Web Wallet for Ritocoin
Be your own bank, take control of your own money and start using Ritocoin today! This web wallet gives you 100% control and privacy over your keys and transactions. We never see or store your keys - only you do! This service uses CloudFlare with Full SSL - encrypted from our server to Cloudflare, then encrypted from CloudFlare to you.
Open Source
This is an open source web based wallet written in javascript and released under the MIT license which means it's free to use and edit.
MultiSig
We offer a fully transparent multisig solution which works seamlessly offline and with other Ritocoin clients.
Wallet
Quick access to an online wallet where only you have access to your own private keys.
Addresses
We support regular addresses and multisig with access to your own private keys!
Ritocoin Community
We have been a part of the Ritocoin community since the beginning. To contact us for support, tag us @traysi on Ritocoin's discord, or email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Wallet Service
The wallet is created based on the combination of the username and password you enter above. This means you can create multiple wallets with the same username but different password. We do not store or even see your login credentials in any way, so it is your responsibility to remember the username and password you use to access your wallet(s).
LogoutWelcome to your wallet, enjoy your stay!
New Address create a new address
Any keys created on this page will need to be manually stored by you. They will be needed later to redeem the Ritocoins.
Address Options
You can use the advanced options below to generate different kind of keys and addresses.
New Multisig Address Secure multisig address
Public keys can be generated in your browser or from your Ritocoin client.
Enter the public keys of all the participants, to create a multi signature address. Maximum of 15 allowed. Compressed and uncompressed public keys are accepted.
Enter the amount of signatures required to release the coins
New Time Locked Address Coins can be released only after a certain date
Use OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY (OP_HODL) to create a time locked address where the funds are unspendable until a set date and time has passed.
Public keys can be generated in your browser or from your Ritocoin client.
Enter the public key that will be able to unlock the funds after the a certain date.
Enter the or required to release the coins:
New HD Address making bip32 even easier
Use the form below to generate a master hierarchical deterministic address.
Address Options
You can use the advanced options below to generate different kinds of master addresses.
Transaction Create a new transaction
Use this page to create a raw transaction
Address, WIF key or Redeem Script:Ritocoin Fee Calculator
This page will give you a guide on the lowest fee to use to get your transaction included within the next few blocks. It works by predicting the size of a transaction and comparing it to another transaction in a recent block to determine an appropriate fee.
Recommended Fee: 0.00000000 Ritocoin
for a transaction of 0 bytes
? Sat/Byte
Inputs
0 Bytes
Regular Compressed 1 148 bytes *estimate
MultiSig 0 0 bytes *estimate
Hodl Time Locked 0 0 bytes *estimate
Unknown 0 0 bytes *estimate
Outputs
0 Bytes
Regular p2pkh (1...) 2 68 bytes *estimate
Regular p2sh (3...) 0 0 bytes *estimate
Blockchain Data
This is based on us comparing your transaction against a very recent transaction found in a very recent block
Block Height: ?
Block #: ?
Block Time: ?
Transaction ID: ?
Transaction Size: 0 bytes
Transaction Fee: 0.00000000
Satoshi per Byte: 0
Based on your data and this recently mined transaction we recommend a fee of 0.00000000 Rito to get it into the next few blocks
Verify transactions and other scripts
Enter the raw transaction, redeem script, pubkey, hd address or wif key to convert it into a readable format that can be verified manually.
Transaction Script
The above script has been decoded
| Txid | N | Script | Signed? | MultiSig? |
| Address | Amount | Script |
WIF key
The above wif key has been decoded
Address:
Public key:
Private key:
Is compressed:
HD Address
Key Derivation
The path of key derivation
Keys
Keys derived from the hd address provided
| Index | Address | Private Key (WIF) | Extended xPub | Extended xPrv |
Sign Transaction once a transaction has been verified
Once you have verified a transaction you can sign and then broadcast it into the network.
Development Javascript framework, API and more
Frequently Asked Questions
Some common questions about this service, and cryptocurrencies in general:How does the wallet work?
From our Wallet Page, for your first time, just pick a username and password and enter those in to create your wallet. Remember those values because you need to use the same values every time you want to re-access your wallet. It will create a single Ritocoin address that you can share with others for them to use to send coins to you.When you first create the wallet, it will show a balance of 0 RVN. Send some coins to the address shown, and some time later you can click the "0 RVN" button to tell it to refresh the balance to get the latest information on how many coins you have.
You can send money out from that same page by clicking on the Spend link. Enter the recipient address and how much you want to send, and optionally change the fee that will be spent, and you're all done.
I sent coins to my wallet, why doesn't the balance reflect the new coins right away?
Blockchain based coins like Ritocoin operate like a ledger. Coins that are "sent" are actually transactions in the ledger, giving control of the coins from one key over to another key. This information is recorded in "blocks" that are mined by miners. Your transaction will (usually) be included in the next block that the network mines, but it will not be immediately available. It is required that at least 6 additional blocks be mined on top of the block containing your transaction, before that transaction is deemed "confirmed" and spendable. The network finds blocks on average every 60 seconds, so you shouldn't have to wait more than 6 minutes or so before your transactions are confirmed.tldr: It might take up to 10 minutes before transactions involving your balance are updated.
Under the "New" pulldown - what is all that?
Those are features available for advanced users who understand cryptocurrencies, and wish to interact with the Ritocoin blockchain without operating a full node of their own.You can create a new address, create transactions from that address, verify, sign and even broadcast them, all from this website. Seriously, how cool is that? One of the best features is the multi-signature addresses. You can use that to involve a third party mediator when sending funds to an untrusted person. You can send coins, and if the other guy doesn't live up to their side of the bargain, you and your mediator can simply reverse the transaction.
Explain the security of this service
First, we log almost nothing. We have a basic web server that logs hits to the site, but your IP address is not included in those logs. We see when someone visited the page, but that's about all we see. The server is hosted on a rackmounted colocated server that we physically control somewhere on the planet earth, and it has a self-signed SSL certificate for this domain. CloudFlare is setup to provide service to our domain, and the SSL settings are set to full. CloudFlare only accesses our server using SSL, and of course, it delivers the content on to you using their own signed SSL certificate.The weak point to the security of this service is you and the computer you use to access this service. Your keys are generated within your browser. Our server never sees your keys. If you are interested in confirming that, you can simply view source on this website, and check out our .js files. There are a few calls to PHP scripts on our server that do things like get balances and broadcast transactions, but you will see that the private key is never sent to those scripts.
It is your responsibility to ensure that you do not have malware that is reading keys from your browser session or from your cache. It is also your responsibility to record your keys in a safe place, so that you do not lose your funds. There is no guarantee that this service will always be available to you, so keeping a personal record of your keys will ensure no loss of funds should our service be interrupted or discontinued. If you lose your keys, or forget your password, it is literally impossible for us to help you recover them.

That is where you can create an address using a special seed that it uses to generate the public and private key pair. Keys created using these seeds will always produce the same key, so it's a convenient way for you make keys using phrases that you might be able to memorize.So say you want to be able to make a key and not record it anywhere. You could make a key using this seed being a very long and random set of words that you then memorize. Later on you can reproduce that key using those words.
Obviously, anyone who knew your phrase would be able to make the key, as well, so the security of the key is only as good as the complexity of the words/phrases that were used to generate it. There are a number of fun things you can do, such as hide a key behind a well known phrase, song lyric, or answer to a riddle.
Why do you not use 2FA (2 Factor Authentication) anywhere on the site?
The Ritocoin Web Wallet was designed to be used in such a way that no information about the user is stored on our server. 2FA would require us to maintain a database of information about our users that they would authenticate against, and therefore goes against the design principles of the service. We do not store any information about you, and therefore as far as we know, it is not possible to use 2FA with our service. If anybody knows of a way for us to provide 2FA without requiring us to store information on the user, we'd welcome that information. See below on how to contact us.Can I use this service for educational purposes?
Absolutely. If you are an educator, you can find great value in leading your students through exercises involving this website. They can all create keys, verify transactions, and broadcast transactions to each other. As the teacher, you could set aside a small number of Ritocoin funds to distribute to your student's keys so they have some money to work with. Cryptocurrency is here to stay and if you have students in your care, Ritocoin is a tremendous resource to help them learn some of the more inner workings of how the blockchain transactions work.What is the charge for this service?
It's a free service, provided by Ritocoin community member @traysi.Any additional questions...
Feel free to email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>with any additional questions, or better yet, join the Ritocoin discord group and tag me there (@traysi) in the #helpdesk channel.Return to the Ritocoin Web Wallet homepage
Ritocoincoin Web Wallet
Information
This web wallet is based on Coinb.in - a free and open source project originally for Bitcoin and released under the MIT license by OutCast3k in 2013.
Privacy
We believe strongly in privacy. This site does not collect IP or transaction data in any way, nor do we store your Ritocoin private keys you generate here. This service exists for your convenience and as a service to the Ritocoin community. Due to the nature of how our service works, we can not help you recover lost keys that you might fail to preserve.
Donate
Please donate Ritocoins to B7PzPtUTVV6SVWqmtJQf18zSPP3TFPsAER if you found this service useful and/or want to see more features!
Visit our homepage or Read our FAQ


Vintage Packers memorabilia goes up for auction
by Logan RudeGREEN BAY, Wis. - A huge collection of vintage Packers memorabilia is being sold in an auction run by Boston-based RR Auction, according to a news release.
The huge collection features some rare items, including the sterling silver trophy the Packers received after the team went undefeated in 1929, winning their first NFL championship.
The auction also features the brown wool topcoat that Vince Lombardi wore during the Packers 1966 season.
“It’s an incredibly rare, museum-quality piece from the personal wardrobe of a Green Bay icon,” said Bobby Livingston, executive vice president at RR Auction.
More modern memorabilia is also included in the collection. Fans have the chance to buy Harry Sydney's 1996 Super Bowl ring, a game-used California Golden Bears jersey signed by Aaron Rodgers, a 1929 championship team photo, a 1966 team-signed football, a set of three original vintage photos of Lombardi and a pair of Nike cleats signed by Brett Favre that he wore during a game.
According to the release, the auction began Nov. 8 and runs until Nov. 21.


