Dean Spielmann;Elisabet Fura;Ganna Yudkivska;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger

The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in PERSON . She was represented before the ORG by PERSON V. GPE , of ORG . The respondent Government were represented by their Agent , PERSON .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

After the NORP coup in DATE , a number of political trials were conducted in former GPE in order to consolidate the power of the NORP party and eliminate opponents of the new totalitarian regime . ORG ( PERSON ) and ORG were created for this purpose by a special law and subject to direct political control by the party . The most important trial was the DATE trial of Ms Milada PERSON and other opponents of the communist regime for high treason and espionage , and the applicant was appointed to act as a member of the prosecutorial steering group . It was later established that the trial had been manipulated in that the issues of guilt and sentencing had been decided on by the political authorities well in advance of the trial and that the defendants had been compelled , by means of inhuman investigation techniques , to admit to offences they had not committed . The trial culminated in a ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE by which CARDINAL of the defendants were sentenced to death and the others received lengthy prison sentences . After having their appeal dismissed on DATE by ORG ( PERSON ) , the CARDINAL persons sentenced to death were executed on DATE .

On DATE , in a climate of political détente , the Presidium of ORG quashed the convictions of CARDINAL and DATE following an appeal in the interests of the law lodged on behalf of those convicted . On this occasion it was found that the investigation had been carried out , using illegal methods , by investigators of ORG and not by the investigating judge . It was also found that many legal provisions ( in particular those of LAW no . CARDINAL ) ) had been infringed during the trial , that the facts had not been sufficiently established , that numerous pieces of evidence had been omitted , that the GPE actions had been partly incited by ORG and that all the relevant authorities had single - mindedly focused on fabricated charges aimed at eliminating the so - called “ class enemies ” . ORG therefore ordered the competent prosecutor to re - examine the case ; consequently , evidence was heard from several persons who had participated in the trial with PERSON . It appears from a statement made in DATE by CARDINAL of the defendants sentenced to life imprisonment that the accused had been forced , through physical and psychological coercion , to learn their statements of evidence , which had been written beforehand , off by heart ; that the confrontations at the hearing had been previously prepared in TIME detail and that TIME of the hearing had in fact been a script which determined the exact questions to be asked by the prosecutors and the answers that the defendants were expected to provide . This witness also reported that the applicant had displayed a hard and pitiless attitude .

Renewed consolidation of the communist regime in DATE meant that there was no further interest in investigating the case and it was discontinued in DATE because the criminal prosecution was time - barred .

The case was not definitively settled until after the collapse of the communist regime in DATE . On DATE the Prosecutor General ruled that there was no case to answer in respect of all those charged . Referring to the judgment of CARDINAL DATE , he found that they had been wrongfully convicted of actions which were in accordance with the principles of a NORP society and that the criminal proceedings had been designed , for political ends , to arbitrarily eliminate opponents of the totalitarian dictatorship under the communist regime .

On DATE the police questioned the applicant about her participation in the trial of PERSON and others . She claimed to be unable to remember certain facts and stated that at the time she had been convinced , having trusted the judgment of the other , more experienced prosecutors and judges , that the activity concerned was designed to undermine the Republic .

On DATE criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant for acting as an accessory to murder ( účastenství na vraždě ) . She was accused of having acted as a prosecutor in the political trial of PERSON and others in DATE .

On DATE the applicant appealed against this decision , arguing that the authorities had not specified which of her acts or omissions constituted the offence in question , for which mens rea was required . She emphasised that the situation of that time should not be viewed emotionally merely because mindsets had changed since then , and that it would have to be proved that she had committed a criminal offence under the law applicable at the material time .

According to the applicant , the decision to open the above - mentioned proceedings was set aside following her complaint , and the police were ordered to reinvestigate the case . She submitted that as soon as the police knew that a prosecution for acting as accessory to murder would be time - barred , new criminal proceedings were brought against her in DATE for the offence of murder .

It is clear from the case file , however , that the new decision to bring criminal proceedings , taken by the police on DATE , still concerned the offence of acting as an accessory to murder under LAW ( Law no . CARDINAL ) . The applicant appealed against this decision , claiming that at the time of the trial she had been a mere student , answering to a higher - ranking prosecutor , and that she had not been able to work independently . She claimed that the charge she was facing was imprecise and did not specify either her intention to commit the offence or in what way she had broken the laws of the time . She also maintained that she had not participated in the investigation and that the investigation file had convinced her of the guilt of the defendants , who had spontaneously confessed during the hearing . She felt it normal to have been present at preparatory meetings , as they were preparing for a public trial , and stated that she had followed the instructions of her supervisors . During her questioning by the police on DATE the applicant exercised her right to silence .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer inspected the file , added some press cuttings from the time of the events and requested that the case be discontinued on the grounds of lack of evidence indicating that her client was guilty . She subsequently asked that the evidence be supplemented by any that might prove the applicant ’s intention to commit the crime in question and expressed surprise at the fact that proceedings had been brought only in DATE , when all of the other participants were deceased .

On DATE the prosecutor allegedly informed the applicant , before formally charging her and without further explanation , that her acts were henceforth to be classified as murder committed as a joint principal ( trestný čin vraždy ve spolupachatelství ) .

In DATE the applicant submitted documents to the court attesting to the fact that , having been in DATE of legal studies at university at the time of the trial , she had been under the instructions of her supervisors and could in no way influence the course of events . She also argued that the provisions of LAW that she was accused of having infringed were very general and concerned only the due diligence of the proceedings , and that the charge against her was not founded on any actual responsibility on her part .

On DATE the applicant requested that the hearing be held without her attendance , for health reasons , and exercised her right to silence on the ground that she had already communicated her comments to the authorities .

DATE ORG ( PERSON ) held the hearing in the absence of the applicant , who was represented by a lawyer . Her deposition was read out , along with many other written documents , and audio and visual recordings of the trial were projected . In response to counsel for the applicant ’s objection that the defence had not yet had the possibility of giving their views on the charge and the evidence read out in court , the court observed that , according to LAW , that right was reserved solely for the defendant herself . At the end of the hearing the applicant ’s lawyer did not file a motion to submit additional evidence and delivered a closing address , noting that the criminal proceedings could have been instituted at the time of the judgment of CARDINAL DATE and that the proceedings brought against the applicant , as the sole survivor , were possible at present only because the limitation period had been changed after DATE . The lawyer admitted that her client had , in participating in the trial , shown her loyalty to the communist regime , but emphasised that at the material time ORG , together with the ORG , had run everything , and that the psychosis in society had turned into a general acceptance of breaking the law . However , the prosecution had not presented any real evidence proving the criminal responsibility of the applicant . Indeed , having had no legal training at the time , she had not been in a position to understand the shortcomings of the trial , particularly since ORG had been directly run by ORG , and had been in no position to influence or change the course of the trial . By taking part in the drafting of the charges and the assessment of the trial the applicant had merely been following the orders of her more experienced supervisors and she had not proposed a sentence in her written submissions . Moreover , no minutes existed from any political meeting bearing the applicant ’s signature as a sign of her attendance .

On DATE ORG found the applicant guilty of murder under LAW ( in force at the time of the judgment ) , committed jointly with the other prosecutors and judges involved in the aforementioned trial and since deceased , and sentenced her to DATE imprisonment . The court considered it to be proven that , having participated in the trial in DATE of PERSON and others as a member of the prosecution , the applicant had acted in breach of DATE Code of Criminal Procedure in force at the time , as she had been aware of the fact that the questions of guilt and sentencing had been decided on by the political authorities well in advance of the trial , which she knew had been designed only to confer an appearance of legality on the physical elimination of the defendants . The court held that the applicant ’s defence , submitted by her lawyer in court , had been refuted by the evidence taken . Among this evidence , in particular , were written documents bearing witness to the fact that the trial had been prepared by ORG and the ORG with the help of ORG and a group of prosecutors within which the applicant , having already proven herself during other political trials , had acted as a “ people ’s prosecutor ” . They showed that the scripted trial and TIME had been prepared in advance by ORG , that the case file of the prosecution had been subject to political approval , that counsel for the defence , the prosecutors and the judges had been instructed by ORG as to how the trial should unfold and that political meetings at which the applicant had been present had taken place DATE after the hearing . The file also contained a written assessment of the trial , signed by the applicant , which emphasised the importance of the political investigations and commended the very good cooperation with ORG . ORG also had at its disposal an appeal in the interests of the law lodged on behalf of the defendants in DATE , which had led to a ORG judgment on DATE . The court considered that this evidence proved that the DATE trial had been manipulated to the point where it amounted in fact to a quadruple murder carried out through the justice system and that the applicant had made a significant contribution to it by failing to comply with , among other provisions , Articles CARDINAL , DATE and DATE of LAW of the time relating to the authorities’ obligation to look for incriminating and exonerating evidence , to protect the interests of the ORG and to establish the truth by all available methods . ORG held that , at the time , the applicant should have known that the death sentences imposed had not been a legal measure and that , jointly with others , she had contributed to conferring an appearance of legality on the political trial in question , and consequently to the murder of CARDINAL people on the basis of their political beliefs . Given that under LAW , which had been in force at the time of the offence , murder was punishable by the death penalty , the court held that the charges against the applicant should be classified as murder under LAW , which was more favourable to her . Although the Code provided for a DATE limitation period , it was also necessary to take into account section CARDINAL of Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL on the Illegality of ORG , which suspended the limitation period between CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE when political motives incompatible with the fundamental principles of a democratic legal system had thwarted a conviction or acquittal . In the present case , therefore , the offences with which the applicant was charged were not time - barred . Taking into account the extenuating circumstances ( the applicant ’s subordinate status and her law - abiding life ) , the amount of time that had passed since the offence had been committed and since she could have first been prosecuted , her age , the state of her health and her degree of involvement in the offence ( less than that of the renowned judges and prosecutors ) , the court imposed a lesser sentence on the applicant than the normal minimum .

