Syllabus
LAPIDES v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA et al.
Petitioner, a professor in the Georgia state university system, filed a state-court suit against respondentsthe systems board of regents (hereinafter Georgia or State) and university officials in their personal capacities and as state agentsalleging that the officials had violated state tort law and 42 U. S. C. §1983 when they placed sexual harassment allegations in his personnel files. The defendants removed the case to Federal District Court and then sought dismissal. Conceding that a state statute had waived Georgias sovereign immunity from state-law suits in state court, the State claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in the federal court. The District Court held that Georgia had waived such immunity when it removed the case to federal court. In reversing, the Eleventh Circuit found that, because state law was unclear as to whether the state attorney general had the legal authority to waive Georgias Eleventh Amendment immunity, the State retained the legal right to assert immunity, even after removal.
Held: A State waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity when it removes a case from state court to federal court. Pp. 210.
(a) Because this case does not present a valid federal claim against Georgia, see Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, the answer to the question presented is limited to the context of state-law claims where the State has waived immunity from state-court proceedings. Although absent a federal claim, the Federal District Court might remand the state claims against the State to state court, those claims remain pending in the federal court, which has the discretion to decide the remand question in the first instance. Thus, the question presented is not moot. Pp. 23.
(b) This Court has established the general principle that a States voluntary appearance in federal court amounts to a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436; Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U. S. 565; Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U. S. 273, and has often cited with approval the cases embodying that principle, see, e.g., College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666. Here, Georgia was brought involuntarily into the case as a defendant in state court, but it then voluntarily removed the case to federal court, thus voluntarily invoking that courts jurisdiction. Unless this Court is to abandon the general principle requiring waiver or there is something special about removal in this case, the general principle should apply. Pp. 45.
(c) Contrary to respondents arguments, there is no reason to abandon the general principle. The principle enunciated in Gunter, Gardner, and Clark did not turn on the nature of the relief and is sound as applied to money damages cases such as this. And more recent cases requiring a clear indication of a States intent to waive its immunity, e.g., College Savings Bank, 527 U. S., at 675681, distinguished the kind of constructive waivers repudiated there from waivers effected by litigation conduct, id. , at 681, n. 3. Nor have respondents pointed to a special feature of removal or of this case that would justify taking the case out from the general rule. That Georgia claims a benign motive for removalnot to obtain litigating advantages for itself but to provide the officials sued in their personal capacities with the interlocutory appeal provisions available in federal courtcannot make a critical difference. Motives are difficult to evaluate, while jurisdictional rules should be clear. Because adopting respondents position would permit States to achieve unfair tactical advantages, if not in this case, then in others, see Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U. S. 381, the rationale for applying the general principle is as strong here as elsewhere. Respondents also argue that Georgia is entitled to immunity because state law does not authorize its attorney general to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity and because, in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U. S. 459, a State regained immunity by showing such lack of authorityeven after the State had litigated and lost the case against it. Here, however, Georgia voluntarily invoked the federal courts jurisdiction, while the State in Ford had involuntarily been made a federal-court defendant. This Court has consistently found waiver when a state attorney general, authorized to bring a case in federal court, has voluntarily invoked that courts jurisdiction. More importantly, in large part the rule governing voluntary invocations of federal jurisdiction has rested upon the inconsistency and unfairness that a contrary rule would create. A rule that finds waiver through a state attorney generals invocation of federal-court jurisdiction avoids inconsistency and unfairness, but a rule that, as in Ford, denies waiver despite the attorney generals state-authorized litigating decision does the opposite. For these reasons, Clark, Gunter, and Gardner represent the sounder line of authority, and Ford, which is inconsistent with the basic rationale of those cases, is overruled insofar as it would otherwise apply. Respondents remaining arguments are unconvincing. Pp. 510.
251 F. 3d 1372, reversed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Opinion
PAUL D. LAPIDES, PETITIONER
v.
BOARD OF
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM
OF GEORGIA et al.
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Eleventh Amendment grants a State immunity from suit in federal court by citizens of other States, U. S. Const., Amdt. 11, and by its own citizens as well, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890) . The question before us is whether the States act of removing a lawsuit from state court to federal court waives this immunity. We hold that it does.
I
Paul Lapides, a professor employed by the Georgia state university system, brought this lawsuit in a Georgia state court. He sued respondents, the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia (hereinafter Georgia or State) and university officials acting in both their personal capacities and as agents of the State. Lapides lawsuit alleged that university officials placed allegations of sexual harassment in his personnel files. And Lapides claimed that their doing so violated both Georgia law, see Georgia Tort Claims Act, Ga. Code Ann. §502123 (1994) and federal law, see Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983 (1994 ed., Supp. V).
All defendants joined in removing the case to Federal District Court, 28 U. S. C. §1441 (1994 ed.), where they sought dismissal. Those individuals whom Lapides had sued in their personal capacities argued that the doctrine of qualified immunity barred Lapides federal-law claims against them. And the District Court agreed. The State, while conceding that a state statute had waived sovereign immunity from state-law suits in state court, argued that, by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment, it remained immune from suit in federal court. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 11 (limiting scope of judicial power of the United States (emphasis added)). But the District Court did not agree. Rather, in its view, by removing the case from state to federal court, the State had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 238 (1985) (State may waive Eleventh Amendment immunity).
The State appealed the District Courts Eleventh Amendment ruling. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139, 144145 (1993) (allowing interlocutory appeal). And the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 251 F. 3d 1372 (2001). In its view, state law was, at the least, unclear as to whether the States attorney general possessed the legal authority to waive the States Eleventh Amendment immunity. And, that being so, the State retained the legal right to assert its immunity, even after removal. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U. S. 459 (1945) .
Lapides sought certiorari. We agreed to decide whether a state waive[s] its Eleventh Amendment immunity by its affirmative litigation conduct when it removes a case to federal court … . Pet. for Cert. (i).
It has become clear that we must limit our answer to the context of state-law claims, in respect to which the State has explicitly waived immunity from state-court proceedings. That is because Lapides only federal claim against the State arises under 42 U. S. C. §1983, that claim seeks only monetary damages, and we have held that a State is not a person against whom a §1983 claim for money damages might be asserted. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 66 (1989) . Compare Tr. of Oral Arg. 5758 (asserting that complaint also sought declaratory judgment on the federal claim), with complaint, App. 919 (failing, implicitly or explicitly, to seek any such relief). Hence this case does not present a valid federal claim against the State. Nor need we address the scope of waiver by removal in a situation where the States underlying sovereign immunity from suit has not been waived or abrogated in state court.
It has also become clear that, in the absence of any viable federal claim, the Federal District Court might well remand Lapides state-law tort claims against the State to state court. 28 U. S. C. §1367(c)(3) (1994 ed.). Nonetheless, Lapides state-law tort claims against the State remain pending in Federal District Court, §1367(a), and the law commits the remand question, ordinarily a matter of discretion, to the Federal District Court for decision in the first instance. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693, 712 (1973) . Hence, the question presented is not moot. We possess the legal power here to answer that question as limited to the state-law context just described. And, in light of differences of view among the lower courts, we shall do so. Compare McLaughlin v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges of Colo ., 215 F. 3d 1168, 1171 (CA10 2000) (removal waives immunity regardless of attorney generals state-law waiver authority); and Newfield House, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dept. of Public Welfare , 651 F. 2d 32, 36, n. 3 (CA1 1981) (similar); with Estate of Porter ex rel. Nelson v. Illinois , 36 F. 3d 684, 690691 (CA7 1994) (removal does not waive immunity); Silver v. Baggiano , 804 F. 2d 1211, 1214 (CA11 1986) (similar); and Gwinn Area Community Schools v. Michigan , 741 F. 2d 840, 846847 (CA6 1984) (similar).
II
The Eleventh Amendment provides that the Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit … commenced or prosecuted against one of the … States by citizens of another State, U. S. Const., Amdt. 11, and (as interpreted) by its own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana , 134 U. S. 1 (1890) . A State remains free to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in a federal court. See, e.g ., Atascadero , supra , at 238. And the question before us now is whether a State waives that immunity when it removes a case from state court to federal court.
It would seem anomalous or inconsistent for a State both (1) to invoke federal jurisdiction, thereby contending that the Judicial power of the United States extends to the case at hand, and (2) to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity, thereby denying that the Judicial power of the United States extends to the case at hand. And a Constitution that permitted States to follow their litigation interests by freely asserting both claims in the same case could generate seriously unfair results. Thus, it is not surprising that more than a century ago this Court indicated that a States voluntary appearance in federal court amounted to a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Clark v . Barnard , 108 U. S. 436, 447 (1883) (States voluntary appearance in federal court as an intervenor avoids Eleventh Amendment inquiry). The Court subsequently held, in the context of a bankruptcy claim, that a State waives any immunity . . . respecting the adjudication of a claim that it voluntarily files in federal court. Gardner v . New Jersey , 329 U. S. 565, 574 (1947) . And the Court has made clear in general that where a State voluntarily becomes a party to a cause and submits its rights for judicial determination, it will be bound thereby and cannot escape the result of its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment. Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U. S. 273, 284 (1906) (emphasis added). The Court has long accepted this statement of the law as valid, often citing with approval the cases embodying that principle. See, e.g ., College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, n. 3 (1999) (citing Gardner ); Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare of Mo. v. Department of Public Health and Welfare of Mo ., 411 U. S. 279, and n. 10 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in result) (citing Clark ); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commn , 359 U. S. 275, 276 (1959) (citing Clark ).
