abstract datatype: conn_private()
erbi_bind_value() = erbi_bind_value_typed() | erbi_bind_value_untyped()
erbi_bind_value_named() = erbi_bind_value_named_typed() | erbi_bind_value_named_untyped()
erbi_bind_value_named_typed() = {erbi_identifier(), erbi_value_type(), any()}
erbi_bind_value_named_untyped() = {erbi_identifier(), any()}
erbi_bind_value_typed() = {erbi_value_type(), any()}
erbi_bind_value_untyped() = any()
erbi_bind_values() = [erbi_bind_value()] | [erbi_bind_value_named()]
erbi_connection() = {erbi_connection, erbi_connection:conn_private()}
erbi_identifier() = atom() | string() | binary()
erbi_statement() = {erbi_statement, erbi_statement:stmt_private()}
erbi_value_type() = atom()
| begin_work/1 | Begins a transaction, or adds a save-point. |
| begin_work/2 | |
| commit/1 | Completes the current transaction; all changes are written to the database. |
| disconnect/1 | Close database connection. |
| do/2 | Same as do(Connection,Statement,[]). |
| do/3 | Execute statement which does not return data. |
| prepare/2 | Prepare query/statement for execution. |
| prepare_cached/2 | Prepare with cacheing. |
| rollback/1 | Undoes all changes made during the transaction. |
| rollback/2 | |
| selectall_dict/2 | Execute and return dicts. |
| selectall_dict/3 | Execute query with bind values and return all records as dicts. |
| selectall_list/2 | Execute and return lists. |
| selectall_list/3 | Execute query with bind values and return all records as lists. |
| selectall_proplist/2 | Execute and return proplists. |
| selectall_proplist/3 | Execute query with bind values and return all records as proplists. |
| selectrow_dict/2 | |
| selectrow_dict/3 | |
| selectrow_list/2 | |
| selectrow_list/3 | Execute Statement and return one record. |
| selectrow_proplist/2 | |
| selectrow_proplist/3 |
begin_work(Connection::erbi_connection()) -> ok | {error, any()}
Begins a transaction, or adds a save-point. Connection SavePoint - [optional] name of Save-point
begin_work(Connection::erbi_connection(), SavePoint::erbi_identifier()) -> ok | {error, any()}
commit(Connection::erbi_connection()) -> ok | {error, any()}
Completes the current transaction; all changes are written to the database. Connection
disconnect(Connection::erbi_connection()) -> ok | {error, any()}
Close database connection
do(Connection::erbi_connection(), Statement::any()) -> {ok, non_neg_integer()} | {error, any()}
Same as do(Connection,Statement,[])
do(Connection::erbi_connection(), Statement::any(), BindValues::erbi_bind_values()) -> {ok, non_neg_integer()} | {error, any()}
Execute statement which does not return data.
Returns count of records affected.prepare(Connection::erbi_connection(), Statement::any()) -> {ok, erbi_statement()} | {error, any()}
Prepare query/statement for execution.
Parses statement and returns a handle which can be used to execute and retrieve rows.prepare_cached(Connection::erbi_connection(), Statement::any()) -> {ok, erbi_statement()} | {error, any()}
Prepare with cacheing.
This function is the same as prepare/2 except if the statement has been previously prepared on this connection, a cached statement handle may be returned.rollback(Connection::erbi_connection()) -> ok | {error, any()}
Undoes all changes made during the transaction. If savepoint is given, undoes changes after that savepoint. Connection SavePoint - [optional]
rollback(Connection::erbi_connection(), SavePoint::erbi_identifier()) -> ok | {error, any()}
selectall_dict(Connection::erbi_connection(), Statement::any()) -> {ok, [dict()]} | {error, any()}
Execute and return dicts
See selectall_dict/3.selectall_dict(Connection::erbi_connection(), Statement::any(), BindValues::erbi_bind_values()) -> {ok, [dict()]} | {error, any()}
Execute query with bind values and return all records as dicts.
Each record is returned as a dictionary created by the standard "dict" module. See selectall_list/3 for more information.selectall_list(Connection::erbi_connection(), Statement::any()) -> {ok, [[any()]]} | {error, any()}
Execute and return lists.
See selectall_list/3 for details.selectall_list(Connection::erbi_connection(), Statement::any(), BindValues::erbi_bind_values()) -> {ok, [[any()]]} | {error, any()}
Execute query with bind values and return all records as lists.
Results are returned as a list of lists. Each list contains the values, in order for that row. This is a convenience method, equivalent to:Stmt = Connection:prepare( Statement ), Result = Stmt:fetchall_list( BindValues ), Stmt:finish(), Result
selectall_proplist(Connection::erbi_connection(), Statement::any()) -> {ok, [[{atom(), any()}]]} | {error, any()}
Execute and return proplists.
See selectall_proplist/3.selectall_proplist(Connection::erbi_connection(), Statement::any(), BindValues::erbi_bind_values()) -> {ok, [[{atom(), any()}]]} | {error, any()}
Execute query with bind values and return all records as proplists.
Each returned record is a proplist; otherwise same as selectall_list/3.selectrow_dict(Connection::erbi_connection(), Statement::any()) -> {ok, dict()} | {error, any()}
selectrow_dict(Connection::erbi_connection(), Statement::any(), BindValues::erbi_bind_values()) -> {ok, dict()} | {error, any()}
selectrow_list(Connection::erbi_connection(), Statement::any()) -> {ok, [any()]} | {error, any()}
selectrow_list(Connection::erbi_connection(), Statement::any(), BindValues::erbi_bind_values()) -> {ok, [any()]} | {error, any()}
Execute Statement and return one record. Statement is closed and remaining data discarded. Connection Statement - Statement to execute BindValues - [Optional] parameters.
selectrow_proplist(Connection::erbi_connection(), Statement::any()) -> {ok, [{atom(), any()}]} | {error, any()}
selectrow_proplist(Connection::erbi_connection(), Statement::any(), BindValues::erbi_bind_values()) -> {ok, [{atom(), any()}]} | {error, any()}
Generated by EDoc, Oct 1 2013, 11:51:25.


In-class Assignment | GD 220-01 | Fall 2018 | 3 CREDITS
Poster Sites
Deliverables
HTML / CSS webpage
Process
- Create a github repository with the following name: [your username].github.io
- Think of two Contrasting words (A&B) that represent yourself in some way— your Interests, personality traits, your design sensibility.
- List 10 other words that relate to both A and B
- Write or find a phrase or quote for each of your original words
- Choose two visual elements (they could be created by you or from the web) that relate to each of your words
- Create an HTML document in your repository folder that includes all of these elements
- Using these different items, use position, transform, and animation to create a fluid, moving "poster". See Buhoy Kim's Studio Odd Hyphen for inspiration.


Temple Inn & Suites
"A nice place to stay"
Menu ☰
Home
Temples
Reservations
Services
Contact Us
Resources
Ogden Utah Temple Picture
Tucson Arizona Temple Picture
Accra Ghana Temple Picture
Provo City Center Temple Picture
Temple History
Temple Information
Reception and Missionary Page Pictures


MyCollege
Apply Here
Browse Our courses here
Want to know more about life at myCollege
See what students say
Tom's Story
Sarahs Story
Discover our state of the art facilities here


MUSIC FROM JOHN CARPENTER'S HALLOWEEN
So you want to see embedded music for one the best horror movies of all time? You also want to see an analysis of this music made with Music21 (Python)? You have come to the right place. The encoded music below was extracted from a MIDI file created in Ableton Live from the audio of the original music. The musical notation was extraced from MuseScore. The metadata that is embedded is taken directly from MuseScore's ability to transfer the notation into XML, which can be encoded using Verovio.
Also! Click HERE to view the Halloween Score's musical data! Hope you enjoy this exercise!
Halloween (1979) Main Film Score + MEI Metadata
Listen to Halloween Main Theme


T.I.’s Wife Responds To Him Checking His Daughter’s Hymen Is Still Intact
by Emma RosemurgeyIt has been more than a week since T.I. proudly confessed to taking his 18-year-old daughter Deyjah Harris to the gynaecologist every year to check her hymen is still intact, but the controversy doesn’t seem to be simmering down any time soon.
The rapper, whose real name is Clifford Joseph Harris Jr, horrified people all over the world when he admitted to encouraging his daughter to waive her right to doctor-patient confidentiality to ensure she is still a virgin.
Of course, there’s no fool proof way of checking if a woman is still a virgin, as the hymen can be broken in a number of different ways from horse riding to inserting a tampon.
After the shock confession, Deyjah responded in a subtle yet extremely telling way by ‘liking’ a series of tweets branding her dad ‘disgusting’, ‘possessive’ and ‘controlling’.
When the 18-year-old was then inundated with messages of support, encouraging her to tell her side of the story, Deyjah told her followers: ‘i loveeeeeee yalllllll’, before liking three tweets which called out her dad for his actions.
While one tweet read simply: ‘That is just beyond possessive,’ another read: ‘This is disgusting, possessive and controlling *whew*,’ and the latter said: ‘”give me my results” first of all mf, those are HER results!! Like WTF.’
Just days later, Deyjah went onto unfollow both her dad and his wife, Tameka ‘Tiny’ Harris, on social media.
While T.I. has said nothing following the backlash of his confession, Tiny has now had her say on the invasion of her daughter’s privacy and it was, erm, brief to say the least.
Tiny uploaded a picture of herself alongside her hubby with the caption ‘Mi amor por siempre’, and she was quickly inundated with comments about Deyjah.
‘Is Deyjah okay? We care…’ one person commented, but instead of confirming her step daughter is in fact alive and well, Tiny replied with a series of eyeroll emojis.
Others quickly responded telling Tiny the situation was serious, ‘maybe some of these folk are trolling, but this is a serious conversation. You can choose to stand by him but you can’t ignore the major issues at hand’.
Another person suggested that because Tiny isn’t Deyjah’s mum she probably has no input on the situation, and to be honest, her reply would suggest she doesn’t really care.
Either way, it’s amazing to see Deyjah standing up against the controlling behaviour of her dad.
Emma Rosemurgey is an NCTJ trained Journalist who started her career by producing The Royal Rosemurgey newspaper in 2004, which kept her family up to date with the goings on of her sleepy north east village. She graduated from the University of Central Lancashire in Preston and started her career in regional newspapers before joining Tyla (formerly Pretty 52) in 2017, and progressing onto UNILAD in 2019.


