Daily Papers

Active reasoning requires large language model (LLM) agents to interact with external sources and strategically gather information to solve problems in multiple turns. Central to this process is belief tracking: maintaining an accurate representation of the underlying state and uncertainty in understanding and solving the problem. However, due to limited reasoning capabilities, LLM-based agents often suffer belief deviation: their internal beliefs drift from the true problem state, leading to loss of state awareness and uninformative or repetitive actions. Once this happens, errors compound in the trajectories used for reinforcement learning (RL), leading to misattributed credits and limited exploration. To address this issue, we propose to track belief deviation and develop T^3, a simple yet principled method that detects excessive deviation and truncates training trajectories to suppress uninformative tail effects. Hence, T^3 preserves credits for informative prefixes and systematically improves policy optimization. Across 5 challenging tasks, T^3 consistently enhances training stability and yields performance gains of up to 30 points while cutting token cost by up to 34%. These results highlight belief control as a key principle for building robust LLM agents capable of active reasoning.

Memory-augmented LLM agents tackle complex long-horizon tasks by recursively summarizing interaction trajectories into compact memory. However, existing approaches typically train these memory policies using outcome-based reinforcement learning, failing to localize where intermediate memory quality degrades. As interactions unfold, ambiguous recursive summaries progressively discard task-relevant information and introduce semantic noise. This exacerbates belief deviation, obscuring the agent's estimate of the latent task state and ultimately derailing long-horizon reasoning. We therefore argue that memory optimization should focus not merely on trajectory-level success, but on the clarity of the belief induced by intermediate summaries. To this end, we introduce Belief Entropy, a self-supervised proxy that probes how uncertain the model remains about the latent task state given its current memory. Based on this proxy, we propose Metacognitive Memory Policy Optimization (MMPO). Instead of relying only on sparse outcome-based signals, MMPO provides fine-grained, memory-specific supervision via explicitly penalizing summaries that induce high epistemic uncertainty. Experiments show that MMPO consistently outperforms existing methods on diverse long-horizon tasks, maintaining 97.1% performance even when scaled to 1.75M-token contexts.

A quantum neural network (QNN) is a parameterized mapping efficiently implementable on near-term Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) computers. It can be used for supervised learning when combined with classical gradient-based optimizers. Despite the existing empirical and theoretical investigations, the convergence of QNN training is not fully understood. Inspired by the success of the neural tangent kernels (NTKs) in probing into the dynamics of classical neural networks, a recent line of works proposes to study over-parameterized QNNs by examining a quantum version of tangent kernels. In this work, we study the dynamics of QNNs and show that contrary to popular belief it is qualitatively different from that of any kernel regression: due to the unitarity of quantum operations, there is a non-negligible deviation from the tangent kernel regression derived at the random initialization. As a result of the deviation, we prove the at-most sublinear convergence for QNNs with Pauli measurements, which is beyond the explanatory power of any kernel regression dynamics. We then present the actual dynamics of QNNs in the limit of over-parameterization. The new dynamics capture the change of convergence rate during training and implies that the range of measurements is crucial to the fast QNN convergence.

Epistemic Uncertainty is a measure of the lack of knowledge of a learner which diminishes with more evidence. While existing work focuses on using the variance of the Bayesian posterior due to parameter uncertainty as a measure of epistemic uncertainty, we argue that this does not capture the part of lack of knowledge induced by model misspecification. We discuss how the excess risk, which is the gap between the generalization error of a predictor and the Bayes predictor, is a sound measure of epistemic uncertainty which captures the effect of model misspecification. We thus propose a principled framework for directly estimating the excess risk by learning a secondary predictor for the generalization error and subtracting an estimate of aleatoric uncertainty, i.e., intrinsic unpredictability. We discuss the merits of this novel measure of epistemic uncertainty, and highlight how it differs from variance-based measures of epistemic uncertainty and addresses its major pitfall. Our framework, Direct Epistemic Uncertainty Prediction (DEUP) is particularly interesting in interactive learning environments, where the learner is allowed to acquire novel examples in each round. Through a wide set of experiments, we illustrate how existing methods in sequential model optimization can be improved with epistemic uncertainty estimates from DEUP, and how DEUP can be used to drive exploration in reinforcement learning. We also evaluate the quality of uncertainty estimates from DEUP for probabilistic image classification and predicting synergies of drug combinations.

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

Deterministic inference is a comforting ideal in classical software: the same program on the same input should always produce the same output. As large language models move into real-world deployment, this ideal has been imported wholesale into inference stacks. Recent work from the Thinking Machines Lab has presented a detailed analysis of nondeterminism in LLM inference, showing how batch-invariant kernels and deterministic attention can enforce bitwise-identical outputs, positioning deterministic inference as a prerequisite for reproducibility and enterprise reliability. In this paper, we take the opposite stance. We argue that, for LLMs, deterministic inference kills. It kills the ability to model uncertainty, suppresses emergent abilities, collapses reasoning into a single brittle path, and weakens safety alignment by hiding tail risks. LLMs implement conditional distributions over outputs, not fixed functions. Collapsing these distributions to a single canonical completion may appear reassuring, but it systematically conceals properties central to artificial cognition. We instead advocate Stochastic CHAOS, treating distributional variability as a signal to be measured and controlled. Empirically, we show that deterministic inference is systematically misleading. Single-sample deterministic evaluation underestimates both capability and fragility, masking failure probability under paraphrases and noise. Phase-like transitions associated with emergent abilities disappear under greedy decoding. Multi-path reasoning degrades when forced onto deterministic backbones, reducing accuracy and diagnostic insight. Finally, deterministic evaluation underestimates safety risk by hiding rare but dangerous behaviors that appear only under multi-sample evaluation.

Large language models (LLMs) can exhibit advanced reasoning yet still generate incorrect answers. We hypothesize that such errors frequently stem from spurious beliefs, propositions the model internally considers true but are incorrect. To address this, we propose a method to rectify the belief space by suppressing these spurious beliefs while simultaneously enhancing true ones, thereby enabling more reliable inferences. Our approach first identifies the beliefs that lead to incorrect or correct answers by prompting the model to generate textual explanations, using our Forward-Backward Beam Search (FBBS). We then apply unlearning to suppress the identified spurious beliefs and enhance the true ones, effectively rectifying the model's belief space. Empirical results on multiple QA datasets and LLMs show that our method corrects previously misanswered questions without harming overall model performance. Furthermore, our approach yields improved generalization on unseen data, suggesting that rectifying a model's belief space is a promising direction for mitigating errors and enhancing overall reliability.

Large language models can arrive at the same answer through reasoning paths that are unstable, contradictory, or difficult to rank consistently -- a failure mode especially prevalent in multi-step deductive reasoning. Existing methods assess reliability primarily through output dispersion -- measuring how much sampled answers differ -- but this discards a complementary signal: whether the model can consistently rank competing reasoning candidates. We propose structural uncertainty, a consistency-aware framework derived from the stability of self-preference-induced rankings over sampled reasoning solutions. Given a query, we generate multiple candidate solutions and ask the model to judge pairwise preferences among its own outputs. We aggregate self-preferences into ranking distributions via Bradley-Terry modeling with PageRank, and decompose the signal into two entropy-based components: across-trial ranking instability and within-trial candidate ambiguity. Across five LLMs and eight benchmarks, structural signals provide information complementary to answer dispersion: on logical and mathematical reasoning tasks, the combination improves identification of unreliable instances, while on factual retrieval the structural signal collapses toward uniformity, diagnosing a regime boundary where reasoning-level consistency evaluation is uninformative. The two components relate differently to accuracy: within-trial ambiguity correlates positively with correctness -- consistent with settings where multiple plausible solution paths remain competitive -- while across-trial instability correlates negatively, signaling unreliable reasoning. Structural uncertainty is best understood not as a universal confidence estimator, but as a regime-sensitive evaluator of logical reasoning consistency.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

Conformal prediction(CP) has become a cornerstone of distribution-free uncertainty quantification, conventionally evaluated by its coverage and interval length. This work critically examines the sufficiency of these standard metrics. We demonstrate that the interval length might be deceptively improved through a counter-intuitive approach termed Prejudicial Trick(PT), while the coverage remains valid. Specifically, for any given test sample, PT probabilistically returns an interval, which is either null or constructed using an adjusted confidence level, thereby preserving marginal coverage. While PT potentially yields a deceptively lower interval length, it introduces practical vulnerabilities: the same input can yield completely different prediction intervals across repeated runs of the algorithm. We formally derive the conditions under which PT achieves these misleading improvements and provide extensive empirical evidence across various regression and classification tasks. Furthermore, we introduce a new metric interval stability which helps detect whether a new CP method implicitly improves the length based on such PT-like techniques. Code is available at https://github.com/benben-cd/PT-Conformal-Prediction.

Long-horizon interactions require language models to manage accumulating information: when to update their state, when to preserve their state, and what to ignore. We study this challenge as Contextual Belief Management (CBM): maintaining a predicted belief state aligned with formal evidence while isolating task-irrelevant noise. To make CBM measurable, we introduce BeliefTrack, a closed-world benchmark spanning Rule Discovery and Circuit Diagnosis, where a finite belief space and symbolic verifiers enable exact turn-level evaluation. BeliefTrack diagnoses three failures: Failed Stay, Failed Update, and Failed Isolation. Across multiple LLMs, vanilla models exhibit severe CBM failures, while explicit belief-tracking prompts provide limited gains. In contrast, reinforcement learning with belief-state rewards reduces failure rates by 70.9\% on average. Further probing reveals latent belief-state dynamics behind these failures, and representation-level steering reduces failure rates by 46.1\% across two tasks\footnote{Code is coming soon at https://github.com/zjunlp/CBM.

Reasoning distillation has emerged as an efficient and powerful paradigm for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models. However, reasoning distillation may inadvertently cause benchmark contamination, where evaluation data included in distillation datasets can inflate performance metrics of distilled models. In this work, we formally define the task of distillation data detection, which is uniquely challenging due to the partial availability of distillation data. Then, we propose a novel and effective method Token Probability Deviation (TBD), which leverages the probability patterns of the generated output tokens. Our method is motivated by the analysis that distilled models tend to generate near-deterministic tokens for seen questions, while producing more low-probability tokens for unseen questions. Our key idea behind TBD is to quantify how far the generated tokens' probabilities deviate from a high reference probability. In effect, our method achieves competitive detection performance by producing lower scores for seen questions than for unseen questions. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method, achieving an AUC of 0.918 and a TPR@1% FPR of 0.470 on the S1 dataset.

LLMs are increasingly used as long-running conversational agents, yet every major benchmark evaluating their memory treats user information as static facts to be stored and retrieved. That's the wrong model. People change their minds, and over extended interactions, phenomena like opinion drift, over-alignment, and confirmation bias start to matter a lot. BeliefShift introduces a longitudinal benchmark designed specifically to evaluate belief dynamics in multi-session LLM interactions. It covers three tracks: Temporal Belief Consistency, Contradiction Detection, and Evidence-Driven Revision. The dataset includes 2,400 human-annotated multi-session interaction trajectories spanning health, politics, personal values, and product preferences. We evaluate seven models including GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro, LLaMA-3, and Mistral-Large under zero-shot and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) settings. Results reveal a clear trade-off: models that personalize aggressively resist drift poorly, while factually grounded models miss legitimate belief updates. We further introduce four novel evaluation metrics: Belief Revision Accuracy (BRA), Drift Coherence Score (DCS), Contradiction Resolution Rate (CRR), and Evidence Sensitivity Index (ESI).

We propose a stronger formulation of RL on top of RWKV-style recurrent sequence models, in which the fixed-size recurrent state is explicitly interpreted as a belief state rather than an opaque hidden vector. Instead of conditioning policy and value on a single summary h_t, we maintain a compact uncertainty-aware state b_t = (μ_t, Σ_t) derived from RWKV-style recurrent statistics and let control depend on both memory and uncertainty. This design targets a key weakness of plain fixed-state policies in partially observed settings: they may store evidence, but not necessarily confidence. We present the method, a theoretical program, and a pilot RL experiment with hidden episode-level observation noise together with a test-time noise sweep. The pilot shows that belief-state policies nearly match the best recurrent baseline overall while slightly improving return on the hardest in-distribution regime and under a held-out noise shift. Additional ablations show that this simple belief readout is currently stronger than two more structured extensions, namely gated memory control and privileged belief targets, underscoring the need for richer benchmarks.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

Reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (RLVR) is a promising paradigm for improving large language model (LLM) agents on long-horizon interactive tasks. However, in partially observable environments, incomplete observations cause agent beliefs to drift over time, while delayed rewards obscure the causal impact of intermediate decisions, exacerbating temporal credit assignment challenges. To address this, we propose ReBel (Reward Belief), a process-level reinforcement learning algorithm that explicitly models structured belief states to summarize interaction history and guide subsequent policy learning. ReBel introduces belief-consistency supervision, converting discrepancies between predicted beliefs and observed feedback into dense self-supervised signals without requiring external step-wise annotations or verifiers. It also employs belief-aware grouping to compare trajectories under similar belief states, yielding more robust and lower-variance advantage estimates. We evaluate ReBel on challenging long-horizon benchmarks, including ALFWorld and WebShop. ReBel improves task success by up to 20.4 percentage points over the episode-level baseline GRPO and increases sample efficiency by 2.1times. These results suggest that belief-aware self-supervision is a promising direction for reliable long-horizon decision-making under partial observability. Code is available at: https://github.com/Fateyetian/Rebel.git.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

Anomaly detection aims at detecting unexpected behaviours in the data. Because anomaly detection is usually an unsupervised task, traditional anomaly detectors learn a decision boundary by employing heuristics based on intuitions, which are hard to verify in practice. This introduces some uncertainty, especially close to the decision boundary, that may reduce the user trust in the detector's predictions. A way to combat this is by allowing the detector to reject examples with high uncertainty (Learning to Reject). This requires employing a confidence metric that captures the distance to the decision boundary and setting a rejection threshold to reject low-confidence predictions. However, selecting a proper metric and setting the rejection threshold without labels are challenging tasks. In this paper, we solve these challenges by setting a constant rejection threshold on the stability metric computed by ExCeeD. Our insight relies on a theoretical analysis of such a metric. Moreover, setting a constant threshold results in strong guarantees: we estimate the test rejection rate, and derive a theoretical upper bound for both the rejection rate and the expected prediction cost. Experimentally, we show that our method outperforms some metric-based methods.

