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Social Policy in Singapore
目录
A Confucian Model? Abstract
Foreword
Social Policy in Singapore: A Confucian Model?
The Singapore Economy: Performance Indicators and the Main Features of State Policies
Public Policies on Educational Financing
Public Policies Governing Singapore’s Health Care System
Public Policies on Social Security and Welfare
Concluding Remarks
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A Confucian Model? Abstract
Social Policy in Singapore: A Confucian Model?
Habibullah Khan
Abstract
According to this paper, Singapore’ success in economic and social development in recent decades has
been due to pragmatic policies and general public acceptance of a limited government role in such areas
as health, social security. Pragmatism has consisted of placing a significant part of the burden of social
welfare on families and individuals rather than on the state while, at the same time, using government
policies to ensure that citizens do take social welfare objectives seriously. The pre-eminent example of
this is Singapore’s social security system which is based on compulsory savings by individuals and firms,
and are managed and invested by the Central Provident Fund (CPF). This provides income security for
retirees in their post-working years without placing an excessive fiscal burden on the state. Similarly, the
health care system is characterized by a pragmatic mix of personal payments, limited national insurance
coverage, and employment-based health care benefits. However, in the sphere of education, government
spending has been substantial in recognition of the fact that Singapore’s economic prospects were tied to
the availability of a highly-skilled workforce. At present, higher education in Singapore remains highly
subsidized and private sector involvement_especially in terms of funding and management_remains low.
World Bank Institute
Copyright 2001
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank
1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A.
First Printing January 2001
家族代代传不见得好。我们还是看开老子当政的情况先。
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Foreword
This paper, entitled Social Policy in Singapore: A Confucian Model? By Professor Habibullah
Khan of National University of Singapore, was prepared for a project on Social Development in
East Asia. The project was organized by the World Bank Institute under the auspices of the
Program for the Study of the Japanese Development Management Experience which is financed
by the Human Resources Development Trust Fund established at the World Bank by the
Government of Japan.
The principal objectives of this Program are to conduct studies on the Japanese and East Asian
development management experience and to disseminate the lessons of this experience to
developing and transition economies. Typically, the experiences of other countries are also
covered in order to ensure that these lessons are placed in the proper context. This comparative
method helps identify factors that influence the effectiveness of specific institutional
mechanisms, governance structures, and policy reforms in different contexts. A related and
equally important objective of the Program is to promote the exchange of ideas among Japanese
and non-Japanese scholars, technical experts and policy makers.
The outputs of the project on Social Development in Asia include seven papers on topics such as
pension systems, health insurance, education, and employment policies which are scheduled to
be published in the WBI Working Paper series. In addition, a set of papers focusing on the social
policy experience of Japan over the past fifty years is being processed separately as a booklength
manuscript.
Farrukh Iqbal, Program Director
World Bank Institute
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Social Policy in Singapore: A Confucian Model?
This document was prepared for publication by the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank under its project
Social development in East Asia. The author wishes to express his gratitude to the participants of the three workshops held in Tokyo, San Francisco, and Cheju in the past year for their comments and suggestions on the earlier versions of this paper.
Singapore was merely a fishing village with an estimated population of 150 when the island was founded as a
British colony by Stamford Raffles in 1819. It attained self-rule in 1959 and political independence in 1965.
Today, the city-state Republic is inhabited by roughly 3 million people, and its economy is characterized by
full employment, high savings and investment rates, a 90 percent home ownership ratio, a healthy balance of
payments and growing foreign exchange reserves, a strong currency, and a low inflation rate. There is little
doubt that Singapore has set an example of how a small country of merely 648 square kilometers can be
transformed into an economically powerful nation within a short span of time. In the World Bank.s
classification, Singapore is listed under .high-income economies. with a per capita gross national product
(GNP) that is higher than that of many developed countries such as Australia, Canada, France, Italy, and the
United Kingdom (see table 1).
A remarkable feature of Singapore.s success story is its simultaneous progress in both economic and social
areas (though the progress in the former is more pronounced than the latter), which can be clearly observed
from the rising trends in virtually all socioeconomic indicators. This result obviously reinforces the earlier
hypothesis of close inter-correlations between social and economic factors regarding development but it does
not show any causal relationship between the two. Although the main thrust of government policies in the past
was to promote growth-enhancing activities such as a large-scale industrialization program implemented in
phases, progress in various social areas such as housing, education, and health was carefully monitored and
nurtured by giving generous subsidies. However, as the policies are mainly motivated by .efficiency. and
.pragmatism,. the long-term objective of the government is to reduce such subsidies so that the problem of
excess demand for social services (resulting in what is known as the .free rider problem.) can be avoided. The
government also has refrained from making any firm commitments to equality and welfare in order to avoid
conflicts with its growth objective, which constituted the foremost and single-minded priority of state action.
Such a development philosophy received strong support from the well-known .Developmental State
model.(Johnson 1982), which is often used to explain the rapid growth in East Asia.s newly industrialized
economies (NIEs).
Table 1. Core Development Indicators for Selected Countries, 1995
How did Singapore achieve a .balanced. development in both social and economic sectors? Most
investigators in the past sought to answer this question from a political economy perspective and their
conclusions tend to highlight the .interventionist. role of the government in pursuing various economic policies
pertaining to industrialization, foreign investment, trade, and so on. While such an approach is useful in
understanding the country.s outstanding economic success, it does not explain how social progress came about. It
is necessary to study the social expenditure policies pursued by the government in order to see how social
indicators improved over the years. Although significant progress has already been made in social indicators
research,1 relatively less attention has focused on the evaluation of social policies pertaining to education, health,
social welfare, and other social issues. As a result, the impact of rising social spending on economic growth is
still an unsettled issue. According to some economists.for example, Ram (1986).government expenditures on
public goods and services play a key role in economic growth as they enhance the productivity of private sector
inputs, harmonize conflicts between private and social interests, and prevent exploitation by foreigners. However,
supply-siders argue that government regulations impose additional costs on firms, and increased taxes associated
with more government spending create inefficiencies and reduce the incentives to work, save, and invest, and
thus hinder economic growth.2 This paper seeks to reexamine the issue by adopting a case-study approach, which
is usually considered more useful for policy purposes, rather than a traditional econometric approach.3 Singapore
offers an interesting case for study since it has achieved unprecedented growth in the past three decades and yet
shown significant progress in key social areas.
Table 1. Core Development Indicators for Selected Countries, 1995
The paper is organized in six sections including this introduction. A brief outline of Singapore.s economy is
presented in the following section, which highlights the country.s impressive socioeconomic performance over
the years using relevant statistics. The government.s overall development philosophy is also briefly discussed in
this section. We turn to educational policies in the third section, which presents key data on public expenditure in
education. This is followed by a section devoted to a discussion on health financing. The section.s central focus is
on the MEDISAVE scheme and its equity and efficiency considerations. The fifth section presents Singapore.s
social security and welfare programs and highlights its unique method of financing social security by using the
mandatory national provident fund mechanism (known as .Central Provident Fund. or CPF). Concluding
remarks are in the final section, which also identifies some .lessons. for other developing countries.
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The Singapore Economy: Performance Indicators and the Main Features of State Policies
Rapid growth in Singapore for the past three decades is viewed by most4 as an .economic miracle.. The size of
the economy in 1996, as measured by real gross domestic product (GDP), was more than 16 times5 that of
1965, the year when Singapore attained political independence. On average, the economy grew by more than 9
percent annually during this period and consistently maintained an upward trend with only two exceptions. In
1975, the economy experienced a slow real growth of only 4 percent owing mainly to oil-price shock. Again in
1985, the economy underwent a short recessionary period and the growth rate fell to minus 1.6 percent for the
first time in Singapore.s history. A number of corrective measures, based on the recommendations of a
powerful economic committee,6 were undertaken immediately and the economy returned to its normal growth
path in less than two years.
Table 1 presents the main development indicators for Singapore and a few other selected countries. It can be
clearly observed that Singapore is far more developed than its Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
counterparts. The striking similarity between Singapore and Hong Kong is also clearly visible from the data.
Although Singapore has outperformed many extremely advanced nations such as Australia, Canada, France, and
the United Kingdom in terms of per capita GNP, it still lags behind these countries in terms of some social
indicators such as literacy rate and the Human Development Index (HDI).7 Singapore is particularly deficient
with regard to educational indicators, which can be seen in its relatively small proportion of the work force with
postsecondary and tertiary education compared with other NIEs and some industrialized countries and in the large
proportion of foreign workers in the top gross monthly income category of employees.8 The government is fully
aware of this problem and the thrust of the present social policy is to concentrate on various educational
investment programs so as to broaden the country.s educational base, and at the same time upgrade the quality of
the existing work force. Given the small size of the population and the declining labor force growth rates, the
government has also further liberalized its immigration policy to ensure the continuing inflow of skilled and
semiskilled labor, which is needed badly for sustaining its rapid growth. With these new measures, it is hoped
that Singapore will soon .catch up. with the West.s advanced nations based on all social indicators including
those reflecting educational performance. Looking at the overall results of table 1, however, one gets the
impression that Singapore has already become a .developed country,. although there is some reluctance on the
part of political leaders to admit this fact owing mainly to the anticipated loss of trade concessions. It is also
generally believed that Singaporeans lack the .social grace. characterizing most developed nations.
Besides rising standards of living, several other features can be discerned from Singapore.s growth
experience. First of all, economic growth has been accompanied by fundamental structural transformation (that is,
the share of manufacturing in the economy rose gradually over the years and in 1996, it was nearly 27 percent of
total GDP). Second, the structure of trade (exports in particular) has changed drastically and Singapore has been
transformed from a predominantly entrepot economy into an industrialized city-state economy. Third, Singapore
has experienced a balance of payments surplus virtually every year since its independence. The obvious
consequence of a positive balance of payments is the accumulation of foreign reserves and a strong currency.
International reserves grew continuously from a meager US$496 million in 1967 to a staggering US$76.8 billion
in 1996.9 In fact, Singapore.s present level of foreign reserves is one of the highest in the world. Finally,
Singapore.s economic development occurred with remarkably low rates of inflation. The annual inflation rate
averaged 3.9 percent during 1985.95,10 and in previous decades it was even below 3 percent in most years.
Relatively lower prices in Singapore resulted in the country.s having one of the highest real GDPs per capita in
the world (in PPP$, as the computation of this index requires purchasing power relationships across countries).
Why was Singapore so successful? According to most observers, the government11 played a crucial role in
the country.s economic development. The government had no ideological commitment to any particular
economic system. Its only concern was the betterment of living for Singaporeans and in order to achieve this
objective, it implemented a host of .pragmatic. policies that involved extensive government intervention in
several areas such as population control, housing, education, medical and health services, compulsory savings,
industrial relations, wage policy, and so on. The economic pragmatism also motivated the government to adopt
an open-door policy not only to foreign investment and technology, but also to foreign managers, engineers,
and technicians.12 The same pragmatism also prompted the government to reject any prestigious project that
had little promise for lucrative returns (for example, steel mills).and in sourcing foreign investment, to prefer
multinational corporations (MNCs) from the United States, Japan, and Western Europe over MNCs from Hong
Kong and Taiwan (China).
The political leaders in Singapore firmly believe in the principle of meritocracy, which dictates the
establishment of systems of reward and advancement at various levels. The perception is that the country.s
progress depends quite heavily on its ability to identify talents and groom them so as to develop their potentials
to the fullest extent. The belief in meritocracy has created a system in which only the .best. in terms of
educational qualifications and training can move up the ranks and into positions of power and responsibility.
An important by-product of meritocracy is the .government knows best. attitude, which is often reflected in
statements made by government officials and political leaders. The meritocratic style has also given rise to
.paternalism,. which characterizes the political leaders in Singapore. The paternalistic approach has led to government intervention in virtually all areas of life (marriage, procreation, education, and so on) as reflected
in the following statement of Lee Kuan Yew:13
I am accused often enough of interfering in the private lives of citizens. If I did not, had I not
done that, we wouldn.t be here today.
