Corneliu Bîrsan;Egbert Myjer;Ineta Ziemele;Ján Šikuta;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos;Nona Tsotsoria

NORP The applicant , Mr Māris Kostjučenkovs , is a NORP national who was born in DATE . At the time of submitting his complaint he was serving a prison sentence in Daugavpils prison . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON .

NORP The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the ORG found the applicant guilty of burglary and sentenced him to DATE and CARDINAL months’ imprisonment . On DATE the judgment came into force .

According to the applicant , immediately after his arrival at Liepāja prison he met “ enemies ” who threatened to subject him to ill - treatment throughout his stay at the prison . Without providing further details in his letter sent on DATE and received by ORG on DATE , the applicant alleged that the threats had been carried out on DATE when , inter alia , he had refused to cooperate with police investigators .

It appears that on DATE he complained to ORG ( “ the prosecutor ’s office ” ) and asked to be transferred to special detention facilities in GPE prison .

NORP The prosecutor ’s office forwarded the aforementioned complaint to ORG , which on DATE and DATE informed the applicant that his transfer to another prison would be examined after the entry into force of a final judgment in his criminal case . It appears that on DATE the applicant received this decision .

At DATE the applicant asked ORG to transfer him to PERSON prison , and on DATE the applicant was transferred there .

NORP In response to the ORG ’s request to specify his complaint concerning ill - treatment in PERSON prison , on DATE the applicant informed the ORG , without providing any further details , that in PERSON prison he had been ill - treated in DATE , but that he had not retained any documents relating to the matter . He asked the ORG to examine only his complaints under LAW . In a letter received by ORG the applicant alleged , without substantiating his allegations , that he had been ill - treated in PERSON temporary detention centre , and that on DATE his complaint in that regard had been dismissed by the prosecutor ’s office .

On an unspecified date in cell no . CARDINAL of GPE prison the inmates had threatened to sexually assault the applicant because he had cooperated in the past with law - enforcement authorities . He had accordingly been moved to another cell .

On DATE he had been transferred to a cell which his fellow inmates had refused to share with him . They had asked him to leave . Accordingly , the applicant had refused to stay in the cell , for which he had received a warning from the prison staff , and had been moved to another cell .

At a later stage , he had been put into yet another cell , where he had had a dispute with a prison guard . For that incident , he had been punished on DATE with DATE of solitary confinement .

After being punished , the applicant had been moved to another cell which the inmates had refused to share with him . He had then been moved to another cell .

In DATE he had been transferred to a cell in another part of the prison ( division CARDINAL ) . In that cell , another inmate , PERSON , had beaten up the applicant . On DATE S. had been punished for that with solitary confinement . The applicant alleged that after having finished his time in solitary confinement , S. had again been put in the same cell as him .

On DATE the applicant had been on duty in the cell . Other inmates had refused to comply with legitimate requests made by the applicant and had made him leave the cell . The prison officers had refused to transfer him to another cell , even in the event that they had accepted that the other inmates had “ attempted to subject him to psychological and physical ill - treatment ” . On DATE , the applicant had been punished with solitary confinement for bullying a cellmate .

After having been punished in the manner noted above , the applicant had been transferred to cell no . CARDINAL in division CARDINAL , where the inmates had allegedly humiliated him and had taken his jacket and shoes .

On DATE in a complaint to ORG the applicant alleged that he had refused to cooperate with investigators , and that one of the officers , PERSON , in PERSON prison had placed him in cells where the other inmates had physically ill - treated and bullied him .

On an unspecified date the applicant complained to ORG of the fact that he had never been transferred to cells with a peaceful environment . He also complained that he had been continuously transferred from one cell to another without any explanation or justification .

In DATE a prosecutor visited the applicant and asked the director of ORG to comment on the matter . The director had stated that he had never threatened the applicant , who had himself created problems by attempting to sexually assault fellow inmates . On DATE the prosecutor dismissed the applicant ’s complaint , noting that the allegations had not been proved and that there had not been any threats to the applicant ’s life and health . The decision was subject to appeal . The letter also informed the applicant that ORG was not empowered to decide on issues concerning the transfer of prisoners from CARDINAL prison to another , and that that issue was within the competence of ORG .

On DATE , after having examined the applicant ’s personal file , the director of the PERSON prison established that the applicant had had conflicts with other inmates “ due to illegal activities ” , for which it had not been possible to place the applicant either in a cell or in common LOC . Accordingly , he proposed that ORG to transfer the applicant to another prison for safety reasons .

On DATE the applicant was transferred to Daugavpils prison to serve his prison sentence there .

On DATE , while serving his prison sentence in Daugavpils prison , the applicant complained to ORG about the warning he had been given by way of administrative punishment on DATE in GPE prison ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE ORG informed the applicant that the administration of PERSON prison had not violated either any provisions of domestic law or the internal rules of the prison . As to the applicant ’s complaint of stolen belongings , ORG had obtained information from PERSON prison to the effect that in DATE , after the applicant ’s release from solitary confinement , his belongings had been returned to him , that this had been certified by his signature , and that the applicant had not raised any complaints in that regard .

During the applicant ’s stay in GPE prison , he had violated prison rules CARDINAL times and he had been punished for having damaged prison property , insulting a prison officer and bullying other prisoners . The applicant had been transferred to another cell CARDINAL times .

While in Daugavpils prison , the applicant had been transferred several times at the request of his cellmates from one cell to another , as he had been constantly creating conflicts by trying to dominate his cellmates .

In DATE and DATE the applicant asked ORG to transfer him to serve his prison sentence in either of PERSON or Pārlielupe prisons , arguing that that would allow him to receive visits from his underage daughter more easily and to avoid physical and verbal ill - treatment from other inmates .

On DATE the request was granted by ORG and the applicant was transferred to Pārlielupe prison . The decision to transfer referred to the applicant ’s conflicts with other inmates and to the fact that he had not been able to receive visits from his relatives .

NORP Since DATE the applicant had been regularly assessed by a psychiatrist owing to minor learning difficulties ( viegla garīga atpalicība ) . In DATE a forensic medical expert determined that the applicant was legally responsible . He was also excluded from the register of persons suffering from mental diseases . It appears that in prison the applicant was assessed by a psychiatrist and , when necessary , received psychiatric treatment .

NORP Per a medical report from PERSON prison , it appears that on DATE , before being placed in solitary confinement , the applicant was examined by a doctor at the request of prison officers . The doctor did not observe any injuries to the applicant . The applicant did not require medical assistance whilst in GPE prison on any other occasions .

On DATE , after having arrived at Daugavpils prison , the applicant was examined by a prison doctor , who observed that the applicant presented no health complaints or bodily injuries .

On DATE the applicant asked for medical assistance as he had sustained bodily injuries – namely , CARDINAL hematomas , which did not in the end require medical treatment . The applicant did not request medical assistance whilst in NORP prison on any other occasions .

In DATE and DATE the applicant requested medical assistance whilst in the LOC and Pārlielupe prisons , as he had been beaten by other inmates and as a result had sustained facial bruises .

The report to ORG on the visit to GPE carried out by ORG for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment ( “ the ORG ” ) from CARDINAL to CARDINAL DATE notes the following :

“ DATE . ... As was the case in DATE , a number of allegations were heard in both establishments [ Daugavpils Prison and Rīga Central Prison ] that prisoners had been threatened by members of the establishments’ Security Departments that they would be placed in cells with inmates prone to violence , if they refused to co - operate with ORG ( i.e. to act as an informant or to confess to a criminal offence ) . In the ORG ’s view , such practices can easily be described as psychological ill - treatment ( see also paragraphs CARDINAL ) .

No allegations of physical / psychological ill - treatment or verbal abuse by staff were heard at FAC . ”

The relevant provisions of LAW ) , applicable at the material time ( in force until DATE ) , Criminal Law ( PERSON ) and PERSON on ORG ( Prokuratūras likums ) are found in GPE v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) .


