The applicant , PERSON , has NORP and NORP nationality . He was born in DATE and lives in GPE in GPE .

The applicant is the father of the child PERSON , born on DATE . The parents separated in DATE . Following police intervention , the applicant ’s wife and son found shelter in a women ’s refuge , were they stayed until DATE .

On DATE ORG ( Amtsgericht ) temporarily transferred parental custody to the child ’s mother . The applicant ’s appeals remained unsuccessful .

Since DATE the child attended kindergarten in PERSON .

Throughout the proceedings , the child remained with his mother ; until DATE the applicant had regular access to him .

In DATE , following a visit during the GPE holidays , the applicant returned DATE than agreed upon .

On DATE , following a weekend visit , the applicant refused to return PERSON to his mother . He took the child out of PERSON kindergarten and registered him at a kindergarten in GPE . On DATE , upon the mother ’s request , ORG ordered that the child be returned to his mother .

As difficulties arose when the applicant had to return the child following a visit on DATE , which necessitated intervention by a ORG officer , the applicant , allegedly upon ORG advice , temporarily suspended the visits .

On DATE the applicant attempted to visit his son . A conflict arose between the parents which culminated in police intervention .

On DATE the applicant , represented by counsel , filed a petition for divorce with ORG , acting in the capacity of a family court . At the same time , he requested that sole parental authority over PERSON should be transferred to him .

On DATE the applicant , in separate interim proceedings , requested ORG to grant him access rights .

On DATE ORG , in the proceedings on the applicant ’s access rights , ordered the psychological expert PERSON to prepare an expert opinion as to how parental authority and access rights should be distributed between the parents .

On DATE PERSON submitted his expert opinion . He found that both parents were in principle able and willing to raise PERSON The mother , however , had not been able to build up an unburdened relationship with her son . Her personality was characterised by introversion , emotional instability and inhibition , by a low capacity to build and stabilise human relationships and by low emphatic capacities ( geringe emotionale ORG . The applicant , on the other hand , had a more stable personality and was considerably better apt to treat PERSON with empathy and loving understanding . The expert further found that the applicant did not show any remarkable signs of aggressiveness . It followed that the applicant was better able to raise the child and to serve him as a role model . The expert concluded that both parents should be granted joint custody , that the child should live with the applicant and that the mother should be granted regular visiting rights .

On DATE the parents concluded a friendly settlement according to which the applicant was granted visiting rights DATE from TIME .

As difficulties arose when the applicant had to return the child following the next visit on DATE , the applicant , allegedly upon ORG advice , temporarily suspended the visits .

On DATE ORG , in the divorce proceedings , ordered the preparation of a fresh expert opinion as to the distribution of parental authority and access rights by the psychological expert PERSON

On DATE PERSON submitted her expert report . Having on several occasions heard and examined both parents and the child , the expert noted that the implementation of the applicant ’s access rights had failed because the applicant insisted on exercising these rights according to his own discretion , without accepting any rules . In this respect , the expert noted that the applicant wanted to fetch the boy at different times than agreed upon , that he refused to return him after visits and that he took him out of kindergarten and registered him in another one at his home place , without having parental authority . He further tried to discredit his wife . According to the expert , the applicant had been unable to realise that his behaviour was damaging his good relationship with his son . There was no indication that the mother influenced the child against him ; on the contrary , the fact that the child still expressed the wish to see his father indicated that such influence had not taken place .

The expert further noted that the mother was perfectly able to raise the child and that she tried to keep him as much as possible out of his GPE post - marital conflicts . She had demonstrated her ability to deal with everyday conflicts . The applicant ’s reproaches against her , which had culminated in the filing of criminal information , were unfounded . According to psychological tests and the mother ’s reports , PERSON did not show any psychological abnormalities . This too indicated that the mother was able to educate and encourage him in accordance with his age and his individual needs .

In so far as the mother was suspicious as to whether the applicant would abide by the agreements on visiting rights , this was justified by her previous experiences . The expert further found that the applicant had shown a high degree of aggressiveness . In so far as the expert PERSON had concluded that the applicant did not show any aggressive behaviour , his assessment had been based on psychological tests which had not been suitable for the purpose at hand . Finally , the expert expressed her doubts as to whether the applicant would be able to adequately deal with DATE problems in case the child ’s needs were opposed to his own interests .

The expert concluded that the child PERSON loved and needed both parents . However , having regard to the persisting conflicts between the parents and the fact that the applicant did not accept the mother as his equal , the granting of joint custody would be contrary to the child ’s best interests . She recommended that sole parental authority should be transferred to the mother . With regard to access rights , the expert noted that it would be in the child ’s interest to have regular contacts with his father . However , both PERSON and his mother would have to be assured that the applicant abided by the rules set up for such contacts . As long as the applicant insisted that the child should live with him , as long as he degraded the mother and as long as he did not change his behaviour with a view to a more constructive strategy aimed at solving conflicts , such visits would have to be supervised .

On DATE ORG , having heard both parents , the child and the experts PERSON and PERSON , issued the divorce decree , transferred sole parental authority to the child ’s mother and temporarily suspended the applicant ’s access rights . ORG noted , firstly , that neither of the parents was willing to accept joint parental authority . Having regard to the development of the GPE conflicts , which had not diminished in spite of the long period of separation , it would be contrary to the child ’s best interests to award joint custody . This had not been contrary to the finding of the first expert PERSON , who had favoured joint custody . In this respect , ORG noted that PERSON ’s expert opinion had been DATE and that PERSON himself , in a supplementary statement dated DATE , had declared that joint custody had to be excluded with a view to the subsequent developments . Furthermore , the expert had expressly declared that his expert opinion was “ outdated ” and that changed circumstances warranted a fresh examination .

ORG found that it was in the child ’s best interest to transfer parental authority to the mother . The applicant was not able to properly raise the child . Following the expert PERSON opinion , that court found that the applicant was not able to adequately deal with DATE problems in case the child ’s needs were opposed to the applicant ’s own interests . Furthermore , the child ’s well - being was jeopardised by the applicant ’s aggressive impulses and by the fact that the applicant did not accept the child ’s mother as his equal , but tried to debase her .

The child ’s mother , on the other hand , had proved that she was able to raise the child and that she had developed strategies to solve conflicts of DATE life . As established by the expert , she had succeeded in keeping PERSON out of his GPE conflicts and to preserve the positive image he had of his father . Insofar as PERSON appeared to be shy and aggrieved when heard by the court , this had to be explained by the fact that the child was torn into the conflict between his parents and that he had to take sides between CARDINAL persons whom he both loved . There was no indication that the child had been negatively influenced against his father , otherwise he would not have declared that he wished to have contact with him . This finding was not contrary to the conclusions drawn by expert PERSON , as the latter had conceded that his report had to be updated as the GPE personal circumstances had changed in the meantime . ORG could not follow the expert PERSON ’s finding that the applicant did no show any signs of aggressive behaviour . In this respect , it pointed out that in DATE , the lease of the applicant ’s flat had been terminated on the ground that the applicant had attacked the lessor ’s wife . In separate proceedings , the director of the women ’s refuge where PERSON ’s mother temporarily found shelter had given testimony on the applicant ’s aggressive behaviour . ORG noted that these findings were in line with the finding of the expert PERSON , who attested the applicant violent impulses .

