Violation of Art. 8;Violation of Art. 6-1;Just satisfaction reserved

ORG The applicant , who is a NORP citizen born in DATE and lives in GPE , was married in DATE . He and his wife have CARDINAL children ; the present case concerns only the youngest of them , S , who was born on DATE . The couple has a history of serious marital and financial difficulties .

ORG On DATE , when the applicant ’s wife was suffering from post - natal depression and alcoholism , S was placed by his parents into the voluntary care ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) of the local authority ( " the ORG " ) . He stayed with foster parents on a temporary basis , returned home on DATE at the applicant ’s request and was again placed voluntarily in care on DATE . After DATE at home on DATE , he was again voluntarily returned to care and remained with foster parents until DATE He then spent a period with his parents before once more , on DATE , returning to and remaining in voluntary care , subject to parental visits and some weekends at home .

ORG Following a suggestion made by her to the ORG ’s social workers , the applicant ’s wife took S home on DATE but subsequently changed her mind and returned him to the foster parents . On DATE , the ORG , which had already given previous consideration to such a course , passed resolutions assuming the parental rights of the applicant and his wife over S ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . It had apparently not informed them that such resolutions were proposed , but on DATE it reached an agreement with them that S would be returned to them in DATE if they overcame their domestic difficulties . In any event , the applicant did not exercise his right to object to the resolution affecting him ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

ORG On DATE , DATE after the applicant ’s wife had been admitted to hospital for treatment following a deterioration in her alcoholism , the ORG reviewed the family circumstances . It was concluded that the prospects of ORG ’s rehabilitation were poor but that the aforementioned agreement should be retained , the social workers responsible considering that there could be no postponement of the date for ORG return to his natural parents beyond DATE . In case it proved impossible to effect the return at that time , it was also agreed that the possibility of finding long - term foster parents should be examined as a contingency plan .

ORG S spent DATE over DATE with his natural family . The applicant continued to look after his CARDINAL older children but in DATE they were placed temporarily into voluntary care as he was threatened with loss of his job if he did not resume work ; the placement was intended to end on his wife ’s discharge from hospital .

A social worker saw the applicant ’s wife in hospital on DATE and reported that she seemed worried at the prospect of the children ’s return home . The social worker warned her that , as regards S , the alternative would be his placement in long - term care . On DATE , the social worker saw the applicant in connection with his matrimonial difficulties and the future of the CARDINAL older children , but the prospect of S not being returned to his natural parents was not discussed .

ORG On DATE , the ORG passed resolutions to assume parental rights over the CARDINAL older children . According to the applicant , he raised no objection since it was agreed between the parents and the ORG ’s care officers that these children would be returned to their parents over a period . They were in fact returned on CARDINAL DATE and have remained at home ever since . The applicant and his wife contend that they understood the agreement to envisage the return of S as well .

ORG According to the report of ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , the social workers responsible for S and the remainder of the applicant ’s family reached the conclusion in DATE or DATE , from their nearly continuous review of the circumstances , that the arrangement for returning S to his natural parents would not work in view of the prognosis for the applicant ’s wife ’s alcoholism and the apparent breakdown of the marriage . On an unrecorded date , an unspecified person or persons in the ORG ’s ORG decided that ORG should not return home but should be placed with foster parents on a long - term basis with a view to adoption and that the natural GPE access to him should be restricted . There is no recorded minute of any decision to this effect having been taken by the ORG in a formal manner at that time and the possibility of such placement was apparently not mentioned to the applicant when the social workers saw him on DATE nor to his wife on DATE , when they visited her to inform her of the resolutions concerning the CARDINAL older children . Although it appears from ORG report that the parents had on previous occasions been made aware of the possibility that S might be placed in long - term care , he was clearly not satisfied that the likely course of events with regard to S had been made sufficiently plain to them and that they had been properly consulted before the decision was taken not to return the child to them .

In any event , on CARDINAL and DATE respectively , the applicant and his wife were informed of the decision orally by the social workers responsible . According to ORG report , the social worker dealing with the case was not sure that even then either parent clearly understood what was being said about PERSON ’s future , their concern at the time being " totally focused " on the CARDINAL older children .

ORG On DATE , the ORG ’s Adoption and ORG , without further reference to the applicant or his wife , considered and approved the proposal to place S with long - term foster parents and to restrict his natural GPE access to him . The ORG was told by the social workers responsible that the applicant and his wife , who were neither present at nor knew of the meeting , disagreed with the proposal . The minute of the ORG ’s discussion records : " It was suggested that if there was to be no parental contact the mother particularly would ‘ search to the ends of the earth for [ ORG . However , parental contact to be controlled and not at [ the foster GPE ] home . "

The ORG informed ORG in the course of his enquiries that , in its view , TIME reflected the intention that the applicant and his wife should not know where PERSON was placed . In any event , it clearly records a decision that access should be restricted , both as to location and frequency , but not terminated .

