To heal the catastrophes of heaven,
Voyage to the land of speaking blood. 1
These words, with their suggestion of a hoped-for remedy for world catastrophe, are those of the poet and playwright Antonin Artaud (1896-1948), the exemplary madman of the modernist avant-garde. They were written in 1935, shortly before Artaud embarked on his own quest for the primitive, a journey to visit the Tarahumara Indians of Mexico. Artaud was, by then, thoroughly disgusted with modern civilization and profoundly disillusioned about the possibility of redemption through art. He believed that "reason, a European faculty, exalted beyond measure by the European mentality, is always an image of death"; that reason had "created the contemporary despair and the material anarchy of the world by separating the elements of the world which a real culture would bring together" (SW, 358-59). In Mexico, in the land of the Tarahumara, Artaud expected to find a true culture, a land of speaking blood where consciousness and language, instead of causing a rupture in being, would be the medium of a deep unity between self and world, spirit and body, intellect and emotion. "Because I kept seeing around me men lying . . . I felt the need . . . to go away to a place where I could at least freely advance with my heart," he wrote (PD, 71). "I came to Mexico to make contact with the red earth" (SW, 537). Stopping off in Mexico City, Artaud was dismayed to find that the city dwellers there had no interest in the Indian cultures surrounding them. He took this as a bad omen. "Nevertheless," he wrote in a letter home, "the Indians exist. . . . and soon I am going to reach the Indians . . . and there I hope to be understood" (SW, 365).
There is no re who better illuminates the complex relationships among three closely related topoi of our age: modernism, madness, and the primitive or tribal mind. A profound influence on modernist art, perhaps the decisive influence on avant-garde theater, Artaud clearly had a critical attitude toward many of the central trends of modern culture and thought. He also spent nine of his last eleven years in asylums. There he displayed many classical signs and symptoms of paranoid, catatonic, and deteriorated forms of schizophrenia--an illness that many psychoanalysts and psychiatrists, as well as many anti-psychiatrists and members of the artistic avant-garde, have seen as involving a regression to the earliest, most unreflective and instinct-ridden stages of human life.
In Artaud's embarking for the land of the Tarahumara, we have the spectacle of a schizophrenic artist, a person of immense influence on twentieth-century culture, setting out on his own quest for the primitive. 2 Ironically enough, he too yearns for the very mode of life--primal and undivided, imbued with passion, immediacy, and a sense of mystical participation--that, according to traditional theoretical accounts, underlies his own psychological condition. 3 It seems, then, that the schizophrenic, at least this schizophrenic, can be as susceptible as anyone else to the myth and the lure of the primitive; and it is worth asking why this should be the case. Does Artaud sense a fundamental affinity between his own mode of being and that of the Tarahumara of his imagination, living in immediate connection with their emotions and in symbiosis with the surrounding world? Or could it be just the reverse: namely, that for Artaud the Tarahumara seemed to offer the haven of an existence quite antithetical to his own?
In both worlds where he has been a re of importance, anti-psychiatry and the artistic avant-garde, Artaud has been primarily understood in the first way. Since the 1960s he has served as the paradigmatic instance of the madman as wildman or primitive, a person who is supposed to incarnate the irrationalist and primitivist esthetic of which he is perhaps the most influential modern exponent. 4 He is the emblematic re for those who adopt Dionysian notions of madness, of modernism (and postmodernism), and of modernism as a kind of madness; and he is thought to embody a postromantic or romantic-modernist esthetic in which insanity has become the privileged "metaphor for passion," the logical consequence of all strong emotion. 5 Perhaps the classic modern expression of this conception is Nietzsche's vision, in The Birth of Tragedy, of an ecstatic surrender of self-control that obliterates all doubt and hesitation to make way for the raptures of unrestrained instinct and primordial unity. Such a conception of madness has often served as a kind of objective correlative. It has been used to exemplify the supposedly Dionysiac nature of the forms of boundary dissolution, self-fragmentation, and social withdrawal that are common in the twentieth century avant-garde--a condition in which the coherent self is said, for instance, to be "dismembered by the very fertility of its resources" in a "triumph of desiring fantasy," dissolved in "exuberant fusion with those scenes which offer themselves, literally, as the theater of our desires." 6 Thus for Sylvère Lotringer, Leo Bersani, and Martin Esslin, Artaud's literary works display the "uncontrollable, polymorphous movement," "heterogeneous multiplicity," or "pornographic tyrannies intrinsic to all desire." They illustrate the triumph of "concrete experience" and "the unrestrained ecstasies of Dionysus" over abstract thought and the "Apollonian principle." Artaud's texts demonstrate that "emotion released from all restraint of logic . . . can result in a glorious rhetoric of unbridled passion." 7
The major works of anti-psychiatry--R. D. Laing's The Politics of Experience, Foucault's Madness and Civilization, and Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia--were all profoundly inspired by their authors' reading of Artaud. In all of them similar images prevail. Foucault speaks, for instance, of madness as a "sovereign enterprise of unreason," a "wild state" of an "inaccessible primitive purity." Laing describes insanity as a release from constraint and a return to "primal man" that offers the hope of healing "our own appalling state of alienation called normality"; while Deleuze and Guattari celebrate the schizophrenic as the "true hero of desire," who is "closest to the beating heart of reality" and the "vital biology of the body." 8
This Dionysian or primitivist image is largely based on the middle years of Artaud's career, the time of his most famous work, The Theater and its Double (written 1931-36), and a period that culminated in his trip to Mexico in 1936. During this, his second period of literary production, consciousness was conceived altogether negatively, and Artaud threw himself into activities designed to eclipse it. We will need to pay closer attention to the lesser-known but, in many respects, more fundamental first period of Artaud's writing, the decade of the 1920s and early thirties during which he offers the most direct descriptions of the anguish that was to plague him throughout his life, motivating yet at the same time undermining his later attempts to escape into immediacy and absorption. As we shall see, it is this first, in a sense Apollonian or Socratic phase, that forms the indispensable ground for understanding not only Artaud's middle or Dionysian period, but also the strangest, final decade of his life. 9
The present paper is not a work of intellectual or cultural history, but a case study of a single individual--an individual who, however, is the most prominent re to stand at the crossroads of psychiatry and the arts in our century. Investigating Artaud's life and work reveals a great irony of twentieth-century thought: that the madness so often imagined to be antithetical to, even perhaps to offer refuge from, the malaise of modern existence, may in fact be a particularly excruciating case of this very same condition--bearing, in heightened form, all its familiar stigmata of distance, deadness, and self-division.
Artaud's major preoccupations in his first period, the 1920s and early thirties, could hardly be less Dionysian in character. His most persistent theme in this period is, as he terms it in The Umbilicus of Limbo , "a congealing of the marrow, an absence of mental fire, a failure of the circulation of life" (SW, 72). In Fragments of a Diary from Hell (written 1925), he describes himself as "definitively apart from life . . . stigmatized by a living death" (SW, 92), and elsewhere he writes, "I am made of blood, obviously I am made of blood. But I cannot see myself right now. I do not think of myself as being alive" (PWW, 82). In a typical passage from this period lasting eight to ten years, Artaud compares himself to an emptiness or absence and to a robot that is nevertheless aware of some inner rift: "God . . . has kept me alive in a void of negations and stubborn self-disavowals. . . . He has reduced me to being a walking robot, but a robot who can feel the rupture of his unconscious" (PWW, 81). 10
In such texts as The Nerve Meter , Artaud speaks repeatedly of the "disembodiment of reality" and of "a kind of constant leakage of the normal level of reality" (SW, 82)--a leakage that originates in the realm of thought but quickly contaminates even his own most fundamental sense of bodily existence. "I feel the ground slipping out from under my thoughts. . . . More than the mind which stays intact . . . it is the nervous trajectory of thought which this erosion affects and subverts. This absence and this standstill are especially felt in the limbs and blood" (PWW, 68; also SW, 94). Even bodily sensations seem unreal to him, like fugitive images from a dream he cannot quite recall: "description of a physical state: . . . Probably localized in the skin, but felt as the radical elimination of a limb, and presenting to the brain only images of limbs that are threadlike and woolly, images of limbs that are far away and not where they should be. A sort of internal fracturing of the whole nervous system" (SW, 65).
