Syllabus
MUEHLER et al. v. MENA
Respondent Mena and others were detained in handcuffs during a search of the premises they occupied. Petitioners were lead members of a police detachment executing a search warrant of these premises for, inter alia , deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership. Mena sued the officers under 42 U. S. C. §1983, and the District Court found in her favor. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the use of handcuffs to detain Mena during the search violated the Fourth Amendment and that the officers questioning of Mena about her immigration status during the detention constituted an independent Fourth Amendment violation.
Held:
1. Menas detention in handcuffs for the length of the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. That detention is consistent with Michigan v. Summers , 452 U. S. 692, in which the Court held that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. The Court there noted that minimizing the risk of harm to officers is a substantial justification for detaining an occupant during a search, id. , at 702703, and ruled that an officers authority to detain incident to a search is categorical and does not depend on the quantum of proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure, id. , at 705, n. 19. Because a warrant existed to search the premises and Mena was an occupant of the premises at the time of the search, her detention for the duration of the search was reasonable under Summers . Inherent in Summers authorization to detain is the authority to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention. See Graham v. Connor , 490 U. S. 386. The use of force in the form of handcuffs to detain Mena was reasonable because the governmental interest in minimizing the risk of harm to both officers and occupants, at its maximum when a warrant authorizes a search for weapons and a wanted gang member resides on the premises, outweighs the marginal intrusion. See id ., at 396397. Moreover, the need to detain multiple occupants made the use of handcuffs all the more reasonable. Cf. Maryland v. Wilson , 519 U. S. 408. Although the duration of a detention can affect the balance of interests, the 2- to 3-hour detention in handcuffs in this case does not outweigh the governments continuing safety interests. Pp. 47.
2. The officers questioning of Mena about her immigration status during her detention did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuits holding to the contrary appears premised on the assumption that the officers were required to have independent reasonable suspicion in order to so question Mena. However, this Court has held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure. Florida v. Bostick , 501 U. S. 429. Because Menas initial detention was lawful and the Ninth Circuit did not hold that the detention was prolonged by the questioning, there was no additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and, therefore, no additional Fourth Amendment justification for inquiring about Menas immigration status was required. Cf. Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U. S. ___ , ___ (slip op., at 24). Pp. 78.
3. Because the Ninth Circuit did not address Menas alternative argument that her detention extended beyond the time the police completed the tasks incident to the search, this Court declines to address it. See, e.g., Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U. S. 129, n. 10. Pp. 89.
332 F. 3d 1255, vacated and remanded.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which OConnor, Scalia, Kennedy , and Thomas, JJ. , joined. Kennedy, J ., filed a concurring opinion. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Souter, Ginsburg , and Breyer, JJ., joined.
Opinion
DARIN L. MUEHLER,
et al.,
PETITIONERS
v.
IRIS
MENA
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Iris Mena was detained in handcuffs during a search of the premises that she and several others occupied. Petitioners were lead members of a police detachment executing a search warrant of these premises. She sued the officers under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, and the District Court found in her favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the use of handcuffs to detain Mena during the search violated the Fourth Amendment and that the officers questioning of Mena about her immigration status during the detention constituted an independent Fourth Amendment violation. Mena v. Simi Valley, 332 F. 3d 1255 (CA9 2003). We hold that Menas detention in handcuffs for the length of the search was consistent with our opinion in Michigan v . Summers , 452 U. S. 692 (1981) , and that the officers questioning during that detention did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights.
***
Based on information gleaned from the investigation of a gang-related, driveby shooting, petitioners Muehler and Brill had reason to believe at least one member of a gangthe West Side Locoslived at 1363 Patricia Avenue. They also suspected that the individual was armed and dangerous, since he had recently been involved in the driveby shooting. As a result, Muehler obtained a search warrant for 1363 Patricia Avenue that authorized a broad search of the house and premises for, among other things, deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership. In light of the high degree of risk involved in searching a house suspected of housing at least one, and perhaps multiple, armed gang members, a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team was used to secure the residence and grounds before the search.
At 7 a.m. on February 3, 1998, petitioners, along with the SWAT team and other officers, executed the warrant. Mena was asleep in her bed when the SWAT team, clad in helmets and black vests adorned with badges and the word POLICE, entered her bedroom and placed her in handcuffs at gunpoint. The SWAT team also handcuffed three other individuals found on the property. The SWAT team then took those individuals and Mena into a converted garage, which contained several beds and some other bedroom furniture. While the search proceeded, one or two officers guarded the four detainees, who were allowed to move around the garage but remained in handcuffs.
Aware that the West Side Locos gang was composed primarily of illegal immigrants, the officers had notified the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that they would be conducting the search, and an INS officer accompanied the officers executing the warrant. During their detention in the garage, an officer asked for each detainees name, date of birth, place of birth, and immigration status. The INS officer later asked the detainees for their immigration documentation. Menas status as a permanent resident was confirmed by her papers.
The search of the premises yielded a .22 caliber handgun with .22 caliber ammunition, a box of .25 caliber ammunition, several baseball bats with gang writing, various additional gang paraphernalia, and a bag of marijuana. Before the officers left the area, Mena was released.
In her §1983 suit against the officers she alleged that she was detained for an unreasonable time and in an unreasonable manner in violation of the Fourth Amendment. App. 19. In addition, she claimed that the warrant and its execution were overbroad, that the officers failed to comply with the knock and announce rule, and that the officers had needlessly destroyed property during the search. The officers moved for summary judgment, asserting that they were entitled to qualified immunity, but the District Court denied their motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed that denial, except for Menas claim that the warrant was overbroad; on this claim the Court of Appeals held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Mena v. Simi Valley, 226 F. 3d 1031 (CA9 2000). After a trial, a jury, pursuant to a special verdict form, found that Officers Muehler and Brill violated Menas Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures by detaining her both with force greater than that which was reasonable and for a longer period than that which was reasonable. The jury awarded Mena $10,000 in actual damages and $20,000 in punitive damages against each petitioner for a total of $60,000.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on two grounds. 332 F. 3d 1255 (CA9 2003). Reviewing the denial of qualified immunity de novo , id. , at 1261, n. 2, it first held that the officers detention of Mena violated the Fourth Amendment because it was objectively unreasonable to confine her in the converted garage and keep her in handcuffs during the search, id., at 12631264. In the Court of Appeals view, the officers should have released Mena as soon as it became clear that she posed no immediate threat. Id., at 1263. The court additionally held that the questioning of Mena about her immigration status constituted an independent Fourth Amendment violation. Id., at 12641266. The Court of Appeals went on to hold that those rights were clearly established at the time of Menas questioning, and thus the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. Id., at 12661267. We granted certiorari, 542 U. S. ___ (2004), and now vacate and remand.
***
In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981) , we held that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. Id., at 705. Such detentions are appropriate, we explained, because the character of the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and because the justifications for detention are substantial. Id., at 701705. We made clear that the detention of an occupant is surely less intrusive than the search itself, and the presence of a warrant assures that a neutral magistrate has determined that probable cause exists to search the home. Id., at 701. Against this incremental intrusion, we posited three legitimate law enforcement interests that provide substantial justification for detaining an occupant: preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found; minimizing the risk of harm to the officers; and facilitating the orderly completion of the search, as detainees self-interest may induce them to open locked doors or locked containers to avoid the use of force. Id., at 702703.
Menas detention was, under Summers , plainly permissible. 1 An officers authority to detain incident to a search is categorical; it does not depend on the quantum of proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure. Id., at 705, n. 19. Thus, Menas detention for the duration of the search was reasonable under Summers because a warrant existed to search 1363 Patricia Avenue and she was an occupant of that address at the time of the search.
