|
Monin et al. (2008) Study 4
|
r(N=67) = .35 ± .22 |
r(N=75) = .16 ± .22 |
Holubar & Frank (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
rebel vs obedient liking effect |
RPP #1 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Payne et al. (2008) Study 4
|
r(N=70) = .35 ± .22 |
r(N=180) = .15 ± .14 |
Vianello (2015)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
implicit-explicit correspondence effect |
RPP #2 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Soto, John et al. (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=230047) = .02 ± 0 |
r(N=455326) = .02 ± 0 |
Soderberg (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
young acquiescent variability effect |
RPP #3 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
| Cox, Arndt et al. (2008) Study 6 |
r(N=100) = .23 ± .19 |
r(N=200) = -.05 ± .14 |
Wissink, Zeelenberg et al. (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
anxious attachment mortality effect |
RPP #4 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Albarracin et al. (2008) Study 5
|
r(N=36) = .38 ± .3 |
r(N=88) = -.03 ± .21 |
Kim, Frank et al. (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
action priming boosts cognitive performance |
RPP #5 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Albarracin et al. (2008) Study 7
|
r(N=98) = .21 ± .19 |
r(N=109) = .16 ± .19 |
Voracek & Sonnleitner (2015)
|
no signal - consistent |
action priming boosts # of thoughts effect |
RPP #6 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Centerbar, Schnall et al. (2008) Study 5
|
r(N=133) = .21 ± .16 |
r(N=113) = .09 ± .18 |
Humphries, Brown et al. (2015)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
affective incoherence effect |
RPP #7 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Amodio, Devine et al. (2008) Study 2
|
r(N=48) = .38 ± .25 |
r(N=75) = .08 ± .23 |
Johnson, Graham et al. (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
intergroup bias regulation effect |
RPP #8 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Harmon-Jones et al. (2008) Study 2
|
r(N=57) = .23 ± .26 |
r(N=71) = .07 ± .24 |
Gable & Mechin (2015)
|
no signal - consistent |
action-oriented mindset dissonance effect |
RPP #9 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
van Dijk, van Kleef et al. (2008) Study 3
|
r(N=103) = .38 ± .17 |
r(N=83) = -.04 ± .22 |
Voracek & Slowik (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
anger communication bargaining effect |
RPP #10 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Lemay & Clark (2008a) Study 5
|
r(N=186) = .17 ± .14 |
r(N=280) = .04 ± .12 |
Baranski (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
walking on eggshells effect |
RPP #11 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Lemay & Clark (2008b) Study 5
|
level 1 R²(N=153) = .68 |
b(N=216) = .72 |
Marigold, Forest et al. (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
head liberates heart effect |
RPP #12 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Ersner-Hershfield et al. (2008) Study 2
|
r(N=110) = .22 ± .18 |
r(N=222) = 0 ± .14 |
Talhelm, Eggleston, & Lee (2015a)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
poignancy effect |
RPP #13 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Correll (2008) Study 2
|
r(N=71) = .27 ± .22 |
r(N=148) = .07 ± .16 |
LeBel (2015) Study 1
|
no signal - inconsistent |
modulation of 1/f noise racial bias emission effect |
RPP #14 |
avoid/use race information vs. control instructions |
1/f noise (weapon identification task) |
very close |
Canadian rather than US undergraduates; keyboard used instead of response box; |
Racial bias (in terms of RT) higher in use and avoid race (compared to control) conditions (d = .34 ± .35); 1/f noise observed within each of the 3 conditions (p<.0001) |
|
|
Forster, Liberman et al. (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=82) = .43 ± .18 |
r(N=71) = .11 ± .24 |
Reinhard (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
aggression priming perceptual effect |
RPP #15 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
| Exline, Baumeister et al. (2008) Study 7 |
r(N=45) = .43 ± .25 |
r(N=135) = .01 ± .17 |
Lin & Frank (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
not so innocent effect |
RPP #16 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Risen & Gilovich (2008) Study 6
|
r(N=122) = .19 ± .17 |
r(N=226) = 0 ± .13 |
Mathur & Frank (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
tempting fate effect |
RPP #17 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Tracy & Robins (2008) Study 4
|
Av. Proportion(N=211) = .78 |
Av. proportion(N=333) = .77 |
Sullivan (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
cross-cultural nonverbal pride expression effect |
RPP #18 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Stanovich & West (2008) Study 8
|
r(N=375) = .22 ± .1 |
r(N=177) = .07 ± .15 |
Baranski (2015)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
Wason task performance and cognitive ability correlation |
RPP #19 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Blankenship & Wegener (2008) Study 5a
|
r(N=261) = .21 ± .12 |
r(N=251) = .04 ± .12 |
Lemm (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
closed open mind effect |
RPP #20 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
| Morrison & Miller (2008) Study 3 |
r(N=37) = .32 ± .3 |
r(N=120) = .2 ± .18 |
Motyl (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
descriptive deviant popularity effect |
RPP #21 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Koo & Fishbach (2008) Study 4
|
η²(N=246) = .041 |
OR(N=768703) = .159 |
Kidwell & Dodson (2015)
|
no signal |
(un)accomplished goal action effect |
RPP #22 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Henderson, de Liver et al. (2008) Study 5
|
r(N=46) = .26 ± .28 |
r(N=70) = .16 ± .24 |
Lane & Gazarian (2015)
|
no signal - consistent |
implemental mind-set attitude strength effect |
RPP #23 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Shnabel & Nadler (2008) Study 4
|
r(N=94) = .27 ± .19 |
r(N=141) = -.1 ± .16 |
E. Gilbert (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
need for acceptance reconcialiation effect |
RPP #24 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Rule & Ambady (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=50) = .3 ± .26 |
r(N=50) = .27 ± .27 |
Talhelm, Eggleston, & Lee (2015b)
|
signal - consistent |
face of success effect |
RPP #25 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
| Fischer, Schulz-Hardt et al. (2008) Study 4 |
r(N=52) = .5 ± .21 |
r(N=150) = .22 ± .16 |
Ratliff (2015)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
selective exposure information quantity effect |
RPP #26 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
| Fischer, Greitemeyer et al. (2008) Study 2 |
r(N=85) = .21 ± .2 |
r(N=140) = .12 ± .16 |
Galliani (2015)
|
no signal - consistent |
ego depletion confirmatory bias effect |
RPP #27 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Goff, Steele et al. (2008) Study 4
|
r(N=55) = .4 ± .23 |
r(N=51) = .01 ± .28 |
Kelso, Gampa, Wright et al. (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
stereotype threat interaction distance effect |
RPP #28 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Eastwick & Finkel (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=163) = .14 ± .16 |
r(N=304) = .03 ± .11 |
Selterman, Chagnon et al. (2015)
|
no signal - consistent |
generalized earning prospect predicts romantic interest effect |
RPP #29 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Murray, Derrick et al. (2008) Study 8
|
r(N=91) = .32 ± .18 |
r(N=76) = -.14 ± .22 |
Sinclair, Goldberg et al. (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
approach priming partner criticism effect |
RPP #30 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
McCrea (2008) Study 5
|
r(N=28) = .34 ± .35 |
r(N=61) = .29 ± .24 |
Chartier (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
math self-handicapping effect |
RPP #31 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Purdie-Vaughns et al. (2008) Study 2
|
r(N=90) = .38 ± .18 |
r(N=1490) = -.04 ± .05 |
Schmidt (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
social identity contingencies effect |
RPP #32 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Alter & Oppenheimer (2008) Study 2
|
r(N=236) = .13 ± .12 |
r(N=1146) = .02 ± .06 |
Foster (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
fluency priming on psychological distance effect |
RPP #33 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Eitam, Hassin et al. (2008) Study 2
|
r(N=86) = .22 ± .2 |
r(N=158) = .1 ± .16 |
Prenoveau & Kirkhart (2015)
|
no signal - consistent |
goal priming boosts learning effect |
RPP #34 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Farris, Treat et al. (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=280) = .55 ± .08 |
r(N=144) = .09 ± .16 |
Attwood, Easey, & Munafo (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
sex difference in perceived sexual interest effect |
RPP #35 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Armor, Massey et al. (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=126) = .68 ± .1 |
r(N=177) = .76 ± .06 |
Lassetter, Brandt et al. (2015)
|
signal - inconsistent (larger) |
prescribed optimism effect |
RPP #36 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Addis, Wong et al. (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=32) = .57 ± .26 |
r(N=32) = .65 ± .22 |
Vasquez (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
age-related episodic memory effect |
RPP #37 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Masicampo & Baumeister (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=115) = .21 ± .18 |
r(N=166) = -.05 ± .16 |
Osborne, Vuu, & Henninger (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
ego depletion boosts attraction effect |
RPP #38 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Hajcak & Foti (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=31) = -.38 ± .32 |
r(N=43) = -.25 ± .29 |
Lewis & Pitts (2015)
|
no signal - consistent |
aversive errors effect |
RPP #39 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Tabibnia, Satpute et al. (2008) Study 2
|
r(N=12) = .85 ± .24 |
r(N=24) = .83 ± .15 |
Beer, Rigney, & Flagan (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
sunny side of fairness effect |
RPP #40 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Lau, Kay & Spencer (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=36) = .38 ± .3 |
r(N=70) = -.03 ± .24 |
Stieger (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
loving woman who justify inequality effect |
RPP #41 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Richeson & Trawalter (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=28) = .37 ± .34 |
r(N=66) = .02 ± .24 |
Lai (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
threat of appearing prejudiced attentional bias effect |
RPP #42 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Crosby, Monin et al. (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=25) = .25 ± .4 |
r(N=30) = .18 ± .36 |
Skorinko & Jonas (2015)
|
no signal - consistent |
offensive behavior looking effect |
