Violation of Art. 6-1;Remainder inadmissible;Non-pecuniary damage - award

David Thór Björgvinsson;Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE . She owns a semidetached house located in a residential area . A tailoring workshop employing CARDINAL people was located in CARDINAL of the building .

On DATE the applicant made an application to ORG for a ban on the operation of the workshop or at least for measures to be taken to reduce the level of noise it generated .

On DATE the Director of ORG , to which the application of DATE must have been transferred , issued a decision in which it found that the workshop was operating without the required permission . He obliged the owner of the workshop to take steps to remedy the situation , inter alia by obtaining an environmental impact assessment of the workshop and by carrying out adaptation works .

On DATE the Governor of ORG approved a “ [ t]echnical project on protection of the environment against noise ” , and obliged the owner to comply with the project and to submit an evaluation of the noise level .

On DATE the Governor of ORG approved the location of the workshop on condition that the owner complied with the requirements set out in the decision of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the Director of ORG of ORG gave instructions as to the way in which the works to adapt the workshop should be conducted . The applicant appealed .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal with the Governor of ORG in which she complained that she had not been allowed to participate in the proceedings . She submitted that she should have been treated as a party to them and that she had not received an answer to her application of DATE .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicant made an application to ORG for the proceedings DATE which must have been discontinued on an unspecified DATE to be reopened in order to enable her to participate as a party to the proceedings in order to have her arguments taken into consideration .

On CARDINAL DATE the Governor of ORG stayed the appeal proceedings against the decision of CARDINAL DATE until the request for reopening of CARDINAL DATE had been considered . The workshop ’s owner appealed .

On DATE ORG quashed the decision of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the Governor of ORG stayed the appeal proceedings against the decision of CARDINAL DATE . The workshop ’s owner appealed .

On DATE ORG upheld the decision of DATE . The applicant appealed .

On DATE the applicant made an application to the Governor of ORG requesting , inter alia , that the decisions of CARDINAL DATE and DATE be quashed and that the operation of the workshop be stayed until a decision was made on the merits of her request of DATE .

On DATE the Minister of Environment quashed the decisions of CARDINAL DATE and DATE . In the written grounds he stated that the noise pollution inside the applicant ’s home was not a matter of environmental protection , so that there was no legal basis for the proceedings to be instituted . The applicant appealed to ORG .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE to the Director of ORG the applicant requested that the appeal proceedings against the decision of DATE be stayed until the appeal against the decision of DATE lodged with ORG had been decided . On DATE the Governor of ORG , to whom this request must have been transmitted , stayed the proceedings as requested . The applicant ’s neighbour appealed .

On DATE ORG quashed the decision of DATE and remitted the case for reconsideration .

On DATE the Governor of ORG upheld the decision of CARDINAL DATE and set a new time - limit for the workshop ’s owner to comply with the imposed obligations .

On DATE the Director of ORG granted permission for the operation of the workshop . The applicant appealed . On DATE the Governor of ORG quashed the decision of CARDINAL DATE and remitted the case for reconsideration . The workshop ’s owner appealed .

On DATE proceedings were instituted to determine whether the operation of the workshop was lawful . On DATE the applicant was informed that on DATE an inspection of the building would be carried out . On DATE ORG dismissed the owner ’s appeal against the decision of DATE .

On DATE the Mayor of ORG stayed the proceedings concerning the granting of permission until the ORG had given a decision as to whether the operation of the workshop complied with the applicable legal requirements . The applicant appealed .

On DATE the Mayor of ORG issued an operation permit for the workshop . The applicant appealed . On DATE the Governor of ORG informed the applicant that the time - limit set by law to decide on her appeal had been extended because of the need for checks to be done by the building inspection authorities .

On DATE the Governor of ORG upheld the decision of DATE . The applicant lodged a complaint with ORG .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE the ORG authorised the operation of the workshop . The applicant appealed .

On DATE ORG quashed the decision of DATE and the preceding decision of CARDINAL DATE . It observed that noise evaluation tests were necessary for a decision allowing the operation of the workshop . Such tests had already been carried out in the case , but not in an appropriate manner . They should have been carried out during TIME of the workshop and at different times and should have allowed for the applicant ’s involvement to enable her to put forward her arguments to the person conducting the tests .

On DATE the ORG stayed the proceedings concerning the permission to operate the workshop . The applicant appealed and they were resumed at an unspecified DATE .

On DATE the Mayor of ORG issued a decision obliging the workshop ’s owner to supplement the submitted documentation by , inter alia , submitting an evaluation of the noise level before DATE .

On DATE ORG gave permission to operate the workshop on the basis of noise evaluation tests carried out by a certain PERSON The applicant appealed , challenging the soundness of the outcome of the tests and the way they had been carried out .

On DATE the ORG of Construction Supervision quashed the decision of DATE , finding that the applicant had not been given an opportunity to be sufficiently involved in the noise evaluation tests .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint with the ORG of ORG about inactivity on the part of ORG , to whom the case had been remitted for reconsideration on the strength of the decision of DATE .

On DATE the ORG of Construction Supervision gave a decision in which it found inactivity on the part of LOC and obliged him to give a decision by DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint with ORG about the administration ’s failure to act in her case .

By a decision of DATE ORG stated that no inactivity on the part of ORG had been found .

On DATE the ORG stayed the proceedings concerning the request for permission to operate , pending the outcome of noise tests to be carried out by ORG . The applicant appealed . On DATE the ORG of Construction Supervision allowed her appeal , quashed the decision staying the proceedings and ordered that they should be conducted further .

On DATE the applicant complained to the administrative court about ORG failure to take any steps to have a proper noise evaluation carried out and to give a decision on the merits of the case . In his reply of CARDINAL DATE ORG summarised the developments in the proceedings since the applicant ’s complaint of CARDINAL October CARDINAL and reiterated that the proceedings were , after its decision of DATE , pending before the first - instance authority . It noted that the applicant ’s appeal against the decision of DATE to stay the proceedings was fully justified .

By a judgment of DATE the ORG regional administrative court partly allowed the applicant ’s complaint and set a DATE timelimit for ORG to give a decision . It summarised the conduct of the proceedings since its judgment of DATE . It further observed that the proceedings had been conducted exceedingly slowly and that no valid justification for this unreasonable delay had been adduced by the administrative authorities .

NORP The proceedings are pending .

Under domestic law inactivity on the part of authorities is open to challenge .

Firstly , a party to administrative proceedings can make a complaint to a hierarchically higher authority under LAW in order to urge the relevant authority to issue a decision within the timelimits fixed in that Code .

If unsatisfied with the outcome of the proceedings initiated by a complaint under LAW , up to DATE a party could have lodged a complaint about inactivity on the part of the administrative authorities with ORG under LAW of DATE on ORG . This provision was repealed with effect from DATE .

On DATE the CARDINAL Act was replaced by LAW of DATE , which provides for similar remedies .


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life;Respect for private life);Non-pecuniary damage - award

András Sajó;Françoise Tulkens;Guido Raimondi;Helen Keller;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicants were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE .

Following the birth of their daughter in DATE , the applicants learned that they were healthy carriers of cystic fibrosis . The child had been born with the disease .

In DATE , when the first applicant was pregnant again , the applicants , who wanted to have a healthy child unaffected by the genetic disease , had a prenatal test carried out . The results showed that the foetus was affected by cystic fibrosis . The applicants then decided to have the pregnancy terminated on medical grounds .

The applicants now want to take advantage of assisted reproduction technology ( hereafter “ ART ” ) and preimplantation genetic diagnosis ( hereafter “ ORG ” ) before the first applicant becomes pregnant again . However , under PERSON no . CARDINAL of DATE , ORG is available only to sterile or infertile couples . There is a blanket ban on the use of ORG .

By a decree of DATE , ORG extended access to ART to couples in which the man suffers from a sexually transmissible viral disease ( such as the HIV virus , or hepatitis B and C ) to allow them to conceive children without the risk of contamination of the woman and/or the fœtus inherent in conception by natural means .

According to the information provided by the ORG and the first third - party intervener , this operation is done by “ sperm washing ” prior to in vitro fertilisation .

“ Access to assisted reproduction technology shall be authorised only where proof is adduced that it is otherwise impossible to eliminate the causes of inability to procreate , and , in any event , [ said access ] shall be limited to medically certified inexplicable cases of sterility or infertility and to cases of sterility or infertility [ deriving ] from a medically certified and verified cause . ... ”

“ ... PERSON couples , composed of CARDINAL persons of opposite sex , who are married or living together as a couple , of potentially fertile age and alive may have access to assisted reproduction technology . ”

“ Individuals satisfying the conditions provided for in section CARDINAL shall be informed of the number and , at their request , the state of health of the embryos produced and destined to be transferred into the womb . ”

“ ... Any test regarding the state of health of an embryo created in vitro , within the meaning of section PERSON ) [ of PERSON no . DATE ] , must be for observation purposes alone ( dovrà essere di tipo osservazionale ) . ... ”

In this decree the reference to “ observation ” purposes mentioned in ORG decree no . CARDINAL of DATE was deleted .

Furthermore , the part of this decree concerning certification of infertility or sterility provides that , for the purposes of access to assisted reproduction technology , this must be done

“ ... having regard also to particular conditions in the presence of which – where the man is a carrier of a sexually transmissible viral disease by infection with HIV , or hepatitis B and C – the high risk of infection for the mother or for the fœtus constitutes de facto , in objective terms , an obstacle to procreation , requiring precautions that necessarily result in infertility of a kind comparable to acute male infertility deriving from a verified and medically certified cause such as that referred to in section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of PERSON no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL ” .

