Opinion
NEW YORK, PETITIONER v. MICHAEL HILL
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether defense counsels agreement to a trial date outside the time period required by Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers bars the defendant from seeking dismissal because trial did not occur within that period.
I
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a compact entered into by 48 States, the United States, and the District of Columbia to establish procedures for resolution of one States outstanding charges against a prisoner of another State. See N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law §580.20 (McKinney 1995); 18 U. S. C. App. §2; 11A U. L. A. 48 (listing jurisdictions). As a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, §10, cl. 3, the IAD is a federal law subject to federal construction. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U. S. 716, 719 (1985) ; Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 442 (1981) .
A State seeking to bring charges against a prisoner in another States custody begins the process by filing a detainer, which is a request by the States criminal justice agency that the institution in which the prisoner is housed hold the prisoner for the agency or notify the agency when release is imminent. Fex v. Michigan, 507 U. S. 43, 44 (1993) . After a detainer has been lodged against him, a prisoner may file a request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint. Art. III(a). Upon such a request, the prisoner shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days, provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. Ibid. Resolution of the charges can also be triggered by the charging jurisdiction, which may request temporary custody of the prisoner for that purpose. Art. IV(a). In such a case, trial shall be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, subject again to continuances for good cause shown in open court. Art. IV(c). If a defendant is not brought to trial within the applicable statutory period, the IAD requires that the indictment be dismissed with prejudice. Art. V(c).
In this case, New York lodged a detainer against respondent, who was a prisoner in Ohio. Respondent signed a request for disposition of the detainer pursuant to Article III of the IAD, and was returned to New York to face murder and robbery charges.
On January 9, 1995, the prosecutor and defense counsel appeared in court to set a trial date. The following colloquy ensued:
[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, [the regular attorney] from our office is engaged in a trial today. He told me that the Court was to set a trial date today. I believe the Court may have preliminarily discussed a May 1st date, and [the regular attorney] says that would fit in his calendar.
The Court: How is that with the defense counsel?
[Defense Counsel]: That will be fine, Your Honor. 164 Misc. 2d 1032, 1035, 627 N. Y. S. 2d 234, 236 (Cty. Ct., Monroe County 1995).
The court scheduled trial to begin on May 1.
On April 17, 1995, respondent moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the IADs time limit had expired. The trial court found that as of January 9, 1995, when the trial date was set, 167 nonexcludable days had elapsed, so that if the subsequent time period was chargeable to the State, the 180 day time period had indeed expired. However, the trial court concluded that [d]efense counsels explicit agreement to the trial date set beyond the 180 day statutory period constituted a waiver or abandonment of defendants rights under the IAD. Id. , at 1036, 627 N. Y. S. 2d, at 237. Accordingly, the court denied respondents motion to dismiss.
Respondent was subsequently convicted, following a jury trial, of murder in the second degree and robbery in the first degree. On appeal, respondent argued that the trial court erred in declining to dismiss the indictment for lack of a timely trial under the IAD. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the decision of the trial court. 244 App. Div. 2d 927, 668 N. Y. S. 2d 126 (1997). The New York Court of Appeals, however, reversed and ordered that the indictment against respondent be dismissed; defense counsels agreement to a later trial date, it held, did not waive respondents speedy trial rights under the IAD. 92 N. Y. 2d 406, 704 N. E. 2d 542 (1998). We granted certiorari. 526 U. S. ___ (1999).
II
No provision of the IAD prescribes the effect of a defendants assent to delay on the applicable time limits. We have, however, in the context of a broad array of constitutional and statutory provisions, articulated a general rule that presumes the availability of waiver, United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U. S. 196, 200201 (1995) , and we have recognized that [t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are … subject to waiver, Peretz v. United States, 501 U. S. 923, 936 (1991) . In accordance with these principles, courts have agreed that a defendant may, at least under some circumstances, waive his right to object to a given delay under the IAD, although they have disagreed on what is necessary to effect a waiver. See , e.g., People v. Jones , 197 Mich. App. 76, 80, 495 N. W. 2d 159, 160 (1992) (waiver if prisoner either expressly or impliedly, agrees or requests to be treated in a manner contrary to the terms of the IAD); Brown v. Wolff , 706 F. 2d 902, 907 (CA9 1983) (waiver if prisoner affirmatively requests to be treated in a manner contrary to the procedures prescribed by the IAD); Drescher v. Superior Ct. , 218 Cal. App. 3d 1140, 1148, 267 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (1990) (waiver if there is a showing of record that the defendant or his attorney freely acquiesced in a trial date beyond the speedy trial period) (internal quotation omitted).
What suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue. [W]hether the defendant must participate personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required for waiver; and whether the defendants choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the right at stake. United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 733 (1993) . For certain fundamental rights, the defendant must personally make an informed waiver. See, e.g. , Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464465 (1938) (right to counsel); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1, 78 (1966) (right to plead not guilty). For other rights, however, waiver may be effected by action of counsel. Although there are basic rights that the attorney cannot waive without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the lawyer hasand must havefull authority to manage the conduct of the trial. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U. S. 400, 417418 (1988) . As to many decisions pertaining to the conduct of the trial, the defendant is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney. Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 634 (1962) (quoting Smith v. Ayer , 101 U. S. 320, 326 (1880) . Thus, decisions by counsel are generally given effect as to what arguments to pursue, see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U. S. 745, 751 (1983) , what evidentiary objections to raise, see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443, 451 (1965) , and what agreements to conclude regarding the admission of evidence, see United States v. McGill , 11 F. 3d 223, 226227 (CA1 1993). Absent a demonstration of ineffectiveness, counsels word on such matters is the last.
Scheduling matters are plainly among those for which agreement by counsel generally controls. This case does not involve a purported prospective waiver of all protection of the IADs time limits or of the IAD generally, but merely agreement to a specified delay in trial. When that subject is under consideration, only counsel is in a position to assess the benefit or detriment of the delay to the defendants case. Likewise, only counsel is in a position to assess whether the defense would even be prepared to proceed any earlier. Requiring express assent from the defendant himself for such routine and often repetitive scheduling determinations would consume time to no apparent purpose. The text of the IAD, moreover, confirms what the reason of the matter suggests: in allowing the court to grant good-cause continuances when either prisoner or his counsel is present, it contemplates that scheduling questions may be left to counsel. Art. III(a) (emphasis added).
Respondent offers two arguments for affirmance, both of which go primarily to the propriety of allowing waiver of any sort, not to the specifics of the waiver here. First, he argues that by explicitly providing for the grant of good-cause continuances, the IAD seeks to limit the situations in which delay is permitted, and that permitting other extensions of the time period would override those limitations. It is of course true that waiver is not appropriate when it is inconsistent with the provision creating the right sought to be secured. E.g., Crosby v. United States, 506 U. S. 255, 258259 (1993) ; Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1, 9 (1959) . That is not, however, the situation here. To be sure, the necessary or reasonable continuance provision is, by clear implication, the sole means by which the prosecution can obtain an extension of the time limits over the defendants objection. But the specification in that provision that the prisoner or his counsel must be present suggests that it is directed primarily, if not indeed exclusively, to prosecution requests that have not explicitly been agreed to by the defense. As applied to agreed-upon extensions, we think its negative implication is dubiousand certainly not clear enough to constitute the affirmative indication required to overcome the ordinary presumption that waiver is available. Mezzanatto, supra , at 201. 1
Second, respondent argues that the IAD benefits not only the defendant but society generally, and that the defendant may not waive societys rights. It is true that a right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not be waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy . Brooklyn Savings Bank v. ONeil, 324 U. S. 697, 704 (1945) (emphasis added). The conditional clause is essential, however: It is not true that any private right that also benefits society cannot be waived. In general, [i]n an adversary system of criminal justice, the public interest in the administration of justice is protected by the participants in the litigation. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 383 (1979) . We allow waiver of numerous constitutional protections for criminal defendants that also serve broader social interests. See, e.g. , Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 275 (1942) (waiver of right to jury trial); Johnson, 304 U. S., at 464 (waiver of right to counsel).
Society may well enjoy some benefit from the IADs time limits: Delay can lead to a less accurate outcome as witnesses become unavailable and memories fade. See, e.g. , Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 5657 (1968) .  For example, because the would-be defendant is already incarcerated in another jurisdiction, societys interests in assuring the defendants presence at trial and in preventing further criminal activity (or avoiding the costs of pretrial detention) are simply not at issue. Cf. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 519 (1972) . In any case, it cannot be argued that societys interest in the prompt resolution of outstanding charges is so central to the IAD that it is part of the unalterable statutory policy, Brooklyn Savings Bank , supra , at 704. In fact, the time limits do not apply at all unless either the prisoner or the receiving State files a request. 2 Thus, the IAD contemplate[s] a degree of party control that is consonant with the background presumption of waivability. Mezzanatto , 513 U. S., at 206. 3
Finally, respondent argues that even if waiver of the IADs time limits is possible, it can be effected only by affirmative conduct not present here. The New York Court of Appeals adopted a similar view, stating that the speedy trial rights guaranteed by the IAD may be waived either explicitly or by an affirmative request for treatment that is contrary to or inconsistent with those speedy trial rights. 92 N. Y. 2d, at 411, 704 N. E. 2d, at 545. The court concluded that defense counsels agreement to the trial date here was not an affirmative request and therefore did not constitute a waiver. Id. , at 412, 704 N. E. 2d, at 546. We agree with the State that this makes dismissal of the indictment turn on a hypertechnical distinction that should play no part. As illustrated by this case, such an approach would enable defendants to escape justice by willingly accepting treatment inconsistent with the IADs time limits, and then recanting later on. Nothing in the IAD requires or even suggests a distinction between waiver proposed and waiver agreed to. In light of its potential for abuseand given the harsh remedy of dismissal with prejudicewe decline to adopt it.
