Opinion
CEDRIC KUSHNER PROMOTIONS, LTD.,
PETITIONER
v.
DON KING et al.
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U. S. C. §1961 et seq ., makes it unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise … to conduct or participate … in the conduct of such enterprises affairs through the commission of two or more statutorily defined crimeswhich RICO calls a pattern of racketeering activity. §1962(c). The language suggests, and lower courts have held, that this provision fore- sees two separate entities, a person and a distinct enterprise.
This case focuses upon a person who is the president and sole shareholder of a closely held corporation. The plaintiff claims that the president has conducted the corporations affairs through the forbidden pattern, though for present purposes it is conceded that, in doing so, he acted within the scope of his authority as the corporations employee. In these circumstances, are there two entities, a person and a separate enterprise? Assuming, as we must given the posture of this case, that the allegations in the complaint are true, we conclude that the person and enterprise here are distinct and that the RICO provision applies.
Petitioner, Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd., is a corporation that promotes boxing matches. Petitioner sued Don King, the president and sole shareholder of Don King Productions, a corporation, claiming that King had conducted the boxing-related affairs of Don King Productions in part through a RICO pattern, i.e. , through the alleged commission of at least two instances of fraud and other RICO predicate crimes. The District Court, citing Court of Appeals precedent, dismissed the complaint. Civ. No. 986859, 1999 WL 771366, *34 (SDNY, Sept. 28, 1999). And the Court of Appeals affirmed that dismissal. 219 F. 3d 115 (CA2 2000) (per curiam) . In the appellate courts view, §1962(c) applies only where a plaintiff shows the existence of two separate entities, a person and a distinct enterprise, the affairs of which that person improperly conducts. Id., at 116. In this instance, it is undisputed that King was an employee of the corporation Don King Productions and also acting within the scope of his authority. Id., at 117. Under the Court of Appeals analysis, King, in a legal sense, was part of, not separate from, the corporation. There was no person, distinct from the enterprise, who improperly conducted the enterprises affairs. And thus §1962(c) did not apply. Ibid.
Other Circuits, applying §1962(c) in roughly similar circumstances, have reached a contrary conclusion. See, e.g. , Brannon v. Boatmens First Nat. Bank of Okla. , 153 F. 3d 1144, 1148, n. 4 (CA10 1998); Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L. P. , 52 F. 3d 640, 647 (CA7 1995); Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal Oaks Motor Car Co. , 46 F. 3d 258, 265, 269 (CA3 1995); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp. , 978 F. 2d 1529, 1534 (CA9 1992). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. We now agree with these Circuits and hold that the Second Circuits interpretation of §1962(c) is erroneous.
We do not quarrel with the basic principle that to establish liability under §1962(c) one must allege and prove the existence of two distinct entities: (1) a person; and (2) an enterprise that is not simply the same person referred to by a different name. The statutes language, read as ordinary English, suggests that principle. The Act says that it applies to person[s] who are employed by or associated with the enterprise. §1962(c). In ordinary English one speaks of employing, being employed by, or associating with others, not oneself. See Websters Third New International Dictionary 132 (1993) (defining associate); id. , at 743 (defining employ). In addition, the Acts purposes are consistent with that principle. Whether the Act seeks to prevent a person from victimizing, say, a small business, S. Rep. No. 91617, p. 77 (1969), or to prevent a person from using a corporation for criminal purposes, National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U. S. 249, 259 (1994) , the person and the victim, or the person and the tool, are different entities, not the same.
The Acting Solicitor General reads §1962(c) to require some distinctness between the RICO defendant and the RICO enterprise. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11. And she says that this requirement is legally sound and workable. Ibid. We agree with her assessment, particularly in light of the fact that 12 Courts of Appeals have interpreted the statute as embodying some such distinctness requirement without creating discernible mischief in the administration of RICO. See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson , 224 F. 3d 425, 445 (CA5 2000); United States v. Goldin Industries, Inc. , 219 F. 3d 1268, 1270 (CA11) (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U. S. 1102 (2000) ; Begala v. PNC Bank , 214 F. 3d 776, 781 (CA6 2000), cert. denied, 531 U. S. __ (2001); Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc. , 103 F. 3d 186, 190 (CA1 1996); Richmond , supra , at 646647; Gasoline Sales, Inc. v. Aero Oil Co. , 39 F. 3d 70, 7273 (CA3 1994); Confederate Memorial Assn., Inc. v. Hines , 995 F. 2d 295, 299300 (CADC 1993); Board of Cty. Commrs, San Juan Cty. v. Liberty Group , 965 F. 2d 879, 885 (CA10), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 918 (1992) ; River City Markets, Inc. v. Fleming Foods West, Inc. , 960 F. 2d 1458, 1461 (CA9 1992); Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc. , 896 F. 2d 833, 840 (CA4 1990); Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Financial Co ., 886 F. 2d 986, 995 (CA8 1989); Bennett v. United States Trust Co. of New York , 770 F. 2d 308, 315, and n. 2 (CA2 1985), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 1058 (1986) ; see also Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co., Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. , 204 F. 3d 1368, 1383, n. 7 (CA Fed. 2000) (approving of distinctness requirement in dicta), cert. denied, 531 U. S. __ (2001). Indeed, this Court previously has said that liability depends on showing that the defendants conducted or participated in the conduct of the enterprise s affairs, not just their own affairs. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U. S. 170, 185 (1993) .
While accepting the distinctness principle, we nonetheless disagree with the appellate courts application of that principle to the present circumstancescircumstances in which a corporate employee, acting within the scope of his authority, 219 F. 3d, at 117, allegedly conducts the corporations affairs in a RICO-forbidden way. The corporate owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct from the corporation itself, a legally different entity with different rights and responsibilities due to its different legal status. And we can find nothing in the statute that requires more separateness than that. Cf. McCullough v. Suter , 757 F. 2d 142, 144 (CA7 1985) (finding either formal or practical separateness sufficient to be distinct under §1962(c)).
Linguistically speaking, an employee who conducts the affairs of a corporation through illegal acts comes within the terms of a statute that forbids any person unlawfully to conduct an enterprise, particularly when the statute explicitly defines person to include any individual … capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property, and defines enterprise to include a corporation. 18 U. S. C. §§1961(3), (4). And, linguistically speaking, the employee and the corporation are different persons, even where the employee is the corporations sole owner. After all, incorporations basic purpose is to create a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of the natural individuals who created it, who own it, or whom it employs. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U. S. 51, 6162 (1998) ; Burnet v. Clark, 287 U. S. 410, 415 (1932) ; 1 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §§7, 14 (rev. ed. 1999).
We note that the Second Circuit relied on earlier Circuit precedent for its decision. But that precedent involved quite different circumstances which are not presented here. This case concerns a claim that a corporate employee is the person and the corporation is the enterprise. It is natural to speak of a corporate employee as a person employed by the corporation. §1962(c). The earlier Second Circuit precedent concerned a claim that a corporation was the person and the corporation, together with all its employees and agents, were the enterprise. See Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N. A. , 30 F. 3d 339, 344 (1994) (affirming dismissal of complaint). It is less natural to speak of a corporation as employed by or associated with this latter oddly constructed entity. And the Second Circuits other precedent also involved significantly different allegations compared with the instant case. See Anatian v. Coutts Bank (Switzerland) Ltd. , 193 F. 3d 85, 89 (1999) (affirming dismissal where plaintiff alleged that same bank was both person and enterprise), cert. denied, 528 U. S. 1188 (2000) ; Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp. , 93 F. 3d 1055, 1064 (1996) (involving complaint alleging that corporate subsidiaries were persons and subsidiaries, taken together as parent, were enterprise), vacated on other grounds, 525 U. S. 128 (1998) ; Bennett , supra , at 315, and n. 2 (same as Anatian ). We do not here consider the merits of these cases, and note only their distinction from the instant case.
Further, to apply the RICO statute in present circumstances is consistent with the statutes basic purposes as this Court has defined them. The Court has held that RICO both protects a legitimate enterprise from those who would use unlawful acts to victimize it, United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576, 591 (1981) , and also protects the public from those who would unlawfully use an enterprise (whether legitimate or illegitimate) as a vehicle through which unlawful … activity is committed, National Organization for Women, Inc., 510 U. S., at 259. A corporate employee who conducts the corporations affairs through an unlawful RICO pattern . . . of activity, §1962(c), uses that corporation as a vehicle whether he is, or is not, its sole owner.
Conversely, the appellate courts critical legal distinctionbetween employees acting within the scope of corporate authority and those acting outside that authorityis inconsistent with a basic statutory purpose. Cf. Reves , supra , at 184 (stating that an enterprise is operated, within §1962(c)s meaning, not just by upper management but also by lower rung participants in the enterprise who are under the direction of upper management (emphasis added)). It would immunize from RICO liability many of those at whom this Court has said RICO directly aims e.g. , high-ranking individuals in an illegitimate criminal enterprise, who, seeking to further the purposes of that enterprise, act within the scope of their authority. Cf. Turkette , supra , at 581 (Congress did nothing to indicate that an enterprise consisting of a group of individuals was not covered by RICO if the purpose of the enterprise was exclusively criminal).
Finally, we have found nothing in the statutes history that significantly favors an alternative interpretation. That history not only refers frequently to the importance of undermining organized crimes influence upon legitimate businesses but also refers to the need to protect the public from those who would run organization[s] in a manner detrimental to the public interest. S. Rep. No. 91617, at 82. This latter purpose, as we have said, invites the legal principle we endorse, namely, that in present circumstances the statute requires no more than the formal legal distinction between person and enterprise (namely, incorporation) that is present here.
In reply, King argues that the lower courts rule is consistent with (1) the principle that a corporation acts only through its directors, officers, and agents, 1 Fletcher, supra , §30, (2) the principle that a corporation should not be liable for the criminal acts of its employees where Congress so intends, Brief for Respondents 2021, and (3) the Sherman Act principle limiting liability under 15 U. S. C. §1 by excluding from unlawful combinations or conspiracies the activities of a single firm, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U. S. 752, n. 15 (1984). The alternative that we endorse, however, is no less consistent with these principles. It does not deny that a corporation acts through its employees; it says only that the corporation and its employees are not legally identical. It does not assert that ordinary respondeat superior principles make a corporation legally liable under RICO for the criminal acts of its employees; that is a matter of congressional intent not before us. See, e.g. , Gasoline Sales, Inc. , 39 F. 3d, at 73 (holding that corporation cannot be vicariously liable for §1962(c) violations committed by its vice president). Neither is it inconsistent with antitrust laws intracorporate conspiracy doctrine; that doctrine turns on specific antitrust objectives. See Copperweld Corp. , supra , at 770771. Rather, we hold simply that the need for two distinct entities is satisfied; hence, the RICO provision before us applies when a corporate employee unlawfully conducts the affairs of the corporation of which he is the sole ownerwhether he conducts those affairs within the scope, or beyond the scope, of corporate authority.
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Opinion
