ARMED FORCES NGT CAT TDSAT TRIBUNAL (AFT) Jurisdiction Section 14: Section 14: Section 14: Section 14: Tribunal to Jurisdiction, Establishment Jurisdiction, settle disputes. powers and of Appellate powers and authority of the Tribunal. authority in Central service Administrative matters. Tribunal. (1) Save as (1)The Central (1) The Tribunal otherwise Government (1) Save as shall have the expressly shall, by otherwise jurisdiction over provided in this notification, expressly all civil cases Act, the Central establish an provided in where a Administrative Appellate this Act, the substantial Tribunal shall Tribunal to be Tribunal shall question relating exercise, on and known as the exercise, on to environment from the Telecom and from the (including appointed day, Disputes appointed day, enforcement of all the Settlement and all the any legal right jurisdiction, Appellate jurisdiction, relating to powers and Tribunal to - powers and environment), is authority authority, involved and exercisable (a) adjudicate exercisable such question immediately any dispute - immediately arises out of the before that day (i) between a before that day 68 implementation by all courts licensor and a by all courts of the (except the licensee; (except the enactments Supreme Court (ii) between two Supreme specified in in relation to- or more service Court or a Schedule I. providers; High Court (a) recruitment, (iii) between a exercising Section 15: and matters service provider jurisdiction Relief, concerning and a group of under articles compensation recruitment, to consumers: 226 and 227 and restitution. any All-India of the Service or to any PROVIDED that Constitution) (1) The Tribunal civil service of nothing in this in relation to may, by an the Union or a clause shall all service order, provide,- civil post under apply in respect matters. (a) relief and the Union or to a of matters (4) For the compensation to post connected relating to - purpose of the victims of with defence or (A) the adjudicating pollution and in the defence monopolistic an application, other service, being, in trade practice, the Tribunal environmental either case, a restrictive trade shall have the damage arising post filled by a practice and same powers under the civilian; unfair trade as are vested enactments practice which in a Civil specified in the (b) all service are Court under Schedule I matters subject to the the Code of (including concerning- jurisdiction of Civil accident the Monopolies Procedure, occurring while (i) a member of and Restrictive 1908, (5 of handling any any All-India Trade Practices 1908) while hazardous Service; or Commission trying a suit in substance); (ii) a person [not established respect of the being a member under sub- following (b) for restitution of an All-India section (1) of matters, of property Service or a section 5 of the namely - damaged; person referred Monopolies and to in clause (c) ] Restrictive (a) (c) for restitution appointed to any Trade Practices summoning of the civil service of Act, 1969 ; and enforcing environment for the Union or any (B) the the attendance such area or civil post under complaint of an of any person areas, as the the Union; or individual and examining Tribunal may (iii) a civilian [not consumer him on oath; think fit. being a member maintainable (b) requiring of an All-India before a the discovery (2) The relief and Service or a Consumer and compensation person referred Disputes production of and restitution in clause (c) ] Redressal documents; of property and appointed to any Forum or a (c) receiving environment defence services Consumer evidence on referred to in or a post Disputes affidavits; clauses (a), (b) connected with Redressal (d) subject to and (c) of sub- defence, Commission or the provisions section (1) shall the National of sections 123 be in addition to and pertaining to Consumer and 124 of the the relief paid or the service of Redressal Indian payable under such member, Commission Evidence Act, the Public person or established 1872, Liability civilian, in under section 9 (1 of 1872) Insurance Act, connection with of the requisitioning 1991. the affairs of the Consumer any public 69 Union or of any Protection Act, record or (3) No State or of any 1986 ; document or application for local or other (C) the dispute copy of such grant of any authority within between record or compensation or the territory of telegraph document relief or India or under authority and from restitution of the control of the any other any office; property or Government of person referred (e) issuing environment India or of any to in sub- commissions under this corporation [or section (1) of for the section shall be society] owned or section 7B of examination of entertained by controlled by the the Indian witnesses or the Tribunal Government; Telegraph Act, documents; unless it is made 1885 ; (f) reviewing within a period (c) all service its decisions; of five years from matters (b) hear and (g) dismissing the date on pertaining to dispose of an application which the cause service in appeal against for default or for such connection with any direction, deciding it compensation or the affairs of the decision or exparte; relief first arose:Union order of the (h) setting concerning a authority under aside any Provided that the person appointed this Act. order of Tribunal may, if to any service or dismissal of it is satisfied post referred to any that the in sub-clause (ii) application for applicant was or sub-clause (iii) default or any prevented by of clause (b), order sufficient cause being a person passed by it from filing the whose services exparte; and application have been placed (i) any other within the said by a State matter which period, allow it Government or may be to be filed within any local or prescribed by a further period other authority the Central not exceeding or any Government. sixty days. corporation [or society] or other (5) The 16: Tribunal to body, at the Tribunal shall have appellate disposal of the decide both jurisdiction. Central questions of Government for law and facts Any person such that may be aggrieved by,- appointment. raised before it. (a) an order or [Explanation - decision, made, for the removal Section 15: on or after the of doubts, it is Jurisdiction commencement hereby declared powers and of the National that references authority in Green Tribunal to "Union" in this matters of Act, 2010, by the sub-section shall appeal appellate be construed as against court authority under including martial. section 28 of the references also to Water a Union (1) Save as (Prevention and territory.] otherwise Control of expressly Pollution) Act, (3) Save as provided in 1974; otherwise this Act, the 70 (b) an order expressly Tribunal shall passed, on or provided in this exercise, on after the Act, the Central and from the commencement Administrative appointed day, of the National tribunal shall all the Green Tribunal also exercise, on jurisdiction, Act, 2010, by the and from the powers and State date with effect authority Government from which the exercisable under section 29 provisions of this under this Act of the Water sub-section in relation to (Prevention and apply to any appeal against Control of local or other any order, Pollution) Act, authority or decision, 1974; corporation [or finding or (c) directions society], all the sentence issued, on or jurisdiction, passed by a after the powers and court martial commencement authority or any matter of the National exercisable connected Green Tribunal immediately therewith or Act, 2010, by a before that date incidental Board, under by all courts thereto. section 33A of (except the the Water Supreme Court (Prevention and [***] in relation Control of to- Pollution) Act, 1974; (a) recruitment, (d) an order or and matters decision made, concerning on or after the recruitment, to commencement any service or of the National post in Green Tribunal connection with Act, 2010, by the the affairs of appellate such local or authority under other authority section 13 of the or corporation Water [or society]; and (Prevention and Control of (b) all service Pollution) Cess matters Act, 1977; concerning a (e) an order or person [other decision made, than a person on or after the referred to in commencement clause (a) of sub- of the National section (1) ] Green Tribunal appointed to any Act, 2010, by the service or post in State connection with Government or the affairs of other authority such local or under section 2 other authority of the Forest or corporation (Conservation) [or society] and Act, 1980; pertaining to the (f) an order or service of such decision, made, person in 71 on or after the connection with commencement such affairs. of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the Appellate Authority under section 31 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981; (g) any direction issued, on or after the commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, under section 5 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; (h) an order made, on or after the commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, granting environmental clearance in the area in which any industries, operations or processes or class of industries, operations and processes shall not be carried out or shall be carried out subject to certain safeguards under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; (i) an order made, on or after the commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, refusing to grant environmental 72 clearance for carrying out any activity or operation or process under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; (j) any determination of benefit sharing or order made, on or after the commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the National Biodiversity Authority or a State Biodiversity Board under the provisions of the Biological Diversity Act, 2002, may, within a period of thirty days from the date on which the order or decision or direction or determination is communicated to him, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal: Provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed under this section within a further period not exceeding sixty days. 73 NGT CAT TDSAT AFT Procedure 19: Procedure Section 22: Section 16: 23: Procedure and powers and powers of Procedure and Procedure and and powers of of Tribunal. powers of powers of the Tribunal. Tribunal. Tribunal. Appellate (1) The Tribunal. Tribunal shall not be bound (1) The Tribunal (1) A Tribunal by the shall not be shall not be procedure laid bound by the bound by the down in the procedure laid procedure laid (1) The Code of Civil down by the down in the Code Appellate Procedure, Code of Civil of Civil Procedure, Tribunal shall 1908 (5 of Procedure, 1908 1908 (5 of 1908) not be bound 1908) but shall but shall be but shall be by the be guided by guided by the guided by the procedure laid the principles principles of principles of down by the of natural natural justice. natural justice Code of Civil justice and and subject to the Procedure, subject to the (2) Subject to the other provisions 1908 (5 of other provisions of this of this Act and of 1908), but shall provisions of Act, the Tribunal any rules made be guided by this Act and shall have power by the Central the principles any rules made to regulate its Government, the of natural thereunder, the own procedure. Tribunal shall justice and, Tribunal shall have power to subject to the have the power (3) The Tribunal regulate its own other to lay down and shall also not be procedure provisions of regulate its own bound by the including the this Act, the procedure rules of evidence fixing of places Appellate including the contained in the and times of its Tribunal shall fixing of place Indian Evidence inquiry and have powers to and time of its Act, 1872. deciding whether regulate its own inquiry and to sit in public or procedure. deciding in private. whether to sit (4) The Tribunal (2) The in public or in shall have, for (3) A Tribunal Appellate camera. the purposes of shall have, for the Tribunal shall discharging its purposes of have, for the functions under 2[discharging its purpose of this Act, the functions under discharging its same powers as this Act], the functions are vested in a same powers as under this Act, civil court under are vested in a the same the Code of Civil civil court under powers as are Procedure, 1908, the Code of Civil vested in a civil while trying a Procedure, 1908 court under the suit, in respect (5 of 1908) while Code of Civil of the following trying a suit, in Procedure, matters, respect of the 1908 (5 of namely:- following matters, 1908) while namely:- trying a suit, in (a) summoning respect of the and enforcing (a) summoning following the attendance and enforcing the matters, of any person attendance of any namely:- and examining person and 74 him on oath; examining him on (a) summoning (b) requiring the oath; and enforcing discovery and (b) requiring the the attendance production of discovery and of any person documents; production of and examining (c) receiving documents; him on oath; evidence on (c) receiving (b) requiring affidavits; evidence of the discovery (d) subject to the affidavits; and production provisions of (d) subject to the of documents; sections 123 and provisions of (c) receiving 124 of the sections 123 and evidence on Indian Evidence 124 of the Indian affidavits; Act, 1872, Evidence Act, (d) subject to requisitioning 1872 (1 of 1872) the provisions any public requisitioning any of sections 123 record or public record or and 124 of the document or document or copy Indian copy of such of such record or Evidence Act, record or document from 1872 , document from any office; requisitioning any office; (e) issuing any public (e) issuing commissions for record or commissions for the examination document or a the examination of witnesses or copy of such of witnesses or documents; record or documents; (f) reviewing its document, from (f) reviewing its decisions; any office; decision; (g) dismissing a (e) issuing (g) dismissing an representation for commissions application for default or for the default or deciding it ex examination of deciding it ex pane; witnesses or parte; (h) setting aside documents; (h) setting aside any order of (f) reviewing ins any order of dismissal of any decisions; dismissal of any representation for (g) dismissing application for default or any an application default or any order passed by it for default or order passed by ex parts; and deciding it, ex it ex parte; (i) any other parte; (i) pass an matter which may (h) setting aside interim order be prescribed by any order of (including the Central dismissal of granting an Government. any application injunction or for default or stay) after any order providing the passed by it, parties exparte; and concerned an (i) any other opportunity to matter which be heard, on any may be application made prescribed. or appeal filed under this Act; (3) Every (j) pass an order proceeding requiring any before the person to cease Appellate and desist from Tribunal shall committing or be deemed to 75 causing any be a judicial violation of any proceeding enactment within the specified in meaning of Schedule I; sections 193 (k) any other and 228, and matter which for the may be purposes of prescribed. section 196, of the Indian (5) All Penal Code, proceedings 1860 (45 of before the 1860) and the Tribunal shall be Appellate deemed to be the Tribunal shall judicial be deemed to proceedings be a civil court within the for the meaning of purposes of sections 193, section 195 219 and 228 for and Chapter the purposes of XXVI of the section 196 of Code of the Indian Penal Criminal Code and the Procedure, Tribunal shall be 1973 (2 of deemed to be a 1974). civil court for the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Section 25: Execution of award or order or decision of Tribunal. (1) An award or order or decision of the Tribunal under this Act shall be executable by the Tribunal as a decree of a civil court, and for this purpose, the Tribunal shall have all the powers of a civil court. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in 76 sub-section (1), the Tribunal may transmit any order or award made by it to a civil court having local jurisdiction and such civil court shall execute the order or award as if it were a decree made by that court. NGT CAT TDSAT AFT Appeal 22: Appeal to Section 18: Section 30: from the Supreme Appeal to Appeal to Tribunal. Court. Supreme Supreme Court. Court. Any person aggrieved by (1) (1) Subject to any award, Notwithstandi the provisions decision or ng anything of section 31, order of the contained in an appeal Tribunal, may, the Code of shall lie to the file an appeal to Civil Supreme the Supreme Procedure, Court against Court, within 1908 (5 of the final ninety days 1908) or in decision or from the date of any other law, order of the communication an appeal Tribunal of the award, shall lie (other than an decision or against any order passed order of the order, riot under section Tribunal, to being an 19): him, on any one interlocutory or more of the order, of the Provided that grounds appellate such appeal is specified in Tribunal to the preferred section 100 of Supreme within a period the Code of Court on one of ninety days Civil Procedure, or more of the of the said 1908: grounds decision or specified in order: Provided that section 100 of Provided the Supreme that Code. further that Court may there shall be entertain any (2) No appeal no appeal appeal after the shall lie against an expiry of ninety against any interlocutory days, if it is decision or order of the satisfied that order made by Tribunal. the appellant the Appellate was prevented Tribunal with (2) An appeal by sufficient the consent of shall lie to the cause from the parties. Supreme preferring the Court as of appeal. (3) Every right from any appeal under order or this section decision of the 77 shall be Tribunal in the preferred exercise of its within a period jurisdiction to of ninety days punish for from the date contempt: of the decision or order Provided that appealed an appeal against: under this sub-section PROVIDED shall be filed that the in the Supreme Supreme Court may Court within entertain the sixty days appeal after from the date the expiry of of the order the said period appealed of ninety days, against. if it is satisfied that the Section 31: appellant was Leave to prevented by appeal. sufficient cause from (1) An appeal preferring the to the appeal in time. Supreme Court shall lie with the leave of the Tribunal; and such leave shall not be granted unless it is certified by the Tribunal that a point of law of general public importance is involved in the decision, or it appears to the Supreme Court that the point is one which ought to be considered by that Court. (2) An application to the Tribunal for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court shall be made within a period of thirty 78 days beginning with the date of the decision of the Tribunal and an application to the Supreme Court for leave shall be made within a period of thirty days beginning with the date on which the application for leave is refused by the Tribunal. Section 32: Condonation. The Supreme Court may, upon an application made at any time by the appellant, extend the time within which an appeal may be preferred by him to that Court under section 30 or sub-section (2) of section 31. NGT CAT TDSAT AFT Exclusion Section 29: Section 27: 15: Civil 33: Exclusion of Bar of execution of court not to of jurisdictio jurisdiction. orders of a have jurisdiction n of Tribunal. jurisdiction. of civil Courts (1) With effect courts. from the date of Subject to the No civil court establishment other provisions shall have On and from of the Tribunal of this Act and jurisdiction to the date from under this Act, the rules,1[the entertain any which any no civil court order of a suit or jurisdiction, shall have Tribunal finally proceeding in powers and jurisdiction to disposing of an respect of any authority entertain any application or an matter which becomes appeal in appeal shall be the Appellate exercisable by respect of any final and shall Tribunal is the Tribunal in matter, which not be called in empowered by relation-to the Tribunal, is question in any or under this service empowered to court (including Act to matters under determine a High Court) determine and this Act, no 79 under its and such order] no injunction Civil Court appellate shall be executed shall be shall have, or jurisdiction. in the same granted by any be entitled to manner in which court or other exercise, such (2) No civil any final order of authority in jurisdiction, court shall have the nature respect of any power or jurisdiction to referred to in action taken authority in settle dispute or clause (a) of sub- or to be taken relation to entertain any section (2) or in pursuance those service question section 20 of any power matters. relating to any (whether or not conferred by claim for such final order or under this Summary: No granting any had actually Act civil court to relief or been made) in have, or be compensation respect of the Summary: No entitled to or restitution of grievance to civil court to exercise, such property which the have jurisdiction, damaged or application jurisdiction to power or environment relates would entertain any authority in damaged which have been suit or relation to may be executed. proceeding in service adjudicated respect of any matters falling upon by the 28: Exclusion of matter which under the Act Tribunal, and jurisdiction of the Appellate [s. 33]. no injunction in courts except Tribunal is respect of any the Supreme empowered to 34: Transfer action taken or Court. determine and of pending to be taken by no injunction cases. or before the On and from the shall be (1) Every suit, Tribunal in date from which granted by any or other respect of the any jurisdiction, court or other proceeding settlement of powers and authority in pending before such dispute or authority respect of any any court any such claim becomes action taken including a for granting any exercisable by the High Court or relief or under this Act by Tribunal [s. other compensation a Tribunal in 15]. authority or restitution of relation to immediately property recruitment and before the date damaged or matters of environment concerning establishment damaged shall recruitment to of the Tribunal be granted by any Service or under this Act, the civil court. post or service being a suit or matters proceeding the concerning cause of action members of any whereon it is Service or based, is such persons that it would appointed to any have been Service or post, within the [no court except jurisdiction of - the Tribunal, if (a) the Supreme it had arisen Court ; after such (b) any industrial establishment Tribunal, Labour within the Court or other jurisdiction of authority such Tribunal, constituted stand 80 under the transferred on Industrial that date to Disputes Act, such Tribunal. 1947 (14 of 1947) or any (2) Where any other suit, or other corresponding proceeding law for the time stands being in force, transferred shall have], or be from any court entitled to including a exercise any High Court or jurisdiction, other powers or authority to authority in the Tribunal relation to such under sub- recruitment or section (1),-- matters concerning such (a) the court or recruitment or other such service authority matters. shall, as soon as may be, Summary: No after such court except the transfer, Supreme Court, forward the any industrial records of Tribunal, Labour such suit, or court or other other authority proceeding to constitutes the Tribunal; under the Industrial (b) the Disputes Act, Tribunal may, 1947, to have on receipt of jurisdiction, such records, power or proceed to authority [s. 28]. deal with such suit, or other proceeding, so far as may be, in the same' manner as in the case of an application made under sub-section (2) of section 14, from the stage which was reached before such transfer or from any earlier stage or de novo as the Tribunal may deem fit. 35: Provision for filing of 81 certain appeals. Where any decree or order has been made or passed by any court (other than a High Court) or any other authority in any suit or proceeding before the establishment of the Tribunal, being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based, is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after such establishment, within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and no appeal has been preferred 'against such decree or order before such establishment or if preferred, the same is pending for disposal before any court including High Court and the time for preferring such appeal under any law for the time being in force had not expired before such establishment, such appeal shall lie to the Tribunal, within ninety days from the 82 date on which the Tribunal is established, or within ninety days from the date of receipt of the copy of such decree or order, whichever is later. NGT CAT TDSAT AFT Act to have Section 33: Act to Section 33: Act to Section 39: Act overriding have overriding have overriding to have effect. effect. effect. overriding effect. The provisions of The provisions of The provisions of this Act, shall have this Act shall have this Act shall effect effect have effect notwithstanding notwithstanding notwithstanding anything anything inconsistent anything inconsistent therewith contained inconsistent contained in any in any other law for therewith other law for the the time being in contained, in any time being in force force or in any other law for the or in any instrument having time being in instrument having effect by virtue of force or in any effect by virtue of any law other than instrument having any law other than this Act. effect by virtue of this Act. any law other than this Act. NGT CAT TDSAT AFT Power of Rule 3(2), 3(3) of Section 5: Section 14-I: Section 20: Chairperson the National Composition of Distribution of Distribution of to transfer Green Tribunal Tribunals and business business among cases. (Practice and Benches thereof. amongst the Benches. Procedure) Rules, Benches. 2011 r/w Section 4 (6) Notwithstanding The Chairperson (4) (d) of the NGT anything contained Where Benches may make Act, 2010. in the foregoing are constituted, provisions as to provisions of this the Chairperson the distribution of Rule 3: section, it shall be of the Appellate the business of Distribution of competent for the Tribunal may, the Tribunal business amongst Chairman or any from time to time, among its the different other Member by notification, Benches. ordinary place or authorized by the make provisions places of Sittings Chairman in this as to the Section 27: of Tribunal. behalf to function as distribution of the Power of [a Bench] consisting business of the Chairperson to (2) The of a Single Member Appellate transfer cases Chairperson shall and exercise the Tribunal amongst from one Bench have the power to jurisdiction, powers the Benches and to another. decide the and authority of the also provide for distribution of the Tribunal in respect the matters which On the business of the of such classes of may be dealt with application of any Tribunal amongst cases or such matters by each Bench. of the parties and the members of the pertaining to such after notice to the Tribunal sitting at classes of cases as Section 14J: parties concerned, 83 different places by the Chairman may Power of and after hearing order and specify by general or special Chairperson to such of them as the matters which order specify: transfer cases. he may desire to may be dealt with Provided that if at be heard, or on by each such sitting any stage of the On the his own motion in accordance with hearing of any such application of any without such the provisions of case or matter it of the parties and notice, the clause (d) of sub- appears to the after notice to the Chairperson may section (4) of Chairman or such parties, and after transfer any case section 4 of the Member that the hearing such of pending before Act. case or matter is of them as he may one Bench for such a nature that it desire to be heard, disposal, to, any (3) If any question ought to be heard by or on his own other Bench. arises as to whether a Bench consisting motion without any matter falls of [two Members], such notice, the within the purview the case or matter Chairperson of of the business may be transferred the Appellate allocated to a place by the Chairman or, Tribunal may of sitting, the as the case may be, transfer any case decision of the referred to him for pending before Chairperson shall transfer to, such one Bench, for be final. Bench as the disposal, to any Chairman may deem other Bench. Section 4(4)(d): fit. The Central Government may, 18: Distribution of in consultation with business amongst the Chairperson of the Benches. the Tribunal, make rules regulating (2) If any question generally the arises as to whether practices and any matter falls procedure of the within the purview Tribunal including of the business :- allocated to a Bench (d) rules relating to of a Tribunal, the transfer of cases by decision of the the Chairperson Chairman thereon from one place of shall be final. sitting (including Explanation: For the the ordinary place removal or doubts, it of sitting) to other is hereby declared place of sitting. that the expression "matters" includes applications under section 19. 25. Power of Chairman to transfer cases from one Bench to another - On the application of any of the parties and after notice to the parties, and after hearing such of them as he may desire to be heard, or on his own motion without 84 such notice, the Chairman may transfer any case pending before one Bench, for disposal, to any other Bench. NGT CAT TDSAT AFT Section 29: Section 14M: Section 34: Transfer of Transfer of Transfer of Transfer of pending pending cases. pending cases. pending cases. cases. (1) Every suit or All applications, (1) Every suit, or other proceeding pending for other proceeding pending before any adjudication of pending before court or other disputes before any court authority the Authority including a High immediately before immediately Court or other the date of before the date of authority establishment of a establishment of immediately Tribunal under this the Appellate before the date of Act, being a suit or Tribunal under establishment of proceeding the cause this Act, shall the Tribunal of action whereon it stand transferred under this Act, is based is such that on that date to being a suit or it would have been, such Tribunal: proceeding the if it had arisen after cause of action such establishment, PROVIDED that whereon it is within the all disputes being based, is such that jurisdiction of such adjudicated under it would have Tribunal, shall stand the provisions of been within the transferred on that Chapter IV as it jurisdiction of the date to such stood Tribunal, if it had Tribunal: immediately arisen after such before the establishment Provided that commencement within the nothing in this sub- of the Telecom jurisdiction of section shall apply to Regulatory such Tribunal, any appeal pending Authority of India stand transferred as aforesaid before a (Amendment) on that date to High Court. Act, 2000, shall such Tribunal. continue to be (2) Every suit or adjudicated by the (2) Where any other proceeding Authority in suit, or other pending before a accordance with proceeding stands court or other the provisions transferred from authority contained in that any court immediately before Chapter, till the including a High the date with effect establishment of Court or other from which the Appellate authority to the jurisdiction is Tribunal under Tribunal under conferred on a this Act: sub-section (1),-- Tribunal in relation (a) the court or to any local or other PROVIDED other authority authority or FURTHER that shall, as soon as corporation 2 [or all cases referred may be, after such society], being a suit to in the first transfer, forward or proceeding the proviso shall be the records of cause of action transferred by the such suit, or other whereon it is based Authority to the proceeding to the is such that it would Appellate Tribunal; 85 have been, if it had Tribunal (b) the Tribunal arisen after the said immediately on may, on receipt of date, within the its establishment such records,
jurisdiction of such under section 14. proceed to deal Tribunal, shall stand with such suit, or transferred on that other proceeding, date to such so far as may be, Tribunal: in the same' manner as in the Provided that case of an nothing in this sub- application made section shall apply to under sub-section any appeal pending (2) of section 14, as aforesaid before a from the stage High Court. which was reached before Explanation.-For the such transfer or purposes of this sub- from any earlier section "date with stage or de novo effect from which as the Tribunal jurisdiction is may deem fit.