The applicant lodged an appeal , arguing that under the original legislation , which was more favourable to her , the offence was time - barred ( as in a similar case concerning the prosecutor PERSON which ended with the charges being dropped ) . She also complained that the rights of the defence had not been respected , alleging that the court had not taken into account the closing address of her lawyer , who , moreover had not been given the opportunity to comment on the criminal charge or the evidence , and that the court had not responded to the submissions of the defence in any way . Furthermore , she deemed evidence consisting of an anonymous letter from a former prison guard , which had prejudiced her in the eyes of the court and the public , to be illegal . In her opinion , there was no evidence to prove that she had intentionally participated in the murder of CARDINAL people based on their political beliefs , that she had knowingly been part of a plan designed to eliminate enemies of the regime regardless of the established facts , that she should have known that the judges had been influenced or that she had taken part in meetings with the political authorities . The applicant criticised the court for not taking into account the fact that , at the time of the events , she had only completed DATE of preparatory legal studies and had been a DATE law student , which did not enable her to understand all of the circumstances surrounding the trial , let alone any potential political manipulations .

In a judgment of DATE delivered in closed court , ORG ( Vrchní soud ) quashed ORG judgment on appeal and discontinued the proceedings on the ground that the limitation period had expired . The court observed firstly that no significant procedural defects had occurred in the proceedings before ORG , that all the evidence necessary in order to elucidate the facts had been properly taken and decided on by the judges and that the court had explained its reasoning as well as the elements supporting its findings . ORG did not therefore agree with the applicant ’s opinion that her guilt had not been proven and found it established that the questions of guilt and sentencing had been decided on before the trial had even begun , that the applicant had taken part in it as a “ people ’s prosecutor ” even though she had not yet finished her studies at university and that she must have been aware , at least broadly , that the provisions of LAW of the time were being breached . The court also rejected her submission that the rights of the defence had not been respected . In this regard it noted that when defendants waived their right to appear before the court , they also waived the right to comment on the evidence taken . Furthermore , when a defendant was not present at the hearing but his or her lawyer was , the right to comment on the evidence and the charges was exercised through the closing address , which was what had happened in this case .

ORG nonetheless held that ORG had not given the aforementioned correctly established facts the appropriate legal classification . It did not accept ORG opinion that LAW was more lenient than LAW , applicable at the material time . Taking into account , in the light of the principle of individual criminal responsibility , the ancillary and limited role of the applicant , the court held that she could not be considered as having committed murder as a joint principal . The court remarked in this regard that the political system of the time had created a mechanism which fabricated political trials and was operated by political leaders ( in particular the secretariat of ORG ) , the security services ( ORG and NORP advisers ) and the judicial service ; judgments were therefore predetermined . Thus , in the chain of command of those who had participated in the trial of PERSON and others , the prosecutors had played a part which was key to the trial but not decisive for its outcome , and the applicant had been at the end of this chain . An objective assessment of her role therefore led to classifying her actions not as murder committed as a joint principal but rather as acting as an accessory to judicial murder , as in the preliminary proceedings . Under LAW , such acts could be classified only as indirect participation in ordinary murder , carrying a sentence of DATE in prison and with a DATE limitation period . In these circumstances , even having regard to section CARDINAL of Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , the limitation period had expired on DATE , and since the proceedings in question had been brought after that date there was no case to answer .

An appeal on points of law against ORG ruling was lodged by ORG , who argued that the present case did not concern indirect participation in murder , but murder committed jointly , an offence which , under LAW , was punishable by the death penalty and not subject to a limitation period . In the prosecutor ’s opinion it was therefore necessary to apply LAW , which was more lenient as it did not provide for the death penalty and fixed the limitation period at DATE . Under section CARDINAL of Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , the limitation period therefore ran from DATE to CARDINAL DATE .

The applicant objected to the grounds of the appeal and consented to it being heard in camera .

Nonetheless , on DATE a public hearing took place before ORG , in the absence of the applicant , who was represented by her lawyer . The latter commented on the appeal , without requesting leave to add to the evidence , and asked the court to uphold the finding that there was no case to answer for lack of evidence proving that his client had been aware of the manipulation and that she had intended to infringe the procedural provisions .

After this hearing , ORG quashed the judgment of DATE and ordered ORG to give a new decision , respecting its binding legal opinion . In ORG opinion , to find the correct legal classification in this case , it was necessary to compare the applicant ’s involvement in the trial with the immutable ethical standards required of a prosecutor . In this regard , the court referred to its decision no . CARDINAL Tz CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE which defined the conditions in which a judge could be held criminally responsible for the murder of innocent people sentenced to death . In view of these principles , applicable mutatis mutandis to prosecutors , the actions of the applicant , who had taken part in the fraudulent manipulation of legal proceedings designed to eliminate opponents of the communist regime , had been completely unethical . As ORG had established , the case was about a political trial the outcome of which had been decided in advance by the political organ of ORG together with ORG . All those who had agreed to take part as judges and prosecutors were in a similar position , that of key enforcers of the will of a political organ , and there was no convincing reason for differentiating between them in terms of criminal responsibility . The fact that the applicant had been chosen after having proved herself in other political trials , had been a member of the main group of prosecutors which had prepared the prosecution , had taken part in the political meetings and delivered the prosecutor ’s closing address , had signed the assessment of the trial and had taken part in the execution of those convicted showed to what extent she had identified with the aim of the trial , namely the physical elimination of innocent victims . Given that the trial , ending in the sentencing to death and execution of the defendants , had constituted the murder mechanism , it was correct to conclude that the applicant , as a prosecutor , had actively participated in the joint commission of the murder and had thus committed a crime which , according to LAW , was punishable by death and hence had no limitation period . It was ORG opinion that the High Court ’s decision was therefore founded on an erroneous legal assessment of the facts and that the conditions for finding that there was no case to answer had not been met . Given that the DATE LAW , which was more favourable to the applicant , provided for a limitation period of DATE ( suspended between CARDINAL DATE and DATE ) , the proceedings in the instant case were not time - barred .

Having agreed to the applicant ’s request that the hearing , planned for DATE , be postponed , ORG held a public hearing on DATE in the courtroom of ORG , the city where the applicant resided . The latter attended the hearing with her lawyer and commented on her case by describing her childhood and her experience of the war and by maintaining that her participation in the trial of PERSON had been presented to her as an opportunity to work with and learn from some excellent lawyers . She had not been aware of any manipulation having occurred , had never spoken to the defendants and had trusted the judgment of those more experienced than herself .

At the end of the hearing , the Prague High Court quashed ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE and found the applicant guilty of ordinary murder as a direct participant within the meaning of LAW ( a ) of LAW , for which she was sentenced to DATE imprisonment . After reiterating its previous findings on the absence of irregularities in the proceedings before ORG , ORG , bound by the legal opinion of ORG and its reasoning regarding the responsibility of the applicant , concluded that the latter had been directly involved in the murder by having participated in a trial breaching Articles CARDINAL , DATE , DATE and others of DATE , breaches of which she must at least have been broadly aware . Under LAW the offence had no limitation period , whilst the DATE LAW provided for a limitation period of DATE ( suspended between CARDINAL DATE and DATE , by virtue of LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . The criminal proceedings were therefore not time - barred in either case at the time of their instigation in DATE . Given that under LAW the above - mentioned offence carried a maximum sentence of DATE imprisonment when DATE had passed since the events , whereas the DATE LAW provided for a life sentence , it made sense to sentence the applicant under LAW . In doing so ORG took into account the extenuating circumstances ( the applicant ’s law - abiding life , the fact that she had committed the offence de facto by obeying orders , the amount of time that had passed since the offence had been committed , the age and health of the applicant and the part she had played in the trial ) , and determined that the sentence should be shorter than the normal minimum .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with ORG , complaining of the media uproar , the defence ’s inability to comment on the evidence taken , the court ’s reading of an anonymous letter from a former prison guard supposedly describing her behaviour during the execution of those convicted , and the application of the principle of collective guilt ( without distinguishing between people according to their function and their ranking in the hierarchy ) . She submitted that the guilty verdict against her was contrary to LAW hereinafter “ the LAW ” ) since an analogous case against GPE , a former military prosecutor , had been discontinued on DATE because it was time - barred , a decision upheld by ORG on DATE . She also argued that the verdict had relied on a mere moral conviction , as a substitute for the lack of evidence refuting her defence ; however the case had to be approached not solely from a moral and ethical perspective , but also from a legal one . Finally , the applicant submitted that it was unacceptable and against the principle of independence of the courts that ORG , bound by ORG legal opinion , should have been influenced , in this regard , in establishing the facts and examining the evidence .

