The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , born in DATE and living in PERSON .

At the relevant time the applicant had been politically active for DATE , as a member of ORG and as candidate for ORG on CARDINAL occasions .

In DATE he was convicted of aggravated debtor ’s dishonesty and a book - keeping offence and sentenced to DATE and CARDINAL months’ imprisonment . The judgment was upheld by a court of appeal and ORG ( korkein oikeus , högsta domstolen ) refused leave to appeal in DATE . A subsequent request for the case to be re - opened was likewise refused .

On DATE ORG of ORG refused the applicant ’s request that the enforcement of his sentence be postponed due to his illness .

On DATE ORG voted to disqualify the applicant from sitting on the assembly on account of his having been sentenced to over six months’ imprisonment . His appeal was refused by ORG ( lääninoikeus , länsrätten ) of ORG on DATE . His further appeal to ORG ( korkein hallinto - oikeus , högsta förvaltningsdomstolen ) was apparently likewise refused .

Meanwhile , on DATE , the Chief Enforcement Officer ( kihlakunnanvouti , häradsfogden ) of PERSON granted the applicant ’s further postponement request in order to enable him to organise certain private matters prior to serving his sentence . He was ordered to start serving his prison term on DATE .

In DATE the applicant requested that the enforcement of his sentence be postponed until DATE so as to allow for his effective participation in the parliamentary elections on CARDINAL DATE in which he intended to present himself as a candidate .

On DATE this request was dismissed , the Chief Enforcement Officer having concluded that the already fixed enforcement would not engender any exceptional and significant losses or difficulties to the applicant , his family , his employer or to society within the meaning of the chapter CARDINAL , section CARDINAL ( c ) of the Act on the Enforcement of Sentences ( laki rangaistusten täytäntöönpanosta , lag om verkställighet av straff ) . Moreover , the considerations militating in favour of the immediate enforcement of his sentence clearly outweighed the inconvenience which such enforcement would cause . Under chapter CARDINAL , section CARDINAL ( d ) of the said Act the decision was automatically referred to ORG which upheld it on DATE .

Having started to serve his sentence on DATE , the applicant , on DATE , filed an extraordinary appeal to ORG , seeking to have the refusal quashed as it had been based on a manifestly incorrect application of the law . He also sought to have the enforcement of his sentence stayed at least until the court had decided the matter . On DATE the court refused to re - open the case .

Meanwhile , on DATE the applicant registered as candidate in the upcoming elections .

His CARDINAL requests for leave immediately prior to and on DATE , in order to enable him to complete his campaign , were all refused by FAC . The refusals were automatically referred to ORG which upheld them .

The applicant was not elected .

The sentences imposed on CARDINAL other defendants convicted in the same criminal proceedings were allegedly not enforced until DATE .

B. Relevant domestic law

Parliamentary elections are normally held DATE in GPE . Under LAW ( valtiopäiväjärjestys , riksdagsordning ) , as in force at the relevant time , anyone entitled to vote in parliamentary elections is likewise entitled to stand as a candidate , unless placed under guardianship ( section CARDINAL ) .


The applicant is a public company “ ORG ” ( NORP акционерное общество « Уральский завод тяжелого машиностроения ORG , ORG “ GPE ” or “ the applicant company ” ) located in GPE . The applicant company is represented before the ORG by PERSON , the head of its legal department .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the applicant company , may be summarised as follows .

Pursuant to decisions of ORG of CARDINAL and DATE , the applicant company was privatised and the assets of the serial devices engineering plant ( Завод серийных машин , “ the Plant ” ) were included , among others , in the applicant company ’s charter capital .

On DATE the applicant company made an offer to the Government to return the Plant into state ownership in exchange for a certain number of the applicant company ’s shares . On DATE the ORG accepted the offer and the terms and conditions of the exchange were developed at a meeting on DATE .

On DATE the applicant company and the ORG signed an agreement on the transfer of the Plant to the ORG for consideration . On DATE the applicant company transferred the Plant to ORG of GPE , acting on behalf of the Government .

On DATE the applicant company invited the Government to pay the stipulated consideration for the Plant . On DATE and CARDINAL DATE ORG of GPE and the Government acknowledged the outstanding debt and offered to pledge the respective amount in DATE ORG budget . However , on DATE and CARDINAL DATE ORG of GPE refused to pay the applicant company with reference to the absence of supporting documentation .

On DATE the applicant company lodged a civil action against the ORG and ORG with ORG ( NORP суд г. GPE ) . The applicant company sought to recover the outstanding payment for the transferred Plant .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant company ’s action . The court held that the Plant had been unlawfully privatised and , therefore , it could not be legitimately transferred back into state ownership for consideration .

On DATE the applicant company brought an appeal ( апелляционная жалоба ) against the judgment of CARDINAL DATE . It argued , inter alia , that the privatisation had been lawful and subsequently approved by a Government resolution .

On DATE the Appeal Instance of ORG ( апелляционная инстанция Арбитражного суда г. GPE ) granted the applicant company ’s action and awarded it ORG to be paid by ORG on behalf of GPE .

On DATE ORG and ORG brought cassation appeals ( кассационные жалобы ) against the judgment of DATE .

On DATE ORG of ORG арбитражный суд GPE округа ) granted the cassation appeals , quashed the judgment of CARDINAL DATE and restored the judgment of DATE .

The applicant company sent several applications for supervisory review ( заявление о принесении протеста в порядке надзора ) . These applications were refused by letters of the deputy President of ORG of GPE of DATE and DATE and a letter of the President of ORG of GPE of DATE .

On DATE the applicant company lodged an application for supervisory review under the new procedure , in force as of DATE .

On DATE the application for supervisory review was dismissed . The applicant company was advised that , under the new procedure , no new applications on the same subject were permissible .

On DATE the new Code on Commercial Procedure of GPE ( NORP процессуальный кодекс ORG ) entered into force , with the exception of LAW of the Code “ Proceedings for the review of courts’ decisions by way of supervision ” ( “ Производство по пересмотру судебных актов в порядке надзора ” ) which became effective as of DATE . LAW established a new procedure for the supervisory review of courts’ decisions that have already entered into legal force .

According to a general rule in LAW , the application for supervisory review can be filed with ORG of GPE within DATE after the contested decision entered into legal force , provided that all other remedies have been exhausted .

The PERSON on the Introduction of the Code on Commercial Procedure of GPE of DATE ( Федеральный закон « О введении в действие Арбитражного процессуального кодекса PERSON CARDINAL-ФЗ ) provided that , in respect of courts’ decisions made before DATE , the period for filing an application for supervisory review of such decisions will be calculated from DATE .


Preliminary objection dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Preliminary objection dismissed (Article 34 - Victim);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Deprivation of property;Peaceful enjoyment of possessions);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing;Reasonable time);Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Alvina Gyulumyan;Christos Rozakis;Corneliu Bîrsan;Egbert Myjer;Elisabeth Steiner;Giovanni Bonello;Jean-Paul Costa;Karel Jungwiert;Lech Garlicki;Lucius Caflisch;Luzius Wildhaber;Margarita Tsatsa-Nikolovska;Mariavaleria Del Tufo;Matti Pellonpää;Nicolas Bratza;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Snejana Botoucharova;Stanislav Pavlovschi;Sverre Erik Jebens;Vladimiro Zagrebelsky

The applicants were born in DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE di GPE .

In DATE the applicants inherited from Mr PERSON several plots of land in GPE di GPE , entered in the land register as folio CARDINAL , parcels CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL . On DATE GPE di ORG had adopted a general development plan , which was approved by ORG on DATE . The land in issue in the present application , an area of CARDINAL sq . m designated as parcel CARDINAL , was made the subject of an expropriation permit under the general development plan with a view to the construction of housing on the land . The land was subsequently included in the zonal development plan approved by ORG on DATE .

NORP In DATE GPE di ORG decided that a cooperative society , PERSON , would carry out building work on the land in question . In a decision of CARDINAL DATE , the administrative authorities granted the cooperative permission to occupy the land .

On DATE , pursuant to Law no . CARDINAL , GPE ORG offered an advance on the compensation payable for the expropriation , the amount having been determined in accordance with PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL . The sum offered , MONEY ( ITL ) , was calculated according to the rules in force for agricultural land , using a value of ITL CARDINAL per square metre as a basis , with the proviso that the final amount of compensation would be determined once a law had been enacted laying down new compensation criteria for building land .

The offer was refused by PERSON .

On DATE ORG issued an expropriation order in respect of the land .

On DATE ORG made a second offer of an advance , this time amounting to ITL CARDINAL,CARDINAL . The offer was not accepted .

In judgment no . CARDINAL of DATE , ORG declared PERSON no . CARDINAL unconstitutional on the ground that it made the award of compensation subject to the enactment of a future law .

As a result of that judgment , PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , which provided that compensation for expropriation should correspond to the market value of the land in question , came back into force .

On DATE served formal notice on ORG to determine the final amount of compensation in accordance with PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL . On DATE he learned that GPE ORG had assessed the final amount at ITL CARDINAL ( ITL CARDINAL per square metre ) in an order of PERCENT .

On DATE , contesting the amount of compensation he had been awarded , PERSON brought proceedings against ORG and the cooperative in the GPE di ORG .

