Daily Papers

Uncertainty learning and quantification of models are crucial tasks to enhance the trustworthiness of the models. Importantly, the recent surge of generative language models (GLMs) emphasizes the need for reliable uncertainty quantification due to the concerns on generating hallucinated facts. In this paper, we propose to learn neural prediction set models that comes with the probably approximately correct (PAC) guarantee for quantifying the uncertainty of GLMs. Unlike existing prediction set models, which are parameterized by a scalar value, we propose to parameterize prediction sets via neural networks, which achieves more precise uncertainty quantification but still satisfies the PAC guarantee. We demonstrate the efficacy of our method on four types of language datasets and six types of models by showing that our method improves the quantified uncertainty by 63% on average, compared to a standard baseline method.

Robust pedestrian trajectory forecasting is crucial to developing safe autonomous vehicles. Although previous works have studied adversarial robustness in the context of trajectory forecasting, some significant issues remain unaddressed. In this work, we try to tackle these crucial problems. Firstly, the previous definitions of robustness in trajectory prediction are ambiguous. We thus provide formal definitions for two kinds of robustness, namely label robustness and pure robustness. Secondly, as previous works fail to consider robustness about all points in a disturbance interval, we utilise a probably approximately correct (PAC) framework for robustness verification. Additionally, this framework can not only identify potential counterexamples, but also provides interpretable analyses of the original methods. Our approach is applied using a prototype tool named TrajPAC. With TrajPAC, we evaluate the robustness of four state-of-the-art trajectory prediction models -- Trajectron++, MemoNet, AgentFormer, and MID -- on trajectories from five scenes of the ETH/UCY dataset and scenes of the Stanford Drone Dataset. Using our framework, we also experimentally study various factors that could influence robustness performance.

We estimate the relative likelihood of success in the searches for primitive versus intelligent life on other planets. Taking into account the larger search volume for detectable artificial electromagnetic signals, we conclude that both searches should be performed concurrently, albeit with significantly more funding dedicated to primitive life. Based on the current federal funding allocated to the search for biosignatures, our analysis suggests that the search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI) may merit a federal funding level of at least 10$ million per year, assuming that the average lifetime of technological species exceeds a millennium.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

It is almost always easier to find an accurate-but-complex model than an accurate-yet-simple model. Finding optimal, sparse, accurate models of various forms (linear models with integer coefficients, decision sets, rule lists, decision trees) is generally NP-hard. We often do not know whether the search for a simpler model will be worthwhile, and thus we do not go to the trouble of searching for one. In this work, we ask an important practical question: can accurate-yet-simple models be proven to exist, or shown likely to exist, before explicitly searching for them? We hypothesize that there is an important reason that simple-yet-accurate models often do exist. This hypothesis is that the size of the Rashomon set is often large, where the Rashomon set is the set of almost-equally-accurate models from a function class. If the Rashomon set is large, it contains numerous accurate models, and perhaps at least one of them is the simple model we desire. In this work, we formally present the Rashomon ratio as a new gauge of simplicity for a learning problem, depending on a function class and a data set. The Rashomon ratio is the ratio of the volume of the set of accurate models to the volume of the hypothesis space, and it is different from standard complexity measures from statistical learning theory. Insight from studying the Rashomon ratio provides an easy way to check whether a simpler model might exist for a problem before finding it, namely whether several different machine learning methods achieve similar performance on the data. In that sense, the Rashomon ratio is a powerful tool for understanding why and when an accurate-yet-simple model might exist. If, as we hypothesize in this work, many real-world data sets admit large Rashomon sets, the implications are vast: it means that simple or interpretable models may often be used for high-stakes decisions without losing accuracy.

We present an accessible first course on diffusion models and flow matching for machine learning, aimed at a technical audience with no diffusion experience. We try to simplify the mathematical details as much as possible (sometimes heuristically), while retaining enough precision to derive correct algorithms.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

We propose a new test to measure a text model's multitask accuracy. The test covers 57 tasks including elementary mathematics, US history, computer science, law, and more. To attain high accuracy on this test, models must possess extensive world knowledge and problem solving ability. We find that while most recent models have near random-chance accuracy, the very largest GPT-3 model improves over random chance by almost 20 percentage points on average. However, on every one of the 57 tasks, the best models still need substantial improvements before they can reach expert-level accuracy. Models also have lopsided performance and frequently do not know when they are wrong. Worse, they still have near-random accuracy on some socially important subjects such as morality and law. By comprehensively evaluating the breadth and depth of a model's academic and professional understanding, our test can be used to analyze models across many tasks and to identify important shortcomings.

