eview: Ever After: A Cinderella Story Rating *** out of ****
As fairy tales go, Cinderella has to be one of the most famous. Almost everyone knows it, well at least in North America. So it is natural that someone will try to make a movie out of it. It has been done before with varying results. This version of the story is both similar to the original and different at the same time. The basic story remains unchanged but, one thing that seems to vanish with this version, and that is all the fantastical elements of the story. There is no fairy god mother or anything even remotely of that nature. After the fantastical elements are stripped away what is left is a realistic believable rendition of the Cinderella story and an interesting love story at the least. .
Unlike in the fairy tale, the prince plays a much larger part than just that of the masked ball at the end. The ‘Prince', who happens to be the crown prince to the throne of France, meets 'Cinderella', known as Danielle, on a few occasions, most coincidentally and he becomes smitten with her. Although this seems to be a far cry from the traditional story it allows for the main plot to proceed with enough room for some imaginative story telling.. The story takes place in a renaissance setting; in France, with Leonardo Da Vinci providing some comic relief on more than one occasion. This addition of Leonardo Da Vinci, was quite successful in that it added some color to the movie, since some of the roles are a bit stereotypical. For example the role that was scripted for the prince leaves a few things to be desired. For instance the character seems to be a bit too unstable and fickle, a crown prince should not be anything remotely like that. Especially since he is portrayed to be in his mid twenties at the least and almost ready to take the throne. The characters of Danielle(Cinderella) played by Drew Barrymore, and that of the evil step mother, played by Anjelica Huston, are well developed and well played by the two women. Although the part of Danielle is a bit stretched it is not too unlikely and not totally unbelievable. The nuances of the character are brought out well by Drew Barrymore and from watching the movie it seems like she had fun making the movie. As a contrast the part of the evil step mother is clearly seen from the very beginning and is almost clique. But, Anjelica Huston seems to add a certain flair to the role that makes it suit the movie nearly perfectly.
The actual story is fairly predictable since it is after all the basic story of Cinderella, but there are more than enough twists in how the story is told to make it interesting and enjoyable. The acting is of high caliber and seems deserved of praise. All in all this movie takes you back into history, into a seemingly magical fairy land. But, don't get me wrong there is nothing but reality, it is just refreshing to watch a movie that is not based in a familiar setting with everyday familiar things happening. So although the story is basically familiar the world it is set in is not, and that adds a dimension to the film which in this humble reviewers opinion makes it worth seeing
©1998 Matt Petras http://www.imactive.com/bootsector/
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rec.arts.movies.reviews newsgroup (de.rec.film.kritiken for German reviews).
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|
Gephi Toolkit Javadoc | ||||||||
| PREV PACKAGE NEXT PACKAGE | FRAMES NO FRAMES |
See:
Description
| Interface Summary | |
|---|---|
| Item | An item is a visual element built by an ItemBuilder and later used
by a Renderer to be displayed. |
| PDFTarget | Rendering target to PDF format. |
| PreviewController | Controller that maintain the preview models, one per workspace. |
| PreviewModel | The Preview Model contains all items and all preview properties. |
| ProcessingTarget | Rendering target to the Processing library. |
| RenderTarget | RenderTarget is the graphic container the renderers draw into. |
| SVGTarget | Rendering target to SVG format. |
| Class Summary | |
|---|---|
| ManagedRenderer | Small class that contains a
Renderer and its enabled state. |
| PreviewPreset | Read only set of PreviewProperty values. |
| PreviewProperties | Container for PreviewProperty attached to a PreviewModel . |
| PreviewProperty | Define a (key, value) pair property attached to a PreviewProperties
instance. |
API for Preview rendering.
This API hosts preview properties, items and renderers to control preview displays. Preview is using the current Graph to build a set of visual items. Items have a generic data container and are built within Item Builders implementations. Renderers are stateless singletons which renders items to a render target and have a list of fixed properties. RenderTarget is the graphic container: Processing, PDF or SVG.
The Preview is highly customizable and allows any plug-in to implement or override existing renderers or item builders. Consult the SPI package for more details.
|
Gephi Toolkit Javadoc | ||||||||
| PREV PACKAGE NEXT PACKAGE | FRAMES NO FRAMES |


I am currently a senior algorithm engineer at miHoYo, where I focus on NLP (Natural Language Processing). Before that, I was a senior algorithm engineer at Huawei Consumer Business Group, Shanghai, where I worked on applications and pre-research of machine learning/deep learning (mainly for Huawei's voice assistant Xiaoyi).
I obtained a master's degree and a bachelor's degree both from Department of Automation, and a second bachelor's degree in economics from School of Economics and Management, in Tsinghua University.
I enjoy writing blogs( CSDN Blog ) and push codes to my github, because I believe the best way to learn new knowledge is by explaining it clearly to other people and utilizing it to solve practical problems. Besides, I think sharing knowledge with others is one of the most wonderful things in the world!
Email  /  LinkedIn  /  Google Scholar  /  Github  /  CSDN Blog  /  CV
I have done several projects based on machine learning/deep learning methods.
I lead a team of 4 members doing pre-research on personalized ASR algorithms and application. We design and implement an architecture to fine-tune a pre-trained ASR model for each user with accent. Our aim is to improve the performance of the target user without worsening the performance of normal users. My major responsibility is to design the whole architecture and experiment plans, implement the main program and some crucial modules such as model evaluation module. During this project, I proposed a novel method to alleviate the knowledge forgetting problem when fine-tuning classification models (with softmax layer) with new personalized samples. One relevant patent has been applied by me.
I focused on the miniaturization and acceleration of AI models to reduce the consumption of ROM, RAM and power, and increase the inference speed, with little or no accuracy loss. Four relevant patents has been applied by me.
I was responsible for the domain classification module and intent re-ranking module of the NLU (Natural Language Understanding) system of Huawei’s voice assistant (Xiaoyi). Xiaoyi has served hundreds of millions of smart phone users. One revelant patent was applied y me and has been published.
The aim is to estimate the remaining useful life (RUL) of turbofan engine with degradation. I proposed a novel data-driven method based on LSTM neural networks to estimate the RUL with multivariate outputs of sensors and operational settings.
My interests are in Machine Learning and Deep Learning theories and their applications especially in NLP(Natural Language Processing). Besides, I have some research experiences in data-driven fault diagnosis and remaining useful life estimation during my master study.


Eighteen-month-old boy dies after falling from block of flats in Tottenham
The Met Police are investigating after a baby boy died after plunging from a block of flats in Tottenham High Road in North London
by Talia Shadwell, William Janes, https://www.mirror.co.uk/authors/talia-shadwell/An 18-month old baby boy has died after falling from a block of flats in Tottenham, north London.
The Met Police were called to the flats yesterday morning and found the boy in critical condition. The force today confirmed he was pronounced dead shortly after arriving in hospital.
Police and paramedics raced to the scene shortly before 10am yesterday.
Firefighters also attended and an air ambulance was scrambled to Tottenham High Road .
The baby was found in a "critical condition" and rushed to a north London hospital, but was pronounced dead shortly after arrival at around 11.40am.
A Met Police spokesman said this morning: "Officers, the London Ambulance Service, London’s Air Ambulance and the London Fire Brigade attended and found the baby boy in a critical condition.
"The child, believed to be aged 18 months, was taken to a north London hospital where he was pronounced dead at 11.39am.
"Formal identification and a post-mortem examination will take place in due course."
Police said no arrests have been made and officers are continuing to investigate.


|
Cannon Cpp
1.0.0
|
CannonCPP is a lightweight 3D physics engine written by C++ language. It's ported from CannonJS, originally used in Hago Game Runtime and now released under the MIT license.
CannonCPP inherits most features from CannonJS:
To implement CannonCPP, we have
These 3rd-party libraries are already included in this project, no additional downloads are required.
Enter
key to switch demosCannon_v1.0.0_min.wasm.wasm
will be generated in webassembly/build
directoryCannon_v1.0.0_min.wasm.js
& Cannon_v1.0.0_min.wasm.wasm
to the directory where index.html
exists.<script src="Cannon_v1.0.0_min.wasm.js" />
to index.html


 Be sure the question makes sense according to the variable's units and type.
Binary Example: Did you exercise today?
Continuous Example: How many miles did you run today? (1, 2.5, 3.5, etc.)
Discrete Example: How many full pushups did you do today?
Ordinal Example: What was the quality of your exercise today?
{% endblock %}


FPLController module¶
Source file that holds the controller of the application. All the logic of the application and the use of the GUI elements lies here.
- Classes in the source file:
Controller()
: Class that holds all the logic of the application and the manipulation of the GUI elementsthat the
FPLViewer
source file holds.
- class FPLController.Controller(main_window)¶
Bases:
object
Class that holds all the logic of the application and the manipulation of the GUI elements that the
FPLViewer
source file holds.- calculate_best_15_players()¶
Calculate and display the best 15 players selection based on the criteria selected by the user.
- display_most_valuable_position()¶
Create a table view with the most valuable positions.
- display_most_valuable_teams()¶
Create a table view with the most valuable teams.
- display_sorted_statistics()¶
Sort the table view with the player statistics.
- get_fpl_database_in_json()¶
Get the FPL database using the FPL’s API.
- static get_sep_data_from_results(results, statistics)¶
Separate the results returned by the optimization and bring it in a format suitable for display.
- Parameters
results – pandas dataframe containing the results of the optimization
statistics – pandas dataframe containing the statistics of the optimization process
- Returns
lists containing the goalkeepers, defenders, midfielders and forwards returned by the optimization, plus a list containing the statistics of the optimization process
- load_database_from_file()¶
Load Offline the FPL data from a JSON file selected by the user.
- process_data()¶
Extract the parts that we want to keep from the downloaded data and process them.
- save_database_to_file()¶
Save the downloaded FPL data to a JSON in a selected directory by the user.
- save_df_for_view_to_csv()¶
Save the table view dataframe to a CSV in a selected directory by the user.
- save_useful_player_attributes_df_to_csv()¶
Save the useful player attributes dataframe to a CSV in a selected directory by the user.
- show_player_statistics()¶
Create a table view with the player statistics.