In this case, the State was brought involuntarily into the case as a defendant in the original state-court proceedings. But the State then voluntarily agreed to remove the case to federal court. See 28 U. S. C. §1446(a); Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Martin, 178 U. S. 245, 248 (1900) (removal requires the consent of all defendants). In doing so, it voluntarily invoked the federal courts jurisdiction. And unless we are to abandon the general principle just stated, or unless there is something special about removal or about this case, the general legal principle requiring waiver ought to apply.
We see no reason to abandon the general principle. Georgia points out that the cases that stand for the principle, Gunter , Gardner , and Clark , did not involve suits for money damages against the Statethe heart of the Eleventh Amendments concern. But the principle enunciated in those cases did not turn upon the nature of the relief sought. And that principle remains sound as applied to suits for money damages.
Georgia adds that this Court decided Gunter , Gardner , and Clark , before it decided more recent cases, which have required a clear indication of the States intent to waive its immunity. College Savings Bank , 527 U. S., at 675681. But College Savings Bank distinguished the kind of constructive waivers repudiated there from waivers effected by litigation conduct. Id. , at 681, n. 3. And this makes sense because an interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment that finds waiver in the litigation context rests upon the Amendments presumed recognition of the judicial need to avoid inconsistency, anomaly, and unfairness, and not upon a States actual preference or desire, which might, after all, favor selective use of immunity to achieve litigation advantages. See Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U. S. 381, 393 (1998) ( Kennedy , J., concurring). The relevant clarity here must focus on the litigation act the State takes that creates the waiver. And that actremovalis clear.
Nor has Georgia pointed to any special feature, either of removal or of this case, that would justify taking the case out from under the general rule. Georgia argues that its motive for removal was benign. It agreed to remove, not in order to obtain litigating advantages for itself, but to provide its co-defendants, the officials sued in their personal capacities, with the generous interlocutory appeal provisions available in federal, but not in state, court. Compare Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U. S. 511, 524530 (1985) (authorizing interlocutory appeal of adverse qualified immunity determination), with Turner v. Giles , 264 Ga. 812, 813, 450 S. E. 2d 421, 424 (1994) (limiting interlocutory appeals to those certified by trial court). And it intended, from the beginning, to return to state court, when and if its co-defendants had achieved their own legal victory.
A benign motive, however, cannot make the critical difference for which Georgia hopes. Motives are difficult to evaluate, while jurisdictional rules should be clear. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf , 240 U. S. 403, 426 (1916) (Holmes, J., concurring). To adopt the States Eleventh Amendment position would permit States to achieve unfair tactical advantage[s,] if not in this case, in others. See Schacht, supra, 393394, 398 ( Kennedy , J., concurring); cf. ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts 366367 (1968) (discussing the unfairness of allowing one who has invoked federal jurisdiction subsequently to challenge that jurisdiction). And that being so, the rationale for applying the general voluntary invocation principle is as strong here, in the context of removal, as elsewhere.
More importantly, Georgia argues that state law, while authorizing its attorney general [t]o represent the state in all civil actions tried in any court, Ga. Code Ann. §45153(6) (1990); see Ga. Const., Art. 5, §3, ¶4, does not authorize the attorney general to waive the States Eleventh Amendment immunity, Ga. Const., Art. I, §2, ¶4, IV(e), (f), reprinted in 2 Ga. Code Ann. (Supp. 1996). Georgia adds that in Ford, 323 U. S. 459, this Court unanimously interpreted roughly similar state laws similarly, that the Court held that no properly authorized executive or administrative officer of the state has waived the states immunity, 328 U. S., at 469, and that it sustained an Eleventh Amendment defense raised for the first time after a State had litigated a claim brought against it in federal court and lost. That is to say, in Ford a State regained immunity by showing the attorney generals lack of statutory authority to waiveeven after the State litigated and lost a case brought against it in federal court. Why, then, asks Georgia, can it not regain immunity in the same way, even after it removed its case to federal court?
The short answer to this question is that this case involves a State that voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of the federal court, while Ford involved a State that a private plaintiff had involuntarily made a defendant in federal court. This Court consistently has found a waiver when a States attorney general, authorized (as here) to bring a case in federal court, has voluntarily invoked that courts jurisdiction. See Gardner , 329 U. S., at 574575; Gunter , 200 U. S., at 285289, 292; cf. Clark , 108 U. S., at 447448 (not inquiring into attorney generals authority). And the Eleventh Amendment waiver rules are different when a States federal court participation is involuntary. See Hans v. Louisiana , 134 U. S. 1 (1890) ; cf. U. S. Const., Amdt. 11 (discussing suits commenced or prosecuted against a State).
But there is a more important answer. In large part the rule governing voluntary invocations of federal jurisdiction has rested upon the problems of inconsistency and unfairness that a contrary rule of law would create. Gunter, supra, at 284. And that determination reflects a belief that neither those who wrote the Eleventh Amendment nor the States themselves (insofar as they authorize litigation in federal courts) would intend to create that unfairness. As in analogous contexts, in which such matters are questions of federal law, cf., e.g. , Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U. S. 425, n. 5 (1997), whether a particular set of state laws, rules, or activities amounts to a waiver of the States Eleventh Amendment immunity is a question of federal law. A rule of federal law that finds waiver through a state attorney generals invocation of federal-court jurisdiction avoids inconsistency and unfairness. A rule of federal law that, as in Ford , denies waiver despite the state attorney generals state-authorized litigating decision, does the opposite. For these reasons one Member of this Court has called for Ford s reexamination. Schacht , supra, at 394, 397 ( Kennedy , J., concurring). And for these same reasons, we conclude that Clark , Gunter , and Gardner represent the sounder line of authority. Finding Ford inconsistent with the basic rationale of that line of cases, we consequently overrule Ford insofar as it would otherwise apply.
The State makes several other arguments, none of which we find convincing. It points to cases in which this Court has permitted the United States to enter into a case voluntarily without giving up immunity or to assert immunity despite a previous effort to waive. See United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506 (1940) ; United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495 (1940) ; see also Oklahoma Tax Commn v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U. S. 505 (1991) . Those cases, however, do not involve the Eleventh Amendmenta specific text with a history that focuses upon the States sovereignty vis-à-vis the Federal Government. And each case involves special circumstances not at issue here, for example, an effort by a sovereign ( i.e ., the United States) to seek the protection of its own courts ( i.e ., the federal courts), or an effort to protect an Indian tribe.
Finally, Georgia says that our conclusion will prove confusing, for States will have to guess what conduct might be deemed a waiver in order to avoid accidental waivers. But we believe the rule is a clear one, easily applied by both federal courts and the States themselves. It says that removal is a form of voluntary invocation of a federal courts jurisdiction sufficient to waive the States otherwise valid objection to litigation of a matter (here of state law) in a federal forum. As Justice Kennedy has pointed out, once the States know or have reason to expect that removal will constitute a waiver, then it is easy enough to presume that an attorney authorized to represent the State can bind it to the jurisdiction of the federal court (for Eleventh Amendment purposes) by the consent to removal. See Schacht , 524 U. S., at 397 (concurring opinion).
We conclude that the States action joining the removing of this case to federal court waived its Eleventh Amendment immunitythough, as we have said, the District Court may well find that this case, now raising only state-law issues, should nonetheless be remanded to the state courts for determination. 28 U. S. C. §1367(c)(3).
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Opinion
PAUL D. LAPIDES, PETITIONER
v.
BOARD OF
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM
OF GEORGIA et al.
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Eleventh Amendment grants a State immunity from suit in federal court by citizens of other States, U. S. Const., Amdt. 11, and by its own citizens as well, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890) . The question before us is whether the States act of removing a lawsuit from state court to federal court waives this immunity. We hold that it does.
I
Paul Lapides, a professor employed by the Georgia state university system, brought this lawsuit in a Georgia state court. He sued respondents, the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia (hereinafter Georgia or State) and university officials acting in both their personal capacities and as agents of the State. Lapides lawsuit alleged that university officials placed allegations of sexual harassment in his personnel files. And Lapides claimed that their doing so violated both Georgia law, see Georgia Tort Claims Act, Ga. Code Ann. §502123 (1994) and federal law, see Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983 (1994 ed., Supp. V).
All defendants joined in removing the case to Federal District Court, 28 U. S. C. §1441 (1994 ed.), where they sought dismissal. Those individuals whom Lapides had sued in their personal capacities argued that the doctrine of qualified immunity barred Lapides federal-law claims against them. And the District Court agreed. The State, while conceding that a state statute had waived sovereign immunity from state-law suits in state court, argued that, by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment, it remained immune from suit in federal court. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 11 (limiting scope of judicial power of the United States (emphasis added)). But the District Court did not agree. Rather, in its view, by removing the case from state to federal court, the State had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 238 (1985) (State may waive Eleventh Amendment immunity).
The State appealed the District Courts Eleventh Amendment ruling. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139, 144145 (1993) (allowing interlocutory appeal). And the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 251 F. 3d 1372 (2001). In its view, state law was, at the least, unclear as to whether the States attorney general possessed the legal authority to waive the States Eleventh Amendment immunity. And, that being so, the State retained the legal right to assert its immunity, even after removal. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U. S. 459 (1945) .
Lapides sought certiorari. We agreed to decide whether a state waive[s] its Eleventh Amendment immunity by its affirmative litigation conduct when it removes a case to federal court … . Pet. for Cert. (i).