CEDRIC KUSHNER PROMOTIONS, LTD.,
PETITIONER
v.
DON KING et al.
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U. S. C. §1961 et seq ., makes it unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise … to conduct or participate … in the conduct of such enterprises affairs through the commission of two or more statutorily defined crimeswhich RICO calls a pattern of racketeering activity. §1962(c). The language suggests, and lower courts have held, that this provision fore- sees two separate entities, a person and a distinct enterprise.
This case focuses upon a person who is the president and sole shareholder of a closely held corporation. The plaintiff claims that the president has conducted the corporations affairs through the forbidden pattern, though for present purposes it is conceded that, in doing so, he acted within the scope of his authority as the corporations employee. In these circumstances, are there two entities, a person and a separate enterprise? Assuming, as we must given the posture of this case, that the allegations in the complaint are true, we conclude that the person and enterprise here are distinct and that the RICO provision applies.
Petitioner, Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd., is a corporation that promotes boxing matches. Petitioner sued Don King, the president and sole shareholder of Don King Productions, a corporation, claiming that King had conducted the boxing-related affairs of Don King Productions in part through a RICO pattern, i.e. , through the alleged commission of at least two instances of fraud and other RICO predicate crimes. The District Court, citing Court of Appeals precedent, dismissed the complaint. Civ. No. 986859, 1999 WL 771366, *34 (SDNY, Sept. 28, 1999). And the Court of Appeals affirmed that dismissal. 219 F. 3d 115 (CA2 2000) (per curiam) . In the appellate courts view, §1962(c) applies only where a plaintiff shows the existence of two separate entities, a person and a distinct enterprise, the affairs of which that person improperly conducts. Id., at 116. In this instance, it is undisputed that King was an employee of the corporation Don King Productions and also acting within the scope of his authority. Id., at 117. Under the Court of Appeals analysis, King, in a legal sense, was part of, not separate from, the corporation. There was no person, distinct from the enterprise, who improperly conducted the enterprises affairs. And thus §1962(c) did not apply. Ibid.
Other Circuits, applying §1962(c) in roughly similar circumstances, have reached a contrary conclusion. See, e.g. , Brannon v. Boatmens First Nat. Bank of Okla. , 153 F. 3d 1144, 1148, n. 4 (CA10 1998); Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L. P. , 52 F. 3d 640, 647 (CA7 1995); Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal Oaks Motor Car Co. , 46 F. 3d 258, 265, 269 (CA3 1995); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp. , 978 F. 2d 1529, 1534 (CA9 1992). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. We now agree with these Circuits and hold that the Second Circuits interpretation of §1962(c) is erroneous.
We do not quarrel with the basic principle that to establish liability under §1962(c) one must allege and prove the existence of two distinct entities: (1) a person; and (2) an enterprise that is not simply the same person referred to by a different name. The statutes language, read as ordinary English, suggests that principle. The Act says that it applies to person[s] who are employed by or associated with the enterprise. §1962(c). In ordinary English one speaks of employing, being employed by, or associating with others, not oneself. See Websters Third New International Dictionary 132 (1993) (defining associate); id. , at 743 (defining employ). In addition, the Acts purposes are consistent with that principle. Whether the Act seeks to prevent a person from victimizing, say, a small business, S. Rep. No. 91617, p. 77 (1969), or to prevent a person from using a corporation for criminal purposes, National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U. S. 249, 259 (1994) , the person and the victim, or the person and the tool, are different entities, not the same.
The Acting Solicitor General reads §1962(c) to require some distinctness between the RICO defendant and the RICO enterprise. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11. And she says that this requirement is legally sound and workable. Ibid. We agree with her assessment, particularly in light of the fact that 12 Courts of Appeals have interpreted the statute as embodying some such distinctness requirement without creating discernible mischief in the administration of RICO. See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson , 224 F. 3d 425, 445 (CA5 2000); United States v. Goldin Industries, Inc. , 219 F. 3d 1268, 1270 (CA11) (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U. S. 1102 (2000) ; Begala v. PNC Bank , 214 F. 3d 776, 781 (CA6 2000), cert. denied, 531 U. S. __ (2001); Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc. , 103 F. 3d 186, 190 (CA1 1996); Richmond , supra , at 646647; Gasoline Sales, Inc. v. Aero Oil Co. , 39 F. 3d 70, 7273 (CA3 1994); Confederate Memorial Assn., Inc. v. Hines , 995 F. 2d 295, 299300 (CADC 1993); Board of Cty. Commrs, San Juan Cty. v. Liberty Group , 965 F. 2d 879, 885 (CA10), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 918 (1992) ; River City Markets, Inc. v. Fleming Foods West, Inc. , 960 F. 2d 1458, 1461 (CA9 1992); Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc. , 896 F. 2d 833, 840 (CA4 1990); Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Financial Co ., 886 F. 2d 986, 995 (CA8 1989); Bennett v. United States Trust Co. of New York , 770 F. 2d 308, 315, and n. 2 (CA2 1985), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 1058 (1986) ; see also Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co., Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. , 204 F. 3d 1368, 1383, n. 7 (CA Fed. 2000) (approving of distinctness requirement in dicta), cert. denied, 531 U. S. __ (2001). Indeed, this Court previously has said that liability depends on showing that the defendants conducted or participated in the conduct of the enterprise s affairs, not just their own affairs. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U. S. 170, 185 (1993) .
While accepting the distinctness principle, we nonetheless disagree with the appellate courts application of that principle to the present circumstancescircumstances in which a corporate employee, acting within the scope of his authority, 219 F. 3d, at 117, allegedly conducts the corporations affairs in a RICO-forbidden way. The corporate owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct from the corporation itself, a legally different entity with different rights and responsibilities due to its different legal status. And we can find nothing in the statute that requires more separateness than that. Cf. McCullough v. Suter , 757 F. 2d 142, 144 (CA7 1985) (finding either formal or practical separateness sufficient to be distinct under §1962(c)).
Linguistically speaking, an employee who conducts the affairs of a corporation through illegal acts comes within the terms of a statute that forbids any person unlawfully to conduct an enterprise, particularly when the statute explicitly defines person to include any individual … capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property, and defines enterprise to include a corporation. 18 U. S. C. §§1961(3), (4). And, linguistically speaking, the employee and the corporation are different persons, even where the employee is the corporations sole owner. After all, incorporations basic purpose is to create a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of the natural individuals who created it, who own it, or whom it employs. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U. S. 51, 6162 (1998) ; Burnet v. Clark, 287 U. S. 410, 415 (1932) ; 1 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §§7, 14 (rev. ed. 1999).
We note that the Second Circuit relied on earlier Circuit precedent for its decision. But that precedent involved quite different circumstances which are not presented here. This case concerns a claim that a corporate employee is the person and the corporation is the enterprise. It is natural to speak of a corporate employee as a person employed by the corporation. §1962(c). The earlier Second Circuit precedent concerned a claim that a corporation was the person and the corporation, together with all its employees and agents, were the enterprise. See Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N. A. , 30 F. 3d 339, 344 (1994) (affirming dismissal of complaint). It is less natural to speak of a corporation as employed by or associated with this latter oddly constructed entity. And the Second Circuits other precedent also involved significantly different allegations compared with the instant case. See Anatian v. Coutts Bank (Switzerland) Ltd. , 193 F. 3d 85, 89 (1999) (affirming dismissal where plaintiff alleged that same bank was both person and enterprise), cert. denied, 528 U. S. 1188 (2000) ; Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp. , 93 F. 3d 1055, 1064 (1996) (involving complaint alleging that corporate subsidiaries were persons and subsidiaries, taken together as parent, were enterprise), vacated on other grounds, 525 U. S. 128 (1998) ; Bennett , supra , at 315, and n. 2 (same as Anatian ). We do not here consider the merits of these cases, and note only their distinction from the instant case.
Further, to apply the RICO statute in present circumstances is consistent with the statutes basic purposes as this Court has defined them. The Court has held that RICO both protects a legitimate enterprise from those who would use unlawful acts to victimize it, United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576, 591 (1981) , and also protects the public from those who would unlawfully use an enterprise (whether legitimate or illegitimate) as a vehicle through which unlawful … activity is committed, National Organization for Women, Inc., 510 U. S., at 259. A corporate employee who conducts the corporations affairs through an unlawful RICO pattern . . . of activity, §1962(c), uses that corporation as a vehicle whether he is, or is not, its sole owner.
Conversely, the appellate courts critical legal distinctionbetween employees acting within the scope of corporate authority and those acting outside that authorityis inconsistent with a basic statutory purpose. Cf. Reves , supra , at 184 (stating that an enterprise is operated, within §1962(c)s meaning, not just by upper management but also by lower rung participants in the enterprise who are under the direction of upper management (emphasis added)). It would immunize from RICO liability many of those at whom this Court has said RICO directly aims e.g. , high-ranking individuals in an illegitimate criminal enterprise, who, seeking to further the purposes of that enterprise, act within the scope of their authority. Cf. Turkette , supra , at 581 (Congress did nothing to indicate that an enterprise consisting of a group of individuals was not covered by RICO if the purpose of the enterprise was exclusively criminal).
Finally, we have found nothing in the statutes history that significantly favors an alternative interpretation. That history not only refers frequently to the importance of undermining organized crimes influence upon legitimate businesses but also refers to the need to protect the public from those who would run organization[s] in a manner detrimental to the public interest. S. Rep. No. 91617, at 82. This latter purpose, as we have said, invites the legal principle we endorse, namely, that in present circumstances the statute requires no more than the formal legal distinction between person and enterprise (namely, incorporation) that is present here.
In reply, King argues that the lower courts rule is consistent with (1) the principle that a corporation acts only through its directors, officers, and agents, 1 Fletcher, supra , §30, (2) the principle that a corporation should not be liable for the criminal acts of its employees where Congress so intends, Brief for Respondents 2021, and (3) the Sherman Act principle limiting liability under 15 U. S. C. §1 by excluding from unlawful combinations or conspiracies the activities of a single firm, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U. S. 752, n. 15 (1984). The alternative that we endorse, however, is no less consistent with these principles. It does not deny that a corporation acts through its employees; it says only that the corporation and its employees are not legally identical. It does not assert that ordinary respondeat superior principles make a corporation legally liable under RICO for the criminal acts of its employees; that is a matter of congressional intent not before us. See, e.g. , Gasoline Sales, Inc. , 39 F. 3d, at 73 (holding that corporation cannot be vicariously liable for §1962(c) violations committed by its vice president). Neither is it inconsistent with antitrust laws intracorporate conspiracy doctrine; that doctrine turns on specific antitrust objectives. See Copperweld Corp. , supra , at 770771. Rather, we hold simply that the need for two distinct entities is satisfied; hence, the RICO provision before us applies when a corporate employee unlawfully conducts the affairs of the corporation of which he is the sole ownerwhether he conducts those affairs within the scope, or beyond the scope, of corporate authority.
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Opinion
