No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for private life)

Anatoly Kovler;Elisabeth Steiner;Erik Møse;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Julia Laffranque;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska

The applicant was provost of the GPE monastery and principal ( Regens ) of the PERSON seminary , where future NORP priests are trained . He resigned from his post as principal on DATE .

In the issue of the DATE news magazine ORG an article was published on searches carried out by police in the PERSON seminary . According to the article , police had searched the seminary on suspicion of someone having downloaded child pornography from the Internet . The article further stated that , according to rumours , police had also found photographs showing seminarians engaging in homosexual activities , and that there were rumours of unwanted homosexual advances towards seminarians involving abuse of authority . The article was accompanied by a photograph of the applicant , showing him standing in a garden , and by an interview with him in which he said that he did not believe that there had been any unwanted sexual advances by superiors and that the rumours were part of an intrigue or a revenge plot by a former seminarian . He denied involvement in any such incidents .

NORP In its issue of CARDINAL DATE ORG published an article entitled “ Go on ! ” ( Trau dich doch ) . The sub - heading read “ NORP scandal . Photographic evidence of sexual antics between priests and their students has thrown the diocese of PERSON into disarray . First the principal and now the deputy principal have resigned . High - ranking dignitaries expect PERSON [ the bishop of the diocese ] to be removed from office . ”

The article stated that the applicant and the deputy principal had had sexual relations with seminarians and that CARDINAL of them had regularly spent DATE or longer periods with the applicant at the GPE monastery . It also stated that there was nothing to corroborate the rumours of unwanted homosexual advances which had been reported DATE . The article further reported that some seminarians had downloaded pornography and child pornography onto their computers . According to the article , the existence of homosexual relations was well - known within the seminary and was even known to the bishop , who had tried to “ hush up ” the case at first . The article contained a photograph showing the applicant with his left arm around one of the seminarians , holding the DATE ’s wrist with his left hand and with his right hand on the man ’s crotch . This picture had been taken by CARDINAL of the seminarians at a birthday party and the applicant was shown looking into the camera , apparently aware that he was being photographed . In the article the applicant was identified by name while the ORG identities were not disclosed . Likewise , in the published photograph , the applicant ’s face was visible while that of the seminarian was blurred . The article was also accompanied by a statement from the applicant saying that the photograph could be interpreted in different ways .

On DATE the applicant initiated proceedings under LAW ( Mediengesetz ) against ORG , the publisher of ORG , in relation to the article published on DATE . Relying on sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the said LAW , he requested compensation for defamation ( üble GPE ) and for the violation of his strictly personal sphere ( höchstpersönlicher Lebensbereich ) caused by the publication of the photograph and the impugned article , especially the following passages :

“ ‘ NORP scandal . Photographic evidence of sexual antics between priests and their students has thrown the diocese of PERSON into disarray.’ ; ‘ A painful truth : PERSON ’s principal engaged in sex with subordinates , also PERSON ’s private secretary and legal adviser ... ’ ; ‘ Photos showing , among others , seminarians from PERSON in kinky situations , in some cases with their superiors ... and because they were doing it with the boss and his deputy too , it was all quite normal and they felt perfectly safe ... ’ ; and ‘ In DATE of DATE principal PERSON allegedly performed a kind of ‘ sacrament of GPE DATE and NORP priest ORG in a PERSON restaurant.’ ”

The publisher of ORG replied that the content of the article was true . The company also argued that in the light of ORG position condemning homosexuality , and the fact that the applicant was responsible for the training of future priests in the seminary , the public had an interest in knowing about the facts published in the article and there was a direct connection with public life . The article was thus lawful by virtue of the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by LAW .

On DATE , after holding several hearings at which evidence was heard from a number of witnesses , ORG ( PERSON , hereinafter “ the Regional Court ” ) dismissed the applicant ’s request for compensation .

ORG observed that a large percentage of readers of the DATE ORG that had published the impugned article and the photograph would read the news magazine in only a cursory manner and would also consult other media before forming their opinion . Those readers would learn that there had been homosexual contacts between the applicant and seminarians and also among seminarians , and that there existed photographs to support this . The published photograph showed that the applicant and the seminarian were more than just friends and had had homosexual contacts . It represented the applicant with his left arm around the seminarian and his hand on the man ’s crotch and conveyed the impression that the latter consented to this close embrace .

Giving a detailed evaluation of various witness statements , ORG found it established that the applicant had had consensual homosexual relationships with several seminarians , one of whom had repeatedly spent DATE at GPE monastery ; this had led to an explicit instruction from Bishop PERSON prohibiting such visits by seminarians . Furthermore , the court found that the applicant had spent DATE with a seminarian during which they shared an apartment in a hotel . It also found that the applicant had performed a ceremony in a restaurant which an outside observer could have understood as bestowing a kind of “ sacrament of marriage ” on CARDINAL seminarians . Moreover , the statements of the witnesses had confirmed that the published photograph had been taken in the applicant ’s apartment at GPE monastery during a birthday party for CARDINAL of the seminarians . ORG therefore held that the facts contained in the article were in essence true .

Owing to the considerable importance of ORG as a role model , the public had a great interest in being informed about what was going on within the ORG . The public also had an interest in knowing what happened in the seminary , especially since it had become known that pictures containing child pornography had been downloaded from the Internet . The circumstances leading to such incidents were a subject of public interest and had a direct connection with public life . The applicant , as the head of the seminary , was a public figure in that capacity . Even though the impugned picture had been taken in his private residence there was a connection to his public life . While accusing a dignitary of ORG of having homosexual contacts constituted the actus reus of defamation within the meaning of section CARDINAL of LAW and exposed his strictly personal sphere within the meaning of section CARDINAL of LAW , the publisher had proved that the reported facts were essentially true . Accordingly , the applicant ’s claim for compensation had to be dismissed .

The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law and fact with ORG ( Oberlandesgericht ) . ORG , after holding a hearing , dismissed the appeal in a judgment of CARDINAL DATE .

ORG upheld the judgment of ORG , ruling that the said court had not erred in fact or in law and had rightly held that the newspaper publisher had managed to prove that the content of the article was true . Regarding the complaint concerning the performance of a sort of sacrament of marriage , ORG found that it had not been proven that this allegation was true ; however , the allegation in question made up only a minor part of the article and thus would not render the judgment void . Furthermore , ORG held that , in reporting on photographic evidence of seminarians in “ kinky situations ” , the publisher had provided proof that the statements were true . The average reader of the magazine would understand the term “ kinky ” to mean a deviation from what was considered normal , which would include a photograph of priests and seminarians in a sexual pose wearing clerical clothing , especially as the persons concerned belonged to a group of people who publicly spoke out against homosexuality and denounced homosexual contacts as sinful . ORG went on to state as follows :

“ The court can not accept the additional arguments to the effect that the substantive law was incorrectly applied because the conduct reported on fell within the sphere of strictly private life and had no connection with public life . ORG , to which the majority of the NORP population belongs and which , according to LAW ( BGBl . II No . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , has public - law status , has a level of importance in GPE going beyond that of a small association , as is clear from the overall content of the ORG and the circumstances in which it was ratified . Accordingly , conduct on the part of ORG dignitaries which is in flagrant contradiction with NORP teachings may very well be of public interest , particularly where DATE as in the present case – homosexual contacts take place and are maintained , albeit on a consensual basis , between staff and students in an educational establishment and between students themselves . ORG strives for acceptance and credibility among the public at large , and the activities of a principal and a deputy principal , particularly those in charge of a training college for future priests , are directly related to public life . ORG is engaged in public relations work in many spheres and regularly makes its views on ( sexual ) morality known to the population as a whole , with the result that the general public is also entitled to be informed if individual officials are failing to practise what they preach , condemning homosexuality as a sin in public while practising it in private , even between staff and students . It should also be taken into consideration that the teachings of ORG on the subject of homosexuality are contrary to the fundamental right to sexual self - determination under LAW and to the prohibition on discrimination ; hence , on this basis also , there is a public interest in the publication of specific allegations that Church dignitaries are failing to observe their ORG ’s teachings on sexual morals . This is even more so where the reports concern homosexual contacts between a teacher and his students . Such relationships of dependency call for particular vigilance in order to avoid potential breaches of a fundamental code of conduct designed to protect the physical and psychological integrity of the students . The media have a vital role in publicly exposing misconduct in a democratic society governed by the rule of law .

The exposure and public condemnation of such misconduct is thus in any event in the public interest ; the same is true of the reports identifying those concerned , without which it would not be possible to express credible criticism of specific inadmissible situations and thus fulfil the role of “ public watchdog ” . The weighing of interests in the present case should undoubtedly lead to the conclusion that the public right to information prevails . The professional activity of an ordained priest who is active in public life both as a clergyman and as head of a seminary does not take place merely within the ORG ; ORG has an important and , in some respects even a ORG role , and the credibility of its officials , who demand moral standards from the population and compliance with the ORG ’s rules of community life , occupies an important position in that regard . In particular , the fact that the events involved students who , as future officials of ORG are supposed to be taught these moral precepts by example , lends those events a public - interest dimension extending beyond the ORG itself and affects all sections of the population ... ”

ORG concluded that since the article had reported essentially true facts and there was a public interest in their being reported , ORG had rightly rejected the applicant ’s request for compensation . The judgment was served on the applicant ’s counsel on DATE .