ORG further decided to temporarily suspend the applicant ’s access rights pursuant to section DATE of LAW ( Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch , see relevant domestic law below ) . It acknowledged that the child had a strong relationship to his father and that it would be desirable to grant regular contacts . This , however , was not possible at the present time . In this respect ORG noted , firstly , that the applicant ’s contacts with his child led to serious conflicts which necessitated police intervention . Referring to the expert PERSON ’s finding , ORG found that access rights could only be granted if the child could be assured that the applicant abided by the rules . As long as the applicant insisted on taking PERSON with him to GPE and did not accept any differing decisions DATE including court orders – such visits would have to be supervised . Such supervision was presently not possible as the applicant was not willing to accept any person as a supervisor , who did not completely meet his own expectations and who did not act accordingly . ORG could not act as a supervisor in the present case due to serious tensions between the applicant and ORG . The applicant had lodged petitions for administrative and criminal review against ORG . Accordingly , the latter had refused to act as a supervisor in the applicant ’s case . Another possible supervisor , PERSON , was only willing to supervise visiting contacts if both parents agreed to this . During the court hearing , ORG had phoned PERSON in order to render visits possible . These endeavours failed , firstly , because the applicant was not willing to bear the costs entailed by supervision . Furthermore , the mother only agreed to commission PERSON in case the applicant accepted that the child remained with her until a final court decision . The applicant had not been willing to make such a declaration . That the mother ’s fears were not unfounded was demonstrated by the fact that the applicant had refused to return the child in DATE . There were no other persons available who could supervise visiting contacts . In any event , the problem would persist as the applicant was not willing to bear the necessary expenses .

On DATE the ORG ( Oberlandesgericht ) rejected the applicant ’s appeal against ORG decisions on parental authority and on the temporary exclusion of access rights . ORG followed ORG reasoning , according to which the serious tensions persisting between the parents excluded the possibility of joint custody . With regard to the transfer of parental custody to CARDINAL parent , ORG left the question undecided whether the applicant was sufficiently able to raise the child on a DATE basis , as the mother had proved to be . The transfer of custody to the mother was in accordance with the wishes the child had expressed when heard by the expert and by the court . The most decisive point was that the transfer of custody to the mother gave continuity to the child ’s present life and educational circumstances . A change of the child ’s present life circumstances which would be added to the psychological burden which had already been imposed on him by his GPE separation could only be justified if such change was compensated by considerable advantages for the child . Such advantages could not be found in the present case . Following the expert PERSON opinion , that court found that the child was well taken care of by his mother . It was not necessary to determine whether the finding of the expert PERSON had been scientifically correct , as they dated back to DATE and the decision had to be taken according to the current circumstances . The expert PERSON did not claim that his findings were still valid . He had , on the contrary , stated that PERSON recommendations may be correct for the time of her examination . The issue which parent was more ready to accept the child ’s relationship with the other parent ( ORG ) clearly pointed in favour of the mother . This was established by the expert PERSON findings as well as by the applicant ’s unfounded allegations during custody and access proceedings , who had reproached the mother of “ brainwashing ” and abusing the child . The fact that the child had looked forward to meet his father disproved the allegations that the mother had influenced the child against him .

With respect to the decision on the temporary exclusion of access rights , ORG confirmed ORG finding that unattended visits could not be granted as long as the applicant did not respect the rules set up for such meetings . Supervised visits were currently not feasible as the applicant refused to cooperate . ORG noted that ORG could not supervise meetings , as the applicant did not accept ORG staff and that ORG had consequently refused to undertake that task . ORG further noted that ORG , in its hearing of CARDINAL DATE , had tried to arrange supervised visits . These endeavours had failed inter alia because the applicant had been unwilling to bear the necessary expenses , in spite of being legally obliged to do so . The applicant had not changed his attitude during second instance proceedings .

On DATE ORG ( Bundesverfassungsgericht ) refused to accept the applicant ’s constitutional complaint and joint request for an interim order for adjudication .

The relevant provisions of LAW ( ORG ) read as follows :

Section DATE

Living separately and joint parental authority

“ ( CARDINAL ) If parents who share joint parental authority are separated more than temporarily , each parent can request the family court to be transferred either sole parental authority or part of the parental authority .

( CARDINAL ) The request shall be granted if

the other parent consents , unless the child is DATE and is opposed to the transfer , or

if it is to be expected that the lifting of joint parental authority and its transfer to the applicant is best suited to serve the child ’s welfare

Section DATE

Contacts between parent and child

“ ( CARDINAL ) The child is entitled to have access to both parents ; each parent is obliged to have contact with , and is entitled to have access to the child .

( CARDINAL ) The parents must not do anything that would harm the child ’s relationship with the other parent or interfere with the child ’s upbringing ...

( CARDINAL ) The family courts can determine the scope of the right of access and can prescribe more specific rules for its exercise , also with regard to third parties . They may oblige the respective parties to fulfil their obligations under paragraph CARDINAL .

( CARDINAL ) The family court can restrict or suspend access rights or the execution of previous decisions on access if such a measure is necessary for the child ’s welfare . A decision restricting or suspending that right for a lengthy period or permanently may only be taken if otherwise the child ’s well - being would be endangered . The family courts may order that the right of access be exercised under the supervision of a third party . Such a third party may be a ORG or a private association ... ”


Angelika Nußberger;Dean Spielmann;Elisabet Fura;Ganna Yudkivska;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in GPE , GPE on DATE and lives in PERSON . He was represented before the ORG by PERSON , from GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON , of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant came to GPE as a refugee in DATE . In DATE , after a routine operation , he started to suffer from severe pain . This pain was treated by strong pain killers which allegedly caused him to suffer brain damage . He was able to recover and to work in a boat factory for a while in DATE and DATE . In DATE , however , he again became unable to work and started to receive sickness allowance ( sjukpenning ) , which was later transformed into an early retirement pension ( förtidspension ) as of DATE .

The applicant applied for life annuity ( livränta ) from ORG ( försäkringskassan ) in GPE , claiming that his injuries had been caused by solvents to which he was exposed while working in the boat factory .

On DATE ORG decided to refuse the application for life annuity as the applicant ’s brain damage could not be considered a work - related accident or a condition caused by the working environment . According to the medical opinion given on DATE by PERSON , ORG own medical doctor ( försäkringsläkare ) , it was not probable that the applicant ’s brain damage was connected to his work .

By letter dated DATE the applicant appealed to ORG ( länsrätten ) in GPE , claiming that he had a right to life annuity . He stated that he had been more sensitive to chemicals due to his prior brain damage in DATE . The applicant submitted a document by D , a professor in procedural law , entitled “ Statement concerning the evidentiary requirements in work injury cases in general , with the case of [ M.B. ] as an example ” . The applicant reserved the right to request that D be heard as an expert witness . He submitted written evidence , mainly articles from medical journals , and requested that this evidence be sent to D for comments .

On DATE ORG , which interpreted the applicant ’s request as a request for a written expert opinion , rejected the applicant ’s request to obtain a statement from NORP The applicant was provided with the opportunity to complete his appeal within DATE .

On DATE the applicant requested that an oral hearing be held without giving any reasons for his request . ORG offered the applicant the opportunity to finalise his submissions and to submit all evidence he wished to invoke . The applicant was also informed that the court would then decide on his request for an oral hearing . Furthermore , the applicant was informed about the applicable legislation concerning oral hearings and was asked to indicate whether he maintained his request .

On DATE the applicant submitted his evidence to ORG . He did not invoke any oral evidence or comments on the issue of an oral hearing .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s request to obtain a written opinion from NORP , the request for an oral hearing and the applicant ’s appeal . After having examined several medical certificates and opinions , included in the applicant ’s case file and submitted by both parties , the court found that the medical evidence did not show that the applicant was more sensitive to solvents or that such shortterm work with solvents would have exposed him to brain damage such as he had suffered . His condition could thus not be considered as a work - related condition and he had therefore no right to life annuity .