ORG On DATE , the senior social worker responsible for the case visited the applicant and his wife to inform them that S was being moved to new foster parents ; the record of his visit states that he told them that he was not prepared to disclose where the foster parents lived . In addition , it appears that since the Area Director of ORG considered that access would jeopardise the chances of S developing a satisfactory relationship with the new foster parents , he had decided that the applicant and his wife should not be allowed to visit S. It is not revealed how , if at all , this decision to terminate access derived from the discussions of ORG as recorded in the minute quoted above . According to the Government , the applicant was made aware of this decision in DATE

ORG On DATE , S was moved to a new foster family for long - term fostering , with a view to adoption .

ORG Some time after DATE and apparently as a result of the shock of being sentenced to prison for theft , the applicant ’s wife made a remarkable recovery from her alcoholism . The couple also resolved their matrimonial difficulties . They continued to seek access to S and protested to ORG at the refusal thereof ; a meeting for them to see the child at the social services building was eventually arranged in DATE . Having consulted solicitors in DATE with a view to challenging the ORG ’s actions , the applicant and his wife were granted legal aid to apply to a juvenile court to discharge the ORG ’s parental rights resolutions concerning S ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) and proceedings were issued on DATE . At the request of the ORG , the hearing , originally fixed for DATE , was postponed to DATE . On DATE , the juvenile court held that both of the resolutions should " henceforth be terminated " , thereby permitting S to be returned to the applicant and his wife .

ORG On DATE , the ORG appealed to ORG against the juvenile court ’s decision ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) and also issued proceedings in the local ORG of ORG to have PERSON made a ward of court ( see paragraphs DATE below ) .

There followed a period of uncertainty as to which of these proceedings the ORG would pursue . On DATE ( the last possible day to prevent the wardship from lapsing ; see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , the ORG took out a notice for an appointment , to be held on DATE , for hearing the summons initiating the wardship . On DATE , when the ORG applied to ORG for directions , the applicant ’s solicitor challenged the propriety of the wardship proceedings as a duplication of the jurisdiction and this question was referred as a preliminary issue to be heard before a ORG judge . On DATE , the judge permitted the ORG , which undertook to withdraw its appeal before ORG , to continue with the wardship proceedings ; he directed that the case be heard as soon as possible and ordered that it be set down in DATE , no earlier date being available having regard to the expected length of the hearing .

ORG The case was heard on CARDINAL and DATE . After evaluating the evidence submitted in relation to ORG ’s well - being and the applicant ’s circumstances ( including a report of DATE from an independent welfare officer ) , ORG held that the wardship should continue and directed that the child should remain with the foster parents with whom he had been placed in DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) : there was no longer any practical alternative to this , too long a period having elapsed since LOC ’s last contact with his natural parents ( on DATE ) for any change to be justified . ORG also held that the applicant and his wife should not have access to the child , noting that restoring rights of access would only encourage them in their attempts to have PERSON returned to them , a course which would not be in his best interests . However , in the course of his judgment , the judge stated :

" I can only say that it is extremely unfortunate that these [ wardship ] proceedings were not heard within a matter of DATE after the [ juvenile court ’s ] decision . I see no reason why they could not have been ... However , the hearing did not take place and the parents and ORG are now faced with the fact that a further DATE have gone by in which ORG has become even closer to his foster parents . "

" ... I am not happy about the use of LAW [ of LAW DATE ] powers to change the status of the child and to cut the parents out of his life , and I am unhappy about a decision arrived at by the local authority without the parents being heard or having the opportunity to make their own representations to the decision - making body ... "

The judge also commented on the " massive help " received by the parents from the social services .

ORG An appeal by the applicant to ORG was dismissed on DATE . ORG expressed its sympathy for the natural parents , describing the case as " tragic " , but stressed that its duty was to arrive at a decision which was in the best interests of the child and that " the question from beginning to CARDINALend is whether the child ’s best interests would be served by remaining with his foster parents or by being transferred to his natural parents " . Although the ORG recognised that " both the mother and the father deserve all the credit for pulling themselves out of an appalling situation " and that they had " succeeded remarkably " in coping with their older children , it found that S presented " a different problem " in the light of the fact that he had spent almost the whole of his life in the care of other people .

ORG The applicant referred the matter to ORG , who has the task of investigating complaints made by a member of the public claiming to have sustained injustice in consequence of maladministration in connection with action taken by a local authority in the exercise of its administrative functions .

In his report of CARDINAL DATE , ORG upheld the applicant ’s allegation of maladministration in the way in which the ORG had taken its decisions concerning ORG , stating in particular that he criticised " the failure to put the parents properly in the picture before firm decisions were taken " .