It has become clear that we must limit our answer to the context of state-law claims, in respect to which the State has explicitly waived immunity from state-court proceedings. That is because Lapides only federal claim against the State arises under 42 U. S. C. §1983, that claim seeks only monetary damages, and we have held that a State is not a person against whom a §1983 claim for money damages might be asserted. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 66 (1989) . Compare Tr. of Oral Arg. 5758 (asserting that complaint also sought declaratory judgment on the federal claim), with complaint, App. 919 (failing, implicitly or explicitly, to seek any such relief). Hence this case does not present a valid federal claim against the State. Nor need we address the scope of waiver by removal in a situation where the States underlying sovereign immunity from suit has not been waived or abrogated in state court.
It has also become clear that, in the absence of any viable federal claim, the Federal District Court might well remand Lapides state-law tort claims against the State to state court. 28 U. S. C. §1367(c)(3) (1994 ed.). Nonetheless, Lapides state-law tort claims against the State remain pending in Federal District Court, §1367(a), and the law commits the remand question, ordinarily a matter of discretion, to the Federal District Court for decision in the first instance. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693, 712 (1973) . Hence, the question presented is not moot. We possess the legal power here to answer that question as limited to the state-law context just described. And, in light of differences of view among the lower courts, we shall do so. Compare McLaughlin v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges of Colo ., 215 F. 3d 1168, 1171 (CA10 2000) (removal waives immunity regardless of attorney generals state-law waiver authority); and Newfield House, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dept. of Public Welfare , 651 F. 2d 32, 36, n. 3 (CA1 1981) (similar); with Estate of Porter ex rel. Nelson v. Illinois , 36 F. 3d 684, 690691 (CA7 1994) (removal does not waive immunity); Silver v. Baggiano , 804 F. 2d 1211, 1214 (CA11 1986) (similar); and Gwinn Area Community Schools v. Michigan , 741 F. 2d 840, 846847 (CA6 1984) (similar).
II
The Eleventh Amendment provides that the Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit … commenced or prosecuted against one of the … States by citizens of another State, U. S. Const., Amdt. 11, and (as interpreted) by its own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana , 134 U. S. 1 (1890) . A State remains free to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in a federal court. See, e.g ., Atascadero , supra , at 238. And the question before us now is whether a State waives that immunity when it removes a case from state court to federal court.
It would seem anomalous or inconsistent for a State both (1) to invoke federal jurisdiction, thereby contending that the Judicial power of the United States extends to the case at hand, and (2) to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity, thereby denying that the Judicial power of the United States extends to the case at hand. And a Constitution that permitted States to follow their litigation interests by freely asserting both claims in the same case could generate seriously unfair results. Thus, it is not surprising that more than a century ago this Court indicated that a States voluntary appearance in federal court amounted to a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Clark v . Barnard , 108 U. S. 436, 447 (1883) (States voluntary appearance in federal court as an intervenor avoids Eleventh Amendment inquiry). The Court subsequently held, in the context of a bankruptcy claim, that a State waives any immunity . . . respecting the adjudication of a claim that it voluntarily files in federal court. Gardner v . New Jersey , 329 U. S. 565, 574 (1947) . And the Court has made clear in general that where a State voluntarily becomes a party to a cause and submits its rights for judicial determination, it will be bound thereby and cannot escape the result of its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment. Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U. S. 273, 284 (1906) (emphasis added). The Court has long accepted this statement of the law as valid, often citing with approval the cases embodying that principle. See, e.g ., College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, n. 3 (1999) (citing Gardner ); Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare of Mo. v. Department of Public Health and Welfare of Mo ., 411 U. S. 279, and n. 10 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in result) (citing Clark ); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commn , 359 U. S. 275, 276 (1959) (citing Clark ).
In this case, the State was brought involuntarily into the case as a defendant in the original state-court proceedings. But the State then voluntarily agreed to remove the case to federal court. See 28 U. S. C. §1446(a); Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Martin, 178 U. S. 245, 248 (1900) (removal requires the consent of all defendants). In doing so, it voluntarily invoked the federal courts jurisdiction. And unless we are to abandon the general principle just stated, or unless there is something special about removal or about this case, the general legal principle requiring waiver ought to apply.
We see no reason to abandon the general principle. Georgia points out that the cases that stand for the principle, Gunter , Gardner , and Clark , did not involve suits for money damages against the Statethe heart of the Eleventh Amendments concern. But the principle enunciated in those cases did not turn upon the nature of the relief sought. And that principle remains sound as applied to suits for money damages.
Georgia adds that this Court decided Gunter , Gardner , and Clark , before it decided more recent cases, which have required a clear indication of the States intent to waive its immunity. College Savings Bank , 527 U. S., at 675681. But College Savings Bank distinguished the kind of constructive waivers repudiated there from waivers effected by litigation conduct. Id. , at 681, n. 3. And this makes sense because an interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment that finds waiver in the litigation context rests upon the Amendments presumed recognition of the judicial need to avoid inconsistency, anomaly, and unfairness, and not upon a States actual preference or desire, which might, after all, favor selective use of immunity to achieve litigation advantages. See Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U. S. 381, 393 (1998) ( Kennedy , J., concurring). The relevant clarity here must focus on the litigation act the State takes that creates the waiver. And that actremovalis clear.
Nor has Georgia pointed to any special feature, either of removal or of this case, that would justify taking the case out from under the general rule. Georgia argues that its motive for removal was benign. It agreed to remove, not in order to obtain litigating advantages for itself, but to provide its co-defendants, the officials sued in their personal capacities, with the generous interlocutory appeal provisions available in federal, but not in state, court. Compare Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U. S. 511, 524530 (1985) (authorizing interlocutory appeal of adverse qualified immunity determination), with Turner v. Giles , 264 Ga. 812, 813, 450 S. E. 2d 421, 424 (1994) (limiting interlocutory appeals to those certified by trial court). And it intended, from the beginning, to return to state court, when and if its co-defendants had achieved their own legal victory.
A benign motive, however, cannot make the critical difference for which Georgia hopes. Motives are difficult to evaluate, while jurisdictional rules should be clear. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf , 240 U. S. 403, 426 (1916) (Holmes, J., concurring). To adopt the States Eleventh Amendment position would permit States to achieve unfair tactical advantage[s,] if not in this case, in others. See Schacht, supra, 393394, 398 ( Kennedy , J., concurring); cf. ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts 366367 (1968) (discussing the unfairness of allowing one who has invoked federal jurisdiction subsequently to challenge that jurisdiction). And that being so, the rationale for applying the general voluntary invocation principle is as strong here, in the context of removal, as elsewhere.
More importantly, Georgia argues that state law, while authorizing its attorney general [t]o represent the state in all civil actions tried in any court, Ga. Code Ann. §45153(6) (1990); see Ga. Const., Art. 5, §3, ¶4, does not authorize the attorney general to waive the States Eleventh Amendment immunity, Ga. Const., Art. I, §2, ¶4, IV(e), (f), reprinted in 2 Ga. Code Ann. (Supp. 1996). Georgia adds that in Ford, 323 U. S. 459, this Court unanimously interpreted roughly similar state laws similarly, that the Court held that no properly authorized executive or administrative officer of the state has waived the states immunity, 328 U. S., at 469, and that it sustained an Eleventh Amendment defense raised for the first time after a State had litigated a claim brought against it in federal court and lost. That is to say, in Ford a State regained immunity by showing the attorney generals lack of statutory authority to waiveeven after the State litigated and lost a case brought against it in federal court. Why, then, asks Georgia, can it not regain immunity in the same way, even after it removed its case to federal court?
The short answer to this question is that this case involves a State that voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of the federal court, while Ford involved a State that a private plaintiff had involuntarily made a defendant in federal court. This Court consistently has found a waiver when a States attorney general, authorized (as here) to bring a case in federal court, has voluntarily invoked that courts jurisdiction. See Gardner , 329 U. S., at 574575; Gunter , 200 U. S., at 285289, 292; cf. Clark , 108 U. S., at 447448 (not inquiring into attorney generals authority). And the Eleventh Amendment waiver rules are different when a States federal court participation is involuntary. See Hans v. Louisiana , 134 U. S. 1 (1890) ; cf. U. S. Const., Amdt. 11 (discussing suits commenced or prosecuted against a State).
But there is a more important answer. In large part the rule governing voluntary invocations of federal jurisdiction has rested upon the problems of inconsistency and unfairness that a contrary rule of law would create. Gunter, supra, at 284. And that determination reflects a belief that neither those who wrote the Eleventh Amendment nor the States themselves (insofar as they authorize litigation in federal courts) would intend to create that unfairness. As in analogous contexts, in which such matters are questions of federal law, cf., e.g. , Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U. S. 425, n. 5 (1997), whether a particular set of state laws, rules, or activities amounts to a waiver of the States Eleventh Amendment immunity is a question of federal law. A rule of federal law that finds waiver through a state attorney generals invocation of federal-court jurisdiction avoids inconsistency and unfairness. A rule of federal law that, as in Ford , denies waiver despite the state attorney generals state-authorized litigating decision, does the opposite. For these reasons one Member of this Court has called for Ford s reexamination. Schacht , supra, at 394, 397 ( Kennedy , J., concurring). And for these same reasons, we conclude that Clark , Gunter , and Gardner represent the sounder line of authority. Finding Ford inconsistent with the basic rationale of that line of cases, we consequently overrule Ford insofar as it would otherwise apply.
The State makes several other arguments, none of which we find convincing. It points to cases in which this Court has permitted the United States to enter into a case voluntarily without giving up immunity or to assert immunity despite a previous effort to waive. See United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506 (1940) ; United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495 (1940) ; see also Oklahoma Tax Commn v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U. S. 505 (1991) . Those cases, however, do not involve the Eleventh Amendmenta specific text with a history that focuses upon the States sovereignty vis-à-vis the Federal Government. And each case involves special circumstances not at issue here, for example, an effort by a sovereign ( i.e ., the United States) to seek the protection of its own courts ( i.e ., the federal courts), or an effort to protect an Indian tribe.