Alvina Gyulumyan;Corneliu Bîrsan;Egbert Myjer;Elisabet Fura;Ineta Ziemele;Josep Casadevall

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

NORP The present application consists of complaints lodged at different times by the applicant , each complaint concerning individual sets of domestic proceedings in respect of which he addressed the Court .

CARDINAL .

From DATE the applicant occupied the post of director of ORG in PERSON , an administrative body under the authority of the mayor . At that time the mayor of PERSON was PERSON The applicant was also working as a part - time legal advisor for the ORG . After his arrest ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , he was released from his duties as director by a decision of ORG DATE and was dismissed from the post of legal advisor by a decision of ORG of CARDINAL DATE .

DATE , a series of articles was published in ORG ( “ GNV ” ) , a local DATE newspaper , in which the applicant and the mayor were accused of having accepted bribes in their professional capacity .

On DATE at TIME QUANTITY police officers paid the applicant a visit and invited him to the police station in order to make a statement . On DATE he was taken from PERSON to GPE along with other individuals and questioned through TIME , concerning alleged acts of corruption . The mayor was also under investigation .

On DATE in the morning the prosecutor issued an arrest warrant in connection with the crimes of accepting bribes over a period of time and abuse of office ( “ luare de mită PERSON formă continuată ” and “ abuz LOC dauna intereselor publice ” ) .

The applicant was released on DATE by an order of ORG .

NORP Throughout the criminal investigations , several articles were published in GNV concerning the mayor 's and the applicant 's alleged acts of corruption . Most of the articles appeared in the gossip column entitled ORG , where petty facts about local public figures were published without mention of the author . The director of PERSON explained to the courts dealing with the defamation claims brought by the applicant against the newspaper that those articles were the creation of all the editors , thus could not be attributed to a particular individual .

On DATE and DATE the newspaper published a “ note ” claiming that it was as a result of its whistle blowing that the mayor and the applicant had been arrested .

On DATE ORG Parchetul Naţional Anticorupţie ) decided to close the criminal proceedings concerning certain counts of bribery while nevertheless continuing them on other counts .

On DATE the prosecutor committed the applicant , the former mayor and CARDINAL other persons to trial on several counts of corruption during the mayor 's mandate . The applicant was indicted for abuse of office and giving bribes ( dare de mită ) .

NORP The prosecutor noted that the applicant had occupied the post of director without the legal formalities - competition for the post , decision of ORG confirming the nomination - having been completed . It also noted that the post of legal advisor did not appear in ORG organisational chart , and that nobody in the local administration knew that the applicant was occupying it .

Furthermore , in DATE the applicant and the mayor had agreed that the former would get his law degree in DATE and that the latter would keep a legal advisor post blocked for him until then . In exchange , the applicant promised PERSON that he would convince his mother and uncle to sell the mayor a plot of land . On DATE the mayor bought that land for a small price , which he never paid .

NORP The prosecutor also noted that the applicant had leased a booth in the market to a company administered by him and owned by his son and another person , and paid for the repair of the booth from the local budget .

The Alba County Court examined the case and rendered its CARDINAL-page long decision on DATE .

The court dismissed as unfounded the accusations that the applicant had occupied his CARDINAL posts in the local administration unlawfully . The court also considered unfounded the allegations concerning the sale of land to the mayor ; it found that the price paid corresponded to the quality of the land and to the prices in the area , and noted that the applicant had never owned the plot in question therefore could never have offered it as a bribe ; it reiterated that as the applicant had occupied his posts in the administration lawfully there was no causal link between them and the impugned sale .

Lastly , the court considered that the applicant had not broken any regulations when attributing the space in the market to his son 's company .

The applicant and the co - defendants were acquitted on all counts .

The judgment was upheld , by a decision of CARDINAL DATE of ORG , and by a final decision of DATE of ORG and Justice ( the latter decision was rendered upon an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant and the codefendants ) .

I.C. published an article in the DATE issue of the satirical DATE magazine ORG . The article mainly concerned the mayor 's alleged dubious business practices , and in this context it touched upon the relationship between the mayor and the applicant .

The applicant complained about a statement in that article which read that he “ was made chief of ORG , from where meat , eggs , milk and wool rain on him every month ” and that the mayor sold some booths in the market at double their value and shared the money with the applicant and another individual .

On DATE the ORG acquitted the journalist and dismissed the applicant 's claim for damages .

It found that the article had been written in the habitual style of a satirical paper and that the fact that the applicant had been arrested and committed to trial afterwards was a good indication for the journalists that he might have committed the alleged offences . On this point , it noted that the applicant had been arrested based on the evidence in the prosecution 's file , and not exclusively on that article , as he had argued in his complaint .

Lastly , the court considered that the author of the article , through journalistic means , had aimed to make public certain negative aspects of the work of civil servants , and not to defame the applicant .

NORP The journalist did not participate in the proceedings , despite several summonses being delivered to him by the police with an order to appear in court ( mandat de aducere ) .

In a final decision of DATE the ORG upheld the judgment . It endorsed the first - instance court 's reasoning and found , in addition , that the journalist had based his article on previously published material and on a press release issued by ORG concerning the mayor and the applicant .

The applicant lodged his complaint with ORG .

On DATE an article was published in GNV about the mayor 's personal real estate acquisitions during his mandate , including the construction of a villa on land bought from the applicant .

The latter lodged a criminal complaint against V.M. , the director of GNV .

V.M. did not participate in the trial .

On DATE the ORG dismissed the criminal complaint and the civil claim for damages . It considered that even if the mayor had in fact bought that land from the applicant 's mother , and not from the applicant himself , as the evidence proved , there was nothing defamatory in the impugned statement .

In a final decision of DATE the ORG upheld the judgment . It endorsed ORG reasoning and added that the fact that V.M. had not participated in the trial and that he had refused to publish the applicant 's comments ( “ dreptul la replică ” ) had no bearing on the case . It also dismissed the applicant 's arguments of a violation of his right to the presumption of innocence , guaranteed by LAW , as it noted that in the case under examination he had not been accused of any criminal act .

The applicant lodged his complaint with ORG on DATE .

On DATE ORG published an article in GNV reporting on the sale of land by the applicant 's mother to the mayor , which he described as a present from the applicant to the mayor in return for the applicant 's post of director .

On DATE the applicant made a criminal complaint against the journalist .

On DATE the ORG acquitted GPE and dismissed the civil claim for damages . On DATE the ORG upheld the judgment , while nevertheless giving its own interpretation of the facts and evidence in the file . In particular , it noted that all the statements of fact made in the article were proven by the evidence in the file and that not even the applicant contested them . It considered that the following value judgments had been made : that the mayor had wanted a trustworthy person on his side ; and that the applicant had paid the favour back by selling the plot of land to him . The court noted that ORG had reported on matters of public interest and that a certain degree of exaggeration was acceptable . It also noted that he had acted in good faith and had not intended to defame the applicant . Lastly , the court pointed out that the applicant had in fact been sent to trial for acts of corruption concerning the sale of that plot of land .

For all these reasons it acquitted the journalist . The court also rejected the civil claims for damages , as it considered that the applicant had not suffered any prejudice as a result of the publication .

The decision was final .

The applicant complained to ORG on DATE .

On DATE an article appeared in the “ PERSON târgului ” column in GPE . The relevant parts read as follows :

“ ORG says that PERSON would like to offer [ the place in the market ] to a favoured trader who would give him , probably as many others do , a present - fee ( taxă tip cadou ) of QUANTITY . We do not know how this sum will appear in the balance sheets and we do not even think this will happen , but we would like to know for how much longer the traders in the market will keep the silence . ”

The applicant lodged a criminal complaint against ORG , director and editor - in - chief respectively of GNV at that time .

On DATE the ORG considered that the information published was based on reliable sources and concerned acts presumably committed by the applicant ; the information had been verified by the journalists before publication and their investigation was likely to have convinced them of its veracity . It also noted that shortly after , the applicant was arrested under the same suspicions .

The court also considered that information on the applicant 's activity was of interest to the public at the time . The journalists ' intention had not been to defame the applicant but to bring those facts to public attention . It concluded that the journalists had not acted in bad faith .

