Opinion
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
FRANCISCO
JIMENEZ RECIO
and
ADRIAN LOPEZ-MEZA
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
We here consider the validity of a Ninth Circuit rule that a conspiracy ends automatically when the object of the conspiracy becomes impossible to achievewhen, for example, the Government frustrates a drug conspiracys objective by seizing the drugs that its members have agreed to distribute. In our view, conspiracy law does not contain any such automatic termination rule.
I
In United States v. Cruz , 127 F. 3d 791, 795 (CA9 1997), the Ninth Circuit, following the language of an earlier case, United States v. Castro, 972 F. 2d 1107, 1112 (CA9 1992), wrote that a conspiracy terminates when there is affirmative evidence of abandonment, withdrawal, disavowal or defeat of the object of the conspiracy (emphasis added). It considered the conviction of an individual who, the Government had charged, joined a conspiracy (to distribute drugs) after the Government had seized the drugs in question. The Circuit found that the Governments seizure of the drugs guaranteed the defeat of the conspiracys objective, namely, drug distribution. The Circuit held that the conspiracy had terminated with that defeat, i.e., when the Government seized the drugs. Hence the individual, who had joined the conspiracy after that point, could not be convicted as a conspiracy member.
In this case the lower courts applied the Cruz rule to similar facts: On November 18, 1997, police stopped a truck in Nevada. They found, and seized, a large stash of illegal drugs. With the help of the trucks two drivers, they set up a sting. The Government took the truck to the drivers destination, a mall in Idaho. The drivers paged a contact and described the trucks location. The contact said that he would call someone to get the truck. And three hours later, the two defendants, Francisco Jimenez Recio and Adrian Lopez-Meza, appeared in a car. Jimenez Recio drove away in the truck; Lopez-Meza drove the car away in a similar direction. Police stopped both vehicles and arrested both men.
A federal grand jury indicted Jimenez Recio, Lopez-Meza, and the two original truck drivers, charging them with having conspired, together and with others, to possess and to distribute unlawful drugs. A jury convicted all four. But the trial judge then decided that the jury instructions had been erroneous in respect to Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza. The judge noted that the Ninth Circuit, in Cruz , had held that the Government could not prosecute drug conspiracy defendants unless they had joined the conspiracy before the Government seized the drugs. See Cruz , supra , at 795796. That holding, as applied here, meant that the jury could not convict Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza unless the jury believed they had joined the conspiracy before the Nevada police stopped the truck and seized the drugs. The judge ordered a new trial where the jury would be instructed to that effect. The new jury convicted the two men once again.
Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza appealed. They pointed out that, given Cruz , the jury had to find that they had joined the conspiracy before the Nevada stop, and they claimed that the evidence was insufficient at both trials to warrant any such jury finding. The Ninth Circuit panel, by a vote of 2 to 1, agreed. All three panel members accepted Cruz as binding law. Two members concluded that the evidence presented at the second trial was not sufficient to show that the defendants had joined the conspiracy before the Nevada drug seizure. One of the two wrote that the evidence at the first trial was not sufficient either, a circumstance she believed independently warranted reversal. The third member, dissenting, believed that the evidence at both trials adequately demonstrated preseizure membership. He added that he, like the other panel members, was bound by Cruz , but he wrote that in his view Cruz was totally inconsistent with long established and appropriate principles of the law of conspiracy, and he urged the Circuit to overrule it en banc at the earliest opportunity. 258 F. 3d 1069, 1079, n. 2 (opinion of Gould, J.).
The Government sought certiorari. It noted that the Ninth Circuits holding in this case was premised upon the legal rule enunciated in Cruz. And it asked us to decide the rules validity, i.e., to decide whether a conspiracy ends as a matter of law when the government frustrates its objective. Pet. for Cert. I. We agreed to consider that question.
II
In Cruz , the Ninth Circuit held that a conspiracy continues until there is affirmative evidence of abandonment, withdrawal, disavowal or defeat of the object of the conspiracy. 127 F. 3d, at 795 (quoting Castro , supra , at 1112). The critical portion of this statement is the last segment, that a conspiracy ends once there has been defeat of [its] object. The Circuits holdings make clear that the phrase means that the conspiracy ends through defeat when the Government intervenes, making the conspiracys goals impossible to achieve, even if the conspirators do not know that the Government has intervened and are totally unaware that the conspiracy is bound to fail. In our view, this statement of the law is incorrect. A conspiracy does not automatically terminate simply because the Government, unbeknownst to some of the conspirators, has defeat[ed] the conspiracys object.
Two basic considerations convince us that this is the proper view of the law. First, the Ninth Circuits rule is inconsistent with our own understanding of basic conspiracy law.  Iannelli v. United States, 420 U. S. 770, 777 (1975) ; see United States v. Shabani , 513 U. S. 10, 16 (1994) ; Braverman v. United States , 317 U. S. 49, 53 (1942) . That agreement is a distinct evil, which may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensues. Salinas v. United States , 522 U. S. 52, 65 (1997) . The conspiracy poses a threat to the public over and above the threat of the commission of the relevant substantive crimeboth because the [c]ombination in crime makes more likely the commission of [other] crimes and because it decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality. Callanan v. United States , 364 U. S. 587, 593594 (1961) ; see also United States v. Rabinowich , 238 U. S. 78, 88 (1915) (conspiracy sometimes quite outweigh[s], in injury to the public, the mere commission of the contemplated crime). Where police have frustrated a conspiracys specific objective but conspirators (unaware of that fact) have neither abandoned the conspiracy nor withdrawn, these special conspiracy-related dangers remain. Cf. 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §6.5, p. 85 (1986) ([i]mpossibility does not terminate conspiracy because criminal combinations are dangerous apart from the danger of attaining the particular objective).  That being so, the Governments defeat of the conspiracys objective will not necessarily and automatically terminate the conspiracy.
Second, the view we endorse today is the view of almost all courts and commentators but for the Ninth Circuit. No other Federal Court of Appeals has adopted the Ninth Circuits rule. Three have explicitly rejected it. In United States v. Wallace , 85 F. 3d 1063, 1068 (CA2 1996), for example, the court said that the fact that a conspiracy cannot actually be realized because of facts unknown to the conspirators is irrelevant. See also United States v. Belardo-Quiñones , 71 F. 3d 941, 944 (CA1 1995) (conspiracy exists even if, unbeknownst to conspirators, crime is impossible to commit); United States v. LaBudda , 882 F. 2d 244, 248 (CA7 1989) (defendants can be found guilty of conspiracy even if conspiracys object is unattainable from the very beginning). One treatise, after surveying lower court conspiracy decisions, has concluded that [i]mpossibility of success is not a defense. 2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §6.5, at 85; see also id ., §6.5(b), at 9093. And the American Law Institutes Model Penal Code §5.03, p. 384 (1985), would find that a conspiracy terminates when the crime or crimes that are its object are committed or when the relevant agreement … is abandoned. It would not find impossibility a basis for termination.
The Cruz majority argued that the more traditional termination rule threatened endless potential liability. To illustrate the point, the majority posited a sting in which police instructed an arrested conspirator to go through the telephone directory … [and] call all of his acquaintances to come and help him, with the Government obtaining convictions of those who did so. 127 F. 3d, at 795, n. 3. The problem with this example, however, is that, even though it is not necessarily an example of entrapment itself, it draws its persuasive force from the fact that it bears certain resemblances to entrapment. The law independently forbids convictions that rest upon entrapment. See Jacobson v. United States , 503 U. S. 540, 548549 (1992) ; Sorrells v. United States , 287 U. S. 435, 442445 (1932) . And the example fails to explain why a different branch of the law, conspiracy law, should be modified to forbid entrapment-like behavior that falls outside the bounds of current entrapment law. Cf. United States v. Russell , 411 U. S. 423, 435 (1973) (defense of entrapment … not intended to give the federal judiciary … veto over disapproved law enforcement practices). At the same time, the Cruz rule would reach well beyond arguable police misbehavior, potentially threatening the use of properly run law enforcement sting operations. See Lewis v. United States , 385 U. S. 206, 208209 (1966) (Government may use decoys and conceal agents identity); see also M. Lyman, Criminal Investigation 484485 (2d ed. 1999) (explaining the importance of undercover operations in enforcing drug laws).
In tracing the origins of the statement of conspiracy law upon which the Cruz panel relied, we have found a 1982 Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Bloch , 696 F. 2d 1213, in which the court, referring to an earlier case, United States v. Krasn , 614 F. 2d 1229 (CA9 1980), changed the language of the traditional conspiracy termination rule. Krasn said that a conspiracy is presumed to continue unless there is affirmative evidence that the defendant abandoned, withdrew from, or disavowed the conspiracy or defeated its purpose.<fs fs="5"> <fs fs="11"> Id., at 1236 (emphasis added). The Bloch panel changed the grammatical structure. It said that a conspiracy is presumed to continue until there is … defeat of the purposes of the conspiracy. 696 F. 2d, at 1215 (emphasis added). Later Ninth Circuit cases apparently read the change to mean that a conspiracy terminates, not only when the defendant defeats its objective, but also when someone else defeats that objective, perhaps the police. In Castro, the panel followed Bloch. 972 F. 2d, at 1112. In Cruz, the panel quoted Castro. This history may help to explain the origin of the Cruz rule. But, since the Circuits earlier cases nowhere give any reason for the critical change of language, they cannot help to justify it.
III
We conclude that the Ninth Circuits conspiracy-termination law holding set forth in Cruz is erroneous in the manner discussed. We reverse the present judgment insofar as it relies upon that holding. Because Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza have raised other arguments not here considered, we remand the case, specifying that the Court of Appeals may consider those arguments, if they were properly raised.
The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Opinion
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
FRANCISCO
JIMENEZ RECIO
and
ADRIAN LOPEZ-MEZA
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
We here consider the validity of a Ninth Circuit rule that a conspiracy ends automatically when the object of the conspiracy becomes impossible to achievewhen, for example, the Government frustrates a drug conspiracys objective by seizing the drugs that its members have agreed to distribute. In our view, conspiracy law does not contain any such automatic termination rule.