On DATE the applicant appealed to ORG ( kammarrätten ) in GPE and maintained what he had claimed before the first instance court . Additionally , he stated that he had invoked oral evidence before the first instance court and claimed that the rejection of his request for an oral hearing constituted a violation of his rights under the Convention . Furthermore , the applicant requested an oral hearing to be held . On DATE the applicant was offered the opportunity to complete his appeal . He was reminded that the issue of whether to grant leave to appeal could be decided even if he did not complete his appeal . He was also informed that his request concerning an oral hearing would not be determined before the issue of leave to appeal . In a submission of CARDINAL DATE the applicant confirmed that he did not request an oral hearing on the question of leave to appeal . He stated that the reasons for his request for an oral hearing concerning the factual issues were complex , that an oral hearing was not unnecessary and that there was no reason not to hold an oral hearing .

On DATE ORG refused leave to appeal .

By letter dated DATE the applicant appealed to ORG ( Regeringsrätten ) , reiterating the grounds of appeal already presented before the lower instances , claiming compensation and requesting the court to hold an oral hearing . The applicant stated that he had been refused an oral hearing before the lower courts and that ORG had also rejected his request to hear an expert witness . He maintained that his case was complex and important and that , for these reasons , he had a right to an oral hearing .

On DATE the applicant was informed that ORG would , first of all , examine whether leave to appeal should be granted and that it had understood his request for an oral hearing to be related to the substance of the case . The applicant was given the opportunity to comment on both issues and to complete his appeal . On DATE the applicant requested once again that an oral hearing be held without clarifying whether it concerned the issue of leave to appeal or the substance of the case .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s request for an oral hearing regarding the issue of leave to appeal and gave the applicant the opportunity to finalise his submissions .

On DATE the applicant completed his appeal and requested that an oral hearing be held with reference to his previous requests .

On DATE ORG refused leave to appeal .

Domestic provisions of relevance in the present case are found in DATE Insurance Act ( Lagen om arbetsskadeförsäkring , SFS CARDINAL:CARDINAL ) and ORG ( Förvaltnings - processlagen , ORG CARDINAL:CARDINAL , “ the DATE LAW ) . The DATE LAW has been incorporated into Chapters CARDINAL and CARDINAL of ORG as of DATE .

According to LAW , section CARDINAL , of the DATE LAW , the term “ work injury ” mainly refers to injuries resulting from accidents or other harmful factors at a person ’s workplace . Under the LAW , all gainfully employed persons working in GPE are insured against work injuries .

For an injury to qualify as a work injury , a causal link must be established between the accident or harmful factor in the workplace and the insured person ’s health problems . What is meant by “ harmful factor ” is the influence of a factor that is very likely to cause an injury or illness such as that incurred by the insured person . At the relevant time , it had to be “ highly probable ” that a certain factor in the working environment could cause a person ’s injuries and , thereby , be considered to constitute a harmful factor . The view that a certain factor is very likely to cause an injury has to be relatively generally accepted ( Govt . PERSON , pp . CARDINAL and DATE ) . This is the case where substantial knowledge exists , within medical or other science , that a certain factor has such harmful effect . If there is a lack of such support , such as , for example , profound differences in expert opinion , this requirement can not be considered fulfilled . Thus , the opinion of a specific researcher or medical doctor should not constitute a sufficient basis for a positive decision on the issue of harmful effect .

Section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL LAW , as in force at the relevant time , was worded as follows :

“ The procedure shall be in writing .

Where it may be assumed to be advantageous for the investigation or promote the expeditious determination of the case , the processing may include an oral hearing regarding certain issues .

In ORG and ORG an oral hearing shall be held if requested by an individual party to the proceedings , unless it is unnecessary or there are particular reasons against holding a hearing . ”

In a case concerning social insurance , leave to appeal was required for ORG to consider an appeal against a decision enacted by ORG . Leave to appeal was to be granted if it was of importance for the guidance of the application of law that a superior court consider the appeal , if reason existed for amendment of ORG conclusion , or if there were otherwise extraordinary reasons to entertain the appeal .

A decision of ORG not to grant leave to appeal could be appealed against to ORG .


The applicant is a NORP national , born in DATE and living in GPE ( GPE ) and GPE ( GPE ) . He is represented before the ORG by PERSON PERSON , a lawyer practising in Antalya(Turkey ) .

A.

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant owns a CARDINAL - story house on a hill overlooking the south coast of GPE . At the time when he had his house built , the south coast was officially designated a conservation area ( doğal sit alanı ) . According to the local master building and settlement plan ( imar planı ) , no building was authorised in this area . In DATE ORG revised the master plan in order to allow homes to be built . Subsequently , property developers were given building permits ( inşaat ruhsatı ) and undertook major building works in the area . As a result , the natural panorama of the south coast began to change rapidly .

In DATE the applicant twice complained to GPE requesting that development be halted with immediate effect . In reply , GPE informed the applicant that the master plan had been revised on DATE and DATE and that several developers had been granted construction permits pursuant to the revision .

The applicant challenged the award of the building permits before ORG ( PERSON ) . He contended that the revision of the master plan did not comply with the requirements prescribed by PERSON no . CARDINAL and that the presence of the buildings would deprive him of his right to the peaceful enjoyment of the panoramic view from his house . He further contended that the preservation of the natural beauty of the site was in “ the public interest ” and the planned high buildings did not meet safety requirements for geographical reasons . He requested the annulment of the building permits awarded to the developers . He also requested the court to order the administration to suspend ( yürütmenin durdurulması ) the building permits pending the outcome of the court ’s final decision on the matter .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the court ordered the administration to stay the execution of the building permits . These decisions were served on the administration on CARDINAL DATE and DATE respectively . The court noted that any further construction carried out on the basis of the permits could give rise to irreparable harm .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the applicant ’s lawyer requested ORG and ORG to comply with the order . The municipalities neither suspended the building permits nor prevented the holders from continuing to build .

Experts appointed by the court ( bilirkişi ) investigated the area and submitted a report which generally bore out the applicant ’s allegations . On DATE ORG found , inter alia , that the revision of the local master construction and settlement plan was not in accordance with relevant law and was not in the public interest ( kamu yararı ) . The court also found that building permits did not comply with the revised master plan . The court accordingly annulled the revision of the master plan as well as all building permits awarded on the basis of the revised plan .

ORG and LOC appealed ( temyiz ) on the ground that the judgment was contrary to substantive and procedural law .

On DATE the CARDINALth Chamber of ORG ( NORP ) upheld the judgment of DATE of ORG . ORG and LOC requested the rectification of the judgment ( karar düzeltme ) of ORG . The request was rejected on DATE .

De facto construction continued in the area even after the annulment of the building permits had become final . The applicant , with reference to the final court judgment , requested ORG and GPE to stop the building being carried out by the holders of the annulled permits and to demolish the existing buildings in the area . The municipalities failed to comply with the request . The applicant then complained to various ORG institutions inter alia , ORG , ORG , ORG , and ORG responsible for urban issues . He did not receive any clear response . The impugned buildings remain to DATE .

B. Relevant domestic law

Article CARDINAL of the LAW provides in its fourth paragraph ( unofficial translation ) :

“ Legislative and executive organs and the administration shall comply with court decisions . These organs and the administration shall neither alter them in any respect nor delay their execution . ”

LAW states ( unofficial translation ) :

“ The administration shall comply with the decisions of ORG , district administrative courts , administrative and tax courts . The administration shall ensure the execution of such decisions within DATE from the date of their notification . ”


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Art. 5-1 and 5-4;Violation of Art. 34;Non-pecuniary damage - award

András Sajó;Françoise Tulkens;Ireneu Cabral Barreto;Kristina Pardalos;Nona Tsotsoria

NORP The applicant was born in DATE and , at the time of lodging his application , he was being held in the Edirne Foreigners ' Admission and ORG in GPE .

The applicant was an active member of ORG of GPE and the NORP and ORG in GPE . He was also on the board of editors of a well - known student journal .

According to the applicant 's submissions , on Students ' Day in GPE in DATE , which was held DATE by university students across the country , CARDINAL students were arrested and placed in solitary confinement in FAC , in GPE . Other members of the board of editors of the student journal that the applicant worked for were among those who were arrested . Subsequently , more students were arrested and imprisoned during the crackdown on students .