We present ExAct, a new video-language benchmark for expert-level understanding of skilled physical human activities. Our new benchmark contains 3521 expert-curated video question-answer pairs spanning 11 physical activities in 6 domains: Sports, Bike Repair, Cooking, Health, Music, and Dance. ExAct requires the correct answer to be selected from five carefully designed candidate options, thus necessitating a nuanced, fine-grained, expert-level understanding of physical human skills. Evaluating the recent state-of-the-art VLMs on ExAct reveals a substantial performance gap relative to human expert performance. Specifically, the best-performing GPT-4o model achieves only 44.70% accuracy, well below the 82.02% attained by trained human specialists/experts. We believe that ExAct will be beneficial for developing and evaluating VLMs capable of precise understanding of human skills in various physical and procedural domains. Dataset and code are available at https://texaser.github.io/exact_project_page/

An algorithm to estimate the evolution of learning curves on the whole of a training data base, based on the results obtained from a portion and using a functional strategy, is introduced. We approximate iteratively the sought value at the desired time, independently of the learning technique used and once a point in the process, called prediction level, has been passed. The proposal proves to be formally correct with respect to our working hypotheses and includes a reliable proximity condition. This allows the user to fix a convergence threshold with respect to the accuracy finally achievable, which extends the concept of stopping criterion and seems to be effective even in the presence of distorting observations. Our aim is to evaluate the training effort, supporting decision making in order to reduce the need for both human and computational resources during the learning process. The proposal is of interest in at least three operational procedures. The first is the anticipation of accuracy gain, with the purpose of measuring how much work is needed to achieve a certain degree of performance. The second relates the comparison of efficiency between systems at training time, with the objective of completing this task only for the one that best suits our requirements. The prediction of accuracy is also a valuable item of information for customizing systems, since we can estimate in advance the impact of settings on both the performance and the development costs. Using the generation of part-of-speech taggers as an example application, the experimental results are consistent with our expectations.

The surprisingly likely criterion in the seminal work of Prelec (the Bayesian Truth Serum) guarantees truthfulness in a game-theoretic multi-agent setting, by rewarding rational agents to maximise the expected information gain with their answers w.r.t. their probabilistic beliefs. We investigate the relevance of a similar criterion for responses of LLMs. We hypothesize that if the surprisingly likely criterion works in LLMs, under certain conditions, the responses that maximize the reward under this criterion should be more accurate than the responses that only maximize the posterior probability. Using benchmarks including the TruthfulQA benchmark and using openly available LLMs: GPT-2 and LLaMA-2, we show that the method indeed improves the accuracy significantly (for example, upto 24 percentage points aggregate improvement on TruthfulQA and upto 70 percentage points improvement on individual categories of questions).

We investigate large language model performance across five orders of magnitude of compute scaling in eleven recent model architectures. We show that average benchmark performance, aggregating over many individual tasks and evaluations as in the commonly-used BIG-Bench dataset, is decently predictable as a function of training compute scale. Specifically, when extrapolating BIG-Bench Hard performance across one order of magnitude in compute, we observe average absolute errors of 6 percentage points (pp). By contrast, extrapolation for individual BIG-Bench tasks across an order of magnitude in compute yields higher average errors of 18pp. Nonetheless, individual task performance remains significantly more predictable than chance. Overall, our work suggests compute scaling provides a promising basis to forecast AI capabilities in diverse benchmarks, though predicting performance in specific tasks poses challenges.

We address the problem of optimizing a Brownian motion. We consider a (random) realization W of a Brownian motion with input space in [0,1]. Given W, our goal is to return an ε-approximation of its maximum using the smallest possible number of function evaluations, the sample complexity of the algorithm. We provide an algorithm with sample complexity of order log^2(1/ε). This improves over previous results of Al-Mharmah and Calvin (1996) and Calvin et al. (2017) which provided only polynomial rates. Our algorithm is adaptive---each query depends on previous values---and is an instance of the optimism-in-the-face-of-uncertainty principle.

Accurately predicting the future would be an important milestone in the capabilities of artificial intelligence. However, research on the ability of large language models to provide probabilistic predictions about future events remains nascent. To empirically test this ability, we enrolled OpenAI's state-of-the-art large language model, GPT-4, in a three-month forecasting tournament hosted on the Metaculus platform. The tournament, running from July to October 2023, attracted 843 participants and covered diverse topics including Big Tech, U.S. politics, viral outbreaks, and the Ukraine conflict. Focusing on binary forecasts, we show that GPT-4's probabilistic forecasts are significantly less accurate than the median human-crowd forecasts. We find that GPT-4's forecasts did not significantly differ from the no-information forecasting strategy of assigning a 50% probability to every question. We explore a potential explanation, that GPT-4 might be predisposed to predict probabilities close to the midpoint of the scale, but our data do not support this hypothesis. Overall, we find that GPT-4 significantly underperforms in real-world predictive tasks compared to median human-crowd forecasts. A potential explanation for this underperformance is that in real-world forecasting tournaments, the true answers are genuinely unknown at the time of prediction; unlike in other benchmark tasks like professional exams or time series forecasting, where strong performance may at least partly be due to the answers being memorized from the training data. This makes real-world forecasting tournaments an ideal environment for testing the generalized reasoning and prediction capabilities of artificial intelligence going forward.