* * *
The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
1 It was suggested at oral argument that agreement in open court to a trial date outside the allowable time period can itself be viewed as a necessary or reasonable continuance for good cause shown in open court. Although an agreed-upon trial date might sometimes merit this description, it is far from clear that it always does so, or that it does so here. Because we find waiver, we do not consider under what circumstances an agreed-upon delay could fit within the good-cause provision.
2 This feature, among others, makes respondents analogy to the Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. §3161 et seq., inapt. The time limits of the Speedy Trial Act begin to run automatically rather than upon request, §§3161(a), (b); dismissal may sometimes be without prejudice, §3162(a)(1),(2), United States v. Taylor, 487 U. S. 326, 332333 (1988) ; and waiver is expressly allowed in certain limited circumstances, 18 U. S. C. §3162(a)(2). In any event, the question of waiver under the Speedy Trial Act is not before us today, and we express no view on the subject.
3 In concluding that objection to a specified delay may be waived, we are mindful that the sending State may have interests distinct from those of the prisoner and the receiving State. This case does not involve any objection from the sending State, and we do not address what recourse the sending State might have under the IAD when the receiving State and prisoner agree to, and the court allows, an inordinate delay. Cf. Article V(e)(At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending State).
Opinion
NEW YORK, PETITIONER v. MICHAEL HILL
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether defense counsels agreement to a trial date outside the time period required by Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers bars the defendant from seeking dismissal because trial did not occur within that period.
I
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a compact entered into by 48 States, the United States, and the District of Columbia to establish procedures for resolution of one States outstanding charges against a prisoner of another State. See N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law §580.20 (McKinney 1995); 18 U. S. C. App. §2; 11A U. L. A. 48 (listing jurisdictions). As a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, §10, cl. 3, the IAD is a federal law subject to federal construction. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U. S. 716, 719 (1985) ; Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 442 (1981) .
A State seeking to bring charges against a prisoner in another States custody begins the process by filing a detainer, which is a request by the States criminal justice agency that the institution in which the prisoner is housed hold the prisoner for the agency or notify the agency when release is imminent. Fex v. Michigan, 507 U. S. 43, 44 (1993) . After a detainer has been lodged against him, a prisoner may file a request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint. Art. III(a). Upon such a request, the prisoner shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days, provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. Ibid. Resolution of the charges can also be triggered by the charging jurisdiction, which may request temporary custody of the prisoner for that purpose. Art. IV(a). In such a case, trial shall be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, subject again to continuances for good cause shown in open court. Art. IV(c). If a defendant is not brought to trial within the applicable statutory period, the IAD requires that the indictment be dismissed with prejudice. Art. V(c).
In this case, New York lodged a detainer against respondent, who was a prisoner in Ohio. Respondent signed a request for disposition of the detainer pursuant to Article III of the IAD, and was returned to New York to face murder and robbery charges.
On January 9, 1995, the prosecutor and defense counsel appeared in court to set a trial date. The following colloquy ensued:
[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, [the regular attorney] from our office is engaged in a trial today. He told me that the Court was to set a trial date today. I believe the Court may have preliminarily discussed a May 1st date, and [the regular attorney] says that would fit in his calendar.
The Court: How is that with the defense counsel?
[Defense Counsel]: That will be fine, Your Honor. 164 Misc. 2d 1032, 1035, 627 N. Y. S. 2d 234, 236 (Cty. Ct., Monroe County 1995).
The court scheduled trial to begin on May 1.
On April 17, 1995, respondent moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the IADs time limit had expired. The trial court found that as of January 9, 1995, when the trial date was set, 167 nonexcludable days had elapsed, so that if the subsequent time period was chargeable to the State, the 180 day time period had indeed expired. However, the trial court concluded that [d]efense counsels explicit agreement to the trial date set beyond the 180 day statutory period constituted a waiver or abandonment of defendants rights under the IAD. Id. , at 1036, 627 N. Y. S. 2d, at 237. Accordingly, the court denied respondents motion to dismiss.
Respondent was subsequently convicted, following a jury trial, of murder in the second degree and robbery in the first degree. On appeal, respondent argued that the trial court erred in declining to dismiss the indictment for lack of a timely trial under the IAD. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the decision of the trial court. 244 App. Div. 2d 927, 668 N. Y. S. 2d 126 (1997). The New York Court of Appeals, however, reversed and ordered that the indictment against respondent be dismissed; defense counsels agreement to a later trial date, it held, did not waive respondents speedy trial rights under the IAD. 92 N. Y. 2d 406, 704 N. E. 2d 542 (1998). We granted certiorari. 526 U. S. ___ (1999).
II
No provision of the IAD prescribes the effect of a defendants assent to delay on the applicable time limits. We have, however, in the context of a broad array of constitutional and statutory provisions, articulated a general rule that presumes the availability of waiver, United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U. S. 196, 200201 (1995) , and we have recognized that [t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are … subject to waiver, Peretz v. United States, 501 U. S. 923, 936 (1991) . In accordance with these principles, courts have agreed that a defendant may, at least under some circumstances, waive his right to object to a given delay under the IAD, although they have disagreed on what is necessary to effect a waiver. See , e.g., People v. Jones , 197 Mich. App. 76, 80, 495 N. W. 2d 159, 160 (1992) (waiver if prisoner either expressly or impliedly, agrees or requests to be treated in a manner contrary to the terms of the IAD); Brown v. Wolff , 706 F. 2d 902, 907 (CA9 1983) (waiver if prisoner affirmatively requests to be treated in a manner contrary to the procedures prescribed by the IAD); Drescher v. Superior Ct. , 218 Cal. App. 3d 1140, 1148, 267 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (1990) (waiver if there is a showing of record that the defendant or his attorney freely acquiesced in a trial date beyond the speedy trial period) (internal quotation omitted).
What suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue. [W]hether the defendant must participate personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required for waiver; and whether the defendants choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the right at stake. United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 733 (1993) . For certain fundamental rights, the defendant must personally make an informed waiver. See, e.g. , Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464465 (1938) (right to counsel); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1, 78 (1966) (right to plead not guilty). For other rights, however, waiver may be effected by action of counsel. Although there are basic rights that the attorney cannot waive without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the lawyer hasand must havefull authority to manage the conduct of the trial. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U. S. 400, 417418 (1988) . As to many decisions pertaining to the conduct of the trial, the defendant is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney. Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 634 (1962) (quoting Smith v. Ayer , 101 U. S. 320, 326 (1880) . Thus, decisions by counsel are generally given effect as to what arguments to pursue, see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U. S. 745, 751 (1983) , what evidentiary objections to raise, see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443, 451 (1965) , and what agreements to conclude regarding the admission of evidence, see United States v. McGill , 11 F. 3d 223, 226227 (CA1 1993). Absent a demonstration of ineffectiveness, counsels word on such matters is the last.
Scheduling matters are plainly among those for which agreement by counsel generally controls. This case does not involve a purported prospective waiver of all protection of the IADs time limits or of the IAD generally, but merely agreement to a specified delay in trial. When that subject is under consideration, only counsel is in a position to assess the benefit or detriment of the delay to the defendants case. Likewise, only counsel is in a position to assess whether the defense would even be prepared to proceed any earlier. Requiring express assent from the defendant himself for such routine and often repetitive scheduling determinations would consume time to no apparent purpose. The text of the IAD, moreover, confirms what the reason of the matter suggests: in allowing the court to grant good-cause continuances when either prisoner or his counsel is present, it contemplates that scheduling questions may be left to counsel. Art. III(a) (emphasis added).
Respondent offers two arguments for affirmance, both of which go primarily to the propriety of allowing waiver of any sort, not to the specifics of the waiver here. First, he argues that by explicitly providing for the grant of good-cause continuances, the IAD seeks to limit the situations in which delay is permitted, and that permitting other extensions of the time period would override those limitations. It is of course true that waiver is not appropriate when it is inconsistent with the provision creating the right sought to be secured. E.g., Crosby v. United States, 506 U. S. 255, 258259 (1993) ; Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1, 9 (1959) . That is not, however, the situation here. To be sure, the necessary or reasonable continuance provision is, by clear implication, the sole means by which the prosecution can obtain an extension of the time limits over the defendants objection. But the specification in that provision that the prisoner or his counsel must be present suggests that it is directed primarily, if not indeed exclusively, to prosecution requests that have not explicitly been agreed to by the defense. As applied to agreed-upon extensions, we think its negative implication is dubiousand certainly not clear enough to constitute the affirmative indication required to overcome the ordinary presumption that waiver is available. Mezzanatto, supra , at 201. 1
Second, respondent argues that the IAD benefits not only the defendant but society generally, and that the defendant may not waive societys rights. It is true that a right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not be waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy . Brooklyn Savings Bank v. ONeil, 324 U. S. 697, 704 (1945) (emphasis added). The conditional clause is essential, however: It is not true that any private right that also benefits society cannot be waived. In general, [i]n an adversary system of criminal justice, the public interest in the administration of justice is protected by the participants in the litigation. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 383 (1979) . We allow waiver of numerous constitutional protections for criminal defendants that also serve broader social interests. See, e.g. , Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 275 (1942) (waiver of right to jury trial); Johnson, 304 U. S., at 464 (waiver of right to counsel).