In a final decision of DATE the ORG upheld the judgment . It endorsed the first - instance court 's arguments and added that the fact that the applicant had later been released from custody and committed to trial only on certain counts did not have an incidence on the alleged offence of defamation committed though the publication of that article .

The applicant lodged his complaint with ORG .

On DATE another article was published in GNV that the applicant found defamatory . On DATE he lodged a criminal complaint against the director and the editor - in - chief of the newspaper .

On DATE the ORG noted that the applicant had not respected the time - limit set by LAW for lodging his complaint . It therefore ended the criminal proceedings .

In a final decision of DATE the ORG upheld the judgment .

On DATE the “ ORG ” column in GNV carried an article entitled “ PERSON mânat de Costică ” ( “ PERSON led by Costică ” ) in which it was alleged that the applicant had advised someone from ORG on how to undermine the authority of the new director who had replaced the applicant in that function , and that the applicant himself was interested in undermining the new director . The applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the director of the newspaper .

On DATE the ORG dismissed the complaint and the claim for damages . The court considered that it did not need to hear the defendant , who refused to participate in the trial . On the merits it found that the imputations were not serious enough to expose the applicant to a criminal sanction or to public contempt . It relied on the ORG 's case - law on LAW , notably in order to ascertain the degree of exaggeration allowed to journalists . As the applicant 's public image had not been damaged , the court dismissed the civil claims for damages .

In a final decision of DATE , ORG dismissed the applicant 's appeal .

The applicant lodged his complaint with ORG on DATE .

On DATE , another article was published in the “ FAC ” column in PERSON , entitled “ One more mogul to go ” ( “ Cu un baron în plus ” ) .

The following remarks were made about the applicant :

“ Former chief of markets arrested and then released , having dirtied his hands with some ' dough ' ( fost pieţar şef arestat şi apoi eliberat ... s - a murdărit pe mâini cu oareşce verzişori ) ... complains that he is being politically persecuted . He crows wherever he can that all barons are free , but he is not . So , our man thinks he is so important that he acts as if he really were in the shoes of a mogul . ”

The applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the director and the editor - in - chief of GNV .

On DATE the ORG considered that the remarks in the article were not capable of defaming the applicant and the mention of his arrest and subsequent release did not expose him to any criminal consequence .

DATE . On DATE the ORG upheld the judgment . It endorsed ORG reasoning and it added that the mere fact that the applicant had not been sent to trial for some of the crimes he was arrested in connection with was not enough to prove bad faith on the part of the journalists . It also noted that “ FAC ” was a satirical column in the newspaper where pieces were published concerning public figures from the county . The decision was final .

On DATE the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against ORG , who had declared in the context of a criminal trial involving the mayor and the journalist PERSON that he had heard that the applicant had requested bribes from the traders in the market . ORG had repeated those affirmations to the press and on national TV . The applicant considered the remarks defamatory .

On DATE the ORG noted that the offence of defamation had been decriminalised by PERSON no . CARDINAL amending LAW and acquitted GPE Consequently , it did not decide on the civil claims for damages .

On DATE the applicant sent a letter to the President of ORG , asking him to order that the civil claims be decided . He considered that in choosing not to examine the civil claims , the court had denied him access to court , in violation of LAW .

His letter was considered to be an appeal against the judgment and was therefore sent to the county court for examination .

On DATE the ORG upheld the judgment and noted that while the criminal court was not competent to examine the civil claims , the applicant could lodge them with the civil courts .

It appears from the documents in the file that the applicant did not do so . However , after ORG decision nr . PERSON ( see paragraph CARDINAL from the “ Relevant domestic law ” part below ) , the applicant again brought an action for defamation against GPE and sought damages . It seems that on DATE the ORG acquitted GPE because the act complained of was not punishable by the criminal law and the judgment was upheld on DATE by ORG . The applicant did not submit copies of those decisions to this ORG .

It appears that the applicant did not lodge a complaint with the civil courts .

The applicant submitted his complaint to ORG on DATE .

On DATE the applicant filed a criminal complaint for defamation against the same ORG , whom he accused of having called him “ dumb ” ( tâmpit ) in his address to the court in a criminal trial where ORG appeared as a witness .

On DATE the ORG acquitted the defendant as the facts were no longer punishable by the criminal law . Accordingly it did not decide on the civil claims . The judgment was upheld on DATE by ORG .

The applicant did not provide the full text of those decisions . It appears , however , that he did not seek damages with the civil courts .

On DATE the applicant lodged his complaint with the ORG .

The applicant complained in DATE about several articles published in GNV which he found defamatory . He lodged his complaint against GPE , the director of the newspaper at that time .

On DATE the ORG noted that defamation had been decriminalised by PERSON no . DATE and therefore acquitted GPE and left the civil claims unresolved .

On DATE the ORG upheld the judgment and noted that the applicant could have pursued the civil claims before a civil court , which he chose not to do . The decision was final .

On DATE the applicant brought the complaint to the ORG .

On DATE the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against an expert accountant who had been appointed by the court in the criminal trial against the applicant to assess some investments made by the local authorities .

On an unspecified date the prosecutor dismissed the complaint . The applicant objected , but the courts upheld the prosecutor 's decision . The final decision in the case was that of DATE by ORG .

The applicant did not provide information on whether he sought civil damages in the proceedings .

He lodged his complaint with ORG on DATE .

DATE . The applicant filed a criminal complaint against ORG , the current director of ORG in PERSON , accusing him of several illegalities in his activity . On DATE the Chief Prosecutor attached to the ORG upheld the prosecutor 's decision not to prosecute ORG The applicant complained to the courts , but his complaint was dismissed on DATE by ORG as out of time . The appeal was also rejected on DATE by ORG ( final decision ) .

The applicant lodged his complaint with ORG on DATE .

GPE and GPE were witnesses in the criminal trial against the applicant . In the proceedings before the courts they withdrew the initial statements they had made to the prosecutor , which were unfavourable to the applicant .

In DATE , the applicant filed a criminal complaint of false testimony against them .

It appears that on DATE the prosecutor attached to ORG decided not to prosecute and that his decision was upheld by ORG in a final decision of CARDINAL DATE . The applicant did not submit copies of the court decisions delivered in the case .

On DATE the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against CARDINAL judges from ORG . He accused them of having arrested him and extended his detention unlawfully and of having behaved abusively towards him , in the knowledge that he had not committed any crime .

On DATE the prosecutor attached to ORG and ORG decided not to prosecute as he considered that the judges had not committed any of the alleged crimes .

The applicant objected and brought his case before the courts .

On DATE ORG upheld the prosecutor 's decision , and on DATE ORG upheld the judgment ( final decision ) .

DATE . The applicant lodged his complaint with ORG DATE .

The applicant lodged a criminal complaint against V.M. , who had allegedly threatened him with “ physical correction ” during a court hearing on DATE . The applicant claimed that he had understood this remark to be a threat that V.M. would beat him up . There is no indication in the file as to whether the applicant sought civil damages from V.M.

On DATE ORG dismissed the complaint , as it considered that the deed committed by PERSON was not severe enough to create in the applicant a “ legitimate and serious fear ” , the element required in order for the deed to constitute the offence of threatening behaviour . It also noted that there was a preexisting conflict between the applicant and PERSON caused by the numerous criminal proceedings they were both involved in .

In a final decision delivered on DATE the ORG upheld the judgment .

On DATE the applicant lodged his complaint with the ORG .

On an unspecified date , the applicant filed an action against ORG , seeking reinstatement to his former positions : part - time legal advisor at FAC and Director of ORG , and payment of his salary for DATE to DATE .

On DATE the ORG noted that the administrative decision ordering the applicant 's dismissal from the post of legal advisor was null and void as it had not been issued in conformity with the legal requirements .

However , it noted that during his preventive detention he was not entitled to receive a salary , and that for the damage allegedly suffered during that time he could lodge an action against the ORG for unlawful detention . Therefore he was not entitled to payment of his salary for that period .

