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海外驻军的利害计算
目录
Chapter Four Strategic Considerations: Benefits of Overseas Posture for Security Cooperation
Does Overseas Basing Provide Cost Advantages for Security Cooperation?
Does Overseas Basing Provide Benefits for Partner Capability Development?
Does Overseas Basing Provide Training Advantages for U.S. Forces?
How Do Rotational Forces Change U.S. Military Strategies for Security Cooperation?
Implications for Posture
Chapter five Risks to Investing in Facilities Overseas
Chapter Six Installation Conditions
Chapter Four Strategic Considerations: Benefits of Overseas Posture for Security Cooperation
U.S. government strategic guidance documents, such as the 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance, 2010 QDR, and DoD defense posture reports to Congress, assert that overseas
posture provides significant strategic benefits, including improved security cooperation
between the United States and partner countries.
DoD doctrine defines security cooperation as “activities undertaken by the
Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with
the U.S. to achieve strategic objectives.”1 Examples of security cooperation include
programs that train and equip foreign partners, provide professional military education,
conduct military exercises, and exchange information. Security cooperation is
a means to several important U.S. national security goals. It helps build the capacity
and professionalism of partner security forces (sometimes called “building partner
capacity”), which can reduce instability, assure partners, and deter adversaries. It may
also strengthen partners’ willingness to use their security forces in support of U.S. foreign
policy goals. Finally, it can improve U.S. military capabilities, particularly those
required for effective coalition operations.
This chapter provides a qualitative assessment of the ways overseas posture might
benefit U.S. security cooperation efforts. Specifically, we analyzed whether U.S. forces
based overseas might provide advantages in terms of cost, partner willingness to deploy
forces, partner capability development, and U.S. training. We also analyzed whether
rotational forces (i.e., forces that deploy overseas regularly) provide advantages similar
to those of forces permanently based overseas.
RAND has produced extensive analyses of security cooperation and nation building,
but there has been very little research about whether forces based overseas provide
security cooperation advantages over U.S.-based forces.2 We focused our research for this component of the study on a number of snapshots that might inform a broader
qualitative analysis. First, we focus primarily on larger-scale security cooperation conducted
overseas, since these activities are more likely to influence decisions about overseas
basing or allocations of rotational forces. Second, while we looked at the conduct
of security cooperation by all four military services, we focused our analysis primarily
on the Army and Air Force. We look specifically at the Marine Corps in terms of
how rotational forces compare with forces permanently stationed overseas and at the
Navy in terms of conducting security cooperation with sea-based forces. Third, while
we address security cooperation conducted around the world, we focused especially on
EUCOM, because of its emphasis on security cooperation and relatively high level of
overseas forces.
Overall, we conclude that overseas basing provides some advantages in each of
these areas but only in certain circumstances, as described below. Although CONUSbased
forces have also conducted extensive security cooperation to positive effect, we
also conclude that overseas basing both improves and increases security cooperation.
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Does Overseas Basing Provide Cost Advantages for Security Cooperation?
The data generally supported our hypothesis that forces based overseas can conduct
security cooperation activities with relatively low marginal cost and at a lower cost
than CONUS-based forces, particularly for large-scale activities. However, the cost
differential is much smaller than the overall incremental cost to base forces overseas,
so the decision to base forces abroad should depend upon other factors. This section
looks at the marginal cost of conducting security cooperation, given that forces are
already based overseas, and the cost differential of security cooperation conducted by
forward compared with CONUS-based forces. Chapter Eight assesses the cost differential
between U.S. and foreign basing as a whole. Security cooperation cost efficiencies
are simply one additional factor, but one that could slightly offset higher overseas
basing costs.
Security cooperation activities can range from multinational exercises with army
battalions and fighter squadrons to military advisory missions to classroom education
to conferences. Similarly, costs can vary from a few hundred to a few million dollars.
Military planners can leverage forces based overseas to reduce costs of security cooperation
by using existing assets, personnel, and U.S. training requirements. For example,
RAND research has shown that USAFE security cooperation—even including
high-end, more expensive activities—adds only $51 million to overall annual operating
costs, roughly 1 percent of USAFE’s $5 billion operating budget.3 Air Force pilots
who need to fly hours for their own training can sometimes fly those hours in concert
with a security cooperation mission. Since some security cooperation costs are partially
covered by fixed costs as well as annual training costs when forces are stationed
in the region, more security cooperation does not result in proportionally more cost.
Thus, as Air Force officials in Europe noted, as squadron numbers go down, so will
security cooperation activities. Planners can mitigate this somewhat by bringing in Air
National Guard or other units from the United States, but costs for security cooperation
grow significantly.4 But it is more likely that the frequency of such activities will
decrease.
U.S. forces based in Europe also reduce transportation costs for security cooperation
in Africa, but only by small amounts. For example, U.S. Naval Forces Africa,
found that, based on an average of four security cooperation missions per year, transportation
costs would be $1.2 million (or 60 percent more) for CONUS-based forces,
compared with $750,000 for European-based forces. U.S. Air Forces Africa found
travel costs for personnel to be about 50 percent more when using CONUS-based forces.
5 U.S. forces from Europe conduct about half of their security cooperation activities
in Africa. While these examples indicate there are potential offsets to the total marginal
costs of basing forces overseas, any savings would constitute a relatively small part
of the overall cost factors considered in this study.
While the examples above help illustrate the potential security cooperation cost
savings of overseas basing, available security cooperation data did not allow for comprehensive
comparisons of the relative costs of security cooperation between forces
based in the United States and those based overseas. A general review of security cooperation
data was inconclusive. This could be because transporting equipment and personnel
for security cooperation events within a region is not consistently less expensive
than transporting them from the United States. It could also be because the data did
not always reflect total costs of activities or because they did not reflect the qualitative
differences between activities. More important than the relatively small potential cost
savings, however, is the fact that when forces are based overseas for multiple reasons (e.g., deterrence, operational reach), the incremental cost to conduct security cooperation
is low, which leads to a higher level of activity. Additional information about security
cooperation costs and overseas basing is in Appendix C.
Does Overseas Basing Improve Partner Willingness to Deploy Forces?
While a partner nation’s political considerations will dominate its decisions about
deploying forces to support multinational operations, U.S. overseas basing and security
cooperation may influence those decisions for several reasons. First, it strengthens
political and military relationships that could translate into U.S. influence or at least
a more general alignment of political values and goals. Second, security cooperation
with U.S. forces overseas may help partners feel secure enough to deploy their forces
in coalition operations rather than to focus exclusively on their own security. Third,
it might support the strengthening of partner capabilities such that partners become
more willing to participate in coalition operations.
Deployment decisions are often overshadowed by other factors. For example,
despite hosting large numbers of U.S. forces, Japan’s constitution severely constrains
its ability to deploy security forces outside its borders. Australia has been the largest
non-NATO contributor of troops to Afghanistan, despite an absence of U.S. bases.
Although it hosts the only U.S. base in Latin America, Honduras provided no troops
to Afghanistan and far fewer to Iraq than its neighbor, El Salvador. On the other hand,
South Korea was the second-largest contributor of ground troops to support U.S. operations
in Iraq after the UK.6 The long-term commitment of U.S. forces to Korea may
have made it politically and militarily feasible for South Korea to contribute forces to
Iraq. While 20 European countries were contributing troops to the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan as of August 2012, it would be difficult to evaluate
to what extent European deployments are due to U.S. overseas basing and security
cooperation rather than shared political values derived from economic, cultural, and
historical ties, as well as the integrating influence of NATO and the capabilities of the
countries themselves. Table 4.1 shows the number of troops contributed by nations in
four categories.
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Table 4.1 International Security Assistance Force Troops, August 2012
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Does Overseas Basing Provide Benefits for Partner Capability Development?
In some cases, basing forces overseas appeared beneficial for strengthening partner
capabilities—particularly for more advanced military capabilities and interoperability—
while in others it appeared that U.S.-based forces could do the job adequately.
Overseas basing appears most important for security cooperation efforts in South
Korea and many countries in Europe. For these countries, security cooperation is an
almost constant activity based on enduring relationships and informal interactions
that are not always captured in databases. Moreover, as described below, there is a
qualitative difference in the type of security cooperation that is conducted by forces
based in those regions. For many other countries, particularly those with less advanced
militaries, security cooperation can be conducted largely through frequent but smallerscale
events using rotational or temporarily deployed forces.
U.S. military leaders in the Pacific noted that because U.S. and Korean forces
operate under one of the world’s most integrated command structures, security cooperation
is continuous and automatic.7 The commander of USFK also serves as commander
of Combined Forces Command, which oversees both U.S. and South Korean
forces. Together, these forces plan, train, collect intelligence, and respond to crises. It
is likely that the constant engagement resulting from the permanent stationing of U.S.
forces has played a role in the dramatic improvements in Korean military capabilities.
These improvements will allow the Korean military to take wartime operational control
of U.S. and Korean forces by 2015.