What made intervention work so well in Singapore? Effective state intervention to bring about economic as
well as social transformation requires the state to be able to formulate and implement coherent economic and social
policies. The formulation of such policies in turn will depend on the .autonomy of the state. from the dominant
class or various interest groups so that the state can pursue goals that do not reflect the interests of these groups. The
government of Singapore initially faced the risks of being captured by certain interest groups backed by the Chinese
business class, which tried to promote China-oriented economic and social policies. The People.s Action Party
(PAP) government led by Lee Kuan Yew successfully neutralized these interest groups with the help of a carefully
designed combination of control mechanisms and achievement-oriented policies. Consequently a stable political
environment prevailed when Singapore emerged as an independent nation on August 9, 1965. After independence,
the government extended and consolidated its control over trade unions and mass media to enhance .stability,.
another crucial factor in determining the effectiveness of state intervention. Finally, the .efficiency. of Singapore.s
leaders is undoubtedly quite high. They have consistently been demonstrating good economic judgment and making
sound economic policies, which have resulted in unprecedented economic growth. A small group of leaders led by
Lee Kuan Yew14 dominated Singapore.s politics right from the beginning and the distinguishing features of these
men are their personal integrity, honesty, dedication, and a high level of formal education. Corruption, endemic in
most developing countries, is virtually absent in Singapore.
The quality of interventionist policies that are applied to a particular sector (or to the economy as a whole)
depend on four key factors: flexibility, selectivity, coherence, and market-friendliness. Singapore.s policies,
economic or social, are characterized by these factors. .Flexibility,. for example, can be seen in the Republic.s
changing industrial strategies. The first strategy, often called .labor-intensive import-substitution strategy,.
emerged in 1961 when protective measures such as tariffs and quotas were introduced, and it continued until
about 1968. The second, called .export-oriented manufacturing strategy. began during 1968.69 when
Singapore moved largely toward free trade. Import restrictions imposed earlier were withdrawn and exchange
controls eliminated. A new strategy, popularly known as .industrial restructuring,. began in 1979 with policies
for economic and technological upgrading. Flexibility15 in industrial policies is also reflected in gradual shifts
in .priorities. announced by the Economic Development Board (EDB).
Like other successful NIEs, Singapore has adopted policies that have been highly .selective,. favoring
certain industries or sectors in line with broad macroeconomic objectives. Projects are selected after careful
evaluation, implemented with extreme precaution, and the performance of selected projects is continuously
reviewed.16 Another feature of government policies is the high degree of .coherence. among them. There has
always been broad agreement on economic goals, and policies have been coordinated to achieve these goals.
Finally, government policies have been directed toward the promotion17 rather than regulation of private
enterprises, and have been .market-friendly. rather than .market-repressing.. Regarding the market.s role, the
prevailing perception in Singapore is that it can be used more effectively as an instrument of policies and goals
rather than an .invisible hand. mechanism. For example, the government decides on the number of certificates
of entitlement (COEs) for car ownerships to be issued in each month but then uses an auction mechanism to
allocate them. Even the public enterprises are run on a commercial basis. They are expected to be efficient,
turn profits, and expand whenever feasible. The government does not provide them with subsidies or any other
privileges. If they lose money, they are allowed to go bankrupt. It is the stated policy of the government not to
buy failing firms (public or private) just to save jobs.
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Public Policies on Educational Financing
Singapore.s sole resource is its people, so the need for educating the population remains paramount. The
highly achievement-oriented government placed utmost importance on education right from the beginning and
its education policy sought to incorporate all private and public schools into a unified national system of
education through direct state funding or generous grants-in-aid. The rationale for government funding of
education includes both social and economic factors. Building nationhood in a multicultural society requires
the development of a common identity and a sense of belonging. These values could only be inculcated
through the adoption of a uniform school system. With independence, social equity issues also became quite
important. Free primary education followed by secondary education with equal access to all races and religious
groups muted these issues, which could otherwise have lead to polarization, and ultimately, hostilities. The
economic rationale behind the state funding of education was equally strong. The serious problem of
unemployment prevailing during the 1960s and the need for an economic plan that could provide a solid
foundation for the economic takeoff suggested that the country badly required a critical mass of literate and
numerate workers. It was strongly believed that educational investment would enhance economic growth by
raising the productivity of the work force and by providing a cutting edge for technology transfer.
Education has become a major industry in most countries in terms of the number of people involved and
the fiscal resources allocated to it. The share of public expenditure in education varies from country to country,
ranging from a low 2 percent to a high 23 percent (table 2). Education in Singapore received the highest
proportion of public budget in 1995 among all the countries listed in table 2. In fact, all the fast-growing
economies in the region (such as the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand) seem to have invested
heavily in education, while the matured industrialized economies (such as the United States, Canada, and the
United Kingdom) are having difficulties in maintaining the same level of state funding for the educational
sector. Japan was an exception until recently, where roughly 20 percent of the public budget had consistently
been spent on education. It should be noted here, however, that in many developed countries the bulk of
educational spending comes from state or local government sources, and since the data in table 2 reflect the
share of central government expenditures alone, the relative positions of these countries18 may be understated.
Ironically, the distribution of total public expenditure (including various levels of government) among three
selected social sectors cannot be studied as cross-national data on such distributions are not available from any
international source.
Table 2. Share of Central Government Expenditure (percent) in Social Sectors for Selected Countries
Public expenditure on education in Singapore has been rising over the years (tables 3 and 4) owing to
increasing costs as well as enrollments at various levels. The country could afford to spend increasing amounts
for educational development as the economy was growing at a much faster rate. However, the rate of increase in
educational spending was effectively checked so as to ensure that it did not exceed the GDP.s growth.19 This goal
was reached (and surpassed) as can be seen from table 4. In fact, the public expenditure on education as a
percentage of GDP consistently declined in the past decade and it presently hovers around 3 percent. The state.s
share of financial commitment to schooling (both primary and secondary) is quite heavy and almost all operating
costs come from public funds (table 5). The share of .private investment. in education is also quite high and has
been rising over the years. Owing to increasing competition among students and rising awareness in the
community for better performance, private expenses for education (for example, private tuition, better texts and
learning aids, home computers, foreign education, and so on) have gone up significantly. Though precise
estimates of such expenses are not currently available, their overall significance and the rising trends can be
observed from the data for private consumption expenditures on .recreation and education. published by the
Department of Statistics.20 Higher education in Singapore is also heavily subsidized. The average subsidy to
educate a student at the National University of Singapore, for example, was S$21,090 in 1996.21 The long-term
aim of the government is to reduce the subsidy gradually but to ensure that less wealthy students are not denied a
college education; to that end, loans with low interest rates are provided from a revolving fund.
Table 3. Public Expenditure (S$ Million) on Education, Health, and Social Security and Welfare in Singapore
Although government involvement in education is quite high by any standard and is likely to remain so in
the foreseeable future, private initiatives in educational funding as well as management have received renewed
focus in Singapore.s recent educational policy. It is increasingly being felt that high subsidies may lead to the
deterioration of educational standards as both students and teachers tend to become more complacent. The
common perception that private academic institutions inculcate .creativity. by promoting competition while
public institutions tend to produce .stereotypical. graduates owing to highly regulatory environments has also
been reflected in recent policy changes. The introduction of .independent schools. on a selective basis in the
early 1990s is a culmination of such thoughts.22
Table 4. Real GDP Growth
Table 5. Government Subsidies on Education in Singapore
Tertiary education has received more private stimulus in recent years. The University Endowment Fund
(UEF) was officially launched on October 8, 1991 to tap alumni support for the Republic.s two public
universities (the National University of Singapore and Nanyang Technological University). The target was to
raise S$1 billion in five years; to show its support, the government contributed half of the targeted sum,
pledged to match all donations dollar-for-dollar up to S$250 million, and granted tax-exempt status for all
donations. Despite these motivations, the target was not reached and as of June 29, 1996, funds raised by the
two universities stood at only S$81.4 million before government matching. The UEF was then decentralized23
for the sake of efficiency in fund-raising and the two universities started separate campaigns in 1997.
Government support for the Fund saw an additional boost as it agreed to match three dollars for every dollar
donated, to be effective from March 13, 1997. Although individual contributions to the Fund still remain
modest, the creation of the UEF institutionalized the tradition of private giving and reinforced the need for
making tertiary education in Singapore a joint venture enterprise between the government and the people. The
government has also announced its plan to restructure the tertiary education in many ways that include the
introduction of a more broad-based curriculum, new admission criteria, and the promotion of more
collaborative research with the private sector and reputable foreign universities. Singapore.s first private
university, the Singapore University of Management (SUM) is set to begin its operation in 2000.
The economic and social impacts of educational investment are well documented. The real social rate of
return of investment in education in Asia, Latin America, and Africa is found to be higher than the real social
rate of return of investment in physical capital (Psacharopoulos 1985). This is less true in industrial countries
where large investments in human resource development have already been made. Rate-of-return studies
undertaken in Singapore also indicate that returns are more than commensurate with returns from investment in
other sectors (Eng 1996). In brief, it pays for society to invest in education. It is also widely known that the
inequality in income distribution in fast growing Asian NIEs is relatively low compared with that in most
developing countries. According to a World Bank study (World Bank 1993), this is partly because high rates
of investment in primary and secondary education have made basic education universal in all of these Asian
countries and thereby have spread earnings more evenly in the population. A recent study (Rao 1996),
however, after computing Gini ratios for Singapore.s work force by level of education concluded that
educational expansion may not guarantee an eventual reduction in income inequality, even though it greatly
assists in raising living standards and improving the quality of life.
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Public Policies Governing Singapore’s Health Care System
The health care financing system has become one of the most complex systems in developed urban societies
today. Individual countries have developed their own national health systems and methods of financing in
accordance with their predominant social values and priorities. The choice of a particular system is often
complicated by the fact that there is a clear tradeoff between the efficiency and equity objectives of health care.
At the one end is universal public health care service, which seems to maximize the social objective of
equitable distribution but not efficiency (that is, consumer satisfaction). At the other end, a completely
privatized health care system seeks to maximize profits and growth targets but may exacerbate the problem of
inequality by making health services inaccessible to the lower-income group. One system rations health care
according to need while the other is built on the ability-to-pay criterion. It is necessary to create some sort of
balance between the two.
The system in Singapore seeks to strike an ideal balance between equity and efficiency objectives by
financing health care services through a mixture of personal payments, limited insurance coverage, and
employment benefits.which include company plans for workers and their families. The National Health Plan
(NHP), announced by the government in 1983, seeks to provide a health service of the highest quality that is
not only available and accessible to the population but also affordable and paid for largely through private
funds. In addition to promoting individual responsibility for maintaining good health, the Plan aims to build up
financial resources so as to create the means to pay for medical care during an illness. The Medisave Scheme,
introduced in April 1984, was designed to fulfill this aim. Although details on its financing will be discussed
later, it should be mentioned here that the Scheme is based on the principle that healthcare is predominantly a
.private. responsibility and one should always set aside a certain portion of one.s savings for meeting such
needs. Although the government helps in administering the Scheme in many ways, it does not provide funds
for paying someone.s medical or hospitalization bills until all individual as well as group efforts fail to meet
such expenses. It thus overcomes the problem of .moral hazard. that characterizes most other health insurance
systems run by private institutions or government bodies.