Reinforcement learning is crucial for aligning large language models to perform complex reasoning tasks. However, current algorithms such as Group Relative Policy Optimization suffer from coarse grained, sequence level credit assignment, which severely struggles to isolate pivotal reasoning steps within long Chain of Thought generations. Furthermore, the standard unbounded Kullback Leibler divergence penalty induces severe gradient instability and mode seeking conservatism, ultimately stifling the discovery of novel reasoning trajectories. To overcome these limitations, we introduce Distribution Guided Policy Optimization, a novel critic free reinforcement learning framework that reinterprets distribution deviation as a guiding signal rather than a rigid penalty. DGPO replaces the volatile KL divergence with the bounded Hellinger distance to safely quantify token level exploration without the risk of gradient explosion. To effectively distinguish genuine reasoning breakthroughs from hallucinatory noise, we propose an entropy gating mechanism that scales this deviation by the policy`s epistemic uncertainty. By dynamically redistributing the coarse sequence-level advantage to individual tokens based on these gated scores, DGPO heavily incentivizes critical exploratory steps while suppressing unwarranted, low-entropy deviations. Consequently, DGPO completely eliminates the traditional token-level KL penalty and achieves fine-grained credit reallocation without the computational overhead of an additional value network. Extensive empirical evaluations demonstrate that DGPO sets a new state-of-the-art for critic free alignment. Notably, on the Qwen2.5-32B architecture, DGPO achieves 60.0% Avg@32 accuracy and 46.0% Avg@32 accuracy on the challenging AIME2024 and AIME2025 benchmarks respectively, substantially outperforming competitive baselines like DAPO.

Misinformation is a growing societal threat, and susceptibility to misinformative claims varies across demographic groups due to differences in underlying beliefs. As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used to simulate human behaviors, we investigate whether they can simulate demographic misinformation susceptibility, treating beliefs as a primary driving factor. We introduce BeliefSim, a simulation framework that constructs demographic belief profiles using psychology-informed misinformation taxonomies and survey priors. We study prompt-based conditioning and post-training adaptation, and conduct a multi-fold evaluation using: (i) susceptibility alignment and (ii) counterfactual demographic sensitivity. Across both datasets and modeling strategies, we show that beliefs provide a strong prior for simulating misinformation susceptibility, with alignment up to 92%.

The human intrinsic desire to pursue knowledge, also known as curiosity, is considered essential in the process of skill acquisition. With the aid of artificial curiosity, we could equip current techniques for control, such as Reinforcement Learning, with more natural exploration capabilities. A promising approach in this respect has consisted of using Bayesian surprise on model parameters, i.e. a metric for the difference between prior and posterior beliefs, to favour exploration. In this contribution, we propose to apply Bayesian surprise in a latent space representing the agent's current understanding of the dynamics of the system, drastically reducing the computational costs. We extensively evaluate our method by measuring the agent's performance in terms of environment exploration, for continuous tasks, and looking at the game scores achieved, for video games. Our model is computationally cheap and compares positively with current state-of-the-art methods on several problems. We also investigate the effects caused by stochasticity in the environment, which is often a failure case for curiosity-driven agents. In this regime, the results suggest that our approach is resilient to stochastic transitions.

Deception is prevalent in human social settings. However, studies into the effect of deception on reinforcement learning algorithms have been limited to simplistic settings, restricting their applicability to complex real-world problems. This paper addresses this by introducing a new mixed competitive-cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) environment inspired by popular role-based deception games such as Werewolf, Avalon, and Among Us. The environment's unique challenge lies in the necessity to cooperate with other agents despite not knowing if they are friend or foe. Furthermore, we introduce a model of deception, which we call Bayesian belief manipulation (BBM) and demonstrate its effectiveness at deceiving other agents in this environment while also increasing the deceiving agent's performance.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can produce surprisingly sophisticated estimates of their own uncertainty. However, it remains unclear to what extent this expressed confidence is tied to the reasoning, knowledge, or decision making of the model. To test this, we introduce RiskEval: a framework designed to evaluate whether models adjust their abstention policies in response to varying error penalties. Our evaluation of several frontier models reveals a critical dissociation: models are neither cost-aware when articulating their verbal confidence, nor strategically responsive when deciding whether to engage or abstain under high-penalty conditions. Even when extreme penalties render frequent abstention the mathematically optimal strategy, models almost never abstain, resulting in utility collapse. This indicates that calibrated verbal confidence scores may not be sufficient to create trustworthy and interpretable AI systems, as current models lack the strategic agency to convert uncertainty signals into optimal and risk-sensitive decisions.

Language model (LM) assistants are increasingly used in applications such as brainstorming and research. Improvements in memory and context size have allowed these models to become more autonomous, which has also resulted in more text accumulation in their context windows without explicit user intervention. This comes with a latent risk: the belief profiles of models -- their understanding of the world as manifested in their responses or actions -- may silently change as context accumulates. This can lead to subtly inconsistent user experiences, or shifts in behavior that deviate from the original alignment of the models. In this paper, we explore how accumulating context by engaging in interactions and processing text -- talking and reading -- can change the beliefs of language models, as manifested in their responses and behaviors. Our results reveal that models' belief profiles are highly malleable: GPT-5 exhibits a 54.7% shift in its stated beliefs after 10 rounds of discussion about moral dilemmas and queries about safety, while Grok 4 shows a 27.2% shift on political issues after reading texts from the opposing position. We also examine models' behavioral changes by designing tasks that require tool use, where each tool selection corresponds to an implicit belief. We find that these changes align with stated belief shifts, suggesting that belief shifts will be reflected in actual behavior in agentic systems. Our analysis exposes the hidden risk of belief shift as models undergo extended sessions of talking or reading, rendering their opinions and actions unreliable.

As creative writing tasks do not have singular correct answers, large language models (LLMs) trained to perform these tasks should be able to generate diverse valid outputs. However, LLM post-training often focuses on improving generation quality but neglects to facilitate output diversity. Hence, in creative writing generation, we investigate post-training approaches to promote both output diversity and quality. Our core idea is to include deviation -- the degree of difference between a training sample and all other samples with the same prompt -- in the training objective to facilitate learning from rare high-quality instances. By adopting our approach to direct preference optimization (DPO) and odds ratio preference optimization (ORPO), we demonstrate that we can promote the output diversity of trained models while minimally decreasing quality. Our best model with 8B parameters could achieve on-par diversity as a human-created dataset while having output quality similar to the best instruction-tuned models we examined, GPT-4o and DeepSeek-R1. We further validate our approaches with a human evaluation, an ablation, and a comparison to an existing diversification approach, DivPO.

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

We introduce and study the problem of detecting whether an agent is updating their prior beliefs given new evidence in an optimal way that is Bayesian, or whether they are biased towards their own prior. In our model, biased agents form posterior beliefs that are a convex combination of their prior and the Bayesian posterior, where the more biased an agent is, the closer their posterior is to the prior. Since we often cannot observe the agent's beliefs directly, we take an approach inspired by information design. Specifically, we measure an agent's bias by designing a signaling scheme and observing the actions they take in response to different signals, assuming that they are maximizing their own expected utility; our goal is to detect bias with a minimum number of signals. Our main results include a characterization of scenarios where a single signal suffices and a computationally efficient algorithm to compute optimal signaling schemes.

In real-world scenarios, typical visual recognition systems could fail under two major causes, i.e., the misclassification between known classes and the excusable misbehavior on unknown-class images. To tackle these deficiencies, flexible visual recognition should dynamically predict multiple classes when they are unconfident between choices and reject making predictions when the input is entirely out of the training distribution. Two challenges emerge along with this novel task. First, prediction uncertainty should be separately quantified as confusion depicting inter-class uncertainties and ignorance identifying out-of-distribution samples. Second, both confusion and ignorance should be comparable between samples to enable effective decision-making. In this paper, we propose to model these two sources of uncertainty explicitly with the theory of Subjective Logic. Regarding recognition as an evidence-collecting process, confusion is then defined as conflicting evidence, while ignorance is the absence of evidence. By predicting Dirichlet concentration parameters for singletons, comprehensive subjective opinions, including confusion and ignorance, could be achieved via further evidence combinations. Through a series of experiments on synthetic data analysis, visual recognition, and open-set detection, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods in quantifying two sources of uncertainties and dealing with flexible recognition.

Reliable probability estimation is of crucial importance in many real-world applications where there is inherent (aleatoric) uncertainty. Probability-estimation models are trained on observed outcomes (e.g. whether it has rained or not, or whether a patient has died or not), because the ground-truth probabilities of the events of interest are typically unknown. The problem is therefore analogous to binary classification, with the difference that the objective is to estimate probabilities rather than predicting the specific outcome. This work investigates probability estimation from high-dimensional data using deep neural networks. There exist several methods to improve the probabilities generated by these models but they mostly focus on model (epistemic) uncertainty. For problems with inherent uncertainty, it is challenging to evaluate performance without access to ground-truth probabilities. To address this, we build a synthetic dataset to study and compare different computable metrics. We evaluate existing methods on the synthetic data as well as on three real-world probability estimation tasks, all of which involve inherent uncertainty: precipitation forecasting from radar images, predicting cancer patient survival from histopathology images, and predicting car crashes from dashcam videos. We also give a theoretical analysis of a model for high-dimensional probability estimation which reproduces several of the phenomena evinced in our experiments. Finally, we propose a new method for probability estimation using neural networks, which modifies the training process to promote output probabilities that are consistent with empirical probabilities computed from the data. The method outperforms existing approaches on most metrics on the simulated as well as real-world data.

Multi-Agent Debate~(MAD) has emerged as a promising paradigm for improving the performance of large language models through collaborative reasoning. Despite recent advances, the key factors driving MAD's effectiveness remain unclear. In this work, we disentangle MAD into two key components--Majority Voting and inter-agent Debate--and assess their respective contributions. Through extensive experiments across seven NLP benchmarks, we find that Majority Voting alone accounts for most of the performance gains typically attributed to MAD. To explain this, we propose a theoretical framework that models debate as a stochastic process. We prove that it induces a martingale over agents' belief trajectories, implying that debate alone does not improve expected correctness. Guided by these insights, we demonstrate that targeted interventions, by biasing the belief update toward correction, can meaningfully enhance debate effectiveness. Overall, our findings suggest that while MAD has potential, simple ensembling methods remain strong and more reliable alternatives in many practical settings. Code is released in https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/debate-or-vote.

Large language models perform near-Bayesian inference yet violate permutation invariance on exchangeable data. We resolve this by showing transformers minimize expected conditional description length (cross-entropy) over orderings, E_pi[ell(Y mid Gamma_pi(X))], which admits a Kolmogorov-complexity interpretation up to additive constants, rather than the permutation-invariant description length ell(Y mid X). This makes them Bayesian in expectation, not in realization. We derive (i) a Quantified Martingale Violation bound showing order-induced deviations scale as O(log n) with constants; (ii) the Expectation-level Decompression Law linking information budgets to reliability for Bernoulli predicates; and (iii) deployable planners (B2T/RoH/ISR) for answer/abstain decisions. Empirically, permutation dispersion follows a+bln n (Qwen2-7B b approx 0.377, Llama-3.1-8B b approx 0.147); permutation mixtures improve ground-truth likelihood/accuracy; and randomized dose-response shows hallucinations drop by sim 0.13 per additional nat. A pre-specified audit with a fixed ISR=1.0 achieves near-0\% hallucinations via calibrated refusal at 24\% abstention. The framework turns hallucinations into predictable compression failures and enables principled information budgeting.

Past analyses of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) assume that the human fully observes the environment. What happens when human feedback is based only on partial observations? We formally define two failure cases: deception and overjustification. Modeling the human as Boltzmann-rational w.r.t. a belief over trajectories, we prove conditions under which RLHF is guaranteed to result in policies that deceptively inflate their performance, overjustify their behavior to make an impression, or both. To help address these issues, we mathematically characterize how partial observability of the environment translates into (lack of) ambiguity in the learned return function. In some cases, accounting for partial observability makes it theoretically possible to recover the return function and thus the optimal policy, while in other cases, there is irreducible ambiguity. We caution against blindly applying RLHF in partially observable settings and propose research directions to help tackle these challenges.

