Opinion
HERNAN ORYAN CASTRO, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED
STATES
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under a longstanding practice, a court sometimes treats as a request for habeas relief under 28 U. S. C. §2255 a motion that a pro se federal prisoner has labeled differently. Such recharacterization can have serious consequences for the prisoner, for it subjects any subsequent motion under §2255 to the restrictive conditions that federal law imposes upon a second or successive (but not upon a first) federal habeas motion. §2255, ¶8. In light of these consequences, we hold that the court cannot so recharacterize a pro se litigants motion as the litigants first §2255 motion unless the court informs the litigant of its intent to recharacterize, warns the litigant that the recharacterization will subject subsequent §2255 motions to the laws second or successive restrictions, and provides the litigant with an opportunity to withdraw, or to amend, the filing. Where these things are not done, a recharacterized motion will not count as a §2255 motion for purposes of applying §2255s second or successive provision.
I
This case focuses upon two motions that Hernan ORyan Castro, a federal prisoner acting pro se , filed in federal court. He filed the first motion in 1994, the second in 1997.
A
The relevant facts surrounding the 1994 motion are the following:
(1) On July 5, 1994, Castro filed a pro se motion attacking his federal drug conviction, a motion that he called a Rule 33 motion for a new trial. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 33.
(2) The Government, in its response, said that Castros claims were more properly cognizable as federal habeas corpus claims, i.e. , claims made under the authority of 28 U. S. C. §2255. But, the Government added, it did not object to the courts considering Castros motion as having invoked both Rule 33 and §2255.
(3) The District Court denied Castros motion on the merits. In its accompanying opinion, the court generally referred to Castros motion as a Rule 33 motion; but the court twice referred to it as a §2255 motion as well. App. 137144.
(4) Castro, still acting pro se , appealed, but he did not challenge the District Courts recharacterization of his motion.
(5) The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed. It said in its one-paragraph order that it was ruling on a motion based upon both Rule 33 and §2255. Judgt. order reported at 82 F. 3d 429 (CA11 1996); App. 147.
B
The relevant facts surrounding the 1997 motion are the following:
(1) On April 18, 1997, Castro, acting pro se , filed what he called a §2255 motion. The motion included claims not raised in the 1994 motion, including a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
(2) The District Court denied the motion; Castro appealed; and the Court of Appeals remanded for further consideration of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. It also asked the District Court to consider whether, in light of the 1994 motion, Castros motion was his second §2255 motion, rather than his first.
(3) On remand, the District Court appointed counsel for Castro. It then decided that the 1997 motion was indeed Castros second §2255 motion (the 1994 motion being his first). And it dismissed the motion for failure to comply with one of §2255s restrictive second or successive conditions (namely, Castros failure to obtain the Court of Appeals permission to file a second or successive motion). §2255, ¶8. The District Court granted Castro a certificate to appeal its second or successive determination. §2253(c)(1).
(4) The Eleventh Circuit affirmed by a split (2-to-1) vote. 290 F. 3d 1270 (2002). The majority suggested and urged district courts in the future to warn prisoners of the consequences of recharacterization and provide them with the opportunity to amend or dismiss their filings. Id. , at 1273, 1274. But it held that the 1994 courts failure to do so did not legally undermine its recharacterization. Hence, Castros current §2255 motion was indeed his second habeas motion. Id. , at 1274.
Other Circuits have taken a different approach. E.g. , United States v. Palmer , 296 F. 3d 1135, 11451147 (CADC 2002) (announcing a rule requiring courts to notify pro se litigants prior to recharacterization and refusing to find the §2255 motion before it second or successive since such notice was lacking). We consequently granted Castros petition for certiorari.
II
We begin with a jurisdictional matter. We asked the parties to consider the relevance of a provision in the federal habeas corpus statutes that says that the
grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application … shall not be the subject of a petition for … a writ of certiorari. 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(3)(E).
After receiving the parties responses, we conclude that this provision does not bar our review here.
Castros appeal to the Eleventh Circuit did not concern an authorization . . . to file a second or successive application. The District Court certified for appeal the question whether Castros §2255 motion was his first such motion or his second. Castro then argued to the Eleventh Circuit that his §2255 motion was his first; and he asked the court to reverse the District Courts dismissal of that motion. He nowhere asked the Court of Appeals to grant, and it nowhere denied, any authorization … to file a second or successive application.
The Government argues that the Eleventh Circuits opinion had the effect of denying authorization . . . to file a second . . . application because the court said in its opinion that Castros motion could not meet the requirements for second or successive motions. 290 F. 3d, at 1273. For that reason, the Government concludes, the courts decision falls within the scope of the jurisdictional provision. Brief for United States 16.
In our view, however, this argument stretches the words of the statute too far. Given the context, we cannot take these words in the opinion as a statutorily relevant denial of a request that was not made. Even if, for arguments sake, we were to accept the Governments characterization, the argument nonetheless would founder on the statutes requirement that the denial must be the subject of the certiorari petition. The subject of Castros petition is not the Court of Appeals denial of an authorization. It is the lower courts refusal to recognize that this §2255 motion is his first, not his second. That is a very different question. Cf. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States , 434 U. S. 275, 282283 (1978) (statute barring court review of lawfulness of agency emission standard in criminal case does not bar court review of whether regulation is an emission standard).
Moreover, reading the statute as the Government suggests would produce troublesome results. It would create procedural anomalies, allowing review where the lower court decision disfavors, but denying review where it favors, the Government. Cf. Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal , 523 U. S. 637, 641642 (1998) (allowing the Government to obtain review of a decision that a habeas corpus application is not second or successive). It would close our doors to a class of habeas petitioners seeking review without any clear indication that such was Congress intent. Cf. Felker v. Turpin , 518 U. S. 651, 660661 (1996) . And any such conclusion would prove difficult to reconcile with the basic principle that we read limitations on our jurisdiction to review narrowly. Utah v. Evans , 536 U. S. 452, 463 (2002) .
We conclude that we have the power to review Castros claim, and we turn to the merits of that claim.
III
Federal courts sometimes will ignore the legal label that a pro se litigant attaches to a motion and recharacterize the motion in order to place it within a different legal category. See, e.g. , Raineri v. United States , 233 F. 3d 96, 100 (CA1 2000); United States v. Detrich , 940 F. 2d 37, 38 (CA2 1991); United States v. Miller , 197 F. 3d 644, 648 (CA3 1999); Raines v. United States , 423 F. 2d 526, 528, n. 1 (CA4 1970); United States v. Santora , 711 F. 2d 41, 42 (CA5 1983); United States v. McDowell , 305 F. 2d 12, 14 (CA6 1962); Henderson v. United States , 264 F. 3d 709, 711 (CA7 2001); McIntyre v. United States , 508 F. 2d 403, n. 1 (CA8 1975) (per curiam); United States v. Eatinger , 902 F. 2d 1383, 1385 (CA9 1990) (per curiam); United States v. Kelly , 235 F. 3d 1238, 1242 (CA10 2000); United States v. Jordan , 915 F. 2d 622, 625 (CA11 1990); United States v. Tindle , 522 F. 2d 689, 693 (CADC 1975) (per curiam) . They may do so in order to avoid an unnecessary dismissal, e.g. , id. , at 692693, to avoid inappropriately stringent application of formal labeling requirements, see Haines v. Kerner , 404 U. S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam) , or to create a better correspondence between the substance of a pro se motions claim and its underlying legal basis. See Hughes v. Rowe , 449 U. S. 5, 10 (1980) (per curiam); Andrews v. United States , 373 U. S. 334 (1963) .
We here address one aspect of this practice, namely, certain legal limits that nine Circuits have placed on recharacterization. Those Circuits recognize that, by recharacterizing as a first §2255 motion a pro se litigants filing that did not previously bear that label, the court may make it significantly more difficult for that litigant to file another such motion. They have consequently concluded that a district court may not recharacterize a pro se litigants motion as a request for relief under §2255unless the court first warns the pro se litigant about the consequences of the recharacterization, thereby giving the litigant an opportunity to contest the recharacterization, or to withdraw or amend the motion. See Adams v. United States , 155 F. 3d 582, 583 (CA2 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Miller , supra , at 646647 (CA3); United States v. Emmanuel , 288 F. 3d 644, 646647 (CA4 2002); In re Shelton , 295 F. 3d 620, 622 (CA6 2002) (per curiam); Henderson v. United States , supra , at 710711 (CA7); Morales v. United States , 304 F. 3d 764, 767 (CA8 2002); United States v. Seesing , 234 F. 3d 456, 463 (CA9 2000); United States v. Kelly , supra , at 12401241 (CA10); United States v. Palmer , 296 F. 3d, at 1146 (CADC); see also 290 F. 3d, at 1273, 1274 (case below) ( suggesting that courts provide such warnings).
No one here contests the lawfulness of this judicially created requirement. The Government suggests that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 47 provides adequate underlying legal authority for the procedural practice. Brief for United States 42. It suggests that this Court has the authority to regulate the practice through the exercise of our supervisory powers over the federal judiciary. E.g. , McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 340341 (1943) . And it notes that limiting the courts authority to recharacterize, approximately as the Courts of Appeals have done, is likely to reduce and simplify litigation over questions of characterization, which are often quite difficult. Brief for United States 42.
We agree with these suggestions. We consequently hold, as almost every Court of Appeals has already held, that the lower courts recharacterization powers are limited in the following way:
The limitation applies when a court recharacterizes a pro se litigants motion as a first §2255 motion. In such circumstances the district court must notify the pro se litigant that it intends to recharacterize the pleading, warn the litigant that this recharacterization means that any subsequent §2255 motion will be subject to the restrictions on second or successive motions, and provide the litigant an opportunity to withdraw the motion or to amend it so that it contains all the §2255 claims he believes he has. If the court fails to do so, the motion cannot be considered to have become a §2255 motion for purposes of applying to later motions the laws second or successive restrictions. §2255, ¶8.