On DATE , after publication of the first article in ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , the applicant brought proceedings against the publisher and the editor - in - chief under LAW ( Urheberrechtsgesetz ) and LAW ORG ) . Those proceedings are the subject of application no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , PERSON and PERSON v. GPE . They are summarised here , in so far as is necessary for the examination of the present case .

Relying on section CARDINAL of LAW the applicant asked ORG ( ORG ) to order the publisher of ORG and its editor - in - chief to

( i ) refrain from making and publishing express statements or statements to the effect that photographs existed which showed him having homosexual contacts or appeared to show that he was homosexual and

( ii ) refrain from publishing photographs of the applicant which violated his legitimate interests , especially in connection with allegations of unwanted homosexual advances involving abuse of authority , which were damaging to his honour and reputation .

The applicant also requested ORG to issue an interim injunction prohibiting the publisher and the editor - in - chief of ORG from publishing the above - mentioned statements and pictures .

After publication of the second article in the issue of ORG , showing for the first time the photograph of the applicant with his hand on the seminarian ’s crotch , the applicant notified ORG of the further statements contained in that article and of the fact that the photograph had been published . He repeated the requests made on DATE .

In so far as relevant in the context of the present case , the applicant ’s request for an interim injunction was rejected by ORG , which gave its decision on DATE , and by ORG , which gave its decision on DATE .

In a decision of DATE ORG varied the lower courts’ decisions , granting point ( ii ) of the applicant ’s request for an interim injunction . The publisher and the editor - in - chief of ORG were thus prohibited from publishing photographs of the applicant , in particular in connection with allegations of unwanted homosexual advances involving abuse of authority , which were damaging to the applicant ’s honour and reputation . However , ORG dismissed point ( i ) of the applicant ’s request , namely that the defendants be ordered to refrain from making and publishing express statements or statements to the effect that photographs existed which showed the applicant having homosexual contacts or appeared to show that he was homosexual .

ORG ( Oberster Gerichtshof ) held that even the publication of true statements was capable of interfering with a person ’s right to privacy and thus might become unlawful . In such cases the interests of the persons concerned in the protection of their reputation or the intimate sphere of their private lives had to be weighed against the interests of the recipient of the information . Referring to the ORG ’s case - law under LAW , ORG noted the importance of freedom of the press , in particular where the latter reported on issues of general interest . In the present case , information about the homosexuality of officials of ORG was an important issue and as such was often the subject of public attention and discussion . It was the media ’s task to report and comment on actual cases . Thus , the applicant ’s interest was outweighed by the publisher ’s right to publish the statements , the truth of which was not in dispute .

As to the publication of the photograph , ORG held as follows :

“ CARDINAL . The publication of images that would cause injury to legitimate interests is prohibited ( section CARDINAL ) of LAW ) . The injury must arise out of the actual publication of the image ( ORG ) . However , not only the image itself must be assessed , but also the manner of its dissemination and the context in which it is set ( PERSON ) . The assessment as to whether legitimate interests have been infringed must aim to establish whether the interests of the person depicted can be objectively said to be worthy of protection ( CARDINAL ORG CARDINAL/CARDINALy = MR DATE , CARDINAL with further references ) .

NORP On the basis of these principles , the interests of the claimant in the present case should be considered worthy of protection , contrary to ORG view .

The accompanying text portrays the claimant in a negative light . He is neither a ‘ figure of contemporary society ‘ par excellence ’’ ( to use the terminology of the NORP case - law ) nor a ‘ public figure’ ( the term used in NORP legal practice ) whose appearance was already known to the general public before the picture was published ( CARDINAL ORG CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . It is clear that the publication of the picture intensifies the demeaning effect of the accompanying text , which is damaging to the honour of the person concerned ( ‘ pillorying effect’ ) . In such cases , therefore , publication of the picture can be justified only if , after the required weighing of interests , the interest of the publisher in publishing is found to prevail ( RIS - Justiz RSCARDINAL ) . However , that is not the case here . The protection of the intimate sphere of the claimant ’s private life carries greater weight in this case than the public interest in being informed of the image , in contrast to the case already examined concerning the text of the article . Of course , there is some force to ORG argument that publication was designed to some extent to ‘ prove the claimant guilty’ after he had denied the accusations as ‘ ORG , and thus to allow the public to make up its own mind on the basis of the photograph . In ORG view , however , this argument is not sufficiently decisive to justify intruding upon the intimate sphere of the claimant ’s private life and providing documentary ‘ evidence’ of the allegations denied by the claimant . It must first be taken into consideration that the photograph was taken at a private party and thus indisputably fell within the private sphere protected by LAW ORG . If sexual freedom between consenting adults is recognised as an absolute personal right and the innermost private sphere is protected under the LAW , then this must also apply in principle to members of religious organisations and ORG officials , even if the practice of that sexual freedom is contrary to the ORG ’s teachings . Forfeiture of the right to anonymity requires particularly weighty reasons which do not apply here to the required degree . There is no overriding interest for the public at large to be informed of the claimant ’s appearance and to identify him via publication of his photograph . Even when publication takes place in connection with a criminal offence , the principle of proportionality of the interference applies . Likewise , even a genuine need to inform must not go beyond what is strictly necessary , so that it can not be accepted in all cases in which the public has reason to take an interest in a particular individual that there is a genuine need to be shown a picture of that person ( RIS - PERSON ) . The interest in dissemination of a picture can only take precedence if the picture has a particular news value – for instance , to warn the public about an escaped criminal ( CARDINAL ORG CARDINAL/CARDINAL = SZCARDINAL CARDINAL Ob CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . In any case , the proportionality principle prohibits publication merely in order to satisfy an appetite for scandal . The interest in being informed can be sufficiently met without publication of an image , simply by reporting the facts and referring to the existence of a photograph ( several photographs ) as evidence . ”

On DATE the applicant narrowed his previous claim to the publication of pictures , amended the wording of the injunction sought and added a claim for damages . He thus requested the court to order the publisher of ORG and its editor - in - chief to refrain from publishing photographs of him which violated his legitimate interests , especially in connection with allegations of unwanted homosexual advances towards seminarians involving abuse of authority , and/or of engaging in sexual antics or “ kinky ” situations with seminarians or similar allegations .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG rejected the claims .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG partly granted the applicant ’s appeal . Relying on section CARDINAL of LAW , it prohibited the publication of photographs of the applicant which violated his legitimate interests by accusing him of unwanted homosexual advances towards seminarians , especially involving abuse of authority , and of engaging in sexual antics or “ kinky ” situations with seminarians or similar accusations . However , it dismissed the claim for compensation .

ORG summarised the content of the articles published in ORG on CARDINAL , DATE and DATE and the reasoning set forth by ORG in its decision of DATE in the interim injunction proceedings . It went on to state as follows :

“ No factual circumstances came to light in the main proceedings which would cause ORG to alter the manner in which it weighed the interests at stake in the preliminary injunction proceedings .

It was established that the photograph was taken in PERSON monastery at the birthday party of CARDINAL of the seminarians , attended by the claimant and CARDINAL students of the seminary . The party was held in a meeting room and a ‘ reception GPE of the apartment made available to the claimant in his capacity as provost of the monastery .

Protection of the private sphere encompasses all matters which , on the basis of their information content , are typically classified as private . This covers individuals in their home , family or other environment removed from the public gaze ( Neukamm , ORG in GPE , CARDINAL ) . The right to protection of CARDINAL ’s private sphere encompasses the spaces in which the individual can rest , relax or simply let go . This includes any LOC from which the individual can exclude outsiders and escape the public gaze ( Neukamm , loc . cit . , CARDINAL ) .

On that basis , there can be no doubt that the birthday party in the claimant ’s apartment fell within the private sphere , despite the fact that it was attended by seminarians and took place ( partly ) in a ‘ reception GPE in the claimant ’s apartment .

Neukamm , loc . cit . , CARDINAL ) . Hence , it is beyond dispute that the photograph in question falls ( exclusively ) within the claimant ’s private sphere .

Furthermore , ORG previously ruled in the preliminary injunction proceedings that the public interest in the text of the article did not automatically justify publication of pictures of the person concerned .

The publication of pictures depicting private conduct is not justified on the grounds of the public ’s interest in being informed ( Neukamm , op . cit . , CARDINAL , and ECtHR judgment of CARDINAL , application no . CARDINAL – News Verlag GmbH ) . This applies also to articles concerning private - life matters ( Neukamm , op . cit . , CARDINAL ) . If the publication of photographs serves the public ’s interest in being informed , that interest must be weighed against the personality rights of the person depicted . As a general rule , the latter should prevail ( Neukamm , op . cit . , CARDINAL ) . ”

ORG also upheld ORG decision in so far as the latter had dismissed the applicant ’s claim for damages . It noted that damages under LAW were to be awarded only if the general requirements laid down in LAW were met . In particular , it was necessary for the publisher to have acted culpably , with at least minor negligence . In the present case , the defendants had based their decision to publish the photograph on an arguable legal opinion . It was a borderline case in which a detailed weighing of the interests at stake had eventually led to the assessment that the publication of the photograph at issue had violated the applicant ’s legitimate interests . In the preliminary injunction proceedings ORG and even ORG had come to the opposite conclusion , holding the view that the publication of the picture had an information value of its own , while ORG had overturned their decisions . In these circumstances , the defendants were entitled to believe that the publication of the picture was admissible , and they had therefore not acted culpably .

