforcement will be by
sea from the United States, given the physical characteristics of such forces. Additional
forward force posture, in a region near but not directly in the location of a contingency,
will have a relatively small effect on force closure.
The threat environment and the wide spectrum of security interests of the United
States also require flexibility, so a robust, globally distributed infrastructure, supported
by air and sealift fleets, is critical. This runs counter to positioning large forces in one
or two overseas areas, which would reduce agility of the total force. Heavy forward
presence in a region helps in just one location, while robust lift capability and en route
infrastructure helps in broadly distributed locations in an environment of high uncertainty
as to contingency locations. CONUS-based lift forces and global infrastructure
allow relatively effective deployment response that can draw on the full set of capabilities
of the U.S. military. Such reach and agility would be difficult to achieve through
forward force presence alone with the current size of the U.S. military.
Whether forces also need to be positioned forward to support broadly distributed
contingency operations is less clear. Close or far, heavy forces cannot be deployed
quickly by air. This leaves rapid response to air and lighter ground forces, and to units
in a region with equipment already aboard ships. But even for light ground forces,
given current U.S. airlift fleets, deployment of air-deployable brigade-sized forces can
be almost as quick from the United States as from a forward base. The forward-based air deployment advantage is limited to two sets of conditions: (1) when very small
units, such as special forces or small infantry units (e.g., a battalion or smaller), need to
be deployed in situations where hours can make a difference and (2) situations in which
airlift is constrained, such as when there are multiple ongoing airlift-intensive events.
Forward maritime presence, both from Navy systems and from marines aboard naval
ships, also provides capabilities to respond quickly to contingencies in areas where the
United States does not have a permanent presence, or when the response requires more
than is immediately provided by land-based forces in the area. Air forces can deploy
with support equipment light enough for relatively rapid contingency response from
afar. In addition, air forces do not necessarily have to deploy directly to the point of
conflict. They just have to be within operational range, creating more flexibility and
creating value in having forward bases that have the infrastructure and support equipment
to enable the base to be used for wide-ranging operations, even if the bases do
not continuously host forces.
This chapter explains and provides support for these conclusions and has three
parts: (1) the role of overseas posture in deployment responsiveness for major contingencies,
(2) the role of posture for smaller contingencies, and (3) the role of overseas
posture in providing bases from which direct operational support can be provided.
The deployment of military assets involves consideration of what forces are needed, the
infrastructure-based routes available to those assets, the location of those forces, what
their mission or missions are, where they are to be sent, the availability of transportation
assets, and the interaction among these considerations. This chapter connects
these considerations. It starts with a description of the implications of different types of
forces for deployment. It then turns to the value of en route infrastructure needs, which
also explains several of the factors that affect the deployment analysis that follows. The
initial part of the deployment analysis discusses the breakpoints in terms of time and
force size at which intertheater sealift becomes a better deployment option than airbased
deployment, which is largely what limits the value of forward regional presence
from a deployment standpoint to early deployment of lighter forces, in-place presence,
and prepositioned equipment. This has implications for the conclusions—both with
respect to major wars and smaller-scale contingencies—because it also illustrates why,
beyond the necessary in-place forces, forward ground-force presence within a region
has limited effect on force closure for major operations. The chapter then examines
in more detail how much responsiveness or resource value overseas basing has for the
deployment of rapid response forces. It then concludes with a discussion of how posture
affects direct operational support responsiveness that enables immediate support
from bases from which assets such as fighter aircraft, intratheater airlift for sustainment,
and ISR can operate.
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Force Types and Implications for Deployment and Presence
While posture generally is about where units are stationed, those decisions are influenced
considerably by how those units move and are thus not the driving factor for
USN and sea-based forces. We start with an overview of different unit and asset types
and relevant considerations for deployment responsiveness.
During the Cold War, approximately one-third of the U.S. Army was stationed in
Europe, with an Army headquarters, two corps with four divisions each, two armored
cavalry regiments, a support command, and supporting units in place, augmented by
prepositioned equipment sets for several divisions. In addition, one division and significant
echelon-above-division (EAD) forces, including a support command, were
stationed in Korea. These were both indicative of the recognition that if large forces
were needed to defend quickly against a major threat, they or least their equipment
must be in place. Today, that permanent presence is being reduced to two BCTs and
five enabling brigades in Europe and has been reduced to a division headquarters with
one brigade and a reduced EAD presence in Korea. These reductions came about as the
Cold War threat in Europe ended and as the situation in Korea has changed, especially
regarding improved South Korean capabilities.
The Army today is both much smaller and much more U.S.-based than the Army
of the Cold War era. While it is feasible to deploy light or even medium-weight Army
units by air, many Army units are very heavy and generally require sealift for deployment.
This requires time and usually railroad transport to get to a seaport, days to load
ships, followed by some nine to 16 days at sea to arrive in the area of operations.1 In
such cases, the time for deployment completion for units based in the United States
does not differ greatly from those based abroad—and could be no different depending
upon the coordination of sealift—with prepositioned equipment having an advantage.
For example, Figure 2.1 compares approximate sealift deployment time to Kuwait for
an ABCT from Germany, from the United States, and with using prepositioned equipment
aboard ships located at Diego Garcia.2 This assumes no warning time or order to
begin moving the prepositioned ships early.
Air Force units are generally regarded as self-deploying. That is true with respect
to the aircraft themselves. They are the fastest-deploying assets but must have access to fuel, munitions, and support, such as maintenance and airfield operations, at the
deployment destination. All services receive the bulk of their fuel and ammunition by
sealift, or in some cases from local supplies with respect to fuel, with the Air Force
prepositioning supplies to speed their delivery or have them available at deployed airfields.
Aircraft-support assets must be airlifted or prepositioned, so the units are not
fully self-deployable, albeit much lighter than that of the Army. Once at their destination,
USAF units have the ability, especially with air-to-air refueling, to engage in
combat operations over a wide area. Thus, they may not deploy directly to the location
of conflict, but to a regional safe base within operating range, which can be a distinct
advantage. With the advent of advanced UAVs, aerial presence over areas of interest
can be sustained for extended periods of time with command and control exercised
from the United States, and bombers can strike from U.S. bases, though access to
closer bases increases their productivity.
Figure 2.1 Sealift Deployment Time for an ABCT to Kuwait
Naval assets such as CSGs are self-deploying in time of need. A significant number
of these forces are forward deployed at sea at any given time, or in transit to or from
forward locations, with a small number of ships homeported overseas, enabling rapid
response flexibility. Naval forces also provide the flexibility and situational advantage
of not needing to secure a ground base, with air assets able to range from the sea to a
significant portion of areas of concern. Like air forces, maritime forces do need logistical
support to maintain combat operations for any given period of time, as stocks of
fuel, munitions, and food are expended. Responsiveness from the United States for naval vessels depends upon force structure, transit time, and the state of readiness of
the crew and the ship.
Similarly, MEUs aboard ARGs are self-deploying, and several are often forward
deployed at sea at any given time, or in transit to or from forward locations, with one
MEU forward based.3 Otherwise, the considerations for deploying Marine Corps units
from the United States are similar to those for Army units, with unit size and equipment
composition determining lift requirements and option feasibility and forward
equipment prepositioning enhancing deployability.
The United States has invested heavily in prepositioning materiel so as to have
it immediately available at an anticipated place of conflict, e.g., Korea, or to speed its
delivery to unknown areas of conflict, e.g., the Navy/Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning
Ship program and the Army’s afloat prepositioning program.4 These programs
greatly reduce the time needed to get the bulk of equipment and sustainment
for selected units overseas, but they still rely on airlift to move personnel and some
equipment.
Force Requirements and Deployment Considerations for Major Combat Operations
DoD uses a detailed planning process to develop and approve plans for future military
contingencies. The most detailed of these plans are called operational plans. These
plans are developed to such detail that the specific kinds of military units that will
be used are named and analysis is done to ensure that those forces can be moved and
logistically supported during a conflict according to prescribed timelines. The combatant
commander develops operational plans with help from many supporting organizations
over months and years. These plans require review and approval by the Secretary
of Defense. In presenting an operational plan to the Secretary of Defense, a combatant
commander is certifying that the goals of the plan can be achieved with the forces
provided in the plan. Since access to foreign facilities can take many years to achieve,
these operational plans use current posture agreements as their assumption regarding
posture. Thus, at a minimum, the plan must be feasible given the current basing
arrangements. There may be other, more advantageous basing options, but identifying
those is more a guide to future diplomacy. Thus the deliberate planning process results in a plan that both the Secretary of Defense and the relevant combatant commander
sign as being executable with the current U.S. posture. Substantial posture changes
may require more detailed examinations of operational impact, including evaluation of
changes to contingency plans. While we did not review or critique these plans, we did
analyze the role of posture in deploying forces to both large-scale conflicts and smallerscale
contingencies to inform long-term posture deliberations.