Finally, Georgia says that our conclusion will prove confusing, for States will have to guess what conduct might be deemed a waiver in order to avoid accidental waivers. But we believe the rule is a clear one, easily applied by both federal courts and the States themselves. It says that removal is a form of voluntary invocation of a federal courts jurisdiction sufficient to waive the States otherwise valid objection to litigation of a matter (here of state law) in a federal forum. As Justice Kennedy has pointed out, once the States know or have reason to expect that removal will constitute a waiver, then it is easy enough to presume that an attorney authorized to represent the State can bind it to the jurisdiction of the federal court (for Eleventh Amendment purposes) by the consent to removal. See Schacht , 524 U. S., at 397 (concurring opinion).
We conclude that the States action joining the removing of this case to federal court waived its Eleventh Amendment immunitythough, as we have said, the District Court may well find that this case, now raising only state-law issues, should nonetheless be remanded to the state courts for determination. 28 U. S. C. §1367(c)(3).
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Opinion
PAUL D. LAPIDES, PETITIONER
v.
BOARD OF
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM
OF GEORGIA et al.
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Eleventh Amendment grants a State immunity from suit in federal court by citizens of other States, U. S. Const., Amdt. 11, and by its own citizens as well, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890) . The question before us is whether the States act of removing a lawsuit from state court to federal court waives this immunity. We hold that it does.
I
Paul Lapides, a professor employed by the Georgia state university system, brought this lawsuit in a Georgia state court. He sued respondents, the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia (hereinafter Georgia or State) and university officials acting in both their personal capacities and as agents of the State. Lapides lawsuit alleged that university officials placed allegations of sexual harassment in his personnel files. And Lapides claimed that their doing so violated both Georgia law, see Georgia Tort Claims Act, Ga. Code Ann. §502123 (1994) and federal law, see Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983 (1994 ed., Supp. V).
All defendants joined in removing the case to Federal District Court, 28 U. S. C. §1441 (1994 ed.), where they sought dismissal. Those individuals whom Lapides had sued in their personal capacities argued that the doctrine of qualified immunity barred Lapides federal-law claims against them. And the District Court agreed. The State, while conceding that a state statute had waived sovereign immunity from state-law suits in state court, argued that, by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment, it remained immune from suit in federal court. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 11 (limiting scope of judicial power of the United States (emphasis added)). But the District Court did not agree. Rather, in its view, by removing the case from state to federal court, the State had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 238 (1985) (State may waive Eleventh Amendment immunity).
The State appealed the District Courts Eleventh Amendment ruling. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139, 144145 (1993) (allowing interlocutory appeal). And the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 251 F. 3d 1372 (2001). In its view, state law was, at the least, unclear as to whether the States attorney general possessed the legal authority to waive the States Eleventh Amendment immunity. And, that being so, the State retained the legal right to assert its immunity, even after removal. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U. S. 459 (1945) .
Lapides sought certiorari. We agreed to decide whether a state waive[s] its Eleventh Amendment immunity by its affirmative litigation conduct when it removes a case to federal court … . Pet. for Cert. (i).
It has become clear that we must limit our answer to the context of state-law claims, in respect to which the State has explicitly waived immunity from state-court proceedings. That is because Lapides only federal claim against the State arises under 42 U. S. C. §1983, that claim seeks only monetary damages, and we have held that a State is not a person against whom a §1983 claim for money damages might be asserted. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 66 (1989) . Compare Tr. of Oral Arg. 5758 (asserting that complaint also sought declaratory judgment on the federal claim), with complaint, App. 919 (failing, implicitly or explicitly, to seek any such relief). Hence this case does not present a valid federal claim against the State. Nor need we address the scope of waiver by removal in a situation where the States underlying sovereign immunity from suit has not been waived or abrogated in state court.
It has also become clear that, in the absence of any viable federal claim, the Federal District Court might well remand Lapides state-law tort claims against the State to state court. 28 U. S. C. §1367(c)(3) (1994 ed.). Nonetheless, Lapides state-law tort claims against the State remain pending in Federal District Court, §1367(a), and the law commits the remand question, ordinarily a matter of discretion, to the Federal District Court for decision in the first instance. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693, 712 (1973) . Hence, the question presented is not moot. We possess the legal power here to answer that question as limited to the state-law context just described. And, in light of differences of view among the lower courts, we shall do so. Compare McLaughlin v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges of Colo ., 215 F. 3d 1168, 1171 (CA10 2000) (removal waives immunity regardless of attorney generals state-law waiver authority); and Newfield House, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dept. of Public Welfare , 651 F. 2d 32, 36, n. 3 (CA1 1981) (similar); with Estate of Porter ex rel. Nelson v. Illinois , 36 F. 3d 684, 690691 (CA7 1994) (removal does not waive immunity); Silver v. Baggiano , 804 F. 2d 1211, 1214 (CA11 1986) (similar); and Gwinn Area Community Schools v. Michigan , 741 F. 2d 840, 846847 (CA6 1984) (similar).
II
The Eleventh Amendment provides that the Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit … commenced or prosecuted against one of the … States by citizens of another State, U. S. Const., Amdt. 11, and (as interpreted) by its own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana , 134 U. S. 1 (1890) . A State remains free to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in a federal court. See, e.g ., Atascadero , supra , at 238. And the question before us now is whether a State waives that immunity when it removes a case from state court to federal court.
It would seem anomalous or inconsistent for a State both (1) to invoke federal jurisdiction, thereby contending that the Judicial power of the United States extends to the case at hand, and (2) to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity, thereby denying that the Judicial power of the United States extends to the case at hand. And a Constitution that permitted States to follow their litigation interests by freely asserting both claims in the same case could generate seriously unfair results. Thus, it is not surprising that more than a century ago this Court indicated that a States voluntary appearance in federal court amounted to a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Clark v . Barnard , 108 U. S. 436, 447 (1883) (States voluntary appearance in federal court as an intervenor avoids Eleventh Amendment inquiry). The Court subsequently held, in the context of a bankruptcy claim, that a State waives any immunity . . . respecting the adjudication of a claim that it voluntarily files in federal court. Gardner v . New Jersey , 329 U. S. 565, 574 (1947) . And the Court has made clear in general that where a State voluntarily becomes a party to a cause and submits its rights for judicial determination, it will be bound thereby and cannot escape the result of its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment. Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U. S. 273, 284 (1906) (emphasis added). The Court has long accepted this statement of the law as valid, often citing with approval the cases embodying that principle. See, e.g ., College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, n. 3 (1999) (citing Gardner ); Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare of Mo. v. Department of Public Health and Welfare of Mo ., 411 U. S. 279, and n. 10 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in result) (citing Clark ); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commn , 359 U. S. 275, 276 (1959) (citing Clark ).
In this case, the State was brought involuntarily into the case as a defendant in the original state-court proceedings. But the State then voluntarily agreed to remove the case to federal court. See 28 U. S. C. §1446(a); Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Martin, 178 U. S. 245, 248 (1900) (removal requires the consent of all defendants). In doing so, it voluntarily invoked the federal courts jurisdiction. And unless we are to abandon the general principle just stated, or unless there is something special about removal or about this case, the general legal principle requiring waiver ought to apply.
We see no reason to abandon the general principle. Georgia points out that the cases that stand for the principle, Gunter , Gardner , and Clark , did not involve suits for money damages against the Statethe heart of the Eleventh Amendments concern. But the principle enunciated in those cases did not turn upon the nature of the relief sought. And that principle remains sound as applied to suits for money damages.
Georgia adds that this Court decided Gunter , Gardner , and Clark , before it decided more recent cases, which have required a clear indication of the States intent to waive its immunity. College Savings Bank , 527 U. S., at 675681. But College Savings Bank distinguished the kind of constructive waivers repudiated there from waivers effected by litigation conduct. Id. , at 681, n. 3. And this makes sense because an interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment that finds waiver in the litigation context rests upon the Amendments presumed recognition of the judicial need to avoid inconsistency, anomaly, and unfairness, and not upon a States actual preference or desire, which might, after all, favor selective use of immunity to achieve litigation advantages. See Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U. S. 381, 393 (1998) ( Kennedy , J., concurring). The relevant clarity here must focus on the litigation act the State takes that creates the waiver. And that actremovalis clear.
Nor has Georgia pointed to any special feature, either of removal or of this case, that would justify taking the case out from under the general rule. Georgia argues that its motive for removal was benign. It agreed to remove, not in order to obtain litigating advantages for itself, but to provide its co-defendants, the officials sued in their personal capacities, with the generous interlocutory appeal provisions available in federal, but not in state, court. Compare Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U. S. 511, 524530 (1985) (authorizing interlocutory appeal of adverse qualified immunity determination), with Turner v. Giles , 264 Ga. 812, 813, 450 S. E. 2d 421, 424 (1994) (limiting interlocutory appeals to those certified by trial court). And it intended, from the beginning, to return to state court, when and if its co-defendants had achieved their own legal victory.