On the other hand, U.S. forces in Japan focus less on building the security capabilities
of their host. While security cooperation certainly occurs, particularly between
the U.S. and Japanese navies, the level of security cooperation depends far less on the
number of U.S. forces stationed there. In Australia, USMC plans to increase training
with Australian forces and allow for more training in Southeast Asia. Elsewhere in
Asia, the United States builds partner capabilities primarily through rotational forces
and temporary deployments rather than through permanent bases, at least partly due
to partners’ political limitations on establishing permanent bases in the region. Plans to
increase the U.S. presence in Asia are at least as much about assurance and deterrence
as strengthening partner capabilities.
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In the Middle East, DoD conducts numerous exercises and other security cooperation
activities with partners, using a small number of permanently assigned forces,
supported by large numbers of rotational and temporarily deployed forces. The Air
Force builds capabilities of partner air forces primarily through forces stationed at
Ali Al Salem, Al Udeid, and Al Dhafra, with support from forces deployed from the
United States. In particular, the Gulf Air Warfare Center at the UAE’s Al Dhafra Air Base strengthens interoperability among air forces in the region. The Navy uses its
Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain to strengthen relationships in the region, while
rotating ships for exercises. The Army and USMC rely primarily on rotational and
temporarily deployed forces.
In Africa, U.S. forces based at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti build capabilities
of partners in East Africa and in the Trans-Sahel region, especially for counterterrorism.
While Camp Lemonnier provides benefits for conducting security cooperation in
the region, it is even more important as a base for counterterrorism operations and for
responding to contingencies in the Middle East and elsewhere. More important for
security cooperation in Africa are U.S. forces based in Europe. For example, USAF
personnel based in Europe not only conduct about 200 security cooperation activities
with European partners each year, but also about 150 with African partners as well,
though the latter were often smaller scale.8 Another example is Africa Endeavor 2011,
an exercise to improve communications interoperability between 35 African militaries
and NATO (including U.S.) military forces and to build capability for future multinational
operations.9
In Europe, the United States organizes about 30 regional exercises each year in
locations, such as Ukraine and Romania. Regional exercises enable host nations to
train larger numbers of their forces with U.S. forces. They also provide benefits to U.S.
forces that train to deploy and operate in a more austere environment.10 Although such
exercises are not necessarily more effective when conducted by U.S. forces that are
based overseas, the closer proximity makes them more likely to occur.
For ground-forces training, Joint Multinational Training Command’s (JMTC’s)
training facilities conduct more multinational training than any other U.S. training
facility. JMTC oversees the Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels training areas, providing
military forces with live-fire and combat-maneuver training, a simulation center, and
professional military education, as well as home-station training for units at 15 other
locations in Europe.11
In 2011, JMTC trained 20,000 U.S. forces and almost 10,000 European and
other forces. Since 2008, JMTC has trained 70,000 U.S. and 33,000 multinational
forces from 27 countries. Most European partners would receive far less training with
U.S. forces without the facilities in Europe, since most partners pay their own way for
this training but may not pay to go to training sites in the United States.
Greater burden sharing with Allies in Europe is a means by which DoD could
improve partner capabilities and interoperability, while also reducing costs. For example,
NATO, or individual NATO members, could be encouraged to share more of the costs for multinational exercises at JMTC. NATO has a clear policy that training is a
responsibility for individual member countries, but multinational exercises are as much
about interoperability as national training. Moreover, NATO funds Allied Command
Transformation, which supports doctrine development and experimentation and oversees
several subordinate commands, including the Joint Warfare Centre in Norway,
the Joint Force Training Centre in Poland, and over a dozen centers of excellence.
Given NATO’s interest in applying its “Smart Defense” concept to improvements in
interoperability and training, Allied Command Transformation could co-locate with
JMTC, improve efficiencies in training across Europe, and begin to share the costs
for operating JMTC.12 NATO Common Funds currently support Allied and partner
participation in JMTC exercises but do not subsidize JMTC’s operating or overhead
costs, despite the fact that European military forces now make up over 30 percent of
the forces trained by JMTC. Although NATO has shown little appetite for taking on
additional costs, future U.S. force reductions in Europe could lead to NATO having to
face the choice between subsidizing (and thereby saving) JMTC and other U.S. facilities
or allowing them to close. Alternatively, other NATO members, such as the UK,
France, Italy, Norway, and Germany, could consider subsidizing JMTC operations
costs and using it as a substitute for their own training ranges, which could potentially
be reduced.
There may also be opportunities for improving security cooperation through multi
national basing and other cost-sharing arrangements. For example, NATO underwrites
over 60 percent of the routine operations and maintenance costs at the Chievres Airbase
in Belgium, which also serves as a USAF operating site. NATO or NATO Allies
also share some costs at U.S. facilities such as Ramstein Air Base, Aviano Air Base, and
Sigonella Naval Air Station, as well as at co-location sites, such as Rota Naval Air Station,
RAF Lakenheath, and RAF Mildenhall. Arrangements like this not only control
U.S. costs but can also facilitate greater levels of security cooperation.
A 2012 RAND study for USAFE found that USAFE forces engage in security
cooperation as part of their daily routine. Security cooperation permeates the everyday
activities of the headquarters staff as well as the six wings that were assessed. Security
cooperation is often included as a core element of USAFE training, which contributes
to partner capability development, particularly capabilities for more effective coalition
operations. The study found that forward basing facilitates important relationship- and
capacity-building activities. A number of activities occur primarily because of forward
basing, including nearly daily air refueling, frequent joint tactical air controller qualification
and training performed by the Warrior Preparation Center near Ramstein Air Force Base, and some hosted events.13 Interviews with USAREUR leaders suggested
similar continuous interaction between U.S. and European ground forces.14
Moreover, the presence of forward-based forces facilitates coalition operations.
The development and sustainment of personal and unit relationships enables smoother
integration during combat operations. It also allows high revisit rates for partners who
require it to increase their capacity for out-of-area operations. Years of interaction with
traditional as well as newer NATO allies have born fruit for coalition building and
capability. For example, European air forces have been able to operate in coalitions
with the USAF in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya in part because they have trained and
exercised together; standardized tactics, techniques, and procedures; and developed
working relationships. These activities over many years have enabled the more advanced
European air forces to plan and fight with the United States. Likewise, USAFE seeks
to bring less-advanced partners into future coalition operations by emphasizing important
contributions that do not require well-established air force capabilities or institutions.
USAFE efforts to develop partner-country capacity in air controller capabilities
for OEF have included allies such as Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, and Latvia that have
no capability to deploy and operate aircraft in overseas contingencies. Security cooperation
activities have also allowed countries such as Poland to execute cargo preparation
operations on their own to enable deployment on U.S. airlifters to out-of-area
operations.15
U.S. forces across Europe, not just those at training facilities, help build the capabilities
of European forces. The Army and Air Force use most of their major units to
conduct security cooperation to one degree or another, whether through combat units
or through military police, military intelligence, medical, or air-ground operations
units. U.S. forces based overseas allow for more frequent interactions between these
specialized units and their foreign counterparts.
While U.S. Special Operations Forces specialize in operating in austere environments
to build partner capabilities, they, too, leverage U.S. bases around the world to
facilitate their security cooperation activities. For example, their ability to maintain
a permanent presence in Europe, particularly through the stationing in Germany of
the First Battalion, Tenth Special Forces Group, allows for a more sustained focus on
improving European special operations capabilities. Through a combination of a permanent
forward presence and rotational forces from the United States, Special Operations
Command, Europe, conducts over 300 security cooperation events per year. The
permanent presence of U.S. Special Operations Forces in Europe also facilitated the
establishment of the NATO Special Operations Headquarters, which coordinates special
operations education, training, and information sharing. Improved European special operations capabilities have been especially evident in their improved performance
over time in Afghanistan and Iraq.16 Thus, while Special Operations Forces can conduct
security cooperation effectively from U.S. bases, their ability to leverage overseas
bases allows them to amplify their effect.
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Does Overseas Basing Provide Training Advantages for U.S. Forces?
Compared with those based in the United States, forces based overseas often benefit
from more frequent training with foreign partners. In particular, U.S. forces learn
to operate more effectively in a coalition and adapt to foreign environments. As one
military officer put it, “At U.S. training sites we train ourselves by ourselves.” In Asia,
Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, however, these benefits often come at the
price of the quality of the training for high-end missions. Whether because of political
restrictions, limited space or infrastructure, or lack of time due to other mission
requirements, training overseas is often seen as more of a constraint than a benefit.
Constraints exist in Europe as well, but the interoperability benefits that come from
training with relatively capable partners compensate for these constraints, which are
not meaningfully different from those that exist at many bases in the United States.17
Along with Canada and Australia, European militaries have been the most capable
and willing partners in recent coalition operations. If the United States continues
to emphasize the importance of coalitions for future conflicts, interoperability with
allied militaries will remain important. Many of the security cooperation activities
conducted by U.S. forces in Europe provide training benefits for both European and
U.S. forces. In particular, bilateral and multilateral training activities that occur across
the continent—both on U.S. and partner bases—enhance U.S. military capabilities.
For example, the Army base at Baumholder provides both quality training and flexibility
due to the ability of U.S. and German forces in that region to use each other’s
ranges.
As indicated earlier, one U.S. Army overseas training center warrants particular
emphasis. JMTC falls in the same category as the National Training Center at Ft.
Irwin, California, and the Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft. Polk, Louisiana.