RPP #43 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Larsen & McKibban (2008) Study 2
|
r(N=119) = .21 ± .18 |
r(N=238) = .5 ± .09 |
Seibel, Vermue et al. (2015)
|
signal - inconsistent (larger) |
having what you want happiness effect |
RPP #44 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Ranganath & Nosek (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=684) = 0 ± .08 |
r(N=3597) = .11 ± .04 |
Cohn (2015)
|
signal - inconsistent (larger) |
implicit attitude generalization occurs immediately effect |
RPP #45 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Vohs & Schooler (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=30) = .5 ± .3 |
r(N=58) = .1 ± .26 |
Giner-Sorolla, Embley et al. (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
anti-free-will boosts cheating effect |
RPP #46 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Williams & Bargh (2008) Study 4
|
r(N=84) = .23 ± .2 |
r(N=125) = .04 ± .18 |
Joy-Gaba, Clay, & Cleary (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
distance priming boosts psychological closeness effect |
RPP #47 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Tamir, Mitchell et al. (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=82) = .59 ± .14 |
r(N=88) = .61 ± .13 |
Masicampo (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
hedonic anger regulation effect |
RPP #48 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Epley, Akalis et al. (2008) Study 3
|
r(N=57) = .17 ± .26 |
r(N=78) = .06 ± .23 |
Sandstrom & Dunn (2015)
|
no signal - consistent |
social disconnection boosts supernatural agent beliefs effect |
RPP #49 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Halevy, Bornstein et al. (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=80) = .77 ± .09 |
r(N=40) = .65 ± .2 |
Thomae, Woo, & Immelman (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
intergroup prisoners dilemma-maximizing difference effect |
RPP #50 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Bressan & Stranieri (2008) Study 2
|
r(N=208) = .19 ± .14 |
r(N=263) = -.03 ± .12 |
Frazier & Hasselman (2015) Study 1
|
no signal - inconsistent |
ovulation boosts attraction to single men effect |
RPP #51 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Bressan & Stranieri (2008) Study 2
|
r(N=208) = .19 ± .14 |
r(N=318) = .02 ± .11 |
Frazier & Hasselman (2015) Study 2
|
no signal - inconsistent |
ovulation boosts attraction to single men effect |
RPP #52 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schnall, Benton & Harvey (2008) Study 2
|
r(N=43) = -.4 ± .26 |
r(N=126) = 0 ± .18 |
Cheung et al. (2015) Study 2
|
no signal - inconsistent |
cleanliness priming |
RPP #53 |
hand washing vs. control condition |
moral wrongness (6 moral dilemmas) |
very close |
US rather than UK undergraduates |
α = .62 on private body consciousness (PBC) subscale |
|
|
Heine, Buchtel et al. (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=70) = -.43 ± .2 |
r(N=16) = -.11 ± .53 |
Lazarevic & Knezevic (2015)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
conscientiousness validity correlation |
RPP #54 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Moeller, Robinson et al. (2008) Study 2
|
r(N=53) = -.31 ± .25 |
r(N=72) = .03 ± .24 |
Levitan & Fernandez-Castilla (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
social dominance verticality embodiment effect |
RPP #55 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Goschke & Dreisbach (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=40) = .37 ± .28 |
r(N=95) = .41 ± .17 |
Costantini & Perugini (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
conflict-triggered goal shielding effect |
RPP #56 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Dai, Wertenbroch et al. (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=56) = .28 ± .24 |
r(N=51) = -.18 ± .28 |
Fuchs, Estel, & Goellner (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
relative frequency value heuristic effect |
RPP #57 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Roelofs (2008) Study 3
|
r(N=24) = .59 ± .29 |
r(N=29) = .15 ± .38 |
van Rijn (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
tracing attention effect |
RPP #58 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
| Morris & Still (2008) Study 6 |
r(N=24) = .61 ± .28 |
r(N=24) = .23 ± .4 |
Goodbourn (2015)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
repetition blindness for nonwords effect |
RPP #59 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Liefooghe, Barouillet et al. (2008) Study 4
|
r(N=25) = .42 ± .35 |
r(N=32) = -.22 ± .35 |
Plessow, Moschl, & Pavel (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
working memory task switching costs effect |
RPP #60 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Storm, Bjork & Bjork (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=240) = .23 ± .12 |
r(N=270) = -.01 ± .12 |
Callahan (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
retrieval-induced forgetting effect |
RPP #61 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Mitchell, Nash & Hall (2008) Study 2
|
r(N=32) = .46 ± .3 |
r(N=48) = .13 ± .28 |
Lakens (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
intermixed-blocked effect revisited |
RPP #62 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Berry, Shanks & Henson (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=24) = .59 ± .29 |
r(N=32) = .4 ± .31 |
Meixner & Bruning (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
independent memory sources for priming & recognition effect |
RPP #63 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Beaman, Neath et al. (2008) Study 2
|
r(N=100) = .72 ± .1 |
r(N=15) = .13 ± .55 |
Kleinberg & Kunkels (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
enhanced memory for word order effect |
RPP #64 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Dodson, Darragh et al. (2008) Study 3
|
r(N=48) = .56 ± .2 |
r(N=33) = -.11 ± .36 |
Calhoun-Sauls (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
retrieval-provoked illusory source recollection effect |
RPP #65 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
| Ganor-Stern & Tzelgov (2008) Study 2 |
r(N=32) = .7 ± .2 |
r(N=32) = .78 ± .16 |
Shaki (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
comparative distance effect revisited |
RPP #66 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Mirman & Magnuson (2008) Study 2
|
r(N=22) = .67 ± .26 |
r(N=30) = .47 ± .3 |
Bosco & Field (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
semantic neighborhood density effect |
RPP #67 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Marsh, Vachon, & Jones (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=48) = .18 ± .29 |
r(N=118) = .08 ± .18 |
Bell (2015)
|
no signal - consistent |
between-sequence phonological similarity effect |
RPP #68 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
| Campbell & Robert (2008) Study 3 |
r(N=36) = .52 ± .25 |
r(N=36) = .52 ± .25 |
Ricker (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
bidirectional association in multiplication memory |
RPP #69 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schmidt & Besner (2008) Study 2
|
r(N=95) = .2 ± .2 |
r(N=242) = .25 ± .12 |
Cloud (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
contingency Stroop effect |
RPP #70 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Fiedler (2008) Study 2
|
r(N=39) = .3 ± .3 |
r(N=47) = .43 ± .24 |
Glockner & Jekel (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
ultimate sampling dilemma effect |
RPP #71 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oberauer (2008) Study 3
|
r(N=32) = .56 ± .26 |
r(N=21) = .4 ± .4 |
Bosch, Neijenhuijs et al. (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
how to say no effect |
RPP #72 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Sahakyan, Delaney et al. (2008) Study 3
|
r(N=96) = .22 ± .19 |
r(N=108) = .02 ± .19 |
Fiedler & May (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
intentional forgetting effect revisited |
RPP #73 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Colzato, Bajo et al. (2008) Study 3
|
r(N=18) = .22 ± .48 |
r(N=32) = .06 ± .36 |
Kappes (2015)
|
no signal - consistent |
bilingualism executive control effect |
RPP #74 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
| Bassok, Pedigo et al. (2008) Study 1 |
r(N=154) = .36 ± .14 |
r(N=49) = .28 ± .26 |
Hung, Lin, & Tsang (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
addition facts priming effect |
RPP #75 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
| Couture, Lafond, & Tremblay (2008) Study 1 |
r(N=24) = .35 ± .38 |
r(N=63) = .27 ± .24 |
Roebke & Penna (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
Hebb repetition effect revisited |
RPP #76 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Reynolds & Besner (2008) Study 5
|
r(N=16) = .16 ± .52 |
r(N=20) = .14 ± .46 |
Lai & Simpson (2015)
|
no signal - consistent |
reading aloud contextual effect |
RPP #77 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Yap, Balota et al. (2008) Study 4
|
r(N=32) = .38 ± .32 |
r(N=71) = .38 ± .2 |
Chartier (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
stimlus quality word frequency effect |
RPP #78 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Janssen, Schirm et al. (2008a) Study 1
|
r(N=32) = .34 ± .32 |
r(N=91) = .1 ± .21 |
Galak (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
semantic interference in naming task revisited |
RPP #79 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Turk-Brown, Isola et al. (2008) Study 4b
|
r(N=8) = .74 ± .54 |
r(N=15) = .7 ± .32 |
Ostkamp & Jakel (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
multidimensional visual statistical learning effect |
RPP #80 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
White (2008) Study 3
|
r(N=37) = .62 ± .21 |
r(N=38) = .48 ± .26 |
Muller & Renkewitz (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
contingency information in causal judgments effect |
RPP #81 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Farrell (2008) Study 2
|
r(N=40) = .52 ± .24 |
r(N=40) = .32 ± .3 |
Olsson & Saxe (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
short-term memory temporal gap effect |
RPP #82 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Pacton & Perruchet (2008) Study 4b
|
r(N=24) = .71 ± .22 |
r(N=24) = .68 ± .25 |
Jahn (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
dependency learning effect |
RPP #83 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Makovski, Sussman et al. (2008) Study 3
|
r(N=12) = .55 ± .49 |
r(N=18) = .35 ± .45 |
Moore (2015)
|
no signal - consistent |
visual working memory orienting attention effect |
RPP #84 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Pleskac (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=68) = .37 ± .21 |
r(N=153) = .1 ± .16 |
Forsell, Dreber et al. (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
learning on risky decision making effect |
RPP #85 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
| Dessalegn & Landau (2008) Study 4 |
r(N=36) = .38 ± .3 |
r(N=47) = -.22 ± .28 |
Fitneva (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