IV
The District Court that considered Castros 1994 motion failed to give Castro warnings of the kind we have described. Moreover, this Courts supervisory power determinations normally apply, like other judicial decisions, retroactively, at least to the case in which the determination was made. McNabb, supra , at 347 (applying new supervisory rule to case before the Court). Hence, given our holding in Part III, supra , Castros 1994 motion cannot be considered a first §2255 motion, and his 1997 motion cannot be considered a second or successive motionunless there is something special about Castros case.
The Government argues that there is something special: Castro failed to appeal the 1994 recharacterization. According to the Government, that fact makes the 1994 recharacterization valid as a matter of law of the case. And, since the 1994 recharacterization is valid, the 1997 §2255 motion is Castros second, not his first.
We do not agree. No Circuit that has considered whether to treat a §2255 motion as successive (based on a prior unwarned recharacterization) has found that the litigants failure to challenge that recharacterization makes a difference. See Palmer , supra , at 1147; see also Henderson , supra , at 711712; Raineri , 233 F. 3d, at 100; In re Shelton , supra , at 622. That is not surprising, for the very point of the warning is to help the pro se litigant understand not only (1) whether he should withdraw or amend his motion, but also (2) whether he should contest the recharacterization, say, on appeal. The lack of warning prevents his making an informed judgment in respect to the latter just as it does in respect to the former. Indeed, an unwarned pro se litigants failure to appeal a recharacterization simply underscores the practical importance of providing the warning. Hence, an unwarned recharacterization cannot count as a §2255 motion for purposes of the second or successive provision, whether the unwarned pro se litigant does, or does not, take an appeal.
The law of the case doctrine cannot pose an insurmountable obstacle to our reaching this conclusion. Assuming for arguments sake that the doctrine applies here, it simply expresses common judicial practice; it does not limit the courts power. See Messenger v. Anderson , 225 U. S. 436, 444 (1912) (Holmes, J.). It cannot prohibit a court from disregarding an earlier holding in an appropriate case which, for the reasons set forth, we find this case to be.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Opinion
HERNAN ORYAN CASTRO, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED
STATES
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under a longstanding practice, a court sometimes treats as a request for habeas relief under 28 U. S. C. §2255 a motion that a pro se federal prisoner has labeled differently. Such recharacterization can have serious consequences for the prisoner, for it subjects any subsequent motion under §2255 to the restrictive conditions that federal law imposes upon a second or successive (but not upon a first) federal habeas motion. §2255, ¶8. In light of these consequences, we hold that the court cannot so recharacterize a pro se litigants motion as the litigants first §2255 motion unless the court informs the litigant of its intent to recharacterize, warns the litigant that the recharacterization will subject subsequent §2255 motions to the laws second or successive restrictions, and provides the litigant with an opportunity to withdraw, or to amend, the filing. Where these things are not done, a recharacterized motion will not count as a §2255 motion for purposes of applying §2255s second or successive provision.
I
This case focuses upon two motions that Hernan ORyan Castro, a federal prisoner acting pro se , filed in federal court. He filed the first motion in 1994, the second in 1997.
A
The relevant facts surrounding the 1994 motion are the following:
(1) On July 5, 1994, Castro filed a pro se motion attacking his federal drug conviction, a motion that he called a Rule 33 motion for a new trial. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 33.
(2) The Government, in its response, said that Castros claims were more properly cognizable as federal habeas corpus claims, i.e. , claims made under the authority of 28 U. S. C. §2255. But, the Government added, it did not object to the courts considering Castros motion as having invoked both Rule 33 and §2255.
(3) The District Court denied Castros motion on the merits. In its accompanying opinion, the court generally referred to Castros motion as a Rule 33 motion; but the court twice referred to it as a §2255 motion as well. App. 137144.
(4) Castro, still acting pro se , appealed, but he did not challenge the District Courts recharacterization of his motion.
(5) The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed. It said in its one-paragraph order that it was ruling on a motion based upon both Rule 33 and §2255. Judgt. order reported at 82 F. 3d 429 (CA11 1996); App. 147.
B
The relevant facts surrounding the 1997 motion are the following:
(1) On April 18, 1997, Castro, acting pro se , filed what he called a §2255 motion. The motion included claims not raised in the 1994 motion, including a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
(2) The District Court denied the motion; Castro appealed; and the Court of Appeals remanded for further consideration of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. It also asked the District Court to consider whether, in light of the 1994 motion, Castros motion was his second §2255 motion, rather than his first.
(3) On remand, the District Court appointed counsel for Castro. It then decided that the 1997 motion was indeed Castros second §2255 motion (the 1994 motion being his first). And it dismissed the motion for failure to comply with one of §2255s restrictive second or successive conditions (namely, Castros failure to obtain the Court of Appeals permission to file a second or successive motion). §2255, ¶8. The District Court granted Castro a certificate to appeal its second or successive determination. §2253(c)(1).
(4) The Eleventh Circuit affirmed by a split (2-to-1) vote. 290 F. 3d 1270 (2002). The majority suggested and urged district courts in the future to warn prisoners of the consequences of recharacterization and provide them with the opportunity to amend or dismiss their filings. Id. , at 1273, 1274. But it held that the 1994 courts failure to do so did not legally undermine its recharacterization. Hence, Castros current §2255 motion was indeed his second habeas motion. Id. , at 1274.
Other Circuits have taken a different approach. E.g. , United States v. Palmer , 296 F. 3d 1135, 11451147 (CADC 2002) (announcing a rule requiring courts to notify pro se litigants prior to recharacterization and refusing to find the §2255 motion before it second or successive since such notice was lacking). We consequently granted Castros petition for certiorari.
II
We begin with a jurisdictional matter. We asked the parties to consider the relevance of a provision in the federal habeas corpus statutes that says that the
grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application … shall not be the subject of a petition for … a writ of certiorari. 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(3)(E).
After receiving the parties responses, we conclude that this provision does not bar our review here.
Castros appeal to the Eleventh Circuit did not concern an authorization . . . to file a second or successive application. The District Court certified for appeal the question whether Castros §2255 motion was his first such motion or his second. Castro then argued to the Eleventh Circuit that his §2255 motion was his first; and he asked the court to reverse the District Courts dismissal of that motion. He nowhere asked the Court of Appeals to grant, and it nowhere denied, any authorization … to file a second or successive application.
The Government argues that the Eleventh Circuits opinion had the effect of denying authorization . . . to file a second . . . application because the court said in its opinion that Castros motion could not meet the requirements for second or successive motions. 290 F. 3d, at 1273. For that reason, the Government concludes, the courts decision falls within the scope of the jurisdictional provision. Brief for United States 16.
In our view, however, this argument stretches the words of the statute too far. Given the context, we cannot take these words in the opinion as a statutorily relevant denial of a request that was not made. Even if, for arguments sake, we were to accept the Governments characterization, the argument nonetheless would founder on the statutes requirement that the denial must be the subject of the certiorari petition. The subject of Castros petition is not the Court of Appeals denial of an authorization. It is the lower courts refusal to recognize that this §2255 motion is his first, not his second. That is a very different question. Cf. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States , 434 U. S. 275, 282283 (1978) (statute barring court review of lawfulness of agency emission standard in criminal case does not bar court review of whether regulation is an emission standard).
Moreover, reading the statute as the Government suggests would produce troublesome results. It would create procedural anomalies, allowing review where the lower court decision disfavors, but denying review where it favors, the Government. Cf. Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal , 523 U. S. 637, 641642 (1998) (allowing the Government to obtain review of a decision that a habeas corpus application is not second or successive). It would close our doors to a class of habeas petitioners seeking review without any clear indication that such was Congress intent. Cf. Felker v. Turpin , 518 U. S. 651, 660661 (1996) . And any such conclusion would prove difficult to reconcile with the basic principle that we read limitations on our jurisdiction to review narrowly. Utah v. Evans , 536 U. S. 452, 463 (2002) .
We conclude that we have the power to review Castros claim, and we turn to the merits of that claim.
III
Federal courts sometimes will ignore the legal label that a pro se litigant attaches to a motion and recharacterize the motion in order to place it within a different legal category. See, e.g. , Raineri v. United States , 233 F. 3d 96, 100 (CA1 2000); United States v. Detrich , 940 F. 2d 37, 38 (CA2 1991); United States v. Miller , 197 F. 3d 644, 648 (CA3 1999); Raines v. United States , 423 F. 2d 526, 528, n. 1 (CA4 1970); United States v. Santora , 711 F. 2d 41, 42 (CA5 1983); United States v. McDowell , 305 F. 2d 12, 14 (CA6 1962); Henderson v. United States , 264 F. 3d 709, 711 (CA7 2001); McIntyre v. United States , 508 F. 2d 403, n. 1 (CA8 1975) (per curiam); United States v. Eatinger , 902 F. 2d 1383, 1385 (CA9 1990) (per curiam); United States v. Kelly , 235 F. 3d 1238, 1242 (CA10 2000); United States v. Jordan , 915 F. 2d 622, 625 (CA11 1990); United States v. Tindle , 522 F. 2d 689, 693 (CADC 1975) (per curiam) . They may do so in order to avoid an unnecessary dismissal, e.g. , id. , at 692693, to avoid inappropriately stringent application of formal labeling requirements, see Haines v. Kerner , 404 U. S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam) , or to create a better correspondence between the substance of a pro se motions claim and its underlying legal basis. See Hughes v. Rowe , 449 U. S. 5, 10 (1980) (per curiam); Andrews v. United States , 373 U. S. 334 (1963) .