The applicant and the defendants lodged extraordinary appeals on points of law with ORG .

ORG rejected the extraordinary appeals in a judgment of DATE , holding that the prerequisite for it to deal with the case , namely a question of law which was of fundamental importance for the unity of the law , was not met . With regard to the defendant ’s appeal it noted that it had already given detailed reasons in its decision of DATE explaining why , as far as the publication of the photograph was concerned , the applicant ’s interests in the protection of his private sphere under LAW outweighed the freedom to impart information protected by LAW in the circumstances of the present case . ORG had followed that reasoning in the main proceedings .

Finally , ORG dismissed the defendant ’s argument that the ORG decisions in the proceedings under sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW were binding on the courts in the present case . It held that a decision taken under sections DATE CARDINAL of LAW did not resolve a preliminary question ( ORG ) in relation to the claim under section CARDINAL of LAW . There was no logical contradiction in prohibiting a newspaper publisher from publishing a picture under section CARDINAL of LAW while on the same facts dismissing a compensation claim under sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW . The finding that the requirements for granting compensation were not met did not provide a basis for concluding that the publication of a picture did not violate legitimate interests within the meaning of section CARDINAL of LAW .

Section CARDINAL of LAW provides for the strict liability of the publisher , inter alia in cases of defamation . The victim can thus claim damages from the publisher . Section CARDINAL reads as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) Where a medium publishes statements which constitute the actus reus of disparagement , insult , derision or defamation the victim shall have a claim against the owner of the medium ( publisher ) for damages for the injury suffered ... ”

( CARDINAL ) The right referred to in paragraph CARDINAL above shall not apply ...

NORP in the case of defamation

( a ) [ where ] the statements published are true or

( CARDINAL ) Where the publication concerns the strictly personal sphere , a claim under subsection CARDINAL shall be excluded only on the grounds set forth in ... subsection CARDINAL ) ... ; in the case of subsection CARDINAL ) , this shall not apply where the published facts are directly related to public life . ”

Section CARDINAL of LAW provides for a claim for damages in cases of interference with the strictly personal sphere of an individual ’s life . It reads as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) If the strictly personal sphere of an individual ’s life is discussed or portrayed in the media in a way liable to publicly undermine the individual concerned , he or she shall have the right to claim compensation from the media proprietor ( publisher ) for the damage sustained . ...

( CARDINAL ) The right referred to in paragraph CARDINAL above shall not apply where

( i ) ...

( ii ) the statements published are true and are directly related to public life ;

( iii ) ... ”

For the purpose of LAW of LAW “ defamation ” is to be understood as defined in LAW ) , which reads as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) Anybody who , in such a way that it may be noticed by a third person , attributes to another a contemptible characteristic or sentiment or accuses him of behaviour contrary to honour or morality and such as to make him contemptible or otherwise lower him in public esteem shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding DATE or a fine ...

( CARDINAL ) Anyone who commits this offence in a printed document , by broadcasting or otherwise in such a way as to make the defamation accessible to a broad section of the public , shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine ...

( CARDINAL ) NORP The person making the statement shall not be punished if it is proved to be true . In the case of the offence defined in paragraph CARDINAL he shall also not be liable if circumstances are established which gave him sufficient reason to believe that the statement was true . ”

Section CARDINAL of LAW , in so far as relevant , reads as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) Images of persons shall neither be exhibited publicly nor in any way made accessible to the public where injury would be caused to the legitimate interests of the persons concerned or , if they have died without having authorised or ordered publication , those of a close relative . ”

Article CARDINAL of LAW ( Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch ) provides as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) Anybody who , as a result of defamation , suffers real damage or loss of profit may claim compensation .

( CARDINAL ) The same shall apply if anyone disseminates allegations which jeopardise a person ’s reputation , income or livelihood , the untruth of which was known or should have been known to him or her . In this case there is also a right to request a retraction and the publication thereof ... ”

The ORG refers to this resolution , adopted by ORG of ORG on DATE . Its relevant passages are reproduced in GPE v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL ) ( [ ORG ] , ORG . CARDINAL and GPE , § DATE , ECHR DATE ) .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial

Giovanni Bonello;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Nebojša Vučinić;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

In DATE the applicant ’s husband died on a pedestrian crossing after being hit by a car . The car was being driven by a certain PERSON

On DATE the applicant filed a claim against PERSON and the “ ORG with the ORG , seeking compensation in the amount of MONEY ( ORG ) . At the same time the applicant requested the court to give her a full exemption from the costs of the proceedings . She submitted that she received only a small pension and that her health had significantly deteriorated .

On DATE ORG partly granted the applicant ’s request . It exempted her from the court fee for processing her claim ( wpis od pozwu ) .

On DATE the Śrem ORG in the course of criminal proceedings convicted PERSON of having caused a traffic accident which resulted in a fatality and sentenced him , inter alia , to a suspended prison term .

In DATE the applicant filed her amended claim with ORG . She sought an award of PLN CARDINAL,CARDINAL in compensation and ORG CARDINAL as a supplementary DATE allowance .

On DATE the ORG awarded the applicant LAW to be paid jointly and severally by the defendants and dismissed her further claims . The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the defendants in the amount of ORG .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal against the firstinstance judgment . On DATE ORG ordered the applicant to pay ORG MONEY in court fees for proceeding with her appeal .

On DATE the applicant asked ORG for an exemption from the relevant fees . She submitted that her income consisted only of a DATE pension in the amount of LAW and that she did not have any property or valuable movables . She also claimed that her health had significantly deteriorated since her husband ’s death .

On DATE the ORG dismissed her request . It considered , in so far as relevant :

“ ( ... ) It should be underlined that the obligation to demonstrate the preconditions for an exemption from the costs rests with the claimant .

Examining the claimant ’s request , the court considers that it can not be granted . The claimant did not demonstrate that she was unable to bear the [ relevant ] costs without entailing a substantial reduction in her and her family ’s standard of living .

A person requesting exemption from costs should submit a declaration of means that she is unable to pay the costs , including detailed information about her family status , her assets and her income , which have to be supported by relevant documents .

In a case where a person seeking exemption from costs has a representative who is an advocate , that representative has an obligation to inform his client about the requirements attached to a declaration of means and the necessary information which must be included therein . In that case , the court is not required to summon the representative of a party seeking exemption from costs to submit an additional declaration .

For these reasons , considering that the claimant ’s request did not contain the required declaration of means , which implies that there is no information enabling [ the court ] to examine the merits of the request , the court , pursuant to LAW , held as in the operative part of the decision . ”

The applicant appealed . She relied on the same arguments as before ORG .

On DATE the ORG dismissed her interlocutory appeal . It found , in so far as relevant :

ORG considers that the grounds of appeal do not justify a departure from the findings of the first - instance court in respect of the appellant ’s ability to pay the [ relevant ] costs .

ORG draws attention to the fact that the claimant received the whole amount of compensation awarded [ by the first - instance court ] . Thus , there were no grounds to hold that she was unable to bear the costs without a reduction in her own necessary support .

As a result , the applicant was prevented from lodging an appeal against the judgment of the Poznań Regional Court of DATE .

The legal provisions applicable at the material time and questions of practice are set out in paragraphs CARDINAL of the judgment delivered by ORG on DATE in the case of PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , ORG CARDINAL-VI ; see also PERSON and GPE v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , § § CARDINAL - CARDINAL ) .


Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 34 - Victim);Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Deprivation of liberty;Article 5-1-d - Educational supervision);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Non-pecuniary damage - award

David Thór Björgvinsson;George Nicolaou;Lech Garlicki;Nebojša Vučinić;Päivi Hirvelä;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicants were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE .

On DATE the first applicant went with a friend to ORG in GPE . She said that she had been raped on DATE by a boy of her own age . The medical staff told her that they could neither examine her nor provide medical assistance because she was a minor and the consent of her legal guardian was necessary . Dr PERSON reported the case to the police and notified the first applicant ’s parents .

DATE , after reporting that an offence of rape had been committed , the applicants attended at ORG no . CARDINAL in GPE , accompanied by a female police officer . The second applicant gave her consent for an examination of her daughter to be carried out . The first applicant was in a state of emotional shock . At the hospital , psychological help was offered to her . Bruises on her body were confirmed by a family doctor DATE after the alleged event took place , DATE .

The rape resulted in pregnancy . The applicants decided together that an abortion would be the best option , considering that the first applicant was a very young minor , that the pregnancy was the result of forced intercourse , and that she wanted to pursue her education .

On DATE the first applicant was questioned by the police . Her mother and the alleged perpetrator ’s defence lawyer were present during the questioning . The first applicant stated that the perpetrator had used force to hold her down and to overcome her resistance .