JMTC operates at full capacity, with some partner countries waiting for months to
use its facilities. In addition to training U.S. forces based in Europe, JMTC trains
Army National Guard and Reserve units from the United States. Though focused in
recent years on training relevant to Afghanistan and Iraq, in 2012 it began a transition
back to full-spectrum training, hosting two Decisive Action Training Events involving hybrid warfare scenarios. The October 2012 event, called Saber Junction, involved the
Second Cavalry Regiment and forces from 19 other countries and included force-onforce,
live-fire, irregular warfare, special operations, and cyber elements. In addition
to the training areas at Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, limited activities were conducted
in the German community between the two bases, creating a training area geographically
as large as the National Training Center—albeit with many more restrictions on
what could be done on one hand, but requirements to deal with the civilian populace
on the other.
Army leaders argue that no U.S. training center can compete with JMTC in the
following areas:
Training for coalition operations at the battalion level and higher: JMTC can
exercise a brigade with battalions from multiple countries. For example, in addition
to its Decisive Action Training Events, two Georgian battalions trained at
JMTC in 2012, and the UK was scheduled to train a battalion-plus. While feasible
at U.S. centers, costs would be prohibitive for many partners and available
capacity extremely limited, given requirements for U.S. training.
Diversity of activities: JMTC executes a wide range of training and education
from the individual soldier to three-star headquarters. JMTC not only supports
air drop, cargo drop, and live close-air-support training like other centers, it also
provides simulations, professional military education, and culturally attuned
mobile training.
Realistic interaction with local communities: The U.S. SOFA with Germany
allows JMTC to work with local officials to create a unique maneuver training
area that includes the community between Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels.18
The benefits described above come with costs. There may be ways to reduce these
costs somewhat through the use of rotational forces, although—as discussed later—
rotational forces bring their own advantages and disadvantages. A detailed analysis
comparing the benefits and relative costs of U.S. military training centers within the
United States and abroad could provide important insights for future investments.
For the Air Force in Europe, much of the training for attaining qualifications and
keeping skills current is carried out in partner countries. While units based in Europe
do conduct some training in the United States (e.g., at Red Flag), it would be expensive
for partners to do the majority of their training events across the Atlantic. As such,
USAFE elects to forge and sustain relationships with countries in Europe to gain access
to their ranges and airspace and to train with them.
The training value of security cooperation events can vary depending on the type
of U.S. unit and aircraft or other equipment, the goal of a training event, the level of sophistication of the partner(s), the availability of ranges and other training environments,
and a number of other factors. For example, the ability of U.S. strike or closeair-
support aircraft (including F-15Es, A-10s, and F-16s) to work with both U.S. and
foreign air controllers at ranges in Croatia enables those U.S. pilots both to remain
current in controlled bombing missions and to encounter different levels of capability
among controllers; at the same time, these events ensure qualification and currency of
the foreign air controllers themselves. U.S. fighters in Europe are able to conduct dissimilar
aircraft training with foreign pilots, who fly Typhoons, MiG-29s, and Tornados.
This training provides U.S. pilots with adaptive skills and allows them to experience
missions against pilots who employ different tactics, capabilities, and procedures,
and it helps prepare U.S. pilots for both combat against adversaries and for combat
integration with allies.
On the other hand, while many U.S. units and personnel derive training benefits
from security cooperation activities and presence in Europe, some benefit less than
others. Some training involving partners appears less beneficial to U.S. currency and
readiness requirements. Partner-nation air forces have less-advanced capabilities than
those of the USAF—with some trying to maintain just a basic capacity to field an
air force—and U.S. tactics at times must be adjusted to account for this in ways that
detract from U.S. training. Events related to fighter interoperability appear to be the
most problematic. For instance, it is a challenge to find adequate air-to-air training for
U.S. pilots. There are a number of reasons for this, including lack of ranges, the need
to “dial back” skills and tactics during exercises to match partner capabilities and meet
nondisclosure requirements, and restrictions in the AOR on important training regimens,
such as launches of AIM-120 air-to-air missiles.
There is significant cultural and interoperability value in working with both
highly capable and less capable partners. It appears, however, that some security cooperation
activities (e.g., high-end, multinational training) are especially beneficial to
U.S. forces. It also appears that U.S.-based and overseas-based forces can benefit from
security cooperation activities. Finally, overseas basing may matter more for developing
military-to-military relationships and interoperability at the strategic and operational
level rather than the tactical level, where tasks are less complex and personnel turnover
is higher. Thus, when considering future U.S. overseas force reductions, there should
be particular attention paid to maintaining strategic and operational interoperability
skills.
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How Do Rotational Forces Change U.S. Military Strategies for Security Cooperation?
As discussed earlier, posture includes more than overseas basing. Rotational forces are
a component of posture that is important for conducting security cooperation activities
and they have the potential to mitigate reductions in overseas basing.
The Navy’s operating practices, which provide global presence at sea, mean that
much of its force conducting security cooperation is, in effect, rotational or on temporary
deployment. Because the Navy deploys constantly for multiple missions (e.g.,
presence, deterrence), it can readily engage in security cooperation in the course of
its operations, thereby maintaining a low marginal cost for these activities. The Navy
certainly uses land-based forces to conduct security cooperation as well, but largely
sees its bases as logistics platforms, as opposed to the focal points for security cooperation.
Naval forces provide some level of flexibility as to where security cooperation
takes place and where the U.S. military has bases. Under any future posture, the Navy
could continue to conduct large multinational exercises or other security cooperation
events in international waters. One example of how the Navy combines the advantages
of forward-based and rotational forces is its use of the Fifth Fleet headquarters in
Bahrain to strengthen relationships in the Persian Gulf region, while using rotational
naval forces to conduct specific security cooperation activities.
The Marine Corps also conducts the majority of its security cooperation using
rotational forces. With a few exceptions (e.g., marines based in Japan), marines conducting
security cooperation activities are generally forward-deployed but not forwardbased.
When overseas, marines are often deployed on ships, conducting multiple missions
as part of an MEU deployment. Because the MEU must train to conduct a range
of missions from small-scale amphibious assaults to evacuations to marine interdiction
to humanitarian assistance, the costs for security cooperation are relatively marginal to
the overall cost of unit operations. In other cases, the Marine Corps creates special task
forces for more limited missions.
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The Black Sea Rotational Force temporarily deploys 200–400 marines to train
partners in that region for six months per year. In 2012, the Marine Corps also began
to utilize a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, consisting of about 180
marines on six-month rotations from Sigonella Naval Air Station in Italy, to conduct
security cooperation across Africa. Also in 2012, the first of what will be regular rotations
of marines arrived at an Australian base in Darwin to conduct multiple missions,
including training with Australian forces and security cooperation throughout Southeast
Asia.
Regardless of whether they are deployed on ships or on land, these rotational forces
have the flexibility to train partners wherever the need is greatest, and to strengthen
their own expeditionary capabilities. On the other hand, these forces tend to focus on
tactical training and rely on the infrastructure of other services or countries. This type of rotational approach to security cooperation could sometimes prove an effective substitute
for permanently stationed forces, when working with partners that are unlikely
to operate with U.S. forces in future complex contingencies or in regions unlikely to
host U.S. bases. For South Korea and many countries in Europe, however, the focus on
tactical training and reliance on the others’ infrastructure means that rotational forces
could only partially mitigate the loss of security cooperation capability that would
come from reductions in permanently stationed forces.
As the Army deactivates two of its remaining four BCTs in Europe, it is considering
how to mitigate these reductions through rotations. The Army could participate in
the NATO Response Force by rotating a portion of a “European Response Force” into
the region, perhaps two times per year for two months each. If the Army were to dedicate
a division to supporting these rotations as part of its “Regionally Aligned Forces”
concept, it could deploy different brigade headquarters, battalion headquarters, and
maneuver battalions each year to give multiple units experience in the region. A set of
equipment for a combined arms battalion could also be left in Germany to reduce the
transportation costs for rotational forces.
The Army could remove additional units from Europe and substitute additional
rotational forces. The cost implications of additional reductions and rotations are
described in Chapters Eight and Ten. Besides the potential cost savings, other benefits
would include slightly increased flexibility for Army headquarters to conduct security
cooperation globally and opportunities to gain multinational experience for more
units. Disadvantages would include greater challenges to building deep military relationships
and less expertise working with highly capable partners. Increasing use of
rotational forces could also strain U.S. forces when long-duration contingency operations
are also underway. The most significant disadvantage would come if there were a
net reduction in multinational training for U.S. forces, particularly if the Army closed
JMTC, its only multinational training center.