directional language feature binding effect |
RPP #86 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Janiszewski & Uy (2008) Study 4
|
r(N=59) = .33 ± .24 |
r(N=120) = .23 ± .17 |
Chandler (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
anchor precision anchoring effect |
RPP #87 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
McKinstry, Dale, & Spivey (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=141) = -.7 ± .09 |
r(N=51) = -.75 ± .13 |
Saxe, Velez, & Feather (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
sample entropy decision making effect |
RPP #88 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nurmsoo & Bloom (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=32) = .5 ± .28 |
r(N=8) = -.45 ± .72 |
Brown, Kleinberg et al. (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
perspective taking in word learning effect |
RPP #89 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Vul & Pashler (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=173) = .29 ± .14 |
r(N=140) = .32 ± .15 |
Steegen, Vanpaemel et al. (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
crowd within effect |
RPP #90 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Vul, Nieuwenstein et al. (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=12) = .13 ± .62 |
r(N=12) = .12 ± .62 |
Barnett-Cowan (2015)
|
no signal - consistent |
temporal selection in attentional blink effect |
RPP #91 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Alvarez & Oliva (2008) Study 3
|
r(N=8) = -.72 ± .55 |
r(N=17) = -.92 ± .09 |
Schlegelmilch et al. (2015)
|
signal - inconsistent (larger) |
representation of ensemble visual features effect |
RPP #92 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Winawer, Huk, & Boroditsky (2008) Study 3
|
r(N=32) = -.69 ± .2 |
r(N=26) = -.53 ± .3 |
Levitan, Errington & Gampa (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
motion affereffect effect |
RPP #93 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nairne, Pandeirada et al. (2008) Study 2
|
r(N=24) = .45 ± .35 |
r(N=38) = .42 ± .28 |
Muller & Renkewitz (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
survival words memory boost effect |
RPP #94 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Demany, Trost et al. (2008) Study 5
|
r(N=4) = .5 ± 1 |
r(N=5) = .51 ± .94 |
Snyder & Irsik (2015)
|
no signal - consistent |
auditory change detection effect |
RPP #95 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Janssen, Alario et al. (2008b) Study 2
|
r(N=30) = .65 ± .23 |
r(N=24) = .5 ± .34 |
Melinger (2015)
|
signal - consistent |
word-order constraint effect |
RPP #96 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
| Forti & Humphreys (2008) Study 1 |
r(N=14) = .72 ± .33 |
r(N=19) = .21 ± .46 |
Dorrough & Fiedler (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
object viewpoint sensitivity effect |
RPP #97 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Palmer & Ghose (2008) Study 2
|
r(N=8) = .86 ± .38 |
r(N=8) = .12 ± .78 |
Saxe, Velez, & Johnston (2015)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
extremal edge effect |
RPP #98 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Lobue & DeLoache (2008) Study 3
|
r(N=48) = .48 ± .23 |
r(N=48) = .18 ± .29 |
Cramblet, Alvarez et al. (2015)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
snake in the grass detection effect |
RPP #99 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Estes, Verges, & Barsalou (2008) Study 1
|
r(N=18) = .6 ± .35 |
r(N=22) = .25 ± .42 |
Renkewitz & Muller (2015)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
head up foot down effect |
RPP #100 |
|
|
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=87) = -.26 ± .42 |
Hunt & Krueger (2014,TAMUC)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #1 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=102) = -.24 ± .39 |
Cheong (2014,Help)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #2 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=162) = -.21 ± .40 |
Devos (2014,SDSU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #3 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=96) = -.20 ± .40 |
Swol (2014,Wisc)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #4 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=87) = -.19 ± .42 |
John & Skorinko (2014,WPI)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #5 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=277) = -.16 ± .39 |
Kappes (2014,LSE)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #6 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=187) = -.16 ± .24 |
Davis & Hicks (2014,TAMU) Study 1
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #7 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=127) = -.15 ± .35 |
Klein et al. (2014,UFL)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #8 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=84) = -.14 ± .43 |
Vranka (2014,Charles)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #9 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=112) = -.14 ± .37 |
Packard (2014,Laurier)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #10 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=113) = -.13 ± .36 |
Cemalcilar (2014,KU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #11 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=169) = -.12 ± .30 |
Bocian & Frankowska (2014,SWPSON) Study 2
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #12 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=146) = -.07 ± .33 |
Huntsinger & Mallett (2014,Luc)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #13 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=1000) = -.06 ± .12 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014, MTURK)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #14 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=108) = -.05 ± .40 |
Hovermale & Joy-Gaba (2014,VCU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #15 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=144) = -.04 ± .34 |
Vianello & Galliani (2014,UNIPD)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #16 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=1329) = -.03 ± .11 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014,PI)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #17 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=84) = .00 ± .43 |
Bernstein (2014,abington)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #18 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=90) = .01 ± .40 |
Vaughn (2014,Ithaca)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #19 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=96) = .01 ± .40 |
Rutchick (2014,CSUN)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #20 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=95) = .01 ± .42 |
Adams & Nelson (2014,PSU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #21 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=103) = .03 ± .36 |
Brumbaugh & Storbeck (2014,QCCUNY) Study 1
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #22 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=123) = .03 ± .39 |
Levitan (2014,Oxy)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #23 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=107) = .10 ± .38 |
Smith (2014,OSU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #24 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=174) = .11 ± .30 |
Kurtz (2014,JMU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #25 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=86) = .13 ± .43 |
Brumbaugh & Storbeck (2014,QCCUNY2) Study 2
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #26 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=103) = .18 ± .26 |
Wichman (2014,WKU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #27 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=225) = .18 ± .36 |
Davis & Hicks (2014,TAMUON) Study 2
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #28 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=120) = .18 ± .40 |
Pilati (2014,brasilia)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #29 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=85) = .19 ± .43 |
Furrow & Thompson (2014,MSVU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #30 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=80) = .21 ± .44 |
Brandt et al. (2014,Tilburg)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #31 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=79) = .21 ± .45 |
Bocian & Frankowska (2014,SWPS) Study 1
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #32 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=95) = .23 ± .40 |
Nier (2014,Conncoll)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #33 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=90) = .24 ± .41 |
Woodzicka (2014,WL)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #34 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=81) = .30 ± .44 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014,UVA)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #35 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=98) = .40 ± .40 |
Morris (2014,McDaniel)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
ML1 #36 |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 1
|
d(N=30) = .77 ± .74 |
d(N=136) = -.07 ± .34 |
Rohrer et al. (2015) Study 1
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
individual effort |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
system justification scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 2
|
d(N=168) = .43 ± .30 |
d(N=420) = .06 ± .19 |
Rohrer et al. (2015) Study 2
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (scrambled sentence) |
individual effort |
exposure to money vs. control (scrambled sentence) |
belief in a just world scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 2
|
d(N=168) = .43 ± .30 |
d(N=115) = -.09 ± .39 |
Schuler & Wänke (in press) Study 2
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (scrambled sentence) |
individual effort |
exposure to money vs. control (scrambled sentence) |
belief in a just world scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 3
|
d(N=80) = .49 ± .44 |
d(N=156) = -.06 ± .31 |
Rohrer et al. (2015) Study 3
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (scrambled sentence) |
individual effort |
exposure to money vs. control (scrambled sentence) |
social dominance orientation scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Caruso et al. (2013) Study 4
|
d(N=48) = .69 ± .58 |
d(N=116) = .13 ± .37 |
Rohrer et al. (2015) Study 4
|
no signal - inconsistent |
money priming (instruction background) |
individual effort |
exposure to money vs. control (instruction background) |
Fair Market Ideology scale |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Vohs et al. (2006) Study 3
|
d(N=39) = .65 ± .65 |
d(N=40) = .07 ± .62 |
Grenier et al. (2012)
|
no signal - consistent |
money priming (scrambled sentence) |
individual effort |
exposure to money vs. control (scrambled sentence) |
helping others (coding sheets for RA) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=83) = .07 ± .44 |