CEDRIC KUSHNER PROMOTIONS, LTD.,
PETITIONER
v.
DON KING et al.
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U. S. C. §1961 et seq ., makes it unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise … to conduct or participate … in the conduct of such enterprises affairs through the commission of two or more statutorily defined crimeswhich RICO calls a pattern of racketeering activity. §1962(c). The language suggests, and lower courts have held, that this provision fore- sees two separate entities, a person and a distinct enterprise.
This case focuses upon a person who is the president and sole shareholder of a closely held corporation. The plaintiff claims that the president has conducted the corporations affairs through the forbidden pattern, though for present purposes it is conceded that, in doing so, he acted within the scope of his authority as the corporations employee. In these circumstances, are there two entities, a person and a separate enterprise? Assuming, as we must given the posture of this case, that the allegations in the complaint are true, we conclude that the person and enterprise here are distinct and that the RICO provision applies.
Petitioner, Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd., is a corporation that promotes boxing matches. Petitioner sued Don King, the president and sole shareholder of Don King Productions, a corporation, claiming that King had conducted the boxing-related affairs of Don King Productions in part through a RICO pattern, i.e. , through the alleged commission of at least two instances of fraud and other RICO predicate crimes. The District Court, citing Court of Appeals precedent, dismissed the complaint. Civ. No. 986859, 1999 WL 771366, *34 (SDNY, Sept. 28, 1999). And the Court of Appeals affirmed that dismissal. 219 F. 3d 115 (CA2 2000) (per curiam) . In the appellate courts view, §1962(c) applies only where a plaintiff shows the existence of two separate entities, a person and a distinct enterprise, the affairs of which that person improperly conducts. Id., at 116. In this instance, it is undisputed that King was an employee of the corporation Don King Productions and also acting within the scope of his authority. Id., at 117. Under the Court of Appeals analysis, King, in a legal sense, was part of, not separate from, the corporation. There was no person, distinct from the enterprise, who improperly conducted the enterprises affairs. And thus §1962(c) did not apply. Ibid.
Other Circuits, applying §1962(c) in roughly similar circumstances, have reached a contrary conclusion. See, e.g. , Brannon v. Boatmens First Nat. Bank of Okla. , 153 F. 3d 1144, 1148, n. 4 (CA10 1998); Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L. P. , 52 F. 3d 640, 647 (CA7 1995); Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal Oaks Motor Car Co. , 46 F. 3d 258, 265, 269 (CA3 1995); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp. , 978 F. 2d 1529, 1534 (CA9 1992). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. We now agree with these Circuits and hold that the Second Circuits interpretation of §1962(c) is erroneous.
We do not quarrel with the basic principle that to establish liability under §1962(c) one must allege and prove the existence of two distinct entities: (1) a person; and (2) an enterprise that is not simply the same person referred to by a different name. The statutes language, read as ordinary English, suggests that principle. The Act says that it applies to person[s] who are employed by or associated with the enterprise. §1962(c). In ordinary English one speaks of employing, being employed by, or associating with others, not oneself. See Websters Third New International Dictionary 132 (1993) (defining associate); id. , at 743 (defining employ). In addition, the Acts purposes are consistent with that principle. Whether the Act seeks to prevent a person from victimizing, say, a small business, S. Rep. No. 91617, p. 77 (1969), or to prevent a person from using a corporation for criminal purposes, National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U. S. 249, 259 (1994) , the person and the victim, or the person and the tool, are different entities, not the same.
The Acting Solicitor General reads §1962(c) to require some distinctness between the RICO defendant and the RICO enterprise. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11. And she says that this requirement is legally sound and workable. Ibid. We agree with her assessment, particularly in light of the fact that 12 Courts of Appeals have interpreted the statute as embodying some such distinctness requirement without creating discernible mischief in the administration of RICO. See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson , 224 F. 3d 425, 445 (CA5 2000); United States v. Goldin Industries, Inc. , 219 F. 3d 1268, 1270 (CA11) (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U. S. 1102 (2000) ; Begala v. PNC Bank , 214 F. 3d 776, 781 (CA6 2000), cert. denied, 531 U. S. __ (2001); Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc. , 103 F. 3d 186, 190 (CA1 1996); Richmond , supra , at 646647; Gasoline Sales, Inc. v. Aero Oil Co. , 39 F. 3d 70, 7273 (CA3 1994); Confederate Memorial Assn., Inc. v. Hines , 995 F. 2d 295, 299300 (CADC 1993); Board of Cty. Commrs, San Juan Cty. v. Liberty Group , 965 F. 2d 879, 885 (CA10), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 918 (1992) ; River City Markets, Inc. v. Fleming Foods West, Inc. , 960 F. 2d 1458, 1461 (CA9 1992); Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc. , 896 F. 2d 833, 840 (CA4 1990); Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Financial Co ., 886 F. 2d 986, 995 (CA8 1989); Bennett v. United States Trust Co. of New York , 770 F. 2d 308, 315, and n. 2 (CA2 1985), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 1058 (1986) ; see also Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co., Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. , 204 F. 3d 1368, 1383, n. 7 (CA Fed. 2000) (approving of distinctness requirement in dicta), cert. denied, 531 U. S. __ (2001). Indeed, this Court previously has said that liability depends on showing that the defendants conducted or participated in the conduct of the enterprise s affairs, not just their own affairs. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U. S. 170, 185 (1993) .
While accepting the distinctness principle, we nonetheless disagree with the appellate courts application of that principle to the present circumstancescircumstances in which a corporate employee, acting within the scope of his authority, 219 F. 3d, at 117, allegedly conducts the corporations affairs in a RICO-forbidden way. The corporate owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct from the corporation itself, a legally different entity with different rights and responsibilities due to its different legal status. And we can find nothing in the statute that requires more separateness than that. Cf. McCullough v. Suter , 757 F. 2d 142, 144 (CA7 1985) (finding either formal or practical separateness sufficient to be distinct under §1962(c)).
Linguistically speaking, an employee who conducts the affairs of a corporation through illegal acts comes within the terms of a statute that forbids any person unlawfully to conduct an enterprise, particularly when the statute explicitly defines person to include any individual … capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property, and defines enterprise to include a corporation. 18 U. S. C. §§1961(3), (4). And, linguistically speaking, the employee and the corporation are different persons, even where the employee is the corporations sole owner. After all, incorporations basic purpose is to create a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of the natural individuals who created it, who own it, or whom it employs. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U. S. 51, 6162 (1998) ; Burnet v. Clark, 287 U. S. 410, 415 (1932) ; 1 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §§7, 14 (rev. ed. 1999).
We note that the Second Circuit relied on earlier Circuit precedent for its decision. But that precedent involved quite different circumstances which are not presented here. This case concerns a claim that a corporate employee is the person and the corporation is the enterprise. It is natural to speak of a corporate employee as a person employed by the corporation. §1962(c). The earlier Second Circuit precedent concerned a claim that a corporation was the person and the corporation, together with all its employees and agents, were the enterprise. See Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N. A. , 30 F. 3d 339, 344 (1994) (affirming dismissal of complaint). It is less natural to speak of a corporation as employed by or associated with this latter oddly constructed entity. And the Second Circuits other precedent also involved significantly different allegations compared with the instant case. See Anatian v. Coutts Bank (Switzerland) Ltd. , 193 F. 3d 85, 89 (1999) (affirming dismissal where plaintiff alleged that same bank was both person and enterprise), cert. denied, 528 U. S. 1188 (2000) ; Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp. , 93 F. 3d 1055, 1064 (1996) (involving complaint alleging that corporate subsidiaries were persons and subsidiaries, taken together as parent, were enterprise), vacated on other grounds, 525 U. S. 128 (1998) ; Bennett , supra , at 315, and n. 2 (same as Anatian ). We do not here consider the merits of these cases, and note only their distinction from the instant case.
Further, to apply the RICO statute in present circumstances is consistent with the statutes basic purposes as this Court has defined them. The Court has held that RICO both protects a legitimate enterprise from those who would use unlawful acts to victimize it, United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576, 591 (1981) , and also protects the public from those who would unlawfully use an enterprise (whether legitimate or illegitimate) as a vehicle through which unlawful … activity is committed, National Organization for Women, Inc., 510 U. S., at 259. A corporate employee who conducts the corporations affairs through an unlawful RICO pattern . . . of activity, §1962(c), uses that corporation as a vehicle whether he is, or is not, its sole owner.
Conversely, the appellate courts critical legal distinctionbetween employees acting within the scope of corporate authority and those acting outside that authorityis inconsistent with a basic statutory purpose. Cf. Reves , supra , at 184 (stating that an enterprise is operated, within §1962(c)s meaning, not just by upper management but also by lower rung participants in the enterprise who are under the direction of upper management (emphasis added)). It would immunize from RICO liability many of those at whom this Court has said RICO directly aims e.g. , high-ranking individuals in an illegitimate criminal enterprise, who, seeking to further the purposes of that enterprise, act within the scope of their authority. Cf. Turkette , supra , at 581 (Congress did nothing to indicate that an enterprise consisting of a group of individuals was not covered by RICO if the purpose of the enterprise was exclusively criminal).
Finally, we have found nothing in the statutes history that significantly favors an alternative interpretation. That history not only refers frequently to the importance of undermining organized crimes influence upon legitimate businesses but also refers to the need to protect the public from those who would run organization[s] in a manner detrimental to the public interest. S. Rep. No. 91617, at 82. This latter purpose, as we have said, invites the legal principle we endorse, namely, that in present circumstances the statute requires no more than the formal legal distinction between person and enterprise (namely, incorporation) that is present here.
In reply, King argues that the lower courts rule is consistent with (1) the principle that a corporation acts only through its directors, officers, and agents, 1 Fletcher, supra , §30, (2) the principle that a corporation should not be liable for the criminal acts of its employees where Congress so intends, Brief for Respondents 2021, and (3) the Sherman Act principle limiting liability under 15 U. S. C. §1 by excluding from unlawful combinations or conspiracies the activities of a single firm, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U. S. 752, n. 15 (1984). The alternative that we endorse, however, is no less consistent with these principles. It does not deny that a corporation acts through its employees; it says only that the corporation and its employees are not legally identical. It does not assert that ordinary respondeat superior principles make a corporation legally liable under RICO for the criminal acts of its employees; that is a matter of congressional intent not before us. See, e.g. , Gasoline Sales, Inc. , 39 F. 3d, at 73 (holding that corporation cannot be vicariously liable for §1962(c) violations committed by its vice president). Neither is it inconsistent with antitrust laws intracorporate conspiracy doctrine; that doctrine turns on specific antitrust objectives. See Copperweld Corp. , supra , at 770771. Rather, we hold simply that the need for two distinct entities is satisfied; hence, the RICO provision before us applies when a corporate employee unlawfully conducts the affairs of the corporation of which he is the sole ownerwhether he conducts those affairs within the scope, or beyond the scope, of corporate authority.
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Opinion