After a request by the applicant that her appeal be considered by a different panel to the one having already ruled on the appeal lodged by ORG , it was decided on DATE that the panel would not withdraw from examining the case .

On DATE , after a session held in camera ( to which the applicant had consented ) , ORG dismissed the appeal for lack of grounds . It noted firstly that in its judgment of DATE it had given the High Court no instructions as to the establishment of the facts or the assessment of the evidence , having limited itself to commenting on the legal assessment of the established facts and the application of the DATE LAW . This assessment had in no way been influenced by the media coverage of the criminal proceedings or by the reading of the anonymous letter , on which ORG had in any case not relied in its findings . ORG also rejected the argument relating to collective guilt , finding that it was only in cases where justice functioned normally that there was cause to distinguish between judges and prosecutors . However , given that in the trial of PERSON and others the judges and prosecutors had all contributed to the pursuit of a political objective , which was to physically eliminate the victims , by conferring an appearance of legality on it , the responsibility borne by the applicant , although less than that of the judges , was not so different that it was incomparable . The court went on to find that the objection that the applicant ’s criminal responsibility was based solely on ethical or moral failings was unfounded , stating that the applicant had been responsible for illegal conduct which infringed the provisions of the CARDINAL Code of Criminal Procedure . Concerning the violation of LAW of the LAW alleged by the applicant with reference to the GPE case , ORG stated that it was not its place to assess the judgment in a case concerning a different defendant , different facts and different criminal legislation , when the binding nature of the judgment referred to was limited to the case in question . The fact that ORG had not taken this decision into account in the applicant ’s case could not amount to a breach of Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the LAW , which in any case was not applicable to specific judicial decisions .

In DATE the applicant began to serve her prison sentence .

On DATE the applicant challenged ORG decisions of DATE and DATE , as well as ORG judgment of DATE , in a constitutional appeal in which she relied on Articles CARDINAL § CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Charter . She complained of the application of the principle of collective guilt and the admission into evidence of the defamatory anonymous letter . She also argued that the contested judgments had not specified which evidence was meant to have proved that she had been aware that the trial had been manipulated , and that it was not possible to commit murder either through ethical or moral failings or by infringing the provisions of LAW . She further complained of the fact that ORG , in its decision of DATE , had given instructions to the High Court regarding the assessment of evidence and of ORG subsequent failure to further investigate the case or hear evidence from the applicant , allowing her only a closing address . Referring once again to the GPE case , the applicant objected to the ORG findings as to which legislation was more favourable to her . Finally , she questioned the reasons for not having initiated proceedings earlier , when other participants in the trial would still have been alive and when she could have more actively defended herself . She believed that the courts had been influenced in the instant case by the objective of convicting her , as she was the last survivor of the trial in question .

On DATE ORG ( PERSON ) dismissed the appeal as manifestly ill - founded in that the applicant had failed to prove that there had been a violation of her fundamental rights . It found firstly that the applicant ’s claims before the court were identical to those which had been put forward in her appeal on points of law , on which ORG had duly ruled ; the applicant was therefore just pursuing the same claim and was treating ORG as a court of fourth instance . Agreeing with the other courts’ view that there was no need to differentiate , for the purposes of criminal responsibility , between the different persons who had taken part in the trial , the ORG noted that the other courts had nonetheless considered the applicant ’s individual conduct . The decisive legal findings had been reached on the basis of facts which had been established by ORG with the help of numerous items of written evidence , as stated in its judgment . These documents , the authenticity of which had not been challenged by the applicant , named the applicant as having taken part in the political meetings and included an assessment of the trial signed by her . In response to the applicant ’s claim that ORG had not accepted her deposition , ORG referred to the courts’ reasoning regarding the consequences of the applicant ’s request that the hearing in the court of first instance take place without her . It also noted that ORG had adequately considered the closing address made for the applicant and that therefore her right to address the court had not been infringed . Moreover , ORG had no obligation to approve every motion to take evidence . Concerning the anonymous letter , ORG found that it was unnecessary evidence as the courts had not based their decisions on it and thus had not had to assess it . The applicant ’s allegations about the influence of the media on the outcome of the proceedings were described as vague and hypothetical . ORG also upheld ORG decision of DATE , in which the latter had merely expressed its opinion on the correct legal classification of the facts which had been established up until that time . The decision had therefore not bound ORG in any way in terms of the facts . Concerning the applicant ’s claims that she could not have committed murder , the court referred to the findings of the lower courts according to which the applicant had misused her role as a prosecutor and had not fulfilled it in accordance with the legal provisions , and had thus actively participated in the murder as a joint principal . ORG also considered it impossible to interpret LAW as not applying to certain methods of committing murder , such as a manipulated trial infringing the procedural provisions ; such an interpretation would guarantee impunity for murders committed through manipulated trials , which would be tantamount to the ORG renouncing the protection of life . In ORG opinion , the courts had , moreover , sufficiently explained why they had considered the DATE LAW to be more favourable to the applicant , even with regard to limitation periods . From a constitutional perspective it was irrelevant that the criminal proceedings against GPE had led to a different result ; as ORG had already stated , LAW could not be relied on in that context . Finally , the question of why the criminal proceedings had not been brought earlier was considered to be speculative and abstract . ORG therefore held that the interpretation and application of the law by the courts and their conduct of the proceedings had not exceeded the limits of constitutionality .

On DATE the Hradec Králové Regional Court ( PERSON ) decided of its own motion that CARDINAL presidential amnesties , from DATE , DATE and DATE , were applicable to the applicant , each of which took DATE off her prison sentence . However , this decision was set aside on DATE by ORG , which ruled that only the DATE and DATE amnesties were applicable to the applicant and that it was appropriate to grant her a pardon in respect of DATE of her sentence in total . In this decision , ORG referred to other criminal cases where it had been established that the DATE amnesty did not apply to persons convicted of murder .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer was informed that ORG had not agreed to her request that an appeal in the interests of the law be lodged on her behalf .

On DATE the President of GPE pardoned the applicant in respect of the rest of her sentence . She was released DATE .

Article CARDINAL guaranteed the right to individual liberty and no one was to be deprived of that liberty except by law .

LAW provided that no one could have proceedings brought against him or her except in cases provided for by the law , and only by a court or authority competent under the law and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law .

Under Article CARDINAL , all holders of public authority had to conform to the laws and regulations of the people ’s democratic regime during the exercise of their functions and powers ; any agent of the public authorities failing to fulfil this obligation was to be punished by law .

Under LAW , any person who acted against another with the intention of causing his or her death and in a way which led to his or her death was guilty of murder .

According to LAW , the death penalty was to be imposed not only on the person who carried out the murder , but also on any person who had ordered it , had laid hands on the victim during the murder or had acted as a joint principal during it .

Article CARDINAL provided for sentences for accomplices to and indirect participants in the murder .

Under Article CARDINAL , offences punishable by the death penalty were not subject to limitation . However , where the offence had been committed DATE before the criminal proceedings were brought , this provision stipulated that the accused could only receive a sentence of between CARDINAL and twenty years’ imprisonment .

Article CARDINAL required the competent criminal authorities to duly consider all the circumstances which might incriminate the accused as well as those relevant to his or her defence , and to inform the accused of his or her rights .

Pursuant to LAW , members of the prosecution were required , within their areas of competence , to defend the well - being of the ORG and act independently of the courts .

Under LAW , prosecutors were required to prosecute of their own motion all offences brought to their attention and to ensure that the investigation was carried out before the competent court and that the persons responsible were punished . They also had to ensure that all methods capable of leading to the discovery of the truth were correctly employed . They had the right to consult files , obtain information about the progress of investigations and formulate appropriate proposals . If they noticed any irregularities or delays they were required to take measures provided by law to remedy them .

LAW provides that any statutory restriction of the fundamental rights and freedoms must apply equally to all cases meeting the conditions laid down .

Under LAW , everybody is entitled to respect for his or her human dignity , personal integrity and good reputation , and to the protection of his or her name .

Articles CARDINAL to CARDINAL guarantee the right to an independent and impartial court , a fair and public trial held without unnecessary delay , the rights of the defence and the principles of the presumption of innocence and of penalties being strictly defined by law .

Article CARDINAL provides that , after taking each item of evidence , the judge must ask the defendant if he or she wishes to comment on it . The defendant ’s comments must appear in TIME of the proceedings .

Under LAW , the limitation period for prosecuting offences is suspended between CARDINAL DATE and DATE if a legally effective conviction or acquittal did not take place owing to political motives incompatible with the fundamental principles of a democratic legal system .

In this decision , ORG considered the possibility of prosecuting a ORG judge , who had sentenced innocent people to death in another political trial in DATE , for murder . Noting that , at the time of the trial , the LAW and laws in force had established rules aimed at ensuring that judges could decide in an independent , impartial and fair manner , ORG held :

“ Even if we must take into account the departure , in reality , of judicial practice from these principles due to the external influence of the executive bodies and the prosecution , it is unacceptable to conclude that judges did not bear responsibility for their decisions . Being in the role of a judge is never purely a matter of applying the law ... but is based first and foremost on ethics . This ethical basis is characterised by certain immutable ethical standards ... even though they are not codified . In order for a judgment to be fair ... and constitute an act of justice , certain principles , which must be respected regardless of the external political situation , must incontestably form part of these unwritten rules . Whilst recognising that the notion of justice is always , in some way , dependent on the conditions of the historical context or the time , the ORG remains nonetheless convinced that , at the very least , certain fundamental ethical requirements can be formulated , applicable to the notions of justice and fair judgment that are not subject to such temporal conditions .