Recent language models have a mysterious tendency to generate false but plausible-sounding text. Such "hallucinations" are an obstacle to the usability of language-based AI systems and can harm people who rely upon their outputs. This work shows shows that there is an inherent statistical reason that pretrained language models hallucinate certain types of facts, having nothing to do with the transformer LM architecture or data quality. For "arbitrary" facts whose veracity cannot be determined from the training data, we show that hallucination is necessary for language models that satisfy a statistical calibration condition appropriate for generative language models. Specifically, if the maximum probability of any fact is bounded, we show that the probability of generating a hallucination is close to the fraction of facts that occur exactly once in the training data (a "Good-Turing" estimate), even assuming ideal training data without errors. One conclusion is that models pretrained to be sufficiently good predictors (i.e., calibrated) may require post-training to mitigate hallucinations on the type of arbitrary facts that tend to appear once in the training set. However, our analysis also suggests that there is no statistical reason that pretraining will lead to hallucination on facts that tend to appear more than once in the training data (like references to publications such as articles and books, whose hallucinations have been particularly notable and problematic) or on systematic facts (like arithmetic calculations). Therefore, different architectures and learning algorithms may mitigate these latter types of hallucinations.

One might think that, once we know something is computable, how efficiently it can be computed is a practical question with little further philosophical importance. In this essay, I offer a detailed case that one would be wrong. In particular, I argue that computational complexity theory -- the field that studies the resources (such as time, space, and randomness) needed to solve computational problems -- leads to new perspectives on the nature of mathematical knowledge, the strong AI debate, computationalism, the problem of logical omniscience, Hume's problem of induction, Goodman's grue riddle, the foundations of quantum mechanics, economic rationality, closed timelike curves, and several other topics of philosophical interest. I end by discussing aspects of complexity theory itself that could benefit from philosophical analysis.

We study the prospect of using TianQin to detect stellar-mass binary black holes (SBBHs). We estimate the expected detection number as well as the precision of parameter estimation on SBBH inspirals, using five different population models. We note TianQin can possibly detect a few SBBH inspirals with signal to noise ratios greater than 12; lowering the threshold and combining multiple detectors can both boost the detection number. The source parameters can be recovered with good precision for most events above the detection threshold. For example, the precision of the merger time most likely occurs near 1s, making it possible to guide the detection of the ground-based detectors, the precision of the eccentricity e_0 most likely occurs near 10^{-4}, making it possible to distinguish the formation channels, and the precision of the mass parameter is better than 10^{-6} in general and most likely occurs near 10^{-7}. We note, in particular, that for a typical merger event, the error volume is likely to be small enough to contain only the host galaxy, which could greatly help in the study of gravitational wave cosmology and relevant studies through the multimessenger observation.

Do large language models (LLMs) anticipate when they will answer correctly? To study this, we extract activations after a question is read but before any tokens are generated, and train linear probes to predict whether the model's forthcoming answer will be correct. Across three open-source model families ranging from 7 to 70 billion parameters, projections on this "in-advance correctness direction" trained on generic trivia questions predict success in distribution and on diverse out-of-distribution knowledge datasets, outperforming black-box baselines and verbalised predicted confidence. Predictive power saturates in intermediate layers, suggesting that self-assessment emerges mid-computation. Notably, generalisation falters on questions requiring mathematical reasoning. Moreover, for models responding "I don't know", doing so strongly correlates with the probe score, indicating that the same direction also captures confidence. By complementing previous results on truthfulness and other behaviours obtained with probes and sparse auto-encoders, our work contributes essential findings to elucidate LLM internals.

There is a substantial body of literature examining the mathematical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), particularly their performance on precise arithmetic operations in autoregressive architectures. However, their ability to perform approximate reasoning in informal, fast-paced mathematical operations has received far less attention, especially among non-autoregressive decoder models. Our work addresses this gap by introducing StreetMath, a benchmark designed to evaluate models' approximation abilities under real-world approximation scenarios. We conduct extensive evaluations across different LLM architectures: Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507, Qwen3-4B-Thinking-2507, Dream-v0-Instruct-7B, Falcon-Mamba-7B-Instruct, and Mamba-GPT-3B. Furthermore, we apply mechanistic interpretability techniques to probe their internal computational states. Our analysis reveals that LLMs generally attempt to compute exact values or invoke external tools even in tasks that call for approximation. Moreover, while models sometimes reach the correct answer in early layers or steps, they still consume more tokens when solving approximation tasks. Additional experiments indicate that exact and approximate arithmetic operations rely on largely separate neural components. Drawing upon research on cognitive psychology, we argue that LLMs do not exhibit cognitive miserliness in the same way humans do in street math settings. We open source our work https://github.com/ctseng777/StreetMath