He argued that the amount determined by ORG was ridiculously low in relation to the market value of the land and requested , among other things , to have the compensation calculated in accordance with PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL . He also sought compensation for the period during which the land had been occupied before the expropriation order had been issued , and for the area of land ( QUANTITY . m ) that had become unusable as a result of the building work .

Preparation of the case for hearing began on DATE .

The cooperative gave notice of its intention to defend and raised an objection , arguing that it could not be considered a party to the proceedings .

On DATE , as ORG had still not given notice of its intention to defend , the GPE di ORG declared it to be in default and ordered an expert assessment of the land . By an order of CARDINAL DATE , an expert was appointed and was given DATE in which to submit his report .

On DATE the ORG gave notice of its intention to defend and raised an objection , arguing that it could not be considered a party to the proceedings . The expert agreed to his terms of reference and was sworn in .

On DATE the expert submitted a report .

On DATE Law no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ( “ Urgent measures aimed at stabilising public finances ” ) came into force . LAW laid down new criteria for calculating compensation for the expropriation of building land . The PERSON was expressly applicable to pending proceedings .

Mr A. Scordino died on DATE . On DATE the applicants declared their intention to continue the proceedings .

On DATE the NORP di ORG appointed another expert and instructed him to assess the compensation for the expropriation according to the new criteria laid down in section CARDINAL bis of Law no . CARDINAL .

The expert submitted his report on DATE , concluding that the land ’s market value on the date of the expropriation had been ITL CARDINAL per square metre . In accordance with the new criteria laid down in CARDINAL bis of PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , the compensation due was ITL QUANTITY .

At a hearing on DATE , the parties asked for time to submit comments on the expert ’s report . Counsel for the applicants produced a separate expert opinion and observed that the expert appointed by the court had omitted to calculate the compensation for the QUANTITY . m of land that was not covered by the expropriation order but had become unusable as a result of the building work .

A hearing was held on DATE at which observations were submitted in reply . The next hearing , scheduled for DATE , was adjourned by the court of its own motion until DATE and then until DATE .

By an order of DATE , the court ordered a further expert assessment and adjourned the proceedings until DATE . However , the hearing was subsequently adjourned on several occasions as the investigating judge was unavailable . At the ORG request , the investigating judge was replaced on DATE and the parties made their submissions at a hearing on DATE .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE , the GPE di ORG held that the applicants were entitled to compensation calculated according to section CARDINAL bis of Law no . CARDINAL , both for the land that had been formally expropriated and for the land that had become unusable as a result of the building work . It also held that the compensation thus determined should not be subject to the further PERCENT statutory deduction applicable where the owner of the expropriated land had not signed an agreement for its transfer ( cessione volontaria ) , seeing that in the applicants’ case the land had already been expropriated when the PERSON had come into force .

In conclusion , ORG ordered ORG and the cooperative to pay the applicants :

( a ) ITL CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( ITL MONEY per square metre for QUANTITY . m of land ) in compensation for the expropriation ;

( b ) ITL CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( ITL CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL per square metre for QUANTITY m ) in compensation for the part of the land that had become unusable and was to be regarded as having been de facto expropriated ; and

( c ) compensation for the period during which the land had been occupied prior to its expropriation .

Those amounts were to be index - linked and subject to interest until the date of settlement .

On DATE the cooperative appealed on points of law , arguing that it could not be considered a party to the proceedings . On DATE respectively the applicants and ORG likewise appealed .

On DATE the cooperative applied for a stay of execution of ORG judgment . That application was dismissed on DATE .

NORP In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE , deposited with the registry on DATE , ORG allowed the cooperative ’s appeal , acknowledging that it was not a party to the proceedings as it had not formally been a party to the expropriation , although it had benefited from it . It upheld the remainder of the Reggio di ORG judgment .

In the meantime , on DATE , the amount awarded by ORG had been deposited at ORG . On DATE tax was deducted from it at a rate of PERCENT in accordance with PERSON no . ORG .

On DATE the applicants applied to the NORP di ORG under PERSON no . CARDINAL of DATE , known as the “ Pinto Act ” , complaining about the excessive length of the above - described proceedings .

The applicants asked the court to find that there had been a violation of LAW and order the NORP ORG and ORG to compensate them for non - pecuniary damage , which they assessed at MONEY ( ORG ) , and the pecuniary damage that they considered they had sustained as a result of the application of PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL to their case .

In a decision of DATE , deposited with the registry on DATE , the NORP di ORG found that the length of the proceedings had been excessive . It held as follows :

“ ... The proceedings began on DATE and ended on DATE . They were conducted at CARDINAL levels of jurisdiction and were not particularly complex .

It can be seen from the case - law of ORG that DATE is deemed to be an acceptable period for proceedings at first instance and DATE at second instance .

The applicants declared their intention to continue the proceedings as the heirs of PERSON , who died in DATE , when a reasonable time had not yet been exceeded .

Accordingly , the delays must be calculated only in respect of the subsequent period , and amount to DATE .

It is not the applicants who are responsible for the delay , but rather the malfunctioning of the judicial system .

The pecuniary damage alleged by the applicants has not been caused by the length of the proceedings and can not therefore be compensated .

Having regard to the foregoing , the applicants are entitled only to compensation for the non - pecuniary damage they have sustained on account of the length of the proceedings , that is , the prolonged uncertainty regarding the outcome of the proceedings and the distress generally experienced as a result of that uncertainty .

In view of what was at stake , the amount to be awarded for non - pecuniary damage is ORG CARDINAL . ”

ORG ordered ORG to pay the applicants a total sum of ORG CARDINAL for non - pecuniary damage alone . With regard to the government , ORG considered that they could not be considered as a party to the proceedings .

Regarding the apportionment of the legal costs , ORG ordered ORG to pay ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL and the applicants to pay the remaining LAW .

The applicants did not appeal to ORG . ORG decision became final on DATE .

Section CARDINAL of Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL provided that , where land was expropriated , the compensation to be paid should correspond to its market value at the time of the expropriation .

DATE , as interpreted by ORG ( see , inter alia , judgment no . CARDINAL of DATE ) , guarantees the payment of compensation for expropriation , in an amount lower than the market value of the land .

Law no . DATE ( supplemented by LAW no . ORG , which subsequently became PERSON no . PERSON , and by LAW no . CARDINAL ) laid down new criteria : compensation for any land , whether it was agricultural or building land , should be paid as though it were agricultural land .

In judgment no . CARDINAL of DATE , ORG declared PERSON no . CARDINAL unconstitutional on the ground that it afforded the same treatment to CARDINAL very different situations by providing for the same form of compensation for building and agricultural land .

The scope of a decision of ORG declaring a law illegal is not limited to the case in question but is erga omnes . It is of retrospective effect in that the law declared unconstitutional can no longer produce any effects or be applied from DATE after the publication of the decision ( LAW taken in conjunction with LAW no . CARDINAL of DATE and LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

ORG has often made explicit the retrospective effect of declarations of unconstitutionality ( see , inter alia , judgment no . CARDINAL of DATE ) . It has indicated in this connection that a declaration of unconstitutionality can be equated with a straightforward annulment , since it makes the law in question unconstitutional from the time of its entry into force , annuls it and makes it inapplicable to any non - final situation ( and to the final situations defined by law ) . Furthermore , no one at all , in particular the courts , may rely on provisions that have been declared unconstitutional to assess a given situation , even if that situation arose prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality ( see , on this point , judgment no . CARDINAL of DATE and decisions no . CARDINAL of DATE , no . CARDINAL of DATE and no . CARDINAL of DATE ) .

A similar decision has been given by ORG , declaring that “ where a law has been declared unconstitutional it can not in any circumstances be applied , given that it must be considered as having never existed , and that a decision declaring a law unconstitutional has a retrospective effect regarding any non - final situation ” ( Court of Cassation , Section II , DATE ; Section V , DATE ) .

When ORG declares a law unconstitutional the provisions that had previously been applicable come back into force ( reviviscenza ) , unless they have also been declared unconstitutional .

After judgment no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL had declared PERSON no . CARDINAL unconstitutional , ORG enacted PERSON no . CARDINAL of DATE , which reaffirmed , but this time on a provisional basis , the criteria that had been declared unconstitutional . The PERSON provided that compensation should be paid in the form of an advance , to be supplemented by a payment calculated on the basis of a subsequent law that would lay down specific compensation criteria for building land .

In judgment no . CARDINAL of DATE , ORG declared PERSON no . CARDINAL unconstitutional on the ground that it made the award of compensation for the expropriation of building land subject to the enactment of a future law and that it reintroduced – even if only on a provisional basis – compensation criteria that had been declared unconstitutional . In that connection ORG reiterated that the legislature had to accept that a law that had been declared illegal stopped producing its effects immediately , and stressed the need to draw up provisions for substantial awards of compensation for expropriation ( serio ristoro ) .

As a result of judgment no . CARDINAL of DATE , section DATE of Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL came back into force . Consequently , the compensation payable for building land was to correspond to the land ’s market value ( see , for example , ORG , Section I , judgment no . DATE of CARDINAL DATE ; Section I , judgment no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ; and plenary court , judgment no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ) .

Section CARDINAL bis of Law no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE introduced a “ temporary , exceptional and urgent ” measure aimed at stabilising public finances , to remain valid until structural measures were adopted . That provision applied to any expropriation under way and to any pending proceedings related thereto . LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , which was published in ORG on DATE , came into force on DATE .