13
Job Continues: Still I Will Hope in God
1 “Behold, my eye has seen all this,
my ear has heard and understood it.
2 What you know, I also know;
I am not inferior to you.
3 But I would speak to the Almighty,
and I desire to argue my case with God.
4 As for you, you whitewash with lies;
worthless physicians are you all.
5 Oh that you would keep silent,
and it would be your wisdom!
6 Hear now my argument
and listen to the pleadings of my lips.
7 Will you speak falsely for God
and speak deceitfully for him?
8 Will you show partiality toward him?
Will you plead the case for God?
9 Will it be well with you when he searches you out?
Or can you deceive him, as one deceives a man?
10 He will surely rebuke you
if in secret you show partiality.
11 Will not his majesty terrify you,
and the dread of him fall upon you?
12 Your maxims are proverbs of ashes;
your defenses are defenses of clay.
13 “Let me have silence, and I will speak,
and let come on me what may.
14 Why should I take my flesh in my teeth
and put my life in my hand?
15 Though he slay me, I will hope in him;
yet I will argue my ways to his face.
16 This will be my salvation,
that the godless shall not come before him.
17 Keep listening to my words,
and let my declaration be in your ears.
18 Behold, I have prepared my case;
I know that I shall be in the right.
19 Who is there who will contend with me?
For then I would be silent and die.
20 Only grant me two things,
then I will not hide myself from your face:
21 withdraw your hand far from me,
and let not dread of you terrify me.
22 Then call, and I will answer;
or let me speak, and you reply to me.
23 How many are my iniquities and my sins?


|
This control flow emulates parallel processing by executing a fragment of each process in each cycle.
The main program has a list of all modules. All modules have an "Update"
function. The control loop executes control cycles, endlessly. Every control cycle, it calls the the Update
functions of all modules, thus creating the illusion of parallelness.
Command structure: Control Loop; Order of execution: Parallel.
|


This is the list of proposed Community and Business Groups. To express support for a group, you must have a W3C account. Once a group has sufficient support (five supporters), W3C announces its creation and people can join it to begin work.
Not seeing a proposed group on this page? It may received enough support; check the current groups.
Log in to show support for groups.
The aim of this group is to explore and develop a set of standards for Organisational Profile Documents (OPDs). In particular we are interested in the usefulness of a machine readable OPD for the automatic discovery of resources in UK higher education institutions. Possible outcomes of the project would be: · Produce a specification for OPD · Create the documentation/supporting materials for OPDs · Promote the OPD to new organisations There is some support/resource from a UKHE funded project, data.ac.uk, more information on OPDs http://opd.data.ac.uk
Supporters
This community recommends an approach for exposing IEEE Learning Object Metadata (LOM), a metadata standard for educational contents, as Linked Data. It is intended as a bridge for linkage of educational metadata into Linked Open Data (LOD). This community aims to describe a mapping of IEEE LOM elements to RDF based on Linked Data principles.
Supporters
This group's aim is to discuss and agree on the use of a custom protocol handler (math:) and standard parameters for enabling the export of mathematical expressions in MathML to other applications, such as assistive technologies, graphing calculators, math notebooks and other mathematics oriented applications, such as IPython and MATLAB. For more information, see https://wiki.benetech.org/display/MATH/Protocol+Handlers+for+External+Applications+to+Process+MathML
Supporters
The primary objective of this group is be a discussion forum and to teach the necessity of accessibility within the Chennai region. A secondary objective is to raise awareness of Web accessibility among college students. This group will not produce specifications.


---
layout: post
title: Schengen storyboards
date: '2013-09-03T17:31:17+02:00'
categories:
- Storyboards
picture_url: https://film-Storyboards.tumblr.com/post/60212884675/schengen-Storyboards
---
Schengen Storyboard
Production: Mindtaste
Agency: ESN
Client: European Commission
Director: Fabrice Armand


"x" "1" "STEINBERG,M, KINOSHITA,FK AND BALLANTYNE,M,MUTAGENICITY STUDIES WITHTOXAPHENE CONGENERS, ORGANOHALOGEN COMPD. 35(ANALYSIS, CHLORINATED BORNANES,CHIRAL CONTAMINANTS, POLYMER ADDITIVES AND MONOMERS):243 __ -246, 1998"


Rules Of The Game
This game is all about playing with numbers
- Numbers divisible by 3 are replaced with "ping"
- Numbers divisible by 5 are replaced with "pong"
- Numbers divisible by 15 are replaced with "pingpong"
DEVELOPER
- NAME : NICKSON KIPKORIR
- OCCUPATION : Software Developer
- GITHUB : Nicksysimple
- AGE : 20yrs
- NATIONALITY: Kenyan


Margin Balance: 0 BTC
Lock Amount: 0 BTC
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Current setting minimum amount of recharge: {{item.recharge_row.recharge_min_amount}} CNY
Currently set the recharge rate valid period: {{item.recharge_row.recharge_set_time}}
Current set recharge exchange rate restriction level: LV {{item.recharge_row.recharge_us_level}}
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1CNY
Maximum amount:
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password:
Level setting:
Validity period:


The RMI Activation Browser node is located in the Runtime tab of the Explorer window. Right-clicking this node opens a contextual menu with items for refreshing the display of the subtree, mounting running systems, and displaying properties.
To add an instance of the Activation browser:
To use a host other than the default host, type the name of the host and its port number and click OK.
A node for the activation system is displayed under the Activation
Browser node. The node designation is in the format of hostname:
port_number
.
| See also | |
|---|---|
| Starting the RMI Activation System
Adding an Activation Group Activation System Node Commands Activation Group Node Commands Activatable Object Node Commands |


| Full Trust Approach | App Approach |
|---|---|
|
Deploy a managed code class which inherits from the HttpHandler interface iHttpHandler
Traditionally in full trust applications, it was possible to create a handler which could direct HTTP requests in the programmed way. Uses are often applications such as converting data from one format to another, or adding a custom api to join server side applications and the client side in a more transparent manner. |
Remote REST api
Now we can add this extra functionality to keep processing server side, by using a remote api that uses the App Model for security.
This allows the program to be separate the process from the Client Side application, and keeps the processing offloaded. As long as all the methods required are available in JSOM, then the processing can be done in the client. |
| Impact of Full Trust Approach | Benefit of App Approach |
|
Not Migratible
The exact implementation of the HttpHandler interface is not migratible to the App Model. Server Performance ImpactHttpHandlers can traditionally be a point of performance issues. Often they are used for processing large amounts of data, be it from multiple sources or from a large list/library. This means having such a component on the farm can, and often will, impact server performance. |
Server Performance
This has added benefits of distributing the processing, heavily reducing the impact on the farm. Disaster recoveryWith less components deployed on the farm, disaster recovery plans become much simpler, and the turn around of activating a DR plan is significantly reduced as the processing components of the farm are separate. |
Efforts and Benefits
| Migration Impact | Critical |
| Re-Design Effort | High |
| Re-Development Effort | High |
| Long Term Benefit | High |
Effort Drivers


Your addresses
Route options
Avoid toll roads
Avoid highways
Avoid ferries
Commute on your timeline
Get traffic on Pebble timeline
Receive pins and reminders from Commute
Arrive at work by
Leave work at
Need help?
Tap here to contact us.


Humans Place in Suspended Animation for First Time
by Andrew OrrHumans have been placed in suspended animation for the first time, in a technique called emergency preservation and resuscitation (EPR).
EPR involves rapidly cooling a person to around 10 to 15°C by replacing all of their blood with ice-cold saline. The patient’s brain activity almost completely stops. They are then disconnected from the cooling system and their body – which would otherwise be classified as dead – is moved to the operating theatre.
A surgical team then has 2 hours to fix the person’s injuries before they are warmed up and their heart restarted. Tisherman says he hopes to be able to announce the full results of the trial by the end of 2020.
Years ago I remember reading in Popular Science of experiments like this involving dogs. It’s amazing that it’s moving to the human stage.
Check It Out: Humans Place in Suspended Animation for First Time


About Us
Ausweg Automation was founded in 2017. Ausweg Automation Plays a palpable role by providing consequent solutions under one roof integrating various branches of engineering for personalized Industrial Automation along with Process Industries & Digital Automation, Material Handling, Automotive, Food & Beverages, Packaging Industries, Pharmaceuticals, Infrastructure, Water treatment plant.
Ausweg Automation has geared its pace in the field of Industrial Automation. The company has strategic alliances with leading MNC brands like DELTA, SICK, SIEMENS, AB, ABB, BCH, SCHNEIDER, PANASONIC for distribution of Industrial Automation products
VISION
"To become a leading automation company that excels in innovation and technology solution provider over the years"
"Our skills overview"
90%
Industry 4.0 (%)
82
Panel designing and building (%)
98
Research and development (%)
90
Robotics and solutions (%)
MISSION
"To achieve Upheaval in Technology - Everything we do is geared toward enabling our customers to increase productivity , reduce costs, improve quality and enhance safety."
Why choose Us?
We Love Innovation
"Every once in a while, a new technology, an old problem, and a big idea turn into an innovation."
We Will Support You
"Everyone can't achieve anything entirely by theirself. There's a support system that is a basic requirement of Human existence."
Integration
"Integration is the method toward obtaining that goal. It is a word of the past, the word of the future and the word of the present is contribution."
Download Our App for all Platform
<Desktop
On website
On Mobile
On Play Store
What our Reader's Say about us
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet.


