Violation of Art. 9;No separate issue under Art. 10;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient;Costs and expenses award - domestic proceedings;Costs and expenses (Convention proceedings) - claim dismissed

On CARDINAL DATE the applicant was chosen to be ORG by the NORP who attended prayers at the mosques of that prefectural district . ORG appointed another mufti . However , the applicant refused to step down .

Fourth sets of criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant under LAW for having usurped the functions of a minister of a “ known religion ” on the ground that on DATE and CARDINAL DATE he had issued and signed messages in the capacity of ORG .

The applicant was legally represented throughout the proceedings by lawyers of his own choice . The courts heard a number of prosecution and defence witnesses .

On DATE the single - member first instance criminal court ( monomeles plimmeliodikio ) of ORG found him guilty in DATE sets of proceedings on the ground that he had issued and signed messages in the capacity of ORG ( decisions ORG . CARDINAL , CARDINAL/CARDINAL , DATE ) . On DATE the single - member first instance criminal court ( monomeles plimmeliodikio ) of ORG found the applicant guilty in the fourth set of proceedings on the same ground ( decision no . DATE ) . The applicant appealed .

NORP On DATE the CARDINAL - member first instance criminal court ( trimeles plimmeliodikio ) of PERSON upheld the applicant ’s conviction in the CARDINAL sets of proceedings . It imposed , as a whole , a sentence of CARDINAL months’ imprisonment converted into a fine ( decisions nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL/CARDINAL , CARDINAL/CARDINAL and DATE ) . He alleged that these convictions amounted to a violation of Articles CARDINAL , CARDINAL and DATE of the Convention .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeals concerning the CARDINAL sets of proceedings . It considered that the offence in LAW was committed “ when somebody appeared as a minister of a known religion and when he discharged the functions of the minister ’s office including any of the administrative functions pertaining thereto ” . The court considered that the applicant had committed this offence because he behaved and appeared as ORG . It further considered that the applicant ’s conviction was not contrary to Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Convention , because the applicant had not been punished for his religious beliefs or for expressing certain views but for usurping the functions of a ORG . As regards LAW , ORG considered that the applicant was legally represented by lawyers of his own choice throughout the proceedings and that he had exercised all his defence rights ( judgment no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

The relevant domestic law and practice are set out in the judgment of DATE in the case of NORP v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL ) , nos . CARDINAL/CARDINAL and CARDINAL , § § DATE .


Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Renate Jaeger;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicants are CARDINAL natural persons who are all NORP citizens ( see list appended ) and an association , the “ NORP de pères malgré - nous d’Alsace - GPE ” ( OPMNAN ) . They were represented before the ORG by Mr A. Friederich , a lawyer practising in GPE .

, may be summarised as follows .

The applicants are orphans whose fathers died while serving in the NORP armed forces during the Second World War as “ malgré nous ” . The term “ malgré nous ” describes the CARDINAL or so male adults from GPE and PERSON who were forcibly conscripted into the NORP armed forces from DATE onwards ; CARDINAL of them died . To prevent these conscripts from deserting , members of their extended family were occasionally taken hostage . Some members of the families of “ malgré nous ” who had deserted the NORP armed forces were subjected to forced labour or sent to concentration camps as reprisals .

GPE as successor to ORG and the NORP Republic agreed on substantial compensation payments . On DATE ORG paid MONEY to GPE to indemnify NORP nationals who had been direct victims of NORP persecution . On the basis of the PERSON - German treaty of DATE , GPE made available MONEY to the “ ORG ” , ORG a foundation established under NORP law , which is responsible , inter alia , for distributing compensation payments to those who were forcibly conscripted ; GPE and the NORP Republic agreed that with these payments the “ malgré nous ” had been compensated . Orphans of deceased “ malgré nous ” were not eligible for compensation .

CARDINAL applicant lodged a petition with the NORP GPE . On DATE the GPE decided to discontinue the examination of the petition on the grounds that the NORP and NORP governments had agreed that the payments in DATE and DATE had been the final gesture ( abschließende PERSON ) towards the former NORP soldiers who had been forcibly conscripted into the NORP armed forces .


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Art. 8;Respondent State to take individual measures;Non-pecuniary damage - award

Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Elisabeth Steiner;George Nicolaou;Khanlar Hajiyev;Peer Lorenzen

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

NORP In DATE the applicant married A. However , in DATE , while she was pregnant , PERSON left the applicant and on DATE gave birth to a daughter , PERSON

Several separate proceedings concerning contact between the applicant and his daughter PERSON were conducted before ORG as well as before ORG ( hereinafter “ the LOC ” ) .