A benign motive, however, cannot make the critical difference for which Georgia hopes. Motives are difficult to evaluate, while jurisdictional rules should be clear. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf , 240 U. S. 403, 426 (1916) (Holmes, J., concurring). To adopt the States Eleventh Amendment position would permit States to achieve unfair tactical advantage[s,] if not in this case, in others. See Schacht, supra, 393394, 398 ( Kennedy , J., concurring); cf. ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts 366367 (1968) (discussing the unfairness of allowing one who has invoked federal jurisdiction subsequently to challenge that jurisdiction). And that being so, the rationale for applying the general voluntary invocation principle is as strong here, in the context of removal, as elsewhere.
More importantly, Georgia argues that state law, while authorizing its attorney general [t]o represent the state in all civil actions tried in any court, Ga. Code Ann. §45153(6) (1990); see Ga. Const., Art. 5, §3, ¶4, does not authorize the attorney general to waive the States Eleventh Amendment immunity, Ga. Const., Art. I, §2, ¶4, IV(e), (f), reprinted in 2 Ga. Code Ann. (Supp. 1996). Georgia adds that in Ford, 323 U. S. 459, this Court unanimously interpreted roughly similar state laws similarly, that the Court held that no properly authorized executive or administrative officer of the state has waived the states immunity, 328 U. S., at 469, and that it sustained an Eleventh Amendment defense raised for the first time after a State had litigated a claim brought against it in federal court and lost. That is to say, in Ford a State regained immunity by showing the attorney generals lack of statutory authority to waiveeven after the State litigated and lost a case brought against it in federal court. Why, then, asks Georgia, can it not regain immunity in the same way, even after it removed its case to federal court?
The short answer to this question is that this case involves a State that voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of the federal court, while Ford involved a State that a private plaintiff had involuntarily made a defendant in federal court. This Court consistently has found a waiver when a States attorney general, authorized (as here) to bring a case in federal court, has voluntarily invoked that courts jurisdiction. See Gardner , 329 U. S., at 574575; Gunter , 200 U. S., at 285289, 292; cf. Clark , 108 U. S., at 447448 (not inquiring into attorney generals authority). And the Eleventh Amendment waiver rules are different when a States federal court participation is involuntary. See Hans v. Louisiana , 134 U. S. 1 (1890) ; cf. U. S. Const., Amdt. 11 (discussing suits commenced or prosecuted against a State).
But there is a more important answer. In large part the rule governing voluntary invocations of federal jurisdiction has rested upon the problems of inconsistency and unfairness that a contrary rule of law would create. Gunter, supra, at 284. And that determination reflects a belief that neither those who wrote the Eleventh Amendment nor the States themselves (insofar as they authorize litigation in federal courts) would intend to create that unfairness. As in analogous contexts, in which such matters are questions of federal law, cf., e.g. , Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U. S. 425, n. 5 (1997), whether a particular set of state laws, rules, or activities amounts to a waiver of the States Eleventh Amendment immunity is a question of federal law. A rule of federal law that finds waiver through a state attorney generals invocation of federal-court jurisdiction avoids inconsistency and unfairness. A rule of federal law that, as in Ford , denies waiver despite the state attorney generals state-authorized litigating decision, does the opposite. For these reasons one Member of this Court has called for Ford s reexamination. Schacht , supra, at 394, 397 ( Kennedy , J., concurring). And for these same reasons, we conclude that Clark , Gunter , and Gardner represent the sounder line of authority. Finding Ford inconsistent with the basic rationale of that line of cases, we consequently overrule Ford insofar as it would otherwise apply.
The State makes several other arguments, none of which we find convincing. It points to cases in which this Court has permitted the United States to enter into a case voluntarily without giving up immunity or to assert immunity despite a previous effort to waive. See United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506 (1940) ; United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495 (1940) ; see also Oklahoma Tax Commn v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U. S. 505 (1991) . Those cases, however, do not involve the Eleventh Amendmenta specific text with a history that focuses upon the States sovereignty vis-à-vis the Federal Government. And each case involves special circumstances not at issue here, for example, an effort by a sovereign ( i.e ., the United States) to seek the protection of its own courts ( i.e ., the federal courts), or an effort to protect an Indian tribe.
Finally, Georgia says that our conclusion will prove confusing, for States will have to guess what conduct might be deemed a waiver in order to avoid accidental waivers. But we believe the rule is a clear one, easily applied by both federal courts and the States themselves. It says that removal is a form of voluntary invocation of a federal courts jurisdiction sufficient to waive the States otherwise valid objection to litigation of a matter (here of state law) in a federal forum. As Justice Kennedy has pointed out, once the States know or have reason to expect that removal will constitute a waiver, then it is easy enough to presume that an attorney authorized to represent the State can bind it to the jurisdiction of the federal court (for Eleventh Amendment purposes) by the consent to removal. See Schacht , 524 U. S., at 397 (concurring opinion).
We conclude that the States action joining the removing of this case to federal court waived its Eleventh Amendment immunitythough, as we have said, the District Court may well find that this case, now raising only state-law issues, should nonetheless be remanded to the state courts for determination. 28 U. S. C. §1367(c)(3).
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Opinion
PAUL D. LAPIDES, PETITIONER
v.
BOARD OF
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM
OF GEORGIA et al.
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Eleventh Amendment grants a State immunity from suit in federal court by citizens of other States, U. S. Const., Amdt. 11, and by its own citizens as well, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890) . The question before us is whether the States act of removing a lawsuit from state court to federal court waives this immunity. We hold that it does.
I
Paul Lapides, a professor employed by the Georgia state university system, brought this lawsuit in a Georgia state court. He sued respondents, the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia (hereinafter Georgia or State) and university officials acting in both their personal capacities and as agents of the State. Lapides lawsuit alleged that university officials placed allegations of sexual harassment in his personnel files. And Lapides claimed that their doing so violated both Georgia law, see Georgia Tort Claims Act, Ga. Code Ann. §502123 (1994) and federal law, see Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983 (1994 ed., Supp. V).
All defendants joined in removing the case to Federal District Court, 28 U. S. C. §1441 (1994 ed.), where they sought dismissal. Those individuals whom Lapides had sued in their personal capacities argued that the doctrine of qualified immunity barred Lapides federal-law claims against them. And the District Court agreed. The State, while conceding that a state statute had waived sovereign immunity from state-law suits in state court, argued that, by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment, it remained immune from suit in federal court. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 11 (limiting scope of judicial power of the United States (emphasis added)). But the District Court did not agree. Rather, in its view, by removing the case from state to federal court, the State had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 238 (1985) (State may waive Eleventh Amendment immunity).
The State appealed the District Courts Eleventh Amendment ruling. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139, 144145 (1993) (allowing interlocutory appeal). And the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 251 F. 3d 1372 (2001). In its view, state law was, at the least, unclear as to whether the States attorney general possessed the legal authority to waive the States Eleventh Amendment immunity. And, that being so, the State retained the legal right to assert its immunity, even after removal. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U. S. 459 (1945) .
Lapides sought certiorari. We agreed to decide whether a state waive[s] its Eleventh Amendment immunity by its affirmative litigation conduct when it removes a case to federal court … . Pet. for Cert. (i).
It has become clear that we must limit our answer to the context of state-law claims, in respect to which the State has explicitly waived immunity from state-court proceedings. That is because Lapides only federal claim against the State arises under 42 U. S. C. §1983, that claim seeks only monetary damages, and we have held that a State is not a person against whom a §1983 claim for money damages might be asserted. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 66 (1989) . Compare Tr. of Oral Arg. 5758 (asserting that complaint also sought declaratory judgment on the federal claim), with complaint, App. 919 (failing, implicitly or explicitly, to seek any such relief). Hence this case does not present a valid federal claim against the State. Nor need we address the scope of waiver by removal in a situation where the States underlying sovereign immunity from suit has not been waived or abrogated in state court.
It has also become clear that, in the absence of any viable federal claim, the Federal District Court might well remand Lapides state-law tort claims against the State to state court. 28 U. S. C. §1367(c)(3) (1994 ed.). Nonetheless, Lapides state-law tort claims against the State remain pending in Federal District Court, §1367(a), and the law commits the remand question, ordinarily a matter of discretion, to the Federal District Court for decision in the first instance. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693, 712 (1973) . Hence, the question presented is not moot. We possess the legal power here to answer that question as limited to the state-law context just described. And, in light of differences of view among the lower courts, we shall do so. Compare McLaughlin v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges of Colo ., 215 F. 3d 1168, 1171 (CA10 2000) (removal waives immunity regardless of attorney generals state-law waiver authority); and Newfield House, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dept. of Public Welfare , 651 F. 2d 32, 36, n. 3 (CA1 1981) (similar); with Estate of Porter ex rel. Nelson v. Illinois , 36 F. 3d 684, 690691 (CA7 1994) (removal does not waive immunity); Silver v. Baggiano , 804 F. 2d 1211, 1214 (CA11 1986) (similar); and Gwinn Area Community Schools v. Michigan , 741 F. 2d 840, 846847 (CA6 1984) (similar).
II
The Eleventh Amendment provides that the Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit … commenced or prosecuted against one of the … States by citizens of another State, U. S. Const., Amdt. 11, and (as interpreted) by its own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana , 134 U. S. 1 (1890) . A State remains free to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in a federal court. See, e.g ., Atascadero , supra , at 238. And the question before us now is whether a State waives that immunity when it removes a case from state court to federal court.
