CASE OF STRAN GREEK REFINERIES AND STRATIS ANDREADIS v. GREECE

Preliminary objections rejected (non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, estoppel);Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of P1-1;Pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

Stran Greek Refineries ( " Stran " ) is a company currently in liquidation . Its registered address is in GPE and Mr Stratis Andreadis was its sole shareholder .

ORG Under the terms of a contract concluded on DATE with ORG , which at the time was governed by a military junta , PERSON undertook to construct a crude oil refinery in the NORP region , near GPE . The refinery was to be built , at an estimated cost of MONEY , by a company which it was proposed to form , ORG , of which the second applicant was to be the sole owner . All the latter ’s rights and obligations were to be automatically transferred to the company upon its incorporation .

The Government ratified the contract by Legislative Decree no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , published in ORG of DATE . Under LAW of the contract , the ORG undertook to purchase , not later than DATE , a plot of land in GPE suitable for the construction of the refinery . On DATE , by LAW ( no . CARDINAL ) , issued pursuant to Legislative Decree no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL on " ORG from Abroad " , the ORG authorised PERSON to import MONEY to finance the scheme .

ORG However , the project stagnated because the ORG failed to fulfil its obligation . On DATE the Ministers of Industry and Agriculture announced at a press conference in GPE the Government ’s decision to return to the proprietors the land which had already been expropriated in accordance with LAW . The following day the LOC police ordered that the work should cease .

In DATE PERSON protested to the relevant authorities and sought permission to proceed with the work . On DATE it even issued an extra - judicial summons inviting the ORG to ratify the purchase of the land in question , but the ORG refused to revoke the police order prohibiting the continuation of the work .

ORG Once democracy had been restored , the Government took the view that the contract and Decree no . CARDINAL were prejudicial to the national economy ; they relied on LAW . CARDINAL of Law no . CARDINAL on the termination of preferential contracts ( kharistikes symvasseis ) concluded under the military regime ( DATE ) . This PERSON , which was enacted by special authorisation under LAW ( Article CARDINAL - see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , possessed superior force .

The applicants did not respond to a proposal addressed to them by the Minister for Co - ordination on DATE inviting them to enter negotiations for the revision or termination of the contract . Accordingly , a ministerial committee on the economy terminated the contract on DATE . The applicants did not challenge this decision in the courts .

ORG Prior to the termination of the contract , Stran had incurred expenditure in connection with the scheme . In particular , it had concluded contracts for the supply of goods and services with foreign and NORP undertakings and had taken out loans .

A dispute then arose between GPE and the ORG . On DATE Stran brought an action ( anagnoristiki agogi ) in ORG for a declaration that the ORG should pay it compensation in the amounts of MONEY , MONEY and MONEY . It argued that the ORG had been in breach of its obligations during the period of validity of the contract , in particular in so far as it had , since DATE , prohibited the continuation of work on the construction of the refinery at LOC and had not , since DATE , taken any steps to expropriate the land required for that construction . It also sought the return of a cheque for MONEY which it had lodged with ORG as security for the proper performance of the contract ; it further claimed reimbursement of the commission and the DATE stamp fee paid to ORG .

The ORG challenged the jurisdiction of the court . It contended that the dispute should be referred to arbitration in accordance with LAW , the relevant paragraphs of which were worded as follows :

" CARDINAL . Any difference , dispute or disagreement arising between the ORG and the Concessionaire as to the application of this LAW and relative to the interpretation of the terms and conditions thereof and the extent of the rights and obligations deriving therefrom shall be resolved exclusively by arbitration by CARDINAL arbitrators according to the following procedure , no other arbitration agreement being required .

The arbitration award shall be definite , final and irrevocable , and shall constitute an enforceable instrument requiring no further action for enforcement or any other formality . It shall be liable to no ordinary or extraordinary judicial remedies , nor shall it be subject to cancellation or suspension before ordinary courts of justice . The party failing to comply with the provisions of the arbitration award shall be obligated to make good any and all damage ( damnum emergens or lucrum cessans ) caused to the other party . "

ORG In a preliminary decision ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) of CARDINAL DATE , ORG Instance rejected the ORG ’s main submission . It held that the arbitration clause concerned solely the settlement of disputes arising from the performance of the contract and not the failure of CARDINAL of the parties to perform the contract . It found further that the ministerial committee on the economy had terminated the contract in issue in its entirety ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) which had the effect of rendering the arbitration clause void as it was not an autonomous provision . In addition , the court dismissed the ORG ’s argument that CARDINAL of the conditions subsequent contained in the contract , namely the lodging of a cheque as security and the payment of the second part of the minimum capital , had not been satisfied . Finally , the court ordered additional investigative measures , including the hearing of CARDINAL witnesses , in order to determine the existence and extent of the damage alleged by GPE .

ORG On DATE the ORG filed an arbitration petition and appointed an arbitrator . It requested the arbitration court to declare that all the claims for compensation against ORG lodged by PERSON in ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) were unfounded .

In its memorial of DATE Stran - which had appointed a professor of law at ORG as arbitrator - maintained primarily that the arbitration court lacked jurisdiction and requested that the arbitration be stayed until the proceedings instituted on DATE had been concluded ; in the alternative and in order to rebut the ORG ’s arguments on the merits , it referred the arbitrators to its pleadings in ORG .

ORG The arbitration court was constituted on DATE ; its president was chosen jointly by the CARDINAL other arbitrators ( Article CARDINAL para . CARDINAL of the contract ) . It made its award on DATE .

It found that it had jurisdiction in that , in its view , the disputes arising from the total failure to perform the contract were also subject to arbitration , which was not restricted to those deriving from non - performance of individual clauses as had been argued by the ORG . The wording of the arbitration clause in DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) was sufficiently general and clear to rule out such distinctions .

On the merits , the arbitration court relied on the evidence adduced by the parties before ORG on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . It found that responsibility for the losses sustained by GPE was shared - PERCENT for the ORG and PERCENT for the company . The latter had commenced work on land which had been the subject of a contested expropriation order and without first obtaining the necessary planning permission . It therefore held ORG claims to be well - founded in an amount not exceeding MONEY , MONEY and MONEY , plus interest at PERCENT from DATE ; however , this reference to interest did not appear in the operative part of the decision . Finally , the court declared that the ORG was unlawfully retaining the cheque lodged as security ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

ORG On DATE the applicant company sought an order from ORG requiring the ORG to return the security , but the court stayed the proceedings pending the conclusion of those instituted on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

ORG On DATE the ORG had asked ORG to set aside the arbitration award of DATE .

It argued that the arbitration court had lacked jurisdiction to hear disputes arising from the contract in issue and ORG financial claims against the ORG . In the alternative , it affirmed that the contracting parties had intended to limit the jurisdiction of the arbitration court to disputes concerning the performance and interpretation of the clauses of the contract and the scope of the rights and duties deriving therefrom ; its jurisdiction could not therefore extend to disputes relating to the total failure to perform the contract . It followed that the dispute in question was a matter for the ordinary civil courts , as ORG had recognised in its judgment no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL . In the further alternative , the ORG argued that the arbitration court ’s lack of jurisdiction was confirmed by the fact that ORG claims against it had become statute - barred following the termination of the contract . Finally , it stressed the declaratory nature of the action brought by GPE on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

ORG In a judgment ( no . DATE ) of DATE the GPE court dismissed the ORG ’s application , holding that the decision terminating the contract had not rendered the arbitration clause void . That clause continued to produce its effects in relation to disputes which had arisen during the period of validity of the contract .

ORG On DATE the applicant company withdrew its first action in ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , but sought to pursue its action for the return of the cheque lodged as security ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

When this action was heard in ORG , on DATE , the ORG , relying on LAW , opposed the discontinuance of the first action . It maintained that the latter action would have resulted in a finding unfavourable to GPE and that the ORG thus had a legitimate interest in seeking a final decision .

However , the court again stayed the proceedings ( decision no . DATE ) on account of the appeal on points of law which was pending ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

ORG In a judgment ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) of CARDINAL DATE , ORG , basing its decision on the same grounds , upheld the judgment of DATE .

It ruled , inter alia :

" In modern NORP legislation the principle of the autonomy of an arbitration clause in relation to the contract prevails . The termination of the contract , for whatever reason , does not bring an end to the power of the arbitrators designated to hear disputes which have arisen during the period of validity of the contract ... The decision of the ministerial committee on the economy did not annul the arbitration clause contained in DATE of the contract and , accordingly , it does not preclude the arbitrators from examining the merits of the dispute . "

ORG On DATE the ORG appealed to ORG .

The hearing was initially set down for CARDINAL DATE , but on that date it was postponed to DATE at the ORG ’s request , on the ground that a draft law concerning the case in question was before ORG .

In reply to a question put by ORG at the hearing on DATE , the ORG lawyer maintained that ORG judge - rapporteur had sent his opinion , which had been favourable to the applicants’ arguments , to the parties before DATE and this affirmation was not disputed by the Government .

