Opinion
JANICE R. L a CHANCE, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, PETITIONER v. LESTER E. ERICKSON, Jr., et al.
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by this case is whether either the Due Process Clause or the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), 5 U. S. C. §1101 et seq. , precludes a federal agency from sanctioning an employee for making false statements to the agency regarding alleged employment-related misconduct on the part of the employee. We hold that they do not.
Respondents Walsh, Erickson, Kye, Barrett, Roberts, and McManus are government employees who were the subject of adverse actions by the various agencies for which they worked. Each employee made false statements to agency investigators with respect to the misconduct with which they were charged. In each case, the agency additionally charged the false statement as a ground for adverse action, and the action taken in each was based in part on the added charge. The employees separately ap- pealed the actions taken against them to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). The Board upheld that portion of the penalty based on the underlying charge in each case, but overturned the false statement charge. The Board further held that an employees false statements could not be used for purposes of impeaching the employees credibility, nor could they be considered in setting the appropriate punishment for the employees underlying misconduct. Finally, the Board held that an agency may not charge an employee with failure to report an act of fraud when reporting such fraud would tend to implicate the employee in employment-related misconduct.
The Director of the Office of Personnel Management appealed each of these decisions by the Board to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In a consolidated appeal involving the cases of Walsh, Erickson, Kye, Barrett, and Roberts, that court agreed with the Board that no penalty could be based on a false denial of the underlying claim. King v. Erickson , 89 F. 3d 1575 (1996). Citing the Fifth Amendments Due Process Clause, the court held that an agency may not charge an employee with falsification or a similar charge on the ground of the employees denial of another charge or of underlying facts relating to that other charge, nor may [d]enials of charges and related facts . . . be considered in determining a penalty. Id ., at 1585. In a separate unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Boards reversal of the false statement charge against McManus as well as the Boards conclusion that an employees false statements . . . may not be considered even for purposes of impeachment. McManus v. Department of Justice , 66 MSPR 564, 568 (1995).
We granted certiorari in both cases, 521 U. S. ___ (1997), and now reverse. In Bryson v. United States , 396 U. S. 64 (1969) , we said: Our legal system provides methods for challenging the Governments right to ask questionslying is not one of them. A citizen may decline to answer the question, or answer it honestly, but he cannot with impunity knowingly and willfully answer with a falsehood. Id. , at 72 (footnote ommitted). We find it impossible to square the result reached by the Court of Appeals in the present case with our holding in Bryson and in other cases of similar import.
Title 5 U. S. C. §7513(a) provides that an agency may impose the sort of penalties involved here for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service. It then sets forth four procedural rights accorded to the employee against whom adverse action is proposed. The agency must:
(1) give the employee at least 30 days advance written notice; (2) allow the employee a reasonable time, but not less than 7 days, to answer orally and in writing and to furnish . . . evidence in support of the answer; (3) permit the employee to be represented by an attorney or other representative; and (4) provide the employee with a written decision and the specific reasons therefor. 5 U. S. C. §7513(b).
In these carefully delineated rights there is no hint of any right to put the government to its proof by falsely denying the charged conduct. Such a right, then, if it exists at all, must come from the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The Fifth Amendment provides that [n]o person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law … . U. S. Const., Amdt. V. The Court of Appeals stated that it is undisputed that the government employees here had a protected property interest in their employment, 89 F. 3d at 1581, and we assume that to be the case for purposes of our decision.
The core of due process is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532, 542 (1985) . But we reject, on the basis of both precedent and principle, the view expressed by the Court of Appeals in this case that a meaningful opportunity to be heard includes a right to make false statements with respect to the charged conduct.
It is well established that a criminal defendants right to testify does not include the right to commit perjury. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U. S. 157, 173 (1986) ; United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620, 626 (1980) ; United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41, 54 (1978) . Indeed, in United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U. S. 87, 97 (1993) , we held that a court could, consistent with the Constitution, enhance a criminal defendants sentence based on a finding that he perjured himself at trial.
Witnesses appearing before a grand jury under oath are likewise required to testify truthfully, on pain of being prosecuted for perjury. United States v. Wong , 431 U. S. 174 (1977) . There we said that the predicament of being forced to choose between incriminatory truth and falsehood … does not justify perjury. Id ., at 178. Similarly, one who files a false affidavit required by statute may be fined and imprisoned. Dennis v. United States , 384 U. S. 855 (1966) .
The Court of Appeals sought to distinguish these cases on the ground that the defendants in them had been under oath, while here the respondents were not. The fact that respondents were not under oath, of course, negates a charge of perjury, but that is not the charge brought against them. They were charged with making false statements during the course of an agency investigation, a charge that does not require that the statements be made under oath. While the Court of Appeals would apparently permit the imposition of punishment for the former but not the latter, we fail to see how the presence or absence of an oath is material to the due process inquiry.
The Court of Appeals also relied on its fear that if employees were not allowed to make false statements, they might be coerced into admitting the misconduct, whether they believe that they are guilty or not, in order to avoid the more severe penalty of removal possibly resulting from a falsification charge. App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a-17a. But we rejected a similar claim in United States v. Grayson , 438 U. S. 41 (1978) . There a sentencing judge took into consideration his belief that the defendant had testified falsely at his trial. The defendant argued before us that such a practice would inhibit the exercise of the right to testify truthfully in the proceeding. We described that contention as entirely frivolous. Id. , at 55.
If answering an agencys investigatory question could expose an employee to a criminal prosecution, he may exercise his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. See Hale v. Henkel , 201 U. S. 43, 67 (1906) ; United States v. Ward , 448 U. S. 242, 248 (1980) . It may well be that an agency, in ascertaining the truth or falsity of the charge, would take into consideration the failure of the employee to respond. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U. S. 308, 318 (1976) (discussing the prevailing rule that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify). But there is nothing inherently irrational about such an investigative posture. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal. , 366 U. S. 36 (1961).
For these reasons, we hold that a government agency may take adverse action against an employee because the employee made false statements in response to an underlying charge of misconduct. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are therefore
Reversed.
Opinion
JANICE R. L a CHANCE, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, PETITIONER v. LESTER E. ERICKSON, Jr., et al.
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by this case is whether either the Due Process Clause or the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), 5 U. S. C. §1101 et seq. , precludes a federal agency from sanctioning an employee for making false statements to the agency regarding alleged employment-related misconduct on the part of the employee. We hold that they do not.
Respondents Walsh, Erickson, Kye, Barrett, Roberts, and McManus are government employees who were the subject of adverse actions by the various agencies for which they worked. Each employee made false statements to agency investigators with respect to the misconduct with which they were charged. In each case, the agency additionally charged the false statement as a ground for adverse action, and the action taken in each was based in part on the added charge. The employees separately ap- pealed the actions taken against them to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). The Board upheld that portion of the penalty based on the underlying charge in each case, but overturned the false statement charge. The Board further held that an employees false statements could not be used for purposes of impeaching the employees credibility, nor could they be considered in setting the appropriate punishment for the employees underlying misconduct. Finally, the Board held that an agency may not charge an employee with failure to report an act of fraud when reporting such fraud would tend to implicate the employee in employment-related misconduct.