I
In United States v. Cruz , 127 F. 3d 791, 795 (CA9 1997), the Ninth Circuit, following the language of an earlier case, United States v. Castro, 972 F. 2d 1107, 1112 (CA9 1992), wrote that a conspiracy terminates when there is affirmative evidence of abandonment, withdrawal, disavowal or defeat of the object of the conspiracy (emphasis added). It considered the conviction of an individual who, the Government had charged, joined a conspiracy (to distribute drugs) after the Government had seized the drugs in question. The Circuit found that the Governments seizure of the drugs guaranteed the defeat of the conspiracys objective, namely, drug distribution. The Circuit held that the conspiracy had terminated with that defeat, i.e., when the Government seized the drugs. Hence the individual, who had joined the conspiracy after that point, could not be convicted as a conspiracy member.
In this case the lower courts applied the Cruz rule to similar facts: On November 18, 1997, police stopped a truck in Nevada. They found, and seized, a large stash of illegal drugs. With the help of the trucks two drivers, they set up a sting. The Government took the truck to the drivers destination, a mall in Idaho. The drivers paged a contact and described the trucks location. The contact said that he would call someone to get the truck. And three hours later, the two defendants, Francisco Jimenez Recio and Adrian Lopez-Meza, appeared in a car. Jimenez Recio drove away in the truck; Lopez-Meza drove the car away in a similar direction. Police stopped both vehicles and arrested both men.
A federal grand jury indicted Jimenez Recio, Lopez-Meza, and the two original truck drivers, charging them with having conspired, together and with others, to possess and to distribute unlawful drugs. A jury convicted all four. But the trial judge then decided that the jury instructions had been erroneous in respect to Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza. The judge noted that the Ninth Circuit, in Cruz , had held that the Government could not prosecute drug conspiracy defendants unless they had joined the conspiracy before the Government seized the drugs. See Cruz , supra , at 795796. That holding, as applied here, meant that the jury could not convict Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza unless the jury believed they had joined the conspiracy before the Nevada police stopped the truck and seized the drugs. The judge ordered a new trial where the jury would be instructed to that effect. The new jury convicted the two men once again.
Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza appealed. They pointed out that, given Cruz , the jury had to find that they had joined the conspiracy before the Nevada stop, and they claimed that the evidence was insufficient at both trials to warrant any such jury finding. The Ninth Circuit panel, by a vote of 2 to 1, agreed. All three panel members accepted Cruz as binding law. Two members concluded that the evidence presented at the second trial was not sufficient to show that the defendants had joined the conspiracy before the Nevada drug seizure. One of the two wrote that the evidence at the first trial was not sufficient either, a circumstance she believed independently warranted reversal. The third member, dissenting, believed that the evidence at both trials adequately demonstrated preseizure membership. He added that he, like the other panel members, was bound by Cruz , but he wrote that in his view Cruz was totally inconsistent with long established and appropriate principles of the law of conspiracy, and he urged the Circuit to overrule it en banc at the earliest opportunity. 258 F. 3d 1069, 1079, n. 2 (opinion of Gould, J.).
The Government sought certiorari. It noted that the Ninth Circuits holding in this case was premised upon the legal rule enunciated in Cruz. And it asked us to decide the rules validity, i.e., to decide whether a conspiracy ends as a matter of law when the government frustrates its objective. Pet. for Cert. I. We agreed to consider that question.
II
In Cruz , the Ninth Circuit held that a conspiracy continues until there is affirmative evidence of abandonment, withdrawal, disavowal or defeat of the object of the conspiracy. 127 F. 3d, at 795 (quoting Castro , supra , at 1112). The critical portion of this statement is the last segment, that a conspiracy ends once there has been defeat of [its] object. The Circuits holdings make clear that the phrase means that the conspiracy ends through defeat when the Government intervenes, making the conspiracys goals impossible to achieve, even if the conspirators do not know that the Government has intervened and are totally unaware that the conspiracy is bound to fail. In our view, this statement of the law is incorrect. A conspiracy does not automatically terminate simply because the Government, unbeknownst to some of the conspirators, has defeat[ed] the conspiracys object.
Two basic considerations convince us that this is the proper view of the law. First, the Ninth Circuits rule is inconsistent with our own understanding of basic conspiracy law.  Iannelli v. United States, 420 U. S. 770, 777 (1975) ; see United States v. Shabani , 513 U. S. 10, 16 (1994) ; Braverman v. United States , 317 U. S. 49, 53 (1942) . That agreement is a distinct evil, which may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensues. Salinas v. United States , 522 U. S. 52, 65 (1997) . The conspiracy poses a threat to the public over and above the threat of the commission of the relevant substantive crimeboth because the [c]ombination in crime makes more likely the commission of [other] crimes and because it decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality. Callanan v. United States , 364 U. S. 587, 593594 (1961) ; see also United States v. Rabinowich , 238 U. S. 78, 88 (1915) (conspiracy sometimes quite outweigh[s], in injury to the public, the mere commission of the contemplated crime). Where police have frustrated a conspiracys specific objective but conspirators (unaware of that fact) have neither abandoned the conspiracy nor withdrawn, these special conspiracy-related dangers remain. Cf. 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §6.5, p. 85 (1986) ([i]mpossibility does not terminate conspiracy because criminal combinations are dangerous apart from the danger of attaining the particular objective).  That being so, the Governments defeat of the conspiracys objective will not necessarily and automatically terminate the conspiracy.
Second, the view we endorse today is the view of almost all courts and commentators but for the Ninth Circuit. No other Federal Court of Appeals has adopted the Ninth Circuits rule. Three have explicitly rejected it. In United States v. Wallace , 85 F. 3d 1063, 1068 (CA2 1996), for example, the court said that the fact that a conspiracy cannot actually be realized because of facts unknown to the conspirators is irrelevant. See also United States v. Belardo-Quiñones , 71 F. 3d 941, 944 (CA1 1995) (conspiracy exists even if, unbeknownst to conspirators, crime is impossible to commit); United States v. LaBudda , 882 F. 2d 244, 248 (CA7 1989) (defendants can be found guilty of conspiracy even if conspiracys object is unattainable from the very beginning). One treatise, after surveying lower court conspiracy decisions, has concluded that [i]mpossibility of success is not a defense. 2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §6.5, at 85; see also id ., §6.5(b), at 9093. And the American Law Institutes Model Penal Code §5.03, p. 384 (1985), would find that a conspiracy terminates when the crime or crimes that are its object are committed or when the relevant agreement … is abandoned. It would not find impossibility a basis for termination.
The Cruz majority argued that the more traditional termination rule threatened endless potential liability. To illustrate the point, the majority posited a sting in which police instructed an arrested conspirator to go through the telephone directory … [and] call all of his acquaintances to come and help him, with the Government obtaining convictions of those who did so. 127 F. 3d, at 795, n. 3. The problem with this example, however, is that, even though it is not necessarily an example of entrapment itself, it draws its persuasive force from the fact that it bears certain resemblances to entrapment. The law independently forbids convictions that rest upon entrapment. See Jacobson v. United States , 503 U. S. 540, 548549 (1992) ; Sorrells v. United States , 287 U. S. 435, 442445 (1932) . And the example fails to explain why a different branch of the law, conspiracy law, should be modified to forbid entrapment-like behavior that falls outside the bounds of current entrapment law. Cf. United States v. Russell , 411 U. S. 423, 435 (1973) (defense of entrapment … not intended to give the federal judiciary … veto over disapproved law enforcement practices). At the same time, the Cruz rule would reach well beyond arguable police misbehavior, potentially threatening the use of properly run law enforcement sting operations. See Lewis v. United States , 385 U. S. 206, 208209 (1966) (Government may use decoys and conceal agents identity); see also M. Lyman, Criminal Investigation 484485 (2d ed. 1999) (explaining the importance of undercover operations in enforcing drug laws).
In tracing the origins of the statement of conspiracy law upon which the Cruz panel relied, we have found a 1982 Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Bloch , 696 F. 2d 1213, in which the court, referring to an earlier case, United States v. Krasn , 614 F. 2d 1229 (CA9 1980), changed the language of the traditional conspiracy termination rule. Krasn said that a conspiracy is presumed to continue unless there is affirmative evidence that the defendant abandoned, withdrew from, or disavowed the conspiracy or defeated its purpose.<fs fs="5"> <fs fs="11"> Id., at 1236 (emphasis added). The Bloch panel changed the grammatical structure. It said that a conspiracy is presumed to continue until there is … defeat of the purposes of the conspiracy. 696 F. 2d, at 1215 (emphasis added). Later Ninth Circuit cases apparently read the change to mean that a conspiracy terminates, not only when the defendant defeats its objective, but also when someone else defeats that objective, perhaps the police. In Castro, the panel followed Bloch. 972 F. 2d, at 1112. In Cruz, the panel quoted Castro. This history may help to explain the origin of the Cruz rule. But, since the Circuits earlier cases nowhere give any reason for the critical change of language, they cannot help to justify it.
III
We conclude that the Ninth Circuits conspiracy-termination law holding set forth in Cruz is erroneous in the manner discussed. We reverse the present judgment insofar as it relies upon that holding. Because Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza have raised other arguments not here considered, we remand the case, specifying that the Court of Appeals may consider those arguments, if they were properly raised.
The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Opinion
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
FRANCISCO
JIMENEZ RECIO
and
ADRIAN LOPEZ-MEZA
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
We here consider the validity of a Ninth Circuit rule that a conspiracy ends automatically when the object of the conspiracy becomes impossible to achievewhen, for example, the Government frustrates a drug conspiracys objective by seizing the drugs that its members have agreed to distribute. In our view, conspiracy law does not contain any such automatic termination rule.
I
In United States v. Cruz , 127 F. 3d 791, 795 (CA9 1997), the Ninth Circuit, following the language of an earlier case, United States v. Castro, 972 F. 2d 1107, 1112 (CA9 1992), wrote that a conspiracy terminates when there is affirmative evidence of abandonment, withdrawal, disavowal or defeat of the object of the conspiracy (emphasis added). It considered the conviction of an individual who, the Government had charged, joined a conspiracy (to distribute drugs) after the Government had seized the drugs in question. The Circuit found that the Governments seizure of the drugs guaranteed the defeat of the conspiracys objective, namely, drug distribution. The Circuit held that the conspiracy had terminated with that defeat, i.e., when the Government seized the drugs. Hence the individual, who had joined the conspiracy after that point, could not be convicted as a conspiracy member.