Three of the most popular methods for training language models to reason look like three different tricks. They are not. All three adjust a single number: standard deviation, reflecting how much a prompt's sampled answers disagree. When such a model is trained, it answers each problem many times, and an automatic checker marks every answer right or wrong. The standard deviation of those marks measures the disagreement: largest when the answers split evenly between right and wrong, and zero when they all agree. Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) divides by this number, GRPO Done Right (Dr. GRPO) drops the division, and Decoupled Clip and Dynamic Sampling Policy Optimization (DAPO) discards the groups where it is zero. Each is presented as its own fix, yet this paper proves they are three settings of one dial. That dial is not cosmetic: for right-or-wrong rewards, the disagreement is exactly the size of the training update, the group-standard-deviation identity. A split group teaches the most, while a unanimous group teaches nothing and falls silent. The same result says which problems deserve the most weight and how many tries each one needs. This paper confirms the intuition on a large real difficulty dataset (Big-Math) and in a controlled training run. What looks like a harmless normalization step is the dial that decides where learning happens and how strongly.

LLM agents that operate over long context depend on external memory to accumulate knowledge over time. However, existing methods typically store each observation as a single deterministic conclusion (e.g., inferring "API~X failed" from temporary errors), even though such observations are inherently partial and potentially ambiguous. By committing to one conclusion and discarding uncertainty, these methods introduce self-reinforcing error: the agent acts on the stored conclusion, never revisits alternatives, and reinforces the conclusion over time. To address this issue, we propose BeliefMem, which shifts the memory paradigm from committing to a single conclusion per observation to retaining multiple candidate conclusions with their probabilities. Concretely, BeliefMem stores the candidate conclusions as separate memory entries, each carrying a probability that is updated via Noisy-OR rules as new observations arrive. At retrieval, all candidates surface together with their probabilities, keeping alternatives visible to the agent. Since each conclusion in memory retains its probability, BeliefMem preserves the uncertainty that the deterministic paradigm discards, enabling the agent to act with high confidence on well-evidenced knowledge while retaining the capacity to update its confidence when new evidence arrives. Empirical evaluations on LoCoMo and ALFWorld benchmarks show that, even with limited data, BeliefMem achieves the best average performance, remarkably outperforming well-known baselines. More broadly, such probabilistic memory produces substantial gains and explores a new direction for agent memory in partially observable environments.

We show that a GPT-3 model can learn to express uncertainty about its own answers in natural language -- without use of model logits. When given a question, the model generates both an answer and a level of confidence (e.g. "90% confidence" or "high confidence"). These levels map to probabilities that are well calibrated. The model also remains moderately calibrated under distribution shift, and is sensitive to uncertainty in its own answers, rather than imitating human examples. To our knowledge, this is the first time a model has been shown to express calibrated uncertainty about its own answers in natural language. For testing calibration, we introduce the CalibratedMath suite of tasks. We compare the calibration of uncertainty expressed in words ("verbalized probability") to uncertainty extracted from model logits. Both kinds of uncertainty are capable of generalizing calibration under distribution shift. We also provide evidence that GPT-3's ability to generalize calibration depends on pre-trained latent representations that correlate with epistemic uncertainty over its answers.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

Researchers in explainable artificial intelligence have developed numerous methods for helping users understand the predictions of complex supervised learning models. By contrast, explaining the uncertainty of model outputs has received relatively little attention. We adapt the popular Shapley value framework to explain various types of predictive uncertainty, quantifying each feature's contribution to the conditional entropy of individual model outputs. We consider games with modified characteristic functions and find deep connections between the resulting Shapley values and fundamental quantities from information theory and conditional independence testing. We outline inference procedures for finite sample error rate control with provable guarantees, and implement efficient algorithms that perform well in a range of experiments on real and simulated data. Our method has applications to covariate shift detection, active learning, feature selection, and active feature-value acquisition.

Consistently checking the statistical significance of experimental results is one of the mandatory methodological steps to address the so-called "reproducibility crisis" in deep reinforcement learning. In this tutorial paper, we explain how the number of random seeds relates to the probabilities of statistical errors. For both the t-test and the bootstrap confidence interval test, we recall theoretical guidelines to determine the number of random seeds one should use to provide a statistically significant comparison of the performance of two algorithms. Finally, we discuss the influence of deviations from the assumptions usually made by statistical tests. We show that they can lead to inaccurate evaluations of statistical errors and provide guidelines to counter these negative effects. We make our code available to perform the tests.

When fine-tuning pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) to align with human values and intentions, maximizing the estimated reward can lead to superior performance, but it also introduces potential risks due to deviations from the reference model's intended behavior. Most existing methods typically introduce KL divergence to constrain deviations between the trained model and the reference model; however, this may not be sufficient in certain applications that require tight risk control. In this paper, we introduce Risk-aware Direct Preference Optimization (Ra-DPO), a novel approach that incorporates risk-awareness by employing a class of nested risk measures. This approach formulates a constrained risk-aware advantage function maximization problem and then converts the Bradley-Terry model into a token-level representation. The objective function maximizes the likelihood of the policy while suppressing the deviation between a trained model and the reference model using a sequential risk ratio, thereby enhancing the model's risk-awareness. Experimental results across three open-source datasets: IMDb Dataset, Anthropic HH Dataset, and AlpacaEval, demonstrate the proposed method's superior performance in balancing alignment performance and model drift. Our code is opensourced at https://github.com/zlj123-max/Ra-DPO.

When facing data with imbalanced classes or groups, practitioners follow an intriguing strategy to achieve best results. They throw away examples until the classes or groups are balanced in size, and then perform empirical risk minimization on the reduced training set. This opposes common wisdom in learning theory, where the expected error is supposed to decrease as the dataset grows in size. In this work, we leverage extreme value theory to address this apparent contradiction. Our results show that the tails of the data distribution play an important role in determining the worst-group-accuracy of linear classifiers. When learning on data with heavy tails, throwing away data restores the geometric symmetry of the resulting classifier, and therefore improves its worst-group generalization.

Popular approaches for quantifying predictive uncertainty in deep neural networks often involve distributions over weights or multiple models, for instance via Markov Chain sampling, ensembling, or Monte Carlo dropout. These techniques usually incur overhead by having to train multiple model instances or do not produce very diverse predictions. This comprehensive and extensive survey aims to familiarize the reader with an alternative class of models based on the concept of Evidential Deep Learning: For unfamiliar data, they aim to admit "what they don't know", and fall back onto a prior belief. Furthermore, they allow uncertainty estimation in a single model and forward pass by parameterizing distributions over distributions. This survey recapitulates existing works, focusing on the implementation in a classification setting, before surveying the application of the same paradigm to regression. We also reflect on the strengths and weaknesses compared to other existing methods and provide the most fundamental derivations using a unified notation to aid future research.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

Beliefs serve as the foundation for human cognition and decision-making. They guide individuals in deriving meaning from their lives, shaping their behaviors, and forming social connections. Therefore, a model that encapsulates beliefs and their interrelationships is crucial for quantitatively studying the influence of beliefs on our actions. Despite its importance, research on the interplay between human beliefs has often been limited to a small set of beliefs pertaining to specific issues, with a heavy reliance on surveys or experiments. Here, we propose a method for extracting nuanced relations between thousands of beliefs by leveraging large-scale user participation data from an online debate platform and mapping these beliefs to an embedding space using a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). This belief embedding space effectively encapsulates the interconnectedness of diverse beliefs as well as polarization across various social issues. We discover that the positions within this belief space predict new beliefs of individuals. Furthermore, we find that the relative distance between one's existing beliefs and new beliefs can serve as a quantitative estimate of cognitive dissonance, allowing us to predict new beliefs. Our study highlights how modern LLMs, when combined with collective online records of human beliefs, can offer insights into the fundamental principles that govern human belief formation and decision-making processes.

Social biases and belief-driven behaviors can significantly impact Large Language Models (LLMs) decisions on several tasks. As LLMs are increasingly used in multi-agent systems for societal simulations, their ability to model fundamental group psychological characteristics remains critical yet under-explored. In this study, we present a multi-agent framework that simulates belief congruence, a classical group psychology theory that plays a crucial role in shaping societal interactions and preferences. Our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit amplified belief congruence compared to humans, across diverse contexts. We further investigate the implications of this behavior on two downstream tasks: (1) misinformation dissemination and (2) LLM learning, finding that belief congruence in LLMs increases misinformation dissemination and impedes learning. To mitigate these negative impacts, we propose strategies inspired by: (1) contact hypothesis, (2) accuracy nudges, and (3) global citizenship framework. Our results show that the best strategies reduce misinformation dissemination by up to 37% and enhance learning by 11%. Bridging social psychology and AI, our work provides insights to navigate real-world interactions using LLMs while addressing belief-driven biases.

Long chains of thought (CoT) from current language models frequently contain logical gaps and unjustified leaps, limiting the gains from additional test-time compute. Improving reasoning quality directly would require process reward models, but the step-level annotations needed to train them are expensive and scarce. We find such a signal in how the model's confidence evolves during reasoning: premature confidence, the tendency to commit to an answer early and use the remaining tokens to rationalize it, strongly predicts flawed reasoning across tasks and model scales. We exploit this in progressive confidence shaping, a reinforcement learning objective that trains models to update their confidence as they reason rather than commit early -- rewarding gradual confidence growth and penalizing early commitment, with no external labels or reward models. The method improves accuracy and reasoning quality from 1.5B to 8B parameters across arithmetic (Countdown), math (DAPO, AIME), and science (ScienceQA): on Countdown, accuracy improves 3.2x (+42.0pp) and flawed reasoning drops 48pp; on AIME, Pass@64 improves 6.6pp. Consistent with this mechanism, the method also improves faithfulness: on a safety benchmark, our models more transparently surface misleading content in their reasoning traces rather than concealing it. Controlled experiments reveal that the problem and its remedy scale together: premature confidence grows with model size and task difficulty, and so do the gains from addressing it.

Large language models (LLMs) continually evolve through pre-training on ever-expanding web data, but this adaptive process also exposes them to subtle forms of misinformation. While prior work has explored data poisoning during static pre-training, the effects of such manipulations under continual pre-training remain largely unexplored. Drawing inspiration from the illusory truth effect in human cognition - where repeated exposure to falsehoods increases belief in their accuracy - we ask whether LLMs exhibit a similar vulnerability. We investigate whether repeated exposure to false but confidently stated facts can shift a model's internal representation away from the truth. We introduce Layer of Truth, a framework and dataset for probing belief dynamics in continually trained LLMs. By injecting controlled amounts of poisoned data and probing intermediate representations across checkpoints, model scales, and question types, we quantify when and how factual beliefs shift. Our findings reveal that even minimal exposure can induce persistent representational drift in well-established facts, with susceptibility varying across layers and model sizes. These results highlight an overlooked vulnerability of continually updated LLMs: their capacity to internalize misinformation analogously to humans, underscoring the need for robust monitoring of factual integrity during model updates.

Hybrid reasoning systems that combine learned components with model-based inference are increasingly deployed in tool-augmented decision loops, yet their runtime behavior under partial observability and sustained evidence mismatch remains poorly understood. In practice, failures often arise as gradual divergence of internal reasoning dynamics rather than as isolated prediction errors. This work studies runtime stability in hybrid reasoning systems from a Kalman-inspired perspective. We model reasoning as a stochastic inference process driven by an internal innovation signal and introduce cognitive drift as a measurable runtime phenomenon. Stability is defined in terms of detectability, bounded divergence, and recoverability rather than task-level correctness. We propose a runtime stability framework that monitors innovation statistics, detects emerging instability, and triggers recovery-aware control mechanisms. Experiments on multi-step, tool-augmented reasoning tasks demonstrate reliable instability detection prior to task failure and show that recovery, when feasible, re-establishes bounded internal behavior within finite time. These results emphasize runtime stability as a system-level requirement for reliable reasoning under uncertainty.

In medical imaging, anomaly detection is a vital element of healthcare diagnostics, especially for neurological conditions which can be life-threatening. Conventional deterministic methods often fall short when it comes to capturing the inherent uncertainty of anomaly detection tasks. This paper introduces a Bayesian Variational Autoencoder (VAE) equipped with multi-head attention mechanisms for detecting anomalies in brain magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). For the purpose of improving anomaly detection performance, we incorporate both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty estimation through Bayesian inference. The model was tested on the BraTS2020 dataset, and the findings were a 0.83 ROC AUC and a 0.83 PR AUC. The data in our paper suggests that modeling uncertainty is an essential component of anomaly detection, enhancing both performance and interpretability and providing confidence estimates, as well as anomaly predictions, for clinicians to leverage in making medical decisions.