The Air Force could consider similar trade-offs for its forces in Europe. While
inherently more mobile than the Army, transportation costs for the Air Force for aircraft
support equipment and personnel can also be significant. Besides the cost implications,
which are described in Chapter Eight, the advantages and disadvantages of
substituting rotational forces for permanent forces are similar to those described for the
Army and appear in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 Potential Advantages and Disadvantages of Substituting Rotational Forces for Forward-Based Forces to Conduct Security Cooperation
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Implications for Posture
In most cases, security cooperation will be one factor among several considerations
in making posture decisions. The strongest security cooperation rationale for keeping
forces in overseas facilities occurs in situations where the United States seeks to build
and maintain high levels of interoperability with a regional partner. In such situations, these forces require access to appropriate training facilities. In other regions, U.S.
forces can conduct more frequent training activities for lower incremental costs with
forces stationed in or near the partner country, but because it costs more to have forces
permanently stationed abroad, many situations are likely to favor U.S.-based forces
conducting training on a rotational basis. In some locations, rotational forces may be
the only near-term option. While the costs of conducting security cooperation with
rotational forces may be lower, they also may not achieve all the benefits of a permanent
presence, including the depth of relationships with partners.
Currently, the United States maintains a training facility in Germany that provides
a venue for sophisticated combined training: the JMTC. If interoperability with
NATO partners remains a high priority, then continuing to fund the JMTC, maintaining
enough forces in Europe to utilize the training facility fully, and conducting
a range of combined training exercises there will also likely remain priorities. In the
Pacific, expanded access to Australian training ranges will allow the United States to
maintain and perhaps expand interoperability with the Australian military. Current
security cooperation goals in Southeast Asia can be achieved without a greater permanent
presence. In the future, a training facility that would allow complex multinational
training could increase the competence of security partners in the region, particularly
if some of those partners invest sufficiently in their military capabilities to make such
a step feasible.
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Chapter five Risks to Investing in Facilities Overseas
This chapter discusses various types of risk that might accompany overseas posture. It
begins by discussing political risk, that is, the risk that a host nation might deny the
United States use of facilities established in a given country. This might occur because
the country does not support the operation that the United States is undertaking,
as was the case in Operation Iraqi Freedom, when a number of countries denied the
United States access for refueling or overflight. This included some longtime allies such
as Turkey, which refused to allow the United States to stage forces from its soil. The
second type of risk is operational, from long-range precision weapons, which might
expose forward-deployed U.S. forces to heavy losses. The third type of risk to consider
comes from violent extremists, who could employ a range of attack methods against
foreign U.S. facilities and personnel.
Political Risks to Access
Since the outbreak of World War II in Europe, the United States has relied on access to
foreign bases to project power across the globe. Access is a broad term that encompasses
permanent basing rights, steady state transit or overflight rights, and permission to use
military facilities or transit through a nation’s sovereign territory or airspace for a particular
operation. In the past, most states only acquired overseas bases through the process of
formal empire.1 With few exceptions, however, in the post–World War II era the United
States has permanently stationed its forces only in countries that have freely agreed to
host an American military presence.2 The United States has forged various types of arrangements—ranging from official basing agreements to informal understandings—to
obtain access to military facilities in foreign countries.”3
To varying degrees, all of the U.S. military services rely on access to foreign
territory or bases to project power, but that access cannot always be assured. As the
United States discovered in 2003 when it sought to move Army units from Germany
to the Middle East, if other nations deny American forces the ability to move through
their territory, it can create significant logistical challenges that can impede military
operations.4
In the 1990s, the United States also had to deal with significant constraints on
its ability to use Middle Eastern bases and the forces stationed at them to enforce the
no-fly zone and sanctions against Iraq. Saudi Arabia and Turkey, for instance, would
not permit the United States to use American fighter aircraft stationed on their soil
to conduct strike operations against Iraqi forces attacking Kurds in September 1996.
Similarly, during Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, Saudi Arabia and the UAE
prohibited the United States from employing fighter aircraft based in their country to
target Iraqi WMD infrastructure. As a result, the United States was limited to using
combat aircraft stationed in Kuwait and Oman, in addition to carrier-based naval aircraft.
Nevertheless, the Saudis and Emirates did permit U.S. forces to fly noncombat
aircraft such as tankers during the operation.5
The United States also faces challenges to peacetime access. For example, in
2009, U.S. forces were expelled from Ecuador when President Rafael Correra refused
to renew the lease to Manta Air base, which was a location used to interdict drug shipments
from South America. As a result, the United States lost access to facilities that it
spent more than $60 million improving.6
During the Bush administration, DoD emphasized that it wanted access to
places “that allow[ed] our troops to be usable and flexible.”7 In other words, Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld aimed to forge access agreements that could guarantee that
the United States would be given contingency access. This was an ambitious goal, as
access—peacetime and contingency—is always uncertain. Because basing agreements
are incomplete contracts, they are always subject to renegotiation, and host nations
typically avoid making explicit promises about contingency access, preferring vague
terms that provide them with flexibility and the power to veto U.S. operations from
their territory.
The historical examples given above illustrate that there are no access guarantees.
In part, this uncertainty is a growing concern due to the fact that there is no longer
any single, overriding, and unambiguous global threat akin to the Soviet Union during
the Cold War. During this period, the United States established overseas garrisons
that were primarily intended to defend host nations against a common threat.8 Today,
however, host nations generally face more varied security challenges; their interests
are therefore less likely to align with those of the United States. Likewise, the United
States often seeks access arrangements that enable it to use bases for a range of different
operations. As a result, it is more difficult to create a direct and enduring tie between
U.S. bases and the security of a host nation, which complicates obtaining and preserving
access.9 Many nations are also hesitant to allow U.S. forces to be stationed on their
soil to counter unspecified future threats because the host nation will be implicated in
any operations that these forces conduct.10
Access comes through agreements between the United States and the host nation
government, but the host nation public can often influence outcomes.11 While public
opinion most directly affects the foreign policy of democratic states, even authoritarian
leaders may have to take into account their citizens’ views.12 Public opposition to an
American military presence can constrain U.S. access; affect the costs of access; and, if
severe enough, lead to U.S. expulsion.
In general, there are many reasons why the population of a host nation might
oppose an American military presence. First, foreign bases are often seen as compromising
a state’s sovereignty.13 Second, some citizens may object to foreign military
bases because of the interruption of their daily lives the bases cause by taking up valuable
land, polluting the environment, generating disruptive noise, and creating safety
hazards.14 Third, people may disagree with the stated mission of U.S. forces or their
particular actions.15
Given these considerations, this section will explore when U.S. bases are at risk
and when a host nation is likely to authorize the United States to use its bases for a
particular operation.
Risks to Peacetime Access: Where Are U.S. Bases at Risk?
Although some host nations contribute funds to construct and maintain U.S. overseas
bases (see Chapter Seven), typically the United States pays the lion’s share of the
costs associated with building and maintaining its overseas military facilities. Investments
in military infrastructure abroad are sunk costs that the United States may not be able to recoup if it is expelled from a base.16 For example, in 1966 French President
Charles de Gaulle withdrew his nation from NATO’s integrated command structure
and announced that all U.S. and NATO troops had to depart France within one year.
In Operation Relocation of Forces from France, the Pentagon had to quickly relocate
the 70,000 U.S. military, civilian, and dependent personnel in France. As a part of
this move, the United States abandoned nearly 200 installations, which represented
an investment of $565 million.17 More recently, between 2004 and 2009, the United
States invested substantially in base construction in Iraq before troops were withdrawn
in 2011.18 While not precisely analogous to the France experience in 1966, it does show
in a different way that the benefits of investments the U.S. military makes in facilities
abroad may not endure.
A number of different studies have sought to identify the conditions under which
an American military presence will generate significant opposition within a host nation
that results in limitations to, or the complete loss of, peacetime access. This is not a
simple question, because while there have been significant protests against U.S. bases
in some countries, such as Italy, the United States has been able to maintain its presence
in Italy, though sometimes operational constraints can limit the flexibility of
those forces.19 By contrast, in other locations, such as Okinawa and South Korea, the
United States has faced sustained and serious public opposition that has led to adjustments,
including reductions to its posture, but basing rights have not been revoked.20
Finally, some nations completely expelled U.S. forces, including Uzbekistan in 2005
and the Philippines in 1992.21
These divergent outcomes are influenced by three different variables—regime
type, the size of the U.S. presence, and the type of access relationship—in determining
the level of access risk that the United States faces.
Two regime types, authoritarian and transitional democracies, could be more
likely to restrict or end access.22 Authoritarian leaders who are not bound by the rule
of law or constrained by a system of checks and balances can easily rescind American
access or capriciously demand that basing agreements be renegotiated. In addition
to being unpredictable, authoritarian regimes are also more prone to be overthrown,
either in a coup or by a democratic revolution.
States that are undergoing a regime change—in particular democratization—are
also unreliable host nations. While their democratization may be in the long-term
interest of the United States, in the short term it could jeopardize an ongoing security
relationship. In part this is due to the fact that new leaders will frequently criticize
basing agreements made by their predecessors, as the United States found in the
Philippines. Additionally, because democratizing states hold elections in the absence
of strong institutions, aspiring leaders may politicize an American military presence
in an effort to win votes. In contrast, consolidated democracies characterized by procedural
legitimacy, institutional stability, and well-regulated political competition are
the most reliable partners and host nations, because they cannot easily abandon their
agreements.23
The size of a U.S. military presence and its proximity to large population centers
may also contribute to access risk.24 Local hostility to bases may be directly related to
the frequency and intensity of interactions between American military personnel and
local communities. According to this view, sprawling base complexes that permanently
host large numbers of American forces are more visible and therefore more likely to
provoke local resentment. Opposition may stem from the fact that large bases are seen
as an affront to nationalism or because large, permanent facilities can create friction
with local communities.25 This rationale underpinned the George W. Bush administration’s
global posture review, which sought to rely on smaller, more austere bases while
moving larger bases away from urban areas.26
Overlapping threat perceptions are another factor that can help determine the
reliability of basing arrangements. If nations offer to host American forces based
on a common perception of a threat, there is a fairly stable foundation for a basing
agreement—so long as the U.S. military presence remains focused on countering this mutual security challenge. However, if the host nation’s threat perception declines or
diverges from that of the United States, basing rights can become increasingly tenuous
and access is more likely to be rescinded.27
Alternatively, some countries primarily make bases available to the United States
as a part of a quid pro quo, which may prove unreliable, particularly in times of crisis.