In this case the lower courts applied the Cruz rule to similar facts: On November 18, 1997, police stopped a truck in Nevada. They found, and seized, a large stash of illegal drugs. With the help of the trucks two drivers, they set up a sting. The Government took the truck to the drivers destination, a mall in Idaho. The drivers paged a contact and described the trucks location. The contact said that he would call someone to get the truck. And three hours later, the two defendants, Francisco Jimenez Recio and Adrian Lopez-Meza, appeared in a car. Jimenez Recio drove away in the truck; Lopez-Meza drove the car away in a similar direction. Police stopped both vehicles and arrested both men.
A federal grand jury indicted Jimenez Recio, Lopez-Meza, and the two original truck drivers, charging them with having conspired, together and with others, to possess and to distribute unlawful drugs. A jury convicted all four. But the trial judge then decided that the jury instructions had been erroneous in respect to Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza. The judge noted that the Ninth Circuit, in Cruz , had held that the Government could not prosecute drug conspiracy defendants unless they had joined the conspiracy before the Government seized the drugs. See Cruz , supra , at 795796. That holding, as applied here, meant that the jury could not convict Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza unless the jury believed they had joined the conspiracy before the Nevada police stopped the truck and seized the drugs. The judge ordered a new trial where the jury would be instructed to that effect. The new jury convicted the two men once again.
Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza appealed. They pointed out that, given Cruz , the jury had to find that they had joined the conspiracy before the Nevada stop, and they claimed that the evidence was insufficient at both trials to warrant any such jury finding. The Ninth Circuit panel, by a vote of 2 to 1, agreed. All three panel members accepted Cruz as binding law. Two members concluded that the evidence presented at the second trial was not sufficient to show that the defendants had joined the conspiracy before the Nevada drug seizure. One of the two wrote that the evidence at the first trial was not sufficient either, a circumstance she believed independently warranted reversal. The third member, dissenting, believed that the evidence at both trials adequately demonstrated preseizure membership. He added that he, like the other panel members, was bound by Cruz , but he wrote that in his view Cruz was totally inconsistent with long established and appropriate principles of the law of conspiracy, and he urged the Circuit to overrule it en banc at the earliest opportunity. 258 F. 3d 1069, 1079, n. 2 (opinion of Gould, J.).
The Government sought certiorari. It noted that the Ninth Circuits holding in this case was premised upon the legal rule enunciated in Cruz. And it asked us to decide the rules validity, i.e., to decide whether a conspiracy ends as a matter of law when the government frustrates its objective. Pet. for Cert. I. We agreed to consider that question.
II
In Cruz , the Ninth Circuit held that a conspiracy continues until there is affirmative evidence of abandonment, withdrawal, disavowal or defeat of the object of the conspiracy. 127 F. 3d, at 795 (quoting Castro , supra , at 1112). The critical portion of this statement is the last segment, that a conspiracy ends once there has been defeat of [its] object. The Circuits holdings make clear that the phrase means that the conspiracy ends through defeat when the Government intervenes, making the conspiracys goals impossible to achieve, even if the conspirators do not know that the Government has intervened and are totally unaware that the conspiracy is bound to fail. In our view, this statement of the law is incorrect. A conspiracy does not automatically terminate simply because the Government, unbeknownst to some of the conspirators, has defeat[ed] the conspiracys object.
Two basic considerations convince us that this is the proper view of the law. First, the Ninth Circuits rule is inconsistent with our own understanding of basic conspiracy law.  Iannelli v. United States, 420 U. S. 770, 777 (1975) ; see United States v. Shabani , 513 U. S. 10, 16 (1994) ; Braverman v. United States , 317 U. S. 49, 53 (1942) . That agreement is a distinct evil, which may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensues. Salinas v. United States , 522 U. S. 52, 65 (1997) . The conspiracy poses a threat to the public over and above the threat of the commission of the relevant substantive crimeboth because the [c]ombination in crime makes more likely the commission of [other] crimes and because it decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality. Callanan v. United States , 364 U. S. 587, 593594 (1961) ; see also United States v. Rabinowich , 238 U. S. 78, 88 (1915) (conspiracy sometimes quite outweigh[s], in injury to the public, the mere commission of the contemplated crime). Where police have frustrated a conspiracys specific objective but conspirators (unaware of that fact) have neither abandoned the conspiracy nor withdrawn, these special conspiracy-related dangers remain. Cf. 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §6.5, p. 85 (1986) ([i]mpossibility does not terminate conspiracy because criminal combinations are dangerous apart from the danger of attaining the particular objective).  That being so, the Governments defeat of the conspiracys objective will not necessarily and automatically terminate the conspiracy.
Second, the view we endorse today is the view of almost all courts and commentators but for the Ninth Circuit. No other Federal Court of Appeals has adopted the Ninth Circuits rule. Three have explicitly rejected it. In United States v. Wallace , 85 F. 3d 1063, 1068 (CA2 1996), for example, the court said that the fact that a conspiracy cannot actually be realized because of facts unknown to the conspirators is irrelevant. See also United States v. Belardo-Quiñones , 71 F. 3d 941, 944 (CA1 1995) (conspiracy exists even if, unbeknownst to conspirators, crime is impossible to commit); United States v. LaBudda , 882 F. 2d 244, 248 (CA7 1989) (defendants can be found guilty of conspiracy even if conspiracys object is unattainable from the very beginning). One treatise, after surveying lower court conspiracy decisions, has concluded that [i]mpossibility of success is not a defense. 2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §6.5, at 85; see also id ., §6.5(b), at 9093. And the American Law Institutes Model Penal Code §5.03, p. 384 (1985), would find that a conspiracy terminates when the crime or crimes that are its object are committed or when the relevant agreement … is abandoned. It would not find impossibility a basis for termination.
The Cruz majority argued that the more traditional termination rule threatened endless potential liability. To illustrate the point, the majority posited a sting in which police instructed an arrested conspirator to go through the telephone directory … [and] call all of his acquaintances to come and help him, with the Government obtaining convictions of those who did so. 127 F. 3d, at 795, n. 3. The problem with this example, however, is that, even though it is not necessarily an example of entrapment itself, it draws its persuasive force from the fact that it bears certain resemblances to entrapment. The law independently forbids convictions that rest upon entrapment. See Jacobson v. United States , 503 U. S. 540, 548549 (1992) ; Sorrells v. United States , 287 U. S. 435, 442445 (1932) . And the example fails to explain why a different branch of the law, conspiracy law, should be modified to forbid entrapment-like behavior that falls outside the bounds of current entrapment law. Cf. United States v. Russell , 411 U. S. 423, 435 (1973) (defense of entrapment … not intended to give the federal judiciary … veto over disapproved law enforcement practices). At the same time, the Cruz rule would reach well beyond arguable police misbehavior, potentially threatening the use of properly run law enforcement sting operations. See Lewis v. United States , 385 U. S. 206, 208209 (1966) (Government may use decoys and conceal agents identity); see also M. Lyman, Criminal Investigation 484485 (2d ed. 1999) (explaining the importance of undercover operations in enforcing drug laws).
In tracing the origins of the statement of conspiracy law upon which the Cruz panel relied, we have found a 1982 Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Bloch , 696 F. 2d 1213, in which the court, referring to an earlier case, United States v. Krasn , 614 F. 2d 1229 (CA9 1980), changed the language of the traditional conspiracy termination rule. Krasn said that a conspiracy is presumed to continue unless there is affirmative evidence that the defendant abandoned, withdrew from, or disavowed the conspiracy or defeated its purpose.<fs fs="5"> <fs fs="11"> Id., at 1236 (emphasis added). The Bloch panel changed the grammatical structure. It said that a conspiracy is presumed to continue until there is … defeat of the purposes of the conspiracy. 696 F. 2d, at 1215 (emphasis added). Later Ninth Circuit cases apparently read the change to mean that a conspiracy terminates, not only when the defendant defeats its objective, but also when someone else defeats that objective, perhaps the police. In Castro, the panel followed Bloch. 972 F. 2d, at 1112. In Cruz, the panel quoted Castro. This history may help to explain the origin of the Cruz rule. But, since the Circuits earlier cases nowhere give any reason for the critical change of language, they cannot help to justify it.
III
We conclude that the Ninth Circuits conspiracy-termination law holding set forth in Cruz is erroneous in the manner discussed. We reverse the present judgment insofar as it relies upon that holding. Because Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza have raised other arguments not here considered, we remand the case, specifying that the Court of Appeals may consider those arguments, if they were properly raised.
The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Opinion
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
FRANCISCO
JIMENEZ RECIO
and
ADRIAN LOPEZ-MEZA
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
We here consider the validity of a Ninth Circuit rule that a conspiracy ends automatically when the object of the conspiracy becomes impossible to achievewhen, for example, the Government frustrates a drug conspiracys objective by seizing the drugs that its members have agreed to distribute. In our view, conspiracy law does not contain any such automatic termination rule.
I
In United States v. Cruz , 127 F. 3d 791, 795 (CA9 1997), the Ninth Circuit, following the language of an earlier case, United States v. Castro, 972 F. 2d 1107, 1112 (CA9 1992), wrote that a conspiracy terminates when there is affirmative evidence of abandonment, withdrawal, disavowal or defeat of the object of the conspiracy (emphasis added). It considered the conviction of an individual who, the Government had charged, joined a conspiracy (to distribute drugs) after the Government had seized the drugs in question. The Circuit found that the Governments seizure of the drugs guaranteed the defeat of the conspiracys objective, namely, drug distribution. The Circuit held that the conspiracy had terminated with that defeat, i.e., when the Government seized the drugs. Hence the individual, who had joined the conspiracy after that point, could not be convicted as a conspiracy member.
In this case the lower courts applied the Cruz rule to similar facts: On November 18, 1997, police stopped a truck in Nevada. They found, and seized, a large stash of illegal drugs. With the help of the trucks two drivers, they set up a sting. The Government took the truck to the drivers destination, a mall in Idaho. The drivers paged a contact and described the trucks location. The contact said that he would call someone to get the truck. And three hours later, the two defendants, Francisco Jimenez Recio and Adrian Lopez-Meza, appeared in a car. Jimenez Recio drove away in the truck; Lopez-Meza drove the car away in a similar direction. Police stopped both vehicles and arrested both men.