Society may well enjoy some benefit from the IADs time limits: Delay can lead to a less accurate outcome as witnesses become unavailable and memories fade. See, e.g. , Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 5657 (1968) .  For example, because the would-be defendant is already incarcerated in another jurisdiction, societys interests in assuring the defendants presence at trial and in preventing further criminal activity (or avoiding the costs of pretrial detention) are simply not at issue. Cf. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 519 (1972) . In any case, it cannot be argued that societys interest in the prompt resolution of outstanding charges is so central to the IAD that it is part of the unalterable statutory policy, Brooklyn Savings Bank , supra , at 704. In fact, the time limits do not apply at all unless either the prisoner or the receiving State files a request. 2 Thus, the IAD contemplate[s] a degree of party control that is consonant with the background presumption of waivability. Mezzanatto , 513 U. S., at 206. 3
Finally, respondent argues that even if waiver of the IADs time limits is possible, it can be effected only by affirmative conduct not present here. The New York Court of Appeals adopted a similar view, stating that the speedy trial rights guaranteed by the IAD may be waived either explicitly or by an affirmative request for treatment that is contrary to or inconsistent with those speedy trial rights. 92 N. Y. 2d, at 411, 704 N. E. 2d, at 545. The court concluded that defense counsels agreement to the trial date here was not an affirmative request and therefore did not constitute a waiver. Id. , at 412, 704 N. E. 2d, at 546. We agree with the State that this makes dismissal of the indictment turn on a hypertechnical distinction that should play no part. As illustrated by this case, such an approach would enable defendants to escape justice by willingly accepting treatment inconsistent with the IADs time limits, and then recanting later on. Nothing in the IAD requires or even suggests a distinction between waiver proposed and waiver agreed to. In light of its potential for abuseand given the harsh remedy of dismissal with prejudicewe decline to adopt it.
* * *
The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
1 It was suggested at oral argument that agreement in open court to a trial date outside the allowable time period can itself be viewed as a necessary or reasonable continuance for good cause shown in open court. Although an agreed-upon trial date might sometimes merit this description, it is far from clear that it always does so, or that it does so here. Because we find waiver, we do not consider under what circumstances an agreed-upon delay could fit within the good-cause provision.
2 This feature, among others, makes respondents analogy to the Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. §3161 et seq., inapt. The time limits of the Speedy Trial Act begin to run automatically rather than upon request, §§3161(a), (b); dismissal may sometimes be without prejudice, §3162(a)(1),(2), United States v. Taylor, 487 U. S. 326, 332333 (1988) ; and waiver is expressly allowed in certain limited circumstances, 18 U. S. C. §3162(a)(2). In any event, the question of waiver under the Speedy Trial Act is not before us today, and we express no view on the subject.
3 In concluding that objection to a specified delay may be waived, we are mindful that the sending State may have interests distinct from those of the prisoner and the receiving State. This case does not involve any objection from the sending State, and we do not address what recourse the sending State might have under the IAD when the receiving State and prisoner agree to, and the court allows, an inordinate delay. Cf. Article V(e)(At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending State).
Opinion
NEW YORK, PETITIONER v. MICHAEL HILL
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether defense counsels agreement to a trial date outside the time period required by Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers bars the defendant from seeking dismissal because trial did not occur within that period.
I
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a compact entered into by 48 States, the United States, and the District of Columbia to establish procedures for resolution of one States outstanding charges against a prisoner of another State. See N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law §580.20 (McKinney 1995); 18 U. S. C. App. §2; 11A U. L. A. 48 (listing jurisdictions). As a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, §10, cl. 3, the IAD is a federal law subject to federal construction. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U. S. 716, 719 (1985) ; Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 442 (1981) .
A State seeking to bring charges against a prisoner in another States custody begins the process by filing a detainer, which is a request by the States criminal justice agency that the institution in which the prisoner is housed hold the prisoner for the agency or notify the agency when release is imminent. Fex v. Michigan, 507 U. S. 43, 44 (1993) . After a detainer has been lodged against him, a prisoner may file a request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint. Art. III(a). Upon such a request, the prisoner shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days, provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. Ibid. Resolution of the charges can also be triggered by the charging jurisdiction, which may request temporary custody of the prisoner for that purpose. Art. IV(a). In such a case, trial shall be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, subject again to continuances for good cause shown in open court. Art. IV(c). If a defendant is not brought to trial within the applicable statutory period, the IAD requires that the indictment be dismissed with prejudice. Art. V(c).
In this case, New York lodged a detainer against respondent, who was a prisoner in Ohio. Respondent signed a request for disposition of the detainer pursuant to Article III of the IAD, and was returned to New York to face murder and robbery charges.
On January 9, 1995, the prosecutor and defense counsel appeared in court to set a trial date. The following colloquy ensued:
[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, [the regular attorney] from our office is engaged in a trial today. He told me that the Court was to set a trial date today. I believe the Court may have preliminarily discussed a May 1st date, and [the regular attorney] says that would fit in his calendar.
The Court: How is that with the defense counsel?
[Defense Counsel]: That will be fine, Your Honor. 164 Misc. 2d 1032, 1035, 627 N. Y. S. 2d 234, 236 (Cty. Ct., Monroe County 1995).
The court scheduled trial to begin on May 1.
On April 17, 1995, respondent moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the IADs time limit had expired. The trial court found that as of January 9, 1995, when the trial date was set, 167 nonexcludable days had elapsed, so that if the subsequent time period was chargeable to the State, the 180 day time period had indeed expired. However, the trial court concluded that [d]efense counsels explicit agreement to the trial date set beyond the 180 day statutory period constituted a waiver or abandonment of defendants rights under the IAD. Id. , at 1036, 627 N. Y. S. 2d, at 237. Accordingly, the court denied respondents motion to dismiss.
Respondent was subsequently convicted, following a jury trial, of murder in the second degree and robbery in the first degree. On appeal, respondent argued that the trial court erred in declining to dismiss the indictment for lack of a timely trial under the IAD. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the decision of the trial court. 244 App. Div. 2d 927, 668 N. Y. S. 2d 126 (1997). The New York Court of Appeals, however, reversed and ordered that the indictment against respondent be dismissed; defense counsels agreement to a later trial date, it held, did not waive respondents speedy trial rights under the IAD. 92 N. Y. 2d 406, 704 N. E. 2d 542 (1998). We granted certiorari. 526 U. S. ___ (1999).
II
No provision of the IAD prescribes the effect of a defendants assent to delay on the applicable time limits. We have, however, in the context of a broad array of constitutional and statutory provisions, articulated a general rule that presumes the availability of waiver, United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U. S. 196, 200201 (1995) , and we have recognized that [t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are … subject to waiver, Peretz v. United States, 501 U. S. 923, 936 (1991) . In accordance with these principles, courts have agreed that a defendant may, at least under some circumstances, waive his right to object to a given delay under the IAD, although they have disagreed on what is necessary to effect a waiver. See , e.g., People v. Jones , 197 Mich. App. 76, 80, 495 N. W. 2d 159, 160 (1992) (waiver if prisoner either expressly or impliedly, agrees or requests to be treated in a manner contrary to the terms of the IAD); Brown v. Wolff , 706 F. 2d 902, 907 (CA9 1983) (waiver if prisoner affirmatively requests to be treated in a manner contrary to the procedures prescribed by the IAD); Drescher v. Superior Ct. , 218 Cal. App. 3d 1140, 1148, 267 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (1990) (waiver if there is a showing of record that the defendant or his attorney freely acquiesced in a trial date beyond the speedy trial period) (internal quotation omitted).
What suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue. [W]hether the defendant must participate personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required for waiver; and whether the defendants choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the right at stake. United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 733 (1993) . For certain fundamental rights, the defendant must personally make an informed waiver. See, e.g. , Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464465 (1938) (right to counsel); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1, 78 (1966) (right to plead not guilty). For other rights, however, waiver may be effected by action of counsel. Although there are basic rights that the attorney cannot waive without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the lawyer hasand must havefull authority to manage the conduct of the trial. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U. S. 400, 417418 (1988) . As to many decisions pertaining to the conduct of the trial, the defendant is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney. Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 634 (1962) (quoting Smith v. Ayer , 101 U. S. 320, 326 (1880) . Thus, decisions by counsel are generally given effect as to what arguments to pursue, see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U. S. 745, 751 (1983) , what evidentiary objections to raise, see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443, 451 (1965) , and what agreements to conclude regarding the admission of evidence, see United States v. McGill , 11 F. 3d 223, 226227 (CA1 1993). Absent a demonstration of ineffectiveness, counsels word on such matters is the last.