Large language models (LLMs) are trained to imitate humans to explain human decisions. However, do LLMs explain themselves? Can they help humans build mental models of how LLMs process different inputs? To answer these questions, we propose to evaluate counterfactual simulatability of natural language explanations: whether an explanation can enable humans to precisely infer the model's outputs on diverse counterfactuals of the explained input. For example, if a model answers "yes" to the input question "Can eagles fly?" with the explanation "all birds can fly", then humans would infer from the explanation that it would also answer "yes" to the counterfactual input "Can penguins fly?". If the explanation is precise, then the model's answer should match humans' expectations. We implemented two metrics based on counterfactual simulatability: precision and generality. We generated diverse counterfactuals automatically using LLMs. We then used these metrics to evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) on two tasks: multi-hop factual reasoning and reward modeling. We found that LLM's explanations have low precision and that precision does not correlate with plausibility. Therefore, naively optimizing human approvals (e.g., RLHF) may not be a sufficient solution.

Generating accurate and calibrated confidence estimates is critical for deploying LLMs in high-stakes or user-facing applications, and remains an open challenge. Prior research has often framed confidence as a problem of eliciting a model's "self-knowledge", i.e., the ability of an LLM to judge whether its own answers are correct; this approach implicitly assumes that there is some privileged information about the answer's correctness that is accessible to the model itself. However, our experiments reveal that an LLM attempting to predict the correctness of its own outputs generally performs no better than an unrelated LLM. Moreover, we hypothesize that a key factor in building a "Correctness Model" (CM) is exposure to a target model's historical predictions. We propose multiple methods to inject this historical correctness information, creating a Generalized Correctness Model (GCM). We first show that GCMs can be trained on the correctness data from many LLMs and learn patterns for correctness prediction applicable across datasets and models. We then use CMs as a lens for studying the source of correctness prediction ability and its generalization, systematically controlling their training data and finding that answer phrasing is a strong predictor for correctness. We further explore alternative methods of injecting history without training an LLM, finding that including history as in-context examples can help improve correctness prediction, and post-hoc calibration can provide complementary reductions in calibration error. We evaluate GCMs based on Qwen3-8B across 5 model families and the MMLU and TriviaQA datasets, as well as on a downstream selective prediction task, finding that reliable LLM confidence estimation is a generalizable and model-agnostic skill learned by systematically encoding correctness history rather than a model-specific skill reliant on self-introspection.

We revisit the noisy binary search model of Karp and Kleinberg, in which we have n coins with unknown probabilities p_i that we can flip. The coins are sorted by increasing p_i, and we would like to find where the probability crosses (to within varepsilon) of a target value tau. This generalized the fixed-noise model of Burnashev and Zigangirov , in which p_i = 1{2} pm varepsilon, to a setting where coins near the target may be indistinguishable from it. Karp and Kleinberg showed that Theta(1{varepsilon^2} log n) samples are necessary and sufficient for this task. We produce a practical algorithm by solving two theoretical challenges: high-probability behavior and sharp constants. We give an algorithm that succeeds with probability 1-delta from \[ 1{C_{\tau, \varepsilon}} \cdot \left(\lg n + O(\log^{2/3} n \log^{1/3} 1{\delta} + \log 1{\delta})\right) \] samples, where C_{tau, varepsilon} is the optimal such constant achievable. For delta > n^{-o(1)} this is within 1 + o(1) of optimal, and for delta ll 1 it is the first bound within constant factors of optimal.

This paper gives three formulas for the pseudoinverse of a matrix product A = CR. The first is sometimes correct, the second is always correct, and the third is almost never correct. But that third randomized pseudoinverse A^+_r may be very useful when A is a very large matrix. 1. A^+ = R^+C^+ when A = CR and C has independent columns and R has independent rows. 2. A^+ = (C^+CR)^+(CRR^+)^+ is always correct. 3. A^+_r = (P^TCR)^+P^TCRQ(CRQ)^+ = A^+ only when rank(P^TA) = rank(AQ) = rank(A) with A = CR.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Many people have flipped coins but few have stopped to ponder the statistical and physical intricacies of the process. We collected 350{,}757 coin flips to test the counterintuitive prediction from a physics model of human coin tossing developed by Diaconis, Holmes, and Montgomery (DHM; 2007). The model asserts that when people flip an ordinary coin, it tends to land on the same side it started -- DHM estimated the probability of a same-side outcome to be about 51\%. Our data lend strong support to this precise prediction: the coins landed on the same side more often than not, Pr(same side) = 0.508, 95\% credible interval (CI) [0.506, 0.509], BF_{same-side bias} = 2359. Furthermore, the data revealed considerable between-people variation in the degree of this same-side bias. Our data also confirmed the generic prediction that when people flip an ordinary coin -- with the initial side-up randomly determined -- it is equally likely to land heads or tails: Pr(heads) = 0.500, 95\% CI [0.498, 0.502], BF_{heads-tails bias} = 0.182. Furthermore, this lack of heads-tails bias does not appear to vary across coins. Additional analyses revealed that the within-people same-side bias decreased as more coins were flipped, an effect that is consistent with the possibility that practice makes people flip coins in a less wobbly fashion. Our data therefore provide strong evidence that when some (but not all) people flip a fair coin, it tends to land on the same side it started.

