Opinion
ALABAMA, PETITIONER
v.
MICHAEL
HERMAN BOZEMAN
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.* *
Forty-eight States, the Federal Government, and the District of Columbia (all of which, for simplicity, we shall call States) have entered into the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Agreement), 18 U. S. C. App. §2, p. 692, an interstate compact. The Agreement creates uniform procedures for lodging and executing a detainer, i.e. , a legal order that requires a State in which an individual is currently imprisoned to hold that individual when he has finished serving his sentence so that he may be tried by a different State for a different crime.
The Agreement provides for expeditious delivery of the prisoner to the receiving State for trial prior to the termination of his sentence in the sending State. And it seeks to minimize the consequent interruption of the prisoners ongoing prison term. In particular, Article IV(c) specifies that the receiving State shall begin the prisoners trial . . . within one hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving State. At the same time, Article IV(e) prohibits return of the individual to the sending State before that trial is complete. It says:
If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoners being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to article V(e) hereof, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice . (Emphasis added.)
The case before us requires us to interpret the Article IV language that we have just quoted. See New York v. Hill, 528 U. S. 110, 111 (2000) (As a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, §10, cl. 3, the [Interstate Agreement on Detainers] is a federal law subject to federal construction) (quoting Carchman v. Nash, 473 U. S. 716, 719 (1985) ; Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 442 (1981) ). The case concerns a defendant whose initial imprisonment was interrupted brieflyfor a single dayduring which time he was brought to the receiving State for purposes of arraignment and then returned immediately to his original place of imprisonment. The question is whether, in such circumstances, the literal language of Article IV(e) bars any further criminal proceedingsbecause the defendant was returned to the original place of imprisonment before trial was had. We conclude that Article IV(e) does bar further proceedings, despite the fact that the interruption of the initial imprisonment lasted for only one day.
I
A
The Council of State Governments drafted the language of the Agreement in 1956. See United States v. Mauro, 436 U. S. 340, 349350 (1978) . The United States joined in 1970. Id. , at 343. And Alabama is one of the 49 other current members. Hill , supra , at 111; Ala. Code §15981 (1995). The Agreement contains nine articles. Article I sets forth the problems that led to the Agreements creation, namely, that
charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.
Article I then adds that it is the . . . purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of … detainers … .
Article II sets forth definitions. Article III gives a prisoner against whom a detainer has been lodged the right to request a final disposition of the relevant charges, in which case he shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty days (unless extended by the trial court for good cause); otherwise, the relevant indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. Art. III(a), (d).
Article IV gives the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information, or complaint is pending, i.e. , the receiving State, the right to have a prisoner against whom it has lodged a detainer . . . made available for trial. Art. IV(a). It says further that, once the prisoner arrives in the receiving State, the trial must begin within one hundred and twenty days unless extended for good cause. Art. IV(c). Article IV also sets forth the antishuttling provision at issue here. To repeat: that provision says that trial must be had . . . prior to the prisoners being returned to the original place of imprisonment; otherwise, the charges shall be dismissed with prejudice. Art. IV(e). Article V sets forth conditions on the receiving State obtaining temporary custody of the prisoner. The remaining articles deal with subsidiary matters, not relevant here with one exception: Article IX provides that the agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes.
For present purposes, it is important to keep in mind that the Agreement basically (1) gives a prisoner the right to demand a trial within 180 days; and (2) gives a State the right to obtain a prisoner for purposes of trial, in which case the State (a) must try the prisoner within 120 days of his arrival, and (b) must not return the prisoner to his original place of imprisonment prior to that trial.
B
In January 1997, respondent Michael Bozeman was serving a sentence of imprisonment for a federal drug crime in federal prison in Marianna, Florida. At the beginning of that month, the district attorney of Covington County, Alabama, who had earlier lodged a detainer against Bozeman in connection with charges related to discharging firearms, sought temporary custody in order to arraign Bozeman on those firearms charges and secure the appointment of counsel. On January 23, federal authorities released Bozeman to local officials. Those officials took him to Covington County, about 80 miles from the federal prison, where he arrived later in the day. Bozeman spent the night in the county jail, appeared in local court the next morning, obtained local appointed counsel, and was transported back to federal prison that evening. About one month later, Bozeman was brought back to Covington County for trial.
At that time, Bozemans local counsel filed a motion to dismiss the state charges on the ground that in January Bozeman had been returned to the original place of imprisonment (namely, the federal prison) prior to trial on state charges being had. See App. 3742. Consequently, he argued, under Article IV(e) the state charges were without any further force or effect, and the local court had to enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
Bozeman was convicted, and the trial court subsequently denied Bozemans motion for dismissal. It wrote that it made much sense to bring Bozeman into the county briefly to deal with short pre-trial matters and then to return him to the surroundings to which he was accustomed. App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a.  Ibid. In the trial judges view, Bozeman certainly would not [have] receive[d] much rehabilitation in a county jail. Ibid. Consequently, the judge concluded, the January transfer was wholly consistent with the Agreements goal, to expedite the prosecution of state charges without interfering with any rehabilitative programs of the federal government. Id. , at 29a.
An intermediate State Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 738 So. 2d 934 (1998). But the Alabama State Supreme Court reversed by a 4-to-3 vote. 781 So. 2d 165 (2000). In its view, the literal language of the Agreement controlled and required dismissal of the state charges. The dissenters argued that the Agreement violation was merely technical, and consequently did not require dismissal. Id. , at 170. The State petitioned for certiorari. In light of differences among the lower courts, we granted the writ. Compare, e.g. , United States v. Schrum , 638 F. 2d 214, 215 (CA10 1981) (per curiam) (adopting District Courts literal interpretation of Agreement), with United States v. Daniels , 3 F. 3d 25, 2728 (CA1 1993) (rejecting literal interpretation of Agreement). And we now affirm the Alabama Supreme Courts decision.
II
Alabama does not deny a violation of Article IV(e) as literally interpreted, for it concedes that its officials returned Bozeman to his original place of imprisonment, before Bozemans county court trial was had. Nor does Alabama claim that Bozeman waived the right to trial before return that Article IV provides. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 1, n. 1. Cf. Hill , 528 U. S., at 114115 (holding that defendant may waive his rights under Art. III of the Agreement). Rather, Alabama, supported by the United States Solicitor General and others, claims that Article IV(e)s basic purpose is to prevent shuttling that would interrupt the prisoners rehabilitation. See, e.g. , United States v. Roy , 830 F. 2d 628, 636 (CA7 1987) (provision is meant to protect the prisoner against endless interruption of the rehabilitation programs because of criminal proceedings in other jurisdictions). They say the one-day interruption that occurred here did not interrupt rehabilitation significantly. Hence, any violation is technical, harmless, or de minimis . And Article IV(e) contains an implicit exception for such trivial violations. Brief for Petitioner 26; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 1213. Cf. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U. S. 214, 231 (1992) (laws ordinarily are enacted with understanding that de minimis exceptions will be recognized). We cannot accept this argument, however, for two reasons.
A
First, the language of the Agreement militates against an implicit exception, for it is absolute. It says that, when a prisoner is returned before trial, the indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. Art. IV(e) (emphasis added). The word shall is ordinarily the language of command. Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U. S. 482, 485 (1947) (quoting Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490, 493 (1935) ).
The cases Alabama cites as supporting a harmless error construction involved statutes that lacked this absolute language. See, e.g. , United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U. S. 711, 716717 (1990) (Bail Reform Act is silent on the issue of a remedy for violations of its time limits). Cf. William Wrigley, Jr. , supra , at 231232 (applying de minimis exception presumption as part of the established background of legal principles against which all enactments are adopted, where text did not provide a contrary indication).
Moreover, the Agreement makes no distinction among different kinds of IV(c) arrivals, say, by exempting those that are followed by return within a short, specified period of time, or those that are simply for the purpose of arraignment. Given the Agreements language and the important consequences of starting the running of the 120-day time limit, we see no basis for such a distinction. Hence, we must assume that every prisoner arrival in the receiving State, whether followed by a very brief stay or a very long stay in the receiving State, triggers IV(e)s no return requirement.
B
Second, even were we to assume for arguments sake that the Agreement exempts violations that, viewed in terms of the Agreements purposes, are de minimis , cf. Article IX (stating that Agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes), we could not say that the violation at issue here qualifies as trivial. That is because the purpose of the no return provision cannot be as Alabama and the Solicitor General describe it, namely, as a simple, direct effort to prevent the interruption of rehabilitation. A provision that prevents returning a prisoner who has arrived in the receiving State does not directly increase the number of days the prisoner will spend in rehabilitation in the sending State. Rather, it directly and intentionally decreases the number of days that prisoner will spend in the sending State.