Small changes in forward presence, on the order of a brigade or regiment or two,
do not affect force closure timelines for MCOs. Instead, such decisions are important
with respect to the size of the immediate response force for MCOs considered necessary
to be in place for initial response to prevent defeat or other objectives. In any
MCO with the current posture and force structure, these forward forces will only represent
a small fraction of responding forces. MCO deployments are large and require
extensive deployments by CONUS-based forces. For example, in 1990s Korea-conflict
simulations, RAND used a ground force of five Army divisions, two armored cavalry
regiments, four separate field artillery brigades, three Army combat aviation brigades,
and six Marine Corps brigades or regiments.5 This force is the equivalent of some 23
combat brigades. During the same time period, DoD and Army planning documents
and RAND analysis associated with the Bottom-Up Review posited major conflicts
requiring between 14 and 27 Army brigade equivalents.6 During Operation Desert
Storm, the Army deployed a force equivalent to 23 brigades.7 The invasion of Iraq in
2003 was conducted with approximately 19 brigade equivalents (13 U.S. Army, four
USMC, and 2 British Army).8 The question for defense planners with regard to MCOs
is whether there are enough ground forces and prepositioned equipment in place at
the start of a contingency to hold and prevent defeat, whether there are enough land
and sea-based air assets within operating range at the start of a contingency or soon
thereafter, whether sufficient infrastructure is in place to deploy required reinforcements,
and whether there are sufficient lift assets. With respect to airlift, the latter two
requirements also provide the ability to rapidly deploy small, additional forces required
to ensure a successful initial defense.9
This reinforcement capability and limited insensitivity of large-scale force closure
to having forces regionally based or CONUS-based does rely on adequate sea and airlift,
which come at substantial cost. In 2013 dollars, LMSRs—used for large-scale sea-borne deployments—are estimated as costing about $560 million and C-17s as about
$240 million per aircraft, with annual operating costs of $8–21 million and $14 million,
respectively.10 Without these lift forces, larger in-place forces in key threat areas
might be required. But this is not a simple trade-off of like capabilities (i.e., forwardbased
forces for lift). Without substantial lift, forward-based forces would be somewhat
“stranded” in place, with limited agility. In contrast, the current levels of lift capacity
provide flexibility to deploy large forces to a broad range of locations, where infrastructure
permits.
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En Route Infrastructure and Capabilities
The foundation of the global reach of the U.S. military comes from access to a broad
network of capable en route bases that support evolving needs from changes in the strategic
environment. On a continuing basis, TRANSCOM identifies routes, air bases
and sea ports, and/or multimodal locations to provide desired global capabilities. As
part of this overall plan, the Air Mobility Command (AMC) Global En Route Strategy
calls for a system of mutually supporting routes centered on two regions, Europe/
Eurasia/Middle East and the Pacific, with multiple routes in each region for resiliency
and higher capacity. The en route system, as it stood in 2010 and which was used in the
deployment analysis discussed later, is illustrated in Figure 2.2. While the system has
evolved some since 2010, this gives a sense of its global coverage.11
Figure 2.2 En Route Bases (c. 2010)
Resiliency in the en route system is an important consideration because it helps
mitigate risk to deployment operations. Having alternate bases available helps ensure
that if one base or route becomes unavailable or degraded due to such factors as weather,
political decisions, accidents, airport limitations, or attacks, other options are readily
available. An example is illustrated in Figure 2.3, which shows two alternate routes
from Dover AFB to Kuwait.12 The northern route travels through Royal Air Force (RAF) Station Mildenhall in the UK, while the southern route uses Naval Station
Rota in Spain.13 Both routes have alternate airfields in close proximity (RAF Fairford and Moron Airbase) that can be used should the primary airfield lack the required
throughput capacity due to operational degradation, insufficient infrastructure, or
host-nation operational restrictions. The availability of a second route also mitigates
risk from weather-induced shutdowns. Equally important, having a viable route passing
through bases in another country mitigates the risk posed by a host nation’s decision
to deny access to en route bases. Finally, having multiple routes increases capacity.
Figure 2.4 illustrates this principle in the Pacific region with routes from Travis
AFB to Osan Air Base in South Korea. While the northern route is significantly
shorter, it is more adversely affected by severe winter weather and requires using en
route airfields close to the potential theater of combat. The southern route is longer, but
generally has better weather. In addition, all en route locations on the southern route
are on U.S. territory.
Figure 2.3 An En Route System with Multiple Routes Mitigates Risk
In addition to the formal basing structure, a network of partner-nation facilities
with little or no permanent U.S. presence can support overseas deployment operations
by providing contingency access and logistics support. These facilities are the result of
long-term agreements between the United States and the host nation and are generally
maintained by periodic U.S. military, contractor, or host-nation support. Such
bases can support security cooperation, counternarcotics, special operations forces, and
small-scale military and mobility operations. As they are usually used only episodically,
it is often desirable to have redundant facilities in areas where access is desired
but where host-nation reliability may be uncertain.
For aircraft, limitations at airfields are referred to as “maximum on ground”
(MOG), which is defined in terms of both parking MOG—how many aircraft can
physically be parked at an airfield—and working MOG—how many can be processed
simultaneously (fueled, unloaded, etc.), which depends on the resources available at the
airfield. In this chapter, all further references to MOG refer to working MOG. Besides
pure space and processing resources, MOG can be affected by how much of an airfield
is allocated to the U.S. military, and throughput can be limited by restrictions, such as
operating hours or host-nation limits on landings.14 With sufficient host-nation political
will, establishing en route bases with the required working MOG can be done relatively
rapidly in countries with developed airfields. The critical bottleneck, however, is
often the availability of fuel.
Perhaps the most critical contribution of the en route system to deployment operations
is its role in ensuring adequate fuel supplies. As Figure 2.5 illustrates, strategic
airlift operations can require a large amount of jet fuel during peak periods. The chart shows the amount of fuel consumed at airfields operating at maximum capacity with
a MOG of 1 through 5. The columns represent fuel requirements for one, three, five,
and seven days. A single day’s fuel requirement ranges from 222,000 gallons for a 1
MOG airfield operating at full capacity to 1,110,000 gallons for a 5 MOG airfield. In a
week of continuous maximum capacity operation, operations at a 3 MOG airfield will
consume 4.7 million gallons of fuel. If this fuel cannot be distributed to aircraft or is
not stored at the airfield (or cannot be readily acquired from local sources), operations
will either slow down or cease.
Figure 2.5 Potential En Route Base Strategic Airlift Fuel Availability Requirements
To help ensure adequate fuel supplies, the AMC and TRANSCOM assess the fuel
storage capacity of facilities in their planning. Large U.S. airbases such as Ramstein Air
Base, Elmendorf Air Base, Misawa Air Base, and Andersen AFB have storage capacities
in excess of 9 million gallons, making them critical en route nodes.15 Fuel resupply
capacity is not likely to be a problem in economically advanced countries or along the
more established routes to the Persian Gulf and North East Asia, but it could be problematic
in conducting operations from airfields in less-developed parts of the world
or where large air mobility operations are not usually conducted.16 This leads to value
in having a number of access bases, or even expansible bases in important areas, and
potentially investing in infrastructure at these bases.
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Deployment by Air and Sea
To explain the underlying reasons for the MCO and small-scale contingency deployment
conclusions, this section discusses general air and sea deployment capabilities.
In any future large-scale deployment, as in the past, the United States will depend
on both airlift and sealift to move forces and sustainment from the United States to
the area of operations. In both cases, it is probable that both military and commercial
assets will be used to move both personnel and materiel.17 Initial movement of USAF, Army, USMC, and USN unit cargo will be primarily by AMC aircraft. The workhorses
of AMC for strategic movements are its fleets of 222 C-17s and 54 C-5s. While
some passengers do move with the materiel, generally most personnel are transported
on commercial chartered aircraft or aboard Civil Reserve Air Fleet aircraft.18
Surface movement is provided by Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships, as
well as commercial vessels under programs analogous to Civil Reserve Air Fleet. Of the
115 noncombatant, civilian-crewed ships MSC operates worldwide, the most modern
are the nine LMSRs, which were procured after difficulties encountered in the first
Gulf War demonstrated the need for large, relatively fast vessels. Another category is
the 32 Maritime Prepositioning Program ships, which include ten LMSRs and 12 container
and roll-on/roll-off ships. Once ships used for equipment prepositioning have
been offloaded, they can enter the common user sealift pool.19 The preponderance of
unit cargo in any large deployment operation will be carried by roll-on/roll-off capable
vessels, which are capable of rapid loading and unloading operations and, especially in
the case of the nominally 24-knot LMSRs, relatively fast transits. This fleet of ships is
crucial for large deployments, particularly for MCOs.20
It might seem obvious that deployment by air is faster than by sea, but airlift may
not be faster than sealift, depending upon the amount of materiel to be moved, the
distance, and throughput capacity of facilities. Only for very small unit movements
is air deployment consistently and significantly faster than by sea, and even here an
exception is being within about 1,000 nm. Both modes, though, depend on reception
capacity at ports of debarkation and, in the case of aircraft, the MOG at en route locations.