The Director of the Office of Personnel Management appealed each of these decisions by the Board to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In a consolidated appeal involving the cases of Walsh, Erickson, Kye, Barrett, and Roberts, that court agreed with the Board that no penalty could be based on a false denial of the underlying claim. King v. Erickson , 89 F. 3d 1575 (1996). Citing the Fifth Amendments Due Process Clause, the court held that an agency may not charge an employee with falsification or a similar charge on the ground of the employees denial of another charge or of underlying facts relating to that other charge, nor may [d]enials of charges and related facts . . . be considered in determining a penalty. Id ., at 1585. In a separate unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Boards reversal of the false statement charge against McManus as well as the Boards conclusion that an employees false statements . . . may not be considered even for purposes of impeachment. McManus v. Department of Justice , 66 MSPR 564, 568 (1995).
We granted certiorari in both cases, 521 U. S. ___ (1997), and now reverse. In Bryson v. United States , 396 U. S. 64 (1969) , we said: Our legal system provides methods for challenging the Governments right to ask questionslying is not one of them. A citizen may decline to answer the question, or answer it honestly, but he cannot with impunity knowingly and willfully answer with a falsehood. Id. , at 72 (footnote ommitted). We find it impossible to square the result reached by the Court of Appeals in the present case with our holding in Bryson and in other cases of similar import.
Title 5 U. S. C. §7513(a) provides that an agency may impose the sort of penalties involved here for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service. It then sets forth four procedural rights accorded to the employee against whom adverse action is proposed. The agency must:
(1) give the employee at least 30 days advance written notice; (2) allow the employee a reasonable time, but not less than 7 days, to answer orally and in writing and to furnish . . . evidence in support of the answer; (3) permit the employee to be represented by an attorney or other representative; and (4) provide the employee with a written decision and the specific reasons therefor. 5 U. S. C. §7513(b).
In these carefully delineated rights there is no hint of any right to put the government to its proof by falsely denying the charged conduct. Such a right, then, if it exists at all, must come from the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The Fifth Amendment provides that [n]o person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law … . U. S. Const., Amdt. V. The Court of Appeals stated that it is undisputed that the government employees here had a protected property interest in their employment, 89 F. 3d at 1581, and we assume that to be the case for purposes of our decision.
The core of due process is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532, 542 (1985) . But we reject, on the basis of both precedent and principle, the view expressed by the Court of Appeals in this case that a meaningful opportunity to be heard includes a right to make false statements with respect to the charged conduct.
It is well established that a criminal defendants right to testify does not include the right to commit perjury. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U. S. 157, 173 (1986) ; United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620, 626 (1980) ; United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41, 54 (1978) . Indeed, in United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U. S. 87, 97 (1993) , we held that a court could, consistent with the Constitution, enhance a criminal defendants sentence based on a finding that he perjured himself at trial.
Witnesses appearing before a grand jury under oath are likewise required to testify truthfully, on pain of being prosecuted for perjury. United States v. Wong , 431 U. S. 174 (1977) . There we said that the predicament of being forced to choose between incriminatory truth and falsehood … does not justify perjury. Id ., at 178. Similarly, one who files a false affidavit required by statute may be fined and imprisoned. Dennis v. United States , 384 U. S. 855 (1966) .
The Court of Appeals sought to distinguish these cases on the ground that the defendants in them had been under oath, while here the respondents were not. The fact that respondents were not under oath, of course, negates a charge of perjury, but that is not the charge brought against them. They were charged with making false statements during the course of an agency investigation, a charge that does not require that the statements be made under oath. While the Court of Appeals would apparently permit the imposition of punishment for the former but not the latter, we fail to see how the presence or absence of an oath is material to the due process inquiry.
The Court of Appeals also relied on its fear that if employees were not allowed to make false statements, they might be coerced into admitting the misconduct, whether they believe that they are guilty or not, in order to avoid the more severe penalty of removal possibly resulting from a falsification charge. App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a-17a. But we rejected a similar claim in United States v. Grayson , 438 U. S. 41 (1978) . There a sentencing judge took into consideration his belief that the defendant had testified falsely at his trial. The defendant argued before us that such a practice would inhibit the exercise of the right to testify truthfully in the proceeding. We described that contention as entirely frivolous. Id. , at 55.
If answering an agencys investigatory question could expose an employee to a criminal prosecution, he may exercise his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. See Hale v. Henkel , 201 U. S. 43, 67 (1906) ; United States v. Ward , 448 U. S. 242, 248 (1980) . It may well be that an agency, in ascertaining the truth or falsity of the charge, would take into consideration the failure of the employee to respond. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U. S. 308, 318 (1976) (discussing the prevailing rule that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify). But there is nothing inherently irrational about such an investigative posture. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal. , 366 U. S. 36 (1961).
For these reasons, we hold that a government agency may take adverse action against an employee because the employee made false statements in response to an underlying charge of misconduct. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are therefore
Reversed.
Opinion
JANICE R. L a CHANCE, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, PETITIONER v. LESTER E. ERICKSON, Jr., et al.
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by this case is whether either the Due Process Clause or the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), 5 U. S. C. §1101 et seq. , precludes a federal agency from sanctioning an employee for making false statements to the agency regarding alleged employment-related misconduct on the part of the employee. We hold that they do not.
Respondents Walsh, Erickson, Kye, Barrett, Roberts, and McManus are government employees who were the subject of adverse actions by the various agencies for which they worked. Each employee made false statements to agency investigators with respect to the misconduct with which they were charged. In each case, the agency additionally charged the false statement as a ground for adverse action, and the action taken in each was based in part on the added charge. The employees separately ap- pealed the actions taken against them to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). The Board upheld that portion of the penalty based on the underlying charge in each case, but overturned the false statement charge. The Board further held that an employees false statements could not be used for purposes of impeaching the employees credibility, nor could they be considered in setting the appropriate punishment for the employees underlying misconduct. Finally, the Board held that an agency may not charge an employee with failure to report an act of fraud when reporting such fraud would tend to implicate the employee in employment-related misconduct.