Bernstein (2014,abington)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #37 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=120) = 0 ± .36 |
Pilati (2014,brasilia)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #38 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
close |
non-US sample |
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=84) = -.03 ± .43 |
Vranka (2014,Charles)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #39 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
close |
non-US sample |
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=94) = -.45 ± .42 |
Nier (2014,Conncoll)
|
signal - inconsistent (opposite) |
flag priming |
ML1 #40 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=94) = -.07 ± .41 |
Rutchick (2014,CSUN)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #41 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=102) = -.11 ± .4 |
Cheong (2014,Help)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #42 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
close |
non-US sample |
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=89) = -.17 ± .42 |
Vaughn (2014,Ithaca)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #43 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=172) = .04 ± .3 |
Kurtz (2014,JMU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #44 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=110) = .14 ± .38 |
Cemalcilar (2014,KU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #45 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
close |
non-US sample |
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=111) = .04 ± .38 |
Packard (2014,Laurier)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #46 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
close |
non-US sample |
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=275) = .04 ± .24 |
Kappes (2014,LSE)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #47 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
close |
non-US sample |
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=145) = .06 ± .32 |
Huntsinger & Mallett (2014,Luc)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #48 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=98) = .09 ± .4 |
Morris (2014,McDaniel)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #49 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=85) = .09 ± .43 |
Furrow & Thompson (2014,MSVU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #50 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
close |
non-US sample |
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=982) = .09 ± .12 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014, MTURK)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #51 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=97) = .27 ± .4 |
Smith (2014,OSU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #52 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=121) = -.01 ± .36 |
Levitan (2014,Oxy)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #53 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=1320) = .03 ± .11 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014,PI)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #54 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=91) = .02 ± .42 |
Adams & Nelson (2014,PSU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #55 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=99) = -.22 ± .4 |
Brumbaugh & Storbeck (2014,QCCUNY) Study 1
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #56 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=85) = .02 ± .43 |
Brumbaugh & Storbeck (2014,QCCUNY2) Study 2
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #57 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=160) = -.11 ± .32 |
Devos (2014,SDSU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #58 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=78) = .19 ± .45 |
Bocian & Frankowska (2014,SWPS) Study 1
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #59 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
close |
non-US sample |
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=169) = -.22 ± .3 |
Bocian & Frankowska (2014,SWPSON) Study 2
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #60 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
close |
non-US sample |
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=182) = -.27 ± .3 |
Davis & Hicks (2014,TAMU) Study 1
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #61 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=86) = .27 ± .43 |
Hunt & Krueger (2014,TAMUC)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #62 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=218) = -.03 ± .27 |
Davis & Hicks (2014,TAMUON) Study 2
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #63 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=79) = .21 ± .44 |
Brandt et al. (2014,Tilburg)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #64 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
close |
non-US sample |
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=126) = -.11 ± .36 |
Klein et al. (2014,UFL)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #65 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=142) = .49 ± .34 |
Vianello & Galliani (2014,UNIPD)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #66 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
close |
non-US sample |
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=80) = -.15 ± .44 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014,UVA)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #67 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=105) = -.07 ± .39 |
Hovermale & Joy-Gaba (2014,VCU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #68 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=95) = -.03 ± .41 |
Swol (2014,Wisc)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #69 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=99) = .11 ± .4 |
Wichman (2014,WKU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #70 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=89) = -.09 ± .42 |
Woodzicka (2014,WL)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #71 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin (2011) Study 2
|
d(N=66) = .50 ± .50 |
d(N=86) = .08 ± .43 |
John & Skorinko (2014,WPI)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
flag priming |
ML1 #72 |
exposure to US flag vs. control (photos) |
political views (8-issues) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=84) = .11 ± .44 |
Bernstein (2014,abington)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #73 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=120) = .08 ± .36 |
Pilati (2014,brasilia)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #74 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=84) = -.01 ± .43 |
Vranka (2014,Charles)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #75 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=95) = .21 ± .41 |
Nier (2014,Conncoll)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #76 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=96) = .03 ± .4 |
Rutchick (2014,CSUN)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #77 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=102) = -.22 ± .39 |
Cheong (2014,Help)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #78 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=90) = .68 ± .43 |
Vaughn (2014,Ithaca)
|
signal - consistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #79 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=174) = .18 ± .3 |
Kurtz (2014,JMU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #80 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=113) = -.16 ± .38 |
Cemalcilar (2014,KU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #81 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=112) = .02 ± .38 |
Packard (2014,Laurier)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #82 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=277) = .18 ± .24 |
Kappes (2014,LSE)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #83 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=146) = .15 ± .33 |
Huntsinger & Mallett (2014,Luc)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #84 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=98) = .19 ± .4 |
Morris (2014,McDaniel)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #85 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=85) = .33 ± .44 |
Furrow & Thompson (2014,MSVU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #86 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=1000) = .26 ± .12 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014, MTURK)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #87 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=107) = -.11 ± .38 |
Smith (2014,OSU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #88 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=122) = .29 ± .36 |
Levitan (2014,Oxy)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #89 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=1328) = .15 ± .11 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014,PI)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #90 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=95) = .29 ± .41 |
Adams & Nelson (2014,PSU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #91 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=101) = -.29 ± .4 |
Brumbaugh & Storbeck (2014,QCCUNY) Study 1
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #92 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=85) = .32 ± .44 |
Brumbaugh & Storbeck (2014,QCCUNY2) Study 2
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #93 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=162) = .3 ± .31 |
Devos (2014,SDSU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #94 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=79) = .35 ± .46 |
Bocian & Frankowska (2014,SWPS) Study 1
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #95 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=168) = .09 ± .3 |
Bocian & Frankowska (2014,SWPSON) Study 2
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #96 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=187) = -.09 ± .29 |
Davis & Hicks (2014,TAMU) Study 1
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #97 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=87) = -.11 ± .43 |
Hunt & Krueger (2014,TAMUC)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #98 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=225) = .31 ± .26 |
Davis & Hicks (2014,TAMUON) Study 2
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #99 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=80) = -.52 ± .45 |
Brandt et al. (2014,Tilburg)
|
signal - inconsistent (opposite) |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #100 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=127) = .12 ± .35 |
Klein et al. (2014,UFL)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #101 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=143) = .17 ± .33 |