Inherent in Summers authorization to detain an occupant of the place to be searched is the authority to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396 (1989) ( Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it). Indeed, Summers itself stressed that the risk of harm to officers and occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation. 452 U. S. , at 703.
The officers use of force in the form of handcuffs to effectuate Menas detention in the garage, as well as the detention of the three other occupants, was reasonable because the governmental interests outweigh the marginal intrusion. See Graham , supra , at 396397. The imposition of correctly applied handcuffs on Mena, who was already being lawfully detained during a search of the house, was undoubtedly a separate intrusion in addition to detention in the converted garage. 2 The detention was thus more intrusive than that which we upheld in Summers . See 452 U. S., at 701702 (concluding that the additional intrusion in the form of a detention was less than that of the warrant-sanctioned search); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408, 413414 (1997) (concluding that the additional intrusion from ordering passengers out of a car, which was already stopped, was minimal).
But this was no ordinary search. The governmental interests in not only detaining, but using handcuffs, are at their maximum when, as here, a warrant authorizes a search for weapons and a wanted gang member resides on the premises. In such inherently dangerous situations, the use of handcuffs minimizes the risk of harm to both officers and occupants. Cf. Summers , supra, at 702703 (recognizing the execution of a warrant to search for drugs may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence). Though this safety risk inherent in executing a search warrant for weapons was sufficient to justify the use of handcuffs, the need to detain multiple occupants made the use of handcuffs all the more reasonable. Cf. Maryland v. Wilson, supra , at 414 (noting that danger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the driver in the stopped car).
Mena argues that, even if the use of handcuffs to detain her in the garage was reasonable as an initial matter, the duration of the use of handcuffs made the detention unreasonable. The duration of a detention can, of course, affect the balance of interests under Graham . However, the 2- to 3- hour detention in handcuffs in this case does not outweigh the governments continuing safety interests. As we have noted, this case involved the detention of four detainees by two officers during a search of a gang house for dangerous weapons. We conclude that the detention of Mena in handcuffs during the search was reasonable.
The Court of Appeals also determined that the officers violated Menas Fourth Amendment rights by questioning her about her immigration status during the detention. 332 F. 3d, at 12641266. This holding, it appears, was premised on the assumption that the officers were required to have independent reasonable suspicion in order to question Mena concerning her immigration status because the questioning constituted a discrete Fourth Amendment event. But the premise is faulty. We have held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 434 (1991) ; see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210, 212 (1984) . [E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; ask to examine the individuals identification; and request consent to search his or her luggage. Bostick , supra , at 434435 (citations omitted). As the Court of Appeals did not hold that the detention was prolonged by the questioning, there was no additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Hence, the officers did not need reasonable suspicion to ask Mena for her name, date and place of birth, or immigration status.
Our recent opinion in Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U. S. ___ (2005), is instructive. There, we held that a dog sniff performed during a traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment. We noted that a lawful seizure can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission, but accepted the state courts determination that the duration of the stop was not extended by the dog sniff. Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 23). Because we held that a dog sniff was not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment, we rejected the notion that the shift in purpose from a lawful traffic stop into a drug investigation was unlawful because it was not supported by any reasonable suspicion. Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 34). Likewise here, the initial Summers detention was lawful; the Court of Appeals did not find that the questioning extended the time Mena was detained. Thus no additional Fourth Amendment justification for inquiring about Menas immigration status was required. 3
In summary, the officers detention of Mena in handcuffs during the execution of the search warrant was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the officers questioning of Mena did not constitute an independent Fourth Amendment violation. Mena has advanced in this Court, as she did before the Court of Appeals, an alternative argument for affirming the judgment below. She asserts that her detention extended beyond the time the police completed the tasks incident to the search. Because the Court of Appeals did not address this contention, we too decline to address it. See Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U. S. 129, n. 10 (2003); National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Smith, 525 U. S. 459, 469470 (1999) .
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
1 In determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred we draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the jury verdict, but as we made clear in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 697699 (1996) , we do not defer to the jurys legal conclusion that those facts violate the Constitution.
2 In finding the officers should have released Mena from the handcuffs, the Court of Appeals improperly relied upon the fact that the warrant did not include Mena as a suspect. See Mena v. Simi Valley, 332 F. 3d 1255, 1263, n. 5 (CA9 2003). The warrant was concerned not with individuals but with locations and property. In particular, the warrant in this case authorized the search of 1363 Patricia Avenue and its surrounding grounds for, among other things, deadly weapons and evidence of street gang membership. In this respect, the warrant here resembles that at issue in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981) , which allowed the search of a residence for drugs without mentioning any individual, including the owner of the home whom police ultimately arrested. See People v. Summers, 407 Mich. 432, 440443, 286 N. W. 2d 226, 226227 (1979), revd, Michigan v. Summers, supra. Summers makes clear that when a neutral magistrate has determined police have probable cause to believe contraband exists, [t]he connection of an occupant to [a] home alone justifies a detention of that occupant. 452 U. S., at 703704.
3 The Court of Appeals reliance on United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975) , is misplaced. Brignoni-Ponce held that stops by roving patrols near the border may be justified on facts that do not amount to the probable cause require[ment] for an arrest. Id., at 880. We considered only whether the patrols had the authority to stop automobiles in areas near the Mexican border, id., at 874 (emphasis added), and expressed no opinion as to the appropriateness of questioning whenan individual was already seized. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 556562 (1976) . We certainly did not, as the Court of Appeals suggested, create a requirement of particularized reasonable suspicion for purposes of inquiry into citizenship status. 332 F. 3d, at 1267.
Opinion
DARIN L. MUEHLER,
et al.,
PETITIONERS
v.
IRIS
MENA
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Iris Mena was detained in handcuffs during a search of the premises that she and several others occupied. Petitioners were lead members of a police detachment executing a search warrant of these premises. She sued the officers under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, and the District Court found in her favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the use of handcuffs to detain Mena during the search violated the Fourth Amendment and that the officers questioning of Mena about her immigration status during the detention constituted an independent Fourth Amendment violation. Mena v. Simi Valley, 332 F. 3d 1255 (CA9 2003). We hold that Menas detention in handcuffs for the length of the search was consistent with our opinion in Michigan v . Summers , 452 U. S. 692 (1981) , and that the officers questioning during that detention did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights.
***
Based on information gleaned from the investigation of a gang-related, driveby shooting, petitioners Muehler and Brill had reason to believe at least one member of a gangthe West Side Locoslived at 1363 Patricia Avenue. They also suspected that the individual was armed and dangerous, since he had recently been involved in the driveby shooting. As a result, Muehler obtained a search warrant for 1363 Patricia Avenue that authorized a broad search of the house and premises for, among other things, deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership. In light of the high degree of risk involved in searching a house suspected of housing at least one, and perhaps multiple, armed gang members, a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team was used to secure the residence and grounds before the search.
At 7 a.m. on February 3, 1998, petitioners, along with the SWAT team and other officers, executed the warrant. Mena was asleep in her bed when the SWAT team, clad in helmets and black vests adorned with badges and the word POLICE, entered her bedroom and placed her in handcuffs at gunpoint. The SWAT team also handcuffed three other individuals found on the property. The SWAT team then took those individuals and Mena into a converted garage, which contained several beds and some other bedroom furniture. While the search proceeded, one or two officers guarded the four detainees, who were allowed to move around the garage but remained in handcuffs.