CEDRIC KUSHNER PROMOTIONS, LTD.,
PETITIONER
v.
DON KING et al.
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U. S. C. §1961 et seq ., makes it unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise … to conduct or participate … in the conduct of such enterprises affairs through the commission of two or more statutorily defined crimeswhich RICO calls a pattern of racketeering activity. §1962(c). The language suggests, and lower courts have held, that this provision fore- sees two separate entities, a person and a distinct enterprise.
This case focuses upon a person who is the president and sole shareholder of a closely held corporation. The plaintiff claims that the president has conducted the corporations affairs through the forbidden pattern, though for present purposes it is conceded that, in doing so, he acted within the scope of his authority as the corporations employee. In these circumstances, are there two entities, a person and a separate enterprise? Assuming, as we must given the posture of this case, that the allegations in the complaint are true, we conclude that the person and enterprise here are distinct and that the RICO provision applies.
Petitioner, Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd., is a corporation that promotes boxing matches. Petitioner sued Don King, the president and sole shareholder of Don King Productions, a corporation, claiming that King had conducted the boxing-related affairs of Don King Productions in part through a RICO pattern, i.e. , through the alleged commission of at least two instances of fraud and other RICO predicate crimes. The District Court, citing Court of Appeals precedent, dismissed the complaint. Civ. No. 986859, 1999 WL 771366, *34 (SDNY, Sept. 28, 1999). And the Court of Appeals affirmed that dismissal. 219 F. 3d 115 (CA2 2000) (per curiam) . In the appellate courts view, §1962(c) applies only where a plaintiff shows the existence of two separate entities, a person and a distinct enterprise, the affairs of which that person improperly conducts. Id., at 116. In this instance, it is undisputed that King was an employee of the corporation Don King Productions and also acting within the scope of his authority. Id., at 117. Under the Court of Appeals analysis, King, in a legal sense, was part of, not separate from, the corporation. There was no person, distinct from the enterprise, who improperly conducted the enterprises affairs. And thus §1962(c) did not apply. Ibid.
Other Circuits, applying §1962(c) in roughly similar circumstances, have reached a contrary conclusion. See, e.g. , Brannon v. Boatmens First Nat. Bank of Okla. , 153 F. 3d 1144, 1148, n. 4 (CA10 1998); Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L. P. , 52 F. 3d 640, 647 (CA7 1995); Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal Oaks Motor Car Co. , 46 F. 3d 258, 265, 269 (CA3 1995); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp. , 978 F. 2d 1529, 1534 (CA9 1992). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. We now agree with these Circuits and hold that the Second Circuits interpretation of §1962(c) is erroneous.
We do not quarrel with the basic principle that to establish liability under §1962(c) one must allege and prove the existence of two distinct entities: (1) a person; and (2) an enterprise that is not simply the same person referred to by a different name. The statutes language, read as ordinary English, suggests that principle. The Act says that it applies to person[s] who are employed by or associated with the enterprise. §1962(c). In ordinary English one speaks of employing, being employed by, or associating with others, not oneself. See Websters Third New International Dictionary 132 (1993) (defining associate); id. , at 743 (defining employ). In addition, the Acts purposes are consistent with that principle. Whether the Act seeks to prevent a person from victimizing, say, a small business, S. Rep. No. 91617, p. 77 (1969), or to prevent a person from using a corporation for criminal purposes, National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U. S. 249, 259 (1994) , the person and the victim, or the person and the tool, are different entities, not the same.
The Acting Solicitor General reads §1962(c) to require some distinctness between the RICO defendant and the RICO enterprise. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11. And she says that this requirement is legally sound and workable. Ibid. We agree with her assessment, particularly in light of the fact that 12 Courts of Appeals have interpreted the statute as embodying some such distinctness requirement without creating discernible mischief in the administration of RICO. See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson , 224 F. 3d 425, 445 (CA5 2000); United States v. Goldin Industries, Inc. , 219 F. 3d 1268, 1270 (CA11) (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U. S. 1102 (2000) ; Begala v. PNC Bank , 214 F. 3d 776, 781 (CA6 2000), cert. denied, 531 U. S. __ (2001); Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc. , 103 F. 3d 186, 190 (CA1 1996); Richmond , supra , at 646647; Gasoline Sales, Inc. v. Aero Oil Co. , 39 F. 3d 70, 7273 (CA3 1994); Confederate Memorial Assn., Inc. v. Hines , 995 F. 2d 295, 299300 (CADC 1993); Board of Cty. Commrs, San Juan Cty. v. Liberty Group , 965 F. 2d 879, 885 (CA10), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 918 (1992) ; River City Markets, Inc. v. Fleming Foods West, Inc. , 960 F. 2d 1458, 1461 (CA9 1992); Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc. , 896 F. 2d 833, 840 (CA4 1990); Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Financial Co ., 886 F. 2d 986, 995 (CA8 1989); Bennett v. United States Trust Co. of New York , 770 F. 2d 308, 315, and n. 2 (CA2 1985), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 1058 (1986) ; see also Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co., Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. , 204 F. 3d 1368, 1383, n. 7 (CA Fed. 2000) (approving of distinctness requirement in dicta), cert. denied, 531 U. S. __ (2001). Indeed, this Court previously has said that liability depends on showing that the defendants conducted or participated in the conduct of the enterprise s affairs, not just their own affairs. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U. S. 170, 185 (1993) .
While accepting the distinctness principle, we nonetheless disagree with the appellate courts application of that principle to the present circumstancescircumstances in which a corporate employee, acting within the scope of his authority, 219 F. 3d, at 117, allegedly conducts the corporations affairs in a RICO-forbidden way. The corporate owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct from the corporation itself, a legally different entity with different rights and responsibilities due to its different legal status. And we can find nothing in the statute that requires more separateness than that. Cf. McCullough v. Suter , 757 F. 2d 142, 144 (CA7 1985) (finding either formal or practical separateness sufficient to be distinct under §1962(c)).
Linguistically speaking, an employee who conducts the affairs of a corporation through illegal acts comes within the terms of a statute that forbids any person unlawfully to conduct an enterprise, particularly when the statute explicitly defines person to include any individual … capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property, and defines enterprise to include a corporation. 18 U. S. C. §§1961(3), (4). And, linguistically speaking, the employee and the corporation are different persons, even where the employee is the corporations sole owner. After all, incorporations basic purpose is to create a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of the natural individuals who created it, who own it, or whom it employs. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U. S. 51, 6162 (1998) ; Burnet v. Clark, 287 U. S. 410, 415 (1932) ; 1 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §§7, 14 (rev. ed. 1999).
We note that the Second Circuit relied on earlier Circuit precedent for its decision. But that precedent involved quite different circumstances which are not presented here. This case concerns a claim that a corporate employee is the person and the corporation is the enterprise. It is natural to speak of a corporate employee as a person employed by the corporation. §1962(c). The earlier Second Circuit precedent concerned a claim that a corporation was the person and the corporation, together with all its employees and agents, were the enterprise. See Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N. A. , 30 F. 3d 339, 344 (1994) (affirming dismissal of complaint). It is less natural to speak of a corporation as employed by or associated with this latter oddly constructed entity. And the Second Circuits other precedent also involved significantly different allegations compared with the instant case. See Anatian v. Coutts Bank (Switzerland) Ltd. , 193 F. 3d 85, 89 (1999) (affirming dismissal where plaintiff alleged that same bank was both person and enterprise), cert. denied, 528 U. S. 1188 (2000) ; Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp. , 93 F. 3d 1055, 1064 (1996) (involving complaint alleging that corporate subsidiaries were persons and subsidiaries, taken together as parent, were enterprise), vacated on other grounds, 525 U. S. 128 (1998) ; Bennett , supra , at 315, and n. 2 (same as Anatian ). We do not here consider the merits of these cases, and note only their distinction from the instant case.
Further, to apply the RICO statute in present circumstances is consistent with the statutes basic purposes as this Court has defined them. The Court has held that RICO both protects a legitimate enterprise from those who would use unlawful acts to victimize it, United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576, 591 (1981) , and also protects the public from those who would unlawfully use an enterprise (whether legitimate or illegitimate) as a vehicle through which unlawful … activity is committed, National Organization for Women, Inc., 510 U. S., at 259. A corporate employee who conducts the corporations affairs through an unlawful RICO pattern . . . of activity, §1962(c), uses that corporation as a vehicle whether he is, or is not, its sole owner.
Conversely, the appellate courts critical legal distinctionbetween employees acting within the scope of corporate authority and those acting outside that authorityis inconsistent with a basic statutory purpose. Cf. Reves , supra , at 184 (stating that an enterprise is operated, within §1962(c)s meaning, not just by upper management but also by lower rung participants in the enterprise who are under the direction of upper management (emphasis added)). It would immunize from RICO liability many of those at whom this Court has said RICO directly aims e.g. , high-ranking individuals in an illegitimate criminal enterprise, who, seeking to further the purposes of that enterprise, act within the scope of their authority. Cf. Turkette , supra , at 581 (Congress did nothing to indicate that an enterprise consisting of a group of individuals was not covered by RICO if the purpose of the enterprise was exclusively criminal).
Finally, we have found nothing in the statutes history that significantly favors an alternative interpretation. That history not only refers frequently to the importance of undermining organized crimes influence upon legitimate businesses but also refers to the need to protect the public from those who would run organization[s] in a manner detrimental to the public interest. S. Rep. No. 91617, at 82. This latter purpose, as we have said, invites the legal principle we endorse, namely, that in present circumstances the statute requires no more than the formal legal distinction between person and enterprise (namely, incorporation) that is present here.
In reply, King argues that the lower courts rule is consistent with (1) the principle that a corporation acts only through its directors, officers, and agents, 1 Fletcher, supra , §30, (2) the principle that a corporation should not be liable for the criminal acts of its employees where Congress so intends, Brief for Respondents 2021, and (3) the Sherman Act principle limiting liability under 15 U. S. C. §1 by excluding from unlawful combinations or conspiracies the activities of a single firm, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U. S. 752, n. 15 (1984). The alternative that we endorse, however, is no less consistent with these principles. It does not deny that a corporation acts through its employees; it says only that the corporation and its employees are not legally identical. It does not assert that ordinary respondeat superior principles make a corporation legally liable under RICO for the criminal acts of its employees; that is a matter of congressional intent not before us. See, e.g. , Gasoline Sales, Inc. , 39 F. 3d, at 73 (holding that corporation cannot be vicariously liable for §1962(c) violations committed by its vice president). Neither is it inconsistent with antitrust laws intracorporate conspiracy doctrine; that doctrine turns on specific antitrust objectives. See Copperweld Corp. , supra , at 770771. Rather, we hold simply that the need for two distinct entities is satisfied; hence, the RICO provision before us applies when a corporate employee unlawfully conducts the affairs of the corporation of which he is the sole ownerwhether he conducts those affairs within the scope, or beyond the scope, of corporate authority.
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Opinion