The MOGs of some of the en route system bases are shown in Table 2.1. Sealift
requires ports with adequate draft, berths with lengths capable of handling large rollon/
roll-off ships, and nearby unit marshaling areas for reception, staging, and onward
movement.
Table 2.1 Representative En Route System MOGs
For airlift, aerial port of debarkation (APOD) MOGs of 2 or 3 are not unusual.
For simplicity, assume two hours are needed to unload a C-17 and launch it again. A
MOG of 2 would then permit 24 aircraft landings to deliver materiel every 24 hours.
Therefore, in ten days, due to MOG restrictions, which could actually result from constraints
at an en route stop due to limited fuel capabilities, for example, airlift could
deliver 240 C-17 loads. Depending upon the unit type and shipload configuration, an
LMSR can deliver between 359 and 513 C-17 loads at once.21 Thus, for any destination
within ten days’ sailing of a seaport, approximately 2,000 nm, a single LMSR could
potentially deliver considerably more materiel than C-17s constrained by a MOG of
2. Of course, airlift has the advantage of delivering a stream of materiel over time,
whereas the LMSR arrives with all the materiel at once.
Port throughput constraints are potentially less restrictive than airfields, when
the ports are in the right place. However, ship transit times can be long: For example,
movement time from Long Beach, California, to Busan, South Korea, is about nine
days.22 And the number of ports capable of handling an LMSR, particularly in lessdeveloped
parts of the world, is limited due to their length and draft.23 For example,
in 2009 TRANSCOM estimated that there were some 22 deep-water ports in Africa
potentially capable of handling the lift ships associated with U.S. afloat prepositioned
squadrons. Of these, 12 are located in just two countries, Egypt and South Africa,
leaving large section of the continent’s coastline inaccessible to fully loaded LMSRs.24
Such limitations could require either multimodal operations or transfer to intratheater
sealift.
What this discussion suggests is that airlift is most appropriate for urgent movement
of relatively light units or other valuable cargo, but that ultimately most unit
cargo must move by sea to its final destination or to where it can be transferred to
ground transport, and for very heavy units sealift is actually faster for complete unit
closure. Figure 2.6 illustrates these relationships.
The x-axis shows the deployment distance, with closure time on the y-axis. The
different colors represent different unit types. There are two transportation modes
shown for the different unit types: a dotted line reflecting the use of 72 C-17s and an
APOD MOG of 2, and a solid line reflecting the use of LMSR ships with port berth
capacity of two ships.25 Starting at the bottom of the graph with the lightest unit, for
the rifle battalion, airlift is much faster than sealift. This is also the only unit size on
the graph that can deploy by air in just a couple of days—whether from a forward base
or from the United States, with substantial airlift in the latter case, although a heavy
combined arms battalion (not shown) could also deploy by air in as few as five days.
For an infantry brigade or above (or the equivalent in C-17 loads), the best case by air
is about 12 days, with sealift from a forward location potentially being somewhat faster
for full unit closure. The airlift advantage erodes significantly for IBCTs and larger
units, although airlift offers much more flexibility in destination. For the ABCT, sea-lift does as well or better than the airlift allocation of 72 C-17s (at lower airlift allocations,
times would be longer than sealift) and is faster for intratheater movement when
APOD MOG is 2 or less. So, generally, the use of airlift for a full or even large part of
an ABCT would be unusual. As unit size or force flow increases above the ABCT or
equivalent, sealift begins to gain increasing advantage and becomes the only reasonable
option. For the heavy division, we show only sealift series since a heavy division would
take about 150 days to close with the use of 72 C-17s.
Figure 2.6 also illustrates the effect of MOG constraints. Where the times remain
the same as distance changes (horizontal portions of series), this shows MOG to be the
constraining factor. In such situations, all of the available aircraft cannot be used. So,
for example, with enough airlift (72 in this case), deployment time for a battalion or a
brigade does not vary with distance of up to 8,400 nm. If, however, the airlift allocation
is relatively limited, it, not MOG, typically become the constraint; in this case, as
the distance increases, so will closure time.
Figure 2.6 Effect of Unit Type/Weight and Lift Variation on Closure Time
For large units, closure time remains relatively long even for short distances from
forward presence, as Figure 2.6 shows. For this reason, this chapter does not show
analysis of how overseas presence affects deployment timelines for the closure of forces
in the conduct of MCOs. That is beyond the scale of deployment that overseas regional
presence can affect when forces are not in place in the location of conflict. Rather,
potential forward unit stationing deployment benefits are limited to initial reinforcements
of small light to medium units or from prepositioned assets to a prepared theater of operation in the event of an MCO or to smaller-scale contingencies, bounding the
analysis that follows. At-sea presence in a region can also provide this type of benefit.
To further illustrate this for heavy forces, consider the deployment of an ABCT
from Ft. Bliss, Texas, to Korea. Moving by sea, an ABCT can arrive in theater after
approximately 18 days.26 By air, this speed can be matched only if a MOG 3 airfield is
available and approximately 75 C-17s are allocated to the mission. In comparison, an
ABCT with equipment prepositioned afloat in the area of Guam can deploy to Korea
in approximately five days, both because it is closer and because the equipment is
already loaded aboard ships, and even faster if timely strategic warning allows the ships
to begin moving before the decision to deploy is made. The unit’s personnel would be
airlifted from the United States to Korea, where they would marry up with the equipment.
This illustrates the value of in-theater prepositioning, especially of heavier forces,
if they might be needed rapidly but some flexibility is desired. The additional flexibility
provided by afloat prepositioned forces is illustrated in Figure 2.7. This map shows the
major regional ports that are within five days’ sailing time of Guam, where prepositioned
equipment ships are stationed, at a speed of 24 knots. Should there be enough
strategic warning to allow these ships to sail prior to making the actual decision to
deploy forces, the closure time could be decreased.
Figure 2.7 Major Ports That Can Be Reached from Guam in Five Days or Less
To further illustrate the value of prepositioning, a Center for Naval Analysis study
of deployment responses from 1990 to 2006 found that ARGs/MEUs were able to
respond to contingencies in less than three days a little more than half the time due to
already being in the area or close by and usually with six days, with some longer times
of up to 12 days when already deployed at sea. Longer times occurred when the ARG/
MEU was in the midst of a force rotation. Of note, though, over half the operations
involved less than 500 personnel going ashore, and three-quarters involved less than
1,000, reflective of small operations that could also be handled by airlift if operations
were inland. The study also noted that, in some cases, the ARG/MEU was moved to a
contingency location, with forces then kept aboard ship for a time before a final decision
to conduct operations was made. This option provides a benefit that can only be
offered by at-sea forces or, to a degree, by equipment prepositioning ships. The key to
this response capability is already having the equipment loaded; being in the area; and,
by definition, already having the lift forces there in the forward location. The study also
concluded that large operations tend to involve deliberate mobilization and deployment
where this type of speed has not been important.27
In short, for major operations the United States relies on (1) a substantial network
of air and sea ports that makes up the en route infrastructure and (2) substantial air
and maritime lift force structure. The location and types of forward combat units do
not in most cases greatly influence the amount of time it takes for the United States
to amass enough force to meet the demands of a major contingency. Initial response
capabilities for these operations have to be primarily provided by forces in place or
already at sea in the area. For smaller contingencies that demand a quick response, the
location of forward forces does not make a substantial impact on deployment time—or
at least enable response on the order of days—except for small units such as battalion
and below or, again, when already at sea in the area.
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Small-Scale Contingency Deployment Analysis
In contrast to the major contingencies, which require generating large numbers of
forces, on the order of a couple dozen brigades, there may be other situations that call
for smaller force packages and rapid response.
Notional Scenarios for Analysis
To test the influence of posture on responsiveness to different, smaller-scale contingencies,
RAND developed 24 small-scale notional deployment scenarios, covering a broad
geographic scope, to assess the effects of U.S. military forward posture on deployment
responsiveness. The scenarios are illustrative and meant to highlight potential significant
differences in responsiveness between overseas and U.S.-based forces. These scenarios
were derived to identify representative ports of embarkation and debarkation
that could be used in the analysis. The scenarios are intended to illustrate the broader
deployment ramifications of forward posture in providing broad global response capabilities.
The scenarios focus on the closure of initial units deemed large enough to be
significant early entry forces for a given mission while still potentially air-deployable.
Accordingly, each scenario assumes the need to deploy a brigade-based ground force
element and several supporting aircraft squadrons to one of four generic crisis categories.
These crisis categories are deterrence, foreign internal defense (FID), peacekeeping
(PKO), and humanitarian relief (HUMRO). Associated with each of these crisis
categories is one of three RAND-developed force packages and necessary deployment
enabler force packages.28 Each scenario consisted of three basic components, which will
be described below: starting and ending airports, deployment routes using the AMC’s
2010 en route system, and a force package (ground and air).29
Figure 2.8 shows the locations of the chosen scenarios, with different colors representing
different types of scenarios (see legend), which drive requirements for different
types of force packages with different lift requirements.30 These locations cover many
of the regions where U.S. forces have operated in recent years, as illustrated by the
USMC deployments since 1990 shown in Figure 2.9.