ORG On CARDINAL DATE ORG enacted PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL on " the compulsory participation of the ORG in private undertakings ... and the redemption of shares " , which entered into force upon its publication in ORG of CARDINAL DATE . This PERSON dealt principally with the renegotiation of a concession for the prospecting for and extraction of oil and natural gas in an area of LOC . However , LAW was worded as follows :

" CARDINAL . The true and lawful meaning of the provisions of Article CARDINAL para . CARDINAL of Law no . CARDINAL concerning the termination of contracts entered into DATE and DATE is that , upon the termination of these contracts , all their terms , conditions and clauses , including the arbitration clause , are ipso jure repealed and the arbitration tribunal no longer has jurisdiction .

Arbitration awards covered by paragraph CARDINAL shall no longer be valid or enforceable .

Any principal or ancillary claims against ORG , expressed either in foreign or local currency , which arise out of the contracts entered into DATE and DATE , ratified by statute and terminated by virtue of PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , are now proclaimed time - barred .

Any court proceedings at whatever level pending at the time of the enactment of this statute , in respect of claims within the meaning of the preceding paragraph , are declared void . "

ORG On DATE , after hearing the opinion of the judge - rapporteur calling for the appeal to be dismissed , ORG delivered its judgment ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . It held that LAW was unconstitutional on the following grounds :

Not only does [ LAW confer superior force on Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , but it also prohibits subsequent amendments or additions thereto , or even authoritative interpretation thereof , in the form of ordinary legislation . The purpose of that superior force and of the provision in LAW requiring that a single law be enacted once and for all within DATE of the entry into force of the LAW was to ensure legislative stability and international confidence for investments in GPE . This opinion is based on the only possible meaning to be attributed to the expression ‘ single law to be enacted once and for all’ and on the ease with which the said provision would be flouted if amendments , additions or authoritative interpretation of that law were allowed ...

It follows that ... the provisions of LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL which purport to provide an authoritative interpretation of and to amend and supplement LAW . CARDINAL of Law no . CARDINAL and which were enacted after the expiry of the time - limit laid down in LAW para . CARDINAL of the LAW are contrary to that instrument . In accordance with LAW para . CARDINAL of the LAW the court is therefore precluded from applying them . The ORG refuses to apply unconstitutional provisions and , pursuant to LAW para . CARDINAL of the Code of Civil Procedure , holds that it is bound to refer the case to ORG sitting in plenary session ... "

ORG The hearing in ORG sitting in plenary session opened on DATE , but as a result of the death of CARDINAL of its members Stran sought a new hearing , which was held on DATE .

ORG delivered its judgment ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) on DATE . It observed , inter alia :

" ... [ The LAW ] provides for the enactment of ‘ a single law to be enacted once and for all’ which by definition possesses superior force inasmuch as it may be neither supplemented nor amended by ordinary legislation ... However , the prohibition on supplementing or modifying the content of [ such ] laws does not mean that they may never be interpreted . The fact that they are sui generis , which gives them precedence over ordinary legislation , ... does not preclude their interpretation where the circumstances so require . The purpose of such interpretation is not to amend the substance of the law interpreted , but to clarify its original meaning and to resolve disputes that have arisen in connection with its application or which may do so in the future . [ The need for such interpretation ] will ultimately be determined by the court which will have to ascertain whether the meaning of the law interpreted actually gave rise to doubts justifying the intervention of the legislature ... Accordingly , the interpretation of LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL is not contrary to LAW merely because it is a law of superior rank . It must nevertheless be determined , on the one hand , whether the interpretation was necessary in the specific case and , on the other , whether the non - interpretative provisions of this PERSON , which have a bearing on the solution of the case in issue , are contrary to LAW ... The wording [ of LAW para . CARDINAL of Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ] lacks clarity and creates doubt as to whether the arbitration clause survives the termination of the contract ... and as to the jurisdiction of the arbitration court . In the instant case doubt first arose in the course of the proceedings brought by [ the applicants ] in the ordinary civil court and again - following the preliminary decision of ORG - when those proceedings had been discontinued and recourse was had to arbitration , where diametrically opposed arguments were put forward ... Irrespective of those doubts , the main issue is the acceptance or rejection of the principle of the autonomous character of the arbitration clause and of its scope . For a long time this matter has been the subject of significant differences of opinion in international case - law and among legal writers . In some countries the principle of the survival of the clause to resolve disputes arising prior to the termination of contracts ... prevails . In other countries the dominant view is that termination of the contract entails the annulment of the clause and therefore the referral of all the disputes to the ordinary courts . In other countries again , the accepted view is that the autonomous character of the arbitration clause operates only in respect of certain types of dispute . It was therefore necessary to provide an interpretation of PERSON no . PERSON and that interpretation resolved the problem for the purposes of NORP law by opting for the annulment of arbitration clauses ... and the removal of jurisdiction from the arbitration court . The fact that the intervention of the legislature occurred ... DATE before the hearing in ORG of this ORG and following a previous adjournment does not mean that it was not necessary and does not render it contrary to LAW paras . CARDINAL and CARDINAL and ORG CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the LAW . The dispute in question provided the opportunity to resolve a problem which had already arisen . Consequently , it can not be concluded that , in giving such an interpretation in this case , the legislature interfered with the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and usurped that jurisdiction . It follows that , contrary to the finding of ORG , Article CARDINAL para . CARDINAL of Law no . DATE is not in breach of the LAW ... "

ORG took the view that paragraph CARDINAL of Article CARDINAL was not unconstitutional as it essentially supplemented paragraph CARDINAL and sought to deprive of effect any arbitration awards that were made after the termination of contracts and that would not have been made if the meaning of PERSON no . PERSON had been clarified in time . In addition , the court refused to examine the constitutionality of paragraph CARDINAL , finding that it had no bearing on the case before it . Finally , it held that the adoption of paragraph CARDINAL shortly before the hearing purported to remove from the courts the possibility of determining the validity of the contested award . That provision therefore violated the principle of the separation of powers .

ORG remitted the case to ORG which , on DATE , quashed ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) and declared void the arbitration award of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

ORG The following provisions of LAW are relevant here :

" CARDINAL . The authentic interpretation of the laws shall rest with the legislative power .

A law which is not truly interpretative shall enter into force only as of its publication . "

" The courts shall be bound not to apply laws , the contents of which are contrary to LAW . "

" CARDINAL . Legislation of higher formal rank enacted before DATE pertaining to the protection of foreign capital shall continue to possess such rank and shall be applicable to capital imported henceforth .

A single law to be enacted once and for all within DATE of the entry into force of this LAW shall specify the terms and the procedure for the termination or revision of preferential administrative agreements or measures concluded or promulgated between DATE and DATE pursuant to Legislative Decree no . DATE , in so far as such agreements or measures concern the investment of foreign capital ... "

According to legal writers , the reference in LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL - which provides , inter alia , that arbitration is to constitute the sole means of resolving disputes concerning foreign investment - confers constitutional status on such arbitration ( LAW , edited by PERSON and PERSON , GPE / GPE , PERSON , DATE , p. CARDINAL ) .

ORG LAW provides , inter alia , as follows :

" The plaintiff may withdraw the action without the consent of the defendant before the latter has filed pleadings on the merits of the case . He may not so withdraw at a later stage if the defendant objects to the withdrawal on the ground that he has a legitimate interest in the proceedings being concluded by a final decision . "

" The effect of the withdrawal of the action is that it shall be deemed never to have been brought ... "

The VIIth section of LAW ( Articles CARDINAL - CARDINAL ) deals with arbitration . The relevant provisions are as follows :

" The arbitrator ... shall , unless stipulated otherwise in the arbitration clause , file the original of the arbitration award with the registry of ORG within whose jurisdiction the decision was given ... "

" CARDINAL . The ordinary remedies do not lie against arbitration awards .

The arbitration agreement may specify an appeal against the arbitration award before different arbitrators ... , but it must at the same time define the conditions , the time - limit and the procedure to be followed for the exercise of such a remedy and for the decision thereon . "

" If the arbitration agreement does not specify the appeal provided for in LAW para . CARDINAL or if the time - limit for filing such an appeal has expired , the arbitration award shall become final ... "

" The arbitration award may be annulled , in whole or in part , only by judicial decision and on the following grounds :

( CARDINAL ) where the arbitration agreement is void ;

( CARDINAL ) where it was made after the arbitration agreement had ORG ceased to be valid ;

( CARDINAL ) where the arbitrators were designated in breach of the ORG terms of the arbitration agreement or of the statutory provisions ... ;

( CARDINAL ) where the arbitrators exceeded the powers attributed ORG to them under the arbitration agreement or by statute ;

( CARDINAL ) where the provisions of Articles CARDINAL para . CARDINAL , CARDINAL and ORG have been infringed ;

( CARDINAL ) where it is contrary to public policy and morality ;

( CARDINAL ) where it is incomprehensible or where it contains ORG contradictory provisions ;

" CARDINAL . Enforcement may be effected solely pursuant to an enforceable decision .

