--- layout: page title: "Developing Backbone.js Applications" prev: OEBPS/ch01.html next: OEBPS/ch01s03.html book_path: books/developing-backbone-js-applications-addy-osmani--_oeb/ --- {% include JB/setup %} {% raw %}
MVC (Model-View-Controller) is an architectural design pattern that encourages improved application organization through a separation of concerns. It enforces the isolation of business data (Models) from user interfaces (Views), with a third component (Controllers) traditionally present to manage logic, user-input and the coordination of models and views. The pattern was originally designed by Trygve Reenskaug while working on Smalltalk-80 (1979), where it was initially called Model-View-Controller-Editor. MVC was described in depth in “Design Patterns: Elements of Reusable Object-Oriented Software” (The “GoF” or “Gang of Four” book) in 1994, which played a role in popularizing its use.
It’s important to understand what the original MVC pattern was aiming to solve as it has changed quite heavily since the days of its origin. Back in the 70’s, graphical user-interfaces were far and few between. An approach known as Separated Presentation began to be used as a means to make a clear division between domain objects which modeled concepts in the real world (e.g a photo, a person) and the presentation objects which were rendered to the user’s screen.
The Smalltalk-80 implementation of MVC took this concept further and had an objective of separating out the application logic from the user interface. The idea was that decoupling these parts of the application would also allow the reuse of models for other interfaces in the application. There are some interesting points worth noting about Smalltalk-80’s MVC architecture:
A Domain element was known as a Model and were ignorant of the user-interface (Views and Controllers)
Presentation was taken care of by the View and the Controller, but there wasn’t just a single view and controller. A View-Controller pair was required for each element being displayed on the screen and so there was no true separation between them
The Controller’s role in this pair was handling user input (such as key-presses and click events), doing something sensible with them.
The Observer pattern was relied upon for updating the View whenever the Model changed
Developers are sometimes surprised when they learn that the Observer pattern (nowadays commonly implemented as a Publish/Subscribe system) was included as a part of MVC’s architecture decades ago. In Smalltalk-80’s MVC, the View and Controller both observe the Model: anytime the Model changes, the Views react. A simple example of this is an application backed by stock market data - for the application to show real-time information, any change to the data in its Models should result in the View being refreshed instantly.
Martin Fowler has done an excellent job of writing about the origins of MVC over the years and if you are interested in further historical information about Smalltalk-80’s MVC, I recommend reading his work.


#
# Ce fichier contient le ccode python appelé le Custom Transformer
# SPATIAL_TYPE_MAPPER_NG
import fme
import fmeobjects
from collections import Counter
from Python.FME_utils import FME_utils
try:
import web_pdb
except:
# No problem if the package is not avalaible
pass
# FME attribute name
SPATIAL_REPRESENTAIOTN_TYPE = "spatial_representation_type"
RESOURCES_SPATIAL_TYPE = "resources{}.spatial_type"
[docs]def set_spatial_representation(feature):
"""This method sets the spatial representation based of the resources{}.spatial_type.
The FME attribute resources{}.spatial_type can take one of the following values
- <empty value>
- a-grid
- b-vector
- c-textTable
The method count the number of occurences of each value except the <empty-value> or ""
value. It will set the spatial representation to the value that has the most count.
In case of equality the a-grid has priority over b-vector and the latter has
priority over c-textTable. For the spatial representation we remove the "a-",
"b-" or "c-" and only keep "grid", "vector" or "textTable" that is set in the
FME attribute spatial_representation_type.
Parameters
----------
feature: FmeFeature object
Feature object to process
Returns
-------
None
"""
# web_pdb.set_trace()
spatial_types = []
# Extract all the attribute spatial_type from the list
resources_spatial_types = FME_utils.extract_attribute_list(feature, RESOURCES_SPATIAL_TYPE)
for dummy, att_spatial_type in resources_spatial_types:
value_spatial_type = feature.getAttribute(att_spatial_type)
if value_spatial_type is not None and value_spatial_type != "":
value_spatial_type = feature.getAttribute(att_spatial_type)
spatial_types.append(value_spatial_type)
# Count the number of spatial for each distinct spatial type
count_spatial_type = Counter(spatial_types)
# Order the counted spatial type from the most to the least
ordered_spatial_type = count_spatial_type.most_common()
# Extract the count of the maximum spatial type
max_count = ordered_spatial_type[0][1]
# Extract all the spatial type that have the same max count
similar_spatial_type = [spatial_type[0] for spatial_type in ordered_spatial_type
if spatial_type[1]==max_count]
# Sort on the spatial_type alphabetically
similar_spatial_type.sort()
spatial_representation_type = similar_spatial_type[0] # Extract the first element of the list
spatial_representation_type = spatial_representation_type[2:] # Extrat from the third charcater to the remaining of the string
# Set the output attribute
feature.setAttribute(SPATIAL_REPRESENTAIOTN_TYPE, spatial_representation_type)
return


US concerned at Cambodia crackdown as neighbours' cooperation decried
PHNOM PENH/BANGKOK: The United States on Friday (Nov 8) expressed concern over Cambodia's crackdown on opposition to authoritarian leader Hun Sen, which has seen dozens of activists arrested and opposition leaders abroad preventing from returning.
Rights group Amnesty International, meanwhile, decried cooperation by Malaysia and Thailand to prevent foreign-based Cambodian opposition figures getting home to rally support.
READ: Cambodian opposition leaders blocked in Paris, Kuala Lumpur
Self-exiled opposition party founder Sam Rainsy, who had vowed to return to Cambodia on Saturday to lead demonstrations against one-party rule, said he had been prevented on Thursday from checking-in for a flight from Paris to Bangkok.
A day earlier, Malaysia detained his banned opposition party's US-based vice president, Mu Sochua, at an airport before releasing her 24 hours later along with two other Cambodian opposition leaders who had been detained earlier as they tried to board a flight to Thailand.
READ: Malaysia detains Cambodian opposition leader Mu Sochua
At least 48 opposition activists in Cambodia have been arrested this year since Sam Rainsy announced plans to return on Nov 9 - Cambodia's independence day - to rally opposition to Prime Minister against Hun Sen.
The United States was "deeply concerned by the recent expanding series of arrests, harassment, and intimidation of members of the Cambodian political opposition and by efforts to thwart the return to Cambodia of citizens seeking peaceful participation in the political process", a US embassy spokeswoman said on Friday
"These actions represent an escalation in suppression of the political opposition," she added.
Hun Sen, who has ruled Cambodia for more than three decades, has described the planned return of opposition leaders abroad as a bid to stage a coup d'etat.
The banned Cambodian National Rescue Party's leader at home, Kem Sokha, remains under house arrest after being charged with treason in 2017.
Joanne Mariner, Amnesty International's research director for Southeast Asia, questioned the action by countries in the region to block opposition leaders and activists from travelling home.
"Cambodia's neighbours should not bow to Hun Sen's pressures," she said.
"Malaysia was right to release Mu Sochua and her two compatriots. But they should never have been detained in the first place."
Cambodia's Supreme Court dissolved the CNRP in 2017, paving the way for Hun Sen's ruling party to win all the seats in parliament in a general election last year.


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{% extends 'training_template.html' %} {% load lesson_extras %} {% load pl_matrix %} {% block modals %} {% include 'xsd_training/modals/qualification_list.html' %} {% include 'xsd_training/modals/lesson_detail.html' %} {% endblock %} {% block training_content %}
{{ trainee.first_name }} joined the database on {{ trainee.date_joined|date }}.
{% if trainee.membership_problem %}| Address | {% if not trainee.address or trainee.post_code %}
{% else %}{{ trainee.formatted_address|safe }} {{ trainee.postcode }}{% endif %} |
|---|---|
| {{ trainee.email }}{% if not trainee.email %} {% endif %} | |
| Home Phone | {{ trainee.home_phone }}{% if not trainee.home_phone %} {% endif %} |
| Mobile Phone | {{ trainee.mobile_phone }}{% if not trainee.mobile_phone %} {% endif %} |
{{ planned }} lessons planned
{{ partially_completed }} lessons partially completed
{{ completed }} lessons completed
{% pl_matrix trainee %} {% if is_training %} Add Lessons in Bulk {% endif %} {% pl_history trainee %}| Current Qualification | {{ trainee.top_qual }} |
|---|---|
| Training For | {{ trainee.training_for }}
|
| I. Qualification | {{ trainee.top_instructor_qual }} |
| I. Number | {{ trainee.instructor_number }} |
| SDCs |
|


