No genealogist of the complex and heterogeneous cultural field we have come to call aesthetic modernism can fail to acknowledge its multiple intersections with that other richly articulated field known as modern psychology. In both cases, an unprecedented preoccupation with the interior landscape of the subject, a no longer self-confident self functioning with increased difficulty in the larger world outside its threatened and vulnerable boundaries, led to voyages of scientific and artistic discovery whose endpoints have yet been reached. Whether it be the empiricist tradition of Ernst Mach, Franz Brentano and William James recently foregrounded by Judith Ryan in The Vanishing Subject, 1 Jean-Martin Charcot's investigations of hysteria inspirational for such modernist movements as Surrealism, or Freudian psychoanalysis, whose importance for modernism is evident in such accounts as Carl Schorske's Fin-de-Siècle Vienna, 2 the story of aesthetic innovation has seemed impossible to narrate without reference to the no less radical developments in psychology happening at virtually the same time. What Ryan calls the "complex intertextuality" 3 between modernism and psychology has perhaps reached its zenith in Louis Sass's recent Madness and Modernism, which boldly seeks to understand such familiar aspects of the modernist temper as perspectivism, dehumanization, alienation, ironic detachment, hyperreflexivity, and spatialized form precisely by finding affinities with the workings of the schizophrenic mind, which was itself first labeled in the 1890s and quickly became, he tells us, "the quintessential form of madness in our time." 4
Cultural fields, however, not only intersect and parallel each other, producing reinforcements, homologies, and elective affinities, but also sometimes interact through repulsions and negations, achieving their fragile definitions by means of abjecting the other. In the case of modernism and psychology, I want to argue, such a process of negative exclusion did, in fact, occur, a process which overlapped and sometimes interfered with the more positive interaction that has been explored by other scholars. In particular, I want to show that what the philosophers of this period called "psychologism" and which many sought mightily to banish from their search for truth also emerged as a source of anxiety at certain key moments in the genesis of aesthetic modernism as well. 5 My evidence will come from both literary and visual instances of this anxiety. 6 Although I do not want to be understood as saying modernism was essentially a repudiation of psychologism, let alone unrelated to developments in the psychological sciences per se, no understanding of its emergence can afford to ignore the haunting presence of this stigmatized "-ism" as a specter that refused to be effortlessly exorcised.
The philosophical critique of psychologism can be traced at least as far back as Kant's claim that:
in logic we do not want to know how understanding is and thinks and how it hitherto has proceeded in thinking, but how it ought to proceed in thinking. Logic must teach us the correct use of the understanding, i.e. that in which it is in agreement with itself. 7
His transcendental deduction was thus explicitly distinguished between the questio facti of the "physiological derivation" of a priori ideas and the questio juris of their validity. The most elaborate and influential development of the critique, however, appeared after a period in which psychologism gained ground among philosophers and the upstart discipline of experimental psychology had emerged to challenge philosophy as the royal road to unlocking the mysteries of the mind. 8 Although there were rumblings throughout the nineteenth century, only at its end did psychologism emerge as a primary target of a philosophical counterattack. In 1884, Gottlob Frege published The Foundations of Arithmetic, which vigorously criticized attempts by philosophers such as Friedrich Beneke, Jakob Fries, John Stuart Mill, and Franz Brentano to reduce the mind, in particular its logical function, to the psyche. 9 More radical psychologizers like Nietzsche were beneath Frege's consideration. 10
Husserl, although himself initially indebted to Brentano, was putatively won over to Frege's position by a devastating review the latter wrote of Husserl's early work The Foundations of Arithmetic in 1894. 11 By his Logical Investigations of 1900, Husserl had come to see that the empirical science of psychology with its inductive laws of association could not provide a basis for a pure, deductive logic, which goes beyond mere probabilistic knowledge. In the 1890s, other philosophers, such as the neo-positivist Alexius Meinong and the neo-Kantians Rudolf Hermann Lotze and Hermann Cohen, also vigorously turned against psychologism, moving away from epistemological questions to logical and ontological ones. 12 In physics as well, a challenge to the radical associationism of Ernst Mach and the "energeticism" of Wilhelm Ostwald was launched by defenders of the reality of discrete atoms like Ludwig Boltzmann. 13 At the same time, sociologists like Emile Durkheim and Max Weber sought to avoid reducing social facts to their alleged psychological substratum, and historians like Wilhelm Dilthey gave up their search for underlying psychological types in favor of hermeneutics of objective meaning. 14
This is not the place to attempt a full-scale history of anti-psychologism, a task admirably carried out by Martin Kusch in a recent study in the sociology of knowledge. 15 Suffice it to say that shortly after Husserl's conversion, it became a fundamental principle of many influential twentieth-century philosophers in different camps, including such otherwise disparate res as Heidegger, Cassirer, Russell, Moore, Carnap, Lukács, and Goldmann. 16 Even the early Wittgenstein, as Cora Diamond has recently shown, sought to banish psychology and follow the Kantian dictum that logic was in agreement only with itself, however much he may have ultimately come to question Frege's belief that logic might be freed of ordinary language as well and expressed in a pure, unequivocal "concept-script." 17
There were, of course, many variations in the alternatives to psychologism provided by these critics, and indeed their target was not always understood in precisely the same way, but the general complaint was as follows. 18 Reducing the mind to the psyche was problematic for logic and mathematics because it opened the door to relativism in which truth was merely a function of the specific thinking mind in which it appeared or of its cumulative experience over time. Even the concepts of a species-wide transcendental consciousness or innate biological capacities (of the kind later defended by Noam Chomsky) were insufficient to ward off the threat of psychological relativism. As Frege put it, "neither logic nor mathematics has the task of investigating minds and contents of consciousness owned by individual men." 19 The philosophy of mind, in other words, was not reducible to the philosophy of actual human minds; the apodictic or a priori character of certain universal truths was not the same as the empirical and a posteriori character of contingent knowledge. "2 + 2 = 4" and the law of contradiction were entirely independent of the minds that held them. The truth content of propositions had to be rigorously separated from the judgments made about them, judgments that would be better understood as correct or incorrect. 20 The sense of a proposition, to put it slightly differently, had to be distinguished from its presentation or representation; confirmation and refutation were not the same as persuasion. Moreover, whereas psychological laws could never be more than vague and probabilistic, based as they were on inductive generalizations, the laws of logic and mathematics were valid, timeless, and pure; the latter could not therefore be derived from the former.
Husserl, to be sure, ultimately paid more attention than did Frege to the links between disembodied, timeless Mind and the actual cognition of real human beings; the ideal realm of logic and mathematics could, after all, manifest itself in the finite, but rational, consciousness of fallible mortals. If not, he reasoned, we could have no access to it. There is thus a possibility of eidetic intuition, Husserl claimed, which provided the immediate evidence of essential objects. 21 Achieving such intuition was, in fact, the point of his phenomenological rather than strictly logical method with its continuing debt to Brentano's notion of intentionality. He thus returned to a variant of the transcendentalism that Frege scorned. Nonetheless, both he and Frege resisted the reduction of objective to subjective ideas, understood either as generalizations from empirical experience or the product of mere introspection into the individual self.
They also shared a strong hostility to what they claimed was the psychologistic confusion of cause and justification, the genetic fallacy that understood validity in terms of origin. Whereas psychologism was determined to reduce logic and mathematics to a prior psychological disposition or the cumulative weight of successive experiences, they wanted to disentangle one from the other. As Frege admonished his readers,
never let us take a description of the origin of an idea for a definition, or an account of the mental and physical conditions on which we become conscious of a proposition for a proof of it. A proposition may be thought, and again it may be true; let us never confuse these two things. 22
Logic and mathematics had timeless validity, which meant their origins or causes were irrelevant to their intrinsic truth content.