Scheduling matters are plainly among those for which agreement by counsel generally controls. This case does not involve a purported prospective waiver of all protection of the IADs time limits or of the IAD generally, but merely agreement to a specified delay in trial. When that subject is under consideration, only counsel is in a position to assess the benefit or detriment of the delay to the defendants case. Likewise, only counsel is in a position to assess whether the defense would even be prepared to proceed any earlier. Requiring express assent from the defendant himself for such routine and often repetitive scheduling determinations would consume time to no apparent purpose. The text of the IAD, moreover, confirms what the reason of the matter suggests: in allowing the court to grant good-cause continuances when either prisoner or his counsel is present, it contemplates that scheduling questions may be left to counsel. Art. III(a) (emphasis added).
Respondent offers two arguments for affirmance, both of which go primarily to the propriety of allowing waiver of any sort, not to the specifics of the waiver here. First, he argues that by explicitly providing for the grant of good-cause continuances, the IAD seeks to limit the situations in which delay is permitted, and that permitting other extensions of the time period would override those limitations. It is of course true that waiver is not appropriate when it is inconsistent with the provision creating the right sought to be secured. E.g., Crosby v. United States, 506 U. S. 255, 258259 (1993) ; Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1, 9 (1959) . That is not, however, the situation here. To be sure, the necessary or reasonable continuance provision is, by clear implication, the sole means by which the prosecution can obtain an extension of the time limits over the defendants objection. But the specification in that provision that the prisoner or his counsel must be present suggests that it is directed primarily, if not indeed exclusively, to prosecution requests that have not explicitly been agreed to by the defense. As applied to agreed-upon extensions, we think its negative implication is dubiousand certainly not clear enough to constitute the affirmative indication required to overcome the ordinary presumption that waiver is available. Mezzanatto, supra , at 201. 1
Second, respondent argues that the IAD benefits not only the defendant but society generally, and that the defendant may not waive societys rights. It is true that a right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not be waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy . Brooklyn Savings Bank v. ONeil, 324 U. S. 697, 704 (1945) (emphasis added). The conditional clause is essential, however: It is not true that any private right that also benefits society cannot be waived. In general, [i]n an adversary system of criminal justice, the public interest in the administration of justice is protected by the participants in the litigation. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 383 (1979) . We allow waiver of numerous constitutional protections for criminal defendants that also serve broader social interests. See, e.g. , Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 275 (1942) (waiver of right to jury trial); Johnson, 304 U. S., at 464 (waiver of right to counsel).
Society may well enjoy some benefit from the IADs time limits: Delay can lead to a less accurate outcome as witnesses become unavailable and memories fade. See, e.g. , Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 5657 (1968) .  For example, because the would-be defendant is already incarcerated in another jurisdiction, societys interests in assuring the defendants presence at trial and in preventing further criminal activity (or avoiding the costs of pretrial detention) are simply not at issue. Cf. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 519 (1972) . In any case, it cannot be argued that societys interest in the prompt resolution of outstanding charges is so central to the IAD that it is part of the unalterable statutory policy, Brooklyn Savings Bank , supra , at 704. In fact, the time limits do not apply at all unless either the prisoner or the receiving State files a request. 2 Thus, the IAD contemplate[s] a degree of party control that is consonant with the background presumption of waivability. Mezzanatto , 513 U. S., at 206. 3
Finally, respondent argues that even if waiver of the IADs time limits is possible, it can be effected only by affirmative conduct not present here. The New York Court of Appeals adopted a similar view, stating that the speedy trial rights guaranteed by the IAD may be waived either explicitly or by an affirmative request for treatment that is contrary to or inconsistent with those speedy trial rights. 92 N. Y. 2d, at 411, 704 N. E. 2d, at 545. The court concluded that defense counsels agreement to the trial date here was not an affirmative request and therefore did not constitute a waiver. Id. , at 412, 704 N. E. 2d, at 546. We agree with the State that this makes dismissal of the indictment turn on a hypertechnical distinction that should play no part. As illustrated by this case, such an approach would enable defendants to escape justice by willingly accepting treatment inconsistent with the IADs time limits, and then recanting later on. Nothing in the IAD requires or even suggests a distinction between waiver proposed and waiver agreed to. In light of its potential for abuseand given the harsh remedy of dismissal with prejudicewe decline to adopt it.
* * *
The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
1 It was suggested at oral argument that agreement in open court to a trial date outside the allowable time period can itself be viewed as a necessary or reasonable continuance for good cause shown in open court. Although an agreed-upon trial date might sometimes merit this description, it is far from clear that it always does so, or that it does so here. Because we find waiver, we do not consider under what circumstances an agreed-upon delay could fit within the good-cause provision.
2 This feature, among others, makes respondents analogy to the Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. §3161 et seq., inapt. The time limits of the Speedy Trial Act begin to run automatically rather than upon request, §§3161(a), (b); dismissal may sometimes be without prejudice, §3162(a)(1),(2), United States v. Taylor, 487 U. S. 326, 332333 (1988) ; and waiver is expressly allowed in certain limited circumstances, 18 U. S. C. §3162(a)(2). In any event, the question of waiver under the Speedy Trial Act is not before us today, and we express no view on the subject.
3 In concluding that objection to a specified delay may be waived, we are mindful that the sending State may have interests distinct from those of the prisoner and the receiving State. This case does not involve any objection from the sending State, and we do not address what recourse the sending State might have under the IAD when the receiving State and prisoner agree to, and the court allows, an inordinate delay. Cf. Article V(e)(At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending State).
Opinion
NEW YORK, PETITIONER v. MICHAEL HILL
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether defense counsels agreement to a trial date outside the time period required by Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers bars the defendant from seeking dismissal because trial did not occur within that period.
I
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a compact entered into by 48 States, the United States, and the District of Columbia to establish procedures for resolution of one States outstanding charges against a prisoner of another State. See N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law §580.20 (McKinney 1995); 18 U. S. C. App. §2; 11A U. L. A. 48 (listing jurisdictions). As a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, §10, cl. 3, the IAD is a federal law subject to federal construction. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U. S. 716, 719 (1985) ; Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 442 (1981) .
A State seeking to bring charges against a prisoner in another States custody begins the process by filing a detainer, which is a request by the States criminal justice agency that the institution in which the prisoner is housed hold the prisoner for the agency or notify the agency when release is imminent. Fex v. Michigan, 507 U. S. 43, 44 (1993) . After a detainer has been lodged against him, a prisoner may file a request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint. Art. III(a). Upon such a request, the prisoner shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days, provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. Ibid. Resolution of the charges can also be triggered by the charging jurisdiction, which may request temporary custody of the prisoner for that purpose. Art. IV(a). In such a case, trial shall be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, subject again to continuances for good cause shown in open court. Art. IV(c). If a defendant is not brought to trial within the applicable statutory period, the IAD requires that the indictment be dismissed with prejudice. Art. V(c).
In this case, New York lodged a detainer against respondent, who was a prisoner in Ohio. Respondent signed a request for disposition of the detainer pursuant to Article III of the IAD, and was returned to New York to face murder and robbery charges.
On January 9, 1995, the prosecutor and defense counsel appeared in court to set a trial date. The following colloquy ensued:
[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, [the regular attorney] from our office is engaged in a trial today. He told me that the Court was to set a trial date today. I believe the Court may have preliminarily discussed a May 1st date, and [the regular attorney] says that would fit in his calendar.
The Court: How is that with the defense counsel?
[Defense Counsel]: That will be fine, Your Honor. 164 Misc. 2d 1032, 1035, 627 N. Y. S. 2d 234, 236 (Cty. Ct., Monroe County 1995).
The court scheduled trial to begin on May 1.
On April 17, 1995, respondent moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the IADs time limit had expired. The trial court found that as of January 9, 1995, when the trial date was set, 167 nonexcludable days had elapsed, so that if the subsequent time period was chargeable to the State, the 180 day time period had indeed expired. However, the trial court concluded that [d]efense counsels explicit agreement to the trial date set beyond the 180 day statutory period constituted a waiver or abandonment of defendants rights under the IAD. Id. , at 1036, 627 N. Y. S. 2d, at 237. Accordingly, the court denied respondents motion to dismiss.
Respondent was subsequently convicted, following a jury trial, of murder in the second degree and robbery in the first degree. On appeal, respondent argued that the trial court erred in declining to dismiss the indictment for lack of a timely trial under the IAD. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the decision of the trial court. 244 App. Div. 2d 927, 668 N. Y. S. 2d 126 (1997). The New York Court of Appeals, however, reversed and ordered that the indictment against respondent be dismissed; defense counsels agreement to a later trial date, it held, did not waive respondents speedy trial rights under the IAD. 92 N. Y. 2d 406, 704 N. E. 2d 542 (1998). We granted certiorari. 526 U. S. ___ (1999).
II
No provision of the IAD prescribes the effect of a defendants assent to delay on the applicable time limits. We have, however, in the context of a broad array of constitutional and statutory provisions, articulated a general rule that presumes the availability of waiver, United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U. S. 196, 200201 (1995) , and we have recognized that [t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are … subject to waiver, Peretz v. United States, 501 U. S. 923, 936 (1991) . In accordance with these principles, courts have agreed that a defendant may, at least under some circumstances, waive his right to object to a given delay under the IAD, although they have disagreed on what is necessary to effect a waiver. See , e.g., People v. Jones , 197 Mich. App. 76, 80, 495 N. W. 2d 159, 160 (1992) (waiver if prisoner either expressly or impliedly, agrees or requests to be treated in a manner contrary to the terms of the IAD); Brown v. Wolff , 706 F. 2d 902, 907 (CA9 1983) (waiver if prisoner affirmatively requests to be treated in a manner contrary to the procedures prescribed by the IAD); Drescher v. Superior Ct. , 218 Cal. App. 3d 1140, 1148, 267 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (1990) (waiver if there is a showing of record that the defendant or his attorney freely acquiesced in a trial date beyond the speedy trial period) (internal quotation omitted).
What suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue. [W]hether the defendant must participate personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required for waiver; and whether the defendants choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the right at stake. United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 733 (1993) . For certain fundamental rights, the defendant must personally make an informed waiver. See, e.g. , Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464465 (1938) (right to counsel); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1, 78 (1966) (right to plead not guilty). For other rights, however, waiver may be effected by action of counsel. Although there are basic rights that the attorney cannot waive without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the lawyer hasand must havefull authority to manage the conduct of the trial. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U. S. 400, 417418 (1988) . As to many decisions pertaining to the conduct of the trial, the defendant is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney. Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 634 (1962) (quoting Smith v. Ayer , 101 U. S. 320, 326 (1880) . Thus, decisions by counsel are generally given effect as to what arguments to pursue, see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U. S. 745, 751 (1983) , what evidentiary objections to raise, see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443, 451 (1965) , and what agreements to conclude regarding the admission of evidence, see United States v. McGill , 11 F. 3d 223, 226227 (CA1 1993). Absent a demonstration of ineffectiveness, counsels word on such matters is the last.
Scheduling matters are plainly among those for which agreement by counsel generally controls. This case does not involve a purported prospective waiver of all protection of the IADs time limits or of the IAD generally, but merely agreement to a specified delay in trial. When that subject is under consideration, only counsel is in a position to assess the benefit or detriment of the delay to the defendants case. Likewise, only counsel is in a position to assess whether the defense would even be prepared to proceed any earlier. Requiring express assent from the defendant himself for such routine and often repetitive scheduling determinations would consume time to no apparent purpose. The text of the IAD, moreover, confirms what the reason of the matter suggests: in allowing the court to grant good-cause continuances when either prisoner or his counsel is present, it contemplates that scheduling questions may be left to counsel. Art. III(a) (emphasis added).
Respondent offers two arguments for affirmance, both of which go primarily to the propriety of allowing waiver of any sort, not to the specifics of the waiver here. First, he argues that by explicitly providing for the grant of good-cause continuances, the IAD seeks to limit the situations in which delay is permitted, and that permitting other extensions of the time period would override those limitations. It is of course true that waiver is not appropriate when it is inconsistent with the provision creating the right sought to be secured. E.g., Crosby v. United States, 506 U. S. 255, 258259 (1993) ; Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1, 9 (1959) . That is not, however, the situation here. To be sure, the necessary or reasonable continuance provision is, by clear implication, the sole means by which the prosecution can obtain an extension of the time limits over the defendants objection. But the specification in that provision that the prisoner or his counsel must be present suggests that it is directed primarily, if not indeed exclusively, to prosecution requests that have not explicitly been agreed to by the defense. As applied to agreed-upon extensions, we think its negative implication is dubiousand certainly not clear enough to constitute the affirmative indication required to overcome the ordinary presumption that waiver is available. Mezzanatto, supra , at 201. 1
Second, respondent argues that the IAD benefits not only the defendant but society generally, and that the defendant may not waive societys rights. It is true that a right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not be waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy . Brooklyn Savings Bank v. ONeil, 324 U. S. 697, 704 (1945) (emphasis added). The conditional clause is essential, however: It is not true that any private right that also benefits society cannot be waived. In general, [i]n an adversary system of criminal justice, the public interest in the administration of justice is protected by the participants in the litigation. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 383 (1979) . We allow waiver of numerous constitutional protections for criminal defendants that also serve broader social interests. See, e.g. , Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 275 (1942) (waiver of right to jury trial); Johnson, 304 U. S., at 464 (waiver of right to counsel).
Society may well enjoy some benefit from the IADs time limits: Delay can lead to a less accurate outcome as witnesses become unavailable and memories fade. See, e.g. , Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 5657 (1968) .  For example, because the would-be defendant is already incarcerated in another jurisdiction, societys interests in assuring the defendants presence at trial and in preventing further criminal activity (or avoiding the costs of pretrial detention) are simply not at issue. Cf. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 519 (1972) . In any case, it cannot be argued that societys interest in the prompt resolution of outstanding charges is so central to the IAD that it is part of the unalterable statutory policy, Brooklyn Savings Bank , supra , at 704. In fact, the time limits do not apply at all unless either the prisoner or the receiving State files a request. 2 Thus, the IAD contemplate[s] a degree of party control that is consonant with the background presumption of waivability. Mezzanatto , 513 U. S., at 206. 3
Finally, respondent argues that even if waiver of the IADs time limits is possible, it can be effected only by affirmative conduct not present here. The New York Court of Appeals adopted a similar view, stating that the speedy trial rights guaranteed by the IAD may be waived either explicitly or by an affirmative request for treatment that is contrary to or inconsistent with those speedy trial rights. 92 N. Y. 2d, at 411, 704 N. E. 2d, at 545. The court concluded that defense counsels agreement to the trial date here was not an affirmative request and therefore did not constitute a waiver. Id. , at 412, 704 N. E. 2d, at 546. We agree with the State that this makes dismissal of the indictment turn on a hypertechnical distinction that should play no part. As illustrated by this case, such an approach would enable defendants to escape justice by willingly accepting treatment inconsistent with the IADs time limits, and then recanting later on. Nothing in the IAD requires or even suggests a distinction between waiver proposed and waiver agreed to. In light of its potential for abuseand given the harsh remedy of dismissal with prejudicewe decline to adopt it.
* * *
The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
1 It was suggested at oral argument that agreement in open court to a trial date outside the allowable time period can itself be viewed as a necessary or reasonable continuance for good cause shown in open court. Although an agreed-upon trial date might sometimes merit this description, it is far from clear that it always does so, or that it does so here. Because we find waiver, we do not consider under what circumstances an agreed-upon delay could fit within the good-cause provision.
2 This feature, among others, makes respondents analogy to the Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. §3161 et seq., inapt. The time limits of the Speedy Trial Act begin to run automatically rather than upon request, §§3161(a), (b); dismissal may sometimes be without prejudice, §3162(a)(1),(2), United States v. Taylor, 487 U. S. 326, 332333 (1988) ; and waiver is expressly allowed in certain limited circumstances, 18 U. S. C. §3162(a)(2). In any event, the question of waiver under the Speedy Trial Act is not before us today, and we express no view on the subject.
3 In concluding that objection to a specified delay may be waived, we are mindful that the sending State may have interests distinct from those of the prisoner and the receiving State. This case does not involve any objection from the sending State, and we do not address what recourse the sending State might have under the IAD when the receiving State and prisoner agree to, and the court allows, an inordinate delay. Cf. Article V(e)(At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending State).
Opinion
NEW YORK, PETITIONER v. MICHAEL HILL
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether defense counsels agreement to a trial date outside the time period required by Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers bars the defendant from seeking dismissal because trial did not occur within that period.
I
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a compact entered into by 48 States, the United States, and the District of Columbia to establish procedures for resolution of one States outstanding charges against a prisoner of another State. See N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law §580.20 (McKinney 1995); 18 U. S. C. App. §2; 11A U. L. A. 48 (listing jurisdictions). As a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, §10, cl. 3, the IAD is a federal law subject to federal construction. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U. S. 716, 719 (1985) ; Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 442 (1981) .
A State seeking to bring charges against a prisoner in another States custody begins the process by filing a detainer, which is a request by the States criminal justice agency that the institution in which the prisoner is housed hold the prisoner for the agency or notify the agency when release is imminent. Fex v. Michigan, 507 U. S. 43, 44 (1993) . After a detainer has been lodged against him, a prisoner may file a request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint. Art. III(a). Upon such a request, the prisoner shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days, provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. Ibid. Resolution of the charges can also be triggered by the charging jurisdiction, which may request temporary custody of the prisoner for that purpose. Art. IV(a). In such a case, trial shall be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, subject again to continuances for good cause shown in open court. Art. IV(c). If a defendant is not brought to trial within the applicable statutory period, the IAD requires that the indictment be dismissed with prejudice. Art. V(c).
In this case, New York lodged a detainer against respondent, who was a prisoner in Ohio. Respondent signed a request for disposition of the detainer pursuant to Article III of the IAD, and was returned to New York to face murder and robbery charges.
On January 9, 1995, the prosecutor and defense counsel appeared in court to set a trial date. The following colloquy ensued:
[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, [the regular attorney] from our office is engaged in a trial today. He told me that the Court was to set a trial date today. I believe the Court may have preliminarily discussed a May 1st date, and [the regular attorney] says that would fit in his calendar.
The Court: How is that with the defense counsel?
[Defense Counsel]: That will be fine, Your Honor. 164 Misc. 2d 1032, 1035, 627 N. Y. S. 2d 234, 236 (Cty. Ct., Monroe County 1995).
The court scheduled trial to begin on May 1.