Section CARDINAL bis provides that the compensation payable for the expropriation of building land is to be calculated using the following formula : market value of the land plus the total of DATE ground rent multiplied by DATE , divided by CARDINAL , minus a PERCENT deduction .

In such cases , the compensation corresponds to PERCENT of the market value . That amount is subject to tax , deducted at source at a rate of PERCENT ( in accordance with LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

The PERCENT deduction can be avoided if the basis for the expropriation is not an expropriation order but a “ voluntary agreement ” for the transfer of the land or , as in the instant case , if the expropriation took place before LAW bis came into force ( see ORG judgment no . CARDINAL of DATE ) . In such cases , the resulting compensation corresponds to PERCENT of the market value . Again , that amount is subject to tax at a rate of PERCENT ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

ORG has held section CARDINAL bis of Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL and its retrospective application to be compatible with the LAW ( judgment no . CARDINAL of DATE , and judgment no . CARDINAL of DATE ) on account of the urgent and temporary nature of the PERSON .

The Code of Expropriation Provisions ( Presidential Decree no . ORG , subsequently modified by Legislative Decree no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , which came into force on DATE , codified the existing provisions and the principles established by the relevant case - law in respect of expropriation .

LAW reiterates the main criteria for calculating compensation for expropriation set forth in LAW no . CARDINAL .

Award of just satisfaction in the event of a breach of the requirement to dispose of proceedings within a reasonable time and amendment to LAW

“ ( CARDINAL ) Anyone sustaining pecuniary or non - pecuniary damage as a result of a violation of ORG , ratified by PERSON no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE , on account of a failure to comply with the ‘ reasonable time’ requirement in LAW , shall be entitled to just satisfaction .

( CARDINAL ) In determining whether there has been a violation , the court shall have regard to the complexity of the case and , in the light thereof , the conduct of the parties and of the judge deciding procedural issues , and also the conduct of any authority required to participate in or contribute to the resolution of the case .

( CARDINAL ) The court shall assess the quantum of damage in accordance with LAW and shall apply the following rules :

( a ) NORP only damage attributable to the period beyond the reasonable time referred to in subsection ( CARDINAL ) may be taken into account ;

( b ) in addition to the payment of a sum of money , reparation for non - pecuniary damage shall be made by giving suitable publicity to the finding of a violation . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) Claims for just satisfaction shall be lodged with the court of appeal in which the judge sits who has jurisdiction under LAW to try cases concerning members of the judiciary in the district where the case in which the violation is alleged to have occurred was decided or discontinued at the merits stage or is still pending .

( CARDINAL ) The claim shall be made on an application lodged with the registry of the court of appeal by a lawyer holding a special authority containing all the information prescribed by LAW .

( CARDINAL ) The application shall be made against the Minister of ORG where the alleged violation has taken place in proceedings in the ordinary courts , the Minister of Defence where it has taken place in proceedings before the military courts and the Finance Minister where it has taken place in proceedings before the tax commissioners . In all other cases , the application shall be made against the Prime Minister .

( CARDINAL ) The court of appeal shall hear the application in accordance with Articles CARDINAL et seq . of ORG . The application and the order setting the case down for hearing shall be served by the applicant on the defendant authority at its elected domicile at the offices of ORG [ Avvocatura dello Stato ] DATE prior to the date of the hearing before the ORG .

( CARDINAL ) The parties may apply to the court for an order for production of all or part of the procedural and other documents from the proceedings in which the violation referred to in LAW is alleged to have occurred and they and their lawyers shall be entitled to be heard by the court in private if they attend the hearing . The parties may lodge memorials and documents up until DATE before the date set for the hearing or until expiry of the time allowed by the court of appeal for that purpose on an application by the parties .

( CARDINAL ) The court shall deliver a decision within DATE after the application is lodged . An appeal shall lie to ORG . The decision shall be enforceable immediately .

( CARDINAL ) To the extent that resources permit , payment of compensation to those entitled shall commence on DATE . ”

“ A claim for just satisfaction may be lodged while the proceedings in which the violation is alleged to have occurred are pending or within DATE from the date when the decision ending the proceedings becomes final . Claims lodged after that date shall be time - barred . ”

“ If the court decides to allow an application , its decision shall be communicated by the registry to the parties , to ORG at ORG to enable him to start an investigation into liability , and to the authorities responsible for deciding whether to institute disciplinary proceedings against the civil servants involved in the proceedings in any capacity . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) Within DATE after the entry into force of this LAW , anyone who has lodged an application with ORG in due time complaining of a violation of the ‘ reasonable time’ requirement contained in LAW , ratified by LAW . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE , shall be entitled to lodge a claim under LAW hereof provided that the application has not by then been declared admissible by ORG . In such cases , the application to the court of appeal must state when the application to the said ORG was made .

( CARDINAL ) The registry of the relevant court shall inform the Minister for ORG without delay of any claim lodged in accordance with section QUANTITY and within the period laid down in subsection ( CARDINAL ) of this section . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) The financial cost of implementing this LAW , which is put at MONEY from DATE , shall be met by releasing funds entered in the DATE budget DATE in the chapter concerning the basic current - liability estimates from the ‘ special fund’ in DATE forecast of ORG . ORG deposits shall be set aside for that purpose .

( CARDINAL ) ORG of the ORG , ORG is authorised to make the appropriate budgetary adjustments by decree . ”

On appeal from decisions delivered by the courts of appeal in “ Pinto ” proceedings , ORG , sitting as a full court ( ORG ) , gave CARDINAL judgments ( nos . CARDINAL , DATE , DATE and DATE ) of CARDINAL DATE , the texts of which were deposited with the registry on DATE , quashing the appeal court ’s decision and remitting the case for a rehearing . It held that “ the case - law of ORG is binding on the NORP courts regarding the application of PERSON no . CARDINAL ” .

In its judgment no . CARDINAL it affirmed , inter alia , the principle that

“ the court of appeal ’s determination of non - pecuniary damage in accordance with LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , although inherently based on equitable principles , must be made in a legally defined framework since reference has to be made to the amounts awarded , in similar cases , by ORG . Some divergence is permissible , within reason ” .

Extracts from the plenary ORG judgment no . CARDINAL deposited with the registry on DATE read as follows :

“ CARDINAL . The present application poses the fundamental question of what legal effect must be given – in implementing PERSON no . CARDINAL of DATE , and in particular in determining the non - pecuniary damage arising out of the breach of the reasonable length of proceedings requirement – to the judgments of ORG , whether considered generally as interpretative guidelines which the said ORG has laid down with regard to the consequences of the said violation , or with reference to a specific case in which ORG has already had occasion to give a judgment on the delay in reaching a decision . ...

As stipulated in section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the said PERSON , the legal fact which gives rise to the right to the just satisfaction that it provides for is constituted by the ‘ violation of ORG , ratified by PERSON no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE , on account of a failure to comply with the “ reasonable time ” requirement in LAW . In other words , PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL identifies the fact constituting the right to compensation by reference to a specific provision of ORG . This Convention instituted a ORG ( ORG , with its seat in GPE ) to ensure compliance with the provisions contained therein ( Article CARDINAL ) . Accordingly , the competence of the said ORG to determine , and therefore to interpret , the significance of the said provisions must be recognised .

As the fact constituting the right conferred by PERSON no . ORG consists of a violation of the LAW , it is for ORG to determine all the elements of such a legal fact , which thus ends by being ‘ brought into ORG by the ORG , whose case - law is binding on the NORP courts in so far as the application of PERSON no . PERSON is concerned .

It is not necessary therefore to pose the general problem of the relationships between the ORG and the internal judicial system , which ORG [ ORG ] has amply discussed in court . Whatever opinion CARDINAL may have about that controversial issue and therefore about the place of the Convention in the context of the sources of domestic law , it is certain that the direct implementation in the NORP judicial system of a provision of the ORG , established by PERSON no . ORG ( that is , by LAW in the part relating to ‘ reasonable time’ ) , can not diverge from the interpretation which ORG gives to the same provision .

The opposite argument , which would permit a substantial divergence between the application accorded to PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL in the national system and the interpretation given by ORG to the right to the reasonable length of proceedings , would deprive the said PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL of any justification and cause the NORP ORG to violate LAW , according to which ‘ The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in LAW ( including the said LAW , which provides for the right to have a case decided within a reasonable time ) .

The reason behind the enactment of PERSON no . PERSON was the need to provide a domestic judicial remedy against violations in respect of the duration of proceedings , so as to give effect to the subsidiary character of intervention on the part of ORG , expressly provided for by LAW ‘ The ORG may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted ... ’ ) . The NORP system for the protection of human rights is founded on the said principle of subsidiarity . From it derives the duty of the GPE which have ratified the ORG to guarantee to individuals the protection of the rights recognised by the LAW , above all in their own internal order and vis - à - vis the organs of the national judicial system . And this protection must be ‘ effective’ ( LAW ) , that is , of a kind to remedy the claim without the need for recourse to ORG .