ORG On DATE , the foster parents with whom S had been placed in DATE were granted leave to apply to adopt the child ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . An adoption order relating to him was made on DATE , ORG having decided to dispense with the applicant ’s consent ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

ORG In the law of GPE and GPE , there are a number of different and partially co - ordinated procedures for dealing with the welfare of children . Whilst the oldest of these is the wardship jurisdiction of ORG , it has for DATE co - existed with , but not been ousted by , various statutory provisions whereby a child who is at risk may be put into the care of a local authority .

Although the terms are not wholly accurate , the legislation is commonly divided into CARDINAL categories : the first provides for " compulsory care " , by establishing machinery whereby a local authority can obtain a court order committing a child to its care ; the second concerns " voluntary care " , the machinery here being originally designed to meet an emergency situation without the need of recourse to the courts . At any given time , there are CARDINAL children in public care in GPE and GPE , of whom CARDINAL are not living with their parents or a relative .

The statutory provisions have been amended on several occasions and many of them were repealed and replaced by LAW ( " LAW " ) , a consolidating measure the greater part of which came into force on DATE . In the following summary of the law in force at the time of the present case , the original enactments are cited first and any corresponding provision of the DATE Act in force at the relevant time is indicated in square brackets .

By way of general background information , the summary covers all CARDINAL of the procedures referred to above ( namely those relating to compulsory care , voluntary care and wardship ) , but in the present case it was the machinery for voluntary care and the wardship jurisdiction of ORG which were directly relevant .

ORG The principal statute concerning compulsory care is ORG " LAW " ) , as amended by LAW DATE and then partly replaced by LAW ; it enables a local authority to obtain , as a temporary measure , a " place of safety order " and , as longer - term measures , a variety of other orders .

ORG Under section CARDINAL ) of the CARDINAL Act , any person , including a local authority , may apply to a justice of the peace for authority to detain a child and take him to a place of safety ; the justice may grant the application if he is satisfied that the applicant has reasonable cause to believe , inter alia , that the child ’s proper development is being avoidably prevented or neglected or his health is being avoidably impaired or neglected or he is being ill - treated , or that he is exposed to moral danger .

A " place of safety order " so granted lasts for a maximum of DATE and can not be extended . The person detaining the child must as soon as possible take such steps as are practicable for informing his parent of the detention and the reason for it .

If the local authority wishes to retain the child in protective surroundings after the DATE period , it has either to make the child a ward of court ( see paragraphs DATE below ) , or to institute care proceedings under LAW ( see paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL below ) , or to apply to a justice or a GPE court for an interim order under section PERSON ) ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) ; if an application of the last kind is refused , the child ’s immediate release " may be ordered " .

ORG Under sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL ) of the DATE Act , a local authority which reasonably believes that there are grounds for making an order as to the care and control or supervision of a child is , subject to certain exceptions , under a duty to institute care proceedings by bringing the child before a juvenile court .

ORG In care proceedings instituted by a local authority , the parties are the local authority and the child , but not the latter ’s parents . The child is entitled , subject to his means , to legal aid and it is open to him to have his parents conduct the case on his behalf either directly or through a lawyer . If the child is of sufficient competence , he may decide that he wishes to be separately represented .

A natural parent who is not acting on behalf of the child is entitled to be notified of and to attend the hearing and to give and call evidence challenging the allegations made by the local authority . As a matter of practice , the court will also allow such parent to cross - examine witnesses on behalf of the local authority and to have separate legal representation .

ORG If the court before which the child is brought is satisfied that one of the grounds specified in LAW exists and that the child is in need of care or control which he is unlikely to receive unless an order is made , it may make , inter alia , a supervision order , a care order or an interim order . The specified grounds include those on which a place of safety order may be made ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

ORG A supervision order is an order placing the child under the structured supervision of the local authority ; subject thereto , he may continue to live with his parents .

ORG A care order is an order committing the child to the care of the local authority . The latter will have the same powers and duties with respect to the child as his parent or guardian would have apart from the care order ( section CARDINAL of the DATE Act [ ORG ) of the DATE Act ] ) , except that it can not cause the child to be brought up in any religious creed other than that in which he would otherwise have been brought up and it can not agree to the child ’s adoption .

ORG An interim order is a care order limited to a specified period not exceeding DATE ; it may be renewed on application ( section QUANTITY of the DATE Act ) . It may be made if the juvenile court hearing the care proceedings is not in a position to decide which of the other specified orders ought to be made ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ) or , alternatively , during the currency of a place of safety order ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The powers and duties of the local authority under an interim order are the same as under a full care order ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

ORG A full care order normally terminates when the child in question attains the age of DATE ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(b ) of the DATE Act ) .

In addition , under sections CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL ) , the juvenile court may , on application by the child or his parent on the child ’s ( but not his own ) behalf and if it considers it appropriate , discharge the care order and may , on discharging it , make a supervision order in respect of the child . Such applications may be made DATE or , with the juvenile court ’s permission , more frequently ( section ORG ) ) . The paramount consideration in deciding whether to discharge the order is the interests of the child .