On an unspecified date in DATE , the applicant arrived illegally in GPE .

On DATE the applicant was arrested by NORP security forces while trying to leave GPE illegally . He was subsequently placed in the Edirne Foreigners ' Admission and ORG .

On DATE the applicant lodged an application for temporary asylum with ORG ( the “ Ministry ” ) .

On DATE the applicant 's request was rejected . According to a letter addressed to the PERSON governor 's office by the Deputy Under- Secretary of ORG , the applicant had stated that he had been involved in the same activities as a certain PERSON , an NORP national who had been deported to GPE on QUANTITY DATE since his presence in GPE constituted a risk for national security . The Deputy Under - Secretary maintained that the applicant 's request had been rejected for the same reason and that this type of person should be not granted temporary asylum in general . He also requested that ORG High Commissioner for Refugees ( ORG ) should not be informed of these facts and that their access to this information should be restricted on national security considerations . The Deputy Under - Secretary finally requested the PERSON governor 's office to notify the applicant of the decision taken in his case and to inform him that he could lodge an objection within DATE against this decision .

On DATE the applicant was served with the decision rejecting his temporary asylum request and was informed that , unless he lodged an objection within DATE , he would be deported to his home country .

On DATE the applicant lodged , with the PERSON governor 's office , a petition written in NORP containing his objection against the decision rejecting his temporary asylum request .

On DATE the applicant made statements to QUANTITY police officers in the presence of an interpreter . He maintained that he was an active member of ORG of GPE and the NORP and ORG . He noted that he had participated in a number of demonstrations held by these organisations and that he had digital photographs of these demonstrations in his possession . He stated that he had left GPE subsequent to the arrest and imprisonment of his friends , who had been involved in the same activities on behalf of those organisations . He asked the NORP authorities to contact the office of the ORG , his lawyer and a national non - governmental organisation , ORG , in order to receive documents and detailed information regarding his activities in GPE .

On DATE his objection was rejected by ORG . According to the official documents , ORG considered that , in the light of the applicant 's militant background , there was a real risk that he would be taken to GPE where he would have military training and that he would be part of military operations targeting GPE .

On DATE the applicant was interviewed by officers from the ORG 's GPE office while he was being held by the NORP authorities . On DATE the applicant was granted refugee status under the ORG 's mandate .

Following his placement in the Edirne Foreigners ' Admission and Accommodation Centre , CARDINAL , the applicant went on a hunger strike in protest against his detention and the refusal of the authorities to allow him to have access to the temporary asylum system . He further alleged that he had been kept in solitary confinement in LOC and that he had attempted to commit suicide there .

On DATE the applicant was transferred to the Kırklareli Foreigners ' Admission and ORG . He alleged that his solitary confinement had continued in this ORG .

On DATE following his visit to the ORG and his meeting with the applicant , Mr PERSON reported that the applicant had alleged that he was being detained alone in a cell . The lawyer had then asked a police officer about the conditions in the cell where the applicant was held . The police officer responded that the cell had a toilet and shower in it . The applicant had also told the lawyer that he had not been subjected to ill - treatment and that he did not need to see a psychologist or a psychiatrist .

On DATE ORG ) , a human rights organisation based in GPE , made a visit in order to observe the living conditions in the ORG . According to this organisation 's report , they were not allowed by the ORG 's administration to visit the inside of the FAC where foreign nationals were held or to hold a meeting with the applicant . The officers orally informed them that ORG had sent them written instructions to restrict access to the applicant . However , they did not wish to show PERSON the document in question . PERSON reported that other persons held in the FAC maintained that they did not know that the applicant had been held in FAC a very long time . Subsequently , they learned that the applicant was kept separately from them . According to the report , the ORG 's administration did not allow the applicant , who was suffering psychologically , to talk with any other detainee . Nor was he authorised to hold a meeting with the representatives of the ORG .

The Government submitted that the applicant was held in the Kırklareli Foreigners ' Admission and ORG , which was not a prison or detention centre . Therefore , there were no prison cells or sections where the applicant could be kept in solitary confinement ; neither was there any instruction to that effect .

On DATE the applicant 's representative lodged petitions with the GPE police headquarters and the department responsible for foreigners , borders and asylum attached to ORG . The applicant 's representative noted , in his petition , that ORG had accepted the applicant within the refugee quota for GPE and that an aeroplane ticket to GPE was booked for the applicant for CARDINAL DATE . He requested the administrative authorities to secure the applicant 's release with a view to facilitating the applicant 's departure from GPE .

On an unspecified date the applicant 's representative further lodged an application with ORG for the applicant 's release .

On DATE ORG dismissed the case , holding that the applicant 's representative had failed to attach the documents relevant to his petition , such as those demonstrating that he had already applied to the administrative authorities and that the latter had rejected his requests . The court asked the applicant 's representative to renew his request in the light of the content of its decision within DATE .

On DATE ORG upheld the decision of DATE .

On DATE the applicant 's representative renewed his request before ORG .

On DATE ORG decided to request the office of the ORG to submit information regarding the applicant . In particular , the documents showing the Government of GPE 's decision to grant the applicant refugee status , the documents relating to the interim measure indicated by the ORG and a copy of the case file were requested from the office of the ORG .

On DATE ORG ordered the applicant 's release from the ORG . In its judgment , ORG took into account the applicant 's status as a refugee under the ORG mandate and the fact that ORG had accepted the applicant within the refugee quota . It therefore decided to release the applicant with a view to his transfer to GPE .

By a letter dated DATE , the Government informed the ORG that on DATE the applicant had escaped . They explained that the applicant had fled from the GPE police headquarters where he had been taken in order for him to receive a wire transfer . The Government maintained that the applicant was not apprehended despite the arrest warrant issued by the GPE police following his escape .

By a letter dated DATE , the applicant 's representative informed the ORG that , upon his and the ORG 's request , on that date the applicant had surrendered to the police in order to be released from the ORG Admission and ORG in accordance with ORG decision of DATE .

On DATE the Government and the applicant 's representative informed the ORG that the applicant had been released from ORG and ORG on DATE . The ORG further noted that the applicant had been granted a residence permit for DATE pending his departure to GPE . The applicant 's representative noted that an aeroplane ticket to GPE was booked for the applicant for DATE .

On DATE the applicant 's representative and the Government informed the ORG respectively that the applicant had left GPE on DATE and arrived in GPE where he was granted refugee status .

A description of the relevant domestic law and practice can be found in GPE and GPE v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § DATE , CARDINAL DATE ) .


Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of P1-1;Non-pecuniary damage - award

Giovanni Bonello;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Nebojša Vučinić;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä

The applicants were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in Bihać .

Prior to the dissolution of the former ORG ( “ the SFRY ” ) the applicants deposited foreign currency in their bank accounts at the GPE banka PERSON filijala Bihać . In GPE , as well as in other successor GPE of the former SFRY , such savings are commonly referred to as “ old ” foreign - currency savings ( for the relevant background information see GPE v. GPE DATE . ) , no . CARDINAL , ORG CARDINAL- ... ) .

Following several unsuccessful attempts to withdraw their funds , the applicants initiated court proceedings seeking the recovery of their entire “ old ” foreign - currency savings and accrued interest .

By a decision of ORG of DATE , the GPE banka PERSON filijala PERSON was ordered to pay the applicants MONEY ( DEM ) , MONEY , MONEY , MONEY , MONEY , MONEY , MONEY and MONEY , default interest on the above amounts at the rate applicable to overnight deposits from private individuals from DATE and legal costs in the amount of DEM CARDINAL,CARDINAL . The judgment entered into force on DATE .

On DATE ORG issued a writ of execution ( rješenje o izvršenju ) . The execution proceedings were effectively stayed DATE and DATE .