CEDRIC KUSHNER PROMOTIONS, LTD.,
PETITIONER
v.
DON KING et al.
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U. S. C. §1961 et seq ., makes it unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise … to conduct or participate … in the conduct of such enterprises affairs through the commission of two or more statutorily defined crimeswhich RICO calls a pattern of racketeering activity. §1962(c). The language suggests, and lower courts have held, that this provision fore- sees two separate entities, a person and a distinct enterprise.
This case focuses upon a person who is the president and sole shareholder of a closely held corporation. The plaintiff claims that the president has conducted the corporations affairs through the forbidden pattern, though for present purposes it is conceded that, in doing so, he acted within the scope of his authority as the corporations employee. In these circumstances, are there two entities, a person and a separate enterprise? Assuming, as we must given the posture of this case, that the allegations in the complaint are true, we conclude that the person and enterprise here are distinct and that the RICO provision applies.
Petitioner, Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd., is a corporation that promotes boxing matches. Petitioner sued Don King, the president and sole shareholder of Don King Productions, a corporation, claiming that King had conducted the boxing-related affairs of Don King Productions in part through a RICO pattern, i.e. , through the alleged commission of at least two instances of fraud and other RICO predicate crimes. The District Court, citing Court of Appeals precedent, dismissed the complaint. Civ. No. 986859, 1999 WL 771366, *34 (SDNY, Sept. 28, 1999). And the Court of Appeals affirmed that dismissal. 219 F. 3d 115 (CA2 2000) (per curiam) . In the appellate courts view, §1962(c) applies only where a plaintiff shows the existence of two separate entities, a person and a distinct enterprise, the affairs of which that person improperly conducts. Id., at 116. In this instance, it is undisputed that King was an employee of the corporation Don King Productions and also acting within the scope of his authority. Id., at 117. Under the Court of Appeals analysis, King, in a legal sense, was part of, not separate from, the corporation. There was no person, distinct from the enterprise, who improperly conducted the enterprises affairs. And thus §1962(c) did not apply. Ibid.
Other Circuits, applying §1962(c) in roughly similar circumstances, have reached a contrary conclusion. See, e.g. , Brannon v. Boatmens First Nat. Bank of Okla. , 153 F. 3d 1144, 1148, n. 4 (CA10 1998); Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L. P. , 52 F. 3d 640, 647 (CA7 1995); Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal Oaks Motor Car Co. , 46 F. 3d 258, 265, 269 (CA3 1995); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp. , 978 F. 2d 1529, 1534 (CA9 1992). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. We now agree with these Circuits and hold that the Second Circuits interpretation of §1962(c) is erroneous.
We do not quarrel with the basic principle that to establish liability under §1962(c) one must allege and prove the existence of two distinct entities: (1) a person; and (2) an enterprise that is not simply the same person referred to by a different name. The statutes language, read as ordinary English, suggests that principle. The Act says that it applies to person[s] who are employed by or associated with the enterprise. §1962(c). In ordinary English one speaks of employing, being employed by, or associating with others, not oneself. See Websters Third New International Dictionary 132 (1993) (defining associate); id. , at 743 (defining employ). In addition, the Acts purposes are consistent with that principle. Whether the Act seeks to prevent a person from victimizing, say, a small business, S. Rep. No. 91617, p. 77 (1969), or to prevent a person from using a corporation for criminal purposes, National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U. S. 249, 259 (1994) , the person and the victim, or the person and the tool, are different entities, not the same.
The Acting Solicitor General reads §1962(c) to require some distinctness between the RICO defendant and the RICO enterprise. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11. And she says that this requirement is legally sound and workable. Ibid. We agree with her assessment, particularly in light of the fact that 12 Courts of Appeals have interpreted the statute as embodying some such distinctness requirement without creating discernible mischief in the administration of RICO. See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson , 224 F. 3d 425, 445 (CA5 2000); United States v. Goldin Industries, Inc. , 219 F. 3d 1268, 1270 (CA11) (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U. S. 1102 (2000) ; Begala v. PNC Bank , 214 F. 3d 776, 781 (CA6 2000), cert. denied, 531 U. S. __ (2001); Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc. , 103 F. 3d 186, 190 (CA1 1996); Richmond , supra , at 646647; Gasoline Sales, Inc. v. Aero Oil Co. , 39 F. 3d 70, 7273 (CA3 1994); Confederate Memorial Assn., Inc. v. Hines , 995 F. 2d 295, 299300 (CADC 1993); Board of Cty. Commrs, San Juan Cty. v. Liberty Group , 965 F. 2d 879, 885 (CA10), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 918 (1992) ; River City Markets, Inc. v. Fleming Foods West, Inc. , 960 F. 2d 1458, 1461 (CA9 1992); Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc. , 896 F. 2d 833, 840 (CA4 1990); Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Financial Co ., 886 F. 2d 986, 995 (CA8 1989); Bennett v. United States Trust Co. of New York , 770 F. 2d 308, 315, and n. 2 (CA2 1985), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 1058 (1986) ; see also Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co., Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. , 204 F. 3d 1368, 1383, n. 7 (CA Fed. 2000) (approving of distinctness requirement in dicta), cert. denied, 531 U. S. __ (2001). Indeed, this Court previously has said that liability depends on showing that the defendants conducted or participated in the conduct of the enterprise s affairs, not just their own affairs. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U. S. 170, 185 (1993) .
While accepting the distinctness principle, we nonetheless disagree with the appellate courts application of that principle to the present circumstancescircumstances in which a corporate employee, acting within the scope of his authority, 219 F. 3d, at 117, allegedly conducts the corporations affairs in a RICO-forbidden way. The corporate owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct from the corporation itself, a legally different entity with different rights and responsibilities due to its different legal status. And we can find nothing in the statute that requires more separateness than that. Cf. McCullough v. Suter , 757 F. 2d 142, 144 (CA7 1985) (finding either formal or practical separateness sufficient to be distinct under §1962(c)).
Linguistically speaking, an employee who conducts the affairs of a corporation through illegal acts comes within the terms of a statute that forbids any person unlawfully to conduct an enterprise, particularly when the statute explicitly defines person to include any individual … capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property, and defines enterprise to include a corporation. 18 U. S. C. §§1961(3), (4). And, linguistically speaking, the employee and the corporation are different persons, even where the employee is the corporations sole owner. After all, incorporations basic purpose is to create a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of the natural individuals who created it, who own it, or whom it employs. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U. S. 51, 6162 (1998) ; Burnet v. Clark, 287 U. S. 410, 415 (1932) ; 1 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §§7, 14 (rev. ed. 1999).
We note that the Second Circuit relied on earlier Circuit precedent for its decision. But that precedent involved quite different circumstances which are not presented here. This case concerns a claim that a corporate employee is the person and the corporation is the enterprise. It is natural to speak of a corporate employee as a person employed by the corporation. §1962(c). The earlier Second Circuit precedent concerned a claim that a corporation was the person and the corporation, together with all its employees and agents, were the enterprise. See Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N. A. , 30 F. 3d 339, 344 (1994) (affirming dismissal of complaint). It is less natural to speak of a corporation as employed by or associated with this latter oddly constructed entity. And the Second Circuits other precedent also involved significantly different allegations compared with the instant case. See Anatian v. Coutts Bank (Switzerland) Ltd. , 193 F. 3d 85, 89 (1999) (affirming dismissal where plaintiff alleged that same bank was both person and enterprise), cert. denied, 528 U. S. 1188 (2000) ; Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp. , 93 F. 3d 1055, 1064 (1996) (involving complaint alleging that corporate subsidiaries were persons and subsidiaries, taken together as parent, were enterprise), vacated on other grounds, 525 U. S. 128 (1998) ; Bennett , supra , at 315, and n. 2 (same as Anatian ). We do not here consider the merits of these cases, and note only their distinction from the instant case.
Further, to apply the RICO statute in present circumstances is consistent with the statutes basic purposes as this Court has defined them. The Court has held that RICO both protects a legitimate enterprise from those who would use unlawful acts to victimize it, United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576, 591 (1981) , and also protects the public from those who would unlawfully use an enterprise (whether legitimate or illegitimate) as a vehicle through which unlawful … activity is committed, National Organization for Women, Inc., 510 U. S., at 259. A corporate employee who conducts the corporations affairs through an unlawful RICO pattern . . . of activity, §1962(c), uses that corporation as a vehicle whether he is, or is not, its sole owner.
Conversely, the appellate courts critical legal distinctionbetween employees acting within the scope of corporate authority and those acting outside that authorityis inconsistent with a basic statutory purpose. Cf. Reves , supra , at 184 (stating that an enterprise is operated, within §1962(c)s meaning, not just by upper management but also by lower rung participants in the enterprise who are under the direction of upper management (emphasis added)). It would immunize from RICO liability many of those at whom this Court has said RICO directly aims e.g. , high-ranking individuals in an illegitimate criminal enterprise, who, seeking to further the purposes of that enterprise, act within the scope of their authority. Cf. Turkette , supra , at 581 (Congress did nothing to indicate that an enterprise consisting of a group of individuals was not covered by RICO if the purpose of the enterprise was exclusively criminal).
Finally, we have found nothing in the statutes history that significantly favors an alternative interpretation. That history not only refers frequently to the importance of undermining organized crimes influence upon legitimate businesses but also refers to the need to protect the public from those who would run organization[s] in a manner detrimental to the public interest. S. Rep. No. 91617, at 82. This latter purpose, as we have said, invites the legal principle we endorse, namely, that in present circumstances the statute requires no more than the formal legal distinction between person and enterprise (namely, incorporation) that is present here.
In reply, King argues that the lower courts rule is consistent with (1) the principle that a corporation acts only through its directors, officers, and agents, 1 Fletcher, supra , §30, (2) the principle that a corporation should not be liable for the criminal acts of its employees where Congress so intends, Brief for Respondents 2021, and (3) the Sherman Act principle limiting liability under 15 U. S. C. §1 by excluding from unlawful combinations or conspiracies the activities of a single firm, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U. S. 752, n. 15 (1984). The alternative that we endorse, however, is no less consistent with these principles. It does not deny that a corporation acts through its employees; it says only that the corporation and its employees are not legally identical. It does not assert that ordinary respondeat superior principles make a corporation legally liable under RICO for the criminal acts of its employees; that is a matter of congressional intent not before us. See, e.g. , Gasoline Sales, Inc. , 39 F. 3d, at 73 (holding that corporation cannot be vicariously liable for §1962(c) violations committed by its vice president). Neither is it inconsistent with antitrust laws intracorporate conspiracy doctrine; that doctrine turns on specific antitrust objectives. See Copperweld Corp. , supra , at 770771. Rather, we hold simply that the need for two distinct entities is satisfied; hence, the RICO provision before us applies when a corporate employee unlawfully conducts the affairs of the corporation of which he is the sole ownerwhether he conducts those affairs within the scope, or beyond the scope, of corporate authority.
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.