While the Medisave scheme represents a major improvement over other tax-based financing schemes in
terms of efficiency, it has certain disadvantages, as pointed out by experts. Phua Kai Hong (1996), for
example, claims that the scheme has encouraged a lot of immediate spending even among younger groups for
more expensive hospital-based services that are commonly perceived to be of a higher quality. There has been
a dramatic shift of demand from government hospitals to restructured and private hospitals and a discernible
upgrading from lower-class to higher-class (in other words, more expensive) beds. There is considerable
ignorance on the part of the public with regard to the limits of Medisave coverage, creating an illusion of more
money being available than what really is. Many also erroneously perceive Medisave funds as frozen assets
that, if unspent, would be retained by the government. All these misgivings have induced many to opt for more
luxurious services than they would have consumed otherwise, Phua argues. Other experts such as Asher
(1994a) have questioned the social .adequacy. of the scheme and recommended supplementary measures. In
view of rising health costs, the government has already accepted the need for supplementing the scheme with
private and public health insurance programs. The Medishield and the Medifund schemes,24 introduced in
recent years, are designed to meet the extra health needs of Singaporeans.
The public expenditure on health care in Singapore is also quite substantial and as a share of total
government expenditure it presently hovers around 6.7 percent (tables 2 and 3). Although the data show an
overall increase in health expenditure in the past decade (table 6), increases are effectively checked and trends
reflect the government.s determination to keep its health budget as low as possible. It is evident that a larger
proportion of health spending is increasingly coming from the private sector, and that the public expenditure
on health as a percentage of GDP shows a downward trend. Hospital services usually account for the bulk of
government expenditure on health; the .restructuring. program (which actually implies the privatization of
certain hospitals), initiated in 1985, aimed to shift the burden of financing expensive health care to the
individual, the family, the employer, and the private sector. It has been observed that admissions into private
and restructured hospitals are rising at a faster rate than those into government hospitals (table 7), which
reflects the citizens. increasing affluence and preferences for better-quality health services.
Table 6. Health Expenditure in Singapore
Table 7. Hospital Admissions in Singapore
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Public Policies on Social Security and Welfare
We want to teach the people that the government is not a rich uncle. You get what you pay for....
We want to disabuse people of the notion that in a good society the rich must pay for the poor. We
want to reduce welfare to the minimum, restrict it only to those who are handicapped or old. To
the others, we offer equal opportunities.... Everybody can be rich if they try hard.
[Mr. Rajaratnam, former Senior Minister, quoted in Vasil (1984)]
Singapore.s policy on social security and welfare is clearly reflected in this frequently cited statement. The
government does not believe in giving unemployment allowances or any other transfer payments, as these
transfers would undermine work incentives. The state should rather concentrate on providing conditions for
full employment and low inflation, which in itself will make it feasible for the vast majority of the population
to fulfill their social security and welfare obligations. An obvious implication of this policy.which views
social security as an individual or family responsibility.is that public expenditure on social security and
welfare in Singapore is very small compared with other high-income economies (tables 2 and 3). How long the
government can keep these expenditures at such a low level, particularly in view of the changing demographic
circumstances, remains to be seen.
The Central Provident Fund (CPF),25 introduced by the British colonial administration in 1955, is the main
instrument of social security in Singapore. The scheme was revised gradually after independence so as to allow
members to use their savings for a variety of purposes (table 8). It is presently characterized by the following
features:
Table 8. The Various Schemes under the CPF System
First, participation is compulsory26 for employers and employees. The major categories not covered by the
scheme include casual and part-time workers, certain categories of contract workers, and foreign workers
earning below a certain wage. The self-employed are compulsorily covered under the Medisave scheme only
and they can make voluntary contributions to the CPF. It is evident from the data presented in table 9 that
roughly two-thirds27 of the total labor force is presently being covered by the CPF scheme.
Table 9. Selected Indicators Pertaining to Singapore.s Central Provident Fund (CPF)
Second, the scheme is financed through mandatory contributions from employers and employees. At the
time of its inception in 1955, the rate was 10 percent of net wages, with a maximum of S$50 per month. As
new schemes were introduced, the rate increased steadily and reached a high of 50 percent of one.s net wage in
July 1984. In April 1986, the rate was reduced to 35 percent to align it with Singapore.s cost-competitiveness,
which had largely eroded in the mid-1980s, leading to a recession during 1985.86. As the economy recovered,
the government started revising the rate upward and since July 1994 the rate has been fixed at 40 percent (split
equally between employer and employee) with a maximum joint contribution of $2,400 per month. The
government has announced that the CPF contribution rate is going to stay at the present level over the long term .The contribution rates are different for older workers (for example, 20 percent for those aged 55.60, 15
percent for workers between 60.65, and 10 percent for those over 65); this was done to reduce the cost of
hiring the elderly, resulting in increasing demand for such workers.28
Third, contributions by both employers and employees, interest credited to members. accounts, any capital
gains earned on approved property, shares and commodity investments, and withdrawals at age 55 are all
exempt from income tax. Fourth, a CPF member maintains Ordinary, Medisave, and Special Accounts. When
one joins the Minimum Sum Scheme (MSS) at age 55, he or she also has a Retirement Account. Under the
MSS, an individual must keep a minimum amount of $45,000 (as of July 1996), of which at least $8,000 must
be in cash, the rest being tied to property. This will be gradually increased to $80,000, of which at least
$40,000 must be in cash, by July 2003. This is to ensure a steady flow of cash income to retirees. The
minimum sum must be left with the CPF Board or an approved bank, or used to purchase a lifetime annuity
from an approved insurance company.29 Of the total CPF contribution of 40 percent, 30 percent is credited to
the Ordinary Account, which can be used for housing, approved investments, CPF insurance, tertiary
education, and topping-up of parents. Retirement Accounts. The Medisave Account (6 percent of total
contribution) can be used for approved hospitalization expenses. Since July 1, 1993, the Medisave contribution
rate for members aged 45 and over has been set at 8 percent. At age 55, in addition to the Minimum Sum,
members who wish to withdraw their savings are required to set aside up to $14,000 in their Medisave
Accounts to meet healthcare needs during retirement. Savings in the Special Account (4 percent of total
contribution) is also meant for old age and contingencies.
Finally, the CPF system is characterized by a wide range of schemes (see table 8) introduced by the
government from time to time to attain different objectives. Although the system was originally designed
to fulfill the purely economic criterion of generating sufficient savings30 for the future, it has subsequently
been used for various social purposes such as creating a sense of belonging and nationhood by
encouraging home ownership (through approved housing and residential property schemes) and by
investing in public limited companies (through approved investment schemes). The Approved Housing
Scheme was set up in 1968 to allow members to use their CPF savings for buying public flats built by the
Housing and Development Board (HDB). In 1981, the government allowed CPF balances to be used to
purchase private residential properties and in 1986, nonresidential properties. Recently the government
also started the program of upgrading older public housing estates on a cost-sharing basis, with 25 percent
borne by homeowners and the remaining 75 percent by the government. This is a part of the government.s
asset enhancement program, which has been highly successful in raising people.s confidence on the PAP
government and its policy of redistributing wealth. Withdrawals from the CPF by members have clearly
been dominated by housing schemes, accounting for between 32 and 67 percent of all withdrawals during
1990.96 (table 9). The Approved Investment Scheme31 was introduced in 1986,under which a proportion
of balances (initially 40 percent and later raised to 80 percent) was allowed to be invested in approved
stocks (the ones traded in the Singapore Stock Exchange), unit trusts, convertible loan stocks, and gold.
The scheme has been gradually liberalized, resulting in a wider choice of investments (including foreign shares and bonds listed locally and in the stock exchanges of Hong Kong, Malaysia, Korea, Thailand, and
Taiwan) for CPF members. Another investment scheme is the Share-Ownership Top-Up Scheme
(SOTUS), under which the government provides small grants of about $200 to $300 to CPF members to
enable them to purchase shares of state enterprises being divested. Withdrawals for investments and other
purposes have fluctuated over the years (reflecting an overall upward trend) and in 1993, 55 percent of
total withdrawals were accounted for by these purposes (owing mainly to the offer of Telecom shares).
In addition to the above-mentioned investment schemes, three types of insurance schemes are
included in the CPF system. First there is the Home Protection Insurance Scheme (HPIS), which is
compulsory and aims to provide mortgage-reducing insurance for members purchasing public flats by
using their CPF savings. Second, the Dependents. Protection Scheme (DPS) is a term-life insurance that
covers members against permanent incapacity or death before age 60. The scheme pays $36,000 to the
insured member or his or her family to help them tide over the initial difficulties if the breadwinner is
permanently disabled or dies suddenly. The DPS is optional and about 80 percent of the eligible
contributors have enrolled in it. Third is the Medishield Scheme, which is the national catastrophic illness
insurance scheme providing members and their dependents with financial protection against high medical
expenses arising from serious illness. It covers only those opting for it up to age 75 (85 percent of eligible
members participated in in 1996) and the yearly premiums are between $12 and $240 depending on one.s
age. The annual deductible is S$1,000 for members staying in class B2 wards and above, and S$500 for
class C wards. Another insurance scheme, Medishield Plus, was introduced on July 1, 1994. The rates are
much higher (between S$60 and $1200 for plan A and between $36 and $720 for plan B) for this scheme
but it also provides larger benefits.
Asher (1993: 153.67, 1994a, 1996) has thoroughly examined the CPF system and claims that it
suffers from several limitations. First, it does not cover the entire labor force and at least a proportion of
those not covered by the scheme will have inadequate funds for retirement. Since August 1, 1995, all
foreign workers including professionals whose monthly salary exceeds S$2,000 are ineligible for
participation in the CPF scheme. As a result, their tax liabilities have increased, leading to a substantial
cut in their take-home pay. In view of Singapore.s dependence on foreign labor (currently foreign
employees number around 300,000, which is one-fifth of the total work force), particularly engineers,
technicians, and other professionals,32 this measure is somewhat disturbing. Second, it does not provide
automatic protection against inflation, and any significant inflation or currency depreciation could
adversely affect the real value of CPF balances. The available evidence, however, indicates that for most
of the years between 1961 and 1996 the real rate of return33 has been positive. Moreover, for those
purchasing property or participating in investment schemes, the real rate of return is likely to be
substantially higher than one based on CPF balances. Third, the CPF system provides extremely limited
opportunities for members to share in Singapore.s economic growth once a member has ceased to
participate in the labor market. This is inherent in any provident fund system because the accumulated
savings received at the time of withdrawal reflect the past performance of the economy and past behavior
of wages. The length of a member.s retirement life could approach that of his or her working years, and
unlike social insurance, the provident fund mechanism cannot automatically adjust for differing life spans
of individuals. Fourth, the CPF does not provide members with adequate retirement income. The average
cash balance of members aged 55 years and over in 1996, for example, was only about S$8,000 (table 10), which is grossly inadequate for covering retirement needs.34 One should remember at this point that the
basic purpose of the CPF is to ensure a modest living (for example, food, shelter, clothing, and health care
services for later years) for its members after retirement and it is likely that members will have to accept a
drop in living standards when they stop working. However, if members invest their savings wisely (in
property, stocks, education for their children, and so on) and plan for retirement well ahead of time, they
may be able to maintain or even enhance their living standards. The Household Expenditure Surveys,
conducted by the Republic.s Department of Statistics, show that living standards in general (including the
living conditions of senior citizens) have been improving over the years. Finally, the transparency of the
CPF system has been significantly reduced owing to its extensive coverage and to the lack of information
about the ultimate deployment of and returns obtained on members. balances.
Table 10. Distribution of CPF Balances by Age Group in Singapore
Despite the above-mentioned limitations, the CPF system has made enormous contributions to
Singapore.s socioeconomic development. It has certainly minimized the explicit budgetary expenditure on
social security, though hidden tax expenditures remain owing to its tax-exempt nature.36 The public
assistance schemes are extremely limited in scope (table 11) and they are strictly administered.37 They are
not intended as unemployment, retirement, or disability support. The recipients are categorized as
follows: (a) the aged destitute; (b) the disabled, the mentally ill, and the chronically sick who are unfit for
work; (c) widows or deserted wives with children under 12 years of age; and (d) orphans. The current
public assistance rates (table 12) are below the Minimum Household Expenditure (MHE) covering only
basic items calculated by the Republic.s Chief Statistician. The government also runs some welfare
homes for the aged but the policy has always been to encourage charities and other voluntary
organizations to run such homes. The data presented in table 13 reflect how this policy has been
successful as more and more destitute individuals went to privately-run Homes for the aged (rather than
government-run .old folks. homes.) in recent years. In general, the number of residents living in welfare
homes increased only marginally during 1990.96.