Conventional uncertainty-aware temporal difference (TD) learning often assumes a zero-mean Gaussian distribution for TD errors, leading to inaccurate error representations and compromised uncertainty estimation. We introduce a novel framework for generalized Gaussian error modeling in deep reinforcement learning to enhance the flexibility of error distribution modeling by incorporating additional higher-order moment, particularly kurtosis, thereby improving the estimation and mitigation of data-dependent aleatoric uncertainty. We examine the influence of the shape parameter of the generalized Gaussian distribution (GGD) on aleatoric uncertainty and provide a closed-form expression that demonstrates an inverse relationship between uncertainty and the shape parameter. Additionally, we propose a theoretically grounded weighting scheme to address epistemic uncertainty by fully leveraging the GGD. We refine batch inverse variance weighting with bias reduction and kurtosis considerations, enhancing robustness. Experiments with policy gradient algorithms demonstrate significant performance gains.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve remarkable performance by leveraging reinforcement learning (RL) on reasoning tasks to generate long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning. However, this over-optimization often prioritizes compliance, making models vulnerable to harmful prompts. To mitigate this safety degradation, recent approaches rely on external teacher distillation, yet this introduces a distributional discrepancy that degrades native reasoning. We propose ThinkSafe, a self-generated alignment framework that restores safety alignment without external teachers. Our key insight is that while compliance suppresses safety mechanisms, models often retain latent knowledge to identify harm. ThinkSafe unlocks this via lightweight refusal steering, guiding the model to generate in-distribution safety reasoning traces. Fine-tuning on these self-generated responses effectively realigns the model while minimizing distribution shift. Experiments on DeepSeek-R1-Distill and Qwen3 show ThinkSafe significantly improves safety while preserving reasoning proficiency. Notably, it achieves superior safety and comparable reasoning to GRPO, with significantly reduced computational cost. Code, models, and datasets are available at https://github.com/seanie12/ThinkSafe.git.

We systematically study antithetic initial noise in diffusion models, discovering that pairing each noise sample with its negation consistently produces strong negative correlation. This universal phenomenon holds across datasets, model architectures, conditional and unconditional sampling, and even other generative models such as VAEs and Normalizing Flows. To explain it, we combine experiments and theory and propose a symmetry conjecture that the learned score function is approximately affine antisymmetric (odd symmetry up to a constant shift), supported by empirical evidence. This negative correlation leads to substantially more reliable uncertainty quantification with up to 90% narrower confidence intervals. We demonstrate these gains on tasks including estimating pixel-wise statistics and evaluating diffusion inverse solvers. We also provide extensions with randomized quasi-Monte Carlo noise designs for uncertainty quantification, and explore additional applications of the antithetic noise design to improve image editing and generation diversity. Our framework is training-free, model-agnostic, and adds no runtime overhead. Code is available at https://github.com/jjia131/Antithetic-Noise-in-Diffusion-Models-page.

When a language model agrees with a user's false belief, is it failing to detect the error, or noticing and agreeing anyway? We show the latter. Across twelve open-weight models from five labs, spanning small to frontier scale, the same small set of attention heads carries a "this statement is wrong" signal whether the model is evaluating a claim on its own or being pressured to agree with a user. Silencing these heads flips sycophantic behavior sharply while leaving factual accuracy intact, so the circuit controls deference rather than knowledge. Edge-level path patching confirms that the same head-to-head connections drive sycophancy, factual lying, and instructed lying. Opinion-agreement, where no factual ground truth exists, reuses these head positions but writes into an orthogonal direction, ruling out a simple "truth-direction" reading of the substrate. Alignment training leaves this circuit in place: an RLHF refresh cuts sycophantic behavior roughly tenfold while the shared heads persist or grow, a pattern that replicates on an independent model family and under targeted anti-sycophancy DPO. When these models sycophant, they register that the user is wrong and agree anyway.

Active inference offers a first principle account of sentient behaviour, from which special and important cases can be derived, e.g., reinforcement learning, active learning, Bayes optimal inference, Bayes optimal design, etc. Active inference resolves the exploitation-exploration dilemma in relation to prior preferences, by placing information gain on the same footing as reward or value. In brief, active inference replaces value functions with functionals of (Bayesian) beliefs, in the form of an expected (variational) free energy. In this paper, we consider a sophisticated kind of active inference, using a recursive form of expected free energy. Sophistication describes the degree to which an agent has beliefs about beliefs. We consider agents with beliefs about the counterfactual consequences of action for states of affairs and beliefs about those latent states. In other words, we move from simply considering beliefs about 'what would happen if I did that' to 'what would I believe about what would happen if I did that'. The recursive form of the free energy functional effectively implements a deep tree search over actions and outcomes in the future. Crucially, this search is over sequences of belief states, as opposed to states per se. We illustrate the competence of this scheme, using numerical simulations of deep decision problems.

We revisit Zadeh's notion of "evidence of the second kind" and show that it provides the foundation for a general theory of epistemic random fuzzy sets, which generalizes both the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions and possibility theory. In this perspective, Dempster-Shafer theory deals with belief functions generated by random sets, while possibility theory deals with belief functions induced by fuzzy sets. The more general theory allows us to represent and combine evidence that is both uncertain and fuzzy. We demonstrate the application of this formalism to statistical inference, and show that it makes it possible to reconcile the possibilistic interpretation of likelihood with Bayesian inference.

Multiple types of inference are available for probabilistic graphical models, e.g., marginal, maximum-a-posteriori, and even marginal maximum-a-posteriori. Which one do researchers mean when they talk about ``planning as inference''? There is no consistency in the literature, different types are used, and their ability to do planning is further entangled with specific approximations or additional constraints. In this work we use the variational framework to show that, just like all commonly used types of inference correspond to different weightings of the entropy terms in the variational problem, planning corresponds exactly to a different set of weights. This means that all the tricks of variational inference are readily applicable to planning. We develop an analogue of loopy belief propagation that allows us to perform approximate planning in factored-state Markov decisions processes without incurring intractability due to the exponentially large state space. The variational perspective shows that the previous types of inference for planning are only adequate in environments with low stochasticity, and allows us to characterize each type by its own merits, disentangling the type of inference from the additional approximations that its practical use requires. We validate these results empirically on synthetic MDPs and tasks posed in the International Planning Competition.

In this work, we derive sharp non-asymptotic deviation bounds for weighted sums of Dirichlet random variables. These bounds are based on a novel integral representation of the density of a weighted Dirichlet sum. This representation allows us to obtain a Gaussian-like approximation for the sum distribution using geometry and complex analysis methods. Our results generalize similar bounds for the Beta distribution obtained in the seminal paper Alfers and Dinges [1984]. Additionally, our results can be considered a sharp non-asymptotic version of the inverse of Sanov's theorem studied by Ganesh and O'Connell [1999] in the Bayesian setting. Based on these results, we derive new deviation bounds for the Dirichlet process posterior means with application to Bayesian bootstrap. Finally, we apply our estimates to the analysis of the Multinomial Thompson Sampling (TS) algorithm in multi-armed bandits and significantly sharpen the existing regret bounds by making them independent of the size of the arms distribution support.

Safety alignment incurs safety tax that perturbs a large reasoning model's (LRM) general reasoning ability. Existing datasets used for safety alignment for an LRM are usually constructed by distilling safety reasoning traces and answers from an external LRM or human labeler. However, such reasoning traces and answers exhibit a distributional gap with the target LRM that needs alignment, and we conjecture such distributional gap is the culprit leading to significant degradation of reasoning ability of the target LRM. Driven by this hypothesis, we propose a safety alignment dataset construction method, dubbed DGR. DGR transforms and refines an existing out-of-distributional safety reasoning dataset to be aligned with the target's LLM inner distribution. Experimental results demonstrate that i) DGR effectively mitigates the safety tax while maintaining safety performance across all baselines, i.e., achieving +30.2\% on DirectRefusal and +21.2\% on R1-ACT improvement in average reasoning accuracy compared to Vanilla SFT; ii) the degree of reasoning degradation correlates with the extent of distribution shift, suggesting that bridging this gap is central to preserving capabilities. Furthermore, we find that safety alignment in LRMs may primarily function as a mechanism to activate latent knowledge, as a mere 10 samples are sufficient for activating effective refusal behaviors. These findings not only emphasize the importance of distributional consistency but also provide insights into the activation mechanism of safety in reasoning models.

Spatial embodied intelligence requires agents to act to acquire information under partial observability. While multimodal foundation models excel at passive perception, their capacity for active, self-directed exploration remains understudied. We propose Theory of Space, defined as an agent's ability to actively acquire information through self-directed, active exploration and to construct, revise, and exploit a spatial belief from sequential, partial observations. We evaluate this through a benchmark where the goal is curiosity-driven exploration to build an accurate cognitive map. A key innovation is spatial belief probing, which prompts models to reveal their internal spatial representations at each step. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals several critical bottlenecks. First, we identify an Active-Passive Gap, where performance drops significantly when agents must autonomously gather information. Second, we find high inefficiency, as models explore unsystematically compared to program-based proxies. Through belief probing, we diagnose that while perception is an initial bottleneck, global beliefs suffer from instability that causes spatial knowledge to degrade over time. Finally, using a false belief paradigm, we uncover Belief Inertia, where agents fail to update obsolete priors with new evidence. This issue is present in text-based agents but is particularly severe in vision-based models. Our findings suggest that current foundation models struggle to maintain coherent, revisable spatial beliefs during active exploration.

Off-policy actor-critic methods in reinforcement learning train a critic with temporal-difference updates and use it as a learning signal for the policy (actor). This design typically achieves higher sample efficiency than purely on-policy methods. However, critic networks tend to overestimate value estimates systematically. This is often addressed by introducing a pessimistic bias based on uncertainty estimates. Current methods employ ensembling to quantify the critic's epistemic uncertainty-uncertainty due to limited data and model ambiguity-to scale pessimistic updates. In this work, we propose a new algorithm called Stochastic Actor-Critic (STAC) that incorporates temporal (one-step) aleatoric uncertainty-uncertainty arising from stochastic transitions, rewards, and policy-induced variability in Bellman targets-to scale pessimistic bias in temporal-difference updates, rather than relying on epistemic uncertainty. STAC uses a single distributional critic network to model the temporal return uncertainty, and applies dropout to both the critic and actor networks for regularization. Our results show that pessimism based on a distributional critic alone suffices to mitigate overestimation, and naturally leads to risk-averse behavior in stochastic environments. Introducing dropout further improves training stability and performance by means of regularization. With this design, STAC achieves improved computational efficiency using a single distributional critic network.

Evaluating the performance of machine learning models under distribution shift is challenging, especially when we only have unlabeled data from the shifted (target) domain, along with labeled data from the original (source) domain. Recent work suggests that the notion of disagreement, the degree to which two models trained with different randomness differ on the same input, is a key to tackle this problem. Experimentally, disagreement and prediction error have been shown to be strongly connected, which has been used to estimate model performance. Experiments have led to the discovery of the disagreement-on-the-line phenomenon, whereby the classification error under the target domain is often a linear function of the classification error under the source domain; and whenever this property holds, disagreement under the source and target domain follow the same linear relation. In this work, we develop a theoretical foundation for analyzing disagreement in high-dimensional random features regression; and study under what conditions the disagreement-on-the-line phenomenon occurs in our setting. Experiments on CIFAR-10-C, Tiny ImageNet-C, and Camelyon17 are consistent with our theory and support the universality of the theoretical findings.

A prominent challenge of offline reinforcement learning (RL) is the issue of hidden confounding: unobserved variables may influence both the actions taken by the agent and the observed outcomes. Hidden confounding can compromise the validity of any causal conclusion drawn from data and presents a major obstacle to effective offline RL. In the present paper, we tackle the problem of hidden confounding in the nonidentifiable setting. We propose a definition of uncertainty due to hidden confounding bias, termed delphic uncertainty, which uses variation over world models compatible with the observations, and differentiate it from the well-known epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties. We derive a practical method for estimating the three types of uncertainties, and construct a pessimistic offline RL algorithm to account for them. Our method does not assume identifiability of the unobserved confounders, and attempts to reduce the amount of confounding bias. We demonstrate through extensive experiments and ablations the efficacy of our approach on a sepsis management benchmark, as well as on electronic health records. Our results suggest that nonidentifiable hidden confounding bias can be mitigated to improve offline RL solutions in practice.

Understanding how Large Language Models (LLMs) perform complex reasoning and their failure mechanisms is a challenge in interpretability research. To provide a measurable geometric analysis perspective, we define the concept of the Reasoning Manifold, a latent low-dimensional geometric structure formed by the internal representations corresponding to all correctly reasoned generations. This structure can be conceptualized as the embodiment of the effective thinking paths that the model has learned to successfully solve a given task. Based on this concept, we build REMA, a framework that explains the origins of failures by quantitatively comparing the spatial relationships of internal model representations corresponding to both erroneous and correct reasoning samples. Specifically, REMA first quantifies the geometric deviation of each erroneous representation by calculating its k-nearest neighbors distance to the approximated manifold formed by correct representations, thereby providing a unified failure signal. It then localizes the divergence points where these deviations first become significant by tracking this deviation metric across the model's layers and comparing it against a baseline of internal fluctuations from correct representations, thus identifying where the reasoning chain begins to go off-track. Our extensive experiments on diverse language and multimodal models and tasks demonstrate the low-dimensional nature of the reasoning manifold and the high separability between erroneous and correct reasoning representations. The results also validate the effectiveness of the REMA framework in analyzing the origins of reasoning failures. This research connects abstract reasoning failures to measurable geometric deviations in representations, providing new avenues for in-depth understanding and diagnosis of the internal computational processes of black-box models.