ORG Under sections CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and ORG of the DATE Act , the child in respect of whom the care order was made , or his parent on the child ’s ( but not his own ) behalf , may appeal to ORG against the making of a care order , against the refusal of an application to discharge a care order or against the making of a supervision order on its discharge . ORG will review the decision by way of re - hearing the case . From ORG a further appeal may , with leave , be made to ORG by way of case stated ; thereafter an appeal lies to ORG and , in rare cases , to ORG .

The local authority has no general right to appeal against a juvenile court ’s refusal to make a care order , except on a point of law to ORG .

ORG The principal statute concerning voluntary care is LAW DATE ( " LAW " ) , as amended by LAW DATE and then replaced by LAW . This legislation in effect enables a parent to place his child into the care of a local authority ; at the initial stage the authority acquires no special status in relation to the child but a different situation may arise subsequently .

ORG LAW the DATE LAW ] imposes on the local authority a duty to receive into its care a child under DATE where it appears , inter alia , that his parents or guardian are for the time being or permanently prevented by illness , incapacity or other circumstances from providing for his proper accommodation , maintenance and upbringing and that the intervention of the authority is necessary in the interests of the child ’s welfare . Whilst the authority must , save as otherwise provided in the LAW , keep the child in its care so long as his welfare requires it and he has not attained the age of DATE , it is also under a duty to endeavour to secure the resumption of parental care where this appears consistent with the child ’s welfare .

ORG LAW the DATE LAW ] specifies that it does not entitle the local authority to keep the child in care if any parent or guardian desires to take over that care . However , if the child has been in care throughout DATE , no person may take him away unless he has given CARDINAL days’ notice of his intention to do so or has the authority ’s consent ( section CARDINAL(CARDINALA ) [ CARDINAL ) ] ) .

Moreover , if a parent requests the return of the child , the authority is not compelled to comply regardless of his welfare ( ORG v. ORG [ DATE ] CARDINAL All England Law Reports CARDINAL ) . If it then considers the transfer of care to the parent to be inconsistent with that welfare , it may either pass a parental rights resolution ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) or apply to make the child a ward of court ( see paragraphs DATE below ) .

ORG If it appears to a local authority in relation to any child who is in its care under LAW [ CARDINAL of the DATE Act ] that , inter alia , a parent of his is unfit to have the care of the child on account , notably , of his habits or mode of life or of having consistently failed without reasonable cause to discharge the obligations of a parent , the local authority may resolve that there vest in it the parental rights and duties with respect to that child ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) [ CARDINAL ) ] ) . The rights and duties which so vest are all rights and duties which by law the mother and father have in relation to a legitimate child and his property , including " a right of access " but excluding the right to agree or refuse to agree to the making of an adoption or certain related orders ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the DATE Act [ CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW ] and section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW DATE ) .

Before passing a parental rights resolution , the local authority must consider a report from its ORG on the desirability of assuming parental rights , which report should contain all the material necessary for the proper exercise of the authority ’s discretion . In deciding the matter , the authority is to regard the interests of the child as of paramount importance and the views of the parents on the proposal are to be taken into account .

ORG If the parent has not already consented in writing to the parental rights resolution and his whereabouts are known , he must be served with notice of it , indicating his right to object by counter - notice within DATE ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ) [ CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ] ) . If such objection is made , the resolution lapses on the expiry of DATE from service of the counter - notice ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) [ CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ] ) . However , within that period , the local authority may " complain " to a juvenile court , in which event the resolution will not lapse until the complaint is determined ; on hearing the complaint , the court may order that the resolution is not to lapse , provided that it is satisfied that the grounds for the resolution were made out when it was passed and subsist at the time of the hearing and that the continuation of the resolution is in the child ’s interest ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) [ CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) ] ) .

ORG A parental rights resolution continues in force until the child attains the age of DATE , unless it is previously rescinded by the local authority or terminated by a juvenile court ( section CARDINAL of LAW [ CARDINAL of the DATE Act ] ) .

The parent concerned , even if he did not originally object to the parental rights resolution , may apply to a juvenile court for its discharge . The court may grant the application if it is satisfied that there were no grounds for the making of the resolution or that it should be terminated in the child ’s interests ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(b ) [ CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(b ) ] ) . An application based on the original foundation for the resolution can , however , be entertained only if lodged within DATE of its adoption ( section CARDINAL of the Magistrates’ Court Act DATE ) .

ORG Under section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act [ CARDINAL of the DATE Act ] , an appeal ( by the parent or the local authority ) lies to ORG of ORG from the making by a juvenile court of an order confirming ( under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) [ CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ] ) or discharging ( under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(b ) [ CARDINAL ) ] ) a parental rights resolution , or from a juvenile court ’s refusal to make such an order . A further appeal lies to ORG and , with leave , to ORG .

ORG of ORG has an inherent jurisdiction , independent of statutory provisions and deriving from the prerogative power of the ORG acting in its capacity as parens patriae , to make a child a ward of court .