We here address one aspect of this practice, namely, certain legal limits that nine Circuits have placed on recharacterization. Those Circuits recognize that, by recharacterizing as a first §2255 motion a pro se litigants filing that did not previously bear that label, the court may make it significantly more difficult for that litigant to file another such motion. They have consequently concluded that a district court may not recharacterize a pro se litigants motion as a request for relief under §2255unless the court first warns the pro se litigant about the consequences of the recharacterization, thereby giving the litigant an opportunity to contest the recharacterization, or to withdraw or amend the motion. See Adams v. United States , 155 F. 3d 582, 583 (CA2 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Miller , supra , at 646647 (CA3); United States v. Emmanuel , 288 F. 3d 644, 646647 (CA4 2002); In re Shelton , 295 F. 3d 620, 622 (CA6 2002) (per curiam); Henderson v. United States , supra , at 710711 (CA7); Morales v. United States , 304 F. 3d 764, 767 (CA8 2002); United States v. Seesing , 234 F. 3d 456, 463 (CA9 2000); United States v. Kelly , supra , at 12401241 (CA10); United States v. Palmer , 296 F. 3d, at 1146 (CADC); see also 290 F. 3d, at 1273, 1274 (case below) ( suggesting that courts provide such warnings).
No one here contests the lawfulness of this judicially created requirement. The Government suggests that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 47 provides adequate underlying legal authority for the procedural practice. Brief for United States 42. It suggests that this Court has the authority to regulate the practice through the exercise of our supervisory powers over the federal judiciary. E.g. , McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 340341 (1943) . And it notes that limiting the courts authority to recharacterize, approximately as the Courts of Appeals have done, is likely to reduce and simplify litigation over questions of characterization, which are often quite difficult. Brief for United States 42.
We agree with these suggestions. We consequently hold, as almost every Court of Appeals has already held, that the lower courts recharacterization powers are limited in the following way:
The limitation applies when a court recharacterizes a pro se litigants motion as a first §2255 motion. In such circumstances the district court must notify the pro se litigant that it intends to recharacterize the pleading, warn the litigant that this recharacterization means that any subsequent §2255 motion will be subject to the restrictions on second or successive motions, and provide the litigant an opportunity to withdraw the motion or to amend it so that it contains all the §2255 claims he believes he has. If the court fails to do so, the motion cannot be considered to have become a §2255 motion for purposes of applying to later motions the laws second or successive restrictions. §2255, ¶8.
IV
The District Court that considered Castros 1994 motion failed to give Castro warnings of the kind we have described. Moreover, this Courts supervisory power determinations normally apply, like other judicial decisions, retroactively, at least to the case in which the determination was made. McNabb, supra , at 347 (applying new supervisory rule to case before the Court). Hence, given our holding in Part III, supra , Castros 1994 motion cannot be considered a first §2255 motion, and his 1997 motion cannot be considered a second or successive motionunless there is something special about Castros case.
The Government argues that there is something special: Castro failed to appeal the 1994 recharacterization. According to the Government, that fact makes the 1994 recharacterization valid as a matter of law of the case. And, since the 1994 recharacterization is valid, the 1997 §2255 motion is Castros second, not his first.
We do not agree. No Circuit that has considered whether to treat a §2255 motion as successive (based on a prior unwarned recharacterization) has found that the litigants failure to challenge that recharacterization makes a difference. See Palmer , supra , at 1147; see also Henderson , supra , at 711712; Raineri , 233 F. 3d, at 100; In re Shelton , supra , at 622. That is not surprising, for the very point of the warning is to help the pro se litigant understand not only (1) whether he should withdraw or amend his motion, but also (2) whether he should contest the recharacterization, say, on appeal. The lack of warning prevents his making an informed judgment in respect to the latter just as it does in respect to the former. Indeed, an unwarned pro se litigants failure to appeal a recharacterization simply underscores the practical importance of providing the warning. Hence, an unwarned recharacterization cannot count as a §2255 motion for purposes of the second or successive provision, whether the unwarned pro se litigant does, or does not, take an appeal.
The law of the case doctrine cannot pose an insurmountable obstacle to our reaching this conclusion. Assuming for arguments sake that the doctrine applies here, it simply expresses common judicial practice; it does not limit the courts power. See Messenger v. Anderson , 225 U. S. 436, 444 (1912) (Holmes, J.). It cannot prohibit a court from disregarding an earlier holding in an appropriate case which, for the reasons set forth, we find this case to be.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Opinion
HERNAN ORYAN CASTRO, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED
STATES
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under a longstanding practice, a court sometimes treats as a request for habeas relief under 28 U. S. C. §2255 a motion that a pro se federal prisoner has labeled differently. Such recharacterization can have serious consequences for the prisoner, for it subjects any subsequent motion under §2255 to the restrictive conditions that federal law imposes upon a second or successive (but not upon a first) federal habeas motion. §2255, ¶8. In light of these consequences, we hold that the court cannot so recharacterize a pro se litigants motion as the litigants first §2255 motion unless the court informs the litigant of its intent to recharacterize, warns the litigant that the recharacterization will subject subsequent §2255 motions to the laws second or successive restrictions, and provides the litigant with an opportunity to withdraw, or to amend, the filing. Where these things are not done, a recharacterized motion will not count as a §2255 motion for purposes of applying §2255s second or successive provision.
I
This case focuses upon two motions that Hernan ORyan Castro, a federal prisoner acting pro se , filed in federal court. He filed the first motion in 1994, the second in 1997.
A
The relevant facts surrounding the 1994 motion are the following:
(1) On July 5, 1994, Castro filed a pro se motion attacking his federal drug conviction, a motion that he called a Rule 33 motion for a new trial. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 33.
(2) The Government, in its response, said that Castros claims were more properly cognizable as federal habeas corpus claims, i.e. , claims made under the authority of 28 U. S. C. §2255. But, the Government added, it did not object to the courts considering Castros motion as having invoked both Rule 33 and §2255.
(3) The District Court denied Castros motion on the merits. In its accompanying opinion, the court generally referred to Castros motion as a Rule 33 motion; but the court twice referred to it as a §2255 motion as well. App. 137144.
(4) Castro, still acting pro se , appealed, but he did not challenge the District Courts recharacterization of his motion.
(5) The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed. It said in its one-paragraph order that it was ruling on a motion based upon both Rule 33 and §2255. Judgt. order reported at 82 F. 3d 429 (CA11 1996); App. 147.
B
The relevant facts surrounding the 1997 motion are the following:
(1) On April 18, 1997, Castro, acting pro se , filed what he called a §2255 motion. The motion included claims not raised in the 1994 motion, including a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
(2) The District Court denied the motion; Castro appealed; and the Court of Appeals remanded for further consideration of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. It also asked the District Court to consider whether, in light of the 1994 motion, Castros motion was his second §2255 motion, rather than his first.
(3) On remand, the District Court appointed counsel for Castro. It then decided that the 1997 motion was indeed Castros second §2255 motion (the 1994 motion being his first). And it dismissed the motion for failure to comply with one of §2255s restrictive second or successive conditions (namely, Castros failure to obtain the Court of Appeals permission to file a second or successive motion). §2255, ¶8. The District Court granted Castro a certificate to appeal its second or successive determination. §2253(c)(1).
(4) The Eleventh Circuit affirmed by a split (2-to-1) vote. 290 F. 3d 1270 (2002). The majority suggested and urged district courts in the future to warn prisoners of the consequences of recharacterization and provide them with the opportunity to amend or dismiss their filings. Id. , at 1273, 1274. But it held that the 1994 courts failure to do so did not legally undermine its recharacterization. Hence, Castros current §2255 motion was indeed his second habeas motion. Id. , at 1274.
Other Circuits have taken a different approach. E.g. , United States v. Palmer , 296 F. 3d 1135, 11451147 (CADC 2002) (announcing a rule requiring courts to notify pro se litigants prior to recharacterization and refusing to find the §2255 motion before it second or successive since such notice was lacking). We consequently granted Castros petition for certiorari.
II
We begin with a jurisdictional matter. We asked the parties to consider the relevance of a provision in the federal habeas corpus statutes that says that the
grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application … shall not be the subject of a petition for … a writ of certiorari. 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(3)(E).
After receiving the parties responses, we conclude that this provision does not bar our review here.
Castros appeal to the Eleventh Circuit did not concern an authorization . . . to file a second or successive application. The District Court certified for appeal the question whether Castros §2255 motion was his first such motion or his second. Castro then argued to the Eleventh Circuit that his §2255 motion was his first; and he asked the court to reverse the District Courts dismissal of that motion. He nowhere asked the Court of Appeals to grant, and it nowhere denied, any authorization … to file a second or successive application.
The Government argues that the Eleventh Circuits opinion had the effect of denying authorization . . . to file a second . . . application because the court said in its opinion that Castros motion could not meet the requirements for second or successive motions. 290 F. 3d, at 1273. For that reason, the Government concludes, the courts decision falls within the scope of the jurisdictional provision. Brief for United States 16.
In our view, however, this argument stretches the words of the statute too far. Given the context, we cannot take these words in the opinion as a statutorily relevant denial of a request that was not made. Even if, for arguments sake, we were to accept the Governments characterization, the argument nonetheless would founder on the statutes requirement that the denial must be the subject of the certiorari petition. The subject of Castros petition is not the Court of Appeals denial of an authorization. It is the lower courts refusal to recognize that this §2255 motion is his first, not his second. That is a very different question. Cf. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States , 434 U. S. 275, 282283 (1978) (statute barring court review of lawfulness of agency emission standard in criminal case does not bar court review of whether regulation is an emission standard).