To be considered fair , a sentence must at the very least fulfil the requirement of punishing the convicted person for an offence actually carried out by them . The judgment must truly be the result of the trial preceding it . The proceedings leading up to the judgment must not be mere formal , insignificant precursors to a predetermined decision . The judgment must genuinely result from the court ’s work and not be imposed from the outside , in other words by institutions outside the judicial system such as political bodies , the executive , etc . The court ’s decision - making process must involve distancing itself from any vested interests in the outcome of the proceedings , including political interests . The judgment must not have the sole objective of becoming a tool in the political struggle conducted by CARDINAL part of society against the other . It must not be a simple act of elimination of individuals or groups of individuals in the context of such a struggle .

The value of these rules lies in the fact that if judges do not abide by them , they deeply betray the fundamental ethical principles of their vocation , regardless of the reason , even if for example they have succumbed to political influence . If , when making their decision , judges are exposed to influences that are contextual or specific to the time , they must not forget that this decision must stand even after those influences are gone . Judges must be aware that , even later , their decisions must fulfil the fundamental requirements of justice .

If a person ’s life is taken as a result of a decision sentencing him or her to death , the question is : when does that judgment constitute a criminal offence , when is it an abuse of power by the judge , and when is it what is known as judicial murder ? Although this question is very difficult to answer , it is not impossible . We must first identify a certain hierarchy of the unlawful elements in the judgment .

There can be times when a judgment is the result of proceedings which have been duly conducted and are based on the assessment of concrete evidence , the issue of guilt or innocence having simply been the subject of differing opinions throughout the various judicial proceedings .

At other times , a judgment may be the result of irregular proceedings where there was insufficient evidence . However these are irregularities which , in substance , testify only to poor decision - making , with no actual intent on the part of the judge to harm the accused . A judgment of this kind is still the result of justice that functions normally .

There can also be cases where a judgment is vitiated because the judge intended to harm the accused or favour someone , but where the judgment was delivered following a trial conducted according to the requirements of proper legal proceedings . Here , the irregular judgment constitutes a substantive breach of the principles of impartiality and objectivity required for exercising the duties of a judge .

The most serious case is that of a judgment given in circumstances devoid of those immutable ethical attributes inherent in the duties of a judge , in particular because

( a ) there was premeditated intent to physically eliminate a person ;

( b ) the judgment was chosen as the tool with which to physically eliminate that person ;

( c ) the judge identified with that aim of the judgment , regardless of the reason ;

( d ) the judge subordinated the way in which he or she conducted the proceedings or participated in the decisions to the objective of delivering , as planned , a judgment amounting to murder ;

( e ) the judge sentenced or participated in the sentencing of the accused with no heed to the course or outcome of the trial ; in reality , the results of the proceedings were not a criterion in determining the judgment DATE on the contrary , the proceedings were adapted to the objective of securing a conviction which amounted to murder ; and

( f ) the accused had no real chance of reversing the premeditated intention to eliminate him , even if , to an outside observer , the proceedings might have given the impression that their content had led to the judgment ( for example if the accused had been coerced into confessing ) .

In these circumstances , the decision to sentence someone can be regarded as a necessary and irreplaceable part of a lethal mechanism . The issue here is not CARDINAL of a mere abuse of power on the judges part , but of murder . That is what is meant in legal terms by judicial murder . The sentencing here is an act that is totally estranged from the ethical foundations on which the duties of a judge rest .

It is thus apparent that in order to decide whether , in the case of a judge , there has been an abuse of power or judicial murder , it is not sufficient to examine the sentence solely in the light of whether or not it is in accordance with the law as a normative act of public authority . The issue can be properly and convincingly resolved only if the sentence is scrutinised in the light of the criteria stemming from the ethical foundations of the office of a judge . ...

It is clear from the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the judgment in case no . CARDINAL Ts II CARDINAL/CARDINAL of the former ORG that in determining the case , the accused had betrayed the ethics of the judicial decision - making process in an extremely serious way . The judgment had not been an act of justice but an act of elimination of the persons convicted by it . That act of elimination had only the appearance of a judgment ; in terms of its content and values , it had nothing to do with justice . It was a case of the person adopting the judgment not being , in reality , the judge in the case but an assistant to or joint principal with those who , at the time , determined that the objective of the trial would be the physical elimination of the accused . Thus , it would not do to exclude CARDINAL of the forms of criminal responsibility of a person accused of murder . The accused can not exonerate him or herself from that responsibility by referring to the responsibility of others who may have also participated in the physical elimination of those convicted . ... ”

In this decision , ORG dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by ORG to the detriment of the person concerned , GPE In a judgment of ORG , GPE had been found guilty of murder under LAW for having contributed , as a military prosecutor and subsequently an investigating judge , to the unjust conviction in DATE of General PERSON , who received the death sentence . GPE had been accused of , among other things , forging parts of the case file , distorting the minutes of the proceedings , leading the investigation in a way that was not objective and was influenced by NORP advisers , and proposing the death penalty . Following GPE ’s appeal , ORG had nonetheless classified the same facts as participation in ordinary murder within the meaning of LAW of LAW in force at the material time , an offence for which that law provided a limitation period of DATE . ORG had therefore concluded that , even taking CARDINAL of PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL into account , the limitation period had expired before criminal proceedings had been instituted against GPE on DATE .

ORG noted that ORG and ORG had relied on the same facts and that the significant difference in their legal assessment of those facts was due to the importance and gravity attached to the forging of parts of the case file . Therefore , after having freely assessed the evidence before them , the CARDINAL courts had come to different legal conclusions based on the same description of the facts . In examining the lawfulness of the legal classification decided on by ORG , from the point of view of the legal assessment of the facts , and noting that it was not its place to interfere in the appellate court ’s procedural assessment of the evidence , ORG found that the said classification corresponded to the facts described . Consequently , ORG appeal on points of law was dismissed as manifestly ill - founded .


The applicant is a NORP national , born in DATE and living in GPE , GPE .

The applicant , using a pseudonym , published a book about the cultivation and production of cannabis . The book was advertised for sale in CARDINAL magazines . CARDINAL copies were sold . The police obtained the names of various customers , established the identity of the applicant and arrested him .

When questioned by the police the applicant denied that the book was intended to incite buyers to cultivate cannabis . When pressed about the question of encouragement and incitement , the applicant , on the advice of his solicitor , declined to answer questions saying that the questions were “ too conjectural ” .

The applicant was subsequently charged with CARDINAL offences under LAW DATE ( “ the DATE LAW ) . He stood trial before a jury at ORG in DATE . The applicant pleaded guilty to the charges of producing and having in his possession cannabis and not guilty to the charge of incitement to commit an offence under LAW .

The prosecution case was that the applicant ’s book amounted to an incitement of those who bought it to cultivate cannabis and was in effect a grower ’s guide . The prosecution relied on the fact that when the police raided the homes of a number of buyers , cannabis plants were found being cultivated according to methods similar to those described in the book . According to the prosecution , the applicant ’s intention in writing and publishing the book could be inferred from the book itself and from the effect which it had on the purchasers of the book . The prosecution called as witnesses several such purchasers who were found to be using the method advocated in the book ( “ the NORP method ” ) to grow cannabis .

The applicant ’s counsel contended in his defence that his book was a genuine contribution to the debate about the legalisation of cannabis , that it only contained general advice and information freely available elsewhere , that it made it clear that growing cannabis was an offence and that its contents were too remote from the likely actions of those who read it . The applicant relied , inter alia , on the testimony of an expert witness to the effect that many books had been published about the cultivation of cannabis . The expert sought to establish with reference to the contents of those books that the applicant did not intend to incite others to break the law .

According to the applicant , his counsel informed the trial judge that he would not be giving evidence on medical grounds and submitted a medical report indicating that the applicant ’s performance in the witness box might be prejudiced on account of the stressful circumstances of his court appearance .

As to the ingredients of the offence of incitement , the judge in his summing up directed the jury that they had to decide whether they were sure that the book :

“ may encourage or persuade , or if you like to put it another way , is capable of encouraging and persuading other people to produce the drug cannabis and thus to break the law . The prosecution do not have to prove that it may encourage and persuade , or is capable of doing that , in relation to people who have never grown cannabis before or who had stopped growing cannabis . As I have said , if it may encourage and persuade people to start up again or to carry on and produce more cannabis that would be quite sufficient for proof of the offence . ... If ... you say that it is an encouragement and persuasion , then you must be sure of something else before you can convict the [ applicant ] , and that is that he knew at the time he was disseminating the book that what he was inciting other people to do would be a crime on their part if they did it but that he nevertheless intended to go ahead and do it anyway . It does not have to be proved of course that that was his only intention in publishing the book . It would be quite enough to show that it was CARDINAL of his intentions . ... ”

As to the applicant ’s silence during police interview and at his trial , the judge directed the jury in the following terms :

“ ... You have had a summary of the [ applicant ’s ] police interviews from which you know that , although he answered many of the police questions , he declined to answer others . The answers which he gave you will of course give such weight to as you think right . ... Some of the questions in the interview , as I have said , he did not want to answer . He did not want to answer questions on the central question of incitement when the police officers were putting them to him . He was quite entitled not answer questions if he did not want to . He could of course have done so but he had an absolute right not to do so . Where he was silent or said , ‘ I do n’t have any comment’ or , ‘ I do n’t want to answer that question’ you must not use that as any evidence that he is guilty or take the view that it makes the prosecution case any stronger than it otherwise would do .