#### spacetime, citizen science, and open source maps
Talk for the Metis Data Science School in NYC
View Slides Here


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Last updated: 2017-04-12
Code version: e75cac0
We want to find the probability that employee is lying, given that the lie detector detected. The calculation is outlined in the code block below and answer is printed underneath.
PDetectedLying <- 0.95
PDetectedNotLying <- 0.01
PNotDetectedLying <- 0.99
PNotDetectedNotLying <- 0.05
PLying <- 0.001
PNotLying <- 0.999
# Therefore...
PLyingDetected <- (PDetectedLying * PLying)/((PDetectedLying * PLying) + (PDetectedNotLying *
PNotLying))
print(PLyingDetected)
[1] 0.08683729
(a)
Here we want to show that if \(X = F^{-1}(U)\), then \(F(X) = U)\).
\[ \begin{align*} F(X) &= P(F^{-1} \leq x) \\ &= P(F(F^{-1}(U)) \leq F(x)) \\ &= P(U \leq F(x)) \\ &= F(x) \\ \end{align*} \]
(b)
Here we want to show that if \(Y = -log(U)\), then \(Y\) ~ \(Exp(1)\).
\[ \begin{align*} P(Y \leq y) &= P(-log(U) \leq y) \\ &= P(U \gt e^{-y}) \\ &= 1 - P(U \leq e^{-y}) \\ &= 1 - e^{-y} \\ \end{align*} \]
Which we can see is the CDF of the exponential distribution with mean 1.
(c)
mean(-log(runif(n = 1000)))
[1] 1.019707
plot(ecdf(-log(runif(n = 1000))))
plot(ecdf(rexp(n = 1000)), add = T, col = "red")
(a)
We know that, \(T_{2}\) ~ \(Exp(\lambda)\), \(\lambda = \frac{1}{2N}\), \(E[T_{2}] = 2N\), and \(\pi\)|\(T_{2}\) ~ \(Pois(\lambda)\) where \(\lambda = 2 \mu T_{2}\).
We also know that \(E[X] = E[E[X|Y]]\). By the law of total expectation we can then derive \(E[\pi]\).
\[ \begin{align*} E[\pi] &= E[E[\pi|T_{2}]] \\ &= E[2 \mu T_{2}] \\ &= 2 \mu E[T_{2}] \\ &= 2 \mu \cdot 2N \\ &= 4 \mu N \\ \end{align*} \]
(b)
\[ \begin{align*} Var[\pi] &= E[Var(\pi|T_{2})] + Var[E(\pi|T_{2})] \\ &= E(2 \mu T_{2}) + Var(2 \mu T_{2}) \\ &= 2 \mu E[T_{2}] + 4 \mu^{2}Var(T_{2}) \\ &= 4N \mu + (4N \mu)^{2} \\ \end{align*} \]
(c)
The relationship does not hold for the number of differences between two seuqnces sampled from a population. THe variance is greater than expected.
(a)
If \(X_{1}\) ~ \(Pois(\lambda_{1})\) and \(X_{2}\) ~ \(Pois(\lambda_{2})\), then what is \(X_{1} + X_{2}\)?
\[ \begin{align*} P(Y = n) &= P(X_{1} + X_{2} = n) \\ &= \sum_{k=0}^{n} P(X_{1} = k)P(X_{2} = n - k) \\ &= \sum_{k=0}^{n} \frac{\lambda_{1}^{k}e^{-\lambda_{1}}}{k!} \frac{\lambda_{2}^{n-k}e^{-\lambda_{2}}}{(n - k)!} \\ &= \frac{e^{(-\lambda_{1} - \lambda_{2})}}{n!} \sum_{k=0}^{n} \binom{n}{k}\lambda_{1}^{k}\lambda_{2}^{n-k} \\ &= \frac{(\lambda_{1} + \lambda_{2})^{n} e^{-(\lambda_{1} + \lambda_{2})}}{n!} \\ \end{align*} \]
Thus we can see that, \(X_{1} + X_{2}\) ~ \(Pois(\lambda_{1} + \lambda_{2})\)
(b)
What is \(P(X_{1} = k | X_{1} + X_{2} = n)\)?
Set \(Y = X_{1} + X_{2}\), then
\[ \begin{align*} P(X_{1} = k | Y = n) &= \frac{P((X_{1} = k) \bigcap (Y = n))}{P(Y = n)} \\ &= \frac{P(X_{1} = k) P(W = n - k)}{P(Y = n)} \\ &= \sum_{k=0}^{n} \binom{n}{k}\left(\frac{\lambda_{1}}{\lambda_{1} + \lambda_{2}}\right)^{k}\left(1 - \frac{\lambda_{1}}{\lambda_{1} - \lambda_{2}}\right)^{n - k} \end{align*} \]
Thus, \(X_{1}\) ~ \(Binom(n, \frac{\lambda_{1}}{\lambda_{1} + \lambda_{2}})\)
We are given,
\[ \widehat{\mu}_{m} = \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} X_{i} \]
(a)
\[ Var[\widehat{\mu}_{m}] = E[(\widehat{\mu}_{m} - \mu^{2})] = \frac{\sigma^{2}}{m} \]
(b)
\[ Var[X] = \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} X_{i}^{2} - \left(\sum_{i=1}^{m} X_{i}\right)^{2} = \widehat{\sigma}_{m}^{2} \]
(c)
\[ Var[\widehat{\mu}_{m}] = \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i = 1}^{m} \left(X_{i} - \widehat{\mu}_{m}\right)^{2} \]
(d)
Unbiased.
(a)
(b)
(c)
\[ E[X_{2}] = E[E[X_{2}|X_{1},N_{1}]] = E[X_{1}] = np \]
(d)
simulation <- function(n, p, r, s) {
# generate matrices
X <- matrix(data = 0, nrow = r, ncol = s)
N <- matrix(data = 0, nrow = r, ncol = s)
# generate initial values
X[, 1] <- rbinom(r, n, p)
N[, 1] <- rpois(r, n)
# loop through number of nodes
for (i in 2:s) {
probs <- X[, i - 1]/N[, i - 1]
N[, i] <- rpois(r, X[, i - 1])
X[, i] <- rbinom(r, N[, i - 1], replace(probs, probs > 1, 1))
}
return(list(X = X, N = N))
}
# run simulation
results <- simulation(500, 0.5, 1000, 4)
(e)
mean(results$X[, 2])
[1] 249.152
(f)
sum(results$X[, 4] > results$X[, 1])/1000
[1] 0.164
(g)
I would expect the proability to be lower for \(X_{4}\) than for \(X_{1}\) the majority of the time due to the large mean and variance for Poisson random variables that you are dividing binomail random variables by to generate an updated probaility of success for future binomial random variables. This says that the number of copies of an allele in a population that changes stochastically over time will tend to zero in this format.
We are given the simple chain graph \(X_{1} \rightarrow X_{2} \rightarrow X_{3} \rightarrow X_{4}\).
(a)
What is \(P(X_{1} = 0, X_{4} = 2)\)?
\[ \begin{align*} P(X_{1}, X_{4}) &= \sum_{X_{2}} \sum_{X_{3}} P(X_{1} \cdots X_{4}) \\ &= \sum_{X_{2}} \sum_{X_{3}} P(X_{1}) P(X_{2}|X_{1}) P(X_{3}|X_{2}) P(X_{4}|X_{3}) \\ &= P(X_{1}) \sum_{X_{2}} P(X_{2}|X_{1}) \sum_{X_{3}} P(X_{3}|X_{2}) P(X_{4}|X_{3}) \\ &= P(X_{1}) \sum_{X_{2}} P(X_{2}|X_{1}) m_{3}(X_{2}) \\ &= P(X_{1}) m_{2}(X_{1}) \\ \end{align*} \]
(b)
\[ P(X_{1} = 0, X_{4} = 2) = 0 \]
sessionInfo()
R version 3.3.2 (2016-10-31)
Platform: x86_64-pc-linux-gnu (64-bit)
Running under: Gentoo/Linux
locale:
[1] LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 LC_NUMERIC=C
[3] LC_TIME=en_US.UTF-8 LC_COLLATE=en_US.UTF-8
[5] LC_MONETARY=en_US.UTF-8 LC_MESSAGES=en_US.UTF-8
[7] LC_PAPER=en_US.UTF-8 LC_NAME=C
[9] LC_ADDRESS=C LC_TELEPHONE=C
[11] LC_MEASUREMENT=en_US.UTF-8 LC_IDENTIFICATION=C
attached base packages:
[1] stats graphics grDevices utils datasets methods base
loaded via a namespace (and not attached):
[1] backports_1.0.5 magrittr_1.5 rprojroot_1.2 formatR_1.4
[5] tools_3.3.2 htmltools_0.3.5 yaml_2.1.14 Rcpp_0.12.9
[9] stringi_1.1.2 rmarkdown_1.3 knitr_1.15.1 git2r_0.18.0
[13] stringr_1.2.0 digest_0.6.12 workflowr_0.3.0 evaluate_0.10
This site was created with R Markdown


Epidendrums and Related Orchid Pages
Encyclia grammatoglossa
Galeandra ?
Go to the
Triangle Orchid Society's Homepage
Back to
Merlise Clyde's Homepage


Sylvanian Families Cakebread Toy Poodle Twins
UK Biography Information
Baby sister Mia Cakebread smiles at everyone she meets.  She can't wait to go to nursery where she can make lots of new friends.
Baby brother Max Cakebread is a quiet baby. He's not fussy about his food and he doesn't get into any mischief. But he loves to move around. If his family turn their backs for one moment, he's crawled somewhere far away before they know it. His family are always amazed by how fast he can crawl away.