The court also considered that from DATE , when he was released from detention , until DATE , when he lodged his present action , the applicant had been inactive and had not returned to work . Therefore , he was not entitled to payment of salary for that period .

Lastly , the court noted that the applicant had been released from the post of director by a decision of ORG DATE and that it was therefore for the administrative court to deal with that part of the request .

In sum , the court ordered ORG to reinstate the applicant as legal advisor and to pay his salary from DATE until effective reinstatement and sent his complaint seeking to be reinstated to his former position as director to the administrative section of ORG .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment , on appeals lodged by both parties .

On DATE the applicant was reinstated as legal advisor by order of ORG .

On DATE ORG ordered ORG to pay the applicant CARDINAL NORP Lei for illegal arrest and noted that the period spent in detention would count as time spent in work for the purposes of calculating the applicant 's pension .

On DATE the applicant lodged his complaint with the ORG . He submitted no further information on the outcome of the case before the administrative courts .

On DATE the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against LAW , the current mayor of PERSON , for abuse of office , accusing him of not having complied with the decisions ordering the applicant 's reinstatement and payment of salary .

On DATE the prosecutor attached to the ORG decided not to prosecute , noting that the mayor had appealed against the CARDINAL DATE judgment ordering the reinstatement and that on DATE ORG had suspended the enforcement until the appeal had been examined . Therefore , PERSON had been right not to enforce the decisions .

On DATE the chief prosecutor upheld the prosecutor 's decision . The prosecutor 's decisions were upheld by ORG on DATE and by ORG in a final decision of DATE , with the same reasoning as that set out in the prosecutor 's initial decision . ORG also noted that on DATE , after the appeal proceedings had ended , the applicant had been reinstated .

The applicant lodged his complaint with ORG on DATE .

The relevant provisions of ORG concerning insult and defamation and liability for paying damages in force at the material time are described in PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE .

The Criminal Code has been amended repeatedly and in DATE the ORG on insult and defamation were repealed ( PERSON no . CARDINAL ; for details , see PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § CARDINAL - CARDINAL , DATE ) .

However , in decision no . CARDINAL of DATE ORG declared unconstitutional the removal of the ORG on insult and defamation from LAW .


The applicant is a NORP citizen born in DATE . He is an honorary vice - president of ORG ( PERSON ) and resides in GPE .

The facts of the case as submitted by the parties may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the post of vice - president of ORG was declared vacant . At that time the applicant was the senior judge . The post remained vacant for DATE and was filled by the applicant on DATE .

On DATE the applicant brought an action for pecuniary and non - pecuniary damages against the ORG before ORG . In particular , the applicant claimed that he should have been promoted soon after the post was declared vacant and that the delay of the ORG to promote him to the post of vice - president of ORG caused him pecuniary damage and raised suspicions as to his abilities .

On DATE the ORG granted the applicant ’s claim insofar as it concerned non - pecuniary damage . The ORG dismissed the remainder of the applicant ’s action on the ground that he had no enforceable claim to the vacant post .

On DATE and DATE respectively the applicant and the ORG appealed against this decision .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal and annulled the decision of ORG . ORG referred in particular to the discretionary powers by which the competent administrative authorities organised their activity .

On DATE the applicant appealed to ORG .

On DATE ORG composed of CARDINAL judges decided to refer the case to a ORG composed of CARDINAL judges .

On DATE ORG composed of CARDINAL judges decided to refer the case to the Plenary because of the important issues it raised .

On DATE ORG sitting in GPE rejected the applicant ’s appeal . In particular ORG held that it was beyond the competence of ORG to decide whether the decision to promote the applicant should be backdated . Therefore ORG was right in rejecting the applicant ’s appeal . The applicant obtained a copy of that decision in DATE .


David Thór Björgvinsson;Giovanni Bonello;Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Nicolas Bratza

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before the ORG by PERSON PERSON , ORG . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Mr C. Whomersley of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant ’s wife died on DATE , leaving CARDINAL children born in DATE and DATE . His claim for widows’ benefits was made in DATE and was rejected on DATE on the ground that he was not entitled to widows’ benefits because he was not a woman . The applicant did not appeal further as he considered or was advised that such a remedy would be bound to fail since no such social security benefits were payable to widowers under GPE law .

The applicant was not in receipt of child benefit at the time of his claim .

The domestic law relevant to this application is set out in PERSON v. the GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , ORG CARDINAL-IV and Runkee and White v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § CARDINAL , DATE .


Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Art. 3 (substantive aspect);Violation of Art. 3 (procedural aspect);Remainder inadmissible;Non-pecuniary damage - award

Ganna Yudkivska;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Peer Lorenzen;Renate Jaeger;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicant was born in DATE and lived in GPE .

At TIME on DATE QUANTITY police officers , responding to a call from the applicant 's girlfriend 's sister , brought the applicant to ORG for treatment of severe alcohol intoxication . A medical employee who examined him recorded that the applicant had several abrasions on his buttocks .

At TIME on DATE the applicant was released .

DATE he was arrested and detained by the police on a charge of disobeying a police officer . CARDINAL records of his arrest were drawn up by CARDINAL different police officers , both indicating the time of the arrest as TIME At an unspecified time on the same date a doctor certified that the applicant had no bodily injuries .

On DATE an ambulance was called to the police station in connection with the deterioration of the applicant 's health and apparent loss of consciousness . The ambulance records note that the call was registered at TIME Upon arriving at the police station , the ambulance team found the applicant conscious but in a very agitated state and trembling . In addition , he had haematomas on his buttocks . He was diagnosed as suffering from alcohol withdrawal , given medication and left in the police station .

On DATE the ORG convicted the applicant of disobeying a police officer and ordered his detention for DATE . At an unspecified time during his detention the applicant was questioned as a witness concerning the murder of a PERSON , whose body had been found on DATE in the vicinity of the applicant 's house . On DATE he confessed to the murder .

On DATE the applicant , who had still not been officially charged , participated as a witness in a reconstruction of the crime scene . In the course of the reconstruction he showed in detail how he had killed Mr K.

On DATE an ambulance was called again and the applicant was transferred to the detoxification centre , where he was diagnosed as suffering from “ psychotic and behavioural disorders , [ a ] state of delirious withdrawal from alcohol , [ and ] hallucinations ” . In addition , he was found to have sustained haemorrhages on his shoulders , legs and buttocks . On DATE the applicant was returned to the police station .

By DATE the applicant had obtained a lawyer in connection with possible murder charges against him , had retracted his confession DATE alleging that it had been given under duress DATE and had denied any involvement in the killing of Mr K.

At TIME on DATE the applicant was released following the expiration of the term of his detention .

At TIME on DATE the applicant was arrested again on a charge of having committed a breach of the peace ( in particular , for urinating in public and swearing ) and , pursuant to a court order issued on DATE , was again remanded in custody for DATE starting from the date of his arrest .

On DATE he was released .

On DATE the applicant underwent a medical assessment in the course of which he was found to be suffering from CARDINAL surface wounds ( on the left shoulder and the left buttock ) which qualified as minor bodily injuries .

On DATE , following complaints by his girlfriend about his aggressive behaviour , the applicant was arrested for the third time on a charge of disobeying a police officer and remanded in custody for DATE by a court order issued on DATE . On DATE the applicant was released .

On DATE the applicant was admitted to hospital on account of his complaints of general weakness , vertigo , pain in the legs and chest , unpleasant sensations inside his anus , constipation and coughing . Based on his complaints , he was diagnosed as suffering from a combination of haemorrhoids , ulcers , several other digestive disorders , pyelonephritis , asthenia and the after - effects of bodily contusions . The applicant remained in hospital until DATE .

NORP In DATE the criminal proceedings against the applicant were discontinued for want of evidence of his involvement in the murder of Mr K.