In this judgment the court set aside on grounds of ultra vires the part of ORG decree no . CARDINAL of DATE limiting any test relating to the state of health of embryos created in vitro to observation purposes alone . The court found that the power to establish the scope of application of such tests was a matter for the legislature alone and not the ministry , which had purely implementing powers .

In this order , following urgent proceedings , the delegated judge of ORG granted , for the first time , a couple who were neither sterile nor infertile , and both healthy carriers of muscular atrophy , access to ORG .

The judge referred , among other things , to the new provisions introduced by ORG decree no . CARDINAL of DATE no longer limiting tests on the state of health of embryos created in vitro to observation purposes alone and authorising access to assisted reproduction for couples in which the man carried a sexually transmissible viral disease .

He thus considered that ORG had to be regarded as CARDINAL of the prenatal monitoring techniques for ascertaining an embryo ’s state of health . Accordingly , prohibiting access to the technique , in the PERSON case , engaged the medical liability of the Health Director of ORG , who was the defendant in the proceedings , for failure to provide a health service .

The judge also found that since the mother had the right to abort an unhealthy fœtus , it would be unreasonable not to guarantee her the right to know the state of health of the embryo by means of ORG .

The judge accordingly ordered the health director to carry out a ORG on the PERSON in vitro embryo in order to determine whether it was affected by muscular atrophy .

NORP The relevant parts of this Convention read as follows :

“ Tests which are predictive of genetic diseases or which serve either to identify the subject as a carrier of a gene responsible for a disease or to detect a genetic predisposition or susceptibility to a disease may be performed only for health purposes or for scientific research linked to health purposes , and subject to appropriate genetic counselling ” .

Paragraph CARDINAL of ORG to LAW provides :

Article CARDINAL as such does not imply any limitation of the right to carry out diagnostic interventions at the embryonic stage to find out whether an embryo carries hereditary traits that will lead to serious diseases in the future child .

LAW , signed on DATE , has not been ratified by ORG .

NORP This directive has established a minimum quality and safety standard for the donation , procurement , testing , processing , preservation , storage and distribution of human tissues and cells , thus providing for harmonisation of national regulations . It also covers embryos transferred following PGD .

The ORG drew up this report with a view to providing information on preimplantation and prenatal diagnosis and the legal and ethical questions arising from their use in various NORP countries . The relevant extracts of this document are worded as follows :

[ a ) Context ]

“ In vitro fertilisation has been performed since DATE to help couples with fertility problems . Advances in reproductive medicine have opened new possibilities to avoid genetic disease by selective transfer of embryos . At DATE , preimplantation genetic diagnosis ( ORG ) was introduced as a possible alternative to prenatal genetic diagnosis ( PND ) for couples at risk of transmitting a particularly severe genetic defect , avoiding the difficult decision of whether or not to terminate a pregnancy . ”

[ b ) ORG cycle ]

“ A “ ORG cycle ” comprises the following steps : ovarian stimulation , oocyte retrieval , in vitro fertilisation of several mature oocytes , by introcytoplasmic sperm injection ( ORG ) , removal of CARDINAL or CARDINAL embryonic cells , genetic analysis of nuclear material from those cells and lastly selection and transfer of embryos not carrying the abnormal genetic characteristics in question . ”

[ c ) ORG uses ]

“ Use of ORG for medical indications has been offered to couples at high risk of transmitting a specific genetic disease of particular gravity ... and untreatable at the time of diagnosis . The risk was often identified on the basis of family history or the birth of affected children . Numerous monogenic indications currently meet these criteria justifying application of ORG , such as cystic fibrosis , PERSON Dystrophy , myotonic dystrophy , GPE ’s disease , spinal muscular atrophy in infants and haemophilia . ”

“ In those countries where preimplantation genetic diagnosis ( ORG ) is performed , it has become an established clinical method to analyse genetic characteristics of embryos created by in vitro fertilisation , and to obtain information which is used to select the embryos to be transferred . The use of ORG is mainly requested by couples carrying genetic conditions linked to severe disorder or premature death of their offspring who wish to avoid initiation of a pregnancy that may not come to term or that may entail the difficult question of terminating the pregnancy in case of a detected particularly severe genetic defect . ”

NORP This report shows that FAC patients from countries where the practice is prohibited go abroad for the diagnosis . NORP patients generally go to GPE , GPE , GPE or GPE .

The study also points to the inconsistency of legislative provisions which prohibit access to ORG yet authorise access to prenatal diagnosis and medical termination of pregnancy in order to avoid serious genetic diseases in children .

The relevant parts of the press release on this report read as follows :

“ Concerted action at ORG and national level is needed to tackle this problem , according to a report adopted by ORG DATE . The current ORG legislative framework is poorly suited to rare diseases and not well defined . Although rare diseases contribute greatly to morbidity and mortality , they are mostly invisible in health care information systems due to the lack of appropriate coding and classification systems . ... ORG adopted an amendment DATE which recommends that Member GPE encourage efforts to avoid rare diseases which are hereditary , through genetic counselling of carrier parents and , where appropriate and “ not contrary to existing national laws and always on a voluntary basis , through pre - implantation selection of healthy embryos ” . ”

The documents in the ORG ’s possession ( namely , the reports of ORG and ORG , paragraphs CARDINAL above ) show that ORG is banned , at least for the prevention of transmission of genetic diseases , in the following countries : GPE , GPE and GPE .

With regard to GPE , the ORG notes that on DATE ORG submitted for consultation a draft amendment to the current ban on ORG contained in LAW , to provide for regulated access . An amendment to LAW will be necessary in order to implement the change .

It also appears that ORG is authorised in the following countries : GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , the GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE and GPE .

PGD is not the subject of specific regulations in the following countries : GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE and GPE . The ORG notes that CARDINAL of those countries ( GPE , GPE and GPE allow access to FAC in practice .

The ORG also observes that in the case of PERSON v. PERSON and Others ( [ DATE ] DATE ) ) , ORG established that the concept of the unborn child did not apply to embryos created through in vitro insemination , which accordingly did not benefit from the protection provided for in LAW . of LAW recognizing the right to life of the unborn child . In that case the applicant , who had already had a child following in vitro fertilisation , had applied to ORG for leave to have implanted CARDINAL other embryos created by the same fertilisation process , despite the lack of consent of her former partner from whom she had separated in the meantime .

This PERSON seeks to extend the use of ORG to precluding the risk of giving birth to a child who is a healthy carrier of a serious genetic disease ( access to this technique to avoid giving birth to children affected by genetic diseases being already provided for in NORP law ) . The relevant passages of the PERSON are set out below :

“ Requests for preimplantation testing have increased over time and this is now an option for couples who run a high risk of giving birth to a child with a serious hereditary disorder where mutation can be detected . ...

Future parents generally prefer preimplantation genetic diagnosis ( ORG ) to prenatal diagnosis . Indeed ... “ where the fœtus is affected this will involve terminating the pregnancy from DATE , which is generally a source of mental distress for parents who have invested emotionally in the fœtus as their future child ... Moreover , it is possible that several successive pregnancies have to be terminated before a healthy fœtus can be obtained [ Source : ORG , opinion no . DATE on the use of ORG ]

Accordingly , the main advantage of preimplantation testing is that termination of pregnancy can be avoided . It has been observed that this constitutes the main motivation of the majority of couples seeking the treatment , these couples having often already endured the distressing experience of terminating a pregnancy on medical grounds . ”


CASE OF ZWIAZEK NAUCZYCIELSTWA POLSKIEGO v. POLAND

Violation of Art. 6-1;Not necessary to examine Art. 13;Pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses award - Convention proceedings

In DATE the administrative authorities handed over to the applicant association the management and use of a property that had been expropriated from a religious association by ORG in DATE . The decision concerning the transfer stipulated inter alia that , on termination of the use of the property , the applicant association would be entitled to recuperate the outlays incurred in connection with any construction work carried out on the buildings , less the normal costs of upkeep .

On DATE ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) , set up pursuant to the PERSON on relations between the ORG and ORG in GPE , returned the property to the religious association . ORG ordered the latter to reimburse the applicant association its outlay to the sum of MONEY ( PLZ ) ( MONEY ( ORG ) ) . That amount was based on a calculation prepared by experts . The applicant association challenged the amount and proposed its own calculation . However , ORG declared that it lacked jurisdiction to examine further claims . Its decision contained a clause to the effect that the decision did not affect the applicant association ’s right to make further claims relating to the DATE decision in accordance with the general provisions of law .

ORG The applicant association subsequently filed an action against ORG with ORG ( sąd wojewódzki ) , in which it applied for reimbursement of the outstanding outlays , relying on the text of the DATE decision in which the administrative authorities had established its right to those outlays . The applicant association also referred to ORG decision of DATE .

On DATE the court awarded the applicant association the sum of PLN CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL by way of reimbursement of its outlays . The court referred to the part of the DATE decision which stated that the applicant association would be entitled to recover the outlays incurred in connection with any construction work carried out on the buildings , less the normal costs of upkeep .

Both parties to the proceedings appealed against this judgment .

On DATE ORG ( sąd apelacyjny ) decided to submit to ORG the question whether the DATE PERSON on the relations between the ORG and ORG in GPE excluded the possibility of submitting to a civil court claims arising out of the use of a property that was returned to its original owner on the strength of a decision by a property commission .

On DATE ORG replied in the affirmative to ORG question .