The Director of the Office of Personnel Management appealed each of these decisions by the Board to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In a consolidated appeal involving the cases of Walsh, Erickson, Kye, Barrett, and Roberts, that court agreed with the Board that no penalty could be based on a false denial of the underlying claim. King v. Erickson , 89 F. 3d 1575 (1996). Citing the Fifth Amendments Due Process Clause, the court held that an agency may not charge an employee with falsification or a similar charge on the ground of the employees denial of another charge or of underlying facts relating to that other charge, nor may [d]enials of charges and related facts . . . be considered in determining a penalty. Id ., at 1585. In a separate unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Boards reversal of the false statement charge against McManus as well as the Boards conclusion that an employees false statements . . . may not be considered even for purposes of impeachment. McManus v. Department of Justice , 66 MSPR 564, 568 (1995).
We granted certiorari in both cases, 521 U. S. ___ (1997), and now reverse. In Bryson v. United States , 396 U. S. 64 (1969) , we said: Our legal system provides methods for challenging the Governments right to ask questionslying is not one of them. A citizen may decline to answer the question, or answer it honestly, but he cannot with impunity knowingly and willfully answer with a falsehood. Id. , at 72 (footnote ommitted). We find it impossible to square the result reached by the Court of Appeals in the present case with our holding in Bryson and in other cases of similar import.
Title 5 U. S. C. §7513(a) provides that an agency may impose the sort of penalties involved here for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service. It then sets forth four procedural rights accorded to the employee against whom adverse action is proposed. The agency must:
(1) give the employee at least 30 days advance written notice; (2) allow the employee a reasonable time, but not less than 7 days, to answer orally and in writing and to furnish . . . evidence in support of the answer; (3) permit the employee to be represented by an attorney or other representative; and (4) provide the employee with a written decision and the specific reasons therefor. 5 U. S. C. §7513(b).
In these carefully delineated rights there is no hint of any right to put the government to its proof by falsely denying the charged conduct. Such a right, then, if it exists at all, must come from the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The Fifth Amendment provides that [n]o person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law … . U. S. Const., Amdt. V. The Court of Appeals stated that it is undisputed that the government employees here had a protected property interest in their employment, 89 F. 3d at 1581, and we assume that to be the case for purposes of our decision.
The core of due process is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532, 542 (1985) . But we reject, on the basis of both precedent and principle, the view expressed by the Court of Appeals in this case that a meaningful opportunity to be heard includes a right to make false statements with respect to the charged conduct.
It is well established that a criminal defendants right to testify does not include the right to commit perjury. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U. S. 157, 173 (1986) ; United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620, 626 (1980) ; United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41, 54 (1978) . Indeed, in United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U. S. 87, 97 (1993) , we held that a court could, consistent with the Constitution, enhance a criminal defendants sentence based on a finding that he perjured himself at trial.
Witnesses appearing before a grand jury under oath are likewise required to testify truthfully, on pain of being prosecuted for perjury. United States v. Wong , 431 U. S. 174 (1977) . There we said that the predicament of being forced to choose between incriminatory truth and falsehood … does not justify perjury. Id ., at 178. Similarly, one who files a false affidavit required by statute may be fined and imprisoned. Dennis v. United States , 384 U. S. 855 (1966) .
The Court of Appeals sought to distinguish these cases on the ground that the defendants in them had been under oath, while here the respondents were not. The fact that respondents were not under oath, of course, negates a charge of perjury, but that is not the charge brought against them. They were charged with making false statements during the course of an agency investigation, a charge that does not require that the statements be made under oath. While the Court of Appeals would apparently permit the imposition of punishment for the former but not the latter, we fail to see how the presence or absence of an oath is material to the due process inquiry.
The Court of Appeals also relied on its fear that if employees were not allowed to make false statements, they might be coerced into admitting the misconduct, whether they believe that they are guilty or not, in order to avoid the more severe penalty of removal possibly resulting from a falsification charge. App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a-17a. But we rejected a similar claim in United States v. Grayson , 438 U. S. 41 (1978) . There a sentencing judge took into consideration his belief that the defendant had testified falsely at his trial. The defendant argued before us that such a practice would inhibit the exercise of the right to testify truthfully in the proceeding. We described that contention as entirely frivolous. Id. , at 55.
If answering an agencys investigatory question could expose an employee to a criminal prosecution, he may exercise his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. See Hale v. Henkel , 201 U. S. 43, 67 (1906) ; United States v. Ward , 448 U. S. 242, 248 (1980) . It may well be that an agency, in ascertaining the truth or falsity of the charge, would take into consideration the failure of the employee to respond. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U. S. 308, 318 (1976) (discussing the prevailing rule that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify). But there is nothing inherently irrational about such an investigative posture. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal. , 366 U. S. 36 (1961).
For these reasons, we hold that a government agency may take adverse action against an employee because the employee made false statements in response to an underlying charge of misconduct. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are therefore
Reversed.
Opinion
JANICE R. L a CHANCE, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, PETITIONER v. LESTER E. ERICKSON, Jr., et al.
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by this case is whether either the Due Process Clause or the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), 5 U. S. C. §1101 et seq. , precludes a federal agency from sanctioning an employee for making false statements to the agency regarding alleged employment-related misconduct on the part of the employee. We hold that they do not.
Respondents Walsh, Erickson, Kye, Barrett, Roberts, and McManus are government employees who were the subject of adverse actions by the various agencies for which they worked. Each employee made false statements to agency investigators with respect to the misconduct with which they were charged. In each case, the agency additionally charged the false statement as a ground for adverse action, and the action taken in each was based in part on the added charge. The employees separately ap- pealed the actions taken against them to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). The Board upheld that portion of the penalty based on the underlying charge in each case, but overturned the false statement charge. The Board further held that an employees false statements could not be used for purposes of impeaching the employees credibility, nor could they be considered in setting the appropriate punishment for the employees underlying misconduct. Finally, the Board held that an agency may not charge an employee with failure to report an act of fraud when reporting such fraud would tend to implicate the employee in employment-related misconduct.
The Director of the Office of Personnel Management appealed each of these decisions by the Board to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In a consolidated appeal involving the cases of Walsh, Erickson, Kye, Barrett, and Roberts, that court agreed with the Board that no penalty could be based on a false denial of the underlying claim. King v. Erickson , 89 F. 3d 1575 (1996). Citing the Fifth Amendments Due Process Clause, the court held that an agency may not charge an employee with falsification or a similar charge on the ground of the employees denial of another charge or of underlying facts relating to that other charge, nor may [d]enials of charges and related facts . . . be considered in determining a penalty. Id ., at 1585. In a separate unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Boards reversal of the false statement charge against McManus as well as the Boards conclusion that an employees false statements . . . may not be considered even for purposes of impeachment. McManus v. Department of Justice , 66 MSPR 564, 568 (1995).
We granted certiorari in both cases, 521 U. S. ___ (1997), and now reverse. In Bryson v. United States , 396 U. S. 64 (1969) , we said: Our legal system provides methods for challenging the Governments right to ask questionslying is not one of them. A citizen may decline to answer the question, or answer it honestly, but he cannot with impunity knowingly and willfully answer with a falsehood. Id. , at 72 (footnote ommitted). We find it impossible to square the result reached by the Court of Appeals in the present case with our holding in Bryson and in other cases of similar import.