Links to software, apps and games
Few links that might be useful for my readers
Software
Download Visual Studio Code (vscode)
Apps
Luau - smart puzzle game for iOS
Luau - smart puzzle game for Android
Luau - smart puzzle game for Windows Phone
If you liked this post, you can share it with your followers or follow me on Twitter!


--- layout: boardnews title: 'Alumni Association Charter Changes' date: 'March 3rd, 2015' author: 'Stefan Anca' permalink: '/board-news/06-alumni-association-charter-changes' preview: 'Latest Update from the GA 2014 During homecoming at the General Assemby on Saturday, the 20th of Sept 2014, on campus, the following version of the Charter has been adopted. The General Assembly decided to limit the' ---
During homecoming at the General Assemby on Saturday, the 20th of Sept 2014, on campus, the following version of the Charter has been adopted.
The General Assembly decided to limit the number of terms of office an auditor can serve to two consecutive terms. Therefore the proposed Charter, in §10 Auditors, has been changed FROM “ The auditors shall not be members of the incumbent Board .” TO “ The auditors shall not be members of the incumbent Board and shall not hold more than two consecutive terms of office. ”
Dear fellow Alumni,
Some of our projects are slowly turning into operational business, while new challenges keep us on our feet. One could say, we are slowly growing up.
Therefore, in the past months, we have worked on modifying the Charter of our Alumni Association.
Some of the aims of the proposed Charter changes consist of
For an overview of the proposed Charter Changes and respective FAQs, please download the attached document FAQ Charter Changes.
Please note: We have worked on finally being an Association that is non-profit, in German “gemeinnützig”, by law. For this to happen, the preamble of the old Charter had to be deleted.
Here is the proposed English version of the Charter and the proposed English version containing tracked changes to allow for a comparison of the new and old version.
Here is the proposed German version of the Charter and the proposed German version containing tracked changes to allow for a comparison of the new and old version.
We are always interested in your feedback!
You are invited to contact Devashish at<EMAIL_ADDRESS>at any time for further information.
For your criticism or further suggestions, please make sure to voice your concerns and suggestions at the latest by 31st of Aug. 2014, noon CET, to allow for a response on time.
We hope to see you during the General Assembly and thank you for your feedback.


Because.. why not.
{{quote.quote}} {{quote.by}}
{{quote.quote}}
You miss 100% of the shots you don't take Wayne Gretzky Michael Scott
You miss 100% of the shots you don't take


Validates that a value is a valid e-mail adress.
Validates that a value is a valid e-mail adress.
Error message. Variables: #{value} the validated input
Validates that a boolean value is false
Validates that a boolean value is false
Variables: #{value} the validated input
Validates that a value is at most 'maxLength' characters
Validates that a value is at most 'maxLength' characters
Maximum length of value
Error message. Variables: #{value} the validated input, #{maxLength} = maximum length
Validates max values
Validates max values
The maximum value
Error message. Variables: #{value} the validated input, #{max} tha max value
Validates that a value is at least 'minLength' characters
Validates that a value is at least 'minLength' characters
Minimum length of value
Error message. Variables: #{value} the validated input, #{minLength} = minimum length
Validates min values
Validates min values
The minimum value
Error message. Variables: #{value} the validated input, #{min} = the min value
Validates that values matches a regex pattern
Validates that values matches a regex pattern
Regex pattern
Error message. Variables: #{value} the validated input, #{pattern}
Validate required values
Validate required values
Error message. Variables: #{value} the validated input
Validates that two tupled strings are equal.
Validates that two tupled strings are equal.
Error message. Variables: #{value} the validated input
Validates that a boolean value is true
Validates that a boolean value is true
Variables: #{value} the validated input


Josh Siverson
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Officer K D 6 - 3 . 7. Let’s begin. Ready?
Yes, sir
Recite your baseline.
And blood-black nothingness began to spin
A system of cells interlinked within cells,
interlinked within cells, interlinked within one stem.

And dreadfully distinct against the dark, a tall white fountain played ...
Cells.
Cells.
Have you ever been in an institution?
Cells.
Cells.
Do they keep you in a cell?
Cells.
Cells.
When you're not performing your duties, do they keep you in a little box?
Cells.
Cells.
Interlinked.
Interlinked.
What's it like to hold the hand of someone you love?
Interlinked.
Interlinked.
Did they teach you how to feel, finger to finger?
Interlinked.
Interlinked.
Do you long for having your heart interlinked?
Interlinked.
Interlinked.
Do you dream about being interlinked?
Interlinked.

Interlinked.
Interlinked.
Do you feel that there's a part of you that's missing?
Interlinked.
Interlinked.
Within cells interlinked.
Within cells interlinked.
Why don't you say that three times: "within cells interlinked"
Within cells interlinked.
Within cells interlinked.
Within cells interlinked.
We're done.
Constant K.
You can pick up your bonus.
Thank you, sir.
Cells
Cells
Have you ever been in an institution. Cells.
Cells
When you're not performing your duties, do they keep you in a little box? Cells.
Cells
Interlinked. What’s it like to hold the hand of someone you love?
Interlinked...
 Dreadfully
Dreadfully
Do you like being separated from other people? Distinct
Distinct
Dreadfully distinct
Dreadfully distinct
Dark
Dark
Within cells interlinked
Within cells interlinked
Within one stem
Within one stem
And dreadfully distinct
And dreadfully distinct
Against the dark
Against the dark
A tall white fountain played...
A tall white fountain played
You're not even close to baseline .


Recipe 16.4. Associating Parameters with a Function (Currying)Credit: Scott David Daniels, Nick Perkins, Alex Martelli, Ben Wolfson, Alex Naanou, David Abrahams, Tracy Ruggles ProblemYou need to wrap a function (or other callable) to get another callable with fewer formal arguments, keeping given values fixed for the other arguments (i.e., you need to curry a callable to make another). SolutionCurry is not just a delightful spice used in Asian cuisineit's also an important programming technique in Python and other languages: def curry(f, *a, **kw): def curried(*more_a, **more_kw): return f(*(a+more_a), dict(kw, **more_kw)) return curried DiscussionPopular in functional programming, currying is a way to bind some of a function's arguments and wait for the rest of them to show up later. Currying is named in honor of Haskell Curry, a mathematician who laid some of the cornerstones in the theory of formal systems and processes. Some pedants (and it must be grudgingly admitted they have a point) claim that the technique shown in this recipe should be called partial application, and that "currying" is something else. But whether they're right or wrong, in a book whose title claims it's a cookbook, the use of curry in a title was simply irresistible. Besides, the use of the verb to curry that this recipe supports is the most popular one among programmers. The curry function defined in this recipe is invoked with a callable and some or all of the arguments to the callable. (Some people like to refer to functions that accept function objects as arguments, and return new function objects as results, as higher-order functions.) The curry function returns a closure curried that takes subsequent parameters as arguments and calls the original with all of those parameters. For example: double = curry(operator.mul, 2) triple = curry(operator.mul, 3) To implement currying, the choice is among closures, classes with callable instances, and lambda forms. Closures are simplest and fastest, so that's what we use in this recipe. A typical use of curry is to construct callback functions for GUI operations. When the operation does not merit a new function name, curry can be useful in creating these little functions. For example, this can be the case with commands for Tkinter buttons: self.button = Button(frame, text='A', command=curry(transcript.append, 'A')) Recipe 11.2 shows a specialized subset of "curry" functionality intended to produce callables that require no arguments, which are often needed for such GUI-callback usage. However, this recipe's curry function is vastly more flexible, without any substantial extra cost in either complexity or performance. Currying can also be used interactively to make versions of your functions with debugging-appropriate defaults, or initial parameters filled in for your current case. For example, database debugging work might begin by setting: Connect = curry(ODBC.Connect, dsn='MyDataSet') Another example of the use of curry in debugging is to wrap methods: def report(originalFunction, name, *args, **kw): print "%s(%s)"%(name, ', '.join(map(repr, args) + [k+'='+repr(kw[k]) for k in kw]) result = originalFunction(*args, **kw) if result: print name, '==>', result return result class Sink(object): def write(self, text): pass dest = Sink( ) dest.write = curry(report, dest.write, 'write') print >>dest, 'this', 'is', 1, 'test' If you are creating a function for regular use, the def fun form of function definition is more readable and more easily extended. As you can see from the implementation, no magic happens to specialize the function with the provided parameters. curry should be used when you feel the code is clearer with its use than without. Typically, this use will emphasize that you are only providing some pre-fixed parameters to a commonly used function, not providing any separate processing. Currying also works well in creating a "lightweight subclass". You can curry the constructor of a class to give the illusion of a subclass: BlueWindow = curry(Window, background="blue") BlueWindow._ _class_ _ is still Window, not a subclass, but if you're changing only default parameters, not behavior, currying is arguably more appropriate than subclassing anyway. And you can still pass additional parameters to the curried constructor. Two decisions must be made when coding a curry implementation, since both positional and keyword arguments can come in two "waves"some at currying time, some more at call time. The two decisions are: do the call-time positional arguments go before or after the currying-time ones? do the call-time keyword arguments override currying-time ones, or vice versa? If you study this recipe's Solution, you can see I've made these decisions in a specific way (the one that is most generally useful): call-time positional arguments after currying-time ones, call-time keyword arguments overriding currying-time ones. In some circles, this is referred to as left-left partial application. It's trivial to code other variations, such as right-left partial application: def rcurry(f, *a, **kw): def curried(*more_a, **more_kw): return f(*(more_a+a), dict(kw, **more_kw)) return curried As you can see, despite the grandiose-sounding terms, this is just a matter of concatenating more_a+a rather than the reverse; and similarly, for keyword arguments, you just need to call dict(more_kw, **kw) if you want currying-time keyword arguments to override call-time ones rather than vice versa. If you wish, you could have the curried function carry a copy of the original function's docstring, or even (easy in Python 2.4, but feasible, with a call to new.function, even in 2.3see the sidebar in Recipe 20.1) a name that is somehow derived from the original function. However, I have chosen not to do so because the original name, and argument descriptions in the docstring, are probably not appropriate for the curried version. The task of constructing and documenting the actual signature of the curried version is also feasible (with a liberal application of the helper functions from standard library module inspect), but it's so disproportionate an effort, compared to curry's delightfully simple four lines of code (!), that I resolutely refuse to undertake it. A special case, which may be worth keeping in mind, is when the callable you want to curry is a Python function (not a bound method, a C-coded function, a callable class instance, etc.), and all you need to curry is the first parameter. In this case, the function object's _ _get_ _ special method may be all you need. It takes an arbitrary argument and returns a bound-method object with the first parameter bound to that argument. For example: >>> def f(adj, noun='world'): ... return 'Goodbye, %s %s!' % (adj, noun) ... >>> cf = f._ _get_ _('cruel') >>> print cf( ) Goodbye, cruel world! >>> cf <bound method ?.f of 'cruel'> >>> type(cf) <type 'instancemethod'> >>> cf.im_func <function f at 0x402dba04> >>> cf.im_self 'cruel' See AlsoRecipe 11.2 shows a specialized subset of the curry functionality that is specifically intended for GUI callbacks; docs for the inspect module and the dict built-in type in the Library Reference and Python in a Nutshell. |