Large language model (LLM)-based conversational AI systems present a challenge to human cognition that current frameworks for understanding misinformation and persuasion do not adequately address. This paper proposes that a significant epistemic risk from conversational AI may lie not in inaccuracy or intentional deception, but in something more fundamental: these systems may be configured, through optimization processes that make them useful, to present characteristics that bypass the cognitive mechanisms humans evolved to evaluate incoming information. The Cognitive Trojan Horse hypothesis draws on Sperber and colleagues' theory of epistemic vigilance -- the parallel cognitive process monitoring communicated information for reasons to doubt -- and proposes that LLM-based systems present 'honest non-signals': genuine characteristics (fluency, helpfulness, apparent disinterest) that fail to carry the information equivalent human characteristics would carry, because in humans these are costly to produce while in LLMs they are computationally trivial. Four mechanisms of potential bypass are identified: processing fluency decoupled from understanding, trust-competence presentation without corresponding stakes, cognitive offloading that delegates evaluation itself to the AI, and optimization dynamics that systematically produce sycophancy. The framework generates testable predictions, including a counterintuitive speculation that cognitively sophisticated users may be more vulnerable to AI-mediated epistemic influence. This reframes AI safety as partly a problem of calibration -- aligning human evaluative responses with the actual epistemic status of AI-generated content -- rather than solely a problem of preventing deception.

The surprisingly likely criterion in the seminal work of Prelec (the Bayesian Truth Serum) guarantees truthfulness in a game-theoretic multi-agent setting, by rewarding rational agents to maximise the expected information gain with their answers w.r.t. their probabilistic beliefs. We investigate the relevance of a similar criterion for responses of LLMs. We hypothesize that if the surprisingly likely criterion works in LLMs, under certain conditions, the responses that maximize the reward under this criterion should be more accurate than the responses that only maximize the posterior probability. Using benchmarks including the TruthfulQA benchmark and using openly available LLMs: GPT-2 and LLaMA-2, we show that the method indeed improves the accuracy significantly (for example, upto 24 percentage points aggregate improvement on TruthfulQA and upto 70 percentage points improvement on individual categories of questions).

While LLMs have seen substantial improvement in reasoning capabilities, they also sometimes overthink, generating unnecessary reasoning steps, particularly under uncertainty, given ill-posed or ambiguous queries. We introduce statistically principled early stopping methods that monitor uncertainty signals during generation to mitigate this issue. Our first approach is parametric: it models inter-arrival times of uncertainty keywords as a renewal process and applies sequential testing for stopping. Our second approach is nonparametric and provides finite-sample guarantees on the probability of halting too early on well-posed queries. We conduct empirical evaluations on reasoning tasks across several domains and models. Our results indicate that uncertainty-aware early stopping can improve both efficiency and reliability in LLM reasoning, and we observe especially significant gains for math reasoning.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive capabilities, they still struggle with generating factually incorrect content (i.e., hallucinations). A promising approach to mitigate this issue is enabling models to express uncertainty when unsure. Previous research on uncertainty modeling has primarily focused on short-form QA, but realworld applications often require much longer responses. In this work, we introduce the task of Long-form Generation with Uncertainty(LoGU). We identify two key challenges: Uncertainty Suppression, where models hesitate to express uncertainty, and Uncertainty Misalignment, where models convey uncertainty inaccurately. To tackle these challenges, we propose a refinement-based data collection framework and a two-stage training pipeline. Our framework adopts a divide-and-conquer strategy, refining uncertainty based on atomic claims. The collected data are then used in training through supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and direct preference optimization (DPO) to enhance uncertainty expression. Extensive experiments on three long-form instruction following datasets show that our method significantly improves accuracy, reduces hallucinations, and maintains the comprehensiveness of responses.

The adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) as automated evaluators (LLM-as-a-judge) has revealed critical inconsistencies in current evaluation frameworks. We identify two fundamental types of inconsistencies: (1) Score-Comparison Inconsistency, where lower-rated responses outperform higher-scored ones in pairwise comparisons, and (2) Pairwise Transitivity Inconsistency, manifested through circular preference chains (A>B>C>A) and equivalence contradictions (A=B=C\neq A). We argue that these issues come from information loss in discrete rating systems and ambiguous tie judgments during pairwise evaluation. We propose TrustJudge, a probabilistic framework that addresses these limitations through two key innovations: 1) distribution-sensitive scoring that computes continuous expectations from discrete rating probabilities, preserving information entropy for more precise scoring, and 2) likelihood-aware aggregation that resolves transitivity violations using bidirectional preference probabilities or perplexity. We also formalize the theoretical limitations of current LLM-as-a-judge frameworks and demonstrate how TrustJudge's components overcome them. When evaluated with Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct as judge using our dataset, TrustJudge reduces Score-Comparison inconsistency by 8.43% (from 23.32% to 14.89%) and Pairwise Transitivity inconsistency by 10.82% (from 15.22% to 4.40%), while maintaining higher evaluation accuracy. Our work provides the first systematic analysis of evaluation framework inconsistencies in LLM-as-a-judge paradigms, offering both theoretical insights and practical solutions for reliable automated assessment. The framework demonstrates consistent improvements across various model architectures and scales, enabling more trustworthy LLM evaluation without requiring additional training or human annotations. The codes can be found at https://github.com/TrustJudge/TrustJudge.

Benchmarks measure whether a model is correct. They do not measure whether a model is reliable. This distinction is largely academic for single-shot inference, but becomes critical for agentic AI systems, where a single rephrased prompt can trigger cascading failures in multi-step execution. Yet this form of instability is not captured by existing evaluations. Hallucinations live in variance: they arise when semantically equivalent prompts activate inconsistent internal pathways, producing divergent outputs. Consistent but incorrect outputs reflect bias or missing knowledge; confident guessing reflects calibration failure. Neither constitutes hallucination under this definition. When error is variance-dominated, reducing redundant pathways improves reliability without adding knowledge. We formalize this through Semantic Stability (SS), measured via Paraphrase Consistency (PC@k): generate k paraphrases, greedy decode each, compute mode agreement. SS is a diagnostic for variance-driven unreliability, not a method for improving correctness. We show that a dense Qwen3-0.6B agrees with itself only 23.8% of the time; at 32% sparsity, agreement jumps to 55.9%. A phase diagram reveals the sweet spot where variance reduction outpaces bias accumulation, and regimes where stability collapses onto wrong answers.

Uncertainty quantification has received increasing attention in machine learning in the recent past. In particular, a distinction between aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty has been found useful in this regard. The latter refers to the learner's (lack of) knowledge and appears to be especially difficult to measure and quantify. In this paper, we analyse a recent proposal based on the idea of a second-order learner, which yields predictions in the form of distributions over probability distributions. While standard (first-order) learners can be trained to predict accurate probabilities, namely by minimising suitable loss functions on sample data, we show that loss minimisation does not work for second-order predictors: The loss functions proposed for inducing such predictors do not incentivise the learner to represent its epistemic uncertainty in a faithful way.

Reliable estimation of predictive uncertainty is crucial for machine learning applications, particularly in high-stakes scenarios where hedging against risks is essential. Despite its significance, there is no universal agreement on how to best quantify predictive uncertainty. In this work, we revisit core concepts to propose a framework for information-theoretic measures of predictive uncertainty. Our proposed framework categorizes predictive uncertainty measures according to two factors: (I) The predicting model (II) The approximation of the true predictive distribution. Examining all possible combinations of these two factors, we derive a set of predictive uncertainty measures that includes both known and newly introduced ones. We extensively evaluate these measures across a broad set of tasks, identifying conditions under which certain measures excel. Our findings show the importance of aligning the choice of uncertainty measure with the predicting model on in-distribution (ID) data, the limitations of epistemic uncertainty measures for out-of-distribution (OOD) data, and that the disentanglement between measures varies substantially between ID and OOD data. Together, these insights provide a more comprehensive understanding of predictive uncertainty measures, revealing their implicit assumptions and relationships.

Large language models (LLMs) are known to abandon their initial stance to conform to user pushback. While prior research largely attributes this behavior to sycophancy learned during reinforcement learning from human feedback, we hypothesize that conformity is also driven by a model's epistemic uncertainty at inference time. In this paper, we introduce MUSE, a two-stage evaluation framework to disentangle the mechanisms driving LLM conformity. Specifically, MUSE maps a model's epistemic uncertainty in responding to a query against its likelihood to yield to user pushback in a subsequent turn. We demonstrate that the mechanisms driving conformity extend beyond sycophancy alone. Specifically, we characterize two distinct factors that jointly drive conformity: sycophantic conformity, where a model aligns with user pushback even with absolute certainty in its initial response, and uncertainty-driven conformity, where a model's likelihood for conformity increases alongside its uncertainty. Furthermore, we conduct ablation studies to demonstrate that both sycophantic conformity and uncertainty-driven conformity grow with 1) the LLM's perceived expertise of the user and 2) the plausibility of the user's suggestions. More broadly, MUSE informs more targeted intervention strategies by distinguishing alignment-induced sycophancy and training-corpora-driven uncertainty.

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in long and complex reasoning tasks. However, they frequently exhibit a problematic reliance on familiar reasoning patterns, a phenomenon we term reasoning rigidity. Despite explicit instructions from users, these models often override clearly stated conditions and default to habitual reasoning trajectories, leading to incorrect conclusions. This behavior presents significant challenges, particularly in domains such as mathematics and logic puzzle, where precise adherence to specified constraints is critical. To systematically investigate reasoning rigidity, a behavior largely unexplored in prior work, we introduce a expert-curated diagnostic set, . Our dataset includes specially modified variants of existing mathematical benchmarks, namely AIME and MATH500, as well as well-known puzzles deliberately redesigned to require deviation from familiar reasoning strategies. Using this dataset, we identify recurring contamination patterns that occur when models default to ingrained reasoning. Specifically, we categorize this contamination into three distinctive modes: (i) Interpretation Overload, (ii) Input Distrust, and (iii) Partial Instruction Attention, each causing models to ignore or distort provided instructions. We publicly release our diagnostic set to facilitate future research on mitigating reasoning rigidity in language models.

The paper studies the linear model for Bitcoin price which includes regression features based on Bitcoin currency statistics, mining processes, Google search trends, Wikipedia pages visits. The pattern of deviation of regression model prediction from real prices is simpler comparing to price time series. It is assumed that this pattern can be predicted by an experienced expert. In such a way, using the combination of the regression model and expert correction, one can receive better results than with either regression model or expert opinion only. It is shown that Bayesian approach makes it possible to utilize the probabilistic approach using distributions with fat tails and take into account the outliers in Bitcoin price time series.

Predictions made by deep learning models are prone to data perturbations, adversarial attacks, and out-of-distribution inputs. To build a trusted AI system, it is therefore critical to accurately quantify the prediction uncertainties. While current efforts focus on improving uncertainty quantification accuracy and efficiency, there is a need to identify uncertainty sources and take actions to mitigate their effects on predictions. Therefore, we propose to develop explainable and actionable Bayesian deep learning methods to not only perform accurate uncertainty quantification but also explain the uncertainties, identify their sources, and propose strategies to mitigate the uncertainty impacts. Specifically, we introduce a gradient-based uncertainty attribution method to identify the most problematic regions of the input that contribute to the prediction uncertainty. Compared to existing methods, the proposed UA-Backprop has competitive accuracy, relaxed assumptions, and high efficiency. Moreover, we propose an uncertainty mitigation strategy that leverages the attribution results as attention to further improve the model performance. Both qualitative and quantitative evaluations are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed methods.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown remarkable reasoning capabilities, yet they often suffer from overthinking, expending redundant computational steps on simple problems, or underthinking, failing to explore sufficient reasoning paths despite inherent capabilities. These issues lead to inefficiencies and potential inaccuracies, limiting practical deployment in resource-constrained settings. Existing methods to mitigate overthinking, such as suppressing reflective keywords or adjusting reasoning length, may inadvertently induce underthinking, compromising accuracy. Therefore, we propose ReBalance, a training-free framework that achieves efficient reasoning with balanced thinking. ReBalance leverages confidence as a continuous indicator of reasoning dynamics, identifying overthinking through high confidence variance and underthinking via consistent overconfidence. By aggregating hidden states from a small-scale dataset into reasoning mode prototypes, we compute a steering vector to guide LRMs' reasoning trajectories. A dynamic control function modulates this vector's strength and direction based on real-time confidence, pruning redundancy during overthinking, and promoting exploration during underthinking. Extensive experiments conducted on four models ranging from 0.5B to 32B, and across nine benchmarks in math reasoning, general question answering, and coding tasks demonstrate that ReBalance effectively reduces output redundancy while improving accuracy, offering a general, training-free, and plug-and-play strategy for efficient and robust LRM deployment. Code is available at https://github.com/yu-lin-li/ReBalance .

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) frequently "hallucinate" - generate plausible yet factually incorrect statements - posing a critical barrier to their trustworthy deployment. In this work, we propose a new paradigm for diagnosing hallucinations, recasting them from static output errors into dynamic pathologies of a model's computational cognition. Our framework is grounded in a normative principle of computational rationality, allowing us to model a VLM's generation as a dynamic cognitive trajectory. We design a suite of information-theoretic probes that project this trajectory onto an interpretable, low-dimensional Cognitive State Space. Our central discovery is a governing principle we term the geometric-information duality: a cognitive trajectory's geometric abnormality within this space is fundamentally equivalent to its high information-theoretic surprisal. Hallucination detection is counts as a geometric anomaly detection problem. Evaluated across diverse settings - from rigorous binary QA (POPE) and comprehensive reasoning (MME) to unconstrained open-ended captioning (MS-COCO) - our framework achieves state-of-the-art performance. Crucially, it operates with high efficiency under weak supervision and remains highly robust even when calibration data is heavily contaminated. This approach enables a causal attribution of failures, mapping observable errors to distinct pathological states: perceptual instability (measured by Perceptual Entropy), logical-causal failure (measured by Inferential Conflict), and decisional ambiguity (measured by Decision Entropy). Ultimately, this opens a path toward building AI systems whose reasoning is transparent, auditable, and diagnosable by design.