| TOC |
|
This specification describes the OAuth 2.0 protocol framework.
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as “work in progress.”
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 4, 2011.
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
1.
Introduction
1.1.
Notational Conventions
1.2.
Terminology
1.3.
Overview
1.4.
Access Grants
1.4.1.
Authorization Code
1.4.2.
Resource Owner Password Credentials
1.4.3.
Client Credentials
1.4.4.
Refresh Token
1.4.5.
Assertion
2.
Client Profiles
2.1.
Web Server
2.2.
User-Agent
2.3.
Native Application
2.4.
Autonomous
3.
Client Credentials
3.1.
Client Password Credentials
3.2.
Client Assertion Credentials
4.
Obtaining End-User Authorization
4.1.
Authorization Request
4.2.
Authorization Response
4.3.
Error Response
4.3.1.
Error Codes
5.
Obtaining an Access Token
5.1.
Access Grant Types
5.1.1.
Authorization Code
5.1.2.
Resource Owner Password Credentials
5.1.3.
Client Credentials
5.1.4.
Refresh Token
5.1.5.
Assertion
5.2.
Access Token Response
5.3.
Error Response
5.3.1.
Error Codes
6.
Accessing a Protected Resource
6.1.
Access Token Types
6.2.
The WWW-Authenticate Response Header Field
6.2.1.
Error Codes
7.
Extensibility
7.1.
Defining New Client Credentials Types
7.2.
Defining New Endpoint Parameters
7.3.
Defining New Header Field Parameters
7.4.
Defining New Access Grant Types
8.
Security Considerations
9.
IANA Considerations
9.1.
The OAuth Parameters Registry
9.1.1.
Registration Template
9.1.2.
Example
Appendix A.
Examples
Appendix B.
Contributors
Appendix C.
Acknowledgements
Appendix D.
Document History
10.
References
10.1.
Normative References
10.2.
Informative References
§
Authors' Addresses
| TOC |
With the increasing use of distributed web services and cloud computing, third-party applications require access to server-hosted resources. These resources are usually protected and require authentication using the resource owner's credentials (typically a username and password).
In the traditional client-server authentication model, the client accesses a protected resource on the server by authenticating with the server using the resource owner's credentials. In order to provide third-party applications access to protected resources, the resource owner shares its credentials with the third-party. This creates several problems and limitations:
OAuth addresses these issues by separating the role of the client from that of the resource owner. In OAuth, the client (which is usually not the resource owner, but is acting on the resource owner's behalf) requests access to resources controlled by the resource owner and hosted by the resource server, and is issued a different set of credentials than those of the resource owner.
Instead of using the resource owner's credentials to access protected resources, the client obtains an access token - a string which denotes a specific scope, duration, and other attributes. Access tokens are issued to third-party clients by an authorization server with the approval of the resource owner. The client uses the access token to access the protected resources hosted by the resource server.
For example, a web user (resource owner) can grant a printing service (client) access to her protected photos stored at a photo sharing service (resource server), without sharing her username and password with the printing service. Instead, she authenticates directly with an authentication service trusted by the photo sharing service (authorization server) which issues the printing service delegation-specific credentials (token).
Access tokens can have different formats, structures, and methods of utilization (e.g. cryptographic properties), based on the resource server security requirements. Access token attributes and the methods used to access protected resources are beyond the scope of this specification and are defined by companion specifications. The interaction between the authorization server and resource server is beyond the scope of this specification.
| TOC |
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.).
This document uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of [I‑D.ietf‑httpbis‑p1‑messaging] (Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Nielsen, H., Masinter, L., Leach, P., Berners-Lee, T., and J. Reschke, “HTTP/1.1, part 1: URIs, Connections, and Message Parsing,” March 2010.). Additionally, the following rules are included from [RFC3986] (Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, “Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax,” January 2005.): URI-reference; and from [I‑D.ietf‑httpbis‑p1‑messaging] (Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Nielsen, H., Masinter, L., Leach, P., Berners-Lee, T., and J. Reschke, “HTTP/1.1, part 1: URIs, Connections, and Message Parsing,” March 2010.): OWS, RWS, and quoted-string.
Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values are case sensitive.
| TOC |
- protected resource
- An access-restricted resource which can be obtained using an OAuth-authenticated request.
- resource server
- A server capable of accepting and responding to protected resource requests.
- client
- An application obtaining authorization and making protected resource requests.
- resource owner
- An entity capable of granting access to a protected resource.
- end-user
- A human resource owner.
- token
- A string representing an access authorization issued to the client. The string is usually opaque to the client. Tokens represent specific scopes and durations of access, granted by the resource owner, and enforced by the resource server and authorization servers. The token may denote an identifier used to retrieve the authorization information, or self-contain the authorization information in a verifiable manner (i.e. a token string consisting of some data and a signature). Tokens may be pure capabilities. Specific additional authentication credentials may be required in order for a client to use a token.
- access token
- A token used by the client to make authenticated requests on behalf of the resource owner.
- refresh token
- A token used by the client to obtain a new access token without having to involve the resource owner.
- authorization code
- A short-lived token representing the authorization provided by the end-user. The authorization code is used to obtain an access token and a refresh token.
- access grant
- A general term used to describe the intermediate credentials (such as an end-user password or authorization code) representing the resource owner authorization. Access grants are used by the client to obtain an access token. By exchanging access grants of different types for an access token, the resource server is only required to support a single authentication scheme.
- authorization server
- A server capable of issuing tokens after successfully authenticating the resource owner and obtaining authorization. The authorization server may be the same server as the resource server, or a separate entity. A single authorization server may issue tokens for multiple resource servers.
- end-user authorization endpoint
- The authorization server's HTTP endpoint capable of authenticating the end-user and obtaining authorization. The end-user authorization endpoint is described in Section 4 (Obtaining End-User Authorization).
- token endpoint
- The authorization server's HTTP endpoint capable of issuing tokens and refreshing expired tokens. The token endpoint is described in Section 5 (Obtaining an Access Token).
- client identifier
- A unique identifier issued to the client to identify itself to the authorization server. Client identifiers may have a matching secret. The client identifier is described in Section 3 (Client Credentials).
| TOC |
OAuth provides a method for clients to access a protected resource on behalf of a resource owner. Before a client can access a protected resource, it must first obtain authorization (access grant) from the resource owner, then exchange the access grant for an access token (representing the grant's scope, duration, and other attributes). The client accesses the protected resource by presenting the access token to the resource server.
The access token provides an abstraction layer, replacing different authorization constructs (e.g. username and password, assertion) for a single token understood by the resource server. This abstraction enables issuing access tokens valid for a short time period, as well as removing the resource server's need to understand a wide range of authentication schemes.
+--------+ +---------------+ | |--(A)- Authorization Request ->| Resource | | | | Owner | | |<-(B)----- Access Grant -------| | | | +---------------+ | | | | Access Grant & +---------------+ | |--(C)--- Client Credentials -->| Authorization | | Client | | Server | | |<-(D)----- Access Token -------| | | | +---------------+ | | | | +---------------+ | |--(E)----- Access Token ------>| Resource | | | | Server | | |<-(F)--- Protected Resource ---| | +--------+ +---------------+
| Figure 1: Abstract Protocol Flow |
The abstract flow illustrated in Figure 1 (Abstract Protocol Flow) describes the overall protocol architecture and includes the following steps:
- (A)
- The client requests authorization from the resource owner. The authorization request can be made directly to the resource owner, or preferably indirectly via an intermediary such as an authorization server.
- (B)
- The client receives an access grant which represents the authorization provided by the resource owner.
- (C)
- The client requests an access token by authenticating with the authorization server using its client credentials, and presenting the access grant.
- (D)
- The authorization server validates the client credentials and the access grant, and if valid issues an access token.
- (E)
- The client makes a protected resource request to the resource server by presenting the access token.
- (F)
- The resource server validates the access token, and if valid, serves the request.
| TOC |
The access grant represents the authorization provided by the resource owner. The access grant type depends on the method used by the client and supported by the authorization server to obtain it.
| TOC |
The authorization code is an access grant obtained by directing the end-user to an authorization server. The authorization server authenticates the end-user, obtains authorization, and issues the an authorization code to the client. Because the end-user only authenticates with the authorization server, the end-user's password is never shared with the client.
The authorization code access grant is suitable when the client is interacting with an end-user via a user-agent.
+----------+ | | | End-User | | | +----------+ ^ | (B) +----|-----+ Client Identifier +---------------+ | -+--(A)--- & Redirect URI ----->| | | User- | | Authorization | | Agent -|--(B)-- User authenticates -->| Server | | | | | | -+--(C)-- Authorization Code --<| | +-|----|---+ +---------------+ (A) (C) | | ^ v +---------+ | | | Client | | | +---------+
| Figure 2: Obtaining an Authorization Code |
The authorization code flow illustrated in Figure 2 (Obtaining an Authorization Code) includes the following steps:
- (A)
- The client initiates the flow by directing the end-user's user-agent to the authorization server's end-user authorization endpoint. The client includes its client identifier, requested scope, local state, and a redirection URI (to which the authorization server will send the user-agent back once access is granted or denied).
- (B)
- The authorization server authenticates the end-user (via the user-agent) and establishes whether the end-user grants or denies the client's access request.
- (C)
- If access is granted, the authorization server directs the user-agent back to the client using the redirection URI provided. The authorization server includes an authorization code for the client to use to obtain an access token.
Once the client obtains an authorization code, it requests an access token by authenticating with the authorization server (using its client credentials) and presenting the authorization code (access grant).
In cases where the client is incapable of maintaining its client credentials secret (such as native applications or an application implemented as a user-agent script), the authorization server issues an access token directly to the client in step (C), instead of issuing an authorization code.
Obtaining an authorization code is described in Section 4 (Obtaining End-User Authorization).
| TOC |
The resource owner password credentials (e.g. a username and password) can be used directly as an access grant to obtain an access token. The credentials should only be used when there is a high degree of trust between the resource owner and the client (e.g. its computer operating system or a highly privileged application), and when other access grant types are not available (such as an authorization code).
Even though this grant type requires direct client access to the resource owner's credentials, the resource owner's credentials are used for a single request and are exchanged for an access token. Unlike the HTTP Basic authentication scheme defined in [RFC2617] (Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, “HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication,” June 1999.), this grant type eliminates the need for the client to store the resource-owner's credentials for future use.
In Figure 3 (Obtaining Resource Owner Password Credentials), the client requests authorization from the resource owner directly. When the resource owner is an end-user, the client typically prompts the end-user for the username and password.
+--------+ +----------+ | |--(A)- Authorization Request ->| Resource | | Client | | Owner | | |<-(B)-- Username & Password ---| | +--------+ +----------+
| Figure 3: Obtaining Resource Owner Password Credentials |
| TOC |
The client credentials can be used as an access grant when the authorization scope is limited to the protected resources under the control of the client, or other protected resources previously arranged with the authorization server. Client credentials are used as an access grant typically when the client is acting on its own behalf (the client is also the resource owner).
| TOC |
Access tokens usually have a shorter lifetime than authorized by the resource owner. When issuing an access token, the authorization server can include a refresh token which is used by the client to obtain a new access token when the current access token expires. When requesting a new access token, the refresh token acts as an access grant. Using a refresh token removes the need to interact with the resource owner again, or to store the original access grant used to obtain the access token and refresh token.
+--------+ Access Grant & +---------------+ | |--(A)-- Client Credentials -->| Authorization | | | | Server | | |<-(B)---- Access Token -------| | | | & Refresh Token +---------------+ | | | | +---------------+ | |--(C)----- Access Token ----->| | | | | | | |<-(D)-- Protected Resource ---| Resource | | Client | | Server | | |--(E)----- Access Token ----->| | | | | | | |<-(F)-- Invalid Token Error --| | | | +---------------+ | | | | Refresh Token & +---------------+ | |--(G)-- Client Credentials -->| Authorization | | | | Server | | |<-(H)----- Access Token ------| | +--------+ & Optional Refresh Token +---------------+
| Figure 4: Refreshing an Access Token |
The refresh token flow illustrated in Figure 4 (Refreshing an Access Token) includes the following steps:
- (A)
- The client requests an access token by authenticating with the authorization server using its client credentials, and presenting an access grant.
- (B)
- The authorization server validates the client credentials and the access grant, and if valid issues an access token and a refresh token.