A federal grand jury indicted Jimenez Recio, Lopez-Meza, and the two original truck drivers, charging them with having conspired, together and with others, to possess and to distribute unlawful drugs. A jury convicted all four. But the trial judge then decided that the jury instructions had been erroneous in respect to Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza. The judge noted that the Ninth Circuit, in Cruz , had held that the Government could not prosecute drug conspiracy defendants unless they had joined the conspiracy before the Government seized the drugs. See Cruz , supra , at 795796. That holding, as applied here, meant that the jury could not convict Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza unless the jury believed they had joined the conspiracy before the Nevada police stopped the truck and seized the drugs. The judge ordered a new trial where the jury would be instructed to that effect. The new jury convicted the two men once again.
Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza appealed. They pointed out that, given Cruz , the jury had to find that they had joined the conspiracy before the Nevada stop, and they claimed that the evidence was insufficient at both trials to warrant any such jury finding. The Ninth Circuit panel, by a vote of 2 to 1, agreed. All three panel members accepted Cruz as binding law. Two members concluded that the evidence presented at the second trial was not sufficient to show that the defendants had joined the conspiracy before the Nevada drug seizure. One of the two wrote that the evidence at the first trial was not sufficient either, a circumstance she believed independently warranted reversal. The third member, dissenting, believed that the evidence at both trials adequately demonstrated preseizure membership. He added that he, like the other panel members, was bound by Cruz , but he wrote that in his view Cruz was totally inconsistent with long established and appropriate principles of the law of conspiracy, and he urged the Circuit to overrule it en banc at the earliest opportunity. 258 F. 3d 1069, 1079, n. 2 (opinion of Gould, J.).
The Government sought certiorari. It noted that the Ninth Circuits holding in this case was premised upon the legal rule enunciated in Cruz. And it asked us to decide the rules validity, i.e., to decide whether a conspiracy ends as a matter of law when the government frustrates its objective. Pet. for Cert. I. We agreed to consider that question.
II
In Cruz , the Ninth Circuit held that a conspiracy continues until there is affirmative evidence of abandonment, withdrawal, disavowal or defeat of the object of the conspiracy. 127 F. 3d, at 795 (quoting Castro , supra , at 1112). The critical portion of this statement is the last segment, that a conspiracy ends once there has been defeat of [its] object. The Circuits holdings make clear that the phrase means that the conspiracy ends through defeat when the Government intervenes, making the conspiracys goals impossible to achieve, even if the conspirators do not know that the Government has intervened and are totally unaware that the conspiracy is bound to fail. In our view, this statement of the law is incorrect. A conspiracy does not automatically terminate simply because the Government, unbeknownst to some of the conspirators, has defeat[ed] the conspiracys object.
Two basic considerations convince us that this is the proper view of the law. First, the Ninth Circuits rule is inconsistent with our own understanding of basic conspiracy law.  Iannelli v. United States, 420 U. S. 770, 777 (1975) ; see United States v. Shabani , 513 U. S. 10, 16 (1994) ; Braverman v. United States , 317 U. S. 49, 53 (1942) . That agreement is a distinct evil, which may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensues. Salinas v. United States , 522 U. S. 52, 65 (1997) . The conspiracy poses a threat to the public over and above the threat of the commission of the relevant substantive crimeboth because the [c]ombination in crime makes more likely the commission of [other] crimes and because it decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality. Callanan v. United States , 364 U. S. 587, 593594 (1961) ; see also United States v. Rabinowich , 238 U. S. 78, 88 (1915) (conspiracy sometimes quite outweigh[s], in injury to the public, the mere commission of the contemplated crime). Where police have frustrated a conspiracys specific objective but conspirators (unaware of that fact) have neither abandoned the conspiracy nor withdrawn, these special conspiracy-related dangers remain. Cf. 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §6.5, p. 85 (1986) ([i]mpossibility does not terminate conspiracy because criminal combinations are dangerous apart from the danger of attaining the particular objective).  That being so, the Governments defeat of the conspiracys objective will not necessarily and automatically terminate the conspiracy.
Second, the view we endorse today is the view of almost all courts and commentators but for the Ninth Circuit. No other Federal Court of Appeals has adopted the Ninth Circuits rule. Three have explicitly rejected it. In United States v. Wallace , 85 F. 3d 1063, 1068 (CA2 1996), for example, the court said that the fact that a conspiracy cannot actually be realized because of facts unknown to the conspirators is irrelevant. See also United States v. Belardo-Quiñones , 71 F. 3d 941, 944 (CA1 1995) (conspiracy exists even if, unbeknownst to conspirators, crime is impossible to commit); United States v. LaBudda , 882 F. 2d 244, 248 (CA7 1989) (defendants can be found guilty of conspiracy even if conspiracys object is unattainable from the very beginning). One treatise, after surveying lower court conspiracy decisions, has concluded that [i]mpossibility of success is not a defense. 2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §6.5, at 85; see also id ., §6.5(b), at 9093. And the American Law Institutes Model Penal Code §5.03, p. 384 (1985), would find that a conspiracy terminates when the crime or crimes that are its object are committed or when the relevant agreement … is abandoned. It would not find impossibility a basis for termination.
The Cruz majority argued that the more traditional termination rule threatened endless potential liability. To illustrate the point, the majority posited a sting in which police instructed an arrested conspirator to go through the telephone directory … [and] call all of his acquaintances to come and help him, with the Government obtaining convictions of those who did so. 127 F. 3d, at 795, n. 3. The problem with this example, however, is that, even though it is not necessarily an example of entrapment itself, it draws its persuasive force from the fact that it bears certain resemblances to entrapment. The law independently forbids convictions that rest upon entrapment. See Jacobson v. United States , 503 U. S. 540, 548549 (1992) ; Sorrells v. United States , 287 U. S. 435, 442445 (1932) . And the example fails to explain why a different branch of the law, conspiracy law, should be modified to forbid entrapment-like behavior that falls outside the bounds of current entrapment law. Cf. United States v. Russell , 411 U. S. 423, 435 (1973) (defense of entrapment … not intended to give the federal judiciary … veto over disapproved law enforcement practices). At the same time, the Cruz rule would reach well beyond arguable police misbehavior, potentially threatening the use of properly run law enforcement sting operations. See Lewis v. United States , 385 U. S. 206, 208209 (1966) (Government may use decoys and conceal agents identity); see also M. Lyman, Criminal Investigation 484485 (2d ed. 1999) (explaining the importance of undercover operations in enforcing drug laws).
In tracing the origins of the statement of conspiracy law upon which the Cruz panel relied, we have found a 1982 Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Bloch , 696 F. 2d 1213, in which the court, referring to an earlier case, United States v. Krasn , 614 F. 2d 1229 (CA9 1980), changed the language of the traditional conspiracy termination rule. Krasn said that a conspiracy is presumed to continue unless there is affirmative evidence that the defendant abandoned, withdrew from, or disavowed the conspiracy or defeated its purpose.<fs fs="5"> <fs fs="11"> Id., at 1236 (emphasis added). The Bloch panel changed the grammatical structure. It said that a conspiracy is presumed to continue until there is … defeat of the purposes of the conspiracy. 696 F. 2d, at 1215 (emphasis added). Later Ninth Circuit cases apparently read the change to mean that a conspiracy terminates, not only when the defendant defeats its objective, but also when someone else defeats that objective, perhaps the police. In Castro, the panel followed Bloch. 972 F. 2d, at 1112. In Cruz, the panel quoted Castro. This history may help to explain the origin of the Cruz rule. But, since the Circuits earlier cases nowhere give any reason for the critical change of language, they cannot help to justify it.
III
We conclude that the Ninth Circuits conspiracy-termination law holding set forth in Cruz is erroneous in the manner discussed. We reverse the present judgment insofar as it relies upon that holding. Because Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza have raised other arguments not here considered, we remand the case, specifying that the Court of Appeals may consider those arguments, if they were properly raised.
The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Opinion
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
FRANCISCO
JIMENEZ RECIO
and
ADRIAN LOPEZ-MEZA
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
We here consider the validity of a Ninth Circuit rule that a conspiracy ends automatically when the object of the conspiracy becomes impossible to achievewhen, for example, the Government frustrates a drug conspiracys objective by seizing the drugs that its members have agreed to distribute. In our view, conspiracy law does not contain any such automatic termination rule.
I
In United States v. Cruz , 127 F. 3d 791, 795 (CA9 1997), the Ninth Circuit, following the language of an earlier case, United States v. Castro, 972 F. 2d 1107, 1112 (CA9 1992), wrote that a conspiracy terminates when there is affirmative evidence of abandonment, withdrawal, disavowal or defeat of the object of the conspiracy (emphasis added). It considered the conviction of an individual who, the Government had charged, joined a conspiracy (to distribute drugs) after the Government had seized the drugs in question. The Circuit found that the Governments seizure of the drugs guaranteed the defeat of the conspiracys objective, namely, drug distribution. The Circuit held that the conspiracy had terminated with that defeat, i.e., when the Government seized the drugs. Hence the individual, who had joined the conspiracy after that point, could not be convicted as a conspiracy member.
In this case the lower courts applied the Cruz rule to similar facts: On November 18, 1997, police stopped a truck in Nevada. They found, and seized, a large stash of illegal drugs. With the help of the trucks two drivers, they set up a sting. The Government took the truck to the drivers destination, a mall in Idaho. The drivers paged a contact and described the trucks location. The contact said that he would call someone to get the truck. And three hours later, the two defendants, Francisco Jimenez Recio and Adrian Lopez-Meza, appeared in a car. Jimenez Recio drove away in the truck; Lopez-Meza drove the car away in a similar direction. Police stopped both vehicles and arrested both men.