Artaud complains of a "lack of normal vitality" which, he says, "prevents me from keeping track of my ideas . . . and from reviewing at will my opinions and decisions" (PWW, 83). One eerie passage describes a "great cold, an excruciating abstinence, the limbo of a nightmare of bones and muscle, with the sensation of the gastric functions snapping like a flag in the phosphoresence of the storm. Larval images that are pushed about as if with a finger and bear no relation to any substance" (SW, 94). Artaud speaks of a "shifting vertigo," a state of "oblique bewilderment" (SW, 65) in which he cannot represent any sort of stable world, either in his consciousness or in words. Body, mind, and external reality: all seem distant, uncoordinated, unreal. He lives instead with a chronic ontological nausea, always on the brink of some vaguely sensed and ineffable, yet horrifying devastation. Some years later Artaud would refer to "this private intellectual vacuum" as the main theme of his writing and the "dominant characteristic of my condition" (SW, 290). Artaud's psychological difficulties had begun in his youth, and he spent considerable time in sanatoria between 1915 and 1920. A lifelong struggle with drug addiction, with periodic attempts at detoxification, began when laudanum was prescribed for him by a doctor at a sanatorium in Neuchâtel.
In his writing of the 1920s, Artaud clearly sees his thinking as the main locus and source of his problems, which he describes as "a frightful illness of the mind" (PWW, 60). "I suffer because the Mind is not in life and life is not the Mind; I suffer from the Mind as organ, the Mind as interpreter, the Mind as intimidator of things to force them to enter the Mind," he writes in The Umbilicus of Limbo (SW, 59). For the most part, however, he does not attempt to escape or suppress thinking. Indeed, at this stage he tends to see thinking as indispensible to human existence and, potentially at least, the richest source of the sentiment of being, the feeling of reality and vitality that constitutes life itself. "That which is true in life always gives the feeling of intelligence," he writes (SW, 189), equating "absolute thought" with "life" (PWW, 71), and defying anyone "to imagine that absolutely unthinkable being, a mind that could really exist without thinking" (SW, 193). Thinking, for Artaud, is not to be identified with the spontaneous or semiconscious activities of object-directed awareness; not, for instance, with a "pure consciousness" that "forbids itself all self-expression" (SW, 193), but only with some form of reflexive self-recognition or self-awareness. "Thinking means something more to me than not being completely dead," he writes.
It means being in touch with oneself at every moment. It means not ceasing for a single moment to feel oneself in one's inmost being, in the unformulated mass of one's life, in the substance of one's reality; it means not feeling in oneself an enormous hole, a crucial absence; it means always feeling one's thought equal to one's thought, however inadequate the form one is able to give it. [SW, 70]
A "living mind," he explains, is one that is "still conscious, lucid, capable of observing and measuring its own life, capable, if necessary and at certain moments, of weighing and judging its own thought" (SW, 192).
Given this identification of thought with self-consciousness, this conceptualization of thinking as a self-sustaining mode of self-awareness, it is understandable that Artaud often attempted to overcome the sense of nonbeing through compulsive attempts to contemplate, control, or describe his own thinking. It was not enough, it seems, for him to open his eyes and see; or, for that matter, to close his eyes and think. To gain a feeling of ontological grounding, experience had somehow to be registered, held fast, and seen twice. Not only did Artaud need to see, he had to watch his own seeing; and not only think, but contemplate his thoughts, constantly testing their responsiveness to his will. Thus he explains that what constitutes thought is not its external reference, accuracy, or transparency, but some reflexive inner sense of its thereness and its myness: "for by having thought I do not mean seeing correctly or even thinking correctly; having thought to me means sustaining one's thought, being able to manifest it to oneself" (SW, 69).
Artaud's writings of this period reflect intense self-preoccupation of two kinds: on the one hand, anguished attempts to trace the fitful and ultimately ineffable contents of his inner life; and, on the other, equally anguished attempts to state the problem of ineffability itself--to express precisely how it feels to be unable to express oneself, and to explain how this inability undermined his literary endeavours and provided him with his central theme. In such explicitly introspective works as his correspondance with the editor Jacques Rivière (1923-24) and the Fragments of a Diary from Hell , Artaud speaks of "persist[ing] in this pursuit, in this need to pin down once and for all the state of my suffocation": "I am definitively apart from life," he writes. "My torment is as subtle and refined as it is bitter. It is necessary for me to make insane efforts of the imagination, multiplied tenfold by the grip of this strangling asphyxia, in order to succeed in thinking my disease" (SW, 92).
To capture precisely his own unique inner sensations, to pin down or state his condition, to think his disease--to Artaud such acts of effortful and controlled self-awareness seemed to offer the best chance of shoring up his eroding self and world and of mastering the linguistic forms that always seemed to dissolve on approach. 11 But inherent in this yearning is a vicious paradox: the very self-consciousness by which Artaud tried to shore things up appears, in fact, to have further exacerbated (and perhaps all along contributed to) the fragmentation and collapse that afflicted his thinking and language as well as his general sense of existence. "Yes, my thought knows itself," writes Artaud in The Umbilicus of Limbo , "and it now despairs of reaching itself. It knows itself, by which I mean that it suspects itself; and in any case it no longer feels itself" (SW, 69). Artaud describes his mind as "present at the profound decline and non-manifestation of its own powers"; his experience takes the form of an "inner dialogue between consciousness and mind, that kind of soliloquy to which everything is reduced and by which everything is ultimately measured in the inner domain, which sees its words burst, its phrases abort, its stability scattered, curiously undermined, full of flight, full of a horrible suspended absence" (SW, 192-93).
Artaud's most explicit descriptions of this sort of mental self-subversion can be found in his letters to the doctor George Soulie de Morant. In 1932, when the Apollonian phase was nearly over and he had already begun his essays on the theater of cruelty, Artaud looks back over his past in an attempt "to illuminate once and for all . . . the dominant characteristic" of the "horribly cruel" and nearly ineffable condition that continues to plague him (SW, 290). The lack of "continuity" or "persistence" in his thinking might, he writes,
in some sense be regarded as analogous to the stammering which possesses my outward elocution almost every time I want to speak. It is as if each time my thought tries to manifest itself it contracts, and it is this contraction that shuts off my thought from within, makes it rigid as in a spasm; the thought, the expression stops because the flow is too violent, because the brain wants to say too many things which it thinks of all at once, ten thoughts instead of one rush toward the exit . . . [SW, 293]
On reading this passage, it is natural to assume that Artaud's thought-blocking or stammering is a consequence of his consciousness being overly full, an assumption that is also consistent with two of the most common characterizations of schizophrenic cognition: the cognitivist notion that such individuals are overwhelmed by internal and external stimuli due to their lack of an attentional gating mechanism or filter capable of blocking out the irrelevant; and the psychoanalytic notion of schizophrenic consciousness as dominated by wildly proliferating primary-process modes of thought. A bit later in the same letter, however, Artaud rejects the idea that his consciousness is a plenitude. As he explains, there is a more profound sense in which his mind is too empty:
[B]ut if one really analyzes a state of this kind it is not by being too full that consciousness errs at these moments but by being too empty, for this prolific and above all unstable and shifting juxtaposition is an illusion. Originally there was no juxtaposition, for it seems that in every state of consciousness there is always a dominant theme, and if the mind has not automatically decided on a dominant theme it is through weakness and because at that moment nothing dominated, nothing presented itself with enough force or continuity in the field of consciousness to be recorded. The truth is, therefore, that rather than an overflow or an excess there was a deficiency; in the absence of some precise thought that was able to develop, there was slackening, confusion, fragility. [SW, 293]
Artaud also denies that the confusion besetting his thinking is the product of a dominance of instinctual over rational processes. What is impaired, he says, is "not merely the thought but the personality, the life" (SW, 294). In the absence of vital impulse, there emerges no charged purpose or idea around which the mind can spontaneously organize itself. "Things have no more odor, no more sex," he writes in The Umbilicus of Limbo; "their logical order is also sometimes broken precisely because of their lack of emotional aroma" (SW, 65). "My thought can no longer go where my emotions and the images that arise within me drive it. I feel castrated even in my slightest impulses" (SW, 92).