This point is obvious once one keeps in mind that the trial must take place within 120 days of the prisoners arrival in the receiving State. Article IV(e)s requirement that the prisoner remain in the county jail means that the prisoner will spend all of those 120 days away from the sending States rehabilitation programs. By contrast, returning the prisoner prior to trialin violation of Article IV(e)would permit the prisoner to participate in the sending States program for some of those days. But to call such a violation technical, because it means fewer days spent away from the sending State, is to call virtually every conceivable antishuttling violation technicala circumstance which, like the 13th chime of the clock, shows that Alabamas conception of the provisions purpose is seriously flawed.
Article IV(e) may seek to remove obstructions to prisoner rehabilitation in a different way. The Agreement not only prevents return, but it also requires the receiving State to pay for the prisoners incarceration in that State during the period prior to trial. Art. V(h) (From the time that a party State receives custody of a prisoner pursuant to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody of the sending State, the [receiving] State … shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping, and returning the prisoner). That requirement may provide the receiving State with an incentive to shorten the pretrial periodto proceed to trial faster than 120 days or not to seek extensionsthus disposing of detainers, and the attendant uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation, in the most expeditious manner. Art. I. See also Cuyler , 449 U. S., at 449 (discussing negative effects of detainers on prisoners). But if that is Article IV(e)s purpose, the transfer here was inconsistent with it. By returning Bozeman to federal prison, the county saved itself the cost of housing him and for a nontrivial several week period, which may have allowed it to delay resolving the detainer.
Alternatively, the Agreements drafters may have thought that the shuttling itself, i.e. , the movement back and forth among prisons, adds to the uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Art. I (emphasis added). And they may have sought to minimize the number of shuttles for that reason alone.
Viewing the Agreement in terms of either purpose, we cannot say that the one-day violation here is de mimimis , technical, or harmless. Neither do the briefs (or, to our knowledge, any lower court opinion) point to any other plausible rehabilitation-related purpose of Article IV(e) specifically, in terms of which the violation here might count as trivial. But we need not decide precisely what led Congress and the many other legislatures to agree to Article IV(e)s antishuttling remedy. Given the Agreements absolute language, it is enough to explain why Alabamas view of the Agreements purpose is not plausible and to point to other purposes more easily squared with Article IV(e)s text and operation.
C
Alabama and amici make additional claims, basically elaborating on the trial courts view that return to the sending State after a brief journey to the receiving State for pretrial purposes is helpful, not harmful, to the prisoner. But given Article IVs text, which indicates a contrary view, the parties would more appropriately address these policy arguments to legislatures.
The Solicitor General also points to a federal statutory provision that says expressly that an order of a court dismissing any indictment, information, or complaint may be with or without prejudice, depending on the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances of the case, and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of the agreement and on the administration of justice. 18 U. S. C. App. §9(1), p. 695. This statutory provision, however, governs only when the United States is a receiving State. §9. And here the United States is not the receiving State. We fail to see how this provision helps, rather than hurts, Alabamas cause. Although we reject Alabamas interpretation of the Agreement, our decision does not bar a receiving State from returning a prisoner when it would be mutually advantageous and the prisoner accordingly waives his rights under Article IV(e). Cf. Hill , 528 U. S., at 114115 (holding that defendant may waive his rights under Art. III of the Agreement)
For these reasons, the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
* * Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join all but Part IIB of this opinion.
Opinion
ALABAMA, PETITIONER
v.
MICHAEL
HERMAN BOZEMAN
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.* *
Forty-eight States, the Federal Government, and the District of Columbia (all of which, for simplicity, we shall call States) have entered into the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Agreement), 18 U. S. C. App. §2, p. 692, an interstate compact. The Agreement creates uniform procedures for lodging and executing a detainer, i.e. , a legal order that requires a State in which an individual is currently imprisoned to hold that individual when he has finished serving his sentence so that he may be tried by a different State for a different crime.
The Agreement provides for expeditious delivery of the prisoner to the receiving State for trial prior to the termination of his sentence in the sending State. And it seeks to minimize the consequent interruption of the prisoners ongoing prison term. In particular, Article IV(c) specifies that the receiving State shall begin the prisoners trial . . . within one hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving State. At the same time, Article IV(e) prohibits return of the individual to the sending State before that trial is complete. It says:
If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoners being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to article V(e) hereof, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice . (Emphasis added.)
The case before us requires us to interpret the Article IV language that we have just quoted. See New York v. Hill, 528 U. S. 110, 111 (2000) (As a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, §10, cl. 3, the [Interstate Agreement on Detainers] is a federal law subject to federal construction) (quoting Carchman v. Nash, 473 U. S. 716, 719 (1985) ; Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 442 (1981) ). The case concerns a defendant whose initial imprisonment was interrupted brieflyfor a single dayduring which time he was brought to the receiving State for purposes of arraignment and then returned immediately to his original place of imprisonment. The question is whether, in such circumstances, the literal language of Article IV(e) bars any further criminal proceedingsbecause the defendant was returned to the original place of imprisonment before trial was had. We conclude that Article IV(e) does bar further proceedings, despite the fact that the interruption of the initial imprisonment lasted for only one day.
I
A
The Council of State Governments drafted the language of the Agreement in 1956. See United States v. Mauro, 436 U. S. 340, 349350 (1978) . The United States joined in 1970. Id. , at 343. And Alabama is one of the 49 other current members. Hill , supra , at 111; Ala. Code §15981 (1995). The Agreement contains nine articles. Article I sets forth the problems that led to the Agreements creation, namely, that
charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.
Article I then adds that it is the . . . purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of … detainers … .
Article II sets forth definitions. Article III gives a prisoner against whom a detainer has been lodged the right to request a final disposition of the relevant charges, in which case he shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty days (unless extended by the trial court for good cause); otherwise, the relevant indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. Art. III(a), (d).
Article IV gives the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information, or complaint is pending, i.e. , the receiving State, the right to have a prisoner against whom it has lodged a detainer . . . made available for trial. Art. IV(a). It says further that, once the prisoner arrives in the receiving State, the trial must begin within one hundred and twenty days unless extended for good cause. Art. IV(c). Article IV also sets forth the antishuttling provision at issue here. To repeat: that provision says that trial must be had . . . prior to the prisoners being returned to the original place of imprisonment; otherwise, the charges shall be dismissed with prejudice. Art. IV(e). Article V sets forth conditions on the receiving State obtaining temporary custody of the prisoner. The remaining articles deal with subsidiary matters, not relevant here with one exception: Article IX provides that the agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes.
For present purposes, it is important to keep in mind that the Agreement basically (1) gives a prisoner the right to demand a trial within 180 days; and (2) gives a State the right to obtain a prisoner for purposes of trial, in which case the State (a) must try the prisoner within 120 days of his arrival, and (b) must not return the prisoner to his original place of imprisonment prior to that trial.
B
In January 1997, respondent Michael Bozeman was serving a sentence of imprisonment for a federal drug crime in federal prison in Marianna, Florida. At the beginning of that month, the district attorney of Covington County, Alabama, who had earlier lodged a detainer against Bozeman in connection with charges related to discharging firearms, sought temporary custody in order to arraign Bozeman on those firearms charges and secure the appointment of counsel. On January 23, federal authorities released Bozeman to local officials. Those officials took him to Covington County, about 80 miles from the federal prison, where he arrived later in the day. Bozeman spent the night in the county jail, appeared in local court the next morning, obtained local appointed counsel, and was transported back to federal prison that evening. About one month later, Bozeman was brought back to Covington County for trial.
At that time, Bozemans local counsel filed a motion to dismiss the state charges on the ground that in January Bozeman had been returned to the original place of imprisonment (namely, the federal prison) prior to trial on state charges being had. See App. 3742. Consequently, he argued, under Article IV(e) the state charges were without any further force or effect, and the local court had to enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
Bozeman was convicted, and the trial court subsequently denied Bozemans motion for dismissal. It wrote that it made much sense to bring Bozeman into the county briefly to deal with short pre-trial matters and then to return him to the surroundings to which he was accustomed. App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a.  Ibid. In the trial judges view, Bozeman certainly would not [have] receive[d] much rehabilitation in a county jail. Ibid. Consequently, the judge concluded, the January transfer was wholly consistent with the Agreements goal, to expedite the prosecution of state charges without interfering with any rehabilitative programs of the federal government. Id. , at 29a.
An intermediate State Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 738 So. 2d 934 (1998). But the Alabama State Supreme Court reversed by a 4-to-3 vote. 781 So. 2d 165 (2000). In its view, the literal language of the Agreement controlled and required dismissal of the state charges. The dissenters argued that the Agreement violation was merely technical, and consequently did not require dismissal. Id. , at 170. The State petitioned for certiorari. In light of differences among the lower courts, we granted the writ. Compare, e.g. , United States v. Schrum , 638 F. 2d 214, 215 (CA10 1981) (per curiam) (adopting District Courts literal interpretation of Agreement), with United States v. Daniels , 3 F. 3d 25, 2728 (CA1 1993) (rejecting literal interpretation of Agreement). And we now affirm the Alabama Supreme Courts decision.