A federal grand jury indicted Jimenez Recio, Lopez-Meza, and the two original truck drivers, charging them with having conspired, together and with others, to possess and to distribute unlawful drugs. A jury convicted all four. But the trial judge then decided that the jury instructions had been erroneous in respect to Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza. The judge noted that the Ninth Circuit, in Cruz , had held that the Government could not prosecute drug conspiracy defendants unless they had joined the conspiracy before the Government seized the drugs. See Cruz , supra , at 795796. That holding, as applied here, meant that the jury could not convict Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza unless the jury believed they had joined the conspiracy before the Nevada police stopped the truck and seized the drugs. The judge ordered a new trial where the jury would be instructed to that effect. The new jury convicted the two men once again.
Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza appealed. They pointed out that, given Cruz , the jury had to find that they had joined the conspiracy before the Nevada stop, and they claimed that the evidence was insufficient at both trials to warrant any such jury finding. The Ninth Circuit panel, by a vote of 2 to 1, agreed. All three panel members accepted Cruz as binding law. Two members concluded that the evidence presented at the second trial was not sufficient to show that the defendants had joined the conspiracy before the Nevada drug seizure. One of the two wrote that the evidence at the first trial was not sufficient either, a circumstance she believed independently warranted reversal. The third member, dissenting, believed that the evidence at both trials adequately demonstrated preseizure membership. He added that he, like the other panel members, was bound by Cruz , but he wrote that in his view Cruz was totally inconsistent with long established and appropriate principles of the law of conspiracy, and he urged the Circuit to overrule it en banc at the earliest opportunity. 258 F. 3d 1069, 1079, n. 2 (opinion of Gould, J.).
The Government sought certiorari. It noted that the Ninth Circuits holding in this case was premised upon the legal rule enunciated in Cruz. And it asked us to decide the rules validity, i.e., to decide whether a conspiracy ends as a matter of law when the government frustrates its objective. Pet. for Cert. I. We agreed to consider that question.
II
In Cruz , the Ninth Circuit held that a conspiracy continues until there is affirmative evidence of abandonment, withdrawal, disavowal or defeat of the object of the conspiracy. 127 F. 3d, at 795 (quoting Castro , supra , at 1112). The critical portion of this statement is the last segment, that a conspiracy ends once there has been defeat of [its] object. The Circuits holdings make clear that the phrase means that the conspiracy ends through defeat when the Government intervenes, making the conspiracys goals impossible to achieve, even if the conspirators do not know that the Government has intervened and are totally unaware that the conspiracy is bound to fail. In our view, this statement of the law is incorrect. A conspiracy does not automatically terminate simply because the Government, unbeknownst to some of the conspirators, has defeat[ed] the conspiracys object.
Two basic considerations convince us that this is the proper view of the law. First, the Ninth Circuits rule is inconsistent with our own understanding of basic conspiracy law.  Iannelli v. United States, 420 U. S. 770, 777 (1975) ; see United States v. Shabani , 513 U. S. 10, 16 (1994) ; Braverman v. United States , 317 U. S. 49, 53 (1942) . That agreement is a distinct evil, which may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensues. Salinas v. United States , 522 U. S. 52, 65 (1997) . The conspiracy poses a threat to the public over and above the threat of the commission of the relevant substantive crimeboth because the [c]ombination in crime makes more likely the commission of [other] crimes and because it decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality. Callanan v. United States , 364 U. S. 587, 593594 (1961) ; see also United States v. Rabinowich , 238 U. S. 78, 88 (1915) (conspiracy sometimes quite outweigh[s], in injury to the public, the mere commission of the contemplated crime). Where police have frustrated a conspiracys specific objective but conspirators (unaware of that fact) have neither abandoned the conspiracy nor withdrawn, these special conspiracy-related dangers remain. Cf. 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §6.5, p. 85 (1986) ([i]mpossibility does not terminate conspiracy because criminal combinations are dangerous apart from the danger of attaining the particular objective).  That being so, the Governments defeat of the conspiracys objective will not necessarily and automatically terminate the conspiracy.
Second, the view we endorse today is the view of almost all courts and commentators but for the Ninth Circuit. No other Federal Court of Appeals has adopted the Ninth Circuits rule. Three have explicitly rejected it. In United States v. Wallace , 85 F. 3d 1063, 1068 (CA2 1996), for example, the court said that the fact that a conspiracy cannot actually be realized because of facts unknown to the conspirators is irrelevant. See also United States v. Belardo-Quiñones , 71 F. 3d 941, 944 (CA1 1995) (conspiracy exists even if, unbeknownst to conspirators, crime is impossible to commit); United States v. LaBudda , 882 F. 2d 244, 248 (CA7 1989) (defendants can be found guilty of conspiracy even if conspiracys object is unattainable from the very beginning). One treatise, after surveying lower court conspiracy decisions, has concluded that [i]mpossibility of success is not a defense. 2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §6.5, at 85; see also id ., §6.5(b), at 9093. And the American Law Institutes Model Penal Code §5.03, p. 384 (1985), would find that a conspiracy terminates when the crime or crimes that are its object are committed or when the relevant agreement … is abandoned. It would not find impossibility a basis for termination.
The Cruz majority argued that the more traditional termination rule threatened endless potential liability. To illustrate the point, the majority posited a sting in which police instructed an arrested conspirator to go through the telephone directory … [and] call all of his acquaintances to come and help him, with the Government obtaining convictions of those who did so. 127 F. 3d, at 795, n. 3. The problem with this example, however, is that, even though it is not necessarily an example of entrapment itself, it draws its persuasive force from the fact that it bears certain resemblances to entrapment. The law independently forbids convictions that rest upon entrapment. See Jacobson v. United States , 503 U. S. 540, 548549 (1992) ; Sorrells v. United States , 287 U. S. 435, 442445 (1932) . And the example fails to explain why a different branch of the law, conspiracy law, should be modified to forbid entrapment-like behavior that falls outside the bounds of current entrapment law. Cf. United States v. Russell , 411 U. S. 423, 435 (1973) (defense of entrapment … not intended to give the federal judiciary … veto over disapproved law enforcement practices). At the same time, the Cruz rule would reach well beyond arguable police misbehavior, potentially threatening the use of properly run law enforcement sting operations. See Lewis v. United States , 385 U. S. 206, 208209 (1966) (Government may use decoys and conceal agents identity); see also M. Lyman, Criminal Investigation 484485 (2d ed. 1999) (explaining the importance of undercover operations in enforcing drug laws).
In tracing the origins of the statement of conspiracy law upon which the Cruz panel relied, we have found a 1982 Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Bloch , 696 F. 2d 1213, in which the court, referring to an earlier case, United States v. Krasn , 614 F. 2d 1229 (CA9 1980), changed the language of the traditional conspiracy termination rule. Krasn said that a conspiracy is presumed to continue unless there is affirmative evidence that the defendant abandoned, withdrew from, or disavowed the conspiracy or defeated its purpose.<fs fs="5"> <fs fs="11"> Id., at 1236 (emphasis added). The Bloch panel changed the grammatical structure. It said that a conspiracy is presumed to continue until there is … defeat of the purposes of the conspiracy. 696 F. 2d, at 1215 (emphasis added). Later Ninth Circuit cases apparently read the change to mean that a conspiracy terminates, not only when the defendant defeats its objective, but also when someone else defeats that objective, perhaps the police. In Castro, the panel followed Bloch. 972 F. 2d, at 1112. In Cruz, the panel quoted Castro. This history may help to explain the origin of the Cruz rule. But, since the Circuits earlier cases nowhere give any reason for the critical change of language, they cannot help to justify it.
III
We conclude that the Ninth Circuits conspiracy-termination law holding set forth in Cruz is erroneous in the manner discussed. We reverse the present judgment insofar as it relies upon that holding. Because Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza have raised other arguments not here considered, we remand the case, specifying that the Court of Appeals may consider those arguments, if they were properly raised.
The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.


Constructor
new PageRank(A:, v:, tol:, d:, maxIt:)
Instantiate a new PageRank object with an adjacency matrix
Parameters:
| Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
A: |
Array.<Array.<Number>> | Adjacency matrix. |
v: |
Array.<Number> | null | Distribution vector (if not specified, uniform over the nodes) |
tol: |
Number | The tolerance threshold for convergence. |
d: |
Number | Damping factor. Probability of transitioning to an adjacent node. |
maxIt: |
Number | Maximum iteration in case the algorithm doesn't converge. |
Members
A :Array.<Array.<Number>>
Adjacency matrix.
Type:
- Array.<Array.<Number>>
a :Array.<Number>
Array with binary dangling nodes vector.
Type:
- Array.<Number>
alpha :Number
Alpha, probability of jumping to random node.
Type:
- Number
d :Number
Damping factor. Probability of transitioning to an adjacent node.
Type:
- Number
H :Array.<Array.<Number>>
Hyperlink matrix containing the weighted links between nodes.
Type:
- Array.<Array.<Number>>
initProb :Number
Initial probability.
Type:
- Number
maxIt :Number
The maximum number of iterations
Type:
- Number
pageCount :Number
Number of pages in the adjacency matrix.
Type:
- Number
result
Contains result of ranking.
tol :Number
The tolerance threshold for convergence.
Type:
- Number
v :Array.<Number>
General distribution vector (uniform over the nodes if not specified).
Type:
- Array.<Number>
Methods
(static) detectDangling(adjacency) → {Array.<Number>}
Detect dangling nodes in the adjacency matrix and return them in an array
where 0 means the node is non-dangling and 1 means the node is dangling.
Parameters:
| Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
adjacency |
Array.<Array.<Number>> | Adjacency matrix |
Returns:
- Type
- Array.<Number>
(static) fromAdjacencyList(v:, tol:, d:, maxIt:)
Create PageRank instance from Adjacency List.
* @param {Array>} adjacencyList: Adjacency List.
Parameters:
| Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
v: |
Array.<Number> | null | Distribution vector (if not specified, uniform over the nodes) |
tol: |
Number | The tolerance threshold for convergence. |
d: |
Number | Damping factor. Probability of transitioning to an adjacent node. |
maxIt: |
Number | Maximum iteration in case the algorithm doesn't converge. |
(static) fromAdjacencyMatrix(adjacency:, v:, tol:, d:, maxIt:)
Create PageRank instance from Adjacency Matrix (same as constructor).