Figure 2.8 Scenario Locations
Figure 2.9 USMC Deployments Since 1990
For each scenario, a small number of representative ports of embarkation were
used to explore the effects of U.S. military posture on deployment responsiveness.
Generally, existing bases, including preposition sites in Korea and Kuwait, were used,
but a few sites (Australia, the Philippines, Djibouti, Diego Garcia, and Guam) were also included to examine the effects of some plausible basing alternatives (either personnel
or equipment). For each scenario, deployment routes needed to be determined.
Appendix E provides the APODs and aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) used in the
notional scenarios.31 Figure 2.10 shows an example of one set of the route calculations
using two different starting-point APOEs for the same contingency APOD, which
would enable comparison of response times from two different basing locations.32
Figure 2.10 Airlift Route Example—Ground Force Deployments from U.S. Bases to Vietnam
Force Packages
The three generic Army force packages were updated and modified versions from force
packages previously developed by RAND.33 The deterrent task force is built around
a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) and includes air and missile defense units,
an AH-64 battalion, a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System battery, and engineer
and chemical support units. The FID/PKO task force is also built around an SBCT
and includes an aviation task force, field artillery, engineers, military police, and civil
affairs units. The smallest of the task forces, the HUMRO task force, is built around
a maneuver enhancement brigade and includes lift helicopters, an infantry battalion,
military police, engineers, and logistics and medical units. Two additional force packages,
a port-opening package and a theater-opening package, were also developed. The
port-opening package operates the ground force portion of the APOD, and the theateropening
package provides logistic support to the deployed personnel; they have to be used in conjunction with the three mission-oriented force packages.34 A summary of
the deployment requirements for these task forces is provided in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 Army Force Packages
The lift requirements for the USAF squadrons were derived from RAND’s Strategic
Tool for the Analysis of Required Transportation (START) program and are
provided in Table 2.3.35
Table 2.3 Aircraft Force Packages
The scenarios focused on potential U.S. Army and USAF deployment packages
because they tend to be the most resource-intensive requirements and because the U.S.
Army makes up the bulk of U.S. ground forces. However, for comparison, one USN
CSG has roughly the equivalent number of fighters as two USAF fighter squadrons.
The planning factors listed in Table 2.4 show the deployment lift requirements for
potential USMC force package contributions.
Table 2.4 Marine Corps Force Packages
Deployment Modeling Results
For the FID scenarios, we compared results based on assuming sufficient airlift to fill
the air bridge (i.e., more aircraft would not reduce time as the working MOG would
become the binding constraint), reflecting critical situations meriting high airlift allocations.36 This also shows the limits of deployment responsiveness given en route and
destination infrastructure. When this is the case, closure times vary little. For example, given aircraft are in place, the first aircraft arrival and unload time starting at Royal
Australian Air Force Base Tindal in Australia and going to Polonia, Indonesia, a distance
of 2,280 miles, would be approximately 11 hours with no en route stops, and
it would require 21 C-17s to fill the air bridge. From Hickam AFB, Hawaii, at 6,103
miles, it would be approximately 25 hours for first aircraft arrival, including two en
route stops for refueling, and it requires 57 C-17s to fill the air bridge. The time from
first aircraft arrival to force closure will then be the same for both cases, leaving just a
14-hour deployment time difference compared to the overall 16-day timeline. In terms
of a military advantage, a 14-hour time difference is not apt to be significant, except for
very time-critical missions, such as responding to a surprise attack on U.S. personnel
that does not end abruptly to protect or rescue them. This would likely be the purview
of special operations forces or potentially small, light conventional Marine Corps or
Army units, not the type of force packages modeled here. Figure 2.11 shows the relatively
similar times for deployment for the FID force package as distance increases
when the air bridge is kept fully utilized.
Figure 2.11 Closure-Time Difference for FID Scenarios with Fully Utilized Air Bridges
What varies instead of time is the number of aircraft needed to achieve these
response times. Figure 2.12 shows the number of airlift assets needed to achieve the
fastest possible response time (left y-axis) for the FID force package given en route and
destination throughput constraints for the different scenarios considered. The number
grows in a linear fashion with distance (right y-axis) when the lowest working MOG at
the APOD or one of the en route bases is the deployment constraint. Working MOG
at a CONUS APOE or a major overseas strategic mobility hub, such as Ramstein
AFB, is typically not the constraint. The aircraft requirement advantage would be the
potential advantage of forward basing for brigade-sized deployments. Results for the
HUMRO scenarios are similar to the more sortie-intense FID cases, but the aircraft numbers required are naturally smaller, as the task force size is smaller by 225 sorties.
Figure 2.12 Aircraft Required to Minimize Closure Time in Nine FID Scenarios
Additionally, many relief operations have been responded to by USN and USMC
forces. We show the results in Appendix E, where we have included two cases of landlocked
African countries, Mali and Burundi, for this airlift-based comparison.
Today, to support mobility requirements for large operations, DoD maintains a
large airlift fleet. This fleet is also available for smaller contingency operations, depending
upon the level of ongoing operations. This underpins the possibility of using large
numbers of aircraft to deploy from CONUS, as described here, when the situation
demands rapid response by these types of brigade-based force packages.
If this fleet were substantially smaller, then broadly distributed forward stationing
would be needed for strong global contingency responsiveness for smaller-scale contingencies.
37 While this could be posed as a trade-off—forward-basing versus lift fleet
investments—in the near term the lift fleet is a sunk cost. Such a trade-off will become
more meaningful when decisions have to be made to begin replacing the fleet, particularly
the C-17s. But typically, the driving factor has been MCO lift requirements.
Additionally, a robust lift fleet, combined with a broad en route structure, can provide
flexibility that would be difficult to achieve through forward-based ground forces and
a smaller lift fleet. It would either require substantial increases in the geographic spread
and level of forward-based forces or some sacrifice in global response capability.38
An excursion in which MOGs at the destinations in Figure 2.12 were increased to
3 resulted in no improvement in closure times because MOG at one or more en route
stops became the binding constraint, illustrating the need to maintain robust throughput
capacity in the en route mobility infrastructure. The constraint could occur either
on inbound or outbound stops. In this analysis, different en route bases and routes
were used for inbound and outbound aircraft to increase system throughput, which is
one of the reasons to have multiple routes to a region.
Of course, if the situation is important enough, the engagement of senior leaders
can sometimes help lift constraints. An example of this occurred during the 1973 Yom
Kippur War, when the United States mounted an airlift to assist Israel. At the outset,
all normal Military Airlift Command (now AMC) routes to Lod airport in Tel Aviv
were unavailable because NATO allies would not permit overflight rights. However,
Portugal was persuaded to allow stops at Lajes in the Azores. The resupply was carried
out by using the routing CONUS–Lajes–Lod–Lajes–CONUS, thereby remaining
over international water at all times between the Azores and Israel by transiting the
Straits of Gibraltar. Crews were staged at Lajes using rather austere facilities, and fuel
resupply at Lajes was augmented by USN tankers. USAF KC-135 tankers were also
staged at Lajes to support refueling of replacement aircraft for the Israeli Air Force.39
Figure 2.13 shows how much closure time might change with varying levels of
aircraft availability. To build this figure, we examined an FID scenario requiring 702
sorties for the ground force using Hickam–Guam–Polonia for the inbound route and
Singapore–Guam–Hickam for the return route, a distance of 6,181 nm. The x-axis
indicates aircraft available. As aircraft are added, closure time improves up to the point
that the APOD MOG is saturated, about 55 aircraft in this case, at which point the
curve flattens. That is, once there are sufficient aircraft to fill the air bridge with a
working MOG of 2, additional aircraft have no effect on closure time. With more limited
numbers of aircraft, closure time would increase substantially. But note that the
fastest air response is slower than sealift in this case.
Figure 2.13 Increase in Aircraft Reduces Closure Time—Hawaii to Indonesia, FID Scenario (6,000 nm)
Figure 2.14 illustrates the limits on forward presence. For some types of forces,
being based overseas does not improve response time unless they happen to be located
at or very near the place of need. Here we examine deployment of the deterrent task
force ground component, which requires 696 sorties. The three alternative APOEs
are Elmendorf, Hickam, and Tindal, Australia. The first two are current locations of
SBCTs, around which the task force is based, and the third postulates the presence of
a rotational SBCT at Tindal. Currently, there are few, if any, other suitable places to
train an SBCT in the theater or for which near-term basing may be politically feasible.
As the figure illustrates, they are similar distances from Osan, Korea (MOG of 3), and
so require similar numbers of aircraft to fill the air bridge and achieve equal closure
performance. This is a case where having a force forward offers no advantage over the
most forward-based units on U.S. soil due to limited stationing options for the given
unit type. In contrast, Tindal to Indonesia has a significant advantage in the similar sortie FID case. All three locations would be somewhat superior to forces stationed in
CONUS, in terms of aircraft required to achieve the depicted deployment time.