@* * Copyright 2023 HM Revenue & Customs * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. *@ @this( layout: Layout, govukButton : GovukButton, submitButton: playHelpers.submitButton ) @()(implicit request : Request[_], messages: Messages) @layout( pageTitle = Messages("calc.resident.properties.introduction.title") ) {
@Messages("calc.resident.properties.introduction.paragraph")
@Messages("calc.resident.properties.introduction.entitledLinkText")@Messages("calc.resident.properties.introduction.continuationInstructions")
@Messages("calc.base.button.continue")


We have a few more questions before you submit your application.
@(acceptanceForm: Form[_root_.forms.QuestionnaireDiversityInfoForm.AcceptanceTerms])(implicit request: Request[_], flash: Flash, user: Option[CachedData], feedbackUrl: String) @import views.html.widgets.{pageProgress, checkbox} @main_template(title = "Before you continue", pageForms = Seq(acceptanceForm)) { @pageProgress(4, 8)
We have a few more questions before you submit your application.
The following questions are:
For security reasons, once you save a page you won't be able to go back and change your answers.


|
App Engine Python SDK
v1.6.9 rev.445
The Python runtime is available as an experimental Preview feature.
|
Public Member Functions | |
| def | __init__ |
| def | MergeFrom |
| def | Equals |
| def | IsInitialized |
| def | ByteSize |
| def | ByteSizePartial |
| def | Clear |
| def | OutputUnchecked |
| def | OutputPartial |
| def | TryMerge |
| def | __str__ |


|
|||||||||||
| PREV CLASS NEXT CLASS | FRAMES NO FRAMES | ||||||||||
| SUMMARY: NESTED | FIELD | CONSTR | METHOD | DETAIL: FIELD | CONSTR | METHOD |
java.lang.Object edu.uci.isr.yancees.YanceesFacade
This class centralized all aspects of yancees: 1) The unique connection to the dispatcher (siena, elvin or other) 2) The access to the specific Facades (publication, subscription, administration), configuring them as necessary 3) The parsing of files in Notification, Subscription and Message wrappers Local users should use this class as the front-end to Yancees notification server Remote users should use the RemoteYanceesInterface. This last interface is most likely to be the preferred one.
| Field Summary | |
static boolean |
PERFORM_XML_VALIDATION
|
static boolean |
PRINT_DEBUG
|
static int |
PS_BUFFER_FLUSH_PERIOD
|
static int |
PS_BUFFER_SIZE
|
| Constructor Summary | |
protected |
YanceesFacade()
This constructor, as protected, prevents the direct instantiation of this object, and guarantees the singleton characteristic of this class. |
| Method Summary | |
void |
bootstrap(java.io.File configFile)
Initialize the client API using the provided configuration file. |
protected void |
finalize()
Automatically called when the object is destroyed, this method disposes all the resources alocated by the server, closing all the connections to the dispatcher in use, saving all data and finalyzing all the plug-ins and so on. |
static YanceesFacade |
getInstance()
The only way to access the unique instance of Yancees is by using this access method. |
ProtocolFacade |
getProtocolAPI()
Get access to the internal protocolAPI and initializes this component if necessary |
PublicationFacade |
getPublisherAPI()
Get access to the internal publisher API and initializes this component if necessary |
SubscriptionFacade |
getSubscriberAPI()
Gets access to the internal subscriber API and initializes this component if necessary |
void |
initialize()
Initializes the system using the default configuration. |
static GenericEvent |
parseEvent(java.io.File eventFile)
Allows users to easity parse their XML events before sending to the APIs |
static GenericMessage |
parseMessage(java.io.File messageFile)
Allows users to easity parse their XML messages before sending to the APIs |
| Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object |
clone, equals, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, toString, wait, wait, wait |
| Field Detail |
public static boolean PRINT_DEBUG
public static boolean PERFORM_XML_VALIDATION
public static int PS_BUFFER_SIZE
public static int PS_BUFFER_FLUSH_PERIOD
| Constructor Detail |
protected YanceesFacade()
| Method Detail |
public static YanceesFacade getInstance()
public void initialize()
public void bootstrap(java.io.File configFile) throws ParsingException
configFile
- is a file having the configuration for all the components
of the system.
ParsingException
protected void finalize() throws java.lang.Throwable
java.lang.Throwable
public ProtocolFacade getProtocolAPI()
public PublicationFacade getPublisherAPI()
public SubscriptionFacade getSubscriberAPI()
public static GenericMessage parseMessage(java.io.File messageFile) throws ParsingException
messageFile
- is the file to be parsed
ParsingException
- in case the public static GenericEvent parseEvent(java.io.File eventFile) throws ParsingException
eventFile
- is the file to be parsed
ParsingException
- in case the
|
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| PREV CLASS NEXT CLASS | FRAMES NO FRAMES | ||||||||||
| SUMMARY: NESTED | FIELD | CONSTR | METHOD | DETAIL: FIELD | CONSTR | METHOD |


Class GeometricEntityBase
An abstract class that serves two purposes:
- To unify all geometric properties
- To provide the GeometryChanged Event that Occurs when there is a geometry change to alert parent classes that they might need to update their geometry
Inherited Members
System.Object.Equals(System.Object)
System.Object.Equals(System.Object, System.Object)
System.Object.GetHashCode()
System.Object.GetType()
System.Object.MemberwiseClone()
System.Object.ReferenceEquals(System.Object, System.Object)
System.Object.ToString()
Namespace: Dxflib.Geometry
Assembly: Dxflib.dll
Syntax
public abstract class GeometricEntityBase
Properties
| Improve this Doc View SourceGeometryEntityType
The entity type
Declaration
public GeometryEntityTypes GeometryEntityType { get; protected set; }
Property Value
| Type | Description |
|---|---|
| GeometryEntityTypes |
Methods
| Improve this Doc View SourceCalcLength()
Calculating the length of the geometric entity
Declaration
protected virtual double CalcLength()
Returns
| Type | Description |
|---|---|
| System.Double | In the base entity it returns 0 |
OnGeometryChanged(GeometryChangedHandlerArgs)
Base class Invocation of the Geometry changed event
Declaration
protected virtual void OnGeometryChanged(GeometryChangedHandlerArgs args)
Parameters
| Type | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| GeometryChangedHandlerArgs | args | Arguments for the event |
UpdateGeometry(Object, GeometryChangedHandlerArgs)
Protected Virtual void function that should define how the geometry entity deals with geometry update
Declaration
protected virtual void UpdateGeometry(object sender, GeometryChangedHandlerArgs args)
Parameters
| Type | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| System.Object | sender | |
| GeometryChangedHandlerArgs | args |
Events
| Improve this Doc View SourceGeometryChanged
The Geometry changed event that alerts subscribers that they might need to update their geometry.
Declaration
public event GeometryChangedHandler GeometryChanged
Event Type
| Type | Description |
|---|---|
| GeometryChangedHandler |


TypexJS naming scheme applies to all primitive immutable types:
It extends to specific Object types:
The suffix specifying the type is an underscore character followed by a single letter:
| Type | Suffix |
|---|---|
| Null | _N |
| Undefined | _U |
| Boolean | _b |
| Number | _n |
| String | _s |
| Array | _a |
| Object | _o |
| Symbol | _y |
| Class | _c |
| RegExp | _r |
To convey even more meaningful information, function identifiers follow a slightly different scheme:
void
function
, we use the v letter for its suffix
a possible alternative is to use the undefined value: U
.| Function return is | Suffix |
|---|---|
| Null | __N |
| Undefined | __U |
| Boolean | __b |
| Number | __n |
| String | __s |
| Array | __a |
| Object | __o |
| Symbol | __y |
| Class | __c |
| RegExp | __r |
| Function | __f |
| Void | __v |
const awesome__s = () => 'An awesome String'
const clone__s = awesome__s
In case of a function returning different types of value, we just omit the type character.
const silly__ = string_b => string_b ? 'A weird String' : 1234
We could do the same for a variable accepting different kinds of type, but is it really a good practice?
let hybrid_ = 'A String'
hybrid_ = 1234 //: What a mess!


| User guide |
There are many ways to build graphical applications in MATLAB, but here we will take a very simple approach. If the application were to become larger and more complex, this approach would be changed to better mitigate the complexity. Some notes on this are contained at the end.
The application is structured as a single function with callbacks and other helper functions stored as "nested" subfunctions, i.e. functions inside the main function. This has the advantage that the nested subfunctions can share access to any variables declared in the main function. This is also a risk as anything we accidentally declare in the main function becomes "global" within the application. For that reason all logic is put into subfunctions and we restrict the main function to just declaring two shared variables:
function
demoBrowser()% Declare shared variables
data = createData(); gui = createInterface( data.DemoNames );% Now update the GUI with the current data
updateInterface(); redrawDemo();% Helper subfunctions
.function
data = createData() ...end
;function
gui = createInterface(names) ...end
;function
updateInterface() ...end
;function
redrawDemo() ...end
;% Callback subfunctions
.function
onMenuSelection() ...end
;function
onListSelection() ...end
;function
onDemoHelp() ...end
;function
onHelp() ...end
;function
onExit() ...end
;end
% Main function
Note that all of the work is done in subfunctions. Most subfunctions are callbacks executed when a button is pressed or a menu selected. The four used at startup are helper functions:
We will not dig into all the subfunctions and callbacks, but instead concentrate on the GUI creation (createInterface) and update (updateInterface).
(Full source code for this application is available here: [ view | edit | run ] )
| A complete example | [Top] | createInterface |