Aware that the West Side Locos gang was composed primarily of illegal immigrants, the officers had notified the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that they would be conducting the search, and an INS officer accompanied the officers executing the warrant. During their detention in the garage, an officer asked for each detainees name, date of birth, place of birth, and immigration status. The INS officer later asked the detainees for their immigration documentation. Menas status as a permanent resident was confirmed by her papers.
The search of the premises yielded a .22 caliber handgun with .22 caliber ammunition, a box of .25 caliber ammunition, several baseball bats with gang writing, various additional gang paraphernalia, and a bag of marijuana. Before the officers left the area, Mena was released.
In her §1983 suit against the officers she alleged that she was detained for an unreasonable time and in an unreasonable manner in violation of the Fourth Amendment. App. 19. In addition, she claimed that the warrant and its execution were overbroad, that the officers failed to comply with the knock and announce rule, and that the officers had needlessly destroyed property during the search. The officers moved for summary judgment, asserting that they were entitled to qualified immunity, but the District Court denied their motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed that denial, except for Menas claim that the warrant was overbroad; on this claim the Court of Appeals held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Mena v. Simi Valley, 226 F. 3d 1031 (CA9 2000). After a trial, a jury, pursuant to a special verdict form, found that Officers Muehler and Brill violated Menas Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures by detaining her both with force greater than that which was reasonable and for a longer period than that which was reasonable. The jury awarded Mena $10,000 in actual damages and $20,000 in punitive damages against each petitioner for a total of $60,000.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on two grounds. 332 F. 3d 1255 (CA9 2003). Reviewing the denial of qualified immunity de novo , id. , at 1261, n. 2, it first held that the officers detention of Mena violated the Fourth Amendment because it was objectively unreasonable to confine her in the converted garage and keep her in handcuffs during the search, id., at 12631264. In the Court of Appeals view, the officers should have released Mena as soon as it became clear that she posed no immediate threat. Id., at 1263. The court additionally held that the questioning of Mena about her immigration status constituted an independent Fourth Amendment violation. Id., at 12641266. The Court of Appeals went on to hold that those rights were clearly established at the time of Menas questioning, and thus the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. Id., at 12661267. We granted certiorari, 542 U. S. ___ (2004), and now vacate and remand.
***
In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981) , we held that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. Id., at 705. Such detentions are appropriate, we explained, because the character of the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and because the justifications for detention are substantial. Id., at 701705. We made clear that the detention of an occupant is surely less intrusive than the search itself, and the presence of a warrant assures that a neutral magistrate has determined that probable cause exists to search the home. Id., at 701. Against this incremental intrusion, we posited three legitimate law enforcement interests that provide substantial justification for detaining an occupant: preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found; minimizing the risk of harm to the officers; and facilitating the orderly completion of the search, as detainees self-interest may induce them to open locked doors or locked containers to avoid the use of force. Id., at 702703.
Menas detention was, under Summers , plainly permissible. 1 An officers authority to detain incident to a search is categorical; it does not depend on the quantum of proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure. Id., at 705, n. 19. Thus, Menas detention for the duration of the search was reasonable under Summers because a warrant existed to search 1363 Patricia Avenue and she was an occupant of that address at the time of the search.
Inherent in Summers authorization to detain an occupant of the place to be searched is the authority to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396 (1989) ( Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it). Indeed, Summers itself stressed that the risk of harm to officers and occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation. 452 U. S. , at 703.
The officers use of force in the form of handcuffs to effectuate Menas detention in the garage, as well as the detention of the three other occupants, was reasonable because the governmental interests outweigh the marginal intrusion. See Graham , supra , at 396397. The imposition of correctly applied handcuffs on Mena, who was already being lawfully detained during a search of the house, was undoubtedly a separate intrusion in addition to detention in the converted garage. 2 The detention was thus more intrusive than that which we upheld in Summers . See 452 U. S., at 701702 (concluding that the additional intrusion in the form of a detention was less than that of the warrant-sanctioned search); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408, 413414 (1997) (concluding that the additional intrusion from ordering passengers out of a car, which was already stopped, was minimal).
But this was no ordinary search. The governmental interests in not only detaining, but using handcuffs, are at their maximum when, as here, a warrant authorizes a search for weapons and a wanted gang member resides on the premises. In such inherently dangerous situations, the use of handcuffs minimizes the risk of harm to both officers and occupants. Cf. Summers , supra, at 702703 (recognizing the execution of a warrant to search for drugs may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence). Though this safety risk inherent in executing a search warrant for weapons was sufficient to justify the use of handcuffs, the need to detain multiple occupants made the use of handcuffs all the more reasonable. Cf. Maryland v. Wilson, supra , at 414 (noting that danger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the driver in the stopped car).
Mena argues that, even if the use of handcuffs to detain her in the garage was reasonable as an initial matter, the duration of the use of handcuffs made the detention unreasonable. The duration of a detention can, of course, affect the balance of interests under Graham . However, the 2- to 3- hour detention in handcuffs in this case does not outweigh the governments continuing safety interests. As we have noted, this case involved the detention of four detainees by two officers during a search of a gang house for dangerous weapons. We conclude that the detention of Mena in handcuffs during the search was reasonable.
The Court of Appeals also determined that the officers violated Menas Fourth Amendment rights by questioning her about her immigration status during the detention. 332 F. 3d, at 12641266. This holding, it appears, was premised on the assumption that the officers were required to have independent reasonable suspicion in order to question Mena concerning her immigration status because the questioning constituted a discrete Fourth Amendment event. But the premise is faulty. We have held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 434 (1991) ; see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210, 212 (1984) . [E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; ask to examine the individuals identification; and request consent to search his or her luggage. Bostick , supra , at 434435 (citations omitted). As the Court of Appeals did not hold that the detention was prolonged by the questioning, there was no additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Hence, the officers did not need reasonable suspicion to ask Mena for her name, date and place of birth, or immigration status.
Our recent opinion in Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U. S. ___ (2005), is instructive. There, we held that a dog sniff performed during a traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment. We noted that a lawful seizure can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission, but accepted the state courts determination that the duration of the stop was not extended by the dog sniff. Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 23). Because we held that a dog sniff was not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment, we rejected the notion that the shift in purpose from a lawful traffic stop into a drug investigation was unlawful because it was not supported by any reasonable suspicion. Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 34). Likewise here, the initial Summers detention was lawful; the Court of Appeals did not find that the questioning extended the time Mena was detained. Thus no additional Fourth Amendment justification for inquiring about Menas immigration status was required. 3
In summary, the officers detention of Mena in handcuffs during the execution of the search warrant was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the officers questioning of Mena did not constitute an independent Fourth Amendment violation. Mena has advanced in this Court, as she did before the Court of Appeals, an alternative argument for affirming the judgment below. She asserts that her detention extended beyond the time the police completed the tasks incident to the search. Because the Court of Appeals did not address this contention, we too decline to address it. See Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U. S. 129, n. 10 (2003); National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Smith, 525 U. S. 459, 469470 (1999) .
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
1 In determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred we draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the jury verdict, but as we made clear in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 697699 (1996) , we do not defer to the jurys legal conclusion that those facts violate the Constitution.