Moreover, reading the statute as the Government suggests would produce troublesome results. It would create procedural anomalies, allowing review where the lower court decision disfavors, but denying review where it favors, the Government. Cf. Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal , 523 U. S. 637, 641642 (1998) (allowing the Government to obtain review of a decision that a habeas corpus application is not second or successive). It would close our doors to a class of habeas petitioners seeking review without any clear indication that such was Congress intent. Cf. Felker v. Turpin , 518 U. S. 651, 660661 (1996) . And any such conclusion would prove difficult to reconcile with the basic principle that we read limitations on our jurisdiction to review narrowly. Utah v. Evans , 536 U. S. 452, 463 (2002) .
We conclude that we have the power to review Castros claim, and we turn to the merits of that claim.
III
Federal courts sometimes will ignore the legal label that a pro se litigant attaches to a motion and recharacterize the motion in order to place it within a different legal category. See, e.g. , Raineri v. United States , 233 F. 3d 96, 100 (CA1 2000); United States v. Detrich , 940 F. 2d 37, 38 (CA2 1991); United States v. Miller , 197 F. 3d 644, 648 (CA3 1999); Raines v. United States , 423 F. 2d 526, 528, n. 1 (CA4 1970); United States v. Santora , 711 F. 2d 41, 42 (CA5 1983); United States v. McDowell , 305 F. 2d 12, 14 (CA6 1962); Henderson v. United States , 264 F. 3d 709, 711 (CA7 2001); McIntyre v. United States , 508 F. 2d 403, n. 1 (CA8 1975) (per curiam); United States v. Eatinger , 902 F. 2d 1383, 1385 (CA9 1990) (per curiam); United States v. Kelly , 235 F. 3d 1238, 1242 (CA10 2000); United States v. Jordan , 915 F. 2d 622, 625 (CA11 1990); United States v. Tindle , 522 F. 2d 689, 693 (CADC 1975) (per curiam) . They may do so in order to avoid an unnecessary dismissal, e.g. , id. , at 692693, to avoid inappropriately stringent application of formal labeling requirements, see Haines v. Kerner , 404 U. S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam) , or to create a better correspondence between the substance of a pro se motions claim and its underlying legal basis. See Hughes v. Rowe , 449 U. S. 5, 10 (1980) (per curiam); Andrews v. United States , 373 U. S. 334 (1963) .
We here address one aspect of this practice, namely, certain legal limits that nine Circuits have placed on recharacterization. Those Circuits recognize that, by recharacterizing as a first §2255 motion a pro se litigants filing that did not previously bear that label, the court may make it significantly more difficult for that litigant to file another such motion. They have consequently concluded that a district court may not recharacterize a pro se litigants motion as a request for relief under §2255unless the court first warns the pro se litigant about the consequences of the recharacterization, thereby giving the litigant an opportunity to contest the recharacterization, or to withdraw or amend the motion. See Adams v. United States , 155 F. 3d 582, 583 (CA2 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Miller , supra , at 646647 (CA3); United States v. Emmanuel , 288 F. 3d 644, 646647 (CA4 2002); In re Shelton , 295 F. 3d 620, 622 (CA6 2002) (per curiam); Henderson v. United States , supra , at 710711 (CA7); Morales v. United States , 304 F. 3d 764, 767 (CA8 2002); United States v. Seesing , 234 F. 3d 456, 463 (CA9 2000); United States v. Kelly , supra , at 12401241 (CA10); United States v. Palmer , 296 F. 3d, at 1146 (CADC); see also 290 F. 3d, at 1273, 1274 (case below) ( suggesting that courts provide such warnings).
No one here contests the lawfulness of this judicially created requirement. The Government suggests that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 47 provides adequate underlying legal authority for the procedural practice. Brief for United States 42. It suggests that this Court has the authority to regulate the practice through the exercise of our supervisory powers over the federal judiciary. E.g. , McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 340341 (1943) . And it notes that limiting the courts authority to recharacterize, approximately as the Courts of Appeals have done, is likely to reduce and simplify litigation over questions of characterization, which are often quite difficult. Brief for United States 42.
We agree with these suggestions. We consequently hold, as almost every Court of Appeals has already held, that the lower courts recharacterization powers are limited in the following way:
The limitation applies when a court recharacterizes a pro se litigants motion as a first §2255 motion. In such circumstances the district court must notify the pro se litigant that it intends to recharacterize the pleading, warn the litigant that this recharacterization means that any subsequent §2255 motion will be subject to the restrictions on second or successive motions, and provide the litigant an opportunity to withdraw the motion or to amend it so that it contains all the §2255 claims he believes he has. If the court fails to do so, the motion cannot be considered to have become a §2255 motion for purposes of applying to later motions the laws second or successive restrictions. §2255, ¶8.
IV
The District Court that considered Castros 1994 motion failed to give Castro warnings of the kind we have described. Moreover, this Courts supervisory power determinations normally apply, like other judicial decisions, retroactively, at least to the case in which the determination was made. McNabb, supra , at 347 (applying new supervisory rule to case before the Court). Hence, given our holding in Part III, supra , Castros 1994 motion cannot be considered a first §2255 motion, and his 1997 motion cannot be considered a second or successive motionunless there is something special about Castros case.
The Government argues that there is something special: Castro failed to appeal the 1994 recharacterization. According to the Government, that fact makes the 1994 recharacterization valid as a matter of law of the case. And, since the 1994 recharacterization is valid, the 1997 §2255 motion is Castros second, not his first.
We do not agree. No Circuit that has considered whether to treat a §2255 motion as successive (based on a prior unwarned recharacterization) has found that the litigants failure to challenge that recharacterization makes a difference. See Palmer , supra , at 1147; see also Henderson , supra , at 711712; Raineri , 233 F. 3d, at 100; In re Shelton , supra , at 622. That is not surprising, for the very point of the warning is to help the pro se litigant understand not only (1) whether he should withdraw or amend his motion, but also (2) whether he should contest the recharacterization, say, on appeal. The lack of warning prevents his making an informed judgment in respect to the latter just as it does in respect to the former. Indeed, an unwarned pro se litigants failure to appeal a recharacterization simply underscores the practical importance of providing the warning. Hence, an unwarned recharacterization cannot count as a §2255 motion for purposes of the second or successive provision, whether the unwarned pro se litigant does, or does not, take an appeal.
The law of the case doctrine cannot pose an insurmountable obstacle to our reaching this conclusion. Assuming for arguments sake that the doctrine applies here, it simply expresses common judicial practice; it does not limit the courts power. See Messenger v. Anderson , 225 U. S. 436, 444 (1912) (Holmes, J.). It cannot prohibit a court from disregarding an earlier holding in an appropriate case which, for the reasons set forth, we find this case to be.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Opinion
HERNAN ORYAN CASTRO, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED
STATES
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under a longstanding practice, a court sometimes treats as a request for habeas relief under 28 U. S. C. §2255 a motion that a pro se federal prisoner has labeled differently. Such recharacterization can have serious consequences for the prisoner, for it subjects any subsequent motion under §2255 to the restrictive conditions that federal law imposes upon a second or successive (but not upon a first) federal habeas motion. §2255, ¶8. In light of these consequences, we hold that the court cannot so recharacterize a pro se litigants motion as the litigants first §2255 motion unless the court informs the litigant of its intent to recharacterize, warns the litigant that the recharacterization will subject subsequent §2255 motions to the laws second or successive restrictions, and provides the litigant with an opportunity to withdraw, or to amend, the filing. Where these things are not done, a recharacterized motion will not count as a §2255 motion for purposes of applying §2255s second or successive provision.
I
This case focuses upon two motions that Hernan ORyan Castro, a federal prisoner acting pro se , filed in federal court. He filed the first motion in 1994, the second in 1997.
A
The relevant facts surrounding the 1994 motion are the following:
(1) On July 5, 1994, Castro filed a pro se motion attacking his federal drug conviction, a motion that he called a Rule 33 motion for a new trial. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 33.
(2) The Government, in its response, said that Castros claims were more properly cognizable as federal habeas corpus claims, i.e. , claims made under the authority of 28 U. S. C. §2255. But, the Government added, it did not object to the courts considering Castros motion as having invoked both Rule 33 and §2255.
(3) The District Court denied Castros motion on the merits. In its accompanying opinion, the court generally referred to Castros motion as a Rule 33 motion; but the court twice referred to it as a §2255 motion as well. App. 137144.
(4) Castro, still acting pro se , appealed, but he did not challenge the District Courts recharacterization of his motion.
(5) The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed. It said in its one-paragraph order that it was ruling on a motion based upon both Rule 33 and §2255. Judgt. order reported at 82 F. 3d 429 (CA11 1996); App. 147.
B
The relevant facts surrounding the 1997 motion are the following:
(1) On April 18, 1997, Castro, acting pro se , filed what he called a §2255 motion. The motion included claims not raised in the 1994 motion, including a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
(2) The District Court denied the motion; Castro appealed; and the Court of Appeals remanded for further consideration of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. It also asked the District Court to consider whether, in light of the 1994 motion, Castros motion was his second §2255 motion, rather than his first.
(3) On remand, the District Court appointed counsel for Castro. It then decided that the 1997 motion was indeed Castros second §2255 motion (the 1994 motion being his first). And it dismissed the motion for failure to comply with one of §2255s restrictive second or successive conditions (namely, Castros failure to obtain the Court of Appeals permission to file a second or successive motion). §2255, ¶8. The District Court granted Castro a certificate to appeal its second or successive determination. §2253(c)(1).
