Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Rait Maruste;Renate Jaeger;Volodymyr Butkevych;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicants , Mr PERSON and PERSON , are NORP nationals who were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Mr PERSON , from ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicants issued proceedings before ORG ( okresní soud ) against a private company claiming damages in the amount of CZK CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) . On DATE they paid court fees .

On DATE ORG found that it lacked material competence to deal with the applicants ' case and transmitted it to ORG ( krajský obchodní soud ) .

On DATE the defendant filed a counterclaim requesting payment of CZK CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( EUR CARDINAL ) .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the action in respect of the second applicant . It granted , at the same time , the defendant 's counterclaim ordering her to pay CZK MONEY to the defendant . It further decided to split the first applicant 's claim and the defendant 's counterclaim brought in the first applicant 's respect for a separated hearing .

On DATE ORG found that ORG was materially competent to deal with the action in respect of the first applicant as well as with the defendant 's counterclaim , and remitted the case to it .

On DATE ORG suspended the proceedings until the delivery of a final judgment in the proceedings concerning the second applicant 's action .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's action and partly granted the defendant 's counterclaim .

The applicant appealed . It appears that the proceedings are still pending .

On DATE the second applicant appealed to ORG ( vrchní soud ) .

On DATE ORG , upon the defendant 's request of DATE , commenced execution proceedings ordering the applicant to pay CZK MONEY ( EUR CARDINAL ) with interests on late payment to the defendant .

On DATE ORG discontinued the execution proceedings in respect of the interests on late payment and ordered the enforcement of ORG judgment by sale of the second applicant 's property . It dismissed the applicant 's request to postpone the execution .

On DATE the first applicant filed an appeal against this decision . On DATE the second applicant appealed .

On DATE ORG ( krajský soud ) rejected the first applicant 's appeal on the ground that he was not a party to the proceedings before it . It discontinued the proceedings in respect of the second applicant 's appeal , and upheld the first CARDINAL grounds of the decision while quashing ORG dismissal to suspend the execution . The latter part of the case was therefore sent back to ORG for further consideration .

It appears that the execution proceedings are still ongoing .

On DATE the second applicant claimed material damages allegedly caused by activities of the organs of judicial power , pursuant to Act no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL then in force . Subsequently , ORG informed the applicant that her claim had been rejected . According to the applicant , ORG had admitted that there had been delays in the proceedings before ORG and ORG but had denied any causal link between the material damage alleged by the applicant and delays in the proceedings .

On DATE the second applicant brought an action for damages against ORG pursuant to section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of Act no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL then in force maintaining that the proceedings brought against the private company in DATE had lasted an unreasonably long time .

In a judgment of DATE ORG dismissed her action .

On DATE ORG ( krajský soud ) upheld the merits of the first instance court 's judgment .

Section PERSON ) as in force until DATE provided that the ORG was liable for damage caused by an irregularity in the conduct of proceedings , including non - compliance with the obligation to perform an act or give a decision within the statutory time - limit . Under section CARDINAL ) a person who had suffered loss on account of such an irregularity was entitled to damages .

On DATE CARDINAL Act no . DATE entered into force amending , inter alia , section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) which newly provides that the ORG is liable for damage caused by an irregularity in the conduct of proceedings , including non - compliance with the obligation to perform an act or give a decision within the statutory time - limit . If the law does not fix a time - limit for these purposes , it is considered that a violation of the duty to perform the act or give the decision within a reasonable time - limit is also considered as an irregularity in the conduct of proceedings . When using the notion of “ reasonable time ” , the LAW refers to ORG and CARDINAL of the Convention .

Act no . DATE also introduced a new section CARDINALa which provides for a reasonable satisfaction for moral prejudice caused by an irregularity in the conduct of proceedings including non - compliance with the obligation to perform an act or to adopt a decision within a reasonable time .


Violation of Art. 5-1;Violation of Art. 5-3;No violation of Art. 34;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE , GPE .

On DATE the applicant was taken into custody by the police . On DATE ORG PERSON ) dismissed his complaint about placing him in police custody .

On DATE ORG ) charged the applicant with aggravated fraud and remanded him in custody . The charges related to a period DATE when the applicant , together with his accomplices , allegedly defrauded several individuals and businesses by obtaining from them under false pretences cash , automobiles , furniture , computers and other goods of a total value of ORG . In addition , the applicant was charged with possession of a forged passport . ORG considered that the applicant ’s detention on remand was warranted by the fact that he was charged with several criminal acts which caused a significant danger to society ( stopień społecznego niebezpieczeństwa jest znaczny ) , as he had acted within a criminal organisation and had obtained valuable goods . In addition , the applicant ’s criminal activity took place over a long time and it was probable that if released he would collude and try to destroy evidence .

On DATE the applicant applied to ORG for release from detention . On DATE ORG rejected the application . He dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant ’s claims that poor health and the financial situation of his family required his release . Moreover , the applicant ’s contention that his illhealth called for release would be decided after a panel of medical experts had examined him .

On DATE and DATE the applicant again made applications to ORG for release from detention . On DATE his requests were dismissed . ORG relied on a medical opinion issued by ORG , which stated that the applicant could remain in detention . In addition , he considered that since the applicant ’s daughter and his cohabitee lived with the latter ’s parents , there was no need for him to be released to care for them .

On DATE the applicant made an application for release from detention . On DATE the ORG rejected his application . The prosecutor referred to the medical opinion of DATE , which confirmed that the applicant ’s state of health allowed the continuation of his detention . Furthermore , he considered that the fact that the applicant ’s daughter had recently received medical treatment in the infant pathology ward of ORG did not constitute a ground for the applicant ’s release . The prosecutor also pointed out that the applicant ’s cohabitee cared for his daughter .

On DATE the ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE . ORG considered that the evidence showed that the applicant had committed the criminal offences with which he was charged . Moreover , the state of health of his daughter did not require that he be released . The prosecutor was also of a view that the applicant ’s detention was necessary to ensure the proper course of the proceedings .

On DATE the applicant lodged with ORG ( Sąd Apelacyjny ) a complaint about his detention . On CARDINAL DATE the court transmitted it to ORG to consider it as a request to change the preventive measure applied to the applicant . On DATE the prosecutor rejected the request . He dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant ’s claims that his own state of health as well as that of several members of his family required his release from detention . In this connection , the prosecutor referred to medical opinions , which stated that the applicant was neither mentally ill nor retarded and that his detention would not cause any risk to his health and life . Furthermore , he considered that the investigation of the applicant ’s claim that his detention constituted a hardship for his family had showed that it was unsubstantiated .

On DATE ORG allowed the request submitted by the prosecution service and extended the applicant ’s detention on remand until DATE . The court considered that the evidence collected in the case sufficiently supported the charges laid against the applicant . It also relied on a significant danger to society caused by the criminal offences in question and the necessity to ensure the proper course of criminal proceedings . Furthermore , the court pointed out that the investigation of the case would have to be continued in order to clarify the applicant ’s role in the commission of the criminal offences and to identify individuals who would be charged with receiving stolen goods from the applicant . Finally , the court considered that the applicant ’s case did not disclose any of the grounds for release from detention listed in LAW of LAW , i.e. danger to the detainee ’s life or health and extreme hardship caused to either the detainee or his family . On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against the decision of ORG .

On DATE the ORG filed with ORG a bill of indictment against the applicant .

On DATE the applicant asked ORG to release him from detention . On DATE the court dismissed his request . It relied on a significant danger to society caused by the criminal offences with which the applicant was charged and the evidence on which they were based . The court was also of the view that the applicant ’s family did not suffer hardship which would justify his release .

On DATE the applicant again filed an application for release but on DATE the ORG rejected it . On CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against that decision . The court observed that the applicant could apply for bail .

On DATE ORG rejected the application for release filed by the applicant on DATE . On DATE the court rejected the application lodged on DATE .

On DATE the applicant made a further application to ORG for release from detention . On DATE the court dismissed his application . It referred to the previous court decisions refusing his requests for release . Moreover , the court considered that the claim that the applicant ’s father suffered hardship was unsubstantiated .

The date of the first hearing was fixed for DATE . However , it was cancelled because CARDINAL of the defendants was ill and could not attend it .

On DATE the applicant made an application to ORG for release from detention . On DATE the court dismissed his request . It relied on a significant danger to society caused by the criminal offences with which the applicant was charged and the evidence on which they were based . The court further considered that the applicant ’s detention was necessary to secure the proper conduct of criminal proceedings . In addition , it observed that the applicant ’s failure to pay child support did not warrant his release , as CARDINAL of his children was in receipt of child support payments from ORG ( ORG ) .

On DATE ORG held a hearing . It was adjourned because CARDINAL defendants failed to attend it .

On DATE the applicant made an application to ORG for release from detention . On DATE the court rejected his request . It relied on the grounds for continuing the applicant ’s detention listed in previous court decisions .

On DATE the applicant asked ORG to release him from detention . On DATE the court dismissed his request . It considered that the evidence collected in the case sufficiently supported the charges laid against the applicant . As the charges could lead to a severe prison sentence , there was a risk of absconding . Furthermore , the court was of the view that the applicant ’s inability to provide care to his children over a long period of time did not result in exceptional hardship for his family .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s application for release from detention filed on DATE . The court relied on the evidence collected in the case , which in its opinion supported the charges laid against the applicant . In addition , it considered that the prospect of a severe penalty , which could be imposed on the applicant , could prompt him to abscond .