It turns out, then, that Artaud's consciousness is not in fact filled with mental contents--not, at least, with mental content of the usual kind. The violent "flow" of which he speaks is composed neither of instinctual urges nor of stimuli nor even of normal images or thoughts, but of something more like meta-levels--perspectives on himself and his own thinking. "[T]en thoughts instead of one rush toward the exit," he says in the letter to George Soulie de Morant, then goes on to explain what these thoughts actually involve:
[T]he brain sees the whole thought at once with all its circumstances, and it also sees all the points of view it could take and all the forms with which it could invest them, a vast juxtaposition of concepts, each of which seems more necessary and also more dubious than the others, which all the complexities of syntax would never suffice to express and expound. [SW, 293]
What plagues Artaud is actually a form of maniacal, reflexive self-awareness. Instead of simply grasping its own content and nothing more, his mind tends to be occupied with levels of awareness that would normally be known only by some other person who observes his subjectivity from without. Indeed, he can become so preoccupied with states of mind as such that there is hardly any interest, or any room, left over for more standard kinds of mental contents. One consequence is a destabilization and undermining of foundations; Artaud describes himself as "losing contact with all those first assumptions which are at the foundation of thought." It is "this catastrophe at a higher level," he explains, that is "the destructive element which demineralizes the mind and deprives it of its first assumptions," thereby making "the ground under my thought crumble" (SW, 290, 94):
It so happens that this slackening, this confusion, this fragility express themselves in an infinite number of ways and correspond to an infinite number of new impressions and sensations, the most characteristic of which is a kind of disappearance or disintegration or collapse of first assumptions which even causes me to wonder why, for example, red (the color) is considered red and affects me as red, why a judgment affects me as a judgment and not as a pain, why I feel a pain, and why this particular pain, which I feel without understanding it . . . for after all there is no reason why what is simply a perverse and perverted way of being and feeling should be the cause of a state that makes me miserable. No doubt that idiotic and crude reaction of people who, when confronted by someone else's pain, say, Don't think about it, is right, but they are metaphysically right and do not know it. [SW, 293-94]
The Dionysian project central to Artaud's second period of writing cannot be understood apart from the forms of experience that precede, underlie, and in the end undermine it. This is not to say that such texts as The Theater and its Double, Artaud's most exciting work and his most significant contribution to esthetics, can be dismissed as of no intrinsic interest. Still, it hardly requires a deep committment to a hermeneutics of suspicion to recognize that Artaud's advocacy of a theater of cruelty is something other than the "uncontrollable, polymorphous movement of desire" imagined by certain champions of his work. 12 Artaud's own words virtually demand that we see his ecstatic project as (at least in part) what one might call a Dionysian defense (and a rather unsuccessful one) against what is essentially an Apollonian or Socratic condition.
Anaïs Nin recounts a time when Artaud, leaving a cafe in an open taxi, stood up, stretched out his arms toward the crowded street, and said, "The revolution will come soon. All this will be destroyed. The world must be destroyed.   Roman decadence. Death. I wanted a theater that would be like a shock treatment, galvanize, shock people into feeling." 13 In the preface to The Theater and its Double, he writes of "the unprecedented number of crimes whose perverse gratuitousness is explained only by our powerlessness to take complete possession of life" (TID, 9). And in his essay on the Balinese theater, he praises the frenzied dance in which "one suddenly senses the headlong fall of the mind," and manages "to cover over the void with fear" (SW, 225).
True theater, Artaud believed, had to be a massive assault putting "direct pressure on the senses" (TID, 125), an arousal of instincts so extreme as to obliterate normal consciousness. Through a Satanic "total exorcism" of intellect and superego, such a theater would overwhelm all scruples and hesitations, all concern with rational purpose, and any tendency to dote upon the future or any other absent world. Distantiated estheticism--that "hellish, truly accursed thing in our time . . . our artistic dallying with forms"--should disappear, to be replaced by a total theater that rivets the attention and eclipses all sense of distance, a theater in which both actors and spectators become "like victims burnt at the stake, signaling through the flames" (TID, 13). In this period Artaud no longer yearns for a private language, a language adequate to the unique intricacies of his inner life, as he had in the 1920s. He calls instead for a nondiscursive and alogical, an affective and respiratory language: "a different language of nature . . . whose sources will be tapped at a point still deeper, more remote from thought" (TID, 110), and which will restore to speech "its old magic, its essential spellbinding power" (TID, 111). No longer does he seek to know and control his mind, for he now recognizes that "all true freedom is dark, and infallibly identified with sexual freedom" (TID, 30).
Artaud's views on the theater of cruelty are well known, and I do not wish to dwell upon them here. In many respects they are an attempt to foster the kind of pure Dionysiac experience described in Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy (a book Artaud is likely to have read). Consciousness--now understood not as the true source of being but as the inclination to nihilate the world and feeling, to hold things off at a distance--is Artaud's ever-present enemy during this period; its obliteration is the central purpose of his new esthetic demands. Artaud's attempts to instantiate such a theater were, in any case, rather unsuccessful, both with audiences and as a curative medium for Artaud himself. Artaud knew, however, of another way to pursue his end. This was to return to what, in Nietzsche's view, is the true origin of theater and the theatrical impulse: the orgiastic rituals of primitive cultures, rituals where there is no audience but only participants, where nothing is symbolized or represented because everything is present, including even the deities and demons who will seem quite literally brought down to earth.
Artaud had long dreamed of cultures more primitive or more innocent: of the ancient Syrians, the Europeans of the Middle Ages, and contemporary tribal peoples, all of whom he imagined as pursuing the mystic project of glimpsing "the great All." "Ever since the genesis of the elements," he wrote, the ancient religions "neither separated the sky from man, nor man from the entire creation" (PWW, 136). Artaud yearned for an "organic culture" in which to drown his increasing estrangement: "a culture based on the mind in relationship to the organs, and the mind bathing in all the organs, and responding to each of them at the same time." 14 After the devast-ating failure of his play, Les Cenci, Artaud decided to leave Paris and travel to a land where such a culture would really exist. He would go to the Mexico of the Tarahumara, that "Primeval Race" of "pure red Indians" who exist "in a feeling of spontaneous solidarity" in touch with the "natural Unconscious"; people whose "magic culture . . . spring[s] forth from the power of the Indian soil," who are "physically strong like Nature" because they are "made of the same substance as nature" (PD, 3-11; PWW, 142).
Like the Surrealists and many others of his generation, Artaud considered tribal man to be free of what Breton termed "the hegemony of consciousness," and therefore as able "to concentrate on the conquest of revelatory emotions." 15 It is hardly surprising that Artaud, an admirer of Breton and sometime member of the Surrealist group, should have imbibed the evolutionist notions popular in his own cultural milieu. More interesting, and more revealing of Artaud's own preoccupations, is the shifting or contradictory quality of his attitudes. The Tarahumara and other pagans and primitives of Artaud's imagination are not, in fact, conceived in simple antithesis to his own alienation and hyperreflexivity: though largely defined in opposition to European consciousness as well as to his own inner state, Artaud does not always imagine them as devoid of alienation so much as, in effect, engaged in effortful struggle against it. "What distinguished the pagans from us," he writes in one passage, "is that at the origin of all their beliefs there is a terrific effort not to think as men, in order to stay in contact with the entire creation, that is, with the divinity" (PWW, 140; emphasis added). At times, in fact, Artaud describes the Tarahumara as living as if they were already dead, as obsessed with philosophy and ideas, and as despising the life of their bodies. 16 Like Artaud himself, the Indians he imagines seem not to be spontaneous primitives so much as willful ones, or better, primitivists who have glimpsed the trajectory of human consciousness and now recoil defensively from its demands. They exist, says Artaud, "in defiance of this age" (PD, 7).
Artaud spent a number of months in Mexico City before he managed to obtain financial support for a visit to the Tarahumara Indians, who lived in the Sierra Madre mountains of northern Mexico. The trip began ominously. Artaud was exhausted and in great physical pain. Among other problems, he was withdrawing from drugs; wanting to rid himself of his European addictions, he had thrown away the last of his heroin before entering the mountainous region. He traveled on horseback into the back country, immersed in a quasi-delusional mood in which everything in the landscape had a doubled look--as if "represent[ing] an experience I had had before" (PD, 84)--or seemed to be filled with an ineffable portentousness: "The land of the Tarahumara is full of signs, forms, and natural efes which in no way seem the result of chance" (SW, 379). 17
When he finally arrived among the Indians, Artaud was unable at first to get them to perform their peyote rituals, and had to wait some weeks in what felt like "heavy captivity." As so often before, Artaud's body felt to him now like a "cataclysm" or a "dislocated assemblage, [a] piece of damaged geology." For twenty-eight days, he felt that "this ill-assembled heap of organs which I was and which I had the impression of witnessing [was] like a vast landscape of ice on the point of breaking up" (SW, 382-83). Not surprisingly, Artaud was moved to doubt the worth of his pilgrimage and his primitivism:
For to have come this far, to find myself at last on the threshhold of an encounter and of this place from which I expected so many revelations, and to feel so lost, so abandoned, so deposed. . . . And all this, for what? For a dance, for a rite of lost Indians who no longer even know who they are or where they come from and who, when you question them, answer with tales whose connection and secret they have lost. . . . And what was it then, what false presentiment, what illusory and artificial intuition caused me to expect some sort of liberation for my body and also and above all a force, an illumination throughout the reaches of my inner landscape, which I felt at that precise minute to be beyond any kind of dimensions? . . . Why this terrible sensation of loss, of a void to be filled, of an event that miscarries? [SW, 384]
But then, at last, the Indians did perform their ritual. As Artaud watched, the priest-sorcerors began pounding the ground and tracing magical numbers and symbols in the dirt. The dancers whirled, lacerating space with their "coyote calls" and tinkling strange bells, while the priests uttered incantations and sprinkled water on the initiates, striking their heads with magical sticks (PD, 31). Artaud, who had taken peyote, felt at moments that he was inside the ultimate theater of cruelty. The Indians lay him on the ground "so that the ritual would descend upon me, so that fire, litany, screams, dance and the night itself like a living human vault might wheel as a living being over me." 18 "To this I knew that my physical destiny was irrevocably bound. I was ready for any burning, and I awaited the first fruits of the fire in view of a conflagration that would soon be universal" (PD, 57-58).