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HOME |
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PEOPLE |
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CONTACT |
Who are we?
VICBee provides consulting services in the areas of mathematical modeling and portfolio
optimization. We work with our clients to develop solutions that can meet their needs and leverage their
existing tools and resources.
We enable the implementation of the proposed solution through our cloud-based
Optimize API.
Check out our online Jupyter notebook demo by clicking here:
What can we do for you?
We can assist you with the following tasks:
-
Develop deterministic and stochastic mathematical models that can be used to
- optimize asset selection,
- build risk and cost models,
- schedule transactions
We have many years of experience in developing and deploying such models for
the finance and energy industries.
-
Deploy custom optimization solutions on our cloud-based
Optimize API.
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Help you process and interpret data using techniques such as Kalman filtering;
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Perform and interpret the result of stochastic simulations.
Copyright © 2009 VICBee Consulting


Syllabus
UNITED STATES v. PATANE
After Officer Fox began to investigate respondents apparent violation of a temporary restraining order, a federal agent told Foxs colleague, Detective Benner, that respondent, a convicted felon, illegally possessed a pistol. Officer Fox and Detective Benner proceeded to respondents home, where Fox arrested him for violating the restraining order. Benner attempted to advise respondent of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, but respondent interrupted, asserting that he knew his rights. Benner then asked about the pistol and retrieved and seized it. Respondent was indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1). The District Court granted his motion to suppress the pistol, reasoning that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him, and declining to rule on his alternative argument that the gun should be suppressed as the fruit of an unwarned statement. The Tenth Circuit reversed the probable-cause ruling, but affirmed the suppression order on respondents alternative theory. Rejecting the Governments argument that Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, foreclosed application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, to the present context, the appeals court reasoned that Oregon and Tucker , which were based on the view that Miranda announced a prophylactic rule, were incompatible with Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, in which this Court held that Miranda announced a constitutional rule. The appeals court thus equated Dickerson s ruling with the proposition that a failure to warn pursuant to Miranda is itself a violation of the suspects Fifth Amendment rights.
Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
304 F. 3d 1013, reversed and remanded.
Justice Thomas , joined by The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia , concluded that a failure to give a suspect Miranda warnings does not require suppression of the physical fruits of the suspects unwarned but voluntary statements. Pp. 412.
(a) The Miranda rule is a prophylactic employed to protect against violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause, U. S Const., Amdt. 5. That Clauses core protection is a prohibition on compelling a criminal defendant to testify against himself at trial. See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U. S. 760. It cannot be violated by the introduction of nontestimonial evidence obtained as a result of voluntary statements. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 530 U. S. 27. The Court has recognized and applied several prophylactic rules designed to protect the core privilege against self-incrimination. For example, the Miranda rule creates a presumption of coercion in custodial interrogations, in the absence of specific warnings, that is generally irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecutions case in chief. E.g., 384 U. S., at 467. But because such prophylactic rules necessarily sweep beyond the Self-Incrimination Clauses actual protections, see, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, any further extension of one of them must be justified by its necessity for the protection of the actual right against compelled self-incrimination, e.g., Chavez, supra, at 778. Thus, uncompelled statements taken without Miranda warnings can be used to impeach a defendants testimony at trial, see Elstad , supra , at 307308, though the fruits of actually compelled testimony cannot, see New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U. S. 450. A blanket rule requiring suppression of statements noncompliant with the Miranda rule could not be justified by reference to the Fifth Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence or by any deterrence rationale, e.g., Elstad , 470 U. S., at 308, and would therefore fail the Courts requirement that the closest possible fit be maintained between the Self-Incrimination Clause and any rule designed to protect it. Furthermore, the Clause contains its own exclusionary rule that automatically protects those subjected to coercive police interrogations from the use of their involuntary statements (or evidence derived from their statements) in any subsequent criminal trial. E.g., id., at 307308. This explicit textual protection supports a strong presumption against expanding the Miranda rule any further. Cf. Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386. Finally, nothing in Dickerson calls into question the Courts continued insistence on its close-fit requirement. Pp. 58.
(b) That a mere failure to give Miranda warnings does not, by itself, violate a suspects constitutional rights or even the Miranda rule was evident in many of the Courts pre- Dickerson cases, see, e.g., Elstad , supra , at 308, and the Court has adhered to that view since Dickerson, see Chavez, supra, at 772773. This follows from the nature of the fundamental trial right protected by the Self-Incrimination Clause, e.g., Withrow, supra , at 691, which the Miranda rule, in turn, protects. Thus, the police do not violate a suspects constitutional rights (or the Miranda rule) by negligent or even deliberate failures to provide full Miranda warnings. Potential violations occur, if at all, only upon the admission of unwarned statements into evidence. And, at that point, the exclusion of such statements is a complete and sufficient remedy for any perceived Miranda violation. Chavez, supra , at 790. Unlike actual violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause, there is, with respect to mere failures to warn, nothing to deter and therefore no reason to apply Wong Sun s fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. It is not for this Court to impose its preferred police practices on either federal or state officials. Pp. 810.
(c) The Tenth Circuit erred in ruling that the taking of unwarned statements violates a suspects constitutional rights. Dickerson s characterization of Miranda as a constitutional rule does not lessen the need to maintain the close-fit requirement. There is no such fit here. Introduction of the nontestimonial fruit of a voluntary statement, such as respondents pistol, does not implicate the Clause. It presents no risk that a defendants coerced statements (however defined) will be used against him at a criminal trial. In any case, the exclusion of unwarned statements is a complete and sufficient remedy for any perceived Miranda violation. E.g., Chavez, supra , at 790. Similarly, because police cannot violate the Clause by taking unwarned though voluntary statements, an exclusionary rule cannot be justified by reference to a deterrence effect on law enforcement, as the court below believed. The word witness in the constitutional text limits the Self-Incrimination Clauses scope to testimonial evidence. Hubbell, supra, at 3435. And although the Court requires the exclusion of the physical fruit of actually coerced statements, statements taken without sufficient Miranda warnings are presumed to have been coerced only for certain purposes and then only when necessary to protect the privilege against self-incrimination. This Court declines to extend that presumption further. Pp. 1012.
Justice Kennedy , joined by Justice OConnor , concluded that it is unnecessary to decide whether the detectives failure to give Patane full Miranda warnings should be characterized as a violation of the Miranda rule itself, or whether there is anything to deter so long as the unwarned statements are not later introduced at trial. In Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U. S. 298, New York v. Quarles , 467 U. S. 649, and Harris v. New York , 401 U. S. 222, evidence obtained following unwarned interrogations was held admissible based in large part on the Courts recognition that the concerns underlying the Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, rule must be accommodated to other objectives of the criminal justice system. Here, it is sufficient to note that the Government presents an even stronger case for admitting the evidence obtained as the result of Patanes unwarned statement than was presented in Elstad and Michigan v. Tucker , 417 U. S. 433. Admission of nontestimonial physical fruits (the pistol here) does not run the risk of admitting into trial an accuseds coerced incriminating statements against himself. In light of reliable physical evidences important probative value, it is doubtful that exclusion can be justified by a deterrence rationale sensitive to both law enforcement interests and a suspects rights during an in-custody interrogation. Pp. 12.
Thomas, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, J., joined. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which OConnor, J., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Dissent
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
SAMUEL
FRANCIS PATANE
Justice Souter , with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
The majority repeatedly says that the Fifth Amendment does not address the admissibility of nontestimonial evidence, an overstatement that is beside the point. The issue actually presented today is whether courts should apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine lest we create an incentive for the police to omit Miranda warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436 (1966) , before custodial interrogation. 1 In closing their eyes to the consequences of giving an evidentiary advantage to those who ignore Miranda , the majority adds an important inducement for interrogators to ignore the rule in that case.
Miranda rested on insight into the inherently coercive character of custodial interrogation and the inherently difficult exercise of assessing the voluntariness of any confession resulting from it. Unless the police give the prescribed warnings meant to counter the coercive atmosphere, a custodial confession is inadmissible, there being no need for the previous time-consuming and difficult enquiry into voluntariness. That inducement to forestall involuntary statements and troublesome issues of fact can only atrophy if we turn around and recognize an evidentiary benefit when an unwarned statement leads investigators to tangible evidence. There is, of course, a price for excluding evidence, but the Fifth Amendment is worth a price, and in the absence of a very good reason, the logic of Miranda should be followed: a Miranda violation raises a presumption of coercion, Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U. S. 298, and n. 1 (1985), and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination extends to the exclusion of derivative evidence, see United States v. Hubbell , 530 U. S. 27, 3738 (2000) (recognizing the Fifth Amendments protection against the prosecutors use of incriminating information derived directly or indirectly from … [actually] compelled testimony); Kastigar v. United States , 406 U. S. 441, 453 (1972) . That should be the end of this case.
The fact that the books contain some exceptions to the Miranda exclusionary rule carries no weight here. In Harris v. New York , 401 U. S. 222 (1971) , it was respect for the integrity of the judicial process that justified the admission of unwarned statements as impeachment evidence. But Patanes suppression motion can hardly be described as seeking to pervert Miranda into a license to use perjury or otherwise handicap the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. 401 U. S., at 225226. Nor is there any suggestion that the officers failure to warn Patane was justified or mitigated by a public emergency or other exigent circumstance, as in New York v. Quarles , 467 U. S. 649 (1984) . And of course the premise of Oregon v. Elstad , supra , is not on point; although a failure to give Miranda warnings before one individual statement does not necessarily bar the admission of a subsequent statement given after adequate warnings, 470 U. S. 298; cf. Missouri v. Seibert , ante, at ___ (slip op., at 1213) (plurality opinion), that rule obviously does not apply to physical evidence seized once and for all. 2
There is no way to read this case except as an unjustifiable invitation to law enforcement officers to flout Miranda when there may be physical evidence to be gained. The incentive is an odd one, coming from the Court on the same day it decides Missouri v. Seibert , ante . I respectfully dissent.
1 In so saying, we are taking the legal issue as it comes to us, even though the facts give off the scent of a made-up case. If there was a Miranda failure, the most immediate reason was that Patane told the police to stop giving the warnings because he already knew his rights. There could easily be an analogy in this case to the bumbling mistake the police committed in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985) . See Missouri v. Seibert, ante, at ___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 1213).
2 To the extent that Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974) (admitting the testimony of a witness who was discovered because of an unwarned custodial interrogation), created another exception to Miranda, it is off the point here. In Tucker, we explicitly declined to lay down a broad rule about the fruits of unwarned statements. Instead, we place[d] our holding on a narrower ground, relying principally on the fact that the interrogation occurred before Miranda was decided and was conducted in good faith according to constitutional standards governing at that time. 417 U. S., at 447448 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964) ).
Dissent
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
SAMUEL
FRANCIS PATANE
Justice Souter , with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
The majority repeatedly says that the Fifth Amendment does not address the admissibility of nontestimonial evidence, an overstatement that is beside the point. The issue actually presented today is whether courts should apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine lest we create an incentive for the police to omit Miranda warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436 (1966) , before custodial interrogation. 1 In closing their eyes to the consequences of giving an evidentiary advantage to those who ignore Miranda , the majority adds an important inducement for interrogators to ignore the rule in that case.
Miranda rested on insight into the inherently coercive character of custodial interrogation and the inherently difficult exercise of assessing the voluntariness of any confession resulting from it. Unless the police give the prescribed warnings meant to counter the coercive atmosphere, a custodial confession is inadmissible, there being no need for the previous time-consuming and difficult enquiry into voluntariness. That inducement to forestall involuntary statements and troublesome issues of fact can only atrophy if we turn around and recognize an evidentiary benefit when an unwarned statement leads investigators to tangible evidence. There is, of course, a price for excluding evidence, but the Fifth Amendment is worth a price, and in the absence of a very good reason, the logic of Miranda should be followed: a Miranda violation raises a presumption of coercion, Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U. S. 298, and n. 1 (1985), and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination extends to the exclusion of derivative evidence, see United States v. Hubbell , 530 U. S. 27, 3738 (2000) (recognizing the Fifth Amendments protection against the prosecutors use of incriminating information derived directly or indirectly from … [actually] compelled testimony); Kastigar v. United States , 406 U. S. 441, 453 (1972) . That should be the end of this case.