The following decisions shall be enforceable :

( b ) arbitration awards ;

" CARDINAL . Enforcement may be effected solely on the basis of the copy of the enforceable decision bearing the stamp conferring authority to execute ...

Endorsement with the stamp conferring authority to execute shall be effected :

( d ) in respect of arbitration awards by the judge of the First Instance Court ... ;

Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , which was enacted pursuant to LAW CARDINAL of the LAW , made possible the revision or revocation of any administrative measure of ratification , issued DATE and DATE , and any contract concluded by the ORG during that period with a legal or a natural person and concerning the investments governed by Legislative Decree no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL . Such measures or contracts were to be revised or terminated where they were incompatible with the LAW or other laws or contrary to morality , and prejudicial to the interests of the ORG , consumers and the national economy .

The contracts were to be terminated where it proved impossible to revise them in their entirety . Termination could be effected at the written request of the person concerned or unilaterally by the ministerial committee on the economy .

Article CARDINAL para . CARDINAL of the PERSON described the consequences of termination in the following terms :

" Following the termination of a contract ... the special privileges and agreements shall cease to have effect and the undertaking or investment shall be subject to the ordinary laws governing ordinary undertakings and investments ... "


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Ann Power-Forde;Dean Spielmann;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

The applicant , a retired captain , worked for ORG ( ORG plovba ORG . ) , a ORG - owned company , from DATE until DATE and from DATE until DATE . On DATE the applicant concluded a temporary contract of work , renewed several times until DATE , with ORG , GPE , GPE , CARDINAL of the parent companies of ORG In DATE the applicant retired due to his disability and back pain .

On DATE the applicant instituted proceedings before ORG against ORG and ORG , seeking recognition of his permanent work status since DATE , his reinstatement and a pecuniary award , inter alia , for the loss of wages .

After CARDINAL hearings , on DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s claim . Both parties appealed .

On DATE the Higher ORG upheld both appeals in part and remitted the case for re - examination . The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the rejected part of the appeal .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal on points of law . He lodged a constitutional complaint .

In the framework of the remitted proceedings , on DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s claim . He lodged an appeal .

NORP On DATE the second - instance court upheld the applicant ’s appeal in part and amended the first - instance decision . He lodged an appeal on points of law .

On DATE ORG rendered a decision rejecting the applicant ’s appeal . He lodged a constitutional complaint .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s constitutional complaint ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE ORG dismissed the second constitutional complaint ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the applicant instituted proceedings against ORG and against ORG , seeking a declaration of employment since DATE , social cover and payment of salaries due since DATE . He also requested an interlocutory injunction .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s request for an interlocutory injunction concerning the termination of his contract and social cover . He lodged an appeal against this decision which was rejected on DATE .

After CARDINAL hearings , on DATE ORG dismissed his claim . He lodged an appeal .

On DATE the second - instance court rejected his appeal . He lodged an appeal on points of law .

On DATE ORG rejected the appeal . He lodged a constitutional complaint on DATE and the proceedings appear to be still pending .

On DATE the applicant instituted proceedings before ORG against a decision of the Pension and Invalidity Insurance Fund .

DATE and DATE CARDINAL hearings were held and CARDINAL experts appointed .

At the last hearing the first - instance court delivered a judgment upholding the applicant ’s claim in part . The defendant appealed .

On DATE the Higher ORG upheld the applicant ’s appeal in part and amended the first - instance judgment .

On DATE the applicant instituted proceedings before ORG challenging a decision of ORG issued on DATE .

On DATE the applicant amended his claim by also challenging a decision of ORG issued on DATE .

On DATE the first - instance court decided that the proceedings should be separated ( reference number of the new set of proceedings Ps DATE ) .

On DATE the first - instance judgment was rendered and his request was upheld in part . The applicant appealed .

On DATE ORG upheld his appeal in part and modified the first - instance judgment .

Following the decision of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) ORG issued a judgment on DATE . The applicant ’s request was upheld in part and the remainder remitted for re - examination before ORG . The defending party appealed .

On DATE ORG upheld the appeal and remitted the case for re - examination before the firstinstance . The proceedings appear to be still pending .

On DATE the applicant instituted proceedings before ORG challenging a decision concerning his unemployment benefits and payment of social security .

On CARDINAL DATE the latter rendered a judgment , dismissing the applicant ’s request . This decision was served on the applicant on DATE . He did not appeal .

On DATE the applicant started proceedings against the Pension and Invalidity Insurance Fund challenging a decision on payment of his salaries .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s claim . This decision was served on the applicant on DATE . He did not appeal .

For relevant domestic law see PERSON v. GPE ( ( dec . ) no . CARDINAL , DATE ) .


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Art. 5-1-a;Violation of Art. 5-5;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - award

András Sajó;Françoise Tulkens;Guido Raimondi;Kristina Pardalos;Nona Tsotsoria

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

In DATE the applicant was sentenced to DATE imprisonment for armed robbery by ORG in GPE . ( ORG subsequently held that the unfairness of the underlying proceedings gave rise to a violation of LAW by the NORP authorities and awarded the applicant just satisfaction : PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , ORG ) . The end date of this sentence was DATE .

On DATE the applicant was transferred to GPE . On DATE ORG in GPE held that he was to serve the remainder of his sentence under a strict regime in a NORP prison ( fegyház ) and that he could be released on parole after serving CARDINAL of the term , i.e. on DATE .

The applicant appealed . On DATE the Attorney ORG intervened in the case , filing a motion for remedy in support of the applicant . The ORG argued that the service of the applicant 's sentence under a strict regime constituted an undue aggravation of his penal situation , in breach of LAW , which entailed that he could be released on probation only belatedly .

On DATE ORG quashed ORG decisions concerning the regime of the applicant 's transferred sentence and his conditional release , holding that they were unlawful . It held that the best approximation of the NORP sentence in NORP law was to have imposed a medium regime ( börtön ) on the applicant for the remainder of his prison term , release on parole then being possible after having served DATE of the sentence .

On DATE the applicant was released .

Subsequently , the applicant brought an official liability action against ORG . He claimed compensation for the fact that , because of that court 's wrong reconciliation of the NORP and NORP penitentiary rules , he had been released on parole only on DATE , whereas under the medium regime he could have already been released in DATE . He also sought damages for having erroneously spent DATE and DATE in a strict - regime prison .

After divergent decisions , on DATE ORG finally dismissed the action . Concerning the belated release , it held that , although ORG interpretation of the law had been overruled , there was no indication that it had carried out the complex task of reconciling the inconsistent NORP and NORP rules with gross negligence giving rise to tort liability . As to the period wrongly spent in a strict - regime prison , it noted that the applicant had not substantiated that he had sustained any actual damage .

DATE , criminal proceedings were conducted against the applicant in GPE for the abuse of firearms . On DATE the ORG sentenced him to DATE suspended imprisonment . The court observed that unlicensed firearms had been found in the applicant 's car and , in so doing , it relied on the testimony of several witnesses . It took into account the extreme protraction of the case since DATE as a crucial mitigating circumstance entailing a suspended sentence .

On DATE ORG upheld this judgment . On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's petition for review .

The Convention on ORG ( NORP Treaty Series no . CARDINAL ) provides as follows :

“ The enforcement of the sentence shall be governed by the law of the administering ORG and that ORG alone shall be competent to take all appropriate decisions . ... ”

“ CARDINAL . In the case of continued enforcement , the administering State shall be bound by the legal nature and duration of the sentence as determined by the sentencing ORG .

If , however , this sentence is by its nature or duration incompatible with the law of the administering ORG , or its law so requires , that ORG may , by a court or administrative order , adapt the sanction to the punishment or measure prescribed by its own law for a similar offence . As to its nature , the punishment or measure shall , as far as possible , correspond with that imposed by the sentence to be enforced . It shall not aggravate , by its nature or duration , the sanction imposed in the sentencing ORG , nor exceed the maximum prescribed by the law of the administering ORG . ”

“ In the case of conversion of sentence , the procedures provided for by the law of the administering ORG apply . When converting the sentence , the competent authority : ...

d. shall not aggravate the penal position of the sentenced person , and shall not be bound by any minimum which the law of the administering ORG may provide for the offence or offences committed . ”


Preliminary objection joined to merits (non-exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Art. 2 (procedural aspect);Not necessary to examine Art. 6-1;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - domestic proceedings;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

On DATE the applicant ’s CARDINAL-year - old wife was about to give birth to their child . She was admitted to a hospital of the ORG at TIME As there was no progress in the delivery and the child showed signs of heart distress , on DATE at TIME a decision was taken to perform a caesarean section . Epidural anaesthesia was administered , as a result of which she went into a coma . All resuscitation efforts failed . The applicant ’s wife was subsequently transported to the intensive therapy unit , where she died on DATE .

A child PERSON was born by a caesarean section , suffering from serious health problems , mostly of a neurological character . He requires permanent medical attention .