It would seem anomalous or inconsistent for a State both (1) to invoke federal jurisdiction, thereby contending that the Judicial power of the United States extends to the case at hand, and (2) to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity, thereby denying that the Judicial power of the United States extends to the case at hand. And a Constitution that permitted States to follow their litigation interests by freely asserting both claims in the same case could generate seriously unfair results. Thus, it is not surprising that more than a century ago this Court indicated that a States voluntary appearance in federal court amounted to a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Clark v . Barnard , 108 U. S. 436, 447 (1883) (States voluntary appearance in federal court as an intervenor avoids Eleventh Amendment inquiry). The Court subsequently held, in the context of a bankruptcy claim, that a State waives any immunity . . . respecting the adjudication of a claim that it voluntarily files in federal court. Gardner v . New Jersey , 329 U. S. 565, 574 (1947) . And the Court has made clear in general that where a State voluntarily becomes a party to a cause and submits its rights for judicial determination, it will be bound thereby and cannot escape the result of its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment. Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U. S. 273, 284 (1906) (emphasis added). The Court has long accepted this statement of the law as valid, often citing with approval the cases embodying that principle. See, e.g ., College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, n. 3 (1999) (citing Gardner ); Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare of Mo. v. Department of Public Health and Welfare of Mo ., 411 U. S. 279, and n. 10 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in result) (citing Clark ); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commn , 359 U. S. 275, 276 (1959) (citing Clark ).
In this case, the State was brought involuntarily into the case as a defendant in the original state-court proceedings. But the State then voluntarily agreed to remove the case to federal court. See 28 U. S. C. §1446(a); Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Martin, 178 U. S. 245, 248 (1900) (removal requires the consent of all defendants). In doing so, it voluntarily invoked the federal courts jurisdiction. And unless we are to abandon the general principle just stated, or unless there is something special about removal or about this case, the general legal principle requiring waiver ought to apply.
We see no reason to abandon the general principle. Georgia points out that the cases that stand for the principle, Gunter , Gardner , and Clark , did not involve suits for money damages against the Statethe heart of the Eleventh Amendments concern. But the principle enunciated in those cases did not turn upon the nature of the relief sought. And that principle remains sound as applied to suits for money damages.
Georgia adds that this Court decided Gunter , Gardner , and Clark , before it decided more recent cases, which have required a clear indication of the States intent to waive its immunity. College Savings Bank , 527 U. S., at 675681. But College Savings Bank distinguished the kind of constructive waivers repudiated there from waivers effected by litigation conduct. Id. , at 681, n. 3. And this makes sense because an interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment that finds waiver in the litigation context rests upon the Amendments presumed recognition of the judicial need to avoid inconsistency, anomaly, and unfairness, and not upon a States actual preference or desire, which might, after all, favor selective use of immunity to achieve litigation advantages. See Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U. S. 381, 393 (1998) ( Kennedy , J., concurring). The relevant clarity here must focus on the litigation act the State takes that creates the waiver. And that actremovalis clear.
Nor has Georgia pointed to any special feature, either of removal or of this case, that would justify taking the case out from under the general rule. Georgia argues that its motive for removal was benign. It agreed to remove, not in order to obtain litigating advantages for itself, but to provide its co-defendants, the officials sued in their personal capacities, with the generous interlocutory appeal provisions available in federal, but not in state, court. Compare Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U. S. 511, 524530 (1985) (authorizing interlocutory appeal of adverse qualified immunity determination), with Turner v. Giles , 264 Ga. 812, 813, 450 S. E. 2d 421, 424 (1994) (limiting interlocutory appeals to those certified by trial court). And it intended, from the beginning, to return to state court, when and if its co-defendants had achieved their own legal victory.
A benign motive, however, cannot make the critical difference for which Georgia hopes. Motives are difficult to evaluate, while jurisdictional rules should be clear. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf , 240 U. S. 403, 426 (1916) (Holmes, J., concurring). To adopt the States Eleventh Amendment position would permit States to achieve unfair tactical advantage[s,] if not in this case, in others. See Schacht, supra, 393394, 398 ( Kennedy , J., concurring); cf. ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts 366367 (1968) (discussing the unfairness of allowing one who has invoked federal jurisdiction subsequently to challenge that jurisdiction). And that being so, the rationale for applying the general voluntary invocation principle is as strong here, in the context of removal, as elsewhere.
More importantly, Georgia argues that state law, while authorizing its attorney general [t]o represent the state in all civil actions tried in any court, Ga. Code Ann. §45153(6) (1990); see Ga. Const., Art. 5, §3, ¶4, does not authorize the attorney general to waive the States Eleventh Amendment immunity, Ga. Const., Art. I, §2, ¶4, IV(e), (f), reprinted in 2 Ga. Code Ann. (Supp. 1996). Georgia adds that in Ford, 323 U. S. 459, this Court unanimously interpreted roughly similar state laws similarly, that the Court held that no properly authorized executive or administrative officer of the state has waived the states immunity, 328 U. S., at 469, and that it sustained an Eleventh Amendment defense raised for the first time after a State had litigated a claim brought against it in federal court and lost. That is to say, in Ford a State regained immunity by showing the attorney generals lack of statutory authority to waiveeven after the State litigated and lost a case brought against it in federal court. Why, then, asks Georgia, can it not regain immunity in the same way, even after it removed its case to federal court?
The short answer to this question is that this case involves a State that voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of the federal court, while Ford involved a State that a private plaintiff had involuntarily made a defendant in federal court. This Court consistently has found a waiver when a States attorney general, authorized (as here) to bring a case in federal court, has voluntarily invoked that courts jurisdiction. See Gardner , 329 U. S., at 574575; Gunter , 200 U. S., at 285289, 292; cf. Clark , 108 U. S., at 447448 (not inquiring into attorney generals authority). And the Eleventh Amendment waiver rules are different when a States federal court participation is involuntary. See Hans v. Louisiana , 134 U. S. 1 (1890) ; cf. U. S. Const., Amdt. 11 (discussing suits commenced or prosecuted against a State).
But there is a more important answer. In large part the rule governing voluntary invocations of federal jurisdiction has rested upon the problems of inconsistency and unfairness that a contrary rule of law would create. Gunter, supra, at 284. And that determination reflects a belief that neither those who wrote the Eleventh Amendment nor the States themselves (insofar as they authorize litigation in federal courts) would intend to create that unfairness. As in analogous contexts, in which such matters are questions of federal law, cf., e.g. , Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U. S. 425, n. 5 (1997), whether a particular set of state laws, rules, or activities amounts to a waiver of the States Eleventh Amendment immunity is a question of federal law. A rule of federal law that finds waiver through a state attorney generals invocation of federal-court jurisdiction avoids inconsistency and unfairness. A rule of federal law that, as in Ford , denies waiver despite the state attorney generals state-authorized litigating decision, does the opposite. For these reasons one Member of this Court has called for Ford s reexamination. Schacht , supra, at 394, 397 ( Kennedy , J., concurring). And for these same reasons, we conclude that Clark , Gunter , and Gardner represent the sounder line of authority. Finding Ford inconsistent with the basic rationale of that line of cases, we consequently overrule Ford insofar as it would otherwise apply.
The State makes several other arguments, none of which we find convincing. It points to cases in which this Court has permitted the United States to enter into a case voluntarily without giving up immunity or to assert immunity despite a previous effort to waive. See United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506 (1940) ; United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495 (1940) ; see also Oklahoma Tax Commn v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U. S. 505 (1991) . Those cases, however, do not involve the Eleventh Amendmenta specific text with a history that focuses upon the States sovereignty vis-à-vis the Federal Government. And each case involves special circumstances not at issue here, for example, an effort by a sovereign ( i.e ., the United States) to seek the protection of its own courts ( i.e ., the federal courts), or an effort to protect an Indian tribe.
Finally, Georgia says that our conclusion will prove confusing, for States will have to guess what conduct might be deemed a waiver in order to avoid accidental waivers. But we believe the rule is a clear one, easily applied by both federal courts and the States themselves. It says that removal is a form of voluntary invocation of a federal courts jurisdiction sufficient to waive the States otherwise valid objection to litigation of a matter (here of state law) in a federal forum. As Justice Kennedy has pointed out, once the States know or have reason to expect that removal will constitute a waiver, then it is easy enough to presume that an attorney authorized to represent the State can bind it to the jurisdiction of the federal court (for Eleventh Amendment purposes) by the consent to removal. See Schacht , 524 U. S., at 397 (concurring opinion).
We conclude that the States action joining the removing of this case to federal court waived its Eleventh Amendment immunitythough, as we have said, the District Court may well find that this case, now raising only state-law issues, should nonetheless be remanded to the state courts for determination. 28 U. S. C. §1367(c)(3).
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Opinion
PAUL D. LAPIDES, PETITIONER
v.
BOARD OF
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM
OF GEORGIA et al.
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Eleventh Amendment grants a State immunity from suit in federal court by citizens of other States, U. S. Const., Amdt. 11, and by its own citizens as well, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890) . The question before us is whether the States act of removing a lawsuit from state court to federal court waives this immunity. We hold that it does.
I
Paul Lapides, a professor employed by the Georgia state university system, brought this lawsuit in a Georgia state court. He sued respondents, the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia (hereinafter Georgia or State) and university officials acting in both their personal capacities and as agents of the State. Lapides lawsuit alleged that university officials placed allegations of sexual harassment in his personnel files. And Lapides claimed that their doing so violated both Georgia law, see Georgia Tort Claims Act, Ga. Code Ann. §502123 (1994) and federal law, see Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983 (1994 ed., Supp. V).
All defendants joined in removing the case to Federal District Court, 28 U. S. C. §1441 (1994 ed.), where they sought dismissal. Those individuals whom Lapides had sued in their personal capacities argued that the doctrine of qualified immunity barred Lapides federal-law claims against them. And the District Court agreed. The State, while conceding that a state statute had waived sovereign immunity from state-law suits in state court, argued that, by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment, it remained immune from suit in federal court. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 11 (limiting scope of judicial power of the United States (emphasis added)). But the District Court did not agree. Rather, in its view, by removing the case from state to federal court, the State had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 238 (1985) (State may waive Eleventh Amendment immunity).