In DATE the applicant underwent a fresh medical assessment in respect of his injuries sustained in DATE . Following an assessment of the medical documents and the applicant 's state of health at the material time , the panel of experts conducting the assessment concluded that it was not improbable that on or DATE he had sustained minor bodily injuries ( bruises and abrasions on his buttocks , shoulders and legs ) . However , noting the lack of detail in the relevant records , the experts were unable to assess the means by which the injuries had been inflicted . They further found no objective evidence of any mechanical intrusion into the applicant 's anus , no causal connection between the above injuries and other health disorders ( including the applicant 's haemorrhoids , digestive and kidney problems , which had been found to have probably developed prior to his detention ) and noted that the diagnosis of DATE concerning the after - effects of bodily contusions had been subjective and unsupported by any evidence .

In DATE the applicant was examined by specialists from ORG Disabled , who refused to grant him invalid status . However , the panel of specialists diagnosed him as suffering from a number of chronic physical conditions ( including haemorrhoids , ulcers , hepatitis and myocardiopathy ) as well as from the “ after - effects of a head injury sustained in DATE in the form of arachnoiditis ” ( inflammation of a membrane surrounding and protecting the nerves of the central nervous system ) .

NORP The applicant was subsequently awarded invalidity status on account of the above illnesses .

On DATE the applicant died of acute heart and pulmonary failure aggravated by bronchopneumonia .

On DATE and DATE PERSON complained to ORG that DATE her son had been ill - treated by police officers in order to extract a confession of PERSON murder from him . In particular , they had beaten him , hung him from a pipe while handcuffed and inserted a truncheon into his anus .

On DATE the acting chief of ORG rejected her complaints as unsubstantiated . He noted , in particular , that the applicant had given a vague and inconsistent account of the purported ill - treatment and was unable to identify the police officers involved or the location in which he had supposedly been ill - treated .

On DATE the chief of ORG , having conducted a further investigation following PERSON GPE 's subsequent complaints , discovered that the applicant 's and the police officers ' respective accounts of events could not be reconciled . In particular , according to the applicant , CARDINAL unidentified police officers had severely beaten him and stuck objects into his anus , demanding that he confess to the killing . The investigator in PERSON case admitted having questioned the applicant about the killing , but denied that any pressure had been applied to him . The ORG transferred the investigation materials to the prosecutor 's office for further enquiries .

On several occasions ( DATE , DATE and CARDINAL DATE ) ORG refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant 's complaints of illtreatment , having found no evidence of any wrongdoing by the police .

These decisions were subsequently annulled by the supervising prosecutorial authorities ( on DATE , CARDINAL May and DATE ) , finding that : the enquiries had been insufficient ; various important witnesses had not been questioned ; inconsistencies between various testimonies had not been reconciled ; medical evidence had not been duly collected and examined ; and no plausible explanation for the applicant 's injuries had been proposed .

On DATE ORG again refused to institute criminal proceedings . The applicant was not informed about this decision .

On DATE , following enquiries made by PERSON , she obtained a full copy of the decision of DATE and subsequently appealed against it on the applicant 's behalf to ORG .

On DATE ORG allowed the applicant 's claims and set aside the decision of DATE . It found , in particular , that the investigation had failed to analyse the conclusions of the medical assessment completed in DATE and to question several important witnesses ( specifically , the applicant 's fellow inmates ) .

On DATE ORG took a fresh decision not to institute criminal proceedings .

On DATE ORG set aside the above decision , having found that its previous instructions had not been properly followed .

On DATE , having questioned several additional witnesses , ORG decided that the applicant 's injuries had been caused by a fall related to an epileptic seizure resulting from the excessive consumption of alcohol .

On DATE ORG set aside this decision , having found that several important witnesses ( specifically , the applicant 's fellow inmates ) had still not been questioned .

On DATE and DATE the prosecutor 's office took fresh decisions not to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant 's alleged ill - treatment which were set aside by the supervising prosecutors on DATE and DATE respectively , each decision making reference to there having been insufficient investigation of the matter .

On DATE a fresh decision not to institute criminal proceedings was taken , relying , in particular , on the impossibility of collecting further evidence because of the death or relocation of numerous witnesses , the inability of the remaining witnesses to recall details and the destruction of relevant documentary records .

On DATE the ORG set aside this decision following an appeal by PERSON . The court noted , in particular , that the case file contained CARDINAL reports concerning the applicant 's arrest on DATE which had been made by CARDINAL different police officers and instructed the investigator to clarify the situation .

On DATE the ORG annulled a further decision of the prosecutor 's office not to institute criminal proceedings , dated DATE , having found that the situation relating to the arrest reports had not been clarified and that no determination of why the applicant had been questioned about PERSON murder during his detention and the circumstances in which he had suffered bodily injuries had taken place .

On DATE a fresh decision was taken not to institute criminal proceedings . The investigating authorities noted , inter alia , that the applicant 's accounts of the relevant events had been inconsistent and that on several occasions he had changed his story . In particular , he had initially alleged that he had been beaten by a rubber truncheon but subsequently insisted that the officers had punched and kicked him . In addition , on DATE he had asserted that he had no claims against the police at all and did not share his mother 's view about the necessity of an investigation .

On DATE ORG upheld the above decision .

PERSON appealed , noting , in particular , that in addition to its failure to establish those responsible for her son 's injuries , the investigation had failed to reconcile a number of factual inconsistencies . For instance , according to the relevant records , an ambulance was first called to the police station to assist the applicant at TIME on DATE , whereas according to both the reports concerning the applicant 's arrest and the court decision of DATE , the applicant had not been arrested until TIME Furthermore , according to statements by PERSON , the applicant 's acquaintance , she had already seen the applicant in the police station at TIME on DATE and had also witnessed an ambulance arriving to help him twice on DATE .

On DATE ORG quashed ORG ruling , set aside the decision of CARDINAL DATE and remitted the complaint of ill - treatment for further investigation . The court noted that previous instructions of judicial authorities had not been followed and ordered that the investigation determine , in particular : ( i ) where , in what circumstances , and by whom bodily injuries had been inflicted on the applicant “ having regard to the fact that on DATE he had been examined by a doctor who had not recorded any injuries ” ; ( ii ) why there were CARDINAL different reports on the applicant 's arrest ; ( iii ) why the applicant had been questioned as a witness about PERSON murder while detained in custody for an unrelated administrative offence ; and ( iv ) why he had confessed to a killing of which he had been innocent . ORG also ordered that the statements of PERSON concerning the circumstances in which she had seen the applicant on DATE be re - examined .

According to the case file , the investigation of the applicant 's complaint of ill - treatment is currently pending .

The relevant domestic law can be found in the judgment in the case of PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) .


Violation of Art. 8;Violation of Art. 14+8;Violation of Art. 14+P1-1;Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient

PERSON was born on DATE at Wilrijk , near GPE ; she is the daughter of PERSON , a NORP national , who is unmarried and a journalist by profession .

PERSON duly reported PERSON ’s birth to the ORG registration officer who informed LOC ( juge de paix ) as is required by LAW ( " LAW " ) in the case of " illegitimate " children .

On DATE , the District Judge of the first district of GPE summoned PERSON to appear before him ( Article CARDINAL ) so as to obtain from her the information required to make arrangements for PERSON ’s guardianship ; at the same time , he informed her of the methods available for recognising her daughter and of the consequences in law of any such recognition ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . He also drew her attention to certain provisions of LAW , including LAW which concerns " exceptional " forms of inheritance ( successions " irrégulières " ) .

On DATE , PERSON recognised her child in accordance with LAW . She thereby automatically became PERSON ’s guardian ( Article CARDINAL bis ) ; the family council , on which the sister and certain other relatives of PERSON sat under the chairmanship of the District Judge , was empowered to take in PERSON ’s interests various measures provided for by law .

On DATE , PERSON adopted her daughter pursuant to LAW . The procedure , which was that laid down by ORG CARDINAL to CARDINAL , entailed certain enquiries and involved some expenses . It concluded on DATE with a judgment confirming the adoption , the effect whereof was retroactive to the date of the instrument of adoption , namely CARDINAL DATE .

At the time of her application to the Commission , Ms. PERSON ’s family included , besides PERSON , her own mother , Mrs. PERSON , who died in DATE , and a sister , Mrs. PERSON .