ORG observed that the DATE PERSON was a statute which addressed , inter alia , an exceptional matter , namely the regularisation of property issues created by expropriations carried out in the past against ORG . It noted that the proceedings before a property commission involved the participation of all parties concerned . The decisions of those commissions were intended to settle all property claims arising out of past expropriations . Such claims DATE including claims concerning outlays incurred by a former user of a property – could be brought before a civil court only in those exceptional cases provided for in section CARDINAL of the DATE Law where a property commission was unable to restore a property to its original owner . ORG pointed out that , following ORG decision , ORG had ceased to own the property . Accordingly , there were no grounds on which a claim against the ORG could be brought before a civil court after DATE .

NORP The decision further read :

“ The clause contained in the decision of ORG to the effect that that decision ‘ [ did ] not hinder the applicant association ’s right to make further possible claims relating to the DATE decision in accordance with the generally applicable provisions of law’ can not be interpreted as allowing the plaintiff to vindicate its claims before a civil court . The application of generally applicable provisions of law [ concerning financial settlements between ORG as the owner of land and the users of land ] is out of the question in the present case . The clause in question can not be interpreted as an undertaking by ORG to satisfy any possible and unspecified claims of the plaintiff association . ”

The relevant section of the operative part of the decision read :

“ A decision by ORG , set up under the provisions of the PERSON on relations between the ORG and ORG in GPE , to the effect that the ownership of real property was returned to its original owner , a church entity , and which contains a ruling on the obligation to reimburse the outlays to the entity which has used such property hitherto , also rules out any possibility of bringing [ before a civil court ] any claims between the user and ORG . ”

On DATE ORG , having regard to ORG decision , quashed the judgment of ORG and dismissed the applicant association ’s action . Both parties to the proceedings appealed .

On DATE ORG dismissed both parties’ cassation appeals . It noted that the applicant association ’s cassation appeal was in fact directed against ORG decision of DATE , whereas that decision was binding on all the courts dealing with the case .

The relevant part of the Law of CARDINAL DATE on relations between the ORG and ORG in GPE provides :

“ ( CARDINAL ) At the request of church entities , proceedings ( hereinafter called ‘ regularisation proceedings’ ) shall be instituted with regard to the restitution of the ownership of nationalised properties .

“ ( CARDINAL ) ORG proceedings shall be conducted by the property commission ... composed of representatives designated in equal numbers by ORG [ Urząd do PERSON ] and the ORG to the Conference of the Episcopate of GPE [ Sekretariat ORG ] .

( CARDINAL ) ORG from the applicant , all ORG and church entities concerned shall be participants in the regularisation proceedings . ...

( CARDINAL ) ORG examines cases in adjudicating groups , composed of members designated by ORG and the ORG to the Conference of the Episcopate of GPE , each of which shall nominate CARDINAL members , and representatives of the hierarchical bodies of the participants in the proceedings , namely CARDINAL representative of each body . ”

“ The regularisation may consist of :

NORP restitution of the ownership of properties ... to church entities ;

NORP the grant of an alternative property ...

the award of compensation , if neither of the solutions provided for DATE above is possible .

Under LAW , if a property commission is unable to reach a conclusion and give a ruling on a request for the restoration of property , the parties to the case may bring their claims to a civil court .


Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of P1-1;Not necessary to examine Art. 13;Pecuniary damage - financial award;Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient;Costs and expenses partial award - domestic and convention proceedings

The applicants were born in DATE , DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE .

The applicants are in receipt of welfare payments for their children . In DATE they brought separate sets of civil proceedings against a local welfare authority , claiming arrears in those payments .

On DATE ORG of GPE awarded the first applicant MONEY ( RUR ) against the welfare authority . This judgment entered into force on DATE .

On DATE the bailiffs discontinued the enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of CARDINAL DATE and returned the writ of execution to the first applicant , as the debtor had insufficient funds .

On DATE the first applicant complained to ORG of GPE about the bailiffs’ failure to execute the judgment in her favour .

By letter of DATE ORG of the GPE informed the first applicant that the judgment in question had not been enforced , as the defendant had insufficient assets , and that it was open to her again to send the writ of execution to the bailiffs’ service .

On DATE the first applicant lodged a court complaint against the bailiffs for their failure to enforce the judgment in her favour .

On DATE ORG of GPE allowed the first applicant ’s complaint and ordered the bailiffs to recommence the enforcement proceedings .

On DATE the first applicant was paid the amount due pursuant to the writ of execution .

On DATE ORG of GPE awarded the second applicant PERSON against the welfare authority . This judgment entered into force on DATE .

On DATE the bailiffs discontinued the enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of CARDINAL DATE and returned the writ of execution to the second applicant , referring to the lack of the debtor ’s funds .

On DATE and DATE the second applicant again sent the writ of execution to the bailiffs’ service .

On DATE the bailiffs returned the writ of execution to the second applicant , having stated that they had been unable to enforce the judgment in her favour , as the defendant refused to pay .

On DATE the judgment of CARDINAL DATE was paid in full .

On DATE ORG of GPE awarded the third applicant ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL . This judgment entered into force on DATE . On DATE the writ of execution was issued and sent to the bailiffs .

On DATE the bailiffs discontinued the enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of CARDINAL DATE and returned the writ of execution to the third applicant by reference to the lack of the debtor ’s funds .

On DATE the third applicant requested the bailiffs’ service and ORG of GPE to ensure the enforcement of the judgment in her favour . It is unclear whether any response was ever sent to that request .

On DATE the third applicant was paid the amount due pursuant to the writ of execution .

Section CARDINAL of LAW of DATE provides that a bailiff ’s order on the institution of enforcement proceedings must fix a time - limit for the defendant ’s voluntary compliance with a writ of execution . The time - limit may not exceed DATE . The bailiff must also warn the defendant that coercive action will follow , should the defendant fail to comply with the time - limit .

Under LAW of the LAW , the enforcement proceedings should be completed within DATE of the receipt of the writ of enforcement by the bailiff .


STOWARZYSZENIE ''POZNAŃSKA MASA KRYTYCZNA'' v. POLAND

David Thór Björgvinsson;George Nicolaou;Ineta Ziemele;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney

NORP The applicant , ORG , is an association registered in ORG . It is represented before the ORG by Mr A. GPE , a lawyer practising in GPE .


The applicant , Mr PERSON , has both NORP and NORP nationality and was born in DATE . He is currently detained in GPE pending extradition to GPE to face charges of murder in GPE . He was represented before the ORG by Mr M.Bilici and Mr PERSON , lawyers practising in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) did not designate an Agent for the purposes of the proceedings before the ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant fled from GPE ( “ GPE ” ) as he was suspected of murdering CARDINAL people and attempting to murder CARDINAL others , in GPE . On DATE ORG issued an arrest warrant for the applicant .

On DATE the applicant was arrested at GPE FAC , while in transit to GPE . He was detained on DATE by ORG , relying on the decision of DATE of ORG .

On DATE ORG sent a diplomatic note to the GPE authorities , informing them about the provisional detention of the applicant .

On DATE ORG in GPE submitted a diplomatic note to ORG , transmitting duly certified and authenticated documents in support of the extradition request concerning the applicant . They presented the affidavit , dated DATE , of Mr PERSON , ORG Deputy District Attorney , stating that his office was determined not to seek the death penalty against the applicant for the CARDINAL counts of murder . The undertaking given by Mr PERSON read as follows :

“ ORG would face the maximum penalty of death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if he is convicted of CARDINAL crime of murder in the first or second degree . Having given consideration to the facts and circumstances of the murders with which ORG is charged , this office has determined not to seek the death penalty against the defendant . Accordingly the maximum possible punishment that could be imposed on the defendant in this case would be life imprisonment without the possibility of parole , plus monetary fines and restitution . This office is aware that this election is irrevocably binding upon us should the petition for extradition be granted in this case such that we could not later elect to pursue the death penalty against ORG for this offence . ”

The affidavit was sworn before the GPE Superior Court Judge and certified by the Associate Director at ORG in ORG on DATE . Furthermore , on DATE the affidavit and its certification were sealed by the Attorney General of ORG and ultimately by the Secretary of ORG .

On DATE , following the questioning of the applicant and the examination of the relevant documents , the ORG prolonged the applicant ’s detention on remand , as it considered that there was no clear request from the GPE authorities to extradite the applicant . On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer filed an objection against the remand decision . His request was dismissed by ORG .

On DATE ORG informed ORG that , the contrary to what the court had noted in its decision of DATE , there was a clear extradition request from the GPE authorities concerning the applicant , in accordance with the relevant international agreement between the CARDINAL countries . On DATE , following ORG request , ORG reconsidered the applicant ’s case and rectified its initial decision . It decided to detain the applicant until his extradition .

On DATE the applicant ’s representative requested the ORG to indicate to ORG , under LAW , the suspension of his client ’s extradition .

On DATE the President of the ORG to which the case had been allocated decided to indicate to the respondent Government that it was desirable in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before the ORG not to extradite the applicant to GPE until further notice , and invited them to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits of the case .

Following this Rule CARDINAL indication , on MONEY DATE ORG requested the suspension of the extradition proceedings .

On DATE and DATE , the ORG received the observations of the ORG and the applicant , respectively .