On April 17, 1995, respondent moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the IADs time limit had expired. The trial court found that as of January 9, 1995, when the trial date was set, 167 nonexcludable days had elapsed, so that if the subsequent time period was chargeable to the State, the 180 day time period had indeed expired. However, the trial court concluded that [d]efense counsels explicit agreement to the trial date set beyond the 180 day statutory period constituted a waiver or abandonment of defendants rights under the IAD. Id. , at 1036, 627 N. Y. S. 2d, at 237. Accordingly, the court denied respondents motion to dismiss.
Respondent was subsequently convicted, following a jury trial, of murder in the second degree and robbery in the first degree. On appeal, respondent argued that the trial court erred in declining to dismiss the indictment for lack of a timely trial under the IAD. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the decision of the trial court. 244 App. Div. 2d 927, 668 N. Y. S. 2d 126 (1997). The New York Court of Appeals, however, reversed and ordered that the indictment against respondent be dismissed; defense counsels agreement to a later trial date, it held, did not waive respondents speedy trial rights under the IAD. 92 N. Y. 2d 406, 704 N. E. 2d 542 (1998). We granted certiorari. 526 U. S. ___ (1999).
II
No provision of the IAD prescribes the effect of a defendants assent to delay on the applicable time limits. We have, however, in the context of a broad array of constitutional and statutory provisions, articulated a general rule that presumes the availability of waiver, United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U. S. 196, 200201 (1995) , and we have recognized that [t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are … subject to waiver, Peretz v. United States, 501 U. S. 923, 936 (1991) . In accordance with these principles, courts have agreed that a defendant may, at least under some circumstances, waive his right to object to a given delay under the IAD, although they have disagreed on what is necessary to effect a waiver. See , e.g., People v. Jones , 197 Mich. App. 76, 80, 495 N. W. 2d 159, 160 (1992) (waiver if prisoner either expressly or impliedly, agrees or requests to be treated in a manner contrary to the terms of the IAD); Brown v. Wolff , 706 F. 2d 902, 907 (CA9 1983) (waiver if prisoner affirmatively requests to be treated in a manner contrary to the procedures prescribed by the IAD); Drescher v. Superior Ct. , 218 Cal. App. 3d 1140, 1148, 267 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (1990) (waiver if there is a showing of record that the defendant or his attorney freely acquiesced in a trial date beyond the speedy trial period) (internal quotation omitted).
What suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue. [W]hether the defendant must participate personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required for waiver; and whether the defendants choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the right at stake. United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 733 (1993) . For certain fundamental rights, the defendant must personally make an informed waiver. See, e.g. , Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464465 (1938) (right to counsel); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1, 78 (1966) (right to plead not guilty). For other rights, however, waiver may be effected by action of counsel. Although there are basic rights that the attorney cannot waive without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the lawyer hasand must havefull authority to manage the conduct of the trial. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U. S. 400, 417418 (1988) . As to many decisions pertaining to the conduct of the trial, the defendant is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney. Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 634 (1962) (quoting Smith v. Ayer , 101 U. S. 320, 326 (1880) . Thus, decisions by counsel are generally given effect as to what arguments to pursue, see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U. S. 745, 751 (1983) , what evidentiary objections to raise, see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443, 451 (1965) , and what agreements to conclude regarding the admission of evidence, see United States v. McGill , 11 F. 3d 223, 226227 (CA1 1993). Absent a demonstration of ineffectiveness, counsels word on such matters is the last.
Scheduling matters are plainly among those for which agreement by counsel generally controls. This case does not involve a purported prospective waiver of all protection of the IADs time limits or of the IAD generally, but merely agreement to a specified delay in trial. When that subject is under consideration, only counsel is in a position to assess the benefit or detriment of the delay to the defendants case. Likewise, only counsel is in a position to assess whether the defense would even be prepared to proceed any earlier. Requiring express assent from the defendant himself for such routine and often repetitive scheduling determinations would consume time to no apparent purpose. The text of the IAD, moreover, confirms what the reason of the matter suggests: in allowing the court to grant good-cause continuances when either prisoner or his counsel is present, it contemplates that scheduling questions may be left to counsel. Art. III(a) (emphasis added).
Respondent offers two arguments for affirmance, both of which go primarily to the propriety of allowing waiver of any sort, not to the specifics of the waiver here. First, he argues that by explicitly providing for the grant of good-cause continuances, the IAD seeks to limit the situations in which delay is permitted, and that permitting other extensions of the time period would override those limitations. It is of course true that waiver is not appropriate when it is inconsistent with the provision creating the right sought to be secured. E.g., Crosby v. United States, 506 U. S. 255, 258259 (1993) ; Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1, 9 (1959) . That is not, however, the situation here. To be sure, the necessary or reasonable continuance provision is, by clear implication, the sole means by which the prosecution can obtain an extension of the time limits over the defendants objection. But the specification in that provision that the prisoner or his counsel must be present suggests that it is directed primarily, if not indeed exclusively, to prosecution requests that have not explicitly been agreed to by the defense. As applied to agreed-upon extensions, we think its negative implication is dubiousand certainly not clear enough to constitute the affirmative indication required to overcome the ordinary presumption that waiver is available. Mezzanatto, supra , at 201. 1
Second, respondent argues that the IAD benefits not only the defendant but society generally, and that the defendant may not waive societys rights. It is true that a right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not be waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy . Brooklyn Savings Bank v. ONeil, 324 U. S. 697, 704 (1945) (emphasis added). The conditional clause is essential, however: It is not true that any private right that also benefits society cannot be waived. In general, [i]n an adversary system of criminal justice, the public interest in the administration of justice is protected by the participants in the litigation. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 383 (1979) . We allow waiver of numerous constitutional protections for criminal defendants that also serve broader social interests. See, e.g. , Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 275 (1942) (waiver of right to jury trial); Johnson, 304 U. S., at 464 (waiver of right to counsel).
Society may well enjoy some benefit from the IADs time limits: Delay can lead to a less accurate outcome as witnesses become unavailable and memories fade. See, e.g. , Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 5657 (1968) .  For example, because the would-be defendant is already incarcerated in another jurisdiction, societys interests in assuring the defendants presence at trial and in preventing further criminal activity (or avoiding the costs of pretrial detention) are simply not at issue. Cf. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 519 (1972) . In any case, it cannot be argued that societys interest in the prompt resolution of outstanding charges is so central to the IAD that it is part of the unalterable statutory policy, Brooklyn Savings Bank , supra , at 704. In fact, the time limits do not apply at all unless either the prisoner or the receiving State files a request. 2 Thus, the IAD contemplate[s] a degree of party control that is consonant with the background presumption of waivability. Mezzanatto , 513 U. S., at 206. 3
Finally, respondent argues that even if waiver of the IADs time limits is possible, it can be effected only by affirmative conduct not present here. The New York Court of Appeals adopted a similar view, stating that the speedy trial rights guaranteed by the IAD may be waived either explicitly or by an affirmative request for treatment that is contrary to or inconsistent with those speedy trial rights. 92 N. Y. 2d, at 411, 704 N. E. 2d, at 545. The court concluded that defense counsels agreement to the trial date here was not an affirmative request and therefore did not constitute a waiver. Id. , at 412, 704 N. E. 2d, at 546. We agree with the State that this makes dismissal of the indictment turn on a hypertechnical distinction that should play no part. As illustrated by this case, such an approach would enable defendants to escape justice by willingly accepting treatment inconsistent with the IADs time limits, and then recanting later on. Nothing in the IAD requires or even suggests a distinction between waiver proposed and waiver agreed to. In light of its potential for abuseand given the harsh remedy of dismissal with prejudicewe decline to adopt it.
* * *
The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
1 It was suggested at oral argument that agreement in open court to a trial date outside the allowable time period can itself be viewed as a necessary or reasonable continuance for good cause shown in open court. Although an agreed-upon trial date might sometimes merit this description, it is far from clear that it always does so, or that it does so here. Because we find waiver, we do not consider under what circumstances an agreed-upon delay could fit within the good-cause provision.
2 This feature, among others, makes respondents analogy to the Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. §3161 et seq., inapt. The time limits of the Speedy Trial Act begin to run automatically rather than upon request, §§3161(a), (b); dismissal may sometimes be without prejudice, §3162(a)(1),(2), United States v. Taylor, 487 U. S. 326, 332333 (1988) ; and waiver is expressly allowed in certain limited circumstances, 18 U. S. C. §3162(a)(2). In any event, the question of waiver under the Speedy Trial Act is not before us today, and we express no view on the subject.
3 In concluding that objection to a specified delay may be waived, we are mindful that the sending State may have interests distinct from those of the prisoner and the receiving State. This case does not involve any objection from the sending State, and we do not address what recourse the sending State might have under the IAD when the receiving State and prisoner agree to, and the court allows, an inordinate delay. Cf. Article V(e)(At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending State).


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Unicode - character data and UTF-8 encoding
See Studio|Demos|unicode simple and Studio|Demos|unicode for examples of J support for non-English language text. These demos require appropriate fonts.
Standard library script unicode.ijs (open'unicode') has utilities for working with unicode.
There are good Unicode and UTF-8 references on the web, including: www.utf-8.com.
UTF-8 and Unicode are fully supported. UTF-8 is multibyte encoding for 8 bit data that includes all Unicode code points and maps 7 bit ASCII unchanged. The system continues to use the J character data type of 8 bits. The big difference is that when it is interpreted as displayable characters the UTF-8 encoding is used rather than ANSI code pages.