Vianello & Galliani (2014,UNIPD)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #102 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=81) = .04 ± .44 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014,UVA)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #103 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=107) = 0 ± .38 |
Hovermale & Joy-Gaba (2014,VCU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #104 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=96) = .08 ± .4 |
Swol (2014,Wisc)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #105 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=103) = -.21 ± .4 |
Wichman (2014,WKU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #106 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=90) = .03 ± .42 |
Woodzicka (2014,WL)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #107 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Husnu & Crisp (2010) Study 1
|
d(N=33) = .86 ± .74 |
d(N=87) = .14 ± .43 |
John & Skorinko (2014,WPI)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
imagined contact effect |
ML1 #108 |
imagined contact (Muslim) vs. control |
willingness to interact with Muslim (4-items) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=84) = .54 ± .44 |
Bernstein (2014,abington)
|
signal - consistent |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #109 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=120) = .24 ± .36 |
Pilati (2014,brasilia)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #110 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=84) = .46 ± .44 |
Vranka (2014,Charles)
|
signal - consistent |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #111 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=95) = .41 ± .42 |
Nier (2014,Conncoll)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #112 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=96) = .53 ± .42 |
Rutchick (2014,CSUN)
|
signal - consistent |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #113 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=102) = -.06 ± .39 |
Cheong (2014,Help)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #114 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=90) = .23 ± .42 |
Vaughn (2014,Ithaca)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #115 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=174) = .57 ± .3 |
Kurtz (2014,JMU)
|
signal - consistent |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #116 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=113) = .49 ± .38 |
Cemalcilar (2014,KU)
|
signal - consistent |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #117 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=112) = .45 ± .38 |
Packard (2014,Laurier)
|
signal - consistent |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #118 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=276) = .41 ± .24 |
Kappes (2014,LSE)
|
signal - consistent |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #119 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=146) = .27 ± .33 |
Huntsinger & Mallett (2014,Luc)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #120 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=97) = .15 ± .4 |
Morris (2014,McDaniel)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #121 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=85) = .33 ± .44 |
Furrow & Thompson (2014,MSVU)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #122 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=999) = .31 ± .12 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014, MTURK)
|
signal - consistent |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #123 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=107) = .45 ± .39 |
Smith (2014,OSU)
|
signal - consistent |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #124 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=122) = .68 ± .37 |
Levitan (2014,Oxy)
|
signal - consistent |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #125 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=1323) = .18 ± .1 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014,PI)
|
signal - consistent |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #126 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=95) = .15 ± .41 |
Adams & Nelson (2014,PSU)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #127 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=102) = -.08 ± .39 |
Brumbaugh & Storbeck (2014,QCCUNY) Study 1
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #128 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=86) = .14 ± .43 |
Brumbaugh & Storbeck (2014,QCCUNY2) Study 2
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #129 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=162) = .28 ± .32 |
Devos (2014,SDSU)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #130 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=79) = -.07 ± .45 |
Bocian & Frankowska (2014,SWPS) Study 1
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #131 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=168) = .12 ± .3 |
Bocian & Frankowska (2014,SWPSON) Study 2
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #132 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=187) = .35 ± .29 |
Davis & Hicks (2014,TAMU) Study 1
|
signal - consistent |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #133 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=87) = .38 ± .43 |
Hunt & Krueger (2014,TAMUC)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #134 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=225) = .32 ± .26 |
Davis & Hicks (2014,TAMUON) Study 2
|
signal - consistent |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #135 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=80) = .5 ± .45 |
Brandt et al. (2014,Tilburg)
|
signal - consistent |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #136 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=127) = .15 ± .35 |
Klein et al. (2014,UFL)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #137 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=144) = .46 ± .33 |
Vianello & Galliani (2014,UNIPD)
|
signal - consistent |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #138 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=81) = .43 ± .44 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014,UVA)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #139 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=108) = .33 ± .38 |
Hovermale & Joy-Gaba (2014,VCU)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #140 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=96) = .13 ± .4 |
Swol (2014,Wisc)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #141 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=102) = .05 ± .4 |
Wichman (2014,WKU)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #142 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=89) = .26 ± .43 |
Woodzicka (2014,WL)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #143 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer et al. (2009 ) Study 1
|
d(N=115) = .23 ± .25 |
d(N=87) = .42 ± .43 |
John & Skorinko (2014,WPI)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sunk cost effect (paid vs. free football ticket) |
ML1 #144 |
sunk cost vs. control (paid vs. free football ticket) |
likelihood of attending rainy football game |
very close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=84) = .12 ± .44 |
Bernstein (2014,abington)
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #145 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=120) = .33 ± .36 |
Pilati (2014,brasilia)
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #146 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=84) = .36 ± .44 |
Vranka (2014,Charles)
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #147 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=95) = .11 ± .4 |
Nier (2014,Conncoll)
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #148 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=96) = .12 ± .4 |
Rutchick (2014,CSUN)
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #149 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=102) = .14 ± .4 |
Cheong (2014,Help)
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #150 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=90) = .07 ± .42 |
Vaughn (2014,Ithaca)
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #151 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=174) = .42 ± .3 |
Kurtz (2014,JMU)
|
signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #152 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=113) = -.07 ± .38 |
Cemalcilar (2014,KU)
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #153 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=112) = .3 ± .38 |
Packard (2014,Laurier)
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #154 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=277) = .2 ± .24 |
Kappes (2014,LSE)
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #155 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=146) = .31 ± .33 |
Huntsinger & Mallett (2014,Luc)
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #156 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=98) = .67 ± .42 |
Morris (2014,McDaniel)
|
signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #157 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=85) = .19 ± .44 |
Furrow & Thompson (2014,MSVU)
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #158 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=1000) = .46 ± .12 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014, MTURK)
|
signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #159 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=107) = .66 ± .4 |
Smith (2014,OSU)
|
signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #160 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=123) = .14 ± .36 |
Levitan (2014,Oxy)
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #161 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=1329) = .22 ± .11 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014,PI)
|
signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #162 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=95) = .64 ± .42 |
Adams & Nelson (2014,PSU)
|
signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #163 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=103) = .29 ± .39 |
Brumbaugh & Storbeck (2014,QCCUNY) Study 1
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #164 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=86) = -.1 ± .43 |
Brumbaugh & Storbeck (2014,QCCUNY2) Study 2
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #165 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=162) = .45 ± .32 |
Devos (2014,SDSU)
|
signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #166 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=79) = .32 ± .45 |
Bocian & Frankowska (2014,SWPS) Study 1
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #167 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=169) = .27 ± .3 |
Bocian & Frankowska (2014,SWPSON) Study 2