How ultimately compelling these criticisms of psychologism may be cannot be decided here. There are, in fact, still heated disputes among philosophers, and defenses have been mounted by positing alternative versions of psychology that allegedly escape its pitfalls. 23 What is important for our purposes is the remarkable extent of its success in the very decades when aesthetic modernism was itself emerging, from the 1890s through World War I. 24 Indeed, its power remained strong well into the era after World War II. Its echo can, for example, still be clearly heard in one of the most powerful theoretical defenses of modernism made in the 1960s, Theodor W. Adorno's Aesthetic Theory. Speaking of the psychoanalysis of works of art in particular, Adorno writes, "it neglects to consider their real objectivity, their inner consistency, their level of form, their critical impulses, their relation to non-psychic reality and, last but not least, their truth content." 25
For certain modernist artists as well, the threat to the integrity of the work of art and its timeless truth value posed by psychologism was also a palpable reality. 26 There was a modernist "mystique of purity," which, as Renato Poggioli noted many years ago,
aspires to abolish the discursive and syntactic element, to liberate art from any connection with psychological and empirical reality, to reduce every work to the intimate laws of its own expressive essence or to the given absolutes of its own genre or means. 27
A displaced variant of the time-honored struggle to maintain a boundary between the sacred and the profane, this aspiration can also be understood as yet another instance of what sociologists have seen as the uneven process of differentiating value spheres characteristic of modernization as a whole. At certain times, the dislocations produced by that process seem to have been especially acute, resulting in a struggle over boundary maintenance or reconration that was particularly fierce. The late nineteenth century in Europe was by all accounts a period in which the cards, cultural as well as social, were being rapidly shuffled in new and threatening ways. 28
The threats that resulted in the generalization of anti-psychologism beyond the confines of philosophy were multifarious: for example, the expansion of confidence in natural science produced a scientistic hubris that threatened the value of other approaches to reality; the extension of new forms of popular commodified culture appealing to the desires and fantasies of the masses menaced the allegedly disinterested real of high art; and the challenge to traditional gender roles in the fin-de-siècle created anxieties about the domination of masculine conceptions of cultural value. Modernism, as Andreas Huyssen has shown, often defended itself against a feminized version of mass culture, which it stigmatized as debased kitsch. 29 Not surprisingly, one weapon in its battle with these demons was the exorcism of psychologism in the name of a universalism that would, however, be based on non-scientific values.
Perhaps the most explicit manifestation of the struggle against psychologism appeared in the development of modernist literature in Britain around the time of World War I. In virtually all accounts of the evolution of British poetry from Yeats to Pound, Ford, and Eliot, the search for something called "impersonality" and the suppression of subjective expressivity has been duly recognized. 30 Although the tangled web of attitudes towards subjective expression and objective presentation in the history of British modernism has prevented the story from being a straightforward narrative of one-dimensional anti-psychologism, it is nonetheless clear that the anxieties we have traced in Frege, Husserl, and the neo-Kantians were given aesthetic voice in the work and theory of the major res in that story.
In fact, the explicit importance of Husserl's critique of psychologism for the poetry and criticism of the influential critic and poet T. E. Hulme has been widely acknowledged. Although it took some time to disentangle Hulme's initial enthusiasm for Bergson's philosophy of flux and immediate experience from his later, very different position--an entanglement abetted by the ensemble publication of essays from his entire career in the collection entitled Speculations, posthumously appearing in 1924--there seems to be a consensus now that he had shifted his opinion in the years directly before the war. 31 Partly due to the relentless critique of Bergsonism as hopelessly romantic and simplistically democratic, made by Pierre Lasserre, Charles Maurras, and other neoclassicist stalwarts of the right-wing Action Française, Hulme's change of heart also reflected a reading of Husserl's attack on psychologism in the Logical Investigations, which apparently allowed him to understand for the first time the implications of the anti-idealist realism he had encountered in the analytical philosophy of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. 32 Liberally citing the German philosopher in the essay that opened Speculations, "Humanism and the Religious Attitude," a version of which had been already published in 1915, Hulme decried the entire trend of modern thought from the Renaissance on as distressingly anthropomorphic, based on the mistaken reduction of objective ideas to a merely human source, the confusion of pure philosophy with Weltanschauung. 33
But Hulme went beyond Frege and Husserl's critique of psychologism in a crucial way: he applied their argument outside of the realm of logic per se. Citing Moore's Principa Ethica of 1903, with its celebrated critique of the naturalist fallacy, Hulme argued that ethical values as well should be understood as irreducible to human construction. 34 It was possible, he contended (without bothering to demonstrate how), to arrange them in an objective hierarchy. A parallel argument loosely derived from Wilhelm Worringer's 1908 Abstraction and Empathy allowed Hulme to denounce aesthetic styles based on intersubjective empathy (or more precisely, on a subject's pantheistic empathy with a beautiful object in the world) as inherently inferior to those, such as Egyptian or Byzantine, which resisted naturalistic organicism in the name of impersonal, geometrical, non-vitalist abstraction. 35 Modern art, exemplified by the sculpture of Jacob Epstein and the paintings of Cézanne and Wyndham Lewis, Hulme argued, promised a return to precision, austerity, and bareness, the anti-humanist values he so admired. 36 It would help clean up the mess produced by transgressing boundaries, that "pot of treacle over the dinner table" Hulme famously identified with the "spilt religion" that was romanticism. 37
This is not the place and I am not the scholar to present a detailed and nuanced account of the complicated resonances of Hulme's ideas among the English modernists, especially the Imagist poets. 38 Nor can we pause to consider related developments in the modernist novel from Flaubert to Virginia Woolf, in which stylistic innovations like the style indirect libre helped create the effect of non-egocentric impersonality in ways that parallelled developments in the poetry of the modern era. 39 And we cannot open up once again the debate about spatial form in modern poetry and the novel launched by Joseph Frank, who acknowledged an explicit debt to Hulme and Worringer. 40 What, however, needs to be at least briefly underlined is the pivotal role of a re of inestimable importance who acknowledged an explicit debt to Hulme and through him to Frege and Husserl: T. S. Eliot.
In his new journal, The Criterion, and elsewhere, Eliot energetically promulgated many of Hulme's ideas, aesthetic as well as political. In such celebrated essays as "Tradition and the Individual Talent" of 1919, he presented many of the same anti-psychologistic arguments we have already encountered. "Poetry," he contended in lines that quickly became canonical, "is not a turning loose of emotion but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression of personality but an escape from personality." 41 His influential notion of an "objective correlative" seems likely, in fact, to have been taken directly from Husserl, whom Eliot read when he studied philosophy at Harvard in 1914. 42 Although his obvious debt to the F. H. Bradley on whom he wrote his dissertation has been widely acknowledged, Eliot also drew on the work of Meinong, Russell, and Moore and the other so-called "new realists" of the period. 43 According to Sanford Schwartz, "in his thesis he undermines the assumptions of the psychologist by reducing consciousness to its objects, and later used the same strategy in his critique of nineteenth-century poetry." 44 Eliot, Schwartz also shows, went on to criticize an equally abstract objectivism, which reified objects as a simple inverse of the romantic reification of the integral subject; he was clearly no naturalist seeing art as a passive reflection of an external world. 45 The poet's ability to fashion words from his immediate experience somehow overcame the very dichotomy between subject and object, challenging as well the infamous "dissociation of sensibility" that Eliot claimed had plagued the modern world ever since the English Revolution placed feeling above wit.