conferred on a Tribunal", in relation to any local or other authority or corporation 1 [or society], means the date with effect from which the provisions of subsection (3) of section 14 or, as the case may be, sub-
section (3) of section 15 are applied to such local or other authority or corporation [or society].
(3) Where immediately before the date of establishment of a Joint Administrative Tribunal any one or more of the States for which it is established, has or have a State Tribunal or State Tribunals, all cases pending before such State Tribunal or State Tribunals immediately before the said date together with the records thereof shall stand transferred on that date to such Joint Administrative 86 Tribunal.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-
section, "State Tribunal" means a Tribunal established under sub-section (2) of section 4.
(4) Where any suit, appeal or other proceeding stands transferred from any court or other authority to a Tribunal under sub-
section (1) or sub-
section (2),-
(a) the court or other authority shall, as soon as may be after such transfer, forward the records of such suit, appeal or other proceeding to the Tribunal; and
(b) the Tribunal may, on receipt of such records, proceed to deal with such suit, appeal or other proceeding, so far as may be, in the same manner as in the case of an application under section 19 from the stage which was reached before such transfer or from any earlier stage or de novo as the Tribunal may deem fit.
(5) Where any case stand transferred to a Joint Administrative Tribunal under sub-
section (3), the Joint Administrative Tribunal may proceed to deal with such case from the stage which was reached before it stood so transferred.
(6) Every case 87 pending before a Tribunal immediately before the commencement of the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 1987, being a case the cause of action whereon it is based is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after such commencement, within the jurisdiction of any court, shall, together with the records thereof, stand transferred on such commencement to such court.
(7) Where any case stands transferred to a court under sub-
section (6), that court may proceed to deal with such case from the stage which was reached before it stood so transferred.
82. A comparative study of the various provisions under the afore referred Acts, in fact, gives a much wider power to the Chairperson of National Green Tribunal in relation to the transfer of cases. Rule 3 of The National Green Tribunal (Practices and Procedure) Rules, 2011 (for short 'Rules of 2011') states that the decision of the Chairperson as regards whether the matter falls within the purview of the business allocated to a place of the sitting or not, would be final. Such a provision is conspicuous by its very absence in the most of the other Acts relating to different Tribunals. The provisions relating to the powers of Chairperson for allocation of 88 business, transfer of cases and constitution of benches have to be construed in light of the settled principles. These aspects are the prerogative of the head of the Tribunal and even judicial discipline and proprietary, being two significant facets of administration of justice, have to be the precepts for such interpretation. Such interpretation should be given that would adhere to these principles and not be in opposition thereto. At this stage, we may notice that in the absence of any specific provision in relation to the power of the Chief Justice of a High Court to transfer cases from one bench to another and in relation to marking of cases, roaster of the benches and matters relating thereto are the exclusive prerogative of the Chief Justice. In the case of Kishore Samrite v. State of U.P, (2013) 2 SCC 398, the Supreme Court held as under:
"25. The roaster and placing of cases before different Benches of the High Court is unquestionably the prerogative of the Chief Justice of that Court. In the High Courts, which have Principal and other Benches, there is a practice and as per rules, if framed, that the senior most Judge at the Benches, other than the Principal Bench, is normally permitted to exercise powers of the Chief Justice, as may be delegated to the senior most Judge. In absence of the Chief Justice, the senior most Judge would pass directions in regard to the roaster of the Judges and listing of cases. Primarily, it is exclusive prerogative of the Chief Justice and does not admit any ambiguity or doubt in this regard.
29. Judicial discipline and propriety are the two significant facets of administration of justice. Every court is obliged to adhere to these principles to 89 ensure hierarchical discipline on the one hand and proper dispensation of justice on the other. Settled canons of law prescribe adherence to the rule of law with due regard to the prescribed procedures. Violation thereof may not always result in invalidation of the judicial action but normally it may cast a shadow of improper exercise of judicial discretion. When extraordinary jurisdiction, like the writ jurisdiction, is very vast in its scope and magnitude, there it imposes a greater obligation upon the courts to observe due caution while exercising such powers. This is to ensure that the principles of natural justice are not violated and there is no occasion of impertinent exercise of judicial discretion."
83. Having due regard to the stated principles in light of the facts before us, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the Chairperson of the National Green Tribunal, in terms of the provisions of the NGT Act, Rules of 2011 and the general practice in relation to such matters, is vested with the power to transfer cases from one bench to another, from one ordinary place of sitting to other place of sitting or even to a place other than that.
84. The National Green Tribunal is vested with the wide jurisdiction which includes the powers of civil court, complete judicial independence, restriction-free procedure, authority and the determinative process, the power to pass final orders; which could be appealed only in accordance with the provisions of the Act, jurisdiction to hear all civil cases relating to environment and further the scheme of the Act sufficiently provides for exercise of 90 power of judicial review in relation to the specified subjects by the Tribunal.
85. The Courts and Tribunals that are engaged in judicial functions dispensing justice to the public at large are expected to have powers which are necessary to perform its basic functions. As already noticed, unless there is a specific exclusion, such normal powers stated to be inherent in its functioning. The Supreme Court in the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd vs Central Government Industrial Tribunal And Ors. AIR 1981 SC 606 while dealing with the powers of the Tribunal in relation to setting aside ex parte award in absence of any such power and the award which has become enforceable as a result of its being published rejecting the contention that the Tribunal had become functus officio, Court held as under:
"We are of the opinion that the Tribunal had the power to pass the impugned order if it thought fit in the interest of justice. It is true that there is no express provision in the Act or the rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to do so. But it is a well-known rule of statutory construction that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. In a case of this nature, we are of the view that the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the statute to the contrary. We do not find any such statutory prohibition. On the other hand, there are indications to the contrary."
86. From the above, it is clear that ancillary or incidentally powers which are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties should be 91 considered to be endowed. If the power of judicial review in its limited scope is not expected to be endowed upon the Tribunal then majority of the cases wherein Orders, Circulars, Notifications issued in exercise of subordinate legislation are challenged could not be fully and completely decided by the Tribunal, though they exclusively fall in the domain of the Tribunal.
87. Another very important aspect that cannot be overlooked by the Tribunal is that Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a discretionary jurisdiction to be exercised by the High Courts. It does not give an absolute right to a person. For variety of reasons, the High Court may decline to entertain a petition in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, while the NGT Act gives a statutory right to an applicant, aggrieved person or any person to approach the Tribunal in all matters relating to Acts specified in Schedule I of the NGT Act. It is not a discretionary jurisdiction like under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
88. On a comparative analysis of various provisions of the different Acts afore-stated, it is evident that power, jurisdiction, judicial independence, exclusion of jurisdiction and other determinative factors prescribed under the NGT Act are of wide connotation and are free of restrictions. Sections 14, 15 and 16 read co-jointly give three different jurisdictions to the Tribunal over all disputes and appeals relating to various fields of environment. The jurisdiction is exercisable in relation to the 92 matters arising from any or all of the Scheduled Acts. Examined objectively, the provisions of the NGT Act are more akin to the provisions of the CAT Act, in contradistinction to the provisions of the TDSAT. The various features and aspects of the NGT Act that we have discussed above would bring the case before the Tribunal within the ambit of L. Chandra Kumar case (supra), as opposed to the case being covered by BSNL case (supra). We have already dealt above, in some elaboration, the aspect as to how the cases relied upon by the respondents do not apply to the facts of the present case, keeping in view the provisions and the legislative scheme of the referred Acts and various judicial pronouncements. At the cost of repetition, we may record here that the language of the various provisions of the NGT Act by necessary implication gives power of judicial review to the Tribunal. There is no specific or even by necessary implication exclusion of such power indicated in any of the provisions. Furthermore, in the scheme of various environmental acts and if the object and purpose of such acts are to be achieved then the power of judicial review would have to be read into the provisions of the NGT Act. If the notifications issued under any of the Scheduled Acts, by virtue of the powers vested by subordinate or delegated legislation, are ultra vires the Act itself or are unconstitutional as they violate Articles 14 or 19 of the Constitution of India, then it has to be construed that the Tribunal is vested with the power of examining such notifications so as to completely and comprehensively decide the disputes, applications, appeals before it. Of course, the 93 powers of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution of India have not been excluded under the provisions of the NGT Act, thus ensuring that the Tribunal performs supplemental functions and does not supplant the Higher Courts.
89. The Supreme Court in the case of K.S. Venkatraman and Co. v. State of Madras, (1966) 2 SCR 229, has stated the proposition that an authority or Tribunal constituted under an Act cannot, unless expressly so authorised, question the validity of the Act or any provisions thereof under which it is constituted. This is a sound principle and has been followed consistently. To put it in other words, a Tribunal or an authority constituted under an Act can even examine the validity of the provisions of the Act which created it, provided it is so expressly authorized by the Act itself. This Tribunal is not travelling into that realm of law, but is concerned with the validity of the notifications issued under the Acts other than the Act that created the National Green Tribunal. For this proposition, we have referred to various judgments above. Subordinate or Delegated Legislation and Executive Order:
90. During the course of arguments, an attempt has been made to raise an issue as to whether issuance of CRZ Notifications is an act of subordinate legislation or is an executive act. This distinction has to be clearly understood in terms of law to enable the Tribunal to examine the merit or otherwise of this contention and the consequences thereof. In our Constitution 'doctrine of 94 separation of power' clearly demarcates the areas of operation of respective organs of the State. Article 13(3) of the Constitution defines 'law' which includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usages having in the territory of India the force of law. The Indian Constitution does not contain any express or implied prohibition against delegation of legislative powers. Delegated legislation is not a new phenomenon. Ever since statutes came to be enacted by the Parliament, the concept of delegated legislation also came into existence. In exercise of such delegated power, the concern authority framed rules or regulations. The exigencies of the modern state, specially, the social and economic reforms have given rise to making of delegated legislation on a large scale. Salmond (Salmond jurisprudence 12th edition page 116) defines "delegated legislation" as "that which proceeds from any authority other than the sovereign power and is, therefore, dependent for its continued existence and validity on some superior or supreme authority". One of the reasons for delegating the power to legislate to the Government is that the areas for which powers are given to make delegated legislation may be so complex that it may not be possible and even may be difficult to set up all the permutations in the statute. The statute may not be so comprehensively drafted so as to provide for all and every situation, thus, to make a law efficacious, practical and effective, normally, the tool of delegated legislation is called in aid. Legislature is to make or enact laws. 'Legislative Act', as defined in The Law Lexicon, 3rd ed. 2012, is an 95 Act which prescribes what the law shall be in future cases arising under it; an act of legislative department of the Government, by which the law to be applied in future cases under particular states of fact is established in the form of statute, ordinance, or other written form. The expression 'executive action' as appearing in Article 166(1) of the Constitution is comprehensive enough and apt to include even orders which emerge after, and embody the results of a judicial or quasi-judicial disposal by Government. (Pioneer Motors Ltd. v. O.M.A Majeed, AIR 1957 Mad 48, 51).