The fact that the books contain some exceptions to the Miranda exclusionary rule carries no weight here. In Harris v. New York , 401 U. S. 222 (1971) , it was respect for the integrity of the judicial process that justified the admission of unwarned statements as impeachment evidence. But Patanes suppression motion can hardly be described as seeking to pervert Miranda into a license to use perjury or otherwise handicap the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. 401 U. S., at 225226. Nor is there any suggestion that the officers failure to warn Patane was justified or mitigated by a public emergency or other exigent circumstance, as in New York v. Quarles , 467 U. S. 649 (1984) . And of course the premise of Oregon v. Elstad , supra , is not on point; although a failure to give Miranda warnings before one individual statement does not necessarily bar the admission of a subsequent statement given after adequate warnings, 470 U. S. 298; cf. Missouri v. Seibert , ante, at ___ (slip op., at 1213) (plurality opinion), that rule obviously does not apply to physical evidence seized once and for all. 2
There is no way to read this case except as an unjustifiable invitation to law enforcement officers to flout Miranda when there may be physical evidence to be gained. The incentive is an odd one, coming from the Court on the same day it decides Missouri v. Seibert , ante . I respectfully dissent.
1 In so saying, we are taking the legal issue as it comes to us, even though the facts give off the scent of a made-up case. If there was a Miranda failure, the most immediate reason was that Patane told the police to stop giving the warnings because he already knew his rights. There could easily be an analogy in this case to the bumbling mistake the police committed in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985) . See Missouri v. Seibert, ante, at ___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 1213).
2 To the extent that Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974) (admitting the testimony of a witness who was discovered because of an unwarned custodial interrogation), created another exception to Miranda, it is off the point here. In Tucker, we explicitly declined to lay down a broad rule about the fruits of unwarned statements. Instead, we place[d] our holding on a narrower ground, relying principally on the fact that the interrogation occurred before Miranda was decided and was conducted in good faith according to constitutional standards governing at that time. 417 U. S., at 447448 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964) ).
Dissent
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
SAMUEL
FRANCIS PATANE
Justice Souter , with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
The majority repeatedly says that the Fifth Amendment does not address the admissibility of nontestimonial evidence, an overstatement that is beside the point. The issue actually presented today is whether courts should apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine lest we create an incentive for the police to omit Miranda warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436 (1966) , before custodial interrogation. 1 In closing their eyes to the consequences of giving an evidentiary advantage to those who ignore Miranda , the majority adds an important inducement for interrogators to ignore the rule in that case.
Miranda rested on insight into the inherently coercive character of custodial interrogation and the inherently difficult exercise of assessing the voluntariness of any confession resulting from it. Unless the police give the prescribed warnings meant to counter the coercive atmosphere, a custodial confession is inadmissible, there being no need for the previous time-consuming and difficult enquiry into voluntariness. That inducement to forestall involuntary statements and troublesome issues of fact can only atrophy if we turn around and recognize an evidentiary benefit when an unwarned statement leads investigators to tangible evidence. There is, of course, a price for excluding evidence, but the Fifth Amendment is worth a price, and in the absence of a very good reason, the logic of Miranda should be followed: a Miranda violation raises a presumption of coercion, Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U. S. 298, and n. 1 (1985), and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination extends to the exclusion of derivative evidence, see United States v. Hubbell , 530 U. S. 27, 3738 (2000) (recognizing the Fifth Amendments protection against the prosecutors use of incriminating information derived directly or indirectly from … [actually] compelled testimony); Kastigar v. United States , 406 U. S. 441, 453 (1972) . That should be the end of this case.
The fact that the books contain some exceptions to the Miranda exclusionary rule carries no weight here. In Harris v. New York , 401 U. S. 222 (1971) , it was respect for the integrity of the judicial process that justified the admission of unwarned statements as impeachment evidence. But Patanes suppression motion can hardly be described as seeking to pervert Miranda into a license to use perjury or otherwise handicap the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. 401 U. S., at 225226. Nor is there any suggestion that the officers failure to warn Patane was justified or mitigated by a public emergency or other exigent circumstance, as in New York v. Quarles , 467 U. S. 649 (1984) . And of course the premise of Oregon v. Elstad , supra , is not on point; although a failure to give Miranda warnings before one individual statement does not necessarily bar the admission of a subsequent statement given after adequate warnings, 470 U. S. 298; cf. Missouri v. Seibert , ante, at ___ (slip op., at 1213) (plurality opinion), that rule obviously does not apply to physical evidence seized once and for all. 2
There is no way to read this case except as an unjustifiable invitation to law enforcement officers to flout Miranda when there may be physical evidence to be gained. The incentive is an odd one, coming from the Court on the same day it decides Missouri v. Seibert , ante . I respectfully dissent.
1 In so saying, we are taking the legal issue as it comes to us, even though the facts give off the scent of a made-up case. If there was a Miranda failure, the most immediate reason was that Patane told the police to stop giving the warnings because he already knew his rights. There could easily be an analogy in this case to the bumbling mistake the police committed in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985) . See Missouri v. Seibert, ante, at ___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 1213).
2 To the extent that Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974) (admitting the testimony of a witness who was discovered because of an unwarned custodial interrogation), created another exception to Miranda, it is off the point here. In Tucker, we explicitly declined to lay down a broad rule about the fruits of unwarned statements. Instead, we place[d] our holding on a narrower ground, relying principally on the fact that the interrogation occurred before Miranda was decided and was conducted in good faith according to constitutional standards governing at that time. 417 U. S., at 447448 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964) ).
Dissent
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
SAMUEL
FRANCIS PATANE
Justice Souter , with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
The majority repeatedly says that the Fifth Amendment does not address the admissibility of nontestimonial evidence, an overstatement that is beside the point. The issue actually presented today is whether courts should apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine lest we create an incentive for the police to omit Miranda warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436 (1966) , before custodial interrogation. 1 In closing their eyes to the consequences of giving an evidentiary advantage to those who ignore Miranda , the majority adds an important inducement for interrogators to ignore the rule in that case.
Miranda rested on insight into the inherently coercive character of custodial interrogation and the inherently difficult exercise of assessing the voluntariness of any confession resulting from it. Unless the police give the prescribed warnings meant to counter the coercive atmosphere, a custodial confession is inadmissible, there being no need for the previous time-consuming and difficult enquiry into voluntariness. That inducement to forestall involuntary statements and troublesome issues of fact can only atrophy if we turn around and recognize an evidentiary benefit when an unwarned statement leads investigators to tangible evidence. There is, of course, a price for excluding evidence, but the Fifth Amendment is worth a price, and in the absence of a very good reason, the logic of Miranda should be followed: a Miranda violation raises a presumption of coercion, Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U. S. 298, and n. 1 (1985), and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination extends to the exclusion of derivative evidence, see United States v. Hubbell , 530 U. S. 27, 3738 (2000) (recognizing the Fifth Amendments protection against the prosecutors use of incriminating information derived directly or indirectly from … [actually] compelled testimony); Kastigar v. United States , 406 U. S. 441, 453 (1972) . That should be the end of this case.
The fact that the books contain some exceptions to the Miranda exclusionary rule carries no weight here. In Harris v. New York , 401 U. S. 222 (1971) , it was respect for the integrity of the judicial process that justified the admission of unwarned statements as impeachment evidence. But Patanes suppression motion can hardly be described as seeking to pervert Miranda into a license to use perjury or otherwise handicap the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. 401 U. S., at 225226. Nor is there any suggestion that the officers failure to warn Patane was justified or mitigated by a public emergency or other exigent circumstance, as in New York v. Quarles , 467 U. S. 649 (1984) . And of course the premise of Oregon v. Elstad , supra , is not on point; although a failure to give Miranda warnings before one individual statement does not necessarily bar the admission of a subsequent statement given after adequate warnings, 470 U. S. 298; cf. Missouri v. Seibert , ante, at ___ (slip op., at 1213) (plurality opinion), that rule obviously does not apply to physical evidence seized once and for all. 2
There is no way to read this case except as an unjustifiable invitation to law enforcement officers to flout Miranda when there may be physical evidence to be gained. The incentive is an odd one, coming from the Court on the same day it decides Missouri v. Seibert , ante . I respectfully dissent.
1 In so saying, we are taking the legal issue as it comes to us, even though the facts give off the scent of a made-up case. If there was a Miranda failure, the most immediate reason was that Patane told the police to stop giving the warnings because he already knew his rights. There could easily be an analogy in this case to the bumbling mistake the police committed in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985) . See Missouri v. Seibert, ante, at ___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 1213).
2 To the extent that Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974) (admitting the testimony of a witness who was discovered because of an unwarned custodial interrogation), created another exception to Miranda, it is off the point here. In Tucker, we explicitly declined to lay down a broad rule about the fruits of unwarned statements. Instead, we place[d] our holding on a narrower ground, relying principally on the fact that the interrogation occurred before Miranda was decided and was conducted in good faith according to constitutional standards governing at that time. 417 U. S., at 447448 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964) ).
Dissent
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
SAMUEL
FRANCIS PATANE
Justice Souter , with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
The majority repeatedly says that the Fifth Amendment does not address the admissibility of nontestimonial evidence, an overstatement that is beside the point. The issue actually presented today is whether courts should apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine lest we create an incentive for the police to omit Miranda warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436 (1966) , before custodial interrogation. 1 In closing their eyes to the consequences of giving an evidentiary advantage to those who ignore Miranda , the majority adds an important inducement for interrogators to ignore the rule in that case.
Miranda rested on insight into the inherently coercive character of custodial interrogation and the inherently difficult exercise of assessing the voluntariness of any confession resulting from it. Unless the police give the prescribed warnings meant to counter the coercive atmosphere, a custodial confession is inadmissible, there being no need for the previous time-consuming and difficult enquiry into voluntariness. That inducement to forestall involuntary statements and troublesome issues of fact can only atrophy if we turn around and recognize an evidentiary benefit when an unwarned statement leads investigators to tangible evidence. There is, of course, a price for excluding evidence, but the Fifth Amendment is worth a price, and in the absence of a very good reason, the logic of Miranda should be followed: a Miranda violation raises a presumption of coercion, Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U. S. 298, and n. 1 (1985), and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination extends to the exclusion of derivative evidence, see United States v. Hubbell , 530 U. S. 27, 3738 (2000) (recognizing the Fifth Amendments protection against the prosecutors use of incriminating information derived directly or indirectly from … [actually] compelled testimony); Kastigar v. United States , 406 U. S. 441, 453 (1972) . That should be the end of this case.
The fact that the books contain some exceptions to the Miranda exclusionary rule carries no weight here. In Harris v. New York , 401 U. S. 222 (1971) , it was respect for the integrity of the judicial process that justified the admission of unwarned statements as impeachment evidence. But Patanes suppression motion can hardly be described as seeking to pervert Miranda into a license to use perjury or otherwise handicap the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. 401 U. S., at 225226. Nor is there any suggestion that the officers failure to warn Patane was justified or mitigated by a public emergency or other exigent circumstance, as in New York v. Quarles , 467 U. S. 649 (1984) . And of course the premise of Oregon v. Elstad , supra , is not on point; although a failure to give Miranda warnings before one individual statement does not necessarily bar the admission of a subsequent statement given after adequate warnings, 470 U. S. 298; cf. Missouri v. Seibert , ante, at ___ (slip op., at 1213) (plurality opinion), that rule obviously does not apply to physical evidence seized once and for all. 2
There is no way to read this case except as an unjustifiable invitation to law enforcement officers to flout Miranda when there may be physical evidence to be gained. The incentive is an odd one, coming from the Court on the same day it decides Missouri v. Seibert , ante . I respectfully dissent.
1 In so saying, we are taking the legal issue as it comes to us, even though the facts give off the scent of a made-up case. If there was a Miranda failure, the most immediate reason was that Patane told the police to stop giving the warnings because he already knew his rights. There could easily be an analogy in this case to the bumbling mistake the police committed in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985) . See Missouri v. Seibert, ante, at ___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 1213).
2 To the extent that Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974) (admitting the testimony of a witness who was discovered because of an unwarned custodial interrogation), created another exception to Miranda, it is off the point here. In Tucker, we explicitly declined to lay down a broad rule about the fruits of unwarned statements. Instead, we place[d] our holding on a narrower ground, relying principally on the fact that the interrogation occurred before Miranda was decided and was conducted in good faith according to constitutional standards governing at that time. 417 U. S., at 447448 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964) ).