ORG The effect of wardship is that custody , in a broad sense , of the child is vested in the court itself ; it assumes responsibility for all aspects of his welfare and may make orders on any relevant matter whatsoever , notably as regards the care and control of and access to the child and his education , religion or property . In making such orders , the court is required to treat the child ’s welfare as the " first and paramount consideration " ( Guardianship of Minors Act DATE , section CARDINAL ) . Unless terminated earlier by order of the court , the wardship continues until the child attains his majority .

Where there are exceptional circumstances making it impracticable or undesirable for the ward to be , or continue to be , under the care of his parents , the court may make an order committing him to the care of the local authority ( LAW DATE , section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ) , subject to the power of the court to give directions ( Matrimonial Causes Act DATE , section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(a ) ) . In such circumstances , custody of the child remains with the court and it is for the court , and not the local authority , to take major decisions regarding the ward ’s future ; it retains , inter alia , jurisdiction to make orders for access to the child .

PERSON proceedings may be instituted by anyone who can show an appropriate interest in the child ’s welfare . An application for a wardship order has to be made by originating summons . The child becomes a ward immediately the summons is issued but the wardship automatically lapses after DATE unless within that time an appointment is made for the hearing of the summons . This appointment is normally held before a registrar who , subject to an appeal to a judge , may give interim directions on such matters as access to the child and may decide that other interested parties be joined in the proceedings .

A judge will hear contested wardship proceedings and also applications - which can be made at any time by any party - for the variation or discharge of an existing wardship order or for directions on such matters as access to or the education of the child . From the judge ’s order , an appeal lies to ORG and thence , with leave , to ORG .

The child may be represented in wardship proceedings by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court ; this is usually the Official Solicitor , who is a full - time public employee entirely independent of the executive .

Under the Rules of ORG , it is possible to seek an order expediting the proceedings , notably if a party thereto is dilatory .

ORG The functions of a local authority in child - care matters are exercised and decisions are taken either by its ORG or by a sub - committee or an officer to whom powers have been delegated . At the time relevant to the present case , the practice varied from authority to authority , there being no precise requirements or guidance even of a non - statutory kind , and much depended on the nature or gravity of the decision to be taken . Whether the child is in its care by virtue of the DATE [ DATE ] or LAW , the local authority must give first consideration to the need to safeguard and promote the child ’s welfare throughout his childhood , and must so far as practicable ascertain his wishes and feelings regarding the decision and give due consideration to them , having regard to his age and understanding ( section CARDINAL of LAW DATE [ CARDINAL ) of the DATE Act ] ) .

Authorities’ decisions in this area are , in fact , often based on the outcome of case reviews or case conferences . The authority is under a statutory duty to review the case of each child in its care at DATE intervals ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the DATE Act ) and , as a matter of practice , the child ’s position will in addition be regularly examined at case conferences . Reviews and conferences will be attended notably by the social workers responsible and senior officials of the authority ’s ORG , as well as by such other persons as health visitors , doctors and police officers .

ORG A parent may on occasion be allowed or invited to attend a case review or case conference or part thereof , although he has no legal right to do so . His contacts with the social workers constitute the most usual channel for the communication of his views on matters to be decided by the authority .

In the absence of legal proceedings , the parent can not compel the local authority to produce or permit inspection of TIME of its relevant meetings or reports produced thereat , although the authority has a discretion to allow such inspection . In proceedings for judicial review ( but not in juvenile court proceedings ) , the court may order the pre - trial disclosure of such documents , but only after leave to institute the proceedings has been obtained ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) ; however , this would be a rare occurrence , the general rule being that the documents are privileged and not open to inspection .

ORG A parent whose child is in the care of a local authority is not automatically deprived of access to him . The continuation of access is , however , a matter within the discretionary power of the authority ( per Lord PERSON in ORG [ DATE ] CARDINAL All England Law Reports CARDINAL ) . Thus , under LANGUAGE law , the question whether and to what extent a parent is to have access to his child who is in public care was , at the relevant time , within the competence of the local authority to decide , without any application to a court .

Both the DATE [ CARDINAL ] Act and the DATE Act reflect the general idea that continuation of parental access to children in public care is in many cases normal and desirable : the former allows the local authority to contribute to the costs of parental visits and the latter makes special provision for certain cases where the parents have not visited the child during a certain period of time .

ORG The statutory remedies described in paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL - CARDINAL above , whereby a parent may challenge or seek the discharge of a care order or a parental rights resolution , are directed to the order or resolution as such , there being , at the relevant time , no specific statutory remedy whereby he could contest the isolated issue of a decision to restrict or terminate his access to his child .