Virtual keyboard test #5: changing target text field on the fly. Text is streamed to the field last focused.
Hide keyboard


Booking & contact
Name
Email
Phone
Street
Number
City
Post Code
Country
Details
Arrive
Depart
1
2
3
People
With Bathroom
Without Bathroom
Room
Zweibett
Doppelbett
Bedding
Please describe your needs e.g. Extra beds, children's cots
Comments
Submit


You can use this page to patch a rom with a supported patch file (IPS Patch or a specific JSON format).


The analog single phase winding has an effective number of turns, and a respective orientation of the winding, . The current in the winding is .
The total complex magnetic potential difference of the single phase winding is determined by:
where is the reference angle of the electrical and magnetic system, respectively. The induced voltage is identical to zero.
Modelica.Magnetic.FundamentalWave.Components.SinglePhaseElectroMagneticConverter, Modelica.Magnetic.FundamentalWave.Components.MultiPhaseElectroMagneticConverter, MultiPhaseElectroMagneticConverter


Area Rules
Midpoint Rule
Trapezoid Rule
Left Riemann Sum Rule
Right Riemann Sum Rule
Function Input Guide
Exponents -> x^e
Square Root -> sqrt(x)
n Root -> x^(1/n)
Trig Functions -> cos(x), sin(x), tan(x), etc
Inverse Trig -> acos(x), asin(x), atan(x), etc
Credits
Made By Earl Kennedy
Uses the
mathjs
for equation parsing


Forms are a huge pain, but hopefully these styles make it a bit easier. All inputs, select, and buttons are normalized for a common height cross-browser so inputs can be stacked or placed alongside each other.
Your email Reason for contacting Questions Admiration Can I get your number? Message Send a copy to yourself


Plot
This film explores a Parisian woman's
descent into prostitution. The movie is comprised of a series of 12
\"tableaux\"-- scenes which are basically unconnected episodes, each
presented with a worded introduction.
Actors
Anna Karina, Sady Rebbot, André S.
Labarthe, Guylaine Schlumberger


==== Startup Items ====
Most systems will have applications that can run at system startup or at user logon that can provide information about the purpose of the system, software and services it interacts with. This information may reveal potential countermeasures that could be in place that may hinder further exploitation of a target network and it’s systems (e.g. HIDS/HIPS, Application Whitelisting, FIM). Information that should be gathered includes:
*List of the applications and their associated versions installed on the system.
*List of operating system updates applied to the system.


The do...while
statement creates a loop that executes a specified statement until the test condition evaluates to false. The condition is evaluated after executing the statement, resulting in the specified statement executing at least once.
do statement while (condition);
statement
{ ... }
) to group those statements.condition
condition
evaluates to true, the statement
is re-executed. When condition
evaluates to false, control passes to the statement following the do...while
.do...while
In the following example, the do...while
loop iterates at least once and reiterates until i
is no longer less than 5.
var i = 0; do { i += 1; console.log(i); } while (i < 5);
Created by Mozilla Contributors, license: CC-BY-SA 2.5


- c - Variable in class sets.general.DerivedSet
-
A number that modifies the fuzzy set.
- Checker - Class in general
-
This class shows in netlogo the variables of the Fuzzy set.
- Checker() - Constructor for class general.Checker
-
- checkListFormat(LogoList) - Static method in class general.SupportFunctions
-
Checks the format of the sets defined with points.
- Clear - Class in primitives.labeling
-
This class implments the primitive clear.
- Clear() - Constructor for class primitives.labeling.Clear
-
- ClearLabel - Class in primitives.labeling
-
This class implements the primitive clear-label.
- ClearLabel() - Constructor for class primitives.labeling.ClearLabel
-
- ClearLabelOfSet - Class in primitives.labeling
-
This class implements the primitive clear-label-of.
- ClearLabelOfSet() - Constructor for class primitives.labeling.ClearLabelOfSet
-
- COG - Class in primitives.defuzzification
-
This class implements the cog-of primitive.Center of gravity.
- COG() - Constructor for class primitives.defuzzification.COG
-
- Command - Interface in primitives.operators
-
Interface to define the operation to perform in the discrete sets.
- continuous - Variable in class sets.general.FuzzySet
-
True if the set is continuous(defined in all points of his universe),
false if not.
- continuousCOG(FuzzySet) - Method in class primitives.defuzzification.COG
-
Calculate the center of gravity of a continuous set.
- continuousFulfillment(FuzzySet, FuzzySet) - Static method in class general.DegreeOfFulfillment
-
Calculate the degree of fulfillment of two continuous sets.
- continuousMeOM(FuzzySet) - Method in class primitives.defuzzification.MeOM
-
Calculate the mean of Maxima of a continuous set.
- continuousParamsUniverse(LogoList) - Static method in class primitives.operators.SupportOperators
-
Calculate the parameters and the universe of continuous sets.
- continuousPlot(Plot, FuzzySet) - Method in class primitives.creation.FuzzyPlot
-
This method plots the continuous sets.
- crossPoint(double, double, double, double, double, double) - Static method in class general.DegreeOfFulfillment
-
Calculate where 2 lines crosses, both lines start and end in the same
places.
- Cut - Class in primitives.implication
-
This class implements the primitive truncate.
- Cut() - Constructor for class primitives.implication.Cut
-
- cutDiscrete(PointSet, double) - Method in class primitives.implication.Cut
-
Truncate a discrete set.
- cutPiecewise(PointSet, double) - Method in class primitives.implication.Cut
-
Truncate a piecewise linear set.
- CutRule - Class in primitives.rules
-
This class implements the truncate-rule primitive.
- CutRule() - Constructor for class primitives.rules.CutRule
-
- CutSet - Class in sets.derived
-
When a continuous fuzzy set is truncated, a new cut-set is created.
- CutSet(FuzzySet, double, boolean, String, double[]) - Constructor for class sets.derived.CutSet
-
Call the constructor of DerivedSet.
- cutting(FuzzySet, double) - Method in class primitives.implication.Cut
-
Checks what kind of fuzzy set is passed and execute the correct action.


Scouting Form
Team Number
Autonomous
None
Center Switch
Side Switch
Scale
Baseline
Cubes in Autonomous
Notes on Autonomous
Teleoperated
Cubes in Own Switch
Cubes in Opponent's Switch
Cubes in Scale
Cubes in Exchange
Notes on Teleoperated
Hangs itself
Hangs others
Offense
Defense
On a Scale from 1-10 (Higher is Better)
Speed of Robot
Proficiency at Picking up Cubes
Proficiency at Keeping Hold of Cubes
Proficiency at Placing Cubes
Additional Notes
Submit


Process Work
To build up a system, the first task was to define the main feature function for
each part. For iOrder, based on the user experience, we designed a simple flow and
easy-used interface. We also wireframed and did mock-ups of the general look and
feel of the App.


Before Change
mask = self.network.mask[1:]
if self.ignore_unk:
mask = numpy.copy(mask)
mask[self.network.word_input[1:] == unk_id] = 0
logprobs *= tensor.cast(mask, theano.config.floatX)
// Cost is the negative log probability normalized by the number of
// training examples in the mini-batch, so that the gradients will also
After Change
logprobs = tensor.log(self.network.prediction_probs)
// If requested, predict <unk> with constant score.
if not unk_penalty is None:
unk_mask = tensor.eq(self.network.word_input[1:], unk_id)
unk_indices = unk_mask.nonzero()
logprobs = tensor.set_subtensor(logprobs[unk_indices], unk_penalty)
// Ignore logprobs, when the next input word (the one predicted) is
// masked out, and possibly also when it is the <unk> token. The mask
// has to be cast to floatX, otherwise the result will be float64 and
// pulled out from the GPU earlier than necessary.