91. The Oxford Dictionary of English, 3rd Edition, 2010 describes 'executive order' as a rule or order issued by the President to an executive branch of the government and having the force of law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of U.O.I v. Cynamide India Ltd. and Anr. etc., (1987) 2 SCC 720, stated the distinction between the executive order and power of legislation as follows:
"7. The distinction between the two has usually been expressed as 'one between the general and the particular'.'A legislative act is the creation and promulgation of a general rule of conduct without reference to particular cases; an administrative act is the making and issue of a specific direction or the application of a general rule to a particular case in accordance with the requirements of policy'. 'Legislation is the process of formulating a general rule of conduct without reference to particular cases and usually operating in future; administration is the process of performing particular acts, of issuing particular orders or of making decisions which apply general rules to particular cases.' It has also been said "Rule making is normally directed toward the formulation of requirements having a general application to all members of a broadly identifiable class" while, "adjudication, on the other hand, applies to specific individuals or situations". But, this is only a bread distinction, not necessarily always true. Administration 96 and administrative adjudication may also be of general application and there may be legislation of particular application only. That is not ruled out. Again, adjudication determines past and present facts and declares rights and liabilities while legislation indicates the future course of action. Adjudication is determinative of the past and the present while legislation is indicative of the future. The object of the rule, the reach of its application, the rights and obligations arising out of it, its intended effect on past, present and future events, its form, the manner of its promulgation are some factors which may help in drawing the line between legislative and non-legislative acts."
92. An act of issuing a Notification is a part of a legislative action. The Notification issued by the Government or any competent authority in exercise of its delegated powers can be judicially noticed. The Supreme Court in the case of State v. Gopal Singh on 21 September, 1956 CriLJ 621 held that "such a notification is a part of the law itself and, therefore, judicial notice of the notification can be taken." In exercise of the power of subordinate legislation when a regulation is made and is validly approved by the legislation, if so required. It becomes a part of the Act and should be read as such (Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Ltd v. NTPC, (2009) 6 SCC 235). The executive order may not be a law but a legislative order is part of the law (Edward Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Ajmer', (S) 1955 1 SCR 735)
93. The Supreme Court while dealing with the cases involving challenge to such Orders and Notifications, stated the precepts that should guide the courts where the question is whether the impugned action is legislative or executive and the scope of its challenge was discussed in the case of Bombay Dyeing and Mfg. 97 Co. Ltd. vs. Bombay Environmental Action Group and Ors., (2006) 3 SCC 434:
"197. A matter involving environmental challenges may have to be considered by a superior court depending upon the fact as to whether the impugned action is a legislative action or an executive action. In case of an executive action, the court can look into and consider several factors, namely,
(i) Whether the discretion conferred upon the statutory authority had been property exercised;
(ii) Whether exercise of such discretion is in consonance with the provisions of the Act;
(iii) Whether while taking such action, the executive government had taken into consideration the purport and object of the Act;
(iv) Whether the same subserved other relevant factors which would affect the public in large;
(v) Whether the principles of sustainable development which have become part of our constitutional law have been taken into consideration; and
(vi) Whether in arriving at such a decision, both substantive due process and procedural due process had been complied with.
198. It would, however, unless an appropriate case is made out, be difficult to apply the aforementioned principles in the case of a legislative act. It is no doubt true that Articles 14, 21, 48A of the Constitution of India must be applied both in relation to an executive action as also in relation to a legislation, however, although the facet of reasonableness is a constitutional principle and adherence thereto being a constitutional duty may apply, the degree and the extent to which such application would be made indisputably would be different. Judicial review of administrative action and judicial review of legislation stand on a different footing. What is permissible for the court in case of judicial review of administrative action may not be permissible while exercising the power of judicial review of legislation.
199. It may, however, be a different thing to contend that the legislation had been enacted without constitutional principles in mind. The real question is whether the constitutional mandates had been complied with in making such legislation.98
209. So far as the argument based on violation of Article 48A of the Constitution is concerned, the provisions thereof are required to be construed as a part of the principle contained in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. A statute may not be ultra vires Article 48A itself if it is not otherwise offensive of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. What, however, cannot be done for striking down legislation can certainly be done for striking down executive action."
94. From the afore-stated principles, there is clear distinction between a legislative order/notification and an executive order and the consequences thereof in law. Even a delegated or subordinate legislation can be challenged on some of the similar grounds upon which the principal legislation itself can be challenged. In the case of Mahalakshmi Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., (2009) 16 SCC, 569, the Supreme Court held that validity of delegated (subordinate) legislation can be challenged on all those grounds on which the validity of a legislation can be challenged. The grounds are as follows: it is ultra vires the Constitution; it is ultra vires of the parent Act; It is contrary to the statutory provisions other than those contained in the parent legislation; The law making power has been exercised unreasonably or in bad faith or goes against the legislative policy and does not fulfil the object and purpose of the parent Act. Thus, the power of judicial review would extend both to legislative as well as acts of delegated or subordinate legislation. The correctness and legality of an executive order can be challenged besides these grounds, on arbitrariness, culpable 99 exercise of power and the order being beyond the competence of the authority passing the order etc.
95. Reverting to the present case the CRZ Notification dated 19th February, 1991, which has been amended on 3rd of October, 2001, was issued in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 3(1) and Section (2) (v) of the Act of 1986 and Rule 5(3) (d) of the Rules of 1986, in declaring coastal stretches as coastal regulation zone and for regulating activities in the coastal regulation zone. The legislature has delegated legislative power to the Central Government to take all measures as it deems necessary or expedient for the purposes of protecting and improving quality of the environment and preventing controlling and abating environmental pollution. This is a very wide power, which has been vested in the Central Government by delegated legislation under these provisions. In the exercise of its powers and with the object of satisfying the stated purpose, the Notification of 2011 has been issued under the power of delegated/subordinate legislation. Thus, there cannot be any doubt that the Notification of 2011 in the case before us, is a piece of delegated legislation and its legality, correctness or otherwise can be questioned only on the limited grounds afore- stated.
96. To bring out this distinction illustratively and more clearly, we may refer to the power of the MoEF (Central Government) to issue Environmental Clearance in terms of the provisions of the 100 Act of 1986 read with the Regulations of 2006. The order granting or refusing Environmental Clearance to a Project Proponent, is not an act of subordinate or delegated legislation but clearly is an executive act. The Central Government in exercise of its executive powers, passes an order whether or not a given project should be granted Environmental Clearance for commencing its operation. In passing such orders, the Central Government does not act in furtherance to the powers vested in it by virtue of delegated legislation. It is merely an executive act relatable to the statutory powers vested in the Central Government. The CRZ Notification issued by the Central Government is therefore an act of delegated legislation while passing of an order of Environmental Clearance is an executive order. This view finds support from the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Utkarsh Mandal vs. Union of India, Writ Petition (civil) no. 9340/2009 which held that "grant of environmental clearance is an executive order which involves application of mind by the executive."
Discussion on preliminary issues B and C:
"B. In the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, part of cause of action has risen at New Delhi and within the area that falls under territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Bench of NGT. Thus, this bench has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present cases.
C. On the cumulative reading and true construction of Section 4 (4) of the NGT Act and Rules 3 to 6 and Rule 11 of Rules of 2011, the Chairperson of NGT has the power and authority to transfer cases from one ordinary place of sitting to other place of sitting or even to place other than that. The Chairperson of NGT has the power to decide the distribution of business of the Tribunal among the members of the Tribunal, including adoption of circuit procedure in accordance with the Rules. An applicant shall ordinarily file 101 an application or appeal at ordinary place of sitting of a Bench within whose jurisdiction the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen; in terms of Rule 11 which has an inbuilt element of exception."
97. It will be appropriate for the Tribunal to examine issues (b) and (c) together as there is commonality in the provisions referred and arguments advanced by the Learned Counsel appearing for the parties. We have already reproduced Sections 14, 15 and 16 relating to Original, Appellate and special jurisdiction vested with the Tribunal. Section 14 in particular vests with the Tribunal a very wide jurisdiction which is to be exercised subject to provisions of the NGT Act. Section 18 describes the manner and methodology as to how an Application in either of the Sections 14, 15 and 16 has to be filed before the Tribunal. Section 18(2) gives the locus standi to the person who can file an application for grant of compensation or settlement of dispute before the Tribunal. Clauses (a) to (f) of sub-section 2 of Section 18 describe elaborately such persons. The application so filed before the Tribunal under the Act shall be dealt with as expeditiously as possible to dispose of appeals and applications within the period of six months from the date of filing. Sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 19 provide that the Tribunal shall not be bound by procedure laid down in the CPC and it shall have power to regulate its own procedure. It shall not be bound by the rules of evidence contained in Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the CPC while trying a suit in respect of the various matters. Let 102 us now examine the significance of cause of action in terms of environmental jurisprudence.
98. The expression 'cause of action' has been used in the provisions of the NGT Act and the Rules framed there under, only at two different places - one under Section 14(3) of the NGT Act and the other under Rule 11 of the Rules of 2011. The earlier relates to prescription of period of limitation of six months while the latter relates to the places of filing of an application before the Tribunal which would be its ordinary place of sitting falling within the jurisdiction. 'Cause of action' has been used in different context and would operate entirely in different fields, as discussed above. The bare reading of Rule 11 which we have reproduced hereafter shows that ordinarily an application or an appeal could be filed with the Registrar of the Tribunal at its ordinary place of sitting falling within the jurisdiction, the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen. In other words, right to institute a petition is relatable to the cause of action having been arisen wholly or in part. Part of cause of action provides a right to an applicant or appellant to institute the appeal or application as the case may be, normally at the bench which has territorial jurisdiction over the place whether cause of action wholly or in part has arisen.
103
99. Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India uses language identical to Rule 11 of the Rules of 2011. There, it is also said that the power could be exercised by any High Courts exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the 'cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power'.
100. The bare reading of these provisions clearly indicates that in a given case, only one High Court or bench of the Tribunal may have territorial jurisdiction to entertain and to decide the petition, while in some other case two High Courts or Benches may have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain a petition/appeal, as the cause of action may have arisen in part in the territorial jurisdiction of either of the benches. The concept of territorial jurisdiction has to be clearly understood as opposed to pecuniary jurisdiction. The earlier concept may provide alternative jurisdiction at two or even more places/ Benches, while the latter would be only in regard to competence of the court to try such matters with reference to its pecuniary jurisdiction.