II
Alabama does not deny a violation of Article IV(e) as literally interpreted, for it concedes that its officials returned Bozeman to his original place of imprisonment, before Bozemans county court trial was had. Nor does Alabama claim that Bozeman waived the right to trial before return that Article IV provides. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 1, n. 1. Cf. Hill , 528 U. S., at 114115 (holding that defendant may waive his rights under Art. III of the Agreement). Rather, Alabama, supported by the United States Solicitor General and others, claims that Article IV(e)s basic purpose is to prevent shuttling that would interrupt the prisoners rehabilitation. See, e.g. , United States v. Roy , 830 F. 2d 628, 636 (CA7 1987) (provision is meant to protect the prisoner against endless interruption of the rehabilitation programs because of criminal proceedings in other jurisdictions). They say the one-day interruption that occurred here did not interrupt rehabilitation significantly. Hence, any violation is technical, harmless, or de minimis . And Article IV(e) contains an implicit exception for such trivial violations. Brief for Petitioner 26; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 1213. Cf. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U. S. 214, 231 (1992) (laws ordinarily are enacted with understanding that de minimis exceptions will be recognized). We cannot accept this argument, however, for two reasons.
A
First, the language of the Agreement militates against an implicit exception, for it is absolute. It says that, when a prisoner is returned before trial, the indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. Art. IV(e) (emphasis added). The word shall is ordinarily the language of command. Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U. S. 482, 485 (1947) (quoting Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490, 493 (1935) ).
The cases Alabama cites as supporting a harmless error construction involved statutes that lacked this absolute language. See, e.g. , United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U. S. 711, 716717 (1990) (Bail Reform Act is silent on the issue of a remedy for violations of its time limits). Cf. William Wrigley, Jr. , supra , at 231232 (applying de minimis exception presumption as part of the established background of legal principles against which all enactments are adopted, where text did not provide a contrary indication).
Moreover, the Agreement makes no distinction among different kinds of IV(c) arrivals, say, by exempting those that are followed by return within a short, specified period of time, or those that are simply for the purpose of arraignment. Given the Agreements language and the important consequences of starting the running of the 120-day time limit, we see no basis for such a distinction. Hence, we must assume that every prisoner arrival in the receiving State, whether followed by a very brief stay or a very long stay in the receiving State, triggers IV(e)s no return requirement.
B
Second, even were we to assume for arguments sake that the Agreement exempts violations that, viewed in terms of the Agreements purposes, are de minimis , cf. Article IX (stating that Agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes), we could not say that the violation at issue here qualifies as trivial. That is because the purpose of the no return provision cannot be as Alabama and the Solicitor General describe it, namely, as a simple, direct effort to prevent the interruption of rehabilitation. A provision that prevents returning a prisoner who has arrived in the receiving State does not directly increase the number of days the prisoner will spend in rehabilitation in the sending State. Rather, it directly and intentionally decreases the number of days that prisoner will spend in the sending State.
This point is obvious once one keeps in mind that the trial must take place within 120 days of the prisoners arrival in the receiving State. Article IV(e)s requirement that the prisoner remain in the county jail means that the prisoner will spend all of those 120 days away from the sending States rehabilitation programs. By contrast, returning the prisoner prior to trialin violation of Article IV(e)would permit the prisoner to participate in the sending States program for some of those days. But to call such a violation technical, because it means fewer days spent away from the sending State, is to call virtually every conceivable antishuttling violation technicala circumstance which, like the 13th chime of the clock, shows that Alabamas conception of the provisions purpose is seriously flawed.
Article IV(e) may seek to remove obstructions to prisoner rehabilitation in a different way. The Agreement not only prevents return, but it also requires the receiving State to pay for the prisoners incarceration in that State during the period prior to trial. Art. V(h) (From the time that a party State receives custody of a prisoner pursuant to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody of the sending State, the [receiving] State … shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping, and returning the prisoner). That requirement may provide the receiving State with an incentive to shorten the pretrial periodto proceed to trial faster than 120 days or not to seek extensionsthus disposing of detainers, and the attendant uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation, in the most expeditious manner. Art. I. See also Cuyler , 449 U. S., at 449 (discussing negative effects of detainers on prisoners). But if that is Article IV(e)s purpose, the transfer here was inconsistent with it. By returning Bozeman to federal prison, the county saved itself the cost of housing him and for a nontrivial several week period, which may have allowed it to delay resolving the detainer.
Alternatively, the Agreements drafters may have thought that the shuttling itself, i.e. , the movement back and forth among prisons, adds to the uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Art. I (emphasis added). And they may have sought to minimize the number of shuttles for that reason alone.
Viewing the Agreement in terms of either purpose, we cannot say that the one-day violation here is de mimimis , technical, or harmless. Neither do the briefs (or, to our knowledge, any lower court opinion) point to any other plausible rehabilitation-related purpose of Article IV(e) specifically, in terms of which the violation here might count as trivial. But we need not decide precisely what led Congress and the many other legislatures to agree to Article IV(e)s antishuttling remedy. Given the Agreements absolute language, it is enough to explain why Alabamas view of the Agreements purpose is not plausible and to point to other purposes more easily squared with Article IV(e)s text and operation.
C
Alabama and amici make additional claims, basically elaborating on the trial courts view that return to the sending State after a brief journey to the receiving State for pretrial purposes is helpful, not harmful, to the prisoner. But given Article IVs text, which indicates a contrary view, the parties would more appropriately address these policy arguments to legislatures.
The Solicitor General also points to a federal statutory provision that says expressly that an order of a court dismissing any indictment, information, or complaint may be with or without prejudice, depending on the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances of the case, and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of the agreement and on the administration of justice. 18 U. S. C. App. §9(1), p. 695. This statutory provision, however, governs only when the United States is a receiving State. §9. And here the United States is not the receiving State. We fail to see how this provision helps, rather than hurts, Alabamas cause. Although we reject Alabamas interpretation of the Agreement, our decision does not bar a receiving State from returning a prisoner when it would be mutually advantageous and the prisoner accordingly waives his rights under Article IV(e). Cf. Hill , 528 U. S., at 114115 (holding that defendant may waive his rights under Art. III of the Agreement)
For these reasons, the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
* * Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join all but Part IIB of this opinion.
Opinion
ALABAMA, PETITIONER
v.
MICHAEL
HERMAN BOZEMAN
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.* *
Forty-eight States, the Federal Government, and the District of Columbia (all of which, for simplicity, we shall call States) have entered into the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Agreement), 18 U. S. C. App. §2, p. 692, an interstate compact. The Agreement creates uniform procedures for lodging and executing a detainer, i.e. , a legal order that requires a State in which an individual is currently imprisoned to hold that individual when he has finished serving his sentence so that he may be tried by a different State for a different crime.
The Agreement provides for expeditious delivery of the prisoner to the receiving State for trial prior to the termination of his sentence in the sending State. And it seeks to minimize the consequent interruption of the prisoners ongoing prison term. In particular, Article IV(c) specifies that the receiving State shall begin the prisoners trial . . . within one hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving State. At the same time, Article IV(e) prohibits return of the individual to the sending State before that trial is complete. It says:
If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoners being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to article V(e) hereof, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice . (Emphasis added.)
The case before us requires us to interpret the Article IV language that we have just quoted. See New York v. Hill, 528 U. S. 110, 111 (2000) (As a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, §10, cl. 3, the [Interstate Agreement on Detainers] is a federal law subject to federal construction) (quoting Carchman v. Nash, 473 U. S. 716, 719 (1985) ; Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 442 (1981) ). The case concerns a defendant whose initial imprisonment was interrupted brieflyfor a single dayduring which time he was brought to the receiving State for purposes of arraignment and then returned immediately to his original place of imprisonment. The question is whether, in such circumstances, the literal language of Article IV(e) bars any further criminal proceedingsbecause the defendant was returned to the original place of imprisonment before trial was had. We conclude that Article IV(e) does bar further proceedings, despite the fact that the interruption of the initial imprisonment lasted for only one day.
I
A
The Council of State Governments drafted the language of the Agreement in 1956. See United States v. Mauro, 436 U. S. 340, 349350 (1978) . The United States joined in 1970. Id. , at 343. And Alabama is one of the 49 other current members. Hill , supra , at 111; Ala. Code §15981 (1995). The Agreement contains nine articles. Article I sets forth the problems that led to the Agreements creation, namely, that
charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.
Article I then adds that it is the . . . purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of … detainers … .
Article II sets forth definitions. Article III gives a prisoner against whom a detainer has been lodged the right to request a final disposition of the relevant charges, in which case he shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty days (unless extended by the trial court for good cause); otherwise, the relevant indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. Art. III(a), (d).