A decision of a local authority concerning access can , however , be challenged by way of an application for judicial review . Anyone who wishes to make such an application must first seek , normally within DATE of the decision , the leave of the court . The circumstances where judicial review will lie may be briefly summarised as follows :

( a ) the authority acted illegally , ultra vires or in bad faith ;

( b ) the authority failed to take into account relevant considerations , took account of irrelevant considerations or came to a decision to which no reasonable authority could have come ( Associated Provincial Picture Houses , Ltd. v. ORG [ DATE ] CARDINAL ORG Bench Reports CARDINAL ) ;

( c ) the authority failed to observe statutory procedural rules or to act fairly ( see notably R v. ORG , ex parte C and R v. GPE , ex parte B , ORG , DATE ) .

The remedy of judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in question but rather the decision - making process itself , and the court will not act as a " court of appeal " from the body involved . Thus , where on a successful application for judicial review the court quashes an authority ’s decision , it will normally remit the matter to the authority for reconsideration ; it may , however , also direct the authority to reach a conclusion in accordance with the court ’s findings ( Rules of ORG , Order CARDINAL , rule ORG ) ) .

ORG In certain circumstances , the wardship jurisdiction may also be invoked to question the decisions of a local authority or a juvenile court relating to a child in the former ’s care . The general rule is that the prerogative power of the Crown is not for all purposes ousted or abrogated by the exercise of the duties and powers conferred on local authorities by legislation . In the leading case of ORG , ORG examined the relationship between the wardship jurisdiction and the authorities’ statutory powers . Their Lordships were unanimously of the view that the courts had no reviewing powers as to the merits of local authority decisions , notably on such matters as access to the child : the general inherent power of the court in its wardship jurisdiction was available to fill gaps or supplement the powers of local authorities but not to supervise ( except on judicial review principles ; see paragraph CARDINAL above ) the exercise of discretion within the field committed to them by statute . Sometimes , however , the local authority itself may invite the supplementary assistance of the court and the wardship may then be continued with a view to action by the court .

The foregoing limits on ORG powers apply only where the wardship proceedings concern a child who is already in public care . If he is not , ORG can examine fully such questions as access and make such order as it considers to be in his best interests .

ORG The inability of parents to approach the courts , save as explained above , where decisions are made by a local authority affecting access to their children led ORG , in ORG Social Security Adjudications Act CARDINAL , to modify the law on this point .

Under the new provisions - which came into force on DATE , that is after the events giving rise to the present case - , a local authority may not refuse to make arrangements for access to a child in care and may not terminate such arrangements unless it has first given notice to the parent . The latter then has a right to apply to a juvenile court for an access order , requiring the local authority to allow access subject to such conditions as the court may specify . Where an access order has been made , there is a right to apply for variation . An appeal against the juvenile court ’s decision lies to ORG . Any court dealing with the matter must regard the welfare of the child as the first and paramount consideration .

This new remedy applies only to decisions refusing or terminating access ; in all other cases , the nature and extent of access remain within the local authority ’s discretion .

ORG In DATE , the Government published a Code of Practice on Access to Children in Care . This document stresses the importance of involving the child ’s natural parents in the local authority ’s decision - making process in this area and of informing them fully and promptly as to the substance of decisions concerning access .

ORG A court can not make an adoption order in respect of a child unless , inter alia , it is satisfied that each parent freely and unconditionally agrees ( LAW DATE , section CARDINAL ) . However , such agreement may be dispensed with upon a number of grounds specified in that section , notably that the parent is withholding consent unreasonably or has persistently failed without reasonable cause to discharge his parental duties . In reaching any decision relating to the adoption of a child , a court must have regard to all the circumstances , first consideration being given to the need to safeguard and promote his welfare throughout his childhood ( Children Act DATE , section CARDINAL ) .

Adoption proceedings in respect of a child who is a ward of court may not be instituted without the leave of ORG . On an application for leave , the court ’s function is to consider whether the proposed adoption application is one that might reasonably succeed , the merits of the matter being examined subsequently , once leave has been granted and after compliance with the requirements concerning notices and reports .


Violation of Art. 6-1;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award

NORP In DATE a group of industrial enterprises in the coal industry was dismantled . As a result , the applicant was dismissed . On DATE ORG annulled his dismissal and ordered the Minister of Industry to assign a company to re - engage him . In DATE , ORG informed the applicant that the Niwka - Modrzejów coal - mine had taken over certain obligations of his former employer and would re - engage him . However , the coal - mine refused to do so , considering that the applicant did not satisfy applicable medical requirements .

On DATE the applicant filed an action against the CARDINAL coal mine with ORG , claiming that he should be re - engaged to work in accordance with the judgment of the same court given on DATE , ordering that he be re - engaged to work as a manager . He also claimed compensation for the period for which he had remained unemployed as a result of the defendant ’s failure to comply with the DATE judgment .

On DATE the defendant company submitted its pleadings in reply to the applicant 's statement of claim . Subsequently there was an exchange of pleadings between the parties . In DATE the judge rapporteur set the date of the first hearing for DATE . Subsequently the applicant informed the court that he would be unable to attend this hearing for medical reasons .