Extradition between GPE and GPE is governed by LAW on extradition and mutual assistance in criminal matters between GPE and GPE ” , signed at GPE on DATE . It entered into force CARDINAL DATE . The relevant provisions of the LAW provide as follows :

Article CARDINAL

“ Contents of the request :

A request relating to a person being prosecuted or who is charged with an offence , and who has yet to be convicted , shall be accompanied by the following :

( a ) A warrant of arrest issued by a judge or other competent judicial officer ;

( b ) A statement of the facts of the case ;

( c ) Such evidence as , according to the laws of ORG , would justify arrest and committal for trial of the person sought if the offence had been committed in the territory of ORG ;

( d ) Evidence proving that the person sought is the person to whom the warrant of arrest refers , including information , if available , on nationality ; and

( e ) The text of the applicable laws of ORG , including the law defining the offence , the law prescribing the punishment for the offence , and the law relating to the limitation of legal proceedings or the enforcement of the penalty for the offence . ... ”

Article CARDINAL

“ Provisional arrest or detention :

( CARDINAL ) In cases of urgency , either ORG may apply for the provisional arrest or detention of the person sought before the request for extradition has been submitted to ORG through diplomatic channels . The request for provisional arrest or detention may be made either through diplomatic channels or directly between ORG of GPE and ORG of GPE .

( CARDINAL ) The application for provisional arrest or detention shall state that a warrant of arrest or a judgment exists and that it is intended to make a request for extradition . It shall also state the offence for which extradition will be requested and when and where such offence was committed and shall give all available information concerning the description of the person sought and nationality . ...

( CARDINAL ) The Requested Party shall make the necessary arrangements for the provisional arrest or detention and shall notify the other ORG when the person sought has been arrested or detained specifying that the person sought will be released if the documents mentioned in LAW are not submitted within DATE from the date of arrest or detention .

( CARDINAL ) If the documents for extradition are submitted to the executive authority of ORG within DATE time limit , the arrest or detention shall continue until a decision on the request for extradition has been reached by the competent authorities of ORG . If the request for extradition is granted , the arrest or detention may be extended to the extent permitted by the laws of ORG . ... ”


The applicant is a NORP national , born in DATE , and living in GPE .

He is represented before the ORG by Mr. PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

The applicant came to GPE in DATE without having a valid visa . In DATE GPE ORG ( Bezirkshauptmannschaft ) found him guilty of illegal entry and imposed a fine of CARDINAL NORP Schillings ( ORG ) on him . Subsequently , the applicant obtained a residence permit which was periodically renewed . In DATE his wife , who is also a NORP national , as well as their son , born in DATE , and their daughter , born in DATE , were allowed to join him under a family reunion scheme . The applicant found employment as a worker . In DATE GPE ORG found him guilty of drunken driving and imposed a fine of ORG CARDINAL on him . In DATE the same authority found him guilty of refusing to undergo a breathalyser test when being reasonably suspected of drunken driving and imposed a fine of ATS CARDINAL , CARDINAL on him .

On DATE ORG issued a residence ban valid for DATE against the applicant . Referring to S. CARDINAL § CARDINAL and § CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of the DATE LAW ( PERSON ) , according to which a residence ban has to be issued against an alien , inter alia , if he has been convicted more than once of a serious administrative offence , it found that the applicant ’s convictions for drunken driving in DATE and refusing to undergo a breathalyser test in DATE constituted such serious offences . Although the residence ban constituted an interference with the applicant ’s private and family life , this measure was necessary , as there were specific reasons to fear that his further stay would be a danger for public security .

On DATE the applicant , represented by counsel , filed an appeal . He argued that the residence ban against him was disproportionate , as the offences committed by him were not of a serious nature . Moreover , it forced him to separate from his family who were dependent on his income . Further , the applicant argued that GPE had become a member of ORG on DATE and was therefore bound by ORG between ORG and GPE . According to this Agreement and the decisions on its implementation , NORP workers who had been legally employed in a member ORG for DATE had a right of free access to the employment market and also to a residence permit . Moreover , measures of public security against such workers could not be based solely on criminal convictions but had to be justified by the specific conduct of the person concerned .

On DATE ORG ) dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . It confirmed that the applicant ’s convictions in DATE and DATE , relating to drunken driving and refusing a breathalyser test , constituted serious administrative offences within the meaning of S. CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW . Referring to LAW of the said LAW which requires the authority to weigh the negative consequences the residence ban would have for the alien and his family against the public interest in issuing a residence ban , it found in particular that the applicant had only lived in GPE since DATE and his family since DATE . Moreover , his family could leave GPE with him . Having regard to the conduct of the applicant and the particular risks it entailed for life and limb as well as the property of others , he had to be considered as a danger for public safety . In sum , the interest in issuing the residence ban outweighed the interests of the applicant and his family in staying in GPE . Finally , ORG between ORG and GPE , relied on by the applicant , did not prohibit the issuing of a residence ban .

On DATE the applicant filed a complaint with ORG ) . He repeated the arguments he had already forwarded in his appeal to ORG .

On DATE the ORG refused to entertain the applicant ’s complaint and referred the case to ORG ( Verwaltungsgerichtshof ) .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s complaint . It found that the contested residence ban was necessary within the meaning of LAW of LAW in the interests of public safety and the prevention of crime . Referring on the one hand to the gravity of the offences committed by the applicant and on the other hand to his short stay in GPE , the ORG confirmed that ORG had duly weighed the interests involved .


SRPSKA PRAVOSLAVNA CRKVENA OPSTINA NA RIJECI v. CROATIA

The applicant , the PERSON ORG ( ORG na ORG ) , is a religious community with its seat in PERSON . It is represented before the Court by PERSON , a lawyer practising in PERSON . The respondent Government are represented by their Agents , first Ms L. PERSON and subsequently PERSON .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant owns in PERSON a flat of a surface of QUANTITY . A certain GPE had a specially protected tenancy of the flat .

On DATE ORG enacted LAW , which regulates the conditions of leasing privately - owned flats , including those previously let under a specially protected tenancy .

Under LAW , on DATE the applicant let the flat to GPE

On DATE the applicant terminated the lease because it intended to lodge a priest in the flat .

Since Ž.J refused to vacate the flat , the applicant instituted proceedings in ORG ( PERSON ORG ) seeking eviction of GPE The applicant based its claim on LAW claiming that it needed the flat for its own use , namely to house its priest . It also claimed that it could provide for GPE another flat also situated in GPE , but a smaller CARDINAL , of a surface of QUANTITY .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s action , finding that it did not need the flat in question for itself but only to install its priest . The court found that the priest could have lived in any other flat including the one that the applicant was offering to GPE

The applicant appealed against the first - instance judgment arguing that installing its priest in the flat at issue amounted to the use of the flat by the applicant itself .

On DATE ORG ( Županijski sud u ORG ) dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . It found that the applicant did not satisfy the conditions of CARDINAL of LAW because it was a legal entity rather than a natural person . The court stated that the question whether there existed a need for the flat at issue on behalf of the applicant , the reasons for eviction of GPE , and the fact that the applicant had offered PERSON another flat , were irrelevant in the present case .

The applicant subsequently filed a constitutional complaint claiming , inter alia , that its property rights were violated because it had no possibility to terminate the lease on the flat that it owned .

On DATE ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) dismissed the applicant ’s complaint . It found that the lower courts’ decisions were based on law , and that the relevant provisions of LAW providing for termination of a lease for personal reasons referred only to natural persons but not to legal entities . It stated that the applicant ’s inability to terminate the lease did not violate its property rights .

Meanwhile , GPE died , but his wife , PERSON , continues to live in the flat .

LAW ( Zakon o najmu stanova , ORG no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE ) ( “ the LAW ” ) regulates the legal relationship between the landlord and the tenant with respect to the lease of flats . It recognises a special category of tenants , namely those who were previously holders of specially protected tenancies on privately - owned flats . Such a category is , according to the LAW , subject to a number of protections , for instance , an obligation for the owners to contract a lease for an unlimited period of time ; payment of a so - called protected rent , the amount of which is to be prescribed by the ORG , as well as limited reasons for the termination of the lease . LAW abolished the specially protected tenancy as such .

Pursuant to LAW a landlord may terminate the lease of a protected tenant in the following cases :

if the tenant does not pay the rent or charges ;

if the tenant sublets the flat or part of it , without permission from the landlord ;

if the tenant or other tenants in the flat disturb other tenants in the building ;

if another person , not figuring in the lease contract , lives in the flat longer than DATE , without permission from the landlord , except where that person is a spouse , child or parent of the tenant or of the other legal tenants in the flat , or a dependant of the tenant or a person on whom the tenant is dependent ;

if the tenant or other legal tenants do not use the flat for living , but for other purposes ;

if the landlord does not have another flat and is entitled to social assistance benefits or is older than DATE .

Under section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW , the landlord may also terminate a lease of a protected tenant if the landlord intends to move into the flat himself or install his children , parents or dependants therein .


The applicants are NORP nationals , born in DATE and DATE respectively and living in GPE and GPE .

A.

The facts of the case , as submitted by the applicants , may be summarised as follows .

The applicants are Justices at ORG of GPE . Between the applicants and the representative of their employer a disagreement arose about the amount of their salary . According to the applicants , they were entitled to receive salary corresponding to a higher salary grade than that actually applied . The Chief Secretary of ORG ( hovioikeuden kansliapäällikkö , hovrättens kanslichef ) made a decision that the applicants were not entitled to the higher salary grade . The applicants asked for a notice of appeal , but did not receive CARDINAL .

The applicants nonetheless appealed to ORG ( korkein hallinto - oikeus , högsta förvaltningsdomstolen ) , which on DATE stated that as the question concerned the interpretation of a collective bargaining contract on civil ORG salaries , the court was not competent to try the case .