28 In these transactional relationships, compensation may take many forms, including
straightforward rent payments, economic assistance, or arms sales. Compensationdriven
access creates an unstable dynamic because the host nation has an incentive to
highlight the problems associated with an American military presence in an effort to
extract larger payments. Consequently, transactional basing agreements typically result
in a vicious bargaining cycle, escalating payments, and restrictions on (or the loss of)
access.
In sum, peacetime access to bases overseas is at greatest risk in authoritarian or
democratizing states; when the facilities have a large, permanent presence that is close
to local populations; and in nations where the United States pays for its access. By
contrast, stable democracies, less conspicuous bases, and mutual defense relationships
present far less risk.
Contingency Access
Contingency access to bases always remains explicitly or implicitly conditional. Nearly
all of the United States’ current basing agreements stipulate that it must consult with
host nation governments before conducting any nonroutine operations from their territory.
Even in the absence of a formal provision, in practice it is almost always necessary
for the United States to seek permission to use a base or deploy its forces from that base
to conduct operations in another location.29
A typical assumption in considering the value of overseas bases is that if a peacetime
investment in a facility is made that it will ensure access in wartime. While
peacetime access likely increases the chances of host-nation consent to use those same
facilities for combat operations in times of crisis, it is not the only way for the United States to get access to combat-relevant facilities. Often the United States gains access
to new facilities in wartime that had not been available previously. In fact, looking
back at major conflicts over the past 40 years, peacetime air bases provided about half
of the bases used in wartime (see Figure 5.1).30 This access can come from countries
whose interests overlap with those of the United States when considering the goals of
the campaign, or alternatively it can come from countries who may be motivated more
by the opportunity to strengthen ties with the United States at a time when the United
States has a need for more operating locations.
Figure 5.1 Posture Adaptations in Wartime: Comparison of Preexisting Access and Total Airfields Used in Recent Conflicts
The U.S. posture is an investment in future security, but in the heat of a crisis
there are opportunities to forge new relationships and to gain access to needed locations.
That does not obviate the need for permanent presence, but it does take some of
the pressure off planners contemplating the appropriate size and geographic locations
of forward facilities. Opportunities to add new locations during a crisis can provide
needed flexibility in combat basing. The disadvantage of operating from a base where
the United States has not previously enjoyed prior access is that it could take time
to get access approval. In addition, the facility may lack some needed infrastructure,
which could hinder the efficiency of operations, at least initially. While some modification
might be made rather quickly—for instance, clearing extra parking space—other potentially vital infrastructure, such as fuel storage capacity, might take longer to
arrange. In particular, this might be a problem if the United States needed to operate
in areas where infrastructure development may be minimal. For instance, airfields in
Africa may require substantial infrastructure upgrades to support major operations.
Similarly, locations in South Asia and Southeast Asia may also have uneven levels of
infrastructure development. To take full advantage of opportunities to operate from
new locations, the United States needs capabilities that can bring them to a standard
that will support combat operations fairly quickly.
In general, a nation’s decision to grant the United States contingency access will
be context-dependent. In part, this calculus will rest on the type of operation the
United States wants to conduct and against whom, in addition to the expected duration
of the mission. Contingency access, therefore, is not a simple yes or no question.
Host nations may authorize the United States to use bases on their territory for certain
types of operations but prohibit others. For instance, host nations may be more
likely to permit non-lethal operations to be conducted from their territory compared
with combat operations. Some nations may balk at allowing the United States to use
certain types of platforms or weapons from their territory. Traditionally, bombers and
nuclear weapons have been particularly sensitive issues. For example, because of New
Zealand’s opposition to nuclear weapons and the United States’ unwillingness to confirm
or deny the presence of such weapons on its naval vessels, New Zealand has long
prevented USN ships from visiting its ports, a policy that led to a suspension of the
security pact between the two nations in the mid-1980s. Moreover, contingency access
may evolve over the course of an operation, growing more restrictive or permissive
depending upon the situation. Finally, the United States may be able to influence the
host nation’s calculus by offering inducements or applying pressure, but it is not guaranteed
that these will result in the desired outcome.
The most important factors that will influence a host nation’s decision include
the degree to which the host nation’s interests and those of the United States overlap,
whether domestic public opinion favors or opposes the particular operation, the host
nation’s perception about the likelihood of reprisals, and the degree to which a host
nation is dependent on American security guarantees.31
One of the most straightforward factors is whether the host nation has similar
interests to the United States with respect to the particular contingency. While a nation
may generally have shared interests with the United States, these can vary depending
upon the situation. Consider the example of Turkey, a longstanding NATO ally. In
2003, Turkey prevented the United States from using its territory to stage ground
forces for the invasion of Iraq in part because it did not share the United States’ interest
in deposing the Saddam Hussein regime. Rather, the overthrow of Hussein raised the specter of an independent Kurdistan, which could in turn exacerbate Turkey’s
chief security concern, the violent extremist threat posed by the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK). Reflecting these interests, Turkey did, however, allow the United States
to station and fly Predator UAVs from Incirlik to observe—and, if needed, to launch
strikes against—the PKK. In short, its willingness to grant access was conditional on
its particular security interests, which were not always aligned with those of the United
States.
Domestic public opinion can also influence a government’s decision to allow contingency
access. If the United States wants to conduct a mission that is viewed unfavorably
by a host nation’s public or that is perceived to lack international legitimacy, a host
nation will probably be less willing to grant access for fear of alienating its constituents.
This is even more likely if the host nation’s legislature has to authorize access for foreign
forces, as is the case in Turkey and the Philippines. Popular opposition to the ongoing
sanctions against Iraq likely influenced Saudi Arabia’s decision to prohibit the United
States from using its bases for combat operations during the late 1990s.
Another factor that may negatively influence whether the United States is granted
contingency access is the perceived likelihood of reprisals, which could take the form
of kinetic attacks or economic retaliation. For example, most European nations denied
the United States permission to use bases in their countries to airlift supplies to Israel
during the 1973 Arab-Israel War because they feared being targeted by an oil embargo.
Reprisal is a concern, but presumably the United States could take steps to mitigate the
effects of retaliatory attacks with the deployment of defense capabilities in a crisis or
crafting military operations to limit retaliatory options (e.g., targeting military capabilities
that may not pose a direct threat to U.S. operations but may pose a threat to
host nations, such as Iraqi Scud missiles in 1991).
Given this irreducible uncertainty, the more countries that provide access for the
U.S. military, the more resilient the U.S. posture will be to access risks. However, the
more dispersed U.S. facilities are across many different nations, the greater the costs,
because each new facility has its own fixed costs. This has led the United States to seek
access to facilities, without permanently stationing forces there and without a responsibility
for maintaining all of the infrastructure, reflective of, for instance, the Air Force
CSLs. Even when this involves some up-front investment to ensure that the infrastructure
can support U.S. operations, this is significantly less costly than establishing and
maintaining U.S. facilities, while still providing flexibility to the force.
Changing Operational Risks to Posture
Military forces, by their nature, accept certain threats as inherent. They plan, train,
and equip to face a range of threats on the battlefield, but in recent years capabilities
have been developed that require a reassessment of posture. The advent of extremely accurate ballistic and cruise missiles could cause catastrophic losses to forces exposed
to them. These weapons could cripple an airbase, incapacitate an aircraft carrier, and
devastate concentrated ground forces. Defenders faced with such a threat can invest in
active defenses, efforts to shoot these weapons out of the sky, dispersal, hardening, and
passive defenses for stationary targets and mobility for mobile targets. In the context
of an assessment of posture, there can also be decisions to deploy forces out of range of
these weapons, or to limit the number and kind of forces exposed.
Ballistic and cruise missiles have been operational for many years. Nazi Germany
used ballistic missiles to attack London during World War II, but their accuracy was so
poor that they were essentially weapons of terror. In recent years, the accuracy of ballistic
missiles has become so precise as to give them the ability to achieve potent military
effects far beyond what was achievable in the past with conventional long-range missiles.
This qualitatively different capability necessitates consideration of such weapons
in posture decisions. China appears to have invested most heavily in such weapons. It
has fielded a variety of ballistic and cruise missiles with varying ranges and accuracies,
and with warheads for different purposes. Iran also has fielded some of these weapons.
In the future, other potential adversaries may also make such investments, so it is likely
that this could become an important operational feature in future conflicts.