On DATE ORG , referring to section CARDINAL ( a ) item CARDINAL in fine of ORG ) ( “ the DATE LAW ) ( see paragraph DATE below ) issued a certificate stating that the first applicant ’s pregnancy had resulted from unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor DATE .

The second applicant went to ORG in GPE to ask for a referral for an abortion . She was advised there to contact PERSON , the regional consultant for gynecology and obstetrics . Other doctors whom the second applicant contacted privately were also of the view that a referral from the regional consultant was necessary .

The second applicant also went to another public hospital in GPE ( the Jan Boży hospital ) and contacted a chief physician there , PERSON , who suggested that the applicants meet with a NORP priest . The second applicant refused .

The second applicant then contacted Dr O. He told her that he was not obliged to issue a referral and advised the second applicant to “ get her daughter married ” . She left his office , but returned shortly afterwards as she was afraid that without the doctor ’s referral it would not be possible to obtain an abortion . He told her to report to the PERSON hospital .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicants reported to that hospital . They were received by the acting chief physician . They clearly stated their intention to have the pregnancy terminated . They were told that they would have to wait until the head of the gynecological ward , PERSON , returned DATE . They were told that it would be best for the first applicant to be hospitalised , with a view to blood and urine tests and an ultrasound scan being carried out . On DATE the first applicant was admitted to that hospital .

On CARDINAL DATE Dr PERSON returned DATE and told the applicants that she needed time to make a decision . She asked them to return on DATE . She then called the second applicant separately to her office and asked her to sign the following statement : “ I am agreeing to the procedure of abortion and I understand that this procedure could lead to my daughter ’s death . ” On DATE the first applicant was discharged from the hospital for DATE .

On TIME the first applicant returned to the hospital alone as her mother was working .

The applicants submitted that Dr PERSON took the first applicant for a talk with a NORP priest , GPE The first applicant was not asked what her faith was or whether she wished to see a priest . During the conversation it transpired that the priest had already been informed about the pregnancy and about the circumstances surrounding it .

The Government disagreed with the above account by the applicants . They stated that the girl had wished to see the priest .

During the conversation the priest tried to convince the first applicant that she should carry the pregnancy to term . The first applicant told him that she could not make the decision herself and that she relied on her parents in the matter . The priest asked her to give him her mobile phone number , which she did . She was given a statement written by PERSON to the effect that she wanted to continue with the pregnancy and she signed it . The applicants submitted that she had signed it as she had not wanted to be impolite to the doctor and priest .

When the second applicant arrived later , the priest spoke to her . She told him that it was the family ’s decision to terminate the pregnancy . Dr PERSON told the second applicant that she was a bad mother . She presented her with the document signed by the first applicant and told her that the first applicant had decided to continue with the pregnancy . An argument took place between the doctor and the second applicant . The first applicant , who was present in the room , started to cry . The doctor said that she would adopt both the first applicant and the baby .

Subsequently , PERSON told the applicants that she would not perform the abortion , that under communism when abortion had been freely available no one had made her perform abortions , and that no doctor would have given permission for an abortion to be performed . According to the applicants , she also implied that none of the other doctors in the hospital would perform an abortion .

The applicants left the hospital . The second applicant contacted ORG ( PERSON na rzecz NORP i Planowania Rodziny - hereinafter , “ the Federation ” ) in GPE for help , as after their experience in GPE she was afraid that no one in that town would perform an abortion .

On an unspecified date the Jan Boży hospital issued a press release to the effect that it would not perform an abortion in the applicants’

NORP The case became national news . A number of articles were published by various local and national newspapers . It was also the subject of various publications and discussions on the internet .

On DATE the applicants went to GPE and contacted a doctor recommended by ORG . They were informed about the procedure and about the available options . In TIME the first applicant was admitted to a hospital in GPE . She submitted to the hospital the certificate issued by the prosecutor ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , and a medical certificate issued by the national consultant in gynecology to the effect that she had a right to a lawful abortion . She signed a consent form to undergo an abortion and her parents also gave their written consent . Shortly afterwards the deputy head of the gynecological ward informed the applicants that he had received information from the FAC hospital that the first applicant did not wish to have an abortion .

On DATE the applicants were told that the first applicant was obliged by law to wait DATE before having an abortion . On DATE the first applicant received a text message from NORP priest GPE that he was working on her case and that people from all over the country were praying for her . She also received numerous text messages along the same lines from a number of unknown third parties . The priest came to the GPE hospital TIME together with PERSON , an antiabortion activist . They were allowed to see the first applicant . They talked to her in her mother ’s absence and tried to persuade her to change her mind . In TIME an unidentified woman came to her room and tried to convince her to continue with the pregnancy . The first applicant was upset about this and about the fact that the hospital apparently had no control over who could approach her .

On DATE the first applicant ’s father came to the hospital , apparently as he had been informed that his consent to the abortion was also necessary . A psychologist spoke with the first applicant ’s parents and then with the applicant . She apparently prepared an opinion on the case . The first applicant ’s parents were not given access to it . The doctor who had admitted the first applicant to the hospital told her that a lot of pressure had been put on the hospital with a view to discouraging it from performing the abortion , and that the hospital was receiving numerous e - mails from persons criticising the applicants for having decided to allow the first applicant to have an abortion .

On DATE , feeling manipulated and helpless , the applicants decided to leave the hospital . As they were leaving , they were harassed by PERSON and Mr M.N .- K. , anti - choice activists waiting at the hospital entrance . The mother stopped a taxi but the activists told the driver that her parental rights had been taken away and that she was trying to kidnap the first applicant . The driver refused to take them . PERSON called the police . The police arrived promptly and took both applicants to the police station .

At the police station the applicants were questioned on DATE , from TIME until TIME No food was offered to them . The officers showed the applicants the family court decision which the police had received by fax at TIME from the GPE hospital . That decision , given by ORG , restricted the second applicant ’s parental rights and ordered the first applicant to be placed in a juvenile shelter immediately ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

Subsequently the police took the first applicant to a car . She was driven around GPE in search of a juvenile shelter that would accept her . The second applicant was not permitted to accompany her daughter . As no place was found in GPE , the police drove the girl to GPE , where she was placed in a shelter at TIME on DATE . She was put in a locked room and her mobile phone was taken from her . On DATE priest GPE visited her there and told her that he would lodge an application with the court requesting it to transfer her to a single mother ’s home run by the NORP church .

A psychologist and an education specialist talked to her . She summarised the conversation thus :

“ They wanted to know the entire story and the Assistant PERSON was present . I told them again about the entire affair with the hospitals and the abortion . They said that it would be better for me to give birth . They did not ask me about my view . I stayed locked in the room DATE . I felt as though I was in a correctional facility , I had bars on the window and a locked door , it was not very pleasant . ”

Later in the morning of DATE the first applicant felt pain and experienced bleeding . In TIME she was taken to the Jan Boży hospital in GPE . She was admitted to the maternity ward . A number of journalists came to see her and tried to talk to her .

On DATE , acting upon a letter from FAC and CARDINAL letters from the headmaster of the school attended by the first applicant dated DATE , and a note drawn up by a nonidentified authority , apparently a court supervisor ( kurator ) , also on DATE , ORG instituted proceedings to divest the second applicant of her parental rights .

In these letters the headmaster referred to a text message sent to a friend of the first applicant in which the first applicant had expressed serious distress and said that she could not count on her mother ’s assistance as she saw abortion as the only solution , and to a conversation between the first applicant and one of her teachers in which she had said that she wished to carry the pregnancy to term . She had also been concerned about the consequences , including psychological ones , that an abortion might have . The headmaster was of the view , relying on a conversation he had had with the class teacher and with the school social pedagogue , that the first applicant might be under pressure from her family . He was concerned that the second applicant had not sought psychological assistance for her daughter , who , it had been suggested by the school , might have suicidal tendencies . The second applicant had been requested to attend at the school ; she had been shown the text message and told to make an appointment with a psychologist immediately and given all the necessary information for contacting a therapist .

Enclosed with the letter was a print - out of a chat between the first applicant and her friend dated DATE . It transpired therefrom that in reaction to the news about the minor ’s pregnancy her father had become violent and had told her that if she wanted to keep her baby she would have to move out of the house ; she also said that she did not know what to do and wanted her friend to help and the school to intervene .

On DATE that court , sitting in camera , ordered the first applicant ’s placement in a juvenile shelter as an interim measure . In its decision the court stated that the documents referred to above demonstrated that the first applicant ’s parents did not take appropriate care of their daughter . She was pregnant ; she had been admitted to FAC , which had refused to carry out an abortion having regard to the first applicant ’s statement that she did not wish to have recourse to it . The court had regard to text messages she had sent to her friend . Doctor PERSON had informed her about the consequences of an abortion . It was reported that the first applicant had travelled to GPE with her mother in order to have an abortion performed there . The first applicant was under pressure from her mother and was unable to take a decision independently . Her hospital stays and the atmosphere in the family were harmful to her . She had to be separated from her family in her own interest . The court relied on Article CARDINAL para CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW .

On DATE the second applicant appealed against that decision . On DATE she filed with the court a written consent to her daughter ’s abortion , which she also submitted to the FAC hospital . On DATE she submitted a declaration by the first applicant stating that she wanted to have an abortion and that she was not being coerced into it .

On DATE the first applicant was questioned at the hospital by a criminal judge in the presence of a prosecutor and a psychologist , in the context of proceedings concerning allegations of coercion with a view to making her terminate her pregnancy . The first applicant testified that she had been forced into a sexual act which had resulted in pregnancy and that her mother had not forced her to make the decision to have a termination . The questioning started at TIME and lasted for TIME . The first applicant ’s parents were not permitted to be present . The first applicant did not have legal assistance or any other adult present to represent her as a minor . DATE the court allowed the second applicant to take her home . On DATE she was discharged from the hospital .

On DATE ORG quashed its decision concerning the first applicant ’s placement in the shelter .

On DATE ORG , relying mainly on an expert opinion prepared by ORG , held that there were no grounds on which to divest the first applicant ’s parents of their parental rights . It discontinued the proceedings .

DATE the second applicant filed a complaint with ORG asking them to help her daughter obtain a lawful abortion , and submitted relevant documents , in particular the prosecutor ’s certificate . An official of ORG , ORG , informed the second applicant that her daughter ’s statement consenting to an abortion would have to be witnessed by CARDINAL persons . When the second applicant informed him that the statement had in fact been signed in the presence of CARDINAL witnesses , he told her that the ORG identification numbers were required and that the faxed copy had to be notarised .

On DATE the second applicant was informed by telephone by a ORG official that the issue had been resolved and that her daughter could undergo an abortion . She was notified that she would have to go to Gdańsk , in northern GPE , QUANTITY from their home in GPE .

On DATE ORG sent a car for the applicants and they were driven to Gdańsk . The first applicant had an abortion in a public hospital there . The applicants submitted that the trip to GPE and the abortion were carried out in a clandestine manner , despite the termination being lawful . When the applicants came back home , they realised that information about their journey to Gdańsk had been put on the Internet by ORG DATE at TIME

On DATE ORG instituted proceedings against the first applicant on suspicion that she had committed a criminal offence punishable under LAW ( sexual intercourse with a minor DATE ) . The first applicant was summoned to appear in court for questioning on DATE .

On DATE the proceedings were discontinued . The court held that the first applicant could only be considered the victim of a criminal offence , not the perpetrator .

On DATE the second applicant informed the prosecutor that her daughter had been raped . According to her submissions , she was not aware that reporting the rape to the prosecuting authorities in DATE was not sufficient for an investigation to be instituted . The investigation against the perpetrator of the alleged rape was ultimately discontinued on DATE .

On DATE the GPE - Śródmieście District Prosecutor discontinued proceedings against the second applicant , the first applicant ’s father , PERSON , and PERSON , who worked for ORG , concerning a suspicion that the first applicant had been coerced into having an abortion against her will . The prosecutor found that they had no case to answer and observed that it was not open to doubt , in the light of the documents submitted by the applicants to the GPE hospital , that she had a right to a lawful abortion .

A second set of proceedings , discontinued on DATE , concerned a suspicion that unknown persons , including doctors from GPE and GPE , NORP priests and members of anti - abortion organisations , had exerted pressure on the first applicant to dissuade her from having an abortion . The prosecutor found that there was no case to answer , because the criminal law did not penalise attempts to persuade a pregnant woman to carry the pregnancy to term as long as no physical violence was used .

The second applicant appealed against that decision .

On DATE the GPE - Śródmieście District Prosecutor discontinued proceedings that had been instituted against PERSON and PERSON M.N .- K. , finding that they had accosted the applicants when they were leaving the hospital in GPE on DATE , but that they had no case to answer because no physical violence had been involved . On DATE ORG dismissed the applicants’ appeal .

DATE . On DATE the GPE - ORG dismissed the first applicant ’s appeal against a decision given on CARDINAL DATE by ORG to discontinue criminal proceedings against the police officers who had detained her at the police station on the basis of the placement order . The prosecutor and the court found that the police officers had no case to answer .

On DATE ORG upheld a decision given on an unspecified date by the police to discontinue an investigation into charges of unlawful disclosure of the applicants’ personal data , finding that no criminal offence against the protection of personal data had been committed . No written grounds were prepared for these decisions as the law did not make it mandatory . The applicants appealed , submitting that when the first applicant had been in the GPE hospital , information about her real name , condition and predicament was available and discussed on many internet fora . This caused considerable stress to the applicants . The medical data were particularly sensitive and their disclosure to the general public was unlawful . It was therefore necessary to establish the identity of the persons who had leaked the information to the public . On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal , finding that the prosecutor ’s decision was lawful and correct .

On DATE ORG upheld a decision given on an unspecified date by the police to discontinue an investigation into charges of disclosure of information protected by law , an punishable under LAW committed by PERSON , possibly also by other doctors working at that hospital , ²by the director of the hospital who had spoken to the press about the NORP case and by priest GPE The applicants appealed submitting that information about the applicants’ situation had been disclosed to the general public .

On DATE ORG dismissed the complaint , holding that the first applicant had not objected to the proposal to speak to the priest ; that prior to her admission to the hospital information about her pregnancy was known in her school and to her friends and that the first applicant had not obliged the priest not to disclose information about her predicament to third parties . The court was of the view that it was well known that cases of teenage pregnancy gave rise to controversy and were normally widely discussed by third parties , social and church organisations engaged in the debate about such cases .

The applicable provisions of domestic law are extensively summarised in the judgments of NORP v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , DATE , and ORG v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , CARDINAL DATE .

NORP In particular , the Law on Family Planning ( Protection of the Human Foetus and Conditions Permitting Pregnancy Termination ) , which is still in force , was passed by ORG in DATE . Section CARDINAL provided at that time : “ every human being shall have an inherent right to life from the moment of conception ” .

Section CARDINAL(a ) of the DATE LAW , in its relevant part :

“ CARDINAL . An abortion can be carried out only by a physician and where

CARDINAL ) NORP pregnancy endangers the mother ’s life or health ;

CARDINAL ) NORP prenatal tests or other medical findings indicate a high risk that the foetus will be severely and irreversibly damaged or suffer from an incurable lifethreatening ailment ;

CARDINAL ) NORP there are strong grounds for believing that the pregnancy is the result of a criminal act .

NORP In the cases listed above under CARDINAL ) , an abortion can be performed until such time as the foetus is capable of surviving outside the mother ’s body ; and in cases listed under CARDINAL ) above , until DATE of pregnancy .

In the cases listed under CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL ) above , the abortion shall be carried out by a physician working in a hospital .

The circumstances in which abortion is permitted under paragraph CARDINAL , sub - paragraphs CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL ) above shall be certified by a physician other than the one who is to perform the abortion , unless the pregnancy entails a direct threat to the woman ’s life . The circumstances specified in paragraph CARDINAL , subparagraph CARDINAL ) above shall be certified by a prosecutor . . ”


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 14+3 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment;Prohibition of torture);Non-pecuniary damage - award

Alvina Gyulumyan;Corneliu Bîrsan;Egbert Myjer;Ineta Ziemele;Josep Casadevall;Luis López Guerra;Nona Tsotsoria

The applicant , who is of NORP origin , was born in DATE and has been lawfully resident in GPE since DATE .

On DATE the applicant was on the public highway in the GPE district near GPE , where she worked as a prostitute , when CARDINAL officers of the national police force asked to see her identity and then ordered her to leave the LOC , which she did immediately .

The applicant alleged that DATE , after returning to the same place , she had noticed the same police officers coming towards her and had attempted to flee . The police officers had caught up with her , struck her on the left thigh and on her wrists with a truncheon and again demanded to see her identity papers . She alleged that during the altercation , which had been witnessed by a number of people including CARDINAL taxi drivers and the security guards of a nearby discotheque , CARDINAL of the police officers had insulted her , saying things like “ get out of here you black whore ” . She was released after presenting her papers to the police officers .

Again according to the applicant , on DATE the same police officers stopped her again and CARDINAL of them hit her on the left hand with his truncheon .

DATE the applicant lodged a formal verbal complaint with GPE investigating judge no . DATE and went to hospital to have her injuries treated . The doctors observed inflammation and mild bruising of the left hand .

The file was allocated to GPE investigating judge no . CARDINAL , who decided to open a judicial investigation and requested an incident report from the police headquarters . In his report of DATE the chief of police of GPE explained that police patrols were common in the district concerned on account of the numerous complaints of theft or physical attacks regularly received from the local residents and the resulting damage done to the district ’s image . He added that foreign female citizens present in the area often attempted to escape from the police because the latter ’s presence hindered them in their work . In the present case the applicant had attempted to avoid inspection by the police but had been stopped by the officers , who had asked her to show her papers without at any time making any humiliating remarks or using physical force . With regard to the identity of the officers , the head of police indicated that the ones who had stopped and questioned the applicant the first time were from the patrol formed by the police officers PERSON CARDINAL and Rayo CARDINAL ( code names given to the officers ) . Contrary to the applicant ’s assertions , those who had stopped her on DATE belonged to a different patrol , called ORG .

