The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He used to run a car rental business .

On DATE ORG informed him that it had begun criminal investigations against him and CARDINAL other persons on the suspicion of insurance fraud . They were suspected of having obtained reimbursement for non - existent car rental costs and of having requested payment for non - refundable kilometres .

On DATE , following ORG arrest warrant , the applicant was arrested on the suspicion that he would attempt to hinder the investigation proceedings ( PERSON ) .

On DATE ORG suspended the execution of the arrest warrant on the condition that the applicant cease to have contact with his co - suspects and any of the witnesses involved .

On DATE the applicant and his co - suspects were indicted for fraud .

On DATE ORG revoked the arrest warrant .

On DATE ORG provisionally discontinued proceedings with the applicant 's consent pursuant to LAW § CARDINAL of LAW ( see relevant domestic law below ) on the condition that the applicant pay a sum of CARDINAL ORG to ORG ( ORG ) .

On DATE , after the applicant had fulfilled this condition , ORG , sitting as a chamber of CARDINAL judges , permanently discontinued proceedings against the applicant but refused to grant him compensation for the time spent in detention on remand , finding that such compensation would not be equitable ( entspricht nicht der Billigkeit ) , in particular as the applicant had waived any right to compensation .

NORP The applicant appealed against this decision , arguing that he had never waived his right to compensation and that compensation would be equitable , as the criminal proceedings had caused him to lose his source of income and had prevented him from finishing his law studies .

By letter to the applicant 's counsel of CARDINAL DATE , the presiding judge of the competent chamber of ORG confirmed that if the proceedings had been pursued , ORG would have opened proceedings against the applicant with regard to parts of the indictment . The applicant would then have been convicted with predominant probability ( “ GPE war auch mit bei weitem überwiegender PERSON zu rechnen ” ) . In CARDINAL of the cases of fraud , this predominant probability was based on the submissions of another accused and of a former suspect . In another case , a conviction for fraud was to be expected following the submission of various car rental receipts ( “ ... war schon i m Hinblick auf die LOC diversen FAC wegen PERSON rechnen ” ) .

On DATE the GPE / ORG rejected the applicant 's appeal . It noted that granting compensation for prosecution measures lay within the discretion of the competent courts or prosecuting offices . The relevant LAW ( ORG über die PERSON für Strafverfolgungs- massnahmen , see relevant domestic law below ) was to be seen as an exception to the rule - according to this provision , compensation should be granted in special cases where the execution of provisional prosecution measures was considered to be grossly disproportionate ( “ grob unverhältnismässig ” ) . This did not apply to the case against the applicant .

ORG noted that the measures of prosecution instituted against the applicant were originally based on a strong suspicion ( dringender Verdacht ) . If the proceedings had continued , ORG would have opened proceedings against the applicant regarding a certain part of the indictment . ORG found that taking into account a remaining suspicion ( “ verbleibender NORP ” ) when deciding on compensation was not in violation of the right to the presumption of innocence under LAW , as it did not involve the establishment or allocation of guilt , but only constituted an admissible and necessary evaluation of the situation . Legal consequences of a non - punitive character , such as the refusal of compensation for prosecution measures , may be linked to such a remaining suspicion . This remaining suspicion , which ORG took into account when deciding on compensation , was only relevant with regard to the question of whether to open proceedings and of whether the public interest in further prosecution could be overcome . It was not relevant with regard to the actual question of guilt or the probability of a conviction .

On DATE ORG refused to entertain the applicant 's complaint against the court decisions and the letter of ORG , finding that the principle of the presumption of innocence did not prevent the establishment and assessment of a remaining suspicion in a decision on the discontinuance of criminal proceedings before a conviction has taken place . It thus also did not prevent courts or prosecuting offices from taking this remaining suspicion into account when deciding on compensation .

The presumption of innocence prohibits imposing sanctions with a punitive or de facto punitive effect on an accused whose guilt has not been established in the relevant criminal proceedings . However , in a decision on the discontinuance of proceedings , legal consequences of a non - punitive character may be linked to a remaining suspicion , but it must become sufficiently clear from its reasoning that this does not occur out of the intention to establish or allocate guilt , but out of the intention to describe and assess the state of suspicion ( PERSON ) . This distinction had to be sufficiently expressed in the decision 's reasons . In this respect , the context of all the given reasons had to be taken into account .