The applicants complain of the Civil Code provisions on the manner of establishing the maternal affiliation of an " illegitimate " child and on the effects of establishing such affiliation as regards both the extent of the child ’s family relationships and the patrimonial rights of the child and of his mother . The applicants also put in issue the necessity for the mother to adopt the child if she wishes to increase his rights .

Under NORP law , no legal bond between an unmarried mother and her child results from the mere fact of birth : whilst the birth certificate recorded at the registry office suffices to prove the maternal affiliation of a married woman ’s children ( LAW ) , the maternal affiliation of an " illegitimate " child is established by means either of a voluntary recognition by the mother or of legal proceedings taken for the purpose ( action en recherche de maternité ) .

Nevertheless , an unrecognised " illegitimate " child bears his mother ’s name which must appear on the birth certificate ( Article CARDINAL ) . The appointment of his guardian is a matter for the family council which is presided over by the District Judge .

Under Article CARDINAL , recognition , " if not inserted in the birth certificate , shall be effected by a formal deed " . ORG is declaratory and not attributive : it does not create but records the child ’s status and is retroactive to the date of birth . However , it does not necessarily follow that the person effecting recognition is actually the child ’s mother ; on the contrary , any interested party may claim that the recognition does not correspond to the truth ( LAW ) . Many unmarried mothers - PERCENT according to the Government , although the applicants consider this an exaggerated figure - do not recognise their child .

Proceedings to establish maternal affiliation ( action en recherche de maternité ) may be instituted by the child within DATE from his attainment of majority or , whilst he is still a minor , by his legal representative with the consent of the family council ( ORG CARDINAL of LAW ) .

The establishment of the maternal affiliation of an " illegitimate " child has limited effects as regards both the extent of his family relationships and the rights of the child and his mother in the matter of inheritance on intestacy and voluntary dispositions .

In the context of the maternal affiliation of an " illegitimate " child , NORP legislation does not employ the concepts of " family " and " relative " . Even once such affiliation has been established , it in principle creates a legal bond with the mother alone . The child does not become a member of his mother ’s family . The law excludes it from that family as regards inheritance rights on intestacy ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . Furthermore , if the child ’s parents are dead or under an incapacity , he can not marry , before attaining the age of CARDINAL , without consent which has to be given by his guardian ( LAW ) and not , as is the case for a " legitimate " child , by his grandparents ( LAW ) ; the law does not expressly create any maintenance obligations , etc . , between the child and his grandparents . However , certain texts make provision for exceptions , for example as regards the impediments to marriage ( Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL ) . According to a judgment of CARDINAL DATE of ORG ( Pasicrisie I , DATE , pp CARDINAL - CARDINAL ) , these texts " place the bonds existing between an illegitimate child and his grandparents on a legal footing based on the affection , respect and devotion that are the consequence of consanguinity ... ( which ) creates an obligation for the ascendants to take an interest in their descendants and , as a corollary , gives them the right , whenever this is not excluded by the law , to know and protect them and exercise over them the influence dictated by affection and devotion " . ORG deduced from this that grandparents were entitled to a right of access to the child .

A recognised " illegitimate " child ’s rights of inheritance on intestacy are less than those of a " legitimate " child . As appears from ORG CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL to CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL to CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Civil Code , a recognised " illegitimate " child does not have , in the estate of his parent who dies intestate , the status of heir but solely that of " exceptional heir " ( " successeur irrégulier " ) : he has to seek a court order putting him in possession of the estate ( envoi en possession ) . He is the sole beneficiary of his deceased mother ’s estate only if she leaves no relatives entitled to inherit ( LAW ) ; otherwise , its maximum entitlement - which arises when his mother leaves no descendants , ascendants , brothers or DATE is DATE of the share which he would have taken if " legitimate " ( LAW . Furthermore , his mother may , during her lifetime , reduce that entitlement by CARDINAL . Finally , Article CARDINAL denies to the " illegitimate " child any rights on intestacy in the estates of his mother ’s relatives .

Recognised " illegitimate " children are also at a disadvantage as regards voluntary dispositions , since Article ORG provides that they " may receive by disposition inter vivos or by will no more than their entitlement under the title ‘ ORG on Intestacy’ " .

Conversely , the mother of such a child , unless she has no relatives entitled to inherit , may give in her DATE or bequeath to him only part of her property . On the other hand , if the child ’s affiliation has not been established , the mother may so give or bequeath to him the whole of her property , provided that there are no heirs entitled to a reserved portion of her estate ( héritiers réservataires ) . The mother is thus faced with the following alternative : either she recognises the child and loses the possibility of leaving all her estate to him ; or she renounces establishing with him a family relationship in the eyes of the law , in order to retain the possibility of leaving all her estate to him just as she might to a stranger .

If the mother of a recognised " illegitimate " child remains unmarried , she has but CARDINAL means of improving his status , namely , " simple " adoption . In such cases , the age requirements for this form of adoption are eased by Article CARDINAL para . CARDINAL , sub - paragraph CARDINAL , of LAW . The adopted child acquires over the adopter ’s estate the rights of a " legitimate " child but , unlike the latter , has no rights on intestacy in the estates of his mother ’s relatives ( LAW ) .

Only legitimation ( Articles CARDINAL - CARDINAL ) and legitimation by adoption ( Articles CARDINAL - CARDINAL ) place an " illegitimate " child on exactly the same footing as a " legitimate " child ; both of these measures presuppose the mother ’s marriage .

GPE has signed , but not yet ratified , LAW of DATE on ORG , which was prepared by ORG and entered into force on DATE . Neither has GPE yet ratified , nor even signed , LAW DATE on ORG born out of PERSON , which was concluded within ORG and entered into force on DATE . Both of these instruments are based on the principle " mater semper certa est " ; the second of them also regulates such questions as maintenance obligations , parental authority and rights of succession .

However , ORG submitted to the ORG on DATE a PERSON to which they referred the ORG in their memorial of DATE and subsequently at the hearings on DATE . The official statement of reasons accompanying the PERSON , which mentions , inter alia , LAW and DATE cited above , states that the PERSON " seeks to institute equality in law between all children " . In particular , maternal affiliation would be established on the mother ’s name being entered on the birth certificate , which would introduce into NORP law the principle " mater semper certa est " . ORG by an unmarried mother would accordingly no longer be necessary , unless there were no such entry . Furthermore , LAW would confer on children born out of wedlock rights identical to those presently enjoyed by children born in wedlock in the matter of inheritance on intestacy and voluntary dispositions .


No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life)

Alvina Gyulumyan;Corneliu Bîrsan;Ineta Ziemele;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos;Luis López Guerra;Nona Tsotsoria

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant was arrested on suspicion of aggravated robbery .

On DATE ORG ( ORG apgabaltiesa ) convicted the applicant of aggravated robbery and sentenced him to DATE and DATE imprisonment .

On DATE , on the applicant ’s appeal , ORG ( GPE tiesas GPE lietu palāta ) upheld in substance the judgment of the first - instance court .

On DATE the ORG of ORG ( PERSON tiesas PERSON ) dismissed the applicant ’s appeal on points of law in a preparatory meeting ( rīcības sēde ) .

On DATE ORG ( PERSON tiesa ) decided to apply a pre - release scheme to the applicant and ordered his release before the end of his sentence .

On DATE the applicant ’s wife gave birth to their son .

On DATE and DATE the applicant received CARDINAL short - term visits from his wife . He also received CARDINAL short - term visits from his aunt during his pre - trial detention .

The applicant was able to receive long - term visits while serving his sentence , starting from DATE . Until his release on DATE the applicant received CARDINAL long - term visits from his wife ; each of these visits lasted for TIME .

According to the Government , the applicant first complained about his dental care on DATE . A prison doctor prescribed pain relieving medication ( Ibuprofen ) and advised him to consult a dentist .

On DATE the applicant complained of toothache to the prison doctor , who prescribed other pain relieving medication ( Analgin ) and advised him to consult a dentist .