101. In the case of Nasiruddin v. S.T.A. Tribunal, [1976]1SCR505, the Supreme Court while dealing with the expression 'cause of action' wholly or in part, held as under:
"37. The expression "cause of action" with regard to a civil matter means that it should be left to the 104 litigant to institute cases at Lucknow Bench or at Allahabad Bench according to the cause of action arising wholly or in part within either of the areas. If the cause of action arises wholly within Oudh areas then the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. Similarly, if the cause of action arises wholly outside the specified areas of Oudh then Allahabad will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action in part arises in the specified Oudh areas and part of the cause of action arises outside the specified areas, it will be open to the litigant to frame the case appropriately to attract the jurisdiction either at Lucknow or at Allahabad".
102. The Supreme Court in the case of Alchemist Ltd. v. State Bank of Sikkim, (2007) 2 SCC 335, held as follows:
"28.From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the ratio laid down in a catena of decisions by this Court, it is clear that for the purpose of deciding whether facts averred by the appellant-petitioner would or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such fact constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of action. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the court, the court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a "part of cause of action", nothing less than that."
103. In the case of Union of India v. Adani Exports Limited and Anr., the Supreme Court had taken a view stating that mere existence of office of a company would not ipso facto give cause of action to the Court within whose jurisdiction such an office is located. The cause of action must be relatable to 105 the facts as they exist on the date of the institution of the suit.
104. This obviously means that situs per say may not vest jurisdiction in a court unless other facts show that even infraction of cause of action has arisen within that jurisdiction.
105. In the case of Rajiv Modi vs. Sanjay Jain & Ors, (2009) 13 SCC 241, the Supreme Court stated the law in that regard as follows:
"12. In order to appreciate the jurisdictional aspect, it would be relevant to discuss the meaning of the expression "cause of action". The Court has laid down that the cause of action is a fundamental element to confer the jurisdiction upon any Court and which has to be proved by the plaintiff to support his right to a judgment of the court. It is relevant to take note of what was stated by this court in state of Bombay v. Narottamdas Jethabhai, 1951 SCR 51. In this case, it is observed, that the jurisdiction of the courts depended in civil cases on a "cause of action" giving rise to a civil liability, and in criminal cases on the commission of an offence, and on the provisions made in the two Codes of Procedure as to the venue of the trial and other relevant matters.
29. In view of the above principles, the Court on the basis of the averments made in the complaint, if it is prima facia of the opinion that the whole or a part of cause of action has arisen in its jurisdiction, it can certainly take cognizance of the complaint. There is no need to ascertain that the allegations made are true in fact".106
106. In a peculiar case relating to the territorial jurisdiction, which had arisen from the Bihar Reorganization Act, 2000, relating to reorganization of Bihar but while construing the provisions of the Act, the court was concerned as to which of the High Courts, i.e. Bihar or Jharkhand will have territorial jurisdiction over the matter. The Notification had been issued under the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 prior to reorganization, though its impact was upon the petitioner located in Jharkhand. Dealing with the expression 'cause of action' wholly or in part under Article 226 (2), the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Commercial Taxes Ranchi and Anr. v Swarn Rekha Cokes and Coals (P) LTD., (2004) 6 SCC 689, held as under:
"25.We shall first deal with the submission urged on behalf of the appellant in Civil Appeal No.7798 of 2002 that the High Court of Judicature at Patna had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and issue a writ o mandamus to the State of Jharkhand.
We have earlier noticed that though the State of Jharkhand was not a party in the writ petition filed before the High Court of Patna, after a leaned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition and granted the relief prayed for, the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Ranchi, Jharkhand State preferred a letters patent appeal impugning the judgment and orders of the learned Single Judge. In the letters patent appeal, no objection was taken to the jurisdiction of the Patna High Court to entertain the writ petition. Moreover, as submitted by Mr. Parasaran, it cannot be said that the entire cause of action was in the State of Jharkhand because the notification of the State of Bihar issued under 107 Section 7(3) (b) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 formed the basis on which the respondents founded their claim. This, therefore, necessarily formed a part of the cause of action and the respondents had to satisfy the Court that the aforesaid notification supported their claim for exemption from payment of sales tax on the purchase of raw materials. No doubt, in these circumstances the State of Jharkhand ought to have been made a party-
respondent. This however, is of no consequence now in view of the fact that the State of Jharkhand itself sought to prefer an appeal against the order of the leaned Single Judge and in fact preferred a letters patent appeal and contested the claim of the respondents. It did not object to the jurisdiction of the High Court at Patna to entertain the writ petition. Since a part of the cause of action lay in the State of Bihar, it cannot be disputed that the High Court of Patna also had the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The objections that the State of now since the State itself preferred an appeal and contested the case of the writ petitioners. Moreover, this objection as to jurisdiction cannot be raised in Civil Appeal No.2450 of 2003 since in that case the State of Bihar itself had refused to grant the benefit of exemption to the appellant therein. So far as Civil Appeal No.2450 of 2003 since in that case the State of Bihar itself had refused to grant the benefit of exemption to the appellant therein. So far as Civil Appeal No.3765 of 2003 is concerned, the judgment has been rendered by the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi. Since common questions arise in all these appeals, we consider it appropriate to decide the questions that arise in all these appeals, we consider it appropriate to decide the questions that arise in all these appeals, particularly, when we find that a part of the cause of action lay in the State of Bihar and consequently, the High Court at Patna had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and grant relief. We, therefore, reject the objection raised by the State of Jharkhand 108 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the High Court of Patna to entertain the writ petition."
107. Learned Senior Advocate, Mr. Vikas Singh appearing for the project proponent heavily relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr., (2004) 6 SCC 254, to contend that the issuance of notification by itself would not fall within the ambit of 'cause of action' wholly or partly and as such the Principal Bench does not has any territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application. According to the Learned Counsel, no 'cause of action' has risen at New Delhi despite the fact that the Notification of 2011 issued by MoEF was issued from New Delhi and MoEF itself is located at Delhi.
108. Thus, let us examine the facts and the principles stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd., v. Union of India and Anr., (2004) 6 SCC 254. The appellant company in that case was a registered company with its registered office at Mumbai. It had obtained a loan from the Bhopal branch of the State Bank of India. The branch issued a notice for repayment of the said loan from Bhopal, purported to be in terms of the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interests Act, 2002. While questioning the vires of the Act, a writ petition was filed 109 before the Delhi High Court which came to be dismissed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction, giving rise to the appeal before the Supreme Court. The contention raised was that since the constitutionality of the Parliamentary Act was in question, the Delhi High Court had the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. On this premise, in paragraph 10 of the judgment, the Supreme Court noticed:
Keeping in view the expressions used in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the court, the court will have jurisdiction in the matter.
In paragraph 21 of the judgment, the court noticed that:
If passing of a legislation gives rise to cause of action, a writ petition questioning the constitutionality thereof can be filed in any High Court of the country. It is not so done, because a cause of action will arise only when the provision of the Act or some of them which were implemented shall give rise to civil or evil consequences to the petitioner.
109. The Court stated the principle that courts would not determine a constitutional question in a vacuum. The court further held that framing of a statute, statutory rule or issue of an executive order or instruction would not confer jurisdiction upon a court only because of the situs of the office of the maker thereof.
110. From the analysis of the above paragraphs of the judgment in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. (supra), it is clear that even a small fraction of 'cause of action' that accrues 110 within the jurisdiction of the court gives territorial jurisdiction to that court. Furthermore, it is not the situs of the office of the maker of a statute, rule, or statutory provision or even the executive order that would confer jurisdiction upon a court. The theory of part of cause of action may not be of help to applicant in such cases. But, where issuances of such provisions, rule, instruction or executive order gives rise to affecting the rights of the people at large or individually or sets into motion the impact of issuance of such notification, then that place would fall within the framework of expression 'cause of action' as arisen wholly or in part. It may be noticed that when an order is passed by a Court or a Tribunal or an executive authority under a provision of a statute or otherwise a part of cause of action arises at that place. Similar reasoning had been adopted by the Supreme Court in Swarn Rekha Cokes and Coals (P) Ltd., (supra).
111. Another test would be whether the facts constitute a material, essential or integral part of 'cause of action' and once such a small fraction of the 'cause of action' arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, the court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit / petition. 111
112. The Supreme Court in the case of Oil Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Ors., (1994) 4 SCC 711, held that the facts forming an integral part of the cause of action would give jurisdiction to the Court, immaterial facts would not. It may be part of the cause of action, free of ulterior motives that would provide jurisdiction to the Court. In Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 2001 Supreme Court 416, the Supreme Court stated that cause of action in its wider sense means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but the infraction coupled with the right itself. It may also be noticed that Courts have also taken the view that merely because some incidental correspondence is exchanged between the parties, having no material or substantial bearing on the integral cause of action, would not vest jurisdiction with a Court.
113. At this stage, itself, it may be useful to notice that even under the un-amended Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. The Union of India and Anr, AIR 1961 SC 532, had held that the High Court within whose jurisdiction the person or authority against whom relief is 112 sought, would have the jurisdiction to entertain and decide a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
114. In light of the above legal principles, now let us examine the applicability of Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. (supra) to the facts of the present case. Firstly, the facts of Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. (supra) are very different and distinguishable. No doubt, the vires of the Act had been challenged before the High Court. But as claimed, the cause of action in favour of the petitioner therein had arisen only and at a place where and when a notice recalling the loan and threat to resort to other civil consequences was issued at Bhopal. The impact or the civil consequences flowing from the said notice were triggered at Bhopal. In absence of service of such notice, no cause of action would have arisen in favour of the applicant. The company was located at Bhopal, though had its registered office at Mumbai and notice of recalling the loan and directing civil consequences to follow was issued at Bhopal and given at Bhopal. It was on this premise that the court took the view that Delhi High Court had no territorial jurisdiction.
115. In the case in hand, the Notification of 2011 was issued by MoEF (6th January, 2011), who are respondents in these petitions and against whom the relief has been claimed at 113 New Delhi. The moment the CRZ Notification is issued, its impact and consequences follows in the entire country, particularly the entire coastal zone area. The CRZ Notification is a Notification in general and is in rem. It binds all, including the States, the Central Government, all persons and legal entities, etc. Upon issuance of such Notification, the restriction as contemplated in law, to the area covered under the Notification, operates without any further action from any quarter. Thus, the impact of the Notification follows instantaneously with its issuance, without any further requirement. Thus, in our considered view it fully satisfies the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgments and even in the case of Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr. (supra), in so far as the issuance of the Notification by MoEF at New Delhi has itself triggered the consequences thereof. Hence, not only but specifically cause of action has also arisen at Delhi in as much as the consequences of the Notification published at New Delhi have come into play instantaneously.
116. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it has to be held that a part of cause of action has arisen within the area under jurisdiction of the Principal Bench. Of course, it has also arisen at Kerala and the areas squarely falling in other coastal states within the territorial jurisdiction of the 114 Southern Bench of the National Green Tribunal. The Courts and Tribunals have often invoked the doctrine of forum conveniens. The Authority which issued the Notification of 2011 and which is expected to deal with the consequences thereof is situated at New Delhi. The Notification was itself issued at New Delhi. The applicants have approached both the Southern Bench and the Principal Bench by filing distinct applications, claiming for different reliefs in terms of Rule 14 of the Rules of 2011, where the application or appeal is to be filed upon a single cause of action, claiming one or more relief provided that they are consequential to one another. The Notification, its correctness, legality or otherwise and a prayer for maintaining 'areas of outstanding natural beauty' and 'areas likely to be inundated due to rise in sea level consequent upon global warming and such other areas as may be declared by the Central Government or the concerned authorities at the State/Union Territory level from time to time', not covered under the Notification, are the prayers which will have serious ramification for the larger parts of the country and falling under the jurisdiction of different benches.
117. Thus, even applying the doctrine of forum conveniens, it would be appropriate for the Principal Bench to hear these matters. In support of what we have concluded, we may refer 115 to Para 30 of Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr. (supra) that reads as under:
"We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens".