Meanwhile , on DATE , the judgment debt became a public debt pursuant to ORG .

On DATE ORG within ORG ( “ ORG ” ) found a violation of LAW No . CARDINAL to the LAW arising from a failure to enforce the judgment of DATE . It ordered ORG to ensure full enforcement of the judgment in issue within DATE , to pay the equivalent of CARDINAL in respect of non - pecuniary damage within DATE and to pay default interest after the expiry of the above time - limits at the DATE rate of PERCENT .

On DATE the applicants received the compensation awarded by ORG .

The judgment of DATE was fully enforced on DATE ( the applicants were paid the principal debt , default interest and legal costs in the amounts specified in the judgment ) .

For relevant law and practice see the admissibility decision in ORG , cited above ; PERSON v. GPE ( dec . ) , no . CARDINAL , DATE ; the judgment in GPE v. GPE , no . DATE ... ; and ORG and Others v. GPE , nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL , DATE .


David Thór Björgvinsson;Giovanni Bonello;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before ORG , solicitors in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant 's wife died on DATE leaving dependent children . In DATE the applicant applied for widows ' benefits . On DATE the applicant was informed that his claim had been disallowed . The applicant did not appeal further as he considered or was advised that such a remedy would be bound to fail since no such social security benefit was payable to widowers under GPE law .

The applicant was in receipt of ORG at the relevant time , the amount of which exceeded the rate of Widowed Mother 's ORG .

The domestic law relevant to this application is set out in PERSON v. the GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , ORG CARDINAL-IV and Runkee and White v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § CARDINAL , DATE .


CASE OF MOUVEMENT RAËLIEN SUISSE v. SWITZERLAND

No violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression)

Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;George Nicolaou;Giorgio Malinverni;Khanlar Hajiyev;Sverre Erik Jebens

The applicant association , which was set up in DATE , is a non - profit association registered in PERSON ( GPE of GPE ) . It is the national branch of ORG , an organisation based in GPE and founded in DATE by PERSON , known as “ PERSON ” . According to its constitution , its aim is to make the first contacts and establish good relations with extraterrestrials .

On DATE the applicant association requested authorisation from the police administration for the city of ORG ( the “ police administration ” ) to conduct a poster advertising campaign in the period DATE . The poster in question , measuring QUANTITY , featured in the upper part the following wording in large yellow characters on a dark blue background : “ The Message from Extraterrestrials ” ; in the lower part of the poster , in characters of the same size but in bolder type , the address of ORG website , together with a telephone number in GPE , could be seen ; at the very bottom was the phrase “ Science at last replaces religion ” . The middle of the poster was taken up by pictures of extraterrestrials’ faces and a pyramid , together with a flying saucer and the LOC .

On DATE the police administration denied authorisation , referring to CARDINAL previous refusals . It had been indicated in a NORP parliamentary report on sects , dating from DATE , and in a judgment of the president of ORG for the district of GPE Sarine ( GPE of GPE ) , that ORG engaged in activities that were contrary to public order ( ordre public ) and immoral .

In a decision of DATE the municipal council of the city of ORG dismissed an appeal from the applicant association , finding that it could not rely on the protection of religious freedom because it was to be regarded as a dangerous sect . The interference with freedom of expression had been based on LAW ( the “ Regulations ” ) ; its purpose was to protect the public interest and it was proportionate , since the organisation advocated , among other things , human cloning , “ geniocracy ” and “ sensual meditation ” .

On DATE the ORG upheld that decision . It noted that , for ORG , life on earth had been created by extraterrestrials , who were also the founders of the various religions and were capable of saving the world , and accepted that this amounted to a religious conviction protected by freedom of conscience and belief . It further accepted that ORG constituted a sufficient legal basis in such matters . The ORG observed that there was nothing offensive in the text and picture on the poster , or in the allusion to extraterrestrials . However , it pointed to the fact that ORG advocated “ geniocracy ” ( a political model based on intelligence ) , and human cloning . Moreover , in a judgment of CARDINAL DATE , concerning a right of reply , ORG had found that the movement also “ theoretically ” advocated paedophilia and incest , especially in the works of PERSON himself . The practice of “ sensual meditation ” could also easily lead to abuse . In addition , the website of PERSON , to which ORG site had a link , proposed specific services in the area of cloning , and eugenism was contrary to the principle of non - discrimination . The poster advertising campaign was prejudicial to morals and to the rights of others . In any event , ORG had other means to disseminate its ideas .

The applicant association appealed to ORG for ORG . It claimed , among other things , that the mere defence of “ geniocracy ” , cloning and sensual meditation were not offensive opinions . Moreover , it argued that the movement denounced paedophilia through its association GPE . The refusal to authorise its poster thus amounted purely and simply to censorship , especially as the applicant association ’s website was , in any event , accessible through a search engine .

NORP In a judgment of DATE ORG dismissed the appeal , after acknowledging , however , that the applicant association defended a global vision of the world and was entitled to both freedom of opinion and religious freedom . It found first that the impugned measure was based on ORG , which constituted a law in the substantive sense , and that the poster had to be assessed in relation to the message conveyed by the books and websites that could be accessed from the movement ’s website . The services proposed by PERSON were manifestly contrary to NORP public order . The court further observed that criminal complaints had been filed against ORG alleging the existence of sexual practices that were intended to systematically corrupt young teenagers . The content of the works on “ geniocracy ” and “ sensual meditation ” could lead certain adults to sexually abuse children , the child being described in certain works as a “ privileged sexual object ” . The comments on “ geniocracy ” and the criticisms of contemporary democracies were likely to undermine public order , safety and morality . For those reasons ORG concluded that it was not justifiable to authorise the dissemination of such ideas on the public highway .

The applicant association lodged a public - law appeal against that judgment with ORG , requesting that it be set aside and that the case be referred back to the respondent authority for a new decision .

In a judgment of DATE , served on the applicant association on DATE , ORG dismissed the appeal . The relevant passages read as follows :

“ The ORG , then ORG , acknowledged that the [ applicant ] association could rely on the right to freedom of religion ( Art . CARDINAL of the LAW , Art . CARDINAL ORG and Art . CARDINAL UN Covenant II ) , in so far as it defended a global vision of the world , especially as regards its creation and the origin of the various religions . ORG disputes this , noting that the aim of the [ applicant ] association as defined in LAW , is not religious in nature . According to a report on ‘ sects’ produced in DATE for ORG , ORG is classified among the movements that present dangers for the individual , especially on account of the excessive financial demands made of its members and practices that cause bodily harm , and also dangers for the community , in particular through an antisocial discourse . Many of the movement ’s publications contain passages described as offensive .

There is no need to ascertain whether a religious movement may , on account of the dangers it represents , be precluded from relying on the right to freedom of religion , or whether the [ applicant ] association presents such dangers . Indeed , the parties agree that the applicant is entitled to rely on the right to freedom of opinion . As to the conditions in which such freedom may be restricted , as laid down in LAW , it makes little difference whether LAW is relied on ( see also LAW and CARDINAL § CARDINAL ECHR ) . The applicant association does not argue that the impugned measure impairs the very essence of its religious freedom , or that the restrictions . On the contrary , the applicant association relies on the principles of proportionality and public interest , without distinction as to the constitutional right invoked .

CARDINAL According to case - law , citizens do not have an unconditional right to an extended use of public space , in particular when a means of advertising on the public highway involves activity of a certain scale and duration , and excludes any similar use by third parties ( ORG judgment CARDINAL I CARDINAL point CARDINALc / aa p. CARDINAL and the judgments cited therein ) . When it wishes to grant authorisation for extended or private use of public space , or when it supervises the conditions under which a licence is used , the ORG must nevertheless take into account , in balancing the interests at stake , the substantive content of the right to freedom of expression ( ORG judgment CARDINAL Ia CARDINAL point CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ) .