UTF-8 is supported by scripts, foreigns, files, GUI forms, controls, and OLE/COM. Your J application can be fully unicode aware.
In addition to support for UTF-8 encoding the 16 bit character data type has extended support. See u: for details.
J interacts with the world with byte strings (strings of 8 bit values). At the keyboard your entry of i.3 causes the bytes 105 46 51 to be sent to J. J builds a sentence from these values, runs it, and sends the byte string 48 32 49 32 50 for display on the screen. The encoding that maps the keyboard presses of i . 3 to the input values 105 46 51 and the output values 48 32 49 32 50 to the screen characters 0 blank 1 blank 2 is the ASCII encoding.
ASCII encoding maps English lowercase and uppercase alphabet, digits, and punctuation and symbols to the byte values 32 through 127. The values 0 through 31 and the value 127 are used for 'controls' such as enter, backspace, and tab. ASCII encoding does not include byte values from 128 to 255.
In previous J releases the restriction to English could be partially relaxed by the use of an encoding called ANSI. This encoding gave character symbol meanings to the byte values 128 to 255. But the increase of 128 symbols only satisfied the requirements of a few European lanuages. User selectable code pages, as an implicit argument, changed the symbols mapped and extended the range of languages covered and the use of double byte sequences (2 bytes indicating a symbol in a code page) allowed the support of all languages. At best the use of ANSI with code pages and double byte sequences was awkward and confusing.
Over many years (and countless committee meetings) standards organizations finally agreed on a mapping of a unique code point (integer value) for every symbol in every language. All symbols required by all languages can be mapped to values in the range 0 to 65535. For example:
97 is a, 65 is A, 240 is æ, and 25180 is a Chinese symbol.
Several years ago J introduced wchar as a second character data type that is similar to the char data but instead of having values of 0 to 255 it can have values of 0 to 65535. A wchar can have any unicode code point.
The whar data type is useful for manipulating unicode data in J. However, the outside world is still very much byte oriented. This includes text files, ijs text files, web pages, email messages, etc and all the software that is oriented towards working with this byte data.
In a perfect world computers would never have had 8 bit bytes and 7 bit ASCII. Instead it would have had 16 bits for character data with the unicode code point mapping.
But given where we are (lots of 8 bit data and 8 bit oriented programs) and the absolute need for computers to more easily and consistently support all languages the UTF-8 encoding offers an interesting and useful compromise.
UTF-8 encoding maps the unicode code points to a string of bytes. This allows the byte oriented nature of much of the existing stuff to continue and still have almost all the advantages of unicode.
Starting in J601 J char data assumes UTF-8 encoding when used as text. This is very different from the previous encoding assumptions based on ANSI and code pages.
If you used non-English language in your J applications you will definitely have to do some conversion work. But the end result will be cleaner and if you are starting now to do this kind of work you'll find things much easier.
A key point is that UTF-8 support is becoming common. In J you can enter and display non-English lanuage text just as you would with any other application. And with email and web page support you can cut and paste with J. The UTF-8 support, in addition to being complete and easy to use on Windows, is also the preferred Unicode approach on Unix.
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Preparation time
1-2 hours
Cooking time
30 mins to 1 hour
Serves
Makes 1 large loaf
Dietary
This loaf, filled with homemade pesto, walnuts, roasted vegetables and feta, is made for sharing and would made a lovely addition to any picnic.
Equipment and preparation: For this recipe you will need three baking trays, a food processor and a sturdy mug or glass.
To make the dough, put the bread flour in a large mixing bowl. Add the salt, sugar, yeast, butter, beaten eggs, milk and approximately 25ml/1fl oz warm water. Mix until combined. Add up to another 100ml/3½fl oz warm water, mixing between additions until you have a soft dough.
Lightly flour a work surface and knead the dough for about 10 minutes, or until it is smooth and elastic.
Lightly oil a large bowl and add the dough. Cover with cling film and set aside to prove for about an hour.
For the filling, preheat the oven to 170C/325F/Gas 3.
Put the onion, pepper and butternut squash onto separate baking trays, drizzle with olive oil and roast in the oven for about 15 minutes, or until tender.
Meanwhile, make the pesto. Heat a small, dry frying pan over a low heat. Add the pine nuts and toast until lightly browned. Add the pine nuts and all the remaining pesto ingredients to a food processor and blend until smooth.
To finish the bread, knock back the proved dough by kneading it for 20 seconds, then cut it into two. Wrap half in oiled cling film and set aside.
On a lightly floured work surface, roll the remaining half of dough into a circle with diameter of approximately 30cm/12in. Let the dough rest for about five minutes – it will shrink back. Roll it out again to a diameter of approximately 32cm/13in and place on a large baking tray.
Spread three tablespoons of pesto over the dough and pile the roasted vegetables, feta and walnuts over the top in layers, making the layers slightly deeper in the centre. This will form the base of the bread.
Roll out the remaining dough as in step 8. This will make the top layer.
Brush the edges of the base with a little water and carefully lift the top layer onto the base.
Use a sharp knife to trim the dough into a neat circle (approximately 30cm/12in diameter). Place a small bowl over the filling. Using a sharp knife, cut the dough into 16 equally-sized strips radiating from the bowl. Carefully twist each strip twice and cut the ends into points. Press the end of each strip onto the baking sheet to stop them unravelling while they prove. Set aside to prove for about 30 minutes.
Preheat the oven to 190C/375F/Gas 5.
For the topping, brush the top of the dough with the beaten egg and sprinkle the pine nuts, salt and pepper in the centre. Bake for 20-25 minutes, or until golden-brown. Check after 15 minutes and cover the twists with aluminium foil if they are browning too quickly. Allow to cool before serving.


Across: 4,18. Among the (7-Down) on a Certain Artefact (1,4,2,3,5) 8. And Lo! Hebrew returns! (6) 9. Something the Duke wrote, in his "trailer" perhaps (7) 10. Sign a Heritage petition to return to straighten (17-Down), for instance (6) 11. Links members use guests (6) 12. Pub nude goes wild with nothing implied (8) 18. see 4-Across 20,21. Among the (7-Down) on a Certain Artefact (6,6) 22,15-Down. Among the (7-Down) on a Certain Artefact (1,4,2,3,4) 23. If a set were described in Ernest's ... (6) 24. ... paper or former paper? (7) Down: 1,2. Among the (7-Down) on a Certain Artefact (1,4,2,3,4) 3. Effect of loud NZ ex PM (6) 5. Not exactly more safe! (8) 6. Fruity offering for Angelica? (6) 7. Use gaming returns for photography (6) 13. Curiously neat sign in the margins (3,5) 14. Reject or depose about retrospective act (7) 15. see 22-Across 16. Cunningly attractive creature? (3,3) 17. Paper or post, even e-mail (rare) (6) 19. Corn that is ground that is corn that is not ground (6)


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17.4 Binary Search TreesBinary trees are a data structure that impose an order on inserted nodes: items less than a node are stored in its left subtree, and items greater than a node are inserted in the right. At the bottom, the subtrees are empty. Because of this structure, binary trees naturally support quick, recursive traversals -- at least ideally, every time you follow a link to a subtree, you divide the search space in half.[3]
Binary trees are named for the implied branch-like structure of their subtree links. Typically, their nodes are implemented as a triple of values: (LeftSubtree, NodeValue, RightSubtree). Beyond that, there is fairly wide latitude in the tree implementation. Here we'll use a class-based approach:
Rather than coding distinct search functions, binary trees are constructed with "smart" objects (class instances) that know how to handle insert/lookup and printing requests and pass them to subtree objects. In fact, this is another example of the OOP composition relationship in action: tree nodes embed other tree nodes and pass search requests off to the embedded subtrees. A single empty class instance is shared by all empty subtrees in a binary tree, and inserts replace an EmptyNode with a BinaryNode at the bottom (see Example 17-13). Example 17-13. PP2E\Dstruct\Classics\btree.pyclass BinaryTree: def __init__(self): self.tree = EmptyNode( ) def __repr__(self): return `self.tree` def lookup(self, value): return self.tree.lookup(value) def insert(self, value): self.tree = self.tree.insert(value) class EmptyNode: def __repr__(self): return '*' def lookup(self, value): # fail at the bottom return 0 def insert(self, value): return BinaryNode(self, value, self) # add new node at bottom class BinaryNode: def __init__(self, left, value, right): self.data, self.left, self.right = value, left, right def lookup(self, value): if self.data == value: return 1 elif self.data > value: return self.left.lookup(value) # look in left else: return self.right.lookup(value) # look in right def insert(self, value): if self.data > value: self.left = self.left.insert(value) # grow in left elif self.data < value: self.right = self.right.insert(value) # grow in right return self def __repr__(self): return '( %s, %s, %s )' % (`self.left`, `self.data`, `self.right`) As usual, BinaryTree can contain objects of any type that support the expected interface protocol -- here, > and < comparisons. This includes class instances with the __cmp__ method. Let's experiment with this module's interfaces. The following code stuffs five integers into a new tree, and then searches for values 0...9: C:\...