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Chapter Eight Conclusions
China’s domestic dynamism now clearly extends to its international
behavior. China is involved in places and on topics previously marginal
to its interests, and it is effectively using tools previously out of
its reach. China is a truly global actor, with interests and influence far
beyond Asia. It is both shaping and being shaped by nations, institutions,
and processes all over the world. China is not yet a global
power but it will eventually get there, depending on one’s standard of
measurement. And by the time China gets there, the concept of being
a “global power” will likely have a very different meaning from the
predominant position of the United States in the international system
since the end of the Cold War.
China’s global activism is being driven by a distinct set of perceptions,
objectives, and policies—some are long-standing and others
are more current, as documented throughout this monograph. To the
extent that any nation possesses and executes a foreign policy strategy,
China has one. Chinese leaders possess the long-standing goals of
advancing national development, protecting China’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity, and securing China’s status as a respected great
power. And to do so, Chinese policymakers have crafted a foreign
policy that seeks to accomplish five specific objectives: economic growth
and development, reassurance, countering constraints, resource diversification,
and reducing Taiwan’s international space. As of summer
2009, China’s traditional goals as well as its more current objectives are
consistent and persistent drivers of its international behavior.
更多资讯，请访问： retter2012.com 。
Chinese leaders continue to approach their foreign policy and foreign
relations through the prism of domestic affairs: how foreign policy
assists the increasingly complex tasks of economic and social development
at home. This does not mean that China is an insular nation that
just wants to be left alone or that Chinese leaders approach their external
affairs as a secondary concern. The reality of China’s international
behavior could not be further from that. The linkage between domestic
and international affairs for China has become stronger and assumed
new dimensions in the last decade; but it is this linkage that will continue
to have a defining influence on China’s external behavior.
The internal-external linkage has shifted from a passive to an
active logic. Domestic growth and stability require an active foreign
policy. For China, acting locally now requires that it think globally.
No longer is Chinese foreign policy simply focused on creating a safe
and stable external environment for reform to continue, as Deng set
out to do three decades ago. Now, China’s foreign policy makes a critical
contribution to meeting China’s most pressing developmental challenges:
China needs diplomacy to gain access to markets, investment,
technologies, and resources—all necessary inputs to sustained growth.
Indeed, more than during the first two decades of reform, China’s
domestic needs have become a driver of as well as a constraint on its
external behavior.
This logic to China’s foreign policy is widely accepted among
China’s policymakers and is likely to remain so. But it is also accurate
to argue that China’s international objectives are continually evolving.
None of China’s long-standing goals (e.g., sovereignty and territorial
integrity) or its more current objectives (e.g., reassurance and countering
constraints) are likely to change in the near future, assuming
there is no major discontinuity in China’s domestic or foreign affairs.
China’s current and next generation of leaders share the CCP’s view of
giving priority to increasing comprehensive national power to facilitate
national revitalization; they also understand how domestic affairs
drives foreign policy.
That said, Chinese interests and objectives are constantly evolving
as China comes to grips with its new responsibilities and the burdens
associated with global involvements, especially in such regions as the Middle East and Latin America which, for decades, were peripheral
to Chinese foreign policy calculations. But these new interests and
responsibilities should be viewed in the context of the widely accepted
domestic logic to China’s foreign policy. China knows, for example,
that it needs to assume new responsibilities but it is wary of doing so
for fear that it lacks the expertise to succeed and that such ventures will
drain resources away from domestic development.
The changing nature of China’s international behavior is further
reflected in its evolution away from strict adherence to long-standing
foreign policy principles, such as noninterference in the internal affairs
of other nations. China’s new perceptions and interests have fostered a
gradual shift in its adherence to this principle—or, in Chinese terms,
a “flexible interpretation” of it. China has done so to allow management
of regional issues that affect its economic and security interests,
as well as its reputation (such as the Darfur crisis in Sudan and political
instability in Burma). As China’s equities in such regions as Africa and
Southeast Asia have grown and China has become more comfortable
with using its influence to effect change, it has come to recognize the
value in promoting political stability and reducing violence in these
regions. This modification in China’s approach was also catalyzed by
external pressure in the form of opprobrium from the United States,
African nations, and nongovernmental organizations. In the end, Chinese
leaders chose to assist in the stabilization and management of
these regional crises.
Implications for Regional and Global Stability
Three major implications for regional and global stability follow from
this study. First, China has been largely working within the current
international system to accomplish its foreign policy objectives. China
is not trying to tear down or significantly revise the current constellation
of global rules, norms, and institutions on economic and security
affairs. Rather, on balance, it is seeking to master them to advance its
international interests—an approach that has proven quite productive
for Beijing.
In the main, Chinese foreign policy is heavily focused on leveraging
the size, appeal, and expectations of China’s economy and its deep
involvement in multilateral institutions—globally and regionally—
to expand Chinese influence and stature, to increase China’s access
to inputs to economic growth, and to reduce constraints on China’s
freedom of action. As China has deepened its involvement in certain
regions and in multilateral institutions, it has sought to shape them in
ways conducive to Chinese goals. China’s role in creating the EAS and
SCO and its effort to derail expansion of the U.N. Security Council
are prominent examples of China’s use of multilateral organizations to
advance specific Chinese objectives.
China has succeeded in implementing this approach in ways that
do not appear immediately aggressive or threatening to other nations
in East Asia and beyond.1 On balance, China has been effective at
reassuring many Asian nations and forestalling the development of
regional coalitions seeking to balance Chinese power. Since the beginning
of this decade, China’s strategy has allowed it to draw a particular
contrast with U.S. foreign policy, which has appeared unilateral, coercive,
and military-oriented to many nations. The perception among
many nations that the Bush administration discounted international
institutions and preferred military force aided China’s efforts to appear
more cooperative and predictable than the United States.
To date, China’s shaping of international institutions has been
limited and episodic. There are more instances of China gradually
accepting international rules than objecting to and then trying to
revise them (and succeeding). Globally, China has adopted numerous
complex trade and nonproliferation commitments, albeit with a mixed
compliance record. Even in East Asia, China’s strategic periphery, it has
backed down when faced with opposition from regional nations about
creation of a China-directed multilateral organization (e.g., EAS). In
Southeast Asia, Beijing appears, so far, to have accepted regional norms
on conflict resolution and has made pledges on peacefully resolving
maritime territorial disputes. Although China’s ultimate behavior on these territorial disputes is still unfolding (including some provocative
activities), its initial commitments indicate, importantly, a degree of
self-binding for the sake of reassurance.
China’s efforts to shape other countries’ policies and preferences
have been similarly limited and focused mainly on issues of particular
sensitivity to China, such as the status of Taiwan and Tibet. In these
instances, the costs to the target state of accommodating China were
often low and the benefits were substantial. There are few instances of
states making costly decisions (for their national interests) in response
to Chinese policy intervention. China has been most effective at raising
its profile among countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; states
in these regions are now more aware of Chinese views and interests.
But China’s actual influence on the behavior of other states has been
limited and episodic. Despite China’s growing presence and interactions
with countries and institutions all over the world, the instances of
China successfully using its diplomacy to change the behavior of other
states are few.
China, to be sure, is dissatisfied with some attributes of the current
international system. It does not accept the current status of Taiwan;
preventing the island’s de jure separation from the mainland remains a
top national security priority. However, Chinese policies on this issue
do not serve as an unambiguous indicator of China’s regional aspirations,
such as those related to territorial acquisition. China’s resolution
of numerous territorial disputes on its land borders and its management
in the last decade of maritime disputes serve as more consistent
indicators of Chinese views on territorial acquisition. Thus, although
China seeks eventual reunification with Taiwan, this goal does not
ipso facto mean that Beijing sees territorial aggrandizement as a way to
accomplish national revitalization as a great power. Chinese behaviors
on maritime territorial issues bears continued watching, especially in
the South China Sea.
Moreover, China is also dissatisfied with the U.S. position as the
predominant global power, motivated in part by the perception that the
United States has sought to use its diplomatic, economic, and military
power to push a development model of free-market democracy. The
Bush administration’s democracy-promotion agenda was a particular concern among Chinese leaders. The Iraq War and “color revolutions”
in Central Asia heightened these anxieties. The latter U.S. approach
made China wary of U.S. power and fearful that this could be directed
at China. This, in turn, has motivated Chinese efforts to work with
other nations, especially Russia, to constrain U.S. advances, globally
and in Asia.
Diversification
In part by design and in part by default, China is pursuing an international
strategy of diversification. It is doing so by simultaneously
broadening its sources of economic prosperity, security, and status.
China is using foreign policy to expand its access to markets,
investment, technology, and resources—the key inputs to economic
growth and modernization. During the early years of China’s reform
and opening, the external sources of growth were mainly trade and
investment with a small number of large industrialized economies,
such as the United States, Japan, and west European countries. Within
the last decade, Chinese leaders have come to realize that the only way
to sustain moderately high growth levels is to more actively go abroad
in search of new markets, investments, technologies, and resources.
China’s extensive economic integration with East Asian nations and its
growing ties with Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East lead this
trend; expanding trade with the latter three regions will be key to maintaining
exports during a global recession. This allows China to reduce
it reliance on one or even a small number of powerful economies, such
as the United States. China also uses such economic relationships to
generate political influence—such as creating a perceived dependence
on China—that Beijing can leverage to pursue other diplomatic priorities,
such as sensitizing nations to China’s preferences and interests.
China is also diversifying its sources of security by developing
new and expanding existing relationships with various power centers.
It is upgrading its bilateral relationships by forming “strategic partnerships”
and “strategic dialogues” with both developed and developing
nations, as well as with major regional groupings such as ASEAN, the
EU, and the GCC. China has embraced multilateral institutions in
virtually every part of the world, in some cases creating them where none previously existed. It uses these mechanisms to reassure countries
about its intentions, to demonstrate the benefits of China’s rise, and,
ultimately, to expand its political influence—often related to gaining
access to markets and resources. A natural consequence of this security
diversification is that China has lessened its reliance on stable and positive
relations with a few major powers, such as the United States, for
its security. By dint of this security diversification process, China now
generates leverage, avoids constraints on its behavior, and gains maneuverability
from a variety of sources.
Last, China is diversifying its sources of international status and
legitimacy. For decades, it relied on crude metrics as the basis of such
status: its large size and population, long history and legacy as a great
Asian power, U.N. Security Council membership, and possession of
nuclear weapons. Now, it has turned to highlighting its economic successes
of the last 30 years and is demonstrating a willingness to share
these with others. Chinese leaders are also slowly redefining their external
profile: They are shifting away from the view of international affairs
as “a struggle” against “hegemony and power politics” toward a more
positive view that stresses “peace, development and cooperation” in
building a “harmonious world.” China also remains one of the most
influential advocates of the principle of nonintervention in the internal
affairs of other states (even though its views have moderated in recent
years), which is an important status-marker for China among developing
nations. For many Chinese, hosting the 2008 Olympics was a
benchmark achievement in its effort to become an accepted “member
of the club” among world powers.
China’s Diplomacy in Transition
China’s international behavior is a deeply transitional phenomenon.
China has clear and widely accepted foreign policy objectives, but they
are also evolving as its economy, society, and polity change. What
occurs inside China is directly linked to China’s external behavior,
more so than ever before, and China’s domestic situation is in a constant
state of flux. China’s diplomacy reflects a balancing of competing
internal and external demands, which are growing in number and variety.
How China manages this balancing act has a direct influence on its external behavior, both facilitating and constraining its policies. For
example, China’s governance challenges are a barrier to efficient foreign
policy decisionmaking and its effective implementation.
An added element of the phenomenon is that China’s international
identity is changing: It represents many things to many nations, often
at the same time. China is both a developing and a developed nation
to many in the international community. It is a regional power in Asia
and a global actor. Chinese policymakers are groping their way forward
with their newfound influence, status, and responsibilities. When
should they lead and when should they follow? They are testing the
effectiveness and limits of their capabilities. Although Chinese policymakers
clearly have objectives in mind in their current foreign policy,
they are pursuing them and then recalibrating in response to domestic
imperatives, internal constraints, external reactions, and a dynamic
international security environment in which threats and opportunities
readily emerge. Ultimately, this process provides the international
community—including the United States—with an important opportunity
to influence this evolution. But it also makes it difficult for the
international community to understand how China’s interests will
evolve over time.
Implications for U.S. Security Interests
This monograph raises numerous implications for U.S. global security
interests, U.S. interests in Asia, the U.S.-China relationship, and the
future of America’s China policy.
Global Challenges
China does not seek to displace the United States as the global superpower.
Chinese leaders do not want China to be a global power on par
with the United States—a peer competitor. They view their domestic
challenges as too great to assume the burdens associated with such a role,
and they recognize that they lack currently the material resources to be
able to project and sustain military and economic power all over the
world. They also fear that playing such a role could deplete much needed resources and might foster a backlash against China. For Chinese
leaders, trying to play such a role would represent a major break
from Dengist orthodoxy on foreign affairs—a significant but not insurmountable
political barrier to a major change in strategy. Such a course
correction would likely only come about in reaction to a dramatic
shift in China’s external security environment—one that precipitated
a complete reassessment by China’s top leaders. In addition, if China
were seeking to become a global competitor to the United States, its
behavior would look far different than it does, as discussed below.
This does not mean that there are not competitive aspects of
China’s foreign policy that challenge U.S. security interests. Some of
China’s international behaviors are directed at eroding U.S. influence
in specific regions and in certain institutions. The most competitive
aspects of China’s foreign policy are evident in the Asia-Pacific region.
China is not currently trying to push the United States out of this
region. Chinese leaders recognize the dangers and likely failure of such
an approach, and some recognize the stability provided by U.S. alliances.
Rather, China is trying to increase its power and influence relative
to the United States. A core Chinese objective is to hinder the U.S.
ability to constrain China; that is, China seeks to maximize its freedom
of action and leverage as means of countering perceived U.S. efforts to
limit Chinese choices. China seeks political influence to increase the
costs, for the United States and its allies, of constraining China.
Thus, China is challenging the United States by trying to reduce
its relative influence, but it does not seek to confront the United States
by trying to expel it. As noted above, China is pursuing this approach
by deepening economic interactions with Asian nations, joining
multilateral organizations to shape regional agendas, expanding bilateral
interactions to shape these nations’ preferences, and generally
reassuring countries on its periphery about China’s intentions and
capabilities. In this sense, China’s approach is more gravitational than
confrontational—pulling nations toward China (to bind them) rather
than pushing them away from the United States or each other.
The logic, in China’s eyes, of its most competitive foreign policies
is essentially defensive. China seeks influence so that the United States
and its allies will not work together to limit China’s options. Chinese actions in the Asia-Pacific region, for example, seek to create an environment
in which the United States cannot constrain China, now or in
the future. Although it has tried and flirted with more offensive options,
such as offering an alternative vision of a regional security order, none
of these have taken hold and China has not pursued them. Rather,
China has actively used economic diplomacy, multilateral interactions,
and bilateral engagement to create a regional security environment in
which states do not view China as a threat, are more sensitive to Chinese
interests, are willing to accommodate China on some issues, and
will not collectively balance Chinese power. This approach has been
successful for China.
Going forward, a key challenge for China is maintaining the fine
balance between challenging and confronting U.S. interests. Although
China may perceive its actions as defensive (i.e., reacting to U.S. efforts
as opposed to actively undermining them), some Chinese policies,
depending on their manifestations, could appear confrontational to
U.S. and regional policymakers. Chinese actions, such as its military
diplomacy, could make competition look increasingly direct, intense,
and potentially adversarial. As China becomes more globally active,
U.S. and Chinese interests will increasingly collide as well as overlap.
As a result, a policy challenge for both Washington and Beijing is to
maximize the latter and minimize the former. To date, Washington
and Beijing have managed to avoid negative outcomes, but more tests
are likely.
Challenges for America’s China Policy
A second major implication for U.S. interests is that China’s diversification
strategy is altering the U.S. ability to shape Chinese behavior
and the conduct of bilateral relations. Washington, for decades following
normalization, effectively leveraged Beijing’s priority on stable
and positive relations with the United States to elicit changes in China’s
policies on international economic and security issues. U.S. policy
played a central role in encouraging (at times, coercing) China’s acceptance
of international rules related to trade and investment, arms control
and nonproliferation, and regional security affairs. U.S. policy was
certainly not the only factor shaping this process of post-Mao internationalization, but it often played a catalytic role by jump-starting internal
debates and accelerating existing ones, including by empowering
China’s domestic advocates for change. Chinese foreign policy elites
used to refer to U.S.-China relations as “the key of keys”—a reflection
of the centrality of the United States to China’s world view and its foreign
policy. This dynamic is now gradually changing.
As the sources of China’s prosperity, security, and status have
broadened, Chinese leaders are no longer as preoccupied with American
views. Over time, Beijing will become less willing to accommodate
U.S. preferences and more able to resist pressure from Washington, or
even generate countervailing forces. The traditional U.S. approach of
relying principally on bilateral diplomacy to shape China’s policies and
practices now confronts new limitations.
Regional Challenges
China’s ascendance in Asia is changing the nature of U.S. relations with
its allies and partners in the region. As China becomes more relevant to
the economic, financial, and military affairs of U.S. allies and partners,
their needs and their demands on Washington will change. As China
looms larger in their economic development and regional security planning,
this could complicate Washington’s ability to “set the agenda for
cooperation” with other nations in the Asia-Pacific region. For example,
this could also result in unwanted policy choices or constraints on
U.S. security cooperation with these nations; challenges in the middle
part of this decade in the U.S.-South Korean alliance are instructive
in this regard, although they appear to have been resolved under the
new Korean leadership. These trends are highly relevant to U.S. defense
planning for a possible conflict over Taiwan. U.S. friends and allies
in Asia will increasingly need to balance the competing visions and
demands of Washington and Beijing. This ongoing process presents
U.S. Asia strategy with an enduring challenge.
In Africa and Latin America, similar but less intensive shifts in
bilateral dynamics are already materializing. In Africa, China’s trade
and investment policies are challenging (and in some cases undermining)
Western efforts to improve human rights and governance practices.
China has effectively leveraged its improved diplomatic ties with African states to advance its goals in multilateral forums, such as in
U.N. debates about Security Council reform. China’s growing trade
and financial interactions with such states as Brazil, Venezuela, and
Bolivia offer these nations choices and options not available when they
relied heavily on economic interactions and security commitments
from the United States. This alters their discourse with Washington in
ways that complicate U.S. diplomacy. Venezuela’s embrace of China as
a poke at the United States (and as a perceived alternative source of oil
demand) is a prominent example of this latter phenomenon.
China’s regional involvements are not only changing the regions
but are shaping Chinese behaviors as well. China’s increased interactions
with African nations have sensitized Beijing to the consequences
of its policies, leading China to recognize the value of improving corporate
governance in Africa and encouraging resolution of the Darfur
crisis in Sudan. These regional interactions, for example, have led China
to moderate its previously staunch adherence to the principle of “noninterference
in the internal affairs of other states.”
A broader challenge for the United States is monitoring the nature,
scope, and pace of China’s global activism. How and where is China
accumulating influence, beyond merely a greater presence and set of
regional interactions? How relevant is China to regional trade flows,
investment, currency trading, science and technology standards, and