- (C)
- The client makes a protected resource requests to the resource server by presenting the access token.
- (D)
- The resource server validates the access token, and if valid, serves the request.
- (E)
- Steps (C) and (D) repeat until the access token expires. If the client does not know the access token expired, it makes another protected resource request. Otherwise, it skips to step (G).
- (F)
- Since the access token is invalid (expired), the resource server returns an invalid token error.
- (G)
- The client requests a new access token by authenticating with the authorization server using its client credentials, and presenting the refresh token (as the access grant).
- (H)
- The authorization server validates the client credentials and the refresh token, and if valid issues a new access token (and optionally, a new refresh token).
| TOC |
Assertions provide a bridge between OAuth and other trust frameworks. They enable the client to utilize existing trust relationships in order to obtain an access token. The access grant represented by an assertion depends on the assertion type, its content, and how it was issued, which are beyond the scope of this specification.
Assertions are used as part of the protocol extensibility model, providing a way for authorization servers to support additional access grant types.
| TOC |
[[ add intro and find new names for the profiles. this section will have normative language in future drafts, similar to -05 and earlier. ]]
| TOC |
The web server profile is suitable for clients capable of interacting with the end-user's user-agent (typically a web browser) and capable of receiving incoming requests (via redirection) from the authorization server (capable of acting as an HTTP server).
+----------+ Client Identifier +---------------+ | -+----(A)--- & Redirect URI ------>| | | End-user | | Authorization | | at |<---(B)-- User authenticates --->| Server | | Browser | | | | -+----(C)-- Authorization Code ---<| | +-|----|---+ +---------------+ | | ^ v (A) (C) | | | | | | ^ v | | +---------+ | | | |>---(D)-- Client Credentials, --------' | | Server | Authorization Code, | | -Based | & Redirect URI | | Client | | | |<---(E)----- Access Token -------------------' +---------+ (w/ Optional Refresh Token)
| Figure 5: Web Server Flow |
The web server flow illustrated in Figure 5 (Web Server Flow) includes the following steps:
- (A)
- The web client initiates the flow by redirecting the end-user's user-agent to the end-user authorization endpoint as described in Section 4 (Obtaining End-User Authorization). The client includes its client identifier, requested scope, local state, and a redirect URI to which the authorization server will send the end-user back once access is granted (or denied).
- (B)
- The authorization server authenticates the end-user (via the user-agent) and establishes whether the end-user grants or denies the client's access request.
- (C)
- Assuming the end-user granted access, the authorization server redirects the user-agent back to the client to the redirection URI provided earlier. The authorization includes an authorization code for the client to use to obtain an access token.
- (D)
- The client requests an access token from the authorization server by authenticating and including the authorization code received in the previous step as described in Section 5 (Obtaining an Access Token).
- (E)
- The authorization server validates the client credentials and the authorization code and responds back with the access token.
| TOC |
The user-agent profile is suitable for client applications residing in a user-agent, typically implemented in a browser using a scripting language such as JavaScript. These clients cannot keep client secrets confidential and the authentication of the client is based on the user-agent's same-origin policy.
Unlike other profiles in which the client makes separate requests for end-user authorization and access token, the client receives the access token as a result of the end-user authorization request in the form of an HTTP redirection. The client requests the authorization server to redirect the user-agent to another web server or local resource accessible to the user-agent which is capable of extracting the access token from the response and passing it to the client.
This user-agent profile does not utilize the client secret since the client executables reside on the end-user's computer or device which makes the client secret accessible and exploitable. Because the access token is encoded into the redirection URI, it may be exposed to the end-user and other applications residing on the computer or device.
+----------+ Client Identifier +----------------+ | |>---(A)-- & Redirection URI --->| | | | | | End <--+ - - - +----(B)-- User authenticates -->| Authorization | User | | | Server | | |<---(C)--- Redirect URI -------<| | | Client | with Access Token | | | in | in Fragment +----------------+ | Browser | | | +----------------+ | |>---(D)--- Redirect URI ------->| | | | without Fragment | Web Server | | | | with Client | | (F) |<---(E)--- Web Page with ------<| Resource | | Access | Script | | | Token | +----------------+ +----------+
| Figure 6: User-Agent Flow |
The user-agent flow illustrated in Figure 6 (User-Agent Flow) includes the following steps:
- (A)
- The client sends the user-agent to the end-user authorization endpoint as described in Section 4 (Obtaining End-User Authorization). The client includes its client identifier, requested scope, local state, and a redirect URI to which the authorization server will send the end-user back once authorization is granted (or denied).
- (B)
- The authorization server authenticates the end-user (via the user-agent) and establishes whether the end-user grants or denies the client's access request.
- (C)
- If the end-user granted access, the authorization server redirects the user-agent to the redirection URI provided earlier. The redirection URI includes the access token in the URI fragment.
- (D)
- The user-agent follows the redirection instructions by making a request to the web server which does not include the fragment. The user-agent retains the fragment information locally.
- (E)
- The web server returns a web page (typically an HTML page with an embedded script) capable of accessing the full redirection URI including the fragment retained by the user-agent, and extracting the access token (and other parameters) contained in the fragment.
- (F)
- The user-agent executes the script provided by the web server locally, which extracts the access token and passes it to the client.
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Native applications are clients running as native code on the end-user's computer or device (i.e. executing outside a user-agent or as a desktop program). These clients are often capable of interacting with (or embedding) the end-user's user-agent but are limited in how such interaction affects their end-user experience. In many cases, native applications are incapable of receiving direct callback requests from the server (e.g. firewall, operating system restrictions).
Native application clients can be implemented in different ways based on their requirements and desired end-user experience. Native application clients can:
When choosing between launching an external browser and an embedded user-agent, developers should consider the following:
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Autonomous clients utilize an existing trust relationship or framework to establish authorization. Autonomous clients can be implemented in different ways based on their requirements and the existing trust framework they rely upon. Autonomous clients can:
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When interacting with the authorization server, the client identifies itself using a set of client credentials which include a client identifier and other properties for client authentication. The means through which the client obtains its credentials are beyond the scope of this specification, but typically involve registration with the authorization server.
Due to the nature of some clients, authorization servers SHOULD NOT make assumptions about the confidentiality of client secrets without establishing trust with the client. Authorization servers SHOULD NOT issue client secrets to clients incapable of keeping their secrets confidential.
The authorization server MAY authenticate the client using any appropriate set of credentials and authentication schemes. The client MUST NOT include more than one set of credentials or authentication mechanism with each request.
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The client password credentials use a shared symmetric secret to authenticate the client. The client identifier and password are included in the request using the HTTP Basic authentication scheme as defined in [RFC2617] (Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, “HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication,” June 1999.) by including the client identifier as the username and client password as the password.
For example (line breaks are for display purposes only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded grant_type=authorization_code&code=i1WsRn1uB1& redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb
Alternatively, the client MAY include the password in the request body using the following parameters:
- client_id
- REQUIRED. The client identifier.
- client_secret
- REQUIRED. The client password.
For example (line breaks are for display purposes only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded grant_type=authorization_code&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3& client_secret=gX1fBat3bV&code=i1WsRn1uB1& redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb
The authorization server MUST accept the client credentials using both the request parameter, and the HTTP Basic authentication scheme. The authorization server MAY support additional authentication schemes suitable for the transmission of password credentials.
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The client assertion credentials are used in cases where a password (clear-text shared symmetric secret) is unsuitable or does not provide sufficient security for client authentication. In such cases it is common to use other mechanisms such as HMAC or digital signatures that do not require sending clear-text secrets. The client assertion credentials provide an extensible mechanism to use an assertion format supported by the authorization server for authentication the client.
Using assertions requires the client to obtain an assertion (such as a SAML (Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, “Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0,” March 2005.) [OASIS.saml‑core‑2.0‑os] assertion) from an assertion issuer or to self-issue an assertion. The assertion format, the process by which the assertion is obtained, and the method of validating the assertion are defined by the assertion issuer and the authorization server, and are beyond the scope of this specification.
When using a client assertion, the client includes the following parameters:
- client_assertion_type
- REQUIRED. The format of the assertion as defined by the authorization server.  The client assertion.
For example, the client sends the following access token request using a SAML 2.0 assertion to authenticate itself (line breaks are for display purposes only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded grant_type=authorization_code&code=i1WsRn1uB1& client_assertion=PHNhbWxwOl[...omitted for brevity...]ZT4%3D& client_assertion_type= urn%3Aoasis%3Anames%sAtc%3ASAML%3A2.0%3Aassertion& redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb
When obtaining an access token using a client assertion together with an authorization code (as described in Section 5.1.1 (Authorization Code)), a mechanism is needed to map between the value of client_id parameter used to obtain the authorization code, and the client assertion. Such mechanism is beyond the out of scope for this specification, but MUST be specified for any client assertion type used in combination with an authorization code.
The authorization server MUST reject access token requests using client assertion credentials that do not contain HMAC or signed values that:
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Before the client can access a protect resource, it MUST first obtain authorization from the end-user. To obtain an end-user authorization, the client sends the end-user to the end-user authorization endpoint. Once obtained, the end-user access grant is expressed as an authorization code which the client uses to obtain an access token.
At the end-user authorization endpoint, the end-user first authenticates with the authorization server, and then grants or denies the access request. The way in which the authorization server authenticates the end-user (e.g. username and password login, OpenID, session cookies) and in which the authorization server obtains the end-user's authorization, including whether it uses a secure channel such as TLS, is beyond the scope of this specification. However, the authorization server MUST first verify the identity of the end-user.
The location of the end-user authorization endpoint can be found in the service documentation. The end-user authorization endpoint URI MAY include a query component as defined by [RFC3986] (Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, “Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax,” January 2005.) section 3, which must be retained when adding additional query parameters.
Since requests to the end-user authorization endpoint result in user authentication and the transmission of sensitive information, the authorization server SHOULD require the use of a transport-layer security mechanism such as TLS when sending requests to the end-user authorization endpoint.
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In order to direct the end-user's user-agent to the authorization server, the client constructs the request URI by adding the following parameters to the end-user authorization endpoint URI query component using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format as defined by [W3C.REC‑html401‑19991224] (Raggett, D., Hors, A., and I. Jacobs, “HTML 4.01 Specification,” December 1999.):
- response_type
- REQUIRED. The requested response: an access token, an authorization code, or both. The parameter value MUST be set to token for requesting an access token, code for requesting an authorization code, or code_and_token to request both. The authorization server MAY decline to provide one or more of these response types.
- client_id
- REQUIRED. The client identifier as described in Section 3 (Client Credentials).
- redirect_uri
- REQUIRED, unless a redirection URI has been established between the client and authorization server via other means. An absolute URI to which the authorization server will redirect the user-agent to when the end-user authorization step is completed. The authorization server SHOULD require the client to pre-register their redirection URI.
- scope
- OPTIONAL. The scope of the access request expressed as a list of space-delimited strings. The value of the scope parameter is defined by the authorization server. If the value contains multiple space-delimited strings, their order does not matter, and each string adds an additional access range to the requested scope.
- state
- OPTIONAL. An opaque value used by the client to maintain state between the request and callback. The authorization server includes this value when redirecting the user-agent back to the client.