2 In finding the officers should have released Mena from the handcuffs, the Court of Appeals improperly relied upon the fact that the warrant did not include Mena as a suspect. See Mena v. Simi Valley, 332 F. 3d 1255, 1263, n. 5 (CA9 2003). The warrant was concerned not with individuals but with locations and property. In particular, the warrant in this case authorized the search of 1363 Patricia Avenue and its surrounding grounds for, among other things, deadly weapons and evidence of street gang membership. In this respect, the warrant here resembles that at issue in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981) , which allowed the search of a residence for drugs without mentioning any individual, including the owner of the home whom police ultimately arrested. See People v. Summers, 407 Mich. 432, 440443, 286 N. W. 2d 226, 226227 (1979), revd, Michigan v. Summers, supra. Summers makes clear that when a neutral magistrate has determined police have probable cause to believe contraband exists, [t]he connection of an occupant to [a] home alone justifies a detention of that occupant. 452 U. S., at 703704.
3 The Court of Appeals reliance on United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975) , is misplaced. Brignoni-Ponce held that stops by roving patrols near the border may be justified on facts that do not amount to the probable cause require[ment] for an arrest. Id., at 880. We considered only whether the patrols had the authority to stop automobiles in areas near the Mexican border, id., at 874 (emphasis added), and expressed no opinion as to the appropriateness of questioning whenan individual was already seized. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 556562 (1976) . We certainly did not, as the Court of Appeals suggested, create a requirement of particularized reasonable suspicion for purposes of inquiry into citizenship status. 332 F. 3d, at 1267.
Opinion
DARIN L. MUEHLER,
et al.,
PETITIONERS
v.
IRIS
MENA
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Iris Mena was detained in handcuffs during a search of the premises that she and several others occupied. Petitioners were lead members of a police detachment executing a search warrant of these premises. She sued the officers under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, and the District Court found in her favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the use of handcuffs to detain Mena during the search violated the Fourth Amendment and that the officers questioning of Mena about her immigration status during the detention constituted an independent Fourth Amendment violation. Mena v. Simi Valley, 332 F. 3d 1255 (CA9 2003). We hold that Menas detention in handcuffs for the length of the search was consistent with our opinion in Michigan v . Summers , 452 U. S. 692 (1981) , and that the officers questioning during that detention did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights.
***
Based on information gleaned from the investigation of a gang-related, driveby shooting, petitioners Muehler and Brill had reason to believe at least one member of a gangthe West Side Locoslived at 1363 Patricia Avenue. They also suspected that the individual was armed and dangerous, since he had recently been involved in the driveby shooting. As a result, Muehler obtained a search warrant for 1363 Patricia Avenue that authorized a broad search of the house and premises for, among other things, deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership. In light of the high degree of risk involved in searching a house suspected of housing at least one, and perhaps multiple, armed gang members, a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team was used to secure the residence and grounds before the search.
At 7 a.m. on February 3, 1998, petitioners, along with the SWAT team and other officers, executed the warrant. Mena was asleep in her bed when the SWAT team, clad in helmets and black vests adorned with badges and the word POLICE, entered her bedroom and placed her in handcuffs at gunpoint. The SWAT team also handcuffed three other individuals found on the property. The SWAT team then took those individuals and Mena into a converted garage, which contained several beds and some other bedroom furniture. While the search proceeded, one or two officers guarded the four detainees, who were allowed to move around the garage but remained in handcuffs.
Aware that the West Side Locos gang was composed primarily of illegal immigrants, the officers had notified the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that they would be conducting the search, and an INS officer accompanied the officers executing the warrant. During their detention in the garage, an officer asked for each detainees name, date of birth, place of birth, and immigration status. The INS officer later asked the detainees for their immigration documentation. Menas status as a permanent resident was confirmed by her papers.
The search of the premises yielded a .22 caliber handgun with .22 caliber ammunition, a box of .25 caliber ammunition, several baseball bats with gang writing, various additional gang paraphernalia, and a bag of marijuana. Before the officers left the area, Mena was released.
In her §1983 suit against the officers she alleged that she was detained for an unreasonable time and in an unreasonable manner in violation of the Fourth Amendment. App. 19. In addition, she claimed that the warrant and its execution were overbroad, that the officers failed to comply with the knock and announce rule, and that the officers had needlessly destroyed property during the search. The officers moved for summary judgment, asserting that they were entitled to qualified immunity, but the District Court denied their motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed that denial, except for Menas claim that the warrant was overbroad; on this claim the Court of Appeals held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Mena v. Simi Valley, 226 F. 3d 1031 (CA9 2000). After a trial, a jury, pursuant to a special verdict form, found that Officers Muehler and Brill violated Menas Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures by detaining her both with force greater than that which was reasonable and for a longer period than that which was reasonable. The jury awarded Mena $10,000 in actual damages and $20,000 in punitive damages against each petitioner for a total of $60,000.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on two grounds. 332 F. 3d 1255 (CA9 2003). Reviewing the denial of qualified immunity de novo , id. , at 1261, n. 2, it first held that the officers detention of Mena violated the Fourth Amendment because it was objectively unreasonable to confine her in the converted garage and keep her in handcuffs during the search, id., at 12631264. In the Court of Appeals view, the officers should have released Mena as soon as it became clear that she posed no immediate threat. Id., at 1263. The court additionally held that the questioning of Mena about her immigration status constituted an independent Fourth Amendment violation. Id., at 12641266. The Court of Appeals went on to hold that those rights were clearly established at the time of Menas questioning, and thus the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. Id., at 12661267. We granted certiorari, 542 U. S. ___ (2004), and now vacate and remand.
***
In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981) , we held that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. Id., at 705. Such detentions are appropriate, we explained, because the character of the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and because the justifications for detention are substantial. Id., at 701705. We made clear that the detention of an occupant is surely less intrusive than the search itself, and the presence of a warrant assures that a neutral magistrate has determined that probable cause exists to search the home. Id., at 701. Against this incremental intrusion, we posited three legitimate law enforcement interests that provide substantial justification for detaining an occupant: preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found; minimizing the risk of harm to the officers; and facilitating the orderly completion of the search, as detainees self-interest may induce them to open locked doors or locked containers to avoid the use of force. Id., at 702703.
Menas detention was, under Summers , plainly permissible. 1 An officers authority to detain incident to a search is categorical; it does not depend on the quantum of proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure. Id., at 705, n. 19. Thus, Menas detention for the duration of the search was reasonable under Summers because a warrant existed to search 1363 Patricia Avenue and she was an occupant of that address at the time of the search.
Inherent in Summers authorization to detain an occupant of the place to be searched is the authority to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396 (1989) ( Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it). Indeed, Summers itself stressed that the risk of harm to officers and occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation. 452 U. S. , at 703.
The officers use of force in the form of handcuffs to effectuate Menas detention in the garage, as well as the detention of the three other occupants, was reasonable because the governmental interests outweigh the marginal intrusion. See Graham , supra , at 396397. The imposition of correctly applied handcuffs on Mena, who was already being lawfully detained during a search of the house, was undoubtedly a separate intrusion in addition to detention in the converted garage. 2 The detention was thus more intrusive than that which we upheld in Summers . See 452 U. S., at 701702 (concluding that the additional intrusion in the form of a detention was less than that of the warrant-sanctioned search); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408, 413414 (1997) (concluding that the additional intrusion from ordering passengers out of a car, which was already stopped, was minimal).
But this was no ordinary search. The governmental interests in not only detaining, but using handcuffs, are at their maximum when, as here, a warrant authorizes a search for weapons and a wanted gang member resides on the premises. In such inherently dangerous situations, the use of handcuffs minimizes the risk of harm to both officers and occupants. Cf. Summers , supra, at 702703 (recognizing the execution of a warrant to search for drugs may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence). Though this safety risk inherent in executing a search warrant for weapons was sufficient to justify the use of handcuffs, the need to detain multiple occupants made the use of handcuffs all the more reasonable. Cf. Maryland v. Wilson, supra , at 414 (noting that danger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the driver in the stopped car).