On DATE the Vice - President of ORG informed ORG and the applicant that the applicant ’s case did not disclose that the proceedings had taken unreasonably long . In particular , he pointed out that CARDINAL individuals were accused in the case , the case file consisted of CARDINAL volumes and evidence had to be taken from fiftyeight witnesses . Furthermore , the ORG observed that the first hearing had been cancelled because CARDINAL of the defendants had been ill . The second hearing had been adjourned until DATE as CARDINAL defendants had failed to attend it . Finally , he stated that “ the judge rapporteur is dealing with CARDINAL other cases and therefore is not able to decide this case sooner than is possible ” .

On DATE ORG held a hearing . It was adjourned because some of the defendants failed to attend it .

On DATE ORG allowed the applicant ’s appeal against ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE rejecting his application for release from detention . The appellate court quashed the impugned decision and instructed the trial court to reconsider the applicant ’s request . It acknowledged that “ in the present case the detention on remand has lasted quite long ” . In addition , the appellate court considered that the trial court ’s statement on the applicant ’s intention to abscond was not precise enough . As the applicant ’s detention had already lasted DATE and as he was not charged with a serious offence , the mere reference to the possibility that the applicant could abscond because of the prospect of a severe penalty was not sufficient . The appellate court also observed that the trial court had not considered whether another preventive measure could replace the applicant ’s detention on remand .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s CARDINAL applications for release submitted in DATE and DATE . The court considered that the charges against the applicant were sufficiently supported by the evidence . Moreover , the difficulties in finding the applicant ’s place of residence during the investigative stage of the proceedings and the prospect of a severe penalty showed that he could go into hiding if released from detention . The court further noted that the applicant could not be released on bail as he had stated that he had no funds to pay it . Finally , it considered that there was no evidence pointing towards the existence of any of the grounds for release provided for by LAW .

The hearing held on DATE was adjourned until DATE as some of the defendants failed to attend it because of ill health .

During the hearing held on DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s application for release from detention . The hearing was adjourned because some of the defendants failed to attend it .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE . The appellate court observed that the applicant ’s release would delay the proceedings , as his cohabitee lived in Opole . It also noted that the applicant had contributed to the delay in the proceedings because on numerous occasions he had submitted requests and appeals . In addition , on several occasions a case file had been transmitted from the trial court to ORG after the applicant had asked to consult it .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE . The appellate court referred to previous court decisions rejecting his applications for release from detention . The court further noted that although the length of the applicant ’s detention could be worrying ( trwa już niepokojąco długo ) , it had not been caused by the inactivity of the trial court . Moreover , the appellate court recommended that “ more energetic steps ” be taken to expedite the proceedings . Finally , it acknowledged that the state of health of the applicant ’s cohabitee and his daughter was not good . However , the court was of the view that the applicant ’s release would not contribute to the improvement of their health .

In a letter of DATE the President of ORG advised the applicant that the trial court could not be blamed for the delay in the proceedings . He pointed out that the court had fixed numerous hearings , which had been adjourned because of the absence of defendants who had been ill .

During the hearing held on DATE the applicant applied for bail . He proposed that the bail be set at PLN CARDINAL,CARDINAL . However , ORG rejected the application . It gave the following reasons for its decision :

“ The circumstances raised by the accused in his application have already been considered by both ORG and ORG . Therefore , taking into account the fact that no new circumstances have taken place , it should be assumed that the reasons for continuing detention on remand have not ceased to exist . ”

NORP On DATE ORG decided to request ORG ( Sąd Najwyższy ) to extend the applicant ’s detention on remand .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE . The appellate court recalled that during DATE it had been considering on a DATE basis the applicant ’s appeals against the trial court ’s refusals to release him . It considered that the factual and legal circumstances concerning the applicant ’s detention had not changed .

On DATE ORG allowed ORG request and extended the applicant ’s detention on remand until DATE . It considered that the prolongation of the applicant ’s detention was justified by the evidence , the possibility that he could go into hiding and the complexity of the case . It also observed that the delay in the proceedings was caused by the behaviour of defendants who had failed to attend hearings .

ORG further reflected on the legality of the applicant ’s detention DATE . The relevant part of the court ’s reasoning may be summarised as follows :

ORG , noting that the application was filed on DATE but posted as late as DATE , first considered what was the proper date of ‘ ORG such an application for the purposes of LAW .

ORG next observed that , depending on the answer to this question , it would have to determine the legal consequences of a potential failure on the part of ORG to respect the rule laid down in DATE a ) LAW of DATE , which stated that in cases where no request for a further prolongation of detention on remand had been ‘ lodged’ , the detention on remand had to be lifted and the person concerned released not later than on DATE .

ORG considered that it should also deal with the question of whether it was competent to rule on the application if it had been ‘ lodged’ after the expiry of the term referred to in LAW ( a ) of LAW of DATE , i.e. after DATE .

Referring to the first question , ORG held that the proper date of ‘ ORG an application under LAW of LAW had to be deemed either the date of posting the request or the date of submitting it to the registry of ORG since to hold otherwise would mean leaving a detainee without any guarantee that ORG was properly supervising his detention . Moreover , if the requesting court was not bound by any time - limits for submitting its application , detention , the most severe among the preventive measures , might continue for an unspecified and unlimited time outside ORG supervision . In consequence , an application under LAW of LAW , a mere ‘ proposal’ to continue detention , would , for all practical purposes , transform into a basis for continuing detention . Clearly , that was not the intention of the legislator .

ORG therefore concluded that since in the applicant ’s case no application for a further prolongation of his detention was ‘ lodged’ DATE , the applicant ’s ( and his GPE ) detention from DATE to the date of its present decision lacked any legal basis and was , accordingly , unlawful .

It went on to find that it was , nevertheless , competent to deal with the application lodged outside the relevant date . It considered that a lower court ’s obligation to release a detainee in case of its failure properly to lodge an application under LAW CARDINAL of the Code of Criminal Procedure was CARDINAL thing , but its right to make such an application at any time was another . In ORG opinion , the application in question should be deemed a “ fresh application ” and be examined as such .

On DATE ORG held a hearing .

On DATE the President of ORG informed the applicant that his complaints about his unjustified detention on remand were unsubstantiated . The President also recalled that on DATE ORG had prolonged the applicant ’s detention and that no hearings could be held in his case at the time when ORG had been considering the request to extend his detention . In addition , he observed that the next hearing was scheduled for DATE .

On DATE ORG dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant ’s challenge to CARDINAL of the judges considering his case .

On DATE ORG held a hearing . It was adjourned because some of the defendants failed to attend it .

During the hearings held on DATE and CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s applications for release from detention . The latter hearing was adjourned because some of the defendants failed to attend it .

The hearing held on DATE was adjourned because some of the defendants did not attend it .

DATE . During the hearing held on DATE ORG decided to sever the charges laid against CARDINAL co - defendants and to consider them in separate proceedings because the co - defendants’ numerous failures to attend hearings resulted in the delay in deciding the applicant ’s case . Thereafter , the proceedings were continued against the applicant and CARDINAL codefendants .

The next hearings were held on CARDINAL , CARDINAL DATE and DATE . The hearing scheduled for DATE was cancelled .

On DATE the hearing was held before ORG . It decided to request ORG to prolong the applicant ’s detention on remand .

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s detention on remand until DATE .

During the hearing held on DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s requests that the charges against him be decided in separate proceedings and that he be released from detention .

On DATE hearings took place before the trial court .

On DATE the applicant was released from detention .

Subsequently , hearings were held on DATE , CARDINAL May , CARDINAL June , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE , DATE and DATE .

In the course of DATE ORG held hearings on the following dates : DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE and CARDINAL May , DATE , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE . The hearings held on DATE and CARDINAL DATE were adjourned because a judge was ill .

On DATE the court held a hearing .

During the hearings held DATE and DATE ORG took evidence from CARDINAL witnesses .

On DATE the ORG convicted the applicant and sentenced him to DATE and CARDINAL months’ imprisonment and to a fine . On DATE the applicant appealed against his conviction .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal .

On DATE the ORG received the applicant ’s letter of DATE . The front of the envelope in which the letter was delivered bears a stamp in NORP : “ Opole Detention Centre , Ward III , Received on CARDINAL . ” On the back of the envelope there is a stamp in NORP : “ Censored . Opole , CARDINAL ” . The top edge of the envelope is sealed with Sellotape . The envelope is postmarked DATE .

NORP Over the period to which the facts of the present case relate , i.e. from DATE to DATE , NORP criminal legislation was amended on several occasions .

In so far as the present case is concerned , there were CARDINAL relevant amendments to LAW ( “ the DATE Code ” ) , a law which is no longer in force as it was repealed and replaced by the socalled “ New Code of Criminal Procedure ” of DATE ( “ the DATE Code ” ) , which entered into force on DATE .

The first such amendment was made by the LAW DATE on LAW to LAW and Other Criminal Statutes which entered into force on DATE , except the amendments relating to the imposition of detention on remand ( in particular , those stating that only a judge was empowered to detain a suspect on remand ) ; the entry into force of the latter amendments being postponed until DATE ( see below ) .