Article IV gives the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information, or complaint is pending, i.e. , the receiving State, the right to have a prisoner against whom it has lodged a detainer . . . made available for trial. Art. IV(a). It says further that, once the prisoner arrives in the receiving State, the trial must begin within one hundred and twenty days unless extended for good cause. Art. IV(c). Article IV also sets forth the antishuttling provision at issue here. To repeat: that provision says that trial must be had . . . prior to the prisoners being returned to the original place of imprisonment; otherwise, the charges shall be dismissed with prejudice. Art. IV(e). Article V sets forth conditions on the receiving State obtaining temporary custody of the prisoner. The remaining articles deal with subsidiary matters, not relevant here with one exception: Article IX provides that the agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes.
For present purposes, it is important to keep in mind that the Agreement basically (1) gives a prisoner the right to demand a trial within 180 days; and (2) gives a State the right to obtain a prisoner for purposes of trial, in which case the State (a) must try the prisoner within 120 days of his arrival, and (b) must not return the prisoner to his original place of imprisonment prior to that trial.
B
In January 1997, respondent Michael Bozeman was serving a sentence of imprisonment for a federal drug crime in federal prison in Marianna, Florida. At the beginning of that month, the district attorney of Covington County, Alabama, who had earlier lodged a detainer against Bozeman in connection with charges related to discharging firearms, sought temporary custody in order to arraign Bozeman on those firearms charges and secure the appointment of counsel. On January 23, federal authorities released Bozeman to local officials. Those officials took him to Covington County, about 80 miles from the federal prison, where he arrived later in the day. Bozeman spent the night in the county jail, appeared in local court the next morning, obtained local appointed counsel, and was transported back to federal prison that evening. About one month later, Bozeman was brought back to Covington County for trial.
At that time, Bozemans local counsel filed a motion to dismiss the state charges on the ground that in January Bozeman had been returned to the original place of imprisonment (namely, the federal prison) prior to trial on state charges being had. See App. 3742. Consequently, he argued, under Article IV(e) the state charges were without any further force or effect, and the local court had to enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
Bozeman was convicted, and the trial court subsequently denied Bozemans motion for dismissal. It wrote that it made much sense to bring Bozeman into the county briefly to deal with short pre-trial matters and then to return him to the surroundings to which he was accustomed. App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a.  Ibid. In the trial judges view, Bozeman certainly would not [have] receive[d] much rehabilitation in a county jail. Ibid. Consequently, the judge concluded, the January transfer was wholly consistent with the Agreements goal, to expedite the prosecution of state charges without interfering with any rehabilitative programs of the federal government. Id. , at 29a.
An intermediate State Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 738 So. 2d 934 (1998). But the Alabama State Supreme Court reversed by a 4-to-3 vote. 781 So. 2d 165 (2000). In its view, the literal language of the Agreement controlled and required dismissal of the state charges. The dissenters argued that the Agreement violation was merely technical, and consequently did not require dismissal. Id. , at 170. The State petitioned for certiorari. In light of differences among the lower courts, we granted the writ. Compare, e.g. , United States v. Schrum , 638 F. 2d 214, 215 (CA10 1981) (per curiam) (adopting District Courts literal interpretation of Agreement), with United States v. Daniels , 3 F. 3d 25, 2728 (CA1 1993) (rejecting literal interpretation of Agreement). And we now affirm the Alabama Supreme Courts decision.
II
Alabama does not deny a violation of Article IV(e) as literally interpreted, for it concedes that its officials returned Bozeman to his original place of imprisonment, before Bozemans county court trial was had. Nor does Alabama claim that Bozeman waived the right to trial before return that Article IV provides. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 1, n. 1. Cf. Hill , 528 U. S., at 114115 (holding that defendant may waive his rights under Art. III of the Agreement). Rather, Alabama, supported by the United States Solicitor General and others, claims that Article IV(e)s basic purpose is to prevent shuttling that would interrupt the prisoners rehabilitation. See, e.g. , United States v. Roy , 830 F. 2d 628, 636 (CA7 1987) (provision is meant to protect the prisoner against endless interruption of the rehabilitation programs because of criminal proceedings in other jurisdictions). They say the one-day interruption that occurred here did not interrupt rehabilitation significantly. Hence, any violation is technical, harmless, or de minimis . And Article IV(e) contains an implicit exception for such trivial violations. Brief for Petitioner 26; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 1213. Cf. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U. S. 214, 231 (1992) (laws ordinarily are enacted with understanding that de minimis exceptions will be recognized). We cannot accept this argument, however, for two reasons.
A
First, the language of the Agreement militates against an implicit exception, for it is absolute. It says that, when a prisoner is returned before trial, the indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. Art. IV(e) (emphasis added). The word shall is ordinarily the language of command. Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U. S. 482, 485 (1947) (quoting Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490, 493 (1935) ).
The cases Alabama cites as supporting a harmless error construction involved statutes that lacked this absolute language. See, e.g. , United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U. S. 711, 716717 (1990) (Bail Reform Act is silent on the issue of a remedy for violations of its time limits). Cf. William Wrigley, Jr. , supra , at 231232 (applying de minimis exception presumption as part of the established background of legal principles against which all enactments are adopted, where text did not provide a contrary indication).
Moreover, the Agreement makes no distinction among different kinds of IV(c) arrivals, say, by exempting those that are followed by return within a short, specified period of time, or those that are simply for the purpose of arraignment. Given the Agreements language and the important consequences of starting the running of the 120-day time limit, we see no basis for such a distinction. Hence, we must assume that every prisoner arrival in the receiving State, whether followed by a very brief stay or a very long stay in the receiving State, triggers IV(e)s no return requirement.
B
Second, even were we to assume for arguments sake that the Agreement exempts violations that, viewed in terms of the Agreements purposes, are de minimis , cf. Article IX (stating that Agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes), we could not say that the violation at issue here qualifies as trivial. That is because the purpose of the no return provision cannot be as Alabama and the Solicitor General describe it, namely, as a simple, direct effort to prevent the interruption of rehabilitation. A provision that prevents returning a prisoner who has arrived in the receiving State does not directly increase the number of days the prisoner will spend in rehabilitation in the sending State. Rather, it directly and intentionally decreases the number of days that prisoner will spend in the sending State.
This point is obvious once one keeps in mind that the trial must take place within 120 days of the prisoners arrival in the receiving State. Article IV(e)s requirement that the prisoner remain in the county jail means that the prisoner will spend all of those 120 days away from the sending States rehabilitation programs. By contrast, returning the prisoner prior to trialin violation of Article IV(e)would permit the prisoner to participate in the sending States program for some of those days. But to call such a violation technical, because it means fewer days spent away from the sending State, is to call virtually every conceivable antishuttling violation technicala circumstance which, like the 13th chime of the clock, shows that Alabamas conception of the provisions purpose is seriously flawed.
Article IV(e) may seek to remove obstructions to prisoner rehabilitation in a different way. The Agreement not only prevents return, but it also requires the receiving State to pay for the prisoners incarceration in that State during the period prior to trial. Art. V(h) (From the time that a party State receives custody of a prisoner pursuant to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody of the sending State, the [receiving] State … shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping, and returning the prisoner). That requirement may provide the receiving State with an incentive to shorten the pretrial periodto proceed to trial faster than 120 days or not to seek extensionsthus disposing of detainers, and the attendant uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation, in the most expeditious manner. Art. I. See also Cuyler , 449 U. S., at 449 (discussing negative effects of detainers on prisoners). But if that is Article IV(e)s purpose, the transfer here was inconsistent with it. By returning Bozeman to federal prison, the county saved itself the cost of housing him and for a nontrivial several week period, which may have allowed it to delay resolving the detainer.
Alternatively, the Agreements drafters may have thought that the shuttling itself, i.e. , the movement back and forth among prisons, adds to the uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Art. I (emphasis added). And they may have sought to minimize the number of shuttles for that reason alone.
Viewing the Agreement in terms of either purpose, we cannot say that the one-day violation here is de mimimis , technical, or harmless. Neither do the briefs (or, to our knowledge, any lower court opinion) point to any other plausible rehabilitation-related purpose of Article IV(e) specifically, in terms of which the violation here might count as trivial. But we need not decide precisely what led Congress and the many other legislatures to agree to Article IV(e)s antishuttling remedy. Given the Agreements absolute language, it is enough to explain why Alabamas view of the Agreements purpose is not plausible and to point to other purposes more easily squared with Article IV(e)s text and operation.
C
Alabama and amici make additional claims, basically elaborating on the trial courts view that return to the sending State after a brief journey to the receiving State for pretrial purposes is helpful, not harmful, to the prisoner. But given Article IVs text, which indicates a contrary view, the parties would more appropriately address these policy arguments to legislatures.
The Solicitor General also points to a federal statutory provision that says expressly that an order of a court dismissing any indictment, information, or complaint may be with or without prejudice, depending on the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances of the case, and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of the agreement and on the administration of justice. 18 U. S. C. App. §9(1), p. 695. This statutory provision, however, governs only when the United States is a receiving State. §9. And here the United States is not the receiving State. We fail to see how this provision helps, rather than hurts, Alabamas cause. Although we reject Alabamas interpretation of the Agreement, our decision does not bar a receiving State from returning a prisoner when it would be mutually advantageous and the prisoner accordingly waives his rights under Article IV(e). Cf. Hill , 528 U. S., at 114115 (holding that defendant may waive his rights under Art. III of the Agreement)
For these reasons, the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
* * Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join all but Part IIB of this opinion.