On DATE the applicant saw a dentist , who discovered that he had dental caries in CARDINAL tooth . During his examination , the dentist noted that the applicant had CARDINAL missing teeth and the remains of CARDINAL damaged teeth . All in all , he had CARDINAL just healthy teeth . The applicant refused the recommended treatment .

On DATE the applicant again complained of toothache to the prison doctor , who prescribed pain relieving medication ( Analgin ) .

On DATE the applicant was examined by a psychiatrist , who considered that the applicant ’s complaints of headaches were related to his dental cavity problems . The doctor advised him to consult a dentist .

On DATE the applicant saw the dentist , who diagnosed him as suffering from periodontal disease ( loose teeth ) . Subsequently , CARDINAL teeth were extracted .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint with ORG ( ORG birojs ) , which at the material time was the institution in charge of organising the execution of criminal sentences and the probation system and was supervised by ORG . His complaint was that he had not been receiving appropriate dental care and that he needed dental prosthetics . The applicant ’s complaint was transferred to ORG ( PERSON vietu pārvalde ) for examination .

On DATE ORG informed the applicant that , following his requests , a dentist had made several extractions . This service had been free of charge . It had been established that the applicant had CARDINAL teeth left . It was presumed that he had not taken appropriate care of his teeth prior to his detention . The applicant was informed that dental prosthetics could be provided only at his own expense and that ORG did not allocate any funds to ORG or prisons for this purpose .

On DATE the applicant submitted a complaint to ORG GPE ( Latvijas NORP prezidenta kanceleja ) about his dental care . The applicant ’s complaint was transferred to ORG and from there to ORG for examination , which transferred the complaint to ORG .

On DATE ORG informed the applicant that he had already received an answer on DATE as regards his complaint of CARDINAL DATE . It reiterated that dental prosthetics could not be provided free of charge in prisons .

Until DATE the detention of persons in remand prisons was governed by an instruction , which had been approved by the Minister of the Interior on DATE .

Rule CARDINAL of that instruction provided that detainees placed in remand prisons were allowed to receive short - term visits upon approval from the authority conducting the criminal proceedings ( that is , either from the investigating authorities or the court , depending on the stage reached in the proceedings ) .

Rule CARDINAL of that instruction stipulated that detainees placed in remand prisons could receive CARDINAL short - term visit ( up to one hour ) per month from family members and other persons only with written permission from the person or body dealing with the particular criminal case .

In DATE ORG took over the supervision of penitentiary institutions from ORG .

On DATE the Minister of ORG issued an order enacting a transitional instruction on the detention of persons in remand prisons . The instruction entered into force on DATE .

Rule CARDINAL of the transitional instruction provided that detainees could receive CARDINAL short - term visit per month with written permission from the authority dealing with the particular criminal case .

The transitional instruction of the Minister of ORG remained applicable until DATE , when ORG no . CARDINAL ( DATE ) took effect . Subsequently , ORG no . FAC ( DATE ) replaced it as of DATE . Finally , ORG ( PERSON turēšanas kārtības likums ) took effect on DATE .

On DATE ORG ( PERSON tiesa ) delivered its judgment in case no . DATE on the compliance of the internal regulations on remand prisons ( issued under the authority of the transitional instruction of the Minister of ORG ) with LAW ( PERSON ) . ORG found , among other things , that the transitional instruction as well as the internal regulations on remand prisons had not been made public and that they were internal normative acts ( iekšējie normatīvie akti ) . As a result , it concluded that some of the rules contained in the internal regulations on remand prisons were unconstitutional , but not those concerning short - term visits .

On DATE the ORG delivered its judgment in case no . DATE on whether the restriction of the duration of short - term visits to TIME for detainees , which emanated from FAC ( in effect since DATE ) , was in compliance with the LAW .

Having examined the ORG ’s case - law , the practice of several member ORG , and ORG , ORG found , on the one hand , that there was no obligation for GPE to ensure long - term visits for detainees and that the restriction to receive such visits was compatible with the LAW , namely , with the right to private and family life contained therein . On the other hand , ORG held that the blanket TIME restriction on DATE short - term visits was not proportionate and thus not compatible with the LAW . The restriction was abrogated as of DATE and , since CARDINAL DATE , the relevant provision reads : “ detainees have the right to receive visits lasting TIME from their relatives or other persons at least once a month ” .

Cabinet Regulation no . CARDINAL ( DATE ) , in force at the material time and effective until DATE , provided as follows :

“ CARDINAL . Convicted persons shall receive the minimum standard of health care free of charge up to the amount established by ORG . In addition , ORG , within its budgetary means , shall provide the convicted persons with :

primary , secondary and tertiary ( in part ) medical care ;

emergency dental care ;

examination of health conditions ;

preventive and anti - epidemic measures ;

medication and injections prescribed by a doctor of the institution ;

medical accessories .

Detained persons shall receive medical care in accordance with LAW , excluding planned in - patient treatment .... Detained persons shall be sent to receive in - patient treatment only in acute circumstances . ”


David Thór Björgvinsson;Giovanni Bonello;Ján Šikuta;Ledi Bianku;Nebojša Vučinić;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä

The applicants , Ms PERSON and Mr PERSON , are NORP nationals who were born in DATE and DATE respectively and currently live in GPE , GPE . They were represented before the ORG by Dr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Dr PERSON , Attorney General .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

Background

The first applicant married PERSON , a NORP citizen , on DATE according to the rites of ORG and in conformity with NORP law .

In DATE she went to GPE . She converted to ORG by means of a declaration . As a result of this declaration the first marriage was deemed to be null and void and consequently she was given permission by a NORP court to marry under the law of GPE .

On DATE she married the second applicant , according to the rites of ORG . The applicants settled in GPE where they established their matrimonial domicile and lived there , lawfully married , for DATE .

In DATE the first applicant went to ORG in GPE and filled in an application requesting registration of her wish to revert to her maiden name , in accordance with LAW . She did not inform ORG that she had divorced PERSON or that she had obtained an annulment of that marriage . On DATE the applicant ’s request was granted .

In DATE the applicants returned to GPE to take care of the first applicant ’s father . The first applicant made several attempts to register her new marriage under LAW ( see Relevant domestic law ) in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus . This registration would have allowed the second applicant to reside in GPE without the need for a visa . It would have granted him the status of an exempt person under LAW on the basis that he lived with and was married to a NORP national .

The first applicant based her requests on a document dated DATE and DATE , issued by ORG . According to this document , her previous marriage had been declared null and void upon her conversion to ORG and her marriage to a NORP man .

However , the Director of ORG refused to register the marriage . The first applicant had failed to prove that she had legally released herself from the obligations of her first marriage by providing a court decision demonstrating that it had been annulled or that she had divorced and that her second marriage had not been polygamous , and therefore contrary to NORP public policy . Moreover , she had failed in the alternative to prove that she was domiciled in GPE since she had retained her NORP citizenship and had indeed returned to GPE after DATE .

She was informed that it was necessary for her to prove that , before contracting her second marriage , she had been released from her previous marriage in accordance with the provisions of NORP law regarding capacity to marry ( see section CARDINAL ( b ) of LAW ) . She was therefore advised to produce the exequatur of a NORP court ordering the Director of ORG to register the alleged annulment or divorce obtained , thus allowing him to register her second marriage .

In the meantime the first applicant ’s father passed away in DATE . However , the applicants remained in GPE to take care of the first applicant ’s mother . Meanwhile , the second applicant ’s visa was renewed on a concessionary basis .