Dissent
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
SAMUEL
FRANCIS PATANE
Justice Souter , with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
The majority repeatedly says that the Fifth Amendment does not address the admissibility of nontestimonial evidence, an overstatement that is beside the point. The issue actually presented today is whether courts should apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine lest we create an incentive for the police to omit Miranda warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436 (1966) , before custodial interrogation. 1 In closing their eyes to the consequences of giving an evidentiary advantage to those who ignore Miranda , the majority adds an important inducement for interrogators to ignore the rule in that case.
Miranda rested on insight into the inherently coercive character of custodial interrogation and the inherently difficult exercise of assessing the voluntariness of any confession resulting from it. Unless the police give the prescribed warnings meant to counter the coercive atmosphere, a custodial confession is inadmissible, there being no need for the previous time-consuming and difficult enquiry into voluntariness. That inducement to forestall involuntary statements and troublesome issues of fact can only atrophy if we turn around and recognize an evidentiary benefit when an unwarned statement leads investigators to tangible evidence. There is, of course, a price for excluding evidence, but the Fifth Amendment is worth a price, and in the absence of a very good reason, the logic of Miranda should be followed: a Miranda violation raises a presumption of coercion, Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U. S. 298, and n. 1 (1985), and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination extends to the exclusion of derivative evidence, see United States v. Hubbell , 530 U. S. 27, 3738 (2000) (recognizing the Fifth Amendments protection against the prosecutors use of incriminating information derived directly or indirectly from … [actually] compelled testimony); Kastigar v. United States , 406 U. S. 441, 453 (1972) . That should be the end of this case.
The fact that the books contain some exceptions to the Miranda exclusionary rule carries no weight here. In Harris v. New York , 401 U. S. 222 (1971) , it was respect for the integrity of the judicial process that justified the admission of unwarned statements as impeachment evidence. But Patanes suppression motion can hardly be described as seeking to pervert Miranda into a license to use perjury or otherwise handicap the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. 401 U. S., at 225226. Nor is there any suggestion that the officers failure to warn Patane was justified or mitigated by a public emergency or other exigent circumstance, as in New York v. Quarles , 467 U. S. 649 (1984) . And of course the premise of Oregon v. Elstad , supra , is not on point; although a failure to give Miranda warnings before one individual statement does not necessarily bar the admission of a subsequent statement given after adequate warnings, 470 U. S. 298; cf. Missouri v. Seibert , ante, at ___ (slip op., at 1213) (plurality opinion), that rule obviously does not apply to physical evidence seized once and for all. 2
There is no way to read this case except as an unjustifiable invitation to law enforcement officers to flout Miranda when there may be physical evidence to be gained. The incentive is an odd one, coming from the Court on the same day it decides Missouri v. Seibert , ante . I respectfully dissent.
1 In so saying, we are taking the legal issue as it comes to us, even though the facts give off the scent of a made-up case. If there was a Miranda failure, the most immediate reason was that Patane told the police to stop giving the warnings because he already knew his rights. There could easily be an analogy in this case to the bumbling mistake the police committed in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985) . See Missouri v. Seibert, ante, at ___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 1213).
2 To the extent that Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974) (admitting the testimony of a witness who was discovered because of an unwarned custodial interrogation), created another exception to Miranda, it is off the point here. In Tucker, we explicitly declined to lay down a broad rule about the fruits of unwarned statements. Instead, we place[d] our holding on a narrower ground, relying principally on the fact that the interrogation occurred before Miranda was decided and was conducted in good faith according to constitutional standards governing at that time. 417 U. S., at 447448 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964) ).
Dissent
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
SAMUEL
FRANCIS PATANE
Justice Souter , with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
The majority repeatedly says that the Fifth Amendment does not address the admissibility of nontestimonial evidence, an overstatement that is beside the point. The issue actually presented today is whether courts should apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine lest we create an incentive for the police to omit Miranda warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436 (1966) , before custodial interrogation. 1 In closing their eyes to the consequences of giving an evidentiary advantage to those who ignore Miranda , the majority adds an important inducement for interrogators to ignore the rule in that case.
Miranda rested on insight into the inherently coercive character of custodial interrogation and the inherently difficult exercise of assessing the voluntariness of any confession resulting from it. Unless the police give the prescribed warnings meant to counter the coercive atmosphere, a custodial confession is inadmissible, there being no need for the previous time-consuming and difficult enquiry into voluntariness. That inducement to forestall involuntary statements and troublesome issues of fact can only atrophy if we turn around and recognize an evidentiary benefit when an unwarned statement leads investigators to tangible evidence. There is, of course, a price for excluding evidence, but the Fifth Amendment is worth a price, and in the absence of a very good reason, the logic of Miranda should be followed: a Miranda violation raises a presumption of coercion, Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U. S. 298, and n. 1 (1985), and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination extends to the exclusion of derivative evidence, see United States v. Hubbell , 530 U. S. 27, 3738 (2000) (recognizing the Fifth Amendments protection against the prosecutors use of incriminating information derived directly or indirectly from … [actually] compelled testimony); Kastigar v. United States , 406 U. S. 441, 453 (1972) . That should be the end of this case.
The fact that the books contain some exceptions to the Miranda exclusionary rule carries no weight here. In Harris v. New York , 401 U. S. 222 (1971) , it was respect for the integrity of the judicial process that justified the admission of unwarned statements as impeachment evidence. But Patanes suppression motion can hardly be described as seeking to pervert Miranda into a license to use perjury or otherwise handicap the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. 401 U. S., at 225226. Nor is there any suggestion that the officers failure to warn Patane was justified or mitigated by a public emergency or other exigent circumstance, as in New York v. Quarles , 467 U. S. 649 (1984) . And of course the premise of Oregon v. Elstad , supra , is not on point; although a failure to give Miranda warnings before one individual statement does not necessarily bar the admission of a subsequent statement given after adequate warnings, 470 U. S. 298; cf. Missouri v. Seibert , ante, at ___ (slip op., at 1213) (plurality opinion), that rule obviously does not apply to physical evidence seized once and for all. 2
There is no way to read this case except as an unjustifiable invitation to law enforcement officers to flout Miranda when there may be physical evidence to be gained. The incentive is an odd one, coming from the Court on the same day it decides Missouri v. Seibert , ante . I respectfully dissent.
1 In so saying, we are taking the legal issue as it comes to us, even though the facts give off the scent of a made-up case. If there was a Miranda failure, the most immediate reason was that Patane told the police to stop giving the warnings because he already knew his rights. There could easily be an analogy in this case to the bumbling mistake the police committed in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985) . See Missouri v. Seibert, ante, at ___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 1213).
2 To the extent that Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974) (admitting the testimony of a witness who was discovered because of an unwarned custodial interrogation), created another exception to Miranda, it is off the point here. In Tucker, we explicitly declined to lay down a broad rule about the fruits of unwarned statements. Instead, we place[d] our holding on a narrower ground, relying principally on the fact that the interrogation occurred before Miranda was decided and was conducted in good faith according to constitutional standards governing at that time. 417 U. S., at 447448 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964) ).
Dissent
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
SAMUEL
FRANCIS PATANE
Justice Souter , with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
The majority repeatedly says that the Fifth Amendment does not address the admissibility of nontestimonial evidence, an overstatement that is beside the point. The issue actually presented today is whether courts should apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine lest we create an incentive for the police to omit Miranda warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436 (1966) , before custodial interrogation. 1 In closing their eyes to the consequences of giving an evidentiary advantage to those who ignore Miranda , the majority adds an important inducement for interrogators to ignore the rule in that case.
Miranda rested on insight into the inherently coercive character of custodial interrogation and the inherently difficult exercise of assessing the voluntariness of any confession resulting from it. Unless the police give the prescribed warnings meant to counter the coercive atmosphere, a custodial confession is inadmissible, there being no need for the previous time-consuming and difficult enquiry into voluntariness. That inducement to forestall involuntary statements and troublesome issues of fact can only atrophy if we turn around and recognize an evidentiary benefit when an unwarned statement leads investigators to tangible evidence. There is, of course, a price for excluding evidence, but the Fifth Amendment is worth a price, and in the absence of a very good reason, the logic of Miranda should be followed: a Miranda violation raises a presumption of coercion, Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U. S. 298, and n. 1 (1985), and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination extends to the exclusion of derivative evidence, see United States v. Hubbell , 530 U. S. 27, 3738 (2000) (recognizing the Fifth Amendments protection against the prosecutors use of incriminating information derived directly or indirectly from … [actually] compelled testimony); Kastigar v. United States , 406 U. S. 441, 453 (1972) . That should be the end of this case.
The fact that the books contain some exceptions to the Miranda exclusionary rule carries no weight here. In Harris v. New York , 401 U. S. 222 (1971) , it was respect for the integrity of the judicial process that justified the admission of unwarned statements as impeachment evidence. But Patanes suppression motion can hardly be described as seeking to pervert Miranda into a license to use perjury or otherwise handicap the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. 401 U. S., at 225226. Nor is there any suggestion that the officers failure to warn Patane was justified or mitigated by a public emergency or other exigent circumstance, as in New York v. Quarles , 467 U. S. 649 (1984) . And of course the premise of Oregon v. Elstad , supra , is not on point; although a failure to give Miranda warnings before one individual statement does not necessarily bar the admission of a subsequent statement given after adequate warnings, 470 U. S. 298; cf. Missouri v. Seibert , ante, at ___ (slip op., at 1213) (plurality opinion), that rule obviously does not apply to physical evidence seized once and for all. 2
There is no way to read this case except as an unjustifiable invitation to law enforcement officers to flout Miranda when there may be physical evidence to be gained. The incentive is an odd one, coming from the Court on the same day it decides Missouri v. Seibert , ante . I respectfully dissent.
1 In so saying, we are taking the legal issue as it comes to us, even though the facts give off the scent of a made-up case. If there was a Miranda failure, the most immediate reason was that Patane told the police to stop giving the warnings because he already knew his rights. There could easily be an analogy in this case to the bumbling mistake the police committed in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985) . See Missouri v. Seibert, ante, at ___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 1213).
2 To the extent that Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974) (admitting the testimony of a witness who was discovered because of an unwarned custodial interrogation), created another exception to Miranda, it is off the point here. In Tucker, we explicitly declined to lay down a broad rule about the fruits of unwarned statements. Instead, we place[d] our holding on a narrower ground, relying principally on the fact that the interrogation occurred before Miranda was decided and was conducted in good faith according to constitutional standards governing at that time. 417 U. S., at 447448 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964) ).
Dissent
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
SAMUEL
FRANCIS PATANE
Justice Souter , with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
The majority repeatedly says that the Fifth Amendment does not address the admissibility of nontestimonial evidence, an overstatement that is beside the point. The issue actually presented today is whether courts should apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine lest we create an incentive for the police to omit Miranda warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436 (1966) , before custodial interrogation. 1 In closing their eyes to the consequences of giving an evidentiary advantage to those who ignore Miranda , the majority adds an important inducement for interrogators to ignore the rule in that case.
Miranda rested on insight into the inherently coercive character of custodial interrogation and the inherently difficult exercise of assessing the voluntariness of any confession resulting from it. Unless the police give the prescribed warnings meant to counter the coercive atmosphere, a custodial confession is inadmissible, there being no need for the previous time-consuming and difficult enquiry into voluntariness. That inducement to forestall involuntary statements and troublesome issues of fact can only atrophy if we turn around and recognize an evidentiary benefit when an unwarned statement leads investigators to tangible evidence. There is, of course, a price for excluding evidence, but the Fifth Amendment is worth a price, and in the absence of a very good reason, the logic of Miranda should be followed: a Miranda violation raises a presumption of coercion, Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U. S. 298, and n. 1 (1985), and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination extends to the exclusion of derivative evidence, see United States v. Hubbell , 530 U. S. 27, 3738 (2000) (recognizing the Fifth Amendments protection against the prosecutors use of incriminating information derived directly or indirectly from … [actually] compelled testimony); Kastigar v. United States , 406 U. S. 441, 453 (1972) . That should be the end of this case.