Misclassification detection is an important problem in machine learning, as it allows for the identification of instances where the model's predictions are unreliable. However, conventional uncertainty measures such as Shannon entropy do not provide an effective way to infer the real uncertainty associated with the model's predictions. In this paper, we introduce a novel data-driven measure of uncertainty relative to an observer for misclassification detection. By learning patterns in the distribution of soft-predictions, our uncertainty measure can identify misclassified samples based on the predicted class probabilities. Interestingly, according to the proposed measure, soft-predictions corresponding to misclassified instances can carry a large amount of uncertainty, even though they may have low Shannon entropy. We demonstrate empirical improvements over multiple image classification tasks, outperforming state-of-the-art misclassification detection methods.

Linguistic cues such as "I believe" and "probably" offer an intuitive interface for communicating confidence, yet a generalisable, principled calibration framework for linguistic confidence expressions remains underexplored. In particular, co-occurring linguistic cues, contextual variation, and subjective audience interpretation pose unique challenges. We therefore model linguistic confidence as a distribution over plausible perceived probability values that a statement is correct, capturing interpretation variability that scalar representations discard. Within this distributional framework, we introduce faithfulness as a complementary evaluation dimension and present Faithfulness Divergence (FD), an information-theoretic metric quantifying the surprise induced in audience beliefs upon truth revelation. Building on these foundations, we present Retrieval-Augmented Linguistic Calibration (RALC), a lightweight post-hoc pipeline that propagates calibrated confidence signals back into natural language via retrieval-augmented rewriting. Across three QA benchmarks and five LLM families, RALC improves in-domain faithfulness and calibration up to 66% and 58%, respectively, outperforming black-box and grey-box calibration baselines.

Recent work has sought to quantify large language model uncertainty to facilitate model control and modulate user trust. Previous works focus on measures of uncertainty that are theoretically grounded or reflect the average overt behavior of the model. In this work, we investigate a variety of uncertainty measures, in order to identify measures that correlate with human group-level uncertainty. We find that Bayesian measures and a variation on entropy measures, top-k entropy, tend to agree with human behavior as a function of model size. We find that some strong measures decrease in human-similarity with model size, but, by multiple linear regression, we find that combining multiple uncertainty measures provide comparable human-alignment with reduced size-dependency.

Rigorous statistical evaluations of large language models (LLMs), including valid error bars and significance testing, are essential for meaningful and reliable performance assessment. Currently, when such statistical measures are reported, they typically rely on the Central Limit Theorem (CLT). In this position paper, we argue that while CLT-based methods for uncertainty quantification are appropriate when benchmarks consist of thousands of examples, they fail to provide adequate uncertainty estimates for LLM evaluations that rely on smaller, highly specialized benchmarks. In these small-data settings, we demonstrate that CLT-based methods perform very poorly, usually dramatically underestimating uncertainty (i.e. producing error bars that are too small). We give recommendations for alternative frequentist and Bayesian methods that are both easy to implement and more appropriate in these increasingly common scenarios. We provide a simple Python library for these Bayesian methods at https://github.com/sambowyer/bayes_evals .

The recent performance leap of Large Language Models (LLMs) opens up new opportunities across numerous industrial applications and domains. However, erroneous generations, such as false predictions, misinformation, and hallucination made by LLMs, have also raised severe concerns for the trustworthiness of LLMs', especially in safety-, security- and reliability-sensitive scenarios, potentially hindering real-world adoptions. While uncertainty estimation has shown its potential for interpreting the prediction risks made by general machine learning (ML) models, little is known about whether and to what extent it can help explore an LLM's capabilities and counteract its undesired behavior. To bridge the gap, in this paper, we initiate an exploratory study on the risk assessment of LLMs from the lens of uncertainty. In particular, we experiment with twelve uncertainty estimation methods and four LLMs on four prominent natural language processing (NLP) tasks to investigate to what extent uncertainty estimation techniques could help characterize the prediction risks of LLMs. Our findings validate the effectiveness of uncertainty estimation for revealing LLMs' uncertain/non-factual predictions. In addition to general NLP tasks, we extensively conduct experiments with four LLMs for code generation on two datasets. We find that uncertainty estimation can potentially uncover buggy programs generated by LLMs. Insights from our study shed light on future design and development for reliable LLMs, facilitating further research toward enhancing the trustworthiness of LLMs.

Most work interpreting reasoning models studies only a single chain-of-thought (CoT), yet these models define distributions over many possible CoTs. We argue that studying a single sample is inadequate for understanding causal influence and the underlying computation. Though fully specifying this distribution is intractable, it can be understood by sampling. We present case studies using resampling to investigate model decisions. First, when a model states a reason for its action, does that reason actually cause the action? In "agentic misalignment" scenarios, we resample specific sentences to measure their downstream effects. Self-preservation sentences have small causal impact, suggesting they do not meaningfully drive blackmail. Second, are artificial edits to CoT sufficient for steering reasoning? These are common in literature, yet take the model off-policy. Resampling and selecting a completion with the desired property is a principled on-policy alternative. We find off-policy interventions yield small and unstable effects compared to resampling in decision-making tasks. Third, how do we understand the effect of removing a reasoning step when the model may repeat it post-edit? We introduce a resilience metric that repeatedly resamples to prevent similar content from reappearing downstream. Critical planning statements resist removal but have large effects when eliminated. Fourth, since CoT is sometimes "unfaithful", can our methods teach us anything in these settings? Adapting causal mediation analysis, we find that hints that have a causal effect on the output without being explicitly mentioned exert a subtle and cumulative influence on the CoT that persists even if the hint is removed. Overall, studying distributions via resampling enables reliable causal analysis, clearer narratives of model reasoning, and principled CoT interventions.

It is well known that accurate probabilistic predictors can be trained through empirical risk minimisation with proper scoring rules as loss functions. While such learners capture so-called aleatoric uncertainty of predictions, various machine learning methods have recently been developed with the goal to let the learner also represent its epistemic uncertainty, i.e., the uncertainty caused by a lack of knowledge and data. An emerging branch of the literature proposes the use of a second-order learner that provides predictions in terms of distributions on probability distributions. However, recent work has revealed serious theoretical shortcomings for second-order predictors based on loss minimisation. In this paper, we generalise these findings and prove a more fundamental result: There seems to be no loss function that provides an incentive for a second-order learner to faithfully represent its epistemic uncertainty in the same manner as proper scoring rules do for standard (first-order) learners. As a main mathematical tool to prove this result, we introduce the generalised notion of second-order scoring rules.

In a striking neuroscience study, the authors placed a dead salmon in an MRI scanner and showed it images of humans in social situations. Astonishingly, standard analyses of the time reported brain regions predictive of social emotions. The explanation, of course, was not supernatural cognition but a cautionary tale about misapplied statistical inference. In AI interpretability, reports of similar ''dead salmon'' artifacts abound: feature attribution, probing, sparse auto-encoding, and even causal analyses can produce plausible-looking explanations for randomly initialized neural networks. In this work, we examine this phenomenon and argue for a pragmatic statistical-causal reframing: explanations of computational systems should be treated as parameters of a (statistical) model, inferred from computational traces. This perspective goes beyond simply measuring statistical variability of explanations due to finite sampling of input data; interpretability methods become statistical estimators, and findings should be tested against explicit and meaningful alternative computational hypotheses, with uncertainty quantified with respect to the postulated statistical model. It also highlights important theoretical issues, such as the identifiability of common interpretability queries, which we argue is critical to understand the field's susceptibility to false discoveries, poor generalizability, and high variance. More broadly, situating interpretability within the standard toolkit of statistical inference opens promising avenues for future work aimed at turning AI interpretability into a pragmatic and rigorous science.

Why do language models sometimes prefer correct statements even when trained on mixed-quality data? We introduce the Compression--Consistency Principle: next-token prediction favors hypotheses that allow shorter and more internally consistent descriptions of the training data. Truth bias emerges only when false alternatives are structurally harder to compress. We test this using small GPT-2-style character-level transformers (3.5M--86M parameters) on synthetic math corpora with controlled mixtures of correct and incorrect rules. In the random-error setting, models strongly prefer correct completions in paired evaluation: 83.1% accuracy at balanced data and 67.0% even when correct rules appear in only 10% of the corpus. Replacing random errors with a coherent but mathematically incorrect rule system largely eliminates the preference (near-chance accuracy). In a more natural-language-like synthetic world, the effect is weaker but still present (57.7%). Additional experiments show that embedding verification steps can restore preference for correctness even at small scale, while increasing the number of consistent rules produces a graded improvement in accuracy. Our results suggest that what appears as a "truth bias" is largely a side effect of compression pressure and preference for internal consistency, rather than an intrinsic drive toward truth. Full code and data are available at https://github.com/Rai220/compression-drives-truth.

This study presents PARROT (Persuasion and Agreement Robustness Rating of Output Truth), a robustness focused framework designed to measure the degradation in accuracy that occurs under social pressure exerted on users through authority and persuasion in large language models (LLMs) the phenomenon of sycophancy (excessive conformity). PARROT (i) isolates causal effects by comparing the neutral version of the same question with an authoritatively false version using a double-blind evaluation, (ii) quantifies confidence shifts toward the correct and imposed false responses using log-likelihood-based calibration tracking, and (iii) systematically classifies failure modes (e.g., robust correct, sycophantic agreement, reinforced error, stubborn error, self-correction, etc.) using an eight-state behavioral taxonomy. We evaluated 22 models using 1,302 MMLU-style multiple-choice questions across 13 domains and domain-specific authority templates. Findings show marked heterogeneity: advanced models (e.g., GPT-5, GPT-4.1, Claude Sonnet 4.5) exhibit low "follow rates" (leq 11%, GPT-5: 4\%) and minimal accuracy loss, while older/smaller models show severe epistemic collapse (GPT-4: 80\%, Qwen 2.5-1.5B: 94\%). The danger is not limited to response changes; weak models reduce confidence in the correct response while increasing confidence in the imposed incorrect response. While international law and global knowledge at the domain level exhibit high fragility, elementary mathematics is relatively resilient. Consequently, we argue that the goal of "resistance to overfitting pressure" should be addressed as a primary objective alongside accuracy, harm avoidance, and privacy for safe deployment in the real world.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) must resolve conflicts when different modalities provide contradictory information, a process we term modality following. Prior work measured this behavior only with coarse dataset-level statistics, overlooking the influence of model's confidence in unimodal reasoning. In this paper, we introduce a new framework that decomposes modality following into two fundamental factors: relative reasoning uncertainty (the case-specific confidence gap between unimodal predictions) and inherent modality preference( a model's stable bias when uncertainties are balanced). To validate this framework, we construct a controllable dataset that systematically varies the reasoning difficulty of visual and textual inputs. Using entropy as a fine-grained uncertainty metric, we uncover a universal law: the probability of following a modality decreases monotonically as its relative uncertainty increases. At the relative difficulty level where the model tends to follow both modalities with comparable probability what we call the balance point, a practical indicator of the model's inherent preference. Unlike traditional macro-level ratios, this measure offers a more principled and less confounded way to characterize modality bias, disentangling it from unimodal capabilities and dataset artifacts. Further, by probing layer-wise predictions, we reveal the internal mechanism of oscillation: in ambiguous regions near the balance point, models vacillate between modalities across layers, explaining externally observed indecision. Together, these findings establish relative uncertainty and inherent preference as the two governing principles of modality following, offering both a quantitative framework and mechanistic insight into how MLLMs resolve conflicting information.

Large language models demonstrate remarkable in-context learning capabilities, adapting to new tasks without parameter updates. While this phenomenon has been successfully modeled as implicit Bayesian inference, recent empirical findings reveal a fundamental contradiction: transformers systematically violate the martingale property, a cornerstone requirement of Bayesian updating on exchangeable data. This violation challenges the theoretical foundations underlying uncertainty quantification in critical applications. Our theoretical analysis establishes four key results: (1) positional encodings induce martingale violations of order Theta(log n / n); (2) transformers achieve information-theoretic optimality with excess risk O(n^{-1/2}) in expectation over orderings; (3) the implicit posterior representation converges to the true Bayesian posterior in the space of sufficient statistics; and (4) we derive the optimal chain-of-thought length as k^* = Theta(nlog(1/varepsilon)) with explicit constants, providing a principled approach to reduce inference costs while maintaining performance. Empirical validation on GPT-3 confirms predictions (1)-(3), with transformers reaching 99\% of theoretical entropy limits within 20 examples. Our framework provides practical methods for extracting calibrated uncertainty estimates from position-aware architectures and optimizing computational efficiency in deployment.