Title 5 U. S. C. §7513(a) provides that an agency may impose the sort of penalties involved here for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service. It then sets forth four procedural rights accorded to the employee against whom adverse action is proposed. The agency must:
(1) give the employee at least 30 days advance written notice; (2) allow the employee a reasonable time, but not less than 7 days, to answer orally and in writing and to furnish . . . evidence in support of the answer; (3) permit the employee to be represented by an attorney or other representative; and (4) provide the employee with a written decision and the specific reasons therefor. 5 U. S. C. §7513(b).
In these carefully delineated rights there is no hint of any right to put the government to its proof by falsely denying the charged conduct. Such a right, then, if it exists at all, must come from the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The Fifth Amendment provides that [n]o person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law … . U. S. Const., Amdt. V. The Court of Appeals stated that it is undisputed that the government employees here had a protected property interest in their employment, 89 F. 3d at 1581, and we assume that to be the case for purposes of our decision.
The core of due process is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532, 542 (1985) . But we reject, on the basis of both precedent and principle, the view expressed by the Court of Appeals in this case that a meaningful opportunity to be heard includes a right to make false statements with respect to the charged conduct.
It is well established that a criminal defendants right to testify does not include the right to commit perjury. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U. S. 157, 173 (1986) ; United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620, 626 (1980) ; United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41, 54 (1978) . Indeed, in United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U. S. 87, 97 (1993) , we held that a court could, consistent with the Constitution, enhance a criminal defendants sentence based on a finding that he perjured himself at trial.
Witnesses appearing before a grand jury under oath are likewise required to testify truthfully, on pain of being prosecuted for perjury. United States v. Wong , 431 U. S. 174 (1977) . There we said that the predicament of being forced to choose between incriminatory truth and falsehood … does not justify perjury. Id ., at 178. Similarly, one who files a false affidavit required by statute may be fined and imprisoned. Dennis v. United States , 384 U. S. 855 (1966) .
The Court of Appeals sought to distinguish these cases on the ground that the defendants in them had been under oath, while here the respondents were not. The fact that respondents were not under oath, of course, negates a charge of perjury, but that is not the charge brought against them. They were charged with making false statements during the course of an agency investigation, a charge that does not require that the statements be made under oath. While the Court of Appeals would apparently permit the imposition of punishment for the former but not the latter, we fail to see how the presence or absence of an oath is material to the due process inquiry.
The Court of Appeals also relied on its fear that if employees were not allowed to make false statements, they might be coerced into admitting the misconduct, whether they believe that they are guilty or not, in order to avoid the more severe penalty of removal possibly resulting from a falsification charge. App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a-17a. But we rejected a similar claim in United States v. Grayson , 438 U. S. 41 (1978) . There a sentencing judge took into consideration his belief that the defendant had testified falsely at his trial. The defendant argued before us that such a practice would inhibit the exercise of the right to testify truthfully in the proceeding. We described that contention as entirely frivolous. Id. , at 55.
If answering an agencys investigatory question could expose an employee to a criminal prosecution, he may exercise his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. See Hale v. Henkel , 201 U. S. 43, 67 (1906) ; United States v. Ward , 448 U. S. 242, 248 (1980) . It may well be that an agency, in ascertaining the truth or falsity of the charge, would take into consideration the failure of the employee to respond. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U. S. 308, 318 (1976) (discussing the prevailing rule that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify). But there is nothing inherently irrational about such an investigative posture. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal. , 366 U. S. 36 (1961).
For these reasons, we hold that a government agency may take adverse action against an employee because the employee made false statements in response to an underlying charge of misconduct. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are therefore
Reversed.
Opinion
JANICE R. L a CHANCE, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, PETITIONER v. LESTER E. ERICKSON, Jr., et al.
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by this case is whether either the Due Process Clause or the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), 5 U. S. C. §1101 et seq. , precludes a federal agency from sanctioning an employee for making false statements to the agency regarding alleged employment-related misconduct on the part of the employee. We hold that they do not.
Respondents Walsh, Erickson, Kye, Barrett, Roberts, and McManus are government employees who were the subject of adverse actions by the various agencies for which they worked. Each employee made false statements to agency investigators with respect to the misconduct with which they were charged. In each case, the agency additionally charged the false statement as a ground for adverse action, and the action taken in each was based in part on the added charge. The employees separately ap- pealed the actions taken against them to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). The Board upheld that portion of the penalty based on the underlying charge in each case, but overturned the false statement charge. The Board further held that an employees false statements could not be used for purposes of impeaching the employees credibility, nor could they be considered in setting the appropriate punishment for the employees underlying misconduct. Finally, the Board held that an agency may not charge an employee with failure to report an act of fraud when reporting such fraud would tend to implicate the employee in employment-related misconduct.
The Director of the Office of Personnel Management appealed each of these decisions by the Board to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In a consolidated appeal involving the cases of Walsh, Erickson, Kye, Barrett, and Roberts, that court agreed with the Board that no penalty could be based on a false denial of the underlying claim. King v. Erickson , 89 F. 3d 1575 (1996). Citing the Fifth Amendments Due Process Clause, the court held that an agency may not charge an employee with falsification or a similar charge on the ground of the employees denial of another charge or of underlying facts relating to that other charge, nor may [d]enials of charges and related facts . . . be considered in determining a penalty. Id ., at 1585. In a separate unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Boards reversal of the false statement charge against McManus as well as the Boards conclusion that an employees false statements . . . may not be considered even for purposes of impeachment. McManus v. Department of Justice , 66 MSPR 564, 568 (1995).
We granted certiorari in both cases, 521 U. S. ___ (1997), and now reverse. In Bryson v. United States , 396 U. S. 64 (1969) , we said: Our legal system provides methods for challenging the Governments right to ask questionslying is not one of them. A citizen may decline to answer the question, or answer it honestly, but he cannot with impunity knowingly and willfully answer with a falsehood. Id. , at 72 (footnote ommitted). We find it impossible to square the result reached by the Court of Appeals in the present case with our holding in Bryson and in other cases of similar import.
Title 5 U. S. C. §7513(a) provides that an agency may impose the sort of penalties involved here for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service. It then sets forth four procedural rights accorded to the employee against whom adverse action is proposed. The agency must:
(1) give the employee at least 30 days advance written notice; (2) allow the employee a reasonable time, but not less than 7 days, to answer orally and in writing and to furnish . . . evidence in support of the answer; (3) permit the employee to be represented by an attorney or other representative; and (4) provide the employee with a written decision and the specific reasons therefor. 5 U. S. C. §7513(b).