Many military activities benefit from centralization. Putting forces at a large air
base, for example, allows for efficiencies of scale in base operations and logistics support.
To the extent that a base is defended from air and ground threats, a larger base
provides opportunities to concentrate defenses. Ground forces also tend to create large
staging areas that are fairly far forward to keep troops engaged in combat well supplied.
Airbases and large depots within range of ballistic and cruise missiles make for
potentially very lucrative targets, which calls for cost-versus-risk trade-offs in pursuing
basing centralization.
A country with a large number precision weapons within range of concentrated
U.S. forces could inflict serious damage in a matter of minutes. The threat to maritime
forces is different due to their mobility, but they still typically need to operate fairly
close to land to achieve effects on shore, which exposes them to long-range threats. The
mobility of maritime forces makes it more difficult for adversaries to find and target
them, but there are ongoing efforts in China, Iran, and other countries to improve
their sensors, command decision speed, and the in-flight guidance systems of their
long-range maritime strike forces.32
DoD strategy documents often talk about the importance of countering antiaccess
challenges. The 2010 QDR highlights the desire “to improve the resiliency of
U.S. forces and facilities in the region [PACOM] in order to safeguard and secure
U.S., allied, and partner assets and interests in response to emerging anti-access and area-denial capabilities.”33 The implication of the growing anti-access threats for U.S.
forward presence could be substantial. Facilities and operational locations that have
served the United States well in past years may now leave U.S. forces vulnerable. In
areas where anti-access capabilities might be employed, the United States may have to
consider much more substantial defensive protection for forward forces than has been
the case. A combination of active defenses, such as missile-defense capabilities; passive
defenses, such as hardening and concealment; and dispersal all can limit exposure to
anti-access threats.
The presence of precision-guided weapons does not mean that the United States
must concede that it cannot operate within range of these weapons. However, it does
mean that if the United States wants to maintain capabilities to operate within range
of these systems, it will have to change the way it operates, including its posture.
It also means that characterization of the different levels of threats to forward
bases help develop tailored responses. For instance, although China, Iran, and North
Korea all have missiles, the accuracy and ranges of these systems are different. To
put these differences in context, RAND developed a simple categorization of threats
into heavy, moderate, light, and minimal zones.34 These threat categories represent the
level of threat in a specified region based on the accuracy and density of a potential
adversary’s particular mix of capabilities and their ranges. The heavy threat zones are
defined as areas under threat from thousands of missiles35 with accuracy better than 50
m CEP.36 Moderate threat zones are defined as areas exposed to hundreds of missiles
with accuracies less than 1,000 m CEP, while the light threat zones lie within range of
missiles with accuracies greater than 1,000 m CEP (see Table 5.1).37
Table 5.1 Estimated Missile Threat Bands by Potential Adversary (Projected)
Taking into account the number, accuracy, and range of current ballistic and
cruise missiles, the United States currently operates from a number of bases within
high threat zones, as shown in Figure 5.2.38,39 All of the bases in the highest threat zone are within range of Chinese systems, with the remainder of the threat bins overwhelmingly
populated by locations potentially threatened by Iranian or North Korean
systems. Another particular concern is the high percentage of bases in Northeast Asia
(over 90 percent) that sit within the heavy threat zone, as shown in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.2 Summary of Number and Type of Locations Under Potential Threat in the Current Posture
Figure 5.3 Percentage of Operating Locations with Airfields Under Potential Threat of Attack, by Adversary
Figure 5.3 also helps to differentiate between the different levels of threats posed
by the Chinese capabilities compared with those from North Korea and Iran. The
options available to the United States are also different, particularly with respect to
Iran, where geography makes many more alternative bases potentially available than in
Northeast Asia. There are almost 400 airbases suitable for fighter aircraft within 1,500
nm of Iran’s borders, including facilities on territory of close NATO allies.40 In contrast,
East Asian geography offers few alternative airbase options.
In calling attention to this, we do not necessarily imply that these bases require
divestment. Rather we are pointing out that, in the context of the overall global posture,
these bases are in a special threat-exposure category. There are a number of potential
strategies that the United States could pursue to address this developing threat.
Depending upon the results of more detailed vulnerability analyses, some bases might
require greater investment in these facilities to harden them, while other analyses could lead to decisions to either divest or repurpose facilities. Different potential strategies are
explored below.
Avoidance: One option is to operate outside of these threat ranges. The implication
for posture is that bases may have to be abandoned, or the forces and equipment
there might have to change substantially. This change would likely have substantial
force structure implications, as it would increase the value of longer-range capabilities
and lower the value of shorter-range capabilities.
Harden and limit exposure: Another option is to operate from a few bases within
range of threat systems but increase and harden their defenses. Some forces would
remain exposed, but this exposure would be limited by the lower number of forces and
the added protection afforded to them. This strategy would make bases within range
of sizable ballistic- and cruise-missile arsenals more expensive than those elsewhere
because more resources would be necessary to harden the facilities against attack. Such
measures could involve building shelters for aircraft, bunkers for ammunition, and
underground fuel-storage tanks. It could also mean thicker and longer runways and
keeping equipment and personnel available to repair them when damaged by attack.
Dispersal: When geographically feasible, increasing the number of operating
areas and facilities within range of these threats is another possible strategy. Given a
finite number of attacking systems, increasing the number of facilities forces potential
attackers to dilute attacks on all facilities or conduct larger, selective attacks that leave
other facilities unmolested. Such a strategy would require dispersal wide enough to
force the attacker to make tough allocation choices. In practice, it may be difficult to
find enough facilities, either because of geographic constraints or political constraints.
The implication of such a strategy for posture is that the United States would need
numerous dispersal options in a given region. Those options may not require substantial
pre-conflict preparation if there are investments in capabilities that enable the
United States to bring facilities rapidly up to a standard sufficient to support the operations
selected for that location. In some instances, the modifications may be minimal;
in others, facilities may require construction and equipment to make them suitable for
operations.
Essentially, the United States may not be able to afford to pose lucrative wartime
targets to adversaries or potential adversaries. Large facilities with substantial combat
capabilities or critical supply nodes, valuable as they maybe in operations short of war,
should not be left vulnerable or without alternatives in times of war. The problem could
be severe enough that no one solution will solve the problem. Combinations of active
defenses, dispersal, hardening, passive defenses, and resilient operating concepts are all
relevant contributors to solutions.
Assessing Violent Extremist Risks to Posture
U.S. military facilities have been the targets of violent extremist attacks in the past,
including some tragic ones, like the 1983 attack on the USMC barracks in Lebanon.
U.S. military personnel also have been the targets of attacks while off base,
again sometimes resulting in terrible consequences, like the 1996 Khobar Towers
attack in Saudi Arabia. Even U.S. warships have suffered attack, most notoriously the
USS Cole in 2000. While military facilities tend to be constructed in ways that make
such attacks difficult and use guards trained to disrupt such attacks, consideration of
violent extremist threats to facilities is warranted when considering posture decisions.
A straightforward way of getting an initial read on violent extremism risk is to
assess the number of violent extremist attacks that a host nation has suffered historically.
This can give an initial indication of which facilities might be at increased danger
of violent extremist attacks relative to other facilities. In general, most violent extremist
groups have a fairly local agenda, so geographically based assessments of past activity
provide a fairly informative picture. However, some groups, like al-Qa’ida, have agendas
that extend beyond immediate geographical areas. To the extent that those groups
can be thought of as able to project power—that is, accomplish attacks in new geographic
areas outside of their base of support—a purely geographic assessment of historic
attacks probably does not fully capture the nature of the threat from such groups.
Another way to assess vulnerability to violent extremist attacks is to focus on the
methods of attack. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military operated against terrorist
groups, such as al-Qa’ida and its affiliates. In those encounters, these groups were very
adaptive from an operational perspective. Confronting these groups fell into the ageold
pattern of military confrontation, in which both sides continuously adapt to their
opponent to try and exploit adversary vulnerabilities and to shore up one’s own vulnerabilities.
In this regard, an assessment of previous attack methods can be instructive.
An unpublished RAND report assessed violent extremist attacks on military targets
between 2000 and early 2009.41 Of those 1,800 incidents, only about 20 percent were
against military facilities (see Figure 5.4).42 The rest were against military personnel
outside of those facilities. As these data included incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan,
there were numerous attacks on personnel in vehicles through IEDs (33 percent), as
well as in exposed locations (43 percent), and only a small fraction occurred in nonmilitary
structures (5 percent).43
Figure 5.4 Breakdown of Nonstate Actor Attacks on Military Targets, 2000–Early 2009
Figure 5.5 breaks down, by tactic, attacks agaist military facilites, represented
by the blue section of Figure 5.4. Like previous studies of other periods, the largest
number of attacks on bases was from indirect and direct weapons fired from outside
the perimeter of the base, although typically these attacks were not very lethal. The
Figure 5.5 Nonstate Actor Attacks on Military Facilities, by Tactic
most lethal attacks tend to be those directed at the front gate of a facility or when
attackers can amass for a large unit assault.44
In addition to the prevalence of previous violent extremist activity in the area,
another consideration is the capability of the host nation’s security forces. In many
cases, host-nation security forces have responsibility for the first layer of defense surrounding
a base. They may be the ones with the first opportunity to thwart an attack.