Equivalent to clicking the ChartWizard button on the standard or chart toolbar. Creates a chart. It is generally easier to use the macro recorder to enter this function on your macro sheet.
Syntax
CHART.WIZARD(long, ref, gallery_num, type_num, plot_by, categories, ser_titles, legend, title, x_title, y_title, z_title, number_cats, number_titles)
CHART.WIZARD?(long, ref, gallery_num, type_num, plot_by, categories, ser_titles, legend, title, x_title, y_title, z_title, number_cats, number_titles)
Long is a logical value that determines which type of ChartWizard button CHART.WIZARD is equivalent to.
If long is TRUE, CHART.WIZARD is equivalent to using the five-step ChartWizard button.
If long is FALSE or omitted, CHART.WIZARD is equivalent to using the two-step ChartWizard button, and gallery_num, type_num, legend, and the title arguments are ignored.
Ref is a reference to the range of cells on the active worksheet that contains the source data for the chart, or the object identifier of the chart if it has already been created.
Gallery_num is a number from 1 to 15 specifying the type of chart you want to create.
| Gallery_num | Chart |
| 1 | Area |
| 2 | Bar |
| 3 | Column |
| 4 | Line |
| 5 | Pie |
| 6 | Radar |
| 7 | XY (scatter) |
| 8 | Combination |
| 9 | 3-D area |
| 10 | 3-D bar |
| 11 | 3-D column |
| 12 | 3-D line |
| 13 | 3-D pie |
| 14 | 3-D surface |
| 15 | Doughnut |
Type_num is a number identifying a formatting option. The first formatting option in any gallery is 1.
Plot_by is the number 1 or 2 and specifies whether the data for each data series is in rows or columns. 1 specifies rows; 2 specifies columns. If plot_by is omitted, Microsoft Excel uses the appropriate value for the chart you're creating.
Categories is the number 1 or 2 and specifies whether the first row or column contains a list of x-axis labels, or data for the first data series. 1 specifies x-axis labels; 2 specifies the first data series. If categories is omitted, Microsoft Excel uses the appropriate value for the chart you're creating. If number_cats is specified, this argument is ignored.
Ser_titles is the number 1 or 2 and specifies whether the first column or row contains series titles, or data for the first data point in each series. 1 specifies series titles; 2 specifies the first data point. If ser_titles is omitted, Microsoft Excel uses the appropriate value for the chart you're creating. If number_titles is specified, this argument is ignored.
Legend is the number 1 or 2 and specifies whether to include a legend. 1 specifies a legend; 2 specifies no legend. If legend is omitted, Microsoft Excel does not include a legend.
For the following arguments, if an argument is omitted or is empty text (""), no title is specified.
Title is text that you want to use as a chart title.
X_title is text that you want to use as an x-axis title.
Y_title is text that you want to use as a y-axis title.
Z_title is text that you want to use as a z-axis title.
Number_cats specifies the number of rows or columns (depending on the value of plot_by) to use for the category labels in the chart. This argument overrides the categories argument.
Number_titles specifies the number of rows or columns (depending on the value of plot_by) to use for the series labels in the chart. This argument overrides the ser_title argument.
Remarks
If you are using the macro recorder, Microsoft Excel records a CREATE.OBJECT and a COPY function when the chart is created and a CHART.WIZARD function when the chart is formatted. You must precede this function with a CREATE.OBJECT function if you are not using the macro recorder.
Related Function
CREATE.OBJECT Creates an object
Return to index


Fit a probabilistic index model as described in Thas et al <doi:10.1111/j.1467-9868.2011.01020.x>. The interface to the modeling function has changed in this new version. The old version is still available at R-Forge. You can install the old package using install.packages('pimold', repos = 'http://R-Forge.R-project.org').
| Version: | 2.0.1 |
| Depends: | R (≥ 3.0), utils |
| Imports: | methods, stats4, nleqslv, BB |
| Suggests: | testthat, MASS |
| Published: | 2017-04-29 |
| Author: | Joris Meys [aut, cre], Jan De Neve [aut], Nick Sabbe [aut], Gustavo Guimaraes de Castro Amorim [aut] |
| Maintainer: | Joris Meys <Joris.Meys at UGent.be> |
| License: | GPL-2 | GPL-3 [expanded from: GPL (≥ 2)] |
| URL: | http://r-forge.r-project.org/projects/pim/ |
| NeedsCompilation: | no |
| Citation: | pim citation info |
| CRAN checks: | pim results |
| Reference manual: | pim.pdf |
| Vignettes: |
An R package for fitting probabilistic index models |
| Package source: | pim_2.0.1.tar.gz |
| Windows binaries: | r-devel: pim_2.0.1.zip, r-release: pim_2.0.1.zip, r-oldrel: pim_2.0.1.zip |
| OS X binaries: | r-release: pim_2.0.1.tgz, r-oldrel: pim_2.0.1.tgz |
| Old sources: | pim archive |
Please use the canonical form https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=pim to link to this page.


| PostgreSQL 9.0.10 Documentation | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prev | Up | Appendix F. Additional Supplied Modules | Next |
The pageinspect module provides functions that allow you to inspect the contents of database pages at a low level, which is useful for debugging purposes. All of these functions may be used only by superusers.
get_raw_page(relname text, fork text, blkno int) returns bytea
get_raw_page
reads the specified block of the named
table and returns a copy as a bytea value. This allows a
single time-consistent copy of the block to be obtained.
fork should be 'main' for
the main data fork, or 'fsm' for the free space map,
or 'vm' for the visibility map.
get_raw_page(relname text, blkno int) returns bytea
A shorthand version of get_raw_page
, for reading
from the main fork. Equivalent to
get_raw_page(relname, 'main', blkno)
page_header(page bytea) returns record
page_header
shows fields that are common to all
PostgreSQL heap and index pages.
A page image obtained with get_raw_page
should be
passed as argument. For example:
test=# SELECT * FROM page_header(get_raw_page('pg_class', 0)); lsn | tli | flags | lower | upper | special | pagesize | version | prune_xid -----------+-----+-------+-------+-------+---------+----------+---------+----------- 0/24A1B50 | 1 | 1 | 232 | 368 | 8192 | 8192 | 4 | 0
The returned columns correspond to the fields in the PageHeaderData struct. See src/include/storage/bufpage.h for details.
heap_page_items(page bytea) returns setof record
heap_page_items
shows all line pointers on a heap
page. For those line pointers that are in use, tuple headers are also
shown. All tuples are shown, whether or not the tuples were visible to
an MVCC snapshot at the time the raw page was copied.
A heap page image obtained with get_raw_page
should
be passed as argument. For example:
test=# SELECT * FROM heap_page_items(get_raw_page('pg_class', 0));
See src/include/storage/itemid.h and src/include/access/htup.h for explanations of the fields returned.
bt_metap(relname text) returns record
bt_metap
returns information about a B-tree
index's metapage. For example:
test=# SELECT * FROM bt_metap('pg_cast_oid_index'); -[ RECORD 1 ]----- magic | 340322 version | 2 root | 1 level | 0 fastroot | 1 fastlevel | 0
bt_page_stats(relname text, blkno int) returns record
bt_page_stats
returns summary information about
single pages of B-tree indexes. For example:
test=# SELECT * FROM bt_page_stats('pg_cast_oid_index', 1); -[ RECORD 1 ]-+----- blkno | 1 type | l live_items | 256 dead_items | 0 avg_item_size | 12 page_size | 8192 free_size | 4056 btpo_prev | 0 btpo_next | 0 btpo | 0 btpo_flags | 3
bt_page_items(relname text, blkno int) returns setof record
bt_page_items
returns detailed information about
all of the items on a B-tree index page. For example:
test=# SELECT * FROM bt_page_items('pg_cast_oid_index', 1); itemoffset | ctid | itemlen | nulls | vars | data ------------+---------+---------+-------+------+------------- 1 | (0,1) | 12 | f | f | 23 27 00 00 2 | (0,2) | 12 | f | f | 24 27 00 00 3 | (0,3) | 12 | f | f | 25 27 00 00 4 | (0,4) | 12 | f | f | 26 27 00 00 5 | (0,5) | 12 | f | f | 27 27 00 00 6 | (0,6) | 12 | f | f | 28 27 00 00 7 | (0,7) | 12 | f | f | 29 27 00 00 8 | (0,8) | 12 | f | f | 2a 27 00 00
fsm_page_contents(page bytea) returns text
fsm_page_contents
shows the internal node structure
of a FSM page. The output is a multiline string, with one line per
node in the binary tree within the page. Only those nodes that are not
zero are printed. The so-called "next" pointer, which points to the
next slot to be returned from the page, is also printed.
See src/backend/storage/freespace/README for more information on the structure of an FSM page.