On DATE the applicant , represented by his father , requested that an investigation of the causes of his wife ’s death be instituted . His request was complied with on DATE . On DATE a post mortem was carried out . A medical opinion prepared immediately thereafter noted , among others , the necessity of obtaining a medical expert opinion as to the circumstances which had led to her death .

On DATE the Wrocław - Krzyki District Prosecutor requested that the medical records of the applicant ’s wife should be submitted to the prosecuting authorities .

On DATE the applicant was interviewed by ORG .

On DATE the Wrocław - Krzyki District Court , at the request of ORG , released the physicians who had dealt with the delivery from their obligation to respect professional secrecy in order to obtain their testimony .

On DATE , CARDINAL , DATE ORG questioned medical staff dealing with the delivery and treatment of the applicant’ s wife as to the circumstances of her death .

NORP In a letter submitted on DATE the applicant requested ORG to hear additional witnesses . On DATE the Wroclaw - Krzyki District Prosecutor questioned CARDINAL other witnesses .

On DATE ORG , having regard to the results of the inquiry , instituted a criminal investigation into a suspected offence of manslaughter , punishable under LAW .

On DATE ORG decided to obtain a medical expert opinion from ORG as to the treatment administered to the applicant ’s wife .

On DATE and DATE and CARDINAL March CARDINAL the ORG heard further witnesses .

In a letter of DATE ORG returned the case - file , explaining that it would not be able to prepare the opinion . On DATE ORG decided to obtain a medical expert opinion from ORG . Apparently the investigations were later stayed .

In DATE ORG resumed the investigations , having obtained an expert opinion prepared by CARDINAL medical experts of ORG .

By a decision of DATE ORG discontinued the investigations considering , in the light of the medical records , the testimony of the witnesses and the medical expert opinion , that the medical staff concerned had no case to answer . However , on the applicant ’s appeal , the investigations were subsequently resumed by a decision of DATE . ORG considered that the investigations had been discontinued prematurely , without all necessary evidence having been taken and without the facts relevant for the decision having been sufficiently established . He decided that the anaesthesiologists dealing with the delivery should be questioned again in order to elucidate discrepancies between their testimony and that further experts should be appointed with a view to establishing whether the conditions of the delivery could have had a negative impact on the health condition of the applicant ’s son .

On DATE and DATE ORG questioned again the CARDINAL anaesthesiologists involved in the treatment of the applicant ’s wife .

On DATE ORG decided to obtain another expert opinion from ORG .

Four experts of ORG prepared an opinion dated DATE and submitted it to ORG on DATE , noting , inter alia , that the applicant ’s son had died as a result of the damage he suffered during the delivery . The experts concluded , referring to the medical records of the case , that no criminal offence had been committed , the failure to reverse the result of anaesthesia not being a consequence of medical negligence .

In a letter dated CARDINAL DATE ORG informed ORG about an editorial error in its opinion in so far as it contained a reference to the death of the applicant ’s son .

On DATE ORG questioned another witness . In a letter submitted on DATE the applicant and his father contested the medical expert opinion of DATE containing among other things the wrong information about the death of the applicant ’s son as a result of damage he had suffered during the delivery . They submitted that this error indicated that the opinion had not been prepared with the requisite care and attention to detail .

On DATE ORG decided to obtain an additional expert opinion from ORG . On DATE this opinion was submitted . It further contained answers to the CARDINAL questions posed by the applicant .

On DATE the ORG discontinued the investigations . In his decision he relied on the medical expert opinion which stated that the treatment of the applicant ’s wife and the handling of the delivery , i.e. the caesarean section , epidural anaesthesia and reanimation had been carried out properly and had been adequate given her state of health and the circumstances . They could not have contributed to the deterioration of her condition or led to her subsequent death .

On DATE the applicant appealed against the decision of DATE .

On CARDINAL DATE the Wrocław - Krzyki District Court upheld the contested decision . It considered that the evidence obtained during the investigation had not provided any grounds on which to bring charges against the medical staff . It also referred to CARDINAL medical expert opinions ( from ORG , PERSON , PERSON and FAC ) according to which the medical treatment of the applicant ’s wife during and after the delivery of birth was not improper . Consequently , no action or omission of a criminal character could have caused her death .

On DATE the Wrocław - Krzyki District Court rejected the applicant ’s appeal of CARDINAL DATE against the decision of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE ORG , at the applicant ’s request , questioned a new medical expert in connection with the circumstances of the death of the applicant ’s wife .

On DATE ORG resumed the investigations , which had been terminated by the decision of DATE .

On DATE , DATE , CARDINAL , DATE , CARDINAL May and DATE ORG questioned the medical staff involved in the dealing with the delivery .

On DATE the ORG submitted to the prosecuting authorities CARDINAL expert opinions prepared for the purposes of disciplinary proceedings which were pending at that time ( see § § DATE and CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE ORG ordered another expert opinion from ORG . Subsequently , it urged the Institute several times to accelerate the preparation of the opinion . On DATE the opinion , prepared by CARDINAL experts , was submitted to ORG . The opinion also contained answers to the CARDINAL questions posed by the applicant .

On DATE ORG interviewed CARDINAL witness .

On DATE the applicant submitted an unsolicited expert opinion prepared by CARDINAL physicians .

On DATE ORG discontinued the investigations . He had regard , inter alia , to the medical expert opinion prepared by experts from ORG , which had stated that the caesarean section , epidural anaesthesia and reanimation had been adequate , given to the condition of the applicant ’s wife and the circumstances .

CARDINAL On DATE the applicant appealed against this decision .

On DATE the ORG decided to quash the contested decision . The Prosecutor observed that the evidence gathered so far in the case was incomplete in that it did not allow for the establishment of the relevant facts . Certain facts relevant for the assessment of the case had to be established , in particular the kind and exact amounts of medication administered to the applicant ’s wife before the caesarean section . Further , certain discrepancies between various depositions of the anaesthesiologist PERSON had to be elucidated . It also seemed that there might have been some errors in the medical records which should be further investigated .

On DATE , DATE and CARDINAL DATE the District Prosecutor heard witnesses . On CARDINAL DATE experts from GPE who had prepared the opinion for the purposes of the disciplinary proceedings pending before ORG were also questioned . On DATE and CARDINAL DATE other witnesses were heard .

On an unspecified date in DATE the prosecuting authorities requested that an additional expert opinion be prepared by ORG of ORG . This opinion is currently being prepared and the file of the investigations has been sent to the Institute .

The proceedings are pending .

On DATE the applicant submitted a request to ORG to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the anaesthetist , PERSON On DATE ORG started an inquiry concerning the causes of death of the applicant ’s wife .

On DATE the inquiry was stayed , the ORG having regard to the parallel criminal investigations which were being conducted at that time by ORG .

On DATE , after the decision of ORG DATE concerning the discontinuance of the criminal proceedings had become final , the proceedings were resumed .

On DATE the ORG requested additional expert opinions from CARDINAL experts from GPE . The opinions were submitted on DATE .

On DATE ORG decided to transmit the disciplinary case concerning the death of the applicant ’s wife to the ORG .

On DATE the ORG transmitted the case - file to ORG .

On DATE ORG in PERSON stayed the proceedings against GPE pending the outcome of the further criminal investigations concerning the death of the applicant ’s wife . It had regard to the fact that on DATE PERSON had allowed the applicant ’s appeal against a decision of DATE to discontinue the proceedings ( see § CARDINAL above ) . The court further observed that a motion to impose disciplinary sanctions had been submitted to that court by ORG only on DATE . The court noted that the disciplinary liability of the physician concerned had become prescribed under the relevant provisions of ORG . However , as the criminal investigations were still pending , the period of prescription “ could be prolonged ” , pursuant to the provisions of LAW .

The proceedings are pending .

On DATE the applicant , acting also on behalf of his son PERSON , lodged a compensation claim against the hospital and against the hospital ’s insurance company with ORG . He claimed a DATE pension for the child , just satisfaction for non - pecuniary damage they had suffered as a result of death of their mother and wife , and compensation for the funeral costs . He argued that his wife ’s death and his son ’s health problems had resulted from negligence in the handling of the anaesthesia administered to his wife during the birth . In passing , he observed that the experts who had prepared the opinion for the criminal investigation had stated that his son had also died ; this was an example , in his view , of how badly the opinion had been prepared .

On DATE the applicant was partly exempted from a court fee .

At a hearing held on DATE ORG ordered that the full medical records of the applicant ’s wife ’s case be submitted in evidence and that the file of the criminal investigations which were pending at that time be also submitted .

On DATE ORG held a hearing . The applicant informed the court that the disciplinary proceedings were pending before ORG . The court decided to request information about the state of the proceedings and any possible expert opinions from the ORG .

In DATE the applicant requested the court to admit in evidence an expert opinion he had privately commissioned before the lodging of the civil case ( see § DATE above ) . This request was apparently refused .

By a decision of DATE ORG stayed the proceedings until the end of the disciplinary proceedings . The court referred to CARDINAL opinions which had been prepared in these proceedings and which indicated that it was likely that certain irregularities had indeed taken place when handling the delivery . The court considered that in these circumstances it was reasonable to stay the proceedings until the disciplinary proceedings had come to an end as their outcome was relevant for the further conduct and , possibly , the outcome of the civil case .