In the light of the above principles , ORG found that the impugned decisions were compatible with LAW . It noted that ORG had refused to grant the applicant compensation under LAW on the ground that if the proceedings against the applicant had been pursued , ORG would have opened court proceedings against the applicant based on parts of the indictment . This evaluation of the remaining suspicion with regard to the question of the opening of proceedings and overcoming the public interest in pursuing prosecution measures neither contained a declaration on the probability of the applicant 's conviction , nor did it contain a criminal allocation of guilt .

According to LAW , criminal proceedings involving a less serious criminal offence ( PERSON ) may be discontinued subject to certain conditions and instructions ( PERSON ) .

If the proceedings are still in the investigation phase , ORG may , with the consent of the competent court and the accused , provisionally refrain from issuing an indictment relating to an offence and may at the same time order the accused ( CARDINAL ) to take measures providing reparation , ( CARDINAL ) to pay a sum of money to a charitable association or the ORG , ( CARDINAL ) to take other measures or ( CARDINAL ) to make maintenance payments of a particular amount , if such conditions and instructions can remove the public interest in prosecution and if this is not in conflict with the seriousness of the crime ( “ ... PERSON , das öffentliche ORG an der Strafverfolgung zu beseitigen , und die Schwere der Schuld nicht entgegensteht ” ) ( LAW ) .

If the accused has already been indicted , the court may , with the consent of both the public prosecutor 's office and the accused , discontinue the proceedings and impose the same conditions and instructions ( Section CARDINALa § CARDINAL ) .

Compensation for various prosecution measures is covered by LAW ( PERSON über die PERSON für GPE ) .

In cases where an accused is acquitted or where the proceedings against him are discontinued or where a court refuses to open the proceedings against him , he is entitled to compensation for damages suffered due to time spent in detention on remand or due to other prosecution measures ( Section CARDINAL ) .

NORP If the discontinuation of the proceedings is subject to the discretion of the prosecutor '

According to the case - law of ORG , cases where the proceedings have been discontinued according to LAW also fall under the scope of the above regulations .


CASE OF KROON AND OTHERS v. THE NETHERLANDS

Violation of Art. 8;No separate issue under Art. 14+8;Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

ORG The first applicant , PERSON , is a GPE national born in DATE . The second applicant , PERSON , born in DATE , was a NORP national at the time of the events complained of ; he subsequently obtained GPE nationality . Although they were not living together at the time , they had a stable relationship from which the third applicant , PERSON , was born in DATE ; he has both NORP and GPE nationality . All CARDINAL applicants live in GPE .

ORG In DATE , PERSON had married Mr PERSON M’Hallem - Driss , a NORP national .

The marriage broke down towards DATE . Thereafter , PERSON lived apart from her husband and lost contact with him . It appears from official records that he left GPE in DATE and his whereabouts have remained unknown ever since .

PERSON was born on DATE . He was entered in the register of births as the son of PERSON and Mr M’Hallem - Driss .

PERSON instituted divorce proceedings in ORG ( arrondissementsrechtbank ) DATE after PERSON ’s birth . The action was not defended and the divorce became final when ORG judgment was entered in the register of marriages on DATE .

ORG On DATE , relying on section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ( PERSON CC " - see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , PERSON and Mr PERSON requested the GPE registrar of births , deaths and marriages ( ambtenaar van de burgerlijke stand ) to allow PERSON to make a statement before him to the effect that Mr M’Hallem - PERSON was not PERSON ’s father and thus make it possible for PERSON to recognise the child as his .

The registrar refused this request on DATE . While expressing sympathy , he noted that PERSON had been born while PERSON was still married to Mr M’Hallem - Driss , so that unless the latter brought proceedings to deny paternity ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and DATE below ) recognition by another man was impossible under GPE law as it stood .

ORG On DATE PERSON and Mr PERSON applied to ORG for an order directing the registrar to add to the register of births PERSON statement that Mr M’Hallem - Driss was not PERSON ’s father and with PERSON recognition of PERSON . They relied on LAW article CARDINAL) of the LAW , taken both alone and together with LAW ) , pointing out that while it would have been possible for PERSON former husband to deny the paternity of PERSON , it was not possible for her to deny her former husband ’s paternity of the child .