At DATE the applicant asked ORG to issue a decision regulating his contact with PERSON

On DATE the applicant complained to ORG that he saw his daughter only for TIME a week and that the child , who had started to recognise human faces , was scared of him because his face was not familiar to her . He requested to be allowed to see the child DATE , because he worked in GPE and his work schedule was organised in such a way that he worked for DATE and then had a fourth day off .

On DATE the applicant saw a psychiatrist at the suggestion of ORG personnel . A medical report drawn up by the psychiatrist indicated that the applicant was suffering from paranoid psychosis and recommended that contact between the applicant and PERSON be supervised by the child 's mother or another person . The psychiatrist reiterated that conclusion in his report of DATE .

On DATE ORG issued a decision giving custody of PERSON to the child 's mother and ordering that meetings between the applicant and PERSON take place DATE TIME at FAC hereinafter “ the FAC ” ) in the presence of the child 's mother and an employee of ORG .

On DATE ORG quashed the first - instance decision on the ground that it was necessary to hold an oral hearing before adopting a decision in the case . Nevertheless , the meetings between the applicant and PERSON were arranged at FAC .

On DATE ORG issued a decision ordering meetings between the applicant and PERSON DATE TIME at FAC in the presence of an employee of ORG .

The applicant lodged an appeal on DATE which was dismissed on DATE by ORG .

Meanwhile , on DATE A. brought a civil action in ORG seeking a divorce from the applicant . On DATE ORG adopted a divorce judgment ordering the applicant to pay maintenance for PERSON and also granting him contact with PERSON DATE TIME in the presence of a third person . The applicant lodged an appeal arguing , inter alia , that it was difficult for him to come to PERSON DATE , due to his work schedule in GPE . He further explained that in order to see his daughter on DATE , he often had to drive at TIME and was obliged to ask his colleagues to replace him at work , which caused him significant difficulties .

On DATE the ORG quashed the part of the judgment concerning contact between the applicant and PERSON and that part of the case was remitted to ORG .

For the purposes of the resumed proceedings before ORG , on DATE the ORG drew up a report on the meetings between the applicant and PERSON The report stated that the applicant and his daughter had been meeting regularly on ORG LOC since DATE and that they had developed a warm personal relationship . However , in view of the child 's age and needs , further meetings on ORG premises would not be possible because the premises were not considered appropriate .

At a hearing held on DATE a psychologist from ORG , PERSON , stated that the meetings between the applicant and his daughter had been held in the ORG 's kitchen or offices of its employees and that the ORG had no suitable space for the meetings .

That opinion was reiterated in a further report of CARDINAL DATE .

In the resumed proceedings ORG gave judgment on DATE granting contact between the applicant and PERSON DATE TIME when PERSON attended school in TIME , and TIME when PERSON attended school in TIME at FAC , in the presence of a member of staff . ORG based its decision on reports by a psychologist and a psychiatrist on the applicant 's mental health , commissioned for the purposes of the proceedings . The reports established that the applicant suffered from paranoid psychosis and stipulated that contact between him and PERSON should be supervised . ORG made no comments as regards the applicant 's argument about the time of the meetings and his work schedule .

As regards the place of the meetings , the relevant part of the judgments reads :

“ ... this court has ordered that contact ... between the child I.K.G. and her father still be held at the premises of ORG , under the supervision of a third person , to be designated by ... FAC ... because it finds that this decision is in the interests of the welfare of the child . An extension of [ the father 's ] parental rights ... is possible on the condition that he undergoes the treatment recommended in the report by the expert [ in psychiatry ] .

This court has ordered that contact take place on the premises of the Counselling Centre given that during these proceedings ORG did not make an adequate proposal as to the LOC on which contact – which should be limited in view of the father 's diagnosis – should take place . This court has also taken into account the fact that the [ child ] attends school on a changing schedule and has ordered contact accordingly ... ”

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal , in which he again explained the situation regarding his work schedule . For that reason he sought an order for contact with PERSON DATE for a duration of TIME , or DATE , with PERSON spending TIME at his home . He also requested to spend CARDINAL of the DATE and DATE , CARDINAL of all bank holidays , and DATE , which was also PERSON 's birthday , with her .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment of the first - instance court . It made no comments as to the applicant 's arguments related to his work schedule in GPE . The relevant part of the judgment concerning a suitable place for meetings between the applicant and his daughter reads :

“ On the basis of the report by ORG of DATE the first- instance court established that the [ opinion of ORG ] was that the meetings between the applicant and his daughter could no longer be held at the LOC of FAC because it was no longer suitable for the child 's needs and in this respect the [ first - instance ] court heard evidence from witness PERSON , a psychologist at ORG . On the basis of her evidence the first - instance court established that on several occasions ORG had sought the opinion of the Counselling centre about the meetings between the applicant and his daughter ; that the witness had actively participated in these meetings ; that the relationship between the applicant and his daughter was good ; and that the staff of the Counselling centre were of the opinion that the decision by LOC concerning contact should be altered , an opinion with which she personally agreed , in particular in view of the passage of time since the last decision by ORG , that the daughter had advanced in age and that the LOC of FAC were no longer suitable . However , she had no idea or suggestion as to a suitable location for the meetings or as to whether the presence of a third person was necessary . Finally , [ she was of the opinion ] that the meetings could also be held outside [ the centre ] , but in the presence of a third person given that the applicant suffered from certain disorders , [ which could lead to him acting overly ] suspicious .