Table 11. Public Assistance and Supplementary Grants in Singapore
Table 12. Public Assistance Rates (Monthly) by Household Structure in Singapore
Table 13. Residents in Welfare Homes for the Aged in Singapore
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Concluding Remarks
Singapore has set an example of how a nation can enable its citizens to live well without deliberate public
assistance. Although the educational expenses of the student population are still heavily subsidized, the longterm
strategy of the government is to reduce the subsidies gradually. In such other areas of social expenditure
as health and social security, the principle of self-help has been the main guiding force behind all the policies
undertaken so far. The results seem to indicate that these policies are working well. On health financing, the
success of the government.s National Health Plan (NHP) can be seen in the growing popularity of private and
restructured hospitals. Although experts are suggesting that Medisave savings do not adequately meet
members. health requirements, the adoption of various supplementary schemes (such as Medishield and
Medifund) has perhaps met the criteria of .social adequacy.. The government has reassured people that no
citizen would be allowed to die without proper medical care (the Medifund provides a safety net for those who
fail to meet their medical expenses from all other sources). On social security and welfare, the available
evidence suggests that the CPF system, with its umbrella of protective and investment measures,38 has
provided an extremely powerful shield against all conceivable odds of life. Those who are not covered by the
program and are desperately in need of some outside help can apply for public assistance, which will partly
meet their financial needs. In line with the stated policy objective by which social security predominantly
remains an individual (and family) responsibility, the government has recently introduced the Maintenance of
Parent Act (1995) through which neglected parents can claim maintenance from their children.
Although there is a gradual reduction of subsidies in health and education provisions with a rise in one.s
income, the government.s interest in these crucial areas of human resource development and work force
planning has not been diluted. The privatization of social service delivery mechanisms (such as housing,
education, and health) has not been seriously considered a viable option as these services often represent a .double coincidence of wants.. While citizens fulfill their basic needs by gaining access to these merit goods,
the political leadership perceives them as essential social engineering instruments that lay the foundation for
continued economic progress and political stability. Privatization in other areas has also been debated in
Singapore and the prevailing perception is that any change in government ownership need not necessarily
imply change in control mechanisms. Given the small domestic base and lack of entrepreneurial ability,
government intervention through public enterprises can be considered an important policy option in the citystate
Republic.
As Singaporeans are becoming more and more affluent and as demand for purely private goods is
increasingly satisfied, demand for public goods is likely to become more intense.39 This may provide the basis
for .reluctant collectivism..that is, the state responding to such populist pressure. One may thus observe that
the size of the government increases with the level of development. This phenomenon has sometimes been
referred to as Wagner.s Law and there seems to be some empirical support for this so-called law.40 The
increasing demand for public goods generates the .free rider. problem. As consumers, citizens seek higher
government expenditure (for example, on social security and welfare, education, health benefits) but as
taxpayers, they are unwilling to finance the provision of these public services. This puts pressure on the state to
bear the burden of public spending and thus sows the seeds of .fiscal disequilibrium,. which in turn stifles
growth by diverting resources from productive activities.
Will Singapore be able to overcome such populist pressures? Perhaps yes. The main reason behind such
optimism is that there is a remarkable degree of social conformism in Singapore. This conformist attitude
could partly be attributable to the paternalistic attitude of the government, which often results in the inculcation
of approved social values. However, one cannot ignore the importance of culture and tradition in affecting the
process of socialization. It is often said that the Confucian ethic has exerted a favorable impact on the
economic development of Singapore, and so long as there is widespread affiliation to such an ethic the socalled
social limits to growth are unlikely to be effective. The following observation from Mr Lee Kuan Yew,41
the main architect of modern Singapore, shows that the Confucian ethic is the central element in containing
social dissension and industrial unrest in Singapore:
Looking back over the past 30 years, one of the driving forces that made Singapore succeed
was: The majority of the people placed the importance of the welfare of the society above the
individual, which is a basic Confucianist concept. The society is more important than the
individual. The family is the most important unit and all the families together form society.
There is a willingness to sacrifice individual gains for a common good. It means a certain
social cohesion that enables us to avoid industrial strife, which has plagued so many
countries, even developing ones.
Although social expenditures in Singapore are not likely to be influenced by populist pressures,
demographic changes might have an impact. According to current projections, by 2030 one in every four
persons in Singapore is expected to be over 60, compared with one in every 11 persons in 1990. Such rapid
aging will call for more supplementary health care and social security measures in the future. At the same time,
traditional family ties and social values will be subject to increasing pressure owing to the modernization of
society, and the government might have to expand its public assistance programs.
What lessons can be learned from Singapore.s experience? Although Singapore is a small city-state and
unique in many ways, the brief assessment of its social policies undertaken in this paper has revealed some important lessons. First of all, Singapore has successfully demonstrated how savings,42 an essential input for
economic growth, can be generated domestically by using the compulsory provident fund scheme. For
example, in 1996, the CPF contributions accounted for 22 percent of Gross National Savings (GNS) and the
total CPF balances stood at a staggering S$72.6 billion, which was 55 percent of the country.s GDP. Second,
the Singapore experience has shown that it is possible to subsidize important social sectors such as education
and health without slowing down the process of growth. While the government spends increasingly on
education and health, it has planned its expenditure judiciously so as to ensure that GDP growth always
remains ahead of expenditure growth.43 Although growth was the single-minded priority of the government,
subsidies were targeted mainly toward lower-income groups (for example, full cost-recovery policy for A and
B1 class hospital beds and subsidized rates for lower-class beds such as B2 and C; more generous subsidies for
small public flats built by HDB compared with near-market rates for executive apartments) so that overall