(4) The Eleventh Circuit affirmed by a split (2-to-1) vote. 290 F. 3d 1270 (2002). The majority suggested and urged district courts in the future to warn prisoners of the consequences of recharacterization and provide them with the opportunity to amend or dismiss their filings. Id. , at 1273, 1274. But it held that the 1994 courts failure to do so did not legally undermine its recharacterization. Hence, Castros current §2255 motion was indeed his second habeas motion. Id. , at 1274.
Other Circuits have taken a different approach. E.g. , United States v. Palmer , 296 F. 3d 1135, 11451147 (CADC 2002) (announcing a rule requiring courts to notify pro se litigants prior to recharacterization and refusing to find the §2255 motion before it second or successive since such notice was lacking). We consequently granted Castros petition for certiorari.
II
We begin with a jurisdictional matter. We asked the parties to consider the relevance of a provision in the federal habeas corpus statutes that says that the
grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application … shall not be the subject of a petition for … a writ of certiorari. 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(3)(E).
After receiving the parties responses, we conclude that this provision does not bar our review here.
Castros appeal to the Eleventh Circuit did not concern an authorization . . . to file a second or successive application. The District Court certified for appeal the question whether Castros §2255 motion was his first such motion or his second. Castro then argued to the Eleventh Circuit that his §2255 motion was his first; and he asked the court to reverse the District Courts dismissal of that motion. He nowhere asked the Court of Appeals to grant, and it nowhere denied, any authorization … to file a second or successive application.
The Government argues that the Eleventh Circuits opinion had the effect of denying authorization . . . to file a second . . . application because the court said in its opinion that Castros motion could not meet the requirements for second or successive motions. 290 F. 3d, at 1273. For that reason, the Government concludes, the courts decision falls within the scope of the jurisdictional provision. Brief for United States 16.
In our view, however, this argument stretches the words of the statute too far. Given the context, we cannot take these words in the opinion as a statutorily relevant denial of a request that was not made. Even if, for arguments sake, we were to accept the Governments characterization, the argument nonetheless would founder on the statutes requirement that the denial must be the subject of the certiorari petition. The subject of Castros petition is not the Court of Appeals denial of an authorization. It is the lower courts refusal to recognize that this §2255 motion is his first, not his second. That is a very different question. Cf. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States , 434 U. S. 275, 282283 (1978) (statute barring court review of lawfulness of agency emission standard in criminal case does not bar court review of whether regulation is an emission standard).
Moreover, reading the statute as the Government suggests would produce troublesome results. It would create procedural anomalies, allowing review where the lower court decision disfavors, but denying review where it favors, the Government. Cf. Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal , 523 U. S. 637, 641642 (1998) (allowing the Government to obtain review of a decision that a habeas corpus application is not second or successive). It would close our doors to a class of habeas petitioners seeking review without any clear indication that such was Congress intent. Cf. Felker v. Turpin , 518 U. S. 651, 660661 (1996) . And any such conclusion would prove difficult to reconcile with the basic principle that we read limitations on our jurisdiction to review narrowly. Utah v. Evans , 536 U. S. 452, 463 (2002) .
We conclude that we have the power to review Castros claim, and we turn to the merits of that claim.
III
Federal courts sometimes will ignore the legal label that a pro se litigant attaches to a motion and recharacterize the motion in order to place it within a different legal category. See, e.g. , Raineri v. United States , 233 F. 3d 96, 100 (CA1 2000); United States v. Detrich , 940 F. 2d 37, 38 (CA2 1991); United States v. Miller , 197 F. 3d 644, 648 (CA3 1999); Raines v. United States , 423 F. 2d 526, 528, n. 1 (CA4 1970); United States v. Santora , 711 F. 2d 41, 42 (CA5 1983); United States v. McDowell , 305 F. 2d 12, 14 (CA6 1962); Henderson v. United States , 264 F. 3d 709, 711 (CA7 2001); McIntyre v. United States , 508 F. 2d 403, n. 1 (CA8 1975) (per curiam); United States v. Eatinger , 902 F. 2d 1383, 1385 (CA9 1990) (per curiam); United States v. Kelly , 235 F. 3d 1238, 1242 (CA10 2000); United States v. Jordan , 915 F. 2d 622, 625 (CA11 1990); United States v. Tindle , 522 F. 2d 689, 693 (CADC 1975) (per curiam) . They may do so in order to avoid an unnecessary dismissal, e.g. , id. , at 692693, to avoid inappropriately stringent application of formal labeling requirements, see Haines v. Kerner , 404 U. S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam) , or to create a better correspondence between the substance of a pro se motions claim and its underlying legal basis. See Hughes v. Rowe , 449 U. S. 5, 10 (1980) (per curiam); Andrews v. United States , 373 U. S. 334 (1963) .
We here address one aspect of this practice, namely, certain legal limits that nine Circuits have placed on recharacterization. Those Circuits recognize that, by recharacterizing as a first §2255 motion a pro se litigants filing that did not previously bear that label, the court may make it significantly more difficult for that litigant to file another such motion. They have consequently concluded that a district court may not recharacterize a pro se litigants motion as a request for relief under §2255unless the court first warns the pro se litigant about the consequences of the recharacterization, thereby giving the litigant an opportunity to contest the recharacterization, or to withdraw or amend the motion. See Adams v. United States , 155 F. 3d 582, 583 (CA2 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Miller , supra , at 646647 (CA3); United States v. Emmanuel , 288 F. 3d 644, 646647 (CA4 2002); In re Shelton , 295 F. 3d 620, 622 (CA6 2002) (per curiam); Henderson v. United States , supra , at 710711 (CA7); Morales v. United States , 304 F. 3d 764, 767 (CA8 2002); United States v. Seesing , 234 F. 3d 456, 463 (CA9 2000); United States v. Kelly , supra , at 12401241 (CA10); United States v. Palmer , 296 F. 3d, at 1146 (CADC); see also 290 F. 3d, at 1273, 1274 (case below) ( suggesting that courts provide such warnings).
No one here contests the lawfulness of this judicially created requirement. The Government suggests that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 47 provides adequate underlying legal authority for the procedural practice. Brief for United States 42. It suggests that this Court has the authority to regulate the practice through the exercise of our supervisory powers over the federal judiciary. E.g. , McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 340341 (1943) . And it notes that limiting the courts authority to recharacterize, approximately as the Courts of Appeals have done, is likely to reduce and simplify litigation over questions of characterization, which are often quite difficult. Brief for United States 42.
We agree with these suggestions. We consequently hold, as almost every Court of Appeals has already held, that the lower courts recharacterization powers are limited in the following way:
The limitation applies when a court recharacterizes a pro se litigants motion as a first §2255 motion. In such circumstances the district court must notify the pro se litigant that it intends to recharacterize the pleading, warn the litigant that this recharacterization means that any subsequent §2255 motion will be subject to the restrictions on second or successive motions, and provide the litigant an opportunity to withdraw the motion or to amend it so that it contains all the §2255 claims he believes he has. If the court fails to do so, the motion cannot be considered to have become a §2255 motion for purposes of applying to later motions the laws second or successive restrictions. §2255, ¶8.
IV
The District Court that considered Castros 1994 motion failed to give Castro warnings of the kind we have described. Moreover, this Courts supervisory power determinations normally apply, like other judicial decisions, retroactively, at least to the case in which the determination was made. McNabb, supra , at 347 (applying new supervisory rule to case before the Court). Hence, given our holding in Part III, supra , Castros 1994 motion cannot be considered a first §2255 motion, and his 1997 motion cannot be considered a second or successive motionunless there is something special about Castros case.
The Government argues that there is something special: Castro failed to appeal the 1994 recharacterization. According to the Government, that fact makes the 1994 recharacterization valid as a matter of law of the case. And, since the 1994 recharacterization is valid, the 1997 §2255 motion is Castros second, not his first.
We do not agree. No Circuit that has considered whether to treat a §2255 motion as successive (based on a prior unwarned recharacterization) has found that the litigants failure to challenge that recharacterization makes a difference. See Palmer , supra , at 1147; see also Henderson , supra , at 711712; Raineri , 233 F. 3d, at 100; In re Shelton , supra , at 622. That is not surprising, for the very point of the warning is to help the pro se litigant understand not only (1) whether he should withdraw or amend his motion, but also (2) whether he should contest the recharacterization, say, on appeal. The lack of warning prevents his making an informed judgment in respect to the latter just as it does in respect to the former. Indeed, an unwarned pro se litigants failure to appeal a recharacterization simply underscores the practical importance of providing the warning. Hence, an unwarned recharacterization cannot count as a §2255 motion for purposes of the second or successive provision, whether the unwarned pro se litigant does, or does not, take an appeal.
The law of the case doctrine cannot pose an insurmountable obstacle to our reaching this conclusion. Assuming for arguments sake that the doctrine applies here, it simply expresses common judicial practice; it does not limit the courts power. See Messenger v. Anderson , 225 U. S. 436, 444 (1912) (Holmes, J.). It cannot prohibit a court from disregarding an earlier holding in an appropriate case which, for the reasons set forth, we find this case to be.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Opinion
HERNAN ORYAN CASTRO, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED
STATES
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under a longstanding practice, a court sometimes treats as a request for habeas relief under 28 U. S. C. §2255 a motion that a pro se federal prisoner has labeled differently. Such recharacterization can have serious consequences for the prisoner, for it subjects any subsequent motion under §2255 to the restrictive conditions that federal law imposes upon a second or successive (but not upon a first) federal habeas motion. §2255, ¶8. In light of these consequences, we hold that the court cannot so recharacterize a pro se litigants motion as the litigants first §2255 motion unless the court informs the litigant of its intent to recharacterize, warns the litigant that the recharacterization will subject subsequent §2255 motions to the laws second or successive restrictions, and provides the litigant with an opportunity to withdraw, or to amend, the filing. Where these things are not done, a recharacterized motion will not count as a §2255 motion for purposes of applying §2255s second or successive provision.