At the hearing of CARDINAL DATE the court , at the request of both parties ' lawyers , stayed the proceedings . In DATE the applicant requested the court to order ORG to join the proceedings as co - defendant and to resume the proceedings . The court refused to resume the proceedings , considering that the applicable provisions of LAW did not allow for so doing .

NORP In DATE the applicant asked the court whether ORG had already been called to join the proceedings . Later in DATE he informed the court that he had withdrawn the power of attorney of his lawyer and requested the court to appoint a lawyer to represent him under the legal aid scheme . He also reiterated his request for the proceedings to be resumed . In a letter to the court of DATE , the applicant complained that the proceedings had exceeded a reasonable time .

On DATE the court resumed the proceedings and assigned a lawyer to represent the applicant . On DATE the applicant requested that the court summon the prosecutor to join the proceedings . The hearing to be held on DATE was adjourned as the defendant ’s representative had not been duly summoned . By a letter of CARDINAL DATE the applicant extended his compensation claim to CARDINAL ( old ) NORP zlotys .

NORP In DATE , following the increase of the applicant ’s claim , the case was transmitted to ORG which became competent to examine the case . On DATE the court fixed the date of the first hearing for DATE and summoned the Minister of Industry to join the proceedings as a codefendant .

On DATE the applicant complained to the Minister of ORG about the length of the civil proceedings and about ORG failure to assess correctly the value of his claim . On DATE the applicant complained again about the delay in the proceedings and requested ORG to order the Minister of Industry to join the proceedings as a co - defendant .

At a hearing on DATE , ORG ordered that ORG should join the proceedings as a co - defendant and requested the defendant enterprise to submit a list of posts in which the applicant could eventually be re - engaged . The applicant was requested to provide information about his earnings since his engagement by another company in DATE . The applicant submitted the requested information on DATE .

The next hearing was held on DATE . In order to establish the applicant 's state of health for the purposes of his claim for compensation for deterioration of his health brought about allegedly by stress originating from his dismissal , the court requested several public health care institutions to submit the applicant ’s medical records . The court further requested the defendant company to submit a description of health requirements for the posts in which the applicant could eventually be re - engaged . It also requested ORG as a co - defendant to submit documents concerning the take - over of the obligations of the applicant ’s former employer by the defendant coal - mine ORG , and in particular concerning the trade union ’s position relating to the possibility of re - engagement of former managers .

As the medical records requested by the court had not been submitted in their entirety , the hearings to be held on DATE and CARDINAL DATE were adjourned and the court urged the health care institutions concerned to submit them .

At a hearing held on DATE the court established that part of the applicant ’s medical records had been misplaced while being processed by the health care institutions . The applicant was therefore required to submit to the court his medical insurance booklet .

On DATE the applicant extended his compensation claim by a further claim for income from technical inventions which he was unable to obtain as a result of his dismissal .

At a hearing on DATE ORG questioned the parties and examined the applicant ’s medical documents . The court further prepared a list of questions concerning the applicant ’s health , to be answered by a neurologist , a psychiatrist and a psychologist , with a view to establishing whether the applicant suffered from any ailments which could have originated from or be linked to his dismissal . On DATE a request to prepare a medical expert opinion , a list of questions and the applicant ’s medical records were submitted to ORG of ORG . The expert report was to be prepared within DATE .

By a letter of DATE the President of ORG informed the applicant that the expert opinion would not be ready before DATE .

On DATE the applicant complained to the court and to the Minister of ORG , alleging that the court had amended the list of questions to be answered by the medical experts and had deleted several questions which were of direct relevance for the outcome of the case . The applicant indicated that he had become aware of these changes only during his medical examination at ORG . He requested the court to put these questions to the experts . This letter apparently remained unanswered .

NORP In a letter of CARDINAL DATE the President of ORG brought to the attention of the President of ORG of ORG that the proceedings in the applicant 's case were unacceptably long and requested him to supervise their conduct , in particular with a view to ensuring that the expert opinion be prepared with no delay .

On DATE the Minister of Justice informed the applicant that his complaint about the length of the proceedings had been forwarded for investigation to the President of ORG .

The medical expert report was submitted to ORG on DATE , after the court had urged the experts in writing CARDINAL times , on DATE , CARDINAL May , DATE , DATE and CARDINAL DATE , and twice by telephone on DATE and on DATE , to expedite their work .

On DATE only a part of the applicant ’s medical files was returned by the experts . On DATE the applicant requested the court to reconstruct the part of the case - file which had allegedly been lost during the transfer from ORG . He reiterated his complains about the length of the proceedings . The remaining part of the files was submitted to the court on DATE . On DATE the court set the date of the next hearing for DATE .

On DATE the Minister of Justice informed the applicant that the missing medical files had been found and that the next hearing before ORG had been fixed for DATE , with a view to pronouncing the judgment on DATE .