The second amendment , effected by the PERSON of DATE on LAW to the LAW ( “ the DATE Interim LAW ) came into force on DATE . Section CARDINAL(a ) of the PERSON introduced special interim rules governing the prolongation of detention on remand beyond the statutory time - limits laid down in LAW and DATE Code in cases where such detention had been imposed DATE ( see below , CARDINAL c ) “ Statutory time - limits for detention on remand ” ) .

At the material time the DATE Code listed as “ preventive measures ” ( środki zapobiegawcze ) , inter alia , detention on remand , bail and police supervision .

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the DATE Code read ( in the version applicable until DATE ) :

“ Preventive measures shall be imposed by the court ; before a bill of indictment has been lodged with the competent court , the measures shall be imposed by the prosecutor . ”

Article CARDINAL ( in the version applicable until DATE ) stated , in so far as relevant :

“ CARDINAL . The prosecutor may order detention on remand for a period not exceeding DATE .

( CARDINAL ) the court competent to deal with the case , upon the prosecutor ’s request , for a period not exceeding one year ;

( CARDINAL ) ORG , upon request of ORG , for a further fixed term required to terminate the investigation . ”

Under LAW a detainee could appeal against a detention order made by a prosecutor to the court competent to deal with his case ; however , he was not entitled to be brought before the judge dealing with his appeal .

Article CARDINAL of the DATE Code set out general grounds justifying imposition of preventive measures . That provision ( as it stood at the material time ) provided :

“ Preventive measures may be imposed in order to ensure the proper conduct of proceedings if the evidence against the accused sufficiently justifies the opinion that he has committed a criminal offence . ”

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL defined grounds for detention on remand . That provision , in the version applicable until DATE provided , in so far as relevant :

“ Detention on remand may be imposed if :

( CARDINAL ) there is a reasonable risk that an accused will abscond or go into hiding , in particular when he has no fixed residence [ in GPE ] or his identity can not be established ; or

( CARDINAL ) there is a reasonable risk that an accused will attempt to induce witnesses to give false testimony or to obstruct the proper conduct of proceedings by any other unlawful means ; or

( CARDINAL ) an accused has been charged with a serious offence or has relapsed into crime in the manner defined in LAW ; or

( CARDINAL ) an accused has been charged with an offence which creates a serious danger to society . ”

On DATE paragraphs ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) were repealed . From that date on that provision read :

“ ( CARDINAL ) there is a reasonable risk that an accused will abscond or go into hiding , in particular when his identity can not be established or he has no permanent abode [ in GPE ] ; or

( CARDINAL ) [ as it stood before DATE ] . ”

Paragraph CARDINAL of Article CARDINAL then read :

“ If an accused has been charged with a serious offence or an intentional offence [ for the commission of which he may be ] liable to a sentence of a statutory maximum of CARDINAL years’ imprisonment , or if a court of first instance has sentenced him to CARDINAL GPE imprisonment , the need to continue detention in order to secure the proper conduct of proceedings may be based upon the likelihood that a heavy penalty will be imposed . ”

The DATE Code set out the margin of discretion as to maintaining a specific preventive measure . Articles CARDINAL § CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Code were based on the precept that detention on remand , the most extreme among the preventive measures , should not be imposed if more lenient measures were adequate .

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL provided :

“ A preventive measure [ including detention on remand ] shall be immediately lifted or varied , if the basis therefor has ceased to exist or new circumstances have arisen which justify lifting a given measure or replacing it with a more or less severe one . ”

Article CARDINAL stated :

“ Detention on remand shall be imposed only when it is mandatory ; this measure shall not be imposed if bail or police supervision , or both of these measures , are considered adequate . ”

The provisions of the LAW providing for “ mandatory detention ” ( for instance , pending an appeal against a sentence of imprisonment exceeding DATE ) were repealed on DATE by the LAW DATE referred to above .

Finally , Article CARDINAL provided :

“ If there are no special reasons to the contrary , detention on remand should be lifted , in particular , if :

( CARDINAL ) it may seriously jeopardise the life or health of the accused ; or

( CARDINAL ) it would entail excessively burdensome effects for the accused or his family . ”

Until DATE , i.e. the date on which the relevant provisions of the Law of CARDINAL DATE on LAW to LAW and Other Criminal Statutes entered into force , the law did not set out any time - limits on detention on remand in court proceedings ; it did so only in respect of the investigative stage ( see above , CARDINAL ) Imposition of detention on remand ; Article CARDINAL in the version applicable until DATE ) .

Article CARDINAL of the DATE Code in the version applicable after DATE provided , in so far as relevant :

“ CARDINAL . The whole period of detention on remand until the date on which the court of first instance gives judgment may not exceed DATE and DATE in cases concerning offences . In cases concerning serious offences [ offences for the commission of which a person was liable to a sentence of a statutory minimum of CARDINAL CARDINAL years’ imprisonment ] this period may not exceed DATE .

NORP In particularly justified cases ORG may , on an application made by the court competent to deal with the case , ... prolong detention on remand for a further fixed period exceeding the time - limits set in DATE , when it is necessary in connection with a suspension of the proceedings , a prolonged psychiatric observation of the accused , when evidence needs to be obtained from abroad or when the accused has deliberately obstructed the termination of the proceedings in the terms referred to in paragraph CARDINAL . ”

DATE . On DATE , by virtue of the Law of DATE , paragraph CARDINAL of that Article was amended and the grounds for prolonging detention beyond the statutory time - limits included also :

“ ... other significant obstacles , which could not be overcome by the authorities conducting the proceedings ... ”

However , as already mentioned ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , under section CARDINAL ( a ) of the DATE Interim PERSON , different rules applied to persons whose detention on remand started prior to CARDINAL August CARDINAL . That section provided :

“ CARDINAL . In cases where the total period of detention on remand which started prior to CARDINAL DATE exceeds the [ maximum ] time - limits referred to in Article QUANTITY of LAW [ as amended by LAW DATE on LAW to LAW and Other Criminal Statutes ] , the accused shall be kept in detention until ORG gives a decision on an application for prolongation of his detention under LAW of LAW .

NORP In cases mentioned in paragraph CARDINAL , if no [ such ] application has been lodged , detention shall be lifted not DATE . ”

In cases where ORG dismissed an application under LAW CARDINAL , a detainee had to be released . As long as it had not given its ruling , the application of the relevant court DATE which had the form of a decision ( “ postanowienie ” ) – was deemed to be a legal basis for the continued detention .

Article CARDINAL § QUANTITY of the DATE Code read , in so far as relevant :

“ CARDINAL . The court competent to deal with the charges laid against a principal offender shall be competent to determine the charges laid against all his accessories and/or other persons , if the offence[s ] committed by the latter are closely related to that [ or those ] committed by a principal offender [ and ] if the criminal proceedings against [ all of them ] are pending simultaneously .

NORP The cases of persons referred to in paragraph CARDINAL shall be joined in the same proceedings ;

NORP In cases where circumstances have rendered a joint determination of all the charges referred to in paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL difficult [ the court ] may sever a specific charge [ or charges ] from the case ... . ”

A first - instance court could , either of its own motion or on an application made by a party , make a severance order at any time .

That offence , until DATE , was defined in LAW CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW of DATE , which provided :

“ Anyone who has committed aggravated fraud shall be liable to a sentence ranging from one to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment . ”

On DATE LAW of DATE was repealed by the socalled “ New Criminal Code ” of DATE and , from then on , the offence of aggravated fraud has been defined by LAW read in conjunction with LAW ; the potential sentence still ranges from one to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment .


CASE OF MITRESKI v. "THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA"

Violation of Art. 5-4;Remainder inadmissible;Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient

Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Renate Jaeger

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

At TIME on CARDINAL DATE the applicant was arrested and taken into police custody . On CARDINAL DATE an investigating judge from ORG ( “ the trial court ” ) questioned the applicant , who was assisted by counsel . An investigation was opened on the grounds of reasonable suspicion of extortion of money from a minor . The investigating judge refused a request by the public prosecutor for the applicant to be detained in prison , but ordered , instead , DATE house arrest ( куќен притвор ) . That measure required the applicant to remain at home and to refrain from using any means of communication for the duration of the order . His passport was also seized and the police were ordered to check his presence in the house DATE . The judge considered that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting the applicant of having committed the offence , but that in the light of his clean record and family circumstances , a non - custodial measure , such as house arrest , was preferable . The applicant 's house arrest was ordered on all the grounds specified in section CARDINAL of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . This decision was served on the applicant and his lawyer at TIME

At TIME DATE , the public prosecutor appealed on the ground that the investigating judge had not provided sufficient reasons for refusing to detain the applicant in prison and had not examined whether house arrest could be supervised effectively . The applicant did not appeal .

On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of the trial court ( “ the panel ” ) , sitting in private , allowed the appeal and replaced the order for the applicant 's house arrest with an order for his detention in prison . It further quashed the order for the confiscation of the applicant 's passport . The panel found that there was a danger that the applicant would interfere with the investigation , in particular by putting pressure on witnesses who had not been heard yet and on the victim , who , being a minor , was vulnerable . Having regard to the gravity of the offence and the way in which it had been committed , the panel ruled that house arrest was an inadequate measure in the applicant 's case . This decision was served on the applicant at TIME . No appeal lay against the panel 's decision .