On the basis of a further opinion by ... expert [ in psychiatry ] PERSON of DATE the first - instance court established that ... there were no reasons to restrict the rights the applicant had thus far enjoyed in connection with his contact with his daughter , and that a possible extension of his parental rights could be granted on the condition that he cooperated in his medical treatment .

Taking the above - mentioned report as a starting point ... the [ first - instance ] court ordered that the meetings between ORG and the applicant should continue at the premises of ORG in the presence of an expert ... since during the proceedings ORG had made no adequate proposal as to the LOC on which contact , which , in view of the applicant 's diagnosis , should be restricted , should take place . The [ first - instance ] court found that that decision had also taken into account that the daughter attended school on a changing schedule and ordered contact with her father accordingly . An extension of his parental rights ... was possible on the condition that he undergo treatment , as recommended in the opinion of the expert .

... in its reasoning the first - instance court cites correct and valid reasons which this court endorses completely . ... the first - instance court ordered that the meetings between the applicant and his daughter were to be held on the premises of FAC , because during the proceedings ORG did not make an adequate proposal as to suitable LOC for those meetings ... ” .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint . Inter alia , he reiterated his arguments about the time of the meetings with PERSON and his work schedule and the arguments concerning the suitability of the LOC for their meetings .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's constitutional complaint . It made no comments as to the applicant 's arguments about the time of the meetings and his work schedule and his arguments concerning suitable LOC for the meetings .

In the meantime , and subsequent to the judgment of ORG of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) on DATE the applicant sought ORG to change the decision on contact between him and PERSON in view of his work schedule , and in view of the statement of ORG that there was no suitable space there for meetings between the applicant and PERSON He also stated that on DATE ORG had informed him that meetings were no longer possible on its LOC . The applicant asked that meetings between him and PERSON be held in his flat in PERSON .

In his submissions of CARDINAL DATE the applicant complained that he had not seen PERSON since DATE because ORG had been closed .

At a hearing held on CARDINAL DATE the applicant stated that he had had no contact with PERSON for DATE .

On DATE ORG ordered contact between the applicant and PERSON DATE a week for TIME on the premises of ORG in the presence of PERSON , a retired special needs expert . The relevant part of the decision reads :

“ ... this court has ordered that the meetings [ between the applicant and his ] daughter shall take place DATE a week for a duration of TIME , depending on the child 's school activities and DATE when the father is in GPE . Since the father is free DATE , because he works for DATE , he is always free on DATE .

Since the applicant had no adequate suggestion as to the premises of the meetings , this court holds that the meetings are to be held on the premises of ORG , which is the most suitable place [ in terms of ] space for the meetings . ”

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal with ORG complaining that the meetings were not possible at ORG and asking that the meetings be held in his flat in GPE . He also complained that for DATE he had had no contact with PERSON

On DATE ORG submitted to ORG that they had no suitable place for meetings between the applicant and PERSON since , owing to a shortage of space , CARDINAL to CARDINAL staff members shared the same office . The only space where the applicant and PERSON could meet was the corridor , which , in the ORG 's view , was not a suitable location .

On DATE ORG upheld the decision of ORG of DATE and specified that meetings be held between the applicant and PERSON DATE TIME when PERSON attended school in TIME , and TIME when PERSON attended school in TIME at FAC , in the presence of PERSON The relevant part of the decision reads :

“ The assessment of the first - instance court as regards the place for the meetings is correct ...

... the first - instance court correctly assessed that , in view of the circumstances of the case , the most suitable place for the meetings could for now only be the premises of a ORG institution , since an institutional setting would enable an appropriate response to made to any unexpected situation . ...

... this court finds that the [ Rijeka Social Welfare Centre ] as a public institution responsible for ... implementation of measures aimed at protecting the interests of minor children , is obliged to enforce such measures , including the supervision of meetings between children and their parents , and to ensure that all necessary conditions are met . This includes [ providing ] the LOC for meetings where they can not be organised in a different manner .