Then there is the question of him not giving evidence in the witness box in court to you . That stands on a slightly different footing . He has an absolute right not to do that but , as he has been told by me through his barrister , the law is that you are allowed to draw any inference , deduction that is , which you think right from the fact that he had declined to go into the witness box and give evidence on oath . The prosecution can not prove their case simply by the fact of his silence . What you should do is ask yourselves whether , on the evidence that you have heard , there is a case against him which calls for an answer from him . If not , if there is not , then his silence would have no significance . But if there is a case against him then you would be entitled to come to the conclusion that the only sensible explanation for his decision not to give evidence is that he has no answer to the case against him or no answer which would stand up to being cross - examined by counsel for the prosecution . You are entitled to use that inference , together with all the other evidence in the case , in concluding that he must be guilty of the charge if that is the inference you choose to draw . But it is entirely up to you to say whether you think it is right to do so or not .

Of course you will also ask yourselves first of all whether there may be any other harmless reason , if I can use that phrase , for his silence . You may think that no such reason is readily obvious and that he is the person in the best position to tell you what his intention was , for example , in producing this book if he thought that it would advance his case to tell you . As I say , it is up to you what inferences you draw , if any . ”

Later on in his summing up the judge stated :

“ What he has never told you of course or told the police is what other books he knows about or has read , nor has he told you how any such books may have affected his own intentions in writing his own . As I say , he could have done because the question of intention has been very much in issue , but he has not . His counsel has made certain suggestions about that but you may think the person best able to explain all that would have been the defendant himself . ...

The police then pressed him on the question of encouragement and incitement and it was at that point that he asked his solicitor how he should answer ... . ”

On DATE the jury by an CARDINAL majority found the applicant guilty of the offence of incitement . The applicant received a DATE prison sentence concurrent on the CARDINAL offences with which he was charged .

The applicant applied for leave to appeal . In his amended grounds of appeal the applicant maintained that the trial judge failed to give the jury a proper direction on the inferences which could be drawn from his silence at the police interview and at his trial . In particular , he alleged that the trial judge failed to inform the jury that there was medical evidence which could explain his silence at the trial . The applicant further stated that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the notion of incitement . The full ORG gave the applicant leave to appeal on the last ground only .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . Delivering judgment , Lord Justice Potter , with reference to precedent , considered that the trial judge in his direction should have invited the jury to ask itself whether the book encouraged or persuaded rather than whether it may encourage or persuade or was capable of encouraging or persuading readers to produce cannabis and thus to break the law . However , having regard to the trial judge ’s direction as a whole with respect to the defence relied on by the applicant , Lord Justice Potter considered that the jury was properly apprised of the requisite ingredients of the offence . He also rejected the applicant ’s contention that sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of ORG DATE , which set out the offence of incitement , did not refer to the production of cannabis . According to Lord Justice Potter , this was an obvious drafting error and sections CARDINAL and DATE were to be construed in relation to section CARDINAL of the same LAW which criminalised the production of cannabis .

ORG substituted a sentence of CARDINAL months’ imprisonment in respect of the applicant ’s convictions for possession and production of cannabis but upheld the DATE prison sentence he received in respect of the offence of incitement .

The relevant domestic law and practice relating to the drawing of adverse inferences from an accused ’s silence during police interview or at his trial is described in detail in the ORG v. the GPE judgment of CARDINAL DATE ( application no . CARDINAL ) .


BENET CZECH, SPOL. S R.O. v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Renate Jaeger

The applicant , PERSON , spol . s r.o . , is a limited liability company incorporated under NORP law with its registered seat in GPE . It was represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE . The respondent Government were represented by their Agent , Mr PERSON , from ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

In DATE criminal proceedings were instituted against a former manager and sole shareholder of the applicant company on the suspicion of having committed tax evasion . Subsequently , prosecuting authorities seized the applicant company 's financial and business documents which were , however , mixed with documents of other companies subjected to the investigation . According to the applicant company , the documents have never been returned to it .

On DATE the prosecuting authorities seized CZK CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL ( EUR CARDINAL ) and DATE ( ORG CARDINAL ) deposited on the applicant company 's bank accounts on the suspicion that these assets might have constituted a profit from criminal activities of the manager . The applicant company says that it was not involved in any business transactions investigated by the police and that its former manager is prosecuted for acts which are not in any way related to the business pursued by the applicant company . The criminal proceedings are still pending .

Meanwhile , numerous tax proceedings were brought against the applicant company in regard of the suspected retrenchment . They all were later discontinued as no tax evasion by the applicant company was detected .

On DATE the applicant company requested that the seizure be lifted . Its request was dismissed by ORG ( vrchní státní zástupce ) on DATE . The prosecutor found irrelevant the applicant company 's objection that the tax proceedings brought against it had been discontinued .

On DATE ORG ( vrchní soud ) dismissed the applicant company 's appeal .

In its constitutional appeal , the applicant company claimed that the seizure of its assets was disproportionate due to its excessive length . On DATE ORG ( Ústavní soud ) declared the appeal inadmissible , finding that a fair balance between the general interest of the society and those of the applicant company arising from its fundamental rights had been struck . The decision was served on the applicant company 's lawyer on DATE .

On DATE the High Prosecutor dismissed the applicant company 's new request for partial lifting of the seizure . ORG upheld this decision on DATE , but on DATE ORG quashed that decision finding a violation of the applicant company 's right to property . It held that the length of the seizure , over DATE , was unreasonable , which thus disrupted the fair balance between the general interest of fighting serious crime and the protection of the rights of the applicant company . On DATE the High Prosecutor lifted fully the seizure of the applicant company 's bank accounts .


David Thór Björgvinsson;Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä

The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . She was represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

The applicant is the mother of PERSON who died , aged DATE , at GPE football stadium .

On DATE , PERSON went to GPE to watch GPE play in the semi - final of ORG at GPE DATE ’s football ground , FAC . The kick - off of the match was scheduled for TIME to kick - off there was a huge build - up of supporters outside LOC entrance to the ground which in turn caused pressure on those trying to get into the ground through the turnstiles .

At CARDINAL . Chief PERSON , who was the police officer in charge of crowd control at the match , decided to authorise the opening of the exit gates at the LOC entrance in order to relieve the pressure at the turnstiles . The opening of CARDINAL of the gates , gate C , resulted in a sudden influx of CARDINAL supporters into the ground , the majority of whom continued through a tunnel into the central spectator pens , CARDINAL and CARDINAL . Each of these pens was capable of holding CARDINAL people but both were already full when the gate was opened . The result of the sudden influx was the build - up of intolerable pressure on supporters at the front of the pens .

Notwithstanding the late arrival of supporters , Chief PERSON decided not to delay kick - off . The match started as scheduled at TIME Shortly after the match began , the pressure in the pens intensified and supporters were crushed against the wall at the front of the pens and suffered severe crush injuries . The match was stopped at CARDINAL . At ORG . the first ORG crew arrived . A major incident vehicle was called at CARDINAL . and arrived at CARDINAL . The applicant ’s son was certified dead at CARDINAL . CARDINAL supporters died following injuries sustained in the disaster , including the applicant ’s son .

On DATE , the then Secretary of ORG for ORG ordered Lord Justice PERSON ( as he then was ) to conduct an inquiry . His terms of reference were :

“ To inquire into the events at GPE DATE Football Ground on DATE and to make recommendations about the needs of crowd control and safety at sports events . ”

The GPE police were appointed to investigate the incident and gather evidence for ORG and assisted Her ORG for GPE , PERSON , who was to conduct the inquests .

Lord Justice PERSON ’s interim report was published on CARDINAL DATE . His final report was published in DATE . Lord Justice PERSON heard oral evidence from CARDINAL witnesses on a wide range of issues leading to the disaster . He also received a number of written submissions . He found that there were a number of causes for the disaster but that the immediate cause was the failure , when gate C was opened , to cut off access to the central pens which were already overfull . Lord Justice PERSON concluded , at paragraph CARDINAL of his interim report , that :

“ The main cause of the disaster was the failure of police control . ”

On DATE , the Coroner formally opened and adjourned the inquests into the deaths of the CARDINAL victims of the disaster ( the CARDINALth victim suffered severe brain damage that left him in a persistent vegetative state and died in DATE ) . ORG ( “ ORG ” ) had been asked to consider bringing criminal charges arising out of the incident and the Coroner decided that the inquests could not be completed until the ORG had reached a decision on whether criminal proceedings would be pursued .

In DATE , following consultation with the ORG and a solicitor connected to ORG , the Coroner decided that the inquests could resume on a limited basis . Although the question of “ how ” the deceased died would be reserved for DATE , the questions of “ who ” , “ when ” and “ where ” could be dealt with before the ORG ’s decision . The Coroner recognised that care would have to be taken to ensure no prejudice to any future criminal prosecutions .