On DATE the investigating judge terminated the panels ' order for the applicant 's detention in prison and ordered DATE house arrest accompanied by the same security measures described above ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The judge found no justification for the applicant 's continued detention in prison since the investigation had been completed . In this connection , he noted that evidence had been taken from the victim and witnesses proposed by both parties . Given the accompanying measures ordered , there was no likelihood of reoffending or obstructing the course of justice by influencing other witnesses , if any .

On DATE the panel dismissed the public prosecutor 's appeal , finding the house arrest and accompanying measures adequate to ensure the applicant 's attendance at the trial .

The panel , sitting in first instance , extended the applicant 's house arrest on CARDINAL occasions , namely , on DATE and CARDINAL DATE , with the stated aim of ensuring his attendance at trial . In doing so , it relied on the gravity of the charges and potential penalty . The applicant unsuccessfully appealed against both orders . ORG decisions dismissing the applicant 's appeals dated DATE and CARDINAL DATE respectively .

On DATE the trial court convicted the applicant of extortion and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment . It further extended the house arrest order until the criminal proceedings are completed . The proceedings are underway .

Section PERSON ) of LAW ( “ the LAW ” ) provides that a CARDINAL - judge panel of the trial court decides , inter alia , appeals against decisions of the investigating judge .

Under section CARDINAL ) , paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL , of the LAW , pre - trial detention can be ordered on reasonable suspicion that the person concerned has committed an offence if there is a risk of his or her absconding , interfering with the investigation or reoffending .

Under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) , ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL) of the LAW , an investigating judge has jurisdiction to order pre - trial detention . The detainee may challenge the detention order before the panel within TIME . The appeal does not suspend the execution of the detention order . The panel must decide the appeal within TIME . The detainee , through his or her lawyer , can request to be notified of the date of the hearing before the panel in order to be able to present his or her arguments orally .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of the LAW provides that the panel , set up under section PERSON ) , may extend the period of detention by DATE at the request of the investigating judge . Such an order can be challenged before the next level of jurisdiction .


Flogaitis;George Nicolaou;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Peer Lorenzen;Spyridon Flogaitis

The applicants , Mr PERSON , Mr PERSON and PERSON are NORP nationals who were born in DATE , DATE and DATE respectively . They live in GPE . They are represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON and Mr Y. ORG , both lawyers practising in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) are represented by their Agent , PERSON , Senior Adviser at ORG , PERSON , Adviser at ORG and PERSON , Legal Assistant at ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicants have a direct or indirect involvement in the operation of ORG , a company under NORP law , which specialises in providing television audience measurement services . In particular , the first applicant was the first managing director of ORG , currently holds PERCENT of that company ’s shares and is the chairman of the board of directors . The second applicant has been the managing director of ORG since DATE . The third applicant was one of the co - founders of ORG and DATE holds PERCENT of the company ’s shares .

ORG was founded in DATE and has remained the sole provider of TV audience data to DATE . The applicants state that it has been noticed worldwide that the relevant national markets prefer to share a common source of television audience data . This is due to the fact that commonly accepted television data in the context of national markets form a decisive parameter in the decision - making process , as regards advertising investment strategies . The applicants submit that GPE is a unique case in the field of terrestrial television broadcasting owing to the fact that , under the successive laws that have been enacted since DATE , when the ORG monopoly was abolished , there are DATE CARDINAL private , CARDINAL regional and CARDINAL local television channels , none of which has a proper operating licence . It is submitted that in this context of institutional anarchy ORG ’s role has become more crucial than in other countries . The applicants claim that , for this reason , ORG has occasionally been the target of campaigns in which its professionalism and reputation have been attacked .

In DATE a high - ranking executive of ORG drafted and made public a report on ORG ’s activities suggesting that ORG and its executives had committed irregularities with regard to the choice of sample and the subsequent processing of television data . ORG , an independent committee created by virtue of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of PERSON no . DATE , conducted a special investigation and cleared ORG of all charges .

In DATE ORG , which at the time was allegedly facing major financial difficulties and low ratings , again drew attention to the above - mentioned report . The latter gained widespread publicity , and on DATE a preliminary examination was ordered in respect of ORG ’s managers by ORG . In DATE all CARDINAL applicants were summoned to the prosecutor ’s office to answer rather general questions , without being bound by oath ( ανομωτί ) . On DATE the public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against the applicants for the concurrent offences of fraud , fraud committed against the ORG and filing of false statements before an administrative authority . On DATE , the case file was transmitted to the investigating judge .

The applicants submit that , on DATE , during the regular off - the - record meeting of the senior prosecuting authority with the media held on the premises of ORG , journalists were briefed that criminal proceedings were to be initiated against the CARDINAL applicants in relation to ORG ’s alleged irregularities . Long excerpts and explicit details about the allegations were read from the unofficial prosecutor ’s report ( πόρισμα ) . This report is only an internal document and NORP law does not provide for such a report . It is only by way of a working practice that such reports are drafted by the prosecutor in charge as an informal description and assessment of the facts for the sole purpose of briefing the supervising prosecutor on the case . Moreover , the accused had not yet been notified of the report , and therefore the applicants had no official knowledge of its content .

On DATE , PERSON , a journalist hosting a popular television show , ORG ORG ( “ The Jungle ” ) , appeared before a large panel of guests , holding a copy of the prosecutor ’s confidential report . While showing the report on camera with frequent close - ups , he went on to read out extensive parts of it . Quoting selected extracts from the report , he stated that ORG was an integral part of a “ network of conspiracy ” and the “ real centre of power ” in GPE , both at political and at economic level . Other guests participating in the panel stated that ORG not only built or destroyed TV careers but also distributed CARDINAL and constituted a “ spider ’s web ” and a “ fraudulent trap ” .

The following DATE ’s newspapers contained extensive articles on the case . CARDINAL GPE dailies quoted parts of the prosecutor ’s confidential report , and CARDINAL of them published photographs of the first CARDINAL applicants and another CARDINAL pages of the original report . The story caused such interest throughout GPE that , on TIME DATE , the first and third applicants were forced to answer pressing questions by journalists live on CARDINAL of the most popular evening television broadcasts .

The applicants submit that both their private and professional lives have dramatically changed . After the disclosure of the prosecutor ’s report and the ensuing publicity , they are allegedly looked upon with distrust and disapproval and are in a state of uncertainty as to their future careers . They state that the impact on their private lives has also been considerable . In particular , the first applicant started receiving anonymous hostile telephone calls and letters , which forced him to seek protection for his LOC from private security guards . After the television reports , the first and second applicants’ children started using their ORG maiden name at school , so as to avoid further abuse . The second applicant , having already had health problems with his vocal cords , suffered a relapse , which required a second operation , after the above - mentioned events took place .

On DATE ORG of ORG dismissed all the charges against the applicants ( decision no . DATE ) . It stated , inter alia , that there were no grounds to commit the applicants for trial .

NORP The relevant provisions of the LAW provide as follows :

“ CARDINAL . All persons are entitled to information , as specified by law . Restrictions to this right may be imposed by law only in so far as they are absolutely necessary and justified for reasons of national security , combating crime or protecting the rights and interests of third parties .

All persons are entitled to participate in ORG Facilitation of access to electronically processed information , as well as of the production , exchange and diffusion thereof , constitutes an obligation of the ORG , always in observance of the guarantees of Articles CARDINAL , ORG and DATE . ”

“ Actions against judicial officers for miscarriage of justice shall be tried , as specified by law , by a special court composed of the President of ORG , as President , and CARDINAL councillor of ORG , one ORG and ORG judge , CARDINAL councillor of ORG , CARDINAL law professors of the law schools of the country ’s universities and CARDINAL lawyers from among the members of ORG for lawyers , as members , all of whom shall be chosen by lot .

In each case , the member of the special court who belongs to the judicial body or branch the actions or omissions of an officer of which the court is called upon to judge shall be exempted . In the case of an action against a member of ORG or an officer of the ordinary administrative courts , the special court shall be presided over by the President of ORG .

No permission shall be required to institute an action for miscarriage of justice . ”

NORP The following provisions of LAW ( PERSON ) to LAW ( Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) are relevant :

“ The ORG shall be liable in accordance with the provisions of LAW concerning legal persons , for acts or omissions of its organs regarding private - law relations or ORG assets . ”

“ The ORG shall be under a duty to make good any damage caused by the unlawful acts or omissions of its organs in the exercise of public authority , except where the unlawful act or omission is in breach of an existing provision but is intended to serve the public interest . The person responsible shall be jointly and severally liable , without prejudice to the special provisions on ministerial responsibility . ”

This section establishes the concept of a special prejudicial act in public law , creating State liability in tort . This liability results from unlawful acts or omissions . The acts concerned may be not only legal acts but also physical acts by the administrative authorities , including acts which are not in principle enforceable through the courts ( PERSON , Interpretation of the Civil Code , section CARDINAL of the Introductory Law to LAW , no . CARDINAL ; ORG , Contract , ORG , volume CARDINAL , Tort , DATE , para . CARDINAL B CARDINAL ; PERSON , Administrative Law , CARDINALrd edition , para . CARDINAL ; ORG judgment no . CARDINAL , PERSON , DATE , p. CARDINAL ; ORG judgment no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , PERSON , DATE , p. CARDINAL ) . The admissibility of an action for damages is subject to CARDINAL condition , namely , the unlawfulness of the act or omission .