118. The applicability of doctrine of forum conveniens is more aptly applicable to the provisions of the Act in relation to the field of territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The use of word 'ordinarily' in Rule 11 is indicative of the legislative intent to provide for 'otherwise'. This appears to be the purpose of law, the Tribunal could refer to the intent of the legislature. This is not a new theory. It was pithily put by Learned Judge L. Hand who observed that the statutes "should be construed not as theorems of Euclid but with imagination of purpose behind them". One can call it the "liberal" approach.
119. Thus, keeping in mind the purpose of the NGT Act and the Rules of 2011, we are impressed with the contention of the Project Proponent.
120. In view of the fact that all the petitions raised common question of law based on somewhat similar facts, for a complete, 116 comprehensive and final decision, it will be appropriate to hear all these petitions together and at one place. Furthermore, to avoid the possibility of passing of conflicting orders by different benches, it is not only desirable but imperative that all cases are heard by one and in the same bench. It will meet the ends of justice. The Chairperson has the power to transfer cases from one bench to another bench, ordinary place of sitting to other place of sitting or even to the place other than that.
121. In view of the above detailed discussion, we hold that the Principal Bench of the Tribunal has territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide these cases as a part of cause of action has arisen in the areas within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Bench. As already held, the Chairperson has the power to transfer cases to and before benches and even places other than that.
122. Therefore, we allow Miscellaneous Application No. 239 of 2014 and direct that the Appeal No. 17 of 2014 pending before the Southern Bench shall stand transferred to the Principal Bench at New Delhi and would be heard together with Application No. 74 of 2014. This application stands disposed of accordingly.
123. There are no specific provisions in the NGT Act which deal with the requirements of territorial jurisdiction and cause of action, per se. However, Chapter 2 of the NGT Act deals with establishment of the Tribunal. Section 4 of the NGT Act requires 117 the government to appoint a Chairperson and ten Judicial and ten Expert members to the NGT. Under sub-Section (4) of Section 4, the Central Government in consultation with the Chairperson of the Tribunal can make rules, regulating generally the practice and procedure of the Tribunal. These rules could relate to the various aspects indicated in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-Section 4 of the NGT Act. The same reads as under:-
"(4) The Central Government may, in consultation with the Chairperson of the Tribunal, make rules regulating generally the practices and procedure of the Tribunal including: -
(a) the rules as to the person who shall be entitled to appear before the Tribunal;
(b) the rules as to the procedure for hearing applications and appeals and other matters [including the circuit procedure for hearing at a place other than the ordinary place of its sitting falling within the jurisdiction referred to in sub-section (3)], pertaining to the applications and appeals;
(c) the minimum number of Members who shall hear the applications and appeals in respect of any class or classes of applications and appeals:
Provided that the number of Expert Members shall, in hearing an application or appeal, be equal to the number of judicial Members hearing such application or appeal;
(d) rules relating to transfer of cases by the Chairperson from one place of sitting (including the ordinary place of sitting) to other place of sitting."
124. In exercise of the powers vested in the Central Government under the above provisions, the Central Government made the Rules of 2011. Rule 3 of the Rules empowers the Chairperson to constitute a Bench of two or more members consisting of at least one Judicial Member and one Expert Member. The Chairperson is further vested with the power to decide the distribution of the 118 business of the Tribunal amongst the members of the Tribunal sitting at different places by order and specify the matters which may be dealt with by each such sitting in accordance with the provisions of clause (d) of sub-Section 4 of Section 4 of the Act. In terms of Rule 3(3), if any question arises as to whether any matter falls within the purview of the business allocated to a place of sitting, the decision of the Chairperson shall be final. Under Rule 4, the Chairperson of the Tribunal by general or special order, decide the cases or class of cases for which circuit procedure may be adopted by the Tribunal. The circuit procedure in terms of Section 4 sub-Section (4), clause (b) of the NGT Act is hearing of a case at a place other than the ordinary place of sitting of the Tribunal falling within the jurisdiction referred to in sub-Section (3) of Section 4 of the NGT Act.
125. Section 4(4)(c) of the NGT Act and its proviso deals with the minimum number of Members who shall hear the cases, applications and appeals and also empowers the Central Government to make rules in that behalf. As per the proviso the number of Judicial Members and the Expert Members in hearing an application or an appeal has to be equal. However, Rule 5 of the Rules of 2011 contemplates that an application or an appeal be heard by a Bench consisting of at least a Judicial or an Expert Member. In terms of Rule 5(2), the Chairperson is empowered to direct hearing of cases or class of cases by a Bench consisting or more than two Members by an order in writing. Rule 6 has been framed in furtherance to Section 4(4)(d) of the NGT Act relating to 119 transfer of cases from one place of sitting to other place of sitting including the ordinary place of sitting of the Bench. Sitting could also be held at a place other than a place at which it ordinarily sits. Even a Judicial Member of the Tribunal can so direct with the previous approval of the Chairperson.
125. Rule 8 provides for procedure for filing of application or appeals and Rule 9 for its scrutiny by the Registrar and/or the authorized officer. Rule 11 is of significance as it states the place of filing of an application or an appeal. Rule 11 of the Rules of 2011 read as under:
"11. Place of filing application or appeal. - An application or appeal, as the case may be, shall ordinarily be filed by an applicant or appellant, as the case may be, with the Registrar of the Tribunal at its ordinary place of sitting falling within the jurisdiction, the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen."
126. The Central Government issued a notification dated 17th August, 2011 specified the places where the Benches of the Nation Green Tribunal would have their ordinary place of sitting. The notification dated 17th August, 2011 reads as under: -
MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS NOTIFICATION New Delhi, the 17th August, 2011 S.O. 1908(E). - In exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (19th of 2010), the Central Government hereby specifies the following ordinary places of sitting of the National Green Tribunal which shall exercise jurisdiction in the area indicated against each: -
Serial number Zone Place of Sitting Territorial
jurisdiction
1. Northern Delhi (Principal place) Uttar Pradesh,
Uttarakhand,
Punjab, Haryana,
Himachal Pradesh,
Jammu and
120
Kashmir, National
Capital Territory of
Delhi and Union
Territory of
Chandigarh.
2. Western Pune Maharashtra,
Gujarat, Goa with
Union Territories of
Daman and Diu and
Dadra and Nagar
Haveli.
3. Central Bhopal Madhya Pradesh,
Rajasthan and
Chattisgarh.
4. Southern Chennai Kerala, Tamil Nadu,
Andhra Pradesh,
Karnataka, Union
Territories of
Pondicherry and
Lakshadweep.
5. Eastern Kolkata West Bengal, Orissa,
Bihar, Jharkhand,
seven sister States of
North-Eastern
region, Sikkim,
Andaman and
Nicobar Islands:
___________________________________________________________________________ Provided that till the Benches of the National Green Tribunal become functional at Bhopal, Pune, Kolkata and Chennai, the aggrieved persons may file petititons before the National Green Tribunal at Delhi and till such time the notification No. S.O. 1003(E), dated the 5th May, 2011 in the Ministry of Environment and Forests, shall continue to be operative.
[F.No. 17(4)/2010-PL] RAJNEESH DUBE, Jt. Secy.
127. One common expression appearing in Section 4; Rule 11 and the Notification is 'ordinary place of sitting'. The Notification dated 17th August, 2011 identifies the ordinary places of sitting of the NGT and the areas indicated over which the respective Benches of the Tribunal shall exercise jurisdiction. This Notification essentially must be read and construed subject to the Rules of 2011 and the provisions of the NGT Act. A notification is law but is subject to the parent Act and even the subordinate 121 legislation under which it is issued. The powers of the Chairperson to constitute a Bench, the place where the cases or class of cases would be heard cannot be limited by the notification of August, 2011. The provisions of Section 4 and Rules 3, 6 and 11 cannot be frustrated by construing the notification in such strict or narrower manner that it would defeat the very object and purpose of the provisions of the Acts and the Rules framed thereunder. The power of the Chairperson to transfer cases in accordance with the Rules is free of any other restriction. The whole purpose is for better attainment of the ends of justice and for better administration of justice. The framers of the Rules of 2011 have specifically used the words "ordinarily be filed by an applicant or appellant with the Registrar of the Tribunal at its ordinary place of sitting falling within the jurisdiction, the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen" under Rule 11. The language of the Rule is not suggestive of application of doctrine of strict or restricted construction. The legislature in its wisdom has used the words which are capable of being given liberal construction on their plain reading. We see no reason as to why we should give them a restricted construction, particularly when this would amount to frustrating the purpose and object of the Act and the Rules thereunder. We are unable to accept the contention on behalf of the respondents that the provisions of other Acts relating to other Tribunals and the language of the NGT Act and the Rules thereunder grant a limited or restricted power to the Chairperson. We have already reproduced supra, the 122 comparative chart of the provisions of the Act even in relation to the power of the Chairperson to transfer cases. Under the NGT Act, power of the Chairperson to constitute Benches, distribution of the business of the Tribunal amongst the members of the Tribunal sitting at different places, transfer cases from one place of sitting to other place of sitting (including the ordinary place of sitting) as well as adoption of circuit benches, is wide enough to transfer cases from one bench to another, from one ordinary place of sitting to another ordinary place of sitting, as well as from one ordinary place of sitting to another place of sitting or even temporarily. If this interpretation is not accepted, then the very purpose of Section 4(4)(b) of the NGT Act and Rules 4 and 6 of the Rules of 2011 would stand defeated. It is a settled rule of interpretation that an interpretation which would further the cause and object of the Act and would render it more practical and effective in the interest of justice administration, should be preferred to the one that would invite results to the contrary. Even upon conjoint reading of the provisions afore-referred, it is not possible for us to come to any other conclusion. The use of the words 'ordinarily' and 'ordinary place of sitting' clearly indicate that the legislature had in its mind that there could be possibility of a case being filed at a place other than the ordinary place of sitting of the Bench. The expression necessarily implies that the cases could be filed at a place other than the ordinary place of sitting.
123
128. Rule 11 of the Rules of 2011 itself carves out an exception that depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, it could be filed at another ordinary place of sitting as well. For instance, the Notification of 17th August, 2011 itself says that other Benches which may not have become operative, their cases could be filed at the Principal Bench. If the framers of the Rules of 2011 intended to totally restrict filing of cases at any other place, then it could not have used the expression 'ordinarily'. "Ordinarily" in its common parlance would mean 'usually' or with no special or distinctive features. The Black's Law Dictionary, 9th Edition, explains the word 'ordinary', as occurring in the regular course of events, normally, usually. The expression 'ordinarily' with its connotations should be understood as opposed to 'solely' or 'required' or 'primarily'. The first of these expressions ex facie attract the rule of liberal construction, while others have a greater element of being mandatory. It is unreasonable to think that the word 'ordinarily' does not admit of any inbuilt expansion and has to be construed in prohibitory terms. It has to be presumed that the rule framing authority was aware of all the relevant considerations, including the fact that there are alternative words available to the word 'ordinarily'. Once the legislature uses such word, it cannot be said that the word has been used without a purpose and intendment, particularly when the language used is unambiguous, clear and admits no confusion. The expression 'ordinarily' has to be understood keeping in view the scheme of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder and is not to be 124 understood in isolation. The view finds due support from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. V. Sarma Rao, (2007) 2 SCC 159. In this case, the Supreme Court was concerned with the meaning of the expression 'ordinarily' under Section 195(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In terms of Section 195(4), a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which the appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court, or in the case of a Civil Court from whose decree no appeal ordinarily lies, to the Principal Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction within whose local jurisdiction such civil court is situated. The Supreme Court held as under: -
"12. Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not recognise administrative discipline; it recognises judicial discipline with regard to the right of the higher authority to exercise appellate powers. The expression "ordinarily" may mean "normally", as has been held by this Court in Kailash Chandra v. Union of India and Krishan Gopal v. Prakashchandra, but the said expression must be understood in the context in which it has been used. "Ordinarily" may not mean "solely" or "in the name", and thus, if under no circumstance an appeal would lie to the Principal District Judge, the court would not be subordinate to it. When in a common parlance the expression "ordinarily" is used, there may be an option. There may be cases where an exception can be made out. It is never used in reference to a case where there is no exception. It never means "primarily"."