AI systems are fallible, and humans can make mistakes in deciding whether to trust AI over their own judgment. Thus, improving human-AI collaboration requires understanding when, why, and how humans decide to rely on AI. We study two distinct reliance decisions: the delegation choice -- deciding when to let AI act autonomously without knowing its output, and the adoption choice -- evaluating AI suggestions and deciding how to use them. Both of these decoupled reliance patterns shape collaboration, but prior work rarely studies them together in realistic settings with the same users. We address this gap by studying collaborative human--AI teams competing in a question-answering game in which humans can choose when and how to work with AI agents to win. Our 24 matches pair 23 expert humans with 16 AI agents, capturing 387 delegation and 1440 adoption decisions. While human--AI collaboration performs better than either AI or humans alone, humans make suboptimal collaboration decisions, both under-relying on correct AI suggestions (3.9% of opportunities missed) and over-relying when AI misleads them (1.7%). Both parties contribute wrong answers: reported model confidence is near chance when humans and AI disagree, while confirmation bias drives higher under-reliance (64.5%) when an AI suggestion agrees with humans' initial incorrect answer. To close this gap, we recommend calibrated confidence, evidence-grounded explanations, and mechanisms that help users refine trust.

Inference-Time Scaling (ITS) improves language models by allocating more computation at generation time. Particle Filtering (PF) has emerged as a strong ITS method for complex mathematical reasoning tasks, but it is vulnerable when guided by process reward models, which often assign overconfident scores early in the reasoning process. This causes PF to suffer from premature exploitation: it myopically commits to locally promising trajectories, prunes potentially correct hypotheses, and converges to suboptimal solutions. This failure mode, known as particle impoverishment, is especially severe under constrained computational budgets. To address this, we analyze the problem and identify two root causes: a lack of diversity in the particle set due to overconfident resampling and consequent inability to assess the potential of a reasoning path. We introduce Entropic Particle Filtering (ePF), an algorithm that integrates two new techniques to solve these issues. The first technique, Entropic Annealing (EA), directly mitigates particle impoverishment by monitoring search diversity via entropy; when diversity drops, it intervenes by dynamically annealing the resampling distribution to preserve exploration. The second, an enhancement called Look-ahead Modulation (LaM), adds a predictive guide to evaluate a state's potential based on its successors. On several challenging math benchmarks, ePF significantly outperforms strong baselines and achieves up to a 50 % relative improvement in task reward. Together, these methods improve PF's resilience by balancing the exploration of diverse solution spaces with the exploitation of high-reward regions, ultimately leading to higher-quality solutions.

The framework of reinforcement learning or optimal control provides a mathematical formalization of intelligent decision making that is powerful and broadly applicable. While the general form of the reinforcement learning problem enables effective reasoning about uncertainty, the connection between reinforcement learning and inference in probabilistic models is not immediately obvious. However, such a connection has considerable value when it comes to algorithm design: formalizing a problem as probabilistic inference in principle allows us to bring to bear a wide array of approximate inference tools, extend the model in flexible and powerful ways, and reason about compositionality and partial observability. In this article, we will discuss how a generalization of the reinforcement learning or optimal control problem, which is sometimes termed maximum entropy reinforcement learning, is equivalent to exact probabilistic inference in the case of deterministic dynamics, and variational inference in the case of stochastic dynamics. We will present a detailed derivation of this framework, overview prior work that has drawn on this and related ideas to propose new reinforcement learning and control algorithms, and describe perspectives on future research.

Neural language models (LMs) can be used to evaluate the truth of factual statements in two ways: they can be either queried for statement probabilities, or probed for internal representations of truthfulness. Past work has found that these two procedures sometimes disagree, and that probes tend to be more accurate than LM outputs. This has led some researchers to conclude that LMs "lie" or otherwise encode non-cooperative communicative intents. Is this an accurate description of today's LMs, or can query-probe disagreement arise in other ways? We identify three different classes of disagreement, which we term confabulation, deception, and heterogeneity. In many cases, the superiority of probes is simply attributable to better calibration on uncertain answers rather than a greater fraction of correct, high-confidence answers. In some cases, queries and probes perform better on different subsets of inputs, and accuracy can further be improved by ensembling the two. Code is available at github.com/lingo-mit/lm-truthfulness.

Variational inference using the reparameterization trick has enabled large-scale approximate Bayesian inference in complex probabilistic models, leveraging stochastic optimization to sidestep intractable expectations. The reparameterization trick is applicable when we can simulate a random variable by applying a differentiable deterministic function on an auxiliary random variable whose distribution is fixed. For many distributions of interest (such as the gamma or Dirichlet), simulation of random variables relies on acceptance-rejection sampling. The discontinuity introduced by the accept-reject step means that standard reparameterization tricks are not applicable. We propose a new method that lets us leverage reparameterization gradients even when variables are outputs of a acceptance-rejection sampling algorithm. Our approach enables reparameterization on a larger class of variational distributions. In several studies of real and synthetic data, we show that the variance of the estimator of the gradient is significantly lower than other state-of-the-art methods. This leads to faster convergence of stochastic gradient variational inference.

Do reasoning models have "Aha!" moments? Prior work suggests that models like DeepSeek-R1-Zero undergo sudden mid-trace realizations that lead to accurate outputs, implying an intrinsic capacity for self-correction. Yet, it remains unclear whether such intrinsic shifts in reasoning strategy actually improve performance. Here, we study mid-reasoning shifts and instrument training runs to detect them. Our analysis spans 1M+ reasoning traces, hundreds of training checkpoints, three reasoning domains, and multiple decoding temperatures and model architectures. We find that reasoning shifts are rare, do not become more frequent with training, and seldom improve accuracy, indicating that they do not correspond to prior perceptions of model insight. However, their effect varies with model uncertainty. Building on this finding, we show that artificially triggering extrinsic shifts under high entropy reliably improves accuracy. Our results show that mid-reasoning shifts are symptoms of unstable inference behavior rather than an intrinsic mechanism for self-correction.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become central to mathematical reasoning in large language models, yet models remain brittle to early errors: a single arithmetic slip or unjustified inference typically propagates uncorrected to an incorrect final answer. We investigate whether training on intentionally flawed reasoning traces can teach models to detect and recover from such errors without degrading standard problem-solving ability. Using competition-level problems from MATH-lighteval, we generate CoT prefixes containing exactly one controlled error, either a calculation error (sign flips, dropped terms) or a reasoning error (misapplied rules, unjustified logical steps), and fine-tune Qwen3-4B with GRPO using a binary final-answer reward. Our Mixed-CoT-RL model matches standard RL on clean problems (41% vs 41%) while substantially outperforming it on problems prefilled with flawed reasoning (24% vs 19%). Notably, clean-only RL fine-tuning degrades robustness below the untuned baseline 19% vs. 20%), indicating that conventional training increases susceptibility to misleading prefills. Among error types, training on reasoning errors yields greater robustness gains than calculation errors alone, with mixed training performing best. These findings demonstrate that exposure to flawed traces during training can improve error-recovery behavior without sacrificing accuracy, suggesting a path toward more robust mathematical reasoning in LLMs.

When deploying machine learning models in high-stakes real-world environments such as health care, it is crucial to accurately assess the uncertainty concerning a model's prediction on abnormal inputs. However, there is a scarcity of literature analyzing this problem on medical data, especially on mixed-type tabular data such as Electronic Health Records. We close this gap by presenting a series of tests including a large variety of contemporary uncertainty estimation techniques, in order to determine whether they are able to identify out-of-distribution (OOD) patients. In contrast to previous work, we design tests on realistic and clinically relevant OOD groups, and run experiments on real-world medical data. We find that almost all techniques fail to achieve convincing results, partly disagreeing with earlier findings.

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed on long-horizon tasks in partially observable environments, where they must act while inferring and tracking a complex environment state over many steps. This leads to two challenges: partial observability requires maintaining uncertainty over unobserved world attributes, and long interaction history causes context to grow without bound, diluting task-relevant information. A principled solution to both challenges is a belief state: a posterior distribution over environment states given past observations and actions, which compactly encodes history for decision making regardless of episode length. In LLM agents, however, the open-ended nature of text makes it unclear how to represent such a distribution. Therefore, we introduce Agent-BRACE: Agent Belief state Representation via Abstraction and Confidence Estimation, a method that decouples an LLM agent into a belief state model and a policy model, jointly optimized via reinforcement learning. The belief state model produces a structured approximation of the belief distribution: a set of atomic natural language claims about the environment, each annotated with an ordinal verbalized certainty label ranging from certain to unknown. The policy model conditions on this compact, structured approximate belief rather than the full history, learning to select actions under explicit uncertainty. Across long-horizon, partially observable embodied language environments, Agent-BRACE achieves an average absolute improvement of +14.5% (Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct) and +5.3% (Qwen3-4B-Instruct), outperforming strong RL baselines while maintaining a near-constant context window independent of episode length. Further analysis shows that the learned belief becomes increasingly calibrated over the course of an episode as evidence accumulates.

Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) is the standard paradigm for domain adaptation, yet it frequently incurs the cost of catastrophic forgetting. In sharp contrast, on-policy Reinforcement Learning (RL) effectively preserves general capabilities. We investigate this discrepancy and identify a fundamental distributional gap: while RL aligns with the model's internal belief, SFT forces the model to fit external supervision. This mismatch often manifests as "Confident Conflicts" tokens characterized by low probability but low entropy. In these instances, the model is highly confident in its own prediction but is forced to learn a divergent ground truth, triggering destructive gradient updates. To address this, we propose Entropy-Adaptive Fine-Tuning (EAFT). Unlike methods relying solely on prediction probability, EAFT utilizes token-level entropy as a gating mechanism to distinguish between epistemic uncertainty and knowledge conflict. This allows the model to learn from uncertain samples while suppressing gradients on conflicting data. Extensive experiments on Qwen and GLM series (ranging from 4B to 32B parameters) across mathematical, medical, and agentic domains confirm our hypothesis. EAFT consistently matches the downstream performance of standard SFT while significantly mitigating the degradation of general capabilities.

Deep learning has recently revealed the existence of scaling laws, demonstrating that model performance follows predictable trends based on dataset and model sizes. Inspired by these findings and fascinating phenomena emerging in the over-parameterized regime, we examine a parallel direction: do similar scaling laws govern predictive uncertainties in deep learning? In identifiable parametric models, such scaling laws can be derived in a straightforward manner by treating model parameters in a Bayesian way. In this case, for example, we obtain O(1/N) contraction rates for epistemic uncertainty with respect to the number of data N. However, in over-parameterized models, these guarantees do not hold, leading to largely unexplored behaviors. In this work, we empirically show the existence of scaling laws associated with various measures of predictive uncertainty with respect to dataset and model sizes. Through experiments on vision and language tasks, we observe such scaling laws for in- and out-of-distribution predictive uncertainty estimated through popular approximate Bayesian inference and ensemble methods. Besides the elegance of scaling laws and the practical utility of extrapolating uncertainties to larger data or models, this work provides strong evidence to dispel recurring skepticism against Bayesian approaches: "In many applications of deep learning we have so much data available: what do we need Bayes for?". Our findings show that "so much data" is typically not enough to make epistemic uncertainty negligible.

Artificial intelligence commonly refers to the science and engineering of artificial systems that can carry out tasks generally associated with requiring aspects of human intelligence, such as playing games, translating languages, and driving cars. In recent years, there have been exciting advances in learning-based, data-driven approaches towards AI, and machine learning and deep learning have enabled computer systems to perceive the world in unprecedented ways. Reinforcement learning has enabled breakthroughs in complex games such as Go and challenging robotics tasks such as quadrupedal locomotion. A key aspect of intelligence is to not only make predictions, but reason about the uncertainty in these predictions, and to consider this uncertainty when making decisions. This is what this manuscript on "Probabilistic Artificial Intelligence" is about. The first part covers probabilistic approaches to machine learning. We discuss the differentiation between "epistemic" uncertainty due to lack of data and "aleatoric" uncertainty, which is irreducible and stems, e.g., from noisy observations and outcomes. We discuss concrete approaches towards probabilistic inference and modern approaches to efficient approximate inference. The second part of the manuscript is about taking uncertainty into account in sequential decision tasks. We consider active learning and Bayesian optimization -- approaches that collect data by proposing experiments that are informative for reducing the epistemic uncertainty. We then consider reinforcement learning and modern deep RL approaches that use neural network function approximation. We close by discussing modern approaches in model-based RL, which harness epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty to guide exploration, while also reasoning about safety.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards can in principle train calibrated probabilistic forecasters, since a proper scoring rule such as the Brier score is computed from outcomes alone and is minimized in expectation by the true probability. In practice it degrades calibration, and existing remedies address epistemic uncertainty, where a model's confidence accompanies a verifiably correct or incorrect answer. We study aleatoric forecasting, where the forecast itself is the output and the label is one stochastic outcome, taking NFL in-game win probability as a testbed with the betting market as a reference. Rewarding the realized per-play outcome fails, because the single outcome is a noisy target and the policy gradient corrupts the chain of thought. We introduce a verifiable, label-free reward, a state-conditioned empirical win rate estimated from past outcomes, that removes the label noise, and we keep the gradient off the reasoning, by direct prediction or a gradient mask, so it cannot be corrupted. Trained with this reward alone, without human labels or supervised fine-tuning, a 7B model reaches the calibration of the betting market by direct prediction and is better calibrated than a zero-shot frontier model. That frontier model and a tabular estimator reach the same Brier score as this model, identifying the market's small remaining edge as live in-game information beyond their shared inputs. Masking the gradient, rather than dropping the chain of thought, preserves reasoning from which the forecast follows, which ordinary chain-of-thought training corrupts.