Play
Login
Upload
Videos from same user
User must have between 3 and 20 characters
Password must have at least 8 characters
Login
New user
Upload


+
-
reset
Power saving mode is
on
Turn PSM
off
Find the temperature of any city:
Current temperature in
London
:
20
degrees


Congress fields Lakhan Jarkiholi from Gokak
by DHNSCongress on Saturday night fielded Lakhan Jarkiholi as its nominee for the assembly bypolls from Gokak against brother Ramesh Jarkiholi who switched over to the BJP.
The party also fielded Raju Kage, who crossed over to the Congress from the BJP on Friday from the Kagwad assembly seat.
Kage will take on Shrimant Gowda Patil in Kagwad. Patil had defected from the Congress to the BJP.
Rizwan Arshad, who contested the Lok Sabha elections unsuccessfully from Bengaluru Central, will be in the fray from the Shivajinagar assembly seat which was earlier represented by senior leader Roshan Baig.
K B Chandrashekar will be in the fray from Krishnarajpet, while Gajanan Mangasuli will contest from Athani.
Venkatrao Ghorpade, the brother of veteran leader Murari Ghorpade will contest from the Vijayanagara assembly seat.
Praveen Peter will be the Congress candidate for the Legislative Council polls from the Bangalore Teachers constituency.


Welcome Keith Eng!
Please join #gilttech in welcoming Keith Eng as our new Corporate IT Systems Engineer! Keith will build and optimize our internal corporate infrastructure in NYC. His work will involve designing and implementing our VMware server virtualization environment, Citrix XenApp 6.5 server farm, Digital Asset Management system and NetApp SAN storage arrays,
analyzing our systems design and performance, diagnosing server/storage and virtualization issues, and many more essentials. A graduate of Stony Brook University, he’s been a systems engineer for more than seven years. We’re super-excited to have him on our team!


| 015:021 Khan | : |
And there is not a thing, but with Us are the stores thereof. And We send it not down except in a known measure. |
| 015:021 Maulana | : |
And there is not a thing but with Us are the treasures of it, and We send it not down but in a known measure. |
| 015:021 Pickthal | : |
And there is not a thing but with Us are the stores thereof. And we send it not down save in appointed measure. |
| 015:021 Rashad | : |
There is nothing that we do not own infinite amounts thereof. But we send it down in precise measure. |
| 015:021 Sarwar | : |
With Us is the source of everything and We do not send it down except in a known quantity. |
| 015:021 Shakir | : |
And there is not a thing but with Us are the treasures of it, and We do not send it down but in a known measure. |
| 015:021 Sherali | : |
And there is not a thing but are limitless treasures thereof with US and WE sent it not down except in a known measure. |
| 015:021 Yusufali | : |
And there is not a thing but its (sources and) treasures (inexhaustible) are with Us; but We only send down thereof in due and ascertainable measures. |
Concepts/Themes Covered: أركان الإسلام > التوحيد > توحيد الله تعالي > وحدانيته Pillars of Islam> Islamic> Oneness of Allah> Singularity and Being Unique أركان الإسلام > (محمد (صلى الله عليه وسلم > مخاطبة الله إياه Pillars of Islam> The Blessed Muhammad(PBUH)> Allah's Address to Him(PBUH) الإيمان > الغيب > الغيب النفسي > القضاء والقدر Faith> The Unseen World> The Psychological Secret> Fate and Divine Decree
This tool uses eight English parallel translations for the Holy Quran imported from Mr. Clay Smith. You can also visit Qurany Concepts for browsing the Quran themes or topics. If you want to search the Holy Quran for keywords, please visit Qurany Keywords.


Using Fg ≈ Fg0, equation (49) is written as
|
| (71) |
where δRδFg is a nonlinear term which is of order O(λ2) or higher, LgδFg and δRFg0 are linear terms which are of order O(λ1) or higher. The linear term δRFg0 is given by
|
| (72) |
In obtaining (72), use has been made of ∂Fg0∕∂α = 0. Another linear term LgδFg is written as
where Ω∂δFg∕∂α is of order O(λ1) and all the other terms are of order O(λ2).Next, to reduce the complexity of algebra, we consider the easier case in which ∂Fg0∕∂μ = 0.
The balance between the leading terms (terms of O(λ)) in Eq. (71) requires that
|
| (74) |
where δFa is a unknown distribution function to be solved from the above equation. It is ready to verify that
|
| (75) |
is a solution to the above equation, accurate to O(λ). [Proof: Substitute expression (75) into the left-hand side of Eq. (74), we obtain
UsingAs is discussed above, the terms of O(λ) can be eliminated by splitting a so-called adiabatic term form δFg. Speciﬁcally, write δFg as
|
| (80) |
where δFa is given by (75), i.e.,
|
| (81) |
which depends on the gyro-angle via δΦ and this term is often called adiabatic term. Plugging expression (80) into equation (71), we obtain
|
| (82) |
Next, let us simplify the linear term on the right-hand side, i.e, δRFg0 −LgfδFa, (which should be of O(λ2) or higher because Ω∂δFa∕∂α cancels all the O(λ1) terms in δRFg0).
LgδFa is written
where the error is of order O(λ3). In obtaining the above expression, use has been made of e∥⋅∂Fg0∕∂X = 0, ∂Fg0∕∂X = O(λ1)Fg0, ∂Fg0∕∂α = 0, ∂Fg0∕∂μ = 0, and the deﬁnition of λB1 and λB2 given in expressions (20) and (21). The expression (83) involves δΦ operated by the Vlasov propagator Lg. Since δΦ takes the most simple form when expressed in particle coordinates (if in guiding-center coordinates, δΦ(x) = δΦ(X−v ×e∥∕Ω), which depends on velocity coordinates and thus more complicated), it is convenient to use the Vlasov propagator Lg expressed in particle coordinates. Transforming Lg back to the particle coordinates, expression (83) is writtenThe consequence of this is that, as we will see in Sec. 3.6, δG is independent of the gyro-angle, accurate to order O(λ1). Therefore, separating δF into adiabatic and non-adiabatic parts also corresponds to separating δF into gyro-angle dependent and gyro-angle independent parts.
Let us rewrite the linear term (87) in terms of δΦ and δA. The δE + v ×δB term in expression (87) is written as
|
| (88) |
Note that this term needs to be accurate to only O(λ). Then
|
| (89) |
where the error is of O(λ2). Using the vector identity v ×∇x ×δA = (∇δA) ⋅v − (v ⋅∇)δA and noting v is constant for ∇x operator, the above equation is written
|
| (90) |
Note that Eq. (22) indicates that ∇xδΦ ≈∇XδΦ, where the error is of O(λ2), then the above equation is written
|
| (91) |
Further note that the parallel gradients in the above equation are of O(λ2) and thus can be dropped. Then expression (91) is written
where δL is deﬁned by|
| (93) |
Using expression (92), equation (87) is written
|
| (94) |
where all terms are of O(λ2).


--- layout: archive title: Zulip Chat Archive permalink: /stream/113488-general/topic/lean.20website.html ---
Is github.io down?
https://status.ws/sites/pages.github.com/5666234905395200
Is working fine here
{% endraw %}Last updated: Apr 24 2020 at 19:02 UTC


| Tests |
|
Test that model loads
|
|
Test that validation can be carried out via an xforms-submit-error handler
|
|
Test output
|
|
Test output MIP enabled
|
|
Test output MIP enabled within repeat
|
|
Test serialize()
|
|
Test loading external instances
|
|
Test for insert with @at xpath expression last()
|


A mobile application for new university students, helping them to stay both productive and happy! Chalmers University of Technology requested a mobile application to support students in their work, especially new students readjusting
from
high school. To explore needs, we interviewed student counsellors and students, surveyed students, researched competitors and consulted literature.
We worked in a Scrum-like fashion with sprints and a backlog. The team consisted of six people. I contributed to all areas including building the backend, designing the front-end, performing research and planning the design and
implementation work. It was our Bachelor Thesis project and a lot of energy went into Android programming.