CARDINAL In the present case , the grounds given by ORG to confirm the refusal by GPE relate to respect for morality and the NORP legal order . ORG took the view that it was necessary to take into account not only the content of the poster but also the ideas conveyed by ORG , together with the works and websites that could be accessed from the movement ’s website . CARDINAL different criticisms are thus directed against the [ applicant ] association . Firstly , the [ applicant ] association ’s website contains a link to that of PERSON , via which this company offers specific cloning - related services to the general public and announced , in DATE , the birth of cloned babies . Cloning is prohibited under NORP law , pursuant to Art . CARDINAL of the LAW and to ORG ( RS CARDINAL ) . Secondly , ORG referred to a judgment of ORG , which mentioned possible sexual abuse of children . Numerous members of the movement had , moreover , been investigated by the police because of their sexual practices . Thirdly , the promotion of ‘ GPE , a doctrine according to which power should be given to the most intelligent individuals , and the criticism consequently directed at contemporary democracies , was likely to undermine the maintaining of public order , safety and morality .

CARDINAL The applicant no longer contests , at this stage , the existence of a sufficient legal basis , namely , in this case , LAW . A municipal by - law offers the same guarantees , in terms of democratic legitimacy , as a Cantonal law , and thus constitutes a sufficient legal basis ( judgment MONEY of CARDINAL DATE point CARDINAL ORG judgment CARDINAL I xxx ; ORG judgment CARDINAL I CARDINAL point CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; CARDINAL GPE CARDINAL point CARDINAL p. CARDINAL and the references cited therein ) . The applicant invokes , however , the principle of public interest and criticises the respondent authorities for going beyond the content of the poster and engaging in an assessment of the [ applicant ] association ’s activities . It argues that if it had generally engaged in conduct that was immoral or in breach of public order , it would have been dissolved by the courts pursuant to Article CARDINAL of LAW . If no decision had been taken to that effect , it would not be possible to prohibit it from publicising its philosophy and world vision .

CARDINAL The poster in itself does not contain anything , either in its text or in its illustrations , that was unlawful or likely to offend the general public . Above the central drawing representing extra - terrestrials appears the text ‘ The Message from Extraterrestrials’ , without any explanation . Below that , the [ applicant ] association ’s website address and a telephone number are printed in bolder type . The phrase ‘ Science at last replaces ORG is admittedly capable of offending the religious beliefs of certain persons , but it is merely the expression of the movement ’s doctrine and can not be described as particularly provocative .

The poster as a whole can thus clearly be seen as an invitation to visit the website of the [ applicant ] association or to contact it by telephone . Faced with such advertising , the authority must examine not only the admissibility of the advertisement ’s message as such , but also that of its content . It is therefore legitimate to ascertain whether the website in question might contain information , data or links capable of offending people or of infringing the law .

Moreover , contrary to the applicant ’s allegation , an association may be criticised for opinions or activities which , without constituting grounds for dissolution within the meaning of LAW , nevertheless justify a restriction on advertising .

CARDINAL As regards cloning , it was not the opinions expressed by the [ applicant ] association in favour of such practices ( particularly in the book Yes to Human Cloning , published in DATE and available via the applicant ’s website ) that were penalised , but the link with the company PERSON , set up by the association itself , which proposes various practical services in this area for payment . The issue is thus not simply , contrary to what the applicant has argued , the expression of a favourable opinion of cloning , protected by LAW , but the practice of that activity , in breach of its prohibition under LAW ( a ) of LAW . That provision , accepted in DATE by the majority of the population and of GPE ( in the form of Article CARDINALnovies ( a ) of the LAW ) , falls in particular within a policy of protection of human dignity , according to the conception thereof that is generally shared in this country ( FF DATE III CARDINAL ; see also the response of ORG to a question from PERSON of DATE ) . The applicant does not contest the unlawfulness of human cloning , especially if it is carried out for commercial gain ( Section CARDINAL § Medically - Assisted Reproduction Act ; Art . CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( e ) of the LAW ) . Nor can it seriously contest the fact that the link to the PERSON website contributes to the promotion of an unlawful activity , and goes further than the mere expression of an opinion . On that first point , which already justifies the decision under appeal , the applicant has not put forward any real relevant argument within the meaning of Art . CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( b ) of LAW .

CARDINAL On DATE the Intercantonal Beliefs Information Centre provided information on ORG . This information shows , among other things , that the movement apparently has a political mission . Virulently attacking democracies , which are referred to as ‘ mediocracies’ , it defends the notion of ‘ GPE , a political model based on ORG level of intelligence . A world government would consist of geniuses , elected by individuals whose intelligence is PERCENT higher than average . Admittedly , “ geniocracy ” is presented as a utopia and not as a genuine political project ; contrary to the finding of ORG , this doctrine does not appear likely to undermine public order or safety .

However , apart from the fact that the doctrine appears to be largely inspired by eugenism , it is manifestly capable of offending the democratic and anti - discriminatory convictions that underpin the rule of law ( see , in particular , the wording of the preamble to LAW of DATE , together with LAW concerning equality and the prohibition of discrimination ) .

CARDINAL.CARDINAL.CARDINAL Lastly , according to the judgment under appeal , it can not be considered that ORG advocates paedophilia . However , numerous members have apparently been investigated by the police on account of their sexual practices . According to a judgment delivered on DATE by ORG Sarine , concerning a right of reply requested by the ORG raëlien GPE , the remarks made by PERSON in his works could lead certain adults to commit acts of sexual abuse against children . The judgment quotes extracts from works by PERSON that can be downloaded from the website of the [ applicant ] association , according to which the sexual education of children should not only be theoretical but should consist of a sensual education aimed at showing them how to derive pleasure from it . That judgment further indicates that , notwithstanding the denial subsequently issued on this point , certain articles published in the DATE newsletter Apocalypse described the child as a ‘ privileged sexual object’ . Lastly , it is stated that a friend and a member of ORG were convicted by ORG and sentenced to DATE imprisonment for sexually assaulting a DATE girl . The judgment was upheld on CARDINAL DATE by ORG . An ordinary appeal and a public - law appeal by the ORG raëlien were dismissed on DATE by ORG , having regard in particular to the equivocal writings of the movement ’s founder or members ( judgments ORG and PERSON ) .

The case - file , moreover , contains various documents concerning criminal proceedings brought against members of the [ applicant ] association for sexual assault . A judgment of DATE of ORG clearly shows that acts of sexual abuse were committed by leaders of the movement against minors . The movement ’s leaders are thus said to have advocated ‘ a broad sexual freedom strongly encouraging commission of the act’ ; they had thus corrupted young teenagers by supposedly philosophical discourse , by increasingly specific sexual fondling and by inciting them more and more forcefully , in order to satisfy ‘ their sexual needs and fantasies with young girls who had just turned DATE , and who were changing partners very quickly’ .

The fact that the impugned articles date from DATE and that there has been no conviction in GPE does not negate the involvement of members of the [ applicant ] association in acts leading to criminal sanctions . The applicant association does not dispute the fact that certain passages in the books available via its website could lead adults to abuse children . On that point also , the applicant ’s arguments do not address the grounds set out in the decision under appeal . Since acts of abuse have indeed been recorded on the part of certain members of ORG , the argument that paedophilia is strongly condemned by the movement ’s official doctrine is not decisive .

CARDINAL Having regard to the foregoing , the refusal issued to the applicant association appears to be justified by sufficient public - interest grounds , because it is necessary to prevent the commission of acts constituting criminal offences under NORP law ( reproductive cloning and sexual acts with children ) . Moreover , certain passages in the works available via the applicant ’s website ( in particular about the ‘ sensual LOC of children , and ‘ GPE ) are likely to be seriously offensive to readers .

CARDINAL The applicant association invokes the principle of proportionality . It points out that the poster itself contains nothing that is contrary to public order , and maintains that the measure is not appropriate to the aim pursued .