Mena argues that, even if the use of handcuffs to detain her in the garage was reasonable as an initial matter, the duration of the use of handcuffs made the detention unreasonable. The duration of a detention can, of course, affect the balance of interests under Graham . However, the 2- to 3- hour detention in handcuffs in this case does not outweigh the governments continuing safety interests. As we have noted, this case involved the detention of four detainees by two officers during a search of a gang house for dangerous weapons. We conclude that the detention of Mena in handcuffs during the search was reasonable.
The Court of Appeals also determined that the officers violated Menas Fourth Amendment rights by questioning her about her immigration status during the detention. 332 F. 3d, at 12641266. This holding, it appears, was premised on the assumption that the officers were required to have independent reasonable suspicion in order to question Mena concerning her immigration status because the questioning constituted a discrete Fourth Amendment event. But the premise is faulty. We have held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 434 (1991) ; see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210, 212 (1984) . [E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; ask to examine the individuals identification; and request consent to search his or her luggage. Bostick , supra , at 434435 (citations omitted). As the Court of Appeals did not hold that the detention was prolonged by the questioning, there was no additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Hence, the officers did not need reasonable suspicion to ask Mena for her name, date and place of birth, or immigration status.
Our recent opinion in Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U. S. ___ (2005), is instructive. There, we held that a dog sniff performed during a traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment. We noted that a lawful seizure can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission, but accepted the state courts determination that the duration of the stop was not extended by the dog sniff. Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 23). Because we held that a dog sniff was not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment, we rejected the notion that the shift in purpose from a lawful traffic stop into a drug investigation was unlawful because it was not supported by any reasonable suspicion. Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 34). Likewise here, the initial Summers detention was lawful; the Court of Appeals did not find that the questioning extended the time Mena was detained. Thus no additional Fourth Amendment justification for inquiring about Menas immigration status was required. 3
In summary, the officers detention of Mena in handcuffs during the execution of the search warrant was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the officers questioning of Mena did not constitute an independent Fourth Amendment violation. Mena has advanced in this Court, as she did before the Court of Appeals, an alternative argument for affirming the judgment below. She asserts that her detention extended beyond the time the police completed the tasks incident to the search. Because the Court of Appeals did not address this contention, we too decline to address it. See Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U. S. 129, n. 10 (2003); National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Smith, 525 U. S. 459, 469470 (1999) .
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
1 In determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred we draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the jury verdict, but as we made clear in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 697699 (1996) , we do not defer to the jurys legal conclusion that those facts violate the Constitution.
2 In finding the officers should have released Mena from the handcuffs, the Court of Appeals improperly relied upon the fact that the warrant did not include Mena as a suspect. See Mena v. Simi Valley, 332 F. 3d 1255, 1263, n. 5 (CA9 2003). The warrant was concerned not with individuals but with locations and property. In particular, the warrant in this case authorized the search of 1363 Patricia Avenue and its surrounding grounds for, among other things, deadly weapons and evidence of street gang membership. In this respect, the warrant here resembles that at issue in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981) , which allowed the search of a residence for drugs without mentioning any individual, including the owner of the home whom police ultimately arrested. See People v. Summers, 407 Mich. 432, 440443, 286 N. W. 2d 226, 226227 (1979), revd, Michigan v. Summers, supra. Summers makes clear that when a neutral magistrate has determined police have probable cause to believe contraband exists, [t]he connection of an occupant to [a] home alone justifies a detention of that occupant. 452 U. S., at 703704.
3 The Court of Appeals reliance on United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975) , is misplaced. Brignoni-Ponce held that stops by roving patrols near the border may be justified on facts that do not amount to the probable cause require[ment] for an arrest. Id., at 880. We considered only whether the patrols had the authority to stop automobiles in areas near the Mexican border, id., at 874 (emphasis added), and expressed no opinion as to the appropriateness of questioning whenan individual was already seized. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 556562 (1976) . We certainly did not, as the Court of Appeals suggested, create a requirement of particularized reasonable suspicion for purposes of inquiry into citizenship status. 332 F. 3d, at 1267.
Opinion
DARIN L. MUEHLER,
et al.,
PETITIONERS
v.
IRIS
MENA
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Iris Mena was detained in handcuffs during a search of the premises that she and several others occupied. Petitioners were lead members of a police detachment executing a search warrant of these premises. She sued the officers under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, and the District Court found in her favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the use of handcuffs to detain Mena during the search violated the Fourth Amendment and that the officers questioning of Mena about her immigration status during the detention constituted an independent Fourth Amendment violation. Mena v. Simi Valley, 332 F. 3d 1255 (CA9 2003). We hold that Menas detention in handcuffs for the length of the search was consistent with our opinion in Michigan v . Summers , 452 U. S. 692 (1981) , and that the officers questioning during that detention did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights.
***
Based on information gleaned from the investigation of a gang-related, driveby shooting, petitioners Muehler and Brill had reason to believe at least one member of a gangthe West Side Locoslived at 1363 Patricia Avenue. They also suspected that the individual was armed and dangerous, since he had recently been involved in the driveby shooting. As a result, Muehler obtained a search warrant for 1363 Patricia Avenue that authorized a broad search of the house and premises for, among other things, deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership. In light of the high degree of risk involved in searching a house suspected of housing at least one, and perhaps multiple, armed gang members, a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team was used to secure the residence and grounds before the search.
At 7 a.m. on February 3, 1998, petitioners, along with the SWAT team and other officers, executed the warrant. Mena was asleep in her bed when the SWAT team, clad in helmets and black vests adorned with badges and the word POLICE, entered her bedroom and placed her in handcuffs at gunpoint. The SWAT team also handcuffed three other individuals found on the property. The SWAT team then took those individuals and Mena into a converted garage, which contained several beds and some other bedroom furniture. While the search proceeded, one or two officers guarded the four detainees, who were allowed to move around the garage but remained in handcuffs.
Aware that the West Side Locos gang was composed primarily of illegal immigrants, the officers had notified the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that they would be conducting the search, and an INS officer accompanied the officers executing the warrant. During their detention in the garage, an officer asked for each detainees name, date of birth, place of birth, and immigration status. The INS officer later asked the detainees for their immigration documentation. Menas status as a permanent resident was confirmed by her papers.
The search of the premises yielded a .22 caliber handgun with .22 caliber ammunition, a box of .25 caliber ammunition, several baseball bats with gang writing, various additional gang paraphernalia, and a bag of marijuana. Before the officers left the area, Mena was released.
In her §1983 suit against the officers she alleged that she was detained for an unreasonable time and in an unreasonable manner in violation of the Fourth Amendment. App. 19. In addition, she claimed that the warrant and its execution were overbroad, that the officers failed to comply with the knock and announce rule, and that the officers had needlessly destroyed property during the search. The officers moved for summary judgment, asserting that they were entitled to qualified immunity, but the District Court denied their motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed that denial, except for Menas claim that the warrant was overbroad; on this claim the Court of Appeals held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Mena v. Simi Valley, 226 F. 3d 1031 (CA9 2000). After a trial, a jury, pursuant to a special verdict form, found that Officers Muehler and Brill violated Menas Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures by detaining her both with force greater than that which was reasonable and for a longer period than that which was reasonable. The jury awarded Mena $10,000 in actual damages and $20,000 in punitive damages against each petitioner for a total of $60,000.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on two grounds. 332 F. 3d 1255 (CA9 2003). Reviewing the denial of qualified immunity de novo , id. , at 1261, n. 2, it first held that the officers detention of Mena violated the Fourth Amendment because it was objectively unreasonable to confine her in the converted garage and keep her in handcuffs during the search, id., at 12631264. In the Court of Appeals view, the officers should have released Mena as soon as it became clear that she posed no immediate threat. Id., at 1263. The court additionally held that the questioning of Mena about her immigration status constituted an independent Fourth Amendment violation. Id., at 12641266. The Court of Appeals went on to hold that those rights were clearly established at the time of Menas questioning, and thus the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. Id., at 12661267. We granted certiorari, 542 U. S. ___ (2004), and now vacate and remand.