Syllabus
TYLER v. CAIN, WARDEN
After petitioner Tyler was convicted of second-degree murder and his conviction was affirmed on appeal, he filed five state petitions for postconviction relief and a federal habeas petition, all of which were denied. After this Court decided Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U. S. 39under which a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood it to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubtTyler filed a sixth state petition, claiming that a jury instruction in his trial was substantively identical to the one condemned in Cage. The State District Court denied relief, and the State Supreme Court affirmed. Seeking to pursue his Cage claim in federal court, Tyler moved the Fifth Circuit for permission to file a second habeas application, as required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The court granted the motion. The District Court then proceeded to the merits of Tylers claim and denied relief. Although the Fifth Circuit affirmed, it stated that the District Court had erred by failing first to determine whether Tyler had satisfied AEDPAs successive habeas standard, which requires a district court to dismiss a claim in a second or successive application unless, as relevant here, the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court , that was previously unavailable. §2244(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Relying on Circuit precedent, the court concluded that Tyler did not meet this standard.
Held: The Cage rule was not made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). Pp. 411.
(a) Based on §2244(b)(2)(A)s plain meaning when read as a whole, made means held. Under the statute, this Court is the only entity that can ma[k]e a new rule retroactive. The new rule becomes retroactive, not by the decisions of the lower court or by the combined action of the Supreme Court and the lower courts, but simply by the action of the Supreme Court. The only way the Supreme Court can, by itself, lay out and construct a rules retroactive effect is through a holding. This Court does not ma[k]e a rule retroactive when it merely establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves their application to lower courts. In such an event, the lower court (or perhaps a combination of courts), not the Supreme Court, develops any legal conclusion derived from those principles. Although the statute uses the word made, not held, Congress is permitted to use synonyms in a statute, see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, and made and held are synonyms in the §2244(b)(2)(A) context. This interpretation is necessary for the proper implementation of AEDPAs collateral review structure. The stringent 30-day time period that §2244(b)(3)(D) imposes on courts of appeals determining whether an application makes a prima facie showing that [it] satisfies the [second habeas standard], §2244(b)(3)(C), suggests that those courts do not have to engage in the difficult legal analysis that can be required to determine questions of retroactivity in the first instance, but need only rely on Supreme Court retroactivity holdings. Pp. 57.
(b) The Cage rule has not been made retroactive … by the Supreme Court. Cage did not make itself retroactive, and neither did Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U. S. 275. Tyler contends that Sullivan s reasoning makes it clear that retroactive application of Cage is warranted by the principles of Teague v. Lane , 489 U. S. 288, in which the Court held that a new rule can be retroactive to cases on collateral review only if it falls within one of two narrow exceptions to the general rule of nonretroactivity. However, the most Tyler can claim is that, based on Teague s principles, this Court should make Cage retroactive to cases on collateral review. It is clear, however, that the Court has not done so. Although the Court can make a rule retroactive over the course of two cases, it has not done so here. Pp. 710.
(c) This Court declines to make Cage retroactive today. Because Tylers habeas application was his second, the District Court was required to dismiss it unless Tyler showed that this Court already had made Cage retroactive. This Court cannot decide today whether Cage is retroactive to cases on collateral review, because that decision will not help Tyler in this case. Any statement on Cage s retroactivity would be dictum, so this Court declines to comment further on the issue. Pp. 1011.
218 F. 3d 744, affirmed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and OConnor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. OConnor, J., filed a concurring opinion. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.
Concurrence
MELVIN TYLER, PETITIONER
v.
BURL
CAIN, WARDEN
Justice OConnor , concurring.
I join the Courts opinion and write separately to explain more fully the circumstances in which a new rule is made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V).
It is only through the holdings of this Court, as opposed to this Courts dicta and as opposed to the decisions of any other court, that a new rule is made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). See ante, at 56; cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412 (2000) . The clearest instance, of course, in which we can be said to have made a new rule retroactive is where we expressly have held the new rule to be retroactive in a case on collateral review and applied the rule to that case. But, as the Court recognizes, a single case that expressly holds a rule to be retroactive is not a sine qua non for the satisfaction of this statutory provision. Ante, at 9. This Court instead may ma[k]e a new rule retroactive through multiple holdings that logically dictate the retroactivity of the new rule. Ibid. To apply the syllogistic relationship described by Justice Breyer , post, at 3 (dissenting opinion), if we hold in Case One that a particular type of rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review and hold in Case Two that a given rule is of that particular type, then it necessarily follows that the given rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. In such circumstances, we can be said to have made the given rule retroactive to cases on collateral review.
The relationship between the conclusion that a new rule is retroactive and the holdings that ma[k]e this rule retroactive, however, must be strictly logical i.e., the holdings must dictate the conclusion and not merely provide principles from which one may conclude that the rule applies retroactively. As the Court observes, [t]he Supreme Court does not ma[k]e a rule retroactive when it merely establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves the application of those principles to lower courts. Ante, at 6. The Court instead can be said to have made a rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A) only where the Courts holdings logically permit no other conclusion than that the rule is retroactive.
It is relatively easy to demonstrate the required logical relationship with respect to the first exception articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989) . Under this exception, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe. Id., at 307 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)). When the Court holds as a new rule in a subsequent case that a particular species of primary, private individual conduct is beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe, it necessarily follows that this Court has made that new rule retroactive to cases on collateral review. The Court has done so through its holdings alone, without resort to dicta and without any application of principles by lower courts.
The matter is less straightforward with respect to the second Teague exception, which is reserved for watershed rules of criminal procedure, 489 U. S., at 311 (plurality opinion). A case announcing a new rule could conceivably hold that infringement of the rule seriously diminish[es] the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction, id., at 315, and that the rule alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding, id., at 311 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey, supra, at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)); see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 242 (1990) , without holding in so many words that the rule applies retroactively and without actually applying that rule retroactively to a case on collateral review. The precise contours of this Teague exception, of course, may be difficult to discern, Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 495 (1990) , and the judgment involved in our ma[king] a new rule retroactive under this exception is likely to be more subjective and self-conscious than is the case with Teague s first exception. But the relevant inquiry is not whether the new rule comes within the Teague exception at all, but the more narrow and manageable inquiry of whether this Courts holdings, by strict logical necessity, ma[k]e the new rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). While such logical necessity does not obtain in this particular case, ante, at 810, this Court could ma[k]e a new rule retroactive under Teague s second exception in this manner.
Concurrence
MELVIN TYLER, PETITIONER
v.
BURL
CAIN, WARDEN
Justice OConnor , concurring.
I join the Courts opinion and write separately to explain more fully the circumstances in which a new rule is made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V).
It is only through the holdings of this Court, as opposed to this Courts dicta and as opposed to the decisions of any other court, that a new rule is made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). See ante, at 56; cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412 (2000) . The clearest instance, of course, in which we can be said to have made a new rule retroactive is where we expressly have held the new rule to be retroactive in a case on collateral review and applied the rule to that case. But, as the Court recognizes, a single case that expressly holds a rule to be retroactive is not a sine qua non for the satisfaction of this statutory provision. Ante, at 9. This Court instead may ma[k]e a new rule retroactive through multiple holdings that logically dictate the retroactivity of the new rule. Ibid. To apply the syllogistic relationship described by Justice Breyer , post, at 3 (dissenting opinion), if we hold in Case One that a particular type of rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review and hold in Case Two that a given rule is of that particular type, then it necessarily follows that the given rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. In such circumstances, we can be said to have made the given rule retroactive to cases on collateral review.
The relationship between the conclusion that a new rule is retroactive and the holdings that ma[k]e this rule retroactive, however, must be strictly logical i.e., the holdings must dictate the conclusion and not merely provide principles from which one may conclude that the rule applies retroactively. As the Court observes, [t]he Supreme Court does not ma[k]e a rule retroactive when it merely establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves the application of those principles to lower courts. Ante, at 6. The Court instead can be said to have made a rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A) only where the Courts holdings logically permit no other conclusion than that the rule is retroactive.
It is relatively easy to demonstrate the required logical relationship with respect to the first exception articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989) . Under this exception, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe. Id., at 307 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)). When the Court holds as a new rule in a subsequent case that a particular species of primary, private individual conduct is beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe, it necessarily follows that this Court has made that new rule retroactive to cases on collateral review. The Court has done so through its holdings alone, without resort to dicta and without any application of principles by lower courts.
The matter is less straightforward with respect to the second Teague exception, which is reserved for watershed rules of criminal procedure, 489 U. S., at 311 (plurality opinion). A case announcing a new rule could conceivably hold that infringement of the rule seriously diminish[es] the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction, id., at 315, and that the rule alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding, id., at 311 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey, supra, at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)); see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 242 (1990) , without holding in so many words that the rule applies retroactively and without actually applying that rule retroactively to a case on collateral review. The precise contours of this Teague exception, of course, may be difficult to discern, Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 495 (1990) , and the judgment involved in our ma[king] a new rule retroactive under this exception is likely to be more subjective and self-conscious than is the case with Teague s first exception. But the relevant inquiry is not whether the new rule comes within the Teague exception at all, but the more narrow and manageable inquiry of whether this Courts holdings, by strict logical necessity, ma[k]e the new rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). While such logical necessity does not obtain in this particular case, ante, at 810, this Court could ma[k]e a new rule retroactive under Teague s second exception in this manner.
Concurrence
MELVIN TYLER, PETITIONER
v.
BURL
CAIN, WARDEN
Justice OConnor , concurring.
I join the Courts opinion and write separately to explain more fully the circumstances in which a new rule is made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V).
It is only through the holdings of this Court, as opposed to this Courts dicta and as opposed to the decisions of any other court, that a new rule is made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). See ante, at 56; cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412 (2000) . The clearest instance, of course, in which we can be said to have made a new rule retroactive is where we expressly have held the new rule to be retroactive in a case on collateral review and applied the rule to that case. But, as the Court recognizes, a single case that expressly holds a rule to be retroactive is not a sine qua non for the satisfaction of this statutory provision. Ante, at 9. This Court instead may ma[k]e a new rule retroactive through multiple holdings that logically dictate the retroactivity of the new rule. Ibid. To apply the syllogistic relationship described by Justice Breyer , post, at 3 (dissenting opinion), if we hold in Case One that a particular type of rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review and hold in Case Two that a given rule is of that particular type, then it necessarily follows that the given rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. In such circumstances, we can be said to have made the given rule retroactive to cases on collateral review.
The relationship between the conclusion that a new rule is retroactive and the holdings that ma[k]e this rule retroactive, however, must be strictly logical i.e., the holdings must dictate the conclusion and not merely provide principles from which one may conclude that the rule applies retroactively. As the Court observes, [t]he Supreme Court does not ma[k]e a rule retroactive when it merely establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves the application of those principles to lower courts. Ante, at 6. The Court instead can be said to have made a rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A) only where the Courts holdings logically permit no other conclusion than that the rule is retroactive.
It is relatively easy to demonstrate the required logical relationship with respect to the first exception articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989) . Under this exception, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe. Id., at 307 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)). When the Court holds as a new rule in a subsequent case that a particular species of primary, private individual conduct is beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe, it necessarily follows that this Court has made that new rule retroactive to cases on collateral review. The Court has done so through its holdings alone, without resort to dicta and without any application of principles by lower courts.
The matter is less straightforward with respect to the second Teague exception, which is reserved for watershed rules of criminal procedure, 489 U. S., at 311 (plurality opinion). A case announcing a new rule could conceivably hold that infringement of the rule seriously diminish[es] the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction, id., at 315, and that the rule alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding, id., at 311 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey, supra, at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)); see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 242 (1990) , without holding in so many words that the rule applies retroactively and without actually applying that rule retroactively to a case on collateral review. The precise contours of this Teague exception, of course, may be difficult to discern, Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 495 (1990) , and the judgment involved in our ma[king] a new rule retroactive under this exception is likely to be more subjective and self-conscious than is the case with Teague s first exception. But the relevant inquiry is not whether the new rule comes within the Teague exception at all, but the more narrow and manageable inquiry of whether this Courts holdings, by strict logical necessity, ma[k]e the new rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). While such logical necessity does not obtain in this particular case, ante, at 810, this Court could ma[k]e a new rule retroactive under Teague s second exception in this manner.
Concurrence
MELVIN TYLER, PETITIONER
v.
BURL
CAIN, WARDEN
Justice OConnor , concurring.
I join the Courts opinion and write separately to explain more fully the circumstances in which a new rule is made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V).
It is only through the holdings of this Court, as opposed to this Courts dicta and as opposed to the decisions of any other court, that a new rule is made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). See ante, at 56; cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412 (2000) . The clearest instance, of course, in which we can be said to have made a new rule retroactive is where we expressly have held the new rule to be retroactive in a case on collateral review and applied the rule to that case. But, as the Court recognizes, a single case that expressly holds a rule to be retroactive is not a sine qua non for the satisfaction of this statutory provision. Ante, at 9. This Court instead may ma[k]e a new rule retroactive through multiple holdings that logically dictate the retroactivity of the new rule. Ibid. To apply the syllogistic relationship described by Justice Breyer , post, at 3 (dissenting opinion), if we hold in Case One that a particular type of rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review and hold in Case Two that a given rule is of that particular type, then it necessarily follows that the given rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. In such circumstances, we can be said to have made the given rule retroactive to cases on collateral review.