security affairs? Will this alter China’s regional or global aspirations,
making it either more expansive or more conservative in its desires?
U.S. diplomacy needs to be keenly attuned to assessing the ways China
is accumulating genuine influence, whether China can operationalize
such influence, and how these developments are shaping China’s intentions.
Although such interactions are not necessarily zero-sum, U.S.
policymakers need to be attuned to how they shape the U.S.-China
“balance of influence” in Asia and beyond.
Another challenge facing the United States is ensuring regional stability
in Asia as three trends converge: China ascends, Japan reemerges
as a military power, and India becomes an Asian power. Although this
study has focused on China’s international behavior, China’s diplomatic
activism, globally and regionally, is having a profound effect on major
power relations in Asia. Historically, China has had territorial conflicts with both Japan and India, and these two states harbor deep concerns
about competition with China for regional leadership. These dynamics
are a source of enduring suspicions among all three nations, fueling
incipient security dilemmas. The relationships among these three
powers are rapidly evolving along both cooperative and competitive
vectors, often simultaneously. A key task for the United States is to use
its role as an external balancer to shape, to the extent possible, relations
among these three in a way that reduces suspicions, minimizes the possibilities
of conflict, and manages crises.
A Counterfactual Approach
Another analytic approach useful for assessing China’s international
behavior and the related challenges to U.S. interests is to examine what
China is not doing. By highlighting the policy choices China has not
taken, a better understanding can be gained of China’s current perceptions,
objectives, and policies.
First, China is not pursuing its core foreign policy objectives
through territorial expansion, military intervention, permanent military
deployments abroad, creation of client states (including through
extensive arms sales), or domination of regional or international institutions.
Chinese international behavior could look far more aggressive
than it currently does, either regionally or globally. This does not mean
that Chinese behaviors do not challenge some U.S. interests, but rather
that the challenge is more specific and subtle.
Second, China is not promoting a radically alternative view of
global or regional affairs in Asia. It is not promoting a “Beijing Consensus”
as an alternative to the “Washington Consensus.”2 Although
some states may view China’s development approach of authoritariancapitalism
as replicable, these are usually dictatorships with little global
appeal. In fact, China’s development path validates the core axioms of
the Washington Consensus more than it challenges them. The global
financial crisis in mid-2008 did more to highlight the limits of freemarket
policies (especially in the financial sector) than any Chinese diplomacy that advocated state intervention in economic policymaking.
Furthermore, China has embraced most of the major global and
regional economic and security institutions. Its participation rate in
intergovernmental institutions is at an all-time high.
In Asia, it is no longer actively promoting its “new security concept,”
as Beijing realizes that this does not resonate with Asian countries
who seek good relations with both the United States and China.
China’s effort to grow its soft power is focused on reassuring nations
about China’s intentions rather than actively peeling them away from
the United States based on a Chinese model of development or regional
security. Most nations are drawn to China because of its large and
growing economy rather than its ideals. China has done well using
its hard power softly rather than generating soft power, as Joseph Nye
originally defined it. Many of the foreign policy ideas China promotes
are broadly consistent with the liberal institutionalist tradition that the
United States pursued after World War II (with the obvious exception
of political liberalization). In other words, China is focused far more on
working within the current rules and institutions to accumulate power
and influence than on opposing and revising them.
China’s international behavior may have appeared to some like an
alternative to the United States during the past eight years of the Bush
administration. Many nations viewed Bush as limiting U.S. involvement
in international organizations, by-passing the U.N. on key questions,
adopting an activist democracy-promotion agenda, and favoring
military force. China was effective at implicitly creating a contrast with
U.S. foreign policy under George W. Bush. Under Barack Obama’s
administration, it is less certain that China will have the same opportunity
to draw such a stark contrast with U.S. foreign policy.
Third, China has not adopted a confrontational posture with the
United States, despite its discomfort with U.S. unipolar status and
the U.S. democracy-promotion agenda. Even during the Bush years,
Chinese leaders avoided confrontation with the United States (such as
on Iraq in 2003), put effort into stabilizing U.S.-China relations (especially
after 9/11), and sought to expand areas of practical cooperation
(e.g., North Korea). U.S. and Chinese leaders have broadened their
channels of diplomatic exchange. These new channels have resulted in limited changes in Chinese behavior on key international security
issues such as North Korea, Iran, Sudan, and Burma. China’s international
behavior reflects a continued recognition that an adversarial
relationship with the United States would have a very negative effect
on China’s security environment and on its ability to accomplish both
its long-standing and its more immediate objectives.
Furthermore, China has not sought to create an anti-U.S. coalition
to balance U.S. power. Beijing has pursued bilateral ties with nations
close to the United States and also those alienated from Washington.
China appears to have quietly rejected such approaches by leaders from
Venezuela and Iran. China has been embracing multilateral organizations
that include U.S. membership and also those that the United
States is not a part of. And, in regional organizations such as the SCO
and EAS, China has not sought to dominate them and has deferred its
advances when they have been met with resistance from regional states,
including U.S. allies.
At the same time, China pursues opportunities to challenge U.S.
preeminence and freedom of action. Sino-Russian relations have a distinct
patina of anti-U.S. sentiment, manifesting in successive actions
in the U.N. to constrain U.S. actions. China has been opportunistic
in using U.S. foreign policy problems to promote Chinese interests at
U.S. expense. China reached out to the EU following the Iraq War to
try to exploit trans-Atlantic tensions to push for elimination of the EU
arms embargo on China. China reached out to both the Philippines
and Thailand in 2004 and 2006 when their ties with the United States
frayed. It is instructive that China has either failed or registered narrow
success in many of these ventures.
Fourth, in Asia, China is not actively trying to break up U.S.
alliances. It is not offering U.S. allies security assurances and military
cooperation as a replacement to their security arrangements with the
United States. Indeed, military diplomacy and defense cooperation is
perhaps the smallest part of China’s bilateral diplomacy with Asian
nations. China is not promoting itself as an alternative security partner
to the United States. Rather, it has focused on growing economic
cooperation and reassuring U.S. allies by participating in regional
institutions and committing to their norms of behavior, at least for now. Since the beginning of this decade, more Chinese strategists recognize
that—official rhetoric aside—U.S. security commitments play
a stabilizing role in Asia.
A final cut at this problem is to consider what a distinct Chinese
balancing strategy would look like. It could include promoting
an alternative concept of global and regional security and pushing
Asian nations to choose between the United States and China.
Such an approach could also include extensive security assistance—
including large-scale joint training and exercises, meaningful intelligence
exchanges, and arms sales in an effort to build an anti-U.S.
coalition. It could also include technical assistance to internal security
agencies in authoritarian regimes to advance one-party rule and
entrench the current regime. There is little evidence that these activities
are occurring, but these areas merit continued watching.
Will China Change in the Future?
Since the end of the Cold War, China’s perceptions and objectives have
driven a foreign policy that has, for the most part, accommodated U.S.
power, focused on the gradual development of China’s economic power
and its military capabilities, and sought to minimize external threats.
Going forward, a key question will be how the dual processes of China’s
growing material capabilities and its expanding global interests
will transform Chinese foreign policy perceptions, objectives, and policies.
Will these trends accelerate ongoing changes in Chinese foreign
policy, such as the increasing sensitivity to its reputation and security
dilemma dynamics, or will it produce alternative behaviors heretofore
unseen? Specifically, as China’s national capabilities expand, will its
intentions change and will it become more aggressive in confronting
the United States?
The analysis in this monograph suggests that this is not likely in
the next two decades, barring a major discontinuity in China’s current
trajectory such as that caused by widespread domestic instability or an
armed conflict with the United States or a major Asian nation. Why?
Simply put: China’s national capabilities will only gradually increase while the internal constraints and external restraints on a revisionist
foreign policy will remain substantial.
China’s accretion of power and influence in the next two decades
will be gradual and limited. China faces numerous constraints on its
ability to sustain robust growth. Few growth projections for China
in the next two decades suggest that China would have the national
resources to meet its substantial developmental needs while simultaneously
supporting a breakout international strategy that would allow an
easy and cost-free sprint to global parity with the United States. Also,
this gradual accretion of Chinese power and influence will occur in a
context of the rise of other major regional powers, such as Japan and
India, who are watching China and checking its advances. These represent
real constraints and restraints on major shifts in China’s international
strategy.
China’s internal challenges will continue to loom large in the foreign
policy calculations of Chinese leaders, suggesting that a fundamental
reorientation in its foreign policy is unlikely. China’s myriad
domestic challenges will continue and some will grow in the next two
decades, such the demographic constraints on growth and the need to
shift to a consumption-based growth model.
For the current fourth generation of leaders and the fifth generation,
the long-standing CCP lexicon of using foreign policy to create a
stable external environment, to gain access to markets and resources,
to minimize external commitments, and to avoid limits on Chinese
choices will persist. Chinese leaders will continue to view their foreign
policy through the prism of fostering domestic stability and growth.
As argued above, China’s domestic challenges increasingly function as
both drivers and constraints on its foreign policy, and none of these are
likely to change radically China’s national interests.
In addition, Chinese leaders are mindful of the past mistakes of
rising powers and want to avoid repeating them. They have studied
the negative experiences of Imperial Japan, Weimar Germany, and the
Soviet Union as well as the positive experience of the rise of the United
States after World War II. They have concluded from these experiences
the importance of not relying on military power to ensure international
stature and of not confronting the dominant power. Rather, Chinese leaders are focused on increasing China’s comprehensive national power
as a way to ensure national revitalization. They realize that this will take
time and international space. Western scholars of international relations
debate China’s ability to avoid such power-transition dynamics,
but the international goals of Chinese leaders are clear on this point.3
As China pursues its current foreign policy strategy, its stake in
the current international system will grow and this will likely provide
greater binding influence on China. China will seek to perpetuate the
system that has allowed it to gain prosperity and improve its security.
This phenomenon has already been at work in the gradual evolution
of its positions on North Korea, Iran, Sudan, and Burma. In all these
cases, China has been more willing to take actions, previously rejected,
in order to manage these problems or at least to prevent their worsening.
This modification in Chinese behaviors is a direct consequence of
the shifts in China’s conception of its national interests, which, in turn,
are a direct result of China’s internationalization. China may change
some of the rules and play a greater role in shaping international organizations
(and potentially further constrain the United States), but
Chinese-initiated changes in the structure of the current international
system are unlikely.
A further consideration is that even as Chinese capabilities and
influence grow, the costs of confronting the United States will remain
high and the benefits of doing so will remain unclear, if not low. U.S.
economic and military power will not remain static over the next 20
years, even if the gap in relative capabilities narrows. And the United
States is not likely to take an overtly confrontational strategy toward
China, which would fundamentally alter Beijing’s cost-benefit calculus
in its international behavior. The United States will continue to remain
important (but not as central as before) to Chinese perceptions of their
external security environment and the structure of the international
system. Even assuming that the world becomes distinctly more multipolar, the U.S. economy and military will continue to cast a long
shadow over Asian and global affairs. In such a world, China’s awareness
of the costs of confrontation with the United States will persist.
These arguments are not meant to imply that China’s international
behavior will not change in the coming two decades. It will
as Chinese capabilities gradually expand, as the international system
becomes more multipolar, and as the U.S. role in global affairs changes.
Chinese diplomacy will likely reflect a growing confidence and swagger.
Other nations will look to China more, and China will become
more comfortable using its capabilities to shape nations and institutions.
It will also become more comfortable about disagreeing with the
United States and more able to resist U.S. pressure.
The resulting policy challenge for the United States lies in monitoring
Chinese international behavior to understand its trajectory. U.S.
policymakers also need to find novel ways to accomplish several goals:
to reduce China’s ability to undercut U.S. interests and deter aggressive
actions; to reassure China that the United States does not treat it as a
strategic adversary in order to short-circuit China’s most intense insecurities
about U.S. intentions; and to generate opportunities for greater
partnership in solving transnational problems that pose a threat to the
stability of the international system.
A final implication of this analysis is that U.S. expectations of
China’s future trajectory should not proceed under the assumption that
U.S. actions are autonomous to the evolution of Chinese perceptions,
objectives, and policies. U.S. policy toward China will continue to be
a major influence on China’s future behavior and on the content and
character of U.S.-China relations. This should remain a central premise
for U.S. policymakers. Even as Chinese interests diversify, the United
States will continue to loom large in, but not predominate, China’s
calculations of its economic and security interests. U.S. policies that
take a highly competitive approach to China could make an adversarial
relationship an inevitable outcome. On the other hand, U.S. efforts to
expand areas of cooperation can reassure China and encourage it to
set aside its narrow interests for the sake of regional and global good.
U.S. policymakers should use all dimensions of U.S. power to signal to Beijing the cost-benefit ratios associated with accommodating or confronting
U.S. interests.
A related consideration is the unfolding relationship between
the Obama administration’s foreign policy and U.S.-China relations.
A U.S. foreign policy that is perceived as less unilateral, ideological,
and coercive than that of the Bush administration will deny China the
opportunity to draw a stark contrast with the United States—in effect,
it will foster a security environment in which China finds less fertile
grounds for constraining U.S. options. A foreign policy that actively and
appropriately uses multilateral institutions and emphasizes, in rhetoric
and in action, the value of negotiated solutions (including those backed
up by the possible use of force) may also make U.S. power appear less
threatening to China and other countries, undercutting the intensification
of the security dilemma in U.S.-China relations and augmenting
the global appeal of the United States.
Policy Recommendations
Several policy recommendations for the United States follow from
these conclusions. At the level of national policy toward China, the
United States should adopt a “mixed strategy” with both cooperative
and competitive elements. Specifically, such a mixed strategy should
include the three components of engagement, institutional binding,
and security balancing.4
The logic of pursuing a mixed strategy toward China stems from
two core dimensions of China’s international behavior: (1) China’s
growing centrality to stability and prosperity in Asia and globally and
(2) the uncertainty about China’s future direction as a rising power and
the corresponding belief that either a very weak or very strong China
could develop and either one would challenge U.S. interests. The latter
aspect of the China challenge is particularly important: The point of
adopting a mixed strategy is to hedge U.S. security “bets” against the
uncertainty about China’s future. Uncertainty is the driver of this
approach, not hidden U.S. projections about China’s intentions.
Each element of this mixed strategy has policy-specific components.
U.S. engagement with China has become an accepted fact of U.S.-China
policy over the past three decades. Global economic realities and the
deep bilateral economic and financial integration demand it, and increasingly
so.5 There are few global security problems—both traditional and
nontraditional—that can be resolved without China’s involvement.
And as China becomes more involved in regions beyond Asia, it has
become central to managing their instabilities as well, such as the
Darfur crisis in Sudan.
In pursuing engagement, the United States should seek to both
shape and test China’s intentions, which is the logic behind the policy
approach of encouraging China to be a “responsible stakeholder.” Perhaps
more important, U.S. policymakers can use engagement to signal
to China that the United States does not seek to contain China, does
not seek to bring about violent political revolution in China, that a
stable and prosperous China is in U.S. interests, and that the United
States is willing to accept and accommodate some Chinese interests.
Meanwhile, the United States can also signal to China that more is
expected of it and that if it wants a greater global role, it has to shoulder additional burdens. The United States should expand the breadth
and depth of bilateral dialogues on economic, diplomatic, and defense
issues to ensure that all the relevant actors in China are engaged. The
Obama administration’s strategic and economic dialogues with China
are important steps in this direction. A challenge for U.S. policy in
effectively engaging China is to do so while also pursuing the more
competitive aspects of U.S. policy, addressed below.
Beyond bilateral engagement, there is more the United States
can do on the multilateral front. The United States needs to become
more active in regional diplomacy in Asia to bolster the credibility and
legitimacy of U.S. presence. China has benefited in the last five years
from the perception that the United States is distracted with Iraq and
Afghanistan and from a related regional skepticism about U.S. power
and ideals. This situation provided an opportunity with which China
could shape regional perceptions and expand China’s influence. Thus,
an important element of a U.S. engagement policy is to be more attentive
to and more frequently present at major multilateral meetings in
Asia to signal the consistency and quality of U.S. commitments to
regional allies and partners. This will shape the regional context of
China’s rise. A renewed U.S. commitment to multilateralism in East
Asia, including joining the East Asia Summit, holding a summit with
ASEAN leaders, and always attending major regional meetings, would
go a long way toward improving regional perceptions of the U.S. commitment
to the region.
On economic questions, U.S. policy should focus on negotiating
high-quality regional trade agreements and investment treaties and
contributing to regional economic crisis-management mechanisms.
U.S. policy needs to reassert itself as central to the economies of East
Asia. The tone of U.S. policy toward China and U.S. policy in East
Asia is important as well. The United States should pursue this agenda
of regional engagement and enhanced multilateralism with confidence,
not as a defensive reaction to concerns about China. The United States
does not need to participate in every multilateral organization that
China joins or establishes. U.S. overreaction to China’s regional diplomacy
would undermine the ultimate U.S. goals of bolstering the credibility and legitimacy of its existing role as a key provider of public and
private goods to Asian nations.
The central premise of a binding strategy is to leverage China’s
desire to have a seat at the table and to gain access to institutional
resources as a way to lock it into commitments. Encouraging China’s
participation also serves as a way to test China’s intentions. Does China
accept the prevailing rules or does it seek to rewrite them? Importantly,
such binding is done in front of China’s peers, which further raises the
costs to China of defecting from rules or norms. Binding need not be
seen as a coercive approach; binding seeks to create opportunities for
China to accept restraint in exchange for both the international community’s
acceptance of some of its interests and China’s access to the
resources and stature of regional and global institutions.
For U.S. policy, this means expanding China’s participation in
major international and regional organizations, such as the International
Monetary Fund and the International Energy Agency. This
would signal U.S. willingness to give China more “voice opportunities”
and help U.S. policymakers gauge China’s ability to contribute
to global problem-solving. Similar U.S. policies had a defining influence
on the evolution of China’s trade and nonproliferation commitments
since the early 1980s. Looking forward, China’s participation
will be needed for the success of global negotiations on climate change,
energy security, pandemic diseases, and other transnational security
challenges.
The final aspect of a mixed state strategy is security balancing. This
topic will not be addressed in detail here, given that Chinese military
modernization was not a subject covered in this monograph. In general
terms, the security balancing component of U.S. strategy involves
enhancing U.S. alliance cooperation and the credibility of U.S. security
commitments to the Asia-Pacific region. Ensuring regional stability
by deterring aggressive actions by any state remains a central goal of
U.S. alliances and force deployments in the region. The United States
should also improve the quality of its regional security cooperation to
ensure that U.S. allies and security partners are not vulnerable to predation
by China and that none of them feel as if the United States
wants them to choose between Washington and Beijing. The United States can also use such security cooperation to broaden the legitimacy
of its presence by addressing both traditional and nontraditional security
challenges. China has been fairly effective at engaging Asian states
on the latter, so the United States would benefit from leveraging its
superior defense capabilities to do the same.
Last, security balancing should not be pursued in a way that is
viewed as ganging-up on China, as that would alienate key allies and
partners. Enhanced alliance coordination should occur alongside active
military-to-military engagement programs between the United States
and China as well as among U.S. allies and China. Such efforts can
help to lessen the security-dilemma dynamics while also ensuring that
U.S. military capabilities can continue to deter potential threats and
reassure U.S. allies and partners.
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Graphic and Web Design Portfolio
by Zachary Asai
Scroll Down to View Work
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Linked
About Me
Outfit Trader Capstone 2015
Ladies First Non-Profit 2015
PPA Non-Profit 2014
Study At Sea 2014
Monterey Bay Shutter Bugs 2015
Colorful Music 2015
Simpsons Database 2014
The Cat's Meow 2014
Together With love 2015