The domestic remedy introduced by Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL did not previously exist in the NORP system , with the consequence that applications against GPE in respect of a violation of LAW had ‘ ORG ( the term used by rapporteur PERSON in the sitting of the ORG of DATE ) ORG . ORG observed , prior to LAW no . PERSON , that the said failures on the part of GPE to comply ‘ reflect a continuing situation that has not yet been remedied and in respect of which litigants have no domestic remedy . This accumulation of breaches accordingly constitutes a practice that is incompatible with the Convention’ ( see the CARDINAL judgments of the ORG delivered on DATE in PERSON , PERSON , ORG and ORG ) .

Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL constitutes the domestic remedy to which a ‘ victim of a violation’ ( as defined by LAW CARDINAL ( failure to comply with the reasonable - time requirement ) must have recourse before applying to ORG to claim the ‘ just satisfaction’ provided for in LAW , which , when the violation exists , is only awarded by ORG ‘ if the internal law of ORG concerned allows only partial reparation to be LAW Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL has therefore allowed ORG to declare inadmissible applications lodged with it ( including before the LAW was passed ) and aimed at obtaining the just satisfaction provided for in LAW of proceedings ( see PERSON , decision of DATE ) .

This mechanism for implementation of the LAW and observance of the principle of subsidiarity in respect of interventions of ORG of GPE does not operate , however , in cases in which the ORG holds that the consequences of the established violation of the ORG have not been redressed by domestic law or that this has been done only ‘ ORG , because in such an event the said LAW provides for the intervention of ORG to protect the ‘ victim of the violation’ . In such cases an individual application to ORG on the basis of LAW is admissible ( see PERSON , decision of DATE ) and the ORG acts directly to protect the rights of the victim whom it considers not to have been adequately protected by domestic law .

The judge of the adequacy or inadequacy of the protection that the victim has had from domestic law is , obviously , ORG , whose duty it is to apply LAW to ascertain whether , in the presence of a violation of a provision of the LAW , the internal law has been able to redress fully the consequences of this violation .

The argument whereby , in applying PERSON no . PERSON , the NORP courts may follow a different interpretation from that which ORG has given to the provisions of LAW ( violation of which is the fact giving entitlement to the right to compensation attributed by the said national law ) implies that the victim of the violation , if he or she receives reparation at national level considered inadequate by ORG , must obtain the just satisfaction provided for in LAW from the latter Court . This would defeat the purpose of the remedy provided for in NORP law by PERSON no . PERSON and entail a violation of the principle of the subsidiarity of the intervention of ORG .

It is therefore necessary to concur with ORG , which , in the above - mentioned decision on the PERSON application ( concerning the inadequacy of the protection afforded by the NORP courts in implementing PERSON no . ORG ) , affirmed that ‘ it follows from the principle of subsidiarity ... that the national courts must , where possible , interpret and apply domestic law in accordance with the Convention’ .

... The preparatory documents of PERSON no . PERSON are even more explicit . In the report concerning the bill of Senator PERSON ( proceedings of the ORG no . CARDINAL of DATE ) it is affirmed that the compensatory mechanism proposed in the legislative initiative ( and then adopted by the LAW ) secures for the applicant ‘ a protection analogous to that which he or she would receive in the international ORG , as the direct reference to LAW makes it possible to transfer to domestic level ‘ the limits of applicability of the same provision existing at international level , limits which depend essentially on the ORG and on the development of the case - law of the GPE authorities , especially that of ORG , whose decisions must therefore guide ... the domestic court in the definition of these limits’ .

The considerations expounded in sections CARDINAL of the document refer in general to the importance of the interpretative guidance of ORG on the implementation of PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL with regard to reparation for non - pecuniary damage .

In this particular instance , however , any possibility for the national court to exclude non - pecuniary damage ( despite having found a violation of LAW ) must be considered as non - existent because such is precluded by the previous decision of ORG which , with reference to the same proceedings , had already ascertained that the unjustified delay in reaching a decision had had consequences involving non - pecuniary damage for the applicant , which the ORG itself redressed for a limited period . From such a decision of ORG it follows that , once the national court has ascertained that the violation has continued in the period following that considered in the said decision , the applicant has continued to suffer non - pecuniary damage , which must be compensated for in application of PERSON no . PERSON .

It can not therefore be maintained DATE as ORG has done DATE that compensation is not due because of the small amounts at stake in the proceedings in question . Such reasoning , apart from being rendered immaterial by the fact that ORG has already ruled that non - pecuniary damage had been sustained because of a delay in the same action , is in any case incorrect , because the amount of what is at stake in an action in which non - compliance with reasonable time - limits has been ascertained can never have the effect of excluding non - pecuniary damage , given that the anxiety and distress resulting from the length of the proceedings normally also occur in cases in which the amounts at stake are small ; hence this aspect may have the effect of reducing the amount of compensation but not of totally excluding it .

NORP In conclusion the decision appealed against must be quashed and the case remitted to ORG , which , in a different composition , will order payment to the applicant of compensation for non - pecuniary damage payable as a result of the violation of the reasonable - time requirement for the period following DATE alone , taking as a reference point payments of the same kind of damages by ORG , from which it may diverge , but only to a reasonable extent ( Court HR , DATE , ORG ) . ”

The Court of Cassation held as follows :

“ ... Where the victim of unreasonably lengthy proceedings dies prior to the entry into force of Law no . PERSON [ the ‘ Pinto Act’ ] this shall preclude a right [ to just satisfaction ] from arising and passing to the heirs , in accordance with the general rule that a person who has died can not become entitled to a right conferred by an Act that is passed after their death ... ”

The Court of Cassation judges noted that the right to compensation for a violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time derived from LAW . The mechanism put in place by the NORP standard did not give applicants a cause of action before the domestic courts . Accordingly , the right to “ just satisfaction ” could neither be acquired nor transferred by a person who had already died by the time the Pinto Act came into force . The fact that the deceased had , while alive , lodged an application with ORG was not decisive . LAW did not constitute , as the applicants had maintained , a procedural standard bringing about a transfer of powers from ORG to the domestic courts .

In this case , which concerned the possibility or otherwise of transferring to heirs the right to compensation deriving from a breach of LAW on account of the length of the proceedings , ORG referred the case to the full court indicating that there was a conflict between the case - law authorities , that is , between the restrictive approach taken by ORG in the earlier judgments regarding heirs and LAW and the CARDINAL judgments delivered by ORG , sitting as a full court , on DATE to the extent that a less strict interpretation would lead to the conclusion that this right to compensation has existed since GPE ratified LAW on DATE .

DATE . In the case giving rise to the order mentioned above referring the case to the full court ( see paragraph CARDINAL ) , ORG , sitting as a full court , established the following principles , thus preventing any further conflicting decisions being given by the courts :

“ ( i ) Law no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE , which ratified the LAW and made it enforceable , introduced into the domestic legal order the fundamental rights , belonging to the category of rights conferred on the individual by public law , provided for in LAW and which correspond to a large extent to those set forth in LAW . In that respect the LAW provisions are confirmatory and illustrative . ...

( ii ) It is necessary to reiterate the principle that the act giving rise to the right to reparation conferred by domestic law corresponds to a breach of the provision in LAW , which is immediately applicable in domestic law .

The distinction between the right to a hearing within a reasonable time , introduced by LAW ( or even pre - existing as a constitutionally protected value ) , and the right to equitable reparation , which was allegedly introduced only by LAW , can not be allowed in so far as the protection provided by the domestic courts does not depart from that previously offered by ORG , the domestic courts being bound to comply with the case - law of ORG . ...

( iii ) Accordingly , the right to equitable reparation for loss sustained as a result of the unreasonable length of proceedings prior to the entry into force of Law no . ORG must be acknowledged by the domestic courts even in favour of the heirs of a party who introduced the proceedings before that date , subject only to the condition that the claim has not already been lodged with ORG and the ORG has not ruled on admissibility . ... ”

This judgment of ORG concerned an appeal by ORG challenging a court of appeal ’s award of compensation for non - pecuniary damage to a juristic person . ORG referred to the decision reached in ORG v. GPE ( [ ORG ] , no . CARDINAL , ORG CARDINAL-IV ) and , after referring to the CARDINAL judgments of the full court delivered on DATE , found that its own case - law was not in line with ORG . It held that there was no legal barrier to awarding just satisfaction to “ juristic ” persons according to the criteria of ORG . Accordingly , since the court of appeal had correctly decided the case , the appeal was dismissed .

ORG made the following observations :

“ ... [ Considering that ] non - pecuniary damage is the normal , albeit not automatic , consequence of a breach of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time , it will be deemed to exist , without it being necessary to specifically prove it ( directly or by presumption ) , on the basis of the objective fact of the breach , on condition that there are no special circumstances indicating the absence of any such damage in the actual case concerned ( PERSON . ORG , DATE , CARDINAL . CARDINAL and DATE ) ;

– the assessment on an equitable basis of compensation for non - pecuniary damage is subject – on account of the specific reference in LAW no . CARDINAL of DATE to LAW ( ratified by PERSON no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ) DATE to compliance with the Convention , in accordance with the judicial interpretation given by ORG ( non - compliance with which results in a violation of the law ) , and must therefore , as far as possible , be commensurate , in substantive and not merely formal terms , with the amounts paid in similar cases by ORG , it being possible to adduce exceptional circumstances that suggest themselves in the particular case , on condition that they are reasoned , not excessive and not unreasonable ( PERSON . ORG , DATE , no . CARDINAL ) ;

– a discrepancy in the method of calculation [ between the ORG ’s case - law and LAW ] shall not affect the general vocation of PERSON no . PERSON to meet the objective of awarding proper compensation for a breach of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time ( vocation acknowledged by ORG in , inter alia , a decision of DATE in GPE ( application no . MONEY ) ) , and accordingly shall not allow any doubt as to the compatibility of that domestic standard with the international commitments entered into by GPE when ratifying LAW and the formal recognition , also at constitutional level , of the principle of LAW ... ”

In the report ORG , revised on DATE , ORG made the following indications regarding an assessment of the Pinto remedy :

“ CARDINAL . As regards the domestic remedy introduced in DATE by the ‘ Pinto Act’ , a number of shortcomings remain , particularly in connection with the effectiveness of the remedy and its application in conformity with the Convention : in particular , the law does not provide yet for the acceleration of pending proceedings .