Through the dissemination of Eliot's ideas by the New Critics of the 1930s and 1940s, impersonality became a new dogma and the isolation of the poem from its contexts of production and reception an article of faith. Like the logic Frege had hoped to rescue from its psychologistic reduction and the ethical imperatives Hulme had sought to distinguish from the humans who followed or transgressed them, aesthetic value, often equated entirely with formal self-referentiality, became an end entirely in itself. The New Critics's dreaded genetic and affective fallacies and the fallacy of expressive form were all little more than redescriptions in poetic terms of the warnings against psychologism made by late nineteenth-century philosophy. Even when later champions of modernism like Charles Altieri sought to reintroduce a notion of agency, they were careful to distinguish the structuring activity of the artist from the emotional interiority of the empirical, suffering subject lurking beneath its surface. 46
All of this is by now well known and needs no belaboring. But what perhaps warrants some attention is the parallel process that can be discerned in the visual arts during this period. Not surprisingly, the value of hard-edged visual distinctness, which Hulme and the Imagists defended as a metaphoric antidote to the sloppy pantheistic continuities they saw in romanticism, could easily be adopted in literal terms by painters anxious to experiment with geometric abstractions and fields of color. 47 Despite the powerful subjectivist impulse in certain visual modernisms, most obviously German Expressionism, others manifested the same suspicion of psychological expression that we have noted in literary modernists like Eliot.
The nineteenth century, to be sure, can be said to have been, by and large, a period of the increasing psychologization of the visual, the abandonment of a geometric optics of representation based on the eye's ability faithfully to mirror the world outside. The story of how, beginning in the second decade of the nineteenth century, scientists of perception undermined the classical observer modeled on the automatic functioning of a camera obscura has been masterfully reconstructed by Jonathan Crary in his recent Techniques of the Observer. 48 No longer a monological, punctual, mechanical eye coolly recording a world outside itself, the new spectator was embodied, binocular, and influenced by internal psycho-physiological processes such as afterimages, the presence of sensations without any simultaneous external stimulus. The psychologization of vision, the loss of confidence in the veracity of the eye and such systems of representation as Renaissance perspective, affected art history and criticism as well as practice. Thus, in his influential Principles of Art History of 1915, Heinrich Wölfflin would write of the oscillating pattern of classical and baroque styles he saw as a constant of visual representation: "There is no denying it--the development of the process is psychologically intelligible." 49
The delayed artistic repercussions of the changes Crary details in the early part of the century can be found most readily in the "glancing," embodied, and dynamic--as opposed to "gazing," disembodied, static--eye of Impressionism, to borrow Norman Bryson's well-known distinction. 50 It has thus been easy for commentators on the literary offshoots of psychological empiricism, such as Judith Ryan, to find compelling parallels between them and Impressionism. 51 Both suggest a withdrawal from the world of stable objects and a new preoccupation with the perceiving subject, a subject in crisis, absorbed by its own dissolution, fascinated and sometimes bewildered by the flux of sensations flooding in from without.
It is, however, with the loose and amorphous body of work that has become known as post-Impressionism, and with the painting of Cézanne in particular, that these parallels begin to break down. Indeed, it might be said that the famous "doubt" that Merleau-Ponty detected in Cézanne was directed not only towards the traditional perspectival order of the Renaissance frozen gaze, but also towards the adequacy of the Impressionists' glancing eye. 52 His attempt to return to objects and paint "nature" was not, however, a restoration of earlier representational realism; instead, it sought the real entirely on the surface of the canvas, where subject and object, perception and the perceived, were not yet distinct and separate. 53 Here a world of pure monstrance, of visual presence rather than representation, began to supplant the sensationalist psychologism of the Impressionists. Although Merleau-Ponty thought Cézanne had anticipated what later psychologists, such as the Gestaltists, were to realize in their laboratories, his description of the painter's achievement suggests a less psychologistic interpretation: "The lived object is not rediscovered or constructed on the basis of the contributions of the senses; rather it presents itself to us from the start as the center from which these contributions radiate." 54
Cézanne's project to capture viewer and viewed together on the flat surface of the canvas and thus realize unmediated visual presence may have been utopian, but it provided a challenge to the psychologism that had come to dominate nineteenth-century spectatorship (a challenge, as Altieri has argued, that had an impact on modernist poetry as well). 55 Thierry de Duve describes that challenge in terms of a difficult choice:
Modernity picked up Cézanne's heritage in the form of an alternative: either I actively destroy the object, the re, and all the realism that goes along with it, in order to preserve that which remains of my subjective integrity--here I have no other choice than to destroy the represented real, but at least in destroying it I make myself master of it--or I agree to sacrifice my subjective unity and allow the plural significance of my self-image to appear, but to the benefit of an unalterable pseudo-object, the self-sufficient epiphany of a world that excludes me. 56
At different times, different movements and res opted for one or the other of these alternatives (and some, to be sure, sought to overcome them by somehow including a dispersed notion of subjectivity in the epiphany itself). 57 But it is perhaps legitimate to say that in the long run most modernist painting, at least as it became canonically described in the criticism of Roger Fry, Clive Bell, Clement Greenberg, and Michael Fried, took the second course. That is, it sought to purge painting of anything allegedly superfluous to it, any expression of the painter's interiority, any representational reference, decorative functionality, or theatrical appeal to the beholder. Instead, painting came increasingly to be understood as a quest to realize only the essential and immanent laws of painting themselves, a quest for an authentic, truth-telling art that would be ontologically "absolute." Even when that absolute was understood in spiritual terms, as it was by Kandinsky, it meant the extirpation of the psychological subject. 58 Very much in the spirit of Kant's defense of logic as understanding "in agreement with itself," high modernism became a game of purification and reduction in which formal pictorial qualities were their own ends. 59 Indeed, for Greenberg, Kant himself was "the first real Modernist" because he "used logic to establish the limits of logic, and while he withdrew much from its old jurisdiction, logic was left in all the more secure possession of what remained to it." 60
Not surprisingly, the aesthetic variant of this strategy of reculer pour mieux sauter, most explicitly realized in the writing of Greenberg after his break with Marxism, often earned a comparison with the New Criticism that was the scholarly handmaiden of literary modernism at this time. 61 Greenberg's explicit embrace of Eliot's banishment of personality from aesthetic judgment was also remarked, as was the similarity between his position and that of Adorno. 62 Although Eliot's later ruminations on culture and tradition suggest a more hermeneutic, contextual perspective, both he and Greenberg could be seen as championing self-reflexivity and self-absorption, in which the aesthetic object is rigidly segregated from anything outside its apparent boundaries. 63
The anti-psychologistic impulse in the Greenbergian version of high modernism is thus not difficult to discern. More surprising is that something similar can be detected in the work of a modernist re, who fell entirely outside of the canon established by Greenberg and the other champions of optical purity and self-sufficiency: Marcel Duchamp. What has been called his "pictorial nominalism," which perhaps became most explicit when Duchamp began fashioning his celebrated "readymades," meant foregrounding the constitutive power of the artist, who named an object an artwork through an act of enunciation ultimately valorized by the institutions of art rather than by his own genius or skill. 64 Eschewing the search for optical purity, indeed truculently indifferent to any optical values, and hostile to the search for the "absolute" essence of the medium of painting, Duchamp was in many respects the antithesis of the artist who hopes for the epiphanous revelation of a self-sufficient world on the flat surface of his canvas. 65 Instead, he promoted the invasion of the realm of the visual by the textual and discursive, allowed the real world literally to appear through the surface of the "canvas" (the Large Glass was a transparent "window" mocking both the old metaphor of the canvas as window and the new celebration of its two-dimensional opacity), and foregrounded the persona of the artist, whose unstable identity registered the crisis of the genius model of creativity.