The fact that the books contain some exceptions to the Miranda exclusionary rule carries no weight here. In Harris v. New York , 401 U. S. 222 (1971) , it was respect for the integrity of the judicial process that justified the admission of unwarned statements as impeachment evidence. But Patanes suppression motion can hardly be described as seeking to pervert Miranda into a license to use perjury or otherwise handicap the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. 401 U. S., at 225226. Nor is there any suggestion that the officers failure to warn Patane was justified or mitigated by a public emergency or other exigent circumstance, as in New York v. Quarles , 467 U. S. 649 (1984) . And of course the premise of Oregon v. Elstad , supra , is not on point; although a failure to give Miranda warnings before one individual statement does not necessarily bar the admission of a subsequent statement given after adequate warnings, 470 U. S. 298; cf. Missouri v. Seibert , ante, at ___ (slip op., at 1213) (plurality opinion), that rule obviously does not apply to physical evidence seized once and for all. 2
There is no way to read this case except as an unjustifiable invitation to law enforcement officers to flout Miranda when there may be physical evidence to be gained. The incentive is an odd one, coming from the Court on the same day it decides Missouri v. Seibert , ante . I respectfully dissent.
1 In so saying, we are taking the legal issue as it comes to us, even though the facts give off the scent of a made-up case. If there was a Miranda failure, the most immediate reason was that Patane told the police to stop giving the warnings because he already knew his rights. There could easily be an analogy in this case to the bumbling mistake the police committed in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985) . See Missouri v. Seibert, ante, at ___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 1213).
2 To the extent that Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974) (admitting the testimony of a witness who was discovered because of an unwarned custodial interrogation), created another exception to Miranda, it is off the point here. In Tucker, we explicitly declined to lay down a broad rule about the fruits of unwarned statements. Instead, we place[d] our holding on a narrower ground, relying principally on the fact that the interrogation occurred before Miranda was decided and was conducted in good faith according to constitutional standards governing at that time. 417 U. S., at 447448 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964) ).
Dissent
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
SAMUEL
FRANCIS PATANE
Justice Souter , with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
The majority repeatedly says that the Fifth Amendment does not address the admissibility of nontestimonial evidence, an overstatement that is beside the point. The issue actually presented today is whether courts should apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine lest we create an incentive for the police to omit Miranda warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436 (1966) , before custodial interrogation. 1 In closing their eyes to the consequences of giving an evidentiary advantage to those who ignore Miranda , the majority adds an important inducement for interrogators to ignore the rule in that case.
Miranda rested on insight into the inherently coercive character of custodial interrogation and the inherently difficult exercise of assessing the voluntariness of any confession resulting from it. Unless the police give the prescribed warnings meant to counter the coercive atmosphere, a custodial confession is inadmissible, there being no need for the previous time-consuming and difficult enquiry into voluntariness. That inducement to forestall involuntary statements and troublesome issues of fact can only atrophy if we turn around and recognize an evidentiary benefit when an unwarned statement leads investigators to tangible evidence. There is, of course, a price for excluding evidence, but the Fifth Amendment is worth a price, and in the absence of a very good reason, the logic of Miranda should be followed: a Miranda violation raises a presumption of coercion, Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U. S. 298, and n. 1 (1985), and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination extends to the exclusion of derivative evidence, see United States v. Hubbell , 530 U. S. 27, 3738 (2000) (recognizing the Fifth Amendments protection against the prosecutors use of incriminating information derived directly or indirectly from … [actually] compelled testimony); Kastigar v. United States , 406 U. S. 441, 453 (1972) . That should be the end of this case.
The fact that the books contain some exceptions to the Miranda exclusionary rule carries no weight here. In Harris v. New York , 401 U. S. 222 (1971) , it was respect for the integrity of the judicial process that justified the admission of unwarned statements as impeachment evidence. But Patanes suppression motion can hardly be described as seeking to pervert Miranda into a license to use perjury or otherwise handicap the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. 401 U. S., at 225226. Nor is there any suggestion that the officers failure to warn Patane was justified or mitigated by a public emergency or other exigent circumstance, as in New York v. Quarles , 467 U. S. 649 (1984) . And of course the premise of Oregon v. Elstad , supra , is not on point; although a failure to give Miranda warnings before one individual statement does not necessarily bar the admission of a subsequent statement given after adequate warnings, 470 U. S. 298; cf. Missouri v. Seibert , ante, at ___ (slip op., at 1213) (plurality opinion), that rule obviously does not apply to physical evidence seized once and for all. 2
There is no way to read this case except as an unjustifiable invitation to law enforcement officers to flout Miranda when there may be physical evidence to be gained. The incentive is an odd one, coming from the Court on the same day it decides Missouri v. Seibert , ante . I respectfully dissent.
1 In so saying, we are taking the legal issue as it comes to us, even though the facts give off the scent of a made-up case. If there was a Miranda failure, the most immediate reason was that Patane told the police to stop giving the warnings because he already knew his rights. There could easily be an analogy in this case to the bumbling mistake the police committed in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985) . See Missouri v. Seibert, ante, at ___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 1213).
2 To the extent that Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974) (admitting the testimony of a witness who was discovered because of an unwarned custodial interrogation), created another exception to Miranda, it is off the point here. In Tucker, we explicitly declined to lay down a broad rule about the fruits of unwarned statements. Instead, we place[d] our holding on a narrower ground, relying principally on the fact that the interrogation occurred before Miranda was decided and was conducted in good faith according to constitutional standards governing at that time. 417 U. S., at 447448 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964) ).
Dissent
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
SAMUEL
FRANCIS PATANE
Justice Souter , with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
The majority repeatedly says that the Fifth Amendment does not address the admissibility of nontestimonial evidence, an overstatement that is beside the point. The issue actually presented today is whether courts should apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine lest we create an incentive for the police to omit Miranda warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436 (1966) , before custodial interrogation. 1 In closing their eyes to the consequences of giving an evidentiary advantage to those who ignore Miranda , the majority adds an important inducement for interrogators to ignore the rule in that case.
Miranda rested on insight into the inherently coercive character of custodial interrogation and the inherently difficult exercise of assessing the voluntariness of any confession resulting from it. Unless the police give the prescribed warnings meant to counter the coercive atmosphere, a custodial confession is inadmissible, there being no need for the previous time-consuming and difficult enquiry into voluntariness. That inducement to forestall involuntary statements and troublesome issues of fact can only atrophy if we turn around and recognize an evidentiary benefit when an unwarned statement leads investigators to tangible evidence. There is, of course, a price for excluding evidence, but the Fifth Amendment is worth a price, and in the absence of a very good reason, the logic of Miranda should be followed: a Miranda violation raises a presumption of coercion, Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U. S. 298, and n. 1 (1985), and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination extends to the exclusion of derivative evidence, see United States v. Hubbell , 530 U. S. 27, 3738 (2000) (recognizing the Fifth Amendments protection against the prosecutors use of incriminating information derived directly or indirectly from … [actually] compelled testimony); Kastigar v. United States , 406 U. S. 441, 453 (1972) . That should be the end of this case.
The fact that the books contain some exceptions to the Miranda exclusionary rule carries no weight here. In Harris v. New York , 401 U. S. 222 (1971) , it was respect for the integrity of the judicial process that justified the admission of unwarned statements as impeachment evidence. But Patanes suppression motion can hardly be described as seeking to pervert Miranda into a license to use perjury or otherwise handicap the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. 401 U. S., at 225226. Nor is there any suggestion that the officers failure to warn Patane was justified or mitigated by a public emergency or other exigent circumstance, as in New York v. Quarles , 467 U. S. 649 (1984) . And of course the premise of Oregon v. Elstad , supra , is not on point; although a failure to give Miranda warnings before one individual statement does not necessarily bar the admission of a subsequent statement given after adequate warnings, 470 U. S. 298; cf. Missouri v. Seibert , ante, at ___ (slip op., at 1213) (plurality opinion), that rule obviously does not apply to physical evidence seized once and for all. 2
There is no way to read this case except as an unjustifiable invitation to law enforcement officers to flout Miranda when there may be physical evidence to be gained. The incentive is an odd one, coming from the Court on the same day it decides Missouri v. Seibert , ante . I respectfully dissent.
1 In so saying, we are taking the legal issue as it comes to us, even though the facts give off the scent of a made-up case. If there was a Miranda failure, the most immediate reason was that Patane told the police to stop giving the warnings because he already knew his rights. There could easily be an analogy in this case to the bumbling mistake the police committed in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985) . See Missouri v. Seibert, ante, at ___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 1213).
2 To the extent that Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974) (admitting the testimony of a witness who was discovered because of an unwarned custodial interrogation), created another exception to Miranda, it is off the point here. In Tucker, we explicitly declined to lay down a broad rule about the fruits of unwarned statements. Instead, we place[d] our holding on a narrower ground, relying principally on the fact that the interrogation occurred before Miranda was decided and was conducted in good faith according to constitutional standards governing at that time. 417 U. S., at 447448 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964) ).
Dissent
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
SAMUEL
FRANCIS PATANE
Justice Souter , with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
The majority repeatedly says that the Fifth Amendment does not address the admissibility of nontestimonial evidence, an overstatement that is beside the point. The issue actually presented today is whether courts should apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine lest we create an incentive for the police to omit Miranda warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436 (1966) , before custodial interrogation. 1 In closing their eyes to the consequences of giving an evidentiary advantage to those who ignore Miranda , the majority adds an important inducement for interrogators to ignore the rule in that case.
Miranda rested on insight into the inherently coercive character of custodial interrogation and the inherently difficult exercise of assessing the voluntariness of any confession resulting from it. Unless the police give the prescribed warnings meant to counter the coercive atmosphere, a custodial confession is inadmissible, there being no need for the previous time-consuming and difficult enquiry into voluntariness. That inducement to forestall involuntary statements and troublesome issues of fact can only atrophy if we turn around and recognize an evidentiary benefit when an unwarned statement leads investigators to tangible evidence. There is, of course, a price for excluding evidence, but the Fifth Amendment is worth a price, and in the absence of a very good reason, the logic of Miranda should be followed: a Miranda violation raises a presumption of coercion, Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U. S. 298, and n. 1 (1985), and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination extends to the exclusion of derivative evidence, see United States v. Hubbell , 530 U. S. 27, 3738 (2000) (recognizing the Fifth Amendments protection against the prosecutors use of incriminating information derived directly or indirectly from … [actually] compelled testimony); Kastigar v. United States , 406 U. S. 441, 453 (1972) . That should be the end of this case.
The fact that the books contain some exceptions to the Miranda exclusionary rule carries no weight here. In Harris v. New York , 401 U. S. 222 (1971) , it was respect for the integrity of the judicial process that justified the admission of unwarned statements as impeachment evidence. But Patanes suppression motion can hardly be described as seeking to pervert Miranda into a license to use perjury or otherwise handicap the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. 401 U. S., at 225226. Nor is there any suggestion that the officers failure to warn Patane was justified or mitigated by a public emergency or other exigent circumstance, as in New York v. Quarles , 467 U. S. 649 (1984) . And of course the premise of Oregon v. Elstad , supra , is not on point; although a failure to give Miranda warnings before one individual statement does not necessarily bar the admission of a subsequent statement given after adequate warnings, 470 U. S. 298; cf. Missouri v. Seibert , ante, at ___ (slip op., at 1213) (plurality opinion), that rule obviously does not apply to physical evidence seized once and for all. 2
There is no way to read this case except as an unjustifiable invitation to law enforcement officers to flout Miranda when there may be physical evidence to be gained. The incentive is an odd one, coming from the Court on the same day it decides Missouri v. Seibert , ante . I respectfully dissent.
1 In so saying, we are taking the legal issue as it comes to us, even though the facts give off the scent of a made-up case. If there was a Miranda failure, the most immediate reason was that Patane told the police to stop giving the warnings because he already knew his rights. There could easily be an analogy in this case to the bumbling mistake the police committed in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985) . See Missouri v. Seibert, ante, at ___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 1213).
2 To the extent that Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974) (admitting the testimony of a witness who was discovered because of an unwarned custodial interrogation), created another exception to Miranda, it is off the point here. In Tucker, we explicitly declined to lay down a broad rule about the fruits of unwarned statements. Instead, we place[d] our holding on a narrower ground, relying principally on the fact that the interrogation occurred before Miranda was decided and was conducted in good faith according to constitutional standards governing at that time. 417 U. S., at 447448 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964) ).