Preliminary inquests ( “ mini - inquests ” ) were held for each of the individuals who had died DATE and DATE . At the mini - inquests , GPE police officers summarised statements relating to each of the deceased , covering the evidence they had gathered in the course of their investigations . The ORG evidence was given orally and on oath . The written summaries themselves were not read in evidence . Evidence was also heard from pathologists who had carried out all the autopsies within TIME of the incident . In the majority of cases , the cause of death was given as traumatic asphyxia and it was said that the individuals would have been unconscious within a matter of TIME and would have died within a matter of TIME thereafter .

On DATE , evidence from a statement made by Special Police Constable ( “ SPC ” ) PERSON on CARDINAL DATE was summarised at the mini - inquest into PERSON death . PERSON had helped carry PERSON off the pitch into the gymnasium . Her evidence suggested that PERSON was still alive at TIME Her statement indicated that PERSON had opened his eyes and muttered the word “ mum ” after he had been taken to the gymnasium . A statement from Police Constable ( “ PC ” ) ORG was also orally summarised at the mini - inquest . His evidence suggested that PERSON was possibly still alive after CARDINAL . PC Bruder reported having seen PERSON after that time have convulsions . PC ORG also thought he had felt a pulse and said in his statement that he had seen PERSON vomit . Despite this evidence , the pathologist considered that PERSON ’s death must have occurred before PERSON attended him .

On DATE , PC ORG amended his statement . He accepted that the “ convulsions ” he had witnessed may merely have been “ twitching ” . He also accepted that he may have been wrong about feeling a pulse and that while he had thought he saw PERSON being sick , it may have been merely spittle or phlegm .

In DATE , the Coroner was advised that the ORG had decided not to prosecute anyone in connection with the incident . The inquest into the question “ how ” the deceased died began on DATE . Prior to this , the Coroner advised that he had decided to impose a cut - off time for evidence which he would hear in relation to the incident . Accordingly , he would hear evidence of events which took place before ORG . only . He was of the view that on the pathological evidence available to him , permanent irrecoverable damage had by then been suffered by all the deceased . In reaching this view , the Coroner took into account the interim report of ORG . Counsel for CARDINAL of the families argued against the cut - off point , primarily on the ground that there was evidence to suggest that not all the victims were dead by ORG . He argued that there had been no investigation or systemic analysis of the organisation or planning of the emergency response and what might have made a difference . The Coroner rejected these submissions .

The resumed inquest heard evidence regarding the arrival of supporters , their approach to the football ground , the entrance to the ground and the build - up of supporters , the opening of the gates , the internal layout of the ground and a broken crowd barrier . No evidence was heard during the resumed inquest regarding the emergency response , its planning or its possible effect on the death of PERSON .

The mini - inquests and the resumed inquest heard , in total , CARDINAL witnesses . In summing up , the Coroner left to the jury the verdicts of unlawful killing , accidental death and open verdict . On DATE , the jury reached a majority verdict ( CARDINAL - CARDINAL ) of accidental death in all cases .

Following the inquest , PERSON and PC Bruder both stated that they changed their statements following visits from LOC Police . PERSON claimed that she had changed her statement as a result of harassment by a police officer . Medical evidence prepared in DATE and DATE by specialists at ORG at ORG in GPE and ORG at ORG respectively suggested that the officers may have been correct in their original statements and that PERSON may have been alive after ORG . and even spoken a word or CARDINAL .

On DATE , relatives of CARDINAL of the deceased , including the applicant , were granted permission to judicially review the inquest verdict of accidental death . On DATE , ORG refused to quash the verdict .

The ORG was instructed to consider bringing criminal charges in respect of the incident . In DATE , he decided not to pursue any criminal proceedings .

In DATE , the applicant lost her civil claim for pre - death suffering because the pathological evidence given at the inquest was that none of the deceased would have felt any pain .

ORG ( “ PCA ” ) appointed the LOC Police to supervise a disciplinary investigation into the conduct of GPE Police officers . In DATE , the ORG directed ORG to prefer disciplinary charges against PERSON , for CARDINAL charge of neglect of duty , and Chief PERSON , for CARDINAL charges of neglect of duty and CARDINAL of discreditable conduct . However , in DATE , Chief PERSON was allowed to retire on health grounds . The disciplinary charges against him were accordingly discontinued as under police regulations , a disciplinary hearing could not proceed when a police officer retired . The ORG decided on CARDINAL DATE to withdraw the charge against PERSON because it considered that it would have been unfair to pursue what was , in effect , a joint charge in the absence of the more senior officer .

Under LAW of LAW DATE , the Attorney General may grant leave to apply to ORG for another inquest to be held . That power can be exercised where there has been insufficiency of inquiry , where new facts have been uncovered or where it is necessary or desirable that a new inquest be held .

In DATE , a first request for leave was made to the Attorney General on the basis of new evidence . This request was rejected in DATE .

In DATE , the Secretary of ORG for ORG ordered a “ scrutiny ” of new evidence uncovered since ORG . Lord Justice PERSON was appointed to :

“ ascertain whether any evidence exists relating to the disaster at FAC on DATE which was not available :

( a ) to the Inquiry conducted by the late Lord PERSON ; or

( b ) to the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Attorney General for the purpose of discharging their respective statutory responsibilities ; or

( c ) to the Chief Officer of GPE Police in relation to police disciplinary matters ;

And in relation to ( a ) to advise whether any evidence previously not available is of such significance as to justify establishment ... of a further public inquiry ; and in relation to ( b ) and ( c ) to draw to their attention any evidence not previously considered by them which may be relevant to their respective duties ; and to advise whether there is any other action which should be taken in the public interest . ”

Lord Justice Stuart - Smith received a number of written submissions and evidence in the course of his inquiry . He also heard oral evidence , including evidence from PERSON and PC Bruder . Although he sat in private , his report was published in DATE and set out in detail the evidence and his findings . He concluded :

“ I have come to the clear conclusion that there is no basis upon which there should be a further ORG or a reopening of ORG . There is no basis for a renewed application to ORG or for the Attorney General to exercise his powers under LAW DATE . I do not consider that there is any material which should be put before ORG or ORG which might cause them to reconsider the decisions they have already taken . Nor do I consider that there is any justification for setting up any further inquiry into the performance of the emergency and hospital services . I have carefully considered the circumstances in which alterations were made to some of the self - written statements of GPE Police officers , but I do not consider that there is any occasion for any further investigation . ”

In DATE , ORG commenced private prosecutions against former Chief PERSON and PERSON , alleging CARDINAL specimen charges of unlawful killing and wilful misfeasance in public office . They were committed to stand trial at ORG on DATE . The trial took place DATE and DATE . PERSON was acquitted on DATE . On DATE , the jury announced that they could not reach a verdict on Chief PERSON and were discharged . On DATE , ORG made an application for re - trial of Chief PERSON . The application was refused on the grounds that he would not get a fair trial .

Following the entry into force of LAW DATE , the applicant made a second request to the Attorney General in DATE to have her case referred to ORG . The application was made on the basis of the alleged insufficiency of the inquiry into PERSON death on the ground that there had been no Article CARDINAL investigation ; and on the basis of new evidence . Her request was refused on DATE .

The Coroner ’s Act DATE provides as follows :

“ CARDINAL Order to hold inquest

( CARDINAL ) This section applies where , on an application by or under the authority of the Attorney - General , ORG is satisfied as respects a coroner ( “ the coroner concerned ” ) either—

( a ) that he refuses or neglects to hold an inquest which ought to be held ; or

( b ) where an inquest has been held by him , that ( whether by reason of fraud , rejection of evidence , irregularity of proceedings , insufficiency of inquiry , the discovery of new facts or evidence or otherwise ) it is necessary or desirable in the interests of justice that another inquest should be held . ”


Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for correspondence;Respect for private life);No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for correspondence;Respect for private life);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy);No violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy);Non-pecuniary damage - award

András Sajó;Françoise Tulkens;Helen Keller;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

At the relevant time , the applicant was a founding member of the NORP political party , led by PERSON . The applicant was also a member of ORG .

On DATE ORG ( “ the SSD ” ) intercepted a telephone conversation between the applicant and PERSON ( “ PERSON ) ( see GPE v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § CARDINAL , DATE ) , a major contributor to the electoral campaign of the ORG President , PERSON . The tapping of ORG telephone had been authorised by a court . The conversation was as follows :

“ PERSON ( ORG ) : So . He [ the ORG President PERSON ] said on television that GPE is n’t on the list of his advisers and wo n’t be included .

PERSON ( GPE ) : Wo n’t be on the list of his advisers ? But I do n’t understand . After all , you always said that [ he would ] .

J.B. : DATE he and I agreed that from DATE I would be on the list [ of advisers to the President ] .

A.D. : I do n’t know anything about this .

J.B. : I am telling you – that was his promise . So he has been stressed for DATE , because he has already betrayed me . You understand ? He has already sold me . And he is stressed , he is afraid to meet . So I have told him , if by DATE he does n’t fulfil any of his promises - not a single one for what I have done for him - I will begin to recover my money . I will have to go public , do you understand ? ...

A.D. : I do n’t know . I do n’t know . I have n’t heard that , I do n’t know .