In these carefully delineated rights there is no hint of any right to put the government to its proof by falsely denying the charged conduct. Such a right, then, if it exists at all, must come from the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The Fifth Amendment provides that [n]o person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law … . U. S. Const., Amdt. V. The Court of Appeals stated that it is undisputed that the government employees here had a protected property interest in their employment, 89 F. 3d at 1581, and we assume that to be the case for purposes of our decision.
The core of due process is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532, 542 (1985) . But we reject, on the basis of both precedent and principle, the view expressed by the Court of Appeals in this case that a meaningful opportunity to be heard includes a right to make false statements with respect to the charged conduct.
It is well established that a criminal defendants right to testify does not include the right to commit perjury. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U. S. 157, 173 (1986) ; United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620, 626 (1980) ; United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41, 54 (1978) . Indeed, in United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U. S. 87, 97 (1993) , we held that a court could, consistent with the Constitution, enhance a criminal defendants sentence based on a finding that he perjured himself at trial.
Witnesses appearing before a grand jury under oath are likewise required to testify truthfully, on pain of being prosecuted for perjury. United States v. Wong , 431 U. S. 174 (1977) . There we said that the predicament of being forced to choose between incriminatory truth and falsehood … does not justify perjury. Id ., at 178. Similarly, one who files a false affidavit required by statute may be fined and imprisoned. Dennis v. United States , 384 U. S. 855 (1966) .
The Court of Appeals sought to distinguish these cases on the ground that the defendants in them had been under oath, while here the respondents were not. The fact that respondents were not under oath, of course, negates a charge of perjury, but that is not the charge brought against them. They were charged with making false statements during the course of an agency investigation, a charge that does not require that the statements be made under oath. While the Court of Appeals would apparently permit the imposition of punishment for the former but not the latter, we fail to see how the presence or absence of an oath is material to the due process inquiry.
The Court of Appeals also relied on its fear that if employees were not allowed to make false statements, they might be coerced into admitting the misconduct, whether they believe that they are guilty or not, in order to avoid the more severe penalty of removal possibly resulting from a falsification charge. App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a-17a. But we rejected a similar claim in United States v. Grayson , 438 U. S. 41 (1978) . There a sentencing judge took into consideration his belief that the defendant had testified falsely at his trial. The defendant argued before us that such a practice would inhibit the exercise of the right to testify truthfully in the proceeding. We described that contention as entirely frivolous. Id. , at 55.
If answering an agencys investigatory question could expose an employee to a criminal prosecution, he may exercise his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. See Hale v. Henkel , 201 U. S. 43, 67 (1906) ; United States v. Ward , 448 U. S. 242, 248 (1980) . It may well be that an agency, in ascertaining the truth or falsity of the charge, would take into consideration the failure of the employee to respond. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U. S. 308, 318 (1976) (discussing the prevailing rule that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify). But there is nothing inherently irrational about such an investigative posture. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal. , 366 U. S. 36 (1961).
For these reasons, we hold that a government agency may take adverse action against an employee because the employee made false statements in response to an underlying charge of misconduct. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are therefore
Reversed.


--- layout: post title: There comes a time in every Emacs-user's life when... published: true date: 2011-12-02 categories: - emacs - gnus posterous_url: http://verdammelt.posterous.com/there-comes-a-time-in-every-emacs-users-life posterous_slug: there-comes-a-time-in-every-emacs-users-life ---
…you just need to nuke-and-pave your configuration.
That time has come for me – especially with respect to my GNUS configuration. I’ve been using GNUS to read news since probably 1990 or earlier, before then I remember using rn.
As for email I’ve used RMAIL and VM. I don’t remember exactly when I switched GNUS but it has been probably at least 5 years.
Over that time my gnus init file has grown pretty hairy. It is time for a shave.
Over the last week I’ve switched to a pretest release of Emacs v24 and during that time I cleaned out a lot of configuration – but feared to clean out much of my gnus configuration. However in trying to get the spam checking working better I realized that a nuke-and-pave is probably the best thing to do now.
So I am about to remove nearly ALL of my gnus configuration. Pray for me.
p.s. I’ll try to blog about my luck or lack-there-of. And also any interesting bits I discover along the way.


YOUNG TAMLANE was son of Earl Murray, and Burd Janet was daughter of Dunbar, Earl of March. And when they were young they loved one another and plighted their troth. But when the time came near for their marrying, Tamlane disappeared, and none knew what had become of him.
Many, many days after he had disappeared, Burd Janet was wandering in Carterhaugh Wood, though she had been warned not to go there. And as she wandered she plucked the flowers from the bushes. She came at last to a bush of broom and began plucking it. She had not taken more than three flowerets when by her side up started young Tamlane.
'Where come ye from, Tamlane, Tamlane?' Burd Janet said; 'and why have you been away so long?'
'From Elfiand I come,' said young Tamlane. 'The Queen of Elfland has made me her knight.'
'But how did you get there, Tamlane?' said Burd Janet.
'I was hunting one day, and as I rode widershins round yon hill, a deep drowsiness fell upon me, and when I awoke, behold! I was in Elfland. Fair is that land and gay, and fain would I stop but for thee and one other thing. Every seven years the Elves pay their tithe to the Nether world, and for all the queen makes much of me, I fear it is myself that will be the tithe.'
'Oh, can you not be saved? Tell me if aught I can do will save you, Tamlane?'
'One only thing is there for my safety. Tomorrow night is Hallowe'en, and the fairy court will then ride through England and Scotland, and if you would borrow me from Elfland you must take your stand by Miles Cross between twelve and one o' the night, and with holy water in your hand you must cast a compass all around you.'
'But how shall I know you, Tamlane?' quoth Burd Janet, 'amid so many knights I've ne'er seen before?'
'The first court of Elves that come by let pass. The next court you shall pay reverence to, but do naught nor say aught.
But the third court that comes by is the chief court of them, and at the head rides the Queen of all Elfland.  Watch my hands, Janet, the right one will be gloved but the left one will be bare, and by that token you will know me.'
'But how to save you, Tamlane?' quoth Burd Janet.
'You must spring upon me suddenly, and I will fall to the ground. Then seize me quick, and whatever change befall me, for they will exercise all their magic on me, cling hold to me till they turn me into red-hot iron. Then cast me into this pool and I will be turned back into a mother-naked man. Cast then your green mantle over me, and I shall be yours, and be of the world again.'
So Burd Janet promised to do all for Tamlane, and next night at midnight she took her stand by Miles Cross and cast a compass round her with holy water.
Soon there came riding by the Elfin court, first over the mound went a troop on black steeds, and then another troop on brown. But in the third court, all on milk-white steeds, she saw the Queen of Elfiand, and by her side a knight with a star in his crown, with right hand gloved and the left bare. Then she knew this was her own Tamlane, and springing forward she seized the bridle of the milk-white steed and pulled its rider down.