And yet, despite his radical problematizing of the mainstream modernist quest for pure visual presence and his deliberate mockery of its ontological pretensions, Duchamp was, I want to argue, equally suspicious of certain versions of psychologism in art. His famous dismissal of "retinal painting" was aimed at the positing of the painter's or beholder's eye, whether gazing or glancing, as the foundation of aesthetic value. His nominalism extended, we might say, to the perception of the artist, whose sensitively recorded act of ephemeral seeing was no less a questionable standard of veracity than the idealized representation of objects allegedly present in the visual field of a disembodied, camera obscura gaze.
Duchamp was even more antagonistic to an aesthetic of expressivity, arguing instead for an anti-romantic art of dehumanization. As Werner Hofmann has noted, "his act of choice consciously opposed the glorification of subjective creation and the principle which holds that the lowly object is ennobled by artistic 'expression.'" 66 Not surprisingly, in the 1950s Duchamp took to quoting T. S. Eliot's "Tradition and the Individual Talent," with its famous distinction between the "man who suffers" and "the mind who creates," and told one critic in 1961 that "Eliot's essay presents his own feelings as well or better than he himself has ever done in writing." 67 In short, even so maverick a re in the pantheon of modernism as Marcel Duchamp felt obliged to distance himself from the lure of psychologism.
Duchamp and Eliot, to be sure, are certainly an odd couple and can only remain together in a tense constellation for a short while before they begin to drift apart. Duchamp, in fact, has emerged in the past few decades as the quintessential critic of modernist pretensions to formalist purity, optical essentialism, and the integrity of the medium. Although he may have called into question expressive notions of genius and disparaged the empirical perception of the artist, his own role in dismantling the Greenbergian consensus has been increasingly written in heroic terms. 68 So too the personal, often erotic traces in his work have come to the fore, in ways that invite the charge of a renewed psychologism. 69
The postmodern appropriation of Duchamp, in fact, would not feel offended by this charge, for one of the most explicit dividing lines between modernism and its putative successor is precisely their differing attitudes towards psychologism. Indeed, in one sense, postmodernism can be said to be a "second psychologism." 70 Its return seems to have been prepared by the widespread recognition that the modernist project of ruthless purification had reached a dead end, as there was little interesting left to write or paint about once all contaminations were banished. The indifference to human suffering that seemed too often to accompany the modernist differentiation of value spheres also made many uneasy, as the extent of the modernist entanglement with fascism became clearer. Similarly, the modernist pretensions to disinterestedness have seemed increasingly hollow in the face of multiculturalist and feminist critiques of its soi-disant universalism, as well as the sociological claim that aesthetic value is really just another name for "cultural capital." 71 And finally, the threat of a scientistic version of psychology seemed less pressing once the literary and hermeneutic dimensions of psychoanalysis came to the fore.
The recent return to some form of psychologism is, in fact, evident in philosophy itself, where a reaction against the privileging of self-identical logic has taken many forms, among them a new sensitivity to the impact of the institutional context of the discipline on its subject matter. 72 The neopragmatism of Richard Rorty is a salient example of a renewed distrust of the fallacy that defenders of psychologism had once mockingly dubbed "logicism." 73 In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, he notes with satisfaction that,
seventy years after Husserl's "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" and Russell's "Logic as the Essence of Philosophy," we are back with the same putative dangers which faced the authors of these manifestoes: if philosophy becomes too naturalistic, hard-nosed positive disciplines will nudge it aside; if it becomes too historicist, then intellectual history, literary criticism, and similar soft spots in "the humanities" will swallow it up. 74
Rorty's plea is to stop worrying in the face of these putative dangers and accept the inevitable blurring of the lines between philosophy and its scientific and historicist neighbors. Heeding his message, some of his pragmatist followers have reread the modernist tradition itself in the hope of resituating its res in the new context; one has gone so far as to try to rescue even T. S. Eliot by turning him into a closet pragmatist, who ultimately came to believe in the virtues of historical tradition and practical wisdom over logical (or aesthetic) truth. 75
Deconstruction has likewise taken aim at Husserl's attempt to use eidetic intuition to provide an avenue of entry into the timeless world of logical truth. Derrida's Speech and Phenomena begins with an attack on the confusions of a transcendental psychologism that seeks to exclude precisely those intrusions from without that any psychologism necessitates. 76 Gleefully extolling the very contamination and pollution that so troubled critics of psychologism, celebrating the temporal deferral and traces of the past that the fetish of spatial form in modernism hoped to keep at bay, restoring modified respect for the representation and mimesis that modernist self-reflexivity had banished, deconstruction transgresses many of the same boundaries that nineteenth-century psychologism had also violated.
Its effects on literary critical attitudes towards psychologism have been evident. Although eschewing any strong notion of the expressive subject and no less suspicious of humanist pieties than Hulme and Eliot were, deconstruction has reversed the New Critics' disdain for romanticism and reintroduced complicated notions of intentionality. 77 One need only mention New Historicism, reception aesthetics, the pervasive influence of Nietzsche, and the proliferation of psychoanalytically informed approaches to reinforce the same point: the taboo against psychologism now seems firmly laid to rest among literary critics. Or more precisely, many have come to feel at home in a gray area between the absolute alternatives of a maximalist psychologistic reductionism, in which all mental activity and all cultural artifacts are merely an expression of emotional states, and an anti-psychologistic purism, in which everything of value must be protected against any pollution from without. 78
Indeed, one of the reasons it may be meaningful to distinguish between modernism and postmodernism, however volatile that distinction may be, is the recent undermining of the taboo, which operated so powerfully during the modernist era. As I hope is now evident, "psychologism," with all of its connotations of reductionism, contamination, and relativism, became one of the main anxieties of that era, a veritable "specter," as one recent commentator has called it, haunting the modernist mind. 79 Postmodernists, in contrast, seem more relaxed and untroubled by these dangers, having learned to live with the ghosts of the past rather than trying to exorcise them. Although they hold no brief for the notion of an integrated subject, whose individual psychology can be the genesis of art, they feel comfortable with a dispersed and decentered subjectivity whose impulses, desires, fetishes, and fantasies disturb the smooth workings of any cultural sublimation. 80
But to give the screw one final turn, postmodernism may itself be haunted by a specter of its own, which refuses to die: the ghost of modernist anti-psychologism. Some contemporary philosophers of mind still struggle, after all, to produce a transcendental account of consciousness that will establish the autonomy of at least mathematics and logic. 81 Certain ethical theorists continue to balk at the "emotivist" reduction of moral imperatives to personal preferences. 82 And what Adorno liked to call the "truth content of art" stubbornly refuses to lose its fascination for those unwilling to level all aesthetic distinctions and reduce all judgments to matters of individual taste.