The State appealed the District Courts Eleventh Amendment ruling. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139, 144145 (1993) (allowing interlocutory appeal). And the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 251 F. 3d 1372 (2001). In its view, state law was, at the least, unclear as to whether the States attorney general possessed the legal authority to waive the States Eleventh Amendment immunity. And, that being so, the State retained the legal right to assert its immunity, even after removal. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U. S. 459 (1945) .
Lapides sought certiorari. We agreed to decide whether a state waive[s] its Eleventh Amendment immunity by its affirmative litigation conduct when it removes a case to federal court … . Pet. for Cert. (i).
It has become clear that we must limit our answer to the context of state-law claims, in respect to which the State has explicitly waived immunity from state-court proceedings. That is because Lapides only federal claim against the State arises under 42 U. S. C. §1983, that claim seeks only monetary damages, and we have held that a State is not a person against whom a §1983 claim for money damages might be asserted. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 66 (1989) . Compare Tr. of Oral Arg. 5758 (asserting that complaint also sought declaratory judgment on the federal claim), with complaint, App. 919 (failing, implicitly or explicitly, to seek any such relief). Hence this case does not present a valid federal claim against the State. Nor need we address the scope of waiver by removal in a situation where the States underlying sovereign immunity from suit has not been waived or abrogated in state court.
It has also become clear that, in the absence of any viable federal claim, the Federal District Court might well remand Lapides state-law tort claims against the State to state court. 28 U. S. C. §1367(c)(3) (1994 ed.). Nonetheless, Lapides state-law tort claims against the State remain pending in Federal District Court, §1367(a), and the law commits the remand question, ordinarily a matter of discretion, to the Federal District Court for decision in the first instance. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693, 712 (1973) . Hence, the question presented is not moot. We possess the legal power here to answer that question as limited to the state-law context just described. And, in light of differences of view among the lower courts, we shall do so. Compare McLaughlin v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges of Colo ., 215 F. 3d 1168, 1171 (CA10 2000) (removal waives immunity regardless of attorney generals state-law waiver authority); and Newfield House, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dept. of Public Welfare , 651 F. 2d 32, 36, n. 3 (CA1 1981) (similar); with Estate of Porter ex rel. Nelson v. Illinois , 36 F. 3d 684, 690691 (CA7 1994) (removal does not waive immunity); Silver v. Baggiano , 804 F. 2d 1211, 1214 (CA11 1986) (similar); and Gwinn Area Community Schools v. Michigan , 741 F. 2d 840, 846847 (CA6 1984) (similar).
II
The Eleventh Amendment provides that the Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit … commenced or prosecuted against one of the … States by citizens of another State, U. S. Const., Amdt. 11, and (as interpreted) by its own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana , 134 U. S. 1 (1890) . A State remains free to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in a federal court. See, e.g ., Atascadero , supra , at 238. And the question before us now is whether a State waives that immunity when it removes a case from state court to federal court.
It would seem anomalous or inconsistent for a State both (1) to invoke federal jurisdiction, thereby contending that the Judicial power of the United States extends to the case at hand, and (2) to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity, thereby denying that the Judicial power of the United States extends to the case at hand. And a Constitution that permitted States to follow their litigation interests by freely asserting both claims in the same case could generate seriously unfair results. Thus, it is not surprising that more than a century ago this Court indicated that a States voluntary appearance in federal court amounted to a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Clark v . Barnard , 108 U. S. 436, 447 (1883) (States voluntary appearance in federal court as an intervenor avoids Eleventh Amendment inquiry). The Court subsequently held, in the context of a bankruptcy claim, that a State waives any immunity . . . respecting the adjudication of a claim that it voluntarily files in federal court. Gardner v . New Jersey , 329 U. S. 565, 574 (1947) . And the Court has made clear in general that where a State voluntarily becomes a party to a cause and submits its rights for judicial determination, it will be bound thereby and cannot escape the result of its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment. Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U. S. 273, 284 (1906) (emphasis added). The Court has long accepted this statement of the law as valid, often citing with approval the cases embodying that principle. See, e.g ., College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, n. 3 (1999) (citing Gardner ); Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare of Mo. v. Department of Public Health and Welfare of Mo ., 411 U. S. 279, and n. 10 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in result) (citing Clark ); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commn , 359 U. S. 275, 276 (1959) (citing Clark ).
In this case, the State was brought involuntarily into the case as a defendant in the original state-court proceedings. But the State then voluntarily agreed to remove the case to federal court. See 28 U. S. C. §1446(a); Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Martin, 178 U. S. 245, 248 (1900) (removal requires the consent of all defendants). In doing so, it voluntarily invoked the federal courts jurisdiction. And unless we are to abandon the general principle just stated, or unless there is something special about removal or about this case, the general legal principle requiring waiver ought to apply.
We see no reason to abandon the general principle. Georgia points out that the cases that stand for the principle, Gunter , Gardner , and Clark , did not involve suits for money damages against the Statethe heart of the Eleventh Amendments concern. But the principle enunciated in those cases did not turn upon the nature of the relief sought. And that principle remains sound as applied to suits for money damages.
Georgia adds that this Court decided Gunter , Gardner , and Clark , before it decided more recent cases, which have required a clear indication of the States intent to waive its immunity. College Savings Bank , 527 U. S., at 675681. But College Savings Bank distinguished the kind of constructive waivers repudiated there from waivers effected by litigation conduct. Id. , at 681, n. 3. And this makes sense because an interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment that finds waiver in the litigation context rests upon the Amendments presumed recognition of the judicial need to avoid inconsistency, anomaly, and unfairness, and not upon a States actual preference or desire, which might, after all, favor selective use of immunity to achieve litigation advantages. See Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U. S. 381, 393 (1998) ( Kennedy , J., concurring). The relevant clarity here must focus on the litigation act the State takes that creates the waiver. And that actremovalis clear.
Nor has Georgia pointed to any special feature, either of removal or of this case, that would justify taking the case out from under the general rule. Georgia argues that its motive for removal was benign. It agreed to remove, not in order to obtain litigating advantages for itself, but to provide its co-defendants, the officials sued in their personal capacities, with the generous interlocutory appeal provisions available in federal, but not in state, court. Compare Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U. S. 511, 524530 (1985) (authorizing interlocutory appeal of adverse qualified immunity determination), with Turner v. Giles , 264 Ga. 812, 813, 450 S. E. 2d 421, 424 (1994) (limiting interlocutory appeals to those certified by trial court). And it intended, from the beginning, to return to state court, when and if its co-defendants had achieved their own legal victory.
A benign motive, however, cannot make the critical difference for which Georgia hopes. Motives are difficult to evaluate, while jurisdictional rules should be clear. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf , 240 U. S. 403, 426 (1916) (Holmes, J., concurring). To adopt the States Eleventh Amendment position would permit States to achieve unfair tactical advantage[s,] if not in this case, in others. See Schacht, supra, 393394, 398 ( Kennedy , J., concurring); cf. ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts 366367 (1968) (discussing the unfairness of allowing one who has invoked federal jurisdiction subsequently to challenge that jurisdiction). And that being so, the rationale for applying the general voluntary invocation principle is as strong here, in the context of removal, as elsewhere.
More importantly, Georgia argues that state law, while authorizing its attorney general [t]o represent the state in all civil actions tried in any court, Ga. Code Ann. §45153(6) (1990); see Ga. Const., Art. 5, §3, ¶4, does not authorize the attorney general to waive the States Eleventh Amendment immunity, Ga. Const., Art. I, §2, ¶4, IV(e), (f), reprinted in 2 Ga. Code Ann. (Supp. 1996). Georgia adds that in Ford, 323 U. S. 459, this Court unanimously interpreted roughly similar state laws similarly, that the Court held that no properly authorized executive or administrative officer of the state has waived the states immunity, 328 U. S., at 469, and that it sustained an Eleventh Amendment defense raised for the first time after a State had litigated a claim brought against it in federal court and lost. That is to say, in Ford a State regained immunity by showing the attorney generals lack of statutory authority to waiveeven after the State litigated and lost a case brought against it in federal court. Why, then, asks Georgia, can it not regain immunity in the same way, even after it removed its case to federal court?
The short answer to this question is that this case involves a State that voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of the federal court, while Ford involved a State that a private plaintiff had involuntarily made a defendant in federal court. This Court consistently has found a waiver when a States attorney general, authorized (as here) to bring a case in federal court, has voluntarily invoked that courts jurisdiction. See Gardner , 329 U. S., at 574575; Gunter , 200 U. S., at 285289, 292; cf. Clark , 108 U. S., at 447448 (not inquiring into attorney generals authority). And the Eleventh Amendment waiver rules are different when a States federal court participation is involuntary. See Hans v. Louisiana , 134 U. S. 1 (1890) ; cf. U. S. Const., Amdt. 11 (discussing suits commenced or prosecuted against a State).