J.B. : PERSON , I have recorded everything on tape , the tape will be ready DATE .

A.D. : Damn , I do n’t know that . I do n’t know that . I know that you declared that you would act differently , that you would n’t go to ORG because the salary is low there , that you would n’t manage to earn a living there . I know only that .

J.B. : That was in the press . At his [ the ORG President ’s ] request : “ Jura , tell that in the meantime you wo n’t go [ to work at ORG ] . And on DATE you will be [ working ] GPE .... That ’s why he has already been suffering for DATE , because he has lied on television . And I do n’t know how he is going to walk away from this ... Death to him as to the President . DATE this lie will surface ... That ’s why he is restless ...

A.D. : I do n’t know these facts , how can I give you an answer .

J.B. : PERSON , I am not asking you for an answer , I am just emotional , because I do n’t know ... how I should go and talk to him . Because I have to go public and say everything now . Rolandas is such - and - such ... We have agreed with him ... And now : he went to PERSON [ D.K.G. - adviser to the President ] , and [ the President ] has said that GPE wo n’t harass you . I do n’t know what she has told him . So the President , you understand , is a corpse already .

A.D. : If it is easier for you , but you ’re behaving improperly .

J.B. : PERSON , I have n’t done anything yet , so far I ’ve done nothing . But he has sold me publicly already .

A.D. : Calm down . He has n’t sold you publicly ; he is not that kind of person ... I do n’t know that you are not going to be an adviser . That was n’t discussed openly , there was no such idea , I have n’t heard about that . He has n’t sold you publicly ; I ca n’t imagine he would do that . He is not like that .

J.B. : You see . Such is the fact ...

A.D. : Such fact ca n’t [ be ] ...

J.B. : Maybe you want to see the agreement with his signature ? I ’ll show it [ to you ] DATE .

A.D. : I can only repeat what I ’ve said .

J.B. : Okay , PERSON , have you called him ?

A.D. : What ? I have called him , but he is n’t picking up his telephone . ”

On DATE the ORG applied to the Attorney ORG with a request for the applicant ’s telephone to be tapped . The request was based on operational information that the applicant maintained contact with ORG and ORG , both of whom had contributed to the electoral campaign of Mr Rolandas GPE . PERSON worked for a NORP public relations company . Subsequently , ORG was convicted of having threatened the ORG President so that the latter would appoint him as an adviser , grant him NORP citizenship and grant other favours , failing which ORG threatened to disclose certain information which could damage the President ’s reputation ( see GPE , cited above , § CARDINAL ) . The monitoring of the applicant ’s telecommunications also had the goal of establishing the nature of his relationship with a NORP citizen , GPE , who , according to the ORG , had been expelled from GPE in DATE for spying for the former GPE .

DATE the Attorney General requested ORG to authorise the tapping of the applicant ’s telephone . The court order was classified as secret , and was not disclosed to the applicant . The Attorney General based his request on the applicant ’s “ possible participation in smuggling strategic goods and other crimes ” . The court granted the request , authorising the measure for DATE . The court order reads :

“ on the basis of the material in the case file of the operation it is reasonable to [ tap the applicant ’s telephone ] in order to verify his involvement in the criminal activities described in the request : the information in the case file ( the operative information and other data ) confirms that [ the applicant ] could be linked to criminal acts which qualify as serious crimes ; in order to establish all the relevant circumstances other operative measures had already been [ exhausted ] , therefore a supplementary investigative measure [ tapping of the applicant ’s telephone ] is to be authorised , pursuant to the rules of the Law on Operational Activities ” .

As came to light later on , the request by the ORG was also based on the applicant ’s allegedly unlawful involvement in attempts to take over the shares of the road - building company “ GPE keliai ” .

On DATE the ORG declassified the recording of the telephone conversation of DATE between the applicant and PERSON It sent the recording to the Attorney ORG . DATE , the latter began a pre - trial investigation into threats to the ORG President .

On DATE the recording of the telephone conversation of DATE between the applicant and PERSON was aired by the ORG - run and private national television channels ORG and ORG . The ORG denied any involvement in leaking the conversation to the media .

Having intercepted the applicant ’s telephone conversations DATE and DATE , the ORG obtained recordings of his communications with the ORG President , the President ’s advisers and the applicant ’s business partners . It can be seen from the transcripts of those recordings that the ORG intercepted CARDINAL conversations between the applicant and the head of ORG . CARDINAL of these telephone calls was from the ORG President to the applicant . The transcripts also reveal that the conversations between the applicant and his interlocutors contained some swearing .

On DATE the Attorney General wrote to the director of the ORG . The Attorney General noted that on DATE the media had made known the fact that the ORG had obtained recordings of telephone conversations between the applicant and the ORG President . Such recordings , if they existed , were unlawful , given that LAW of the Law on Operational Activities prohibited any operational activities in respect of the head of ORG ( see “ Relevant domestic law ” below ) . The ORG was ordered to make sure that the recordings were not made public and were destroyed the same day .

The letter of the Attorney General does not specify whether by that time the content of the applicant ’s conversations with the ORG President had already been disclosed to the public .

The letter also read that “ noting the illegal practice , which began on DATE , of transfer and making public operational information , the ORG is ordered to adhere strictly to the requirements of LAW and the Law on State Secrets , as well as those concerning Criminal Procedure ” . On this point the Attorney General emphasised that classified information obtained during operational activities , as well as data concerning a person ’s private life and/or demeaning to his or her honour or dignity should not be disclosed . Furthermore , once the operational investigation had been terminated and where the information concerning the target of the surveillance activities had not proved to be true , such information had to be destroyed . Lastly , the information collected during a pre - trial investigation was to remain confidential , unless a prosecutor decided otherwise .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint with the Attorney General , alleging that the tapping of his telephone had been unlawful . He also complained that his telephone call with the ORG President had been intercepted . The applicant alleged a breach of privacy .

On DATE the Attorney General requested information from the ORG regarding the leak .

On DATE the ORG informed the Attorney General that neither recordings nor transcripts of the applicant ’s conversation with PERSON of DATE had been given to the media . It noted that on CARDINAL DATE the transcripts of that recording had been declassified and submitted to the Attorney ORG for the purpose of a pre - trial investigation .

By a letter of DATE , the Attorney General requested the ORG to conduct an inquiry into the leak , as a result of which the applicant ’s and PERSON ’s telephone conversation of DATE had been aired on television ( paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the Attorney ORG informed the applicant that his telephone conversations had been monitored in accordance with the law . The applicant ’s conversations with the ORG President had been recorded while the ORG had been tapping the applicant ’s telephone , and not that of the President . The operational investigation in respect of the applicant had been terminated on DATE . The applicant was advised to address the ORG in order to obtain the information held on him . To the extent that the applicant complained about the damage he had allegedly sustained by the disclosure of his telephone conversation [ of DATE ] to the media , he was advised to bring an action before the civil courts .

On DATE the ORG wrote to the Attorney ORG that the information gathered pointed to the conclusion that the applicant and other persons were attempting to unlawfully acquire the shares of the “ ORG keliai ” company . The behaviour of the applicant and his interlocutors could be characterised as extortion of property .

In DATE the applicant attempted to challenge the lawfulness of the court order authorising the tapping of his telephone . On DATE ORG informed the applicant by letter that the law did not provide for an appeal against court orders of that type .

The applicant also wrote to the ORG , requesting it to disclose the results of its inquiry into the leak . He explained that such information was necessary in order to enable him to prepare a civil action for damages . The applicant also requested access to the information on him held by the ORG .

On DATE the ORG replied that the information recorded by the ORG had been declassified and transferred to the prosecutors as evidence in CARDINAL sets of criminal proceedings unrelated to the applicant ( namely , the proceedings against PERSON for blackmailing the ORG President and the proceedings relating to the influence of civil servants in the management decisions of the “ GPE keliai ” company ) . The applicant was advised that he could obtain access to that evidence with a prosecutor ’s authorisation .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint with ORG , again challenging the court order of CARDINAL DATE . He argued that there had been no lawful grounds for the tapping , and that his rights under LAW had been breached . The applicant was also critical of the fact that the ORG had intercepted and made public his telephone conversations with the ORG President and PERSON He further complained about the absence of a domestic remedy against the court order authorising telephone tapping , alleging a violation of LAW .

By a letter of DATE , the President of ORG returned to the applicant his complaint without examination . The President stressed that to grant a person the right of access to court orders authorising operational measures and to allow him to challenge such court orders would deprive the secret investigative actions of their meaning . He also noted that LAW did not prohibit secret investigative measures as such , provided that the interference involved was necessary in the interests of national security or for the prevention of crime . Well - reasoned court orders were to guarantee that the investigating authorities acted within the law .

On DATE the ORG informed the Attorney General that in DATE and DATE the applicant and a NORP citizen , GPE , had organised visits by NORP civil servants to GPE and visits by NORP officials to GPE . The applicant had acted in cooperation with the advisers to the NORP President . The applicant also had business dealings with ORG According to the ORG , the applicant had ceased to organise such visits once the NORP media had made public the ORG report “ On negative tendencies posing a threat to national security ” . The ORG also reiterated that the above facts could be linked to [ unlawful ] attempts to take over the shares of the “ ORG keliai ” company . The ORG asked the Attorney General to verify the information by way of criminal proceedings .