If Derrida is right in claiming that the specter of Marx still haunts our apparently post-Marxist world, the same might well be the case for the anti-psychologism that flourished during the heyday of modernism. 83 As the continuing wars over multiculturalism and the canon testify, it would be premature to believe that the pressures that produced the fear of psychologism have entirely subsided, or that the search for aesthetic value is entirely a thing of the past. Whatever the future of the debate, one thing is clear: it would be a serious mistake to ignore the creative energies unleashed by the effort to fend off psychologism during the previous era. For even if it now seems a losing battle, or its outcome at best a stalemate, the struggle was an indisputable ingredient in the making of that remarkable phenomenon we call modern art.
Martin Jay teaches European intellectual history at the University of California, Berkeley. Among his most recent works are Force Fields , Downcast Eyes , and The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, coedited with Anton Kaes and Edward Dimendberg . He is currently working on the discourse of experience in recent European and American theory.
1. Judith Ryan, The Vanishing Subject: Early Psychology and Literary Modernism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
2. Carl E. Schorske, Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture (New York: Knopf, 1980).
3. Ryan, The Vanishing Subject, 224.
4. Louis A. Sass, Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of Modern Art, Literature, and Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 13.
5. The most recent and complete account of the debate over "psychologism" can be found in Martin Kusch, Psychologism: A Case Study of the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge (New York: Routledge, 1995). He notes that the term itself was coined by Johann Eduard Erdmann in his Grundrisse der Geschiche der Philosophie (Berlin: W. Hertz, 1866). A Hegelian, Erdmann introduced the term to describe the work of Friedrich Eduard Beneke, but did not actively criticize it (Kusch, Psychologism, 101).
6. It would also be possible to make a case based on musical examples, beginning with Eduard Hanslick's defense of "absolute music," continuing through the post-Wagnerian rejection of romanticism, and culminating in Schoenberg's twelve-tone row. If Ortega y Gasset is right in his well-known analysis of the modernism "dehumanization of art," the pivotal re was Debussy. For a recent discussion of anti-psychologistic impulses in Stravinsky, see Richard Taruskin, "A Myth of the Twentieth Century: The Rite of Spring, the Tradition of the New, and 'The Music Itself,'" 2 (January 1995): 1-26.
7. Immanuel Kant, Logic, trans. Robert S. Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), 16. The origins of what was later called psychologism can perhaps be put in the late seventeenth century, with the rise of British empiricism. It had an impact in Germany through such res as Johann Nicolaus Tetens, whose Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung, 2 vols. (Leipzig: bei M. G. Weidmanns Erben, 1777) was a spur to the first Critique. For a discussion of Kant on psychology, see Gary Hatfield, "Empirical, Rational, and Transcendental Psychology: Psychology as Science and as Philosophy," in Paul Guyer, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). In Germany, psychologism was revived by the post-Kantians Jakob F. Fries and Friedrich E. Beneke in the early nineteenth century. See the discussion in John Fizer, Psychologism and Psychoaesthetics: A Historical and Critical View of their Relations (Amsterdam: J. Benjamins, 1981), introduction.
8. For a discussion of the growth of experimental psychology and the philosophers' defensive response, see Mitchell G. Ash, Gestalt Psychology in German Culture, 1890-1967: Holism and the Quest for Objectivity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), especially chapter three.
9. Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, 2d rev. ed., trans. J. L. Austin (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1980).
10. For a recent account of the psychologizing imperative in Nietzsche, see Graham Parkes, Composing the Soul: Reaches of Nietzsche's Psychology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
11. Gottlob Frege, "Review of E. G. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik I," in Gottlob Frege: Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, ed. B. McGuinness (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1984). For an assessment of the review and its implications, see Jitendranath N. Mohanty, Husserl and Frege (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), chapter two. He claims that Husserl was already moving beyond psychologism by 1891 and that Frege's attribution of a strong version of it to him was mistaken. Also see Claire Ortiz Hill, Word and Object in Husserl, Frege, and Russell: The Roots of Twentieth-Century Philosophy (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1991).
12. See David F. Lindenfeld, The Transformation of Positivism: Alexius Meinong and European Thought, 1880-1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), chapter five; Thomas E. Willey, Back to Kant: The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical Thought, 1960-1914 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978), 108f.; and Gillian Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology (London: Athlone, 1981), chapter one. It should be noted that Heidegger's initial critique of psychologism, Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus: Ein kritischpositiver Beitrag zur Logik (Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1914), was written when he was a student of the neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert.
13. "Energeticism" was an attempt to subsume all phenomena under the category of energy, "matter" being merely an anthropomorphic projection onto a world of flux.
14. Although Durkheim's sociology, echoing that of Auguste Comte, was more resolutely hostile to methodological individualism than Weber's, even the latter insisted that a proper sociological explanation of behavior was irreducible to psychological states of mind. Dilthey's attitude towards psychologism was intensified by his reading of Husserl's Philosophical Investigations, but he showed signs of skepticism as early as 1860. See the discussion in Michael Ermarth, Wilhelm Dilthey: The Critique of Historical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 182f.
15. Kusch, in Psychologism, shows how loose and amorphous the debate was, with almost every re on both sides of the fence, including Husserl himself, being accused of some variety of psychologism. He situates the debate in the context of the institutional challenge to philosophy presented by the rise of experimental psychology, exemplified by Wilhelm Wundt, Hermann Ebbinghaus, Georg Elias Müller, and Carl Stumpf, in the 1880s.
16. It is important to note, as Dagfinn Føllesdal was perhaps the first to underline in his "Husserl's Notion of Noema," Journal of Philosophy 66 (16 October 1969): 680-87, that both the analytical and phenomenological traditions shared a common root in anti-psychologism (although Frege was more important for the analytical tradition and Husserl for the continental). Here the celebrated gap between Anglo-American and continental philosophy yawned far less widely than is normally assumed. This is not to deny, of course, that some later philosophers in these traditions reopened the question of the links between psychology and philosophy, e.g. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose debts to Gestalt psychology are evident.
17. Cora Diamond, The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991). Also see Nicholas F. Gier, Wittgenstein and Phenomenology: A Comparative Study of the Later Wittgenstein, Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1981), 204-206, for a discussion of Wittgenstein's complicated debt to Frege's anti-psychologism.
18. Lucien Goldmann, to take one example, was hostile to psychologism only when it meant the individual, libidinal psyche. But he supported the idea of a collective, cognitive psyche and derided neo-Kantians for their attempt to deny any human origins to the objects of knowledge. See his Immanuel Kant, trans. Robert Black (London: NLB, 1971), 153-56. In general, Marxist critics of psychologism refused the absolutizing of logic evident in Frege, the neo-Kantians, and Husserl, which they saw as the acceptance of reification. Their anti-psychologism only meant a resistance to understanding the subject of knowledge in psychological rather than trans-individual, social terms.
19. Frege, "Thoughts," in McGuinness, ed., Collected Papers, 369.
20. For a typical anti-psychologistic elaboration of this distinction, see Ralph Eaton, General Logic: An Introductory Survey (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1931), 16f.
21. For comparisons of Husserl and Frege, see Mohanty, Husserl and Frege, and Robert Hanna, "Logical Cognition: Husserl's Prolegomena and the Truth in Psychologism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (June 1993): 251-75.
22. Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, vi.
23. See, for example, J. Meiland, "Psychologism in Logic: Husserl's Critique," Inquiry 19 (autumn 1976): 325-39, and John Aach, "Psychologism Reconsidered: A Re-evaluation of the Arguments of Frege and Husserl," Synthese 85 (November 1990): 315-38. Aach claims that Skinnerian behaviorism can avoid the pitfalls of the associationist psychology that Frege and Husserl mistakenly identified with psychology tout court.