The client directs the end-user to the constructed URI using an HTTP redirection response, or by other means available to it via the end-user's user-agent. The authorization server MUST support the use of the HTTP GET method for the end-user authorization endpoint, and MAY support the use of the POST method as well.
For example, the client directs the end-user's user-agent to make the following HTTP request using transport-layer security (line breaks are for display purposes only):
GET /authorize?response_type=code&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3& redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com
If the client has previously registered a redirection URI with the authorization server, the authorization server MUST verify that the redirection URI received matches the registered URI associated with the client identifier. The authorization server SHOULD NOT redirect the user-agent to unregistered or untrusted URIs to prevent the endpoint from being used as an open redirector. If no valid redirection URI is available, the authorization server SHOULD inform the end-user of the error occured. [[ provide guidance on how to perform matching ]]
Parameters sent without a value MUST be treated as if they were omitted from the request. The authorization server SHOULD ignore unrecognized request parameters.
The authorization server validates the request to ensure all required parameters are present and valid. If the request is invalid, the authorization server redirects the user-agent back to the client using the redirection URI provided with the appropriate error code as described in Section 4.3 (Error Response).
The authorization server authenticates the end-user and obtains an authorization decision (by asking the end-user or by establishing approval via other means). When a decision has been established, the authorization server directs the end-user's user-agent to the provided client redirection URI using an HTTP redirection response, or by other means available to it via the end-user's user-agent.
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If the end-user grants the access request, the authorization server issues an access token, an authorization code, or both, and delivers them to the client by adding the following parameters to the redirection URI (as described below):
- code
- REQUIRED if the response type is code or code_and_token, otherwise MUST NOT be included. The authorization code generated by the authorization server. The authorization code SHOULD expire shortly after it is issued to minimize the risk of leaks. The client MUST NOT reuse the authorization code. If an authorization code is used more than once, the authorization server MAY revoke all tokens previously issued based on that authorization code. The authorization code is bound to the client identifier and redirection URI.
- access_token
- REQUIRED if the response type is token or code_and_token, otherwise MUST NOT be included. The access token issued by the authorization server.
- token_type
- REQUIRED if the response includes an access token. The type of the token issued. The token type informs the client how the access token is to be used when accessing a protected resource as described in Section 6.1 (Access Token Types).
- expires_in
- OPTIONAL. The duration in seconds of the access token lifetime if an access token is included. For example, the value 3600 denotes that the access token will expire in one hour from the time the response was generated by the authorization server.
- scope
- OPTIONAL. The scope of the access token as a list of space-delimited strings if an access token is included. The value of the scope parameter is defined by the authorization server. If the value contains multiple space-delimited strings, their order does not matter, and each string adds an additional access range to the requested scope. The authorization server SHOULD include the parameter if the requested scope is different from the one requested by the client.
- state
- REQUIRED if the state parameter was present in the client authorization request. Set to the exact value received from the client.
The method in which the authorization server adds the parameter to the redirection URI is determined by the response type requested by the client in the authorization request using the response_type parameter.
If the response type is code, the authorization server adds the parameters to the redirection URI query component using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format as defined by [W3C.REC‑html401‑19991224] (Raggett, D., Hors, A., and I. Jacobs, “HTML 4.01 Specification,” December 1999.).
For example, the authorization server redirects the end-user's user-agent by sending the following HTTP response:
HTTP/1.1 302 Found Location: https://client.example.com/cb?code=i1WsRn1uB1
If the response type is token or code_and_token, the authorization server adds the parameters to the redirection URI fragment component using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format as defined by [W3C.REC‑html401‑19991224] (Raggett, D., Hors, A., and I. Jacobs, “HTML 4.01 Specification,” December 1999.).
For example, the authorization server redirects the end-user's user-agent by sending the following HTTP response (URI line breaks are for display purposes only):
HTTP/1.1 302 Found Location: http://example.com/rd#access_token=FJQbwq9& token_type=example&expires_in=3600
Clients SHOULD ignore unrecognized response parameters. The sizes of tokens and other values received from the authorization server, are left undefined by this specification. Clients should avoid making assumptions about value sizes. Servers should document the expected size of any value they issue.
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If the end-user denies the access request or if the request fails for reasons other than a missing or invalid redirection URI, the authorization server informs the client by adding the following parameters to the redirection URI query component using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format as defined by [W3C.REC‑html401‑19991224] (Raggett, D., Hors, A., and I. Jacobs, “HTML 4.01 Specification,” December 1999.):
- error
- REQUIRED. A single error code as described in Section 4.3.1 (Error Codes).
- error_description
- OPTIONAL. A human-readable text providing additional information, used to assist in the understanding and resolution of the error occurred.
- error_uri
- OPTIONAL. A URI identifying a human-readable web page with information about the error, used to provide the end-user with additional information about the error.
- state
- REQUIRED if the state parameter was present in the client authorization request. Set to the exact value received from the client.
For example, the authorization server redirects the end-user's user-agent by sending the following HTTP response:
HTTP/1.1 302 Found Location: https://client.example.com/cb?error=access_denied
If the request fails due to a missing or invalid redirection URI, the authorization server SHOULD inform the end-user of the error, and MUST NOT redirect the end-user's user-agent to the invalid redirection URI.
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The authorization server includes one of the following error codes with the error response:
- invalid_request
- The request is missing a required parameter, includes an unsupported parameter or parameter value, or is otherwise malformed.
- invalid_client
- The client identifier provided is invalid.
- unauthorized_client
- The client is not authorized to use the requested response type.
- redirect_uri_mismatch
- The redirection URI provided does not match a pre-registered value.
- access_denied
- The end-user or authorization server denied the request.
- unsupported_response_type
- The requested response type is not supported by the authorization server.
- invalid_scope
- The requested scope is invalid, unknown, or malformed.
[[ Add mechanism for extending error codes ]]
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The client obtains an access token by authenticating with the authorization server and presenting its access grant (in the form of an authorization code, resource owner credentials, an assertion, or a refresh token).
Since requests to the token endpoint result in the transmission of clear-text credentials in the HTTP request and response, the authorization server MUST require the use of a transport-layer security mechanism when sending requests to the token endpoints. Servers MUST support TLS 1.2 as defined in [RFC5246] (Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, “The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2,” August 2008.), and MAY support additional transport-layer security mechanisms.
The client requests an access token by making an HTTP POST request to the token endpoint. The location of the token endpoint can be found in the service documentation. The token endpoint URI MAY include a query component.
The client authenticates with the authorization server by adding its client credentials to the request as described in Section 3 (Client Credentials). The authorization server MAY allow unauthenticated access token requests when the client identity does not matter (e.g. anonymous client) or when the client identity is established via other means (e.g. using an assertion access grant).
The client constructs the request by including the following parameters using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format in the HTTP request entity-body:
- grant_type
- REQUIRED. The access grant type included in the request. Value MUST be one of authorization_code, password, refresh_token, client_credentials, or an absolute URI identifying an assertion format supported by the authorization server.
- scope
- OPTIONAL. The scope of the access request expressed as a list of space-delimited strings. The value of the scope parameter is defined by the authorization server. If the value contains multiple space-delimited strings, their order does not matter, and each string adds an additional access range to the requested scope. If the access grant being used already represents an approved scope (e.g. authorization code, assertion), the requested scope MUST be equal or lesser than the scope previously granted, and if omitted is treated as equal to the previously approved scope.
In addition, the client MUST include the appropriate parameters listed for the selected access grant type as described in Section 5.1 (Access Grant Types).
Parameters sent without a value MUST be treated as if they were omitted from the request. The authorization server SHOULD ignore unrecognized request parameters.
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The client requests an access token using an authorization code, resource owner password credentials, client credentials, refresh token, or assertion.
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The client includes the authorization code using the authorization_code access grant type and the following parameters:
- code
- REQUIRED. The authorization code received from the authorization server.
- redirect_uri
- REQUIRED. The redirection URI used in the initial request.
For example, the client makes the following HTTP request by including its client credentials via the client_secret parameter described in Section 3 (Client Credentials) and using transport-layer security (line breaks are for display purposes only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded grant_type=authorization_code&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3& client_secret=gX1fBat3bV&code=i1WsRn1uB1& redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb
The authorization server MUST:
If the request is valid, the authorization server issues a successful response as described in Section 5.2 (Access Token Response).
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The client includes the resource owner credentials using the password access grant type and the following parameters: [[ add internationalization consideration for username and password ]]
- username
- REQUIRED. The resource owner's username.
- password
- REQUIRED. The resource owner's password.
For example, the client makes the following HTTP request by including its client credentials via the client_secret parameter described in Section 3 (Client Credentials) and using transport-layer security (line breaks are for display purposes only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded grant_type=password&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3& client_secret=47HDu8s&username=johndoe&password=A3ddj3w
The authorization server MUST validate the client credentials (if present) and end-user credentials and if valid issue an access token response as described in Section 5.2 (Access Token Response).
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The client can request an access token using only its client credentials using the client_credentials access grant type. When omitting an explicit access grant, the client is requesting access to the protected resources under its control, or those of another resource owner which has been previously arranged with the authorization server (the method of which is beyond the scope of this specification).
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The client includes the refresh token using the refresh_token access grant type and the following parameter:
- refresh_token
- REQUIRED. The refresh token associated with the access token to be refreshed.
For example, the client makes the following HTTP request by including its client credentials via the client_secret parameter described in Section 3 (Client Credentials) and using transport-layer security (line breaks are for display purposes only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded grant_type=refresh_token&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3& client_secret=8eSEIpnqmM&refresh_token=n4E9O119d
The authorization server MUST verify the client credentials (if present), the validity of the refresh token, and that the resource owner's authorization is still valid. If the request is valid, the authorization server issues an access token response as described in Section 5.2 (Access Token Response). The authorization server MAY issue a new refresh token, in which case, the client MUST discard the old refresh token and replace it with the new refresh token.
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The client includes an assertion by specifying the assertion format using an absolute URI (as defined by the authorization server) as the value of the grant_type parameter and by adding the following parameter:
- assertion
- REQUIRED. The assertion.
For example, the client makes the following HTTP request using transport-layer security, and client authentication is achieved via the assertion (line breaks are for display purposes only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded grant_type=urn%3Aoasis%3Anames%3Atc%3ASAML%3A2.0%3Aassertion& assertion=PHNhbWxwOl[...omitted for brevity...]ZT4%3D
The authorization server MUST validate the client credentials (if present) and the assertion and if valid issues an access token response as described in Section 5.2 (Access Token Response). The authorization server SHOULD NOT issue a refresh token (instead, it should require the client to use the same or new assertion).
Authorization servers SHOULD issue access tokens with a limited lifetime and require clients to refresh them by requesting a new access token using the same assertion if it is still valid. Otherwise the client MUST obtain a new valid assertion.
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After receiving and verifying a valid and authorized access token request from the client, the authorization server issues the access token and optional refresh token, and constructs the response by adding the following parameters to the entity body of the HTTP response with a 200 (OK) status code:
The token response contains the following parameters:
- access_token
- REQUIRED. The access token issued by the authorization server.
- token_type
- REQUIRED. The type of the token issued. The token type informs the client how the access token is to be used when accessing a protected resource as described in Section 6.1 (Access Token Types).
- expires_in
- OPTIONAL. The duration in seconds of the access token lifetime. For example, the value 3600 denotes that the access token will expire in one hour from the time the response was generated by the authorization server.
- refresh_token
- OPTIONAL. The refresh token used to obtain new access tokens using the same end-user access grant as described in Section 5.1.4 (Refresh Token). The authorization server SHOULD NOT issue a refresh token when the access grant type is an assertion or a set of client credentials.
- scope
- OPTIONAL. The scope of the access token as a list of space-delimited strings. The value of the scope parameter is defined by the authorization server. If the value contains multiple space-delimited strings, their order does not matter, and each string adds an additional access range to the requested scope. The authorization server SHOULD include the parameter if the requested scope is different from the one requested by the client.
The parameters are including in the entity body of the HTTP response using the application/json media type as defined by [RFC4627] (Crockford, D., “The application/json Media Type for JavaScript Object Notation (JSON),” July 2006.). The parameters are serialized into a JSON structure by adding each parameter at the highest structure level. Parameter names and string values are included as JSON strings. Numerical values are included as JSON numbers.
The authorization server MUST include the HTTP Cache-Control response header field with a value of no-store in any response containing tokens, secrets, or other sensitive information.
For example:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json Cache-Control: no-store { "access_token":"SlAV32hkKG", "token_type":"example", "expires_in":3600, "refresh_token":"8xLOxBtZp8" }
Clients SHOULD ignore unrecognized response parameters. The sizes of tokens and other values received from the authorization server, are left undefined by this specification. Clients should avoid making assumptions about value sizes. Servers should document the expected size of any value they issue.
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If the token request is invalid or unauthorized, the authorization server constructs the response by adding the following parameter to the entity body of the HTTP response using the application/json media type:
- error
- REQUIRED. A single error code as described in Section 5.3.1 (Error Codes).
- error_description
- OPTIONAL. A human-readable text providing additional information, used to assist in the understanding and resolution of the error occurred.
- error_uri
- OPTIONAL. A URI identifying a human-readable web page with information about the error, used to provide the end-user with additional information about the error.
For example:
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request Content-Type: application/json Cache-Control: no-store { "error":"invalid_request" }
If the client provided invalid credentials using an HTTP authentication scheme via the Authorization request header field, the authorization server MUST respond with the HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status code. Otherwise, the authorization server SHALL respond with the HTTP 400 (Bad Request) status code.
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The authorization server includes one of the following error codes with the error response:
- invalid_request
- The request is missing a required parameter, includes an unsupported parameter or parameter value, repeats a parameter, includes multiple credentials, utilizes more than one mechanism for authenticating the client, or is otherwise malformed.
- invalid_client
- The client identifier provided is invalid, the client failed to authenticate, the client did not include its credentials, provided multiple client credentials, or used unsupported credentials type.
- unauthorized_client
- The authenticated client is not authorized to use the access grant type provided.
- invalid_grant
- The provided access grant is invalid, expired, or revoked (e.g. invalid assertion, expired authorization token, bad end-user password credentials, or mismatching authorization code and redirection URI).
- unsupported_grant_type
- The access grant included - its type or another attribute - is not supported by the authorization server.
- invalid_scope
- The requested scope is invalid, unknown, malformed, or exceeds the previously granted scope.
[[ Add mechanism for extending error codes ]]
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Clients access protected resources by presenting an access token to the resource server. The resource server MUST validate the access token and ensure it has not expired and that its scope covers the requested resource. The methods used by the resource server to validate the access token are beyond the scope of this specification, but generally involve an interaction or coordination between the resource server and authorization server.
The method in which the client utilized the access token to authenticate with the resource server depends on the type of access token issued by the authorization server.
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[[ add token type explanation, maybe with links to other token specs ]]
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If the protected resource request does not include authentication credentials, contains an invalid access token, or is malformed, the resource server MUST include the HTTP WWW-Authenticate response header field. The WWW-Authenticate header field uses the framework defined by [RFC2617] (Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, “HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication,” June 1999.) as follows:
challenge = "OAuth2" [ RWS 1#param ] param = scope / error / error-desc / error-uri / ( token "=" ( token / quoted-string ) ) scope = "scope" "=" <"> scope-v *( SP scope-v ) <"> scope-v = 1*quoted-char quoted-char = ALPHA / DIGIT / "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "'" / "(" / ")" / "*" / "+" / "-" / "." / "/" / ":" / "<" / "=" / ">" / "?" / "@" / "[" / "]" / "^" / "_" / "`" / "{" / "|" / "}" / "~" / "\" / "," / ";" error = "error" "=" quoted-string error-desc = "error_description" "=" quoted-string error-uri = "error_uri" = <"> URI-reference <">
The scope attribute is a space-delimited list of scope values indicating the required scope of the access token for accessing the requested resource. The scope attribute MUST NOT appear more than once.
If the protected resource request included an access token and failed authentication, the resource server SHOULD include the error attribute to provide the client with the reason why the access request was declined. The parameter value is described in Section 6.2.1 (Error Codes). In addition, the resource server MAY include the error_description attribute to provide a human-readable explanation, and the error-uri attribute with an absolute URI identifying a human-readable web page explaining the error. The error, error_description, and error_uri attribute MUST NOT appear more than once.
For example, in response to a protected resource request without authentication:
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized WWW-Authenticate: OAuth2
And in response to a protected resource request with an authentication attempt using an expired access token:
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized WWW-Authenticate: OAuth2 error="invalid_token", error_description="The access token expired"
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When a request fails, the resource server responds using the appropriate HTTP status code (typically, 400, 401, or 403), and includes one of the following error codes in the response:
- invalid_request
- The request is missing a required parameter, includes an unsupported parameter or parameter value, repeats the same parameter, uses more than one method for including an access token, or is otherwise malformed. The resource server SHOULD respond with the HTTP 400 (Bad Request) status code.
- invalid_token
- The access token provided is expired, revoked, malformed, or invalid for other reasons. The resource SHOULD respond with the HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status code. The client MAY request a new access token and retry the protected resource request.
- insufficient_scope
- The request requires higher privileges than provided by the access token. The resource server SHOULD respond with the HTTP 403 (Forbidden) status code and MAY include the scope attribute with the scope necessary to access the protected resource.
[[ Add mechanism for extending error codes ]]
If the request lacks any authentication information (i.e. the client was unaware authentication is necessary or attempted using an unsupported authentication method), the resource server SHOULD not include an error code or other error information.
For example:
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized WWW-Authenticate: OAuth2
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[[ TBD ]]
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Applications that wish to define new request or response parameters for use with the end-user authorization endpoint or the token endpoint SHALL do so in one of two ways: register them in the parameters registry (following the procedures in Section 9.1 (The OAuth Parameters Registry)), or use the x_ parameter name prefix.
Parameters utilizing the x_ parameter name prefix MUST be limited to vendor-specific extensions that are not commonly applicable, and are specific to the implementation details of the authorization server where they are used. All other new parameters MUST be registered, and MUST NOT use the x_ parameter name prefix.
Parameter names MUST conform to the param-name ABNF, and parameter values syntax MUST be well-defined (e.g., using ABNF, or a reference to the syntax of an existing parameter).
param-name = 1*name-char name-char = "-" / "." / "_" / DIGIT / ALPHA
| TOC |
Applications that wish to define new parameters for use in the OAuth WWW-Authenticate header field MUST register them in the parameters registry, following the procedures in Section 9.1 (The OAuth Parameters Registry).
Parameter names MUST conform to the param-name ABNF and MUST NOT begin with x_. Parameter values MUST conform to the param-value ABNF and their syntax MUST be well-defined (e.g., using ABNF, or a reference to the syntax of an existing parameter).
param-value = quoted-value | quoted-string
| TOC |
The assertion access grant type allows the authorization server to accept additional access grants not specified. Applications that wish to define additional access grant types can do so by utilizing a new or existing assertion type and format.
| TOC |
[[ TBD ]]
| TOC |
| TOC |
This document establishes the OAuth parameters registry.
Additional parameters to be use in the end-user authorization endpoint request, the end-user authorization endpoint response, the token endpoint request, the token endpoint response, or the WWW-Authenticate header field, are registered on the advice of one or more Designated Experts (appointed by the IESG or their delegate), with a Specification Required (using terminology from [RFC5226] (Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, “Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs,” May 2008.)). However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Expert(s) may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published.
Registration requests should be sent to the<EMAIL_ADDRESS>mailing list for review and comment, with an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request for parameter: example"). [[ Note to RFC-EDITOR: The name of the mailing list should be determined in consultation with the IESG and IANA. Suggested name: oauth-ext-review. ]]
Before a period of 14 days has passed, the Designated Expert(s) will either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision both to the review list and to IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful. Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the<EMAIL_ADDRESS>mailing list) for resolution.
| TOC |
- Parameter name:
- The name requested (e.g., "example").
- Parameter usage location:
- The location(s) where parameter can be used. The possible locations are: the end-user authorization endpoint request, the end-user authorization endpoint response, the token endpoint request, the token endpoint response, the or the WWW-Authenticate header field.
- Change controller:
- For standards-track RFCs, state "IETF". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, e-mail address, home page URI) may also be included.
- Specification document(s):
- Reference to document that specifies the parameter, preferably including a URI that can be used to retrieve a copy of the document. An indication of the relevant sections may also be included, but is not required.
- Related information:
- Optionally, citations to additional documents containing further relevant information.
| TOC |
The following is the parameter registration request for the scope parameter as defined in this specification:
- Parameter name:
- scope
- Parameter usage location:
- The end-user authorization endpoint request, the end-user authorization endpoint response, the token endpoint request, the token endpoint response, and the WWW-Authenticate header field.
- Change controller:
- IETF
- Specification document(s):
- [[ this document ]]
- Related information:
- None
| TOC |
[[ TBD ]]
| TOC |
The following people contributed to preliminary versions of this document: Blaine Cook (BT), Brian Eaton (Google), Yaron Goland (Microsoft), Brent Goldman (Facebook), Raffi Krikorian (Twitter), Luke Shepard (Facebook), and Allen Tom (Yahoo!). The content and concepts within are a product of the OAuth community, WRAP community, and the OAuth Working Group.
The OAuth Working Group has dozens of very active contributors who proposed ideas and wording for this document, including: [[ If your name is missing or you think someone should be added here, please send Eran a note - don't be shy ]]
Michael Adams, Andrew Arnott, Dirk Balfanz, Brian Campbell, Leah Culver, Bill de hÓra, Brian Ellin, Igor Faynberg, George Fletcher, Tim Freeman, Evan Gilbert, Kristoffer Gronowski, Justin Hart, Mike Jones, John Kemp, Chasen Le Hara, Torsten Lodderstedt, Alastair Mair, Eve Maler, James Manger, Laurence Miao, Chuck Mortimore, Justin Richer, Peter Saint-Andre, Nat Sakimura, Rob Sayre, Marius Scurtescu, Naitik Shah, Justin Smith, Jeremy Suriel, Christian Stübner, Paul Tarjan, Franklin Tse, and Nick Walker.
| TOC |
[[ Add OAuth 1.0a authors + WG contributors ]]
| TOC |
[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-11
-10
-09
-08
-07
-06
-05
-04
-03
-02
-01
-00
| TOC |
| TOC |
| TOC |
| [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] | Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, “Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0,” OASIS Standard saml-core-2.0-os, March 2005. |
| TOC |
| Eran Hammer-Lahav (editor) | |
| Yahoo! | |
| Email: |<EMAIL_ADDRESS>|
| URI: | http://hueniverse.com |
| David Recordon | |
| Email: |<EMAIL_ADDRESS>|
| URI: | http://www.davidrecordon.com/ |
| Dick Hardt | |
| Microsoft | |
| Email: |<EMAIL_ADDRESS>|
| URI: | http://dickhardt.org/ |