\PP2E\Dstruct\Classics>python >>> from btree import BinaryTree >>> x = BinaryTree( ) >>> for i in [3,1,9,2,7]: x.insert(i) ... >>> for i in range(10): print (i, x.lookup(i)), ... (0, 0) (1, 1) (2, 1) (3, 1) (4, 0) (5, 0) (6, 0) (7, 1) (8, 0) (9, 1) To watch this tree grow, add a print statement after each insert. Tree nodes print themselves as triples, and empty nodes print as *. The result reflects tree nesting: >>> y = BinaryTree( ) >>> y * >>> for i in [3,1,9,2,7]: ... y.insert(i); print y ... ( *, 3, * ) ( ( *, 1, * ), 3, * ) ( ( *, 1, * ), 3, ( *, 9, * ) ) ( ( *, 1, ( *, 2, * ) ), 3, ( *, 9, * ) ) ( ( *, 1, ( *, 2, * ) ), 3, ( ( *, 7, * ), 9, * ) ) At the end of this chapter, we'll see another way to visualize trees in a GUI (which means you're invited to flip ahead now). Node values in this tree object can be any comparable Python object; for instances, here is a tree of strings: >>> z = BinaryTree( ) >>> for c in 'badce': z.insert(c) ... >>> z ( ( *, 'a', * ), 'b', ( ( *, 'c', * ), 'd', ( *, 'e', * ) ) ) >>> z = BinaryTree( ) >>> for c in 'abcde': z.insert(c) ... >>> z ( *, 'a', ( *, 'b', ( *, 'c', ( *, 'd', ( *, 'e', * ) ) ) ) ) Notice the last result here: if items inserted into a binary tree are already ordered, then you wind up with a linear structure, and you lose the search-space partitioning magic of binary trees (the tree grows in right branches only). This is a worst-case scenario, and binary trees generally do a good job of dividing up values in practice. But if you are interested in pursuing this topic further, see a data structures text for tree-balancing techniques that automatically keep the tree as dense as possible. Also note that to keep the code simple, these trees store a value only, and lookups return a 1 or (true or false). In practice, you sometimes may want to store both a key and an associated value (or even more) at each tree node. Example 17-14 shows what such a tree object looks like, for any prospective lumberjacks in the audience. Example 17-14. PP2E\Dstruct\Classics\btree-keys.pyclass KeyedBinaryTree: def __init__(self): self.tree = EmptyNode( ) def __repr__(self): return `self.tree` def lookup(self, key): return self.tree.lookup(key) def insert(self, key, val): self.tree = self.tree.insert(key, val) class EmptyNode: def __repr__(self): return '*' def lookup(self, key): # fail at the bottom return None def insert(self, key, val): return BinaryNode(self, key, val, self) # add node at bottom class BinaryNode: def __init__(self, left, key, val, right): self.key, self.val = key, val self.left, self.right = left, right def lookup(self, key): if self.key == key: return self.val elif self.key > key: return self.left.lookup(key) # look in left else: return self.right.lookup(key) # look in right def insert(self, key, val): if self.key == key: self.val = val elif self.key > key: self.left = self.left.insert(key, val) # grow in left elif self.key < key: self.right = self.right.insert(key, val) # grow in right return self def __repr__(self): return ('( %s, %s=%s, %s )' % (`self.left`, `self.key`, `self.val`, `self.right`)) if __name__ == '__main__': t = KeyedBinaryTree( ) for (key, val) in [('bbb', 1), ('aaa', 2), ('ccc', 3)]: t.insert(key, val) print t print t.lookup('aaa'), t.lookup('ccc') t.insert('ddd', 4) t.insert('aaa', 5) # changes key's value print t And here is this script's self-test code at work; nodes simply have more content this time around: C:\...\PP2E\Dstruct\Classics>python btree-keys.py ( ( *, 'aaa'=2, * ), 'bbb'=1, ( *, 'ccc'=3, * ) ) 2 3 ( ( *, 'aaa'=5, * ), 'bbb'=1, ( *, 'ccc'=3, ( *, 'ddd'=4, * ) ) ) |
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India vs Bangladesh, 1st T20I: Rohit Sharma all set to surpass MS Dhoni
by IANSHighlights
- Rohit Sharma will become the most-capped Indian T20I player after MS Dhoni when the star opener will take the field against Bangladesh on Sunday
- Rohit has played 98 T20Is since making his debut at the World T20 in 2007 and will go past Dhoni's tally of 98 T20Is for India
- Rohit will also move to third place on the list of players with most T20I appearances
NEW DELHI: Stand-in skipper Rohit Sharma is on the verge of achieving another feat on Sunday when he leads the Men in Blue in the first contest of the three-match T20I rubber at the Arun Jaitley Stadium as the star opener will become the most-capped Indian T20I player after MS Dhoni.
Rohit has played 98 T20Is since making his debut at the World T20 in 2007 and will go past Dhoni's tally of 98 T20Is for India.
Meanwhile, the Mumbai batsman will move to the third place on the list of players with most T20I appearances after Pakistan's Shoaib Malik (111) and Shahid Afridi (99).
Meanwhile on Sunday, Rohit could also break Virat Kohli's record for most runs scored in T20I cricket. Rohit is currently seven runs behind Kohli's tally. While the stand-in captain averages just above 30 in T20Is, Kohli is well ahead 2,450 runs.
Rohit had earlier captained India to the Asia Cup victory last year when Kohli was rested.
Speaking on the eve of the match on Saturday, Rohit told reporters: "My job as a captain is very simple -- I just want to take the team forward from where Virat has left the team.
"What I have done at the limited opportunities that I have got is to maintain what Virat has done previously with the team. I am just trying to carry that forward."


Class ReaperElement
- java.lang.Object
-
- com.arjuna.ats.internal.arjuna.coordinator.ReaperElement
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- All Implemented Interfaces:
java.lang.Comparable<ReaperElement>
public class ReaperElement extends java.lang.Object implements java.lang.Comparable<ReaperElement>
-
-
Field Summary
Fields Modifier and Type Field Description Reapable
_control
int
_status
int
_timeout
java.lang.Thread
_worker
static int
CANCEL
static int
CANCEL_INTERRUPTED
static int
COMPLETE
static int
FAIL
static int
RUN
static int
SCHEDULE_CANCEL
static int
TRACE
status of a reaper element which has been queued for stack trace capture by a reaper worker.static int
ZOMBIE
-
Constructor Summary
Constructors Constructor Description ReaperElement(Reapable control, int cancelIntervalSeconds)
ReaperElement(Reapable control, int cancelIntervalSeconds, long traceGracePeriodMills)
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Method Summary
All Methods Instance Methods Concrete Methods Modifier and Type Method Description int
compareTo(ReaperElement other)
Order by absoluteTimeout first, then by Uid.boolean
equals(java.lang.Object o)
long
getNextCheckAbsoluteMillis()
Returns the absolute time of the next status check, in millisecondslong
getTransactionTimeoutAbsoluteMillis()
Returns the absolute time of the transaction expiry, in millisecondsint
hashCode()
void
setNextCheckAbsoluteMillis(long nextCheckAbsoluteMillis)
Sets the absolute time of the next status check (i.e.java.lang.String
statusName()
java.lang.String
toString()
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-
-
Field Detail
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_control
public final Reapable _control
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_timeout
public int _timeout
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_status
public int _status
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_worker
public java.lang.Thread _worker
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RUN
public static final int RUN
- See Also:
- Constant Field Values
-
SCHEDULE_CANCEL
public static final int SCHEDULE_CANCEL
- See Also:
- Constant Field Values
-
CANCEL
public static final int CANCEL
- See Also:
- Constant Field Values
-
CANCEL_INTERRUPTED
public static final int CANCEL_INTERRUPTED
- See Also:
- Constant Field Values
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FAIL
public static final int FAIL
- See Also:
- Constant Field Values
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COMPLETE
public static final int COMPLETE
- See Also:
- Constant Field Values
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ZOMBIE
public static final int ZOMBIE
- See Also:
- Constant Field Values
-
TRACE
public static final int TRACE
status of a reaper element which has been queued for stack trace capture by a reaper worker.- See Also:
- Constant Field Values
-
-
Method Detail
-
toString
public java.lang.String toString()
- Overrides:
toString
in classjava.lang.Object
-
compareTo
public int compareTo(ReaperElement other)
Order by absoluteTimeout first, then by Uid. This is required so that the set maintained by the TransactionReaper is in timeout order for efficient processing.- Specified by:
compareTo
in interfacejava.lang.Comparable<ReaperElement>
- Parameters:
other
- the ReaperElement to compare- Returns:
- 0 if equal, 1 if this is greater, -1 if this is smaller
-
equals
public boolean equals(java.lang.Object o)
- Overrides:
equals
in classjava.lang.Object
-
hashCode
public int hashCode()
- Overrides:
hashCode
in classjava.lang.Object
-
statusName
public final java.lang.String statusName()
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getNextCheckAbsoluteMillis
public long getNextCheckAbsoluteMillis()
Returns the absolute time of the next status check, in milliseconds- Returns:
- The absolute wakeup time, in millis
-
setNextCheckAbsoluteMillis
public void setNextCheckAbsoluteMillis(long nextCheckAbsoluteMillis)
Sets the absolute time of the next status check (i.e. wakeup) for this element.- Parameters:
nextCheckAbsoluteMillis
- value in milliseconds
-
getTransactionTimeoutAbsoluteMillis
public long getTransactionTimeoutAbsoluteMillis()
Returns the absolute time of the transaction expiry, in milliseconds- Returns:
- The absolute timeout time, in millis
-
-