129. Still in another case, Kailash Chandra v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 1346, the Supreme Court was concerned with the following rule:
"Rule 2046(2): A ministerial servant who is not governed by sub-clause (b) may be required to retire at the age of 55 years but should ordinarily be retained in service if 125 he continues to be efficient up to the age of 60 years. He must not be retained after that age except in very special circumstances which must be recorded in writing and with the sanction of the competent authority."
130. Therein, while interpreting the word 'ordinarily' appearing in the said Rule, the Supreme Court held as under: -
"8. Reading these words without the word "ordinarily" we find it unreasonable to think that it indicates any intention to cut down at all the right to require the servant to retire at the age of 55 years or to create in the servant any right to continue beyond the age of 55 years if he continues to be efficient. They are much more appropriate to express the intention that as soon as the age of 55 years is reached the appropriate authority has the right to require the servant to retire but that between the age of 55 and 60 the appropriate authority is given the option to retain the servant but is not bond to do so.
9. This intention is made even more clear and beyond doubt by the use of the word "ordinarily". "Ordinarily" means "in the large majority of cases but not invariably". This itself emphasises the fact that the appropriate authority is not bound to retain the servant after he attains the age of 55 even if he continues to be efficient. The intention of the second clause therefore clearly is that while under the first clause the appropriate authority has the right to retire the servant who falls within clause (a) as soon as he attains the age of 55, it will, at that stage, consider whether or not to retain him further. This option to retain for the further period of five years can only be exercised if the servant continues to be efficient; but in deciding whether or not to exercise this option the authority has to consider circumstances other than the question of efficiency also; in the absence of special circumstances he "should" retain the servant; but what are special circumstances is left entirely to the authority's decision. Thus, after the age of 55 is reached by the servant the authority has to exercise its discretion whether or not to retain the servant; and there is no right in the servant to be retained, even if he continues to be efficient."
131. From the discussion of the above two cases, it is clear that the word 'ordinarily' means 'in the large majority of cases' but not invariably. This itself emphasizes that there is an element of 126 discretion vested in the Tribunal in relation to the institution of cases. In appropriate cases where the interest of justice may so demand, the cases could be permitted to be instituted in either of the ordinary place of sitting of two Benches, in whose jurisdiction the cause of action has partly arisen.
132. Thus, this expression appearing in Rule 11 cannot be termed as absolute and without any exception, as that is the legislative intent and purpose. It is also a well-known rule of construction that a provision of a statute must be construed so as to give it a sensible meaning. Legislature expects the Courts to observe the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pareat. The Supreme Court, in the case of H.S. Vankani v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 4 SCC 301, stated that "it is a well-settled principle of interpretation of statutes that a construction should not be put on a statutory provision which would lead to manifest absurdity, futility, palpable injustice and absurd inconvenience or anomaly."
133. In Navinchandra Mafatlal v. CIT, AIR 1955 SC 58, the Supreme Court stated the law that "the cardinal rule of interpretation is that the words should be read in their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning subject to this rider that in construing words in a constitutional enactment conferring legislative powers the most liberal construction should be put upon the words so that the same may have effect in their widest amplitude.
127
134. Another aspect under this very submission would be in relation to the interpretation of the words appearing in Rule 11 above "at its ordinary place of sitting falling within the jurisdiction, the cause of action, wholly or in part has arisen."
135. "Cause of Action" means every fact which is necessary to establish to support the right to obtain a judgment. It is a bundle of facts which are to be pleaded and proved for the purpose of obtaining the relief claimed in the suit. In a recent judgment in the case of Kehar Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) All India NGT Reporter 556, this Tribunal explained the meaning and implications of the words "cause of action" as follows -
"16. 'Cause of action', therefore, must be read in conjunction with and should take colour from the expression 'such dispute'. Such dispute will in turn draw its meaning from Section 14(2) and consequently Section 14(1) of the NGT Act. These are inter-connected and inter-dependent. 'Such dispute' has to be considered as a dispute which is relating to environment. The NGT Act is a specific Act with a specific purpose and object, and therefore, the cause of action which is specific to other laws or other objects and does not directly relate to environmental issues would not be 'such dispute' as contemplated under the provisions of the NGT Act. The dispute must essentially be an environmental dispute and must relate to either of the Acts stated in Schedule I to the NGT Act and the 'cause of action' referred to under Sub-section (3) of Section 14 should be the cause of action for 'such dispute' and not alien or foreign to the substantial question of environment. The cause of action must have a nexus to such dispute which relates to the issue of environment/substantial question relating to environment, or any such proceeding, to trigger the prescribed period of limitation. A cause of action, which in its true spirit and substance, does not relate to the issue of environment/substantial question relating to environment arising out of the specified legislations, thus, in law cannot trigger the prescribed period of limitation under Section 14(3) of the NGT Act. The term 'cause of action' has to be understood in distinction to 128 the nature or form of the suit. A cause of action means every fact which is necessary to establish to support the right to obtain a judgment. It is a bundle of facts which are to be pleaded and proved for the purpose of obtaining the relief claimed in the suit. It is what a plaintiff must plead and then prove for obtaining the relief. It is the factual situation, the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court remedy against another. A cause of action means every fact which, if traversed, would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which, taken with the law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It does not comprise evidence necessary to prove such facts but every fact necessary for the plaintiff to prove to enable him to obtain a decree. The expression 'cause of action' has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense, cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit including not only the infraction coupled with the right itself. To put it more clearly, the material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute the cause of action. (Refer: Rajasthan High Court Advocates Asson. V. Union of India [(2001) 2 SCC 294]; Sri Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and Ramai v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1975) 2 SCC 671]; A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. A.P. Agencies, Salem [(1989) 2 SCC 163]; Bloom Dekor Limited v. Sujbhash Himatlal Desai and Ors. with Bloom Dekor Limited and Anr. v. Arvind B. Sheth and Ors. [(1994) 6 SCC 322]; Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair v. Narayanan Nair and Ors. [(2004) 3 SCC 277]; Y. Abraham Ajith and Ors. v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Anr. [(2004) 8 SCC 100]; Liverpool and London S.P. and I. Asson Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I and Anr.[(2004) 9 SCC 512]; Prem Chand Vijay Kumar v. Yashpal Singh and Anr. [(2005) 4 SCC 417]; Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. and Ors. v. Owners and Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express and Ors. [(2006) 3 SCC 100])"
136. In this very judgment, the Tribunal emphasised that the cause of action must be construed and relate to environmental issues arising from the Scheduled Acts and 'such dispute' appearing in Section 14 of the NGT Act. Besides this, the 129 Tribunal has to keep in mind that Section 14 of the NGT Act does not, in any manner, restrict the locus standi of the person who may file application relating to substantial question of environment, (including enforcement of a legal right in relation to the environment) which arises from the implementation of the specified acts in Schedule I of the NGT Act. Similarly, Section 16 uses the words "any person aggrieved" which again is a very generic term. Under Section 15 of the NGT Act, a person is expected to file an application who claims relief and compensation, restitution of property damaged for restitution of environment for such area or areas. Again restitution of environment may not be person specific but purpose specific. A person aggrieved may not necessarily be a person who has suffered a personal injury. Any person aggrieved can challenge an order granting Environment Clearance even though the applicant might not have suffered personally. Section 14 gives a very wide meaning to the person seeking to invoke jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 14. At this stage, we may refer to the judgment of the Tribunal in the case of Samata v. Union of India, (2014) 1 All India NGT Reporter (South Zone) where the Court held as under:-
"29. Both under Section 11 of the NEAA Act,.1997 and Section 18 of the NGT Act, 2010 any person aggrieved by the grant of EC as shown above can maintain an appeal. The 'aggrieved person' as contemplated in the Act came up for interpretation before the Tribunal in a number of cases. An aggrieved person contemplated in the above provisions would refer to the substantial grievance as to denial of some personal, pecuniary or property right or imposing an obligation on a person.130
The grievance so ventilated should not be either fanciful or sentimental, but must be substantial. A person calling himself as an 'aggrieved' must have suffered a legal grievance that he has been wrongfully deprived of something or refused wrongfully. The aggrieved person can either be aggrieved either directly or indirectly. In so far as the environmental matters are concerned, it cannot be stated that the person really aggrieved should alone be permitted to initiate an action. It is not necessary that the person, who initiates action, is a resident of that particular area wherein the proposed industrial site is located. It is true that the appellants have not participated in the proceedings of the public hearing. It is true that it is necessary to scan the credentials of the appellants as to their intention and motive. Even assuming that the appellants have not participated in the proceedings of the public hearing, they would lose their right to challenge the approval or the EC. If the appellants come forward with a case apprehending damage and danger to environment and ecology if the project in question was not properly envisaged and did not satisfy the Principles of Sustainable Development and Precautionary Principles, they can maintain the appeal and be allowed to agitate as to the correctness of the study made in respect of ecology and environment. In the instant case, nothing substantial has been demonstrated in order to doubt the credentials of the appellants. What are all stated by the 3rd respondent is that the appellants are residents of a different area though within the State and they are not aggrieved persons. The first appellant is a registered Non Governmental Organisation working in the field of Environment and the 2nd appellant is a social and environmental group with the objective of working for the welfare of the local communities and creating awareness on environmental issues and have filed the letter of authorisation issued by the respective bodies to initiate proceedings. Hence, they are to be termed as 'aggrieved persons' as envisaged under the above provisions, who can maintain the appeal and thus, this question is answered in favour of the appellants."
137. Applying the rule of liberal construction as to who can approach the Tribunal under the environmental jurisprudence, a Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Prafulla Samantra v. 131 Ministry of Environment & Forests & Ors. (2009) ILR 5 Delhi 821 held as under: -
"The world as we know is gravely imperilled by mankind's collective folly. Unconcern to environment has reached such damaging levels which threatens the very existence of life on this planet. If standing before a special tribunal, created to assess impact of projects and activities that impact, or pose potential threats to the environment or local communities, is construed narrowly, organizations working for the betterment of the environment whether in form of NGOs or otherwise would be effectively kept out of the discourse, that is so crucial an input in such proceedings. Such association of persons, as long as they work in the field of environment, possess a right to oppose and challenge all actions, whether of the State of private parties, that impair or potentially impair the environment. In cases where complaints, appeals, etc. are filed bona fide by public spirited interested persons, environmental activists or other such voluntary organizations working for the betterment of the community as a whole, they are to be construed as 'aggrieved persons' within the meaning of that expression under Section 11(2)(c) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986."
138. Upon an analytical examination of the above judicial dictums, it is evidently clear that the expressions used by the framers of law in Sections 2(m), 4 and 14 to 16 of the NGT Act and Rules 3 to 6 and Rule 11 of the Rules of 2011 require liberal and purposive construction. Certainly, not only infraction of a cause of action but part of the cause of substantial cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Bench. As already noticed, part of the cause of action has also arisen at Kerala and for that matter in all coastal states. Thus, both the Benches, i.e. the Principal Bench and the Southern Bench will have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the appeal/applications. The application at Chennai by a different 132 party, namely A. Joseph Vijayan v. Union of India, Appeal No. 17 of 2014, challenging the grant of Environmental Clearance to the project proponent vide order dated 3rd January, 2014 was filed first. Immediately thereafter, Appeal Nos. 14 of 2014 was filed at the Principal Bench at Delhi as well as a different but a more comprehensive Application No. 74 of 2014 was also filed at the Principal Bench. The parties in the appeals at Chennai and the Principal Bench are different. The cause of action pleaded in Application No. 74 of 2014 at the Principal Bench is entirely different and distinguished than the subject matter of the two appeals, one before the Southern Bench and the other before the Principal Bench at Delhi.