Similarly, since most attacks on military targets occur against personnel off the base,
the host-nation security forces become even more relevant.45
Overall, the current U.S. military posture is predominantly in countries that
have relatively low incidence of violent extremism and that have fairly capable security
forces.
Implications for Posture
Foreign facilities provide excellent opportunities to put U.S. forces in position to quickly
respond to contingencies, to deter potential foes, to assure allies, and to strengthen
ties between the United States and host nations, but with those opportunities also
come risks. The political risks associated with overseas presence come from uncertainties
regarding the duration of the peacetime access and the level of access to military
facilities the United States might enjoy in future conflicts. A loss of access—whether
during peacetime or restrictions during a conflict—risks stranding investments that
the United States has made in the infrastructure of those facilities.
There are several variables relevant to weighing risk factors for different countries.
Peacetime access tends to be most secure for established democracies with mature
institutions. Greater access risk tends to come from authoritarian countries and newly
democratizing countries. In addition, the type of facility and its location can also be a
factor, with large facilities near population centers being the most difficult to maintain
peacetime access.
In recent past conflicts, there have been several instances where a host country
has refused to grant full access to U.S. forces to conduct operations. During contingencies,
access risk is not evenly distributed among different types of bases, with access
for launching combat operations being the most difficult to secure and with access for
sensors and transit being more common for countries to provide.
In a crisis, U.S. access will be influenced by the interest of the host nation, popular
perceptions about the conflict, and the risks of reprisal perceived by the host nation.
As a result, some level of redundancy in the U.S. posture is necessary to minimize the
disruptions from such restrictions. As will be covered in Chapter Eight, each new facility that the United States opens increases costs, so while some redundancy is necessary
to guard against political access risks, some prioritization is in order. The United States
could try to reduce risks by trying to increase the geographic dispersion of the peacetime
access of its forces, but costs and political challenges may leave few opportunities
to create new large bases, nor may such large facilities be necessary. In many cases,
smaller facilities with little or no footprint may provide sufficient presence without
requiring substantial U.S. investments or ongoing operational costs. While these can
certainly be a less costly alternative, it is uncertain whether such peacetime efforts will
pay dividends in a conflict. That is, will a country be more likely to grant operational
access to a facility that the United States had previously operated from, or established a
very small presence on, compared with a facility where the United States had no previous
connection? While there are no guarantees about future access, that does not mean
that the United States should abandon forward bases. Rather, the number of options
and the alignment of U.S. and host-nation goals affect the likelihood of gaining needed
access for a given conflict.
There are also factors that can mitigate the consequences of losing access—or not
having it in the first place. In some circumstances, maritime presence can compensate
for lost access. Another countervailing factor to mitigate some of the access risk is the
historical precedent of obtaining new access during a conflict. In every major conflict
of the last 40 years, the United States has been able to add new operating facilities.
The operational challenges posed by accurate and numerous precision weapons
pose another risk to U.S. forward presence. The threat is currently most severe in
Northeast Asia, where China has fielded numerous precision capabilities and where the
geography of the region leaves few alternatives. In that region, a complex calculation
regarding the benefit of assuring allies and deterring foes must be considered against
the level of investment the U.S. might be willing to make to implement a mixed strategy
of hardening facilities and dispersing capabilities to multiple locations. In considering
different options, the United States should strive to not present very lucrative
targets, which could risk an early, crippling strike against U.S. forces.
Risks against U.S. forces from violent extremists are not new, and U.S. military
facilities are already designed with such strikes in mind. In the past, attacks against
facilities have highlighted that attackers tend to favor indirect weapons, to fire over a
fence and into a compound, or to attack the gate or perimeter. However, it is not just
the facility that should concern planners, but also the safety of personnel when they are
required to travel off the base. This may be the time when U.S. personnel are at greatest
risk. The risk of violent extremist attacks can be assessed in part by looking at historical
trends of such attacks in the area where the facility is located, as most violent extremist
groups are geographically localized. This is not true for other groups that have an
international agenda and have demonstrated a capability to launch attacks beyond
their immediate base of support.
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Chapter Six Installation Conditions
In assessing trade-offs between alternative postures, future restoration and modernization
(R&M) costs at different facilities could be a factor in policy choices. Differences
in estimates of current requirements for R&M among locations offer the best available
insights into this question. Were these requirements to differ among locations,
disparities in the physical condition of facilities would be largely responsible. Differences
in facilities’ conditions do not just affect current R&M needs, but could also
affect future costs, including more near-term recapitalization requirements.1 To the
extent that anticipated needs differ between U.S. and overseas facilities, these differences
would need to be integrated into the assessment of the relative costs—including
both installation support and MILCON.2
In this chapter, we consider the evidence on facility conditions and, as far as possible,
use that evidence to derive estimates of the requirements for R&M across locations.
DoD gathers information on installation conditions in the form of a “Q-rating,”
depicted as a facility conditions index (FCI), scaled 0 to 100, for each structural asset
that relates to the facility’s R&M needs.
We find that foreign facilities appear to be no less fit and possibly slightly more
fit than U.S. facilities, but shortcomings in the data hinder the analysis, including the
comparison of FCIs across locations and the estimation of R&M requirements. Where
we observe differences between U.S. and foreign FCIs, those differences tend to be
small on average. The average FCI for all structural assets in the United States is about
84.5, and the average for all foreign locations is 86.5; if weighted by plant replacement
value (PRV), the respective averages are 86.6 and 89.2. Our discussions with subjectmatter
experts lend support to the general conclusion that foreign facilities are at least as fit as U.S. facilities, but there are a number of reasons, pertaining largely to differences
in the ways in which the services conduct assessments and construct FCIs, to
treat the estimates cautiously. As a practical matter, given the small differences that we
found in average conditions and our concerns about the quality of the underlying data,
our posture cost modeling in Chapter Eight and estimated cost effects of the illustrative
posture changes in Chapter Ten assume the same relative conditions in the United
States and overseas for existing facilities.
In the following discussion, we present an introduction to the facility condition
data and their limitations and a more-detailed summary of the results of our analysis.
Data on Installation Conditions
Data pertaining to installation conditions are housed in the “Real Property Database”
(RPAD), which is maintained by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L). Ratings are assigned at the “asset level”
to each building or other structure in the database.3 The relevant data element in the
RPAD is that of the “Facility Physical Quality Rate,” which captures the “Q-rating.”
According to the RPAD data dictionary:4
That rate is a percentage used to depict the physical capability of existing facilities
as measured by a condition index [referred to as the facility condition index or
“FCI”]. The Facility Physical Quality Rate represents a facility’s restoration and
modernization requirement but does not represent a facility’s sustainment or new
footprint requirement. The Facility Physical Quality Rate estimates will not contain
any annual sustainment tasks or “deferred sustainment” costs, although they
may contain restoration costs caused by deferred sustainment. The Facility Physical
Quality Rate will also not represent costs to build out capacity deficits. Facility
Physical Quality Rate will be in terms of the estimated cost to restore and modernize
facilities to full-up “90–100 percent rating” status.
On this basis, the FCI, scaled 0 to 100, represents an asset’s R&M requirement
compared with that asset’s ability to support a particular mission. (Up until FY 2008,
this data element was reported on the basis of quality rating bands: i.e., Q-1 [90– 100, good condition], Q-2 [80–89, fair condition], etc.) Moreover, the FCI should be
derived from the sum of necessary R&M costs in comparison with the asset’s PRV.5
AT&L guidance6 provides a formula for calculating Q-ratings:
1 – [requirements]/PRV x 100
That guidance also specifies the content of the numerator (see Table 6.1).
The RPAD does not include a data element for the underlying R&M requirement,
but it does include a data element for the PRV. On that basis, it is technically
possible to back out the R&M requirement from the available data, but the validity of
the resulting measure depends on whether the FCI has, in fact, been calculated from an
R&M estimate, in accordance with the AT&L guidance, and whether the underlying
data are accurate. However, an AT&L analysis of the data, building on prior internal
work and prepared at RAND’s request, suggests substantial data integrity problems,
relating primarily to differences in the ways in which the services assess facility conditions
and construct FCIs.7 Of particular relevance to our interest in assessing U.S. and
foreign installation conditions is any methodological difference across the services that
could bias comparisons of the two.
Table 6.1 AT&L Guidance on Q-Rating Calculations
Among the concerns that AT&L cites the following:
lack of consistency in how the FCIs are calculated
lack of progress in condition assessments
inflated condition assessments.
Our subsequent analysis, which draws additional insight from further exploration
of the underlying data and from conversations with USAFE mission-support representatives
and other subject-matter experts, largely confirms these concerns.