The applicant appealed , arguing , inter alia , that the disciplinary court of ORG which could eventually be called upon to give a ruling in this case , was composed of CARDINAL physicians and just CARDINAL judge , which rendered these proceedings inherently unfair in that it was unlikely that it would be fully impartial .

By a decision of DATE ORG rejected the appeal as having been lodged outside the applicable time - limit .

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE the applicant applied for the resumption of the stayed proceedings , arguing that in any event the civil court was not bound by the conclusions of the organs of the professional association of physicians .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG refused to resume the stayed proceedings on the ground that a team of specialists had been charged with the preparation of the opinion for the purpose of the disciplinary proceedings in order to assess the medical procedures followed in the case and such opinions had already been partly prepared . Their conclusions indicated possible negligence on the part of the medical staff involved ; in addition , the medical records of the applicant ’s late wife had been included in the files of the disciplinary proceedings , which were already well advanced . Hence , a decision of the disciplinary court could influence the judgment to be given in the civil proceedings .

On DATE the applicant requested the civil court to take measures in order to have the disciplinary proceedings accelerated .

In a letter of DATE ORG in PERSON informed ORG that the proceedings were still pending , that on DATE charges would be brought against PERSON and that the files of the case would be sent , together with a motion for the imposition of a disciplinary penalty , to ORG of ORG .

On DATE ORG informed the applicant that the civil proceedings would be resumed after the disciplinary proceedings had come to an end .

On DATE a motion to have a disciplinary penalty imposed on PERSON was submitted to ORG .

By a letter of DATE , in reply to a query submitted by the civil court on DATE , the Regional Agent for Disciplinary Matters of the local ORG reiterated that on DATE the case had been submitted to the disciplinary court .

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE the applicant requested the civil court to resume the proceedings . The applicant emphasised that there had been no progress whatsoever in the disciplinary proceedings since DATE , when the disciplinary case had been brought to the court . This delay could only be attributed to the unwillingness of ORG to conduct an effective investigation into the medical negligence which was arguably involved in his case . He invoked the possibility that any disciplinary liability would be prescribed as a result of the lapse of time .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s request for the proceedings to be resumed , considering that they should remain stayed until the criminal proceedings pending before FAC were completed .

The proceedings are pending .

The Chambers of Physicians’ Act of CARDINAL DATE established ORG as a professional organisation of physicians . Membership of a local ORG is mandatory . The disciplinary responsibility of physicians for professional misconduct may be determined in proceedings before the organs of the ORG , i.e. agents for disciplinary matters and disciplinary courts . Agents and members of the courts for each region are elected by members of a local chamber . The Chief Agent for ORG and ORG are elected by ORG , composed of delegates of local chambers .

DATE . Pursuant to LAW , the following penalties may be imposed in disciplinary proceedings : a warning , a reprimand , suspension of the right to practise medicine for a period from DATE and striking off the register of physicians .

The procedure to be followed in disciplinary proceedings is governed by the Order on Procedure in Disciplinary Proceedings issued by the Minister of Health on DATE .

NORP Under this Order , the agent for disciplinary matters must investigate the matter if he obtains credible information that the rules of professional conduct have been infringed . When investigating such a complaint , the agent may question a physician charged with professional misconduct , may appoint experts and question witnesses , and take such other evidence as he or she sees fit . A physician charged with professional misconduct is entitled to make any submissions which in his or her opinion are relevant .

If information existing at the time when investigations are instituted , or gathered in the course of an investigation , is sufficient to charge a physician with professional misconduct , an agent shall draw up a motion to the court for a disciplinary penalty to be imposed , containing a detailed description of the alleged offence and written grounds .

Pursuant to LAW , the agent shall discontinue proceedings if he concludes that the material gathered in the case does not suffice for drawing up a motion for a penalty to be imposed .

A complainant may lodge an appeal against this decision with the Chief Agent for Disciplinary Matters . A further refusal of the Chief Agent may be appealed against to ORG .

Under LAW , if the court , having received a motion for a penalty to be imposed , decides that the case is ready for examination at a hearing , it orders that a hearing be held . A physician is summoned to a hearing , whereas his defence counsel and the agent are informed of its date .

Under LAW , in disciplinary proceedings the complainant is entitled to : submit a request for evidence to be taken , lodge with the disciplinary court an appeal against the agent ’s decision to discontinue the proceedings , and lodge an appeal against a decision of a first - instance court on the merits , but only on the question of responsibility . The complainant is entitled to have access to the case - file , but the agent can limit this access to documents which are not covered by medical secrecy .

DATE . Pursuant to LAW , the proceedings before the court are public for members of ORG .

Under LAW of LAW Civil Code , the ORG is liable for damage caused by its agents in the exercise of their functions . There is established case - law of the NORP courts to the effect that this liability of the ORG includes also liability for damage caused by medical treatment in a public system of medical care , run either by the ORG or by the municipalities .

LAW provides that a person who unintentionally causes the death of a human being shall be sentenced to imprisonment for DATE .

On DATE the Law of DATE on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time ( LOC o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki ) ( “ the DATE Law ” ) entered into force . Under LAW read in conjunction with LAW , a party to pending proceedings may ask for the proceedings to be speeded up and/or request just satisfaction for their unreasonable length .

The PERSON lays down various legal means designed to counteract and/or provide redress for undue delays in judicial proceedings .

The relevant part of LAW reads :

The relevant parts of DATE provide :

“ CARDINAL . The complaint shall be examined by the court immediately above the court conducting the impugned proceedings . ”

DATE , in its relevant part , reads :

“ CARDINAL . A complaint about the unreasonable length of proceedings shall be lodged while the proceedings are pending . ... ”

Article CARDINAL provides for measures that may be applied by the court dealing with the complaint . The relevant part provides :

“ CARDINAL . The court shall dismiss a complaint which is unjustified .

NORP If the court considers that the complaint is justified , it shall find that there was an unreasonable delay in the impugned proceedings .

At the request of the complainant , the court may instruct the court examining the merits of the case to take certain measures within a specified time . Such instructions shall not concern the factual and legal assessment of the case .

NORP If the complaint is justified the court may , at the request of the complainant , grant ... just satisfaction in an amount not exceeding PLN CARDINAL,CARDINAL to be paid by ORG . If such just satisfaction is granted it shall be paid out of the budget of the court which conducted the delayed proceedings . ”

Article CARDINAL provides for an additional compensatory remedy :

“ CARDINAL . A party whose complaint has been allowed may seek compensation from ORG ... for the damage it suffered as a result of the unreasonable length of the proceedings . ”

Article CARDINAL further specifies :

“ A party which has not lodged a complaint about the unreasonable length of the proceedings under LAW ) may claim – under LAW ... DATE compensation for the damage which resulted from the unreasonable length of the proceedings after the proceedings concerning the merits of the case have ended . ”


Giovanni Bonello;Ján Šikuta;Josep Casadevall;Lech Garlicki;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä;Stanislav Pavlovschi

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint with ORG . He claimed that his neighbour , who lived upstairs , had carried out illegal construction work as a result of which the walls of the applicant 's flat had begun to crack .

On DATE an on - site inspection was conducted by the authorities .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint about the inactivity of the authorities with ORG ( PERSON ) .

On DATE the ORG discontinued the proceedings . It was found that the work had been carried out in conformity with the law . The applicant appealed to ORG .

On DATE the applicant 's complaint about inactivity was transferred to ORG . It appears that the proceedings concerning this complaint remained dormant until DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint about inactivity with the Minister of the Interior .

On DATE his complaint of CARDINAL DATE was transferred to ORG .

On DATE his complaint was transferred to ORG .

On DATE ORG found the complaint about inactivity , not specifying which one , well - founded and fixed a new time - limit for the authorities to take all necessary action .

On DATE ORG issued a decision . It found that the work had been brought into conformity with the law . The applicant appealed .

On DATE the applicant again lodged a complaint about inactivity .

On DATE ORG quashed the decision of DATE and remitted the case . The applicant appealed to ORG .

On DATE ORG found the applicant 's complaint about inactivity of DATE well - founded and fixed a new DATE time - limit for the authorities . However the administrative authorities do not appear to have complied with the timelimit .

Eventually , as it transpires from the submissions of the applicant as well as from the observations submitted by the Government , on DATE ORG gave a judgment on the merits of the applicant 's case . It further transpires that the applicant failed to lodge a cassation appeal with ORG . Hence , the judgment of DATE became final .

For a presentation of domestic law , see : PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , DATE ; PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , DATE .

NORP The relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the excessive length of judicial proceedings , in particular the applicable provisions of LAW of DATE on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time ( LOC o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki ) ( “ the CARDINAL Act ” ) , are stated in the ORG 's decisions in the cases of ORG v. GPE no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( dec . ) , § § DATE , ECHR CARDINAL-V and NORP v. GPE no . CARDINAL ( dec . ) , ORG CARDINAL-VIII and the judgment in the case of GPE v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , ECHR CARDINAL-V.