ORG refused this request on DATE . It held that in spite of the justified wish of PERSON and PERSON to have biological realities officially recognised , their request had to be refused since , under the law as it stood , PERSON was the legitimate child of Mr M’Hallem - Driss . There were only limited exceptions to the rule that the husband of the mother was presumed to be the father of a child born in wedlock . This was justified in the interests of legal certainty , which were of great importance in this field , and by the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others . The law as it stood was therefore not incompatible with Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL ( article CARDINAL , article DATE ) of the Convention .

ORG Relying again on Articles DATE and CARDINAL ( article CARDINAL , article DATE ) , PERSON and Mr PERSON appealed to ORG ( gerechtshof ) .

ORG rejected the appeal on CARDINAL DATE . It held that LAW article CARDINAL) was applicable but had not been violated . The restrictions imposed on the mother ’s right to deny the paternity of her husband satisfied the requirements of Article CARDINAL para . CARDINAL ( article LAW ) . There had , however , been a violation of LAW taken together with LAW ) , since there was no sound reason for the difference of treatment which the law established between husband and wife by not granting the latter the possibility , available to the former , of denying the husband ’s paternity . Nevertheless the appeal could not be allowed ; it was not open to the court to grant the ORG request , as that would require the creation of new GPE law , including administrative procedure , and would therefore go beyond the limits of the judiciary ’s powers to develop the law . Only the legislature could decide how best to comply with LAW as regards the possibility of denying paternity of a child born in wedlock .

PERSON and Mr PERSON then lodged an appeal on points of law with ORG ( PERSON ) .

They argued , firstly , that ORG had violated LAW article CARDINAL) of the LAW by holding that the limitations imposed by section PERSON on the mother ’s possibility of denying her husband ’s paternity - more particularly the fact that she might do so only in respect of a child born after the dissolution of the marriage - satisfied the requirements of Article CARDINAL para . CARDINAL ( article LAW ) . ORG had not properly weighed up the interests involved . It ought to have considered the relative weight of , on the one hand , the interests of the biological father and his child and , on the other , the interests protected by the legislation . ORG should have given priority to the former interests , which in the case before it were best served by severing the legal ties between PERSON and Mr M’Hallem - Driss and establishing such ties between PERSON and PERSON , who were entitled , under LAW article CARDINAL) of the LAW , to have their family relationship recognised .

In addition , they suggested that it followed from ORG finding of a violation of LAW ) that the interference concerned could not under any circumstances be covered by LAW CARDINAL ( article LAW ) .

Secondly , they argued that , by holding that it was not empowered to grant the ORG request as that would require the creation of new GPE law , ORG had violated Articles DATE and CARDINAL ( article DATE ) taken together . In the applicants’ submission , there was no reason to consider that only the legislature was able to remove the discrimination which ORG had rightly found to exist ; it was sufficient to disregard the requirement that the child must have been born after the dissolution of the mother ’s marriage .

ORG Following the advisory opinion of ORG , ORG rejected the appeal on DATE .

ORG did not rule on the question whether section PERSON violated Article CARDINAL ( article CARDINAL) , or Article CARDINAL taken together with Article CARDINAL ( article DATE ) . It considered that it was not necessary to do so , because it agreed with ORG that , even if there had been such a violation , solving the problem of what should replace section PERSON went beyond the limits of the judiciary ’s powers to develop the law . This finding was based on the following reasoning :

" In this connection , it should not be overlooked that if a possibility were to be created for the mother to deny [ her husband ’s ] paternity [ of a child born ] during marriage , the question would immediately arise as to what other limitations should apply in order not to jeopardise the child ’s interest in certainty regarding its descent from its legitimate parents , which interest the child generally has and which is part of the basis for the present system . Such limitations have therefore also been written into LAW ( Wetsvoorstel PERSON ; PERSON van de ORG to ORG of ORG - , DATE , DATE , sections CARDINAL et seq . ) , which is now before ORG ... [ I]t is not certain whether [ these limitations ] will be retained , added to or withdrawn in the course of the further parliamentary discussion , many variations being conceivable , regard also being had to the need to ensure equal treatment of the father and the mother , in so far , at any rate , that unequal treatment is not justified . "

The judgment of ORG was reported in PERSON ( GPE Law Reports - " GPE " ) , DATE , CARDINAL .

ORG CARDINAL more children were born to PERSON and Mr PERSON after the birth of PERSON : a daughter , PERSON , in DATE and twins , PERSON and PERSON , in DATE . They were all recognised by PERSON .

PERSON and Mr PERSON do not cohabit . The applicants claim , however , that Mr PERSON contributes to the care and upbringing of their children .