Figure 2.14 In Some Scenarios, There Are No Deployment Advantages to Forward Basing
A second deterrence scenario depicted in Figure 2.15, support to the Republic of
Georgia, shows a case in which forward-deployed forces can provide an advantage in
terms of airlift requirements. All the overseas locations postulated, whether in Europe,
Africa, or Southwest Asia, require a relatively low number of aircraft to minimize
response time, while CONUS locations require many times the number of aircraft for
comparable closure with a MOG of 3 at the APOD.
Figure 2.15 Forward-Deployed Force Deployment Effects in the Georgia Scenario
In summary, for smaller-scale contingencies, very fast, airlift-supported groundforce
response on the order of a few days or less can only be provided for relatively
small forces around the size of a battalion or less. In these cases, forward presence can
only make a difference of a few hours to a dozen plus, depending upon the location,
when substantial airlift is devoted to the mission. This difference is important for a
limited set of missions, such as those that special forces might undertake. Additionally,
forward-deployed seaborne forces already in a region can arrive in this time frame as
well. For larger but still air-deployable forces, such as infantry brigades and possibly up
to Stryker brigades (or portions thereof), there is limited difference in time between
being forward-based and CONUS-based when the situation is critical enough to merit
a high airlift allocation. The potential advantage of being forward from a deployment
perspective is reduced airlift requirements to fully utilize the air bridge to the destination,
given the typical throughput limits of airfields in less developed areas. This would
be important if other events were already constraining airlift or, if in the future, the airlift fleet were smaller. It would also make it less stressing to pursue fast response in
less time-sensitive cases where there might still be some value in the speed.
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Direct Operational Support
Once deployed to the area of a crisis, U.S. fighter/attack aircraft, ISR, and potentially
logistics forces will need regional facilities not directly in the location of operations
from which to operate and provide support. This section describes the considerations
for determining the ability of a set of bases in a posture to support operations in different
regions and for different tasks. It then discusses how these considerations can
be used to compare the effectiveness of different postures to quickly enable the provision
of these types of support for contingencies in different locations. The comparison
approach is based on measures of whether facilities are close enough to a contingency
to provide a base of operations for different types of assets.
Operational Support Considerations
The use of fighter aircraft is most efficient when they can operate within unrefueled
range from their base. This is nominally 700 miles, with variation among aircraft.
They can operate out to approximately 1,500 miles on a sustained basis when aerially refueled,40 with difficulty operating farther, particularly on a sustained basis, based on
pilot endurance limits.
For ISR assets, such as MQ-9s and P-8s, the distance from a base to the location
of interest determines the number of assets needed. For systems that are unable to be
aerially refueled, like the MQ-9, fuel load becomes a limiting factor. For assets such as
the P-8, crew duty limits and the space available inside the aircraft to carry spare crewmembers
becomes a limiting factor.
When the operating area is an austere area, operations must begin quickly, or the
threat conditions are high, support has to be provided from a support base rather than
building up stocks at the point of consumption. Options for delivery could be truck
convoy, intratheater sealift, or intratheater airlift, such as C-130s. At the worst case, the
operation would need a support location within range of C-130s.
Finally, HUMROs could require substantial amounts of supplies to be airlifted
in during the initial response period, either until ships can begin arriving or if the
area does not permit sealift access. In such cases, the ability to reach the area by C-17s
would be valuable.
Assessing the Ability to Provide Operational Support to Contingencies
The military plans for and responds to very diverse missions that occur all over the
world. Given the large number of possible locations and missions that might arise in
the future, how can the suitability and effectiveness of a posture be assessed? To facilitate
an examination of this issue, we chose a mix of representative tasks and associated
platforms that would be important to perform in each of the scenarios described in
this chapter. As described in the earlier considerations section, these should be done
at a base near—but not at—a contingency location. For example, if the contingency
location is in a high-threat location, one would not want to base fighter aircraft there,
but rather at a nearby safe haven.
For each such asset type, we determined distance-based metrics to assess how well
bases in a posture contribute to military operations in the posited scenarios. Then we
used these metrics to assess the feasibility and value of a base to be the source of the
various types of support. First, characteristics of facilities were assessed, to eliminate
installations that could not contribute to support of the given asset. Elimination usually
was associated with a characteristic, such as runway length, that excluded some
types of locations from consideration for hosting a specific type of asset. Of the candidate
facilities that remained, combinations of force structure size, operational feasibility,
and effectiveness measures were applied for each scenario. Feasibility thresholds
were linked to the maximum range of the assets needed to perform the task, or to human factors, such as flight-duration limitations. This further narrowed the list of
possible facilities to those within these maximum ranges. Facilities were then evaluated
in terms of how efficiently a mission could be performed, in terms of the number
of assets required.
Force elements for each scenario received a qualitative score from 1 to 3, based
on varying thresholds of performance. For example, locations that performed the best
on a metric for a given scenario received a score of 3 (meaning that they required the
smallest number of forces or support assets to accomplish the representative mission).
Those locations that performed the worst received a score of 1, while locations that had
intermediate performance received scores of 2.41
Figure 2.16 illustrates the application of this method. It provides an examination
of the number of MQ-9s required to maintain a single 24/7 orbit as the distance from
the originating base increases. In doing so, it shows that beyond 1,000 nm, the number
of MQ-9s needed increases rapidly and ultimately becomes impractical or prohibitive.
The most efficient range, requiring a system of four MQ-9s, is shown in the green
region; the yellow region shows the range in which two systems are required; and the
red shows where more than two systems are required. The line becomes vertical where
it is no longer practical to fly a mission from a base. These thresholds are first-order
approximations, meant to be representative of what a military planner might desire in
terms of distance from a support base to an operation to avoid putting an undue strain
on the force.
Figure 2.16 MQ-9s Required to Sustain One ISR Orbit at Varying Distances
As depicted in Figure 2.17, the current U.S. posture provides locations for efficient
MQ-9 operations covering Europe, the Middle East, Northeast Asia, and parts
of Southeast Asia. The circles show the coverage zone from available bases, including
access-only bases, with the darkness of the circle reflecting the number of overlapping
zones in an area (see legend).
Figure 2.17 Operational ISR Coverage from Current Locations (500 nm)
The full set of metrics developed for use in the assessment of the operations is
shown in Table 2.5, along with the parameters used for the thresholds for the three
rankings for each metric and explanations for the thresholds. These metrics were derived
from prior RAND analysis, AMC planning factors, and discussions with subject-matter
experts. They are meant to provide a first-order approximation of the performance
and efficient use of the system in question to help produce a relative assessment of force
postures with respect to these aspects of operational support.
For each scenario, the best support location was identified for each asset, the distance
measured, and the score determined, as per the process depicted in Figure 2.18.
Table 2.5 Operational Support Assessment Parameters
Figure 2.18 Scenario Rating Process
Implications for Posture
First, we conclude that without a robust en route infrastructure and lift fleet, rapid
global response is not possible. Moreover the en route structure needs to have broad
geographic coverage, with multiple routes to mitigate the large number of risks that en
route bases face. Without a robust en route instructure and lift, rapid response capabilities would be limited to a small number of locations with in-place or nearby forces,
and places with high threats might need substantial increases in forward presence. So
while in one respect, one could think of lift investments and forward unit stationing
as a trade-off, it is not a trade-off of like capabilities, unless one were solely focused on
a couple of contingency locations. Lift and global posture produce a level of flexibility
that would be difficult to achieve through forward unit stationing alone.
Second, forward-stationed forces are most important in two cases: for providing
enough immediate response capability to prevent defeat in high-threat locations and
for the types of missions for which hours or a few days of difference in response time
matters. The first drives the need for in-place forces in high-threat locations—either
ground forces directly in place (or with equipment prepositioned on land), air assets
within operating range, or nearby ground forces with dedicated lift (immediately available
or already at sea) or at-sea prepositioned equipment. The level of such force needed
to prevent defeat until reinforcements arrive is the purview of war planning. It is a
function of such factors as allied nation capabilities, the nature of the threat, and U.S.
capabilities across all warfighting domains. As these factors evolve, so do in-place force
needs. For example, the United States has reduced in-place forces in South Korea over
the past 20 years. Beyond this, there is limited effect on force closure between having
other forces regionally based or CONUS-based.42 Given throughput constraints and
transit times, very large forces cannot be deployed in a matter of days or even a few
weeks. The second case, very-quick-response missions to locations where force is not in
place, centers on very small ground forces, such as special operations units or an infantry
battalion or smaller, and air assets that can operate from regional bases.
For smaller-scale contingencies requiring initial response from force packages
built around light- and medium-weight brigade-sized units, there is limited response
time advantage for regionally based forces compared with those in CONUS. This
rests upon the assumption that when relatively rapid response is truly critical, with
days making a difference, airlift allocation will likely be high. In contrast, heavy brigades
such as ABCTs can often be deployed more quickly by sealift, particularly when
moving prepositioned afloat assets to a port close to the point of operations, since sealift
is faster than airlift for deploying such units. So, if they might be needed quickly,
they do need to be in place or have prepositioned equipment. But this will tend to
be critical for higher-intensity, higher-threat situations more closely related to MCO
planning.