Vuku Chief Driko:
I am not at all interested in the reunification of our ancient kingdom nor in the symbol of its authority.
You noble Orcs will die in the end after fighting for supremacy over the continent, be we shall survive for eternity!


public class Algo
extends java.lang.Object
As per the usual, we have a catalogue of tests for every exported(public) function. Please, ensure you do the same
Algos as discussed on page 55 of cracking the coding interview NOTE: These are algorithms for practicing big o understanding and in no means should be interpreted as the 'correct' way to develop an algorithm.
| Modifier and Type | Class and Description |
|---|---|
static class |
Algo.numChars
A wrapper sub class for the numChars O() problem
|
| Constructor and Description |
|---|
Algo() |
| Modifier and Type | Method and Description |
|---|---|
static int[] |
appendToNew(int[] array,
int value)
Takes an array and appends a new value to said array
|
static int[] |
copyArray(int[] array)
Takes an array and copies it by moving one item at a time to a new array
This is an example of a more tricky big o approximation
|
static int |
div(int a,
int b)
Gets the result of a/b
Uses a interesting approach that leaves no remainder.
|
static int |
intersection(int[] a,
int[] b)
Finds the intersection of two arrays of integers
Uses merge sort and then binary search to find the intersection
|
static int |
mod(int a,
int b)
Finds the mod of a on b
Uses simple arithmetic operations to get the modulo result
|
static int |
power(int a,
int b)
Gets the result of a raised to the power of b
Uses recursion to achieve the calculation of a raised to the power of b
|
int |
product(int a,
int b)
The time complexity of product is b
|
static int |
sqrt(int n)
Gets the square root of a number through recursion
|
private static int |
sqrtHelper(int n,
int min,
int max) |
static int |
sqrtLoop(int n)
Gets the square root of an integer through a iterative loop
Uses a non recursive method as opposed to the bethod above
|
static int |
sumDigits(int n)
Sums the numbers within a digit
|
@Contract(pure=true) public int product(int a, int b)
a
- the item to sumb
- the number with which to multiply a bypublic static int power(int a, int b)
a
- the number to raise b tob
- the number to power@Contract(pure=true) public static int mod(int a, int b)
a
- the number with which to mod b byb
- the number to mod@Contract(pure=true) public static int div(int a, int b)
a
- the divisorb
- the numberpublic static int sqrt(int n)
n
- the number to find the square rootprivate static int sqrtHelper(int n, int min, int max)
public static int sqrtLoop(int n)
n
- The integer to square@Contract(pure=true) public static int[] copyArray(int[] array)
array
- an array of int.@Contract(pure=true) public static int[] appendToNew(int[] array, int value)
array
- The array on which to appendvalue
- The value to appendpublic static int sumDigits(int n)
n
- The digit to sumpublic static int intersection(int[] a, int[] b)
a
- The first arrayb
- The second array