'He's won, he's won amongst us all,' shrieked out the eldritch crew, and all came around her and tried their spells on young Tamlane.
First they turned him in Janet's arms like frozen ice, then into a huge flame of roaring fire.  Then suddenly a dove was struggling in her arms, and almost flew away. Then they turned him into a swan, but all was in vain, till at last he was turned into a red-hot glaive, and this she cast into a well of water and then he turned back into a mother-naked man. She quickly cast her green mantle over him, and young Tamlane was Burd Janet's for ever.
Then sang the Queen of Elfiand as the court turned away and began to resume its march:
'She that has borrowed young Tamlane
Has gotten a stately groom,
She's taken away my bonniest knight,
Left nothing in his room.
'But had I known, Tamlane, Tamlane,
A lady would borrow thee,
I'd hae ta'en out thy two grey eyne,
Put in two eyne of tree.
'Had I but known, Tamlane, Tamlane,
Before we came from home,
I'd hae ta'en out thy heart o' flesh,
Put in a heart of stone.
'Had I but had the wit yestreen
That I have got today,
I'd paid the Fiend seven times his teind
Ere you'd been won away.'
And then the Elfin court rode away, and Burd Janet and young Tamlane went their way homewards and were soon after married after young Tamlane had again been sained by the holy water and made Christian once more.


Imagine our two dimensional space representation with regular, carthesian coordinates, often represented by x and y.
If one asked you to encode it into any programming language you would create something like that:
Now if you would like to put a time evolution on it, it would require to put it into another array with appropriate time stamps assigned to it. Not speaking about indexes checks, some IndexOutOfBoundExceptions etc.
Imagine same situation with proposed by us implementation. To define an tensor with coordiates of type carthesian coordinate and value of Double you type:
Ok till now, we admit, there is no clear advantege... but what if you would like to use non integer coordinates?
In regular array approach you need to specifie another arrays with indexes that coresponds to indexes in position, and then map them on each iteration with some index kept and so on, and so on.
With tensors approach this is easy, you just define your coordinates with value they have. Then they imidietly point to value.
To get a subset (slice) with Tensorics you only have to call:
To get a aggregated subset (average or root mean squere) you only have to call:
This however requires a knowledge about Field » that has to be same tape as values in your tensor.
All of this operations gives you imidiet access to slice (which is again tensor, with reduced number of coordinates). So you can still manipulate it however you want.
Fill with examples of Units etc etc ...
Fill with examples and more comments
Having a unified objects it is easy to manipulate them. Simple addition and subtraction is provided like following.
Note! You can always specify a strategy what to do when there is no element in in one of tensors you play with. There is of course always a default strategy (see JavaDoc for details)
Fill with examples and more comments
kajetan arek Or go directly to our GitHub repositiry »


--- layout: post title: "Drain" description: "A Drain is a filter abstraction over an Iterator, with the purpose of making out-of-process queries more efficient." date: 2014-07-23 14:25 UTC tags: [Software Design, Architecture] --- {% include JB/setup %}
{{ page.description }}
For some years now, the Reused Abstractions Principle has pushed me towards software architectures based upon fewer and fewer abstractions, where each abstraction, on the other hand, is reused over and over again.
 If you have only Iterators, you'll have to read all your data into memory, and then filter in memory. If you have lots of data on storage, this is obviously going to be prohibitively slow, so you'll need a way to select only a subset out of your persistent store.
This problem should be familiar to every student of software development. Pure abstractions tend not to survive contact with reality (there are examples in both Object-Oriented, Functional, and Logical or Relational programming), but we should still strive towards keeping abstractions as pure as possible.
One proposed solution to the Query Problem is to use something like IQueryable, but unfortunately, IQueryable is an extremely poor abstraction (and so are F# query expressions, too).
In my experience, the most important feature of IQueryable is the ability to filter before loading data; normally, you can perform projections in memory, but when you read from persistent storage, you need to select your desired subset before loading it into memory.
Inspired by talks by Bart De Smet, in my Pluralsight course, I define custom filter interfaces like:
type IReservations = inherit seq<Envelope<Reservation>> abstract Between : DateTime -> DateTime -> seq<Envelope<Reservation>>
or
type INotifications = inherit seq<Envelope<Notification>> abstract About : Guid -> seq<Envelope<Notification>>
Both of these interfaces derive from IEnumerable<T> and add a single extra method that defines a custom filter. Storage-aware implementations can implement this method by returning a new sequence of only those items on storage that match the filter. Such a method may
The custom interfaces shown above follow a common template: the interface derives from IEnumerable<T> and adds a single 'filter' method, which filters the sequence based on the input argument(s). In the above examples, IReservations define a Between method with two arguments, while INotifications defines an About method with a single argument.
In order to generalize, it's necessary to find a common name for the interface and its single method, as well as deal with variations in method arguments.
All the really obvious names like Filter, Query, etc. are already 'taken', so I hit a thesaurus and settled on the name Drain. A Drain can potentially drain a sequence of elements to a smaller sequence.
When it comes to variations in input arguments, the solution is to use generics. The Between method that takes two arguments could also be modelled as a method taking a single tuple argument. Eventually, I've arrived at this general definition:
module Drain = type IDrainable<'a, 'b> = inherit seq<'a> abstract On : 'b -> seq<'a> let on x (d : IDrainable<'a, 'b>) = d.On x
As you can see, I decided to name the extra method On, as well as add an on function, which enables clients to use a Drain like this:
match tasks |> Drain.on id |> Seq.toList with
In the above example, tasks
is defined as IDrainable<TaskRendition, string>, and id
is a string, so the result of draining on the ID is a sequence of TaskRendition records.
Here's another example:
match statuses |> Drain.on(id, conversationId) |> Seq.toList with
Here, statuses
is defined as IDrainable<string * Guid, string * string> - not the most well-designed instance, I admit: I should really introduce some well-named records instead of those tuples, but the point is that you can also drain on multiple values by using a tuple (or a record type) as the value on which to drain.
One of the great features of Drains is that an in-memory implementation is easy, so you can add this function to the Drain module:
let ofSeq areEqual s = { new IDrainable<'a, 'b> with member this.On x = s |> Seq.filter (fun y -> areEqual y x) member this.GetEnumerator() = s.GetEnumerator() member this.GetEnumerator() = (this :> 'a seq).GetEnumerator() :> System.Collections.IEnumerator }
This enables you to take any IEnumerable<T> (seq<'a>) and turn it into an in-memory Drain by supplying an equality function. Here's an example:
let private toDrainableTasks (tasks : TaskRendition seq) = tasks |> Drain.ofSeq (fun x y -> x.Id = y)
This little helper function takes a sequence of TaskRendition records and defines the equality function as a comparison on each TaskRendition record's Id property. The result is a drain that you can use to select one or more TaskRendition records based on their IDs.