An exception to the limited-advantage conclusion for smaller-scale contingency
deployment is that forward-deployed forces require fewer aircraft to deploy to contingency
locations in the same region. Positioning an overseas garrison a short distance
from a potential deployment location, especially if within unrefueled range of a C-17,
can dramatically reduce the number of aircraft required to execute the movement, freeing
up lift to move other assets to meet up with prepositioned equipment or aviation
units. This could be important if there are critical, time-sensitive operations occurring
in parallel that limit aircraft availability. This would be more important if airlift fleets
are ever reduced, although choices between locations would then also likely have to
made, reducing the overall level of deployment response flexibility.
Available basing also affects the ability to support operations effectively with assets
that typically need to operate from safe havens or must have a more robust support
infrastructure. These include combat aircraft, ISR platforms, and sustainment assets.
This chapter provides rough approximations of the operating ranges for exemplar assets
in these categories and how resource efficiency changes with operating range. This can
be used to assess whether a range of contingencies in different regions can be supported
effectively from different sets of bases.
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Chapter Three Strategic Considerations: Benefits of Overseas Posture for Deterrence and Assurance
This chapter begins by describing the role that the overseas defense posture plays in
deterring potential adversaries. It then discusses how a forward presence might actually
detract from U.S. interests. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the complement
of deterrence: assurance.
The Role of Foreign Posture in Deterring Potential Foes
One of the expected benefits of foreign presence is its contribution to deterrence. A
2004 DoD report to Congress on the global U.S. posture opens with this rationale:
“Together with our overall military force structure, our global defense posture enables
the United States to assure allies, dissuade potential challengers, deter our enemies, and
defeat aggression if necessary.”1 The 2006 Deterrent Operations Joint Operating Concept
provided a more explicit link between foreign posture and deterrent goals. More
recently, the 2010 QDR and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance linked U.S. forward
presence to deterrent goals and to strengthening alliances. The latter stated:
U.S. forces will conduct a sustainable pace of presence operations abroad, including
rotational deployments and bilateral and multilateral training exercises. These
activities reinforce deterrence, help to build the capacity and competence of U.S.,
allied, and partner forces for internal and external defense, strengthen alliance
cohesion, and increase U.S. influence.2
In short, the U.S. global presence is intended to contribute to long-standing strategic
goals of assuring partners and deterring potential adversaries.
Deterrence Ideas and Practice
While much of the conventional deterrent potential of the United States comes from
the perceived dominance of the U.S. military, it is not enough simply to have a powerful
military. The United States must also be seen as willing to use force in the face of
aggression it has tried to deter. Deterrence involves perceptions about military might
but also political will. To deter a specific act of aggression, a country needs both the
capacity and the will to use military force to prevent that aggression from being successful.
Foreign bases and force presence contribute to both of these ingredients of
deterrence. They indicate a willingness of the United States to become involved in conflicts
abroad, and they shape perceptions about the effectiveness of the U.S. military to
project power quickly and sustain it over time.
Fundamentally, deterrence seeks to manipulate the cost-benefit calculations of
another to shape behavior to better advantage. Ultimately, deterrence requires an
appreciation of the values, motivations, beliefs, and fears of an adversary.3 The challenge
of deterrence is to find ways to manipulate behaviors in situations where the stability
of a government regime could be at stake and when colored by the strong fears
and emotions that influence decisions of war.4
The credibility of a deterrent threat rests on the perceived willingness and capacity
of the country to implement it, particularly when trying to protect a third party. Going
to war is both costly and risky. Going to war to help defend another country when you
have not been directly attacked may not always be considered an automatic decision
by the aggressor, degrading deterrence. Deterrent commitments need to be reinforced
through a variety of pronouncements and visible displays of support to establish credibility
and convince others of a willingness to risk lives and suffer losses. Since Vietnam,
the U.S. willingness to sustain losses in a distant theater has often been called
into question, often erroneously, but when trying to deter a future action, perceptions
and expectations factor into these decisions. If ties to a country or region are weak, it is
more likely that adversaries will discount deterrent moves as a bluff.5
The second element of a credible deterrent threat is the ability to carry it out. Can
a state back up its deterrent threat with appropriate military capacity and action? Most
relevant to this calculation is not the overall net assessment of national military power
among the protagonists, but an assessment of the forces likely to be devoted to the
conflict. For instance, during the Vietnam War, the United States kept a substantial fraction of its forces devoted to deterring Soviet aggression in Europe. Furthermore, a
weaker state still may not be deterred, even if the local balance of forces is unfavorable,
if it cares more about winning the conflict and is prepared to take greater losses.
This chapter addresses how the United States can convincingly show its willingness
and capacity to deter aggression of many different potential actors in many different
regions of the world, as well as the role of forward presence in these efforts. In
2006, DoD offered some specifics about how posture might contribute to deterrent
strategy. As the Deterrent Operations Joint Operating Concept asserted:
US capabilities resident in forward-stationed and forward-deployed multi-purpose
combat and expeditionary forces enhance deterrence by improving our ability to
act rapidly around the globe. Forward presence strengthens the role of partners
and expands joint and multinational capabilities. Our presence conveys a credible
message that the United States remains committed to preventing conflict and
demonstrates commitment to the defense of US and allied vital interests.6
Building on this, we can assess whether overseas posture contributes to deterrence
in the following ways:
1. Showing a costly commitment to a country or region
2. Maintaining capabilities to prevent a quick victory
3. Improving capabilities of allies and friends, particularly through security
cooperation
4. Improving understanding of regional dynamics.
Costly Commitments: To the extent that deterrence involves calculations of
military power and intent, the forces deployed abroad demonstrate the investment of
both the United States and the host nation in the security of that region. The costs
of stationing those forces forward are a strong indication of a willingness to become
involved in stabilizing and engaging the region and are more convincing than statements
alone.7 In situations where putting those forces forward puts them at increased
risk, it becomes a clear statement to adversaries and allies alike that, should an attack
be launched against the host, the United States will become immediately involved in
the host nation’s defense. Security treaties, like those the United States has with NATO
allies, Japan, and Korea, can also play a role in emphasizing to both allies and potential
foes the willingness of the United States to tie its security to that of other countries. To
the extent that these treaties contain strong mutual defense clauses, they can contribute
both to deterring potential adversaries and assuring partners.
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Preventing a Quick Victory: Preventing an adversary from achieving a quick
victory, particularly by using military force to change facts on the ground, is important
to deterrence strategy.8 The ability of U.S. forces stationed abroad to respond immediately
or more quickly to a crisis than those based in the United States strengthens
the overall deterrent value of the force. Several examinations of historical crises suggest
that, particularly with authoritarian adversaries, having the means to prevent such
leaders from achieving a quick victory is important.9 Deterring something that has yet
to happen is considered easier than taking action to reverse something that has already
happened.10 Having a capability to quickly meet an act of aggression carries this advantage.
U.S. forces based at the point of friction, or near enough to the point of friction
that they can arrive in time to prevent a quick victory, reduces these temptations.11
Having forces in the region as tensions rise could also be preferable in circumstances
where introducing new forces to a region might be considered destabilizing. The ability
of the United States to reinforce the early deployments with a more sustained and
much larger force through visible global deployment capabilities strengthens the deterrent
value of these early-response capabilities.
Improve Partner Capabilities: In trying to improve our ability to deter attacks
against an ally or friend, the extent to which the partner nation is seen as militarily
competent and able to make a substantial contribution to its own defense is relevant. In
this way, efforts to train and exercise with partners, plan and organize joint commands,
and procure compatible equipment all contribute to enhancing the capabilities of the
host nation and their combined operating ability with U.S. force.12
Understanding Regional Dynamics: The presence of U.S. forces in the region
also provides the time and contacts for the U.S. military to better understand regional
dynamics. This can contribute to deterrence in that devising successful deterrent strategies
requires a nuanced understanding of the values and interests of a potential adversary, as well as those of partners and allies. It is much easier to develop that understanding
through repeated contact with relevant officials in the area. Forward presence
provides more opportunities for such contact and greater depth of understanding of
regional political factors.
Deterrence must be tailored toward a specific threat. The 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance is specific about trying to deter North Korea and terrorist groups (in particular
al-Qa’ida and Hezbollah), but is more cautious about naming other potential
adversaries. Instead, it tends to focus on threatening methods of attack, such as antiaccess
capabilities, in which it names China and Iran; nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons; and even cyber security, in addition to general “aggression.”13 Considering
the global interests of the United States, its forces must be flexible and prepared for a
wide variety of conflicts located in many different environments. Still, looking at some
of the specifics about how U.S. posture might contribute to deterring some of these
identified or implied threats or strategic concerns may be instructive. These different
strategic concerns are addressed in turn below.