wealth distribution would improve as economic growth proceeded. Third, the Singapore system of social
security has shown how generosity can be combined with the criterion of international competitiveness. While
the CPF contribution rates were gradually raised, they were kept at a more .competitive. level for old-age
workers. Such a policy, though nonoptimal from a welfare point of view, helped Singapore maintain its high
growth consistently for the past three decades, resulting in higher living standards for everyone including
senior citizens. Fourth, the Singapore model has shown that the redistribution of wealth rather than income is a
better strategy for achieving equitable development. The main rationale behind the model.s asset enhancement
program is to allow Singaporeans to have a direct stake in the growth and prosperity of their country.
Enhancing their assets through prudent investments (in housing or approved shares) have also put many
Singaporeans in a better position to secure a comfortable retirement. Such a strategy can also avoid the .moral
hazard. problem, which often arises in traditional income-transfer programs. Finally, the success of
Singapore.s social security policy has largely been attributed to the conformist attitude of its population.
Although changes in attitudinal and behavioral patterns cannot easily be brought about, .social consciousness.
(so that people voluntarily place the common good above self-interest) can perhaps be inculcated through
appropriate educational and mass media programs.
Can other developing countries .model. their social policies based on Singapore.s experience? Perhaps
not. While they can draw on useful lessons outlined above, the adoption of the system and its successful
implementation would require a conducive sociopolitical environment. Interventionist strategies, as practiced
in Singapore, tend to work well in a Confucian society characterized by altruism and close family ties. They
may not yield the same results in liberal democracies plagued with corruption, inefficiency, union militancy,
and political instability.
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新加坡的共同价值
新加坡共同价值社会化路径及对我国核心价值观建设的启示
2013年08月19日 中国社会科学网 作者：杜晓燕、宋希斌
内容摘要：民众对国家的认同是国家存在与发展的基础，核心价值观则是民众对国家认同的关键。新加坡共同价值观的成功传播得益于六条切实可行的社会化路径，这对我国十八大提出的核心价值观的传播与建设具有借鉴意义。
The Grand Master's Insights on China
赶走卡扎菲的年轻人
普京的强硬基因
关 键 词：新加坡共同价值观；社会化；核心价值观；启示
作者简介：杜晓燕(1979-)，女，陕西礼泉人，西安交通大学人文学院讲师、博士。研究方向为廉政建设；宋希斌 (1979-)，男，山西太谷人，西安交通大学人文学院讲师、博士。研究方向为政治制度。
基金项目：本文是2012年度国家社科基金青年项目：“国家公务人员廉政建设研究”（项目编号：12CZZ023）的阶段性成果。
以色列（Israel）简介
美国著名政治学家布莱克提出：“现代社会高度依赖它的公民的各种形式的承认与合作，国家的结构在很大程度上取决于它获得这种承认的能力”。(1)民众对国家的认同是国家存在与发展的基础。正是这种国家认同使整个国家内部形成一种强大的凝聚力和向心力。对于多民族国家而言，民众观念中如果只有狭隘的民族主义感情，那么就会造成国家地域化、族群化分裂，影响社会稳定，动摇国家统一的根基。而民众对国家的认同集中体现于对国家核心价值观的认同，因此，很多国家都致力于国家价值观的建设。如美国以“美国梦”为核心，倡导个人主义、自由、平等、博爱、勤奋、实效。中共十八大也首次明确提出社会主义核心价值观的具体内容“倡导富强、民主、文明、和谐，倡导自由、平等、公正、法治，倡导爱国、敬业、诚信、友善，积极培育社会主义核心价值观” (2)，然而，如何更好地被民众所接受，内化为人们生活和行为的道德准则，则成为一个新的难题。近期，众多社会矛盾凸显，更增加了加强社会主义核心价值观建设的紧迫性。纵览世界，新加坡是构建与传播核心价值观最为成功的国家之一，又因其与中国有相似的国情，值得我们学习与借鉴。
一、新加坡共同价值观的提出与内涵
1、共同价值观的提出历程
从1965年建国初的一穷二白到80年代初期，新加坡已发展成新型工业化国家，不仅是东南亚地区海运、空运贸易、加工制造、金融服务、旅游中心和最大的修船、造船基地与石油输出港，而且成为世界第三大贸易港、第三大炼油中心和第五大金融中心，人均国民生产总值也从1960年的1215新加坡元(约397美元)，增加到1980年的14604新加坡元(约6707美元)，达到发达国家收入水平。然而，随着国家的快速发展，在引进西方科技的同时，西方的价值观与不良风气也随之侵入，传统的以家庭为中心的东方传统社会理念被打破，新加坡出现了金钱挂帅、惟利是图、贪图享受、物欲横流、人际关系冷漠，以及吸毒、卖淫、嫖娼等现象，尤其是青少年受“西化”思想的侵害更为严重，造成了新加坡严重的社会道德危机。据统计，新加坡离婚率由1978年的4.4%增至1985年的11%。1985年，未婚少女堕胎数只占合法堕胎总数的5%。80年代，新加坡的吸毒问题也十分严重，据统计，1984年，因注射和吸服海洛因而被捕的人有2584人，1988年增长到5220人，增加幅度达到102%。因上述原因，新加坡出现强烈的海外移民倾向。70年代，申请移民外国的家庭，每年只有1000户，80年代早期，亦不超过2000户，而到1989年则高达7000户。新加坡政府当时做过一个调查，每六个新加坡人中就有一人曾考虑要移居外国。(3)
时任总理李光耀在1972年“教师联合会第二十六周年纪念会”指出：“新加坡的生活，并不只靠着更多的旅馆，更多的宴会，越来越多的餐厅，更多的汽车……更多的十三个月薪金——这一切固然是需要的，但是，如果我们在这发展过程中，迷失方向，不能认识自己，把自己和那些不同类的混淆起来，……那么以上所说的一切都将是徒然的。”(4)上述危机使新加坡政府日益清楚地意识到构建国家共同价值观的重要性和紧迫性。1988年10月，新加坡第一副总理吴作栋在对人民行动党年轻一代的演讲中，第一次公开建议新加坡应发展自己的国民意识，提出要制定一套各种族人民均能接受的共同价值观来作为未来社会发展的基础，并号召在全国范围内开展新加坡共同价值观的大讨论。1989年1月，新加坡总统黄金辉在国会演讲中，首次提出了共同价值观的主要内容。后来经过广泛地讨论修改，1991年1月4日，吴作栋以总理名义向国会提呈《共同价值观白皮书》，获得批准。
2、共同价值观的具体内涵
1991年1月获准的《共同价值观白皮书》，是新加坡对“共同价值观”最完整、最准确的官方阐释。
（1）国家至上，社会为先
其英文是：Nation Before Community and Society Above Self。这是共同价值观体系的首要内容。它主要是指命国家、社会、个人三者之间的利益归属关系，即：各个地区的局部利益应服从国家的整体利益，个人利益也应服从国家和社会的利益。把国家和社会利益置于个人利益之上，注意培养全民的爱国主义精神和对国家盛衰、民族兴亡的强烈责任感。
（2）家庭为根，社会为本
其英文是：Family as the Basic Unit of Society。新加坡政府认为一个公民只有重视家庭、注重亲情、孝敬父母，才能遵守纪律、忠于国家和社会。国家的基本单位家庭稳定了，社会才会稳固，才能为人们提供更好的生活环境，才能为老人和孩子提供更优越的生存空间。
（3）关怀扶持，尊重个人
其英文是：Community Support and Respect for the Individual。这个共同价值观是对社会中每个人关怀、爱护和照顾的基本要求。新加坡强调每位公民享有的权利是不容侵犯的，国家必须为公民提供平等的机会，国家发展所带来的财富也应当公平地分配。社会不仅要奖励工作、生活中的强者，也要照顾和保护弱势群体，使社会更有人文关怀，更富人情味。
（4）求同存异，协商共识
其英文是：Consensus，not Conflict。新加坡是一个多种族、多宗教和多元文化的国家，社会中存在着各种复杂的矛盾和利益关系，人们的思想观念也存在较多差异，因此，在这个根底脆弱的国家，当发生矛盾与分歧时，一定要本着互谅互让、互相协商的精神化解矛盾，消除分歧。每一项社会政策的出台和实施都要尽可能多的得到大家的认可和支持。
（5）种族和谐，宗教宽容
其英文是：Racial and Religious Harmony。《共同价值观白皮书》指出，种族与宗教和谐共处是新加坡赖以生存的基础。在新加坡，不同种族的人，在受教育和就业等方面机会均等。新加坡没有国教，但有不同的宗教信仰，因此，新加坡政府强调各宗教之间必须容忍。宗教与政治两者在新加坡不可混淆，任何政党和教派都必须把政治和精神信仰分开。新加坡宪法第16章第3节明确规定：“除本身的信仰例外，没有人应被命令接受任何宗教指导、参与宗教仪式或崇拜。”(5)
二、新加坡共同价值观的社会化路径
新加坡元老李光耀指明了共同价值观在新加坡国家建设中的重要作用，他说：“我们是汇合了来自中国、印度以及马来世界不同地域的移民，我们必须传授给我们年轻的一代以共同的基本社会行为准则、社会价值观以及道德教条。这些准则、价值观以及教条将能塑造完整的未来新加坡人”。(6)新加坡共同价值观社会化的最终目标是协助新加坡政府建设一个具有道德意识和凝聚力的社会，核心精神是通过各种族之间的和睦、和谐来维持和促进国家的稳定。新加坡共同价值观的成功塑造和传播，实质上是政府通过一系列政策、措施有意识、有目的地使民众产生对国家的信任感、忠诚感和归属感，使民众能够自觉地将自己和国家的命运联系起来，有意识地为国家的发展和稳定做贡献。
（一）学校、家庭、社会共同参与的德育教育制度是新加坡共同价值观传播的体制保障
在新加坡700多平方公里的土地上，分布着152所中学、10所大专院校、4所本科院校以及数百所小学，构成了新加坡庞大的教育系统。(7)
1、学校教育
（1）小学共同价值观教育
新加坡小学进行共同价值观教育使用的教材是《好公民》一书。《好公民》课程包括35个单元，分别是：仁(爱己、爱人、爱物)；孝(孝顺、缅怀祖先)；家庭和谐(手足情深、爱护家庭声誉、家和万事兴)；礼(尊敬别人、尊敬老师、尊敬长辈、守法)：责任感(对己、对家庭、对他人、公德心)；恕(容忍、为他人着想、原谅别人)；忠(爱校、以我校为荣、敬业乐业、爱国)；信(守诺言、自信)；诚；勇；毅；节俭慷慨(节俭、慷慨)；义(公正、平等)；协作精神；睦邻精神(睦邻、种族和谐)。课程内容的重点各个年级各不相同，小学一年级以“个人”为中心，二年级以“家庭”为中心，三年级以“学校”为中心，四年级以“邻居”为中心，五年级以“国家”为中心，六年级以“世界”为中心。(8)整个教材遵循传统的道德观念，对学生进行有关社会、生活准则、道德责任、种族和谐，以及热爱祖国、忠于祖国等方面的教育，按循序渐进的结构逻辑从个人到世界放射性地扩展开来。
（2）中学公民道德教育
新加坡中学遵循教育部颁布的《公民与道德教育大纲》进行共同价值观教育。在该《大纲》中，新加坡教育部规定了中学教育的五大道德价值观念：第一，国家利益高于社区利益，社会利益先于个人利益；第二，家庭是社会的基础；第三，支持社会，尊重个人；第四，珍视团结，防止冲突；第五，实现种族和宗教平等。为了加强德育课教学，新加坡要求各学校必须设置道德教育室，规定校长必须兼任德育教育室主任。德育课分数要计入学生升学考试的总成绩中。(9)
2、家庭教育
2000年9月，由新加坡社区发展部、青年及体育部三家联合成立了家庭教育民众委员会，委员会通过学校来培训家长如何与学生交流沟通，如何对学生进行共同价值观教育。该委员会2002 年4月启动了学校家庭教育计划（School Family Education Programme，SFE计划），专门负责对家长进行培训。(10)参与SFE 计划的每个学校每年至少要开办100小时的家庭生活教育课程，其中70小时面向家长和教职工（包括10小时的休闲活动与友情联络），30小时面向学生。(11)
向家长开设的课程有：建立自信、了解孩子、自律策略、有效沟通技巧、建立和谐的婚姻并养成健康的生活方式、如何凝聚家庭成员、学习理财技能、平衡工作与生活之间的关系等。由于新加坡是多种族多民族国家，为了满足受众的需要，对于有些课程，学校会安排华语和英语两场讲座。
3、社会教育
新加坡共同价值观的教育很注重社会实践活动，力求做到知行合一。1990年教育部制定和推行了一项学生社区服务计划。该计划规定，学校要设置专职的课外活动主任，专门负责学生社区服务计划。这些计划包括“好朋友”计划、关怀与分享计划、到福利收养所和儿童组织服务、清洁环境计划、临时服务如春节慰问活动和慈善捐赠活动等。除此之外，新加坡政府也积极创造良好的社会环境予以配合，如经常在全国开展“文明礼貌周”、“禁烟周”等活动。
（二）严密完善的社区管理体制是新加坡共同价值观传播的组织保障
随着“居者有其屋”计划的实施，新加坡90％以上的国民住进政府统一建筑的组屋内，政府规定每个组屋区必须严格按照与全国种族比例相同的人数居住，这样传统的按种族聚集居住的模式被打破，使得新加坡由散漫的社会变成纪律严明和组织严密的社会。在政府组屋计划实施后，许多传统社会组织如宗乡会所等逐渐消失，被现代社区管理组织所取代。这样的基层管理组织在新加坡主要有三个：人民协会、公民协商委员会和居民委员会。这“三驾马车”由政府支持和控制，除了宣传政府政策、提供社区管理服务之外，还组织民众开展各类社区活动，在协助新加坡政府传播新加坡共同价值观时发挥了很大的作用。
1、人民协会
人民协会是一个法定组织，主席由总理兼任，另有一名部长负责日常工作，其常设机构是人民协会的董事会，由包括总理在内的15名董事组成，其中10人是由总理任命，其余5人由人民协会各附属团体选举产生。(12) 人民协会下属有130个社区中心，每个社区中心由一个管理委员会负责管理。管理委员会的主要职责有：
(1)完成所在社区中心的活动计划；
(2)鼓励居民参加社区的各项活动；
(3)竭力完成人民协会在社区中开展的各项工作；
(4)把社区居民的心愿反映给人民协会总部，同时把政府的相关政策与运行情况反馈给社区居民。(13)
2、公民协商委员会
公民协商委员会由总理公署直接领导，设立于1965年1月，1993年达到81个。委员会的目的是确保人民行动党的政策、信息能及时传达给选民。公民协商委员会成员至少每月与该区国会议员聚会一次，就促进本选区的发展与福利进行磋商，向国会提出有关议案以及建议政府应采取的措施。公民协商委员会的主要职能是：
(1)传达信息。根据民众的要求给政府提出意见和建议，并把政府的相关信息反馈给民众，使民众知晓并支持以人民行动党为首的政府的相关政策与行动；
(2)保障新加坡民众享受公民权利和履行公民义务。(14)
3、居民委员会
新加坡政府最主要的基层组织之一是居民委员会，新加坡有300多个。居民委员会由建屋发展局领导，它的主要工作是为居民提供与政府更好的沟通渠道，使政府能迅速地解决诸如维修电梯、走廊照明等问题；保障居民的安全，防止犯罪、吸毒及反社会活动，鼓励居民之间的交往和种族和谐相处。