The relationship between the conclusion that a new rule is retroactive and the holdings that ma[k]e this rule retroactive, however, must be strictly logical i.e., the holdings must dictate the conclusion and not merely provide principles from which one may conclude that the rule applies retroactively. As the Court observes, [t]he Supreme Court does not ma[k]e a rule retroactive when it merely establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves the application of those principles to lower courts. Ante, at 6. The Court instead can be said to have made a rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A) only where the Courts holdings logically permit no other conclusion than that the rule is retroactive.
It is relatively easy to demonstrate the required logical relationship with respect to the first exception articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989) . Under this exception, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe. Id., at 307 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)). When the Court holds as a new rule in a subsequent case that a particular species of primary, private individual conduct is beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe, it necessarily follows that this Court has made that new rule retroactive to cases on collateral review. The Court has done so through its holdings alone, without resort to dicta and without any application of principles by lower courts.
The matter is less straightforward with respect to the second Teague exception, which is reserved for watershed rules of criminal procedure, 489 U. S., at 311 (plurality opinion). A case announcing a new rule could conceivably hold that infringement of the rule seriously diminish[es] the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction, id., at 315, and that the rule alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding, id., at 311 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey, supra, at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)); see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 242 (1990) , without holding in so many words that the rule applies retroactively and without actually applying that rule retroactively to a case on collateral review. The precise contours of this Teague exception, of course, may be difficult to discern, Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 495 (1990) , and the judgment involved in our ma[king] a new rule retroactive under this exception is likely to be more subjective and self-conscious than is the case with Teague s first exception. But the relevant inquiry is not whether the new rule comes within the Teague exception at all, but the more narrow and manageable inquiry of whether this Courts holdings, by strict logical necessity, ma[k]e the new rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). While such logical necessity does not obtain in this particular case, ante, at 810, this Court could ma[k]e a new rule retroactive under Teague s second exception in this manner.
Concurrence
MELVIN TYLER, PETITIONER
v.
BURL
CAIN, WARDEN
Justice OConnor , concurring.
I join the Courts opinion and write separately to explain more fully the circumstances in which a new rule is made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V).
It is only through the holdings of this Court, as opposed to this Courts dicta and as opposed to the decisions of any other court, that a new rule is made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). See ante, at 56; cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412 (2000) . The clearest instance, of course, in which we can be said to have made a new rule retroactive is where we expressly have held the new rule to be retroactive in a case on collateral review and applied the rule to that case. But, as the Court recognizes, a single case that expressly holds a rule to be retroactive is not a sine qua non for the satisfaction of this statutory provision. Ante, at 9. This Court instead may ma[k]e a new rule retroactive through multiple holdings that logically dictate the retroactivity of the new rule. Ibid. To apply the syllogistic relationship described by Justice Breyer , post, at 3 (dissenting opinion), if we hold in Case One that a particular type of rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review and hold in Case Two that a given rule is of that particular type, then it necessarily follows that the given rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. In such circumstances, we can be said to have made the given rule retroactive to cases on collateral review.
The relationship between the conclusion that a new rule is retroactive and the holdings that ma[k]e this rule retroactive, however, must be strictly logical i.e., the holdings must dictate the conclusion and not merely provide principles from which one may conclude that the rule applies retroactively. As the Court observes, [t]he Supreme Court does not ma[k]e a rule retroactive when it merely establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves the application of those principles to lower courts. Ante, at 6. The Court instead can be said to have made a rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A) only where the Courts holdings logically permit no other conclusion than that the rule is retroactive.
It is relatively easy to demonstrate the required logical relationship with respect to the first exception articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989) . Under this exception, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe. Id., at 307 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)). When the Court holds as a new rule in a subsequent case that a particular species of primary, private individual conduct is beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe, it necessarily follows that this Court has made that new rule retroactive to cases on collateral review. The Court has done so through its holdings alone, without resort to dicta and without any application of principles by lower courts.
The matter is less straightforward with respect to the second Teague exception, which is reserved for watershed rules of criminal procedure, 489 U. S., at 311 (plurality opinion). A case announcing a new rule could conceivably hold that infringement of the rule seriously diminish[es] the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction, id., at 315, and that the rule alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding, id., at 311 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey, supra, at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)); see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 242 (1990) , without holding in so many words that the rule applies retroactively and without actually applying that rule retroactively to a case on collateral review. The precise contours of this Teague exception, of course, may be difficult to discern, Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 495 (1990) , and the judgment involved in our ma[king] a new rule retroactive under this exception is likely to be more subjective and self-conscious than is the case with Teague s first exception. But the relevant inquiry is not whether the new rule comes within the Teague exception at all, but the more narrow and manageable inquiry of whether this Courts holdings, by strict logical necessity, ma[k]e the new rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). While such logical necessity does not obtain in this particular case, ante, at 810, this Court could ma[k]e a new rule retroactive under Teague s second exception in this manner.
Concurrence
MELVIN TYLER, PETITIONER
v.
BURL
CAIN, WARDEN
Justice OConnor , concurring.
I join the Courts opinion and write separately to explain more fully the circumstances in which a new rule is made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V).
It is only through the holdings of this Court, as opposed to this Courts dicta and as opposed to the decisions of any other court, that a new rule is made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). See ante, at 56; cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412 (2000) . The clearest instance, of course, in which we can be said to have made a new rule retroactive is where we expressly have held the new rule to be retroactive in a case on collateral review and applied the rule to that case. But, as the Court recognizes, a single case that expressly holds a rule to be retroactive is not a sine qua non for the satisfaction of this statutory provision. Ante, at 9. This Court instead may ma[k]e a new rule retroactive through multiple holdings that logically dictate the retroactivity of the new rule. Ibid. To apply the syllogistic relationship described by Justice Breyer , post, at 3 (dissenting opinion), if we hold in Case One that a particular type of rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review and hold in Case Two that a given rule is of that particular type, then it necessarily follows that the given rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. In such circumstances, we can be said to have made the given rule retroactive to cases on collateral review.
The relationship between the conclusion that a new rule is retroactive and the holdings that ma[k]e this rule retroactive, however, must be strictly logical i.e., the holdings must dictate the conclusion and not merely provide principles from which one may conclude that the rule applies retroactively. As the Court observes, [t]he Supreme Court does not ma[k]e a rule retroactive when it merely establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves the application of those principles to lower courts. Ante, at 6. The Court instead can be said to have made a rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A) only where the Courts holdings logically permit no other conclusion than that the rule is retroactive.
It is relatively easy to demonstrate the required logical relationship with respect to the first exception articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989) . Under this exception, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe. Id., at 307 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)). When the Court holds as a new rule in a subsequent case that a particular species of primary, private individual conduct is beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe, it necessarily follows that this Court has made that new rule retroactive to cases on collateral review. The Court has done so through its holdings alone, without resort to dicta and without any application of principles by lower courts.
The matter is less straightforward with respect to the second Teague exception, which is reserved for watershed rules of criminal procedure, 489 U. S., at 311 (plurality opinion). A case announcing a new rule could conceivably hold that infringement of the rule seriously diminish[es] the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction, id., at 315, and that the rule alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding, id., at 311 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey, supra, at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)); see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 242 (1990) , without holding in so many words that the rule applies retroactively and without actually applying that rule retroactively to a case on collateral review. The precise contours of this Teague exception, of course, may be difficult to discern, Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 495 (1990) , and the judgment involved in our ma[king] a new rule retroactive under this exception is likely to be more subjective and self-conscious than is the case with Teague s first exception. But the relevant inquiry is not whether the new rule comes within the Teague exception at all, but the more narrow and manageable inquiry of whether this Courts holdings, by strict logical necessity, ma[k]e the new rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). While such logical necessity does not obtain in this particular case, ante, at 810, this Court could ma[k]e a new rule retroactive under Teague s second exception in this manner.
Concurrence
MELVIN TYLER, PETITIONER
v.
BURL
CAIN, WARDEN
Justice OConnor , concurring.
I join the Courts opinion and write separately to explain more fully the circumstances in which a new rule is made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V).
It is only through the holdings of this Court, as opposed to this Courts dicta and as opposed to the decisions of any other court, that a new rule is made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). See ante, at 56; cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412 (2000) . The clearest instance, of course, in which we can be said to have made a new rule retroactive is where we expressly have held the new rule to be retroactive in a case on collateral review and applied the rule to that case. But, as the Court recognizes, a single case that expressly holds a rule to be retroactive is not a sine qua non for the satisfaction of this statutory provision. Ante, at 9. This Court instead may ma[k]e a new rule retroactive through multiple holdings that logically dictate the retroactivity of the new rule. Ibid. To apply the syllogistic relationship described by Justice Breyer , post, at 3 (dissenting opinion), if we hold in Case One that a particular type of rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review and hold in Case Two that a given rule is of that particular type, then it necessarily follows that the given rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. In such circumstances, we can be said to have made the given rule retroactive to cases on collateral review.
The relationship between the conclusion that a new rule is retroactive and the holdings that ma[k]e this rule retroactive, however, must be strictly logical i.e., the holdings must dictate the conclusion and not merely provide principles from which one may conclude that the rule applies retroactively. As the Court observes, [t]he Supreme Court does not ma[k]e a rule retroactive when it merely establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves the application of those principles to lower courts. Ante, at 6. The Court instead can be said to have made a rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A) only where the Courts holdings logically permit no other conclusion than that the rule is retroactive.
It is relatively easy to demonstrate the required logical relationship with respect to the first exception articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989) . Under this exception, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe. Id., at 307 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)). When the Court holds as a new rule in a subsequent case that a particular species of primary, private individual conduct is beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe, it necessarily follows that this Court has made that new rule retroactive to cases on collateral review. The Court has done so through its holdings alone, without resort to dicta and without any application of principles by lower courts.
The matter is less straightforward with respect to the second Teague exception, which is reserved for watershed rules of criminal procedure, 489 U. S., at 311 (plurality opinion). A case announcing a new rule could conceivably hold that infringement of the rule seriously diminish[es] the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction, id., at 315, and that the rule alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding, id., at 311 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey, supra, at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)); see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 242 (1990) , without holding in so many words that the rule applies retroactively and without actually applying that rule retroactively to a case on collateral review. The precise contours of this Teague exception, of course, may be difficult to discern, Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 495 (1990) , and the judgment involved in our ma[king] a new rule retroactive under this exception is likely to be more subjective and self-conscious than is the case with Teague s first exception. But the relevant inquiry is not whether the new rule comes within the Teague exception at all, but the more narrow and manageable inquiry of whether this Courts holdings, by strict logical necessity, ma[k]e the new rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). While such logical necessity does not obtain in this particular case, ante, at 810, this Court could ma[k]e a new rule retroactive under Teague s second exception in this manner.
Concurrence
MELVIN TYLER, PETITIONER
v.
BURL
CAIN, WARDEN
Justice OConnor , concurring.
I join the Courts opinion and write separately to explain more fully the circumstances in which a new rule is made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V).
It is only through the holdings of this Court, as opposed to this Courts dicta and as opposed to the decisions of any other court, that a new rule is made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). See ante, at 56; cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412 (2000) . The clearest instance, of course, in which we can be said to have made a new rule retroactive is where we expressly have held the new rule to be retroactive in a case on collateral review and applied the rule to that case. But, as the Court recognizes, a single case that expressly holds a rule to be retroactive is not a sine qua non for the satisfaction of this statutory provision. Ante, at 9. This Court instead may ma[k]e a new rule retroactive through multiple holdings that logically dictate the retroactivity of the new rule. Ibid. To apply the syllogistic relationship described by Justice Breyer , post, at 3 (dissenting opinion), if we hold in Case One that a particular type of rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review and hold in Case Two that a given rule is of that particular type, then it necessarily follows that the given rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. In such circumstances, we can be said to have made the given rule retroactive to cases on collateral review.
The relationship between the conclusion that a new rule is retroactive and the holdings that ma[k]e this rule retroactive, however, must be strictly logical i.e., the holdings must dictate the conclusion and not merely provide principles from which one may conclude that the rule applies retroactively. As the Court observes, [t]he Supreme Court does not ma[k]e a rule retroactive when it merely establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves the application of those principles to lower courts. Ante, at 6. The Court instead can be said to have made a rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A) only where the Courts holdings logically permit no other conclusion than that the rule is retroactive.
It is relatively easy to demonstrate the required logical relationship with respect to the first exception articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989) . Under this exception, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe. Id., at 307 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)). When the Court holds as a new rule in a subsequent case that a particular species of primary, private individual conduct is beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe, it necessarily follows that this Court has made that new rule retroactive to cases on collateral review. The Court has done so through its holdings alone, without resort to dicta and without any application of principles by lower courts.