U.S. forces based in South Korea are intended to show North Korea that the
United States remains committed and retains the capacity to assist tangibly in the
defense of South Korea.14 This threat could take may forms: invasion, acts of military
coercion, terror attacks from ballistic missiles, or chemical weapons. The South Korean
military has the ability to confront many of these attacks on its own, but the United
States remains prepared to assist. The kinds of capabilities that might be useful are
often specialized, such as missile defense capabilities, expertise in chemical weapons,
and sensors.
The sustained presence of U.S. forces in South Korea has many operational benefits
that in turn augment the deterrent value of both U.S. and South Korean forces.
That sustained presence allows for the development of bilateral military plans, an organizational
structure that can command and control the application of coalition military
power, regular opportunities for coalition training and exercises, and a greater
incentive to consider interoperability in making acquisition decisions. Finally, the U.S.
forces gain in-depth knowledge of the local conditions that could be invaluable in a
contingency. This would include many factors, from geography and weather to political
and cultural organization and values.
The South Korean military has now developed capabilities to deal with many
kinds of North Korean attacks on its own. It has invested in advanced capabilities,
conducts sophisticated training, and constantly maintains a state of high readiness.
For most situations, the presence of the United States demonstrates the U.S. commitment to defending Korea, coupled with the capabilities of the South Korean forces for
immediate defense.
Like North Korea, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is opposed by the United
States. The United States also opposes Iran’s support of Hezbollah and its threats to its
neighbors. A number of U.S. capabilities in the region could be said to be contributing
to deterring Iran. U.S. combat aircraft in the Arabian Peninsula, along with naval
warships and MEU/ARG presence in the Arabian Sea could contribute to deterrence
of a number of regional conflicts, including threats from Iran to use land-based cruise
missiles to close the Strait of Hormuz.
U.S. forces in the region could also be used to try to hinder Iran’s nuclear weapons
program, though the decision to use military force would need to take into account
a variety of competing interests and potential outcomes. Such an action would likely
involve long-range strike platforms, such as bombers or sea-launched cruise missiles.
Some strike missions can be conducted from distant bomber bases, some of which are
in the United States, without assistance from forward presence. Others may require
assistance from forward facilities, particularly if the mission needs support from offboard
sensors. Depending on the air defense characteristics, it may also require fighter
assistance, electronic warfare, combat search and rescue, and tanker support. As the
Defense Strategic Guidance specifically links Iran with an anti-access strategy, the U.S.
presence in close proximity to Iran has to be critically assessed not only for the combat
power it can deliver against Iran, but also for its likely resilience to anti-access actions.
The presence of U.S. forces in the region contributes to deterrence by maintaining an
ability to respond quickly to a number of different potential Iranian provocations and
by demonstrating a willingness of the United States to remain involved in regional
security.
The United States has an extensive relationship with China that is qualitatively
different from those with North Korea and Iran, which are both under trade sanctions.
With ongoing territorial disputes in the South and East China seas, and with the longstanding
impasse over Taiwan’s status, there are many issues to work though. Friction
points have led each side to try to use military capabilities for influence. For instance,
in 1995 and 1996, China sought to influence the behavior of Taiwan by launching
ballistic missiles that landed near Taiwan. The United States responded with warnings
and the deployment of an aircraft carrier to the area. From the U.S. perspective, the
United States sought to deter China from attacking Taiwan through the positioning of
military forces.15 The key capability development that could threaten perceptions about
the U.S. ability to effectively counter some Chinese acts of aggression is the investments China has made in long-range precision weapons, which are explored in more
detail in Chapter Five. Still, there are many reasons for the two sides to avert conflict.
Countering terrorist groups remains an important national security priority.
While initially there was considerable skepticism about the possibility of deterring terrorist
groups, there is a growing body of literature devoted to assessments of influencing
terrorist groups.16 To the extent that it can identify and locate terrorist leadership
and operational cells, the United States will want to maintain capabilities that it can
employ to act on such information to capture and, if necessary, kill those involved.
However, there are other ways to hinder terrorist operations. While individual terrorists
may not be deterrable, terrorist groups must operate like other organizations: They
must raise funds, recruit and train personnel, and design and carry out operations.
These organizational necessities present opportunities to hinder operations and weaken
terrorist organizations.17
Currently, the United States is drawing from forward forces to hinder terrorist
groups in several areas. In addition to the large effort to disrupt terrorist groups
in Pakistan, the United States also has active counterterror initiatives in Yemen and
Somalia. For both, the United States benefits from having access to facilities nearby in
Djibouti.18 UAVs are primary tools for U.S. counterterrorism operations, both as sensors
to locate and monitor terrorist groups and as platforms to launch strikes.
To assert that foreign bases contribute to deterrence is not to imply they are the
only way to achieve deterrent effects. If the United States pulled its combat aircraft out
of range of the Persian Gulf and reduced or stopped its maritime patrols in the region,
the United States might still be able to deter Iran by maintaining both a clear diplomatic
strategy to convince friends and Iran of the continued U.S. interest in the Gulf
and by maintaining an ability to deploy forces to the region; however, that response
would be less prompt because initial forces would not be in place in the region for
immediate action. Some of that delay could be mitigated by prepositioned equipment,
which would allow the United States to fly forces to the region quickly to fall in on
their equipment. Other risks to removing presence from a region where the United
States seeks to deter conflict could come from loss of access to facilities that make
up the en route infrastructure. Follow-on forces could also be slower if the en route
infrastructure were degraded. In fact, they could be very slow if regional partners did
not provide prompt or sufficient access to bases in the area, or if those facilities needed
improvements before they were suitable for U.S. combat operations.19 Furthermore, while a diplomatic strategy may be effective in certain circumstances, in others it will
be necessary to couple it with clear demonstrations of relevant military capabilities.
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The Adversary Gets a Vote
There are ways in which forward presence could detract from U.S. interests. Adding
military capability to a region can be destabilizing. Steps that one side takes to increase
its security by deterring a potential foe may often be viewed by that adversary as threatening
to its own security, particularly when the move strengthens the position of a
world power in another region. As Robert Jervis said, “A world power cannot help but
have the ability to harm many others that is out of proportion to the others’ ability to
harm it.”20 Just as the Soviet Union’s preparations to deploy nuclear weapons to Cuba
in 1962 evoked a crisis, an action that a country initially intends to increase its security
can lead to an unstable situation and evoke a strong counter-action.
Forward forces may be exposed, leaving them more vulnerable to an early attack.
In efforts to prevent a future conflict, states often signal resolve through the deployment
of military forces. There is a danger that, in crafting such signals, a state can lose
sight of the consequences of such deployments if deterrence fails. Exposed forces might
create incentives for adversaries to preemptively strike in hopes of catching U.S. forces
off guard and vulnerable.21 Such inherent risks of forward presence should be integral
to considerations about the size and location of U.S. forces and periodically reassessed
as new threats develop.
In 1941, the United States was surprised by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
but such an attack by a weaker state on a stronger one was not a unique event in history,
and weaker states have often tried to deter stronger states.22 When seeking to
deter another state, the vulnerabilities of one’s own forces cannot be ignored. Sometimes
weaker states attack stronger ones.23 Historically, there are three situations in
which such attacks have occurred: when weak states had high motivations, when
weak states suffered from misperceptions, and when the stronger state had military
vulnerabilities.24
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美国驻日本军事基地
珍珠链战略（String of pearls）
中日再战推演
Not all deterrent threats will work, even when the overall balance of forces is
favorable. In posturing military forces to convey deterrent threats, leaving them vulnerable
to devastating attacks could be quite risky. Douglas MacArthur’s poor defensive
preparations in the Philippines at a time of heightened tensions left the U.S. Pacific
bomber force vulnerable to attack and gave the Japanese an opportunity to destroy a
major retaliatory capability of the U.S. military after the Pearl Harbor attack. This suggests
that U.S. forward presence should be of sufficient size to absorb attack and still
present credible denial of quick victory to the adversary.
A forward posture can also be detrimental to U.S. interests to the extent that it
limits flexibility. The agreements and current practices that allow access for U.S. forces
to a country could, in some cases, actually end up tying down military assets and capabilities
that could better be used elsewhere.25 In fact, this problem was addressed in the
2010 QDR, when part of the DoD posture strategy sought flexibility and continuous
adaptation in the U.S. posture.26 This can be an issue of friction even with some of
the United States’ oldest and closest allies that host U.S. forces, particularly if their
governments or populations oppose the U.S. action in another country. In such situations,
it may be difficult for U.S. forces to operate from allied facilities. Even when the
host country has more neutral feelings about the U.S. action, it may be concerned that
taking U.S. capabilities elsewhere increases its own vulnerabilities.27
Forward-deployed forces provide the United States with many capabilities and
options that could not be achieved if those same forces were stationed permanently
in the United States, but these forces do have limitations. While forward-deployed
forces may provide some measure of deterrence against some major conflicts, the forces
that are forward-deployed are not sufficient of themselves to address conflicts of every
scope. U.S. forward forces can be the leading edge of a U.S. response, but they rely on
augmentation forces from elsewhere.