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #168 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=187) = .58 ± .29 |
Davis & Hicks (2014,TAMU) Study 1
|
signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #169 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=87) = .11 ± .43 |
Hunt & Krueger (2014,TAMUC)
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #170 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=225) = .3 ± .26 |
Davis & Hicks (2014,TAMUON) Study 2
|
signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #171 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=80) = .4 ± .45 |
Brandt et al. (2014,Tilburg)
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #172 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=127) = .25 ± .36 |
Klein et al. (2014,UFL)
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #173 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=144) = .01 ± .33 |
Vianello & Galliani (2014,UNIPD)
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #174 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=81) = .27 ± .44 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014,UVA)
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #175 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=108) = .56 ± .39 |
Hovermale & Joy-Gaba (2014,VCU)
|
signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #176 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=96) = .07 ± .4 |
Swol (2014,Wisc)
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #177 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=103) = .5 ± .4 |
Wichman (2014,WKU)
|
signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #178 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=90) = .04 ± .42 |
Woodzicka (2014,WL)
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #179 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
| Hyman & Sheatsley (1950) |
d(N=) = .16 |
d(N=87) = .13 ± .43 |
John & Skorinko (2014,WPI)
|
no signal - consistent |
reciprocity norm effect |
ML1 #180 |
question order (allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US first vs. vica versa) |
allow US/N. Korean reporter into N. Korea/US (2 binary choices) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=84) = .22 ± .44 |
Bernstein (2014,abington)
|
no signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #181 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=119) = .18 ± .36 |
Pilati (2014,brasilia)
|
no signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #182 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=84) = .29 ± .44 |
Vranka (2014,Charles)
|
no signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #183 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=94) = .14 ± .41 |
Nier (2014,Conncoll)
|
no signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #184 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=96) = .79 ± .42 |
Rutchick (2014,CSUN)
|
signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #185 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=102) = .19 ± .39 |
Cheong (2014,Help)
|
no signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #186 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=90) = .53 ± .42 |
Vaughn (2014,Ithaca)
|
signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #187 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=174) = .68 ± .3 |
Kurtz (2014,JMU)
|
signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #188 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=113) = -.09 ± .37 |
Cemalcilar (2014,KU)
|
no signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #189 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=112) = .29 ± .38 |
Packard (2014,Laurier)
|
no signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #190 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=277) = .38 ± .24 |
Kappes (2014,LSE)
|
signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #191 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=146) = .41 ± .33 |
Huntsinger & Mallett (2014,Luc)
|
signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #192 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=98) = .09 ± .4 |
Morris (2014,McDaniel)
|
no signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #193 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=84) = -.03 ± .44 |
Furrow & Thompson (2014,MSVU)
|
no signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #194 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=999) = .44 ± .12 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014, MTURK)
|
signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #195 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=107) = .27 ± .38 |
Smith (2014,OSU)
|
no signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #196 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=122) = .17 ± .36 |
Levitan (2014,Oxy)
|
no signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #197 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=1322) = .27 ± .1 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014,PI)
|
signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #198 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=95) = .43 ± .41 |
Adams & Nelson (2014,PSU)
|
signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #199 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=101) = .94 ± .42 |
Brumbaugh & Storbeck (2014,QCCUNY) Study 1
|
signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #200 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=85) = .4 ± .44 |
Brumbaugh & Storbeck (2014,QCCUNY2) Study 2
|
no signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #201 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=162) = .41 ± .32 |
Devos (2014,SDSU)
|
signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #202 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=79) = -.01 ± .45 |
Bocian & Frankowska (2014,SWPS) Study 1
|
no signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #203 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=167) = .31 ± .31 |
Bocian & Frankowska (2014,SWPSON) Study 2
|
signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #204 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=186) = .34 ± .3 |
Davis & Hicks (2014,TAMU) Study 1
|
signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #205 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=87) = .52 ± .44 |
Hunt & Krueger (2014,TAMUC)
|
signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #206 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=224) = .38 ± .27 |
Davis & Hicks (2014,TAMUON) Study 2
|
signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #207 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=80) = .55 ± .45 |
Brandt et al. (2014,Tilburg)
|
signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #208 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=127) = .5 ± .36 |
Klein et al. (2014,UFL)
|
signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #209 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=144) = -.26 ± .33 |
Vianello & Galliani (2014,UNIPD)
|
no signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #210 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=81) = .16 ± .44 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014,UVA)
|
no signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #211 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=108) = .31 ± .38 |
Hovermale & Joy-Gaba (2014,VCU)
|
no signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #212 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=96) = .22 ± .41 |
Swol (2014,Wisc)
|
no signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #213 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=103) = .65 ± .4 |
Wichman (2014,WKU)
|
signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #214 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=90) = -.36 ± .42 |
Woodzicka (2014,WL)
|
no signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #215 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Lorge & Curtiss (1936 )
|
d(N=) = NR |
d(N=87) = .23 ± .43 |
John & Skorinko (2014,WPI)
|
no signal |
quote attribution (on attitudes) effect |
ML1 #216 |
liked (G. Washington) vs. disliked (O. Bin Laden) individual |
agreement with political quote |
close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=84) = .29 ± .44 |
Bernstein (2014,abington)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #217 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=120) = .96 ± .38 |
Pilati (2014,brasilia)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #218 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=84) = .54 ± .44 |
Vranka (2014,Charles)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #219 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=95) = .44 ± .41 |
Nier (2014,Conncoll)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #220 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=96) = .54 ± .42 |
Rutchick (2014,CSUN)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #221 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=102) = .45 ± .4 |
Cheong (2014,Help)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #222 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=90) = .39 ± .42 |
Vaughn (2014,Ithaca)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #223 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=174) = .44 ± .3 |
Kurtz (2014,JMU)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #224 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=113) = -.16 ± .38 |
Cemalcilar (2014,KU)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #225 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=112) = .6 ± .38 |
Packard (2014,Laurier)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #226 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=277) = .52 ± .24 |
Kappes (2014,LSE)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #227 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=146) = .55 ± .33 |
Huntsinger & Mallett (2014,Luc)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #228 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=98) = .63 ± .41 |
Morris (2014,McDaniel)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #229 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=85) = .47 ± .44 |
Furrow & Thompson (2014,MSVU)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #230 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=1000) = .51 ± .13 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014, MTURK)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #231 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=107) = .43 ± .39 |
Smith (2014,OSU)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #232 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=123) = .42 ± .36 |
Levitan (2014,Oxy)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #233 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=1329) = .48 ± .11 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014,PI)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #234 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=95) = .42 ± .41 |