（三）廉洁高效的公务员队伍是新加坡共同价值观传播的人员保障
一些学者认为新加坡是一个“行政国家”，其成功得益于拥有一支高素质的公务员队伍。目前，新加坡有超级公务员494人，占公务员总数的0.7%；一级公务员8977人，占13.2%；二级公务员19290人，占28.4%。(15)其中属于决策层的是超级公务员，其他公务员负责管理与执行。李光耀总理在1971年新加坡大学先修班的学生讲话时也阐明新加坡成功的要素之一是具有“一批有干劲，愿意付出代价，而又受过良好教育，并且训练有素的人口”，新加坡千千万万人的命运就是由这批“最高层的政府高级人员、部长和最高级的行政人员来决定”。(16)对于共同价值观的构建与传播，新加坡公务员是最直接与重要的参与者与执行者。
为了保证公务员具有较高的政治素养，保持对国家的忠诚感与归属感，新加坡于1958年建立了公务员政治学习中心。李光耀在第一期学员班开学典礼上指出：“公务员的廉洁与高效率工作，是国家机器正常运转、国家政策得以顺利实施的关键，而公务人员的腐败最终将使整个社会制度彻底崩溃。”此后，李光耀多次强调：“当一个公务员，就必须有奉献精神。” (17)李光耀认为，要通过对公务员的教育，在新加坡形成一种廉洁的政治文化。公务员在任职时必须填写宣誓书，宣誓尽忠职守，决不贪污，决不违法，保守国家机密，如果违反职责义务，愿意接受最严厉的惩罚。为保证公务员能力得到不断提升，1971年新加坡建立了公务员进修学院。该学院隶属财政部公共服务署，每年培训4500-5000名公务员。新加坡政府规定每个公务员每年至少要接受10小时的专业培训。公务员在受训期间必须认真学习，培训结束后一个月内要向常务秘书和公务员委员会提交受训报告。(18)
（四）严明完备的法治为新加坡共同价值观的传播提供了必要的法律保障
注重法治建设，以法促德，是新加坡共同价值观建设的重要特色。新加坡政府认为，共同价值观的构建和传播，必须有相应的法治作为基础和保障，必须通过立法、制度和执法来强制人们遵守共同的行为规范，形成良好而文明的社会秩序和社会风尚。新加坡完备的立法和严格的执法，不仅为共同价值观的构建和传播提供了有力的法治保障，而且把共同价值观在内的精神文明建设的许多内容纳入了法治化轨道，以详尽并具有操作性的法律条规对人们的行为进行引导和规范，收到了显著成效。
1、完备的法律体系。新加坡现行法律已达500余种，从国家体制到公务员管理，从民族宗教到商业活动，从城市管理到公民个人生活，都有相当完备的法律法规。对随地吐痰、乱扔废弃物、随地大小便、乱涂乱画、随便攀折花木、乱吐口香糖等其他国家法律中无案可查的内容，新加坡都一一做了详细的立法规定。
2、罚款严厉。新加坡罚款项目之多，数额之大，在世界少有。例如，违反规定吸烟时被发现将处以罚款500新元，相当于人民币4000元；在路上乱丢弃垃圾和随地吐痰，将被罚款1000新元；乱丢垃圾者不仅要罚款千元，还要挂着“垃圾虫”的牌子，在繁华的地段打扫卫生若干
天。据新加坡统计局统计资料显示，1981-1990年这10年新加坡所收罚金总额为9.1亿新元。(19)
3、严刑峻法。新加坡是实行严刑峻法的国家，是世界上少数几个保留绞刑、鞭刑的国家。1975年新加坡“滥用毒品修正法令”规定，对贩卖或进出口超过15克海洛因或30克吗啡的贩毒者，一律处以绞刑。2004年初，国际特赦组织发表一份报告，称新加坡处死的囚犯占人口比率世界最高。新加坡的人口虽只有400万，从1991年至今却处死了400多名死刑犯。(20)鞭刑在新加坡发挥了巨大的威慑力，有效制止了恶性犯罪的发生。鞭刑要求一鞭下去，皮肉皆开。执行鞭刑时，各大报纸的记者都会去拍照报道，第二天便传遍全国。
4、强化道德规范。对于很多富有献身精神、助人为乐、同情和帮助弱者的行为，新加坡政府会以登报、奖励等形式进行表彰，引导人们向他们学习，努力“向上、向善、向美”。此外，新加坡政府还出台了一系列法律法规，倡导共同价值观，如政府分配组屋时，对于二世同堂、三世同堂的家庭给予价格优惠和优先安排；规定夫妻在孩子未满3周岁以前，不能提出离婚，更不能为了离婚把孩子送给他人或送进护婴院等；规定凡国家机关工作人员、国家公务员、国家企业工作人员在婚姻以外拥有情人或发生两性关系均属违法行为。(9)
（五）严格管理的媒体为新加坡共同价值观的传播创造了良好的舆论环境
为了在新加坡民众中传播共同价值观，促进种族团结，新加坡政府对媒体进行了严格的限制和管理，使其成为政府教育民众的得力工具。新加坡领导人李光耀早在1971年国际新闻编辑人员协会会议上阐明了新加坡政府对待媒体的态度：“当新兴国家要求人民勤奋劳动、遵守纪律、争取社会进步的时候，他们的人民会被有关西方的种种见闻困惑。他们从媒介上看到争取和平中的暴力事件、城市游击队、毒品、放任的恋爱、玩世不恭的哲学。我们要求大众媒介加强而不是破坏我们学校所培育的文化价值和社会风尚。”(21)新加坡广播管理局严禁媒体和网络宣扬任何关于暴力和种族宗教仇视的言论，媒体十分注重对国家团结和民族和谐等内容的报道和宣传，竭力传播新加坡共同价值观。
为了加强对媒体的管理与控制，早在1964年新加坡还是马来西亚的一个州时，就制定了《煽动叛乱治罪法令》，禁止任何带有煽动暴乱倾向的行为、言论和出版物。对新闻出版界最有影响的法令是1974年颁布的《报章与印刷出版法令》，此后又在1977、1986、1988和1990年进行了四次修改。《报章与印刷出版法令》规定：每份报刊都要登记，报刊所有人应向文化与信息部申办年度执照。报刊的出版者必须是一家公共公司，而不能是个人或家庭，公司的负责人应是新加坡公民。报刊的出版执照每年更换一次，当政府认为报刊有违法行为时可以随时撤销执照。任何人印刷、销售、散发未经许可的报刊，将被处以罚款或监禁。任何一家报业公司未经文化部同意不得接受外国投资，而且经过同意的外国投资也只能用于商业目的，否则也将处以监禁和罚款。(21) 特别是1986年新加坡议会对《报纸和印刷出版法令》作了重要补充，授权政府当外国出版物在新加坡国内事务问题上出现影响新加坡读者情况时，有权减少其发行量。新加坡政府要求发行的外国报刊必须尊重新加坡的主权，遵守新加坡的法律和新闻政策，否则新加坡新闻及艺术部长有权通过宪报宣布任何在新加坡发行的外国报刊为“参与新加坡国内政治”的报刊，限制它在新加坡的销售和发行量。除了通过法律途径严格控制传媒外，新加坡政府还通过成立报业控股公司、购买报纸60%以上的股份、合并报纸等办法将所有的报纸牢牢控制在手中。
除了上述措施外，为了防止西方各种腐朽堕落的生活方式以及不健康的思想文化等对青少年的侵蚀和负面影响，新加坡政府亦借助法律杠杆对各种大众传播媒介进行严格管理。如政府把各种进口影片分成不同的等级，严格规定AR级的外国影片不能在居民区放映；如果21岁以下的青少年观看AR级的外国影片，一经查出，电影院就会受到惩罚，罚款金额高达2万新加坡元(约合人民币12万元)。(22)
（六）全国性运动为新加坡共同价值观的传播营造了良好的社会氛围
新加坡被称为“运动之国”，新加坡政府几乎每年都会发起一个或更多的运动。这些运动的共同特点是透过政府的影响力，以运动的形式改变国民性，宣传新加坡共同价值观。负责1974-1986年间政府各项运动的组织者B．Nair说：“在那时，运动的目的是建立一个国家和在移民中培养主人公的感觉”。(23)
据统计，新加坡1958-1982年间，一共发动过66项全国性运动。如1958年8月的反吐痰运动，1958年10月的大扫除运动，1958年12月的消灭害虫运动，1959年7月的学习马来语运动，1962年3月、1964年8月、1965年8月和11月的国语周运动，1968-1971年进行的4次“保持新加坡清洁和防止污化”运动。从l979年6月开始，新加坡更是开展了一系列构建共同价值观的活动，如：1979年6月开始第一次全国礼貌月活动，以后每年都会举行。1979年11月举办敬老周运动，至今每年举行。从1988年开始，政府每年都要开展一次“国民意识周”活动，激发国民的爱国热情，增强国民的爱国意识。2003年开展了“家庭周”运动，在全社会倡导孝敬父母、热爱家庭的观念。这些运动赢得了群众，也教育了群众，深化了人们对新加坡共同价值观的理解和认识，为新加坡国民进一步贯彻、践行共同价值观奠定了良好的基础。
新加坡共同价值观的成功塑造与传播增强了民众对国家的认同感和忠诚度，对国家的经济和社会发展充满信心。进入九十年代，不少全国性社会调查结果验证了这一点，如1994年新加坡国立研究院做的一份调查显示：84%的受调查者为作为新加坡人感到非常自豪，有超过70%的人对新加坡非常有信心。1996年9月，新加坡电视机构和美国盖洛普公司联合对全国525名各阶层人士进行的民意调查结果显示：70%的人认为新加坡未来5年在衣食住行方面会变得更好，70%的人认为现在的生活比过去好，66%认为国家更加团结，90%的人对新加坡的前途充满信心。(24)1999年新加坡南洋大学对990名新加坡人的问卷调查显示，90％的人自认为是“新加坡人”，74％希望被称为新加坡人而非华人、马来人或印度人，74％的人愿意为新加坡而战并付出生命。(25)
三、对中国特色社会主义核心价值观建设的启示
1、植根中华传统文化，借鉴西方文明成果，构建中国特色社会主义核心价值观
新加坡共同价值观的确立及其教育的成功开展，离不开对儒家文化的扬弃和对西方文明成果的借鉴。中国是儒家文化的发源地，尤其是儒家思想中的“仁、义、礼、智、信”等观念，在不同历史时期都不同程度地推动了社会道德体系的发展。当前，我国各种社会价值观念纷繁复杂，先进文化与落后文化并存、积极价值观念与消极价值观念交织。在这种社会背景下，不断丰富和完善社会主义核心价值观，构建一种富有时代特征、人文内涵、民族特色的核心价值观迫在眉睫。
2、以道德实践为基础构建学校—家庭—社会“三位一体”的德育教育网络
新加坡共同价值观教育的实践证明，以道德实践为基础，构建学校—家庭—社会相互衔接、相互补充的综合德育模式，对于促使共同价值观教育生活化、大众化具有积极价值。当前，我国虽然也强调把社会主义核心价值体系融入国民教育的全过程，但在实践中“并没有扭转德育工作队伍孤军奋战的状况，所有教师、所有管理人员、所有教育环节、所有课程都担负着育人重任的责任意识还没有真正形成；社会和家庭教育不但难以与学校道德教育形成合力，而且在不少方面还直接抵消了学校本来就实效不太高的道德教育”。(9) 中国德育教育须以道德实践为基础，构建学校、家庭、社会三位一体的综合德育网络，必须重视道德实践和日常行为训练在核心价值观形成中的作用，积极探索实践育人的有效途径；必须强化家庭的德育功能，充分发挥家庭在青少年价值观塑造中的基础性作用；必须加强核心价值观教育的社会环境建设，形成学校、家庭、社会齐抓共管的综合德育体系。
3、加强公务员管理，注重公务员道德修养教育
新加坡在共同价值观传播过程中十分重视公务员道德素养教育，注重培养政府官员的廉洁自律观念，取得了显著成效。中国社会科学院副院长李慎明教授认为：“建设社会主义核心价值体系领导干部是关键。领导干部的行为及其体现出来的理论素养、理想信念、精神面貌、思想境界、道德情操，对社会主义核心价值体系建设起着重要的示范和导向作用。” (26)因此，建设社会主义核心价值体系并使之真正成为引领当代社会思潮的核心价值观，其首要的举措和根本的方略是加强公务员道德素养教育，使广大党员和领导干部首先确立并践行社会主义核心价值观，以此带动和激发广大人民群众实践社会主义核心价值观的主动性和积极性，从而促进社会主义核心价值观在全社会的认同和确立。
4、不断完善社会主义法治建设，完善道德约束机制
新加坡共同价值观的成功传播说明核心价值观教育必须有相应的法律制度作为保障。一个社会公民文明素质的提高和社会道德良序的形成，宣传、舆论、道德教育、典型示范固然重要，但仅此远远不够，还必须将核心价值观教育的诸多内容制度化、法治化，成为人人都必须遵守的行为规范，并尽可能地在日常行为中巩固下来，将核心价值观变成一系列看得见、摸得着的切实可行的做法。
5、营造良好的文化与社会舆论氛围，建立健全舆论引导机制
新加坡卓有成效的媒体管理与控制为传播其共同价值观起到了重要作用，而建设中国特色社会主义核心价值观，也必须有一个良好的社会舆论环境。首先要加强舆论导向，培养良好的道德氛围。广播、电视、报纸、刊物等大众媒体，要坚持团结稳定鼓劲、正面宣传为主，牢牢把握正确舆论导向，满腔热情地宣传两个文明建设中涌现出来的、反映新时期道德要求的新事物、新典型。要利用群众喜爱的名牌栏目，如“焦点访谈”、“今日说法”等加强对社会普遍关注的道德热点问题的引导。其次，要积极开展舆论监督，有力地批评背离中国特色社会主义核心价值观的错误言行和丑恶现象。要加大网上正面宣传和管理工作的力度，鼓励发布进步、健康、有益的信息，防止反动、迷信、淫秽、庸俗等不良内容通过网络传播。要引导网络机构和广大网民增强网络道德意识，共同建设网络文明。要坚决制止出版、播映、演出格调低下的作品和节目，依法打击反动、淫秽及各种非法出版物。最后，要切实加强对娱乐服务场所的监督管理，严厉打击卖淫嫖娼、赌博、吸毒等社会丑恶现象。此外，要大力提倡各种形式的社会公益广告。
6、深入开展群众性的社会主义核心价值观实践活动
新加坡各种全国性运动有力地改变了国民的一些陋习，有效地宣传了共同价值观。对中国而言，也需要深入开展群众性的社会主义核心价值观实践活动。每个公民既是核心价值观建设过程的参与者，也是核心价值观建设成果的受益者，要坚持在各种类型的群众性精神文明创建活动中强化社会主义核心价值观，如开展“精神文明月”、“道德模范评选活动”、“红歌会”、“心连心艺术团慰问演出”等活动。
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:1: HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH PRINCIPAL SEAT AT JABALPUR W.P. No.16970/2014 Tirupati Kankaiya Arolu vs. State of M.P. and Others Present: Hon'ble Shri Rajendra Menon,J & Hon'ble Shri S.K.Seth,J. -------------------------------------------------------------- Shri Anand Nayak, learned counsel for the petitioner. Shri Swapnil Ganguly, learned Government Advocate for the respondent no.1/State. Shri Ashish Shroti, learned counsel for the respondent no.2. Shri Vivek Rusia, learned counsel for the respondent nos.3 and 4. Shri Sanjeev Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the respondent no.5. -------------------------------------------------------------- O R D E R
(09/09/2015) Petition claiming to be a social worker and a public spirited person has filed this writ petition and his grievance in that respondent nos.3 and 4 have installed a Electricity Power Generation Plant (Power House) near Tawa River at Sarni in District Betul :2: (M.P.) it is adjacent to various villages and for the purpose of generation of electricity hard coal is used which is supplied from the coal mines belonging to Western Coal Field Limited. It is alleged that during the process of generation of electricity coal dust (chura) rejected by the plant/machinery is dumped in a dump yard which is adjacent to Tawa Dam (Tawa River) which ultimately merges into the Naramada River near Hoshangabad (M.P.). The area is surrounded by various colonies belonging to the Electricity Board, Western Coal Field Limited and many villages. It is inhabited by the employees working for these establishment and other villages who use the water from the dam/river for drinking purpose. It is said that the coal dust (chura) which is known as mill reject coal comes into the dam/river as a result the water is polluted and it becomes unsuitable for human consumption or drinking purpose.