The relevant provisions of LAW read as follows :

“ Any person whose personal rights are unlawfully infringed shall be entitled to bring proceedings to enforce cessation of the infringement and restraint of any future infringement . Where the personal rights infringed are those of a deceased person , the right to bring proceedings shall be vested in his spouse , descendants , ascendants , brothers , sisters and testamentary beneficiaries . In addition , claims for damages in accordance with the provisions relating to unlawful acts shall not be excluded . ”

“ In the cases provided for in DATE , the court may , in the judgment it gives on the application of the person whose right has been infringed , and regard being had to the nature of the infringement , also order the infringer to make reparation for the plaintiff ’s non - pecuniary damage . Such reparation shall consist in the payment of a sum of money , publication of the ORG

“ Whoever unlawfully and culpably causes damage to another shall be bound to make reparation to the other for any damage thus caused ... ”

“ In the case of an unlawful act , the court may , irrespective of any award of compensation for pecuniary damages , award reasonable compensation ... for any non - pecuniary harm suffered ... ”

“ CARDINAL . Anyone who is under the legal obligation to perform judicial duties and discloses to a third person confidential information of the deliberations or the vote in which he took part shall be punished by DATE imprisonment .

“ A civil servant who , with the exception of cases described under ORG CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL , deliberately and with the intention of unlawfully obtaining a pecuniary advantage for himself or another or who causes prejudice to the ORG or a third party , discloses to a third person ( a ) information which came to his knowledge because of his position or ( b ) a document either entrusted to him or accessible to him owing to his position , shall be punished by CARDINAL months’ imprisonment . ”

“ A civil servant who deliberately breaches an official duty with the intention of unlawfully obtaining a pecuniary advantage for himself or another or who causes prejudice to the ORG or a third party shall be punished by up to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment , save where the offence is punishable pursuant to another provision of criminal law . ”

“ CARDINAL . Except in cases which amount to defamation ( Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL ) , anyone who by words or by deeds or by any other means injures another ’s reputation shall be punished by DATE imprisonment or by a pecuniary penalty . The pecuniary penalty may be imposed in addition to imprisonment .

If the injury to reputation is not severe , considering the circumstances and the person injured , the offender shall be punished by imprisonment or a fine .

The provision of paragraph CARDINAL of Article CARDINAL shall apply in this case . ”

“ CARDINAL . An insult committed through an act ( Article CARDINAL , paragraph CARDINAL ) shall be punishable by CARDINAL months’ imprisonment if it was unprovoked by the victim .

If CARDINAL or more persons participated in the act referred to in the previous paragraph , it shall be punishable by CARDINAL months’ imprisonment . ”

“ Anyone who by any means disseminates information to a third party concerning another which may damage the latter ’s character or reputation shall be punished by up to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment or a pecuniary penalty . The pecuniary penalty may be imposed in addition to imprisonment . ”

“ If , in a case under LAW , the information is false and the offender was aware of the falsity thereof , he shall be punished by up to three months’ imprisonment , and , in addition , a pecuniary penalty may be imposed and deprivation of civil rights under LAW may be ordered . ”

“ CARDINAL . Anyone who by any means asserts or disseminates information concerning a corporation with respect to its business , financial position , products or members of its board of directors which may lower the confidence of the public in the corporation and generally harm its business shall be punished by DATE imprisonment or a pecuniary penalty .

If the accused proves the truth of the information which he asserted or disseminated , he shall not be punished .

If the information which the accused asserted or disseminated is false , and he was aware of the falsity thereof , he shall be punished by imprisonment . ”

Article CARDINAL of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows :

“ The judicial investigation takes place in writing and without any publicity ( ... ) ”

Article CARDINAL of LAW provides in so far as relevant :

NORP The competent judicial authorities are bound to initiate disciplinary proceedings when their attention is drawn by any means to acts committed by the judiciary which may constitute a disciplinary fault ( ... ) ”

Section CARDINAL ) of PERSON no . ORG provides :

“ Anyone who unlawfully interferes in any way whatsoever with a personal data file , or takes notice of such data , or extracts , alters , adversely affects , destroys , processes , transfers , discloses , makes accessible to unauthorised persons , or permits such persons to take notice of , such data or anyone who exploits such data in any way whatsoever , shall be punished by imprisonment and a fine and , in the case of sensitive data , by imprisonment for a period of CARDINAL ( DATE and a fine amounting to MONEY ( GRD CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL ( GRD CARDINAL ) , unless otherwise subject to more serious sanctions . ”

NORP In its PERSON judgment of DATE ( Case C-CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) ORG of ORG made clear that , since , in international law , a ORG which incurred liability for a breach of an international commitment was viewed as a single entity , irrespective of whether the breach which gave rise to the damage was attributable to the legislature , the judiciary or the executive , that principle must apply a fortiori in the ORG legal order since all ORG authorities , including the legislature , were bound , in performing their tasks , to comply with the rules laid down by Community law which directly governed the situation of individuals .


The applicant is an NORP national , born in DATE and currently detained in GPE . Before the ORG , he is represented by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

In DATE , the applicant , accused of belonging to a criminal association and of drug - trafficking , was arrested . The suspicions against him were partly based on the content of certain wiretappings .

In an order of CARDINAL DATE , the investigating judge committed the applicant for trial , commencing on DATE before ORG .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE , filed with the registry on CARDINAL DATE , ORG , relying on the content of the wiretappings , sentenced the applicant to DATE imprisonment .

The applicant and ORG lodged an appeal with ORG .

In a judgment of DATE , filed with the registry on DATE , ORG confirmed the first - instance decision .

The applicant appealed on points of law .

In a judgment of DATE , ORG rejected the appeal .


Preliminary objection dismissed (lack of authority);Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 13;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

NORP The applicant company is a private limited company ( osaühing ) , registered in GPE .

On DATE , T. , the lawyer of PERSON , lodged a request with ORG ( maakohus ) for securing a claim by ORG and P. According to PERSON , she had been in the possession of CARDINAL shares ( corresponding to MONEY of the share capital ) of PERSON , a public limited company , which had been unlawfully transformed into the applicant company , PERSON . The defendants had been entered in the commercial register as members of the management board of the company . PERSON submitted that P. intended to sell the company 's buildings at CARDINAL and FAC FAC in GPE . She requested the court to enter a notation in ORG prohibiting the disposal of the buildings concerned .

On DATE ORG granted the request .

On DATE the applicant company appealed against the interlocutory measure .

On DATE ORG annulled the interlocutory measure , as the plaintiff had not lodged the claim with ORG within DATE . This decision became final on DATE .

On DATE ORG ( ringkonnakohus ) took a decision concerning the appeal against the interlocutory measure . It noted that , although the appeal was well - founded , there was no need to quash the challenged decision as it had already been annulled .

On DATE , PERSON 's lawyer lodged a claim against the applicant company with ORG . The plaintiff alleged that she had been a shareholder of ORG , which had been transformed into the applicant company . However , she had not been entered on the list of shareholders of the applicant company after the transformation . She alleged that the P. was about to sell the buildings belonging to the applicant company and that this would be in breach of her rights . She requested that the management board of the applicant company be obliged to transfer to her a share in the value of CARDINAL NORP kroons ( EEK ) and that a notation prohibiting the disposal of the buildings at CARDINAL and FAC Pikk Street be entered in ORG .

On DATE ORG again ordered that a notation prohibiting the disposal of the buildings at CARDINAL and FAC Pikk Street be entered in ORG in order to secure PERSON 's claim .

ORG scheduled CARDINAL preliminary hearings from DATE to CARDINAL DATE . They were adjourned for various reasons : because of the negotiations between the parties to settle the case , the plaintiff 's requests to require documents from the applicant company , the parties ' or their representatives ' absence , the plaintiff 's applications to amend the object of the action and to bring additional claims .

On DATE the judge hearing the case made a ruling concerning her withdrawal . ORG had received copies of several petitions whereby the applicant company 's statutory representatives had requested that criminal proceedings be initiated against the judge concerned and the chairperson of ORG , since they had , allegedly , continuously committed serious crimes against the petitioners , involving denial of human existence , violence and crimes against human rights .

On DATE another judge of ORG made a ruling concerning her withdrawal , since the representatives of the applicant company had made several petitions for initiating criminal proceedings also against her . On DATE CARDINAL further judges ruled on their withdrawal .

By a letter of DATE the chairperson of ORG requested the chairperson of ORG to change the jurisdiction over the matter , since all of the judges of ORG had withdrawn from hearing the case . The chairperson of ORG considered the withdrawals unjustified and returned the case to ORG .

A preliminary hearing of the case was scheduled for DATE . However , on DATE the plaintiff 's lawyer informed ORG that PERSON , the plaintiff , had died on DATE . He requested that the proceedings be suspended . On CARDINAL DATE ORG decided to suspend the proceedings until ascertaining the identity of the plaintiff 's successor .

On DATE ORG resumed the proceedings and invited NORP , PERSON 's heir , to act as the plaintiff .

On DATE ORG held a preliminary hearing . NORP submitted to the court a request to amend the object of the action . ORG , member of the management board of the applicant company , asserted that he had not been authorised to represent the company .