139. Obviously, it would be in the interest of all stakeholders as well as in the interest of administration of justice that these applications/appeals are heard by one and the same Bench and together. To sum up, the Principal Bench has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide the applications before it and the Chairperson has the power to transfer the appeal from Southern Bench to the Principal Bench for its disposal in accordance with law.
Discussion of Objection D:
The Original Application No. 74 of 2014 is a device to indirectly and effectively seek insertion of certain words into the CRZ Notification, 2011, which is impermissible.
140. It is contended by the respondents that the prayer in the Original Application No. 74 of 2014 is a device to indirectly do 133 what is not directly permissible. Impliedly it seeks to insert into the Notification of 2011, what areas have been excluded, which is impermissible. Thus, petition is not maintainable.
141. To examine the merit or otherwise of this contention, we may recapitulate the prayers made in the above referred cases.
142. In the Appeal no. 14 of 2014, the applicants have challenged and prayed for setting aside the grant of Environmental and CRZ Clearance dated 3rd January, 2014 to the Project Proponent by Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests, in relation to the Vizhinjam Port Project, International Deep Water Multi-purpose sea port at Vizhinjam in Thiruvananthapuram (Trivandrum) district of Kerala and no other relief has been prayed though in this application a reference has been made to CRZ Notification of 2011 and its effects. In application 74 of 14, the same applicant has prayed that the coastal 'areas of outstanding natural beauty' and 'areas likely to be inundated due to rise in sea level and consequent upon global warming and such other areas, as may be declared by the Central Government or concerned authorities at the State/Union Territory level from time to time' along the coast line of India, be protected as CRZ-I areas or otherwise, notwithstanding their non-inclusion in the Notification of 2011. It is also prayed that these areas be preserved and no activity which would damage such areas be undertaken. In this application, the applicant has also referred in some detail to the Notification of 1991 as well as of 2011, but has not prayed either 134 for setting aside of the Notification of 2011 or quashing or even praying for inclusion of the excluded areas back into the said Notification.
143. Learned Counsel appearing for the applicant during the course of submission clearly took a stand that they were not challenging the legality, correctness or validity of the Notification of 2011. De hors the Notification, they are praying for protection and preservation of the areas which are of outstanding natural beauty and are likely to be inundated due to rise in sea level consequent upon global warming. According to the applicant, these claimed reliefs are required to be considered independent of the Notification. However, the contention of the Project Proponent is that in the garb of the prayer made in this application, in fact the appellant is challenging exclusion of areas from Notification of 1991 and prays for inclusion of the same areas in the Notification of 2011 which amounts to raising indirect challenge to the said Notification, which is impermissible.
144. We have heard the Learned Counsel appearing for the parties on these preliminary submissions at some length. We must even at the cost of repetition clarify that at this stage, we are not concerned with the merit or demerits of the case but are only dealing with the preliminary submissions made by the Learned Counsel appearing for the Project Proponent as to the maintainability of the present application. We have already held that even if there was a challenge to the validity of the Notification 135 of 2011, the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to examine the same, of course, within the limitations laid on the grounds of challenge which are available for a delegated or a subordinate legislation. It is contended that for the purpose of arguments on the merits of the case, the applicant does not question the validity of the Notification of 2011. Thus to that extent, objection taken by the Project Proponent cannot be sustained and is inconsequential. What remains is the relief claimed by the applicant that the aforesaid areas must be preserved and protected de hors the fact that they do not form part of the Notification of 2011. This is the contention which has to be examined by the Tribunal when the case is heard on merits. At this stage, we are only concerned with the facts that whether a prayer of this kind is contemplated under section 14 read with Section 15 of the NGT Act or not. The moment the area is covered under the Notification of 2011, the restriction contemplated in law in relation to activity, construction and other matters would apply instantaneously. The areas which are not covered under the Notification of 2011 can still be required to be preserved and protected in different ways known under the accepted norms, in so far as it relates to a substantial question relating to environment. The competent authority including the Central Government may be called upon to formulate such guidelines or directions as contemplated under Sections 3 and 5 of the Act of 1986 and the Rules framed thereunder, particularly Rule 5. Thus, it is also possible that after hearing the matter on merits, the Tribunal comes to the 136 conclusion that these areas need no environmental protection and being not covered by any specific notification, any use of or activity in such areas would be permissible in accordance with law. But this is a question that can be determined only after the matter has been heard fully on merits. The expression 'environment' has been defined under Section 2(a) of the 1986 Act. It is a very wide definition and covers not only water, air and land but even the interrelationship which exists among and between water, air and land, and human beings, other living creatures, plants, micro-organism and property. Section 2 (b) of the said Act describes 'Environmental pollutant' as any solid, liquid or gaseous substance present in such concentration as may be, or tend to be, injurious to environment. In addition thereto, Section 2(c) of the NGT Act similarly defines the expression 'environment', while in Section 2(m) 'substantial question relating to environment' has been explained so as to include a direct violation of specific statutory environmental obligation and the gravity of damage to the environment, which includes the environmental consequences relating to a specific activity or by a point source of pollution.
145. The definition under Section 2(m) is an inclusive definition, thus, has to be construed in a liberal manner and to give it a wider connotation. In the case of Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and Ors.1987 1 SCC 424, the Supreme Court while dealing with the expression include state that:
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"All that is necessary for us to say is this: Legislatures resort to inclusive definitions (1) to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases so as to take in the ordinary, popular and natural sense of the words and also the sense which the statute wishes to attribute to it, (2) to include meanings about which there might be some dispute, or, (3) to bring under one nomenclature all transactions possessing certain similar features but going under different names. Depending on the context in the process of enlarging, the definition may even become exhaustive."
146. In Goa Foundation v. Union of India 2013 NGT Reporter, New Delhi 234, a Bench of this Tribunal was concerned with maintainability of application relating to western ghats and the various expressions appearing in the relevant provisions of the NGT Act particularly definition section with regard to application filed under Section 14 and the scope of Tribunal jurisdiction held as under:
"The contents of the application and the prayer thus should firstly satisfy the ingredients of it being in the nature of a civil case and secondly, it must relate to a substantial question of environment. It could even be an anticipated action substantially relating to environment. Such cases would squarely fall within the ambit of Section 14(1). Next, in the light of the language of Section 14(1), now we have to examine what is a substantial question relating to 'environment'. Section 2(1)(c) of the NGT Act explains the word 'environment' as follows:
"'environment' includes water, air and land and the inter-relationship, which exists among and between water, air and land and human beings, other living creatures, plants, micro-organism and property."
Section 2(m) defines the term 'substantial question relating to environment' as follows:
"It shall include an instance where, --
(i) there is a direct violation of a specific statutory environmental obligation by a person by which, -
(A) the community at large other than an individual or group of individuals is affected or 138 likely to be affected by the environmental consequences; or (B) the gravity of damage to the environment or property is substantial; or (C) the damage to public health is broadly measurable;
(ii) the environmental consequences relate to a specific activity or a point source of pollution".
23. The legislature, in its wisdom, has defined the word 'environment' in very wide terms. It is inclusive of water, air, land, plants, micro-organisms and the inter- relationship between them, living and non-living creatures and property. Similarly, 'substantial question relating to environment' also is an inclusive definition and besides what it means, it also includes what has been specified under Section 2(m) of the NGT Act. Inclusive definitions are not exhaustive. One has to, therefore, give them a very wide meaning to make them as comprehensive as the statute permits on the principle of liberal interpretation. This is the very basis of an inclusive definition. Substantial, in terms of the Oxford Dictionary of English, is of considerable importance, strongly built or made, large, real and tangible, rather than imaginary. Substantial is actual or real as opposed to trivial, not serious, unimportant, imaginary or something. Substantial is not the same as unsubstantial i.e. just enough to avoid the de minimis principle. In In re Net Books Agreement [1962] 1 WLR 1347, it was explained that, the term 'substantial' is not a term that demands a strictly quantitative or proportional assessment. Substantial can also mean more than reasonable. To put it aptly, a substantial question relating to environment must, therefore, be a question which is debatable, not previously settled and must have a material bearing on the case and its issues relating to environment.
24. Section 2(m) of the NGT Act classifies 'substantial question relating to environment' under different heads and states it to include the cases where there is a direct violation of a specific statutory environmental obligation as a result of which the community at large, other than an individual or group of individuals, is affected or is likely to be affected by the environmental consequences; or the gravity of damage to the environment or property is substantial; or the damage to public health is broadly measurable. The other kind of cases are where the environmental consequences relate to a specific activity or a point source of pollution. In other words, where there is a direct violation of a statutory duty or obligation which is likely to affect the community, it will 139 be a substantial question relating to environment covered under Section 14(1) providing jurisdiction to the Tribunal. When we talk about the jurisdiction being inclusive, that would mean that a question which is substantial, debatable and relates to environment, would itself be a class of cases that would squarely fall under Section 14(1) of the NGT Act. Thus, disputes must relate to implementation of the enactments specified in Schedule I to the NGT Act. At this stage, reference to one of the scheduled Acts i.e. Environment Protection Act, 1986 may be appropriate."
147. Keeping in view these definitions of wide magnitude and connotations, it is obvious that any question relating to environment, falling within the Scheduled Acts would have to be examined by the Tribunal, subject to the provisions of the relevant Acts. In light of this, the Tribunal would have to examine on merits whether the areas in question, even though not covered under the CRZ Notification 2011 require some protection or preservation within the ambit and scope of environmental jurisprudence. Thus, in light of the above, we are unable to hold that the application 74 of 2014 is liable to be dismissed at the very threshold.
148. Ergo and for the reasons afore-stated, we answer the four issues framed by us with reference to the preliminary and other objections raised by the Respondents as follows: A. NGT has complete and comprehensive trappings of a court and within the framework of the provisions of the NGT Act and the principles afore-stated, the NGT can exercise the limited power of judicial review to examine the constitutional validity/vires of the subordinate/delegated legislation. In the present case the CRZ Notification of 2011, 140 that has been issued under provisions of the Environment Protection Act, 1986. However, such examination cannot extend to the provisions of the statute of the NGT Act and the Rules framed thereunder, being the statute that created this Tribunal. The NGT Act does not expressly or by necessary implication exclude the powers of the higher judiciary under Articles 226 and/or 32 of the Constitution of India. Further, while exercising the 'limited power of judicial review', the Tribunal would perform the functions which are supplemental to the higher judiciary and not supplant them.
B. In the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, part of cause of action has risen at New Delhi and within the area that falls under territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Bench of NGT. Thus, this bench has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present cases. C. On the cumulative reading and true construction of Section 4 (4) of the NGT Act and Rules 3 to 6 and Rule 11 of Rules of 2011, the Chairperson of NGT has the power and authority to transfer cases from one ordinary place of sitting to other place of sitting or even to place other than that. The Chairperson of NGT has the power to decide the distribution of business of the Tribunal among the members of the Tribunal, including adoption of circuit procedure in accordance with the Rules. An applicant shall ordinarily file an application or appeal at ordinary place of sitting of a Bench within whose jurisdiction the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen; in terms of Rule 11 which has an inbuilt element of exception.
D. Original Application No. 74 of 2014 cannot be dismissed as not maintainable on the ground that it attempts to do indirectly which cannot be done directly and which is impermissible.
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149. Having answered the formulated questions as above, we direct that the matter be listed for arguments on merits.
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Swatanter Kumar Chairperson Hon'ble Mr. Justice U.D. Salvi Judicial Member Hon'ble Dr. D.K. Agrawal Expert Member Hon'ble Mr. B.S. Sajwan Expert Member Hon'ble Dr. R.C. Trivedi Expert Member July 17, 2014 142