***
In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981) , we held that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. Id., at 705. Such detentions are appropriate, we explained, because the character of the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and because the justifications for detention are substantial. Id., at 701705. We made clear that the detention of an occupant is surely less intrusive than the search itself, and the presence of a warrant assures that a neutral magistrate has determined that probable cause exists to search the home. Id., at 701. Against this incremental intrusion, we posited three legitimate law enforcement interests that provide substantial justification for detaining an occupant: preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found; minimizing the risk of harm to the officers; and facilitating the orderly completion of the search, as detainees self-interest may induce them to open locked doors or locked containers to avoid the use of force. Id., at 702703.
Menas detention was, under Summers , plainly permissible. 1 An officers authority to detain incident to a search is categorical; it does not depend on the quantum of proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure. Id., at 705, n. 19. Thus, Menas detention for the duration of the search was reasonable under Summers because a warrant existed to search 1363 Patricia Avenue and she was an occupant of that address at the time of the search.
Inherent in Summers authorization to detain an occupant of the place to be searched is the authority to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396 (1989) ( Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it). Indeed, Summers itself stressed that the risk of harm to officers and occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation. 452 U. S. , at 703.
The officers use of force in the form of handcuffs to effectuate Menas detention in the garage, as well as the detention of the three other occupants, was reasonable because the governmental interests outweigh the marginal intrusion. See Graham , supra , at 396397. The imposition of correctly applied handcuffs on Mena, who was already being lawfully detained during a search of the house, was undoubtedly a separate intrusion in addition to detention in the converted garage. 2 The detention was thus more intrusive than that which we upheld in Summers . See 452 U. S., at 701702 (concluding that the additional intrusion in the form of a detention was less than that of the warrant-sanctioned search); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408, 413414 (1997) (concluding that the additional intrusion from ordering passengers out of a car, which was already stopped, was minimal).
But this was no ordinary search. The governmental interests in not only detaining, but using handcuffs, are at their maximum when, as here, a warrant authorizes a search for weapons and a wanted gang member resides on the premises. In such inherently dangerous situations, the use of handcuffs minimizes the risk of harm to both officers and occupants. Cf. Summers , supra, at 702703 (recognizing the execution of a warrant to search for drugs may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence). Though this safety risk inherent in executing a search warrant for weapons was sufficient to justify the use of handcuffs, the need to detain multiple occupants made the use of handcuffs all the more reasonable. Cf. Maryland v. Wilson, supra , at 414 (noting that danger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the driver in the stopped car).
Mena argues that, even if the use of handcuffs to detain her in the garage was reasonable as an initial matter, the duration of the use of handcuffs made the detention unreasonable. The duration of a detention can, of course, affect the balance of interests under Graham . However, the 2- to 3- hour detention in handcuffs in this case does not outweigh the governments continuing safety interests. As we have noted, this case involved the detention of four detainees by two officers during a search of a gang house for dangerous weapons. We conclude that the detention of Mena in handcuffs during the search was reasonable.
The Court of Appeals also determined that the officers violated Menas Fourth Amendment rights by questioning her about her immigration status during the detention. 332 F. 3d, at 12641266. This holding, it appears, was premised on the assumption that the officers were required to have independent reasonable suspicion in order to question Mena concerning her immigration status because the questioning constituted a discrete Fourth Amendment event. But the premise is faulty. We have held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 434 (1991) ; see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210, 212 (1984) . [E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; ask to examine the individuals identification; and request consent to search his or her luggage. Bostick , supra , at 434435 (citations omitted). As the Court of Appeals did not hold that the detention was prolonged by the questioning, there was no additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Hence, the officers did not need reasonable suspicion to ask Mena for her name, date and place of birth, or immigration status.
Our recent opinion in Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U. S. ___ (2005), is instructive. There, we held that a dog sniff performed during a traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment. We noted that a lawful seizure can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission, but accepted the state courts determination that the duration of the stop was not extended by the dog sniff. Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 23). Because we held that a dog sniff was not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment, we rejected the notion that the shift in purpose from a lawful traffic stop into a drug investigation was unlawful because it was not supported by any reasonable suspicion. Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 34). Likewise here, the initial Summers detention was lawful; the Court of Appeals did not find that the questioning extended the time Mena was detained. Thus no additional Fourth Amendment justification for inquiring about Menas immigration status was required. 3
In summary, the officers detention of Mena in handcuffs during the execution of the search warrant was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the officers questioning of Mena did not constitute an independent Fourth Amendment violation. Mena has advanced in this Court, as she did before the Court of Appeals, an alternative argument for affirming the judgment below. She asserts that her detention extended beyond the time the police completed the tasks incident to the search. Because the Court of Appeals did not address this contention, we too decline to address it. See Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U. S. 129, n. 10 (2003); National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Smith, 525 U. S. 459, 469470 (1999) .
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
1 In determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred we draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the jury verdict, but as we made clear in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 697699 (1996) , we do not defer to the jurys legal conclusion that those facts violate the Constitution.
2 In finding the officers should have released Mena from the handcuffs, the Court of Appeals improperly relied upon the fact that the warrant did not include Mena as a suspect. See Mena v. Simi Valley, 332 F. 3d 1255, 1263, n. 5 (CA9 2003). The warrant was concerned not with individuals but with locations and property. In particular, the warrant in this case authorized the search of 1363 Patricia Avenue and its surrounding grounds for, among other things, deadly weapons and evidence of street gang membership. In this respect, the warrant here resembles that at issue in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981) , which allowed the search of a residence for drugs without mentioning any individual, including the owner of the home whom police ultimately arrested. See People v. Summers, 407 Mich. 432, 440443, 286 N. W. 2d 226, 226227 (1979), revd, Michigan v. Summers, supra. Summers makes clear that when a neutral magistrate has determined police have probable cause to believe contraband exists, [t]he connection of an occupant to [a] home alone justifies a detention of that occupant. 452 U. S., at 703704.
3 The Court of Appeals reliance on United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975) , is misplaced. Brignoni-Ponce held that stops by roving patrols near the border may be justified on facts that do not amount to the probable cause require[ment] for an arrest. Id., at 880. We considered only whether the patrols had the authority to stop automobiles in areas near the Mexican border, id., at 874 (emphasis added), and expressed no opinion as to the appropriateness of questioning whenan individual was already seized. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 556562 (1976) . We certainly did not, as the Court of Appeals suggested, create a requirement of particularized reasonable suspicion for purposes of inquiry into citizenship status. 332 F. 3d, at 1267.
Opinion
DARIN L. MUEHLER,
et al.,
PETITIONERS
v.