I
This case focuses upon two motions that Hernan ORyan Castro, a federal prisoner acting pro se , filed in federal court. He filed the first motion in 1994, the second in 1997.
A
The relevant facts surrounding the 1994 motion are the following:
(1) On July 5, 1994, Castro filed a pro se motion attacking his federal drug conviction, a motion that he called a Rule 33 motion for a new trial. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 33.
(2) The Government, in its response, said that Castros claims were more properly cognizable as federal habeas corpus claims, i.e. , claims made under the authority of 28 U. S. C. §2255. But, the Government added, it did not object to the courts considering Castros motion as having invoked both Rule 33 and §2255.
(3) The District Court denied Castros motion on the merits. In its accompanying opinion, the court generally referred to Castros motion as a Rule 33 motion; but the court twice referred to it as a §2255 motion as well. App. 137144.
(4) Castro, still acting pro se , appealed, but he did not challenge the District Courts recharacterization of his motion.
(5) The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed. It said in its one-paragraph order that it was ruling on a motion based upon both Rule 33 and §2255. Judgt. order reported at 82 F. 3d 429 (CA11 1996); App. 147.
B
The relevant facts surrounding the 1997 motion are the following:
(1) On April 18, 1997, Castro, acting pro se , filed what he called a §2255 motion. The motion included claims not raised in the 1994 motion, including a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
(2) The District Court denied the motion; Castro appealed; and the Court of Appeals remanded for further consideration of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. It also asked the District Court to consider whether, in light of the 1994 motion, Castros motion was his second §2255 motion, rather than his first.
(3) On remand, the District Court appointed counsel for Castro. It then decided that the 1997 motion was indeed Castros second §2255 motion (the 1994 motion being his first). And it dismissed the motion for failure to comply with one of §2255s restrictive second or successive conditions (namely, Castros failure to obtain the Court of Appeals permission to file a second or successive motion). §2255, ¶8. The District Court granted Castro a certificate to appeal its second or successive determination. §2253(c)(1).
(4) The Eleventh Circuit affirmed by a split (2-to-1) vote. 290 F. 3d 1270 (2002). The majority suggested and urged district courts in the future to warn prisoners of the consequences of recharacterization and provide them with the opportunity to amend or dismiss their filings. Id. , at 1273, 1274. But it held that the 1994 courts failure to do so did not legally undermine its recharacterization. Hence, Castros current §2255 motion was indeed his second habeas motion. Id. , at 1274.
Other Circuits have taken a different approach. E.g. , United States v. Palmer , 296 F. 3d 1135, 11451147 (CADC 2002) (announcing a rule requiring courts to notify pro se litigants prior to recharacterization and refusing to find the §2255 motion before it second or successive since such notice was lacking). We consequently granted Castros petition for certiorari.
II
We begin with a jurisdictional matter. We asked the parties to consider the relevance of a provision in the federal habeas corpus statutes that says that the
grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application … shall not be the subject of a petition for … a writ of certiorari. 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(3)(E).
After receiving the parties responses, we conclude that this provision does not bar our review here.
Castros appeal to the Eleventh Circuit did not concern an authorization . . . to file a second or successive application. The District Court certified for appeal the question whether Castros §2255 motion was his first such motion or his second. Castro then argued to the Eleventh Circuit that his §2255 motion was his first; and he asked the court to reverse the District Courts dismissal of that motion. He nowhere asked the Court of Appeals to grant, and it nowhere denied, any authorization … to file a second or successive application.
The Government argues that the Eleventh Circuits opinion had the effect of denying authorization . . . to file a second . . . application because the court said in its opinion that Castros motion could not meet the requirements for second or successive motions. 290 F. 3d, at 1273. For that reason, the Government concludes, the courts decision falls within the scope of the jurisdictional provision. Brief for United States 16.
In our view, however, this argument stretches the words of the statute too far. Given the context, we cannot take these words in the opinion as a statutorily relevant denial of a request that was not made. Even if, for arguments sake, we were to accept the Governments characterization, the argument nonetheless would founder on the statutes requirement that the denial must be the subject of the certiorari petition. The subject of Castros petition is not the Court of Appeals denial of an authorization. It is the lower courts refusal to recognize that this §2255 motion is his first, not his second. That is a very different question. Cf. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States , 434 U. S. 275, 282283 (1978) (statute barring court review of lawfulness of agency emission standard in criminal case does not bar court review of whether regulation is an emission standard).
Moreover, reading the statute as the Government suggests would produce troublesome results. It would create procedural anomalies, allowing review where the lower court decision disfavors, but denying review where it favors, the Government. Cf. Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal , 523 U. S. 637, 641642 (1998) (allowing the Government to obtain review of a decision that a habeas corpus application is not second or successive). It would close our doors to a class of habeas petitioners seeking review without any clear indication that such was Congress intent. Cf. Felker v. Turpin , 518 U. S. 651, 660661 (1996) . And any such conclusion would prove difficult to reconcile with the basic principle that we read limitations on our jurisdiction to review narrowly. Utah v. Evans , 536 U. S. 452, 463 (2002) .
We conclude that we have the power to review Castros claim, and we turn to the merits of that claim.
III
Federal courts sometimes will ignore the legal label that a pro se litigant attaches to a motion and recharacterize the motion in order to place it within a different legal category. See, e.g. , Raineri v. United States , 233 F. 3d 96, 100 (CA1 2000); United States v. Detrich , 940 F. 2d 37, 38 (CA2 1991); United States v. Miller , 197 F. 3d 644, 648 (CA3 1999); Raines v. United States , 423 F. 2d 526, 528, n. 1 (CA4 1970); United States v. Santora , 711 F. 2d 41, 42 (CA5 1983); United States v. McDowell , 305 F. 2d 12, 14 (CA6 1962); Henderson v. United States , 264 F. 3d 709, 711 (CA7 2001); McIntyre v. United States , 508 F. 2d 403, n. 1 (CA8 1975) (per curiam); United States v. Eatinger , 902 F. 2d 1383, 1385 (CA9 1990) (per curiam); United States v. Kelly , 235 F. 3d 1238, 1242 (CA10 2000); United States v. Jordan , 915 F. 2d 622, 625 (CA11 1990); United States v. Tindle , 522 F. 2d 689, 693 (CADC 1975) (per curiam) . They may do so in order to avoid an unnecessary dismissal, e.g. , id. , at 692693, to avoid inappropriately stringent application of formal labeling requirements, see Haines v. Kerner , 404 U. S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam) , or to create a better correspondence between the substance of a pro se motions claim and its underlying legal basis. See Hughes v. Rowe , 449 U. S. 5, 10 (1980) (per curiam); Andrews v. United States , 373 U. S. 334 (1963) .
We here address one aspect of this practice, namely, certain legal limits that nine Circuits have placed on recharacterization. Those Circuits recognize that, by recharacterizing as a first §2255 motion a pro se litigants filing that did not previously bear that label, the court may make it significantly more difficult for that litigant to file another such motion. They have consequently concluded that a district court may not recharacterize a pro se litigants motion as a request for relief under §2255unless the court first warns the pro se litigant about the consequences of the recharacterization, thereby giving the litigant an opportunity to contest the recharacterization, or to withdraw or amend the motion. See Adams v. United States , 155 F. 3d 582, 583 (CA2 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Miller , supra , at 646647 (CA3); United States v. Emmanuel , 288 F. 3d 644, 646647 (CA4 2002); In re Shelton , 295 F. 3d 620, 622 (CA6 2002) (per curiam); Henderson v. United States , supra , at 710711 (CA7); Morales v. United States , 304 F. 3d 764, 767 (CA8 2002); United States v. Seesing , 234 F. 3d 456, 463 (CA9 2000); United States v. Kelly , supra , at 12401241 (CA10); United States v. Palmer , 296 F. 3d, at 1146 (CADC); see also 290 F. 3d, at 1273, 1274 (case below) ( suggesting that courts provide such warnings).
No one here contests the lawfulness of this judicially created requirement. The Government suggests that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 47 provides adequate underlying legal authority for the procedural practice. Brief for United States 42. It suggests that this Court has the authority to regulate the practice through the exercise of our supervisory powers over the federal judiciary. E.g. , McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 340341 (1943) . And it notes that limiting the courts authority to recharacterize, approximately as the Courts of Appeals have done, is likely to reduce and simplify litigation over questions of characterization, which are often quite difficult. Brief for United States 42.
We agree with these suggestions. We consequently hold, as almost every Court of Appeals has already held, that the lower courts recharacterization powers are limited in the following way:
The limitation applies when a court recharacterizes a pro se litigants motion as a first §2255 motion. In such circumstances the district court must notify the pro se litigant that it intends to recharacterize the pleading, warn the litigant that this recharacterization means that any subsequent §2255 motion will be subject to the restrictions on second or successive motions, and provide the litigant an opportunity to withdraw the motion or to amend it so that it contains all the §2255 claims he believes he has. If the court fails to do so, the motion cannot be considered to have become a §2255 motion for purposes of applying to later motions the laws second or successive restrictions. §2255, ¶8.