In the framework of its examination of the CARDINALst DATE report , ORG expressed concern at the fact that this legislation did not foresee the speeding up of the proceedings and that its application posed a risk of aggravating the backlog of the appeal courts .

It should be pointed out that in the framework of its examination of DATE report , ORG had noted with concern that the Convention had no direct effect and had consequently invited the NORP authorities to intensify their efforts at national level as well as their contacts with the different bodies of ORG competent in this field .

In this interim resolution the Ministers’ Deputies indicated as follows :

“ ORG ...

Noting ...

– the setting - up of a domestic remedy providing compensation in cases of excessive length of proceedings , adopted in DATE ( the ‘ Pinto’ law ) , as well as the recent development of the case - law of ORG , increasing the direct effect of the case - law of ORG in the NORP legal system , while noting that this remedy still does not enable for acceleration of proceedings so as to grant effective redress to all victims ;

Stressing that the setting - up of domestic remedies does not dispense GPE from their general obligation to solve the structural problems underlying violations ;

Finding that despite the efforts undertaken , numerous elements still indicate that the solution to the problem will not be found in the near future ( as evidenced in particular by the statistical data , the new cases before both domestic courts and ORG , the information contained in the annual reports submitted by the government to ORG and in the reports of ORG at ORG ) ;

Stressing the importance the LAW attaches to the right to fair administration of justice in a NORP society and recalling that the problem of the excessive length of judicial proceedings , by reason of its persistence and extent , constitutes a real danger for the respect of the rule of law in GPE ;

URGES the NORP authorities to enhance their political commitment and make it their effective priority to meet GPE ’s obligation under the ORG and the ORG ’s judgments , to secure the right to a fair trial within a reasonable time to all persons under GPE ’s jurisdiction ;

ORG for the Efficiency of Justice was set up at ORG by Resolution Res(CARDINAL)CARDINAL with the aim of ( a ) improving the efficiency and the functioning of the justice of member GPE with a view to ensuring that everyone within their jurisdiction can enforce their legal rights effectively , thereby generating increased confidence of the citizens in the justice system and ( b ) enabling a better implementation of the international legal instruments of ORG concerning efficiency and fairness of justice .

In its framework programme ( CEPEJ ( CARDINAL ) CARDINAL Rev CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) , the ORG noted that the mechanisms which are limited to compensation are too weak and do not adequately incite the GPE to modify their operational process , and provide compensation only a posteriori in the event of a proven violation instead of trying to find a solution for the problem of delays .


David Thór Björgvinsson;Giovanni Bonello;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza

The applicants are : PERSON , born in DATE , living in GPE , and Mr PERSON , born in DATE , PERSON , born in DATE and PERSON , born in DATE , all CARDINAL living in GPE .

They were represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in ORG , GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Mr PERSON , of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicants’ grandfather ORG owned a house in ORG that had been divided into flats . He survived the Holocaust and in DATE left GPE , having appointed PERSON as a representative for the purposes of managing the property . They remained in constant contact and PERSON – and subsequently his wife – kept the applicants’ grandfather informed about the situation and financial affairs of the property until his death in DATE .

In DATE the local municipality in ORG took over the management of the house , having stated in the relevant decision that the property had not been managed and supervised by its owner at all since DATE and that , as a result , it was in a bad state of repair . This decision was served on PERSON , the widow of the late manager of the property , PERSON , who subsequently stayed in touch with the applicants .

In DATE ORG requested ORG to declare that it had acquired ownership of the property by way of adverse possession . The court accepted the claimant ’s submission that the owner was at that time of unknown abode and appointed a guardian ad litem for the ORG grandfather .

On DATE the court allowed ORG request . No written grounds were prepared for that decision , as the court was obliged to prepare such grounds only if a judicial decision was being appealed against . Accordingly , ORG became owner of the property .

On an unspecified later date , but in any case before DATE , an entry in the land register was made to confirm the ORG ’s ownership of the property concerned .

In DATE ORG ownership of land was transferred to local municipalities as part of a countrywide legal reform of local government . Accordingly , the ORG municipality took over the rights to land within its borders that had previously been owned by ORG .

In DATE the applicants obtained decisions from various NORP courts to the effect that they were the legal successors of their grandfather PERSON

In DATE the applicants requested that the proceedings concerning the acquisition of ownership by adverse possession that had ended with the DATE decision be reopened . They argued that these proceedings were invalid in law since they had been flawed as a result of serious procedural shortcomings . The court had appointed a guardian ad litem for their father , which was obviously incorrect as he had died in DATE and no guardian ad litem could be appointed in respect of a deceased person . Further , the court had failed to publish an announcement about the guardian having been appointed for the applicants’ grandfather , which resulted in the proceedings being invalid in law as it thereby became impossible for the parties to have their rights properly represented in the proceedings .

Their request was eventually dismissed on DATE , the appellate court having upheld the lower court ’s conclusion that the applicants had failed to submit their request within the DATE time - limit from CARDINAL DATE , the date on which they had learned about the DATE decision .

On DATE the Minister of ORG brought an appeal on points of law against the DATE decision on the applicants’ behalf . The Minister argued that the decision should be quashed for the following reasons :

i ) in the proceedings the court had failed to take into consideration that the property had not in fact been abandoned by the owner but had been managed , at least until DATE , by his representative , who had been validly appointed in DATE ;

ii ) the claimant had failed to disclose to the court the fact that in DATE the defendant had been alive , and that it was not true that at that time it had been impossible to get in touch with him ;

iii ) this failure had a direct incidence on the finding that ORG had been in de facto possession of the property for the period required by law for adverse possession ;

iv ) the court had erred in that it had appointed a guardian ad litem for a person who was dead at that time ;

v ) in the DATE decision the court had failed to indicate a ) DATE from which the ORG had acquired ownership by adverse possession , b ) whether it had regarded the ORG as being in possession in bad or in good faith and c ) how it had calculated the period of adverse possession necessary for the acquisition of ownership by adverse possession .

Following the appeal , on DATE ORG quashed the DATE decision , invalidated the proceedings which had led to it and ordered that the ORG ’s request for a declaration that it had acquired the ownership by adverse possession be re - examined . ORG shared the view of the Minister of Justice concerning the error that the court had committed in appointing a guardian ad litem for a person who was dead . It observed that , contrary to the relevant legal obligation , no press announcement had been made about the proceedings having been instituted . Importantly , the court had also failed to make any effort to establish the whereabouts of the former owner or his legal successors .

ORG further noted that when giving the DATE decision the court had failed to make findings crucial for the legal assessment of the case , such as the determination of DATE of possession , the manner of its calculation and the legal basis for considering that the ORG had been in possession of the property in question cum animo rem sibi habendi .

ORG did not pronounce on the Minister ’s submission that the ORG ’s representatives had failed to disclose to the court in DATE certain relevant information regarding the status of the property .

Subsequently , the proceedings concerning the ORG ’s original request for a declaration that it had acquired the property through adverse possession were resumed . In these proceedings the applicants submitted that because of all the procedural shortcomings identified by ORG , the ORG should be considered to have acquired ownership in bad faith . Under the relevant law , the period necessary at that time for acquisition of ownership through adverse possession where there was bad faith was DATE . This period could only be calculated as running , at the earliest , from DATE . Hence , it had not ended by the date on which the present set of proceedings was already pending , the running of the period of adverse possession having been interrupted by the appeal lodged on the applicants’ behalf by the Minister .

On DATE ORG held that ORG had acquired ownership of the property through adverse possession on DATE . The court noted that CARDINAL conditions had to be fulfilled for such acquisition to be effective : CARDINAL ) the property had to be in the possession of the claimant acting cum animo rem sibi habendi and CARDINAL ) the statutory period of possession had to have expired .

The court found that the period DATE could not be taken into account as regards adverse possession of the property since during this period the ORG had been acting only as its manager . However , as from DATE , the date on which the decision of CARDINAL DATE had become final , the ORG had to be regarded as being in possession of the property “ like a property owner ” ( cum animo rem sibi habendi ) . The DATE decision authorised the ORG to dispose of the property , even if the decision itself had been procedurally flawed .

ORG further found that the DATE decision had justified the ORG ’s assertion that it had become the owner of the property concerned . Accordingly , on DATE the ORG had obtained possession in good faith since that possession had arisen from a valid judicial decision . The period of adverse possession required by law in case of good faith was DATE .