The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before the Court by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON , Attorney , Attorney ORG ) .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

In DATE the applicant graduated as a medical doctor . On DATE he was granted a licence to perform duty service ( turnustjeneste ) at a hospital and thereafter he and a friend started to serve at ORG .

On DATE the applicant was arrested and detained on remand for DATE due to his and a friend ’s involvement in CARDINAL incidents , which included notably an attempt of burglary , violence against the police and consumption of hashish and ecstasy .

On DATE ORG notified the applicant that they considered suspending and withdrawing his duty service licence , following which the applicant withdrew from his duty service and was granted special leave with salary , until he went on sick leave in DATE .

On DATE ORG ( byrett ) convicted the applicant for his involvement in attempts of burglary ( Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL ) , obstruction of the police in their attempt to arrest his accomplice ( Article CARDINAL ) , violence against the police ( Article CARDINAL ) and consumption of hashish and ecstasy ( section CARDINAL of LAW ) and sentenced him to CARDINAL months’ imprisonment ( unconditional ) . On the other hand , ORG rejected the prosecutor ’s request to sentence the applicant under LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW to a loss of right to practice as a doctor .

The applicant appealed against the conviction but ORG ( lagmannsrett ) refused him leave to appeal on DATE . As the applicant did not lodge an appeal against that decision within the statutory DATE time - limit ( running from notification ) , the decision became final on DATE or on some date shortly thereafter .

The applicant served his prison sentence from DATE . Thereafter he was again on sick leave .

In the meantime , on DATE , the applicant made a request for being re - instated as an intern but , on DATE , ORG ( ORG ) decided to suspend his licence under LAW pending a possible revocation under LAW CARDINAL of LAW DATE ( GPE , hereinafter referred to as “ the DATE LAW ) . The decision was taken primarily on the ground of the matters in respect of which he had been convicted and which were deemed “ conduct unworthy of a doctor ” for the purposes of LAW CARDINAL . Regard was also had to certain irregularities noted with regard to various instances of prescription of medicines and the storage of medical journals , which , it is undisputed , played a secondary part in the decision .

On DATE the applicant instituted proceedings before ORG asking it to quash the suspension of DATE . ORG notes that , pursuant to CARDINAL of LAW , such an action was to be examined under LAW of the Code of Civil Procedure concerning judicial appeals against administrative decisions .

On DATE ORG repealed the suspension considering that the applicant was no longer deemed unsuited to perform the profession of medical doctor and issued a disciplinary warning . In DATE he ended his sick leave and resumed his duty service .

In view of this change , the applicant altered his suit before ORG to concern a claim for compensation on account of the suspension ( section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act ) .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s compensation claim , finding that his suspension had not been unlawful or contrary to LAW .

On appeal , that judgment was upheld by ORG on DATE .

The applicant ’s further appeal was rejected by ORG ( PERSON ) on DATE . ORG unanimously found that the suspension did not violate LAW , but was divided ( CARDINAL in favour and CARDINAL against ) as to whether the suspension could be regarded as lawful under LAW notwithstanding the ORG rejection in the trial of the prosecution ’s request to deprive the applicant of his right to practice .

PERSON , who gave the reasons for the majority , held , in so far as the issue of double jeopardy under LAW No . CARDINAL was concerned , that the suspension did not constitute a criminal matter attracting the application of this provision , having regard to the CARDINAL criteria for “ criminal charge ” in LAW set out in the PERSON and Others v. the GPE judgment of DATE ( Series A no . CARDINAL ) . Therefore , the revocation or the suspension of a licence to practice as a doctor , on the ground that the legal conditions for practicing no longer were fulfilled , did not constitute a criminal punishment for the purposes of LAW No . CARDINAL to the LAW , which therefore did not apply . The minority agreed with this conclusion .

In so far as concerned the issue under LAW reasoning , which the other justices of the majority endorsed in the main , included the following observations :

“ ( CARDINAL ) It would in my view be useful to start by providing an overview of the NORP system for granting and revoking permits to practise as a doctor . I should note that authorisation is the term used for the most comprehensive permit to practise as a doctor . A licence , including an intern ’s licence as applicable in our case , on the other hand , provides more limited rights . Nevertheless , the legal issues raised by the case will be the same .

( CARDINAL ) According to section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW of DATE , a precondition for the granting of an authorisation to practise as a doctor was that the candidate was ‘ of good conduct’ . Under section CARDINAL of the LAW an authorisation could be withdrawn by civil judgment where the doctor was considered unfit to conduct his practice on the grounds of insanity or weakening of the mental faculties or abuse of strong drink or anaesthetising agents . The grounds for loss of authorisation were listed in exhaustive detail and accordingly legal action with respect to revocation could not be brought were the doctor subsequently to be found guilty of breach of the requirement as to good conduct . In the event of conviction of criminal offences , however , deprivation could take the form of a disqualification pursuant to LAW . This general provision , which is now LAW , provides the legal authority to sentence a person found guilty of a criminal offence in the following way if the public interest so requires :

‘ Loss for a specific period not exceeding DATE or in perpetuity of the right to hold office or to carry out any activity or occupation that the defendant has shown himself or herself to be unfit for or might conceivably abuse or for which a high degree of public confidence is required . ... ’

( CARDINAL ) In the DATE Act , which applies in our case , the requirement as to good conduct as a precondition for authorisation and licensing was continued , with the difference that breaches of this condition would now constitute direct grounds for revocation under LAW . LAW CARDINAL ) made it a condition for the grant of authorisation or a licence that the medical practitioner was not in a situation that could lead to the revocation of the authorisation or licence . This was regulated in LAW CARDINAL , the first paragraph of which read as follows :

‘ An authorisation or licence may be revoked if a doctor is not fit to practise medicine on the grounds of serious mental illness , psychological or physical debility , long absence from the profession , the misuse of alcohol , drugs , or other substances with similar effects , grave lack of professional insight , improper medical practice , or conduct unworthy of a ORG

( CARDINAL ) Section CARDINAL provided the legal authority for the suspension of an authorisation or licence where there were just and sufficient causes to suppose that grounds existed for revocation . Under section CARDINAL , the decision to revoke was no longer taken by the courts but by the Ministry , generally after an opinion had been obtained from ORG . This authority was subsequently delegated to ORG . According to LAW , the decision could not be appealed but it could be brought before a court of law , which could review all aspects of the matter . If a suspension or revocation proved to be invalid or was set aside on other grounds , CARDINAL provided that the doctor could claim damages for losses sustained in accordance with the usual rules .

( CARDINAL ) This system is continued in the current LAW of DATE No . CARDINAL - which came into force on DATE . ...

( CARDINAL ) Generally the system exists in parallel with the system of sanctions provided for under criminal law . This relates to the different guilt requirements under the CARDINAL systems and to the fact that the objectives and subjects for assessments are different , see Proposition No . CARDINAL to the PERSON ( DATE ) , pp . CARDINAL and CARDINAL . It is assumed that as a general rule the public health authorities may consider revocation , even if health personnel have not been disqualified by judgment in a criminal case . It is emphasised that the regulatory authority shall be concerned with protecting patients against unqualified practitioners , not with punishment .

( CARDINAL ) In light of the inter - relationship between the regulations discussed above , [ the applicant ] ’s alternative submission relating to LAW . CARDINAL may also have a bearing on corresponding questions under LAW . Accordingly , in my view it is appropriate to consider this aspect first .

( CARDINAL ) The question is whether the suspension decision , which was adopted after [ the applicant ] had been convicted of the actions in question , but acquitted of the plea that he be disqualified , must be viewed as a re - prosecution in contravention of LAW No . CARDINAL . That the facts underlying the suspension decision in all essential respects are the same as those underlying the criminal conviction , is not disputed .

( DATE ) Before I continue I reiterate that the suspension of the licence presupposed the existence of a reasonable basis for assuming that ‘ grounds existed for revocation’ . Although this case concerns the suspension of a licence , and a revocation , the real issue is nevertheless whether LAW No . CARDINAL serves as an obstacle to the revocation of a licence where a judgment in a criminal case has already been rendered with respect to the same actions and where the plea for disqualification has not been allowed .

( CARDINAL ) In light of ORG case law as it now stands , the issue that must be considered will be identical to the question of whether this constitutes punishment pursuant to LAW , see most recently the judgment of DATE in case No . CARDINAL HR-CARDINAL - CARDINAL-A paragraph DATE . As noted in paragraph CARDINAL of the said judgment , this question must be decided on the basis of the so - called PERSON criteria , ( see PERSON and Others v. the GPE , judgment of DATE , Series A no . CARDINAL ) . How is the situation classified under national law , the nature and purpose of the statutory rule that was applied and the content and severity of the sanction in question .

( CARDINAL ) It will be apparent from my introductory discussion that neither the revocation nor the suspension of a permit to practise as a doctor will constitute punishment under NORP law .