Opinion
ALABAMA, PETITIONER
v.
MICHAEL
HERMAN BOZEMAN
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.* *
Forty-eight States, the Federal Government, and the District of Columbia (all of which, for simplicity, we shall call States) have entered into the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Agreement), 18 U. S. C. App. §2, p. 692, an interstate compact. The Agreement creates uniform procedures for lodging and executing a detainer, i.e. , a legal order that requires a State in which an individual is currently imprisoned to hold that individual when he has finished serving his sentence so that he may be tried by a different State for a different crime.
The Agreement provides for expeditious delivery of the prisoner to the receiving State for trial prior to the termination of his sentence in the sending State. And it seeks to minimize the consequent interruption of the prisoners ongoing prison term. In particular, Article IV(c) specifies that the receiving State shall begin the prisoners trial . . . within one hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving State. At the same time, Article IV(e) prohibits return of the individual to the sending State before that trial is complete. It says:
If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoners being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to article V(e) hereof, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice . (Emphasis added.)
The case before us requires us to interpret the Article IV language that we have just quoted. See New York v. Hill, 528 U. S. 110, 111 (2000) (As a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, §10, cl. 3, the [Interstate Agreement on Detainers] is a federal law subject to federal construction) (quoting Carchman v. Nash, 473 U. S. 716, 719 (1985) ; Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 442 (1981) ). The case concerns a defendant whose initial imprisonment was interrupted brieflyfor a single dayduring which time he was brought to the receiving State for purposes of arraignment and then returned immediately to his original place of imprisonment. The question is whether, in such circumstances, the literal language of Article IV(e) bars any further criminal proceedingsbecause the defendant was returned to the original place of imprisonment before trial was had. We conclude that Article IV(e) does bar further proceedings, despite the fact that the interruption of the initial imprisonment lasted for only one day.
I
A
The Council of State Governments drafted the language of the Agreement in 1956. See United States v. Mauro, 436 U. S. 340, 349350 (1978) . The United States joined in 1970. Id. , at 343. And Alabama is one of the 49 other current members. Hill , supra , at 111; Ala. Code §15981 (1995). The Agreement contains nine articles. Article I sets forth the problems that led to the Agreements creation, namely, that
charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.
Article I then adds that it is the . . . purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of … detainers … .
Article II sets forth definitions. Article III gives a prisoner against whom a detainer has been lodged the right to request a final disposition of the relevant charges, in which case he shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty days (unless extended by the trial court for good cause); otherwise, the relevant indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. Art. III(a), (d).
Article IV gives the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information, or complaint is pending, i.e. , the receiving State, the right to have a prisoner against whom it has lodged a detainer . . . made available for trial. Art. IV(a). It says further that, once the prisoner arrives in the receiving State, the trial must begin within one hundred and twenty days unless extended for good cause. Art. IV(c). Article IV also sets forth the antishuttling provision at issue here. To repeat: that provision says that trial must be had . . . prior to the prisoners being returned to the original place of imprisonment; otherwise, the charges shall be dismissed with prejudice. Art. IV(e). Article V sets forth conditions on the receiving State obtaining temporary custody of the prisoner. The remaining articles deal with subsidiary matters, not relevant here with one exception: Article IX provides that the agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes.
For present purposes, it is important to keep in mind that the Agreement basically (1) gives a prisoner the right to demand a trial within 180 days; and (2) gives a State the right to obtain a prisoner for purposes of trial, in which case the State (a) must try the prisoner within 120 days of his arrival, and (b) must not return the prisoner to his original place of imprisonment prior to that trial.
B
In January 1997, respondent Michael Bozeman was serving a sentence of imprisonment for a federal drug crime in federal prison in Marianna, Florida. At the beginning of that month, the district attorney of Covington County, Alabama, who had earlier lodged a detainer against Bozeman in connection with charges related to discharging firearms, sought temporary custody in order to arraign Bozeman on those firearms charges and secure the appointment of counsel. On January 23, federal authorities released Bozeman to local officials. Those officials took him to Covington County, about 80 miles from the federal prison, where he arrived later in the day. Bozeman spent the night in the county jail, appeared in local court the next morning, obtained local appointed counsel, and was transported back to federal prison that evening. About one month later, Bozeman was brought back to Covington County for trial.
At that time, Bozemans local counsel filed a motion to dismiss the state charges on the ground that in January Bozeman had been returned to the original place of imprisonment (namely, the federal prison) prior to trial on state charges being had. See App. 3742. Consequently, he argued, under Article IV(e) the state charges were without any further force or effect, and the local court had to enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
Bozeman was convicted, and the trial court subsequently denied Bozemans motion for dismissal. It wrote that it made much sense to bring Bozeman into the county briefly to deal with short pre-trial matters and then to return him to the surroundings to which he was accustomed. App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a.  Ibid. In the trial judges view, Bozeman certainly would not [have] receive[d] much rehabilitation in a county jail. Ibid. Consequently, the judge concluded, the January transfer was wholly consistent with the Agreements goal, to expedite the prosecution of state charges without interfering with any rehabilitative programs of the federal government. Id. , at 29a.
An intermediate State Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 738 So. 2d 934 (1998). But the Alabama State Supreme Court reversed by a 4-to-3 vote. 781 So. 2d 165 (2000). In its view, the literal language of the Agreement controlled and required dismissal of the state charges. The dissenters argued that the Agreement violation was merely technical, and consequently did not require dismissal. Id. , at 170. The State petitioned for certiorari. In light of differences among the lower courts, we granted the writ. Compare, e.g. , United States v. Schrum , 638 F. 2d 214, 215 (CA10 1981) (per curiam) (adopting District Courts literal interpretation of Agreement), with United States v. Daniels , 3 F. 3d 25, 2728 (CA1 1993) (rejecting literal interpretation of Agreement). And we now affirm the Alabama Supreme Courts decision.
II
Alabama does not deny a violation of Article IV(e) as literally interpreted, for it concedes that its officials returned Bozeman to his original place of imprisonment, before Bozemans county court trial was had. Nor does Alabama claim that Bozeman waived the right to trial before return that Article IV provides. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 1, n. 1. Cf. Hill , 528 U. S., at 114115 (holding that defendant may waive his rights under Art. III of the Agreement). Rather, Alabama, supported by the United States Solicitor General and others, claims that Article IV(e)s basic purpose is to prevent shuttling that would interrupt the prisoners rehabilitation. See, e.g. , United States v. Roy , 830 F. 2d 628, 636 (CA7 1987) (provision is meant to protect the prisoner against endless interruption of the rehabilitation programs because of criminal proceedings in other jurisdictions). They say the one-day interruption that occurred here did not interrupt rehabilitation significantly. Hence, any violation is technical, harmless, or de minimis . And Article IV(e) contains an implicit exception for such trivial violations. Brief for Petitioner 26; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 1213. Cf. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U. S. 214, 231 (1992) (laws ordinarily are enacted with understanding that de minimis exceptions will be recognized). We cannot accept this argument, however, for two reasons.
A
First, the language of the Agreement militates against an implicit exception, for it is absolute. It says that, when a prisoner is returned before trial, the indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. Art. IV(e) (emphasis added). The word shall is ordinarily the language of command. Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U. S. 482, 485 (1947) (quoting Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490, 493 (1935) ).
The cases Alabama cites as supporting a harmless error construction involved statutes that lacked this absolute language. See, e.g. , United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U. S. 711, 716717 (1990) (Bail Reform Act is silent on the issue of a remedy for violations of its time limits). Cf. William Wrigley, Jr. , supra , at 231232 (applying de minimis exception presumption as part of the established background of legal principles against which all enactments are adopted, where text did not provide a contrary indication).
Moreover, the Agreement makes no distinction among different kinds of IV(c) arrivals, say, by exempting those that are followed by return within a short, specified period of time, or those that are simply for the purpose of arraignment. Given the Agreements language and the important consequences of starting the running of the 120-day time limit, we see no basis for such a distinction. Hence, we must assume that every prisoner arrival in the receiving State, whether followed by a very brief stay or a very long stay in the receiving State, triggers IV(e)s no return requirement.
B
Second, even were we to assume for arguments sake that the Agreement exempts violations that, viewed in terms of the Agreements purposes, are de minimis , cf. Article IX (stating that Agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes), we could not say that the violation at issue here qualifies as trivial. That is because the purpose of the no return provision cannot be as Alabama and the Solicitor General describe it, namely, as a simple, direct effort to prevent the interruption of rehabilitation. A provision that prevents returning a prisoner who has arrived in the receiving State does not directly increase the number of days the prisoner will spend in rehabilitation in the sending State. Rather, it directly and intentionally decreases the number of days that prisoner will spend in the sending State.