Parameters:
| Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
adjacency: |
Array.<Array.<Number>> | Adjacency matrix. |
v: |
Array.<Number> | null | Distribution vector (if not specified, uniform over the nodes) |
tol: |
Number | The tolerance threshold for convergence. |
d: |
Number | Damping factor. Probability of transitioning to an adjacent node. |
maxIt: |
Number | Maximum iteration in case the algorithm doesn't converge. |
(static) fromEdgeList(edgeList:, v:, tol:, d:, maxIt:)
Create PageRank instance from Edge List.
Edge List ist array of arrays of length two where each inner array defines an edge between two nodes.
e.g. [[0, 1], []]
Parameters:
| Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
edgeList: |
Array.<Array.<Number>> | Edge List from which to build the adjacency matrix |
v: |
Array.<Number> | null | Distribution vector (if not specified, uniform over the nodes) |
tol: |
Number | The tolerance threshold for convergence. |
d: |
Number | Damping factor. Probability of transitioning to an adjacent node. |
maxIt: |
Number | Maximum iteration in case the algorithm doesn't converge. |
(static) getMappedResults(pi, nameMap) → {Object.<string, Number>}
Map the results of a pi vector to the names in a nameMap.
Parameters:
| Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
pi |
Array.<Number> | Results of PageRank |
nameMap |
Object.<string, Number> | Keys are name of node, values are index in pi |
Returns:
keys are name of node, values are ranking
- Type
- Object.<string, Number>
(static) makeMatrixH(adjacency:) → {Array.<Array.<Number>>}
Convert an adjacency matrix into an H (hyperlink) matrix.
Parameters:
| Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
adjacency: |
Array.<Array.<Number>> | The adjacency matrix to convert. |
Returns:
- Type
- Array.<Array.<Number>>
iterate(nameMap) → {Object}
Perform the Power Method iterations of the algorithm.
Parameters:
| Name | Type | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
nameMap |
Object.<string, Number> | null | null | optional. Keys are node names, values are index in adjacency matrix. |
Returns:
- Contains the resulting array, number of iterations, and whether the algorithm converged
- Type
- Object


Contains three main functions (i.e., three pieces of furniture): table1() which produces a well-formatted table of descriptives common as Table 1 in research articles, tableC() which produces a well-formatted table of correlations, tableF() which provides frequency counts, and washer() which is helpful in cleaning up the data. These furniture-themed functions are designed to simplify common tasks in quantitative analysis. Other data summary and cleaning tools are also available.
| Version: | 1.8.7 |
| Depends: | R (≥ 2.10) |
| Imports: | knitr, magrittr, cli, crayon, dplyr, rstudioapi, tibble, forcats |
| Suggests: | pkgload, tidyverse, rmarkdown, testthat, MASS, sjmisc |
| Published: | 2018-11-10 |
| Author: | Tyson S. Barrett [aut, cre], Emily Brignone [aut], Daniel J. Laxman [aut] |
| Maintainer: | Tyson S. Barrett <t.barrett at aggiemail.usu.edu> |
| License: | GPL-3 |
| NeedsCompilation: | no |
| Citation: | furniture citation info |
| Materials: | NEWS |
| CRAN checks: | furniture results |
| Reference manual: | furniture.pdf |
| Vignettes: |
Furniture Table 1 |
| Package source: | furniture_1.8.7.tar.gz |
| Windows binaries: | r-devel: furniture_1.8.7.zip, r-release: furniture_1.8.7.zip, r-oldrel: furniture_1.8.7.zip |
| OS X binaries: | r-release: furniture_1.8.7.tgz, r-oldrel: furniture_1.8.7.tgz |
| Old sources: | furniture archive |
| Reverse suggests: | MarginalMediation |
Please use the canonical form https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=furniture to link to this page.


Country Singer Kane Brown Reveals Plans For Baby Number Two, Reveals Daughter Looks Like Him
November 25, 2019
Country Singer Kane Brown Reveals Plans For Baby Number Two, Reveals Daughter Looks Like Him
Kane Brown and his wife Katelyn Jae recently welcomed their daughter into the world, but the country singer revealed plans for baby number two to Us Weekly at the American Music Awards on Sunday night.
“We thought we were having a boy originally, so now I feel like we’re going to have to have a boy so he can protect her,” Kane explained to the site.
Although they originally thought they were going to have a boy, the couple welcomed their daughter on October 29. Following her birth, they announced her arrival on social media by sharing a photo of the couple holding her. They named her Kingsley Rose Brown.
When it comes to parenting, Kane revealed that he is a “protective dad.”
Since welcoming their daughter, the couple have become closer, the country singer explained to the site. He revealed that he “didn’t think” they could be closer, but that’s what happened after their daughter was born.
“I didn’t think we could be … but we’re just a family now,” the country singer explained.
He said that both he and his wife have their families in different states adding, “So having [our daughter] is kind of like having everybody with us in a weird way.”
Kane also spoke to People on the red carpet, opening up about the upcoming holidays and the fact that his daughter looks so much like him.
“She’s starting to look more like me. I feel bad for my wife. But she has her nose,” he said.
He said that his wife’s family will be there with them to celebrate Thanksgiving. He also told the site that since welcoming his daughter, everything has been “great.” He noted that his Katelyn has been “amazing.”
Recently, Kane shared a photo of himself with his daughter to Instagram, calling her his “little twin.”
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The photo had over 659,000 likes from his more than 2 million followers and plenty of comments from fans and fellow country music stars.
Shay Mooney of the hit country duo Dan and Shay wrote, “LOL the best.”
Kane’s wife also chimed in on the adorable picture and said, ” My whole world in one picture.”
While at the American Music Awards, Kane was nominated for Favorite Male Country Artist. He had some tough competition with Thomas Rhett and Luke Combs also being nominated. Nonetheless, Kane ended up walking away with the award Sunday night.


Package sample
Class AddNewDonationController
java.lang.Object
sample.LogINpanelController
sample.AddNewDonationController
public class AddNewDonationController extends LogINpanelController
This is a Class for handling the adding new donation. This is a Controller
Class that handles the sample.AddNewDonation.fxml. This Adding new donation
is particularly for a feature for the donor class of user. They can add new
donation by providing the necessary information. This fxml file has the
text-fields and the dropdown boxes. They will be able to queue a donation in
the mother list upon filling this form. This particular class extends the
LogINpanelController that was used to handle the sample.LogIN.fxml.
-
Field Summary
Fields inherited from class sample.LogINpanelController
type, user
-
Constructor Summary
Constructors Constructor Description AddNewDonationController()
-
Method Summary
Modifier and Type Method Description boolean
checkAlert()
This functions is for checking all the errors in the add new donations Information.boolean
checkDate()
This methods is here to check the validity of the date of new donation Here the Date of Birth of the User and donation date are fetched from the database and the result set is compared.void
getLoc()
This is a method to get the Locations that are stored in the database.void
initialize()
This is a method without any parameter.void
pressBack(javafx.event.ActionEvent even)
This method is here for the functionality of the "Back" button.void
pressSubmitDonation(javafx.event.ActionEvent even)
This method is here for the functionality of the submit button, A successful submission will record the data into the database.Methods inherited from class sample.LogINpanelController
checkCredentials, getType, getUser, pressLogIN, pressRegister
Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object
equals, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, toString, wait, wait, wait
-
Constructor Details
-
AddNewDonationController
public AddNewDonationController()
-
-
Method Details
-
getLoc
public void getLoc()This is a method to get the Locations that are stored in the database. The methods is interacting with the database with the hardcoded credentials and using an SQL Query to extract the relevant information that are needed Here a catch block is used to handle the exceptions and prevent the program from crashing. These exceptions are caught in the variable e. In case of any exception there is a dialogue box that will appear and it will Show the appropriate string value that is extracted from the e variable and this will be set as the title of the dialogue box. Another good practice is maintained in this method that is the method is closing the connection rather then waiting for the garbage collector to close it. This is saving the program from creating any additional inconsistency in the stored data. The value in the resizability method is set false so that distortion in the UI is not possible at all. -
initialize
public void initialize()This is a method without any parameter. The purpose of this is to initialize and make way for the Observalelists to begin working. here the items are set accordingly to the Lists- Overrides:
initialize
in classLogINpanelController
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checkDate
public boolean checkDate()This methods is here to check the validity of the date of new donation Here the Date of Birth of the User and donation date are fetched from the database and the result set is compared. For an invalid date this iterative variable will give 0 value and return false. Also It is checking Whether the user is less than 18 years old and this also will return a false result. The donation date keeps track of whether the donor is donating more than once within the span of 3 months. Here a catch block is used to handle the exceptions and prevent the program from crashing. These exceptions are caught in the variable e. In case of any exception there is a dialogue box that will appear and it will Show the appropriate string value that is extracted from the e variable and this will be set as the title of the dialogue box.- Returns:
- boolean which returns true for a valid date and false for an invalid date and invalid age of the user. True is return for the opposite case.
-
checkAlert
public boolean checkAlert()This functions is for checking all the errors in the add new donations Information. The function is here to show alert on three scenarios. First of all it checks the text field of the mobile number. If the mobile number is not given or blank than it will show error. But for a given mobile number it wil show alert because of the digits less than the number of 11. ALso it will check for the valid characters inserted. Then, using the previous checkDate method it will check the validity of the date and alert accordingly. The location details supports no granularity check rather it sees whether any details is given or not and alerts the user Otherwise.- Returns:
- boolean which depends on the value of alert check
-
pressSubmitDonation
public void pressSubmitDonation(javafx.event.ActionEvent even) throws java.io.IOException, java.lang.NullPointerExceptionThis method is here for the functionality of the submit button, A successful submission will record the data into the database. The method establishes connection the database and accordingly goes for the the Data Manipulation to write into the database. Now the inserted data are in the PreparedStatement object to write into the database. If the gender given is null the system will choose the gender of the user automatically. After a pressing the button any sort of anomalies will raise an alert. But for a proper scenario it will show a confirmation dialogue box to the user and upon passing "okay" the data will be written. In the catch block it is capturing any sort of exceptions that may occur and showing the string value of that on the warning stage.- Parameters:
even
- which is ActionEvent object.- Throws:
java.io.IOException
- That is a checked exception. Shows any exceptions that occur due to the i/p and o/p of the total flow.java.lang.NullPointerException
- it is thrown when an application attempts to use an object reference that has the null value. This is a RunTimeException and handling it is very toilsome.