ORG Every municipality has a separate register for births ( section CARDINAL:CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ORG ) ; this is kept by CARDINAL or more registrars of births , deaths and marriages ( section CARDINAL:CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ) .

An entry in the register of births , or birth certificate , mentions the mother ’s husband as the father if the mother was married at the time of the birth or within a period of CARDINAL DATE immediately preceding the birth ; in all other cases , the name of the father is mentioned only if he recognises the child before or at the time the entry is made ( section CARDINAL:CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ( c ) ORG ) .

ORG An interested party or the public prosecutor ( officier van justitie ) can apply to ORG within the jurisdiction of which the register in question is located for an order to correct or add to the register of births . ORG decision is forwarded to the registrar of births , deaths and marriages ; the correction or addition is made in the form of a note in the margin or at the foot of the certificate ( section CARDINAL:CARDINAL ( CARDINAL)-(CARDINAL ) ORG ) .

" The husband shall be the father of a child born in wedlock . Where a child is born before the GPE DATE following dissolution of the marriage , the former husband shall be its father , unless the mother has remarried . "

ORG thus creates CARDINAL legal presumptions . Firstly , a child born during marriage is presumed to be the issue of the mother ’s husband ; secondly , a child born before the GPE day following the dissolution of the mother ’s marriage is presumed to be the progeny of the mother ’s former husband . The first presumption may be rebutted only by the mother ’s husband , who to that end must provide proof to the contrary ( sections CARDINAL GPE - see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The second presumption may be rebutted by either the mother or her former husband ; the mother ’s former husband will , however , have to adduce proof , whereas for the mother a statement is sufficient ( section CARDINAL:CARDINAL CC - see following paragraph ) .

ORG Section CARDINAL:CARDINAL CC reads as follows :

" CARDINAL . ORG The mother may deny that a child born to her within DATE following the dissolution of the marriage is the child of her former husband by making a statement to that effect before the registrar of births , deaths and marriages , provided that another man recognises the child by the instrument in which that statement is recorded ...

ORG The mother ’s statement and the recognition must take place within DATE of the child ’s birth .

ORG The [ mother ’s ] statement and the recognition shall take effect only if the mother and the man who recognises the child marry each other within DATE of the birth of the child ... CARDINAL . ORG If a judgment annulling the recognition in an action brought by the former husband becomes final , the mother ’s statement shall also lose its force .

ORG ... "

ORG In its judgment of CARDINAL DATE ( GPE DATE , CARDINAL ) , ORG deprived section PERSON ( CARDINAL ) ORG of its effect .

In the case in question - in which a child had been born within DATE of the dissolution of its mother ’s marriage - it was established , firstly , that there was a relationship between the child and its biological father which qualified as " family life " for the purposes of LAW article CARDINAL) of the LAW and , secondly , that the mother and the biological father , who did not wish to marry , wanted the paternity of the mother ’s former husband to be denied and the child to be recognised by its biological father .

ORG found that section PERSON ( CARDINAL ) ORG constituted an " interference " within the meaning of LAW article CARDINAL) , since it obstructed the formation of legally recognised family ties unless the mother and the biological father got married .

In deciding whether such interference was permissible under the terms of LAW para . CARDINAL ( article LAW ) , ORG noted that when section PERSON ( CARDINAL ) ORG had been enacted it was considered more important to protect a child from being deprived of its " legitimate " status than to enable it to establish ties with its biological father . Since then , however , the relative importance of these CARDINAL opposing interests had changed ; in particular , following the judgment of ORG in the ORG v. GPE case ( DATE , Series A no . CARDINAL ) , legal differences between " legitimate " and " illegitimate " children had to a large extent disappeared . In view of these developments , it could no longer be said that in cases where , for the purposes of LAW article CARDINAL) of the LAW , there was a relationship between the child and its biological father amounting to " family life " , the importance of maintaining a child ’s " legitimate " status overrode the interest protected by section PERSON ( CARDINAL ) ORG .

ORG Section CARDINAL ORG reads as follows :

" The husband can only deny paternity of the child by bringing an action to this end against the mother as well as against the child , which , unless it has come of age , shall be represented in the proceedings by a guardian ad litem appointed for that purpose by ORG ( kantonrechter ) . "

Section CARDINAL:CARDINAL ORG reads :

" CARDINAL . ORG The court shall allow the action to deny paternity if the husband can not be the father of the child .