The matter is less straightforward with respect to the second Teague exception, which is reserved for watershed rules of criminal procedure, 489 U. S., at 311 (plurality opinion). A case announcing a new rule could conceivably hold that infringement of the rule seriously diminish[es] the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction, id., at 315, and that the rule alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding, id., at 311 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey, supra, at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)); see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 242 (1990) , without holding in so many words that the rule applies retroactively and without actually applying that rule retroactively to a case on collateral review. The precise contours of this Teague exception, of course, may be difficult to discern, Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 495 (1990) , and the judgment involved in our ma[king] a new rule retroactive under this exception is likely to be more subjective and self-conscious than is the case with Teague s first exception. But the relevant inquiry is not whether the new rule comes within the Teague exception at all, but the more narrow and manageable inquiry of whether this Courts holdings, by strict logical necessity, ma[k]e the new rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). While such logical necessity does not obtain in this particular case, ante, at 810, this Court could ma[k]e a new rule retroactive under Teague s second exception in this manner.
Concurrence
MELVIN TYLER, PETITIONER
v.
BURL
CAIN, WARDEN
Justice OConnor , concurring.
I join the Courts opinion and write separately to explain more fully the circumstances in which a new rule is made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V).
It is only through the holdings of this Court, as opposed to this Courts dicta and as opposed to the decisions of any other court, that a new rule is made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). See ante, at 56; cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412 (2000) . The clearest instance, of course, in which we can be said to have made a new rule retroactive is where we expressly have held the new rule to be retroactive in a case on collateral review and applied the rule to that case. But, as the Court recognizes, a single case that expressly holds a rule to be retroactive is not a sine qua non for the satisfaction of this statutory provision. Ante, at 9. This Court instead may ma[k]e a new rule retroactive through multiple holdings that logically dictate the retroactivity of the new rule. Ibid. To apply the syllogistic relationship described by Justice Breyer , post, at 3 (dissenting opinion), if we hold in Case One that a particular type of rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review and hold in Case Two that a given rule is of that particular type, then it necessarily follows that the given rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. In such circumstances, we can be said to have made the given rule retroactive to cases on collateral review.
The relationship between the conclusion that a new rule is retroactive and the holdings that ma[k]e this rule retroactive, however, must be strictly logical i.e., the holdings must dictate the conclusion and not merely provide principles from which one may conclude that the rule applies retroactively. As the Court observes, [t]he Supreme Court does not ma[k]e a rule retroactive when it merely establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves the application of those principles to lower courts. Ante, at 6. The Court instead can be said to have made a rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A) only where the Courts holdings logically permit no other conclusion than that the rule is retroactive.
It is relatively easy to demonstrate the required logical relationship with respect to the first exception articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989) . Under this exception, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe. Id., at 307 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)). When the Court holds as a new rule in a subsequent case that a particular species of primary, private individual conduct is beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe, it necessarily follows that this Court has made that new rule retroactive to cases on collateral review. The Court has done so through its holdings alone, without resort to dicta and without any application of principles by lower courts.
The matter is less straightforward with respect to the second Teague exception, which is reserved for watershed rules of criminal procedure, 489 U. S., at 311 (plurality opinion). A case announcing a new rule could conceivably hold that infringement of the rule seriously diminish[es] the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction, id., at 315, and that the rule alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding, id., at 311 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey, supra, at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)); see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 242 (1990) , without holding in so many words that the rule applies retroactively and without actually applying that rule retroactively to a case on collateral review. The precise contours of this Teague exception, of course, may be difficult to discern, Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 495 (1990) , and the judgment involved in our ma[king] a new rule retroactive under this exception is likely to be more subjective and self-conscious than is the case with Teague s first exception. But the relevant inquiry is not whether the new rule comes within the Teague exception at all, but the more narrow and manageable inquiry of whether this Courts holdings, by strict logical necessity, ma[k]e the new rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). While such logical necessity does not obtain in this particular case, ante, at 810, this Court could ma[k]e a new rule retroactive under Teague s second exception in this manner.
Concurrence
MELVIN TYLER, PETITIONER
v.
BURL
CAIN, WARDEN
Justice OConnor , concurring.
I join the Courts opinion and write separately to explain more fully the circumstances in which a new rule is made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V).
It is only through the holdings of this Court, as opposed to this Courts dicta and as opposed to the decisions of any other court, that a new rule is made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). See ante, at 56; cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412 (2000) . The clearest instance, of course, in which we can be said to have made a new rule retroactive is where we expressly have held the new rule to be retroactive in a case on collateral review and applied the rule to that case. But, as the Court recognizes, a single case that expressly holds a rule to be retroactive is not a sine qua non for the satisfaction of this statutory provision. Ante, at 9. This Court instead may ma[k]e a new rule retroactive through multiple holdings that logically dictate the retroactivity of the new rule. Ibid. To apply the syllogistic relationship described by Justice Breyer , post, at 3 (dissenting opinion), if we hold in Case One that a particular type of rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review and hold in Case Two that a given rule is of that particular type, then it necessarily follows that the given rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. In such circumstances, we can be said to have made the given rule retroactive to cases on collateral review.
The relationship between the conclusion that a new rule is retroactive and the holdings that ma[k]e this rule retroactive, however, must be strictly logical i.e., the holdings must dictate the conclusion and not merely provide principles from which one may conclude that the rule applies retroactively. As the Court observes, [t]he Supreme Court does not ma[k]e a rule retroactive when it merely establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves the application of those principles to lower courts. Ante, at 6. The Court instead can be said to have made a rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A) only where the Courts holdings logically permit no other conclusion than that the rule is retroactive.
It is relatively easy to demonstrate the required logical relationship with respect to the first exception articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989) . Under this exception, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe. Id., at 307 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)). When the Court holds as a new rule in a subsequent case that a particular species of primary, private individual conduct is beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe, it necessarily follows that this Court has made that new rule retroactive to cases on collateral review. The Court has done so through its holdings alone, without resort to dicta and without any application of principles by lower courts.
The matter is less straightforward with respect to the second Teague exception, which is reserved for watershed rules of criminal procedure, 489 U. S., at 311 (plurality opinion). A case announcing a new rule could conceivably hold that infringement of the rule seriously diminish[es] the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction, id., at 315, and that the rule alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding, id., at 311 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey, supra, at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)); see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 242 (1990) , without holding in so many words that the rule applies retroactively and without actually applying that rule retroactively to a case on collateral review. The precise contours of this Teague exception, of course, may be difficult to discern, Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 495 (1990) , and the judgment involved in our ma[king] a new rule retroactive under this exception is likely to be more subjective and self-conscious than is the case with Teague s first exception. But the relevant inquiry is not whether the new rule comes within the Teague exception at all, but the more narrow and manageable inquiry of whether this Courts holdings, by strict logical necessity, ma[k]e the new rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). While such logical necessity does not obtain in this particular case, ante, at 810, this Court could ma[k]e a new rule retroactive under Teague s second exception in this manner.
Concurrence
MELVIN TYLER, PETITIONER
v.
BURL
CAIN, WARDEN
Justice OConnor , concurring.
I join the Courts opinion and write separately to explain more fully the circumstances in which a new rule is made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V).
It is only through the holdings of this Court, as opposed to this Courts dicta and as opposed to the decisions of any other court, that a new rule is made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). See ante, at 56; cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412 (2000) . The clearest instance, of course, in which we can be said to have made a new rule retroactive is where we expressly have held the new rule to be retroactive in a case on collateral review and applied the rule to that case. But, as the Court recognizes, a single case that expressly holds a rule to be retroactive is not a sine qua non for the satisfaction of this statutory provision. Ante, at 9. This Court instead may ma[k]e a new rule retroactive through multiple holdings that logically dictate the retroactivity of the new rule. Ibid. To apply the syllogistic relationship described by Justice Breyer , post, at 3 (dissenting opinion), if we hold in Case One that a particular type of rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review and hold in Case Two that a given rule is of that particular type, then it necessarily follows that the given rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. In such circumstances, we can be said to have made the given rule retroactive to cases on collateral review.
The relationship between the conclusion that a new rule is retroactive and the holdings that ma[k]e this rule retroactive, however, must be strictly logical i.e., the holdings must dictate the conclusion and not merely provide principles from which one may conclude that the rule applies retroactively. As the Court observes, [t]he Supreme Court does not ma[k]e a rule retroactive when it merely establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves the application of those principles to lower courts. Ante, at 6. The Court instead can be said to have made a rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A) only where the Courts holdings logically permit no other conclusion than that the rule is retroactive.
It is relatively easy to demonstrate the required logical relationship with respect to the first exception articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989) . Under this exception, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe. Id., at 307 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)). When the Court holds as a new rule in a subsequent case that a particular species of primary, private individual conduct is beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe, it necessarily follows that this Court has made that new rule retroactive to cases on collateral review. The Court has done so through its holdings alone, without resort to dicta and without any application of principles by lower courts.
The matter is less straightforward with respect to the second Teague exception, which is reserved for watershed rules of criminal procedure, 489 U. S., at 311 (plurality opinion). A case announcing a new rule could conceivably hold that infringement of the rule seriously diminish[es] the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction, id., at 315, and that the rule alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding, id., at 311 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey, supra, at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)); see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 242 (1990) , without holding in so many words that the rule applies retroactively and without actually applying that rule retroactively to a case on collateral review. The precise contours of this Teague exception, of course, may be difficult to discern, Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 495 (1990) , and the judgment involved in our ma[king] a new rule retroactive under this exception is likely to be more subjective and self-conscious than is the case with Teague s first exception. But the relevant inquiry is not whether the new rule comes within the Teague exception at all, but the more narrow and manageable inquiry of whether this Courts holdings, by strict logical necessity, ma[k]e the new rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). While such logical necessity does not obtain in this particular case, ante, at 810, this Court could ma[k]e a new rule retroactive under Teague s second exception in this manner.
Concurrence
MELVIN TYLER, PETITIONER
v.
BURL
CAIN, WARDEN
Justice OConnor , concurring.
I join the Courts opinion and write separately to explain more fully the circumstances in which a new rule is made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V).
It is only through the holdings of this Court, as opposed to this Courts dicta and as opposed to the decisions of any other court, that a new rule is made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). See ante, at 56; cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412 (2000) . The clearest instance, of course, in which we can be said to have made a new rule retroactive is where we expressly have held the new rule to be retroactive in a case on collateral review and applied the rule to that case. But, as the Court recognizes, a single case that expressly holds a rule to be retroactive is not a sine qua non for the satisfaction of this statutory provision. Ante, at 9. This Court instead may ma[k]e a new rule retroactive through multiple holdings that logically dictate the retroactivity of the new rule. Ibid. To apply the syllogistic relationship described by Justice Breyer , post, at 3 (dissenting opinion), if we hold in Case One that a particular type of rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review and hold in Case Two that a given rule is of that particular type, then it necessarily follows that the given rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. In such circumstances, we can be said to have made the given rule retroactive to cases on collateral review.
The relationship between the conclusion that a new rule is retroactive and the holdings that ma[k]e this rule retroactive, however, must be strictly logical i.e., the holdings must dictate the conclusion and not merely provide principles from which one may conclude that the rule applies retroactively. As the Court observes, [t]he Supreme Court does not ma[k]e a rule retroactive when it merely establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves the application of those principles to lower courts. Ante, at 6. The Court instead can be said to have made a rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A) only where the Courts holdings logically permit no other conclusion than that the rule is retroactive.
It is relatively easy to demonstrate the required logical relationship with respect to the first exception articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989) . Under this exception, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe. Id., at 307 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)). When the Court holds as a new rule in a subsequent case that a particular species of primary, private individual conduct is beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe, it necessarily follows that this Court has made that new rule retroactive to cases on collateral review. The Court has done so through its holdings alone, without resort to dicta and without any application of principles by lower courts.
The matter is less straightforward with respect to the second Teague exception, which is reserved for watershed rules of criminal procedure, 489 U. S., at 311 (plurality opinion). A case announcing a new rule could conceivably hold that infringement of the rule seriously diminish[es] the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction, id., at 315, and that the rule alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding, id., at 311 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey, supra, at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)); see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 242 (1990) , without holding in so many words that the rule applies retroactively and without actually applying that rule retroactively to a case on collateral review. The precise contours of this Teague exception, of course, may be difficult to discern, Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 495 (1990) , and the judgment involved in our ma[king] a new rule retroactive under this exception is likely to be more subjective and self-conscious than is the case with Teague s first exception. But the relevant inquiry is not whether the new rule comes within the Teague exception at all, but the more narrow and manageable inquiry of whether this Courts holdings, by strict logical necessity, ma[k]e the new rule retroactive within the meaning of §2244(b)(2)(A). While such logical necessity does not obtain in this particular case, ante, at 810, this Court could ma[k]e a new rule retroactive under Teague s second exception in this manner.