CARDINAL In accordance with LAW . , any restriction on a fundamental right must be proportionate to the aim pursued . It must be appropriate to the fulfilment of that aim and any damage to private interests must be kept to a minimum ( ORG judgment CARDINAL I CARDINAL point CARDINAL p. CARDINAL and the references cited therein ) .

CARDINAL.CARDINAL.CARDINAL In the present case , the public interest does not only consist in limiting the publicity given to the [ applicant ] association ’s website , in view of the reservations expressed above about public order and morality ; it is even more important to ensure that the ORG does not provide any support for such publicity by making public space available for it , which might suggest that it endorses or tolerates the opinions or conduct in question . From that perspective , the prohibition of the posters is appropriate to the aim pursued . Furthermore , the measure criticised by the applicant is confined to the display of posters in public spaces . The [ applicant ] association remains free to express its beliefs by many other means of communication at its disposal ( see the PERSON judgment of DATE , ORG CARDINAL-IX , p. CARDINAL , § CARDINAL ) .

CARDINAL.CARDINAL.CARDINAL The applicant takes the view that the authority should have suggested that it make changes to the poster in order to make the content admissible . However , even though it was aware of the objections raised against its poster campaign , the applicant itself never proposed a version of the poster that was likely to be authorised . ORG , for its part , found that the poster should be prohibited even without the reference to the website , but this seems questionable ; there is no doubt , however , that the removal of the address in question would deprive the poster campaign of its object , which , as has been shown , is essentially to advertise the website itself . It is therefore difficult to see what comprehensible meaning the poster could have had without that reference to the website and to the telephone number .

CARDINAL.CARDINAL.CARDINAL The impugned measure therefore respects the principle of proportionality , in all its aspects . It constitutes , for the same reasons , a restriction that is necessary ‘ in a democratic society’ , in particular for the protection of morals , within the meaning of Articles CARDINAL § CARDINAL and CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the ORG . ”

Article CARDINAL of the Federal Constitution concerns reproductive medicine and gene technology involving human beings . That provision reads as follows :

“ Human beings shall be protected against the misuse of reproductive medicine and gene technology .

The ORG shall legislate on the use of human reproductive and genetic material . In doing so , it shall ensure the protection of human dignity , privacy and the family and shall adhere in particular to the following principles :

( a ) All forms of cloning and interference with the genetic material of human reproductive cells and embryos are unlawful .

( b ) Non - human reproductive and genetic material may neither be introduced into nor combined with human reproductive material .

( c ) Methods of medically - assisted reproduction may be used only if infertility or the risk of transmitting a serious illness can not otherwise be overcome , but not in order to conceive a child with specific characteristics or for research purposes ; the fertilisation of human egg cells outside a woman ’s body is permitted only under the conditions laid down by the law ; no more human egg cells may be developed into embryos outside a woman ’s body than are capable of being immediately implanted .

( d ) The donation of embryos and all forms of surrogate motherhood are unlawful .

( e ) Trade in human reproductive material and in products obtained from embryos is prohibited .

( f ) The genetic material of a person may be analysed , registered or made public only with the consent of the person concerned or if the law so provides .

( g ) Everyone shall have access to data relating to their ancestry . ”


Violation of Art. 8;Remainder inadmissible;Non-pecuniary damage - award

The applicant is a NORP national who was born in GPE , GPE , in DATE , and lives in GPE , GPE .

In DATE the applicant acquired NORP citizenship by registration in consequence of his marriage to a NORP national . Subsequently , on DATE the marriage was annulled by court order as it had been found to be a marriage of convenience . However , the applicant retained NORP nationality according to the law in force at the time .

On DATE the applicant married a NORP national in GPE .

In DATE following DATE the applicant applied to ORG to have his marriage registered in GPE .

On several occasions , notwithstanding the presentation of his NORP identity card and a NORP passport , ORG required “ as a matter of policy ” that the applicant submit a letter from ORG declaring that he was a citizen of GPE .

According to the Government the authorities also noted that the requisite translation of the NORP marriage certificate presented by the applicant had not been apostilled by ORG of GPE .

NORP Despite his contention that the request for a letter from ORG did not have a legal basis in domestic law , the applicant requested the ORG to issue the letter . ORG refused to issue such a letter , allegedly replying that he was not bound to issue it then , if at all .

Following the applicant 's request , by a decision of ORG dated DATE , the Director of ORG was directed to register the marriage , upon the applicant submitting his original act of marriage in NORP together with an LANGUAGE translation authenticated by his lawyer .

The applicant 's request remained unsatisfied notwithstanding this decision .

On DATE the decision of CARDINAL DATE was revoked by ORG . The latter , while expressing doubts as to whether the applicant could apply to ORG , held that a NORP passport was not conclusive evidence of citizenship . Furthermore , the Director was vested with discretion to demand documents which he considered reasonable to prove the authenticity of what was submitted to him . The court therefore agreed that the NORP certificate of marriage produced by the applicant was not sufficiently authenticated evidence satisfying the Director of ORG , having regard to LAW ( see relevant domestic law , below ) .

On DATE the applicant instituted proceedings before ORG ( FAC ) in its constitutional jurisdiction . He complained that the refusal to register his marriage was in violation of his LAW alone and in conjunction with LAW .

It appeared from the evidence given by an official employed at ORG that there were CARDINAL reasons for the refusal to register the marriage . Firstly , the documents presented by the applicant had not been authenticated by ORG of GPE , which is the competent authority to attach apostilles to such public documents , and , secondly , that every person who applied for registration was asked to produce a letter of citizenship .

According to the evidence of the relevant Minister , the request for such a certificate did not result from a law or legal notice but from an internal regulation . While in the course of the present proceedings a circular , applicable to all Government departments , was issued stating that NORP passports could be accepted as proof of citizenship , the Minister stated that a letter of citizenship was the best evidence to prove citizenship at any precise moment .

On DATE , during these proceedings , the Head of ORG also confirmed that the applicant was a NORP citizen .

On DATE the applicant withdrew his complaint in relation to Article CARDINAL taken in conjunction with Article CARDINAL .

On DATE , the court rejected the application , with legal costs to be paid by the applicant . It held that Article CARDINAL had not been breached , since the Director of ORG had not categorically refused to register the marriage , but had merely requested appropriate documentation . Moreover , Article CARDINAL did not extend to a general obligation on the part of a Contracting State to respect the choice by married couples of the country of their matrimonial residence and to accept the non - national spouse for settlement in that country .

On DATE , the applicant appealed to ORG .

On DATE the court invited the Director of ORG to indicate the law on which the Registry based its insistence on the “ letter of nationality ” . The Director stated that it was a matter of policy . The case was then adjourned to CARDINAL DATE for the Head of the Nationality department to testify .

Meanwhile , on DATE , the applicant was called upon by the ORG to register the marriage . He was asked to submit the original or an authenticated copy of his marriage certificate . No further documents were requested .

On DATE the marriage was registered on the basis of the documents originally submitted by the applicant .

On DATE , before ORG , the appeal was maintained as the Director of ORG did not accept that the first judgment should be revoked and the costs refunded to the applicant .

On DATE , ORG found that there had not been a violation of LAW . It held that the request for a “ letter of citizenship ” was in accordance with law , namely Article CARDINAL ) of the Civil Code according to which the Director of ORG had to be satisfied that CARDINAL of the parties to the marriage was a NORP citizen . Although an identity card and a passport were prima facie evidence of nationality they were not conclusive , especially when citizenship had been obtained through registration ( as in the case of the applicant ) or naturalisation , both being subject to revocation according to section QUANTITY of LAW ( see relevant domestic law ) . The Minister 's deposition in respect of the recently issued circular was irrelevant , since responsibility for ascertaining the compliance with the requirements of Article CARDINAL ) was for the Director of ORG . Thus , the requirement of a letter of nationality was in accordance with the law , pursued a legitimate aim and was proportionate . However , ORG noted that from the witness testimony at the hearing of DATE , it was clear that the applicant was a NORP citizen ; however , interdepartmental lethargy had meant that the Director of ORG only called upon the applicant to register the marriage on DATE . Thus , the ORG revoked the first - instance judgment in part by ordering the costs to be shared between the parties . It further noted that the applicant had withdrawn his LAW complaint and consequently no appeal lay against it .