On DATE the applicants instituted proceedings before ORG ( FAC ) in its constitutional jurisdiction . Invoking Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Convention , they claimed that the refusal to register their marriage amounted to a breach of their rights and that NORP marriage law discriminated against ORG . They argued that marriages celebrated anywhere according to the rites of ORG were easily recognised , but not marriages contracted under other religions . Similarly , any annulment of a marriage by ORG ( including the dispensation of the Holy Pontiff and the “ LOC ” ) was endorsed for NORP under NORP law .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicants’ claims for non - exhaustion of ordinary remedies as the first applicant had not brought an action before ORG in accordance with section CARDINAL of LAW to prove that her first marriage was null and void . However , the court considered the complaints manifestly ill - founded since she had failed to prove her domicile , which was necessary for CARDINAL of LAW to apply . She was a citizen of GPE and NORP law did not recognise divorce on religious grounds . Indeed , under LAW of LAW , a decision declaring a NORP marriage null and void was not automatically registered . In particular , one of the prerequisites was the participation of the spouses during the proceedings . However , in the present case PERSON was totally unaware of any proceedings . Moreover , it was for the national legislation to lay down rules regarding the validity of marriages in pursuance of the ORG ’s public policy , and , therefore , no violation of LAW arise in the present case . Lastly , the court noted that the applicants had failed to prove that they had suffered discrimination vis a vis someone in an analogous situation on one of the grounds mentioned in LAW .

The applicants appealed . By a judgment of DATE ORG upheld the appeal in part . While revoking the part of the judgment dismissing the merits , it reaffirmed that the applicants had failed to make use of the ordinary remedy provided by law , namely instituting proceedings before ORG in its ordinary jurisdiction , which could have ordered the registration of the marriage if the requisite criteria had been fulfilled .

On DATE PERSON , the applicant ’s first husband , passed away . On the basis that there were no longer any impediments to the first applicant ’s remarriage the applicants attempted to obtain a marriage licence in GPE in order to remarry there . To proceed with such a licence they allegedly were requested to provide proof of a divorce in respect of their marriage contracted in GPE .

In accordance with LAW , LAW of LAW , any marriage of a citizen of GPE drawn up or registered in a foreign country by a competent authority in that country , may , at the request of any interested person and upon the Director of ORG being satisfied of the authenticity of such act , be registered in LOC .

In this respect , LAW reads as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) The Director shall not receive any act which is not written in clear and legible characters , or which contains abbreviations , or which may appear to him to be otherwise defective or irregular .

( CARDINAL ) In any such case , the act shall be presented by the Director to CARDINAL of the Visitors of notarial acts , who , after hearing , if necessary , the person who had made the act , shall determine the manner in which , according to law , the act is to be drawn up .

( CARDINAL ) The Director may not refuse to receive any act which is countersigned by CARDINAL of the said Visitors . ”

LAW “ LAW ” ) , LAW of LAW , applies to all marriages whether contracted in a civil or religious form . LAW , in so far as relevant reads as follows :

Section CARDINAL

“ ( CARDINAL ) A marriage , whether contracted in a civil or in a religious form , shall be valid only if all the provisions of this LAW applicable thereto or to marriage generally are satisfied or observed .

Section CARDINAL

Section CARDINAL

A decision of a foreign court on the status of a married person or affecting such status shall be recognised for all purposes of law in GPE if the decision is given by a competent court of the country in which either of the parties to the proceedings is domiciled or of which either of such parties is a citizen . ”

In so far as relevant , LAW provides as follows :

Section CARDINAL

“ ( CARDINAL ) A marriage celebrated in GPE after the coming into force of this section , in accordance with the norms and formalities established by ORG , shall as from the moment of its celebration , be recognised and have the same civil effects as a marriage celebrated in accordance with the norms and formalities of this LAW .

Section CARDINAL

( CARDINAL ) A decision which has become executive , given by a tribunal , and declaring the nullity of a NORP marriage shall , where one of the parties is domiciled in , or a citizen of , GPE , and subject to the provisions of section CARDINAL , be recognised and upon its registration in accordance with the said section CARDINAL , shall have effect as if it were a decision by a court and which has become res judicata .

Section CARDINAL

( CARDINAL ) Registration of a decision as referred to in section CARDINAL shall be effected by ORG .

( CARDINAL ) ORG registers that decision by giving a decree declaring the decision enforceable in GPE ; such decree shall not be given unless ORG is satisfied that :

( i ) the ORG was competent to judge the case of nullity of the marriage insofar as the marriage was a NORP marriage ; and

( ii ) during and in the proceedings before the ORG there was assured to the parties the right of action and defence in a manner substantially not dissimilar to the principles of LAW ; and

( iii ) there does not exist a contrary judgment binding the parties pronounced by a court , and which has become res judicata , based on the same grounds of nullity ; and

( iv ) in the case of a marriage celebrated in GPE after CARDINAL DATE , there has been delivered or transmitted to ORG the act of marriage laid down by this LAW ; and ...

Section CARDINAL

A decree given by the NORP Pontiff " super matrimonio rato et non consummato " , when CARDINAL of the spouses is domiciled in or is a citizen of GPE , shall , subject to the provisions of section CARDINAL , be recognised and upon its registration in accordance with the said section CARDINAL , shall have effect as if it were a decision given by a court and which has become res judicata annulling a marriage on the grounds of non - consummation , in accordance with section CARDINALA.

Section CARDINAL

( CARDINAL ) ( a ) Registration shall be effected by an order of ORG declaring the decree of the NORP Pontiff enforceable in GPE .

( b ) ORG shall register the decree if it is satisfied that it refers to a NORP marriage which was celebrated after the coming into force of this section and either of the spouses is domiciled in or is a citizen of GPE .

Section CARDINAL

In the course of an application under sections CARDINAL and DATE , ORG shall not go into the merits of the case leading to the decision or the decree the registration of which is demanded in the application , but shall limit itself to ascertaining if the requirements of this LAW for the registration requested exist . ”

GPE is a party to an agreement with ORG on the recognition of civil effects in respect of canonical marriages and decisions of ecclesiastical authorities and tribunals on such marriages . LAW further provides that the Government may enter into such agreements with other churches , religions or denominations . LAW reads as follows :

Section CARDINAL

( CARDINAL ) The Government may enter into agreements with other churches , religions or denominations regarding the recognition of marriages celebrated in accordance with the rules and norms of that church , religion or denomination , and declarations of nullity or annulment of such marriages by the organs of such church , religion or denomination having authority in accordance with its rules .

( CARDINAL ) Such agreements shall conform substantially to the provisions of the Agreement between the Holy See and GPE . ”

LAW , in so far as relevant , reads as follows :

A marriage entered into by CARDINAL non - baptised persons is dissolved by means of ORG in favour of the faith of the party who has received baptism by the very fact that a new marriage is contracted by the same party , provided that the non - baptized party departs .

The non - baptized party is considered to depart if he or she does not wish to cohabit with the baptised party or to cohabit peacefully without affront to the Creator unless the baptised party , after baptism was received , has given the other a just cause for departing .

In Canon PERSON this refers to the dissolution of a marriage between CARDINAL unbaptised parties , one of whom is later baptised and seeks to marry in the church .

Articles CARDINAL to CARDINAL of ORG ( “ COCP ” ) , LAW of LAW , deal with the enforcement of judgments of tribunals of countries other than GPE . The provisions read as follows :

Article CARDINAL

“ Where regulations of ORG provide , with regard to the matters under this title , in any manner different than in this title , the said regulations shall prevail , and the provisions of this Title shall only apply where they are not inconsistent with the provisions of such regulations or in matters not falling within the ambit of such regulations .

Article CARDINAL

Saving the provisions of the NORP Judgments ( Reciprocal Enforcement ) Act , any judgment delivered by a competent court outside GPE and constituting a res judicata may be enforced by the competent court in GPE , in the same manner as judgments delivered in GPE , upon an application containing a demand that the enforcement of such judgment be ordered .

Article CARDINAL

( CARDINAL ) The provisions of the last preceding article shall not have effect :

( a ) if the judgment sought to be enforced may be set aside on any of the grounds mentioned in article CARDINAL ( standard grounds for retrial ) ;

( b ) in the case of a judgment by default , if the parties were not contumacious according to foreign law ;

( c ) if the judgment contains any disposition contrary to public policy or to the internal public law of GPE .

( CARDINAL ) For the purposes of this article , the plea to the jurisdiction of the court by which the judgment was delivered , may be raised in terms of article ORG ) , even though that court may have adjudged upon a plea to its jurisdiction , in the case of any action brought against any person not subject to the jurisdiction of that court by reason of domicile or residence , unless such person had voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction thereof . ”