This point is obvious once one keeps in mind that the trial must take place within 120 days of the prisoners arrival in the receiving State. Article IV(e)s requirement that the prisoner remain in the county jail means that the prisoner will spend all of those 120 days away from the sending States rehabilitation programs. By contrast, returning the prisoner prior to trialin violation of Article IV(e)would permit the prisoner to participate in the sending States program for some of those days. But to call such a violation technical, because it means fewer days spent away from the sending State, is to call virtually every conceivable antishuttling violation technicala circumstance which, like the 13th chime of the clock, shows that Alabamas conception of the provisions purpose is seriously flawed.
Article IV(e) may seek to remove obstructions to prisoner rehabilitation in a different way. The Agreement not only prevents return, but it also requires the receiving State to pay for the prisoners incarceration in that State during the period prior to trial. Art. V(h) (From the time that a party State receives custody of a prisoner pursuant to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody of the sending State, the [receiving] State … shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping, and returning the prisoner). That requirement may provide the receiving State with an incentive to shorten the pretrial periodto proceed to trial faster than 120 days or not to seek extensionsthus disposing of detainers, and the attendant uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation, in the most expeditious manner. Art. I. See also Cuyler , 449 U. S., at 449 (discussing negative effects of detainers on prisoners). But if that is Article IV(e)s purpose, the transfer here was inconsistent with it. By returning Bozeman to federal prison, the county saved itself the cost of housing him and for a nontrivial several week period, which may have allowed it to delay resolving the detainer.
Alternatively, the Agreements drafters may have thought that the shuttling itself, i.e. , the movement back and forth among prisons, adds to the uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Art. I (emphasis added). And they may have sought to minimize the number of shuttles for that reason alone.
Viewing the Agreement in terms of either purpose, we cannot say that the one-day violation here is de mimimis , technical, or harmless. Neither do the briefs (or, to our knowledge, any lower court opinion) point to any other plausible rehabilitation-related purpose of Article IV(e) specifically, in terms of which the violation here might count as trivial. But we need not decide precisely what led Congress and the many other legislatures to agree to Article IV(e)s antishuttling remedy. Given the Agreements absolute language, it is enough to explain why Alabamas view of the Agreements purpose is not plausible and to point to other purposes more easily squared with Article IV(e)s text and operation.
C
Alabama and amici make additional claims, basically elaborating on the trial courts view that return to the sending State after a brief journey to the receiving State for pretrial purposes is helpful, not harmful, to the prisoner. But given Article IVs text, which indicates a contrary view, the parties would more appropriately address these policy arguments to legislatures.
The Solicitor General also points to a federal statutory provision that says expressly that an order of a court dismissing any indictment, information, or complaint may be with or without prejudice, depending on the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances of the case, and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of the agreement and on the administration of justice. 18 U. S. C. App. §9(1), p. 695. This statutory provision, however, governs only when the United States is a receiving State. §9. And here the United States is not the receiving State. We fail to see how this provision helps, rather than hurts, Alabamas cause. Although we reject Alabamas interpretation of the Agreement, our decision does not bar a receiving State from returning a prisoner when it would be mutually advantageous and the prisoner accordingly waives his rights under Article IV(e). Cf. Hill , 528 U. S., at 114115 (holding that defendant may waive his rights under Art. III of the Agreement)
For these reasons, the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
* * Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join all but Part IIB of this opinion.
Opinion
ALABAMA, PETITIONER
v.
MICHAEL
HERMAN BOZEMAN
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.* *
Forty-eight States, the Federal Government, and the District of Columbia (all of which, for simplicity, we shall call States) have entered into the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Agreement), 18 U. S. C. App. §2, p. 692, an interstate compact. The Agreement creates uniform procedures for lodging and executing a detainer, i.e. , a legal order that requires a State in which an individual is currently imprisoned to hold that individual when he has finished serving his sentence so that he may be tried by a different State for a different crime.
The Agreement provides for expeditious delivery of the prisoner to the receiving State for trial prior to the termination of his sentence in the sending State. And it seeks to minimize the consequent interruption of the prisoners ongoing prison term. In particular, Article IV(c) specifies that the receiving State shall begin the prisoners trial . . . within one hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving State. At the same time, Article IV(e) prohibits return of the individual to the sending State before that trial is complete. It says:
If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoners being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to article V(e) hereof, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice . (Emphasis added.)
The case before us requires us to interpret the Article IV language that we have just quoted. See New York v. Hill, 528 U. S. 110, 111 (2000) (As a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, §10, cl. 3, the [Interstate Agreement on Detainers] is a federal law subject to federal construction) (quoting Carchman v. Nash, 473 U. S. 716, 719 (1985) ; Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 442 (1981) ). The case concerns a defendant whose initial imprisonment was interrupted brieflyfor a single dayduring which time he was brought to the receiving State for purposes of arraignment and then returned immediately to his original place of imprisonment. The question is whether, in such circumstances, the literal language of Article IV(e) bars any further criminal proceedingsbecause the defendant was returned to the original place of imprisonment before trial was had. We conclude that Article IV(e) does bar further proceedings, despite the fact that the interruption of the initial imprisonment lasted for only one day.
I
A
The Council of State Governments drafted the language of the Agreement in 1956. See United States v. Mauro, 436 U. S. 340, 349350 (1978) . The United States joined in 1970. Id. , at 343. And Alabama is one of the 49 other current members. Hill , supra , at 111; Ala. Code §15981 (1995). The Agreement contains nine articles. Article I sets forth the problems that led to the Agreements creation, namely, that
charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.
Article I then adds that it is the . . . purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of … detainers … .
Article II sets forth definitions. Article III gives a prisoner against whom a detainer has been lodged the right to request a final disposition of the relevant charges, in which case he shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty days (unless extended by the trial court for good cause); otherwise, the relevant indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. Art. III(a), (d).
Article IV gives the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information, or complaint is pending, i.e. , the receiving State, the right to have a prisoner against whom it has lodged a detainer . . . made available for trial. Art. IV(a). It says further that, once the prisoner arrives in the receiving State, the trial must begin within one hundred and twenty days unless extended for good cause. Art. IV(c). Article IV also sets forth the antishuttling provision at issue here. To repeat: that provision says that trial must be had . . . prior to the prisoners being returned to the original place of imprisonment; otherwise, the charges shall be dismissed with prejudice. Art. IV(e). Article V sets forth conditions on the receiving State obtaining temporary custody of the prisoner. The remaining articles deal with subsidiary matters, not relevant here with one exception: Article IX provides that the agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes.
For present purposes, it is important to keep in mind that the Agreement basically (1) gives a prisoner the right to demand a trial within 180 days; and (2) gives a State the right to obtain a prisoner for purposes of trial, in which case the State (a) must try the prisoner within 120 days of his arrival, and (b) must not return the prisoner to his original place of imprisonment prior to that trial.
B
In January 1997, respondent Michael Bozeman was serving a sentence of imprisonment for a federal drug crime in federal prison in Marianna, Florida. At the beginning of that month, the district attorney of Covington County, Alabama, who had earlier lodged a detainer against Bozeman in connection with charges related to discharging firearms, sought temporary custody in order to arraign Bozeman on those firearms charges and secure the appointment of counsel. On January 23, federal authorities released Bozeman to local officials. Those officials took him to Covington County, about 80 miles from the federal prison, where he arrived later in the day. Bozeman spent the night in the county jail, appeared in local court the next morning, obtained local appointed counsel, and was transported back to federal prison that evening. About one month later, Bozeman was brought back to Covington County for trial.
At that time, Bozemans local counsel filed a motion to dismiss the state charges on the ground that in January Bozeman had been returned to the original place of imprisonment (namely, the federal prison) prior to trial on state charges being had. See App. 3742. Consequently, he argued, under Article IV(e) the state charges were without any further force or effect, and the local court had to enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
Bozeman was convicted, and the trial court subsequently denied Bozemans motion for dismissal. It wrote that it made much sense to bring Bozeman into the county briefly to deal with short pre-trial matters and then to return him to the surroundings to which he was accustomed. App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a.  Ibid. In the trial judges view, Bozeman certainly would not [have] receive[d] much rehabilitation in a county jail. Ibid. Consequently, the judge concluded, the January transfer was wholly consistent with the Agreements goal, to expedite the prosecution of state charges without interfering with any rehabilitative programs of the federal government. Id. , at 29a.
An intermediate State Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 738 So. 2d 934 (1998). But the Alabama State Supreme Court reversed by a 4-to-3 vote. 781 So. 2d 165 (2000). In its view, the literal language of the Agreement controlled and required dismissal of the state charges. The dissenters argued that the Agreement violation was merely technical, and consequently did not require dismissal. Id. , at 170. The State petitioned for certiorari. In light of differences among the lower courts, we granted the writ. Compare, e.g. , United States v. Schrum , 638 F. 2d 214, 215 (CA10 1981) (per curiam) (adopting District Courts literal interpretation of Agreement), with United States v. Daniels , 3 F. 3d 25, 2728 (CA1 1993) (rejecting literal interpretation of Agreement). And we now affirm the Alabama Supreme Courts decision.