-
pressBack
public void pressBack(javafx.event.ActionEvent even) throws java.io.IOExceptionThis method is here for the functionality of the "Back" button. This will redirect the user to the Parent that is the "root" which is sample.fxml- Overrides:
pressBack
in classLogINpanelController
- Parameters:
even
- which is an object of ActionEvent Class refers to the event of action for the method- Throws:
java.io.IOException
- which is a checked exception. Used to identify errors in i/p and o/p of a particular workflow.
-


paddy-power-betfair
Businessmodel of Paddy Power Betfair
Customer Segments
Paddy Power Betfair offers a range of sports betting and bookmaking services to general consumers through multiple channels. The accessibility and ease-of-use of the Company’s online platforms cater to more casual consumers that wish to place occasional bets, as well as to more regular gamblers who are able to utilise the more readily utilise the other functions and resources offered online.
Paddy Power Betfair serves an extensive customer base in the UK, which accounts for the bulk of its revenue. The Company also serves a significant customer base in both Ireland and Australia, and serves customers in the US through a single online betting platform.
Value Propositions
Paddy Power Betfair provides value to its customers in the following ways:
- Its reputation and industry standing, with the Company established as a leading provider of sports betting and bookmaking services, having a positive reputation and large market share within a competitive industry;
- Its brand strength, with the Company providing services through several popular brands, including Paddy Power, Betfair, and TVG, each of which has a distinct brand identity and large following;
- The accessibility and functionality of its online platforms, with the Company’s online sports betting platforms, and supplementary mobile applications, enabling casual and more regular gamblers to easily place bets from anywhere and at any time;
- Its multiple service channels, with the Company additionally offering bookmaking services through physical retail outlets, and telephone bookmaking teams, ensuring that all customers have access to the Company’s services; and
- Its international reach, with the Company offering services to clients across the UK, Ireland, and Australia, as well as to customers in the US through its TVG platform. ### Channels
Paddy Power Betfair operates a corporate website at www.paddypowerbetfair.com, through which it provides information on its brands, services, and regional markets.
The Company serves clients directly through multiple online bookmaking platforms, notably www.paddypower.com, www.betfair.com, www.tvg.com, and www.sportsbet.com.au, as well as through corresponding mobile applications for iOS and Android devices. These platforms enable customers to place bets, track odds, and manage account details. Paddy Power Betfair additionally operates two television channels in the US under its TVG brand, which broadcasts horse racing events on which customers can place bets.
Paddy Power Betfair additionally operates a network of physical retail bookmaking outlets in the UK and Ireland, including numerous locations across major cities such as London, Birmingham, and Manchester. The Company employs sales and service personnel in these outlets who are able to serve customers directly.
Paddy Power Betfair also provides telephone bookmaking services through dedicated telephone sales teams under its various brands, who operate out of the Company’s network of call centres and offices across the UK Ireland, Australia and the US.
Customer Relationships
Paddy Power Betfair provides services to customers on a largely self-service basis, with its online and mobile betting platforms accounting for a significant portion of its business. These platforms and mobile applications allow customers to place bets, manage account details, track odds, and withdraw winnings without interacting directly with members of the Company’s sales and service teams.
Paddy Power Betfair provides a more personalised service through its network of physical retail outlets and its dedicated telephone bookmaking teams. Through these channels, customers are able to access guidance on betting markets and odds, and can receive tailored responses to queries and complaints. The Company seeks to establish longstanding relationships with its clients through high-quality customer service and regular offers and rewards for regular customers.
Paddy Power Betfair offers ongoing support to its customers under its various brands. Customers are able to contact the Company’s support personnel over the phone, via email, or through an online contact form, in order to receive personalised assistance. The Company also offers a range of online support resources – such as FAQs and user guides – that can be access by customers independently.
Paddy Power Betfair additionally operates a number of social media accounts under its various brands – including with Twitter, Facebook, Google+, and YouTube – through which it is able to publish company updates and interact directly with customers.
Key Activities
Paddy Power Betfair is an Ireland-based online betting and gaming company. The Company provides a range of sports betting and bookmaking services to customers across the UK, Ireland, Australia, and the US.
It aligns its operations into five reportable business segments: Online (ex Australia), which comprises the operations of the Company’s UK, Ireland, and US-based online betting portals; Online Australia, which comprises the online operations of the Company’s Australian betting brand Sportsbet; UK Retail, which comprises the operation of the Company’s UK-based network of retail outlets; Irish Retail, which comprises the operation of the Company’s Ireland-based network of retail outlets; and Telephone, which comprises the Company’s telephone bookmaking services. The Company’s core brands are Paddy Power, Betfair, Sportsbet, and TVG.
Key Partners
Paddy Power Betfair works closely with a network of partner companies and organisations. These partners can be organised broadly into the following categories:
- Supplier and Vendor Partners, comprising suppliers of services, technologies, and equipment that are utilised across the Company’s various operating units and segments I support of its core sports betting and bookmaking operations;
- Affiliate and Marketing Partners, comprising a range of online companies and websites that assist in marketing the Company’s services and driving traffic to its online portals in return for commissions;
- Payment and Technology Partners, comprising various technology companies and specialist payment solutions providers that assist in developing and maintaining the Company’s online platforms;
- Business-to-Business Partners, comprising a range of betting and bookmaking companies with which the Company’s shares resources, technologies, and sports betting products; and
- Strategic and Alliance Partners, comprising market leading companies across a range of sectors with which the Company collaborates on joint projects in branding, marketing, and development. Paddy Power Betfair has a number of key partnerships in place. In 2015 the Company notably renewed long-term partnerships with international bookmaking companies PMU International in France, and Canada’s British Columbia Lottery Corporation, and launched a new partnership with Reta in Spain.
Key Resources
Paddy Power Betfair’s key resources are its technologies and intellectual properties, its online platforms, its IT and communications infrastructure, its sales and marketing channels, its partnerships, and its personnel.
Paddy Power Betfair owns a number of intellectual properties and utilises a range of proprietary technologies in the development and implementation of its service offerings. Searches of records published by the US Patent and Trademark Office identified a single patent application in filed with Paddy Power Betfair (under its former name) listed as assignee: ‘System and method for fantasy sports gambling’.
Paddy Power Betfair additionally owns and or leases a number of physical properties across its operating markets, in particular its chain of retail outlets across the UK and Ireland.
Cost Structure
Paddy Power Betfair incurs costs in relation to the development of its proprietary technologies, the development and operation of its various online platforms, the maintenance of its IT and communications infrastructure, the operation of betting activities, the operation of its sales and distribution channels, the implementation of its marketing and advertising campaigns, the procurement of professional services, the management of its partnerships, and the retention of its personnel.
In 2015 Paddy Power Betfair recorded total operating expenses in the amount of €647.47 million. This included employee expenses in the amount of €296.92 million, property expenses in the amount of € 68.65 million, marketing expenses in the amount of €117.95 million, and technology and communications expenses in the amount of €58.73 million. The Company also recorded direct betting costs in the amount of €276.27 million.
Revenue Streams
Paddy Power Betfair generates revenue through the provision of online, physical, and telephone sports betting and bookmaking services. The Company principally derives its revenue through the operation of various betting activities.
In 2015 Paddy Power Betfair generated revenue for the year in the amount of €1.09 billion, up on the €881.6 million recorded by the Company in 2015. Over the course of the year, the Company’s revenue grew 24% and surpassed €1 billion for the first time.


# Information Technology 3
## Flexbox
#### Kristof Michiels
## In this presentation
- Flexbox?
- Flexbox containers and items
- Flex-direction and flexing over multiple lines/columns
- Aligning flexbox elements
- Letting elements grow and shrink with "flex"
## Flexbox
- Full name of the CSS module: CSS Flexible box layout module
- Gives control for layouting elements on __1 AXIS__ (horizontal or vertical)
- We may use it for __menus and other navigation, lists of items, image galleries__, ...
- Grid Layout (works in 2 dimensions) remains primary tool for page layout, supported in some cases by Flexbox
## Flexbox
- Elements can grow or shrink within their containers
- Other possibilities:
- Give all elements same heights
- Centering elements horizontally or vertically
- Changing the order of elements without changing the HTML
## Flexbox containers and items
## Making a flexbox container
- You create a flexbox container with _display:flex_
- On the next slide you'll find a basic example:
- If we turn on the flexbox container the 5 divs are placed horizontally in a row
- The 5 elements are placed automatically from left to right, taking no more than their natural width
## A flexbox container
https://codepen.io/admkrm/pen/KbgvLQ
## Flex-direction and flexing over multiple lines/columns
## Controlling "flow" with flex-direction
- Flex-direction allows you to control how the elements are placed in the container
- Values we can use: row (standard) | column | row-reverse | column-reverse
- Use row and the axis is horizontal, use column and it is vertical
## Controlling "flow" with flex-direction
https://codepen.io/admkrm/pen/YdGrJV
## Flexing over multiple lines with flex-wrap
- With flex-wrap you can allow the flexbox container to spread over multiple lines
- Values: nowrap (standard) | wrap | wrap-reverse
## Flexing over multiple lines with flex-wrap
https://codepen.io/admkrm/pen/LMROYy
## Flexing over multiple lines with flex-wrap
https://codepen.io/admkrm/pen/JwROKN
## Aligning flex elements
## Aligning flex elements
- Aligning on the head-axis is done with justify-content
- It is applied on the flex container
- Values: flex-start (standard) | flex-end | center | space-between | space-around
```
div.mydiv {
display: flex;
justify-content: flex-start;
}
```
## Aligning flex elements (horizontal axis)
https://codepen.io/admkrm/pen/ebdeXW
## Aligning flex elements (vertical axis)
https://codepen.io/admkrm/pen/roMYXz
## Aligning on the cross-axis
- By which we mean the height (with flex-direction:row) and left/right (with flex-direction:column)
- You do it using the align-items property
- You place align-items on the flex container
- Values: stretch (standard) | flex-start | flex-end | center | baseline
```
div.mydiv {
display: flex;
align-items: flex-start;
}
```
## Aligning on the cross-axis
https://codepen.io/admkrm/pen/PXGENo
## Aligning individual elements(on cross-axis)
- You do it with align-self
- Values: stretch (standard) | flex-start | flex-end | center | baseline
```
div {
align-self: flex-start;
}
```
## Aligning multiple flex-lines
- You do it with align-content
- Determines how you spread multiple flex-lines over the cross-axis
- Values: stretch (standard) | flex-start | flex-end | center | space-around | space-between
```
body {
display: flex;
flex-direction: row;
height: 60vh;
align-content: center;
flex-wrap: wrap;
border: 0.1rem solid grey;}
```
## Aligning multiple flex-lines
https://codepen.io/admkrm/pen/qLapov
## Flexbox in a navigation menu
https://codepen.io/admkrm/pen/BvLJeW
## Letting elements grow and shrink with "flex"
## Letting elements grow and shrink with "flex"
- With the flex property we can make elements grow and shrink automatically
- This property is placed on the elements, not the flex container
- Values: none | 'flex-grow flex-shrink flex-basis'
- Default: 0 1 auto;
- 1 means "turn on", 0 voor "turn off"
- Flex-basis: sets the starting width. You may use it to set the width of your element
## "Flexing" with flex
https://codepen.io/admkrm/pen/vvXdmy
## Toying with flex and flex-grow
https://codepen.io/admkrm/pen/REGQQV
## Shortcuts for the flex property
- _flex:initial_ : same as flex: 0 1 auto;
- _flex: auto_ : same as flex: 1 1 auto;
- _flex: none_ : same as flex: 0 0 auto;
- _flex: number_ : same as flex: number 1 0px; =Absolute flex. Number decides how much room the element gets
## Changing the order of flex elements
- With the property border
- Good for responsive web design
- Expecially if you use flexbox for layouting and we won't :-)
- Works the same way as z-index with positioning
- Standard value for each element is 0
## Changing the order
https://codepen.io/admkrm/pen/VqKQoz
## IT3 - Flexbox
#### kristof.michiels01@ap.be


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Plug-In Menu
Plugins This will allow you load a plug-in.