NORP In a decision of CARDINAL October DATE GPE investigating judge no . CARDINAL issued a provisional discharge order and decided to discontinue the proceedings on the ground that there was insufficient evidence that an offence had been committed .

That decision was served on the applicant or her representative on DATE , at the latter ’s request .

The applicant applied to GPE investigating judge no . CARDINAL to have the decision reversed , and subsequently appealed . She complained of the discriminatory attitude of the police officers and requested that various evidence - gathering measures be taken , such as identification of the officers in question and taking witness statements from the persons who had been present during the incidents . In a decision of DATE , investigating judge no . CARDINAL refused to reverse his decision on the grounds that the applicant ’s allegations had not been corroborated by objective evidence in the file . The judge observed that

“ the medical report [ provided by the applicant ] contains no date and , in any event ... mentions only inflammation and bruising of the hand , with no mention of any injury to the thigh .

[ The facts submitted ] merely show that the applicant repeatedly failed to obey police orders given in the course of their duties , designed to prevent the shameful spectacle of prostitution on the public highway . ”

An appeal by the applicant was examined by LOC , which gave a decision on DATE allowing the appeal in part , setting aside the discharge order and ordering proceedings for a minor criminal offence to be instituted before the investigating judge against the QUANTITY police officers , who had been identified on the basis of the information contained in the report drawn up by the police headquarters .

In the context of those proceedings the applicant asked to be able to identify the officers through a CARDINAL - way mirror . Her request was rejected on the grounds that this was an unreliable method of identification given the length of time that had already elapsed since the incidents and the fact that the officers in question had been wearing helmets throughout , as the applicant had acknowledged . No evidence against the accused was taken during the trial .

On DATE investigating judge no . CARDINAL gave judgment at the end of a public hearing during which evidence was heard from the police officers charged , who were not formally identified by the applicant . In his judgment the judge observed that during the judicial investigation an incident report had been requested from the police headquarters according to which the officers involved had stated that no incident had occurred when they had stopped and questioned the applicant . The judge drew attention to the fact that the medical report provided by the applicant did not specify the date on which it had been drawn up . Furthermore , the findings in the report were not conclusive as to the cause of the injuries . Lastly , the judge reproduced verbatim the grounds of the decision of DATE relating to the applicant ’s conduct and the purpose of the intervention by the police and concluded that her allegations were not objectively corroborated . In the light of those arguments , the judge acquitted the police officers .

The applicant appealed . She challenged the refusal to allow her to identify the perpetrators through a CARDINAL - way mirror and criticised the fact that the only investigative measure taken by the investigating judge in response to her complaint had been to request a report from the police headquarters .

In a judgment of DATE , ORG dismissed her appeal and upheld the investigating judge ’s judgment . It pointed out that the right to use a range of evidence - gathering measures did not include the right to have each and every proposed measure accepted by a court . In the instant case identification through a CARDINAL - way mirror would not have added anything to the evidence on the file .

Relying on Articles CARDINAL ( prohibition of discrimination ) , CARDINAL ( protection of physical integrity ) and DATE ( right to a fair trial ) of the LAW , the applicant lodged an amparo appeal with ORG . In a decision of DATE , ORG dismissed the appeal on grounds of a lack of constitutional basis for the complaints raised .

NORP The applicant was stopped and questioned again on DATE . On DATE she went to the casualty department of a public medical centre , where the doctor observed abdominal pain and bruising on the hand and knee .

On DATE she lodged a criminal complaint with GPE investigating judge no . CARDINAL , alleging that CARDINAL of the police officers had struck her on the hand and knee with a truncheon and that the officers had singled her out on account of her racial origin and had not stopped and questioned other women carrying on the same activity . She also stated that she had subsequently been taken to the police station , where she had refused to sign a statement drawn up by the police saying that she admitted having resisted police orders . Referring to the incidents that had occurred during the first episode , the applicant requested the removal of the police officer who had assaulted her and that her complaint be joined to the CARDINAL previously lodged with investigating judge no . CARDINAL . Neither of her requests was granted .

The case was allocated to GPE investigating judge no . CARDINAL , who decided to open a judicial investigation . The applicant requested certain evidence - gathering measures , including obtaining from the police the identification numbers of the officers who had been on duty on CARDINAL and DATE . In the alternative , should that information not permit identification of the police officers responsible , the applicant requested that all the police officers who had patrolled the area during DATE be summoned so that they could be identified through a CARDINAL - way mirror . Her request was rejected .

NORP In the course of the judicial investigation , investigating judge no . CARDINAL requested an incident report from the police headquarters .

A report by the LOC chief of police dated DATE explained , firstly , that the applicant had admitted working as a prostitute in the area in question , which was an activity that had given rise to numerous complaints from local residents . In that connection he considered that the sole purpose of the applicant ’s complaints ( including the CARDINAL of DATE ) had been to allow her to pursue her occupation unhindered by the police . With regard to the identity of the officers in question , the chief of police observed that the computer records had not registered any intervention on DATE ; only those of CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE had been recorded in respect of that area .

On DATE investigating judge no.CARDINAL issued a provisional discharge order and decided to discontinue the proceedings on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence that an offence had been committed .

The applicant sought to have that decision reversed by the judge and subsequently appealed . The judge dismissed her request by a decision of CARDINAL DATE . Subsequently , ORG dismissed her appeal on DATE . The Audiencia referred both to the report of the police headquarters in which there was no record of an intervention by the police on the alleged date and the statements in the report regarding the applicant ’s true motives in lodging her complaints . It also considered that the medical report supplied by the applicant did not enable the cause of the injuries to be unequivocally established .

Relying on Articles CARDINAL ( right to dignity ) , CARDINAL ( prohibition of discrimination ) , CARDINAL ( right to physical and mental integrity ) and CARDINAL ( right to a fair trial ) of the LAW , the applicant lodged an amparo appeal with ORG . In a decision of DATE , ORG dismissed the appeal on grounds of a lack of constitutional basis for the complaints raised .


The applicant is a NORP national of NORP origin . He was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was employed as a medical technician in ORG . In DATE , after GPE became independent following the dissolution of the former GPE , the applicant worked in ORG in GPE .

As ORG withdrew from GPE in DATE , the applicant , who had been declared disabled , applied for an invalidity pension . In DATE ORG in GPE granted him the right to retire on grounds of invalidity and paid him a pension until DATE .

Following the dissolution of the former GPE and in the absence of an agreement on the succession or any relevant bilateral treaty , ORG decided to provide for an advance payment of military pensions , since the GPE fund had ceased to pay former servicemen living in GPE . The purpose of this regulation was to find a temporary solution for retired military personnel and some other categories of military benefiting from the scheme , until the issues of the State succession had been settled .

NORP The proceedings in question in the present case concern the applicant ’s claim for an advance on his military pension .

On DATE the applicant applied for an advance on his military pension under the Advance on Payment of Military Pensions Decree ( Official Gazette no . CARDINAL of DATE ) .

On DATE the Pension and Invalidity Insurance Fund ( Skupnost pokojninskega in invalidskega zavarovanja ) found that the applicant had no right to advance payments . On DATE the Pension and Invalidity Insurance Fund dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . The applicant sought judicial review of those decisions .

On DATE ORG in GPE ( PERSON združenega dela pokojninskega in invalidskega zavarovanja ORG ) dismissed the applicant ’s action . On DATE ORG ( Višje delovno in socialno sodišče ) in GPE upheld the lower court ’s decision . The second - instance decision was served on DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal with ORG ( PERSON sodišče ) alleging breaches of his constitutional rights in the aforementioned proceedings .

On DATE the Constitutional Court invited the applicant to complete his appeal . ORG and the Pension and Invalidity Insurance Fund were requested to submit records . The applicant filed supplementary submissions on DATE but ORG did not receive them until DATE .

On DATE and DATE a panel of CARDINAL judges considered the case in the preliminary proceedings . On DATE ORG declared the applicant ’s constitutional appeal admissible .

On DATE ORG asked ORG to submit a statement , which was supplied on DATE .

On DATE the plenary court began consideration of the merits of the applicant ’s case .

In addition , the Pension and Invalidity Insurance Fund was asked on DATE to submit its opinion . They complied with the request on DATE .

On DATE , DATE and DATE ORG held further deliberations .

On DATE ORG , by a majority , rejected the constitutional appeal as being manifestly ill - founded . The decision was served on DATE .

On DATE the applicant applied for a pension under general pension and invalidity insurance regulations .

On DATE the Pension and Invalidity Insurance Fund granted the applicant the right to his pension from DATE .

Article CARDINAL of the Constitution of GPE ( PERSON ) reads , so far as it is relevant :

... on constitutional appeals of violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms by specific acts ; ...

Unless otherwise provided by law , the Constitutional Court shall hear a constitutional appeal only if legal remedies have been exhausted . The Constitutional Court shall decide whether a constitutional appeal is admissible for adjudication on the basis of statutory criteria and procedures . ”

“ Proceedings before the Constitutional Court shall be regulated by law .

The law shall determine who may require proceedings to be instituted before ORG . Anyone who demonstrates a legal interest may request the institution of proceedings before ORG .