2. Accordingly, contending that the Authority of the State Government and the Pollution Control Board are not taking any action for preventing the aforesaid pollution being caused by the respondents to the river in question, this writ petition has been filed.
3. On notice being issued, respondent no.2, the statutory authority discharging function under the Pollution Control Act, represented by Shri Ashish Shroti have filed a detailed reply along with an inquiry report vide Annexure R-1 and from this report, it is clear that the contention of the petitioner are not correct. In the report submitted by the authorities of :3: the Pollution Control Board, it indicated that the coal dust is collected and dumped in an area which is surrounded by the thick wall there is no question of coal dust going into the river or the dam in question. Sometimes in the rainy season there may be possibility of seepage but that is not very alarming and contending that there is no pollution in the river as alleged, a report from the Central Laboratory is also field with regard to testing of the water of the river and the report indicates that no adverse material is available to say that the water is polluted. By filing a detailed documents along with Annexure/R-2. Shri Ashish Shroti points out that the contention of the petitioner that the coal dust being dumped by the respondent nos.3 and 4 is causing pollution is not correct.
4. That apart, respondent nos.3 and 4 have also filed a detailed reply and they deny the allegation made in the writ petition. On the contrary they say that initially this coal dust was being sold by auction to respondent no.5 and on a dispute between respondent nos.3 ,4 and 5, arbitration proceedings were initiated which has now been concluded. It is further stated by respondent nos.3 and 4, that as far as the coal mill reject is concerned they are proposing to use them and convert it to do carpentering work for the coal handling plant yard itself and therefore within a short period of time even this problem would be rectified.
:4:5. Shri Anand Nayak, invites our attention to the report submitted by the Pollution Control Board and argues that in this report it is indicated that respondent nos.3 and 4 should take steps for auctioning of the coal dust which is collected so that even if there is any chances of pollution by the amalgamation of coal dust the same can be ruled out. However, Shri Vivek Rusia submits that this would not be necessary once the respondents as indicated have already initiated process for using the coal dust for carpentering purpose and various other purpose.
6. Having considered the rival contentions and on going through the report submitted by the Pollution Control Board, we are satisfied that the allegation of the petitioner with regard to pollution being caused in the river because of the coal dust being dumped is not correct. The report of the Pollution Control Board particularly the report with regard to testing of water of the river does not indicate any pollution, therefore, the contentions of the petitioner seems to be baseless. That apart, with regard to apprehension indicated by the Pollution Control Board in the matter of removal of the coal dust, in the additional submission submits by respondent nos.3 and 4 in para-12 it has been clearly indicated that the disposal of the mill reject coal sold by auctioning through contractor is now being stopped w.e.f. February, 2013 and very soon the same mill reject coal which is dumped and stocked in the Coal Handelling Plant is being used for the purpose of carpentering of the coal :5: stock yard. That apart, as huge quantity of coal is required for power generation, the mill reject coal will be mixed with superior quality of imported coal and then used.
7. Accordingly, in the light of the aforesaid, we see no reason to make any further indulgence instead we observe that respondent nos.3 and 4 may proceed to utilize the coal dust as indicated by them, in the additional submission so that remotest possibility of pollution be controlled is ruled out.
With the aforesaid observations for the present, we find no case is made out for any further indulgence into the matter accordingly, this petition stands disposed of.
(Rajendra Menon) (S.K. Seth) Judge Judge mn


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Handbook of Basic Atomic Spectroscopic Data
Jean E. Sansonetti and W. C. Martin
I. Introduction
This handbook is designed to provide a selection of the most important and frequently used atomic spectroscopic data in an easily accessible format. The compilation includes data for the neutral and singly-ionized atoms of all elements hydrogen through einsteinium (Z = 1-99). The wavelengths, intensities, and spectrum assignments are given in a table for each element, and the data for the approximately 12,000 lines of all elements are also collected into a single table, sorted by wavelength (a "finding list").
More complete data for a smaller number of the most persistent lines of each spectrum are given in additional tables for each element. In addition to the wavelengths and intensities, the energy levels and transition probabilities (where available) are listed for a total of about 2,350 lines in these tables. We also give a separate table of energy level data for each spectrum which, although incomplete, includes levels additional to those involved in the persistent-line transitions.
More complete data than those selected for this Handbook can usually be found in references given with the tables for particular spectra. The data from most of the NIST compilations we have used are available online from the Atomic Spectra Database (ASD; see [MFKM99]). In addition to more extensive data for many of the spectra in this Handbook, the ASD has data for higher ionization stages of many elements and includes the references.
Although we have made heavy use of previous compilations, our tables for the great majority of elements include at least some data compiled by us from more recent original literature and, in some cases, from unpublished material. Our most extensive use of data from the original literature has been for the heavier elements. Although the data are incomplete, our wavelength and energy level tables for these elements, especially, comprise a supplement to the ASD. For example, the current version of the ASD includes energy-level data for only two spectra (Mo I, II) of the 72 spectra of the neutral and singly-ionized atoms of the elements Rb to Ba (Z=37-56) and Hf to Ra (Z=72-88). No complete and critical compilations of energy levels have appeared for most of these spectra since vols. 2 and 3 of Atomic Energy Levels [M52, M58]. For the actinide elements Ac - Es (Z =89-99), we were able to rely almost entirely on the very complete compilation by Blaise and Wyart [BW92b].
For some spectra, especially some of the lighter elements, we have taken data from existing compilations that have been superseded by data reported in more recent literature.
II. Atomic Data Tables
A small selection of non-spectroscopic atomic data has been provided for each element. Included are the atomic number and weight and a list of naturally occurring isotopes, including the isotopic mass, the relative abundance, the nuclear spin (in units of h/2), and the magnetic moment (in units of nuclear magnetons). For elements with no naturally occurring isotopes, the most commonly observed isotopes are listed. These data are taken from J. Emsley [E95].
III. Strong Line Tables
For each of the elements a list of the strongest lines in the spectra of the neutral and singly-ionized atoms has been compiled. This list includes the wavelength, the ionization stage, the reference for the wavelength measurement, and an intensity. Unless otherwise noted, the spectroscopic data in this Handbook pertain to the naturally occurring isotopic mix for each element.
A. Wavelengths
The wavelengths for many spectra have been taken from Reader et al. [RCWM80]. Wavelengths given to three decimal places in [RCWM80] have a stated uncertainty of less than 0.001 Å, and many of the two-place wavelengths in [RCWM80] are rounded off from three-place values in the original literature.
Laboratory observations carried out since the publication of [RCWM80] have yielded improved wavelength data for many spectra, including more accurate wavelengths, increased range of wavelength coverage, and more reliable assignments of observed lines to particular spectra. We have used more recent data for many of the spectra. However, it is important to note that our retention of wavelengths from [RCWM80] for any particular spectrum does not imply that more accurate data do not now exist.
In compiling data from the original literature, we have in many cases departed from the practice of [RCWM80] by quoting wavelengths without rounding off, especially in cases where the literature values were given to three or fewer decimal places. The original references should be consulted for uncertainty estimates.
B. Intensities
Unlike the other tabulated data, the relative intensities are not basic data and must be used with caution. The relative intensities of the spectral lines observed for any element depend upon the light source and excitation conditions. Thus, even if the relative intensities observed in a particular experiment are adjusted to correct for the wavelength dependence of the sensitivity of the spectrometer and detector, the intensities will in general be different from relative intensities given by a previous observer or tabulated in a compilation such as this one. With a caveat that users should keep these considerations in mind, we list a relative intensity for each line. For some lines the wavelengths are so close to another that it was impossible to make two separate intensity measurements. For those lines the intensity of the blended line is given for each and both intensities are marked with an asterisk.
For uniformity we have assigned an intensity of 1000 to the strongest line(s) of each spectrum. In most cases the chosen line (or lines) can reasonably be regarded as the ultimate line (Sec IV). The relative intensities for most spectra here are based on values from [RCWM80]. We have attempted to give improved intensities for some spectra by using more recent and apparently more accurate data than those available to the compilers of [RCWM80].
It should be noted that the intensities in [RCWM80] for lines of neutral and singly-ionized atoms of about half the elements (mainly nd- and nf-shell metals) were taken at least in part from [MCS75]. These intensities were obtained from observations of 10-A, 220-V direct-current arc discharges between copper electrodes having 0.1% of the element under investigation. The relative intensities were put on a linear scale by the use of standardized lamps.
For several spectra we have altered some of the intensities found in the literature to give smoother transitions between wavelength regions covered by different observers. We have also adjusted reported intensities given in a single reference in some cases where the reported values were clearly affected by strong self-absorption and/or by large wavelength-dependent non-linearities. Such adjustments were necessary in order to assign the largest intensities to the inherently strongest persistent lines (usually the ultimate lines).
Lines we have selected as persistent (Sec IV) are indicated by the letter "P" following the intensity. For some spectra, other descriptive codes have been included to characterize the line shape or give other related information. They have the following meanings:
b - band head
c - complex
d - line consists
of two unresolved lines
h - hazy
l - shaded to
longer wavelengths
P - a persistent
line
r - easily reversed
s - shaded to
shorter wavelengths
u - unresolved
shoulder on strong line
w - wide
In general, the character of a line depends on the spectroscopic source used, the resolution of the spectrometer, etc. Most of the line characterizations in our tables are quoted from [RCWM80], so that the characters given for lines of metallic elements usually pertain to the arc source used by Meggers et al. [MCS75] (see above). In some cases we have given character notations from [RCWM80] for lines for which the tabulated wavelengths were obtained with a very different (low-pressure) source.