On DATE the court held a preliminary hearing . N. , a member of the management board of the applicant company , again asserted that he had not been authorised to represent the company . The court agreed and decided that he could not take part in the proceedings . It heard the plaintiff 's lawyer and scheduled a new hearing for CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the court again held a preliminary hearing . There appeared the plaintiff 's lawyer ; the applicant company 's representatives lacked due authorisation to act on its behalf . The court concluded the preliminary hearing and scheduled the trial hearing for DATE .

On DATE ORG held a trial hearing in the presence of NORP and his lawyer . PERSON was also present but had no authority to represent the applicant company .

ORG delivered its judgment on DATE . NORP 's claim was granted in part . The court obliged the management board of the applicant company to enter NORP on the list of its shareholders with a share of a nominal value of EEK CARDINAL .

Both the applicant company and NORP appealed against the judgment of ORG . On DATE ORG quashed ORG judgment and remitted the case back to it for fresh examination , since ORG , a shareholder of the applicant company , had not been involved in the proceedings .

On DATE ORG ( NORP ) refused the applicant company leave to appeal .

On DATE the ORG decided to resume the proceedings and to invite ORG to participate therein as a third party . It requested the plaintiff 's lawyer to provide evidence concerning the status of ORG , including on whether this company had been dissolved and , if so , whether there was a successor .

In DATE T. , the plaintiff 's lawyer , and the representatives of the applicant company were unsuccessfully seeking an opportunity to sell the buildings on FAC .

ORG held a preliminary hearing on DATE in the presence of the plaintiff 's representative and ORG who had no authority to represent the applicant company . ORG , registered in GPE , had refused the summonses sent by the court . The hearing was adjourned at the request of the plaintiff 's lawyer in order to find out whether ORG was an existing legal entity .

On DATE the plaintiff 's lawyer informed the court that the parties had started negotiations to settle the case . By DATE it became evident that no agreement could be reached .

On DATE and DATE ORG made requests to the authorities of GPE to receive information on ORG

On DATE ORG received an agreement concluded between the plaintiff and the defendant company whereby they settled the case . On DATE , ORG approved the settlement and annulled its interlocutory measure applied on DATE to secure the action . The plaintiff and the applicant company declared that they abandon their right to appeal against ORG decision whereby the settlement was confirmed .

The relevant provisions of LAW ( ORG põhiseadus ) read as follows :

“ Everyone has the right to the protection of the state and of the law . ...

The law shall protect everyone from the arbitrary exercise of state authority . ”

“ The guarantee of rights and freedoms is the duty of the legislative , executive and judicial powers , and of local governments . ”

“ Everyone whose rights and freedoms are violated has the right of recourse to the courts . Everyone has the right , while his or her case is before the court , to petition for any relevant law , other legislation or procedure to be declared unconstitutional .

The courts shall observe the LAW and shall declare unconstitutional any law , other legislation or procedure which violates the rights and freedoms provided by LAW or which is otherwise in conflict with LAW . ”

“ Everyone has the right to compensation for moral and material damage caused by the unlawful action of any person . ”

The pertinent provisions of LAW ( GPE seadustik ) , applicable until DATE , read as follows :

“ The purpose of civil procedure is to hear and adjudicate civil matters justly and expeditiously . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) A court shall decide on the acceptance of a statement of claim within DATE after the filing thereof .

“ ( CARDINAL ) If a court holds a preliminary hearing , it shall be held within DATE after the filing of the statement of claim . A court shall summon the participants in a proceeding to a preliminary hearing .

( CARDINAL ) If possible , a court session shall be held by the court within DATE after the filing of a statement of claim .

( CARDINAL ) A court shall justify the adjournment of the hearing of a matter . The reason shall be recorded in TIME of the court session . A new court session shall be held within a reasonable period of time . A court shall determine the time and place of a new court session , taking into consideration the opinions of the participants in the proceeding .

( CARDINAL ) If a court adjourns the hearing of a matter for DATE , it shall make a written ruling .

( CARDINAL ) A participant in the proceeding may file an appeal against such ruling if the participant in the proceeding finds that the hearing of the matter is adjourned for an unreasonably long period of time . A ruling of a court of appeal concerning an appeal against such ruling is not subject to appeal . ”

“ An appeal may be filed against a ruling on the suspension of a proceeding . A ruling of a court of appeal concerning an appeal against such ruling is not subject to appeal . ”

( CARDINAL ) The parties and other participants in a proceeding may file an appeal against a ruling of the court of first instance if the right to file an appeal against a ruling is prescribed in this Code , or if the court ruling hinders the further conduct of the proceeding .

In a decision of DATE , ORG of ORG ( case no . CARDINAL - CARDINAL ) held that if no specific deadline had been provided for , the public authorities – ORG in the case at hand – had to perform actions within reasonable time . Otherwise , LAW would be violated . It found that administrative courts were authorised to examine such complaints under LAW ORG seadustik ) .

In a judgment of DATE , the plenary ORG ( case no . CARDINAL ) noted that a right to effective proceedings for one 's protection was guaranteed under LAW , DATE and DATE of the LAW . It would be contrary to LAW to exclude some basic rights from effective judicial protection . ORG concluded that administrative courts were authorised , under LAW , to examine whether certain procedural measures in criminal proceedings – in that case search and seizure – infringed the fundamental rights and freedoms of an individual .

In a judgment of DATE , ORG of ORG ( case no . CARDINAL ) held that even in cases where a person accused of a criminal offence had been removed from his or her office in accordance with the law but he or she was subsequently acquitted or the criminal proceedings against him or her were discontinued , he or she had to have a possibility of obtaining just compensation from the ORG . The court noted that although the matter was not regulated by law , this omission could not exclude the ORG 's responsibility before the individual . It held that in such cases compensation could be claimed on the basis of general principles of law even when no specific legal provisions existed .

In a judgment of DATE , ORG of ORG ( case no . CARDINAL - CARDINAL ) found , relying on LAW and CARDINAL of the LAW , that unlawful act or measure – including inaction or delay – in performing public functions served as grounds for compensation for damage . LAW was considered directly applicable . This case concerned a delay by municipal authorities in privatisation proceedings .


The applicant , Mr PERSON Nosov , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He is represented before the ORG by Mr A. Shepelin , a lawyer practising in GPE . The respondent Government are represented by Mr PERSON , Representative of GPE at ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the limited liability company Azimut - Elita , in which the applicant owned MONEY , sold petrol to the public company GPE .

On DATE PERSON paid a part of the stipulated purchase price . Following unsuccessful attempts to recover the amount outstanding , Azimut - Elita assigned debt to the limited liability company GPE , of which the applicant was , in his submission , director but not the owner . The Government referred to the GPE company as “ belonging ” to the applicant .

In DATE PERSON sued GPE for the amount outstanding and interest thereon .

On DATE ORG of the Kabardino - Balkaria Republic granted the action and awarded Kompanyony MONEY ( “ RUR ” ) . The Kompanyony company was represented by a PERSON , acting on the basis of a form of authority of DATE .

On DATE the Appellate Collegium of ORG of the Kabardino - Balkaria Republic upheld the judgment of DATE . The judgment became enforceable and on DATE a writ of execution was issued .

On DATE Kompanyony assigned the debt to PERSON . , a sole trader . On DATE the writ was submitted to the court bailiffs’ service for enforcement .

As no cassation appeal was lodged within the established time - limit , on DATE the judgment became final .

On an unspecified date in DATE the GPE company went into liquidation pursuant to a judicial decision in unrelated proceedings .

On DATE PERSON assigned the debt to the limited liability company FAC , in which the applicant was , in his submission , director but not the owner . The Government indicated that the company “ belonged ” to the applicant but its director in DATE had been a certain Mr M.

On DATE ORG sued GPE for damages incurred through its failure to comply with the judgment .

On DATE Judge NORP of ORG of ORG issued CARDINAL procedural orders ( определение ) . The first order granted GPE an extension of the time - limit for the submission of a cassation appeal and ordered that the so submitted cassation appeal should be examined . The second order granted GPE a deferral of court fees in connection with its cassation appeal . Both orders were issued on standard printed forms : in the first order the words “ [ the defendant ] refers to the fact that it missed the time - limit because of ” were struck through ; no grounds for granting the extension were given . Similarly , in the second order the words “ [ on the basis of ] the [ defendant ’s ] certificate no . _ _ _ of _ _ _ _ CARDINAL showing its insufficient funds ” were struck through and replaced with the words “ at the [ defendant ’s ] request ” without any further details .

On DATE the applicant filed his objections to the procedural orders which he signed as the director of ORG . He informed the court that he had been the director of ORG from DATE when the company had gone into liquidation without succession . The debt was assigned , by the mediation of PERSON . , to ORG . The applicant argued that , in conformity with LAW ) of LAW , the proceedings could not be re - opened or resumed because the original plaintiff had been liquidated . If the court would nevertheless consider it possible to examine the appeal , he asked that ORG be joined to the proceedings and copies of the request for the extension of the time - limit and statement of appeal be served on it .

On DATE ORG of ORG , sitting in a CARDINAL - judge formation presided over by Judge PERSON , quashed the judgments of CARDINAL DATE and DATE on the ground that the courts had given an incorrect assessment of the relevant facts , and remitted the claim for a new examination . As regards the reasons for the re - opening , the court held as follows :

“ The public company ORG has lodged a cassation appeal ... Pursuant to LAW , the time - limit for lodging a cassation appeal has been extended ...