But there is a more important answer. In large part the rule governing voluntary invocations of federal jurisdiction has rested upon the problems of inconsistency and unfairness that a contrary rule of law would create. Gunter, supra, at 284. And that determination reflects a belief that neither those who wrote the Eleventh Amendment nor the States themselves (insofar as they authorize litigation in federal courts) would intend to create that unfairness. As in analogous contexts, in which such matters are questions of federal law, cf., e.g. , Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U. S. 425, n. 5 (1997), whether a particular set of state laws, rules, or activities amounts to a waiver of the States Eleventh Amendment immunity is a question of federal law. A rule of federal law that finds waiver through a state attorney generals invocation of federal-court jurisdiction avoids inconsistency and unfairness. A rule of federal law that, as in Ford , denies waiver despite the state attorney generals state-authorized litigating decision, does the opposite. For these reasons one Member of this Court has called for Ford s reexamination. Schacht , supra, at 394, 397 ( Kennedy , J., concurring). And for these same reasons, we conclude that Clark , Gunter , and Gardner represent the sounder line of authority. Finding Ford inconsistent with the basic rationale of that line of cases, we consequently overrule Ford insofar as it would otherwise apply.
The State makes several other arguments, none of which we find convincing. It points to cases in which this Court has permitted the United States to enter into a case voluntarily without giving up immunity or to assert immunity despite a previous effort to waive. See United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506 (1940) ; United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495 (1940) ; see also Oklahoma Tax Commn v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U. S. 505 (1991) . Those cases, however, do not involve the Eleventh Amendmenta specific text with a history that focuses upon the States sovereignty vis-à-vis the Federal Government. And each case involves special circumstances not at issue here, for example, an effort by a sovereign ( i.e ., the United States) to seek the protection of its own courts ( i.e ., the federal courts), or an effort to protect an Indian tribe.
Finally, Georgia says that our conclusion will prove confusing, for States will have to guess what conduct might be deemed a waiver in order to avoid accidental waivers. But we believe the rule is a clear one, easily applied by both federal courts and the States themselves. It says that removal is a form of voluntary invocation of a federal courts jurisdiction sufficient to waive the States otherwise valid objection to litigation of a matter (here of state law) in a federal forum. As Justice Kennedy has pointed out, once the States know or have reason to expect that removal will constitute a waiver, then it is easy enough to presume that an attorney authorized to represent the State can bind it to the jurisdiction of the federal court (for Eleventh Amendment purposes) by the consent to removal. See Schacht , 524 U. S., at 397 (concurring opinion).
We conclude that the States action joining the removing of this case to federal court waived its Eleventh Amendment immunitythough, as we have said, the District Court may well find that this case, now raising only state-law issues, should nonetheless be remanded to the state courts for determination. 28 U. S. C. §1367(c)(3).
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.


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in the World
(2018)
CONTRIBUTORS
Here, I placed the biographies of myself and the instructor. This section also includes the references for the various sources used for this project.
BIOGRAPHIES
Lydia Jin is a graduate student in the Data Science Master's program at The George Washington University.
Dr. Nima Zahadat is a professor of data science, information systems security, and digital forensics. His research focus is on studying the Internet of Things, data mining, information visualization, mobile security, security policy management, and memory forensics. He has been teaching since 2001 and has developed and taught over 100 topics. Dr. Zahadat has also been consultant with the federal government agencies, the US Air Force, Navy, Marines, and the Coast Guard. He enjoys teaching, biking, reading, and writing.
REFERENCES
Bootstrap Timeline: https://codepen.io/jasondavis/pen/fDGdK
CSS Timelines: https://www.w3schools.com/howto/howto_css_timeline.asp
CSS Image Gallery: https://www.w3schools.com/css/css_image_gallery.asp
CSS Color Codes: https://www.quackit.com/css/css_color_codes.cfm
CSS Links: https://www.w3schools.com/css/css_link.asp
Fixed Footer: https://www.w3schools.com/howto/howto_css_fixed_footer.asp
CSS Side Navigation: https://www.w3schools.com/howto/howto_js_sidenav.asp
DATASET: https://www.kaggle.com/shrutimehta/zomato-restaurants-data/version/2


In Example 4, all modules were defined in the order in which they were expected to run.
By adding scope-ready on top of scope-private and scope-bootstrap, the same modules may now be defined out of order.
Usinc scope-log, the order of calls to scope() and calls to the code is logged to the console, if available.


When I say 'full stack' I actually mean it. I've spent a decade as a systems admin; I understand the back end of systems intimately. Now my focus is coding; what can I create for you?
Someone has to fuel the ideas that make this world flourish. Pieces, parts, questions and answers - put all of these things together and you've got a good start toward shaping the future.
I am a team player. I'll teach, learn, find solutions, reconcile differences, and ultimately work towards our collective goal as part of a great team.
Hi, I'm Kyle Kowalski, a lifelong student with a professional focus on all things IT. In school I focused on problem solving. Often technology has a solution, a better solution that just requires a little work to create.
This desire to help led me to a career as a systems administrator. My focus was primarily on Microsoft Windows systems and the myriad of associated software suites. I found a wonderful niche in systems automation. My team functioned much better when a system was automated and monitored effectively - b onus points for having a system tell you what was broken and how to fix it.
My drive for automation lead me to scripting: PowerShell. I have to admit, I really enjoyed learning PowerShell. I was able to script away huge swaths of my job. The basic monitoring and maintenance tasks were automated and I simply had to deal with any issues that were brought to my attention - usually an email from the monitor on an ailing system. It was beautiful.
The cloud changed my career. Systems are disappearing into the cloud at a rapid pace - admins can scale better and monitor more systems productively. My ability to deal with the issues directly was dimished, so I started to look elseware; how could I get my hands back into things?
Coding! It seems my career has reached this plateau, I am establishing myself as a coder; here is my portfolio.
Please Enjoy!
- Kyle


Surfing is a surface water sport in which the wave rider, referred to as a surfer, rides on the forward or deep face of a moving wave, which usually carries the surfer towards the shore. Waves suitable for surfing are primarily found in the ocean, but can also be found in lakes or rivers in the form of a standing wave or tidal bore. However, surfers can also utilize artificial waves such as those from boat wakes and the waves created in artificial wave pools.
Wave Intensity
Tube shape is defined by length to width ratio. A perfectly
cylindrical vortex has a ratio of 1:1. Other forms include:
1. Square: <1:1
2. Round: 1-2:1
3. Almond: >2:1
Tube speed is defined by angle of peel line.
4. Fast: 30°
5. Medium: 45°
6. Slow: 60°
Surfing Equipment
The Surfboard
The Fins
The Leash
The Surfwax
The Wetsuit
The Surf Watch
The Surf Earplugs
The Boots and Gloves
Surfing destinations in India
Visakhapatnam
Andaman Islands
Kovalam Beach, Kerala
Gokarna, Karnataka
Goa
Varkala, Kerala


WITNESS LIST
Child Protection, Select Committee
September 10, 2014 - 10:00 AM
Border Support Operations
On:
Gruber, David (DSHS)
Janek, Kyle (Health & Human Services Commission)
McCraw, Steven (Texas Department of Public Safety)
Specia, John (Department of Family and Protective Services)
CPS Workforce and Use of Data to Improve Outcomes
On:
Barrera, Denise (CPS)
Barrera, Denise (Department of Family and Protective Services)
Brown, Shelia (Department of Family and Protective Services)
Chishty, Farhat (Self; Grade - Justice for All)
Copeland, Michelle (Self; TX State Employees Union)
Etheredge, Todd (Department of Family and Protective Services)
Flye, Tammie (Department of Family and Protective Services)
Francis, Will (National Association of Social Workers - Texas Chapter)
Funk, Jim (Self; Texas state employees union)
Giles, Susan (Self; Texas state employees union)
Guerrero, Nicole (State Auditor's Office)
Harris, Ashley (Texans Care for Children)
Hawley, Nicole (Department of Family and Protective Services)
Janek, Kyle (Health and Human Services Commission)
Litzinger, Linda (Self)
Magnuson, K (Self)
Martinez, Diana (TexProtects, The Texas Assoc. For the Protection of Children)
Matthews, Jana (Department of Family and Protective Services)
Pirzada, Imtiaz (Self)
Salazar, Stanley salazar (Self)
Salinas valdez, Debby (Self; GRADE)
Specia, John (Department of Family and Protective Services)
Voss, Angie (Department of Family and Protective Services)
Voss, Angie (Department of Family and Protective Services, Child Protective Services)
Votaw, Mary (Self; Texas state employees union)
Wiederhold, Jennifer (State Auditor's Office)
Wilson, Columba (Self)
Registering, but not testifying:
On:
Barton, Annick (Department of Family and Protective Services)
Black, Lisa (Department of Family and Protective Services)
Burstain, Jane (Self)
Ford, Stacy (Self; Chrpa)
Stick, Jeremy (Department of Family and Protective Services)
1
WITNESS LIST
On:
Sunset Commission Recommendations
On:
Tripp, Amy (Sunset Advisory Commission)
Registering, but not testifying:
On:
Black, Lisa (Department of Family and Protective Services)
Specia, John (Department of Family and Protective Services)
2


Bosnian Refugee Camp Called ‘Dangerous and Inhumane’
by ASSOCIATED PRESSBIHAC, Bosnia-Herzegovina (AP) — Doctors Without Borders is warning that refuge-seekers trying to reach Western Europe are living in “dangerously cold and harsh conditions” in Bosnia, where tensions have mounted over the influx of thousands of people fleeing war and poverty.
Doctors Without Borders on Friday warned that the improvised Vucjak refugee camp in northwestern Bosnia does not meet minimum living standards, describing it as a “dangerous and inhumane place.”
Bosnia has been overwhelmed by the influx of thousands of people fleeing violence or poverty in their home countries. Most flock to the northwest section of the Balkan country, which borders European Union member Croatia.
This has led to tensions in the border region, with authorities there demanding that other parts of the country share the burden.
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