The experience was clearly ecstatic, but its impact, unfortunately, was short-lived (PD, 82). Before long, Artaud's sense of cosmic transformation seems to have turned negative, his sense of mystical union undermined by an encroaching and all too familiar sense of ontological insecurity and catastrophe. In The New Revelations of Being, a pamphlet written shortly after his return to Europe, Artaud predicts a cosmic holocaust, a destruction of civilization or ruination brought on by Fire, Water, Earth, and by "a Star which will occupy the entire surface of the air, in which the Spirit of Man had been immersed." 19
In other passages in The New Revelations of Being, Artaud comes close to admitting the essentially reactive or defensive nature of his Dionysian project, this attempt to cover the void with fear that now seemed to him to have been doomed from the start:
For a long time I have felt the Void, but I have refused to throw myself into the Void. . . .
When I believed that I was denying this world, I know now that I was denying the Void. . . .
What I have suffered from until now is having denied the Void.
The void which was already within me. [SW, 413]
Now he prefers to accept rather than to t separation and nonbeing, as if the only possible act of affirmation was the paradoxical one of affirming nonbeing itself:
I know that someone wanted to enlighten me by means of the Void and that I refused to let myself be enlightened. . . .
I struggled to exist, to try to accept the forms (all the forms) with which the delirious illusion of being in the world has clothed reality.
I no longer want to be one of the deluded.
Dead to the world, to what composes the world for everyone else, fallen at last, fallen, risen in this void which I was denying, I have a body which suffers the world and disgorges reality. . . .
It is a real Desperate Person who speaks to you and who has not known the happiness of being in the world until now that he has left this world, now that he is absolutely separated from it.
The others who have died are not separated. They still turn around their dead bodies.
I am not dead, but I am separated. [SW, 413-14]
The New Revelations of Being was the last work Artaud completed before breaking down into frank psychosis. Shortly after finishing it, he embarked on a final desperate journey to Ireland, where he believed he was meant to await the impending holocaust. The trip went badly; there were reports of violent or threatening behavior; and on arriving back in France, Artaud was in a straitjacket. It was the beginning of nine years of confinement in mental hospitals.
After his arrival at Le Havre in September 1937, Artaud was placed in a series of mental hospitals. Following the acutely disturbed phase of his trip to Ireland, he now lapsed into a state more characteristic of chronic schizophrenia. For a year and a half he was nearly catatonic, refusing to respond to visitors or write to his friends. On being declared incurable, he was transferred, in February 1939, to a hospital on the outskirts of Paris. There he began to write letters and receive visitors, who were appalled to see what had happened to their friend. After four years, Artaud was again transferred, this time to an asylum in Rodez in southern France where he remained until 1946, when intercession by friends and admirers willing to guarantee his financial support made possible his release and return to Paris.
From the time of the ill-fated trip to Ireland, Artaud was frequently preoccupied with grandiose and violent fantasies that had a more overtly psychotic quality than did the eccentricities of his earlier years. At Rodez, for example, he would frequently circle his room uttering wild cries and, at meals, would sometimes engage in such strange rituals as belching in rhythmic patterns or getting down on his hands and knees to draw magic circles. At times he felt his body was occupied by a succession of different souls, whose conversation he was able to overhear; and he declared that all "things and beings inevitably obey the commandment of my breath" (PWW, 188).
In these last ten years of his life, Artaud continued to be plagued by feelings of ontological insecurity and nonbeing. In letters written in Rodez, for instance, he complains of horrible splittings of the personality that make him "absolutely incapable of working, thinking, and feeling that I was alive" (SW, 438). Though he blamed these feelings on the electroshock treatments he received, they can, in fact, be difficult to distinguish from those he had described so often before, as in his early texts, The Umbilicus of Limbo and The Nerve Meter . Artaud's continuing sense of ontological insecurity, at the limit a fear of world catastrophe, is apparent in his descriptions of van Gogh, an important alter-ego re of this period. Artaud speaks of van Gogh as a man who "understood the phenomenal nature of the problem," the fact that in him "every real landscape is as if latent in the crucible where it is going to be reborn" (SW, 505). The sense of cosmic or godlike responsibility thereby implied was accompanied by feelings of all-encompassing threat: van Gogh's paintings, says Artaud, are like atomic bombs or bursts of fire (SW, 483); "the apocalypse, a consummated apocalypse, is brooding right now in the paintings of old martyred van Gogh," the artist who "has caught the moment when the pupil is about to pour itself out in the void" (SW, 497, 510). And, writes Artaud in 1947, "I am also like poor van Gogh. I no longer think but each day I come nearer to the explosions I am producing." 20
At first glance, Artaud's third phase may well appear to perpetuate and exaggerate his second phase, with its revulsion for consciousness and its valorization of the body. In "Chiote à l'Esprit" (Shit to the Mind), a poem written about a year before his death, he declares:
the mind is pretentious and phony.
A kind of larval smoke which only lives upon what it has drawn out from the body struggling to make a gesture and not an idea or fact.
For really, what are these ideas, facts, values and qualities?
Lifeless terms which only become real when the body has sweated them out. [PWW, 166]
Now more than ever, Artaud believes in the redemptive power of bodily being, and yearns for an existence in which "there is no inside, no mind, no outside or consciousness, nothing but the body just as you see it--a body whose existence doesn't cease even when the eye looking at it turns away. And this body is a fact: me" (PWW, 168). 21
Unlike in the Dionysian phase, however, Artaud no longer looks to instinct and desire, or to pleasure and pain, as offering refuge from the deadening, distantiating tendencies of the mind. The following passage is an implicit critique of the theater-of-cruelty aesthetic, for it suggests that even the most intense physical sensations are now vulnerable to consciousness's derealizing power: "When my hand burns, / there is the fact that my hand burns which, considered as a fact, is already in trouble, / having the feeling that my hand is burning means entering another domain. / If I have the idea that my hand burns, I am no longer in my hand but in a state of supervision" (PWW, 167). 22 Even basic biological facts have lost their incontrovertible, anchoring power; and are now liable to feel like absurd phenomena, arbitrary products of human will that might just as well not have existed, or have existed in some very different form: "There where it smells of shit / it smells of being. / Man could very well have avoided shitting, / and kept his anal pocket closed, / but he chose to shit / like he could've chosen to live / instead of consenting to live dead" (WRS, 291).
But it is not merely that instinct and sensuality are vulnerable to the depredations of consciousness; the Dionysian realm now takes on certain of the ontological characteristics previously associated with the realm of mind. Lust and all the other imperatives of the flesh had previously been experienced as plenitude, sources of a heightened sentiment of being.  In "Le Visage Humain," an essay published the year before his death, it is the organs of sense perception, the bodily sites of intentional, world-directed consciousness, that appear as grotesque voids: "But this means that the human face as it is is still searching with two eyes, a nose, a mouth and four openings of the burial vault of approaching death" (WRS, 277). In another work from the same period, Artaud le Momo, desire is represented in similar terms: thus Artaud describes the human body as: "This tongue between four gums, / this meat between two knees, / this piece of hole / for madmen" (SW, 524). A passage from his radio play of 1947, "To Have Done with the Judgment of God," describes human life as an "electric battery"
whose abilities and emphases
have been oriented toward sexual life
while it is made
precisely for absorbing
by its voltaic displacements
all the errant availabilities
of the infinity of the void,
of the increasingly incommensurable
holes of void
of a never fulfilled organic possibility. [WRS, 312]
In contrast with his earlier polarizing of the sensual and the cerebral, Artaud now sees the mental self as a parasite that corrupts an otherwise self-sufficient and innocent body, transforming it into an organ of desire:
The anchored mind
screwed into me
by the psycho-lubricious
thrust
of heaven
is the one that thinks
every temptation
every desire
every inhibition. [SW, 523]
In his later years, Artaud was obsessed with thoughts of parasitic beings bent on destroying him by sucking life from him, by robbing him of his masculinity, as well as by appealing to corporeal desires. The essence of these "psycholascivious parasites" is the same as what, for Artaud, now characterizes both consciousness and desire: namely, pure nothingness, a condition they create and by which they are also created. Thus the parasites are "born without cessation, / from each other, / from the holes of the air, / from the roaming vacuities of space" (PWW, 181). 23
Since Artaud now believes that both "feelings and the mind have poisoned life" (PWW, 167), he wants to cut off every sort of connection with the external world, to be "chaste and pure, / virgin, intact, untouchable" (PWW, 192):
there is no learning, no knowledge,
life has been lost from the day that one single
thing was known.