The applicants then took legal action against the ORG in ORG ( työtuomioistuin , arbetsdomstolen ) . On DATE , the court found that , according to the LAW on ORG ( laki työtuomioistuimesta , lag om arbetsdomstolen ) , a civil servant bound by a collective bargaining contract on civil PERSON salaries was allowed to take legal action before ORG . However , since the applicants were not members of a trade union and therefore not bound by the contract , they could not take legal action before ORG .

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

According to Section DATE , LAW , of LAW ( Suomen Hallitusmuoto , ORG ) , as in force at the relevant time , everyone has the freedom of association . Freedom of association entails the right to form an association without a permit , to be a member or not to be a member of an association and to participate in the activities of an association . The freedom to form trade unions and to organise in order to look after other interests is likewise guaranteed .

According to LAW and CARDINAL , everyone is equal before the law . No one shall , without an acceptable reason , be treated differently from other persons on the ground of sex , age , origin , language , religion , conviction , opinion , health , disability or other reason that concerns his or her person .

Section CARDINAL guarantees to everyone the right to have his or her case dealt with appropriately and without undue delay by a legally competent court of law or other authority , as well as to have a decision pertaining to his or her rights or obligations reviewed by a court of law or other independent organ for the administration of justice .

In its decision no . CARDINAL rendered on DATE ORG held that the above mentioned LAW , inter alia , guarantees also to a judge not belonging to a trade union the right to have a dispute concerning his salary decided by a court . As the appellants in the case in question could not have their case decided by ORG , ORG examined their claim but rejected it on the merits .

As from DATE LAW is replaced by LAW NORP perustuslaki , PERSON grundlag ) , which contains provisions identical to those mentioned above .


CASE OF WILLIAM FAULKNER v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Violation of Art. 8;Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient;Costs and expenses award - Convention proceedings

The applicant , who was born in DATE , was released from detention in DATE . Prior to that he was detained at FAC , County GPE , GPE , on temporary transfer from a NORP prison while serving a DATE sentence for a drug offence .

On DATE a sealed letter sent by him to the NORP Minister of ORG was returned to him by the prison authorities . Following the ORG ’s admissibility decision , the ORG informed the ORG that ORG was unable to explain why the letter had not been sent , since there was nothing untoward in its content .

The relevant domestic legislation is the Prison and Young Offenders Centre Rules ( GPE ) DATE ( “ the Rules ” ) , which came into effect on DATE .

Rule CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) allows the Secretary of ORG to impose restrictions on communications between a prisoner and others , either generally or in a particular case , with a view to securing discipline and good order or the prevention of crime or in the interests of any persons . Under Rule CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) , except as provided by the ORG , every letter or communication to or from a prisoner may be read or examined by the Governor who may , at his discretion , stop any such letter on the grounds that it is not permitted under paragraph ( CARDINAL ) or that it may undermine the prison ’s security .


Violation of Art. 8;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in Gross - Rohrheim ( GPE ) .

On DATE the applicant registered his marriage with PERSON in GPE . After the marriage they moved to GPE .

On DATE , during her stay at her GPE home in GPE , PERSON gave birth to a son to whom she gave her surname , despite objections from the applicant . Shortly thereafter the birth was registered ; the applicant was named as the child ’s father in the register .

In DATE PERSON and her son returned to GPE . The applicant believed that he was the boy ’s father and treated him as his own .

On DATE the applicant moved to GPE . Until DATE he waited for PERSON and the son to join him there . However , in a letter of DATE , PERSON informed him that she had no plans to continue their marriage and would be applying for maintenance for the child . At about that time the applicant ’s relatives in GPE advised him that he was not the boy ’s father .

On DATE the applicant petitioned for divorce and brought an action contesting paternity . On DATE the divorce was granted .

On DATE the ORG of GPE delivered judgment in the paternity action . It noted that genetic ( DNA ) tests of DATE and CARDINAL June CARDINAL demonstrated that the applicant could not be the boy ’s father . Although PERSON maintained that the applicant was the father , in the absence of any doubts as to the accuracy of the tests , the court established that the applicant was not the father of her son .

ORG ruled , however , that the case was governed by ORG and LAW of DATE because the child had been born before DATE , that is to say before the new LAW of the LOC came into effect . ORG and LAW set a DATE limitation period for an action contesting paternity , the starting point of which was calculated from the date the putative father was informed that he had been registered as the father . As the applicant had not contested paternity when the child was born and had only applied to the courts in DATE , after the expiry of the time - limit , his action was held to be time - barred . The fact that a new Family Code had been introduced which did not lay down a limitation period for paternity actions was irrelevant because it was only applicable to family - law disputes arising after DATE .

On DATE , on an appeal by the applicant , ORG upheld the judgment of DATE .

On DATE and DATE ORG and ORG of GPE , respectively , refused requests by the applicant for supervisory review .

On DATE the Justice of the Peace of the Third Court Circuit of the Zheleznodorozhniy District of GPE granted PERSON ’s claim for maintenance and made a charging order over the applicant ’s interest in a flat .

On DATE the ORG upheld the maintenance order .

The RSFSR Marriage and Family Code of DATE ( PERSON РСФСР о браке и семье ) provided that a person entered in the birth register as the father of a child could contest the entry within DATE of the date he became or should have become aware that the entry had been made ( Article CARDINAL ) .

The Family Code of GPE of DATE ( PERSON кодекс PERSON , in force from DATE ) provides that a person entered in the birth register as the father of a child may contest the entry by means of judicial proceedings ( LAW ) . It does not set any time - limit for bringing an action .

Resolution no . CARDINAL of ORG of GPE of DATE “ On application by courts of LAW of GPE to the cases concerning paternity and maintenance ” established that , in respect of children born before DATE , ORG and LAW was applicable and , accordingly , the time - limit for contesting paternity was DATE from the date the person became or should have become aware of his registration as the child ’s parent .


The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

In DATE the applicant , a police officer at that time , was charged with bribe taking . He was suspected in providing “ protection ” to a group of black market dealers in return for regular payments . On DATE he was arrested and , since he was a former policeman , placed in a special detention facility for former law enforcement officials .

On DATE he was transferred for DATE to a “ common ” cell where ordinary criminal suspects were detained . In his words , the investigator placed him in that cell in order to put pressure on him .

On DATE the applicant complained about this fact to the prosecution authorities . On DATE the local prosecutor informed the applicant that the person responsible for placing him in that cell was reprimanded . There is no information on any further development regarding this complaint .

On DATE the applicant was convicted of bribe taking by ORG . He was sentenced to DATE imprisonment in a colony of the strict regime .

The applicant indicates that he was unable to study the record of the trial hearings . He indicates that he signed a waiver where he renounced his right to examine the record . He claims , however , that he did so under the pressure of the judge .

The applicant and his lawyers appealed . They challenged the findings of the first instance court as to the facts of the case and complained of misinterpretation of the domestic law and various irregularities in the proceedings during the investigation and before the first instance court . The defence indicated inter alia that in the course of the pre - trial detention the applicant had been placed in a common cell , in breach of the relevant provisions of the domestic law . However , the brief of appeal did not mention that the applicant had been unable to study the trial record . The applicant did not request his personal presence at the hearing before the court of appeal .

On DATE the applicant ’s conviction was upheld by ORG . The applicant was not present at the court of appeal ’s hearing and remained in the detention centre . However , his CARDINAL lawyers were in the courtroom and during the hearing the applicant was able to communicate with the judges through a video communication system , which allowed him to see and hear what happened in the court room , and put questions to the participants of the hearing . ORG , basing on the materials of the case - file and the parties’ pleadings , upheld the finding of the lower court in full . It did not detect any serious irregularity in the proceedings before the trial court which would require the review of the case .

After conviction the applicant was sent to serve his sentence in a correctional colony in GPE .

In DATE , due to the changes in LAW , the applicant ’s sentence was reduced to DATE and DATE , and he was transferred to a colony with a milder regime .

LAW of DATE , as in force at the relevant time , provided that the criminal defendant should indicate in his points of appeal whether or not he wanted to participate personally in the hearing before the court of appeal . LAW provided that the court of appeal might choose whether or not the applicant should participate in the hearings . However , by Ruling of DATE no . CARDINAL ORG invalidated that provision as anticonstitutional . ORG found that the criminal defendant should always have the possibility to participate in the proceedings before the court of appeal . However , ORG did not specify whether personal participation was needed , or participation through a video communication system was sufficient .

The new Code of Criminal Proceedings , as in force from DATE , provides that the criminal defendant may choose whether or not he wants to participate in the proceedings ( LAW ) . However , the choice between personal presence and participation via the video communication system belongs to the court .


The applicant , born in DATE , was an NORP national at the time of the events complained of . He has since obtained GPE nationality and , as far as the ORG is aware , is at present living in the GPE .

The applicant first arrived in the GPE in DATE . DATE he met PERSON , a GPE national . On DATE a daughter , PERSON , was born to the couple , who were not married and were not living together . By a decision of CARDINAL DATE , ORG judge ( kantonrechter ) appointed the applicant as the auxiliary guardian ( toeziend voogd ) of PERSON as her mother ipso jure being her guardian ( voogdes ) .

At some time in or around DATE , the applicant moved in with PERSON and their daughter in the house of PERSON ’s mother . They lived together for DATE .

NORP The applicant went to LOC in DATE and stayed there for DATE . During this time , contact between the applicant on the one hand and PERSON and PERSON on the other was limited to the exchange of some letters .

The applicant returned to the GPE in DATE . The applicant states that he saw DATE until DATE . Despite the applicant ’s repeated requests , PERSON refused to give him permission to recognise ( erkennen ) S.