ORG further noted that the point in dispute was whether ORG could count towards the period of adverse possession required for acquisition of the property the period of its occupation arising from a judicial decision which had been quashed after the period of adverse possession had expired . That question was answered in the affirmative by ORG in the ORG of DATE , no . III CZP CARDINAL/CARDINAL , and ORG applied that conclusion to the present case . Accordingly , the period of adverse possession in good faith having come to end on DATE , it was on that date that the ORG had acquired title to the property concerned .

The applicants appealed . They submitted that the lower court had erred in holding that the claimant had acquired title through adverse possession in the absence of good faith and of the requisite character of possession ( cum animo rem sibi habendi ) .

It was wrong , in their view , to disregard DATE decision since the ORG had come into possession of the property when it had taken over its management in DATE . That coming into possession had been unjustified , and thus in bad faith , since the owner ’s representatives had at the relevant time duly managed the property . ORG had continued to manifest its bad faith by withholding relevant information from the court when making its application in DATE .

The applicants contested the argument that the ORG could be regarded as being in possession in good faith as a result of the DATE decision having become final . Having regard to the circumstances in which the ORG had taken over the management of the property in DATE , they argued that after DATE the ORG had simply continued to manage the property . Thus , its possession could not be regarded as possession cum animo rem sibi habendi . Furthermore , the ORG could not benefit from the DATE decision because that decision had been rendered in proceedings in which the applicants DATE as a result of the ORG ’s actions – had been deprived of any possibility to defend their interests . If the court were to hold otherwise , the very concept of good faith would be undermined .

The applicants also argued , referring to ORG Resolution of DATE , that it was necessary to consider whether the State authorities’ actions had led to the deprivation of their property . They disagreed with the automatic conclusion that since the possession had arisen from a judicial decision it would always have to be considered possession in good faith .

On DATE ORG dismissed their appeal as unfounded . It analysed in detail all the arguments raised in the appeal .

ORG firstly noted that , contrary to the ORG assertion , it was not necessary to determine the circumstances relating to the ORG ’s taking over the management of the property in DATE since the ORG ’s rights stemming from an administrative decision on management could not be considered as possession cum animo rem sibi habendi . This view had been expressed by ORG in its decision of DATE .

ORG stressed that the date of the decision on acquisition of title by adverse possession , and in particular the date on which this decision had become final , was of crucial relevance for the calculation of the period of adverse possession . It was from DATE that the claimant ( the ORG ) had obtained a judicial decision declaring that it had become the owner of the property concerned . It noted that ORG Resolution of DATE , no . III CZP CARDINAL/CARDINAL allowed ORG to count towards the period of adverse possession the period throughout which the ORG had exercised the right to dispose of the property “ like a property owner ” on the basis of a judicial decision which was quashed after the period of adverse possession had expired . In the present case the court was dealing with precisely such a situation .

ORG observed that that situation was different from the CARDINAL which was analysed in ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE , no . III CKU CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( published in OSNC CARDINAL/CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) in which ORG had held that :

“ if ORG right to dispose of a property “ like a property owner ” is based on an administrative decision which is subsequently set aside with retrospective effect ( ex tunc ) on account of a manifest mistake of law , then ORG may not take into account the fact and period of such occupation when calculating the period of adverse possession referred to in LAW ” .

ORG noted , however , that as ORG had underlined in its ORG no . III CZP CARDINAL/CARDINAL , and by contrast to the above situation , adjudication by civil courts did not amount to ORG sovereign interference in private - law relations since the courts were established to apply the law in civil cases . In the same ORG had emphasised that even manifest breaches of procedural rules in deciding a case may not – as such – be qualified as manifestation of ORG exercise of its sovereign powers . ORG noted that ORG when deciding the case in DATE had committed flagrant errors which resulted in the decision being quashed , but nevertheless that did not deprive the claimant of a possibility to have its application granted .

In these particular circumstances ORG concurred with ORG that certainly from the date on which the decision of CARDINAL DATE had become final the claimant should be regarded as being in possession of the property cum animo rem sibi habendi . That date marked also the beginning of the period of adverse possession . In this respect , ORG noted that the applicants had not rebutted the legal presumption established in LAW that the actual possessor of a property should be considered to be in possession of it “ like a property owner ” . Instead , they had focused their submissions on showing that the taking over of the property ’s management in DATE had been unlawful and had not analysed the relevance of the DATE decision which declared that the ORG had become the owner of the property .

Lastly , ORG considered the issue of good or bad faith on the part of the ORG which was relevant for the calculation of the period of adverse possession . In this respect , it referred to the legal presumption in favour of good faith laid down in LAW and found that the applicants had not discharged the burden upon them of proving bad faith on the part of the claimant . In this respect ORG held as follows :

“ If bad faith on the part of the claimant were to be assumed at the time when that ( DATE ) decision was given and when it became final , it would have to mean that , regardless of such content of the decision supported by the authority of the court vested with determination of civil - law cases , the claimant would have still to believe that the title did not belong to him or suspect that another person was the owner . Such a view , in the appellate court ’s opinion , can not be sustained ” .

At the same time , ORG noted that the above conclusion could not be seen as its approval of the manner in which the DATE proceedings had been conducted .

Consequently , ORG held that the DATE period of adverse possession in good faith having come to an end on DATE , the ORG had acquired ownership of the property concerned with effect from that date .

On DATE ORG refused to entertain a cassation appeal lodged by the applicants , finding that no serious legal issue arose in the case such as to justify examination of the appeal .

LAW provides :

“ If a law makes legal consequences dependent upon good or bad faith , good faith shall be presumed ”

Article CARDINAL of the Civil Code reads :

“ It shall be presumed that a person in actual possession of property is in possession “ like a property owner ” ( cum animo rem sibi habendi ) ”

Adverse possession is regulated in Article CARDINAL of LAW . Up until DATE that provision provided that a person could acquire ownership of land after CARDINAL years’ continuous and independent possession in good faith . Otherwise , a longer period of DATE applied .

In DATE LAW was amended and the statutory periods of adverse possession in good and bad faith were extended by DATE . Article CARDINAL , in force since CARDINAL DATE , reads :

“ § CARDINAL . Persons in possession of property , although they are not the owner , shall acquire title thereto if they have been in continuous and independent possession thereof for DATE , save where they came into such possession in bad faith .

§ CARDINAL . After DATE , persons in possession of property shall acquire title thereto even if they came into possession thereof in bad faith . ”

Persons in possession of the property can apply to the district court for a declaration that , as of a specific date , they acquired ownership of property on the strength of adverse possession for a statutory period .

In its Resolution No . III CZP CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE ( published in OSNC CARDINAL/CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , ORG held that :

“ ORG may count towards the period of adverse possession , within the meaning of Article CARDINAL , the period of occupation “ like a property owner ” on the basis of a court judgment which was [ subsequently ] quashed as a result of an extraordinary appeal ( rewizja nadzwyczajna ) after the period of adverse possession had elapsed . ”

In the written grounds ORG observed that the manner in which the possessor came into possession of the property , including whether he was aware of any unlawfulness in this respect , was immaterial for the validity of adverse possession . The latter circumstance was relevant for the calculation of the period of adverse possession . Furthermore , ORG noted that the validity of adverse possession would not be affected in a case where the final court judgment declaring acquisition of title was subsequently quashed on appeal .

ORG further observed that in exceptional circumstances it might be possible to disregard the legal consequences of the application of civil law . In particular , such a possibility might arise when an unlawful interference by the ORG exercising its sovereign prerogatives ( imperium ) in private - law relations was a determining factor which led to the deprivation of a civil right . By contrast , adjudication by civil courts did not constitute ORG sovereign interference in private - law relations , since the courts had been established to apply the law in civil cases . Accordingly , even grave procedural errors committed by a court when determining a case could not of themselves be qualified as a manifestation of ORG exercise of its sovereign powers . There would have to be some additional , exceptional circumstances indicating that the ORG had abused its sovereign prerogatives or acted unlawfully with a view to depriving a person of his or her civil right .


The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . The respondent Government were represented by Mr P.A. Laptev , Representative of GPE at ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant was a civil servant in ORG . DATE he was assigned to the NORP embassy in GPE as an attaché . By an order of DATE he was dismissed from ORG on the ground of expiration of the term of his labour contract .

On DATE the applicant brought proceedings for reinstatement . On DATE the ORG of GPE found that the applicant had been employed for an indefinite period and that his dismissal had , therefore , been unlawful . It ordered the respondent Ministry to reinstate him in his post of an attaché at the NORP embassy in GPE and update his labour records accordingly . It stated that the judgment was subject to immediate enforcement . ORG appealed against the judgment . On DATE ORG rejected the ORG appeal and upheld the judgment which came into force on DATE .

On DATE the ORG ordered the applicant ’s reinstatement in his post in accordance with the judgment of DATE . However , as the DATE term of his assignment in GPE had been expired and no extension was possible the applicant was offered , in DATE , posts of an attaché available in the central office of ORG in GPE . He refused to accept the offers and requested the continuation of his work in the capacity of an attaché at the embassy in GPE .

On DATE he applied to the bailiff requesting the enforcement of the judgment . On DATE the bailiff brought enforcement proceedings .

By an order of CARDINAL DATE the applicant was appointed an attaché at the historical and documentary department of the central office of ORG as of DATE . He refused to assume his office .