This article does not propose any novel algorithm or new hardware for sparsity. Instead, it aims to serve the "common good" for the increasingly prosperous Sparse Neural Network (SNN) research community. We attempt to summarize some most common confusions in SNNs, that one may come across in various scenarios such as paper review/rebuttal and talks - many drawn from the authors' own bittersweet experiences! We feel that doing so is meaningful and timely, since the focus of SNN research is notably shifting from traditional pruning to more diverse and profound forms of sparsity before, during, and after training. The intricate relationships between their scopes, assumptions, and approaches lead to misunderstandings, for non-experts or even experts in SNNs. In response, we summarize ten Q\&As of SNNs from many key aspects, including dense vs. sparse, unstructured sparse vs. structured sparse, pruning vs. sparse training, dense-to-sparse training vs. sparse-to-sparse training, static sparsity vs. dynamic sparsity, before-training/during-training vs. post-training sparsity, and many more. We strive to provide proper and generically applicable answers to clarify those confusions to the best extent possible. We hope our summary provides useful general knowledge for people who want to enter and engage with this exciting community; and also provides some "mind of ease" convenience for SNN researchers to explain their work in the right contexts. At the very least (and perhaps as this article's most insignificant target functionality), if you are writing/planning to write a paper or rebuttal in the field of SNNs, we hope some of our answers could help you!

This article presents an experiment in fine-tuning a pretrained causal language model (Meta's Llama 3.1 8B Instruct) for aiding in three fundamental tasks of philological research: chronological and geographic attribution as well as text restoration in ancient Greek inscriptions and documentary papyri. Using a prompt-based instruct approach, the fine-tuned models surpass the state of the art in key metrics. For inscriptions, the models achieve a lower average character error rate (CER) of 22.5% (vs. 26.3%), while closely matching top-1 accuracy (60.9% vs. 61.8%) and top-20 accuracy (77.5% vs. 78.3%) for sequences up to 10 characters. They also provide a practical advantage by ignoring spaces during reconstruction, aligning better with the scriptio continua typically used in ancient written artifacts. In geographic attribution, the model outperforms previous benchmarks with a top-1 accuracy of 75.0% (vs. 70.8%) and a top-3 accuracy of 83.7% (vs. 82.1%). For dating, it achieves an average deviation of 26.2 years (vs. 29.3) and a median deviation of 1 year (vs. 3) from the actual date range. The models also set new baselines for documentary papyri, with a CER of 16.3%, a top-1 accuracy of 71.3%, and top-20 of 85.0% in text reconstruction; a top-1 accuracy of 66.4% and top-3 of 79.9% in geographic attribution; and, in chronological attribution, a deviation of 21.7 years from the actual termini post/ante quem, with a median deviation of 0 years.

We provide here a dataset for tasks related to natural language understanding and natural language inference. The dataset contains logical puzzles in natural language from three domains: comparing puzzles, knighs and knaves, and zebra puzzles. Each puzzle is associated with the entire set of atomic questions that can be generated based on the relations and individuals occurring in the text. For each question we provide the correct answer: entailment, contradiction or ambiguity. The answer's correctness is verified against theorem provers. Good puzzles have two properties: (i) each piece of information is necessary and (ii) no unnecessary information is provided. These properties make puzzles interesting candidates for machine comprehension tasks.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

U.S. national security customers have begun to utilize large language models, including enterprise versions of ``off-the-shelf'' models (e.g., ChatGPT) familiar to the public. This uptake will likely accelerate. However, recent studies suggest that off-the-shelf large language models frequently suggest escalatory actions when prompted with geopolitical or strategic scenarios. We demonstrate two simple, non-technical interventions to control these tendencies. Introducing these interventions into the experimental wargame design of a recent study, we substantially reduce escalation throughout the game. Calls to restrict the use of large language models in national security applications are thus premature. The U.S. government is already, and will continue, employing large language models for scenario planning and suggesting courses of action. Rather than warning against such applications, this study acknowledges the imminent adoption of large language models, and provides actionable measures to align them with national security goals, including escalation management.