IRIS
MENA
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Iris Mena was detained in handcuffs during a search of the premises that she and several others occupied. Petitioners were lead members of a police detachment executing a search warrant of these premises. She sued the officers under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, and the District Court found in her favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the use of handcuffs to detain Mena during the search violated the Fourth Amendment and that the officers questioning of Mena about her immigration status during the detention constituted an independent Fourth Amendment violation. Mena v. Simi Valley, 332 F. 3d 1255 (CA9 2003). We hold that Menas detention in handcuffs for the length of the search was consistent with our opinion in Michigan v . Summers , 452 U. S. 692 (1981) , and that the officers questioning during that detention did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights.
***
Based on information gleaned from the investigation of a gang-related, driveby shooting, petitioners Muehler and Brill had reason to believe at least one member of a gangthe West Side Locoslived at 1363 Patricia Avenue. They also suspected that the individual was armed and dangerous, since he had recently been involved in the driveby shooting. As a result, Muehler obtained a search warrant for 1363 Patricia Avenue that authorized a broad search of the house and premises for, among other things, deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership. In light of the high degree of risk involved in searching a house suspected of housing at least one, and perhaps multiple, armed gang members, a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team was used to secure the residence and grounds before the search.
At 7 a.m. on February 3, 1998, petitioners, along with the SWAT team and other officers, executed the warrant. Mena was asleep in her bed when the SWAT team, clad in helmets and black vests adorned with badges and the word POLICE, entered her bedroom and placed her in handcuffs at gunpoint. The SWAT team also handcuffed three other individuals found on the property. The SWAT team then took those individuals and Mena into a converted garage, which contained several beds and some other bedroom furniture. While the search proceeded, one or two officers guarded the four detainees, who were allowed to move around the garage but remained in handcuffs.
Aware that the West Side Locos gang was composed primarily of illegal immigrants, the officers had notified the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that they would be conducting the search, and an INS officer accompanied the officers executing the warrant. During their detention in the garage, an officer asked for each detainees name, date of birth, place of birth, and immigration status. The INS officer later asked the detainees for their immigration documentation. Menas status as a permanent resident was confirmed by her papers.
The search of the premises yielded a .22 caliber handgun with .22 caliber ammunition, a box of .25 caliber ammunition, several baseball bats with gang writing, various additional gang paraphernalia, and a bag of marijuana. Before the officers left the area, Mena was released.
In her §1983 suit against the officers she alleged that she was detained for an unreasonable time and in an unreasonable manner in violation of the Fourth Amendment. App. 19. In addition, she claimed that the warrant and its execution were overbroad, that the officers failed to comply with the knock and announce rule, and that the officers had needlessly destroyed property during the search. The officers moved for summary judgment, asserting that they were entitled to qualified immunity, but the District Court denied their motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed that denial, except for Menas claim that the warrant was overbroad; on this claim the Court of Appeals held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Mena v. Simi Valley, 226 F. 3d 1031 (CA9 2000). After a trial, a jury, pursuant to a special verdict form, found that Officers Muehler and Brill violated Menas Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures by detaining her both with force greater than that which was reasonable and for a longer period than that which was reasonable. The jury awarded Mena $10,000 in actual damages and $20,000 in punitive damages against each petitioner for a total of $60,000.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on two grounds. 332 F. 3d 1255 (CA9 2003). Reviewing the denial of qualified immunity de novo , id. , at 1261, n. 2, it first held that the officers detention of Mena violated the Fourth Amendment because it was objectively unreasonable to confine her in the converted garage and keep her in handcuffs during the search, id., at 12631264. In the Court of Appeals view, the officers should have released Mena as soon as it became clear that she posed no immediate threat. Id., at 1263. The court additionally held that the questioning of Mena about her immigration status constituted an independent Fourth Amendment violation. Id., at 12641266. The Court of Appeals went on to hold that those rights were clearly established at the time of Menas questioning, and thus the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. Id., at 12661267. We granted certiorari, 542 U. S. ___ (2004), and now vacate and remand.
***
In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981) , we held that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. Id., at 705. Such detentions are appropriate, we explained, because the character of the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and because the justifications for detention are substantial. Id., at 701705. We made clear that the detention of an occupant is surely less intrusive than the search itself, and the presence of a warrant assures that a neutral magistrate has determined that probable cause exists to search the home. Id., at 701. Against this incremental intrusion, we posited three legitimate law enforcement interests that provide substantial justification for detaining an occupant: preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found; minimizing the risk of harm to the officers; and facilitating the orderly completion of the search, as detainees self-interest may induce them to open locked doors or locked containers to avoid the use of force. Id., at 702703.
Menas detention was, under Summers , plainly permissible. 1 An officers authority to detain incident to a search is categorical; it does not depend on the quantum of proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure. Id., at 705, n. 19. Thus, Menas detention for the duration of the search was reasonable under Summers because a warrant existed to search 1363 Patricia Avenue and she was an occupant of that address at the time of the search.
Inherent in Summers authorization to detain an occupant of the place to be searched is the authority to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396 (1989) ( Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it). Indeed, Summers itself stressed that the risk of harm to officers and occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation. 452 U. S. , at 703.
The officers use of force in the form of handcuffs to effectuate Menas detention in the garage, as well as the detention of the three other occupants, was reasonable because the governmental interests outweigh the marginal intrusion. See Graham , supra , at 396397. The imposition of correctly applied handcuffs on Mena, who was already being lawfully detained during a search of the house, was undoubtedly a separate intrusion in addition to detention in the converted garage. 2 The detention was thus more intrusive than that which we upheld in Summers . See 452 U. S., at 701702 (concluding that the additional intrusion in the form of a detention was less than that of the warrant-sanctioned search); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408, 413414 (1997) (concluding that the additional intrusion from ordering passengers out of a car, which was already stopped, was minimal).
But this was no ordinary search. The governmental interests in not only detaining, but using handcuffs, are at their maximum when, as here, a warrant authorizes a search for weapons and a wanted gang member resides on the premises. In such inherently dangerous situations, the use of handcuffs minimizes the risk of harm to both officers and occupants. Cf. Summers , supra, at 702703 (recognizing the execution of a warrant to search for drugs may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence). Though this safety risk inherent in executing a search warrant for weapons was sufficient to justify the use of handcuffs, the need to detain multiple occupants made the use of handcuffs all the more reasonable. Cf. Maryland v. Wilson, supra , at 414 (noting that danger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the driver in the stopped car).
Mena argues that, even if the use of handcuffs to detain her in the garage was reasonable as an initial matter, the duration of the use of handcuffs made the detention unreasonable. The duration of a detention can, of course, affect the balance of interests under Graham . However, the 2- to 3- hour detention in handcuffs in this case does not outweigh the governments continuing safety interests. As we have noted, this case involved the detention of four detainees by two officers during a search of a gang house for dangerous weapons. We conclude that the detention of Mena in handcuffs during the search was reasonable.
The Court of Appeals also determined that the officers violated Menas Fourth Amendment rights by questioning her about her immigration status during the detention. 332 F. 3d, at 12641266. This holding, it appears, was premised on the assumption that the officers were required to have independent reasonable suspicion in order to question Mena concerning her immigration status because the questioning constituted a discrete Fourth Amendment event. But the premise is faulty. We have held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 434 (1991) ; see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210, 212 (1984) . [E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; ask to examine the individuals identification; and request consent to search his or her luggage. Bostick , supra , at 434435 (citations omitted). As the Court of Appeals did not hold that the detention was prolonged by the questioning, there was no additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Hence, the officers did not need reasonable suspicion to ask Mena for her name, date and place of birth, or immigration status.