( CARDINAL ) As regards the second PERSON criterion - the nature and purpose of the provision - it is clear to me that the theme for assessment will be the standard specified in section CARDINAL of the DATE Act by reference to section CARDINAL , which I have reproduced in my introductory overview . The overarching standard is whether the doctor is unfit to practise his profession , in our case on the grounds of ‘ conduct unworthy of a GPE . Although the conduct to which the standard is directed will frequently involve - and in our case in fact does involve - criminal actions , I am not inclined to agree with [ the applicant ] in his submission that it is the criminal actions that make up the nature of the provision . The theme for assessment is whether the doctor satisfies the requirements for holding a permit to practise the profession and continuing to practise the profession .

( CARDINAL ) The provisions of the DATE Act are aimed specifically at a professional group that is dependent upon a special degree of confidence in the mind of the public and accordingly requires a public permit in order to practise . The legislative history of the LAW strongly emphasised the need for doctors to observe a high professional and ethical standard and the need for society to control who practises the profession by requiring a public permit to be held and , moreover , that such permits may be revoked if the preconditions are no longer fulfilled ( see inter alia NOU ( NORP Official Report ) CARDINAL pp . CARDINAL and DATE ) . ORG therefore proposed the continuation of the existing scheme , but added that a breach of the precondition as to good conduct could result in revocation . The Ministry concurred ( see ORG . CARDINAL to the PERSON ( DATE ) , p. CARDINAL ) . The ORG emphasised that the grounds for loss of an authorisation or licence would need to encompass more than criminal actions . The ORG stated as follows :

‘ There should also be room for revoking an authorisation or licence in the case of conduct or actions that are not criminal , but this should occur only rarely . On the other hand , not every criminal action should lead to revocation ; here as in other contexts the doctor must be found unfit to practise the profession . The blameworthy circumstances must normally relate to his or her medical practice . Nevertheless , there may be instances in which conduct outside the profession may entail that the doctor does not enjoy the necessary confidence , for instance if he or she commits theft , embezzles in the context of his or her practice , defamation or assault of other persons etc.’

( CARDINAL ) As will be apparent from my introductory discussion of the provisions this object has at all times been of central importance and it is now expressly provided for in the purpose clause of ORG . The object of the provisions is not to punish persons who are in breach of the standard but rather to prevent them from causing their patients harm or violating the relationship of trust that must of necessity exist between the general public and the medical profession . This is expressly emphasised in Proposition No . CARDINAL to the PERSON ( DATE ) , p. CARDINAL , second column . In my assessment this is a long way from the domain of criminal law , a fact that the existence in most NORP countries of equivalent arrangements serves to emphasise .

( CARDINAL ) [ The applicant ] has submitted that disqualification pursuant to LAW , which is described as punishment , far and away serves the same purpose as the revocation provisions of LAW . This is indisputably correct , but will nevertheless not be of particular significance . I refer here to ORG ( GPE Retstidende- “ ORG . ” ) DATE p CARDINAL , paragraph CARDINAL , where a parallel of this nature was found not to be decisive with respect to rights vesting in an individual permit issued by the public authorities . Nor does the fact that the sanction is for actions that have already been performed change my assessment that this is primarily a civil law sanction . Finally I should also note that there is no direct link between the sanction in question and the preconditions for punishment , as was found to be the case in GPE . DATE p.CARDINAL , paragraph CARDINAL . As I have already noted , the overarching and decisive point is whether the doctor in question is unfit to practise the medical profession .

( DATE ) The third PERSON criterion - the content and severity of the sanction - can not lead to a different conclusion . Clearly , depriving a doctor of the right to practise will have a serious impact on that doctor . However , in decisions of this type , often referred to as disciplinary decisions , the point of departure has been that the sanctions in question must be very serious - in practice prison sentences , see ORG . DATE p. CARDINAL and , at p. CARDINAL , reference to PERSON v. GPE ( application no . CARDINAL ) , see also ORG . DATE p. CARDINAL , paragraph CARDINAL . A common point of departure has been that the decisions in question have been directed at a limited circle of people .

( CARDINAL ) No decision by ORG directly addresses the question of the revocation of a public permit to practise a profession . The ORG has referred to a number of dismissal decisions that indicate that this lies outside the domain of criminal law . As regards the revocation of a permit to conduct business , ORG held as follows in its dismissal decision in GPE v. GPE ( application MONEY ) , a case concerning the revocation of a taxi licence on the grounds of tax offences :

‘ ... The ORG considers that the revocation of the licence did not constitute a determination of a criminal charge against the applicant . Although it may be regarded as a severe measure , what was decisive for the revocation was the applicant ’s suitability to run a commercial taxi business , and , more specifically , whether he fulfilled the conditions therefore under administrative law provisions . Thus , the revocation can not be characterised as a penal sanction and the nature of the relevant proceedings can not be regarded as criminal ... ’

( CARDINAL ) The decision then refers to ORG v. GPE judgment of DATE , where the revocation of a liquor licence on the grounds of irregularities did not constitute a penal sanction .

( CARDINAL ) In NORP legal tradition the exercise of certain activities requires a public licence . The issuing of licences of this nature is , typically , an administrative activity . It would be inconsistent if the same did not apply to the revocation - reversal - of a licence of this nature where a recipient no longer fulfils the preconditions for holding the licence .

( CARDINAL ) Against this background it is clear to me that the revocation and suspension of a licence to practise as a doctor on the grounds that the statutory and necessary preconditions for continuing to practise this activity are no longer present does not constitute a penal sanction in ORG view . The question regarding the concrete application of LAW No . CARDINAL will therefore not arise . ”


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Positive obligations;Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions);Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He is a former employee of ORG , ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) . He worked at the ORG from DATE to DATE , when he was dismissed from his position as a senior engineer at his own request . At the time of his dismissal the applicant was not paid the wages owed to him .

In DATE a construction company , the Closed JSC PERSON ( hereafter the ORG ) , instituted bankruptcy proceedings against the ORG on account of its failure to comply with contractual obligations .

The bankruptcy proceedings were initiated on DATE by ORG ( “ the LOC ” ) . The applicant acted in these proceedings as a representative of the ORG .

On DATE the ORG declared the ORG bankrupt . It also established a liquidation commission to manage its debts . The liquidation commission consisted of representatives of ORG , ORG , ORG of ORG , ORG ( a ORG - owned bank ) and the ORG . The liquidators were obliged to elect the chairman and members of the liquidation commission within DATE .

On DATE the commission made an inventory of the ORG ’s property .

On DATE the liquidation commission elected Mr Bogushko as its chairman .

DATE and DATE , in accordance with the submissions of the parties , the liquidation commission was not in operation .

On DATE the then chair of the liquidation commission , PERSON , resigned .

On DATE the liquidation commission elected Mr PERSON as its chairman .

On DATE the President of the ORG decided that the bankruptcy proceedings concerning the ORG should be referred from Judge PERSON for consideration by another judge ( Judge PERSON ORG ) .

On DATE the President of ORG ( the “ ZRCC ” , former ORG as renamed in DATE as a result of “ small judicial reform ” ) , decided that the bankruptcy proceedings concerning the ORG should be referred for consideration from Judge PERSON ORG to another judge ( Judge PERSON ) .

On DATE the ZRCC found that the liquidation commission appointed in DATE had deviated from its duties . It also informed the members of the liquidation commission that they had incurred criminal liability for failure to comply with the judgments and decisions of the domestic courts .

On DATE , DATE and DATE , the ORG requested the liquidation commission to submit a report on the results of the operation .

On DATE the liquidation commission elected a new chairman , Mr Otryshko . The commission discussed the proposal for the friendly settlement of the ORG ’s debts . The new chairman of the commission submitted a report to the ZRCC that made no reference to the ORG ’s salary debts .

On DATE the ORG ’s shareholders agreed to enter into a friendly settlement with the creditors .

On DATE the liquidation commission decided to conclude a friendly settlement in the bankruptcy proceedings pending against the ORG .

On DATE the ZRCC held a hearing with a view to discussing the possible friendly settlement and the report by the liquidation commission . The hearing was adjourned until DATE .

On DATE the ZRCC terminated the bankruptcy proceedings concerning the ORG by way of a friendly settlement between the ORG and its creditors ( the ORG and ORG ) .

NORP In DATE the applicant instituted proceedings in ORG ( the “ ORG ” ) against the ORG , seeking the recovery of salary arrears .

On DATE ORG allowed the applicant ’s claims and ordered the ORG to pay him CARDINAL NORP hryvnas ( ORG ) .

NORP In DATE the applicant instituted proceedings in ORG , seeking compensation for the delay in the payment of salary arrears awarded to him by the decision of CARDINAL DATE . On DATE ORG rejected his claims as being unsubstantiated . On DATE ORG upheld that decision .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG of ORG served notice on the ORG to pay the applicant the sums due .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s additional claims for compensation for the delay in payment of salary arrears as it was unsubstantiated . That judgment was upheld on DATE by ORG .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG bailiffs ( “ the court bailiffs ” ) instituted enforcement proceedings in the case and requested the ORG to pay the applicant the sum due .