IV
The District Court that considered Castros 1994 motion failed to give Castro warnings of the kind we have described. Moreover, this Courts supervisory power determinations normally apply, like other judicial decisions, retroactively, at least to the case in which the determination was made. McNabb, supra , at 347 (applying new supervisory rule to case before the Court). Hence, given our holding in Part III, supra , Castros 1994 motion cannot be considered a first §2255 motion, and his 1997 motion cannot be considered a second or successive motionunless there is something special about Castros case.
The Government argues that there is something special: Castro failed to appeal the 1994 recharacterization. According to the Government, that fact makes the 1994 recharacterization valid as a matter of law of the case. And, since the 1994 recharacterization is valid, the 1997 §2255 motion is Castros second, not his first.
We do not agree. No Circuit that has considered whether to treat a §2255 motion as successive (based on a prior unwarned recharacterization) has found that the litigants failure to challenge that recharacterization makes a difference. See Palmer , supra , at 1147; see also Henderson , supra , at 711712; Raineri , 233 F. 3d, at 100; In re Shelton , supra , at 622. That is not surprising, for the very point of the warning is to help the pro se litigant understand not only (1) whether he should withdraw or amend his motion, but also (2) whether he should contest the recharacterization, say, on appeal. The lack of warning prevents his making an informed judgment in respect to the latter just as it does in respect to the former. Indeed, an unwarned pro se litigants failure to appeal a recharacterization simply underscores the practical importance of providing the warning. Hence, an unwarned recharacterization cannot count as a §2255 motion for purposes of the second or successive provision, whether the unwarned pro se litigant does, or does not, take an appeal.
The law of the case doctrine cannot pose an insurmountable obstacle to our reaching this conclusion. Assuming for arguments sake that the doctrine applies here, it simply expresses common judicial practice; it does not limit the courts power. See Messenger v. Anderson , 225 U. S. 436, 444 (1912) (Holmes, J.). It cannot prohibit a court from disregarding an earlier holding in an appropriate case which, for the reasons set forth, we find this case to be.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.


AWS::ElasticBeanstalk::ApplicationVersion
Creates an application version, an iteration of deployable code, for an Elastic Beanstalk application.
Syntax
To declare this entity in your AWS CloudFormation template, use the following syntax:
JSON
{ "Type" : "AWS::ElasticBeanstalk::ApplicationVersion", "Properties" : { "ApplicationName" :
String
, "Description" :String
, "SourceBundle" : {SourceBundle
} } }
YAML
Type: AWS::ElasticBeanstalk::ApplicationVersion Properties: ApplicationName:
String
Description:String
SourceBundle:SourceBundle
Members
ApplicationName
-
Name of the Elastic Beanstalk application that is associated with this application version.
Required: Yes
Type: String
Update requires: Replacement
Description
-
A description of this application version.
Required: No
Type: String
Update requires: Some interruptions
SourceBundle
-
The location of the source bundle for this version.
Required: Yes
Type: Source Bundle
Update requires: Replacement
Return Values
Ref
When the logical ID of this resource is provided to the Ref
intrinsic
function, Ref
returns the resource name.
For more information about using the Ref
function, see Ref.
Example
JSON
"myAppVersion" :{ "Type" : "AWS::ElasticBeanstalk::ApplicationVersion", "Properties" : { "ApplicationName" : {"Ref" : "myApp"}, "Description" : "my sample version", "SourceBundle" : { "S3Bucket" : { "Fn::Join" : ["-", [ "elasticbeanstalk-samples", { "Ref" : "AWS::Region" } ] ] }, "S3Key" : "php-newsample-app.zip" } } }
YAML
myAppVersion: Type: AWS::ElasticBeanstalk::ApplicationVersion Properties: ApplicationName: Ref: "myApp" Description: "my sample version" SourceBundle: S3Bucket: Fn::Join: - "-" - - "elasticbeanstalk-samples" - Ref: "AWS::Region" S3Key: "php-newsample-app.zip"
See Also
-
For a complete Elastic Beanstalk sample template, see Elastic Beanstalk Template Snippets.


{% include "education/progress/_progress_detail_partial.html" %}
{% with location_data.items as list %}
{% show_pages %}
{% endwith %}
| {{ sub_location_type|capfirst }} | Literacy sub theme completed |
|---|---|
| {{ sub_location.name }} | {{ mode|format_mode }} |


--- layout: default title: Home ---
Bhante Sujato lives at Lokanta Vihara, the “Monastery at the End of the World”. The vihara is located on the lands of the traditional owners, the Burramattagal people of the Darug nation, in Harris Park, Sydney. We pay our respects to Darug elders past, present, and emerging.
Bhante Sujato is a senior teaching monk in Australia and the region. He is currently focussing on leading the team for SuttaCentral, a website for early Buddhist texts, translations, and parallels.
At the Monastery at the End of the World we try to be simple, frugal, and content. The little we have is second-hand where possible; either donated or rescued from cast-offs. We rely on the kindness of others, going on alms-round (piṇḍapāta) in our local community for our only meal of the day.
An Online Session for the Buddhist Community on the Voice Referendum, organized by the Australian Sangha Association.
Please join us for this important meeting.
Zoom Meeting Details:
If you have any technical problems during this session, please call 08 9525 3420 and Venerables Mettaji and Vossagga will try and help you.
Bhante Sujato’s teachings and practice in the heart of the north shore.>
Humans only, no machines. This event is not on the internet!
Location: Crows Nest Centre, 2 Ernest Place, Crows Nest
Time: every Wednesday
Program:
Join Bhante Sujato for a regular Friday night session of meditation and teaching. This is a hybrid event. Join us in person or online.
Location: Harris Park Community Centre, 11 Albion St, Harris Park
Time: AEST (UTC+10) every Friday
Program:
Join online using the link below. We use Jitsi, which is pretty much like Zoom. Join from a browser without installing anything, or if you like, install the app.
Session LinkChant along using our 717 Chanting Book.
Times are in Australian Eastern Daylight time, AEDT UTC+11. Use the time converter to to access your time zone.
Missed a talk? Our friend Michael has been recording our Monks in Space sessions: Lokanta Live.
| Mon–Fri | 11am, cnr. Wigram + Marion St., Harris Park |
| Sat/Sun | No set almsround |
| July 17–31 | No Pindapata (Bhante away) |
On weekdays, Bhante Sujato walks for alms-food in the local area (piṇḍapāta). Come along and put some food in the bowl!
Monday to Fridays only. Corner of Wigram and Marion streets, Harris Park, outside the Post Office around 11:00am.
Almsround is a tradition that dates back to the time of the Buddha. Piṇḍapāta is not begging. The monks simply walk or stand silently and receive what is offered.
On weekends, the sangha are happy to accept invitations from our lay community who wish to offer a meal at their homes. For more information, contact<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Please note that the roster may be booked in adavance.
Bhante Akaliko moved out of Lokanta Vihara in July 2022. He is spending some time as a wandering monk whilst focussing on his next project, Little Dust, which aims to bring the Dhamma to regional areas across Australia.
Little DustHe is also leading Rainbodhi, the innovative and inspiring spiritual friendship group for LGBTQIA+ Buddhists.
RainbodhiThe monastery and the work of bhante is supported by an informal network of Dhamma friends. You can support Lokanta Vihara by offering to help with rent and utilities by contacting Deepika Weerakoon<EMAIL_ADDRESS>The monks do not accept any money directly.
Join our Signal chat group, Friends till the End, to hear what we are up to and interact with other community members. You'll need to install the signal app if you don't have it already.
Contact Lokanta Vihara:
lokanta.vihara@gmail.com


sm-printer-js
SimFile
Title
empty title
Subtitle
empty subtitle
Artist
empty artist
Difficulty
None
Measure


Tech Challenge - Tuesday 29th June 2021
This is the article that is going to answer all of your questions about this topic.
First of all, let’s have a brief introduction into each concept.
Here is a visual image for you:
This is an analogy to help you out:
Let’s say that you have a framed picture hanging at your lounge.
The picture itself will be your element’s content, and the frame which contains it will be its border.
Then the margin will be in this case all of the remaining space around that wall.
Please note: all three properties can be used at the same time for a single element, since they all represent different attributes of the element.
Now, let’s take a look at an example image:
This is what your code for html should look like:
And finally, this is how CSS itself should look like:
Please note: for the value to apply, it also needs to have a “border-style” on CSS, like the example above.
Here is an example:
Conclusion:
Padding is the distance between the element’s content and the border.
Border is the frame that contains the element’s content.
And margin is the space outside the element’s border.
I hope this helps,


| DOSE: T+ 0:00 |
25 mg |
oral |
AMT |
(powder / crystals) |
| T+ 0:00 |
0.5 mg |
oral |
Pharms - Clonazepam |
(pill / tablet) |
| T+ 1:00 |
25 mg |
oral |
AMT |
(powder / crystals) |
'Nothing is but I am', the phrase filled slowly with the breath of a giant. Somehow this seemingly innocuous mantra had wormed its way into my vocal cords. It seemed ripe from the fat tree of forbidden new age fruits. No self respecting automaton would willfully admit to such nonsense. Next, we'll trade in our bibles and guns for magnetic feathers and colloidal silver.
'Nothing is...' no nothing is, the closest we can pin anything down in Reality is that it appears, or that it seems so.' ...But I am' that seems certain enough, but then I realize that Nothing IS, which negates I AM. Paper beats rock. The laws of nature can not be tricked by words as easily as we.
And thank god for that ability, or falability if you prefer, for through a slight bit of unconscious balderdashing, the phrase reapeared suddenly brazen with new meaning and solid intent, 'Nothing is but I am.' Each breath swallowing whole, the paradox of owning the Illusion. I AM exists in the void, all else is Maya.