--- layout: docs template: t-docs title: Foundations > SPACES name: spaces collection: docs-foundations ---
Defines the spaces used in other layers, specially objects and some utilities.
All the values should be expressed in px
. If you need a relative unit based values, you can use the core functions in the context.
A safe checking is included to ensure this unit specification and the numeric values.


{% load sekizai_tags cms_tags %}{% if request.toolbar.edit_mode %} {# Code is only rendered in edit mode #} {% comment %} CMS needs render_plugin to be called, but the plugins should not be anywhere in the page. So we use a sekizai block which is never rendered {% endcomment %} {% addtoblock "null" %}


There is a thin semantic line between functional and weird, and that line is covered in jellyfish
This website is powered by Jekyll, built from Poole, and hosted on GitHub Pages


I am a full-stack developer who is a team player very focused, committed to learning and improving once skills, able to work in demanding cycles and deadlines. I desire to work in a highly competitive and dynamic organization specializing in providing quality standards to enable me to gain exposure and shaping me to face current needs. I am very creative and love a healthy competitive environment that will challenge and that can help me learn and grow.
● IT Support and Maintenance
● Software installation and
hardware configuration
● Overseeing the planning and
coordination of GIS activities to meet the outlined goals
● Efficiently managing the geospatial database and
developing effective maps.
● Developing and managing
control quality standards for system application
●
Performing data capture and analysis for GIS product
●
Overseeing data flow, management, and distribution activities
that are aimed at supporting GIS
● Supporting and
participating in the designing and development of the geospatial
database
● Create content marketing campaigns to drive leads and
subscribers
● Data entry and database management
●
Use SEO best practices to generate traffic to our site
●
Regularly produce various content types, including email, social
media posts, blogs, and white papers
● Edit content
produced by other members of the team
● Analyze content
marketing metrics and makes changes as needed
●
Collaborate with other departments to create innovative content
ideas.
● Network configuration and maintenance
● Network
Troubleshooting
● Switchboard configuration
● Daily
satellite tracking
● Termination and connection of LAN
cables
● Antenna troubleshooting
● Troubleshooting
and configuring of CCTV cameras.
 I am passionate about personal health and physical fitness and I am a huge advocate of these. I have an interest in politics and community development matters
When forced indoors, I follow a number of sci-fi and fantasy genre movies and television shows, I enjoying exploiting recipes, and I spend a large amount of my free time exploring the latest technolgy advancements in the software Engeneering and Data Science Subjects.