I use this a lot for unit testing.
It's also easy to define an empty drain, by adding this value to the Drain module:
let empty<'a, 'b> = Seq.empty<'a> |> ofSeq (fun x (y : 'b) -> false)
Here's a usage example:
let mappedUsers = Drain.empty<UserMapped, string>
Again, this can be handy when unit testing.
While the in-memory implementation is useful when unit testing, the entire purpose of the Drain abstraction is to enable various implementations to implement the On method to perform a custom selection against a well-known data source. As an example, you could imagine an implementation that translates the input arguments of the On method into a SQL query.
If you want to see examples of this, my Pluralsight course demonstrates how to implement IReservations and INotifications with various data stores - I trust you can extrapolate from those examples.
You can base an entire mainstream application on the two abstractions of Iterator and Observer. However, the problem when it comes to Iterators is that conceptually, you'll need to iterate over all potentially relevant elements in your system - and that may be millions of records!
However impure it is to introduce a third interface into the mix, I still prefer to introduce a single generic interface, instead of multiple custom interfaces, because once you and your co-workers understand the Drain abstraction, the cognitive load is still quite low. A Drain is an Iterator with a twist, so in the end, you'll have a system built on 2½ abstractions.
P.S. 2018-06-20. While this article is a decent attempt to generalise the query side of a fundamentally object-oriented approach to software architecture, I've later realised that dependency injection, even when disguised as partial application, isn't functional. The problem is that querying a database, reading files, and so on, is essentially non-deterministic, even when no side effects are incurred. The functional approach is to altogether reject the notion of dependencies.
Comments


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Who is Amanda Lucy and why does she care about the Denver Restaurant Scene?
Amanda Lucy has been interested in baking, and later, cooking, since a young age. As a teenager, she used to make all of the desserts for her family of five, and sometimes other meals. She also has always been interested in foreign travel, making several visits to Montreal and Quebec while at college in Northern NY State, and also studying overseas in London, England and Caen, France. Whenever on travel, Amanda Lucy studies the local restaurant offerings, carefully researching and coordinating where she and her travel companions should spend their time and money.
As a middle-aged adult, she is now a foodie and well-versed in wine and cocktails, and has never stopped traveling. Her passion is creating and consuming good food; she cooks at home for her family, frequently trying new techniques and recipes. She is most adept at modifying recipes to her and her guests’ tastes, but is working toward one day being talented at creating her own dishes. She is drawn to the fine restaurant scene, but is always up for finding the more casual venues that have something unique and delicious to offer; and there are many of both in the Denver area!
In addition to travel and good food, Amanda Lucy’s interests include the performing arts. Denver has a lush performing arts scene, and one of Amanda Lucy’s favorite things to do is to combine dinner and a show. When her two sons were performing with the Colorado Children’s Chorale, Amanda Lucy had many occasions to choose a restaurant in a variety of locations across Denver (based on where a rehearsal or dress rehearsal may be taking place) to enjoy during the rehearsal time; most frequently this was at the Denver Center for Performing Arts (DCPA) right downtown. As a many-year subscriber of the Colorado Symphony with her mother, Amanda Lucy also has had almost weekly occasions to choose a restaurant near DCPA with her mother to enjoy before a performance. As a result, Amanda Lucy’s knowledge of the Denver restaurant scene is pretty thorough, and she is excited to share her experiences with others.
Look to Amanda Lucy for menu summaries, ambiance, any uniqueness about a venue, wine guidance, and some of her own thoughts on food choices and pairings. She hopes this can become an exchange, and welcomes the thoughts and feedback of others regarding their own experiences.


4-in-row game
Welcome to the game.
Please select player 1:
Human
Computer
Please select player 2:
Human
Computer
Please select game type:
Traditional game
Special game*
*In the special game coins can be dropped at each position (this is fun!)
.


Team MBR
Home
Schedule
Squad
Add Player
First Name:
Last Name
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Captain:


Miguel Angel Caro-Quintero Pleads Guilty to Trafficking Massive Amounts of Marijuana from Mexico to the United States
| U.S. Attorney’s Office October 23, 2009 |
DENVER—Miguel Angel Caro-Quintero, age 46, a resident and national of the Republic of Mexico and a reputed member of the Sonora Cartel, pled guilty today to charges of marijuana trafficking, United States Attorney David Gaouette and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Special Agent in Charge Jeffrey Sweetin announced. The guilty pleas were tendered before U.S. District Court Judge Philip A. Brimmer. The plea agreement resolves indictments from the District of Arizona and the District of Colorado. Caro-Quintero, who appeared at the hearing in custody, is scheduled to be sentence for his criminal conduct on February 4, 2010. The defendant admitted to trafficking more than 100 tons of marijuana from 1985 through 1988, resulting in more than $100,000,000 in payment being sent to Mexico.
Miguel Angel Caro-Quintero was indicted by a federal grand jury in Denver in 1990. He was indicted by a federal grand jury in Arizona in 1994. He was arrested in Los Mochis, Sinaloa, Mexico, in December 2001. He was then extradited to the United States on February 25, 2009. Prior to his extradition, Caro-Quintero was held in custody pending extradition, and served a prison sentence in Mexico for weapons possession crimes. The defendant and his older brother, Rafael Caro-Quintero, were identified as significant foreign narcotics traffickers under The Kingpin Act in June 2000, subjecting them and their associates to economic sanctions. Rafael Caro-Quintero was accused of being the mastermind behind the kidnapping and murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena in 1985, and was prosecuted by the Mexican government. Rafael Caro-Quintero was convicted in Mexico and is serving a 40-year prison sentence for the murder of the DEA Special Agent.
According to the stipulated facts admitted at the change of plea hearing in the District of Colorado case, beginning in 1985, Miguel Angel Caro-Quintero and others knowingly engaged in a series of racketeering acts constituting in a sustained and persistent pattern of activity in which:
- Tons of marijuana were grown or acquired in Mexico;
- Shipments of hundreds of pounds of marijuana repeatedly were brought into the United States from Mexico;
- The marijuana shipments were transported from state to state within the United States;
- The shipments were broken down into smaller loads;
- The divided loads of marijuana were delivered to sub-distributors at a number of locations in the United States;
- The marijuana was marketed for cash at a number of locations, including Colorado;
- The cash proceeds were collected and counted;
- A portion of the gross cash sales was transported to Mexico; and
- Cash proceeds transported to Mexico were delivered to the defendant in payment for the marijuana he provided.
Caro-Quintero generally managed operations within Mexico, including growing and harvesting ton-quantity crops of Marijuana in Mexico to supply and re-supply the drug trafficking venture. The defendant acquired land and farming equipment. Caro-Quintero hired workers who processed, stored, and moved marijuana crops in Mexico. The Mexican side of the venture required farms, buildings, and vehicles.