The Constitutional Court shall decide on a majority vote of all its judges unless otherwise provided for in individual cases by the LAW or by statute . ORG may decide whether to institute proceedings following a constitutional appeal with such lesser number of judges as may be provided by statute . ”

LAW ( Zakon o Ustavnem sodišču ) governs the composition and functioning of ORG .

“ ORG is the highest body of judicial authority for the protection of constitutionality , legality , human rights and basic freedoms …

Decisions of ORG are legally binding . ”

Sections CARDINAL of that Act concern constitutional appeals by individuals ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

“ Any one who believes that his or her human rights and basic freedoms have been violated by a particular act of a state body , local community body or statutory authority may lodge a constitutional appeal with ORG , subject to compliance with the conditions laid down by LAW . ... ”

“ A constitutional appeal may be lodged only after all legal remedies have been exhausted .

Before all special legal remedies have been exhausted , ORG may exceptionally hear a constitutional appeal if a violation is probable and if certain irreparable consequences for the appellant would occur as a result of the implementation of a particular act . ”

“ A constitutional appeal shall be lodged within DATE after the date of the decision against which the constitutional appeal lies .

In specially founded cases ORG may exceptionally hear a constitutional appeal lodged after the expiry of the time - limit stated in the first paragraph of this section . ”

“ The constitutional appeal must indicate the particular act which is the subjectmatter of the appeal and the facts that give rise to the allegation of a violation of human rights and basic freedoms on which the appeal is based .

A constitutional appeal shall be lodged in writing . There shall be enclosed with it a copy of the particular act that is the subject - matter of the appeal and all documents forming the basis of the appeal .

The appeal and annexed documents shall be lodged in triplicate . ”

Sections DATE govern the preliminary procedure .

“ A decision on whether a constitutional appeal is admissible and to institute proceedings shall be taken in private by a committee of CARDINAL judges of ORG .

If the appeal is incomplete or if ORG is unable to examine it because it does not contain all the required information or documents referred to in the preceding section of this act , the ORG shall require the appellant to complete the appeal within a specified time . ”

Sections CARDINAL set out the procedure for the adjudication of the constitutional appeal and provide :

“ If the constitutional appeal is found to be admissible , it shall be sent to the body which issued the act and against which the constitutional appeal has been lodged , so that it may reply to the constitutional appeal within a determined period . ”

“ If a constitutional appeal is admissible , it shall be examined by ORG in private unless ORG decides to hold a public hearing . ”

“ The Constitutional Court shall issue a decision declaring that the appeal was unfounded or shall accept the appeal and quash the act that was the subject of the appeal or declare it null and void in whole or in part , and return the matter to the competent body . ... ”

Section CARDINAL concerns ORG decision if the appeal is upheld and reads :

“ If ORG quashes an individual act , it may also decide a contested right or freedom if such procedure is necessary in order to put an end to consequences that have already occurred as a result of that act or if such is the nature of the constitutional right or freedom and provided that a decision can be reached on the basis of information in the record . ”


The applicant is a NORP national living in GPE . She is represented before the Court by ORG , a solicitors’ firm in GPE

The applicant is a social worker working with children DATE . She also works on a voluntary basis as a classroom assistant in a local school . She is homosexual and her sexual orientation is known to her employer and to the school where she assists . The applicant has CARDINAL children DATE .

The applicant has been involved in a homosexual relationship with L since DATE . L obtained a divorce in DATE but the custody and care of ORG CARDINAL children ( born in DATE , CARDINAL , DATE and DATE , respectively ) were the subject of ORG proceedings . In or around DATE L and her former husband agreed interim shared care arrangements according to which the children would spend alternative DATE with each parent .

On DATE L and her former husband settled the ORG proceedings . L ’s former husband would have custody of the children and her access to them would continue on the basis of the shared care arrangement . L also agreed that she would not permit the children to come into contact with or remain in the company of the applicant or of any other person known to L to be lesbian . ORG made an order on DATE in the terms of this agreement . As a result of difficulties surrounding the applicant ’s contact with L , the matter was brought before ORG on DATE when PERSON again undertook to the ORG that she would comply with the order of CARDINAL DATE . Following another summons issued by ORG former husband , on DATE L undertook to ORG that she would instruct the applicant not to call at her home at any time when she had access to the children , and she undertook not to answer or open the door if the applicant called at her house during a scheduled access visit . ORG recorded L ’s undertakings in its order of DATE and dismissed the summons . Since then L lives DATE at her own address with her children and DATE with the applicant .

During the course of the custody proceedings , social work and psychologist reports were submitted to ORG dealing , inter alia , with the applicant ’s position in relation to L and her children .

The detailed report of a child and adolescent psychiatrist , PERSON , of DATE concluded that research showed there was no evidence that children living with lesbian mothers were adversely affected in terms of their sexual identity , personal development , peer relationships or social adjustment . He considered that there was no evidence that ORG sexual orientation posed a threat to the children or that GPE ’s relationship with the applicant would adversely affect the children . The evidence was that cohabitation between L and the applicant , provided that relationship was good , would have a positive effect on the children . Given the acrimonious relationship between L and her former husband , the children ’s need for stability and security , the difficulties ORG husband experienced with the shared care arrangements and since GPE was the main care giver , it was that expert ’s opinion that L should be granted custody with frequent access being given to GPE ’s former husband .

A social work report of DATE indicated that there was nothing to suggest that L could not provide adequate care and protection for the children . Given the GPE acrimonious relationship and the children ’s need for stability , custody was recommended in favour of L with regular access in favour of ORG husband . A further social work report of DATE highlighted the husband ’s concern about L ’s relationship with the applicant . Having considered all of the care and custody options , the social worker indicated that he was unable to assess the children ’s views on their mother ’s homosexuality and that there was a lack of definitive research on the possible effects on the children ’s developments of being in the custody of L who was homosexual . He found it extremely difficult to make a definite recommendation , but considered that custody should be given to L , her husband ’s condition as regards the children having no contact with the applicant being considered “ untenable ” .

Dr Harbinson , a consultant psychiatrist , did not agree with PERSON report of DATE . In his report of DATE , he considered that it was difficult to dismiss the vital importance of parents as role models for their children and the stigmatisation attached in our society to homosexuality . He considered that it would not be wise to raise the issue of ORG homosexuality with the children at that stage .

PERSON produced an addendum to his report in DATE pointing out that PERSON had done limited research on lesbian couples and children and had misinterpreted the research quoted . He repeated that it was not the sexual orientation of parents that was the issue but rather the quality of the GPE relationship . He added that psychological studies had shown that where the mother ( the main care giver ) was living with her lesbian partner , the mother was psychologically more secure and stable and this was , in turn , beneficial for the children . He confirmed his recommendation that L have custody of the children , with her husband having regular access .


Violation of Art. 8;Non-pecuniary damage - award

András Sajó;Françoise Tulkens;Ireneu Cabral Barreto;Nona Tsotsoria;Vladimiro Zagrebelsky

The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

NORP In DATE the applicant married Mr PERSON . According to birth certificate no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL Mr PERSON was entitled to bear the CARDINAL above - mentioned forenames from the very moment of his birth . Her husband signed the marriage certificate as “ PERSON ” . The applicant chose to bear her husband ’s name by putting the suffix “ -né ” referring to the marriage ( házasságra utaló toldás ) after the first given name ( PERSON ) of her husband . In accordance with the widespread custom in GPE , the latter only used his first given name even in official contexts . The applicant ’s married name was registered as PERSON on the marriage certificate .

The official before whom the marriage took place did not observe that the name chosen was against the law since , at the material time , a woman could only choose to bear the whole name of her husband , including all the given names . In the present case , the applicant ’s correct married name should have been PERSON .

The mistake was not revealed in DATE when identity cards were introduced in GPE . The applicant ’s renewed identity card issued in DATE also contained the name PERSON . The applicant used this name in all official and private business . In particular , her social security card and tax identification certificate were issued in the name ORG .

In DATE GPE introduced electronic data recording . In the new ORG ( PERSON ) the applicant ’s name was automatically entered in the manner prescribed by law , as PERSON . However , she did not receive any official notification of this fact . In DATE she and her husband were entered on the electoral register ( választói névjegyzék ) under the names PERSON and PERSON . This database relied on the general ORG .

In DATE the applicant ’s husband died . The applicant then used the name PERSON with the prefix “ özv . ” indicating that she was a widow .

In DATE the applicant lost her identity card . Based on ORG , ORG issued a new card which indicated her name as the widow of PERSON ( özv . PERSON ) . On CARDINAL DATE the applicant obtained an official certificate containing this name . The certificate ’s only function was to enable her to access her bank account since her new identity card contained a name that was different from the one she had used when opening the account . The text of the certificate expressly stated that it had been issued for CARDINAL - time use .

The applicant lodged a complaint with ORG , seeking permission to bear the name PERSON . In DATE the Ministry informed her that , since her husband ’s official name was PERSON , she was entitled and obliged to bear that name in its entirety as a widow , and that it was not possible to change it to another form . Her name is at present registered as PERSON .