PERSON contracted a terminal illness . On DATE she made a will in which she expressed the wish that , after her death , her brother PERSON should have guardianship of her daughter , PERSON In DATE the applicant instigated summary injunction proceedings ( kort geding ) before the President of ORG ( arrondissementsrechtbank ) , seeking an order for PERSON to give him permission to recognise PERSON On DATE the President gave a judgment refusing to grant the injunction sought . The President considered that PERSON had not abused her power to withhold permission to the applicant ’s recognition of PERSON , since the change of surname which such recognition would entail for PERSON could not be deemed to be in her best interests . However , the President added by way of obiter dictum that it was important for both the applicant and his daughter that contacts between them be continued . The President therefore thought it desirable that S. spend DATE with her father .

In a further , supplementary will dated DATE PERSON stated that she had agreed with another of her brothers , PERSON , that after her death PERSON would be placed with his family . PERSON further stated that it was her express wish that the applicant should not visit her daughter as this would seriously disrupt the life of the family in which PERSON was to be raised . PERSON also expressed the opinion that it would be contrary to the best interests of her daughter if the applicant were to obtain access to S. According to PERSON , the applicant had no fixed abode , no residence permit , no employment and no financial means ; he would only use the care for his daughter as a pretext for obtaining a residence permit in the GPE and thus be entitled to social - security benefits . Prior to her illness , the applicant had not shown much interest in LOC , nor had he contributed financially to S. ’s upbringing .

PERSON died on DATE . In conformity with her wishes , her brother , PERSON , was granted guardianship of PERSON and she was placed in PERSON PERSON ’s family . The applicant saw PERSON once DATE under an arrangement with the NORP family .

Following PERSON death , the applicant requested ORG , Deaths and Marriages ( ambtenaar van de burgerlijke stand – “ the Deventer Registrar ” ) to draw up a deed of recognition and to enter this into the register of births . By a letter of DATE , ORG notified the applicant of his refusal to do so , being of the opinion that NORP law , which did not provide for the recognition of children , applied .

On DATE the applicant lodged a request pursuant to LAW ) with ORG asking that ORG be ordered to draw up the deed of recognition and enter it in the appropriate registers . Although ORG agreed with the applicant that GPE law applied , it nevertheless refused to grant the request on DATE . It considered that , when alive , PERSON had always withheld her permission for the applicant ’s recognition of PERSON ; it had not been established that there was family life within the meaning of LAW ; following Ms R. ’s death somebody other than the applicant had been granted the guardianship of PERSON ; and PERSON was , moreover , not living with the applicant .

Meanwhile , in DATE , the applicant requested ORG to grant him access to LOC every other weekend , as had been recommended by the President of ORG . He submitted that Mr H.R. was frustrating his right to regular and undisturbed access to his daughter . At the hearing in those proceedings on DATE , Mr ORG and PERSON stated that there was not and never had been family life between the applicant and PERSON ; that the applicant only wanted regular access to S. in order to obtain a residence permit ; that PERSON was settling into her new family ; that PERSON called Mr PERSON “ Daddy ” ; that PERSON did not enjoy the applicant ’s visits ; and that she did not trust him . In reply , the applicant stated that PERSON was very important to him ; that the late PERSON had been heavily influenced by her overbearing mother ; that unbeknownst to PERSON mother the applicant had continued the relationship with PERSON after they had stopped living together ; and that it was PERSON mother who had told PERSON not to call the applicant “ Daddy ” .

At the conclusion of the hearing ORG , being of the opinion that there was “ family life ” between the applicant and PERSON , decided provisionally that the contacts between the applicant and PERSON were to continue at the offices of ORG ( PERSON ) , and that it would take a decision based on a report to be drawn up by that organisation .

NORP The applicant lodged an appeal with ORG ( gerechtshof ) of GPE against the decision of ORG not to order ORG to draw up a deed of recognition . He argued that PERSON refusal to consent to his recognition of S. no longer had any effect after her death . That being so , there was no call for the courts to go into the question whether or not there existed family life between the applicant and S. Should the Court of Appeal nevertheless be of the opinion that it ought to examine this question and that a balancing exercise as required by LAW was called for , the applicant submitted that he was the natural father of PERSON ; that not only had there been a meaningful relationship between PERSON and himself , they had also lived together as a family for some time and they had contributed equally to the care and upbringing of PERSON The applicant also referred to his request lodged with ORG to have his rights of access to S. increased . While he conceded that during the mother ’s DATE an unwanted recognition might have constituted a disproportionate interference with her private and family life , after her death only the interests of the applicant and the child remained to be balanced against each other , and there were no weighty interests on the side of the child which militated against recognition .

The applicant lastly submitted that it had been his desire from the outset to obtain guardianship ( voogdij ) of S. after her mother ’s death and that PERSON should live with him . In order for a request for a change of guardianship to stand any chance of success , the applicant ought first to have recognised his daughter . The applicant urged ORG to deal with his request speedily as he was being threatened with expulsion , the Deputy Minister of Justice ( ORG ) not accepting that there was family life between the applicant and PERSON would serve to confirm officially the natural ties between father and daughter .

At the hearing before ORG on DATE , the applicant submitted , inter alia , that he had always done everything possible to ensure PERSON ’s happiness but that PERSON family had never accepted him . However , the relationship between PERSON and him was very strong .

NORP In a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . It held that the explicit refusal of PERSON to consent to the applicant ’s recognition of PERSON had not ceased to have effect after her death , as she had stated in her will that she maintained the refusal which she had considered to be in the best interests of S.

The Court of Appeal further found that , even assuming that family life had at CARDINAL time existed between the applicant and PERSON , that tie had been broken by subsequent events . The contacts which had taken place between the applicant on the one hand and PERSON and PERSON on the other had been so sparse and irregular , and so devoid of mutual commitment , that they could no longer be regarded as constituting family life . ORG went on to hold , however , that even if it had to be assumed that family life still existed , the interests of the child should be its foremost consideration . These interests would be best served by allowing PERSON to grow up in the family where she had been placed after the death of her mother and in accordance with her mother ’s explicit last wishes , and where she received the care she needed . The recognition intended by the applicant was aimed at bringing about a change in this situation and , for that reason , could not be held to be in the best interests of ORG found that this was all the less so as the applicant had never had the care of S. , had not previously indicated that he actually wished to care for her and , in addition , had not substantiated his claim that he would be able to discharge his duty of care in a responsible manner . Moreover , recognition would mean that S. would automatically take the applicant ’s surname , whereas she now had the same surname as the other members of the family in which she was growing up .

The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with ORG ( PERSON ) , arguing , inter alia , that ORG had been wrong to hold that the refusal of PERSON to consent to the applicant ’s recognition of PERSON could still have effect after her death . Moreover , the relevant legal provisions did not require that , in order for the natural father to recognise a child following the death of the mother , there should be family life between them . In any event , contrary to what ORG had found , there was family life between the applicant and PERSON , so that ORG finding on this point was incomprehensible .

According to the applicant , ORG had also been wrong to hold that it would be in the best interests of S. to be raised in PERSON family . The legislature had , on the contrary , deemed that recognition by the natural father would serve a child ’s interests in a case such as the present where the mother had died . Moreover , recognition as such would not entail any changes in the child ’s living arrangements . Such changes could only be brought about if the applicant were to file a request for a change in the guardianship arrangements , in which event the interests of the child could be assessed at that time . Finally , the applicant submitted that ORG could not have properly assessed what was in the best interests of S. without having sought the opinion of ORG .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE , ORG dismissed the appeal on points of law . It agreed with the applicant that PERSON refusal to consent to his recognition of DATE to which she had been entitled , such a right having been provided by law in order to protect the interests of mothers in her position – was no longer valid after her death . ORG had given additional reasons for its decision not to order ORG to draw up a deed of recognition , even assuming that family life did exist . This reasoning , in the view of ORG , was sufficient in itself to support ORG decision . In this regard ORG pointed out that , as a result of a valid recognition , legally recognised family ties ( familierechtelijke betrekkingen ) would be created between the child and the person who had recognised the child . This far - reaching consequence meant that recognition could affect interests of the child which were protected by LAW . Although recognition could serve these interests , it could similarly harm them . LAW had thus required ORG to balance the applicant ’s interest in having the relationship between himself and PERSON confirmed as a legally recognised family tie , assuming that this relationship constituted family life , against the interest of the child in continuing to live with the legal family in which she had lived ever since her mother had died , and to keep that family ’s surname . ORG found that ORG had adequately acquitted itself of this task .

Given that the applicant had never made a secret of the fact that he intended to obtain guardianship of LOC and to have her live with him , ORG had been correct to take into account S. ’s interest in not having her residence with PERSON family threatened by the outcome of further legal proceedings . Finally , the legal provisions in force had not required ORG to seek advice from ORG , and it had been up to ORG itself to determine whether or not it needed such advice .

During and following the proceedings before ORG , a change in PERSON ’s living arrangements occurred ; ORG was unable to take these new circumstances into account as , pursuant to LAW ) , it was bound by the facts as established by ORG and contained in the case file .

In DATE returned to live with her maternal grandmother . According to ORG , CARDINAL of the reasons for this was the distress caused to the family of her uncle , PERSON , by the applicant ’s seeking access to S. On DATE ORG requested the juvenile judge ( kinderrechter ) of ORG to issue a supervision order ( ondertoezichtstelling ) in respect of S. During a hearing on DATE , the juvenile judge stated that for the time being it would be best if PERSON stayed with her grandmother , but that there should be contact between the applicant and PERSON and that the applicant ’s future role in the life of PERSON should be further examined . On DATE the juvenile judge issued a supervision order and appointed a family guardian ( gezinsvoogd ) .