Date: 23 March Updated: 23 May 2016
What's your take on the DBC / EDA experience?
I knew this would be a challenge, but it turns out it is not only a change of mindset for me - but also my whole family. The glue that has enabled everyone else to walk out the door without worrying about food, clothes or where most things are is walking away to study.. I have been practising amnesia and letting family members be responsible for their own belongings. Hopefully everyone will all slowly adjust to looking after themselves, bu it doesn't happen overnight.
What are your impressions?
This is the kind of style of learning I'd like to think our children are doing within our schools. EDA teachers are mentors, and teachers are 'change agents', mentoring our children to learn as they learn best. This is what EDA are truly putting into practice. Ken Robinson has plenty to say about this kind of group learning in these Ted Talks on education. Basically we all learn better when we are self motivated and want to do better/solve a problem/ or find a way forward.
How do you see yourself engaging with this type of culture?
I have already visited the Wellington EDA hub and seen group work in progress and the team brainstorming for finding a good solutions. I know this is the way forward, having worked for years with my design business, but also facilitating a learning network, so I am excited about the prospects. I need to admit I do not know the way forward quickly, limit my research times, and ask for help earlier. The culture is fine, I just want to try and keep up with the work and not fearing the jump ahead.
Have your expectations of EDA changed? If so, how?
Yes, dramatically so... Only some of this unique and experimental way of learning was visible before I joined the course. I like the kitchen versus restaurant example of owning your own education process instead of it being within a consumer process. Why do we assume all learning must be taught and learn in a certain way using testing and repeated reinforcement of facts handed to us on a plate? I realise I am the compass and need to learn how to direct myself to use the maps effectively.
Are you excited to participate in this kind of learning environment? Does it make you nervous?
Im very excited, and of course it makes me nervous - anything unknown is like this, and I seem to be in continual catch-up. After the first influx of information when you feel totally overloaded. I need to plan take more strategic learning steps - one at a time - that is all I can do. Others already more advanced than me. As long as we review and evaluate each step as a group as we go forward, it should end up in a better direction. This is truly unstoppable learning! There is a new big world out there to waiting for us to discover, but can I actually keep up with everyone else, and can my brain take it?