ORG If during the period in which the child was conceived the husband did not have intercourse with the mother , or if they lived apart during that time , the court shall also declare the action to deny paternity well - founded , unless facts are established which make it appear possible that the husband is the father of the child . "

Such proceedings must be brought within DATE from DATE on which the father became aware of the fact that the child had been born ; however , if the mother has made a statement of the kind provided for in section PERSON ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , this time - limit does not expire until DATE after the birth of the child ( section CARDINAL:CARDINAL CC ) .

ORG According to section PERSON , legitimacy is proved by a person ’s parentage ( afstamming ) and the marriage of his or her parents . If there is no birth certificate , the parentage of a " legitimate " child is proved by the undisturbed possession of the status of " legitimate " child .

Section CARDINAL:CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ORG reads as follows :

" An illegitimate child has the status of natural child ( natuurlijk kind ) of its mother . Upon recognition it acquires the status of natural child of its father . "

" An illegitimate child and its descendants have legally recognised family ties ( familierechtelijke betrekkingen ) with the child ’s mother and her blood relations and , after the child has been recognised , also with the father and his blood relations . "

" ORG may be effected : ( a ) ORG on the child ’s birth certificate ; ( b ) ORG by an instrument of recognition drawn up by a registrar of births , deaths and marriages ; ( c ) ORG by any notarial deed ( notariële akte ) . "

There is no requirement that the man recognising an " illegitimate " child should be the biological father . Moreover , it is not possible for a man to recognise a " legitimate " child , even if he is the biological father .

ORG under section PERSON ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) may be annulled on application by the mother ’s former husband if the man who has recognised the child is not the child ’s biological father ( section CARDINAL:CARDINAL para . CARDINAL ORG ) .

ORG Section CARDINAL:CARDINAL ORG reads as follows :

" CARDINAL . Adoption is effected by a decision of ORG at the request of a married couple who wish to adopt a child .

ORG The request can only be granted if the adoption is in the apparent best interests of the child , as regards both breaking the ties with the [ natural ] parents and reinforcing the ties with the adoptive parents , or - in the case of adoption of a legitimate or natural child of CARDINAL of the adoptive parents - as regards both breaking the ties with the other parent and reinforcing the ties with the stepparent , and provided that the conditions laid down in the following section are satisfied .

ORG ...

ORG ... "

" CARDINAL . Adoption shall be subject to the following conditions :

( a ) ...

( b ) ORG that the child is not the legitimate or natural child of a legitimate or natural child of one of its adoptive parents ;

( c ) ORG that neither adoptive parent is CARDINAL or DATE older than the child ;

( d ) ORG that the request is not opposed by a parent or the parents with legally recognised family ties with the child . Nevertheless the court shall not be obliged to refuse a request opposed by a parent who was summoned DATE previously to be heard on the occasion of a similar request by the same couple that was refused , although the conditions laid down in paragraphs ( e ) to ( g ) below were satisfied ;

( e ) ...

( f ) ...

( g ) ORG that the adoptive parents were married DATE before DATE the request was filed .

ORG In the case of adoption of a legitimate or natural child of one of the adoptive parents , the conditions set forth in paragraphs ( c ) and ( g ) of the preceding subsection shall not apply . In the case of adoption of a legitimate child of one of the adoptive parents , the condition specified in paragraph ( d ) shall be replaced by the condition that the former spouse , whose marriage with the spouse of the stepparent has been terminated [ by divorce or dissolution of the marriage after judicial separation ] , if he or she has legally recognised family ties with the child , does not oppose the request .

ORG ... "

" By adoption the adopted person acquires the status of legitimate child of the adoptive parents . However , if the adopted person already had the status of legitimate child of one of the spouses who adopted him or her , he or she shall retain it and by adoption acquire the status of legitimate child of the other spouse . "


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property

András Sajó;Françoise Tulkens;Ireneu Cabral Barreto;Nona Tsotsoria;Vladimiro Zagrebelsky

The applicant was born in DATE and currently lives in GPE .

In the course of a police operation conducted on DATE in the village of GPE , GPE , the applicant ’s house , which happened to be close to the scene , was accidentally burned down together with the adjacent farm buildings . The house had been the applicant ’s place of residence prior to the incident .