[ The court ] has not received observations on the points of appeal . The court received a telegram from the Kompanyony company that contained a request to adjourn the proceedings until the evidence showing liquidation of the Kompanyony company had been produced . The request for adjournment was dismissed . ”

ORG instructed the first - instance court to examine whether the PERSON company had gone into liquidation and , if so , discontinue the proceedings in accordance with LAW .

On DATE ORG of the Kabardino - Balkaria Republic discontinued proceedings in the action for damages lodged by FAC on DATE because the underlying judgment had been quashed .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG of the Kabardino - Balkaria Republic issued a new decision . It noted that , according to the information from the tax authorities , ORG had been liquidated . The summons addressed to the company was returned as undelivered . The court held to discontinue the proceedings because the plaintiff failed to appear and ordered the PERSON company to bear RUR CARDINAL in court fees .

On DATE ORG sold the applicant the right to claim the debt and damages arising out of the judgment of DATE . According to a receipt of DATE , the applicant paid the stipulated amount of RUR CARDINAL ( approximately EUR CARDINAL ) in cash .

On an unspecified date the applicant complained to ORG of GPE about the procedural orders of DATE . He referred to the fact that the time - limit had been extended DATE after it had expired , whilst the defendant was a big factory with large administrative staff . Furthermore , he noted that ORG failed to give any reasons for the extension .

On DATE Judge PERSON of ORG responded that there were no grounds for lodging an application for supervisory review . The applicant ’s arguments about the absence of a justification for granting the extension were not addressed in the response .

The Pamir-CARDINAL company sued GPE for the damage incurred through its failure to comply with the judgment of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE ORG of the Kabardino - Balkaria Republic dismissed the Pamir-CARDINAL ’s claim . It noted that the judgment of CARDINAL DATE had been quashed on DATE and that the plaintiff failed to prove the existence of damage and the causal link with the defendant ’s actions .

Articles CARDINAL and DATE provided that organisations could be represented before commercial courts by their bodies , acting within the scope of powers conferred on them by law , regulations or articles of association , or by special representatives acting on the basis of a form of authority .

LAW ) established that the commercial court should discontinue the proceedings if the organisation which was a party to the case was liquidated .

Article CARDINAL provided that the commercial court could extend a time - limit at the request of a party if it established that the party had missed the time - limit for a good reason .

Article CARDINAL set the time - limit for lodging a cassation appeal at DATE after the judgment or decision of the commercial court became enforceable .

Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL required the service of copies of the cassation appeal on all parties to the proceedings , failing which the appeal would be disallowed .


Violation of P1-1;Violation of Art. 6-1;Pecuniary damage - financial award;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant is the owner of an apartment in GPE , which she had let to D.D'A.M.

In a registered letter of DATE , the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on DATE and asked her to vacate the LOC by DATE .

On DATE , she served a notice to quit on the tenant and summoned her to appear before ORG .

By a decision of DATE , which was made enforceable on DATE , ORG upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by DATE .

On DATE and on CARDINAL DATE , the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the LOC .

On DATE , she served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on DATE .

DATE and DATE , the bailiff made CARDINAL attempts to recover possession . Each attempt proved unsuccessful , as , under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension for the staggering of evictions , the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession .

On DATE , the applicant recovered possession of the apartment , because the tenant spontaneously vacated the premises .

The relevant domestic law is described in the ORG 's judgment in the case of ORG GPE [ ORG ] , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , ORG CARDINAL-V.


CASE OF KARANOVIC v. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Violation of Art. 6-1;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses - claim dismissed

NORP In DATE he was granted an old - age pension from the pension fund of the former GPE .

NORP In DATE the applicant left his home in GPE , in what is DATE GPE , and moved to what is DATE PERSON . While he was internally displaced , he received his pension from ORG .

Upon his return to GPE in DATE , the applicant unsuccessfully sought to receive his pension from GPE .

On DATE he complained to ORG .

On DATE ORG joined the applicant ’s case ( no . CH/CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) and those of PERSON and Ms Pašalić ( nos . CH/CARDINAL/CARDINAL and CH/CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) and adopted a single decision . It was read out at a public hearing on DATE . Having been taken by ORG , the decision became final immediately .

ORG held that the applicant ( together with Mr PERSON and PERSON ) was discriminated against in his enjoyment of the right to social security as guaranteed by LAW . The reasons were set out in the decision which reads , in the relevant part , as follows :

“ CARDINAL . In the former ORG ( hereinafter “ SFRY ” ) , civilian pensions were administered by the CARDINAL ORG under their own respective laws and institutions . In addition , the state - level LAW ( ORG no . CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , and CARDINAL ) granted equal minimum rights to every SFRY citizen and regulated the rights of persons who moved from one Republic to another .

Following changes brought about by the armed conflict , pensions in GPE came to be administered by CARDINAL separate funds : ORG hereinafter the “ ORG ” ) , ORG hereinafter the “ ORG ” ) , and ORG ( hereinafter the “ ORG ” ) . ORG and ORG subsequently merged , following a DATE decision by ORG , into ORG ( hereinafter the “ ORG ” ) , which has been operational DATE . Presently there is CARDINAL pension fund in the ORG and one in ORG , and all legislation directly concerning pension systems is made at the Entity level .

The basic calculation schemes for determining rights to pension and disability insurance are different in each entity . CARDINAL result of this has been significantly lower pensions in ORG . In DATE , the average pension in the ORG was CARDINAL [ NORP markas ( BAM ) ] , and the average pension in ORG was CARDINAL [ BAM ] . The minimum pension payment prescribed by law in GPE is CARDINAL [ BAM ] , while the minimum pension in the Republika Srpska is DATE [ BAM ] .

The system of pension insurance in GPE , as inherited from the former SFRY , has been based on the “ pay / go ” principle that salary contributions from current workers support the current pensioners . Thus , money that comes into the system as contributions is immediately paid out as pensions , rather than becoming interest - generating capital from which the interest is paid out as pensions . When the current workers retire , salary contributions from the future generation of workers will finance the current workers’ pensions . Therefore , the pension system as a whole has had the character of a general social insurance system . This is also the case with the current ORG Funds .

On DATE , ORG , ORG , and ORG entered into the Agreement on Mutual Rights and Obligations in Execution of Pension and ORG ( hereinafter the “ LAW ” ) ( ORG , no . CARDINAL , DATE ; PERSON , no CARDINAL/CARDINAL , DATE ) , under which they agreed that the ORG that had made payments to pensioners before the LAW came into force would continue to pay those pensions regardless of the ORG place of temporary or permanent residence . ORG entered into force on DATE ...

ORG , with the authorisation of the Republika Srpska government , unilaterally terminated LAW in DATE ( ORG , no . CARDINAL , DATE ) . According to a DATE report by the ORG High Commissioner for Refugees ( hereinafter “ ORG ” ) , despite its withdrawal from the Agreement , ORG has continued to pay those pensioners already recognised as its beneficiaries . For its part , ORG has declared that it will continue to follow the Agreement and pay its beneficiaries now living in the Republika Srpska .

According to the DATE ORG report , the absence of harmonised legislation between the CARDINAL Entities and the lack of state - level legislation regulating pension and other social benefits causes problems for displaced pensioners and returnees . Specifically , these problems arise from the different pension calculation schemes and different pension amounts in each Entity .

As a practical matter , a person who retired in GPE and held a pension there before the armed conflict , but later began receiving pension payments from ORG after displacement to ORG , would continue , after returning to GPE , to receive the lower pension payment from ORG . Such a returnee , while receiving the smaller ORG pension , would also face a higher cost of living in GPE than in ORG . Moreover , such a returnee would receive a pension much lower than a person who had made similar pension contributions during their working life but remained in the GPE throughout the armed conflict .

Under various inter - state pension benefits agreements , some civil pensioners from ORG who moved to other countries during the armed conflict continue to enjoy their full pension rights from ORG . For example , under LAW GPE and GPE ( ORG on ORG , No . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , DATE ) , the responsible domestic insurer is obligated to pay full rights to a pension beneficiary , even if that person is residing in the other contracting state . According to ORG , no major problems are reported with regard to refugees from GPE and GPE receiving their full pensions in GPE . As of DATE , similar agreements had been signed and implemented between GPE and GPE and GPE and GPE , while other such agreements were in the works . According to ORG , users of pensions from GPE were receiving pensions in CARDINAL countries ( mostly in GPE and GPE ) in DATE .

This disparity leaves no doubt that persons who were internally displaced during the armed conflict are , upon their return , treated differently . Each of the present applicants left GPE in DATE at the outset of the armed conflict . These applicants now receive smaller pensions simply because they left the Federation for a period of time , not on their own free will , to live in LOC . Those who remained enjoy greater pension rights than those who left , even though they may have been identically situated before the armed conflict .