 Is that even possible? I feel the need for some mental liquid drano. And so on...
And so the 3-6 hour point of a 50 mg, oral, AMT experience transpired. My thoughts become a heinous tangle of knots and snags.
If only I was a 4th dimensional being, I would have more room to figure this stuff out. The first effects were felt even prior to actual ingestion. I had just received my lab sample, and somehow cross-contamination occurred. I spilled some on my banana. As I thought about the starving children throughout the world so logically, I realized I had to eat the infected banana. Actually, someone actually wrote that this happened in some TFMPP report. What I believe happened (for real this time) was that I absorbed or inhaled the powder whilst I was separating it into the proper dosage units. So, even prior to ingestion I had what I like to call, 'activation in my temples.' The phrase sounds both religious and sci-fi at the same time and is how I describe the candy, soft glowing feeling that you get in your temples and third eye area when the elves are working some serious O.T. in the serotonin factory.
So with my temples already activated, I ingested 25 mg in a gelcap to start, along with .5 mg clonazepam to reduce any psychic tension during the ascent. My plan was to ingest 50 mg total, but to take it in two doses separated by at least an hour. After reading about the nausea and jitters many folks have experienced, this seemed the logical approach, not to overload the system all at once. Within 30 minutes I was settling back to a nice case of perma grin. Some slight accleration of the heart was noticed, coupled with some slight twicthin of the leg muscles. Yawning also began around the hour mark. Tracers and vanishing objects were starting to wiggle there way into my perception.
I had taped The Power of Myth off of ch. 13 and was set to watch it through. In hindsight, this may have been the whole spark for my mantra. I'm sure that the void was mentioned at least a dozen times, or then again I could have imagined that... However, the question remains, which came first: The question, or the answer?
Semantic buffoonery. That's what transgressed between the time where I ingested the second 25 mg gelcap. Asking myself pointless questions with the full expectation of staring Profundity itself in the dark eye. A bowl of cannabis synergized wonderfully, rounding out the AMT chemical signature with some desperately needed warm static around the soul. Try as I might the static could not keep me, I kept returning to the lament that words run me. There is no escape. Except perhaps through drugs and meditation. Or perhaps even more likely, a serendiptious bolt of lightning.
It strikes me as odd that many repoters have claimed little to no cognitive enhancements/alterations while on AMT. It certainly appears to have lodged a molecule or two in between my language nueron clusters. I began to realize that I was running myself around in circles chasing my own withered carrot on a rope. It was nearing the 2 hour point, and everything my eyes took in was awash with movement. The words on my computer screen melted and reformed with the poignancy of liquid metal. The pink celing insullation tacked up to my basement ceiling seemed to flow like the ether it self, as if cotton candy was the root of all existence. And wouldn't that be nice...
The amount of visual distortion was impressive in shear scope, but not much in the way of artful or bearing inner wisdoms (at least I didn't find any). I felt cheated in a way, here I was neck deep in dancing cotton candy but I had not noticed any of the supposed MDMA like feelings. Nothing remotely similar was felt in the way of a 'candyflip' experience either. Perhaps its been too long away for me from LSD and MDMA to recognize the parralel lines as prominently drawn as the rest of the reports seesm to indicate. Or perhaps the empathogen qualities would have been more pronounced had I spent the evening with friends.
My mood was certainly in an elevated state, I had extra energy (aeb, leg twicthing and excessive semantic twitching), but nothing I could really say belong to either MDMA or LSD. AMT seemed to bear more resemblence to DPT freebase in my mind, except an assload longer of a trip in the AMT, which length ironically seemed to both make time lag and go by very quickly at the same time. My mind was certainly in a haze, something thick and humid was felt. As if my brain had been saturated by the 'Syrup of Wahoo!' (T. Robbins)
More cannabis was imbibed at about the 2:30 mark.
Which returns me to Nothing is But I am. I almost was able to lose my sense of meaning behind the words as I repeated them in full earnest. The words become almost musical notes, the sound of a train on it track. CEVs run rampant throughout the chanting. I felt as if I had the best ever psychedelic screen saver hardwired into my pineal gland. Slight jaw tension/facial tension felt. Soon I found myself surfing a wave of incongrous thoughts, not quite delusional, for I was aware that things were not making sense but in a seemingly beautiful way. Again, some 4rth dimensional space would be nice. I wonder if I was able to rotate myself in the 4rth dimension, would I come back with my insides all reversed? I certainly felt that some of my insides at least had already gone though the ole switch a roo.
Luckily I experienced no real nausea or any side effect that were unbearable. Cannabis repeatedly revitalized the experience as it seemed to lose some steam. Visuals varied from strange geometric houdini worms to actual day dream visions. These were interesting as I actually felt myself 'slip' my focus into the fantasy almost to the point that I existed in that place instead. The sensation was similar to that of the falling sensation sometimes felt at the onset of sleep, but slower and warmer.
Butterflies stil swam in my stomach, but at least they weren't cold butterflies. These visions were all very pleasant and easy. Beaches and grassy hills. Dreaming awake. It's a bizarre mix of getting amnesia and watching reruns on late night t.v. And soon it enough I find myself gaping not at reruns, but infomercials that once again absorbed the entirety of my puny attention span. Their mouths all move so fast. Jabber jabbo jibeee!
Shpongle was incredible on repeat place as a sonic backdrop behind the t.v. Somewhere in the above mess I found time to also watch 'Fear and Lothing in Las Vegas.' But I can not remember ay what point I watched it. But I'm convinced it was the damned reptilian 4th dimensional overlords again. Messing with my head again. Nothing is, But I am still thinking about this phrase well past the point where I decided that sleep would be a pitiful joke, a farse. I sit an try to meditate, but I am determined to fall asleep. Which doesn't help me actually do it. My mind slows down, as if congealing. I can feel a certain burned out feeling in my head, as if some warm syrup had spread throughout my brain.
And eventually, the gods have mercy. Sleep comes sometime between the 13-15 hour. All in all a good experience, but quite an investment of time is required. This one requires planning and time manegment skills. Hang on tight.
Experience Reports are the writings and opinions of the individual authors who submit them.
Some of the activities described are dangerous and/or illegal and none are recommended by Erowid.


Luxury watches stolen in Paignton burglary
Timepieces by Rolex, Breitling and Boss were stolen
by Howard LloydPolice are investigating a burglary in Paignton which saw a number of luxury watches stolen.
The incident happened on Brixham Road in Paignton on Sunday November, 3.
A number of watches - a Rolex, a Breitling and a Boss - were stolen from a property between 4.30pm and 6pm.
The victim describes the Rolex watch as having a gold face with dots instead of numbers and the wrist band is gold and silver.
The Breitling watch has a large face and possibly a brown strap.
Anyone with information is asked to contact police via 101 quoting crime reference number CR/099654/19.


compromise-speed demo:
nlp.keypress() demo
avoid re-parsing a full-text on each keystroke
open devtools and type more text, to see
Like the time I caught the ferry over to Shelbyville - I needed a new heel for my shoe, so I decided to go to Morganville which is what they called Shelbyville in those days. So, I tied an onion to my belt which was the style at the time. Now, to take the ferry cost a nickel. And in those days, nickels had pictures of bumblebees on em. Give me five bees for a quarter, you'd say.
loading


My Team
Name :Jerry Garcia
Role: Manager
ID: 1
Email Me Here
Office: 13
Name :Bob Weir
Role: Engineer
ID: 2
Email Me Here
My GitHub
Name :Phil Lesh
Role: Intern
ID: 3
Email Me Here
School: Berley


< Back
Full view code
/**
* JS: Create instance
* ---------------------------------------- */
var slider = new Slideview('#full-view', {
slidesToShow: 1,
endSlideBack: true // `true` indicates that it slides back to the 1st slide when reaching the end
});
/**
* Full view styles
* ---------------------------------------- */
.slideview { height: 100%; }
.slide {
/* Hide all slides so we can fade in the active
* slide and implement a fadeIn/fadeOut effect. */
opacity: 0.2;
min-height: 480px;
background-position: center center;
-webkit-background-size: cover;
-moz-background-size: cover;
background-size: cover;
-webkit-transition: opacity .9s;
-moz-transition: opacity .9s;
-ms-transition: opacity .9s;
-o-transition: opacity .9s;
transition: opacity .9s;
}
.slide.active {
/* Fade it in. */
opacity: 1;
/* The active one should have a higher z-index
* than the other in case they overlap. */
z-index: 10;
-webkit-transition: opacity .6s;
-moz-transition: opacity .6s;
-ms-transition: opacity .6s;
-o-transition: opacity .6s;
transition: opacity .6s;
}
.next-slide { z-index: 5; }
/**
* Remove the fadeIn/fadeOut while we're sliding all
* the way to the first or last slide.
*/
.slide-to-first .slide, .slide-to-last .slide { opacity: 1; }
/**
* Make sure images fill their container.
*/
.slide img {
display: block;
width: 100%;
height: auto;
}
/**
* Specify a slide transition other than default.
*/
.offscreen {
-webkit-transition: -webkit-transform 0.35s ease-in-out;
-moz-transition: -moz-transform 0.35s ease-in-out;
-ms-transition: -ms-transform 0.35s ease-in-out;
-o-transition: -o-transform 0.35s ease-in-out;
transition: transform 0.35s ease-in-out;
}
/**
* Style the nav.
*/
.nav { position: relative; }
.nav a {
position: absolute;
bottom: 40px;
display: inline-block;
}
.nav .prev { left: 0; left: 30px; }
.nav .next { right: 0; right: 30px; }