I am not of your world
mine is on the other side of everything that is, knows and is aware of itself, desires and makes itself. [PWW, 165]
The body he now wishes to become is a purified body, a "body without organs." The psycholascivious parasites are dependent creatures who corrupt by inducing the dependencies of desire. To evade their corrupting influence it is necessary that all holes be covered over and all organs extirpated--those of consciousness as well as of instinct, eyes and ears as well as genitals, anus, and mouth. At the end of "To Have Done with the Judgment of God," Artaud dreams of an operation on an "autopsy table" in which all the organs of the human body are removed:
When you will have made [Man] a body without organs,
then you will have delivered him from all his automatic reactions
and restored him to his true freedom. [SW, 571]
In his attempt to remove everything that might evoke any hint of ontological dependency, or of the absence and nonbeing this now implies, Artaud was forced to deny virtually every conceivable form of sapient or sensate human existence: "I hate and denounce as a coward all sensations and all being. / I hate and denounce the so-called sensations of being. / I am by nature clean and pure" (PWW, 192). What Artaud desires in this final year of his life is a paradoxical and impossible state: to be the kind of being that has no sensation of being, and, at the same time, to experience this condition. He wants to return to a time before mind existed, a time when, "as for consciousness, no one had ever thought of it" (SW, 505). Thus he wants to create a theater very different from that of The Theater and its Double, a theater in which man would be a "sculptural object" rather than a "swollen creature"; and he insists that Man could, indeed should, have made up his mind "to lose being, that is, to die alive" (SW, 559). 24
The state of grace that Artaud now imagines is antithetical to that of the psycholascivious parasites: devoid as it is not only of all need for ingestion, excretion, or desire, but also of any consciousness of the ambient world. Now his great wish is to become "an old tree with grooves / which didn't eat / didn't drink / didn't breathe" (PWW, 182); and he dreams of an idyllic golden age, a time
when man was a tree without organs or function, but possessed of will, [this time] will return. For the great lie has been to make man an organism, / ingestion, / assimilation, / incubation, / excretion, / thus creating a whole order of hidden functions which are outside / the realm of the deliberative will; / the will that determines itself at each instant; for it was this, that human tree that walks, / a will that determines itself at each instant, / without functions that were hidden, underlying, governed by the unconscious. [SW, 515] 25
The pure will of this "tree without organs or functions" is not that of "digestive humanity" (SW, 519). It is an uncontaminated, self-determining, utterly independent will, a will that is conscious through and through, and free of any determination by underlying motives. It is the will of a creature supreme in its indifference and harboring no desire other than the wish to constitute itself beyond any risk of neediness or nonbeing.
Artaud's body without organs is obviously not a Dionysian body. It is also different from the synthesis inherent in a romantic or Hegelian unification of body with soul, mind with universe, self with other, or a Nietzschean union of the Apollonian and Dionysian principles. To reconcile the psychical with the physical in the form of the organic would, for Artaud, be tantamount to creating a psycholascivious parasite, the loathsome creature who combines the dependencies inherent in both knowing mind and yearning body. Artaud's "body without organs," his "tree without organs or function," implies a strange coming-together of spirit and substance--a denaturing of both mind and body in which each element is purified to a point of self-negation that is also a point of convergence between the two. As we have seen, the body without organs is a body without desire and sentience, almost a mere substance. In one sense, then, it might be seen as the final stage in an anti-Hegelian progression whereby Artaud passes from self-consciousness back through the imperatives of passion and pain, and on toward states of vegetal or even inorganic matter. In another way, however, it can seem a return to the condition of his first, highly cerebral phase. Artaud's body without organs is, after all, a pure and worldless will--self-determining, self-identical, and self-aware. If it is a body, it is a curiously Apollonian one. If it is a synthesis, it is one founded on negation rather than reconciliation: all the elements are there, but denied rather than affirmed. The body without organs of this supposed champion of unbridled passion is not, then, a bodymind but a not-body / not-mind, apotheosis of pure negation.
Louis A. Sass is Professor of Clinical Psychology at Rutgers University. He is the author of Madness and Modernism and The Paradoxes of Delusion .
1. Antonin Artaud, in Susan Sontag, ed., Antonin Artaud: Selected Writings, trans. Helen Weaver (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1976), 353; hereafter abbreviated SW. References to other works by Artaud will be given from the following editions: Naomi Greene, ed., Antonin Artaud: Poet Without Words (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), hereafter abbreviated PWW; Antonin Artaud, The Peyote Dance, trans. Helen Weaver (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1976), hereafter abbreviated PD; Antonin Artaud, The Theater and its Double, trans. Mary Caroline Richards (New York: Grove Press, 1958), hereafter abbreviated TID; and Antonin Artaud, Watchfiends and Rack Screams; Works from the Final Period, edited and translated by Clayton Eshleman with Bernard Bador (Boston: Exact Change, 1995), hereafter abbreviated WRS.
2. In order to escape "the habits of modern thinking," Artaud seeks what he calls "a regression into time" (SW, 162).
3. On the prominence of primitivist and Dionysian images of schizophrenia, see Louis Sass, Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of Modern Art, Literature, and Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 1-23.
4. Martin Esslin, for example, refers to Artaud as "always the complete incarnation of his own thought"; see his Antonin Artaud (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), 123.
5. Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation (New York: Dell, 1969), 170.
6. Leo Bersani, A Future for Astyanax: Character and Desire in Literature (New York: Columbia University, 1984), 272. Such a conception seems, incidentally, to betray the hidden romanticism inherent in some postmodern discourses that would like to present themselves as, above all, antiromantic.
7. Sylvère Lotringer, "Libido Unbound: The Politics of 'Schizophrenia,'" Semiotexte 2, no. 3 : 8-10. See Esslin, Antonin Artaud, 122-27, and Bersani, Future for Astyanax, 272. For these authors, as for André Breton in his first manifesto of Surrealism, madness becomes "the emblem of creative insurrection against rationalist repression linked to social power" (J. H. Matthews, Surrealism, Insanity, and Poetry [Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982], 4-5).
8. R. D. Laing, The Politics of Experience (New York: Ballantine Books, 1967), 126, 167. Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), 278. Also, Foucault quoted in Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 37. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem, and H. Lane (New York: Viking, 1971), 87-88. Deleuze and Guattari reject the notion of the schizophrenic as "the autistic rag--separated from the real and cut off from life" (19-20). When such a state occurs, they claim, it is not the result of the schizophrenic process itself but rather of its interruption, whether through incarceration or through the deadening effect of a society that recoils from those who threaten it. The re of Artaud lies behind their image of schizophrenia as a state hyper-imbued with passion and the life force.
9. It goes without saying that I adopt the terms Apollonian and Dionysian from Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy. My purpose here is to capture the dominant and distinctive features of each of these three phases, and thereby to bring out the main lines of Artaud's psychological and esthetic development. I recognize that, in doing so, I exaggerate somewhat the unity of Artaud's concerns in each period: there is more heterogeneity within, and more overlap between, these periods than is reflected in my presentation. I am indebted to various works on Artaud's life and work, including Martin Esslin, Antonin Artaud; Ronald Hayman, Artaud and After (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); Bettina Knapp, Antonin Artaud: Man of Vision (New York: David Lewis, 1969); and, especially, Naomi Greene, Antonin Artaud.
10. André Breton, more clear-sighted than many of Artaud's devotees, once described Artaud as having led him to a place that was "abstract, a gallery of ice . . . a place of lacunae and ellipses where personally I could no longer communicate with the innumerable things I like" (quoted in Greene, PWW, 23). Artaud himself once wrote that what made him different from the Surrealists was the fact that he despised life as much as they loved it (PWW, 23).
11. Artaud could be said to yearn for a "private language," in Wittgenstein's sense of the phrase. See Louis Sass, "Antonin Artaud, Modernism, and the Yearning for a Private Language," in Kjell S. Johannessen and Tore Nordenstam, eds., Culture and Value: Philosophy and the Cultural Sciences, vol. 3 (Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 1995), 255-60.