Adams & Nelson (2014,PSU)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #235 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=103) = .61 ± .4 |
Brumbaugh & Storbeck (2014,QCCUNY) Study 1
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #236 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=86) = .58 ± .44 |
Brumbaugh & Storbeck (2014,QCCUNY2) Study 2
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #237 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=162) = .68 ± .32 |
Devos (2014,SDSU)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #238 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=79) = .99 ± .48 |
Bocian & Frankowska (2014,SWPS) Study 1
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #239 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=169) = .31 ± .3 |
Bocian & Frankowska (2014,SWPSON) Study 2
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #240 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=187) = .35 ± .3 |
Davis & Hicks (2014,TAMU) Study 1
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #241 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=87) = .86 ± .45 |
Hunt & Krueger (2014,TAMUC)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #242 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=225) = .37 ± .26 |
Davis & Hicks (2014,TAMUON) Study 2
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #243 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=80) = .84 ± .46 |
Brandt et al. (2014,Tilburg)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #244 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=127) = .67 ± .36 |
Klein et al. (2014,UFL)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #245 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=144) = .72 ± .34 |
Vianello & Galliani (2014,UNIPD)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #246 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=81) = .27 ± .44 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014,UVA)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #247 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=108) = .56 ± .39 |
Hovermale & Joy-Gaba (2014,VCU)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #248 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=96) = .41 ± .41 |
Swol (2014,Wisc)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #249 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=103) = .74 ± .4 |
Wichman (2014,WKU)
|
signal - consistent |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #250 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=90) = .23 ± .42 |
Woodzicka (2014,WL)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #251 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Schwarz, Strack et al. (1985) Study 1
|
d(N=132) = .50 |
d(N=87) = .32 ± .43 |
John & Skorinko (2014,WPI)
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
scale options anchoring effect |
ML1 #252 |
low vs. high category scales |
self-reported TV watching |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=77) = .74 ± .47 |
Bernstein (2014,abington)
|
signal - consistent |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #253 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=113) = .36 ± .38 |
Pilati (2014,brasilia)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #254 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=80) = .82 ± .46 |
Vranka (2014,Charles)
|
signal - consistent |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #255 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=86) = .46 ± .44 |
Nier (2014,Conncoll)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #256 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=88) = .01 ± .42 |
Rutchick (2014,CSUN)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #257 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=97) = .17 ± .4 |
Cheong (2014,Help)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #258 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=88) = .47 ± .43 |
Vaughn (2014,Ithaca)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #259 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=167) = .64 ± .31 |
Kurtz (2014,JMU)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #260 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=105) = .84 ± .4 |
Cemalcilar (2014,KU)
|
signal - consistent |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #261 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=108) = .97 ± .4 |
Packard (2014,Laurier)
|
signal - consistent |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #262 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=267) = .74 ± .25 |
Kappes (2014,LSE)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #263 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=141) = .59 ± .34 |
Huntsinger & Mallett (2014,Luc)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #264 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=91) = .53 ± .42 |
Morris (2014,McDaniel)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #265 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=61) = .28 ± .52 |
Furrow & Thompson (2014,MSVU)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #266 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=894) = .55 ± .14 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014, MTURK)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #267 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=90) = .58 ± .42 |
Smith (2014,OSU)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #268 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=117) = .55 ± .37 |
Levitan (2014,Oxy)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #269 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=1236) = .6 ± .12 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014,PI)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #270 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=89) = .42 ± .42 |
Adams & Nelson (2014,PSU)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #271 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=93) = .25 ± .42 |
Brumbaugh & Storbeck (2014,QCCUNY) Study 1
|
no signal - inconsistent |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #272 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=8) = .7 ± 1.79 |
Brumbaugh & Storbeck (2014,QCCUNY2) Study 2
|
no signal - consistent (imprecise) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #273 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=155) = .39 ± .32 |
Devos (2014,SDSU)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #274 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=76) = .39 ± .46 |
Bocian & Frankowska (2014,SWPS) Study 1
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #275 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=165) = .55 ± .32 |
Bocian & Frankowska (2014,SWPSON) Study 2
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #276 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=179) = .37 ± .3 |
Davis & Hicks (2014,TAMU) Study 1
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #277 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=84) = .51 ± .44 |
Hunt & Krueger (2014,TAMUC)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #278 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=208) = .1 ± .28 |
Davis & Hicks (2014,TAMUON) Study 2
|
no signal - inconsistent |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #279 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=78) = .09 ± .45 |
Brandt et al. (2014,Tilburg)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #280 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=125) = .61 ± .36 |
Klein et al. (2014,UFL)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #281 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=134) = .72 ± .35 |
Vianello & Galliani (2014,UNIPD)
|
signal - consistent |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #282 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=81) = 1.04 ± .47 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014,UVA)
|
signal - consistent |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #283 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=101) = .65 ± .4 |
Hovermale & Joy-Gaba (2014,VCU)
|
signal - consistent |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #284 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=91) = .64 ± .43 |
Swol (2014,Wisc)
|
signal - consistent |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #285 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=95) = .3 ± .41 |
Wichman (2014,WKU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #286 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=90) = .07 ± .42 |
Woodzicka (2014,WL)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #287 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = 1.01 |
d(N=84) = .53 ± .44 |
John & Skorinko (2014,WPI)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
sex difference in implicit math attitudes |
ML1 #288 |
sex (male vs. female) |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=84) = .55 ± .44 |
Bernstein (2014,abington)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #289 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=120) = .53 ± .37 |
Pilati (2014,brasilia)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #290 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=84) = .1 ± .44 |
Vranka (2014,Charles)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #291 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=95) = .86 ± .43 |
Nier (2014,Conncoll)
|
signal - consistent |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #292 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=96) = .56 ± .41 |
Rutchick (2014,CSUN)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #293 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=102) = .59 ± .4 |
Cheong (2014,Help)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #294 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=90) = .72 ± .43 |
Vaughn (2014,Ithaca)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #295 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=174) = .74 ± .31 |
Kurtz (2014,JMU)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #296 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=113) = .56 ± .38 |
Cemalcilar (2014,KU)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #297 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=112) = .82 ± .39 |
Packard (2014,Laurier)
|
signal - consistent |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #298 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=277) = .73 ± .24 |
Kappes (2014,LSE)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #299 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=146) = .72 ± .34 |
Huntsinger & Mallett (2014,Luc)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #300 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=98) = .31 ± .4 |
Morris (2014,McDaniel)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #301 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=85) = .54 ± .44 |
Furrow & Thompson (2014,MSVU)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #302 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=1000) = .62 ± .13 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014, MTURK)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #303 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=107) = .67 ± .39 |