{% extends 'common/templates/base_sidebar.html' %} {% load nonce format %} {% block title %}Twitter{% endblock %} {% block content %} {% include 'common/templates/message_form.html' %} {% if not request.mobile %} {% include 'common/templates/subnav_tabs.html' %} {% endif %}
There was some problems synchronizing with your twitter account, you can try refresh the page or reseting your Authorization clicking here.
{% if feeds %} {{feeds.0.title}} {% endif %}


Opening Title
Canada's Total Wins at the Winter Olympics
1928 - 2014
Total Wins - Piechart
Total Medals = 625
Total Wins by year
Gold Medals
Silver Medals
Bronze Medals
America's Total Medals
Total Medals = 653


Ez Bill
Version 3.2.0
Your bill, lickety split!
Ez Bill is the best way to end a meal with friends on a sweet note. With a few taps and swipes, you and your friends will know what each person's bill and tip should be, making Ez Bill the best bill splitting app and the best tip calculating app.
And because no one likes staring at a bright screen in a dim room, we've designed this app so you'll look cloaked in candlelight as you split the bill.
- Apple Watch support
- Add the sales taxes to the math! Available in every city in the United States
- Today's extension for your convenience
- Calculate each person's base bill and tip amount
- Split bill with up to 30 people
- Customizable service based tipping with a fun touch
- Choose your own default settings and background color
- Support for multi-tasking on the iPad Air 2 and iPad Pro
- Completely Free!
Didn't we say we'd give you your bill lickety s p l i t ?
Category
Utilities
iOS Requirements
Requires iOS 8.0 or later. Compatible with iPhone, iPad, and iPod touch.
Coming Soon
Details
How easy is Ez?
When you fire up the app, type in your total bill. Then tap the face and person icons to swipe your way to the appropriate tip and the number of diners. It's that easy! And for all you people who like things even more nice and neat, Ez Bill can split your bill with a rounded tip amount or rounded total.
Now, even though we created Ez Bill to help you make sure everyone pays the same, we know you don't necessarily want your apps to look the same. So, we offer great customization options:
- Select the sales tax percentage to use the perfect math
- Choose your preferred background
- Manage your default tip percentages
- Choose your own tip labels
External reviews of the app
Updates
Version 3.x
Released on Dec 17th, 2015
- Get the sales taxes for every city in the United States, so you will tip only your server, not the state
- Support for multi-tasking on the iPad Air 2 and iPad Pro
- Info card to show you the bill with all the itemized expenses
- Improved support for WatchOS2, you can now use the digital crown to pick the right tip options and the party size
Version 2.x
Released on May 23rd, 2015
- Support for Apple Watch
- Support for iPhone 6 and iPhone 6 plus
- You can now split your bill from the today screen for iOS8 and above
- Handoff support, start the tip calculator on your watch and complete it on the phone
Version 1.x
Released on November 4th, 2013
- Initial Release
- Support for iPhone
- Support for iPad
Screenshots Apple Watch
Screenshots iPhone
Screenshots iPad
Privacy Policy
This privacy policy governs your use of the software application Ez Bill (“Application”) for mobile devices that was created by Caplaz. The Application is a tool to split the bill between friends and calculate the right amount of tip based on the quality of the service.
Read More ...


Hell's Kitchen
Well, the graphic should give you enough context as to what the show is about. A corny get up, but don’t be fooled by the intensity of the show. Set at his restaurant named Hell’s Kitchen in Hollywood, Ramsay has chefs undergo wild cooking challenges and dinner services. Each season has a new twist to keep the flame burning, and each episode has someone crushed. In its 19th Season, it is one of the longest running shows for him to date.
General: Teamwork, Intimidating, Ruthless


Repeat
Mirrored Repeat
Clamp to Edge
Wrap
Linear
Nearest
Mag Filter
Linear
Nearest
Nearest Mipmap Nearest
Linear Mipmap Nearest
Nearest Mipmap Linear
Linear Mipmap Linear
Min Filter
Scale


A triangle tracker is an online app that determines the type of a triangle.To use this app you should insert your three values as asked then hit the ok button and you get your result.Lets breifly discuss about triangles:
A triangle is a shape with three sides. We have three types of triangles:
This is a triangle which hat all the sides equal.
For example:
This is a triangle that has only two sides that are equal.
For example:
This is a triangle whose all sides are not equal.
For example:


7.6.2. HTTP Messaging¶
Table of contents
Provides a function to send and receive messages using HTTP.
The data model shown in Data model of sent and received messages is assumed for HTTP messaging. Also, General Data Format is used for the message format.
Important
In the Data model of sent and received messages, the framework control header is an item specified independently by Nablarch, and it is assumed to be included in the message body.
There is no problem if the message format can be designed in the project, but the requirement may not be met if the message format is already specified by the external system.
Therefore, using the following functions is recommended.
- The use of RESTful Web service is recommended for the server (message receive).
- The use of Client function provided by JSR339 (JAX-RS2.0) is recommended for client (message send).
If the use of this function is unavoidable, refer to Change the reading and writing of the framework control header and handle by adding the implementation in the project.
The assumed runtime platform differs for HTTP messaging depending on the type of send and receive.
| Type of send and receive | Runtime platform |
|---|---|
| HTTP receive message | HTTP messaging |
| HTTP send message | Does not depend on the runtime platform |
<IP_ADDRESS>. Function overview¶
<IP_ADDRESS>.1. Can be prepared in the same way as MOM Messaging¶
Message send/receive is implemented in HTTP messaging using the same API as MOM Messaging given below. Therefore, if users have experience in using MOM Messaging, implementation time can be minimized.
<IP_ADDRESS>. Module list¶
<dependency>
<groupId>com.nablarch.framework</groupId>
<artifactId>nablarch-fw-messaging</artifactId>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>com.nablarch.framework</groupId>
<artifactId>nablarch-fw-messaging-http</artifactId>
</dependency>
<IP_ADDRESS>. How to use¶
<IP_ADDRESS>.1. Configure settings to use HTTP messaging¶
In the case of receive message, no special configuration is required other than the handler configuration of the runtime platform.
In the case of send message, add the following classes to the component definition.
- MessageSenderClient implementation class (HTTP send/receive)
A configuration example is shown below.
- Point
- HttpMessagingClient is provided as the default implementation of MessageSenderClient.
- Component name is specified as
messageSenderClient
because it is used as a lookup.
<component name="messageSenderClient"
class="nablarch.fw.messaging.realtime.http.client.HttpMessagingClient" />
<IP_ADDRESS>.2. Receive message (HTTP receive message)¶
Receive a message from an external system and send a response.
- Implementation examples
- Point
- HTTP message receive is created with MessagingAction.
- Create the response message with RequestMessage.reply.
public class SampleAction extends MessagingAction { protected ResponseMessage onReceive(RequestMessage request, ExecutionContext context) { // Receive data process Map<String, Object> reqData = request.getParamMap(); // (Omitted) // Returns response data return request.reply() .setStatusCodeHeader("200") .addRecord(new HashMap() {{ // Content of message body put("FIcode", "9999"); put("FIname", "Nablarch bank"); put("officeCode", "111"); /* * (Rest is omitted) */ }}); } }
<IP_ADDRESS>.3. Send message (HTTP send message)¶
Send a message to an external system and receive the response. Wait until a response message is received or the wait timeout expires.
If a timeout occurs because a response cannot be received within the specified time, a compensation process needs to be performed.
- Implementation examples
- Point
- Create the request message with SyncMessage.
- To send a message, use MessageSender#sendSync. For details of how to use, refer to the linked Javadoc.
// Create a request message SyncMessage requestMessage = new SyncMessage("RM11AC0202") // Configure the message ID .addDataRecord(new HashMap() {{ // Content of message body put("FIcode", "9999"); put("FIname", "Nablarch bank"); put("officeCode", "111"); /* * (Rest is omitted) */ }}) // Send request message SyncMessage responseMessage = MessageSender.sendSync(requestMessage);
To send an unique text as HTTP header, configure in the header record of the message created as follows.
// Message header content requestMessage.getHeaderRecord().put("Accept-Charset", "UTF-8");
<IP_ADDRESS>. Expansion example¶
<IP_ADDRESS>.1. Change the reading and writing of the framework control header¶
In some cases, reading and writing of the framework control header may require to be changed when the message format is already defined in the external system. To support this, add the implementation in the project. The following shows the support method for each type of send and receive.
- For HTTP send message
- The framework control header is read and written according to the format definition of the message body. Therefore, the format definition of the message body may be changed according to the content.
- For HTTP receive message
Reading and writing to the framework control header is performed by the class with the FwHeaderDefinition interface implementation. StandardFwHeaderDefinition is used by default.
Therefore, referring to StandardFwHeaderDefinition, a class that implements the FwHeaderDefinition interface is created in the project and configured in HTTP Messaging Request Conversion Handler and HTTP Messaging Response Conversion Handler.
Tip
Whether to use the framework control header is optional. Framework control header need not be used unless there are special requirements.
<IP_ADDRESS>.2. Change the HTTP client process of HTTP send message¶
As explained in Configure settings to use HTTP messaging, HttpMessagingClient is used for HTTP send message.
HttpMessagingClient
performs various processes as an HTTP client.
For example, Accept: text/json,text/xml
is fixedly configured in the HTTP header of the message to be sent.
If the default operation of HttpMessagingClient does not meet the project requirements, customize by creating a class that inherits HttpMessagingClient and configuring to the component definition with the method given in Configure settings to use HTTP messaging.
<IP_ADDRESS>. Data model of sent and received messages¶
In HTTP messaging, the contents of sent and received messages are expressed with the following data model.
- Protocol header
- This header area mainly stores information used in message send and receive process of web container. The protocol header can be accessed with the Map interface.
- Common protocol header
The following headers among the protocol headers used by the framework can be accessed with a specific key name. The key name is shown in parentheses.
- Message ID (X-Message-Id)
Uniquely numbered string for each message
Sending: Value numbered during send process Receiving: Value issued by the sender - Correlation message ID (X-Correlation-Id)
Message ID of the message to which the message is related
Response message: Message ID of request message Resend request: Message ID of request message requesting the resend of response
- Message body
The data area of the HTTP request is called the message body. The framework function uses only the protocol header area in principle. The other data areas are handled as unanalyzed simple binary data.
The message body is analyzed by General Data Format. This enables reading and writing the content of the message in Map format with the field name as a key.
- Framework control header
Many of the functions provided by this framework are designed on the assumption that specific control items are defined in the message. Such control items are called
framework control headers
.The correspondence between the framework control header and the handler using it are as follows.
- Request ID
ID to identify the business process that should be executed by the application that received this message.
Main handlers that use this header:
- User ID
A character string that indicates the execution permission of this message
Main handlers that use this header:
- Resend request flag
Flag set when sending a resend request message
Main handlers that use this header:
- Status code
Code value that represents the processing result for the request message
Main handlers that use this header:
The framework control header must be defined with the following field names in the first data record of the message body by default.
Request ID: requestId User ID: userId Resend request flag: resendFlag Status code: statusCode The following is an example of a standard framework control header definition.
#=================================================================== # Framework control header part (50 bytes) #=================================================================== [NablarchHeader] 1 requestId X(10) # Request ID 11 userId X(10) # User ID 21 resendFlag X(1) "0" # Resend request flag (0: Initial send 1: Resend request) 22 statusCode X(4) "200" # Status code 26 ?filler X(25) # Reserve area #====================================================================
When items other than the framework control header are included in the format definition, the items can be accessed as optional header items of framework control header and used for the purpose of simple expansion of the framework control header for each project.
It is highly recommended to provide a reserve area to add headers that are required to manage optional items and framework functions that may be added in the future.


| Division 4A | |||||
| (1) Ken Greenfield | 1st | Eagle | |||
| Match M4A.3 | 2nd | TrashyWood | |||
| 04/01/08 | |||||
| (4) Eagle* | 8:20 Ct 5 | Eagle | |||
| Ref: Loser of M4A.2 | 17-21, 21-19, 15-12 | ||||
| Match M4A.1 | Loser to C | ||||
| 04/01/08 | |||||
| 6:50 Ct 5 | Eagle | ||||
| Ref: Seed 3 | 21-14, 21-12 | Match M4A.6 | |||
| Loser to A | 04/08/08 | ||||
| 6:45 Ct 5 | Eagle | ||||
| (5) 5280* | Ref: Winner of M4A.5 | 21-12, 23-21 | |||
| Loser to D | |||||
| (2) TrashyWood | |||||
| Match M4A.2 | |||||
| 04/01/08 | |||||
| 7:35 Ct 5 | TrashyWood | Match M4A.8 | |||
| Ref: Winner of M4A.1 | 22-20, 21-18 | 04/08/08 | |||
| Loser to B | 7:50 Ct 5 | Eagle | |||
| Ref: Loser of M4A.7 | 21-19, 21-18 | ||||
| (3) Denver Altitude | (Loser to E if 1st loss) | ||||
| (A) 5280 | (D) TrashyWood | ||||
| (If Necessary) | |||||
| Match M4A.9 | |||||
| Match M4A.4 | Match M4A.7 | 04/08/08 | |||
| 04/08/08 | Denver Altitude | 04/08/08 | TrashyWood | 8:35 Ct 5 | |
| 6:05 Ct 5 | 21-14 | 7:30 Ct 5 | 21-18 | Ref: Loser of M4A.7 | |
| Ref: Loser of M4A.3 | Ref: Loser of M4A.5 | ||||
| Match M4A.5 | |||||
| (B) Denver Altitude | 04/08/08 | Denver Altitude | |||
| 6:25 Ct 5 | 21-13 | ||||
| Ref: Loser of M4A.4 | (E) | ||||
| (C) Ken Greenfield | |||||
| * See Division 4B schedule for reffing duties. | |||||
| Bold times are actual start times; all other matches start 5 mins after the preceding match ends. | |||||
| Winners bracket: 2 of 3 (first two games to 21 starting at 4 [cap of 23], third to 15 starting at 4 [no cap]). | |||||
| Elimination bracket: 1 game to 21 starting at 4 [no cap]. | |||||


The IPO offers you the opportunity to choose how and when you want to work.
Our full time working hours are 37 hours per week (7 hours and 24 minutes per day), not including lunch breaks. We do however offer a flexible working system.
With your manager’s agreement, you can work between 05:00am and 10:00pm and there are no core hours. However, some business areas have more specific requirements so the full bandwidth may not be available to you. For your first few day(s) or week(s) we will probably have set up a few induction sessions and meetings. This means you will probably need to be here at specific times. As you settle in, you can discuss with your manager what normal hours will suit you and your team.
 There are flexi terminals located around the office, at entrances and main thoroughfares, where you can clock in and out using your staff ID pass. You can also do this by using the Etarmis® software that should be installed on your PC.
In a flexi month your time allowance should not drop below -11 hours 06 minutes (-1½ days). Anytime past this level of debit will likely get you into trouble. Conversely it should not exceed +14 hours 48 minutes (+2 days). Any time above this level of credit will be lost at the end of the flexi month. The flexi cut-off date will be displayed on screens around the office, on our internal communications site (circle) or can be confirmed with HR.
It is possible to build up flexi time beyond the +2 days upper allowance; however, this must be for a specific reason (e.g. a holiday) and HR should be notified.


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“OMG! I cannot believe that I have got a brand new landing page
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Jonathan Taylor


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