On DATE the court bailiffs requested the ORG to provide correct information as to its bank accounts , so that the sums due the applicant could be procured .

A resolution to initiate enforcement proceedings in the case was issued by ORG ( the “ bailiffs ” ) on DATE , following the transfer of jurisdiction for the enforcement from the court bailiffs .

On DATE the bailiffs informed the applicant that the judgment could not be executed immediately on account of the entry into force of the new LAW and the referral of all the enforcement proceedings from the jurisdiction of the courts to the jurisdiction of ORG .

On DATE the bailiffs initiated enforcement proceedings in the case .

On DATE the bailiffs informed the applicant that a request had been sent to the ORG on DATE concerning the inactivity of the liquidation commission . It also stated that no response had been received from the ORG .

On DATE and DATE the bailiffs informed the applicant that the writ of execution could not be sent to the liquidation commission as the commission did not exist de facto . It also informed the applicant that the writs of execution issued by ORG had only been received on DATE by the bailiffs .

On DATE and DATE the applicant complained about the non - enforcement of a judgment in his favour to ORG and ORG . On DATE ORG transmitted his complaints to ORG formerly ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) . On DATE the ORG forwarded his complaints to the ORG for a reply .

On DATE the bailiffs informed the applicant that the most recent chair of the liquidation commission was PERSON . They also stated that , in accordance with section CARDINAL of LAW , writs of execution had to be transferred to the liquidation commission from the bailiffs .

On DATE the bailiffs suspended the enforcement proceedings until the election of a new chairman of the liquidation commission and the formation of a new commission .

On DATE ORG of the LOC informed the bailiffs about the membership of the liquidation commission and its chairman ( Mr Otryshko ) . This information was to be provided to the applicant .

On DATE the bailiffs terminated the enforcement proceedings pending before them in the applicant ’s case by transmitting the writs of execution to the liquidation commission for the ORG .

On DATE the applicant complained to the bailiffs about the failure to enforce the judgment .

On DATE the bailiffs informed the applicant that they were no longer responsible for the enforcement of the judgment of CARDINAL DATE .

In DATE the judgment of DATE was partly enforced by the liquidation commission and the applicant was paid ORG CARDINAL in compensation .

On DATE the applicant complained to the ZRCC about the failure to enforce the judgment in his favour . By a letter of CARDINAL DATE , a judge of the PERSON informed the applicant of the friendly settlement in the case . She also stated that the applicant could not be considered a creditor of the ORG as he had not applied to the court in the course of the ORG bankruptcy proceedings to be declared a creditor . She also refused to provide him with documents concerning the bankruptcy proceedings in the case .

On DATE the applicant lodged complaints with the ORG concerning the failure to pay his salary arrears and the inactivity of the liquidation commission and the bailiffs . On DATE the ORG informed the applicant that his complaints had been forwarded to ZRCC for a reply .

On DATE the applicant lodged complaints with the ZRCC , seeking a declaration that he was a creditor of the ORG and an order requiring the ORG to enforce the judgment of CARDINAL DATE . He also sought a declaration that the friendly settlement reached by the ORG and its creditors was unlawful . By a letter of CARDINAL DATE , the ZRCC informed the applicant that , as he had failed to lodge a request to be recognised as a creditor during the bankruptcy proceedings in the case ( DATE ) , he could not claim to be a creditor and could not therefore seek to have the friendly settlement declared unlawful .

On DATE the applicant lodged complaints with ORG , seeking a declaration that the inactivity of the Head of ORG was unlawful in view of his failure to enforce the judgment of DATE .

On DATE the complaint was left without consideration for failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law .

DATE . On DATE the applicant again lodged a complaint with ORG against the bailiffs , seeking to have their failure to enforce the judgment of CARDINAL DATE declared unlawful . In DATE ORG rejected this complaint on account of the applicant ’s failure to comply with the requirements as to its form and content . The applicant was allowed DATE to rectify the matter .

On DATE the applicant resubmitted his complaint .

On DATE ORG rejected his complaints as being lodged out of time .

On DATE the ORG of Appeal ( the “ ORG ” ) quashed that decision and remitted the case to the same court for a fresh consideration .

On DATE the applicant lodged additional complaints with ORG , seeking the annulment of the bailiffs’ resolution of DATE on the termination of the enforcement proceedings .

The proceedings concerning the failure of the bailiffs to act and the resolution on terminating the enforcement proceedings were disjoined , forming CARDINAL separate proceedings : case no . CARDINAL - CARDINAL/CARDINAL and case no . DATE .

On DATE ORG found in favour of the applicant in the first case ( no . CARDINAL - CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . It also declared unlawful the failure of the bailiffs to enforce the judgment for a lengthy period ( DATE and DATE ) and found the applicant ’s complaints to be substantiated . The applicant appealed against this decision as he thought that a mere acknowledgment of the fact that the bailiffs had acted unlawfully was not sufficient to rectify the situation . On DATE ORG upheld the judgment given on DATE and dismissed the applicant ’s appeal .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s claims concerning the allegedly unlawful termination of the enforcement proceedings in his second case as being unsubstantiated ( case no . DATE ) . The applicant appealed to ORG , seeking the resumption of the enforcement proceedings and an extension of the time allowed for lodging an appeal . On DATE ORG quashed the judgment of DATE and did not consider the applicant ’s complaints as they had been lodged out of time ( section CARDINAL of LAW ) .

On DATE the applicant requested ORG to extend the time for considering his complaints against the bailiffs’ resolution of DATE on terminating the enforcement proceedings in his second case ( no . DATE ) . In particular , he alleged that the delay in lodging his complaints was due to the fact that he had received the resolution of DATE in a version that was illegible ( it was sent to him twice , on DATE and DATE ) . He had lodged his complaints only on DATE as he could not read the documents supplied to him by the bailiffs , which were allegedly of a very poor quality . He has not given the ORG any further information as to the outcome of these proceedings .

On DATE the applicant lodged a cassation appeal against the ruling of CARDINAL DATE in the first case ( no . CARDINAL - CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

On DATE ORG informed the applicant that his appeal had been received . It also stated that it was pending for consideration before ORG .

On DATE a panel of CARDINAL judges of ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal as it found no infringements of the rules of substantive or procedural law . It also found that there were no grounds for remitting the appeal for consideration by ORG .


David Thór Björgvinsson;Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before the Court by Mr P. Kavonius , a lawyer practising in GPE . The respondent Government were represented by their agent , Mr PERSON of ORG .

The applicant had a voluntary pension insurance from DATE until DATE into which he paid in total MONEY ( ORG ) . From DATE his employer was responsible for paying contributions to the insurance policy and in DATE it paid CARDINAL instalment of EUR CARDINAL .

By a decision of DATE ORG ( kansaneläkelaitos - KELA , folkpensionsanstalten – ORG , hereafter “ KELA ” ) granted the applicant an old - age pension ( kansaneläke , folkspension ) of ORG DATE as from DATE . The occupational pension ( työeläke , arbetspension ) paid to the applicant by a life insurance company was taken into consideration in calculating the amount of his old - age pension .

On DATE an insurance company granted the applicant a pension based on his voluntary pension insurance retroactively as from DATE .

As a result of this new pension decision the ORG informed the applicant by letter of DATE that there had been an error in the previous decision of CARDINAL DATE and that his old - age pension would diminish as a result of the pending rectification . The applicant was invited to inform the ORG of his opinion on the rectification by DATE . A form to this effect was attached to the letter . The applicant did not reply to the letter .

On DATE the ORG made a decision to cease the payment of the applicant ’s old - age pension as of DATE due to the increase in his other pensions . The applicant did not appeal against this decision which thus became final .

By a letter dated DATE the ORG informed the applicant that the old - age pension he had received in the period DATE and DATE , in total ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL , was in fact in excess due to the new calculations and that he should let the ORG know his opinion on the matter by DATE . The applicant did not reply to the letter .

On DATE the ORG decided to recover the entire old - age pension paid . The applicant was given DATE to pay .

On DATE the applicant appealed to ORG ( tarkastuslautakunta , prövningsnämnden ) against the decision of CARDINAL DATE . He claimed that the entire voluntary pension was regarded by the ORG as CARDINAL paid by his employer whereas he himself , the tax authorities and his insurance company considered the main part of that pension as being paid by the applicant .

On DATE ORG dismissed his appeal , stating that there were no reasons for making an exception to the rule that pension payments to which the recipient was not entitled should be paid back .

On DATE the applicant appealed to ORG , which dismissed his appeal on DATE without elaborating on the reasons or addressing the specific circumstances of the applicant ’s pension .

On DATE the ORG requested the applicant to contact them regarding the schedule of repayments . Subsequently the insurance company ’s lawyer contacted the ORG and provided additional clarifications , to no avail . On CARDINAL DATE a payment order was sent to the applicant .