On DATE the recordings and transcripts of the applicant ’s telephone conversations with NORP businessman PERSON , ORG and the ORG President were deposited with the registry of ORG , which was about to hear the ORG President ’s impeachment case . The prosecutors did not impose any restrictions on the disclosure of those recordings .

At the hearing of ORG on DATE , some of the recordings were played . Given that the hearing was public and directly broadcast by national television , the conversations were aired .

On DATE the applicant requested the opening of a criminal investigation in relation to the disclosure of the contents of his conversations at ORG hearing . He argued that after the disclosure “ none of his foreign partners would want to do business with [ him ] or [ his ] company ” .

On DATE the prosecutors refused to open criminal proceedings . They noted that the information had been disclosed during a public hearing at ORG and in accordance with domestic law . A further complaint by the applicant was dismissed by the Attorney General , who observed that disclosure of the applicant ’s conversations during the proceedings in ORG was a normal part of the judicial process . Furthermore , the disclosed materials contained no information about the applicant ’s private life . By a final decision of CARDINAL May CARDINAL the GPE City Second District Court upheld the ORG decisions .

On DATE ORG found that the ORG President had committed gross violations of the LAW and a breach of his constitutional oath on account of , inter alia , exploiting his official status to influence decisions by the “ GPE keliai ” company concerning the transfer of shares with a view to defending the property interests of certain private individuals close to him . He was also found guilty of having knowingly hinted to PERSON that the law - enforcement institutions were investigating him and tapping his telephone conversations ( see GPE v. GPE [ ORG ] , no . CARDINAL , § DATE , DATE ) .

The applicant lodged an administrative complaint against the refusal by the ORG to grant him access to the recordings of his telephone conversations .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s action as unsubstantiated . The court accepted that pursuant to the domestic legislation a person had a right to obtain information of a private nature held on him by the ORG institutions ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) . Nonetheless , the information the applicant sought access to had much wider implications ; therefore it could not be regarded as concerning his private life . Furthermore , that information had in the meantime been given to the prosecutors as evidence in criminal proceedings ( paragraph CARDINAL above ) . Disclosure of such information was explicitly prohibited by LAW . The court also noted that ORG rights , as established in [ LAW of ] LAW , could be restricted only when this was provided for by law , necessary in a NORP society and with the aim of protecting rights and freedoms of others . In the applicant ’s case , such a restriction had been established by law . There was no proof that by refusing the applicant access to the transcripts of his telephone conversations the ORG had acted arbitrarily . It followed that the applicant ’s right to receive information had not been infringed .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal , upholding the reasoning of the lower court .

NORP In reply to an inquiry by the applicant ’s lawyer , on CARDINAL DATE the Deputy Attorney General wrote that to DATE the ORG had not informed the prosecutors about the results of an internal investigation into the circumstances how the media had got hold of the applicant ’s telephone conversation with PERSON ( paragraphs CARDINAL and DATE above ) .

By a letter of DATE , the ORG informed the applicant that , given that there was no ground for an internal investigation into the lawfulness and reasonableness of the tapping of his phone , as sanctioned by the court on DATE , no inquiry had ever taken place at the level of the ORG .

The Law on Operational Activities ( Operatyvinės veiklos įstatymas ) , adopted by ORG and published in ORG ( PERSON žinios ) on DATE , in force at the relevant time , provided :

“ CARDINAL . Operational activities are overt and covert intelligence activities by operational entities conducted in accordance with the procedure established by this PERSON .

Targets of operational activities are crimes being planned , being perpetrated , or already committed , persons engaged in planning or committing crimes or persons who have committed a crime , vigorous actions of these individuals in neutralising operational activities or by infiltrating law enforcement , national defence , or other government and administrative institutions , and activities of foreign intelligence services and other persons and events linked with State security matters . ”

“ The tasks of operational activities shall be as follows :

CARDINAL ) NORP crime prevention ;

CARDINAL ) NORP solving crimes and establishing the identity of the individuals who are planning , are engaged in or have already committed criminal acts ;

CARDINAL ) NORP protection of individuals from criminal influence ;

CARDINAL ) NORP actions posing a threat to the constitutional order , its independence , economic safety of the State , or other important interests of national security ( ... ) ;

CARDINAL ) NORP protection of ORG secrets ;

CARDINAL) investigation of the activities of the intelligence services of other GPE ;

CARDINAL ) ensuring the safety of the entities of operational activities . ”

NORP The individual and ORG rights and freedoms may not be violated in the course of operational activities . Individual restrictions on these rights and freedoms shall be temporary and may be applied only in accordance with the procedure established by laws , striving to defend another person ’s rights and freedoms , property and the security of the ORG and society ( ... ) .

It shall be prohibited to apply operational activities to the President of the Republic .

NORP In case the rights and freedoms of an individual and citizens have been violated , the entities of operational activities must restore the rights which have been violated and compensate the damage according to the procedure established by legal acts .

The classified information obtained in the course of operational activities , as well as that about a person ’s personal and family life and information demeaning his or her honour or dignity may not be disclosed , with the exception of ... situations stipulated in LAW .

Within DATE of the completion of the operational investigation and provided that the operational information about the target of the operational activities did not prove to be true , information about a person ’s private life must be destroyed ( ... ) .

A person who considers that the activities of the entities of operational activities have violated his rights and freedoms may appeal against those actions to the chief of the entity of operational activities , a prosecutor or a court . ”

“ An operational investigation shall be conducted , when :

CARDINAL ) NORP information is held with respect to a serious crime being planned ( ... ) ;

CARDINAL ) NORP information is available regarding the activities of the special services of other GPE ;

CARDINAL ) protection of ORG secrets is being implemented ;

CARDINAL ) NORP information is available concerning actions which are endangering the constitutional system of the State , its independence , economic security ... or other important interests of national security . ”

“ CARDINAL . The covert monitoring of ... telegraph and other communications and the use of technical equipment in accordance with special procedure shall be authorised by the chairman of a regional court or the chairman of the criminal cases division of that court , on the basis of a reasoned recommendation by the Attorney General , the Assistant Attorney General , or ... a recommendation by the chief prosecutor of the regional prosecutor ’s office or ... assistant regional chief prosecutor , that recommendation being based on the information submitted by the chiefs of the entities of operational activities or their authorised deputy chiefs .

The implementation of actions recommended for aims of conspiracy concerning the actions indicated in paragraph CARDINAL of this LAW , may be authorised by any district court .

The request for covert monitoring shall indicate :

CARDINAL ) NORP the name , surname and position of the officer who submitted the request ;

CARDINAL ) a description of the target or the name and surname of the person in respect of whom operations shall be conducted ;

CARDINAL ) NORP facts ( grounds ) warranting a request to employ the operational activities ;

CARDINAL ) an estimate how long the operational measures will be applied ;

CARDINAL ) NORP the aim of the investigation .

The covert monitoring ... and the use of technical equipment according to special procedure shall be authorised for no longer than DATE . This period may be extended ( ... ) . ”

“ CARDINAL . Classified operational information may be declassified according to the procedure established by laws and used as evidence in a criminal case ( ... ) .

Classified operational information may be used for other purposes in cases determined by the laws ( ... ) . ”

The Code of Criminal Procedure reads :

“ CARDINAL . Information about a pre - trial investigation shall not be made public . It may be made public only subject to a prosecutor ’s authorisation and only to such an extent as is determined as permissible ( ... ) . ”

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW stipulates that citizens have the right to receive , according to the procedure established by law , any information concerning them which is held by the ORG institutions .

The PERSON on the Right to Obtain Information from ORG and ORG ( PERSON gauti informaciją iš valstybės ir savivaldybių įstaigų įstatymas ) , in force as of DATE , provided that a person had a right to obtain information of a private nature held on him by the authorities ( LAW ) . Nonetheless , the authorities could refuse to reveal information , the disclosure of which could damage the interests of ORG security , defence , foreign policy , or hinder a criminal investigation . A refusal to disclose information had to be necessary in a NORP society and based on reasons more weighty than a person ’s right to obtain information . The authorities’ refusal to reveal information held on a person could be appealed against to the administrative courts ( DATE ) .


CASE OF CEVDET AND HATİCE YILMAZ v. TURKEY

Violation of P1-1;Pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses award - Convention proceedings

The applicants live in GPE .

On DATE ORG and Highways expropriated plots of land belonging to the applicants . A committee of experts assessed the value of the plots of land and the relevant amount was paid to the applicants when the expropriation took place .

Following the ORG request for increased compensation , on DATE ORG of First - instance awarded them additional compensation plus interest at the statutory rate .

On DATE ORG quashed the judgment .

On DATE ORG of First - instance awarded the applicants additional compensation plus interest at the statutory rate .

On DATE ORG quashed the judgment .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG of First - instance awarded the applicants additional compensation of MONEY ( TRL ) plus interest at the statutory rate applicable at the date of the court ’s decision , running from DATE , the date on which the title deed to the land had been transferred to ORG and Highways in the land registry .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment .

On DATE ORG and Highways paid the applicants TRL CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL .

The relevant domestic law and practice are set out in the ORG v. GPE ( judgment of DATE , Reports of Judgments and Decisions CARDINAL-IV ) .