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

We test whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can be used to simulate human participants in social-science studies. To do this, we run replications of 14 studies from the Many Labs 2 replication project with OpenAI's text-davinci-003 model, colloquially known as GPT3.5. Based on our pre-registered analyses, we find that among the eight studies we could analyse, our GPT sample replicated 37.5% of the original results and 37.5% of the Many Labs 2 results. However, we were unable to analyse the remaining six studies due to an unexpected phenomenon we call the "correct answer" effect. Different runs of GPT3.5 answered nuanced questions probing political orientation, economic preference, judgement, and moral philosophy with zero or near-zero variation in responses: with the supposedly "correct answer." In one exploratory follow-up study, we found that a "correct answer" was robust to changing the demographic details that precede the prompt. In another, we found that most but not all "correct answers" were robust to changing the order of answer choices. One of our most striking findings occurred in our replication of the Moral Foundations Theory survey results, where we found GPT3.5 identifying as a political conservative in 99.6% of the cases, and as a liberal in 99.3% of the cases in the reverse-order condition. However, both self-reported 'GPT conservatives' and 'GPT liberals' showed right-leaning moral foundations. Our results cast doubts on the validity of using LLMs as a general replacement for human participants in the social sciences. Our results also raise concerns that a hypothetical AI-led future may be subject to a diminished diversity-of-thought.

The field of machine learning has achieved striking progress in recent years, witnessing breakthrough results on language modelling, protein folding and nitpickingly fine-grained dog breed classification. Some even succeeded at playing computer games and board games, a feat both of engineering and of setting their employers' expectations. The central contribution of this work is to carefully examine whether this progress, and technology more broadly, can be expected to continue indefinitely. Through a rigorous application of statistical theory and failure to extrapolate beyond the training data, we answer firmly in the negative and provide details: technology will peak at 3:07 am (BST) on 20th July, 2032. We then explore the implications of this finding, discovering that individuals awake at this ungodly hour with access to a sufficiently powerful computer possess an opportunity for myriad forms of long-term linguistic 'lock in'. All we need is a large (>> 1W) data centre to seize this pivotal moment. By setting our analogue alarm clocks, we propose a tractable algorithm to ensure that, for the future of humanity, the British spelling of colour becomes the default spelling across more than 80% of the global word processing software market.

Large language models (LLMs) have made significant advancements in various natural language processing tasks, including question answering (QA) tasks. While incorporating new information with the retrieval of relevant passages is a promising way to improve QA with LLMs, the existing methods often require additional fine-tuning which becomes infeasible with recent LLMs. Augmenting retrieved passages via prompting has the potential to address this limitation, but this direction has been limitedly explored. To this end, we design a simple yet effective framework to enhance open-domain QA (ODQA) with LLMs, based on the summarized retrieval (SuRe). SuRe helps LLMs predict more accurate answers for a given question, which are well-supported by the summarized retrieval that could be viewed as an explicit rationale extracted from the retrieved passages. Specifically, SuRe first constructs summaries of the retrieved passages for each of the multiple answer candidates. Then, SuRe confirms the most plausible answer from the candidate set by evaluating the validity and ranking of the generated summaries. Experimental results on diverse ODQA benchmarks demonstrate the superiority of SuRe, with improvements of up to 4.6% in exact match (EM) and 4.0% in F1 score over standard prompting approaches. SuRe also can be integrated with a broad range of retrieval methods and LLMs. Finally, the generated summaries from SuRe show additional advantages to measure the importance of retrieved passages and serve as more preferred rationales by models and humans.

Without writing a single line of code by a human, an example Monte Carlo simulation based application for stochastic dependence modeling with copulas is developed using a state-of-the-art large language model (LLM) fine-tuned for conversations. This includes interaction with ChatGPT in natural language and using mathematical formalism, which, under careful supervision by a human-expert, led to producing a working code in MATLAB, Python and R for sampling from a given copula model, evaluation of the model's density, performing maximum likelihood estimation, optimizing the code for parallel computing for CPUs as well as for GPUs, and visualization of the computed results. In contrast to other emerging studies that assess the accuracy of LLMs like ChatGPT on tasks from a selected area, this work rather investigates ways how to achieve a successful solution of a standard statistical task in a collaboration of a human-expert and artificial intelligence (AI). Particularly, through careful prompt engineering, we separate successful solutions generated by ChatGPT from unsuccessful ones, resulting in a comprehensive list of related pros and cons. It is demonstrated that if the typical pitfalls are avoided, we can substantially benefit from collaborating with an AI partner. For example, we show that if ChatGPT is not able to provide a correct solution due to a lack of or incorrect knowledge, the human-expert can feed it with the correct knowledge, e.g., in the form of mathematical theorems and formulas, and make it to apply the gained knowledge in order to provide a solution that is correct. Such ability presents an attractive opportunity to achieve a programmed solution even for users with rather limited knowledge of programming techniques.