24. Kusch argues that the war itself, at least in Germany, produced a general intellectual consensus that stilled the battle over psychologism, leaving phenomenology the winner. The war also provided a new role for experimental psychology as an applied discipline, which took its practitioners away from philosophical disputes. Those who remained in philosophy departments in a general atmosphere that was anti-scientific and anti-atomistic made their peace with the reigning orthodoxy. See Kusch, Psychologism, chapter eight.
25. Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, trans. C. Lenhardt (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1984), 12. Adorno, to be sure, goes on to challenge Kant's contrary denial of any interest, any desire in allegedly autotelic works of art. "In contrast of the Kantian or Freudian views on the matter," he argues, "works of art necessarily evolve in a dialectic of interests and disinterestedness" (Aesthetic Theory, 17). Earlier, Adorno provided an equally dialectical treatment of Husserl's one-sided anti-psychologism. See Theodor Adorno, Against Epistemology: A Metacritique, trans. Willis Domingo (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983), chapter one.
26. Peter Bürger's controversial distinction between modernism and the avant-garde in his Theory of the Avant-Garde, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), is useful in this context. Those artists who most feared psychologistic pollution conform to his definition of modernist, whereas those who were less anxious, for example the Surrealists, were members of the avant-garde that sought to reconcile life and art.
27. Renato Poggioli, The Theory of the Avant-Garde, trans. Gerald Fitzgerald (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 201. For another discussion of the modernist fetish of purity, see Frederick R. Karl, Modern and Modernism: The Sovereignty of the Artist 1885-1925 (New York: Atheneum, 1985), 162-69. He claims that the demand for purification ultimately means that "authority of style was based not on the assimilation of other styles but on the expression of honest feeling which is then transformed into individuality of style" (Modern and Modernism, 153). Such an argument underestimates the modernist desire to purify the work of psychological and emotional residues.
28. See, for example, H. Stuart Hughes's classic study Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought 1890-1930 (New York: Knopf, 1958).
29. Andreas Huyssen, After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986). He points to the links between certain misogynist theories of psychology during this period, such as Nietzsche's and Freud's, and modernist elitism, but he neglects the opposite connection, which ties anti-psychologism with misogyny. By isolating works from the contexts of their production and reception, anti-psychologism furthered the fiction that they were timeless, universal creations undisturbed by issues of gender.
30. See, for example, Sanford Schwartz, The Matrix of Modernism: Pound, Eliot, and Early 20th-century Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), and Michael H. Levenson, A Genealogy of Modernism: A Study of English Literary Doctrine 1908-1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). On the vexed notion of "impersonality," see in particular Brian Lee, Theory and Personality: The Significance of T. S. Eliot's Criticism (London: Athlone Press, 1979).
31. For a persuasive account, see Levenson, A Genealogy of Modernism, chapter six; Richard Shusterman, "Remembering Hulme: A Neglected Philosopher-Critic-Poet," Journal of the History of Ideas 46 (October-December 1985): 559-76; and Richard Shusterman, T. S. Eliot and the Philosophy of Criticism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 30f. They are directed against the earlier claims by Murray Krieger, The New Apologists for Poetry (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956) and Frank Kermode, Romantic Image (London: Routledge and Paul, 1961) that Hulme was actually in the romantic tradition, even Coleridgean, because of his debts to Bergson.
32. For an argument about the importance of analytical philosophy for Hulme and then T. S. Eliot, see Shusterman, T. S. Eliot and the Philosophy of Criticism.
33. T. E. Hulme, Speculations: Essays on Humanism and the Philosophy of Art, ed. Herbert Read (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1924).
34. Among certain German neo-Kantians, most notably the Heidelberg School around Windelband and Rickert, a search for objective values (Werte) rather than mere validity (Geltung) had also been conducted. But Hulme does not seem to have been influenced directly by their work.
35. Wilhelm Worringer, Abstraction and Empathy: A Contribution to the Psychology of Style, trans. Michael Bullock (New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1953). As his subtitle indicates, Worringer was actually interested in providing a psychological explanation for the stylistic dispositions of different artists and periods of the kind Hulme disdained. For recent analyses of the complicated reception of Worringer's work, see Neil H. Donahue, ed., Invisible Cathedrals: The Expressionist Art History of Wilhelm Worringer (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).
Aesthetic empathy, it should be noted, had been most extensively defended by the German philosopher Theodor Lipps. As Levenson notes,
Lipps also appeared in Husserl's Logical Investigations, where he is criticized as a proponent of psychologism. Indeed, Worringer's argument against Lipps and on behalf of abstraction bears notable similarities of Husserl's defense of 'pure logic,' and although I know of no evidence of any contact or influence, the theories of the two res meet in Hulme's enthusiastic embrace. [A Genealogy of Modernism, 96]
36. A similar argument, with a far less positive evaluation, was famously made in 1925 by José Ortega y Gasset, The Dehumanization of Art and Other Essays on Art, Culture, and Literature, trans. Helene Weyl (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).
37. Hulme, Speculations, 118. Romanticism blundered by trying to realize perfection, which belongs only to the religious sphere, in human affairs. Modern art wisely sought its perfection only in the sphere of art and eschewed the romantics' redemptive hope of transring life as well.
38. For one attempt to underscore his political influence, see John R. Harrison, The Reactionaries (London: Gollancz, 1967).
39. For a discussion of Woolf, which shows her links to the work of Russell and the technique of "speakerless sentences" pioneered by Flaubert, see Ann Banfield, "Describing the Unobserved: Events Grouped Around an Empty Centre," in The Linguistics of Writing: Arguments Between Language and Literature, ed. Nigel Fabb et al. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987). Banfield provides a useful corrective to Judith Ryan's claim in The Vanishing Subject, chapter fifteen, that Woolf provides another example of the influence of impressionistic psychological empiricism, with a touch of psychoanalysis.
40. See Joseph Frank, "Spatial Form in Modern Literature," in The Avant-Garde Tradition in Modern Literature, ed. Richard Kostlenetz (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1982), 72-76.
41. T. S. Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent," in Selected Prose of T. S. Eliot, ed. Frank Kermode (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 43. It is even cited in Sass's Madness and Modernism as an example of the impersonal aesthetic of early modernism, which replaced the romantic concern with inner experience and the unique self. He then goes on to say, however, that in the latter's place was soon put a fetish for innovation that "placed, if anything, even more emphasis on novelty of perspective" (Madness and Modernism, 135).
42. Schwartz, The Matrix of Modernism, 166-67.
43. On Eliot's debt to F. H. Bradley see, for example, Lewis Freed, T. S. Eliot: The Critic as Philosopher (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1979).
44. Schwartz, The Matrix of Modernism, 166.
45. For another analysis of the subjective moment in Eliot's criticism, see Shusterman, T. S. Eliot and the Philosophy of Criticism, chapter three.
46. Charles Altieri, Painterly Abstraction in Modernist American Poetry: The Contemporaneity of Modernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 38.
47. According to Hulme, poetry "is not a counter language, but a visual concrete one. . . . It always endeavors to arrest you, and to make you continuously see a physical thing, to prevent you gliding through an abstract process" (Speculations, 134).
48. Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990).
49. Heinrich Wolfflin, Principles of Art History: The Problem of the Development of Style in Later Art, trans. M. D. Hottinger (New York: Dover, 1932), 229. As we have noted, Worringer also sought a psychology of style.
50. Norman Bryson, Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze (London: MacMillan Press, 1983). Crary explores the impact of the new models of visuality on Impressionism, most notably Manet, in "Unbinding Vision," October 68 (spring 1994): 21-44.