The lean research
command supports the following options:
| Option | Description |
|---|---|
--port <value> |
The port to run Jupyter Lab on (defaults to 8888). |
--data-provider <value> |
Update the Lean configuration file to retrieve data from the given provider, which must be Local , QuantConnect , or Terminal Link . |
--download-data |
Update the Lean configuration file to download data from the QuantConnect API, alias for --data-provider QuantConnect . |
--data-purchase-limit <value> |
The maximum amount of QCC to spend on downloading data during the research session when using QuantConnect as data provider. |
--terminal-link-environment <value> |
The environment to run in, which must be Production or Beta . |
--terminal-link-server-host <value> |
The host on which the Terminal Link server is running. |
--terminal-link-server-port <value> |
The port on which the Terminal Link server is running. |
--terminal-link-openfigi-api-key <value> |
The Open FIGI API key to use for mapping Options. |
--detach , -d |
Run Jupyter Lab in a detached Docker container and return immediately. The name of the Docker container is shown before the command ends. You can use Docker's own commands to manage the detached container. |
--no-open |
Don't open the Jupyter Lab environment in the browser after starting it. |
--image <value> |
The LEAN research image to use (defaults to quantconnect/research:latest ). |
--update |
Pull the LEAN research image before starting the research environment. |
--no-update |
Use the current LEAN research image. |
--lean-config <path> |
The Lean configuration file that should be used (defaults to the nearest lean.json file). |
--verbose |
Enable debug logging. |
--help |
Display the help text of the lean research command and exit. |


WATCH: PM's adviser Hafeez Shaikh grilled over price of tomatoes
by News DeskAdviser to the Prime Minister on Finance Abdul Hafeez Shaikh has drawn public ire for his recent comments on tomato prices in Karachi.
In a video shared widely on social media platforms, Shaikh is seen dismissing reporters’ concerns over the rising prices of tomatoes in the port city.
“Look, tomatoes are being sold for Rs17 per kilogramme at the sabzi mandi,” says the PM’s adviser.
When reporters inform him that the fruit is being sold for Rs240 per kg by retailers in the city, Shaikh dismisses their assertion as a lie.
A journalist then asks: “Which sabzi mandi, sir?” and Shaikh responds, “You go and check it out yourself!”
The comments by the PM’s adviser have generated controversy particularly since the price of tomatoes in Karachi reached its highest-ever mark over the past few days.
According to a report by Express News, the wholesale price of tomatoes exceeded Rs200 per kilogramme for the first time in the city’s history, while shops and street vendors were selling at Rs250 to Rs300 per kilogramme.
According to wholesalers, tomatoes were sold for Rs200 to Rs240 per kg at the city’s main vegetable market.
VIDEO COURTESY: NEWS 247 URDU


[:page name="shutdown451View" args="reason"] [:include "/webapp/view/templates/head.html" /]
[= reason, encode: 'none']


%include inc/header.html %>
Check out the latest developments in the GitHub repo
//user controller, home/controller/user.js
export default class extends think.controller.base {
//login action
async loginAction(){
if(this.isGet()){
return this.display();
}
//data is validated in logic
let data = this.post();
let md5 = think.md5('think_' + data.pwd);
let result = await this.model('user').where({name: data.name, pwd: md5}).find();
if(think.isEmpty(result)){
return this.fail('login fail');
}
//set userInfo to session
await this.session('userInfo', result);
return this.success();
}
}
Support ES6/7 FeaturesYou can write code with full features of ES6/7 (Generator Function, Class, Async & Await etc.), the compiled code generate by Babel is test to stably run in Node.js.
Rich Database SupportSupport Mysql, Sqlite, Mongodb with highly encapsulated and easy to use methods, in which SQL injection filters are also implemented.
Hook & MiddlewareRich hooks and middlewares are provided for accessing user request.
REST APIAuto-generated REST API without writting extra code. Data level authorization control is supported by which you can allow/disallow data access to certain user
Support WebSocketYou only write one set of code to support common websocket clients like socket.io and sockjs.
Rich AdapterEasy swiching between Cache, Store, Session and Template, to change your app's behavior without concerning what 's behinde.
Hot Module Replacement(HMR)In development mode, HMR monitors file changes and replace them in the active runtime, without restarting Node.js.
Common Line InterfaceSupport invoke Action in CLI, easier to simulate timer behaviors.
ThinkJS established the benchmark of usability and innovativeness, represents high level standard among Node frameworks. I wish everyone contribute to build up a prosperous community.
Ying Yue360 75team Leader
ThinkJS 2.0 is disruptive, condense the author's painstaking efforts, we belive her performance, availability and extensibility will bring the developer more surprise and shock!
Songfeng LiTranslator of《Prefessional JavaScript for Web Developers》
The best part of ThinkJS is she has a smooth learning curve and easy to use! It is a good choice whether you use it on project or learning Node.js! w3ctech is developed in ThinkJS.
Yubo Zhouw3ctech sponsor


Preparation time
less than 30 mins
Cooking time
30 mins to 1 hour
Serves
Serves 2
Lightly spiced guinea fowl served with sweetcorn and a rich sauce makes a special dinner for two.
For the sweetcorn purée, heat half the butter in a large frying pan and add the corn. Cook for 1-2 minutes then add the stock and simmer for 3-4 minutes. Stir in the remaining butter and the cauliflower and blend until smooth. Set aside.
For the guinea fowl Maryland, preheat the oven to 180C/160C Fan/Gas 4.
Heat a deep-fat fryer to 180C, or alternatively half fill a large deep saucepan with vegetable oil and heat it until a cube of bread turns golden-brown within 1 minute of being added to the oil. (CAUTION: hot oil can be dangerous. Do not leave unattended.)
Combine the spices and rub them into the guinea fowl. Heat an ovenproof frying pan and, once hot, add the meat and cook until golden-brown all over. Deglaze the pan with the brandy by stirring the bottom to loosen any charred bits of meat. Cook for a few minutes to allow the alcohol to burn off. Add the chicken stock to the pan, cover with aluminium foil and finish in the oven for 8-10 minutes.
In a frying pan, heat a knob of butter and fry the sweetcorn until the butter is brown. Stir in the birch syrup. Keep warm until ready to serve.
With the skin on, use kitchen paper to ensure the banana is dry. Deep fry the banana, with the skin on, until it is brown and bubbling then remove from the fryer. Cut in half widthways.
When the guinea fowl is cooked, remove it from the pan and set aside to rest. Put the pan on the hob and heat until the volume of liquid has reduced to a sauce. Remove from the heat and whisk in the remaining butter and cream to finish.
To serve, carve the breasts and serve with the toasted corn, banana halves and sweetcorn purée. Spoon over the sauce and garnish with watercress.


CrimPapers
Articles published on 14 July 2020
On 14 July 2020, 10 new articles were published in 8 journals.
Gender Punitivism: Queer Perspectives on Identity Politics in Criminal Justice by Moira Pérez, Blas Radi
Worsening Child Outcomes? Caregiver Imprisonment and Its Impact on Child Poverty, Health, Well-Being and Education in Uganda
The Benefits of Live Court Date Reminder Phone Calls During Pretrial Case Processing
Tempering Expectations: A Qualitative Study of Prosecutorial Reform by Rebecca Richardson, Besiki Luka Kutateladze
Reply to Mac Giolla and Ly (2019): on the Reporting of Bayes Factors in Deception Research by Neil M. McLatchie,
lara Warmelink,
daria Tkacheva
Bailey V, the Rise and Fall of the Rehabilitative Ideal, 1895–1970 by Lynsey Black
“And You Will Wait …”: Carceral Transportation in Electronic Monitoring As Part of the Punishment Process by Erin Eife, Gabriela Kirk
Danielle Celermajer, the Prevention of Torture: An Ecological Approach by Ergun Cakal, Andrew M Jefferson, Tomas Max Martin
The Last Stand of Al Andalus Lessons on the Changing Nature of War From An Early Modern Islamic Insurgency by Javier Jordán
Women’s Experiences of the Intersections of Work and Intimate Partner Violence: A Review of Qualitative Research by Jennifer C. D. Macgregor, Najibullah Naeemzadah, Casey L. Oliver, Tanaz Javan, Barbara J. Macquarrie, C. Nadine Wathen


An implementation of the Real-time Adaptive Penalization (RAP) algorithm through which to iteratively update a regularization parameter in a streaming context.
| Version: | 1.1 |
| Depends: | lars, lassoshooting, MASS |
| Published: | 2016-10-31 |
| Author: | Ricardo Pio Monti |
| Maintainer: | Ricardo Pio Monti <ricardo.monti08 at gmail.com> |
| License: | GPL-2 |
| NeedsCompilation: | no |
| CRAN checks: | rRAP results |
| Reference manual: | rRAP.pdf |
| Package source: | rRAP_1.1.tar.gz |
| Windows binaries: | r-devel: rRAP_1.1.zip, r-release: rRAP_1.1.zip, r-oldrel: rRAP_1.1.zip |
| OS X binaries: | r-release: rRAP_1.1.tgz, r-oldrel: rRAP_1.1.tgz |
| Old sources: | rRAP archive |
Please use the canonical form https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=rRAP to link to this page.


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The following InputMethod types are implemented by the default
'SU_messages':query_input(
InputMethod,
Prompt,
RawInput)
(and these are the input methods known to the third,
fall-back step):
line
read_line/2
and the code-list is returned as
RawInput.
term(
Options)
prompt/2
), and a
Prolog term is read by read_term/2
using the given
Options, and is returned as RawInput.
^term(
Term,
Options)
T-Vs^term(T,[variable_names(Vs)])
input method will
return the term read, paired with the list of variable
names.


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program mix ( inWave1:wave, inWave2:wave, outWave:wave ) { outWave[c,i] = inWave1[c,i] + inWave2[c,i]; }
This pseudo-code fragment is meant to illustrate that the input and output sounds consist of arrays with two dimensions: the channel dimension and the sample dimension. In actuality, the operation of the Sonic wave assignment statement is to read and write audio data in files, not memory. In summary, the Sonic language allows the programmer to operate on large arrays on secondary storage using a concise and familiar syntax.for ( int i=0; i < numberOfSamples; ++i ) for ( int c=0; c < numberOfChannels; ++c ) outWave[c,i] = inWave1[c,i] + inWave2[c,i];
Next Section: How Sonic is Translated into C++
Return to Sonic Home Page


Start:
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Chang group is contributing in building a strong pipeline which will be used in deploying a speech-to-text of an African laguage. we would like your contribution by reading this provided word above.
Learn moreIn weeks 4 & 5 of 10 Academy trainings of batch 4, We built an AI model for either Swihali or Amharic language. For both of the cases, We have experienced the lack and quality of data. If we Had had a diverse and large training set, our model could have improved and our model could have transformed the lives of many in East Africa.
Recognizing the value of large data sets for speech-to-text data sets, and seeing the opportunity that there are many text corpuses for both languages, and understanding that complex data engineering skills is valuable. That is why we designed and built a robust, large scale, fault tolerant, highly available Kafka cluster that can be used to post a sentence and receive an audio file.
front end developer
handling kafka producer part.
js developer.
handling Spark part
Handling kafka consumer part
Handling s3 bucket part.
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