Our recent opinion in Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U. S. ___ (2005), is instructive. There, we held that a dog sniff performed during a traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment. We noted that a lawful seizure can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission, but accepted the state courts determination that the duration of the stop was not extended by the dog sniff. Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 23). Because we held that a dog sniff was not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment, we rejected the notion that the shift in purpose from a lawful traffic stop into a drug investigation was unlawful because it was not supported by any reasonable suspicion. Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 34). Likewise here, the initial Summers detention was lawful; the Court of Appeals did not find that the questioning extended the time Mena was detained. Thus no additional Fourth Amendment justification for inquiring about Menas immigration status was required. 3
In summary, the officers detention of Mena in handcuffs during the execution of the search warrant was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the officers questioning of Mena did not constitute an independent Fourth Amendment violation. Mena has advanced in this Court, as she did before the Court of Appeals, an alternative argument for affirming the judgment below. She asserts that her detention extended beyond the time the police completed the tasks incident to the search. Because the Court of Appeals did not address this contention, we too decline to address it. See Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U. S. 129, n. 10 (2003); National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Smith, 525 U. S. 459, 469470 (1999) .
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
1 In determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred we draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the jury verdict, but as we made clear in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 697699 (1996) , we do not defer to the jurys legal conclusion that those facts violate the Constitution.
2 In finding the officers should have released Mena from the handcuffs, the Court of Appeals improperly relied upon the fact that the warrant did not include Mena as a suspect. See Mena v. Simi Valley, 332 F. 3d 1255, 1263, n. 5 (CA9 2003). The warrant was concerned not with individuals but with locations and property. In particular, the warrant in this case authorized the search of 1363 Patricia Avenue and its surrounding grounds for, among other things, deadly weapons and evidence of street gang membership. In this respect, the warrant here resembles that at issue in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981) , which allowed the search of a residence for drugs without mentioning any individual, including the owner of the home whom police ultimately arrested. See People v. Summers, 407 Mich. 432, 440443, 286 N. W. 2d 226, 226227 (1979), revd, Michigan v. Summers, supra. Summers makes clear that when a neutral magistrate has determined police have probable cause to believe contraband exists, [t]he connection of an occupant to [a] home alone justifies a detention of that occupant. 452 U. S., at 703704.
3 The Court of Appeals reliance on United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975) , is misplaced. Brignoni-Ponce held that stops by roving patrols near the border may be justified on facts that do not amount to the probable cause require[ment] for an arrest. Id., at 880. We considered only whether the patrols had the authority to stop automobiles in areas near the Mexican border, id., at 874 (emphasis added), and expressed no opinion as to the appropriateness of questioning whenan individual was already seized. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 556562 (1976) . We certainly did not, as the Court of Appeals suggested, create a requirement of particularized reasonable suspicion for purposes of inquiry into citizenship status. 332 F. 3d, at 1267.


what plant desciptions means - Extensions
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Gallery
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Aloe vera - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Common names include Chinese Aloe, Indian Aloe, True Aloe, Barbados Aloe, Burn Aloe, First Aid Plant. The species epithet vera means "true" or "genuine". http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aloe_vera
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dodder Dodder is a parasitic plant. This means that it lives off of other plants. In fact, Dodder cannot live on its own. There are many different species of Dodder, and they . http://www.fcps.edu/islandcreekes/ecology/dodder.htm
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Monstera deliciosa - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Monstera deliciosa is a species of flowering plant native to tropical . 1 Names; 2 Description; 3 Cultivation; 4 Fruit; 5 Other uses; 6 References; 7 External links . The specific epithet deliciosa means "delicious", referring to the edible fruit. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monstera_deliciosa
Per-Response Latency Extension
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WPAD Server
Atropa belladonna - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 1 Description; 2 Naming and taxonomy; 3 Toxicity; 4 Uses . Plants grow to 1.5 metres (4.9 ft) tall with 18 centimetres (7.1 in) long ovate leaves. . The name " belladonna" comes from the Italian language, meaning "beautiful lady"; originating . http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atropa_belladonna
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- Functions
- Loops I: while and simple for
- Loops II: nested loops and loops over indexes
- Loops III: nested loop patterns and loops over adjacent indexes
- Files and dictionaries
- Dictionary patterns: sorting, inverting, removing duplicates
- Objects I: basics
- Objects II: inheritance, composition, interactive objects
- Recursion


Doctors from London meet Tamil Nadu Health Minister
A team of neurologists from King’s College Hospital met Health Minister C. Vijayabaskar and Health Secretary Beela Rajesh in connection with a treatment protocol for patients with Parkinson’s disease
by Special CorrespondentStarting January, a treatment protocol for patients with Parkinson's disease will be launched at Rajiv Gandhi Government General Hospital (RGGGH).
As per a Memorandum of Understanding, doctors from the King's College Hospital, London will train neurologists at RGGGH. A team of neurologists from King's College Hospital met Health Minister C. Vijayabaskar and Health Secretary Beela Rajesh on Friday.
“We are planning to launch treatment protocols for treating Parkinson’s disease from January. This was a preliminary meeting with the team from King's College Hospital. They demonstrated the treatment method followed by them for the last 15 years,” the Health Secretary said.
The team will start to treat patients at RGGGH from January and train neurologists in the protocol, she added. “In this, the same drug will be used for patients but in a different sustained release mechanism,” she explained.
A doctor and a few nurses from RGGGH were deputed for the training being conducted by the team in Hyderabad this weekend.
The Parkinson’s clinic at RGGGH receives around 400 patients every week.


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Ajanta Pharma Q2 net profit dips 7% to Rs 116 crore; stock ends flat
Income from operations rose to Rs 643 crore during the period under review, as compared with Rs 544 crore in the year-ago period
by Press Trust of IndiaDrug firm Ajanta Pharma on Tuesday reported 7 per cent decline in net profit at Rs 116 crore for the second quarter ended September 30.
The company had posted a net profit of Rs 125 crore in the same period of previous fiscal.
Income from operations, however, rose to Rs 643 crore during the period under review, as compared with Rs 544 crore in the year-ago period, Ajanta Pharma said in a regulatory filing.
Shares of the company on Tuesday ended 0.20 per cent down at Rs 1,002.40 apiece on the BSE.


I worked at Directly in San Francisco, CA (and briefly in Palo Alto, CA), from December 2010 until October 2019.
In Palo Alto, we're squatting the offices of Cyanogen Inc, the company behind CyanogenMod. They were kind enough to let us use a few desks in their Palo Alto office.
Before that, we were squatting the offices of ROI DNA in San Francisco, CA. Their CEO, Matt Querie, goes back a long time with Antony and Jeff. The first office was just around the corner from my old office back at Epicentric. It was nice to rediscover the old neighborhood. But then ROI DNA decided to move so they could expand and had us move with them. Remember the dark basement, back at Epicentric? Yep, that's were they went next. Ten years later and my desk had moved twenty feet. Only now, the basement had been fully remodeled. Our suite was half the basement (the half with the windows) and the new paint made it a lot brighter.
When I started with Directly, I used the same development platform I had at ShopWell: a MacBook Pro laptop with a 24" monitor and Amazon EC2. The monitor I used at ShopWell I had bought with my own money, so I took it back with me when I left. And I managed to buy my laptop back from them, which I then used at Directly. So it was the actual same hardware. :-)
Since then, I've upgraded to a MacBook Pro with retina display and a 27" monitor. The laptop uses SSD instead of a spinning hard disk, so it is really fast and really quiet.
Shortly after we moved to Palo Alto, CA, my bicycle got stolen when I locked it on a public bike rack right outside the office. I had to get a new bike and Clovis and I built a custom bike rack so I can keep it safe in the office.