Smith (2014,OSU)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #304 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=123) = .26 ± .36 |
Levitan (2014,Oxy)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #305 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=1329) = .57 ± .11 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014,PI)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #306 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=95) = .63 ± .42 |
Adams & Nelson (2014,PSU)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #307 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=103) = .69 ± .4 |
Brumbaugh & Storbeck (2014,QCCUNY) Study 1
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #308 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=86) = .3 ± .43 |
Brumbaugh & Storbeck (2014,QCCUNY2) Study 2
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #309 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=162) = .42 ± .32 |
Devos (2014,SDSU)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #310 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=79) = .57 ± .46 |
Bocian & Frankowska (2014,SWPS) Study 1
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #311 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=169) = .52 ± .31 |
Bocian & Frankowska (2014,SWPSON) Study 2
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #312 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=187) = .55 ± .3 |
Davis & Hicks (2014,TAMU) Study 1
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #313 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=87) = .48 ± .43 |
Hunt & Krueger (2014,TAMUC)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #314 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=225) = .49 ± .26 |
Davis & Hicks (2014,TAMUON) Study 2
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #315 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=80) = 1.03 ± .47 |
Brandt et al. (2014,Tilburg)
|
signal - consistent |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #316 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=127) = 1.17 ± .38 |
Klein et al. (2014,UFL)
|
signal - consistent |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #317 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=144) = .86 ± .34 |
Vianello & Galliani (2014,UNIPD)
|
signal - consistent |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #318 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=81) = .82 ± .46 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014,UVA)
|
signal - consistent |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #319 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=108) = .32 ± .38 |
Hovermale & Joy-Gaba (2014,VCU)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #320 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=96) = 1.09 ± .44 |
Swol (2014,Wisc)
|
signal - consistent |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #321 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=103) = .7 ± .4 |
Wichman (2014,WKU)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #322 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=90) = .49 ± .43 |
Woodzicka (2014,WL)
|
no signal - inconsistent (imprecise) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #323 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) Study 1
|
d(N=307) = 1.2 |
d(N=87) = .67 ± .44 |
John & Skorinko (2014,WPI)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
gain versus loss framing (unusual disease) |
ML1 #324 |
gain (saved) vs. loss (will die) framing |
% Ps choosing risky choice (binary choice) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=80) = .6 ± .46 |
Bernstein (2014,abington)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #325 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=114) = .36 ± .38 |
Pilati (2014,brasilia)
|
no signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #326 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=72) = .87 ± .49 |
Vranka (2014,Charles)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #327 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=83) = .62 ± .45 |
Nier (2014,Conncoll)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #328 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=92) = .51 ± .42 |
Rutchick (2014,CSUN)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #329 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=96) = .52 ± .41 |
Cheong (2014,Help)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #330 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=85) = .77 ± .44 |
Vaughn (2014,Ithaca)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #331 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=164) = .72 ± .32 |
Kurtz (2014,JMU)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #332 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=104) = .53 ± .4 |
Cemalcilar (2014,KU)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #333 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=106) = .97 ± .4 |
Packard (2014,Laurier)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #334 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=255) = .65 ± .26 |
Kappes (2014,LSE)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #335 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=142) = .53 ± .34 |
Huntsinger & Mallett (2014,Luc)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #336 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=93) = .5 ± .42 |
Morris (2014,McDaniel)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #337 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=73) = .34 ± .47 |
Furrow & Thompson (2014,MSVU)
|
no signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #338 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=981) = .62 ± .13 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014, MTURK)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #339 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=105) = .11 ± .39 |
Smith (2014,OSU)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #340 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=102) = 1.16 ± .43 |
Levitan (2014,Oxy)
|
signal - inconsistent (larger) |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #341 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=1204) = .72 ± .12 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014,PI)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #342 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=93) = .58 ± .42 |
Adams & Nelson (2014,PSU)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #343 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=93) = .42 ± .42 |
Brumbaugh & Storbeck (2014,QCCUNY) Study 1
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #344 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=80) = .34 ± .45 |
Brumbaugh & Storbeck (2014,QCCUNY2) Study 2
|
no signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #345 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=159) = .61 ± .32 |
Devos (2014,SDSU)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #346 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=78) = .12 ± .45 |
Bocian & Frankowska (2014,SWPS) Study 1
|
no signal - inconsistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #347 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=154) = .59 ± .32 |
Bocian & Frankowska (2014,SWPSON) Study 2
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #348 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=178) = .74 ± .31 |
Davis & Hicks (2014,TAMU) Study 1
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #349 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=81) = .74 ± .45 |
Hunt & Krueger (2014,TAMUC)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #350 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=214) = .59 ± .28 |
Davis & Hicks (2014,TAMUON) Study 2
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #351 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=74) = .68 ± .48 |
Brandt et al. (2014,Tilburg)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #352 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=117) = .38 ± .37 |
Klein et al. (2014,UFL)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #353 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=126) = .76 ± .37 |
Vianello & Galliani (2014,UNIPD)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #354 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=77) = 1.12 ± .49 |
Schmidt & Nosek (2014,UVA)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #355 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=106) = .72 ± .4 |
Hovermale & Joy-Gaba (2014,VCU)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #356 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=94) = .79 ± .42 |
Swol (2014,Wisc)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #357 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=97) = .43 ± .41 |
Wichman (2014,WKU)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #358 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=86) = .07 ± .43 |
Woodzicka (2014,WL)
|
no signal - inconsistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #359 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Oppenheimer & Monin (2009) Study 2a
|
d(N=59) = .69 ± .54 |
d(N=84) = .98 ± .46 |
John & Skorinko (2014,WPI)
|
signal - consistent |
retroactive gambler's fallacy effect |
ML1 #360 |
three 6s vs. two 6s & one 3 (rolling dice) |
# of times dice rolled (open-ended) |
very close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = .93 |
d(N=84) = .52 ± .45 |
Bernstein (2014,abington)
|
signal - consistent |
implicit-explicit math attitude correlation |
ML1 #361 |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
explicit math attitudes (composite) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = .93 |
d(N=117) = 1 ± .41 |
Pilati (2014,brasilia)
|
signal - consistent |
implicit-explicit math attitude correlation |
ML1 #362 |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
explicit math attitudes (composite) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = .93 |
d(N=84) = .65 ± .46 |
Vranka (2014,Charles)
|
signal - consistent |
implicit-explicit math attitude correlation |
ML1 #363 |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
explicit math attitudes (composite) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = .93 |
d(N=94) = 1.14 ± .48 |
Nier (2014,Conncoll)
|
signal - consistent |
implicit-explicit math attitude correlation |
ML1 #364 |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
explicit math attitudes (composite) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = .93 |
d(N=95) = .42 ± .42 |
Rutchick (2014,CSUN)
|
signal - inconsistent (smaller) |
implicit-explicit math attitude correlation |
ML1 #365 |
implicit math attitudes (math vs. art IAT) |
explicit math attitudes (composite) |
close |
|
|
|
|
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) Study 2
|
d(N=91) = .93 |
d(N=101) = .63 ± .42 |
Cheong (2014,Help)
|
signal - consistent |