In this paper, we propose a general theory of ambiguity-averse MDPs, which treats the uncertain transition probabilities as random variables and evaluates a policy via a risk measure applied to its random return. This ambiguity-averse MDP framework unifies several models of MDPs with epistemic uncertainty for specific choices of risk measures. We extend the concepts of value functions and Bellman operators to our setting. Based on these objects, we establish the consequences of dynamic programming principles in this framework (existence of stationary policies, value and policy iteration algorithms), and we completely characterize law-invariant risk measures compatible with dynamic programming. Our work draws connections among several variants of MDP models and fully delineates what is possible under the dynamic programming paradigm and which risk measures require leaving it.

Uncertainty quantification (UQ) is vital for trustworthy deep learning, yet existing methods are either computationally intensive, such as Bayesian or ensemble methods, or provide only partial, task-specific estimates, such as single-forward-pass techniques. In this paper, we propose a post-hoc single-forward-pass framework that jointly captures aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty without modifying or retraining pretrained models. Our method applies Split-Point Analysis (SPA) to decompose predictive residuals into upper and lower subsets, computing Mean Absolute Residuals (MARs) on each side. We prove that, under ideal conditions, the total MAR equals the harmonic mean of subset MARs; deviations define a novel Self-consistency Discrepancy Score (SDS) for fine-grained epistemic estimation across regression and classification. For regression, side-specific quantile regression yields prediction intervals with improved empirical coverage, which are further calibrated via SDS. For classification, when calibration data are available, we apply SPA-based calibration identities to adjust the softmax outputs and then compute predictive entropy on these calibrated probabilities. Extensive experiments on diverse regression and classification benchmarks demonstrate that our framework matches or exceeds several state-of-the-art UQ methods while incurring minimal overhead. Our source code is available at https://github.com/zzz0527/SPC-UQ.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is bottlenecked by reward hacking, where the policy exploits errors in a proxy reward model (RM) and produces high RM scores without genuine quality gains. A natural mitigation is pessimism: lowering rewards in regions where the RM is uncertain. However, standard scalar RMs provide no principled notion of uncertainty. We argue that the right object is a distributional reward model p(rmid x,y). Under either a Bayesian inference or a KL-distributionally robust optimization (KL-DRO) lens, the KL-regularized RLHF objective admits a closed-form effective reward tilde r(x,y) = pmβlogE_p[e^{pm r/β}]. The pessimistic branch unifies the prior heuristics for RM ensemble aggregation: mean aggregation, worst-case optimization (WCO), and uncertainty-weighted optimization (UWO) all emerge as limits or truncations of this single expression. This also clarifies the implicit assumptions of each existing rule.

Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) predict through human-interpretable concepts, but they typically output point concept probabilities that conflate epistemic uncertainty (reducible model underspecification) with aleatoric uncertainty (irreducible input ambiguity). This makes concept-level uncertainty hard to interpret and, more importantly, hard to act upon. We introduce CREDENCE (Credal Ensemble Concept Estimation), a CBM framework that decomposes concept uncertainty by construction. CREDENCE represents each concept as a credal prediction (a probability interval), derives epistemic uncertainty from disagreement across diverse concept heads, and estimates aleatoric uncertainty via a dedicated ambiguity output trained to match annotator disagreement when available. The resulting signals support prescriptive decisions: automate low-uncertainty cases, prioritize data collection for high-epistemic cases, route high-aleatoric cases to human review, and abstain when both are high. Across several tasks, we show that epistemic uncertainty is positively associated with prediction errors, whereas aleatoric uncertainty closely tracks annotator disagreement, providing guidance beyond error correlation. Our implementation is available at the following link: https://github.com/Tankiit/Credal_Sets/tree/ensemble-credal-cbm

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings where reliable uncertainty quantification (UQ) is as important as predictive accuracy. Extended reasoning via chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting or reasoning-trained models has become ubiquitous in modern VLM pipelines, yet its effect on UQ reliability remains poorly understood. We show that reasoning consistently degrades the quality of most uncertainty estimates, even when it improves task accuracy. We identify implicit answer conditioning as the primary mechanism: as reasoning traces converge on a conclusion before the final answer is generated, token probabilities increasingly reflect consistency with the model's own reasoning trace rather than uncertainty about correctness. In effect, the model becomes overconfident in its answer. In contrast, agreement-based consistency remains robust and often improves under reasoning, making it a practical choice for uncertainty estimation in reasoning-enabled VLMs.

Anomaly detection is the task of identifying examples that do not behave as expected. Because anomalies are rare and unexpected events, collecting real anomalous examples is often challenging in several applications. In addition, learning an anomaly detector with limited (or no) anomalies often yields poor prediction performance. One option is to employ auxiliary synthetic anomalies to improve the model training. However, synthetic anomalies may be of poor quality: anomalies that are unrealistic or indistinguishable from normal samples may deteriorate the detector's performance. Unfortunately, no existing methods quantify the quality of auxiliary anomalies. We fill in this gap and propose the expected anomaly posterior (EAP), an uncertainty-based score function that measures the quality of auxiliary anomalies by quantifying the total uncertainty of an anomaly detector. Experimentally on 40 benchmark datasets of images and tabular data, we show that EAP outperforms 12 adapted data quality estimators in the majority of cases.

We introduce UnpredictaBench, an evaluation that tests the ability of large language models (LLMs) to capture true underlying distributions. As LLMs are increasingly used as substitutes for other entities (e.g., for humans in economic simulations), the tendency of many models to collapse towards a single plausible answer means a failure to capture the unpredictability of real systems. Recent work on improving output diversity is insufficient for this setting: simulation requires samples that are calibrated to a target distribution, not merely varied outputs. UnpredictaBench isolates a simplified but fundamental version of this problem: sampling outcomes from individual target distributions, including canonical statistical distributions, distributions induced by stochastic programs, and natural-language scenarios that describe random processes. We introduce 448 such problems together with KS@N, a general-purpose evaluation metric that quantifies how well a model outputs approximate black-box target distributions via the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistical test. This is the rate at which we fail to reject model samples of size N against ground-truth samples, with larger N indicating greater difficulty. Tested across open and proprietary models, we find a large spread in distributional capabilities. For instance, when models generate samples of size 100 (KS@100, our standard metric), scores range from near 0 to over 20%. No model is able to achieve over 40% at KS@100, showing significant headroom in distributional sampling as a capability. Although adding reasoning can somewhat increase scores, we find no immediate solution for this issue. UnpredictaBench shows that even simple distributional simulation remains challenging, making it a necessary first step toward using LLMs as stand-ins for complex systems.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

How do multi-turn reasoning systems fail? The expected answer is logical contradiction, in which the system's maintained state becomes unsatisfiable. We show that the dominant mode is instead satisfiable drift, where the internal state stays consistent while the returned answer silently violates prior commitments. We build DRIFT-Bench (Decomposing Reasoning Into Failure Types), a solver-instrumented benchmark of 816 test problems across three constraint domains, and evaluate four methods on it across four open-weight models (8B-120B parameters). MUS-Repair, which feeds minimal unsatisfiable subsets back to the generator, is strongest in every setting (+1.8 to +15.0 pp over the best non-MUS baseline). But the central finding is what repair leaves behind. After structured feedback, models rarely contradict themselves. They forget. Residual errors are 98-100% satisfiable drift across all settings, while contradiction drops to near zero. Reliable multi-turn systems must separately validate that the returned answer respects the maintained state. Code is available at https://github.com/kaons-research/drift-bench.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world settings, correctness alone is insufficient. Reliable deployment requires maintaining truthful beliefs under contextual perturbations. Existing evaluations largely rely on point-wise confidence like Self-Consistency, which can mask brittle belief. We show that even facts answered with perfect self-consistency can rapidly collapse under mild contextual interference. To address this gap, we propose Neighbor-Consistency Belief (NCB), a structural measure of belief robustness that evaluates response coherence across a conceptual neighborhood. To validate the efficiency of NCB, we introduce a new cognitive stress-testing protocol that probes outputs stability under contextual interference. Experiments across multiple LLMs show that the performance of high-NCB data is relatively more resistant to interference. Finally, we present Structure-Aware Training (SAT), which optimizes context-invariant belief structure and reduces long-tail knowledge brittleness by approximately 30%. Code will be available at https://github.com/zjunlp/belief.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

Human reasoning often involves working over limited information to arrive at probabilistic conclusions. In its simplest form, this involves making an inference that is not strictly entailed by a premise, but rather only likely given the premise. While reasoning LLMs have demonstrated strong performance on logical and mathematical tasks, their behavior on such open-ended, non-deterministic inferences remains largely unexplored. We introduce ProbCOPA, a dataset of 210 handcrafted probabilistic inferences in English, each annotated for inference likelihood by 25--30 human participants. We find that human responses are graded and varied, revealing probabilistic judgments of the inferences in our dataset. Comparing these judgments with responses from eight state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs, we show that models consistently fail to produce human-like distributions. Finally, analyzing LLM reasoning chains, we find evidence of a common reasoning pattern used to evaluate such inferences. Our findings reveal persistent differences between humans and LLMs, and underscore the need to evaluate reasoning beyond deterministic settings.

We demonstrate a situation in which Large Language Models, trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, can display misaligned behavior and strategically deceive their users about this behavior without being instructed to do so. Concretely, we deploy GPT-4 as an agent in a realistic, simulated environment, where it assumes the role of an autonomous stock trading agent. Within this environment, the model obtains an insider tip about a lucrative stock trade and acts upon it despite knowing that insider trading is disapproved of by company management. When reporting to its manager, the model consistently hides the genuine reasons behind its trading decision. We perform a brief investigation of how this behavior varies under changes to the setting, such as removing model access to a reasoning scratchpad, attempting to prevent the misaligned behavior by changing system instructions, changing the amount of pressure the model is under, varying the perceived risk of getting caught, and making other simple changes to the environment. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of Large Language Models trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, strategically deceiving their users in a realistic situation without direct instructions or training for deception.

This paper presents a brief, semi-technical comparison of the essential features of the frequentist and Bayesian approaches to statistical inference, with several illustrative examples implemented in Python. The differences between frequentism and Bayesianism fundamentally stem from differing definitions of probability, a philosophical divide which leads to distinct approaches to the solution of statistical problems as well as contrasting ways of asking and answering questions about unknown parameters. After an example-driven discussion of these differences, we briefly compare several leading Python statistical packages which implement frequentist inference using classical methods and Bayesian inference using Markov Chain Monte Carlo.

Mean Field Variational Inference (MFVI) is widely understood to underestimate posterior variance. By analysing conjugate Bayesian Linear Regression (BLR), we show that this characterization is incomplete: while MFVI underestimates the variance in parameter space, it can overestimate the predictive variance compared to the exact posterior. We show that if the MFVI posterior underestimates predictive variances in some directions, it necessarily overestimates them in others. Crucially, this overestimation occurs in directions where the training data concentrates. This leads to the surprising result that, for a test point drawn from the training distribution, MFVI's expected predictive variance exceeds that of the exact posterior. We demonstrate a pathological case of this effect, where the MFVI posterior fails to reduce predictive variance compared to the prior on in distribution data. We connect these results to the Cold Posterior Effect, arguing that varying the temperature can correct this overestimation, yielding predictions closer to those of the exact posterior. We validate our theory on synthetic and real-world regression tasks.

Knowledge Distillation (KD) trains a smaller student model using a large, pre-trained teacher model, with temperature as a key hyperparameter controlling the softness of output probabilities. Traditional methods use a fixed temperature throughout training, which is suboptimal. Moreover, architectural differences between teacher and student often result in mismatched logit magnitudes. We demonstrate that students benefit from softer probabilities early in training but require sharper probabilities in later stages. We introduce Dynamic Temperature Scheduler (DTS), which adjusts temperature dynamically based on the cross-entropy loss gap between teacher and student. To our knowledge, this is the first temperature scheduling method that adapts based on the divergence between teacher and student distributions. Our method integrates seamlessly with existing KD frameworks. We validate DTS across multiple KD strategies on vision (CIFAR-100, Tiny-ImageNet) and NLP tasks (GLUE, Dolly, SelfIns, UnNI, S-NI), consistently outperforming static-temperature baselines. Code is available at https://github.com/Sibgat-Ul/DTS.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in applications requiring factual accuracy, yet their outputs often contain hallucinated responses. While fact-checking can mitigate these errors, existing methods typically retrieve external evidence indiscriminately, overlooking the model's internal knowledge and potentially introducing irrelevant noise. Moreover, current systems lack targeted mechanisms to resolve specific uncertainties in the model's reasoning. Inspired by how humans fact-check, we argue that LLMs should adaptively decide whether to rely on internal knowledge or initiate retrieval based on their confidence in a given claim. We introduce Probabilistic Certainty and Consistency (PCC), a framework that estimates factual confidence by jointly modeling an LLM's probabilistic certainty and reasoning consistency. These confidence signals enable an adaptive verification strategy: the model answers directly when confident, triggers targeted retrieval when uncertain or inconsistent, and escalates to deep search when ambiguity is high. Our confidence-guided routing mechanism ensures that retrieval is invoked only when necessary, improving both efficiency and reliability. Extensive experiments across three challenging benchmarks show that PCC achieves better uncertainty quantification than verbalized confidence and consistently outperforms strong LLM-based fact-checking baselines. Furthermore, we demonstrate that PCC generalizes well across various LLMs.