51. Ryan, The Vanishing Subject, 17f.
52. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Cézanne's Doubt," in Sense and Nonsense, trans. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia A. Dreyfus (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964).
53. For a selection of Cézanne's remarks about returning to nature and leaving cultural conventions behind, see the section on him in Herschel B. Chipp, Theories of Modern Art: A Source Book by Artists and Critics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 16-23.
54. Chipp, Theories of Modern Art, 15.
55. Altieri, Painterly Abstraction in Modernist American Poetry, 178f.
56. Thierry de Duve, Pictorial Nominalism: On Marcel Duchamp's Passage from Painting to the Readymade, trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 77-78.
57. One might see certain Surrealist paintings in this light.
58. As Antoine Compagnon writes, "initially, in the mind of the first abstract painter, abstraction was supposed to make individual psychology extinct, to explore a world of meanings and energies, and to produce images with which we would all be able to commune spiritually" (Antoine Compagnon, The Five Paradoxes of Modernity, trans. Franklin Philip [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 67).
59. Another philosophical lineage for the impersonality and universalism of modernist abstraction culminating in Mondrian has been suggested by Donald Kuspit, The Cult of the Avant-Garde Artist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 45f. He sees Spinoza as the great predecessor of this visual flight from the messiness of human emotions.
60. Clement Greenberg, "Modernist Painting," in G. Battcock, ed., The New Art: A Critical Anthology (New York: Dutton, 1973), 67.
61. See, for example, John McGowan, Postmodernism and its Critics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 9.
62. Robert Storr, "No Joy in Mudville: Greenberg's Modernism Then and Now," in Modern Art and Popular Culture: Readings in High and Low, ed. Kirk Varnadoe and Adam Gopnik (New York: Abrams, 1990), 169f. Noting Greenberg's Jewish anxiety about assimilation, he compares it with Eliot's Anglo-Catholicism, and concludes that
Greenberg's similar insistence on the aesthetic "extinction of personality," and his determination to purge from art all traces of mundane existence, for which kitsch became the shorthand term, reflect not so much a political or even art-historical perspective, as they do a fundamentally religious one. Located against the backdrop of Jewish emigration from the shtetl and the ghetto, the opposition of purity and impurity stands as a metaphor for the perilous choices imposed by cultural assimilation in the New World. [Storr, "Greenberg's Modernism," 175].
Situated in the context of the anti-psychologistic tradition as a whole, however, Greenberg's values seem less quirkily reflective of his own personal predicament.
For a comparison between Greenberg and Adorno, see Compagnon, The Five Paradoxes of Modernity, 47. Adorno's position was less internalist than Compagnon suggests, although he was a critic of vulgar Marxist reductionism.
63. See Shusterman, T. S. Eliot and the Philosophy of Criticism, for comparisons with Gadamer and Rorty.
64. See de Duve, Pictorial Nominalism. See also his recent essay, "Echoes of the Readymade: Critique of Pure Modernism," October 70 (fall 1994): 61-98.
65. Nor was he attracted to Cézanne's project of revealing a primordial ontology of visuality, prior to the split between subject and object. See Jean-François Lyotard, Les Transformateurs Duchamp (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1977), 68.
66. Werner Hofmann, "Marcel Duchamp and Emblematic Realism," in Marcel Duchamp in Perspective, ed. Joseph Masheck (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975), 61.
67. An account of Duchamp's lecture in Houston at a conference on "The Creative Act" and the discussion that followed is contained in Marcel Duchamp: Work and Life, ed. Pontus Hulten (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), under the listing for April 5, 1957; he liberally cites Eliot. The remark was made to Lawrence D. Steefel, Jr., and is cited in his "Dimension and Development in The Passage from the Virgin to the Bride," in Masheck, ed., Marcel Duchamp in Perspective, 97.
68. For an analysis of Duchamp's function as the paradoxical (male) master of a tradition that eschews father res, see Amelia Jones, Postmodernism and the Engendering of Marcel Duchamp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
69. See, for example, Rosalind E. Krauss, The Optical Unconscious (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), chapter three, in which Duchamp is presented as introducing carnal desire rather than cerebral reflexivity into his art. She explicitly contrasts his work to the ascetic, contemplative aesthetics of Bloomsbury theorists such as Robert Fry, which she claims was derived from G. E. Moore's anti-psychologistic ethics. A very different account, which nonetheless also stresses the psychological sources of his work, can be found in Jerrold Seigel, The Private Worlds of Marcel Duchamp (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). According to Seigel, "behind Duchamp's claim to have devoted his career to destabilizing his personality, countering the pull of taste and habit with an aesthetic of indifference and avoiding the trap of fixed identity by his various stages of self-contradiction, there lurked an uncompromising exaltation of the self" (The Private Worlds of Marcel Duchamp, 206). This self, however, was less a sovereign maker than a chooser, who worked with the "givens" provided by chance or the debris of the culture around him.
70. The German philosopher Odo Marquard has argued that a "second psychologism" can be discerned as early as the dissemination of psychoanalysis almost a century ago. See his Transcendentaler Idealismus, Romantische Naturphilosophie, Psychoanalysis (Cologne: Verlag für Philosophie J. Dinter, 1987).
71. Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); John Guillory, Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
72. See, for example, the essays in The Institution of Philosophy: A Discipline in Crisis? ed. Avner Cohen and Marcelo Dascal (Lasalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989).
73. See, for example, Wilhelm Wundt, "Psychologismus und Logizismus," in his Kleine Schriften, vol. 1 (Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann, 1910), 511-634.
74. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 168.
75. Shusterman, T. S. Eliot and the Philosophy of Criticism, chapter eight. In an earlier essay, "Remembering Hulme: A Neglected Philosopher-Critic-Poet," Shusterman tries to do the same for the re who has been taken as the quintessential anti-psychologist. His evidence, however, is basically limited to one aphorism in the unfinished collection entitled Cinders, which Herbert Read included in Speculations, which begins "The truth is that there are no ultimate principles, upon which the whole of knowledge can be built once and for ever as upon a rock . . . " (Hulme, Speculations, 233-34). On this basis, Shusterman claims Hulme was close to Rorty in his anti-foundationalist stress on the priority of Weltanschauungen to absolute truth. Putting aside the performative contradiction entailed in a sentence against absolute truth that begins "the truth is . . . , " Hulme, it seems to me, was attacking the humanist pretension to combine cognitive, ethical, and religious knowledge in one grand system, not the possibility of foundations in separate spheres. His appeal for strict discontinuity between those spheres and belief in the authority of revealed religion in value questions makes him a far cry from Rorty's philosophy of relativist edification.
76. Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 12f.
77. On Paul de Man's reaction to New Criticism in these terms, see Lindsay Waters, introduction to Paul de Man, Critical Writings, 1953-1978, ed. Lindsay Waters (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), xl-lix.
78. See, for example, Roman Ingarden's essay "Psychologism and Psychology," New Literary History (winter 1974): 215-23, for an attempt to distinguish between reductionist psychologism and the subtle use of psychological insights, which respect the relative integrity of the work.
79. Mohanty, Husserl and Frege, 115.
80. It is for this reason that many commentators see Surrealism in certain of its guises as an anticipation of many postmodernist positions. See, for example, Hal Foster, Compulsive Beauty (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993).
81.For example, Mohanty, Husserl and Frege.