“ ( CARDINAL ) As a general rule , women should be entered in the registry under their family name ( birth name ) and forename . Exceptions , having to bear their husbands’ as well as their own family name and forename :

( a ) married women , widows ... ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) After the marriage , the wife shall bear

a ) her whole maiden name , or

b ) the whole name of her husband with the suffix referring to the marriage , to which she may attach her whole maiden name , or

c ) her husband ’s family name with the suffix referring to the marriage , to which she attaches her whole name , or

d ) her husband ’s family name to which she attaches her first name . ... ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) A person bearing his / her spouse ’s name can not alter it by way of a name - change ( névváltoztatás ) . ”


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Tribunal established by law)

Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He is a farmer .

Following a dispute over ownership rights to a plot of land between the applicant and LOC in the district formerly known as GPE ( “ the GPE ” ) , criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant .

On DATE the ORG convicted the applicant under LAW ( violation of a lawful owner ’s right to a plot of land , by means of unauthorised occupation , alteration or cultivation thereof ) and sentenced him to a fine in the amount of CARDINAL conventional financial units ( CARDINAL old NORP manats , equivalent to CARDINAL new NORP manats ( AZN ) , which according to the official exchange rates published by ORG amounted to MONEY ( ORG ) at the relevant time ) . The court found that the applicant had unlawfully occupied and cultivated a plot of land of QUANTITY owned by the LOC . The ORG based its findings on witness statements and information provided by ORG ( “ the NORP ” ) .

On an unspecified date , the applicant appealed against the judgment of CARDINAL DATE , arguing that the plot of land in question was part of a larger parcel of land measuring QUANTITY belonging to his family farming business . On DATE ORG upheld the first - instance court ’s judgment .

The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law , alleging that the lower courts had erred in their assessment of the facts . On DATE ORG , composed of a panel of CARDINAL judges including judge GPE , quashed the judgment of ORG of DATE and remitted the case for a new examination to ORG . ORG noted , in particular , that the conviction was based on insufficient evidence .

Taking into consideration the findings of ORG , ORG sent a new request to the ORG and the GPE requesting detailed information about the exact location , measurements and ownership of the plot of land . GPE submitted that , according to the official records , the plot in question belonged to GPE and not the applicant . The PERSON conducted an on - site inspection of the plot of land and submitted to the court that the plot in question was part of the GPE ’s estate . On DATE ORG delivered a new judgment upholding ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE convicting the applicant . The court held that the disputed plot of land which the applicant cultivated belonged to the GPE and that the relevant law had been applied correctly .

The applicant appealed . On DATE ORG , composed of a panel of CARDINAL judges including judge GPE , examined the applicant ’s appeal . It found that ORG had examined all the relevant and available evidence and had committed no breaches of substantive or procedural law . Accordingly , ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal and upheld ORG judgment of DATE .

NORP The relevant provisions of LAW ( “ the CCrP ” ) concerning the disqualification of judges provided as follows :

Article CARDINAL . Objection to a judge

“ CARDINAL . An objection to a judge ( or judicial formation ) must state reasons ... An objection to a judge may be considered justified and be granted unconditionally if there exists CARDINAL of the following grounds precluding a person ’s participation in a criminal proceedings as a judge :

DATE . if the judge had participated as a judge in the examination of the same criminal case or another prosecution matter in a court of first instance or appeal or before ORG , or on the basis of newly discovered facts ( the judge ’s examination of the file at the pre - trial stage by way of judicial supervision , or the initial hearing of the case , shall not preclude his subsequently examining the case as a member of the court of first instance or appeal or ORG ) ;

In any of the cases covered by LAW , the judge shall disqualify himself or herself . ”

The following are the relevant provisions of the ORG concerning the review of the relevant decisions delivered in domestic proceedings and reopening of the domestic proceedings following a finding by ORG of a violation of the Convention :

Article CARDINAL . FAC for review of judicial decisions in connection with the violation of rights and freedoms

“ CARDINAL . The following are grounds for review of judicial decisions in connection with the violation of rights and freedoms :

finding by ORG a violation of the provisions of LAW in the criminal proceedings , simplified pre - trial proceedings or proceedings involving a complaint under the private prosecution procedure , conducted by courts of GPE ; ... ”

Article CARDINAL . Procedure for review of judicial decisions in connection with the violation of rights and freedoms

“ CARDINAL . The Plenum of ORG is vested with the competence to review judicial decisions in connection with the violation of rights and freedoms .

Where grounds exist under ORG and DATE , the ORG of the ORG examines the cases only on points of law , in connection with the execution of judgments of ORG and ORG . After a judgment of ORG or ORG is received by ORG , the President of ORG assigns the case to one of the [ ORG ] judges for preparation and presentation of the case at the ORG [ of ORG ] . The case shall be reviewed at a hearing of the ORG of ORG DATE after the judgment of ORG or ORG is received by ORG . ... ”

Article CARDINAL . Decision taken after review in connection with the finding by ORG a violation of the provisions of LAW in the criminal proceedings conducted by courts of GPE

“ CARDINAL . Having conducted a review in cases stipulated by DATE , the Plenum of ORG has competence to deliver one of the following decisions :

to quash , fully or partially , judicial decisions of the first - instance , appellate and cassation courts , as well as judicial decisions delivered under the procedure of additional cassation ... , and to remit the criminal case , the case materials of simplified pre - trial proceedings , or the case materials of proceedings involving a complaint under the private prosecution procedure , for re - examination by the relevant firstinstance or appellate court ;

CARDINAL.CARDINAL.CARDINAL . to amend a decision of the court of cassation and/or additional cassation in situations stipulated in ORG and CARDINAL of this Code ;

to quash a decision of the court of cassation and/or additional cassation and to deliver a new decision . ”

In its decision no . CARDINAL of DATE concerning the ORG practice on implementation of the rules concerning objections to a judge or the bench , the Plenum of ORG held that when relevant legal grounds for disqualification exist , a judge must withdraw from the examination of the case of his or her own accord , even when the parties to the proceedings have not raised an objection . This requirement to withdraw is defined by the ORG as the judge ’s “ legal duty ” ( paragraph CARDINAL ) . A judge who has already heard a criminal case in a court of first instance , appeal or cassation , can not take part in the re - examination of the same criminal case ( paragraph CARDINAL ) .


Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;Elisabeth Steiner;George Nicolaou;Giorgio Malinverni;Sverre Erik Jebens

The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE , LOC . The applicant is a retired military serviceman .

“ ... the military commissioner is to reinstate PERSON in the list of military personnel and to eliminate the violations of the procedure of his discharge from work ... and then [ again ] exclude PERSON from the list of military personnel , after having provided him with all kinds of military provisions , including monetary ones ... ”

On DATE the Military Commissioner replied to the applicant stating that in DATE he had been provided with a flat in GPE , that in DATE his wife had privatised the flat and that in DATE she had sold it . The letter further stated :

“ ... Thus , you have forfeited your entitlement to be provided with housing by the ORG or by ORG ... ”

On DATE the applicant brought proceedings against the Military Commissioner at ORG .

On DATE ORG refused to examine the applicant ’s complaint stating that the same complaint had been already examined by the court ’s decision of DATE . The applicant appealed against this decision to the court of LOC ( ORG ) . On DATE ORG overruled this decision and returned the case for a fresh examination .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s complaint . The court referred to the Military Commissioner ’s letter of CARDINAL DATE and stated that the applicant had missed the DATE statutory time - limit for the appeal against actions of officials . The text of the court ’s decision stated , inter alia , the following :

“ ... During the hearing the applicant stated that he did not miss the DATE time - limit for appeal of actions of officials , as he had received the Military Commissioner ’s written refusal ... on DATE and that he had lodged his complaint with the court on DATE ...

The court finds that the applicant ’s reference [ to the above dates ] is unsubstantiated for the following reasons :

... according to LAW and LAW , a citizen must lodge his complaint within DATE from the date when he learnt about a violation of his rights [ by a ORG official ] .

The ORG finds that it is obvious that after the sale of his flat in GPE on DATE the applicant was aware of the absence of housing for him and his family . Further , by the Military Commissioner ’s order no . CARDINAL issued on DATE the applicant was excluded from the list of the military personnel . Being aware of the exclusion from the list , the applicant appealed this order in DATE to ORG .

In these circumstances , the court finds that the applicant was aware of the exclusion from the list of military personnel [ and of the relevant entitlements ] ... and the violation of his rights by the ORG official in DATE ...

... The applicant ’s [ current ] complaint was received by ORG on DATE .

In this situation the ORG finds that the DATE time limit for appeal against the actions of the Military Commissioner ... was missed by the applicant .

As to the applicant ’s reference that the time limit started running over again after ... in DATE he had received the written refusal of the ORG official , the court finds it unconvincing as the time limit [ for the appeal against actions of officials ] should be calculated from the earliest event ... ”

The applicant appealed this decision to ORG . On DATE ORG upheld the decision of ORG and it became final .

LAW , in force as of DATE stipulates :

“ Limitation period for judicial complaints :

A citizen has the right to apply to a court within DATE starting from DATE when he leant about the violation of his rights [ by a ORG official ] . ”