Regarding marriages in foreign countries , LAW , LAW of LAW , in so far as relevant , reads as follows :

( CARDINAL ) Any act of birth , marriage or death of a citizen of GPE drawn up or registered in a foreign country by a competent authority in that country , ... may , at the request of any person interested and upon the Director of ORG being satisfied of the authenticity of such act , be registered in these LOC in the same manner as if it were an act drawn up by any of the persons mentioned in this Title .

( CARDINAL ) The person making the request shall , for the purposes of registration , deliver to the Director the act in respect of which such request is made .

In this respect , LAW reads as follows :

( CARDINAL ) The Director shall not accept any act which is not written in clear and legible characters , or which contains abbreviations , or which may appear to him to be otherwise defective or irregular .

( CARDINAL ) In any such case , the act shall be presented by the Director to CARDINAL of the Visitors of notarial acts , who , after hearing , if necessary , the person by whom the act has been made , shall determine the manner in which , according to law , the act is to be drawn up .

( CARDINAL ) The Director may not refuse to accept any act which is countersigned by CARDINAL of the said Visitors .

In respect of registration and the validity of marriages , sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW , LAW of LAW , provide as follows :

Section CARDINAL

( CARDINAL ) Registration is not essential to the validity of marriage .

( CARDINAL ) Registration shall not operate to validate a marriage which , independently of such registration , is null .

( CARDINAL ) A marriage shall not have effect for any purpose of law unless and until the appropriate act of marriage is completed and delivered for registration in accordance with the provisions of articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW .

Section CARDINAL

A marriage , whether celebrated in GPE or abroad , shall be valid for all purposes of law in GPE if -

( a ) as regards the formalities thereof , the formalities required for its validity by the law of the country where the marriage is celebrated are observed ; and

( b ) as regards the capacity of the parties , each of the persons to be married is , by the law of the country of his or her respective domicile , capable of contracting marriage .

Article CARDINAL of LAW ( “ COCP ” ) provides a list of documents requiring no proof of authenticity other than that which they bear on the face of them . ORG - article ( f ) refers to the certificates issued from ORG .

According to a notice published on the Government website by ORG and Expatriate affairs , dated DATE , regarding registration of foreign certificates concerning citizens of GPE at ORG , the documents required for registration of a marriage abroad by a citizen of GPE are as follows : CARDINAL ) marriage certificate , CARDINAL ) birth certificate CARDINAL ) father 's birth certificate CARDINAL ) parents ' marriage certificate CARDINAL ) NORP passport .

According to section CARDINAL of LAW , LAW , as in force since DATE , the Minister may by order deprive of his NORP citizenship any citizen of GPE who is such by registration or naturalisation if he is satisfied that the registration or certificate of naturalisation was obtained by means of fraud , false representation or the concealment of any material fact or on any other of an exhaustive list of grounds .

According to LAW , apostilles may only be issued by a ORG designated by the ORG on whose territory the public document has been executed . Its Article CARDINAL lists the competent authorities , which in so far as relevant in respect of GPE , reads as follows :

ORG of GPE ;

ORG of GPE ;

ORG of GPE ;

ORG of the executive bodies in subjects of GPE ;

ORG and the authorised bodies for archives of the executive power in subjects of GPE ;

ORG ;

ORG of GPE on official archive documents on military service ( employment ) in ORG , ORG GPE and ORG ( ORG ) , issued in GPE .


Violation of Art. 6-1 with regard to the length of the proceedings;Inadmissible under Art. 6-1 with regard to the fairness of the proceedings;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

On DATE the applicant lodged a motion with ORG , claiming a division of inheritance and dissolution of co - ownership of a certain property .

The court held hearings on : CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE , DATE , CARDINAL DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE .

Having regard to the lack of progress in the proceedings , and apparently aiming at obtaining possession of the property by other legal means , on DATE the applicant lodged a motion with ORG , claiming acquisitive CARDINAL of the property in question . By a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed her motion . By a decision of DATE ORG dismissed her further appeal and upheld the contested decision .

Further hearings in the dissolution case were held on DATE , DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE .

The court ordered a number of expert opinions . They were submitted to the court on : CARDINAL DATE , DATE , DATE , CARDINAL DATE , DATE , DATE , CARDINAL DATE , DATE , CARDINAL DATE , DATE and DATE . ORG

By a decision of DATE ORG stayed the proceedings due to the fact that one of the parties to the proceedings had died . By virtue of the same decision the court resumed the proceedings , having regard to his heirs ' request that the proceedings be resumed .

On DATE the ORG gave a judgment on the merits .

On DATE the ORG dismissed the applicant 's appeal .

By a decision of DATE ORG declined to examine the cassation appeal , considering that it had not been shown that arguable public interest grounds existed which would justify the examination of the appeal .


Giovanni Bonello;Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before the ORG by PERSON , solicitors in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant ’s wife died on DATE , leaving CARDINAL child born in DATE . In DATE or DATE the applicant applied for widows’ benefits . On DATE the applicant was informed that his claim had been disallowed as he was not a woman . By a letter of CARDINAL DATE the GPE agency confirmed their decision and the lack of his right to an appeal . The applicant did not appeal further as he considered or was advised that such a remedy would be bound to fail since no such social security benefit was payable to widowers under GPE law .

The applicant was not in receipt of child benefit at the time of his claim .

The domestic law relevant to this application is set out in PERSON v. the GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , ORG CARDINAL-IV and Runkee and White v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § CARDINAL , DATE .


The applicant , PERSON is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Mr PERSON of ORG .

The proceedings initiated upon the applicant ’s motion

On DATE the applicant lodged an action against her father with ORG . She sought an increase of the amount of maintenance to be paid by her father , who was partially incapacitated .

On DATE the first hearing was held .

On an unknown date the court requested the case file of the proceedings for annulment of the marriage of the applicant ’s parents .

On DATE the applicant supplemented her action by seeking maintenance also from her grandfather .

On DATE the court was informed by ORG that in the proceedings for annulment of the applicant ’s GPE marriage the court had not ruled on the issue of the applicant ’s maintenance .

On DATE the applicant amended her claim as she no longer wished to claim maintenance from her grandfather and changed the amount of maintenance claimed from her father .

On DATE ORG gave a judgment . The applicant ’s father was ordered to pay the applicant DATE maintenance in the amount of MONEY in place of the previous amount of QUANTITY per month . The court made the judgment immediately enforceable .

On DATE the applicant ’s father lodged an appeal .

On DATE the court requested the guardian of the applicant ’s father to confirm his appeal as the applicant ’s father was partially incapacitated .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE the legal representative of the applicant ’s father stated that he did not support the appeal .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s father ’s appeal of DATE on formal grounds .

The proceedings initiated upon the applicant ’s father ’s motion

On DATE the applicant ’s father lodged a motion for exemption from court fees , which was subsequently granted by ORG .

On DATE , CARDINAL May and DATE ORG held hearings in the case .

By a judgment of DATE ORG reduced the amount of maintenance from CARDINAL FAC to CARDINAL . The court - appointed guardian lodged an appeal on behalf of the applicant ’s father . It was rejected on DATE by ORG for non - compliance with the prescribed time - limit .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against the judgment of DATE . The applicant was served with the decision on DATE .

At a hearing held on DATE the applicant ’s father withdrew his motion for annulment of the alimony decision .