... this court finds that it is in the interest of the daughter , irrespective of her current age ... , to meet her father DATE for TIME , depending on her school schedule , because DATE is , owing to the child 's DATE schedule , the most appropriate day . ”

On DATE , while his appeal against the decision of ORG was still pending , the applicant again requested ORG to change its decision on contact between him and PERSON He relied on the above allegations of the ORG about the shortage of space .

The applicant also reiterated his arguments as regards his work schedule .

On DATE ORG ordered contact between the applicant and PERSON DATE when the applicant was free for a duration of TIME in the presence of a third person . The parents were to find a solution as to the place of the meetings .

The applicant alleged that this judgment was not properly enforced because no suitable place for the meetings was found and the child 's mother refused to let him meet PERSON in his flat .

The relevant articles of LAW ( Ustav PERSON , ORG no . CARDINAL . of DATE , consolidated text ) provide :

“ Everyone has the right to respect and legal protection of his or her private and family life ... ”

The relevant part of LAW from DATE ( Obiteljski zakon , ORG no CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , in force until DATE , reads :

“ When parents do not live together a social welfare centre shall decide with which parent the child shall live and also order the manner and time of the contact with the other parent , where it is not decided by this LAW that such decision is to be adopted by a court .

The relevant part of LAW ( Obiteljski zakon , ORG nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL and DATE ) reads :

“ ( CARDINAL ) When parents do not live together a court shall decide with which parent the child shall live and also order the manner and time of the contact with the other parent .

( CARDINAL ) In order to ensure the child 's welfare contact and meetings between the child and the parent he or she is not living with may be restricted or banned , and in view of the circumstance of each case a court may also designate a person who shall be present during contact .


Ledi Bianku;Nebojša Vučinić;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä;Sverre Erik Jebens;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON , of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant entered into a preliminary contract under which a Mr ORG undertook to sell to the applicant a plot of land . Shortly afterwards , ORG died .

On DATE the applicant brought an action against ORG ’s heirs before GPE , requesting the court to declare the contract final .

In these proceedings the applicant argued that ORG could have sold the land as he had obtained it through adverse possession . The defendants contested the claim , stating that the land had belonged to their father , a son of ORG , who had died before ORG and who had purchased the plot in DATE .

The court held a number of hearings in which the applicant participated without counsel .

By a judgment of DATE ORG dismissed the action , finding that the preliminary contract had been null and void ab initio as it had not determined with sufficient precision the boundaries of the disputed plot of land .

On an unspecified date the applicant filed an appeal with ORG .

The court held several hearings . At the hearing of DATE the applicant failed to appear . According to the record from the hearing , the court accepted a request , filed by the applicant ’s representative , for additional evidence to be obtained .

By a judgment of DATE ORG upheld the lower court ’s judgment .

On DATE the applicant filed a cassation appeal , presenting once again his arguments , namely that the preliminary contract had been valid as the plot had been identifiable and that ORG had acquired it through adverse possession . The defendants made submissions in reply , which were accessible to the applicant .

The hearing before ORG was listed for DATE .

On DATE the applicant requested the adjournment of the hearing on the ground of ongoing health problems . In support he presented a medical certificate .

At the hearing on DATE the defendants objected to the applicant ’s request for adjournment . They stated that the applicant had counsel who could represent him . Following deliberations , the court found that the applicant :

“ ... had had counsel in the proceedings before the second - instance court as evident from the legal representation contract [ between him and ] PERSON [ The latter ] was authorised to represent the [ applicant ] at all levels of the court proceedings ... ”

The court therefore found that the conditions for adjournment set out in LAW had not been met and proceeded with the hearing .

At the hearing the defendants requested that the cassation appeal be dismissed on the grounds already set out in their written submissions in reply to the cassation appeal .

By a judgment of DATE ORG dismissed the appeal . The court examined the arguments of the parties and agreed with the applicant that the preliminary contract had been valid . It found , however , that ORG had never obtained title to the plot .

The applicant has submitted a declaration by PERSON to the effect that he never acted as counsel for the applicant in the proceedings at issue .

At the material time the relevant court was under a duty to adjourn a hearing in the event that a party and his representative were not able to attend due to an impediment which the party could not have removed ( LAW ) . This provision was reproduced verbatim in LAW DATE ( Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) .

At the material time the cassation appeal was to be submitted to the relevant Court of Appeal which was under a duty to send a copy to the other party . The other party was then entitled to submit , within DATE , submissions in reply to the cassation appeal . On expiration of this period , ORG was duty - bound to send both the cassation appeal and the reply to ORG , which would then examine the case in an open hearing ( Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL in relation to ORG CARDINALг and PERSON of LAW ) .

The Code of Civil Procedure DATE introduced new requirements and procedure for the admissibility of cassation appeals .