public static final class CanonMakernoteDirectory.CameraSettings
extends java.lang.Object
| Modifier and Type | Field and Description |
|---|---|
static int |
TAG_AF_POINT_SELECTED
12288 = None (Manual Focus)
12289 = Auto Selected
12290 = Right
12291 = Centre
12292 = Left
|
static int |
TAG_CONTINUOUS_DRIVE_MODE
0 = Single Frame or Timer Mode
1 = Continuous
|
static int |
TAG_CONTRAST
0 = Normal
1 = High
65535 = Low
|
static int |
TAG_DIGITAL_ZOOM
0 = No Digital Zoom
1 = 2x
2 = 4x
|
static int |
TAG_EASY_SHOOTING_MODE
0 = Full Auto
1 = Manual
2 = Landscape
3 = Fast Shutter
4 = Slow Shutter
5 = Night
6 = Black & White
7 = Sepia
8 = Portrait
9 = Sports
10 = Macro / Close-Up
11 = Pan Focus
|
static int |
TAG_EXPOSURE_MODE
0 = Easy Shooting (See Easy Shooting Mode)
1 = Program
2 = Tv-Priority
3 = Av-Priority
4 = Manual
5 = A-DEP
|
static int |
TAG_FLASH_ACTIVITY
0 = Flash Did Not Fire
1 = Flash Fired
|
static int |
TAG_FLASH_DETAILS |
static int |
TAG_FLASH_MODE
0 = Flash Not Fired
1 = Auto
2 = On
3 = Red Eye Reduction
4 = Slow Synchro
5 = Auto + Red Eye Reduction
6 = On + Red Eye Reduction
16 = External Flash
|
static int |
TAG_FOCAL_UNITS_PER_MM |
static int |
TAG_FOCUS_MODE_1
0 = One-Shot
1 = AI Servo
2 = AI Focus
3 = Manual Focus
4 = Single
5 = Continuous
6 = Manual Focus
|
static int |
TAG_FOCUS_MODE_2
0 = Focus Mode: Single
1 = Focus Mode: Continuous
|
static int |
TAG_FOCUS_TYPE
0 = Manual
1 = Auto
3 = Close-up (Macro)
8 = Locked (Pan Mode)
|
static int |
TAG_IMAGE_SIZE
0 = Large
1 = Medium
2 = Small
|
static int |
TAG_ISO
0 = Check ISOSpeedRatings EXIF tag for ISO Speed
15 = Auto ISO
16 = ISO 50
17 = ISO 100
18 = ISO 200
19 = ISO 400
|
static int |
TAG_LONG_FOCAL_LENGTH |
static int |
TAG_MACRO_MODE
1 = Macro
2 = Normal
|
static int |
TAG_METERING_MODE
3 = Evaluative
4 = Partial
5 = Centre Weighted
|
static int |
TAG_QUALITY
2 = Normal
3 = Fine
5 = Superfine
|
static int |
TAG_SATURATION
0 = Normal
1 = High
65535 = Low
|
static int |
TAG_SELF_TIMER_DELAY |
static int |
TAG_SHARPNESS
0 = Normal
1 = High
65535 = Low
|
static int |
TAG_SHORT_FOCAL_LENGTH |
static int |
TAG_UNKNOWN_10 |
static int |
TAG_UNKNOWN_12 |
static int |
TAG_UNKNOWN_13 |
static int |
TAG_UNKNOWN_2 |
static int |
TAG_UNKNOWN_3 |
static int |
TAG_UNKNOWN_4 |
static int |
TAG_UNKNOWN_7 |
static int |
TAG_UNKNOWN_8 |
static int |
TAG_UNKNOWN_9 |
| Constructor and Description |
|---|
CanonMakernoteDirectory.CameraSettings() |
public static final int TAG_MACRO_MODE
public static final int TAG_SELF_TIMER_DELAY
public static final int TAG_QUALITY
public static final int TAG_FLASH_MODE
public static final int TAG_CONTINUOUS_DRIVE_MODE
public static final int TAG_UNKNOWN_2
public static final int TAG_FOCUS_MODE_1
public static final int TAG_UNKNOWN_3
public static final int TAG_UNKNOWN_4
public static final int TAG_IMAGE_SIZE
public static final int TAG_EASY_SHOOTING_MODE
public static final int TAG_DIGITAL_ZOOM
public static final int TAG_CONTRAST
public static final int TAG_SATURATION
public static final int TAG_SHARPNESS
public static final int TAG_ISO
public static final int TAG_METERING_MODE
public static final int TAG_FOCUS_TYPE
public static final int TAG_AF_POINT_SELECTED
public static final int TAG_EXPOSURE_MODE
public static final int TAG_UNKNOWN_7
public static final int TAG_UNKNOWN_8
public static final int TAG_LONG_FOCAL_LENGTH
public static final int TAG_SHORT_FOCAL_LENGTH
public static final int TAG_FOCAL_UNITS_PER_MM
public static final int TAG_UNKNOWN_9
public static final int TAG_UNKNOWN_10
public static final int TAG_FLASH_ACTIVITY
public static final int TAG_FLASH_DETAILS
public static final int TAG_UNKNOWN_12
public static final int TAG_UNKNOWN_13
public static final int TAG_FOCUS_MODE_2
Copyright © 2003-2012 Drew Noakes. All Rights Reserved.


Token Sale NOT AVAILABLE to citizens and residents of United States of America, China, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Cuba, Seychelles, and Syria.
Terms and Conditions


My Dog Bennett, The Wonder Doodle
Bennett is 2 1/2 years old and loves food, pooping, and bedtime.


Breadcrumbs help users navigate back up a hierarchy of pages. They are especially useful when a user links directly to a page that is nested in a hierarchy but needs to go to a parent page. (example: documentation)


Created by Adrián Pradilla / @apradillap
Gems enables you look at the awesome packaging system that Ruby provides for distributing programs and libraries. This presentation will show you examples of what it can do.
Package manager for the Ruby programming language.
Need to send emails?
Need a testing framework (or three)?
Want to set up a web server?
Nead to Search Engine Optimization (SEO) plugin for Ruby on Rails applications?
Need flexible authentication solution?
There's different types of fragments, like:
grow
shrink
fade-out
current-visible
highlight-red
highlight-blue
The gem command is used to install, build, download and upload Gem packages.
gem install rails
gem uninstall rails
gem list --local
gem list --remote
gem rdoc --all
gem search rails --remote
gem update
source 'https://rubygems.org'
# Bundle edge Rails instead: gem 'rails', github: 'rails/rails'
gem 'rails', '4.2.5'
# Use PostgreSQL
gem 'pg'
# Use SCSS for stylesheets
gem 'sassc-rails'
# Use Uglifier as compressor for JavaScript assets
gem 'uglifier', '>= 1.3.0'
# Use CoffeeScript for .coffee assets and views
gem 'coffee-rails', '~> 4.1.0'
# See https://github.com/rails/execjs#readme for more supported runtimes
# gem 'therubyracer', platforms: :ruby
# Use jquery as the JavaScript library
gem 'jquery-rails'
gem 'jquery-ui-rails'
# Turbolinks makes following links in your web application faster. Read more: https://github.com/rails/turbolinks
gem 'turbolinks'
gem 'devise'
# Use ActiveModel has_secure_password
# gem 'bcrypt', '~> 3.1.7'
gem 'omniauth'
gem 'omniauth-twitter'
gem 'omniauth-facebook', '~> 3.0.0'
gem 'omniauth-google-oauth2', '~> 0.3.0'
source 'https://rubygems.org'
ruby '2.2.3'
gem 'rails', '~> 4.1.6'
gem 'protected_attributes'
gem 'rails-observers'
gem 'rb-readline'
gem 'sidekiq', '~> 4.0.1'
# Turns every field on a editable one
gem "best_in_place", :git => "git://github.com/bernat/best_in_place", ref: "ee95961e639022e6aa528704b8cb4789596ea61b"
# State machine for attributes on models
gem 'state_machine', require: 'state_machine/core'
gem 'statesman'
# Database and data related
gem 'pg', '0.17.1'
gem 'dbhero', '>= 1.1.8'
gem 'postgres-copy'
gem 'pg_search'
Next chapter
https://github.com/plataformatec/devise
https://github.com/ryanb/cancan
https://github.com/deivid-rodriguez/byebug
https://github.com/mperham/sidekiq
https://github.com/activeadmin/activeadmin
https://github.com/thoughtbot/paperclip
https://github.com/norman/friendly_id
https://github.com/sparklemotion/nokogiri
...
Use Mysql as the database for Active Record.
>> Euromillion.randomillion
[5, 8 , 17, 25, 48]
Try it out at
http://guides.rubygems.org/make-your-own-gem/


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