On DATE the applicant sued ORG and ORG for the damage done and , in a judgment of DATE , the FAC in GPE ordered the respondent authorities to pay him CARDINAL NORP laris ( GEL ) ( MONEY ( ORG ) ) in compensation for the destruction of his property ( “ the judgment debt ” ) . The operative part of the judgment indicated that the payment should be made from ORG for DATE .

The judgment of DATE was upheld in full by ORG and ORG of GPE on DATE and DATE , respectively , and became binding on DATE .

On DATE the Krtsanisi - Mtatsminda District Court issued the respondent authorities with a writ of execution which reiterated the obligation to discharge the judgment debt from the DATE ORG . The authorities remained inactive .

Subsequent to the applicant ’s complaint , on DATE ORG of ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) invited the respondent authorities to discharge the judgment debt of their own accord within DATE , on pain of forcible enforcement measures . The allotted time expired without the judgment debt having been paid , but no measures followed .

On DATE ORG issued ORG with an order to pay the judgment debt . However , as that order indicated the wrong amount , ORG sent it back on DATE unenforced .

On DATE the applicant asked ORG for news of progress in the enforcement proceedings .

On DATE ORG replied that it was unable to discharge the judgment debt , as ORG had failed to do so of its own accord .

In a decision of DATE , at the applicant ’s request , ORG removed from the judgment of DATE , as an objectively unenforceable condition , the indication that the debt should be paid from the DATE ORG . That decision became binding on CARDINAL DATE , and on DATE ORG issued a writ for its enforcement .

On DATE , on the basis of the previous enforcement writ of DATE , ORG requested ORG to disburse the judgment debt . The latter authority did so on DATE , and DATE the applicant retrieved the debt in full .

The relevant legal provisions concerning the conduct of enforcement proceedings against a public agency funded from ORG were cited in the case of ORG and ORG v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , ECHR CARDINALVIII ) .


Violation of Art. 3;Violation of Art. 5-4;No violation of Art. 6-3-c;No violation of Art. 6-3-b;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the investigating authorities of ORG of FAC opened a criminal investigation based on a complaint by Mr. PERSON who alleged that the applicant had shot at his windows with a hunting rifle in revenge for an unpaid debt . Following Mr. PERSON ’s second complaint on DATE concerning a similar incident , a second investigation was opened and joined with the first .

It appears that these investigations led to the applicant ’s arrest on CARDINAL DATE . Following interrogations , he was detained on DATE under suspicion of having committed a crime under Sections CARDINAL § CARDINAL and QUANTITY of LAW of GPE which concerns intentional destruction of , or damage to , property and hooliganism and which carries a sentence of DATE imprisonment .

The following day , DATE , the applicant was released under his written undertaking not to leave the town as a measure of restraint .

On DATE the prosecution authorities forwarded the case - file and an indictment to ORG of FAC for examination and trial . However , on DATE the court remitted the case for further investigations . During these subsequent investigations the authorities issued , on DATE , an arrest warrant against the applicant as he had on a number of occasions failed to attend for interrogation . The applicant was arrested on DATE and remained in detention until DATE when ORG ordered his release , finding the alleged risk of the applicant absconding unsubstantiated .

NORP In the meantime , on DATE , the resumed investigations had been brought to an end and the case - file sent , once more , to ORG for adjudication . However , on DATE ORG ordered further investigation to be carried out . In the course of this investigation , on DATE , the authorities anew ordered the applicant ’s arrest and detention on the basis that the applicant had changed his residence , failed to appear for interrogations and hampered the proceedings . On DATE an arrest warrant was issued and on DATE the applicant was arrested and detained on remand in the ORG of GPE .

According to the report issued by the Chief Prison Directorate of the Ministry of Justice , submitted by the ORG , the applicant stayed at the Remand Centre IZ-CARDINAL/CARDINAL from DATE until DATE and from CARDINAL DATE until DATE . He was kept in CARDINAL different cells described as follows : cell no . CARDINAL ( CARDINAL m² of surface , CARDINAL bunks , the sanitary conditions satisfactory ) ; cell no . CARDINAL ( CARDINAL m² of surface , CARDINAL bunks , the sanitary conditions satisfactory ) ; cell no . CARDINAL ( CARDINAL m² of surface , CARDINAL bunks , the sanitary conditions satisfactory ) ; cell CARDINAL , CARDINAL , DATE ( CARDINAL m² of surface for each cell , CARDINAL bunks , the sanitary conditions of each of the cells satisfactory ) . It appears from the report that the sanitary and technical conditions of the cells in which the applicant was held were monitored on a regular basis .