Indeed , it appears that the present applicants ( and others who were internally displaced and have returned to ORG ) are in a worse position than Federation pensioners who moved to other countries during the armed conflict . Many Federation pensioners who moved to other countries during the armed conflict continue to enjoy full pension rights from ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

Moreover , the prospect of returning to live in the Federation ( where the cost of living is higher than in PERSON ) on a smaller ORG pension presents a significant obstacle to the return of displaced persons . The present applicants attest to these difficulties , and the Federation , in its observations , admits that they should have been aware of them ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . CARDINAL of the important objectives of the settlement of the conflict in GPE was to facilitate the return of displaced persons ( see generally the General Framework Agreement for Peace in GPE , Annex CARDINAL ) . The ORG considers that displaced person status is a status relevant for the purposes of LAW ( b ) [ of LAW ] and further finds that the current situation regarding displaced ORG pensions is inimical to the goals of Annex CARDINAL . The only reason put forward for the different treatment is ORG , which , by its terms , makes displaced person status the basis for different treatment . But displaced person status can not serve as a justification for disparate treatment , especially where , as here , it carries with it a connotation of discrimination on ethnic grounds . Under the circumstances , the ORG concludes that the different , poorer treatment of the applicants with regard to their pension payments has no objective justification . ”

ORG made the following orders :

“ CARDINAL . The ORG finds it appropriate to order ORG to take all necessary legislative and administrative actions by DATE to ensure that the applicants are no longer discriminated against in their enjoyment of pension rights guaranteed by LAW , particularly in comparison to those pensioners who remained in the Federation during the armed conflict .

The ORG further orders ORG to compensate each applicant for the difference between the pension that he or she would be due under LAW between the pension funds and the amount the applicant would have received from ORG , from DATE of his or her application to ORG [ i.e. from DATE ] until DATE the GPE ’s compliance with the remedy ordered in paragraph CARDINAL [ immediately above ] . ”

In DATE ( the exact date has not been indicated ) the applicant received CARDINAL NORP markas ( which corresponds to MONEY ) by way of compensation from ORG .

NORP The applicant still receives his pension from ORG . Since the pension legislation has not yet been harmonised between the CARDINAL Entities , pensions in ORG are still generally lower than in GPE . Furthermore , pensioners in PERSON , as opposed to pensioners in GPE , do not receive the nominal amount of their pensions , but MONEY thereof ( this is owing to the financial difficulties of the Entity ) .

The Agreement on Human Rights was signed by GPE and its Entities on DATE , when it entered into force . The following are the relevant provisions :

Article I

“ The Parties shall secure to all persons within their jurisdiction the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms , including the rights and freedoms provided in LAW and its Protocols and the other international agreements listed in the Appendix to this Annex ...

LAW and CARDINAL

To assist in honoring their obligations under LAW , the Parties hereby establish ORG ( the ‘ Commission’ ) . The Commission shall consist of CARDINAL parts : ORG .

ORG and ORG shall consider , as subsequently described :

a. alleged or apparent violations of human rights as provided in LAW and the Protocols thereto , or

b. alleged or apparent discrimination on any ground such as sex , race , color , language , religion , political or other opinion , national or social origin , association with a national minority , property , birth or other status arising in the enjoyment of any of the rights and freedoms provided for in the international agreements listed in the Appendix to this ORG , where such violation is alleged or appears to have been committed by the Parties , including by any official or organ of the Parties , LAW , or any individual acting under the authority of such official or organ .

Article XI § CARDINAL

The Parties shall implement fully decisions of the ORG . ”

On DATE the Parties to ORG extended the mandate of ORG until DATE . On DATE ORG and ORG merged . Special chambers were created within ORG on an interim basis with a mandate to decide on cases received by the former ORG . DATE until DATE , the special chambers were named the “ ORG within the LAW ” ( see the agreement of DATE published in ORG ( “ ORG ” ) no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ) . Although the special chambers continued operating thereafter , they were no longer named ORG within the Constitutional Court ” ( see the agreement of DATE published in ORG no . CARDINAL of DATE ) . The special chambers were also entrusted with a mandate to examine complaints about non - enforcement of the decisions of the former ORG and to issue declarations in this connection ( see Rule CARDINAL of LAW published in ORG no . CARDINAL of DATE and Rule CARDINAL of the Rules of Procedure published in ORG no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ) . The declarations at issue certify that a decision of the former ORG was not fully enforced without affording any redress .

In accordance with LAW NORP zakon ORG ; published in ORG . CARDINAL of DATE and CARDINAL of DATE ; amendments published in ORG . CARDINAL of DATE , CARDINAL of DATE , CARDINAL of DATE , CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL of DATE , CARDINAL of DATE and CARDINAL of DATE ) , non - enforcement of a final and enforceable decision of ORG amounts to a criminal offence :

“ An official of the institutions of GPE , of the Entities or of GPE of GPE , who refuses to enforce a final and enforceable decision of ORG , of ORG , or who prevents the enforcement of any such decision , or who frustrates the enforcement of the decision in some other way , shall be punished by imprisonment for a term DATE . ”


Violation of Art 6-1;Violation of P1-1;Not necessary to examine Art 13;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - award

The applicant was born in DATE and resides in the town of ORG , GPE region , GPE .

The applicant instituted proceedings in the ORG of Donetsk Region against ORG . CARDINAL ( Шахта CARDINAL « Новогродівська » ) - a ORG - owned enterprise - to recover salary arrears and other payments due to her late husband .

On DATE the ORG found in favour of the applicant ( ORG міського суду PERSON області ) and awarded her CARDINAL NORP hryvnias ( “ UAH ” ) . The judgment was sent for enforcement to the ORG ( ORG виконавчої служби PERSON міського управління юстиції ) .

Subsequently , the applicant instituted proceedings in the Novogrodivskyy Town Court of GPE against the Novogrodivskyy Town Bailiffs ' Service for failure to enforce the judgment in her favour . On DATE ORG rejected the applicant 's claim , finding no fault had been committed by ORG . The court stated that ORG had acted properly in enforcing the judgment of CARDINAL DATE . However , by a number of decisions of ORG of GPE , ORG had been prohibited from selling the property of ORG , due to the bankruptcy proceedings which had been initiated against the company . On DATE ORG of GPE rejected the applicant 's appeal in cassation .

In DATE , the applicant instituted another set of proceedings in the ORG of GPE against the Novogrodivskyy Town Bailiffs ' Service for failure to enforce the judgment in her favour . On DATE ORG rejected the applicant 's claim , for the same reasons as before . On DATE ORG upheld the decision of the first instance court of DATE . On DATE ORG rejected the applicant 's appeal in cassation .

NORP In DATE ORG was reorganised and became a structural subdivision of ORG . As the latter thereby became the debtor , in DATE the enforcement proceedings were transferred to ORG ( ORG виконавчої служби LOC міського управління юстиції ) .

The judgment in the applicant 's favour was enforced by instalments , the last amount being paid on DATE .

The applicant instituted proceedings in the ORG of the GPE region against ORG claiming compensation for material and moral damage caused to her by the delay in the enforcement of the judgment in her favour . On DATE the court found against the applicant . On DATE the ORG upheld this judgment . The applicant appealed in cassation and the proceedings are still pending .

NORP The relevant domestic law is summarised in the judgment of ORG v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § CARDINAL , DATE ) .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial

Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Stanislav Shevchuk;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in LOC .

On DATE the applicant instituted proceedings in ORG against a private company , PERSON , for non - fulfilment of its contractual obligations , under which it should have provided the applicant with agricultural products .

On DATE ORG left the applicant ’s complaint without consideration , holding that it fell within the jurisdiction of the commercial courts .

On DATE ORG quashed that ruling and remitted the case for a fresh consideration .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s claims as unsubstantiated .

On DATE ORG quashed that decision and remitted the case for a fresh consideration .

On DATE ORG found in part for the applicant .

On DATE ORG upheld that decision .

On DATE the ORG of ORG , following an objection ( протест ) lodged by its President , quashed the decisions of the lower courts and remitted the case to ORG for a fresh consideration .

On an unspecified date the PERSON company lodged a counterclaim with that court seeking the annulment of the contract .

After DATE the case was reconsidered by the courts at CARDINAL levels of jurisdiction on QUANTITY occasions because the courts of first instance and appeal had committed factual and legal errors in their decisions .

On DATE the ORG allowed the applicant ’s claim in part and ordered the successor of the PERSON company , GPE , to transfer QUANTITY of potatoes , worth CARDINAL NORP hryvnas ( ORG ) , and QUANTITY of wheat , worth UAH MONEY , to the applicant . It also ordered the applicant to return QUANTITY of meat , worth UAH CARDINAL , to GPE .

On DATE ORG upheld that judgment . On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal in cassation .

In the course of the proceedings CARDINAL hearings were adjourned , CARDINAL of which were adjourned due to the applicant ’s failure to attend and the remaining CARDINAL due to the need to call witnesses or due to their or their respondent ’s failure to attend .

On an unspecified date the Bailiffs started enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of DATE .

On DATE ORG modified the procedure of enforcement , ordering the GPE company to pay the applicant ORG CARDINAL for the products due to him under the judgment of DATE .

On DATE ORG , following a request by the ORG company to modify the procedure of enforcement of the judgment of DATE , ordered cross - cancellation of the debts under that judgment in the amount of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL and ruled that ORG was to pay the applicant ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL . The ruling of DATE was not appealed against and became final .

On DATE the judgment of DATE was enforced in full .

In DATE the applicant instituted proceedings against the GPE company , seeking compensation for the difference between the award paid and the in market prices of the products due to him under the judgment of DATE .

On DATE ORG quashed that decision and discontinued the proceedings in the case , holding that the issue had been settled by the final judgment of DATE .

On DATE ORG quashed the decision of CARDINAL DATE and remitted the case for a fresh consideration to ORG , before which it is still pending .