Naturally occurring information-seeking questions often contain questionable assumptions -- assumptions that are false or unverifiable. Questions containing questionable assumptions are challenging because they require a distinct answer strategy that deviates from typical answers for information-seeking questions. For instance, the question "When did Marie Curie discover Uranium?" cannot be answered as a typical "when" question without addressing the false assumption "Marie Curie discovered Uranium". In this work, we propose (QA)^2 (Question Answering with Questionable Assumptions), an open-domain evaluation dataset consisting of naturally occurring search engine queries that may or may not contain questionable assumptions. To be successful on (QA)^2, systems must be able to detect questionable assumptions and also be able to produce adequate responses for both typical information-seeking questions and ones with questionable assumptions. Through human rater acceptability on end-to-end QA with (QA)^2, we find that current models do struggle with handling questionable assumptions, leaving substantial headroom for progress.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

There is both much optimism and pessimism around artificial intelligence (AI) today. The optimists are investing millions of dollars, and even in some cases billions of dollars into AI. The pessimists, on the other hand, predict that AI will end many things: jobs, warfare, and even the human race. Both the optimists and the pessimists often appeal to the idea of a technological singularity, a point in time where machine intelligence starts to run away, and a new, more intelligent species starts to inhabit the earth. If the optimists are right, this will be a moment that fundamentally changes our economy and our society. If the pessimists are right, this will be a moment that also fundamentally changes our economy and our society. It is therefore very worthwhile spending some time deciding if either of them might be right.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

We obtain almost sure bounds for the weighted sum sum_{n leq t} f(n){n}, where f(n) is a Steinhaus random multiplicative function. Specifically, we obtain the bounds predicted by exponentiating the law of the iterated logarithm, giving sharp upper and lower bounds.

Thanks to rapid progress in artificial intelligence, we have entered an era when technology and philosophy intersect in interesting ways. Sitting squarely at the centre of this intersection are large language models (LLMs). The more adept LLMs become at mimicking human language, the more vulnerable we become to anthropomorphism, to seeing the systems in which they are embedded as more human-like than they really are. This trend is amplified by the natural tendency to use philosophically loaded terms, such as "knows", "believes", and "thinks", when describing these systems. To mitigate this trend, this paper advocates the practice of repeatedly stepping back to remind ourselves of how LLMs, and the systems of which they form a part, actually work. The hope is that increased scientific precision will encourage more philosophical nuance in the discourse around artificial intelligence, both within the field and in the public sphere.

One method for obtaining generalizable solutions to machine learning tasks when presented with diverse training environments is to find invariant representations of the data. These are representations of the covariates such that the best model on top of the representation is invariant across training environments. In the context of linear Structural Equation Models (SEMs), invariant representations might allow us to learn models with out-of-distribution guarantees, i.e., models that are robust to interventions in the SEM. To address the invariant representation problem in a {\em finite sample} setting, we consider the notion of epsilon-approximate invariance. We study the following question: If a representation is approximately invariant with respect to a given number of training interventions, will it continue to be approximately invariant on a larger collection of unseen SEMs? This larger collection of SEMs is generated through a parameterized family of interventions. Inspired by PAC learning, we obtain finite-sample out-of-distribution generalization guarantees for approximate invariance that holds probabilistically over a family of linear SEMs without faithfulness assumptions. Our results show bounds that do not scale in ambient dimension when intervention sites are restricted to lie in a constant size subset of in-degree bounded nodes. We also show how to extend our results to a linear indirect observation model that incorporates latent variables.

In natural language processing, a recently popular line of work explores how to best report the experimental results of neural networks. One exemplar publication, titled "Show Your Work: Improved Reporting of Experimental Results," advocates for reporting the expected validation effectiveness of the best-tuned model, with respect to the computational budget. In the present work, we critically examine this paper. As far as statistical generalizability is concerned, we find unspoken pitfalls and caveats with this approach. We analytically show that their estimator is biased and uses error-prone assumptions. We find that the estimator favors negative errors and yields poor bootstrapped confidence intervals. We derive an unbiased alternative and bolster our claims with empirical evidence from statistical simulation. Our codebase is at http://github.com/castorini/meanmax.

We present Visuelle 2.0, the first dataset useful for facing diverse prediction problems that a fast-fashion company has to manage routinely. Furthermore, we demonstrate how the use of computer vision is substantial in this scenario. Visuelle 2.0 contains data for 6 seasons / 5355 clothing products of Nuna Lie, a famous Italian company with hundreds of shops located in different areas within the country. In particular, we focus on a specific prediction problem, namely short-observation new product sale forecasting (SO-fore). SO-fore assumes that the season has started and a set of new products is on the shelves of the different stores. The goal is to forecast the sales for a particular horizon, given a short, available past (few weeks), since no earlier statistics are available. To be successful, SO-fore approaches should capture this short past and exploit other modalities or exogenous data. To these aims, Visuelle 2.0 is equipped with disaggregated data at the item-shop level and multi-modal information for each clothing item, allowing computer vision approaches to come into play. The main message that we deliver is that the use of image data with deep networks boosts performances obtained when using the time series in long-term forecasting scenarios, ameliorating the WAPE and MAE by up to 5.48% and 7% respectively compared to competitive baseline methods. The dataset is available at https://humaticslab.github.io/forecasting/visuelle