Regarding consistency, the AT&L analysis references three primary considerations:
the skill sets of those undertaking the assessments; the processes employed by
those undertaking the assessments; and the components’ different interpretation of the
FCI numerator, including the calculation of R&M. Whereas AT&L’s guidance is clear
on what should and should not be included in the numerator (Table 6.1), the AT&L
analysis reports that the Navy uses calculates a condition index, capacity index, and
configuration index and assigns an FCI that represents the worst of these three; the Air
Force does similarly, except it does not include capacity requirements; and the Army
is “the purest amongst the three.”8 In this context, “purity” refers to adherence to the
AT&L guidance.9
Although we cannot attest to a lack of consistency from direct experience, other
credible sources—including the terms of references for “methodology” in the AT&L
guidance and discussions with practitioners—support the generalities of the claim,
if not all the specifics. The AT&L guidance on rating methodology seeks “validity”
and “accuracy,” but clearly allows flexibility—not necessarily a bad thing—that could,
ultimately, lead to inconsistency in the conduct of assessments. However, the guidance
does not call for flexibility in either the application of the criteria or the definition of
the FCI, both of which appear to be reflected in the service practices described above.10
Additionally, USAFE personnel indicated that the Air Force reports only R&M
that has a place on the near-term docket. More specifically, the Air Force uses “100s”
for the FCI when it has not identified any projects for a facility and validates projects for only two years beyond the current fiscal year.11 For that reason, anything in the
backlog of R&M that has not yet been formalized as a validated project in that twoyear
window does not affect the score. We have no evidence that any other service
employs this practice.
Regarding the lack of progress in making assessments, AT&L reports that over
12,000 assets still did not have FCIs in the RPAD as of FY 2011; that many assets
share just a few FCI values, which it describes as a carry-over of the mid-rating quality
bands from reports pre-dating the change in reporting in FY 2008 (e.g., 95, which is
the mid-point of the old Q-1 band of 90–100); and that the Army assigns many FCIs
on the basis of business rules because of the high costs of assessment.
We note that although 12,000 is a large number, it represents less than 2 percent
of the total pool of 648,617 assets in the AT&L analysis.12 Moreover, the AT&L analysis,
produced for RAND under considerable time pressure, included all quality-rated
structural assets, regardless of their status in the inventory, even if surplus, closed,
or disposed. Our own analysis of the RPAD data indicate that about 50 percent of
the assets lacking FCIs were active assets, and the rest were disposed (45 percent) or
closed (5 percent). Our analysis of the RPAD data on asset reviews, which involved
the calculation of the average lapse of time since the most recent physical inspection or
functional (adequacy) condition survey recorded in the RPAD, suggests, perhaps more
importantly, that many assets might not have been reviewed in recent years. However,
whether this finding speaks to a genuine lack of awareness of installation conditions
on the part of the reporting components, to a lack of reporting for inclusion in the
database, or to the difficulty of identifying the most relevant indicators of progress in
making assessments is an open question.
Lastly, the AT&L analysis refers to “inflated condition assessments” that could
impede the comparison of conditions across services and locations. In particular, it
calls out the relatively large share of “100” scores among Air Force assets, describing
them as placeholder values for assets without assessments. Our analysis of the RPAD
data confirmed the relatively large share of 100s, which is also consistent with the practice
reported to us by Air Force installation management personnel of assigning 100s
to assets in the absence of any pending, validated projects.13 Thus, the issue of inflation
appears to be one of reporting methodology, such as using 100s for placeholder values,
rather than one of “inflation” per se.
The analysis shown in Table 6.2 also suggests substantial differences in scoring
across services—we find that the differences are just as stark when we calculate the
shares of assets obtaining scores of 100 and a little less stark, but still present, when we calculate the same shares weighted by PRV (i.e., the percentage of PRV accounted for
by facilities with ratings of 100), further supporting the lack of consistency in measurement
and reporting across the components. The differences in how the services assess
installation conditions hinder the analysis and interpretation of the RPAD data.
Table 6.2 Components’ Shares of Assets and PRV with FCIs Equal to 100
Findings on Installation Conditions
Having reviewed the problems associated with the RPAD data, we proceed with our
analysis of installation conditions and call out the relevance of those problems at each
juncture. We do so noting that we hesitate to draw firm conclusions strictly on the
basis of the underlying data and so, to the extent possible, supplement those data with
evidence drawn from discussions with subject-matter experts.
To compare installation conditions across the United States, U.S. territories, and
foreign locations, we calculated two FCI averages from the FY 2011 data.14 The first
is PRV-weighted and second is unweighted. Although we present the results of both
calculations in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 for completeness, we believe that the first calculation
provides a better representation of the data; the unweighted or “simple” average
overstates the importance of small assets in the mix. Regardless of the measure, be it
weighted or unweighted, we find that FCIs are higher, on average, in foreign locations
than in the United States. This result holds, in aggregate (Table 6.3) and for most of the
“countries of interest” (Table 6.4) that we discuss in the chapter on host-nation support
and U.S. payments.
Table 6.3 Comparisons of Aggregate U.S., Territorial, and Foreign FCIs
Table 6.4 Comparisons of Aggregate and Country-Level FCIs
The difference in U.S. and foreign FCIs could, in fact, reflect underlying differences
in quality; that is, foreign assets could be “fitter” than U.S. assets. Our analysis
of the data indicates that U.S. assets are, on average, older than foreign assets. If age
were correlated with condition, hence FCI, this could be an explanatory factor. (We
find evidence of a correlation between age and FCI values in data aggregated at the
country and territory levels, but do not find evidence of such a correlation in asset-level
data.) Perhaps more compellingly, we found confirmation in our discussions with U.S.
military representatives in Europe and in the general logic of consolidations. Overall,
discussion with EUCOM representatives suggested that closures had emphasized older
facilities, leaving the remaining facilities in above-average condition, some having been
recently upgraded or modernized.15 Similarly, USAREUR representatives also noted
that, in the course of consolidating facilities, USAREUR had used installation condition
as a criterion, thereby shedding facilities with deferred maintenance and retaining
those in relatively good shape.16 The same could well hold true in other venues that
have undergone such change.
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 provide estimates of the implied R&M needs that we derived
from the RPAD data on FCI and PRV, using the AT&L-provided formula for calculating
the FCI (presented above). However, we urge caution in the interpretation of those
estimates because the services do not uniformly—if at all—use estimates of R&M to
develop their respective FCIs. Thus, the R&M figures are mere arithmetic artifacts of
the underlying FCI and PRV values in the RPAD data.
Having flagged the apparent differences in U.S. and foreign quality ratings,
we comment on the ways in which problems in the data might accentuate those differences.
Specifically, we note that the tendency to assign “100s” might be greater
overseas than in the United States. In aggregate, we find that about 45 percent of all
foreign assets and 38 percent of all U.S. assets have FCI values of 100 and that about
38 percent of foreign-located PRV and 35 percent of all U.S-located PRV has an FCI
value of 100 (Table 6.5). It could just be that there are that many more “100s” overseas,
but it could also be that methodological differences have biased the comparative
results. One reason to believe that methodology has played a part is that the Air Force,
which tends to assign a larger share of 100s than the other components, also has a
larger share of its assets in foreign locations than the other services. The Air Force holds
23 percent of its reportable assets and 20 percent of its reportable PRV in foreign locations;
comparable figures for the other services are as follows: Army, 14 and 16 percent; Navy and the Marine Corps, 17 and 15 percent.17 A comparison of the percentages of
U.S. and foreign assets and PRV with scores of 100 that excludes the Air Force lends
further support to the hypothesis that methodology is a contributing factor. Absent the
Air Force data, the shares of U.S. and foreign assets with FCI values of 100 are almost
indistinguishable—both are about 27 percent—and the share of U.S.-located PRV
with an FCI value of 100 is slightly higher than that of foreign-located PRV.
Table 6.5 Locational Shares of Assets and PRV with FCIs Equal to 100
In conducting this analysis, we sought to triangulate our results with an examination
of relative spending on foreign, U.S., and U.S. territorial MILCON. For example,
we assessed the ratio of MILCON to PRV, by location, over the past three years. Ultimately,
we found this approach unsatisfying because we could neither clearly assign the
totality of the MILCON estimates to particular locations nor interpret the resulting
ratios. In any given year, a nonnegligible share of all MILCON funding is assigned to
the category “unspecified worldwide funds”; moreover, any observable differences in
MILCON spending across locations also likely reflect changes in mission and priorities
and activities performed at installations (e.g., due to restationing or realignment,
which drive a significant portion of MILCON funding), unrelated to relative installation
conditions.18
Implications of Findings on Installation Quality for Postures
The data on installation conditions are weak, but, in combination with other qualitative
evidence from U.S. military representatives overseas, they suggest that installation
conditions overseas are at least as good as those in the United States and U.S. territories
and possibly better. The differences do not appear to be large. If taken at face value, the
FCIs on foreign soil are higher than in the United States, but on average differ by less
than 3 percentage points.
What does this finding mean for locational decisions and the cost estimates that
might inform them? At the very least, it suggests that it would be imprudent to assume
that relocating from a foreign location to a U.S. analogue would necessarily spare
the U.S. military a relatively high impending R&M bill. In some instances, relocation
might imply an upgrade in the physical condition of the facilities, but in other
instances it might imply a downgrade. The answer will depend on the conditions of the
particular facilities in question. As a practical matter, given the small differences that
we found in average U.S. and foreign conditions and our concerns about the quality of
the underlying data, our cost modeling in Chapter Eight and estimated cost effects of
the illustrative posture changes in Chapter Ten assume the same relative conditions in
the United States and overseas for existing facilities.
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