12. Lotringer, "Libido Unbound," 8.
13. Anaïs Nin quoted in Esslin, Artaud, 37.
14. Artaud quoted in Knapp, Antonin Artaud, 135.
15. Breton quoted in Greene, PWW, 128.
16. See PD, 3, 9, 10. Later, when the trip was over, Artaud would recall a conversation with the Tarahumara priest who gave him peyote. The priest had described his own world in terms reminiscent of decadent, alienated Europe. "The world in the beginning was completely real," Artaud reports him as saying. "It resounded in the human heart and with the human heart. Now the heart is no longer in it, nor is the soul because God has withdrawn from it" (PD, 34).
17. Even the number of times Artaud perceived certain forms in shadows and rock formations seemed significant: "I saw repeated eight times the same rock which projected two shadows on the ground. . . . And everything I saw seemed to correspond to a number" (SW, 380-81). He looked about him with the kind of scrutiny that forces the object to yield up some special yet elusive meaning: "I noticed in the mountain that it is useful to have the obsession of counting. There was not a shadow that I did not count, when I felt it creep around something; and it was often by adding up shadows that I found my way back to strange centers." For discussion of this sort of predelusional mood, see Sass, Madness and Modernism, "The Truth-Taking Stare," 43-74; and Sass, The Paradoxes of Delusion: Wittgenstein, Schreber, and the Schizophrenic Mind (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 97-113.
18. See Knapp, Antonin Artaud, 151, and SW, 391.
19. Artaud quoted in Esslin, Artaud, 48.
20. Artaud quoted in Hayman, Artaud and After, 18. For more on the experience of world catastrophe in schizophrenia, see Sass, Madness and Modernism, "World Catastrophe," 300-323.
21. "The self is not the body, it is the body that is the self," wrote Artaud in 1946-47 (WRS, 251). In a letter from 1948, Artaud speaks of
a nauseating flocculation of the infectious life of being
which the PURE BODY
repulses
but which
the PURE SPIRIT
accepts
and which the Mass
through its rites brings about. . . .
But this is what popular consciousness will never understand,
that a macerated and trampled body . . .
will be superior to a spirit handed over to all the phantasms of the interior life
which is merely the leaven
and the seed
for all the stinking phantasmagorical bestializations. [WRS, 330]
22. This sense of derealization was a persistent fear even during Artaud's Dionysian phase. In the preface to The Theater and its Double, he writes, "If our life lacks brimstone, i.e., a constant magic, it is because we choose to observe our acts and lose ourselves in considerations of their imagined form instead of being impelled by their force" (TID, 8). Artaud's comments on his play Les Cenci make a related point: "There will be between the Theater of Cruelty and The Cenci the difference which exists between the roaring of a waterfall or the unleashing of a natural storm, and all that remains of their violence once it has been recorded in an image" (quoted in Stephen Barber, Antonin Artaud: Blows and Bombs [London: Faber and Faber, 1993], 70).
23. In "To Have Done with the Judgment of God," Artaud speaks of "the void which advances with all its forms / of which the most perfect representation / is the march of an incalculable group of crab lice." To the question, "And what exactly is consciousness?" he answers, "It is nothingness. . . . It seems that consciousness / is in us / linked / to sexual desire / and hunger" (WRS, 294, 297-98).
24. Artaud's attitude toward language in his final period partakes of this same paradoxicality: at times he advocated a language that seems totally devoid of meaning, incomprehensible to everyone, the self included. It appears that Artaud had arrived at a point where, at moments, only utter eschewal of meaning, complete opacity of language, could ward off the nihilating potentiality of human awareness and proclaim a bedrock of existence independent of consciousness's nihilating power. In the following poem he shifts from the theme of ontological suffering toward the undeniable reality of sound, of pure word-objects utterly devoid of sense: " . . .therefore no more suffering. / no more illness / dysentery / suffocation . . . / ka loughin / re te ka la gouda / ka lagouda / e te ka loughin" (PWW, 213). Just as the body had to be rid of consciousness and desire, of anything that points or yearns beyond itself, so language had to be rid of any tendency for the signifier to refer to a distant or separate realm: "All true language is incomprehensible,/ like the clack / of chattering teeth; / or the clack (whorehouse) / of the toothy femur (bloody)" (PWW, 169).
25. In a passage from Suppots et Supplications (dictated 1946- 47), Artaud speaks of a "stone [that] has an aura which is being, and it is in the aura of being, the integral aura of being, the tide of inexhaustible will" (WRS, 252).
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| | Roadmap (const std::vector< double > &minimums, const std::vector< double > &maximums) |
| | Default constructor. Init configuration space without obstacles. More...
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| | Roadmap (std::string filepath_configuration_space, std::string filepath_obstacles) |
| | If files are specified for configuration space and obstacles, load data from files. More...
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| void | runPRM (int iterations, double radius, double step_size) |
| | Generate probabilistic roadmap. Based on [1] and [2]. [1] L. E. Kavraki, P. Švestka, J. C. Latombe, and M. H. Overmars, “Probabilistic roadmaps for path planning in high-dimensional configuration spaces,” IEEE Trans. Robot. Autom., 1996. [2] L. E. Kavraki, M. N. Kolountzakis, and J. C. Latombe, “Analysis of probabilistic roadmaps for path planning,” IEEE Trans. Robot. Autom., vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 166–171, 1998. More...
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| void | runQRM (int iterations, double radius, double step_size) |
| | Generate quasi-random roadmap. Based on [1]. [1] M. S. Branicky, S. M. Lavalle, K. Olson, and L. Yang, “Quasi-Randomized Path Planning,” in IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, 2001, pp. 1481–1487. More...
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| void | runLRM (int iterations, double radius, double step_size) |
| | Generate lattice roadmap. Based on [1]. [1] S. M. LaValle and M. S. Branicky, “On the relationship between classical grid search and probabilistic roadmaps,” Int. J. Rob. Res., vol. 23, no. 7–8, pp. 673–692, 2004. More...
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| std::vector< int > | computePath (const std::vector< double > &src, const std::vector< double > &dst) |
| | Add a vertex to roadmap. More...
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| void mpl::Roadmap::runLRM |
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int |
iterations, |
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double |
radius, |
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double |
step_size |
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) |
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Generate lattice roadmap. Based on [1]. [1] S. M. LaValle and M. S. Branicky, “On the relationship between classical grid search and probabilistic roadmaps,” Int. J. Rob. Res., vol. 23, no. 7–8, pp. 673–692, 2004.
| void mpl::Roadmap::runPRM |
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int |
iterations, |
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double |
radius, |
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double |
step_size |
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) |
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Generate probabilistic roadmap. Based on [1] and [2]. [1] L. E. Kavraki, P. Švestka, J. C. Latombe, and M. H. Overmars, “Probabilistic roadmaps for path planning in high-dimensional configuration spaces,” IEEE Trans. Robot. Autom., 1996. [2] L. E. Kavraki, M. N. Kolountzakis, and J. C. Latombe, “Analysis of probabilistic roadmaps for path planning,” IEEE Trans. Robot. Autom., vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 166–171, 1998.
| void mpl::Roadmap::runQRM |
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int |
iterations, |
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double |
radius, |
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double |
step_size |
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) |
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Generate quasi-random roadmap. Based on [1]. [1] M. S. Branicky, S. M. Lavalle, K. Olson, and L. Yang, “Quasi-Randomized Path Planning,” in IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, 2001, pp. 1481–1487.