On DATE ORG refused to comply with a new request from the applicant to draw up a deed of recognition and enter it in the register of births . The applicant again turned to ORG , submitting that the circumstances leading to the rejection of his first request had changed as PERSON was no longer living with her uncle . He further stated that he was concerned about his daughter ’s well - being in view of the advanced age of the grandmother and the latter ’s overbearing character . Moreover , the applicant submitted that he was capable of looking after PERSON himself .

ORG rejected the applicant ’s request on DATE . It considered that the change in LOC ’s living arrangements had been brought about by the juvenile judge and could not be held to be to the detriment of S. Moreover , the persons responsible for the care and upbringing of S. were in receipt of assistance as a result of the supervision order . The change in the living arrangements could therefore not , as such , alter the result in the balancing exercise that had been carried out by ORG . Noting that the applicant was still attempting to obtain guardianship of PERSON , ORG finally considered that the recognition of PERSON by the applicant would not be in her best interests .

The applicant did not file an appeal against ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE .

Following the entry into force of the Law of DATE , which abolished the institution of auxiliary guardianship , the applicant is no longer S. ’s auxiliary guardian .

The applicant , who since the events complained of has taken GPE nationality , has married another woman by whom he has a son .

A child born out of wedlock had the status of the natural child of its mother . It became the natural child of its father after having been recognised by DATE the “ father ” , for the purposes of this provision , being the man who recognised the child , whether or not he was the biological father ( Article CARDINAL:CARDINAL of LAW ) .

A child born out of wedlock automatically had legally recognised family ties with its mother and her relatives . ORG by the father entailed the creation of a legally recognised family tie between him and the child , as well as between the child and the father ’s relatives ( Article CARDINAL of LAW ) . At the relevant time the surname of such a child was the surname of its father if the latter had recognised the child , and the mother ’s surname if not ( LAW of LAW ) .

Recognition of a child could be effected on the birth certificate itself or by a separate deed of recognition drawn up for that purpose by ORG , Deaths and Marriages or a notary ( LAW ) . A deed of recognition drawn up by the registrar was entered in the register of births ( LAW ) . At the request of an interested party , the regional court could order that a deed be entered in the appropriate registers ( LAW ) .

A recognition was invalid if it was done during the mother ’s lifetime without her prior consent in writing ( LAW ) of LAW ) . However , in view of the right of the father and the child to respect for their “ family life ” , as guaranteed by LAW , ORG construed this provision in such a way that the effective right of veto which the provision gave the mother could be overridden if she abused it ( see , inter alia , ORG decision of DATE , PERSON , no . CARDINAL ) .

The man who had recognised the child could apply to the district court for guardianship of the child . If a person other than the mother had guardianship , such an application could only be refused if there was reason to fear that the child ’s interests would be neglected . However , if the mother had guardianship , the application would only be allowed if the district court considered that the child ’s interests would thus be best served ( Article ORG of LAW ) .

In proceedings concerning , inter alia , parental authority , guardianship and access , the competent court could obtain advice from ORG if it felt that it needed such advice in order to make a proper assessment of the best interests of the child ( LAW ) .

On DATE a new LAW came into force . It is still provided that , for a man to recognise a child who is not yet DATE as his , the prior written permission of the mother is required ( LAW ) ) . If the mother ’s permission is lacking , it may be replaced by the permission of the regional court ( LAW ) . However , the man who seeks such permission must be the child ’s biological father ; in addition , recognition must not be detrimental to the mother ’s relationship with the child or to the child ’s own interests ( ibid . ) . The explanatory memorandum on the bill which eventually led to the enactment of this provision makes it clear that the permission of the regional court is required in all situations where the mother ’s permission can not be obtained , including in the event of her death ( GPE ( Parliamentary Documents ) II , DATE session , CARDINAL no . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) . In addition , the child ’s written permission is required if he or she has reached DATE ( d ) ) .

At the same time LAW was introduced into LAW , pursuant to which a child may request the regional court to issue a judicial declaration of paternity ( gerechtelijke vaststelling van vaderschap ) in order to have a legal tie established between him or her and the biological father . No time - limit applies for lodging such a request .

The status of the Convention in GPE domestic law is regulated by the following provisions of LAW :

“ Provisions of treaties and of resolutions of international institutions which may be binding on all persons by virtue of their contents shall become binding after they have been published . ”

“ Statutory regulations in force within the GPE shall not be applicable if such application is in conflict with the provisions of treaties that are binding on all persons or of resolutions by international institutions . ”

An example of a decision of ORG in which a provision of domestic law was considered to be incompatible with a provision of the LAW , and for that reason held to be overridden by the latter , is that of DATE , cited in paragraph CARDINAL above .


Alvina Gyulumyan;Corneliu Bîrsan;Egbert Myjer;Elisabet Fura;Ineta Ziemele;Josep Casadevall

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP citizen who was born in DATE . He was represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Mr C .- PERSON , ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

ORG made a tax audit of a restaurant business , owned by a holding company owned , in its turn , by the applicant and CARDINAL other persons . Following the audit ORG , by decisions of DATE , raised the company ’s turnover by MONEY ( SEK ) and considered that MONEY of that amount had been paid to the company owners during the tax assessment DATE and DATE . Consequently , by the same decisions , the applicant ’s taxable income for DATE was raised by SEK CARDINAL,CARDINAL . Moreover , as the revised taxation involved a discretionary assessment due to allegedly undisclosed salary payments in the applicant ’s tax returns , tax surcharges ( skattetillägg ) were imposed on him , amounting to SEK CARDINAL,CARDINAL and CARDINAL , respectively , for DATE ( in total MONEY ( ORG ) ) .

The applicant appealed to ORG ( länsrätten ) of GPE through his legal counsel . On DATE ORG reconsidered its decisions but did not change them .

On DATE the applicant applied to ORG for legal aid . Referring to LAW ( c ) of the LAW , he maintained that he had no financial means to pay for legal representation as he had not been granted a respite to pay the tax amounts , that the legal issues were not uncomplicated as statistical information concerning the NORP restaurant business had been used in determining the revised taxes and that the tax surcharges imposed on him were considerable . He further stated that , being of foreign origin , he did not fully master the NORP language .

On DATE the court refused the applicant legal aid . It noted that , under the terms of LAW ( Rättshjälpslagen , DATE ) , the scope for granting legal aid to a businessman in a taxation case was very limited . According to a leading decision by ORG ( Regeringsrätten ) , the application of LAW ( c ) in a case concerning tax surcharges would depend on the size of the surcharges and the nature of the case ; only if the penalties were particularly heavy and the legal issues complicated could legal aid be granted by virtue of the LAW ( RÅ DATE ref . CARDINAL ) . The instant case concerned mainly the question whether the documentation obtained by ORG constituted a sufficient ground for increasing the first applicant ’s liability to income tax . The court found that , although the documentation was relatively extensive , the legal issues , including those related to the subordinate questions concerning the tax surcharges , were not of such a character that the applicant had a right to legal aid under NORP law or the Convention .

On DATE ORG ( kammarrätten ) in GPE rejected the applicant ’s appeal , subscribing to the reasons given by ORG . On DATE ORG refused leave to appeal .

By a judgment of DATE , ORG reduced the company ’s unrecorded revenues and salary payments . Accordingly , in a further judgment of DATE the court lowered the applicant ’s taxable income to SEK CARDINAL for each of the assessment years . In consequence of this finding , the tax surcharges were also reduced , to SEK CARDINAL,CARDINAL and CARDINAL , respectively , for DATE ( in total approximately ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) . The court also decided that the applicant be compensated for litigation costs under LAW for Costs and Expenses in Cases Concerning Taxes , etc . ( NORP om ersättning för kostnader i ärenden och mål om skatt , m.m . , CARDINAL ) . The applicant was awarded SEK CARDINAL concerning the court proceedings and SEK CARDINAL,CARDINAL concerning the proceedings before ORG ( in total about EUR CARDINAL ) . He had claimed SEK CARDINAL and CARDINAL , respectively .

The applicant appealed against the taxation and the tax surcharges to ORG , where the case was still pending at the time of the present decision .


No violation of Art. 6-1 with regard to fairness;Violation of Art. 6-1 with regard to length;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses (domestic proceedings) - claim dismissed;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicants are a married NORP couple , born in DATE and DATE respectively and resident in GPE . In DATE they bought a real property from the owner of a neighbouring property , PERSON , who had undertaken to tear down a lean - to which the latter had constructed partly on the land purchased by the applicants before splitting it up into a separate property . The applicants and PERSON allegedly reached a further agreement to the effect that the latter consented to the applicants’ construction of a car shelter which would be connected to a new sauna building which ORG agreed to construct on his own property so as to replace the sauna in his lean - to .

On DATE ORG ( rakennus - valvontavirasto , byggnadsinspektionen ) granted permission to demolish the lean - to . Following that demolition , ORG ( rakennuslautakunta , byggnadsnämnden ) , on DATE , granted the applicants permission to construct a dwelling - house and a car shelter on their property . L. did not appeal but refused to demolish the whole of his lean - to and to construct the new sauna building to be connected to the applicants’ dwelling .

In DATE L. was prohibited from using his existing sauna as its chimney top was found to be partly under the roof level of the applicants’ car shelter . The ORG offer to have the chimney top extended was refused by L.

On DATE representatives of ORG inspected the applicants’ car shelter and found that it complied with the building permit . L. lodged an objection with ORG against this finding .