By letters of CARDINAL , DATE and CARDINAL DATE the Ministry informed the bailiff of their efforts to enforce the judgment and to settle the situation with the applicant ’s employment . They explained , inter alia , with reference to the applicable legislation and the rules of rotation of diplomatic staff that there was no legal basis for the applicant ’s continued service in the embassy in GPE .

By an order of DATE the ORG dismissed the applicant on the ground of his refusal to work .

On DATE the bailiff imposed a fine on the head of the personnel department of ORG for his failure to enforce the judgment . ORG challenged the bailiff ’s decision in ORG which on DATE stayed the enforcement proceedings pending its decision . The applicant ’s request to join the proceedings and his appeal against the decision to stay the enforcement were rejected . On DATE ORG found the bailiff ’s decision imposing the fine lawful .

On DATE the ORG quashed their order of DATE on the applicant ’s dismissal and ordered his reinstatement with his place of work in the central office of ORG . The applicant was paid remuneration for the preceding period and compensation for the late payment . On DATE the Ministry fixed the applicant ’s remuneration which included an allowance for his diplomatic rank of an attaché and an allowance for work with information involving ORG secret .

By a decision of DATE the bailiff discontinued the enforcement proceedings in view of the enforcement of the judgment .

On DATE the applicant appealed against the bailiff ’s decision to discontinue the proceedings . On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal and upheld the bailiff ’s decision . It found that the term of the applicant ’s assignment to the embassy in GPE had expired on DATE and that thereafter the ORG had provided him with work in its central office in accordance with the labour law requirements . It held that the judgment of DATE as upheld on DATE had been fully enforced . On DATE ORG upheld the judgment of DATE .

On DATE the applicant brought an action challenging the ORG ’s order of CARDINAL DATE by which he had been dismissed on the ground of his refusal to work .

On DATE the Presnenskiy District Court of GPE found for the applicant . The enforcement proceedings were brought on DATE and discontinued on DATE in view of the applicant ’s actual reinstatement . The applicant ’s appeal to ORG against the termination of the enforcement proceedings is pending . The judgment of CARDINAL DATE was upheld on appeal by ORG on DATE .

On DATE the applicant was dismissed from ORG on the ground of his absence from work . On DATE he brought proceedings in the ORG of GPE to challenge his dismissal . On DATE ORG found for ORG . The applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment . The proceedings are pending .

On DATE the applicant brought proceedings claiming pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages caused by his dismissal in DATE . On DATE the Presnenskiy District Court of GPE stayed the proceedings pending the outcome of the first set of proceedings concerning the applicant ’s reinstatement .

On DATE ORG granted the applicant ’s claims in part and ordered ORG to pay the applicant MONEY ( “ RUR ” ) in damages , including the applicant ’s salary for the period between the date of his dismissal in DATE and DATE . On DATE ORG corrected the judgment stating that the amount awarded to the applicant was RUR CARDINAL . On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal and upheld the judgment .

On DATE the applicant applied for the enforcement of the judgment of DATE , as amended on DATE and upheld on DATE . On DATE the bailiff brought enforcement proceedings . ORG considered that the applicant should have submitted the writ of execution to ORG in accordance with the procedure provided by the applicable legislation .

On DATE the bailiff ordered that the ORG ’s money on their bank account be seized in order to enforce the judgment . Following the Ministry ’s appeal against the bailiff ’s decision , on DATE ORG stayed the enforcement proceedings . By a decision of DATE the ORG quashed the bailiff ’s decision of CARDINAL DATE as unlawful .

On DATE the applicant lodged a request for reopening the case in view of newly - discovered circumstances . On DATE the Presnenskiy District Court of GPE granted the applicant ’s request , quashed the judgment of DATE , as amended on DATE and upheld on DATE , and ordered a fresh examination of the case . On DATE ORG granted the applicant ’s request for withdrawing the writ of execution issued in respect of the judgment of DATE , as amended on DATE and upheld on DATE .

Hearings listed for DATE and DATE did not take place since the applicant , who had been duly notified of the hearings , had failed to appear . On DATE ORG of GPE ordered that the case not be examined on the ground of the applicant ’s failure to appear in court . The applicant did not appeal and the decision became final on DATE .

On DATE the applicant brought proceedings claiming his remuneration and damages for the period after DATE . On DATE ORG granted his claims in part and ordered the Ministry to pay him RUR CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL covering the salary arrears for the period between DATE and DATE . Following the applicant ’s appeal the ORG quashed the judgment on DATE and remitted the case to the firstinstance court for a fresh examination .

In DATE the applicant submitted new claims for the payment of his salary until then . In DATE he requested to seize the ORG ’s bank accounts . The request was dismissed by a final decision of ORG of DATE . In DATE the applicant submitted new claims concerning his salary arrears . The proceedings are pending .

The applicant also brought other proceedings concerning his disputes with his employer .

Thus , on DATE the applicant lodged an application with ORG of GPE challenging the constitutionality of the Government ’s regulations which laid down terms and conditions of service for ORG employees abroad . On DATE the secretariat of the court informed the applicant that the court did not have jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of by - laws , that it dealt exclusively with the issues of the constitutionality of laws , and that therefore his application could not be examined .

On DATE the applicant lodged an application before ORG of the Russian Federation challenging the lawfulness of the same regulations . On DATE ORG terminated the proceedings because the Government had quashed the regulations in issue . The applicant ’s appeal was dismissed on DATE .


CASE OF PRISYAZHNIKOVA AND DOLGOPOLOV v. RUSSIA

Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of P1-1;Pecuniary damage - financial awards;Non-pecuniary damage - financial awards

The applicants were born DATE and DATE respectively , and live in GPE in the Sakha ( GPE of GPE .

The applicants brought a civil action against the ORG , seeking to enforce ORG promissory notes for purchase of a NORP - made car or to recover the monetary value thereof .

On DATE the Ust - Yanskiy District Court of the Sakha ( GPE Republic found for the applicants and awarded MONEY ( “ RUR ” ) to the first applicant and RUR CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL to the second applicant against ORG .

On DATE ORG of the Sakha ( GPE Republic ( hereinafter DATE “ the ORG ” ) rejected an appeal by ORG and upheld the judgment .

The enforcement proceedings were opened on CARDINAL DATE , but the judgment was not enforced .

NORP By interim decision of CARDINAL DATE , Judge NORP of ORG of the Sakha ( GPE ) Republic refused a request by ORG for obtaining the case file for the purpose of initiating supervisory - review proceedings . ORG had claimed that the courts had incorrectly applied the substantive law .

By letter of DATE , ORG President rejected a renewed request by ORG for launching the supervisory - review proceedings .

On DATE ORG introduced a new application for supervisory review of the judgments in the applicants ' favour , founded on the same grounds as before .

On DATE ORG President issued an interim decision on remitting the applicants ' cases for examination on the merits to ORG by way of supervisory review . In the procedural part , the interim decision of CARDINAL DATE , but not the letter of DATE , was mentioned .

On DATE the Presidium of ORG of the Sakha ( GPE ) Republic , in a CARDINAL - judge formation presided over by ORG President , found that the lower courts had not taken into account certain provisions relating to reimbursement of ORG promissory notes . On that ground , relying on Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Code of Civil Procedure , the ORG quashed the judgments in the applicants ' favour and dismissed their claim as having no basis in the domestic law .

A judicial decision becomes legally binding after the appeal court has examined the matter ( LAW ) . A judicial decision must be enforced once it became legally binding , unless the law provides for its immediate enforcement ( LAW ) .

The relevant provisions governing the supervisory - review proceedings read as follows :

“ CARDINAL . Courts may issue judicial decisions in the form of judicial orders , judgments and interim decisions ... ”

“ CARDINAL . Judicial decisions that have become legally binding , with the exception for judicial decisions by the ORG of ORG of GPE , may be appealed against ... to a court exercising supervisory review , by parties to the case and by other persons whose rights or legal interests have been adversely affected by these judicial decisions .

Judicial decisions may be appealed against to a court exercising supervisory review within DATE after they became legally binding ... ”

“ An application for supervisory review must contain :

( CARDINAL ) the name of the court to which it is addressed ;

( CARDINAL ) a reference to the first - instance , appeal or cassation courts that examined the case and a summary of their decisions ;

( CARDINAL ) a reference to the judgment or decision which is being appealed against ... ”

“ CARDINAL . Having examined an application for supervisory review , the judge issues an interim decision on –

( CARDINAL ) obtaining the case file if there exist doubts as to the lawfulness of the judicial decision ;

( CARDINAL ) refusing to obtain the case file if the arguments in the application for supervisory review may not , in accordance with the federal law , result in quashing of the judicial decision .

NORP The President of the regional ORG ... may disagree with the judge 's decision refusing to obtain the case file . In such case the President issues his own decision on obtaining the case file . ”

“ CARDINAL . Having examined the case file obtained by the supervisory - review court , the judge issues an interim decision on –

– refusing to remit the case for examination on the merits by the supervisory - review court ;

– remitting the case for examination of the application for supervisory review on the merits by the supervisory - review court . ”

“ CARDINAL . NORP The President of the regional ORG ... may disagree with the judge 's decision refusing to remit the case for examination on the merits by the supervisory - review court . In such case the President issues his own decision on remitting the case for examination on the merits by the supervisory - review court . ”

“ CARDINAL . A judicial decision on remitting the case for examination on the merits by a supervisory - review court must contain :

( CARDINAL ) a reasoned description of the grounds for remitting the case for examination on the merits ... ”

“ CARDINAL . Having examined the case by way of supervisory review , the court may

( CARDINAL ) quash or alter the judicial decision issued by a court of first , second or supervisory - review instance and issue a new judicial decision , without remitting the matter for a fresh examination , if substantive legal provisions have been erroneously applied or interpreted . ”

Once instituted , enforcement proceedings must be completed within DATE upon receipt of the writ of execution by the bailiff ( Section CARDINAL ) .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property

Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Volodymyr Butkevych

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE . At the material time he was a tax inspector .