Night has come, all developers have left the office after a long day of coding. Player receives the device, views their role, and gives the device to the next player once finished.
Hand the device to this player. Click on the avatar above once you are ready.
//DEVELOPER//
Later, during the day you will discuss with your coworkers who the potential bug may be.
//BUG//
You are the bug.
Select a player's code to infect.
Morning has come, the office awakens.
NAME was fired for buggy code.
The former employee is not allowed to talk until the end of the game.
All players now openly discuss yesterday's events and who might be the bug. Everybody should say their opinion. After the discussion, every player will vote on who they think the bug is. The person with the most votes will be fired.
The voting will begin.
Vote for who you think corrupted the code.
The office has voted, NAME was fired for buggy code. The remaining developers get back to work for the day
The former employee is not allowed to talk until the end of the game.
The office could not agree on who the bug was. No more developers will be fired today
The work day has ended. Developers go home for the night.
The bugs have won!
The company has gone backrupt; bad management may have been a factor.
Congratulations! You have voted out the bug!
You should probably still try to find a different company to work for though. This place seems to have a high turnover rate...


Sign up
Email address or Username
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Client Id
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Redirect Uri
Server
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thDisable
Can be used to "turn off" (disable) Thymol processing of any particular Thymeleaf attribute. This can be very useful when debugging.
thDisable specifies an array of Thymeleaf attribute names that are to be disabled at run-time.
For example, if you don't want to process th:remove attributes define the following:
var thDisable = [ "remove" ];
Or if you wish to turn off template inclusion/substitution/replacement define the following:
var thDisable = [ "include", "substituteby", "replace" ];