Leak Trace This will allow you load a plug-in that depicts leaks in the 3D View.
|
Load Leak File This will allow you to browse for the map (.Lin) file. |
Zombielight This will allow you load a plug-in that depicts actual lighting in the 3D View.
|
Show Light This will allow you to see only light from light entities in the 3D View. Shadows This will allow you to see light shadows in the 3D View after you initiate a "Preview". Build Light Preview This will allow you to see full lighting effects in the 3D View. |
Shapes This will allow you load a plug-in that builds shapes automatically.
|
Arch This will allow you to create an arch. Cone This will allow you to create a cone. Cylinder This will allow you to create a cylinder. |


Asynchronous JavaScript: From Callback Hell to Promises
Check the Developer Console for Output. View Page Source for Code.


Since 2009, more than 100 customers including all Telcos and Top Financial Organizations in Turkey have trusted Securrent to keep their information security infrastructure up and running 7x24x365. If you have any information security related challange, contact our sales team. Let us know how we can help you today.


Methods summary
public static
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type
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string
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files( mixed $directory )
We will scan directory and return only files with .php extension
We will scan directory and return only files with .php extension
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- $directory
mixed $directory
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array
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getVersion( )
Get the migration version
Get the migration version
Returns
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getMigrationClass( )
Get the migration class name
Get the migration class name
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updateMigration( string $type = 'up' )
Call migration and do update
Call migration and do update
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Please, fill the fields below based on you. Remembering that you can update some of them after
© 2019


Package gameClient
Class EdgesWithPok
java.lang.Object
gameClient.EdgesWithPok
public class EdgesWithPok
extends java.lang.Object
this class in a "helper" class, we build this to prevent the agents from walking to the same pokemon.
this class contains one data structure = a Map build this way:
.
in this way we assure that pokemon "connected" to some agent wont be chose again.
in the "init" function in the main class, we initiate that structure with all the agents at the specific game,
and each agent pokemon is "null"
if the agent is "pointing" to null, we can know that no pokemon "connected" to him and we can choose new one!
this class has 3 functions:
addPok = connect agent to his chosen pokemon
getPok = return the pokemon that connected to the agent.
containsPok = function that checks if a specific pokemon is connected to some agent.
containsPok function is using the "equals" function. we override this function in the CL_Pokemon class.
-
Constructor Summary
Constructors Constructor Description EdgesWithPok()
-
Method Summary
Modifier and Type Method Description void
addPok(int id, CL_Pokemon pok)
connect agent to his chosen pokemonboolean
containsPok(CL_Pokemon pok)
returns true if the pokemon is already connected to some agent , and false if there isnt an agent connected to itCL_Pokemon
getPok(int id)
returns the pokemon that connected to the agent.
-
Constructor Details
-
EdgesWithPok
public EdgesWithPok()
-
-
Method Details
-
addPok
connect agent to his chosen pokemon- Parameters:
id
- - id of the agentpok
- - chosen pokemon
-
containsPok
returns true if the pokemon is already connected to some agent , and false if there isnt an agent connected to it- Parameters:
pok
- - pokemon- Returns:
- true/false
-
getPok
returns the pokemon that connected to the agent.- Parameters:
id
- - id of the agent- Returns:
- the connected pokemon (CL_Pokemon type)
-


Let’s assume we have a Java collection of employee objects that we want to output into Excel. The Employee class may look like this
public class Employee { private String name; private Date birthDate; private BigDecimal payment; private BigDecimal bonus; // ... constructors // ... getters/setters }
To use Jxls to output this object collection into an Excel we need to do the following
Add required Jxls libraries to your project
Create an Excel template using a special markup
Use Jxls API to process the prepared template and fill it with the employee data
Let’s look at each of these steps in detail.
The easiest way to add Jxls libraries to your project is to use Maven and specify the required libraries in your project build configuration file.
Jxls jars are available in the Central Maven repository.
We need to add the following dependency to core Jxls module
<dependency> <groupId>org.jxls</groupId> <artifactId>jxls</artifactId> <version>2.2.7</version> </dependency>
Alternatively you can download Jxls distribution from the Sourceforge site and use the jars from the distribution.
Besides the dependency to core Jxls module we need to add a dependency to an implementation of Jxls transformer engine which will execute all the underlying Java to Excel manipulations.
As it is explained in Transformers section (see Main Concepts)) Jxls core module does not depend on any specific Java-Excel library and works with Excel exclusively through a predefined interface. Currently Jxls supplies two implementations of this interface in separate modules based on the well-known Apache POI and Java Excel API libraries.
To use Apache POI API based transformer implementation add the following dependency
<dependency> <groupId>org.jxls</groupId> <artifactId>jxls-poi</artifactId> <version>1.0.6</version> </dependency>
To use Java Excel API based transformer implementation add the following dependency
<dependency> <groupId>org.jxls</groupId> <artifactId>jxls-jexcel</artifactId> <version>1.0.3</version> </dependency>
A template is an excel file which uses a special markup to specify how Jxls should output the data.
Jxls provides some built-in markup processors which can be used to parse an excel template and extract control commands.
A custom markup processor can be created if needed. So one define his own markup for an excel template and parse in a proper way to create Jxls Commands structure.
Let’s look at the built-in Jxls markup processors.
By default Jxls supports Apache JEXL as an expression language that can be used in an excel template to refer to java object properties and methods. The object must be available in Jxls context under a certain key. To output the employee name in a cell we can put the following text in the cell ${employee.name}. Basically we just surrounded Jexl expression with ${ and }. We assume that in the context there is an Employee object under the employee key.
The property notation is configurable so you may decide to use for example [[employee.name]] as a property notation. See Expression Language for more details on how to do it.
The final template for the example to output a list of Employee objects can be downloaded here and looks like this
In the template cells in row 4 we refer to the employee object properties using JEXL expressions as described above.
Cell A1 contains an excel comment with the following text jx:area(lastCell="D4"). It defines the root area of our template to be A1:D4.
A comment to A4 cell defines Jxls Each-Command with the following comment text jx:each(items="employees" var="employee" lastCell="D4"). The Each-Command will iterate the collection of objects under employees key in Jxls context and place each individual collection item into the context under employee key (defined by var attribute). The body area of the Each-Command is A4:D4 (defined by the lastCell attribute) and it will be cloned and processed with each new Employee object in the context.
This example assumes usage of XlsCommentAreaBuilder class to construct Jxls areas from the template. By using this class you can define Jxls commands in Excel cell comments. If you prefer to define the commands in Java code then the template will be the same except you have to remove the comments from the cells.
Here you can see how to use Jxls API to process the excel template
... logger.info("Running Object Collection demo"); List<Employee> employees = generateSampleEmployeeData(); try(InputStream is = ObjectCollectionDemo.class.getResourceAsStream("object_collection_template.xls")) { try (OutputStream os = new FileOutputStream("target/object_collection_output.xls")) { Context context = new Context(); context.putVar("employees", employees); JxlsHelper.getInstance().processTemplate(is, os, context); } } ...
In this example we are loading the template from the classpath resource object_collection_template.xls. And the target excel file will be written to target/object_collection_output.xls.
All the main processing is performed in a single line
JxlsHelper.getInstance().processTemplate(is, os, context);
By default JxlsHelper assumes that you want to override the template sheet with the data.
But you may also choose to generate the data at another sheet by using the following method
JxlsHelper.getInstance().processTemplateAtCell(is, os, context, "Result!A1");
Here the area will be processed at cell A1 of Result sheet.
The final report can be downloaded here and looks like this


See everyone who signed up for your email list but never confirmed their email address and manually confirm them or remove them.
If used properly, I don't see why not, but I'm not a lawyer or an expert so use this at your own risk.
MailChimp does suspend accounts that violate their terms or acceptable use policy so don't do that!
NOTE: As of October 31, 2017 MailChimp defaults all mailing lists to single-opt-in, making this tool largely unnecessary moving forwards—unless you live in the E.U.
If you're still using double-opt-in, or managed a MailChimp list before the change, you might still have unconfirmed subscribers, which can be managed here.
Don't worry - nothing you enter or see here will be saved anywhere, but if you're paranoid you can also run this tool locally.