In many cases, this reliance has become less of a concern because allies have developed
fairly substantial military capabilities in their own right. NATO allies, South
Korea, and to some extent Japan, though it has policy constraints, can meet many
potential threats on their own. In those cases, the U.S. presence is probably more about
the level of commitment shown by the United States. In most areas, given the strong
capabilities of the U.S. military compared with other militaries, potential adversaries
are more likely to question the U.S. commitment, rather than capability. A substantial foreign presence is an important way to show this commitment, but it is not the only way.
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Assuring Allies
The United States seeks not only to deter foes, but also to assure allies and friends
of mutual security commitments. Like deterrence, the concept of assurance gained
prominence in the nuclear age. In particular, the idea originates from a commitment
by one party to extend nuclear guarantees to protect an ally. Today, the reliance on
nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy is diminished, but the dominant capabilities
of conventional U.S. military forces make conventional assurance a relevant concept.
During the Cold War, the United States frequently had to reassure key allies—
despite the Article 5 assurance of the NATO Treaty that an attack against one would
be treated as an attack against all—that, should the Soviet Union threaten them with
nuclear weapons or even with only conventional capabilities, the United States was
prepared to extend the deterrent and retaliatory capabilities of its nuclear force to those
allies. This included taking the step of storing tactical nuclear weapons in Europe,
again both to deter and assure.
Convincing allies of the authenticity of a security commitment may actually be
harder than convincing potential adversaries. As a former British Defense Minister
only somewhat facetiously stated, “It takes only five percent credibility of American
retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five percent credibility to reassure the
Europeans.”28 This was most pertinent to NATO allies, and NATO documents were
explicit about this. Even now, NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept articulates a “supreme
guarantee” of security from alliance nuclear forces, “particularly those of the United
States.”29 Such a policy had a number of benefits for the United States. First, it diminished
incentives for countries to develop their own nuclear deterrent, which coincides
with the nonproliferation goals of the United States. Second, it strengthened the alliance;
the United States could hardly make a more weighty alliance commitment to
bind the security of alliance members. Finally, it countered what otherwise would
have been escalation dominance over allies by the Soviet Union; in any conflict with
a non-nuclear ally, the Soviet Union could threaten nuclear attack, and the ally would
have no ability to counter without nuclear security guarantees from another alliance
member. This bargain worked. The number of NATO nuclear states remained small,
while the alliance, by historical standards, became closer than ever.
These extended nuclear protections were not only for NATO members. The
United States also offered similar guarantees to Japan and Korea.30 These countries
have the economic and technical means to pursue nuclear weapons, but have refrained
from acquiring them, despite North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and the longstanding
nuclear forces in nearby China and Russia. The formal treaties with Japan
and Korea, the presence of U.S. troops, and U.S. policies of extended deterrence all
likely influenced the nuclear weapons policies of these allies.
Today, when the United States announces that assuring allies is part of its strategy,
certainly this historic nuclear assurance is part of what it means; however, the
concept has expanded to include a conventional aspect as well and a specific link to
the U.S. posture. The 2010 QDR states, “The long-term presence of U.S. forces abroad
reassures allies and partners of our commitment to mutual security relationships.” In
the same way that nuclear weapons were offered previously, here the dominance of
U.S. conventional military capabilities are offered to help deter threats to allies and
host nations to meet broader security goals. The United States wants to signal that it
will come to the aid of close allies and nations hosting U.S. bases that are threatened
by a variety of potential attacks. This can be codified in treaty alliances, bilateral agreements,
or sometimes informally.
The 2001 QDR elevated the concept of assuring allies to one of four top security
goals. It stated:
The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of
the U.S. commitment to allies and friends. The U.S. military plays a critical role
in assuring allies and friends that the Nation will honor its obligations and will be
a reliable security partner. Through its willingness to use force in its own defense
and that of others and to advance common goals, the United States demonstrates
its resolve and steadiness of purpose and the credibility of the U.S. military to meet
the Nation’s commitments and responsibilities.31
Assuring friends and allies with conventional capabilities has similarities with
nuclear guarantees but also some key differences. As was the case with extending
nuclear protections, by extending to allies protection through conventional forces, the
United States can also meet its nonproliferation objectives and strengthen its security
alliances. The nature of the threat is very different, though, and that leads to different
needs for the United States and different needs and incentives for host nations.
Aligning Interests
While overlapping interests create the conditions for establishing U.S. presence in a
host nation, overlapping interests do not mean identical interests or imply identical
threat perceptions and goals. There are two reasons why the interests of the United
States may not be congruent with those of alliance partners and host nations. First,
even if they agree on a common enemy, they will not have identical views about that
adversary and how it should be handled. Second, the United States takes a global view
of security interests and commitments in a way that a local partner is unlikely to share.
Understanding and overcoming these different threat perceptions and relationships
with potential adversaries is a key ingredient to the assurance that the United
States seeks to provide. The hosts live in the region, and their strategic outlook is
as much shaped by their history as it is shaped by a range of present-day political,
economic, and human interactions. These factors combine to produce different perceptions
of interests and different cost-benefit calculations, especially when considering
the intentions of neighbors and the threats of war. Allies and host nations may
not simply view their interests as the inverse of their adversaries’ being deterred, and,
because the consequences of conflict are likely to be disproportionately borne by them,
they are likely to be much more cautious.
Another difficulty in aligning interests comes from the fact that the United States
has global interests and tends to utilize assets globally to pursue its interests. While
other countries have global interests too, the geographic scope and scale of U.S. activities
to shape events is unparalleled. In many cases, this means that while the United
States seeks access to a country to pursue global interests, the host nation typically
takes the local perspective of domestic politics and the threats it faces before it agrees
to the continued presence of the U.S. military.
The 2010 QDR, reinforced by the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, links U.S.
posture to the goals of having flexible and adaptive forces and a robust deployment
architecture that allows them to deploy globally.32 This goal stems from a view of the
global threats with which the United States is concerned, as well as the widely distributed
operations in which the U.S. military now commonly engages. A base in Country
A may be used to conduct surveillance of Country B, which might accrue more to the
benefit of Country C than to that of the “host” for U.S. forces, Country A. In most
host countries, spelling this out may prove inconvenient. The fact is that when the
United States conducts military operations today, it does so utilizing capabilities from
its global force. This operational reality probably could be better communicated to host
populations. The Defense Strategic Guidance describes the broad global agenda of the
United States in the following way:
Across the globe we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new
partnerships with a growing number of nations—including those in Africa and
Latin America—whose interests and viewpoints are merging into a common vision
of freedom, stability, and prosperity.33
Aligning interests can help the United States maintain the flexibility that it seeks
from its posture. One potential drawback of a foreign presence is the extent to which it
ties U.S. forces to a particular threat. To use Korea as an example, if the United States
had to operate in Korea today, it would require access and cooperation from Japan,
as was the case during the Korean War. What is different now is that U.S. operations
would need not only the cooperation of Japan but probably also that of several other
countries to utilize fully all the conventional assets it might want to employ to help
defend South Korea. UAV pilots might be located thousands of miles away while they
direct their aircraft over Korea. Similarly, satellite ground stations and intelligence
analysis operations are not in Korea. The forces operating in Korea would rely on a
global logistics network of air bases and seaports.
In seeking flexibility, the United States may have to work to assure host nations.
The host nation may legitimately be concerned that when U.S. forces are taken away
for other operations, it might embolden the adversary they seek to deter. Flexibility is
quite important to the United States to balance its commitments around the world and
maintain the capability to respond dynamically. Assuring allies thus requires an ongoing
dialogue about interests, threat perceptions, and intentions.
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Implications for Posture
Regional forces, particularly those directly in place where the threat is greatest, that
are seen to prevent quick victory by adversaries can contribute to deterrence, as can
missile defense capabilities that prevent coercion by states with substantial missile arsenals.
Forward forces that can provide such capabilities are CSGs, expeditionary strike
groups, light Army units, and various combat and sensor aircraft. In addition, missile
defenses, either land-based or maritime, can provide the capability to parry the coercive
use of long-range missiles. To be able to respond within a number of hours, it is
not enough to be forward, but to be forward in the right region. Of these forces, missile
defenses and Army ground forces need to be located in the affected area. Even deployed
CSGs and expeditionary strike groups may take several days to reach a crisis area if
they are not already close by. In some instances, the presence of U.S. forces becomes
important to emphasize not just the military capability to respond to a threat, but also
the interest and political will to do so. This is very important to assure allies of the U.S.
commitment to their security.
While forward forces often can contribute to deterrence, there is no accurate way
to estimate how much of a forward presence is required to meet deterrent goals. Since
there is significant cost to keeping a forward military presence, careful evaluation of
the necessity of each forward unit is warranted. Much of the deterrent influence of the
U.S. military comes from its ability to generate highly capable forces and deploy and
sustain them anywhere in the world, which relies upon a network of air and sea transportation
hubs described in Chapter Two. As such, when considering the needs for
forward-deployed forces to meet deterrent goals, it should be in the context of maintaining
capabilities to thwart quick victories and to assure allies of U.S. commitments.
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