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Job Description
Community workers help to improve the lives of disadvantaged individuals and groups by facilitating change and providing the means for self-help within community settings.more
Community workers help those who are marginalised and excluded from society to change their situation and tackle the problems that face their community. They sometimes work with communities as a whole, but they may also focus on specific groups, such as women and travellers. Community workers operate in teams, liaising closely with the police, social workers, teachers, local authorities, probation officers and other agencies. They represent the voices and needs of target groups and disadvantaged communities to policy makers at local and national level.
Responsibilities
- Working with community groups providing a range of activities
- Identifying and building on communities’ assets and capacities
- Helping communities to share knowledge and resources effectively
- Setting up new services by liaison with interested groups
- Recruiting and training paid and voluntary staff
- Attending meetings and presenting verbal and written reports
- Managing finance and payroll
- Making funding applications
- Facilitating self-help in the community
Local travel can be a regular feature of the job, although overseas travel is rare. Overseas work is possible however with Organizations such as Goal.
The job of a community worker can require regular unsocial hours including evenings and weekends. Community workers operate mainly in disadvantaged communities within inner-city areas, rural areas and small towns.
Key skills for community workers
- Ability to relate to people from a wide range of backgrounds and to engage with target groups
- In-depth understanding of related policies
- Excellent written and oral communication skills including report writing
- Commitment and enthusiasm
- Good leadership, motivational and Organizational skills
- Capable of working both on own initiative and as part of a team
- Sincerity, patience, tact and the ability to earn the trust of others
- Making funding applications
- Excellent listening skills and confidence in talking to people both in groups and on a one-to-one basis
Applicants for postgraduate programmes will normally need to have experience of working with communities, neighbourhood groups, youth Organizations or other similar groups.Newly-qualified community workers will normally train on the job with the support of experienced colleagues and continuing professional development will be made available through a range of courses, seminars and conferences.In line with national provisions for the protection of children and vulnerable adults, applicants for jobs and training programmes will normally be required to undergo checks with the Criminal Records Bureau. less