II
Alabama does not deny a violation of Article IV(e) as literally interpreted, for it concedes that its officials returned Bozeman to his original place of imprisonment, before Bozemans county court trial was had. Nor does Alabama claim that Bozeman waived the right to trial before return that Article IV provides. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 1, n. 1. Cf. Hill , 528 U. S., at 114115 (holding that defendant may waive his rights under Art. III of the Agreement). Rather, Alabama, supported by the United States Solicitor General and others, claims that Article IV(e)s basic purpose is to prevent shuttling that would interrupt the prisoners rehabilitation. See, e.g. , United States v. Roy , 830 F. 2d 628, 636 (CA7 1987) (provision is meant to protect the prisoner against endless interruption of the rehabilitation programs because of criminal proceedings in other jurisdictions). They say the one-day interruption that occurred here did not interrupt rehabilitation significantly. Hence, any violation is technical, harmless, or de minimis . And Article IV(e) contains an implicit exception for such trivial violations. Brief for Petitioner 26; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 1213. Cf. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U. S. 214, 231 (1992) (laws ordinarily are enacted with understanding that de minimis exceptions will be recognized). We cannot accept this argument, however, for two reasons.
A
First, the language of the Agreement militates against an implicit exception, for it is absolute. It says that, when a prisoner is returned before trial, the indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. Art. IV(e) (emphasis added). The word shall is ordinarily the language of command. Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U. S. 482, 485 (1947) (quoting Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490, 493 (1935) ).
The cases Alabama cites as supporting a harmless error construction involved statutes that lacked this absolute language. See, e.g. , United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U. S. 711, 716717 (1990) (Bail Reform Act is silent on the issue of a remedy for violations of its time limits). Cf. William Wrigley, Jr. , supra , at 231232 (applying de minimis exception presumption as part of the established background of legal principles against which all enactments are adopted, where text did not provide a contrary indication).
Moreover, the Agreement makes no distinction among different kinds of IV(c) arrivals, say, by exempting those that are followed by return within a short, specified period of time, or those that are simply for the purpose of arraignment. Given the Agreements language and the important consequences of starting the running of the 120-day time limit, we see no basis for such a distinction. Hence, we must assume that every prisoner arrival in the receiving State, whether followed by a very brief stay or a very long stay in the receiving State, triggers IV(e)s no return requirement.
B
Second, even were we to assume for arguments sake that the Agreement exempts violations that, viewed in terms of the Agreements purposes, are de minimis , cf. Article IX (stating that Agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes), we could not say that the violation at issue here qualifies as trivial. That is because the purpose of the no return provision cannot be as Alabama and the Solicitor General describe it, namely, as a simple, direct effort to prevent the interruption of rehabilitation. A provision that prevents returning a prisoner who has arrived in the receiving State does not directly increase the number of days the prisoner will spend in rehabilitation in the sending State. Rather, it directly and intentionally decreases the number of days that prisoner will spend in the sending State.
This point is obvious once one keeps in mind that the trial must take place within 120 days of the prisoners arrival in the receiving State. Article IV(e)s requirement that the prisoner remain in the county jail means that the prisoner will spend all of those 120 days away from the sending States rehabilitation programs. By contrast, returning the prisoner prior to trialin violation of Article IV(e)would permit the prisoner to participate in the sending States program for some of those days. But to call such a violation technical, because it means fewer days spent away from the sending State, is to call virtually every conceivable antishuttling violation technicala circumstance which, like the 13th chime of the clock, shows that Alabamas conception of the provisions purpose is seriously flawed.
Article IV(e) may seek to remove obstructions to prisoner rehabilitation in a different way. The Agreement not only prevents return, but it also requires the receiving State to pay for the prisoners incarceration in that State during the period prior to trial. Art. V(h) (From the time that a party State receives custody of a prisoner pursuant to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody of the sending State, the [receiving] State … shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping, and returning the prisoner). That requirement may provide the receiving State with an incentive to shorten the pretrial periodto proceed to trial faster than 120 days or not to seek extensionsthus disposing of detainers, and the attendant uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation, in the most expeditious manner. Art. I. See also Cuyler , 449 U. S., at 449 (discussing negative effects of detainers on prisoners). But if that is Article IV(e)s purpose, the transfer here was inconsistent with it. By returning Bozeman to federal prison, the county saved itself the cost of housing him and for a nontrivial several week period, which may have allowed it to delay resolving the detainer.
Alternatively, the Agreements drafters may have thought that the shuttling itself, i.e. , the movement back and forth among prisons, adds to the uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Art. I (emphasis added). And they may have sought to minimize the number of shuttles for that reason alone.
Viewing the Agreement in terms of either purpose, we cannot say that the one-day violation here is de mimimis , technical, or harmless. Neither do the briefs (or, to our knowledge, any lower court opinion) point to any other plausible rehabilitation-related purpose of Article IV(e) specifically, in terms of which the violation here might count as trivial. But we need not decide precisely what led Congress and the many other legislatures to agree to Article IV(e)s antishuttling remedy. Given the Agreements absolute language, it is enough to explain why Alabamas view of the Agreements purpose is not plausible and to point to other purposes more easily squared with Article IV(e)s text and operation.
C
Alabama and amici make additional claims, basically elaborating on the trial courts view that return to the sending State after a brief journey to the receiving State for pretrial purposes is helpful, not harmful, to the prisoner. But given Article IVs text, which indicates a contrary view, the parties would more appropriately address these policy arguments to legislatures.
The Solicitor General also points to a federal statutory provision that says expressly that an order of a court dismissing any indictment, information, or complaint may be with or without prejudice, depending on the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances of the case, and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of the agreement and on the administration of justice. 18 U. S. C. App. §9(1), p. 695. This statutory provision, however, governs only when the United States is a receiving State. §9. And here the United States is not the receiving State. We fail to see how this provision helps, rather than hurts, Alabamas cause. Although we reject Alabamas interpretation of the Agreement, our decision does not bar a receiving State from returning a prisoner when it would be mutually advantageous and the prisoner accordingly waives his rights under Article IV(e). Cf. Hill , 528 U. S., at 114115 (holding that defendant may waive his rights under Art. III of the Agreement)
For these reasons, the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
* * Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join all but Part IIB of this opinion.


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java.lang.SecurityException
if the client is not
connected from the local machine.
java.lang.SecurityException
if the client is not
connected via the loopback address.
NailStats
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object
is tracking the same class.
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at the time of the NGServer's creation
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or nailMain()
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| Exported Interfaces - Summary |
| ::com::sun::star::beans::XPropertySet |
- (referenced entity's summary:)
- provides information about and access to the
properties from an implementation.