IV. Persistent-Line Tables
In spectroscopic observations made with low concentrations of a particular element relative to other substances in the source, the number of observable lines of the element is found to decrease with decreasing concentration until only the most "persistent" or "sensitive" lines remain. Some authors refer to the last such line(s) as the raie(s) ultime, i.e., the ultimate line(s). Although the ultimate lines depend in principle on the source, the spectrometer, and other features of the experiment, a relatively small group of lines can be specified for each element that will include the ultimate lines as observed over a broad range of experimental conditions. We designate our selection of these lines "persistent lines".
The strongest persistent lines usually include one or more resonance lines, i.e. transitions to the ground level or term. We include at least one of the resonance lines in our persistent line table for each spectrum. The most sensitive or ultimate lines for many spectra lie in the vacuum-ultraviolet region (wavelength < 2000 Å). In such cases we have tried to include some lines above 2000 Å in the persistent lines list. We have also tried to make these tables more generally useful for many spectra by covering broader wavelength ranges than most tables of this sort.
In addition to the information given in the strong lines table, the list of persistent lines includes the energy levels involved in the transition, complete with configuration, term designations, and J values. Where available, the transition probability is also given, along with the reference from which it is taken.
A. Transition Probabilities
The values are listed as Aki in units of 108 s-1. These Aki values can easily be converted to oscillator strengths, fik, gifik, or log(gifik), or line strength, S, by using the following formula:
gi fik = 1.499x10-8Aki2gk = 303.8 -1 S ,
where i refers to the lower energy level, k refers to the upper level, is the wavelength in Ångstroms, and g = 2J+1 for a given level.
The transition probability data are taken primarily from three compilations and from references cited therein. The NIST compilation [FW96] contains transition probabilities for about 9000 lines, covering most elements. Major recent compilations by Morton for elements from H to Ga [M91, M02] and from Ge to Bi (plus Th and U) [M00] have data for lines longward of the Lyman limit (911.754 Å) and include a number of useful new references.
The NIST transition-probability compilations include values with uncertainties ranging from 1% to larger than 50%, with an approximate uncertainty range being indicated for each line by an assigned letter. We have not included or assigned such letters here, but this information is given in the NIST publications and in the ASD for all transition-probability values taken from these sources. For data taken from the original literature or from non-NIST compilations, the user can consult the cited references for accuracy estimates.
B. Energy-Level Classifications
The values of the two levels classifying each line are given under "Energy Levels," with the lower level on the left. The energy-level classifications for a few persistent lines are not known, as indicated by the absence of level values. Clicking on one of the level values yields another page showing the configurations, term names, and J values for the levels classifying the line. The accuracies and spectroscopic designations of the levels are discussed in the next section.
V. Energy Level Tables
The tabulated energy levels represent a selection of the available data for each spectrum, including all levels involved in the persistent-line classifications. At least the lower levels of the ground configuration and other low-lying configurations are given. The levels of some of the simpler spectra are given complete up through the highest tabulated level, but most of the known energy level structures of the more complex spectra are omitted here. The ionization energies are included except for a few spectra for which no reliable values are available. The reference for each level represents the source of the level value.
Estimated uncertainties for the levels can usually be found in the references. In our tables, the uncertainties are only roughly indicated by the number of decimal places or significant figures in the values. The uncertainty corresponding to a particular number of decimals may easily vary by an order of magnitude, however, even within the data for one spectrum. In most cases, the uncertainty is probably between 1 and ~30 units in the last decimal place or significant figure, but still larger errors can occur. The uncertainty in the relative position of two levels having different uncertainties is at least as large as the greater of the two level uncertainties. In this regard, it is important to notice the number of decimals given for the ground level; the uncertainties of the absolute values of the excited levels and ionization energy are at least as large as the indicated ground-level uncertainty.
The configuration and term notations are standard for NIST compilations. Explanations of the notations for the different coupling schemes and of the arrangement of the data can be found in [MZH78], [MW96] and online as a part of the "Help" section of ASD [MFKM99]. Some levels of complex spectra are given without term names, either because the level has not been interpreted theoretically or because the calculated eigenvector for the level yields no meaningful unique name. Some of these levels have been assigned simple numerical designations under "Term". The parity of levels lacking designations is indicated by a degree symbol in the "Term" column for odd-parity levels.
VI. Finding List
This table gives the wavelength, intensity, spectrum, and reference for each line in this compilation, listed in order of increasing wavelength. Although this list has fewer lines than the finding list of [RCWM80] or [MCS75], it includes some lines not given in the earlier publications.
VII. Acknowledgements
We wish to acknowledge the generous help of several NIST colleagues. Arlene Robey gave expert assistance with data-handling and bibliographic aspects of the work. We would like to acknowledge the patience and persistence of Shari Young in preparing these data for publication. The cooperation and helpfulness of Jonathan Baker, Svetlana Kotochigova, Peter Mohr, Victor Kaufman, Gillian Nave, Joseph Reader, Craig Sansonetti, and Jack Sugar in supplying unpublished data are greatly appreciated. We also thank Jeffrey Fuhr and Wolfgang Wiese for guidance in finding and assessing transition-probability data.
A number of colleagues from other laboratories have kindly provided unpublished data or electronically readable files of published data. We are very grateful to Vladimir Azarov, Jean Blaise, James Brault, Gordon Drake, Sveneric Johansson, Gabriele Kalus, Alexander Kramida, Ulf Litzen, Donald Morton, Byron Palmer, Juliet Pickering, Alexander Ryabtsev, Toshizo Shirai, and Ward Whaling for this help.
[BW92b] J. Blaise and J.-F. Wyart, Energy Levels and Atomic Spectra
of Actinides, International Tables of Selected Constants 20,
Tables de Constantes, Paris (1992).
[E95] J. Emsley, The Elements, Oxford Chemistry Guides, Oxford
Univ. Press, New York, NY (1995).
[FW96] J. R. Fuhr and W. L. Wiese, NIST Atomic Transition Probability
Tables, CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, 77th Edition, D. R.
Lide, Ed., CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL (1996).
[M91] D. C. Morton, Astrophys. J. Suppl. Ser. 77, 119
(1991).
[M00] D. C. Morton, Astrophys. J. Suppl. Ser. 130, 403
(2000).
[M02] D. C. Morton, unpublished compilation of atomic data for resonance
absorption lines (Part III) (2002), to be submitted for publication in
Astrophys. J. Suppl. Ser.
[M52] C. E. Moore, Atomic Energy Levels, Natl. Bur. Stand. (U.S.)
Circ. 467, Vol. II (1952); reprinted as Natl. Stand. Ref. Data Ser., Natl.
Bur. Stand. (U.S.) 35 (1971).
[M58] C. E. Moore, Atomic Energy Levels, Natl. Bur. Stand. (U.S.)
Circ. 467, Vol. III (1958); reprinted as Natl. Stand. Ref. Data. Ser.,
Natl. Bur. Stand. (U.S.) 35 (1971).
[MCS75] W. F. Meggers, C. H. Corliss, and B. F. Scribner, Tables
of Spectral-Line Intensities, Natl. Bur. Stand. (U.S.), Monogr. 145
(1975).
[MFKM99] W. C. Martin, J. R. Fuhr, D. E. Kelleher, A. Musgrove, J. Sugar,
W. L. Wiese, P. J. Mohr and K. Olsen, NIST Atomic Spectra Database (Version
2.0), (1999) [Online]. Available: http://physics.nist.gov/asd. National
Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD.
[MW96] W. C. Martin and W. L. Wiese, Atomic Spectroscopy, in
Atomic Molecular, & Optical Physics, G.W.F. Drake, Ed., American Inst.
of Physics,Woodbury, New York, pp. 135-153 (1996).
[MZH78] W. C. Martin, R. Zalubas, and L. Hagan, Atomic Energy Levels-The
Rare-Earth Elements, Nat. Stand. Ref. Data Series, Nat. Bur. Stand
(U. S.) 60 (1978).
[RCWM80] J. Reader, C. H. Corliss, W. L. Wiese, and G. A. Martin, Wavelengths
and Transition Probabilites for Atoms and Atomic Ions, Natl. Stand.
Ref. Data Ser., Natl. Bur. Stand. (U.S.) 68 (1980) Part I, Sec.
1 of these tables (lines arranged by element) are included with some corrections
and additions in J. Reader and C. H. Corliss, Line Spectra of the Elements,
CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, 77th Edition, D. R. Lide, Ed., CRC
Press, Boca Raton, FL (1997).


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| oob {scales} | R Documentation |
This set of functions modify data values outside a given range.
The oob_*()
functions are designed to be passed as the oob
argument of
ggplot2 continuous and binned scales, with oob_discard
being an exception.
These functions affect out of bounds values in the following ways:
oob_censor()
replaces out of bounds values with NA
s. This is the
default oob
argument for continuous scales.
oob_censor_any()
acts like oob_censor()
, but also replaces infinite
values with NA
s.
oob_squish()
replaces out of bounds values with the nearest limit. This
is the default oob
argument for binned scales.
oob_squish_any()
acts like oob_squish()
, but also replaces infinite
values with the nearest limit.
oob_squish_infinite()
only replaces infinite values by the nearest limit.
oob_keep()
does not adjust out of bounds values. In position scales,
behaves as zooming limits without data removal.
oob_discard()
removes out of bounds values from the input. Not suitable
for ggplot2 scales.
oob_censor(x, range = c(0, 1), only.finite = TRUE) oob_censor_any(x, range = c(0, 1)) oob_discard(x, range = c(0, 1)) oob_squish(x, range = c(0, 1), only.finite = TRUE) oob_squish_any(x, range = c(0, 1)) oob_squish_infinite(x, range = c(0, 1)) oob_keep(x, range = c(0, 1)) censor(x, range = c(0, 1), only.finite = TRUE) discard(x, range = c(0, 1)) squish(x, range = c(0, 1), only.finite = TRUE) squish_infinite(x, range = c(0, 1))
x |
A numeric vector of values to modify. |
range |
A numeric vector of length two giving the minimum and maximum limit of the desired output range respectively. |
only.finite |
A logical of length one. When |
The oob_censor_any()
and oob_squish_any()
functions are the same
as oob_censor()
and oob_squish()
with the only.finite
argument set to
FALSE
.
Replacing position values with NA
s, as oob_censor()
does, will typically
lead to removal of those datapoints in ggplot.
Setting ggplot coordinate limits is equivalent to using oob_keep()
in
position scales.
Most oob_()
functions return a vector of numerical values of the
same length as the x
argument, wherein out of bounds values have been
modified. Only oob_discard()
returns a vector of less than or of equal
length to the x
argument.
censor()
, squish()
, squish_infinite()
and
discard()
are no longer recommended; please use oob_censor()
,
oob_squish()
, oob_squish_infinite()
and oob_discard()
instead.
oob_squish()
: Homer Strong<EMAIL_ADDRESS># Censoring replaces out of bounds values with NAs oob_censor(c(-Inf, -1, 0.5, 1, 2, NA, Inf)) oob_censor_any(c(-Inf, -1, 0.5, 1, 2, NA, Inf)) # Squishing replaces out of bounds values with the nearest range limit oob_squish(c(-Inf, -1, 0.5, 1, 2, NA, Inf)) oob_squish_any(c(-Inf, -1, 0.5, 1, 2, NA, Inf)) oob_squish_infinite(c(-Inf, -1, 0.5, 1, 2, NA, Inf)) # Keeping does not alter values oob_keep(c(-Inf, -1, 0.5, 1, 2, NA, Inf)) # Discarding will remove out of bounds values oob_discard(c(-Inf, -1, 0.5, 1, 2, NA, Inf))


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