NORP In DATE L. brought a civil action against the applicants , demanding , inter alia , that they be ordered to tear down the car shelter which they had allegedly built in violation of the fire regulations . ORG ( raastuvanoikeus , rådstuvurätten ) held its first hearing in DATE but adjourned the case at ORG request in anticipation of ORG forthcoming decision .

On DATE ORG dismissed ORG ’s objection against the outcome of the inspection on DATE and confirmed that the applicants had constructed their buildings in accordance with the permit delivered in DATE . ORG found that PERSON had contributed to the fact that he had been prohibited from using his sauna , having refused to carry out his own construction works as agreed with the applicants . Had he fulfilled his part of their joint agreement in accordance with the building permission granted to that effect , the roof of his and the applicants’ respective buildings would have been at the same height . ORG considered that the dispute between the parties was to be resolved by the civil courts .

L. appealed to ORG ( lääninoikeus , länsrätten ) of PERSON , arguing that while he had consented to the applicants’ constructing up to the boundary line , he had not agreed to any construction on their part preventing him from using his existing sauna and requiring him to take construction measures of his own . Although he had informed the applicants that his consent did not cover those aspects , they had not informed ORG accordingly . As a result the building permit and the approval of the applicants’ construction works had been based on false premises .

NORP In DATE the applicants filed a counter claim against PERSON , demanding that he be ordered to carry out his part of their alleged agreement . The CARDINAL suits were joined at the ORG request . ORG second hearing was held on DATE but the case was again adjourned at ORG ’s request .

On DATE ORG upheld ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE . L. appealed further to ORG ( korkein hallinto - oikeus , högsta förvaltningsdomstolen ) and also requested the annulment of ORG decision of DATE , whereby it had granted the applicants a building permit .

ORG third hearing was held on DATE . The case was again adjourned at PERSON ’s request , as he had not yet received ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE ORG ( maaoikeus , jorddomstolen ) of ORG dismissed PERSON ’s appeal against a refusal to move a marker indicating his and the applicants’ joint boundary line .

The civil case was again heard on DATE but was now adjourned at the request of both parties in anticipation of ORG decision in respect of PERSON ’s annulment request .

ORG fifth hearing was held on DATE but the case was again adjourned at PERSON ’s request . Following a sixth hearing on DATE ORG adjourned the case for the summoning of witnesses .

On DATE ORG dismissed PERSON ’s request for annulment of ORG decision of DATE . The court held that an error had indeed been committed during ORG examination of the applicants’ request for a building permit . The court noted however the nature of PERSON ’s written undertakings towards the applicants which had led to the error , the manner in which their car shelter had been built as well as the fact that it would be easy to arrange for the smoke from ORG ’s sauna to be evacuated in a manner acceptable from the point of view of fire safety . The court therefore considered that ORG decision of DATE did not violate PERSON ’s rights , nor was it necessary in the general interest to annul that decision . The court furthermore dismissed PERSON ’s appeal against ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE .

NORP In DATE L. extended his civil action against the applicants by bringing further claims partly based on different legislation . At ORG seventh hearing on CARDINAL DATE it took evidence from the applicants’ witnesses PERSON and P. The case was again adjourned at ORG request .

At the eighth hearing on DATE witnesses A. and ORG were heard at PERSON ’s request and witness PERSON was heard at the request of the applicants . A. furthermore handed in reports of his inspections in situ dated CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE . According to the applicants , ORG had by then already refused their request that the court conduct its own inspection . The case was adjourned at both parties’ request so as to enable them to lodge further submissions in writing .

At ORG ninth hearing on DATE CARDINAL further witness was heard at the applicants’ request and another witness at L. ’s request . The parties requested permission to make their final pleadings in writing and the case was adjourned for judgment at DATE .

Each of the CARDINAL hearings was presided over by a different judge .

Due to a national reorganisation of the courts of first instance the case was transferred to ORG ( käräjäoikeus , tingsrätten ; formerly ORG ) . In its judgment of DATE it found that ORG decision of DATE had not given rise to res judicata . ORG , moreover , accepted PERSON ’s extended action for consideration . It considered that whereas PERSON was the only witness who could have testified regarding the true character of the alleged agreement between the applicants and PERSON , P. ’s testimony had not been so detailed and certain that it could be regarded as decisive evidence that PERSON had agreed to tear down the whole of his lean - to . The court therefore found it established that the applicants had understood all along that PERSON had not intended to tear down the whole of his lean - to . By constructing the car shelter in the manner established they had effectively prevented PERSON from using his sauna . The applicants were therefore ordered to demolish their shelter and to restore PERSON ’s lean - to into its original state . It followed that the applicants’ counter suit had to be dismissed .

The applicants were ordered to pay L. FIM CARDINAL ( about EUR CARDINAL ) in compensation for the damage which the construction of their shelter had caused to his lean - to . They were ordered to pay a further FIM CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( some EUR CARDINAL ) a year ( as from DATE ) in compensation for the impossibility for L. to use his sauna . They also had to reimburse PERSON ’s costs in the amount of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( about EUR CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) .

As regards the extent of the damages suffered by PERSON , the ORG based itself exclusively on A. ’s testimony . After ORG judgment the applicants filed a criminal complaint against him , suspecting that he had committed perjury .

The applicants appealed against ORG judgment and later supplemented their appeal with a copy of the record of the pre - trial investigation into the suspected perjury which in their view showed that PERSON ’s testimony had not been truthful .

On DATE ORG ( hovioikeus , hovrätten ) dismissed the ORG appeal and upheld ORG judgment , including its reasons . ORG refused to take into account the pre - trial investigation record concerning PERSON , as it had been submitted out of time and no special reasons militated in favour of accepting it as evidence . The applicants were ordered to pay PERSON ’s costs in the amount of ORG ( about EUR CARDINAL ) .

On DATE ORG ( korkein oikeus , högsta domstolen ) refused the applicants leave to appeal .

In order to tear down their car shelter and restore PERSON ’s lean - to the applicants were to obtain permission from FAC . In an opinion to ORG dated CARDINAL DATE ORG nevertheless considered that ORG demolition order was “ not an equitable solution ” , since the only change needed from the point of view of fire safety would be to extend PERSON ’s chimney top to QUANTITY above the applicants’ car shelter . FAC would therefore not permit the car shelter to be torn down and such demolition would be contrary to the general interest by spoiling the appearance of the neighbourhood and violate both local planning regulations and general regulations on fire safety . ORG

On DATE the ORG convicted A. of perjury and sentenced him to CARDINAL months’ conditional imprisonment . It found it established that he had deliberately omitted various relevant information from his testimony in PERSON ’s civil case against the applicants . In the light of this judgment the applicants requested ORG to reopen the proceedings .

L. died in DATE , having sold his property .

On DATE ORG granted the applicants’ request for a reopening of the proceedings in so far as they had been ordered to compensate PERSON for the damage which the construction of their car shelter had caused to his lean - to as well as to pay him the costs incurred in the proceedings before the lower courts . ORG referred to A. ’s conviction of perjury .

Referring to its decision of CARDINAL DATE , ORG declined to examine anew the applicant ’s request for a re - opening of the case in respect of the order requiring them to demolish the car shelter , to restore PERSON ’s lean - to into its state prior to the construction of the shelter as well as to pay NORP DATE compensation for the fact that he had been prevented from using his sauna .

As of DATE the current owners of ORG house had not requested , and the authorities had not enforced , the aforementioned CARDINAL orders .

In re - opening part of the case ORG instructed the applicants to file , within DATE , a new action against PERSON before FAC . They initiated such proceedings against PERSON ’s successors on CARDINAL DATE and supplemented their statement of claim on DATE in light of the defendants’ written observations . The court ’s preparatory hearing was held on DATE .

On DATE the parties reached a settlement whereby PERSON ’s successors undertook to reimburse the applicants the amount of ORG CARDINAL ( i.e. the compensation which the applicants had paid to L. ) as well as a further sum of EUR CARDINAL . PERSON ’s insurance company undertook to reimburse EUR CARDINAL of the costs paid by the applicants . The sums were to be divided between the applicants and their insurance company as later agreed . The applicants and PERSON ’s successors declared that they had no further claims against one another whether in relation to the proceedings initiated in DATE or to any previous court proceedings or related events .

The settlement was approved by ORG on DATE .

According to LAW ( oikeudenkäymiskaari , rättegångsbalken ) , as in force at the relevant time ( LAW , section CARDINAL ) , the chairman and CARDINAL lay judges constituted the quorum in a district court . Each of the lay judges had a personal vote .

If a party considered that civil or criminal proceedings had been delayed unjustifiably , a procedural complaint ( kantelu , klagan ) could be lodged with the court of appeal within DATE from the adjournment ( LAW , section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL of LAW ) . If it was important for the resolution of the case that an issue under examination in other proceedings be resolved first , or if there was another long - term impediment to the case being examined , the court could adjourn the case until such time that the impediment has ceased to exist ( section CARDINAL ) . These provisions were repealed with effect from DATE .


David Thór Björgvinsson;Giovanni Bonello;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was unrepresented before the ORG . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant ’s wife died on DATE , leaving no dependent children . His claim for widows’ benefits was made on DATE and was rejected on DATE on the ground that he was not entitled to widows’ benefits because he was not a woman . This decision was confirmed by an appeal tribunal on DATE . The applicant did not appeal further as he considered or was advised that such a remedy would be bound to fail since no such social security benefits were payable to widowers under GPE law .

The domestic law relevant to this application is set out in PERSON v. the GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , ORG CARDINAL-IV and Runkee and White v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § CARDINAL , DATE .