Suppose Alice trains an open-weight language model and Bob uses a blackbox derivative of Alice's model to produce text. Can Alice prove that Bob is using her model, either by querying Bob's derivative model (query setting) or from the text alone (observational setting)? We formulate this question as an independence testing problem--in which the null hypothesis is that Bob's model or text is independent of Alice's randomized training run--and investigate it through the lens of palimpsestic memorization in language models: models are more likely to memorize data seen later in training, so we can test whether Bob is using Alice's model using test statistics that capture correlation between Bob's model or text and the ordering of training examples in Alice's training run. If Alice has randomly shuffled her training data, then any significant correlation amounts to exactly quantifiable statistical evidence against the null hypothesis, regardless of the composition of Alice's training data. In the query setting, we directly estimate (via prompting) the likelihood Bob's model gives to Alice's training examples and order; we correlate the likelihoods of over 40 fine-tunes of various Pythia and OLMo base models ranging from 1B to 12B parameters with the base model's training data order, achieving a p-value on the order of at most 1e-8 in all but six cases. In the observational setting, we try two approaches based on estimating 1) the likelihood of Bob's text overlapping with spans of Alice's training examples and 2) the likelihood of Bob's text with respect to different versions of Alice's model we obtain by repeating the last phase (e.g., 1%) of her training run on reshuffled data. The second approach can reliably distinguish Bob's text from as little as a few hundred tokens; the first does not involve any retraining but requires many more tokens (several hundred thousand) to achieve high power.

In this report, we argue that there is a realistic possibility that some AI systems will be conscious and/or robustly agentic in the near future. That means that the prospect of AI welfare and moral patienthood, i.e. of AI systems with their own interests and moral significance, is no longer an issue only for sci-fi or the distant future. It is an issue for the near future, and AI companies and other actors have a responsibility to start taking it seriously. We also recommend three early steps that AI companies and other actors can take: They can (1) acknowledge that AI welfare is an important and difficult issue (and ensure that language model outputs do the same), (2) start assessing AI systems for evidence of consciousness and robust agency, and (3) prepare policies and procedures for treating AI systems with an appropriate level of moral concern. To be clear, our argument in this report is not that AI systems definitely are, or will be, conscious, robustly agentic, or otherwise morally significant. Instead, our argument is that there is substantial uncertainty about these possibilities, and so we need to improve our understanding of AI welfare and our ability to make wise decisions about this issue. Otherwise there is a significant risk that we will mishandle decisions about AI welfare, mistakenly harming AI systems that matter morally and/or mistakenly caring for AI systems that do not.

We study the task of agnostically learning halfspaces under the Gaussian distribution. Specifically, given labeled examples (x,y) from an unknown distribution on R^n times { pm 1}, whose marginal distribution on x is the standard Gaussian and the labels y can be arbitrary, the goal is to output a hypothesis with 0-1 loss OPT+epsilon, where OPT is the 0-1 loss of the best-fitting halfspace. We prove a near-optimal computational hardness result for this task, under the widely believed sub-exponential time hardness of the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem. Prior hardness results are either qualitatively suboptimal or apply to restricted families of algorithms. Our techniques extend to yield near-optimal lower bounds for related problems, including ReLU regression.

By analogy with conjectures for random matrices, Fyodorov-Hiary-Keating and Fyodorov-Keating proposed precise asymptotics for the maximum of the Riemann zeta function in a typical short interval on the critical line. In this paper, we settle the upper bound part of their conjecture in a strong form. More precisely, we show that the measure of those T leq t leq 2T for which $ max_{|h| leq 1} |zeta(1/2 + i t + i h)| > e^y log T {(loglog T)^{3/4}} is bounded by Cy e^{-2y} uniformly in y \geq 1. This is expected to be optimal for y= O(\log\log T). This upper bound is sharper than what is known in the context of random matrices, since it gives (uniform) decay rates in y$. In a subsequent paper we will obtain matching lower bounds.

We resolve an open problem of Hanneke on the subject of universally consistent online learning with non-i.i.d. processes and unbounded losses. The notion of an optimistically universal learning rule was defined by Hanneke in an effort to study learning theory under minimal assumptions. A given learning rule is said to be optimistically universal if it achieves a low long-run average loss whenever the data generating process makes this goal achievable by some learning rule. Hanneke posed as an open problem whether, for every unbounded loss, the family of processes admitting universal learning are precisely those having a finite number of distinct values almost surely. In this paper, we completely resolve this problem, showing that this is indeed the case. As a consequence, this also offers a dramatically simpler formulation of an optimistically universal learning rule for any unbounded loss: namely, the simple memorization rule already suffices. Our proof relies on constructing random measurable partitions of the instance space and could be of independent interest for solving other open questions. We extend the results to the non-realizable setting thereby providing an optimistically universal Bayes consistent learning rule.