On DATE ORG of Donetsk ( hereinafter “ the ORG ” ) fined the applicant ORG CARDINAL under an administrative procedure for a corruption offence . The applicant was consequently dismissed from his position .

On DATE the ORG quashed this judgment and terminated the proceedings .

On DATE ORG awarded the applicant UAH CARDINAL in compensation for moral damage to be paid by ORG of GPE .

This judgment was not appealed and became final on DATE .

NORP In DATE ORG in GPE initiated the enforcement proceedings .

On DATE the writ of execution was transferred to ORG in GPE , which on DATE refused to open the enforcement proceedings and transferred the writ to ORG ( hereinafter “ the GPE ” ) .

On DATE the ORG refused to open the enforcement proceedings on the ground that it fell outside of its competence .

NORP Since DATE the enforcement proceedings are pending before ORG of ORG .

The judgment of CARDINAL DATE remains unenforced .

The relevant domestic law is summarised in the judgment of PERSON v. GPE ( no . PERSON , § § DATE , DATE ) .


No violation of Art. 3;Violation of Art. 5-3;Not necessary to examine Art. 5-4;Violation of Art. 5-5;Violation of Art. 6-1 (composition of state security court);Not necessary to examine remaining complaints under Art. 6;No violation of Art. 13;No violation of Art. 14;Remainder inadmissible;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - domestic and Convention proceedings

The applicants were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE .

In a report drafted by the gendarmes and signed by the applicant on DATE , it was stated that he was taken into custody on the basis of information contained in a document found on a ORG terrorist .

NORP In his statement taken by the gendarmes on DATE the applicant confessed in detail to his involvement in the activities of the ORG .

On DATE the applicant and CARDINAL others were examined by a doctor at ORG , who concluded there were no traces of blows on their bodies .

Later on DATE , the applicant was first brought before ORG then before the judge at ORG where he refuted his statements dated DATE and he contested his involvement in the activities of the ORG . He confessed to having possessed a PERSON rifle without a permit . The court ordered his detention on remand .

In his petition dated DATE filed with ORG , the applicant alleged that he had been severely tortured for DATE while in police custody . He stated that he had been told to strip , blindfolded , severely beaten and strung up by his arms . Moreover , he objected to the court ’s decision to detain him on remand .

On an unspecified date ORG issued a decision of non - jurisdiction as the charges against the applicant fell within the competence of ORG .

On DATE ORG at ORG filed a bill of indictment charging the applicant with engaging in acts aimed at the separation of a part of the territory of the ORG , under LAW and LAW .

At the hearing held on DATE , the applicant denied the allegations against him and claimed that he had been forced to sign the statements drafted in police custody . The court refused the applicant ’s request for release pending trial , in view of the state of the evidence and the nature of the offence of which he was accused . It further decided to join the applicant ’s case to the second applicant ’s case , as they raised similar issues .

On DATE the applicant was taken into custody by the security forces at ORG . According to the arrest report drafted by the gendarmes and signed by the applicant , he was taken into custody in the village of PERSON in the course of an investigation concerning the ORG .

On DATE the applicant took the police officers of ORG of the Siirt Security Directorate to where he was hiding weaponry , namely a PERSON rifle , a hand grenade and bullets . The police officers later drafted an on - site inspection report , describing the location of the hideout and the weapons found there .

In his statement taken by the gendarmes on DATE , the applicant confessed in detail to his involvement in the activities of the ORG .

On DATE the applicant and CARDINAL other suspects were taken to ORG for an examination . According to the medical report drafted on DATE , no traces of blows were found on the applicant ’s body .

On DATE , the applicant was brought before ORG where he accepted having possessed a rifle , a hand grenade and bullets , but denied having participated in the activities of the ORG . Later he was brought before ORG where he reiterated that he had no involvement in the activities of the ORG . The court ordered his detention on remand .

In a petition dated DATE filed with ORG , the applicant refuted all the charges brought against him and requested to be released . He alleged that while he was held in police custody , he had had to accept all the allegations against him as he had been severely tortured . Moreover , he maintained that , as the police officers had threatened him , he was afraid to complain about these acts before the public prosecutor and the judge at the criminal court .

On an unspecified date , ORG issued a decision of lack of jurisdiction as the charges against the applicant fell within the competence of ORG .

On DATE the public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with ORG , accusing the applicant and CARDINAL others of having engaged in acts aimed at the separation of a part of the territory of the ORG . The public prosecutor requested that the applicant be convicted and sentenced under LAW § CARDINAL of LAW and LAW .

On DATE , upon the request of the judge at ORG , ORG took the statements of QUANTITY police officers from ORG of ORG , who had questioned the second applicant and had drafted the on - site inspection report . The police officers described the course of events during the on - site inspection . They also maintained that no pressure had been inflicted on the accused .

At the hearing of CARDINAL DATE , the applicants were not present before ORG . It therefore issued summonses to them for the next hearing , scheduled for DATE . The court requested that a ballistic examination be carried out by ORG concerning the rifle found in the possession of the second applicant . It continued the applicants’ remand in custody pending trial , but released CARDINAL other accused persons .

At the hearing of CARDINAL DATE , some of the accused , including the applicants , were present in court . The statements of the police officers who had signed the on - site inspection report were submitted to the court . The court also heard CARDINAL defence witnesses and asked the accused for their comments . The lawyers of both applicants maintained that they did not have any comments to make concerning these statements . They also demanded the applicants’ release pending trial , contending that the accusations brought against them were unfounded . The court ordered the prolongation of their detention on remand considering the nature of the charges and the content of the case - file .

At the CARDINAL subsequent hearings which were held DATE and DATE , ORG was unable to reach a decision as the relevant ballistic report had not been received . At each hearing , the court rejected the ORG requests for release pending trial , in view of the state of the evidence and the nature of the offence .

On DATE the court received the ballistic report . At the following hearing , held on DATE , the public prosecutor submitted his opinion on the merits . He proposed that the applicants be convicted and sentenced under LAW of LAW and LAW . The court rejected once again the ORG request for release pending trial because of the serious nature of the charges and the state of the evidence .

At the hearing of CARDINAL DATE , ORG was unable to give a final decision as the prison authorities had failed to bring the first applicant to court . On DATE and CARDINAL DATE , the court rescheduled the hearing to a later date in order to obtain this applicant ’s final statements .

On DATE the prison authorities again failed to bring the first applicant before ORG . His lawyer maintained that the applicant was absent against his will and requested the court to postpone the hearing in order to take his last statements . The second applicant repeated his previous statements . The court convicted the applicants of engaging in acts aimed at the separation of a part of the territory of the ORG . The court sentenced them to DATE and QUANTITY months’ imprisonment under LAW of LAW and LAW . The decision was given in the absence of the first applicant .

The applicants appealed against the decision of ORG .

On DATE ORG quashed the decision on the ground that ORG did not respect the rights of defence during the proceedings . It emphasized in its decision that the court had convicted the first applicant in his absence , depriving him of his right to submit his final defence . It held that , due to the close connection between the accused , it was appropriate to quash the decision in favour of all the accused .

On DATE ORG served a summons on the applicants for the following hearing .

On DATE the court sent a notice to ORG to ascertain the prison in which the applicants were detained and the address of CARDINAL of the accused who were released pending trial . Moreover , it requested the population registry office to confirm the apparent death of CARDINAL of the accused .

At the hearing of DATE the court requested the transfer of the applicants , who were detained in GPE and GPE prisons , to FAC .

On DATE the court postponed the hearing once again as the applicants were still not present and the addresses of the other accused were not yet known to the court .

On DATE and DATE the applicants were present before the court . They submitted their opinion concerning the decision of ORG . However , as the other accused , who had been released pending trial , failed to appear , the court was once again unable to reach its final decision .

The applicants did not attend the following CARDINAL hearings . According to the prison records it was their express wish to not to attend . Moreover during this period neither the office of the public prosecutor nor the population register office submitted to the court the requested information concerning the other accused .

At the hearing of DATE , in the presence of only the ORG lawyers , ORG gave its final decision . It convicted the applicants as charged and sentenced them to DATE and QUANTITY months’ imprisonment . It acquitted CARDINAL of the accused and decided to sever the case concerning the others whose addresses were still unknown to the court .

On DATE the applicants appealed to ORG . In their petition they maintained that , according to LAW ( a ) of the Code on Criminal Procedure , statements that are obtained using forbidden methods , such as torture , pressure or ill - treatment , can not be taken into consideration by the court . They contended that they had signed their statements under pressure , without knowing their contents . They therefore requested the quashing of ORG decision , arguing that it was mainly based on their statements taken in police custody .

On DATE ORG upheld the decision of the first instance court .