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| XSingleSelectQueryComposer |
- (referenced entity's summary:)
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| Packages that use WorldDescription | |
|---|---|
| ussr.physics | An abstract model of a physics engine, serves as the interface between physics-engine independent classes and the physics engine. |
| ussr.physics.jme | A physics simulation implementation based on JME (JMonkeyEngine). |
| ussr.samples | Generic infrastructure for simulations as well as examples of simulations mixing different robots. |
| ussr.samples.atron | Simulation examples based on the ATRON modular self-reconfigurable robot. |
| ussr.samples.atron.natives | ATRON examples based on native (implemented in C) controllers |
| ussr.samples.atron.network | ATRON network controller. |
| ussr.samples.atron.simulations | Concrete examples of ATRON simulations. |
| ussr.samples.mtran | Preliminary simulations based on the M-TRAN modular self-reconfigurable robot |
| ussr.samples.odin.simulations | Concrete Odin simulation examples. |
| ussr.samples.stickybot | Small example of a spherical robot with magnetic connectors on its surface. |
| ussr.samples.white | Simple and very preliminary example of a reconfigurable robot with hinge-joints at the edges. |
| Uses of WorldDescription in ussr.physics |
|---|
| Methods in ussr.physics with parameters of type WorldDescription | |
|---|---|
void |
PhysicsSimulation.setWorld(WorldDescription world)
Define the world in which the robots are simulation, including starting configuration of the robot and physical obstacles. |
| Uses of WorldDescription in ussr.physics.jme |
|---|
| Fields in ussr.physics.jme declared as WorldDescription | |
|---|---|
WorldDescription |
JMESimulation.worldDescription
|
| Methods in ussr.physics.jme with parameters of type WorldDescription | |
|---|---|
protected com.jmex.physics.StaticPhysicsNode |
JMEBasicGraphicalSimulation.createSky(WorldDescription world)
buildSkyBox creates a new skybox object with all the proper textures. |
void |
JMESimulation.setWorld(WorldDescription world)
|
| Uses of WorldDescription in ussr.samples |
|---|
| Methods in ussr.samples with parameters of type WorldDescription | |
|---|---|
protected void |
GenericSimulation.adaptWorldToSimulationHook(WorldDescription world)
Adapt description of simulation world, hook method that subclasses can override |
void |
ObstacleGenerator.obstacalize(ObstacleGenerator.ObstacleType type,
WorldDescription world)
|
void |
MultiRobotSimulation.runSimulation(WorldDescription world,
boolean startPaused)
|
void |
GenericSimulation.runSimulation(WorldDescription world,
boolean startPaused)
|
| Uses of WorldDescription in ussr.samples.atron |
|---|
| Methods in ussr.samples.atron with parameters of type WorldDescription | |
|---|---|
protected void |
GenericATRONSimulation.changeWorldHook(WorldDescription world)
|
| Uses of WorldDescription in ussr.samples.atron.natives |
|---|
| Methods in ussr.samples.atron.natives with parameters of type WorldDescription | |
|---|---|
protected void |
EightToCarSimulation.changeWorldHook(WorldDescription world)
|
| Uses of WorldDescription in ussr.samples.atron.network |
|---|
| Methods in ussr.samples.atron.network with parameters of type WorldDescription | |
|---|---|
protected void |
ATRONCarSimulationRemoteControl.changeWorldHook(WorldDescription world)
|
| Uses of WorldDescription in ussr.samples.atron.simulations |
|---|
| Methods in ussr.samples.atron.simulations with parameters of type WorldDescription | |
|---|---|
protected void |
SnakeCarDemo.changeWorldHook(WorldDescription world)
|
protected void |
EightToCarSimulationJ.changeWorldHook(WorldDescription world)
|
protected void |
ConveyorSimulation.changeWorldHook(WorldDescription world)
|
protected void |
ATRONTestSimulation.changeWorldHook(WorldDescription world)
|
protected void |
ATRONSimpleVehicleSimulation.changeWorldHook(WorldDescription world)
|
protected void |
ATRONCarSimulation.changeWorldHook(WorldDescription world)
|
| Uses of WorldDescription in ussr.samples.mtran |
|---|
| Methods in ussr.samples.mtran with parameters of type WorldDescription | |
|---|---|
protected void |
MTRANSimulation.changeWorldHook(WorldDescription world)
|
void |
MTRANSampleSimulation1.changeWorldHook(WorldDescription world)
|
void |
MTRANSimulation.runSimulation(WorldDescription world,
boolean startPaused)
|
| Uses of WorldDescription in ussr.samples.odin.simulations |
|---|
| Methods in ussr.samples.odin.simulations with parameters of type WorldDescription | |
|---|---|
void |
OdinSimulation1.runSimulation(WorldDescription world,
boolean startPaused)
|
void |
OdinActBasedSimulation.runSimulation(WorldDescription world,
boolean startPaused)
|
void |
OdinSimulationWheelTest.runSimulation(WorldDescription world,
boolean startPaused,
float[] gene)
|
void |
OdinSimulationHingeTest.runSimulation(WorldDescription world,
boolean startPaused,
float[] gene)
|
| Uses of WorldDescription in ussr.samples.stickybot |
|---|
| Methods in ussr.samples.stickybot with parameters of type WorldDescription | |
|---|---|
protected void |
StickyBotSimulation1.adaptWorldToSimulationHook(WorldDescription world)
|
| Uses of WorldDescription in ussr.samples.white |
|---|
| Methods in ussr.samples.white with parameters of type WorldDescription | |
|---|---|
protected void |
WhiteSimulation.changeWorldHook(WorldDescription world)
|
void |
WhiteSimulation.runSimulation(WorldDescription world,
boolean startPaused)
|
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<learningObjectMapRef>
Use a <learningObjectMapRef>
element to include a map reference to a
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map.
Category: Learning and training: map domain elements


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PHPUnit_Framework_TestCase::getMock
Returns a mock object for the specified class.
Signature
public function getMock(string
$originalClassName,
[array|null
$methods = '',
[array
$arguments = '',
[string
$mockClassName = '',
[boolean
$callOriginalConstructor = true,
[boolean
$callOriginalClone = true,
[boolean
$callAutoload = true,
[boolean
$cloneArguments = false,
[boolean
$callOriginalMethods = false]]]]]]]] )
Parameters
$originalClassName
— string- Name of the class to mock.
$methods
— array- When provided, only methods whose names are in the array
are replaced with a configurable test double. The behavior
of the other methods is not changed.
Providing null means that no methods will be replaced. $arguments
— array- Parameters to pass to the original class' constructor.
$mockClassName
— string- Class name for the generated test double class.
$callOriginalConstructor
— boolean- Can be used to disable the call to the original class' constructor.
$callOriginalClone
— boolean- Can be used to disable the call to the original class' clone constructor.
$callAutoload
— boolean- Can be used to disable __autoload() during the generation of the test double class.
$cloneArguments
— boolean$callOriginalMethods
— boolean
Returns
- PHPUnit_Framework_MockObject_MockObject
Errors/Exceptions
Violations
Checkstyle
| Line | Column | Severity | Message |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1262 | 254 | warning | Line exceeds 120 characters; contains 253 characters |


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Final Fantasy 7-15 are coming to Xbox Game Pass PC
by Wes FenlonAt X019 in London today, Square Enix showed up to announce a whole boatload of Final Fantasy games are coming to Xbox Game Pass, including Game Pass for PC.  That's a lot of Final Fantasy—though all of the above games are available on Steam, they'll now also be playable for a hard-to-beat $5 per month on Game Pass. There are a ton more games coming to Game Pass this year and next—check out our continuously updated game list where we're keeping track of them all.
Sadly, though Square Enix did have some Kingdom Hearts news for console players, there's no sign of Kingdom Hearts 3 making its way to PC.


[§558-1] Title. This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the Land Trust Act. [L 1978, c 151, pt of §1]


In the following, you can browse the location data associated with the page '#{currentContentItem.title}'. Click on "Edit" to modify the location.


- Author
- Enrico Bertolazzi (enric.nosp@m.o.be.nosp@m.rtola.nosp@m.zzi@.nosp@m.unitn.nosp@m..it), homepage: http://www.ing.unitn.it/~bertolaz
- Version
- 1.0.7
- Note
- first release Jan 12, 1998
- Date
- 2020
- Copyright
- see License.txt.
- Affiliation:
- Department of Industrial Engineering
University of Trento
Via Sommarive 9, I – 38123 Trento, Italy
enric.nosp@m.o.be.nosp@m.rtola.nosp@m.zzi@.nosp<EMAIL_ADDRESS>This library is available at
Splines
Splines
is a set of C++ classes which implements various spline interpolation. The classes are the following:
- ConstantSpline, for piecewise constants functions
- LinearSpline, for piecewise linear interpolation
- CubicSpline, for classical cubic spline interpolation
- AkimaSpline, for Akima "non oscillatory" spline interpolation
- BesselSpline, for Bessel "non oscillatory" spline interpolation
- PchipSpline,
- QuinticSpline, Simple quintic spline based oin PCHIP with 4th derivative set to 0 at nodal points
References
- F.N. Fritsch and R.E. Carlson, Monotone Piecewise Cubic Interpolation, SIAM Journal of Numerical Analysis, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 238-246, April 1980.
Usage
The usage is simple:
#include "Splines.hh"
using namespace SplinesLoad;
....
CubicSpline spline;
double x[] = {1,2,3,4};
double y[] = {3,1,1,3};
spline.build(x,y,4);
cout << spline(1.1) << '\n';
cout << spline.D(1.1) << '\n';
cout << spline.DD(1.1) << '\n';
cout << spline.DDD(1.1) << '\n';
splines can be built incrementally
#include "Splines.hh"
using namespace SplinesLoad;
....
CubicSpline spline;
spline.pushBack( 1, 3 );
spline.pushBack( 2, 1 );
spline.pushBack( 3, 1 );
spline.pushBack( 4, 3 );
spline.build();
cout << spline(1.1) << '\n';
cout << spline.D(1.1) << '\n';
cout << spline.DD(1.1) << '\n';
cout << spline.DDD(1.1) << '\n';
or by using standard vector
#include "Splines.hh"
#include <vector>
using namespace SplinesLoad;
using namespace std;
....
CubicSpline spline;
std::vector x, y;
x.push_back(1); y.push_back(3);
x.push_back(2); y.push_back(1);
x.push_back(3); y.push_back(1);
x.push_back(4); y.push_back(3);
spline.build(x,y);
cout << spline(1.1) << '\n';
cout << spline.D(1.1) << '\n';
cout << spline.DD(1.1) << '\n';
cout << spline.DDD(1.1) << '\n';
Compile and tests**
Edit makefile file to match compiler of your OS and do:
make
To run the test
make run
To generate documentation (using DOXYGEN: http://www.stack.nl/~dimitri/doxygen/index.html)
make doc


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