In accordance with LAW of LAW on detention the applicant was allowed DATE walks for not TIME .

According to a letter from the Head of ORG for GPE , submitted by the Government , the applicant was on admission to the remand centre examined by the general practitioner , the dermatologist , the venerologist and the psychiatrist who found his health to be satisfactory . In the course of a check - up DATE after his arrival , on DATE , post - tuberculosis changes in the upper lobe of the right lung were detected . During the detention the applicant did not make requests for medical assistance , no diseases were detected in the course of routine examination and his state of health was considered to be satisfactory .

Without disputing the size of the cells the applicant submitted that these were dirty and infected with cockroaches , bed - bugs and lice . The DATE inspection did nothing to remedy that . The cells were overcrowded , leaving QUANTITY of surface per person . The detainees were obliged to sleep in turns and the applicant could wash DATE . The windows were covered with steel shutters and let in very little light .

On DATE ORG of ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against the ruling of ORG of FAC of DATE .

On DATE the Moskovskiy ORG of Kaliningrad rejected the applicant ’s application of DATE for release pending trial .

On DATE a Deputy President of ORG made an application for supervisory review of the decisions of the Moskovskiy District Court of DATE and DATE . The Deputy President alleged that these decisions had been unlawful as far as they had effectively deprived the applicant of his right to obtain a judicial review of his detention .

On DATE the Presidium of ORG granted the application . It set aside the decisions of ORG of DATE and DATE and ordered a fresh examination of the applicant ’s application for release . It appears that the applicant did not pursue the case following which the proceedings were terminated .

On DATE , following the completion of the investigation ordered by ORG on DATE ( see § CARDINAL above ) , the public prosecutor prepared the indictment and submitted the case to ORG for adjudication . The indictment referred to Sections CARDINAL § CARDINAL and QUANTITY of LAW . On DATE the court decided that the applicant should be given time to study the case - file and set the trial to commence on DATE . Due to the seriousness of the charges against the applicant the court appointed a defence counsel . It appears that the applicant refused the appointment of CARDINAL different defence counsels and eventually the court decided to entrust the applicant ’s defence to PERSON as the applicant had not suggested any other lawyers . During the trial , on DATE , the applicant requested that he be represented by his mother and his sister . On DATE the court rejected the applicant ’s request referring in particular to the fact that the case was complex and that therefore special legal knowledge and professional experience , which his mother and sister did not have , were required . A subsequent request of DATE to be represented by his relatives was likewise rejected .

By judgment of DATE ORG found the applicant guilty of the charges against him and sentenced him to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment . The applicant appealed against the judgment , complaining also that he had not been allowed to choose his legal assistance .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment . On DATE the ORG of ORG lowered the sentence to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment .

On an unspecified date the applicant filed a supervisory complaint in order to review the domestic courts’ judgment in his case . On DATE the judicial panel on criminal cases of ORG rendered its judgment which in part found in the applicant ’s favour . ORG quashed the domestic courts’ judgments in so far as they related to the conviction under LAW of LAW , whereas the remainder of the conviction was upheld . The applicant has been released from prison having served the sentence related to the remaining conviction .

Code of Criminal Procedure of DATE , in force at the material time :

“ ... The accused may ... appeal to court against unlawfulness and groundlessness of detention ... ”

“ DATE be admitted as defenders : an advocate authorised by a bar office ; a representative of a trade union or of another public association ...

Where authorized by a court decision or ruling , close relatives , legal representatives and other persons may be admitted as defenders . ”

“ A defender ’s participation is obligatory in proceedings :

NORP in which a public or private prosecutor is involved ... ”

“ ... When a prison administration receives a detainee ’s [ appeal to a court against pre - trial detention ] , it must pass the [ appeal ] to the relevant court immediately , and , at any rate , not TIME after its receipt , having informed a public prosecutor ...

If the appeal has been lodged via the prison administration , the prosecutor must send [ the documents confirming the lawfulness and validity of the detention as a measure of restraint ] to the court within TIME after receipt of the prison administration ’s notification that the person concerned has lodged the appeal ... ”

“ ... A judge must review the lawfulness of the detention ... within DATE after receipt of documents confirming the lawfulness and validity of the detention as a measure of restraint ... ”

LAW of GPE of DATE :

“ Everyone has the right to professional legal aid . In cases established by law , legal aid is granted free ... ”