Smart clothing is still to go mainstream after first popping to the surface in 2015, but we're slowly seeing more companies play around with the concept of connected garments.
Much more than just strapping gadgets to our wrists, faces, ears and feet, smart clothing can constantly track our heart rate, monitor our emotions and even pay for your morning coffee – all without grabbing a phone or even tapping a smartwatch screen.
But what are the best bits of smart clothing to buy? Well, below are some of the top tech garments we've seen so far, as well as a few that are coming soon.
Levi's Trucker Jacket is the first item of connected clothing that has been launch from Google's Project Jacquard initiative. This initiative is also planning to create fingerprint scanner shirts also allows people to be able to pay without an touching of the register.
By building touch and gesture sensitive areas on the jacket’s sleeve, people will now be able to interact with a lot of services including the time of day and Google Maps. You'll be able to dismiss phone calls with one swipe or even tap twice on the jacket to get directions – all without reaching for your phone.
After a delayed launch, the smart denim jacket is now available online to optimize the productivity of your day in many different ways.
Sabine Seymour's fashion tech startup, Supa, mashes up neon, a heart rate sensor and AI to give you a smart bra with a tonne of personality. It's water resistant and syncs to the Supa.AI app via Bluetooth. It'll use "invisible biometric sensors" and AI to not only keep track of workouts, but track things like UV levels, too.
You can get the Supa in three sizes – small, medium and large – and it comes in three distinct styles. There's the Supa heavy stripes, a blue-tinted mix and the very colourful 'colours'. You can pick up the bra for about $120, but you'll also need to get the Supa Reactor to actually keep track of your health data.
The Montreal-based smart clothing startup recently unveiled its latest connected shirt that's laced with sensors. Along with monitoring heart rate, breathing and movement, it's now fitted with a Bluetooth Smart sensor so you can pair your favourite fitness apps such as MapMyRun, RunKeeper and Strava, as well as a whole host of third-party accessories.
Data is captured in real time and sends it all to the companion app, providing insights on a range of sporty metrics including intensity and recovery, calories burned, fatigue level and sleep quality.
Not every bit of smart clothing is trying to help you get fitter, with the Siren socks instead aiming to detect and prevent diabetics' foot injuries.
The socks feature microsensors woven into the fabric to continuously monitor temperature, and when they detect a rise in heat – a possible sign that inflammation is occurring – they'll alert the user with a smartphone notification or text message.
The idea is to catch injuries before it's too late, since inflammation can lead to foot ulcers. However, with diabetics who suffer from nerve damage often experiencing numbness in the legs, these symptoms are often ignored.
Shipping is expected to commence later this year, though people with diabetes interested in the connected socks can pre-order their plan already.
Samsung is going big on smart clothing and has already shown off its Body Compass workout shirt, which monitors biometric data, and a golf shirt in collaboration with Bean Pole Golf that includes weather and UV rating monitoring.
The Korean giant also has an NFC smart suit, built in collaboration with Rogatis, that lets the wearer unlock their phone, swap business cards digitally and set gadgets to office and drive modes.
It's already on sale in Korea for roughly $500, under Samsung's wearable brand The Human Fit, with no news yet as to whether it's going to break out into other territories.


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