At the hearing held on DATE the applicant 's lawyer was not present for medical reasons . The court decided to request the local Bar to assign a new lawyer to the case and to request ORG to submit an additional expert opinion in order to establish the percentage of the applicant 's health 's loss which could be attributed to his dismissal . On DATE the case - file was again sent to ORG for a further report to be prepared .

On DATE the applicant submitted pleadings to the court in which he argued that ORG should order his re - engagement . On DATE the court urged ORG to submit the complementary medical opinion .

On DATE the President of ORG forwarded to the applicant a letter from the President of ORG of ORG explaining that the delay in the proceedings in DATE had been caused by the experts ' failure to prepare their report in due time . On DATE the additional expert report was submitted to the court . On DATE the presiding judge fixed the date of the next hearing for DATE and ordered the defendant to submit a list of salaries earned by persons employed in posts comparable to that of the applicant in order to establish the income which he had lost following his dismissal .

On DATE the applicant complained to ORG about the length of the proceedings . He submitted , in particular , that since DATE the court had failed to take any steps to ensure that the expert opinion be prepared , that the court had not reacted to the fact that ORG had persistently failed to send its representative to the hearings , that the court had ordered him to submit the same documents several times and that hearings had not been held often enough .

At a hearing on DATE the court again questioned the applicant and decided that the medical report should be submitted to ORG so that its specialists could reply to objections that the applicant had expressed in its regard .

In their further report of CARDINAL DATE the medical experts estimated the applicant 's health loss at PERCENT .

On DATE the applicant submitted further pleadings to the court . He requested that the defendants apologise in writing for his unjustified dismissal and publish the apology in the gazette of the mining industry .

In his pleadings of CARDINAL DATE the applicant requested the court to give a decision to the effect that he should be employed by the defendant enterprise PERSON as Chief PERSON . In his further pleadings of CARDINAL DATE he requested that the period from DATE to CARDINAL DATE be counted towards the period giving rise to social insurance disability benefits of employees of the mining industry .

The hearing on DATE was adjourned , as the medical experts failed to attend , having submitted a justification therefor . They were questioned by the court at the hearing on DATE .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE the court awarded the applicant compensation from ORG of CARDINAL ORG for the loss of income resulting from his unemployment from DATE and CARDINAL ORG for loss of health caused by stress which he had suffered , and dismissed the applicant ’s remaining claims . Written grounds for the judgment were sent to the parties on DATE . On DATE the court dismissed the applicant 's request of CARDINAL DATE to have the judgment supplemented by rulings on his various requests and claims submitted in the course of the proceedings .

On DATE ORG refused the applicant 's request to institute criminal proceedings against persons who had allegedly breached his rights guaranteed by various provisions of labour law and had committed numerous other offences to the applicant 's detriment .

On DATE the applicant , and on DATE ORG , lodged their appeals against the judgment of DATE with ORG . On DATE the case file and the appeals were transmitted to ORG .

On DATE the applicant was re - engaged in the Niwka - Modrzejów coal mine , pursuant to the judgment of CARDINAL DATE . Apparently the applicant , dissatisfied with his new post , later instituted proceedings in ORG , claiming that he should obtain a post identical to that from which he had been dismissed in DATE .

On DATE ORG quashed in part ORG decision of DATE and ordered that the case be re - examined regarding the alleged breach of the applicant 's rights as an employee . On DATE ORG discontinued , however , the investigations , finding that no offence had been committed . The applicant appealed .

On DATE the applicant complained to ORG that there was no progress in the appellate proceedings pending before ORG .

In letters of CARDINAL and DATE and of CARDINAL and DATE the applicant submitted additional arguments in support of his appeal to ORG .

On DATE ORG partly amended the first - instance judgment of CARDINAL DATE in that it reduced certain sums awarded to the applicant as compensation and increased other sums . The court also partly dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . Further , a part of the judgment concerning the compensation claim for the loss of earnings , caused by the defendant enterprise ’s failure to re - engage the applicant after DATE , was quashed . Likewise , the part relating to his compensation claim for his reduced earning power resulting from the deterioration of his health , was quashed and the case was remitted to the lower court for reconsideration .

The case was subsequently re - examined by ORG . Hearings were held before that court on CARDINAL and DATE , CARDINAL DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE .

By a partial judgment of DATE ORG awarded the applicant compensation . The defendant coal mine lodged an appeal against this judgment . On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal .

A further hearing was held before ORG on DATE . The applicant was questioned and on that occasion he reduced his compensation claims . The hearing was adjourned in order for the defendants to submit their comments .

DATE . On DATE the hearing was adjourned as the defendant ’s representatives failed to attend . On the same date the court imposed a fine on the applicant for insulting the court . By a judgment of DATE ORG awarded further compensation to the applicant . On DATE the court rejected the applicant ’s appeal against the decision of DATE imposing a fine on him .

On DATE ORG refused the applicant ’s request for interpretation of the DATE judgment .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against the judgment of DATE .

Subsequently the applicant lodged a cassation appeal with ORG .