Sqor is the next best thing to hanging in a locker room with all your favorite athletes. It gives you insider’s access to the athletes who matter to you. They live on Sqor. And they share exclusive, behind-the-scenes videos and photos, fan Q&A’s, workout tips, and much more. It’s a must for any sports fan.
WHY SQOR?
Get inside their head Find out what Sqor Athletes really think about their performance, competitors, and more. See first-hand the hard work and drive it takes to be a professional athlete with live posts, workout videos, and technique tips.
Life happens off the field Experience the personal side of athletes: how they train, spend their free time, and get involved in their communities.
Ask and you shall receive Comment on athletes’ posts or ask them questions. Athletes will post comments or short videos with their answers.
Games and giveaways Participate in games or enter giveaways to win signed gear and other cool stuff.
A community of fans Hear other Sqor Fans weigh in on today’s hottest sports topics. Share your insights, too!
GETTING STARTED
-Download Sqor for iOS or Android devices or sign up online.
-Set up your profile.
-Choose which athletes, teams, sports, and leagues you want to hear about.
-Get involved. Follow other Sqor fans, post comments and photos, and much more.


HANA Analytics Adapter
Congratulations, you have reached
analytics adapter for SAP HANA extended application services, advanced model.
ServerInfo
HeartBeat
Check that the authenticated user has the proper authorities. [..., haa!t####.Display,...]


Context Scope and Topics Program Invited Speakers Venue Submission Important Dates Program Committee Steering Committee Registration


[1]
SMALL, COMPACT, EASY TO USE, GOOD VIDEO; 1 MEGAPIXAL STILLS, STILL GOOD QUALITY
[2]
Size Hard Disk Remote Control; Power Supply/Charger Burned after two month'sf operation
[3]
image quality; none that i could see


Name
Playerlist
Server IP: <IP_ADDRESS>:0000
Player: 0/0
Player: 0/0
Player: 0/0
Player: 0/0
Player: 0/0
Player: 0/0
No bullying, sexism, racism, homophobia or any other hate-based chatting.

Repeatedly raiding the same tribe ain't allowed.
blockage of caves & obelisks ain't allowed.
Treat others as you'd like to be treated yourself.


|
PMIC
|
Universal Serial Bus Full Speed Device. More...
#include <stm32f103xb.h>
Data Fields | |
| __IO uint16_t | EP0R |
| __IO uint16_t | RESERVED0 |
| __IO uint16_t | EP1R |
| __IO uint16_t | RESERVED1 |
| __IO uint16_t | EP2R |
| __IO uint16_t | RESERVED2 |
| __IO uint16_t | EP3R |
| __IO uint16_t | RESERVED3 |
| __IO uint16_t | EP4R |
| __IO uint16_t | RESERVED4 |
| __IO uint16_t | EP5R |
| __IO uint16_t | RESERVED5 |
| __IO uint16_t | EP6R |
| __IO uint16_t | RESERVED6 |
| __IO uint16_t | EP7R |
| __IO uint16_t | RESERVED7 [17] |
| __IO uint16_t | CNTR |
| __IO uint16_t | RESERVED8 |
| __IO uint16_t | ISTR |
| __IO uint16_t | RESERVED9 |
| __IO uint16_t | FNR |
| __IO uint16_t | RESERVEDA |
| __IO uint16_t | DADDR |
| __IO uint16_t | RESERVEDB |
| __IO uint16_t | BTABLE |
| __IO uint16_t | RESERVEDC |
Universal Serial Bus Full Speed Device.
| __IO uint16_t BTABLE |
Buffer Table address register, Address offset: 0x50
| __IO uint16_t CNTR |
Control register, Address offset: 0x40
| __IO uint16_t DADDR |
Device address register, Address offset: 0x4C
| __IO uint16_t EP0R |
USB Endpoint 0 register, Address offset: 0x00
| __IO uint16_t EP1R |
USB Endpoint 1 register, Address offset: 0x04
| __IO uint16_t EP2R |
USB Endpoint 2 register, Address offset: 0x08
| __IO uint16_t EP3R |
USB Endpoint 3 register, Address offset: 0x0C
| __IO uint16_t EP4R |
USB Endpoint 4 register, Address offset: 0x10
| __IO uint16_t EP5R |
USB Endpoint 5 register, Address offset: 0x14
| __IO uint16_t EP6R |
USB Endpoint 6 register, Address offset: 0x18
| __IO uint16_t EP7R |
USB Endpoint 7 register, Address offset: 0x1C
| __IO uint16_t FNR |
Frame number register, Address offset: 0x48
| __IO uint16_t ISTR |
Interrupt status register, Address offset: 0x44
| __IO uint16_t RESERVED0 |
Reserved
| __IO uint16_t RESERVED1 |
Reserved
| __IO uint16_t RESERVED2 |
Reserved
| __IO uint16_t RESERVED3 |
Reserved
| __IO uint16_t RESERVED4 |
Reserved
| __IO uint16_t RESERVED5 |
Reserved
| __IO uint16_t RESERVED6 |
Reserved
| __IO uint16_t RESERVED7[17] |
Reserved
| __IO uint16_t RESERVED8 |
Reserved
| __IO uint16_t RESERVED9 |
Reserved
| __IO uint16_t RESERVEDA |
Reserved
| __IO uint16_t RESERVEDB |
Reserved
| __IO uint16_t RESERVEDC |
Reserved