Network Working Group B. Aboba Request for Comments: 2618 G. Zorn Category: Standards Track Microsoft June 1999 RADIUS Authentication Client MIB Status of this Memo This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. Abstract This memo defines a set of extensions which instrument RADIUS authentication client functions. These extensions represent a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB) for use with network management protocols in the Internet community. Using these extensions IP-based management stations can manage RADIUS authentication clients. 1. Introduction This memo defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB) for use with network management protocols in the Internet community. In particular, it describes managed objects used for managing RADIUS authentication clients. Today a wide range of network devices, including routers and NASes, act as RADIUS authentication clients in order to provide authentication and authorization services. As a result, the effective management of RADIUS authentication clients is of considerable importance. Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 2618 RADIUS Authentication Client MIB June 1999 2. The SNMP Management Framework The SNMP Management Framework presently consists of five major components: o An overall architecture, described in RFC 2571 [1]. o Mechanisms for describing and naming objects and events for the purpose of management. The first version of this Structure of Management Information (SMI) is called SMIv1 and described in STD 16, RFC 1155 [2], STD 16, RFC 1212 [3] and RFC 1215 [4]. The second version, called SMIv2, is described in STD 58, RFC 2578 [5], RFC 2579 [6] and RFC 2580 [7]. o Message protocols for transferring management information. The first version of the SNMP message protocol is called SNMPv1 and described in STD 15, RFC 1157 [8]. A second version of the SNMP message protocol, which is not an Internet standards track protocol, is called SNMPv2c and described in RFC 1901 [9] and RFC 1906 [10]. The third version of the message protocol is called SNMPv3 and described in RFC 1906 [10], RFC 2572 [11] and RFC 2574 [12]. o Protocol operations for accessing management information. The first set of protocol operations and associated PDU formats is described in STD 15, RFC 1157 [8]. A second set of protocol operations and associated PDU formats is described in RFC 1905 [13]. o A set of fundamental applications described in RFC 2573 [14] and the view-based access control mechanism described in RFC 2575 [15]. Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed the Management Information Base or MIB. Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the SMI. This memo specifies a MIB module that is compliant to the SMIv2. A MIB conforming to the SMIv1 can be produced through the appropriate translations. The resulting translated MIB must be semantically equivalent, except where objects or events are omitted because no translation is possible (use of Counter64). Some machine readable information in SMIv2 will be converted into textual descriptions in SMIv1 during the translation process. However, this loss of machine readable information is not considered to change the semantics of the MIB. Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 2618 RADIUS Authentication Client MIB June 1999 3. Overview The RADIUS authentication protocol, described in [16], distinguishes between the client function and the server function. In RADIUS authentication, clients send Access-Requests, and servers reply with Access-Accepts, Access-Rejects, and Access-Challenges. Typically NAS devices implement the client function, and thus would be expected to implement the RADIUS authentication client MIB, while RADIUS authentication servers implement the server function, and thus would be expected to implement the RADIUS authentication server MIB. However, it is possible for a RADIUS authentication entity to perform both client and server functions. For example, a RADIUS proxy may act as a server to one or more RADIUS authentication clients, while simultaneously acting as an authentication client to one or more authentication servers. In such situations, it is expected that RADIUS entities combining client and server functionality will support both the client and server MIBs. 3.1. Selected objects This MIB module contains two scalars as well as a single table: (1) the RADIUS Authentication Server Table contains one row for each RADIUS authentication server that the client shares a secret with. Each entry in the RADIUS Authentication Server Table includes fifteen columns presenting a view of the activity of the RADIUS authentication client. 4.  CONTACT-INFO " Bernard Aboba Microsoft Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 2618 RADIUS Authentication Client MIB June 1999 One Microsoft Way Redmond, WA 98052 US Phone: +1<PHONE_NUMBER> EMail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>DESCRIPTION "The MIB module for entities implementing the client side of the Remote Access Dialin User Service (RADIUS) authentication protocol." REVISION "9906110000Z" -- 11 Jun 1999 DESCRIPTION "Initial version as published in RFC 2618" ::= { radiusAuthentication 2 } radiusMIB OBJECT-IDENTITY STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The OID assigned to RADIUS MIB work by the IANA." ::= { mib-2 67 } radiusAuthentication OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {radiusMIB 1} radiusAuthClientMIBObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthClientMIB 1 } radiusAuthClient OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthClientMIBObjects 1 } radiusAuthClientInvalidServerAddresses OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of RADIUS Access-Response packets received from unknown addresses." ::= { radiusAuthClient 1 } radiusAuthClientIdentifier OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SnmpAdminString MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The NAS-Identifier of the RADIUS authentication client. This is not necessarily the same as sysName in MIB II." ::= { radiusAuthClient 2 } radiusAuthServerTable OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF RadiusAuthServerEntry MAX-ACCESS not-accessible Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 2618 RADIUS Authentication Client MIB June 1999 STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The (conceptual) table listing the RADIUS authentication servers with which the client shares a secret." ::= { radiusAuthClient 3 } radiusAuthServerEntry OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX RadiusAuthServerEntry MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION "An entry (conceptual row) representing a RADIUS authentication server with which the client shares a secret." INDEX { radiusAuthServerIndex } ::= { radiusAuthServerTable 1 } RadiusAuthServerEntry ::= SEQUENCE { radiusAuthServerIndex Integer32, radiusAuthServerAddress IpAddress, radiusAuthClientServerPortNumber Integer32, radiusAuthClientRoundTripTime TimeTicks, radiusAuthClientAccessRequests Counter32, radiusAuthClientAccessRetransmissions Counter32, radiusAuthClientAccessAccepts Counter32, radiusAuthClientAccessRejects Counter32, radiusAuthClientAccessChallenges Counter32, radiusAuthClientMalformedAccessResponses Counter32, radiusAuthClientBadAuthenticators Counter32, radiusAuthClientPendingRequests Gauge32, radiusAuthClientTimeouts Counter32, radiusAuthClientUnknownTypes Counter32, radiusAuthClientPacketsDropped Counter32 } radiusAuthServerIndex OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Integer32 (1..2147483647) MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION "A number uniquely identifying each RADIUS Authentication server with which this client communicates." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 1 } radiusAuthServerAddress OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX IpAddress MAX-ACCESS read-only Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 2618 RADIUS Authentication Client MIB June 1999 STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The IP address of the RADIUS authentication server referred to in this table entry." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 2 } radiusAuthClientServerPortNumber OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Integer32 (0..65535) MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The UDP port the client is using to send requests to this server." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 3 } radiusAuthClientRoundTripTime OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX TimeTicks MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The time interval (in hundredths of a second) between the most recent Access-Reply/Access-Challenge and the Access-Request that matched it from this RADIUS authentication server." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 4 } -- Request/Response statistics -- -- TotalIncomingPackets = Accepts + Rejects + Challenges + UnknownTypes -- -- TotalIncomingPackets - MalformedResponses - BadAuthenticators - -- UnknownTypes - PacketsDropped = Successfully received -- -- AccessRequests + PendingRequests + ClientTimeouts = -- Successfully Received -- -- radiusAuthClientAccessRequests OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of RADIUS Access-Request packets sent to this server. This does not include retransmissions." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 5 } radiusAuthClientAccessRetransmissions OBJECT-TYPE Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 2618 RADIUS Authentication Client MIB June 1999 SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of RADIUS Access-Request packets retransmitted to this RADIUS authentication server." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 6 } radiusAuthClientAccessAccepts OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of RADIUS Access-Accept packets (valid or invalid) received from this server." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 7 } radiusAuthClientAccessRejects OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of RADIUS Access-Reject packets (valid or invalid) received from this server." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 8 } radiusAuthClientAccessChallenges OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of RADIUS Access-Challenge packets (valid or invalid) received from this server." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 9 } -- "Access-Response" includes an Access-Accept, Access-Challenge -- or Access-Reject radiusAuthClientMalformedAccessResponses OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of malformed RADIUS Access-Response packets received from this server. Malformed packets include packets with an invalid length. Bad authenticators or Signature attributes or unknown types are not Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 2618 RADIUS Authentication Client MIB June 1999 included as malformed access responses." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 10 } radiusAuthClientBadAuthenticators OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of RADIUS Access-Response packets containing invalid authenticators or Signature attributes received from this server." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 11 } radiusAuthClientPendingRequests OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Gauge32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of RADIUS Access-Request packets destined for this server that have not yet timed out or received a response. This variable is incremented when an Access-Request is sent and decremented due to receipt of an Acess-Accept, Access-Reject or Access-Challenge, a timeout or retransmission." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 12 } radiusAuthClientTimeouts OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of authentication timeouts to this server. After a timeout the client may retry to the same server, send to a different server, or give up. A retry to the same server is counted as a retransmit as well as a timeout. A send to a different server is counted as a Request as well as a timeout." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 13 } radiusAuthClientUnknownTypes OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of RADIUS packets of unknown type which were received from this server on the authentication port." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 14 } Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 2618 RADIUS Authentication Client MIB June 1999 radiusAuthClientPacketsDropped OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of RADIUS packets of which were received from this server on the authentication port and dropped for some other reason." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 15 } -- conformance information radiusAuthClientMIBConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthClientMIB 2 } radiusAuthClientMIBCompliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthClientMIBConformance 1 } radiusAuthClientMIBGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthClientMIBConformance 2 } -- compliance statements radiusAuthClientMIBCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The compliance statement for authentication clients implementing the RADIUS Authentication Client MIB." MODULE -- this module MANDATORY-GROUPS { radiusAuthClientMIBGroup } ::= { radiusAuthClientMIBCompliances 1 } -- units of conformance radiusAuthClientMIBGroup OBJECT-GROUP OBJECTS { radiusAuthClientIdentifier, radiusAuthClientInvalidServerAddresses, radiusAuthServerAddress, radiusAuthClientServerPortNumber, radiusAuthClientRoundTripTime, radiusAuthClientAccessRequests, radiusAuthClientAccessRetransmissions, radiusAuthClientAccessAccepts, radiusAuthClientAccessRejects, radiusAuthClientAccessChallenges, radiusAuthClientMalformedAccessResponses, Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 9] RFC 2618 RADIUS Authentication Client MIB June 1999 radiusAuthClientBadAuthenticators, radiusAuthClientPendingRequests, radiusAuthClientTimeouts, radiusAuthClientUnknownTypes, radiusAuthClientPacketsDropped } STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The basic collection of objects providing management of RADIUS Authentication Clients." ::= { radiusAuthClientMIBGroups 1 } END 5. References [1] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An Architecture for Describing SNMP Management Frameworks", RFC 2571, April 1999. [2] Rose, M., and K. McCloghrie, "Structure and Identification of Management Information for TCP/IP-based Internets", STD 16, RFC 1155, May 1990. [3] Rose, M., and K. McCloghrie, "Concise MIB Definitions", STD 16, RFC 1212, March 1991. [4] Rose, M., "A Convention for Defining Traps for use with the SNMP", RFC 1215, Performance Systems International, March 1991. [5] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, "Structure of Management Information Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58, RFC 2578, April 1999. [6] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, "Textual Conventions for SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2579, April 1999. [7] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, "Conformance Statements for SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2580, April 1999. [8] Case, J., Fedor, M., Schoffstall, M., and J. Davin, "Simple Network Management Protocol", STD 15, RFC 1157, May 1990. [9] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Introduction to Community-based SNMPv2", RFC 1901, January 1996. Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 10] RFC 2618 RADIUS Authentication Client MIB June 1999 [10] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Transport Mappings for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC 1906, January 1996. [11] Case, J., Harrington D., Presuhn R., and B. Wijnen, "Message Processing and Dispatching for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 2572, April 1999. [12] Blumenthal, U., and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model for Version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv3)", RFC 2574, April 1999. [13] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Protocol Operations for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC 1905, January 1996. [14] Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B. Stewart, "SNMP Applications", RFC 2573, April 1999. [15] Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R., and K. McCloghrie, "View-based Access Control Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 2575, April 1999. [16] Rigney, C., Rubens, A., Simpson W. and S. Willens, "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2138, April 1997. 6. Security Considerations There are no management objects defined in this MIB that have a MAX- ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create. So, if this MIB is implemented correctly, then there is no risk that an intruder can alter or create any management objects of this MIB via direct SNMP SET operations. There are a number of managed objects in this MIB that may contain sensitive information. These are: radiusAuthServerAddress This can be used to determine the address of the RADIUS authentication server with which the client is communicating. This information could be useful in mounting an attack on the authentication server. radiusAuthClientServerPortNumber This can be used to determine the port number on which the RADIUS authentication client is sending. This information could be useful in impersonating the client in order to send data to the authentication Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 11] RFC 2618 RADIUS Authentication Client MIB June 1999 server. It is thus important to control even GET access to these objects and possibly to even encrypt the values of these object when sending them over the network via SNMP. Not all versions of SNMP provide features for such a secure environment. SNMPv1 by itself is not a secure environment. Even if the network itself is secure (for example by using IPSec), there is no control as to who on the secure network is allowed to access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects in this MIB. It is recommended that the implementers consider the security features as provided by the SNMPv3 framework. Specifically, the use of the User-based Security Model RFC 2574 [12] and the View-based Access Control Model RFC 2575 [15] is recommended. Using these security features, customer/users can give access to the objects only to those principals (users) that have legitimate rights to GET or SET (change/create/delete) them. 7. Acknowledgments The authors acknowledge the contributions of the RADIUS Working Group in the development of this MIB. Thanks to Narendra Gidwani of Microsoft, Allan C. Rubens of MERIT, Carl Rigney of Livingston and Peter Heitman of American Internet Corporation for useful discussions of this problem space. 8. Authors' Addresses Bernard Aboba Microsoft Corporation One Microsoft Wy Redmond, WA 98052 Phone:<PHONE_NUMBER> EMail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Glen Zorn Microsoft Corporation One Microsoft Way Redmond, WA 98052 Phone:<PHONE_NUMBER> EMail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 12] RFC 2618 RADIUS Authentication Client MIB June 1999 9. Intellectural Property Statement The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF Secretariat. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive Director. Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 13] RFC 2618 RADIUS Authentication Client MIB June 1999 10. Full Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implmentation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than English. The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.  Acknowledgement Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society. Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 14]


Note
Click here to download the full example code
2.1.2. Soliton implosion in a NLPM750 PCF¶
This examples demonstrates breakdown of a high-order soliton in a NL-PM-750 photonic crystal fiber, described in Ref. [1]. For the numerical simualtion the forward model for the analytic signal including the Raman effect is used [1,2].
In particular, this example reproduces the propagation scenario shown in Fig.~2 of Ref. [1]. The resulting figure shows the breakdown of a high-order soliton of duration \(t_{\rm{S}}=10\,\mathrm{fs}\), center frequency \(\omega_{\rm{S}}=1.884\,\mathrm{rad/fs}\), and soliton order \(N_{\rm{S}}=10\). This process is also referred to as soliton implosion. For more details see Ref. [1].
- References:
[1] I. Babushkin, A. Tajalli, H. Sayinc et al., Simple route toward efficient frequency conversion for generation of fully coherent supercontinua in the mid-IR and UV range, Light: Science & Applications 6 (2017) e16218, https://doi.org/10.1038/lsa.2016.218
[2] A. Demircan, Sh. Amiranashvili, C. Bree, C. Mahnke, F. Mitschke, G. Steinmeyer, Rogue wave formation by accelerated solitons at an optical event horizon, Appl. Phys. B 115 (2014) 343, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00340-013-5609-9
import fmas
import numpy as np
from fmas.grid import Grid
from fmas.models import FMAS_S_R
from fmas.solver import IFM_RK4IP
from fmas.analytic_signal import AS
from fmas.propagation_constant import PropConst, define_beta_fun_NLPM750
from fmas.tools import change_reference_frame, plot_evolution
def main():
# -- INITIALIZATION STAGE
# ... DEFINE SIMULATION PARAMETERS
t_max = 3000. # (fs)
t_num = 2**14 # (-)
z_max = 8.0e3 # (micron)
z_num = 10000 # (-)
z_skip = 10 # (-)
n2 = 3.0e-8 # (micron^2/W)
wS = 1.884 # (rad/fs)
tS = 10.0 # (fs)
NS = 10. # (-)
# ... PROPAGGATION CONSTANT
beta_fun = define_beta_fun_NLPM750()
pc = PropConst(beta_fun)
# ... COMPUTATIONAL DOMAIN, MODEL, AND SOLVER
grid = Grid( t_max = t_max, t_num = t_num, z_max = z_max, z_num = z_num)
model = FMAS_S_R(w=grid.w, beta_w=pc.beta(grid.w), n2 = n2)
solver = IFM_RK4IP( model.Lw, model.Nw)
# -- SET UP INITIAL CONDITION
A0 = NS*np.sqrt(np.abs(pc.beta2(wS))*model.c0/wS/n2)/tS
Eps_0w = AS(np.real(A0/np.cosh(grid.t/tS)*np.exp(1j*wS*grid.t))).w_rep
solver.set_initial_condition( grid.w, Eps_0w)
# -- PERFORM Z-PROPAGATION
solver.propagate( z_range = z_max, n_steps = z_num, n_skip = z_skip)
# -- SHOW RESULTS
utz = change_reference_frame(solver.w, solver.z, solver.uwz, pc.vg(wS))
plot_evolution( solver.z, grid.t, utz,
t_lim = (-100,100), w_lim = (0.5,8.), DO_T_LOG = True)
if __name__=='__main__':
main()
Total running time of the script: ( 1 minutes 24.165 seconds)


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---
title: "Water Conservation Garden Sneak Peek!"
date: "2017-05-04 17:11:00 -06:00"
categories:
- whats-blooming
layout: "post"
blog-banner: "whats-blooming-now-spring.jpg"
post-date: "May 05, 2017"
post-time: "5:11 PM"
blog-image: "2017-05-04-wbn.jpg"
published: true
---
We know you are all anxious to see the new Garden, so we thought you would enjoy a preview.
The Water Conservation Garden will open to the public May 20, 2017! We are so excited to finally show off all the hard work that has gone into it. We hope to see you there!