82. See, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).
83. For Derrida on Marx, see his Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994).
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--- layout: post authors: ["Raniere Silva"] title: "Fee Waivers and Discounted Fees" date: 2015-08-24 time: "14:00:00" tags: ["Steering Committee"] ---
A couple of weeks ago the Steering Committee met in person and one of the topics discussed was fee waivers and discounted fees for workshops and instructor training. Continue reading for our conclusions.
In the past, Software Carpentry has granted fee waivers and discounted fees in several cases when our staff was involved in finding instructors for a workshop. For example, Software Carpentry has waived the fees for the Workshops for Women in Science and Engineering (WISE) because these events contribute to closing the gender gap in computational science. The SCF has also waived fees for workshops run in countries with weak economies and relatively lower expenditures on research and development.
Software Carpentry has decided we will grant waivers and discounted fees to workshops
To help ensure that any workshop given a waiver or a discount was accessible to the maximum number of learners, the Foundation asks that the host presents documented information about the total costs and total income (from entry fees, if they charge them) from running the workshop. This implies that hosts may charge an entry fee of participants while still getting a discount or a waiver, as long as entry fees go directly to fund the costs of the workshop. These can include, but are not limited to:
As a long term goal, the foundation hopes to be able to give financial help for a few workshops and instructors training each year.


Chicken Run
Every once in a while a so-called children's movie comes along that's NOT some wicked preachy/ goofy musical/promotion for a line of toys and video games. That's what "Chicken Run" is - a beautifully animated lighthearted comedy that will pretty much be considered a kid's movie but you don't have to be eight years old to like it.
Instead of employing computer animation this movie instead uses the seemingly forgotten art of claymation. Not that there's anything wrong with cartoon and computer animation but this gives the film a refreshing appeal in today's movie market.
The story revolves around a large group of chickens on an egg farm in England. The story is told from the chickens' point of view so of course we sympathize with their plight of trying to escape. They are lead by Ginger, who dreams of freedom but whose repeated escape attempts always fail. One day an American rooster named Rockey Rhodes ends up in the pen with them and claims he can teach them to fly out of there.
For the most part, the "story" is predictable, but the way it's told has such a smooth style it's very enjoyable. There's a lot of comedy here, both the generic slapstick but there's a lot of layers to satire that appear upon closer inspection. It's not the most thematic movie ever made, but there's nothing wrong with it either.
GRADE: B
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Chromaticity is a color palette creation tool that focuses on design problems that require the use of perceptual color spaces.
The aim of Chromaticity is to fill the current void of manual color palette design tools that are geared towards perceptual design. Tools like Adobe Color are fantastic for general design, but don't provide support for Lab or Jab. Other tools like paletton do a fantastic job at porting Adobe Color's idea to model color vision deficiencies, but do not provide a comprehensive platform for selecting colors for visualization applications. In contrast, Chromaticity affords many of the design capabilities of both tools, while also providing more robust support for many common tasks when choosing colors for visualization design. For instance, looking at whether colors are noticeably different or creating perceptually grounded sequential palettes.
Perceptual color spaces are different than digital color spaces like RGB or CYM, which model digital or print delivery of color. RGB is an additive color space that is modeled after how monitors and many other electronics emit or record color: by differing amounts of red, green, and blue lights. CYM is a subtractive color space that is modeled after how many printing methods use mixtures of cyan, yellow, and magenta pigments to create color.
In contrast, perceptual color spaces model how the human brain perceives color. Chromaticity provides two similar models. One, CIELAB is the current common standard for design in perceptual color spaces. CIELAB is more commonly refered to as just "Lab" in practice. The other is a color space called Jab, which is part of the CIECAM02-UCS color appearance model (more on that later).
Both Lab and Jab are modeled after opponent processing theory, and define color based on lightness (L* or J*), redness-to-greenness (a*), and blueness-to-yellowness (b*). Another key part of both color spaces is that they both approximate perceptual uniformity. In other words, the distance between any two colors actually carries meaning: it approximates how easily the human brain can differentiate them. The main difference between Lab and Jab is that Jab is an updated model that provides better approximations, and this also means its layout is a bit different, which you can see in the color picker. Perceptual uniformity also highlights why Lab and Jab are different from RGB and CYM, as distance doesn't relate to perceptual similarity in RGB and CYM. This is a critical difference if you are selecting colors for a design project where color distance encodes meaning, or if colors need to be legibly different.
Wait, but if Jab is an updated version of Lab, why should we even bother using Lab? The biggest reason is that it is still unclear whether using CIECAM02-UCS has any practical benefit over CIELAB. CIECAM02-UCS was made to be more precise, but if you make online content that will be viewed across hundreds of different kinds of devices and viewing conditions compared to a controlled perception laboratory, CIECAM02-UCS's increased precision may not be of practical value. Another reason is that providing both color spaces gives more flexibility to designers. Because the two color spaces position colors differently, it gives designers more options for color appearences since, for example, creating sequential scales in both between the same two colors can look very different.
If you want to learn more about CIECAM02-UCS or use it in your own projects, check out the d3-cam02 D3 module or the colorspacious Python library.
Chromaticity's color picker supports color selection in four color spaces: Lab (CIELAB), LCh (CIELCh), Jab (CIECAM02-UCS), and RGB.
You can save a selected palette by clicking the "+" button.


{% extends 'base.html' %} {% block activetab %}
TACC Reactors provide users with a scalable "serverless" computing platform based on Docker container technology and the Actor Model of concurrent computation. The opensource Abaco web service underpins the Reactors service:
Every TACC rector is associated with a Docker image, and registering a reactor is as simple as specifying a valid image on the Docker Hub. Once registered, a TACC Reactor is assigned an ID and gets a Messages Inbox URL associated with that ID. Sending a POST request to a rector's inbox URL queues a container execution where the message payload of the POST request is injected into the container at runtime.
The system can handle thousands of concurrent messages to a reactor's inbox; the messages will be queued internally and the containers will be launched sequentially. Thus, reactors can be used to "respond to events" using the webhooks paradigm. Morevover, TACC Reactor containers are authenticated with a short-term access token representing the user who registered the reactor enabling them to access any of TACC's APIs. Additionally, reactor containers have access to other TACC resources such as the user's home directory on the work file system.
For more information, see the Reactor Turorial or User Guide


"I totally just hacked the Gibson." @1337807 #rubyonales 3/6/2015, 6:31:01 PM Favs: 3 Retweets: 0 link


Vodafone's Black Friday Throws a FIFA 20 PS4 Bundle in With an Xperia 5
by Shabana ArifIf long, thin phones are your bag, you're going to love this Vodafone deal that gets you a 500GB PlayStation 4 for free.
Just sign up for a 24-month Unlimited contract for Xperia 5 to get the FIFA 20 500GB PS4 bundle worth £249. The monthly contract price starts from £36 per month with £29 upfront - that's a discount of £23 per month on the usual price, saving you £552 over the course of the contract.

The Xperia 5 was unveiled at IFA 2019 and features the 21:9 CinemaWide Display which offers more screen space. It has a 6.1-inch OLED display with Full HD+ resolution, and HDR.
You can only get the black model at Vodafone, so you're out of luck if you were hoping for grey or blue. Keep up to date with all of the Black Friday deals doing the rounds over on our Black Friday hub.


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Bit twiddling in ANSI Common Lisp
Compare Lisp versus C manipulating 5 bits from a sequence with 7 or more bytes:
(setf bits (ldb (byte 5 7) value))
bits = (word >> 7) & 0x1F;
(setf new-value (dpb bits (byte 5 7) value))
new_value = (value & (~(0x1F << 7)))|((bits & 0x1F) << 7);