According to the stipulated facts regarding the District of Arizona case, Caro-Quintero admitted to working with others in a conspiracy to deliver approximately 3,000 pounds of marijuana to buyers in Arizona in 1994. The marijuana delivered in Arizona was provided to the would-be buyers by the defendant on credit, in anticipation of later payment. The defendant subsequently had conversations with undercover investigators posing as customers regarding the quality of the marijuana and the price and payment arrangements for more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana.
“Today’s guilty plea demonstrates the Department of Justice’s willingness to pursue drug kingpins no matter how long ago they were charged with a crime,” said U.S. Attorney David Gaouette. “I especially want to thank all of the law enforcement agents and officers here in Colorado as well as in Arizona and Mexico for their perseverance in bringing this major drug trafficker to justice.”
“The guilty plea of Miguel Caro-Quintero is another step to closing the book on this once powerful and brutally violent criminal band of family members and associates,” said DEA Special Agent in Charge Jeffrey Sweetin. “He will now face justice for the misery and destruction he caused in both the United States and Mexico. This is yet another illustration that DEA and our courageous partners in Mexico are successfully attacking violent criminal organizations at every level.”
Caro-Quintero faces not less than 10 years, and not more than 20 years' imprisonment for the Colorado case. He faces a maximum penalty of not more than five years' imprisonment for the Arizona case.
This case was investigated and supported by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Field Divisions in Colorado and Arizona, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Denver Field Division, with additional help from the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. Marshals Service, the U.S. Bureau of Prisons, state and local investigators from Utah and Colorado, members of the Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office, and law enforcement officers in Mexico. The Department of Justice Criminal Division’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section provided critical support in the investigation and prosecution. The Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs provided significant assistance in the extradition. The Department of Justice’s Office of Enforcement Operations provided assistance and support to the investigation and prosecution.
Caro-Quintero is being prosecuted in Colorado by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Mark Barrett, Guy Till, and Susan “Zeke” Knox.


Fire, Air, Water and Earth are used in a cycle to provide four blocks of six hours each. This time is the same everywhere on earth. It was created to give a similar idea of time everywhere in the world without relying on morning/evening etc in one specific location.
After the @ you see the number of quarterdays after the Unix epoch mod 200 plus 1. This means that this number resets to 1 after every 200 quarterdays, or 50 days. You can use this to make sure that you plan a meeting on exactly the same day, and if you want to use it over a longer period of time you can use it in combination with normal calendar elements like adding a month reference.
Refer to the little disk below for when each element occurs in your exact location (down is midnight, up is noon, left is morning, right is evening).
Note: this is a prototype, and probably a pretty big change will come soon. Keep an eye on this page to see the system develop!


Celebrity Bonus Space
Vikram
McKown
Bruno
Eva Putnam/Boykin
Spargur
Maria Gagne
NJ Superdick
Berdean
No2BigGovernment
LibreTax
Gerry Trissel aka TaxMan007
Kenosha.Tax.Guy (Randall Cook)
More to come.....


|
jade-engine
0.0
|
#include <IScene.h>
Public Member Functions | |
| virtual void | SpriteHovered (Sprite *oldSprite, Sprite *newSprite) |
| virtual void | Start () |
| virtual void | PreUpdate () |
| virtual void | Update () |
| bool | GetInitialized () const |
| void | SetInitialized (const bool initialized) |
| bool | GetActive () const |
| void | SetActive (const bool active) |
Interface for Scene classes.
Scene is a high-level building block of a game in Jade engine. It is a collection of game objects that are updated and rendered at the same time, and usually contains logic that operates on those game objects.
All game objects created while a scene is active, such as during it's Start() function will be considered part of that scene and will stop being updated and rendered when a new scene is played. Exception to that are objects created with kObjectLayer_Persistent_UI ObjectLayer which are always rendered and updated.
All scenes must inherit from IScene and can override the public virtual functions in order receive callbacks from the Jade engine.
Template for new scene:
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inline |
Returns whether this scene is currently active, i.e. its Update() is being called every frame.
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Returns whether this scene was already initialized, i.e. its Start() was already called.
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Triggered ever frame by the Jade Engine while this scene is active.
To obtain delta time since last frame use GTime.deltaTime.
The trigger order is the following: IScene::PreUpdate -> IGameObject::Load -> IGameObject::Update -> IScene::Update -> IGameObject::Load -> IGameObject::Render.
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inline |
Set this scene as active, i.e. its Update() will being called every frame.
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inline |
Set this scene as initialized, i.e. next GGame.PlayScene will now longer trigger Start().
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inlinevirtual |
Triggered the first time this scene is played.
An ideal callback to initialize the scene's game objects. Only triggered once, i.e. second call to GGame.PlayScene with this scene will not trigger Start(). Start() will be triggered immediately when GGame.PlayScene is called while the first Update() will happen next frame.
Reimplemented in JadeEngine::OptionsMenuScene, JadeEngine::MainMenuScene, and JadeEngine::PoweredByJadeEngineScene.
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inlinevirtual |
Triggered every frame by the Jade Engine while this scene is active.
To obtain delta time since last frame use GTime.deltaTime.
The trigger order is the following: IScene::PreUpdate -> IGameObject::Load -> IGameObject::Update -> IScene::Update -> IGameObject::Load -> IGameObject::Render.
Reimplemented in JadeEngine::OptionsMenuScene, JadeEngine::MainMenuScene, and JadeEngine::PoweredByJadeEngineScene.


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Post.parsing
ApplicationDataVO.php
ApplicationFacade.php
ApplicationMediator.php
ApplicationView.php
BasicDemo.php
Controller.php
Facade.php
ICommand.php
IController.php
IFacade.php
IMediator.php
IModel.php
INotification.php
INotifier.php
IObserver.php
IProxy.php
IView.php
MacroCommand.php
Mediator.php
Model.php
Notification.php
Notifier.php
Observer.php
Proxy.php
SimpleCommand.php
StartApplicationCommand.php
StartModelCommand.php
StartViewCommand.php
View.php
ApplicationDataProxy.php
Warnings:
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ApplicationDataVO.php
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ApplicationFacade.php
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ApplicationMediator.php
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ApplicationView.php
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BasicDemo.php
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Controller.php
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Facade.php
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ICommand.php
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IController.php
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IFacade.php
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IMediator.php
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IModel.php
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INotification.php
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INotifier.php
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IObserver.php
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IProxy.php
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IView.php
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MacroCommand.php
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Mediator.php
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Model.php
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Notification.php
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Notifier.php
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Observer.php
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Proxy.php
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SimpleCommand.php
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StartApplicationCommand.php
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StartModelCommand.php
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StartViewCommand.php
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View.php
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